

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1981–1988
VOLUME XI**

START I



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988

Volume XI

START I

Editor James Graham Wilson
General Editor Kathleen B. Rasmussen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. Throughout the course of the project, many, but not all records at each Presidential library were scanned. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not

always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important docu-

ments and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2016 and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 23 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 16 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-

rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward START I.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
The Historian

Kathleen B. Rasmussen
General Editor

Foreign Service Institute
April 2021

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. Two volumes in the subseries are devoted to the crafting and negotiation of the landmark U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaties: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I, and Volume XII, INF, 1984–1987. These volumes are closely linked to the four volumes in the subseries devoted to Reagan's Soviet policies: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, October 1986–January 1989. They ought also to be considered alongside *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977–1983, which chronicles the deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, as well as *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984, and Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988, which cover the Strategic Modernization Program, Strategic Defense Initiative, interpretations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Reagan administration's policy of "Interim Restraint," under which the United States respected the terms of the unratified 1979 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) until the end of 1986; and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988, which includes coverage of defense policy and strategic planning, military-to-military relations and risk reduction, and competing estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions. Readers should also consult the arms control chapters in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XL, Global Issues. Documentation on the completion of START I will be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

This volume begins in the summer of 1981, when the Ronald Reagan administration recast the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which the president went on to announce in a speech at Eureka College on May 9, 1982. Following rounds of negotiations in Geneva from June 1982 to

November 1983, START was incorporated into the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), which commenced in Geneva on March 12, 1985, and included the resumption of negotiations on Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) and the initiation of Defense and Space Talks (DST). Given the pivotal role of strategic defenses in negotiations on strategic arms reductions, deliberations and instructions pertaining to DST are included in this volume, which concludes in January 1989 with the presidential transition to the administration of George H.W. Bush.

This volume conveys the development of and changes to U.S. negotiating positions, summations of the rounds of talks in Geneva, and the advances and setbacks in reaching an agreement, whether they occurred in Moscow, Washington, Reykjavik, New York, or elsewhere. Major themes in START are brought out in documentation such as agency memoranda and position papers, records of National Security Council meetings, National Security Decision Directives, and reporting telegrams from the U.S. delegation in Geneva. Key moments often preceded ministerial meetings between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and superpower summits between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The pre-meeting briefing materials, high-level correspondence, and memoranda of conversation documenting these ministerials and summits included in this volume speak to the pivotal roles played by Reagan, Shultz, Gorbachev, and Shevardnadze in advancing the negotiations. Progress also occurred in experts meetings led by Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze and Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, and in the work of Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff and James Timbie of the Department of State, who were stalwart figures throughout. Memoranda to principals, reports of interagency deliberations, and records of U.S.-Soviet experts discussions reflect the importance of such working-level interactions. Documents reflecting the position of the Department of Defense on the START negotiations and the efforts of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to develop START verification procedures are also included here.

The "T" in START can refer either to "Talks" or "Treaty." Negotiations are sometimes (redundantly) referred to as the "START Talks," and the potential outcome as a "START Treaty." The formal agreement, which Bush and Gorbachev would later sign, on July 31, 1991, bore the title: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. On January 3, 1993, Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or "START II." In the interest of simplification, the editor of this volume has chosen the title: "START I."

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, especially Cate Sewell and Lisa Jones, the Library of Congress, especially Jeffrey Flannery and Ernest Emrich, and the National Security Council, especially Tom Lutte. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency was accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency; Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance. The editor wishes to extend special thanks to Damian Leader at the Department of State.

James Graham Wilson collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Kathleen B. Rasmussen, then-Chief of the Global Issues and General Division. The volume was reviewed by Kathleen B. Rasmussen and then-Historian of the Department of State Stephen Randolph. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Matthew R.G. Regan did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

James Graham Wilson
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library illuminate high-level decision-making involving the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Therein are files of the Executive Secretariat, which include key collections such as the USSR Country File, the Head of State File, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), National Security Council (NSC) Meeting Files, and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) files. In some instances, the original version of NSDDs and minutes of NSC and NSPG meetings and their preparatory material remain at the National Security Council in Washington. Key collections of individuals include the files of National Security Advisors Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert “Bud” McFarlane, John Poindexter, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell, as well as those of Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff. Also at the Reagan Library is a set of the George Shultz papers housed at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto.

The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department of State includes the cable traffic between Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Key lot files include: Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files, 1953, 1972–1989; Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie; and Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005. The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, will eventually include these collections as part of Record Group 59 (RG 59); at printing, they are in various stages of accession.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of those Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files

Lot 82D307; Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Walter Stoessel Files

Lot 85D308; Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files

Lot 89D56; C. Max Kampelman Files

- Lot 89D149; Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of Policy Planning to the Secretary and other Principals, January 1981–January 1989
- Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989
- Lot 93D188, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990
- Lot 93D592, Executive Secretariat, Program Files for Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms,
- Lot 96D262; Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983
- Lot 01D127; Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, 1969–1980 Subject Records of James P. Timbie
- Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005
- Lot 16D0355, James Timbie Files

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

- National Security Council Intelligence Files
- White House Staff and Office Files
- Executive Secretariat, National Security Council
 - Agency File
 - Cable File
 - Country File: USSR
 - Subject File
 - Nuclear-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
- Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Files
 - Richard Allen Files
 - Frank Carlucci Files
 - William Clark Files
 - Sven Kraemer Files
 - Robert Linhard Files
 - Jack Matlock Files
 - Robert McFarlane Files
 - John Poindexter Files
 - Colin Powell Files
 - President's Daily Diary
- Personal Papers
 - Charles Hill Papers
 - George Shultz Papers

Library of Congress

- Manuscript Division
 - Papers of Alexander M. Haig
 - Papers of Caspar W. Weinberger

National Security Council

- National Security Council meetings

National Security Planning Group meetings
Special Situation Group meetings
Crisis Pre-Planning Group meetings
National Security Decision Directives
National Security Study Directives

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

OSD Files: FRC 330–90–0033, Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, 1981–1987

Selected Published Sources

Brinkley, Douglas, ed., *The Reagan Diaries Unabridged*. New York: Harper Collins, 2009.
Shultz, George. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York: Scribner's, 1993.

United States. Department of State. *Bulletin*, 1981–1988.

———. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981–1988.

Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ALCM, Air-Launched Cruise Missile

ASAT, Anti-Satellite

ASBM, Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile

ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare

ATB, Advanced Technology Bomber (B-2 “stealth bomber”)

AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

BM, Ballistic Missile

BSTS, Boost Surveillance and Tracking System

BW, Biological Weapons

BWC, Biological Weapons Convention

CBM, Confidence Building Measure

CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCEUR, Commander In Chief, European Command

CINCLANT, Commander In Chief, Atlantic Command

CINCNOAD, Commander In Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command

CINCPAC, Commander In Chief, Pacific Command

CINCSAC, Commander In Chief, Strategic Air Command

CDE, Convention on Disarmament in Europe

CM, Cruise Missile

COB, Close of Business

COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

CODEL, Congressional Delegation

CONUS, Continental United States

COS, Chief of Staff

CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSBM, Confidence and Security Building Measures

CSCE, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban

CW, Chemical Weapons

C³, Command, Control, and Communications

C³I, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

D&S, Defense and Space Talks

DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD, Department of Defense

DST, Defense and Space Talks

XX Abbreviations and Terms

EMBOFF, Embassy Officer

ER, Office of Economic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

ERW, Enhanced Radiation Weapon

EUCOM, European Command

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EXDIS, Exclusive Distribution

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBS, Forward-Based Systems

FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FYDP, Future Years Defense Program

FYI, For Your Information

GBS, Global Broadcast System

GDR, German Democratic Republic

GRAV, Gravity Bombs

GRIP, National Security Council channel for arms control issues with limited distribution

GLCM, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

GNP, Gross National Product

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IG, Interdepartmental Group

IISS, International Institute for Strategic Studies

INF, Intermediate Nuclear Forces

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDT, Joint Draft Text

LRINF, Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

LRTNF, Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MEMCON, Memorandum of Conversation

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFR, Memorandum for the Record

MIRV, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle

MLBM, Mobile Land-Based Missile

MLM, Military Liaison Mission

MM, Minuteman Missile

MX/M-X, Missile eXperimental

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NIAC, Night Action
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIH, National Institutes of Health
NNFU, Nuclear Non-First Use
NOCONTRACT, Not Releasable to Contractors
NODIS, No Distribution
NOFORN, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSDD, National Security Decision Directive
NSSD, National Security Study Directive
NSS, National Security Strategy
NST, Nuclear and Space Talks
NTM, National Technical Means
NUF, Non-Use of Force
NYT, *New York Times*

OBE, Overtaken By Events
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ORCON, Originator's Control
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI, On-Site Inspections

P, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
PIAIB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PL, Public Law
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PPM, Perimeter-to-Portal Monitoring
PPCM, Perimeter-to-Portal Continuous Monitoring
PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PNG, Persona Non Grata
PRC, People's Republic of China
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum
PROPIN, Proprietary Information Involved

R, Romeo Time Zone (Eastern Standard Time, USA)
RCM, Robert C. McFarlane
REFTEL, Reference Telegram
REVCON, Review Conference
R-F, Radio-Frequency
RPT, Repeat
RPV, Remote-Piloted Vehicle
RSFSR, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
RV, Re-entry Vehicle
RW, Radiological Warfare
RWR, Ronald Wilson Reagan

S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/MS, Office of the Secretary of State, Marshall Shulman
S/P, Office of the Secretary of State, Policy Planning Staff

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Department Duty Officer, Operations Center, Department of State
SACG, Special Arms Control Group
SACPG, Senior Arms Control Planning Group
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAWG, Special Actions Working Group
SC, Security Council (United Nations)
SCC, Special Coordination Committee; Standing Consultative Commission
SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative
SDV, Strategic Delivery Vehicle
SECDEF, Secretary of Defense
SEPTTEL, Separate Telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
SIG, Senior Interagency Group; Senior Interdepartmental Group
SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM, Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
SMUN, Soviet Mission to the United Nations
SNDV, Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SPECAT, Special Category Message
SRAM, Short-Range Attack Missile
SSCI, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSI, Suspect Site Inspections
SSOD, Special Session on Disarmament
START, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SU, Soviet Union

TASS, official Soviet news agency
TLAM, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TNF, Theater Nuclear Forces
TW, Throw weight

UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDELMC, United States Delegation to the NATO Military Committee
USEUCOM, United States European Command
USG, United States Government
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USNATO, United States Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USNMR, United States National Military Representative
USOC, United States Olympic Committee
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VADM, Vice Admiral

WH, White House; Warheads

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

Abramowitz, Morton "Mort," Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from February 1, 1985 until 1986; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1986 until 1989

Adelman, Kenneth, Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from April 1983 until December 1987

Akhromeyev, Sergei F., Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from September 1984

Allen, Lew, Jr., General, USAF; Chief of Staff until June 1982

Allen, Richard V., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982

Andropov, Yuri, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from June 1983 until February 9, 1984

Arbatov, Georgii, Director of the Institute for U.S.A. and Canada Studies

Armstrong, Michael H., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1984

Armstrong, Anne, Chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from October 1981

Aspin, Leslie "Les," Congressman (D-Wisconsin)

Baker, James A., III, White House Chief of Staff from January 1981 until January 1985; Secretary of the Treasury from February 1985 until August 1988

Baldrige, Malcolm H., Secretary of Commerce from January 1981 until July 1987

Barrow, Robert, General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps until June 1983

Bessmertnykh, Alexander, Minister at the Soviet Embassy in Washington until 1983; Chief of the USA Department, from 1983 until 1986; Deputy Foreign Minister from 1986 until 1988

Biden, Joseph, Senator (D-Delaware)

Block, John R., Secretary of Agriculture from January 1981

Boverie, Richard, Member of the Defense Policy Directorate of the National Security Council from 1982 until 1983

Brandt, Willy, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bremer, L. Paul, III, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from February 1981 until March 1983

Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Soviet Union until November 1982

Brock, William E., III, United States Trade Representative from January 1981

Buckley, James L., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 28, 1981, until August 20, 1982; Counselor of the Department of State from September 9, 1982, until September 26, 1982

Burns, William F., General, USA; Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations from November 1981 until June 1984; Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations from February 1985 until December 1986; Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from December 1986 until January 1988; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from January 1988

Burt, Richard R., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from January 23, 1981, until March 1982; Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Busey, James B., Admiral, USN, Vice Chief, Naval Operations, from 1985 until 1987

Bush, George H.W., Vice President of the United States from January 1981

Carlucci, Frank C., III, Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, 1981, until December 31, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 2, 1986, until November 5, 1987; thereafter, Secretary of Defense

Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981, until January 29, 1987

Chain, John T., Jr., General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985; Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command from June 22, 1986

Cherne, Leo, Vice Chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from October 1981

Chernenko, Konstantin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985

Clark, William P., Jr. "Judge," Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982 until October 17, 1983

Cohen, William, Senator (R-Maine)

Cooper, Henry F., Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Space, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State

Crowe, William J., Jr., Admiral, USN; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1, 1985

Dam, Kenneth W., Deputy Secretary of State from September 1982 until June 1985

Deaver, Michael K., Deputy White House Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until May 1985

deGraffenreid, Kenneth E., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council until December 1986

Dicks, Norman, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington)

Dobriansky, Paula J., Deputy Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council until 1984; thereafter Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate

Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States until May 1986

Dodd, Christopher, Senator (D-Connecticut)

Dubin, Yuri, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from May 1986

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Assistant Secretary of State (Designate) for European Affairs until May 14, 1981; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 14, 1981, until January 26, 1982; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982

Edwards, James B., Secretary of Energy from January 1981 until November 1982

Fortier, Donald R., Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Policy Development Directorate, National Security Council until 1985; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1985 until August 1986

Gates, Robert M., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, from September 1983 until April 1986; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 1986, Acting Director of Central Intelligence from December 18, 1986, until May 26, 1987

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

Glenn, John, Senator (D-Ohio)

Glitman, Maynard "Mike," Deputy Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, from 1981 until 1983; Chief U.S. Negotiator, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, from 1983 until 1985; Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, from 1985 until 1987

Goldberg, Sherwood "Woody," Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until June 1982

Gompert, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs from 1981 until 1982; Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1982

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985

Gore, Albert S. "Al," Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Tennessee) until 1985; Senator (D-Tennessee) from 1985

Gorman, Paul, Gen., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gray, Alfred M., Jr., General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps from July 1, 1987

Gregg, Donald, member, National Security Council Staff until July 1982; thereafter, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Gromyko, Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Union, until July 1985

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Secretary of State from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982

Harper, Edwin, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget

Hartman, Arthur A., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, from October 1981

Hayakawa, S.I., Senator (R-California)

Hayward, Thomas B., Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy until June 30, 1982

Helms, Jesse, Senator (R-North Carolina)

Herrington, John, Secretary of Energy from February 1985 until January 1989

Hill, M. Charles, Executive Secretary of the Department of State until January 1, 1985; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Secretary

Holmes, H. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until September 1982; U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from September 1982 until June 26, 1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from April 14, 1986

Howe, Jonathan T., Rear Admiral, USN; Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1982; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from May 10, 1982, until July 1, 1984

Ifft, Edward, Senior Department of State Representative to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 1981 until February 1988

Inman, Bobby R., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 1981 until June 1982

Jones, David C., General, USAF; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 1982

Kampelman, Max M., Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1983; head of U.S. human rights mission to Europe in 1984; Head of the Delegation and Head Negotiator for Defense and Space, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State

Karpov, Viktor, P. Head of the Delegation and Head Negotiator for START, Nuclear and Space Talks with the United States in Geneva; Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Kassebaum, Nancy, Senator (R-Kansas)

Keel, Alton G., Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 15 to November 24, 1986; Acting President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 25 to December 18, 1986; Ambassador to NATO from December 18, 1986

Kelley, P.X., General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps, from July 1983 until June 1987

Kent, Glenn, General, USAF, Designer of the Single Integrated Operational Plan

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., U.S. Representative to the United Nations from February 1981 until April 1985

Kissinger, Henry, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State during the Nixon and Ford administrations

Korniienko, Georgii, First Deputy Foreign Minister, Soviet Union

Kraemer, Sven, member, National Security Council Staff from 1981 until 1987

Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A., Head Negotiator for Defense and Space, Nuclear and Space Talks with the United States in Geneva, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union

Lehman, Ronald, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy from 1981 until 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Defense Programs and Arms Control June 1983 until January 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1986 until March 1986; United States Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms from March 1986 until February 1988; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from February 1988 to May 1989

Lenz, Allen, Staff Director of the National Security Council from January 1981 to 1982

Linhard, Robert, Colonel, USA; Member of the Defense Policy Directorate of the National Security Council Staff until 1983; member of the Defense Program and Arms Control Directorate of the National Security Council Staff from 1983 until January 1986; thereafter Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate from January 1986

Lugar, Richard, Senator (R-Indiana)

Mathias, Charles, Senator (R-Maryland)

Matlock, Jack F., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council from 1983 until April 1987; thereafter, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

McDaniel, Rodney, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1986 until 1987

McFarlane, Robert C. "Bud," Counselor of the Department of State from February 28, 1981 until April 4, 1982; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1982 until November 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1983 until December 1985

McMahon, John N., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from June 1982 until March 1986

Meese, Edwin "Ed," III, Counselor to the President from January 1981 until January 1984; Attorney General of the United States from January 1984 until July 1988

Mitterand, Francois, President of France from May 1981

Mobbs, Michael, Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from October 1985

Montgomery, Hugh, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 1981 until January 1985

Moreau, Arthur, Adm., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from May 1983 until October 1985

Murphy, Daniel, Adm., Chief of Staff, Office of the Vice President, from 1981 until 1984

Nance, James "Bud" W., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from January 1981 until January 1982

Negroponte, John, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from November 1987

Nitze, Paul, Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, from November 1981 until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control from December 1984

Nunn, Samuel "Sam," Senator (D-Georgia)

Obukhov, Aleksey, Deputy START Negotiator (USSR) from 1981 until 1983; Head of the INF Group rounds I through V, head of the START group VI and VII, head of the NST delegation for rounds VII and VIII

Palmer, Robie Marcus Hooker "Mark," Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Soviet Affairs from 1982 until 1986

Pearson, W. Robert, Member, National Security Council Staff, from 1985 until 1987

Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island); Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Percy, Charles H., Senator (R-Illinois) from 1967 until 1985; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1981 until 1985

Perle, Richard N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from August 1981 until May 1987

Pipes, Richard, Director of East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council from January 1981 until December 1982

Platt, Nicholas, Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary from January 7, 1985

Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN, Military Assistant to the President from April 1981 until November 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1983 until December 1985; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 1985 until November 1986

Powell, Colin, Colonel, USA, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, from July 1983 until June 1986; thereafter Lieutenant General; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 1986 until November 1987; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 5, 1986, until January 20, 1989

Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States

Reed, Thomas C., Consultant to the National Security Council Staff from January 1982 until June 1982; Special Assistant to the President from June 1982 until December 1982

Regan, Donald, Secretary of Treasury from January 1981 until February 1985

Ridgway, Rozanne, L., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from 1985

Rixse, Jay, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense

Rogers, Bernard, General, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until June 1987

Rostow, Eugene V., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from July 1981 until January 1983

Rowen, Henry S., Chairman, National Intelligence Council from July 1981 to September 1983

Rowny, Edward L., General, USA; Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985

Sarbanes, Paul, Senator (D-Maryland)

Schneider, William, Associate Director, Office of Management and the Budget

Scowcroft, Brent, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Ford administration; Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces from December 1982

Shevardnadze, Eduard, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from July 1985

- Shoemaker, Christopher**, Member of the Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council Staff until 1982
- Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of State from July 16, 1982, until January 20, 1989
- Simons, Thomas W., Jr.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State from 1982 until 1985; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia from 1986
- Specter, Arlen**, Senator (R-Pennsylvania)
- Spiers, Ronald L.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until October 1981
- Stearman, William**, member, National Security Council Staff from February 1981
- Stevens, Paul Schott**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from November 1987
- Stockman, David**, Director, Office of Budget and Management from January 1981 until 1985
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1981 until January 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982
- Taft, William Howard IV**, General Counsel, Department of Defense from April 1981 until February 1984; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1984
- Thatcher, Margaret**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
- Thayer, Paul**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1983 until January 1984
- Timbie, James**, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Arms Control from 1983
- Tower, John. G.** Senator (R-Texas) until January 3, 1985; Head START Negotiator, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State
- Tsongas, Paul**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)
- Ustinov, Dmitri F.**, Soviet Minister of Defense until December 1984
- Velikhov, Yevgeny P.**, Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences and Scientific Advisor to Gorbachev
- Vessey, John W., Jr.**, General, USA, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1982 until September 1985
- Vuono, Carl**, General, USA; Chief of Staff of the Army, from June 1987
- Walters, Vernon A.**, U.S. Ambassador at Large from July 22, 1981
- Warner, John**, Senator (R-Virginia)
- Weinberger, Caspar W. "Cap"**, Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1981, until November 1987
- Webster, William H.**, Director of Central Intelligence from May 26, 1987
- Welch, Larry**, General, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force from July 1986
- West, Francis J., Jr. "Bing"**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until April 1981, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April 1981 until April 1983
- Wheeler, Michael O.**, Colonel, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983
- Whitehead, John. C.**, Deputy Secretary of State from June 1985
- Wick, Charles Z.**, Director, United States Information Agency, from June 9, 1981
- Wickham, John A.**, General, USA; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from 1983 until 1987
- Wolfowitz, Paul**, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State, from January 1981 until December 1982; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs from December 1982 until March 1986; United States Ambassador to Indonesia from April 1986
- Zimmerman, Warren**, Deputy Head of the Delegation, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from May 1985

START I, 1981–1988

Chapter 1, July 1981–January 1985

1. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Rostow)¹

Washington, July 29, 1981

SUBJECT

Preliminary START Discussions

In accord with your wishes, here is a brief statement of my views on a possible opening phase of START² consultations with the Russians, preceding the initiation of formal negotiations on arms reductions. (S)

SALT was a sort of bastard child of our short-lived love affair with the Soviet Union. One of its basic faults was that the theoretical premises of limiting nuclear arms were never analyzed: we simply adopted the MAD doctrine, assumed the Russians shared it too, and proceeded to negotiate caps on launchers and ABM. This hasty approach proved to have been most unfortunate. This time we may want to precede actual bean-counting exercises—which, according to your own testimony, may be months off—with semi-formal discussions with the Russians concerning some fundamentals, to wit:

- Strategic doctrine.
- Units of measurement of arms control.
- The data base and exchange of data information.
- Verification.
- Means to improve prevention of accidental war. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, USSR—START 1/2. Secret. Sent through Allen, who did not initial the memorandum.

² In May 22 meeting of the National Security Council, Allen said: “We’ve all been imprisoned by the SALT language. We need some new categories, e.g., Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. They would be known as START.” See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988 vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 56.

The advantages of this kind of exchanges, which could begin on short notice, would be two-fold:

—One might learn something useful.

—We would seize the initiative in arms control talks and deflect some of the heat from us (especially if Moscow should refuse to participate in such an exchange of views). (S)

My notion is that these talks would lead to no agreement: they would be meant to clarify our mutual approaches to issues that are indeed fundamental to effective arms control. Participants should include high arms control representatives from both sides (but not the eventual negotiators) and have a set agenda lasting, say, something on the order of three to four weeks. (S)

Carnes Lord concurs; Robert Schweitzer will comment separately.³

³ Not found.

2. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 21, 1981

SUBJECT

Preliminary Conversations on Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

For the US:

Eugene V. Rostow, ACDA

Amb. E. Rowny, ACDA

James P. Timbie, ACDA

Alan Holmes, State (EUR)

For the USSR:

Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

The meeting had been arranged at the request of Mr. Rostow.

Mr. Rostow said it was the hope of the USG that this conversation would be the first of a series of informal exchanges with the Soviet Union on a number of problems the USG regards as fundamental to the possibility of success in arms control negotiations, including START

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P810120–2056. Secret.

and TNF as well as others such as BW and CW. We do not expect these talks necessarily to result in agreements at this stage, but rather we hope for frank and searching discussions which could affect the atmosphere and the outcome of the negotiations ahead of us. USG believes there is a need for the two governments to exchange views on a number of difficult and troublesome issues—through diplomatic conversation or perhaps at small meetings of experts, if the Soviet Government thinks well of the idea, in Washington or in Moscow.

USG believes the issue of verification would be a good place to start such discussions. Verification of arms control agreements is one of the most important aspects of arms control; verification will be much more difficult than in the past. It is essential that both sides have confidence in their ability to verify arms control agreements. One of the problems which SALT II faced in the Senate was a lack of confidence in verification. There were verification problems associated with the new types provision, with the MIRV limits, with the denial of telemetry, as well as with the broader problem of manufacture. For the Soviet Government, it is not difficult to know what USG is doing or to verify compliance. We have *Aviation Week*, and what is not published in *Aviation Week* is printed in the *Washington Post*. The Soviet situation is altogether different. There is a long Soviet tradition of secrecy, and there is also a pattern of concealment. It is much more difficult for USG to verify Soviet compliance, and more broadly to assess Soviet plans and programs. NTM are remarkable devices and impressive in many ways, but we are reaching the limits of what they can do in view of the increasing complexity of nuclear weapons systems, their scale and variety. In future agreements the two governments must go beyond NTM and use cooperative measures to make verification possible. We have made a list of cooperative measures which have been used and proposed in the past. It is a long list, longer than we expected, and we are learning all we can from past experience.

In the TNF and START negotiations, the two governments will have to agree on treaty provisions which are relevant to the conditions they face today—not those of the past—rules which limit the destructive power of nuclear weapons equally, equitably, and in the interest of stability, an interest which both governments share. What is the best way to compare the destructive power of nuclear weapons? How can each side verify these attributes of the other's systems? These are the problems to be solved in the negotiations. Rostow suggested that the problems will prove to be insoluble unless both governments undertake to solve them together. He commented that he had been struck by a recent article in the Soviet press by a Mr. Krasikov. (Rostow handed

over the attached excerpt.)² This is exactly the problem USG has in mind.

There is also the issue of data. The days when the US provided all the data are over. USG was encouraged by Soviet willingness to provide some data in SALT and in MBFR, but that is only a beginning. Much more is needed, as the Rome communiqué of NAC pointed out.³

There are other subjects which it would be useful to discuss: for example, means to improve prevention of accidental war and our respective views of what arms control is supposed to accomplish. Many of our differences arise from differences in doctrine and intention, and perhaps from misunderstandings about what the other side wants. Doctrine might well be a fruitful subject to examine. The SCC has been a useful forum for discussions between the US and the Soviet Union but that forum is limited. The last session was a disappointment for USG. The issues raised by the American side were not resolved. They must be resolved at the next session. The issues that Matlock raised in Moscow⁴ must also be resolved.

The two governments have no choice but to talk to each other. The development of nuclear weapons and other aspects of Soviet policy have produced a situation of instability which compels Soviet-American cooperation. There are marriages of love and there are marriages of convenience. The relation between our two countries is such as to require something like a marriage of necessity. The alternatives are much worse.

Bessmertnykh said he was sure his government would welcome Rostow's proposal. He wanted to clarify whether our interest in first raising questions about verification and data applies to all the negotiations or only to SALT and TNF. Did we believe it was advisable to discuss verification generally, or specifically with regard to SALT? Bessmertnykh thought well of the word START Rostow had suggested as a substitute for SALT.

Rostow said that verification was fundamental to all arms control efforts. Its application, of course, would be different in the different areas. If we could reach an understanding on the critical idea that there

² Attached but not printed is an English translation of an August 16 TASS article by Anatoliy Krasikov titled "War or Peace," in which an unknown hand bracketed the phrase "one should realize that as new types and modifications of weapons are coming into being it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a common denominator for defining the equilibrium of forces, and to verify arms limitation."

³ For the text of the final communiqué of the May 4–5 ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, see telegram 10771 from Rome, May 5 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D812011–0307)

⁴ For Matlock's July 23 tour d'horizon with Korniyenko, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988 vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 76.

must be more cooperation, that verification would no longer be a cat-and-mouse game, this would apply to all the negotiations. Then we could go on to agree how it would be most useful to proceed,—diplomatic discussions like this, meetings of experts, perhaps no follow-up at all except in the several negotiations themselves.

Bessmertnykh said that if the general idea of verification were decoupled from the talks themselves, this might get us up too high, or we might find ourselves in the forest. The verification issues are intimately connected with specific areas. The procedures in each area are different; the solutions in each area are different.

Rostow agreed.

Bessmertnykh welcomed the idea of the necessity of cooperation. Recognition of the importance of cooperation is a first step. Perhaps this is a good start. He accepts the notion that we have a marriage of necessity, a phrase to which he returned several times. On data, he understood the importance of data and thought that we had come to a certain level on this subject. He thought the key point was not who provides the data but the attitude toward the data. For example, in Vienna the Soviets had provided data but the West had not accepted it. In SALT it was different, and the SALT experience was not a bad way to go.

On SALT II, Bessmertnykh noted that the USG is not satisfied with certain parts of SALT II; and USSR is not satisfied with other parts. Each side must try to imagine what the other side is trying to do. Rostow had mentioned certain weak points in verification. The Soviet Union on the other hand believes it gave USG gifts on verification. For example, D and P. The USSR accepted that all the missiles in that category are MIRVed, even though everybody knew only a small number of them actually are. On the question of distinguishing Minuteman II from Minuteman III, a comparable issue arose, and this too was resolved in the US favor. For the USSR, this was a gesture, and if we had a Senate we would have had great difficulty explaining to that Senate what we had done.

Rostow said he understood the concept of compromise and that the Soviet view was a natural one in view of the past. On the data question in Vienna that you referred to, he thinks this is a good example of the problems we face. When he talks to people he explains that all the data has until recently been provided by the US side, and people can't believe it. They tell me they would never buy a house that way, or a car. Time is the only possible cure for these suspicions based on past experience, time and a better experience with genuine cooperation.

Bessmertnykh pointed out that the first question Moscow will ask is what is the SALT situation. To say that there is no SALT II is impossi-

ble. What is the status of the SALT II Treaty? It is in the Senate, it is signed, but you have no position.

Rostow replied that we are working hard, night and day, to reach a fully considered position. You may be sure it will be a constructive position, and it will embody some of the work done in the negotiations for SALT II. We will have ideas of our own, both on TNF and on SALT. They will be positive and they will build upon the experience of the past.

Bessmertnykh said that the USSR is prepared to continue the SALT process. The work of all those years, of General Rowny and others, should be preserved. Rostow said that was our view too, although we shall propose certain changes.

Rostow referred again to the Krasikov article, saying that as we move toward more modern measures for counting the destructive power of weapons, verification becomes more difficult. This is a problem we will have to face up to.

Bessmertnykh said his side pays more attention to the general strategic situation and thought discussions about strategic doctrine might be useful. He noted Rostow's reference in his confirmation hearings to ambiguity and approved Rostow's comment that some ambiguity was inevitable, but that we should try to minimize it. Rostow should know that the Soviets don't like ambiguity either. He noted the example of circumvention which turned out to be too ambiguous, and had turned out badly for them. He said an agreement with an advantage to one side was impossible.

Rostow said he welcomed Bessmertnykh's view of the importance of strategic doctrine, of discussing what each side wants. He agreed that these questions were fundamental and should be examined carefully.

Bessmertnykh asked whether the informal talks Rostow was proposing were preconditions for the negotiations themselves, and a pretext for delaying the negotiations. Rostow said he was glad Bessmertnykh had brought that point up. The President has made no preconditions for the TNF or START negotiations. Secretary Haig has pointed out that certain linkage was a fact. Rostow recalled that he was in the government during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He remembered the effect that had had on the prospects for negotiations at that time.

Bessmertnykh said he accepted linkage in this sense.

Rostow said that the conversations started today are not preconditions for TNF or START; and they are not intended to delay the start of the negotiations. On the contrary, they are intended to prepare the way for those negotiations. That is why Rostow had noted earlier that these talks need not necessarily result in agreements or understandings

at this stage. We have no impulse to delay, but we must be well prepared.

Bessmertnykh said these discussions could go on in parallel with the negotiations. We could discuss doctrine. People could come together, diplomatic people, military people. We believed that we had reached a certain level of trust and confidence in each other by handling the most sensitive elements together. If the new Administration believes a certain amount of trust and confidence is possible, then progress is possible. If there is no trust and confidence, the situation is hopeless. We welcomed the new Administration, and thought having new people was a good idea. They bring with them fresh thoughts.

Rostow mentioned that he had read about personal attacks on him in the Soviet press. Bessmertnykh said he followed the American press more than the Soviet press, but he thought Rostow had been spared, and that he should not take it personally if he was caught up in this exchange of salvos. Rowny was also sometimes mentioned in the press. We are professionals and this sort of thing should not cloud our relations.

Rostow handed over a copy of the attached talking points,⁵ as well as a brief account for the press of the fact, but not the content, of these discussions.⁶

Bessmertnykh said he approved the announcement, Bessmertnykh also took a copy of the Krasikov excerpt, saying that Krasikov had been expounding the American view.

Bessmertnykh said he would report the conversation to Moscow and would be in touch with Rostow when he receives instructions.⁷

Attachments:

Krasikov Article

Talking Points

Draft Press Release

⁵ Attached but not printed are Rostow's undated talking points on verification.

⁶ Attached but not printed is an undated statement: "The Director of ACDA, Dr. Eugene Rostow, met this afternoon with Mr. Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Charge of the Embassy of the USSR in Washington, on arms control issues. This was the first meeting of the Director with a Soviet representative and it is anticipated that further exchanges will take place concerning arms control problems."

⁷ The Department transmitted the memorandum of conversation in telegram 229568 to Moscow and NATO, August 27, copying for information London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Geneva, and MBFR Vienna. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810403-0659)

3. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹**

Washington, November 15, 1981, 0222Z

304512. Subject: Soviet reply to Rostow/Bessmertnykh conversation of August 21.² Ref: State 229568.³

1. Secret–entire text.

2. In the course of a luncheon a deux at the Soviet Embassy at Dobrynin's invitation on 11 November, the Soviet ambassador gave ACDA director Rostow a quote official unquote answer on instructions to the questions Rostow put to Bessmertnykh on August 21 (see Reftel).

3. Dobrynin made it clear that the reply was a response to a comment Rostow had made in New York to the effect—that the US was still waiting for a reply to the questions he had asked Bessmertnykh in August.

4. The Soviet Union agreed that problems of quote control unquote, compliance, and verification were important and should be considered not in isolation but in the context of each negotiation, where the issues would be more tangible Dobrynin added that it might be useful to supplement such discussions with conversations between them in Washington. The use of such channels had proved helpful in the past, when negotiations had reached an impasse.

5. The Soviet Union continued to regard national technical means as the primary method of verification.

6. Rostow replied that the Soviet response was welcome and was within the framework of the issue as he had put it in August. We could accept the procedure the Soviet side proposed. USG had also noted Brezhnev's comments on verification in his recent interview in *Der Spiegel*.⁴ In connection with the Soviet thesis that each verification problem was different, Rostow stressed the extreme importance in our minds of the issues that had arisen in connection with chemical and biological weapons, where national technical means were far less adequate than was the case with nuclear weapons. We were concerned that the Soviet Union was refusing even scrutiny by experts in these

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810541–1005. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, the Mission to NATO, and MBFR Vienna. Drafted by Rostow; cleared in S/S; approved by Rostow.

² See Document 2.

³ See footnote 7, Document 2.

⁴ Reference is to Brezhnev's interview in *Der Spiegel*, November 2, 1981, on the occasion of his visit to Bonn.

situations. Dobrynin replied by quoting an alleged remark by Richard Burt to the effect that the USG was convinced the Soviet Union was using bacteriological weapons in Afghanistan although quote we had no evidence unquote. He repeated this several times with relish and denied that the Soviet Union would use or had used chemical or biological weapons.⁵ Rostow said he had not seen any report of Burt's comment, but it was hardly an answer to Rostow's point or to the American demarches on the subject.

7. Dobrynin hoped that in our comments to the press USG would respect the privacy of diplomatic conversations. He said that Bessmertnykh had been somewhat concerned by stories in the press about the August 21 conversation. Rostow replied that it was our earnest policy to stay well behind the line between the permissible and the impermissible in this regard. In the New York episodes to which Dobrynin referred, we were responding to the steady drumbeat of Soviet propaganda accusing us of avoiding or delaying nuclear arms control talks. Moreover, it was Rostow's plan to keep both our own public and the Soviet Union fully informed on the broad lines of our thinking and would continue to do so. Rostow believed the chances for success in the talks would be improved if the Soviet government understood what was in our minds. Dobrynin said here and at several other points that we should ignore Soviet propaganda. Rostow replied it was a little difficult to follow that advice.

8. As Rostow left, Dobrynin gave him the following talking points. (You will note that Dobrynin did not repeat not touch the more tendentious items in the talking points and that those items contain a number of manifest inaccuracies, several of which were dealt with in the original conversation.) Begin text.

A. "It has been noticed in Moscow that your recent statements in New York referring to your conversation with the Minister-Counselor of the USSR Embassy in Washington gave a distorted picture of whose fault it is that the Soviet-American negotiations on various questions of arms limitation are being delayed. To try to create an impression as if the whole trouble was in the Soviet side not responding to certain considerations you set forth on the questions of arms limitations verification is, at the very least, not serious, let alone the fact that it's actually inaccurate.

B. "In response to the thoughts that you expressed at that time in a generalized manner, concerning the desirability of having a prelimi-

⁵ Burt's November 10 statement on the "Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia" before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1982, pp. 52–54.

nary exchange of views on ways and methods of verification of the compliance with possible future agreements prior to the resumption of negotiations on specific questions of arms limitation, the Soviet side called attention to the fact that this was an irrelevant—and unpromising proposition.

C. “Our position of principle remains unchanged, verification can be discussed only simultaneously and in close connection with the consideration of the substance of any specific aspects of arms limitation, and they cannot be divorced from the concrete arms limitation measures.

D. “The desire to turn the verification question into an isolated problem and to make its resolution—in fact a condition for the solution of issues of arms limitation including strategic arms limitation, can be regarded in no other way than as yet another manifestation of the U.S. side’s general policy, whereby instead of seeking to solidify the existing agreements in the arms-limitation area and to try to conclude new agreements in this respect, attempts are being made to block negotiations and to undermine whatever positive that was achieved earlier. Such an attitude, naturally, can find no support on our side.

E. “Adequate verification of the compliance with the obligations under arms limitation constitutes an inseparable and important part of the appropriate agreements. The Soviet Union is, no less than the U.S., interested in finding effective solutions on verification matters in the process of achieving specific agreements on arms limitation measures.

F. “Of fundamental importance, from the standpoint of the functioning of the verification system regarding the compliance of the sides with their obligations in the area of arms limitation and disarmament, is the verification through national technical means. And this should be the case for the future too, when time comes for the conclusion of new agreements in this regard. Specific details of the verification question, as well as the practical application of that principle will, of course, be subject of a special consideration during subsequent negotiations. It is to be repeated, however, that the resolution of such questions is only possible when they are considered in close connection with the other elements of the negotiated agreements.” End text.

Clark

4. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, February 19, 1982

SUBJECT

START Preparations

This memo is in response to your questions concerning the status and schedule of USG preparations for the initiation of START negotiations. Interagency preparations have bogged down within the last month and are confused by a number of inadequately coordinated efforts as follows:

1. *The START IG*, co-chaired by State's PM (Burt) and OSD (Perle), but dominated by State, spent last year in preparatory activities focused on: (a) comprehensive, if not totally honest, review of SALT compliance and verification issues; (b) overall guidance for US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) meetings; (c) outline of basic considerations for initial policy framework; and (d) approval in October of a detailed work program, to include a matrix of eight diverse force structures on the basis of which to calculate and recommend major reduction proposals consistent with US national security requirements, equity, and verifiability, and to be ready for NSC review in April 1982.

Although substantial interagency agreement had been reached on these efforts in the Working Group by late December, the IG's PM chairman at that time rejected most of the previous work, substantially slowed the Work Program, and, in spite of protests from the other agencies, essentially opposed convening of IGs required to resolve remaining issues and to get on with the job (see Tab IA).² The IG was last convened on January 12.

2. *The START IG's Working Group, and a Technical Subgroup* chaired by OSD, have further refined the IG-approved matrix to focus initially on three of the force packages and on cuts of 30%. However, there is no agreement yet on many critical assumptions and evaluation criteria, and assured DOD/JCS computer support is lacking. The Work Program

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR078, NSDD 33 [START Negotiations]. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Reed. Attached but not printed are two February 19 papers, "Handling the Core Issues: Units of Limitation" and "General Outline of the Proposed Approach."

² Attached but not printed is a February 19 chart listing the status of the work for the START Interagency Group and START Interagency Group's Working Group.

is currently scheduled to be completed for NSC review by May, but it is behind schedule and requires substantial revamping.

3. *The SCC Backstopping Committee*, chaired by ACDA, has assessed, with occasional overall guidance from the START IG, specific SALT compliance issues in preparation for the SCC meetings of March and October 1981 and March 1982. Such issues have included Soviet radars, ABM missiles, encryption, etc. The Backstopping Committee, which is also working on ABM Treaty review issues, has been weak in terms of forcing compliance issues with the Soviets and in terms of articulating lessons learned from the SALT I and II experience. Meanwhile, the US delegation to the SCC still lacks a chairman.

4. *Independent efforts* are being undertaken in addition to, and somewhat in opposition to, the formal START IG/Working Group/Technical Subgroup analytical efforts. These independent efforts include competitive and extremely close-hold proposals being fostered separately by State's PM (Burt to Haig) and by ACDA (Timbie to Rostow). These efforts have deliberately leapfrogged the interagency process and have been designed to capture and lock cabinet-level principals into simple outcomes—e.g., 7,000 warhead limit (PM) and 50% cut (ACDA)—that essentially ignore the formal interagency analytical program. The PM and ACDA proposals are known to NSC staff only through bootleg copies and have not yet been brought into the inter-agency process.

A semi-independent review effort by Chief START negotiator, Ambassador Ed Rowny, has been circulated by him to Rostow, OSD, and NSC staff as an aid to the formal analytical process.

In the face of this mix of proliferating and uncoordinating efforts, with START IGs not regularly convened and with Working Group and Technical Group stalled, NSC-level action is required to overcome delay, confusion, and wasted efforts. It is necessary to assure systematic and timely preparations and to lay on the table and analyze current independent proposals.

We believe that the best way of meeting this objective is by formalizing the Work Program³ via a National Security Study Directive. Attached at Tab I, as prepared by Bob Linhard, are outlines of the basic elements, including schedule and substantive issues, which need to be addressed in an NSSD. With informal consultation in the next day or two with other agencies, we will submit for your consideration a draft NSSD based upon the elements outlined at Tab I. Executing this NSSD with discipline should assure NSC review by mid-May.

³ Attached but not printed is a February 16 paper, "Proposed Approach—Terms of Reference for Focusing/Completing Ongoing START Preparations."

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve preparation of a draft NSSD based upon the elements outlined at Tab I.⁴

⁴ Reed indicated his approval.

5. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 1, 1982

SUBJECT

U.S. Preparations for Strategic Arms Reductions Talks

Issue

Should the preparations underway for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) be formalized by issuing a National Security Study Directive?

Facts

While substantial preparatory analytical work has been completed, the major additional interagency work required can best be assured through the focus, discipline, and momentum provided by an NSSD.

Discussion

The proposed NSSD will prepare us to establish U.S. policy, the U.S. negotiating position, and U.S. strategies for START, and will provide a foundation to guide the conduct of the U.S. as negotiations progress. The establishment of the NSSD will assure comprehensiveness and timeliness of the interagency work. The NSSD sets a date for completion of the study by May 1, 1982. This will assure necessary momentum

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—070, NSSD 3-82 3 MAR 82 START NEGOTIATION. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads "Signed." Kraemer and Linhard sent the memorandum to Clark for his signature under cover of a March 1 memorandum in which they argued "Building upon work already completed by the START IG, the NSSD will provide the highest-level direction without which we believe it will be impossible to assure coordinated, timely presentation of options and recommendations to the NSC." (Ibid.)

and timely preparation of options and recommendations for consideration by the National Security Council. Resulting decisions will be formalized in a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD).

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you sign the National Security Study Directive 3–82 at Tab A. ²

² Reagan indicated his approval by writing a checkmark and his initials. The NSDD is printed as Document 6.

6. National Security Study Directive 3–82¹

Washington, March 3, 1982

*U.S. POLICY AND NEGOTIATING POSITION
FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS*

Introduction

This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for completing the review of U.S. policy and the development of a negotiating position for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START).

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—070, NSDD 3–82 3 MAR 82 START NEGOTIATION. Top Secret. Clark forwarded the NSDD to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Casey, Jones, and Rostow, under cover of a March 3 memorandum (which McFarlane signed on Clark's behalf): "The President has directed that the program of preparations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks be formalized by the issuance of NSDD 3–82, Subject: U.S. Policy and Negotiating Position for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, for NSC consideration. Building on prior interagency work, this effort will prepare the Government to establish U.S. policy, the U.S. negotiating position, and strategies for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Resulting National Security Council decisions will be incorporated in a National Security Decision Directive. The attached National Security Study Directive (NSDD 3–82) provides the guidelines for the review." (Ibid.)

Objective of Review

To produce a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), Subject: U.S. Policy and Negotiating Position for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, for consideration by the National Security Council.

Scope

The review will result in a report for National Security Council consideration, which will include, as a minimum, the following topics:

- U.S. interests and objectives in entering into these negotiations.
- U.S. objectives within the negotiations.
- Factors that may constrain U.S. options within negotiations.
- Criteria appropriate for evaluating alternative U.S. approaches in terms of U.S. interests and objectives.
- Issues requiring resolution to develop an integrated U.S. approach to negotiations.
- Evaluation of the alternative solutions for each issue and recommendations with respect to the alternatives.
- Integration of the resolution of the individual issues into a single, comprehensive U.S. approach, or alternative comprehensive approaches, for NSC consideration.
- Assessment of the comprehensive approach(es) in terms of U.S. interests and objectives.
- U.S. negotiating position and strategies to implement the U.S. comprehensive approach(es).

This study will establish U.S. policy, the U.S. negotiating position, and U.S. strategies for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks.

Administration

Management of the NSSD 3–82 review will be the responsibility of the existing START Interdepartmental Group, which should draw upon the significant work it has already completed. A timetable for the completion of work remaining is provided at attachment.² The Interdepartmental Group will report its findings for National Security Council consideration not later than May 1, 1982. Resulting National Security Council decisions will be incorporated into a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD).

Any approach or alternative approaches recommended to the National Security Council should, as a minimum, permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union to execute U.S. national military strategy

² Attached but not printed is the timetable for the completion of work remaining.

with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit their timely assessments of the approach(es) in terms of this criterion to the Interdepartmental Group for use in developing the proposed U.S. position, and will certify to the military sufficiency of each approach as part of the report submitted to the National Security Council.

Dissemination of this NSSD, subsequent study material, and the resulting NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.

Ronald Reagan

7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 20, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting, Wednesday, April 21, 1982

Issue: What factors affect the choice of basic units to be limited in a START agreement?

Facts: The basic unit of limitation used in SALT II was Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (i.e., ballistic missile launchers plus heavy bombers). All agencies agree that this unit alone is inadequate for START, but there are disagreements on how it should be supplemented or replaced.

Possible candidates for limitations (which are not mutually exclusive) include the number of ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile warhead weight, ballistic missile throw weight, and the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

All agencies concur that a START agreement should provide for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels, but agencies differ as to what the level should be. Views differ on the desirability of limiting ballistic missile launchers, and on whether to limit ballistic missile throw weight directly or indirectly.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—070, NSSD 3–82 3 MAR 82 START NEGOTIATION. Top Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

All agencies agree that it is to the U.S. advantage to seek different, looser constraints on bombers than on missiles.

Discussion: The purpose of this NSC meeting is to begin highest-level *discussion* developing our START negotiating position. Follow-up meetings are being scheduled for necessary *decision* making early in May.

The choice of a unit of limitation must especially address: (1) how we intend to make significant reductions; and (2) control Soviet potential to break out of an agreement, while (3) providing sufficient U.S. military capability to execute our own military strategy; and (4) assuring a verifiable agreement.

Tab A1

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

START DISCUSSION PAPER

This paper summarizes those issues which should determine a U.S. START negotiating position. A five-page summary of criteria and candidate elements for limitation is followed by a short description of agency views on those elements and our approach to the negotiations.

Criteria

The following criteria are those which must guide formulation of a position for START:

- *Military capability.* A START agreement must permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability, taking into account that allowed to the Soviet Union, to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
- *Equality.* Nothing less than equality is acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement for military reasons and for political/perceptual reasons.
- *Strategic stability.* A START agreement must promote stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. Significant constraints on the most threatening Soviet systems—ICBMs—could contribute to this goal.

² Top Secret.

- *Effective verification.* A START agreement must provide for necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures required to achieve this objective.

- *Substantial reductions on each side.* Whatever unit of measurement is adopted should lend itself to substantial reductions below current levels of forces. Reductions should be to equal ceilings.

- *Easily understood.* To gain support and hence underscore the credibility of the U.S. negotiating position, the approach we choose should be explainable in clear and simple terms.

- *Alliance impact.* A START agreement should take into account Allied concerns: the ability of the U.S. to maintain a credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF negotiations, and the likelihood of success.

- *Anticipated Soviet reaction.* The Soviets will undoubtedly resist any of the reductions proposals now being considered. We should concern ourselves with how defensible the proposal is against Soviet propaganda efforts.

Units of Account

Which elements of strategic nuclear forces should be subject to specific limitations in a START agreement? This “unit of account” issue has been the focus of interagency discussion and is of central importance in defining the basic framework of a U.S. START position. The basic unit used in SALT II was strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ballistic missile launchers plus heavy bombers). All agencies agree that this unit alone is inadequate for START, but there are disagreements on how it should be supplemented or replaced.

Possible candidates for limitations, which are not mutually exclusive, include the number of ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile warhead weight, ballistic missile throw-weight, and the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Summary of Alternative Units of Account

1. Number of Ballistic Missile Warheads

The number of warheads, the weapons atop missiles, are a direct indicator of strategic power. The sides are about equal in the number of ballistic missile warheads. All agencies concur that a START agreement should provide for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to an equal level for each side. Agencies differ as to what that level should be.

2. The Number of Ballistic Missile Launchers

Views differ on the desirability of limiting the number of launchers (a device that launches ballistic missiles). The Soviets have a substantial lead in launchers. Some agencies believe such limits are important to

reduce the potential for a rapid buildup of Soviet strategic capabilities in the event of treaty abrogation (i.e., a large force of single warhead missiles permitted by a Treaty might be rapidly fitted with multiple warheads). They also believe that limiting launchers will facilitate verification and preserve some continuity with past negotiations. Other agencies believe such limits are undesirable because they could foreclose possible U.S. options and do not by themselves significantly reduce Soviet capabilities.

3. Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight and/or Warhead Weight

Missile throw-weight is the weight that can be delivered by an individual missile; it effectively determines the number and size of warheads that can be delivered by a ballistic missile. The Soviets have a growing advantage in throw-weight: currently about 2-½ times the U.S. level of missile throw-weight. Some agencies believe we should explicitly seek sharp reductions in throw-weight to equality at low levels. Other agencies believe it would be preferable to seek constraints on warhead weight. Still other agencies would seek sharp reduction in Soviet throw-weight by requiring reductions in or the elimination of the Soviets' heavy ICBMs, i.e., the SS-18, plus constraints on future ICBMs.

4. Bombers

All agencies agree that it is to the U.S. advantage to seek different, looser constraints on bombers than on missiles. The United States currently has a small lead in bombers even if Soviet BACKFIRE bombers are included, and a substantial lead in bomber weapons. All agree that BACKFIRE should be included and that we could accept equal levels of bombers. Some agencies prefer that such limits be omitted from the U.S. opening position.

Verification

In general, the Intelligence Community believes that high confidence levels in monitoring units of account, where achievable, will require access to flight test data, prohibitions on concealment, type and counting rules and agreed definitions. In many cases, cooperative measures would be needed to enhance and supplement national technical means. Our capabilities to monitor the units of account under consideration are summarized below. It should be noted that the relative verifiability of these units of account depends on factors such as specific treaty provisions and collateral constraints, which are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, there are factors, such as refire missiles, which could have a significant impact on verification but would affect equally all the units of account.

A. Ballistic Missile Launchers

High confidence in counting SLBM and fixed ICBM launchers can be achieved with national technical means and appropriate counting rules. For land-mobile ICBM launchers, intrusive measures would be required for high confidence.

B. Deployed Ballistic Missile Warheads

With flight test data and counting rules, we would have high confidence in the number of warheads to be attributed to each missile system and high confidence in the aggregate deployed warhead count for SLBMs and fixed ICBM launchers.

C. [1 line not declassified]

[9 lines not declassified]

D. [1 line not declassified]

[3 lines not declassified]

E. [1 line not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (6 lines) not declassified]

Tab A2**Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³**

Washington, undated

Questions for Discussion

Note: Although the choice of the units of account will be a critical decision in determining our negotiating proposal for START, the scale of reductions that we seek to achieve is equally critical. Thus, in addressing the questions below, the proposed level of limitations as well as the units of account should be discussed.

1. How does our choice of units of account help us to achieve significant reductions and also protect our military requirements?

2. How does our choice of units of account build or undercut support for the President's strategic modernization program and for the defense program as a whole?

³ Top Secret.

3. What is the political environment surrounding START? How does the choice of units of account build or undercut support for the U.S. position?

—with the public?

—in Congress?

—with our Allies?

4. Is continuity with SALT I and SALT II good or bad?

5. How does verification bear on the choice of the U.S. negotiating proposal?

6. Are some proposals more resilient than others? What is the relationship between our negotiating position and the likely course of the negotiations?

7. Do we require equality in every important measure of strategic capability? What are the requirements of Public Law 92-448?⁴

Tab A3

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

State Department Views

The choice of our START proposal will be one of the most important decisions reached in this Administration. Our supporters and critics alike will view our proposals as a litmus test of our seriousness in seeking an agreement.

It is imperative that our proposal elicit broad support in the US and with our allies, enhancing the credibility of US arms control policy and strengthening the President's position during his trip to Europe⁶

⁴ Reference is to the Jackson Amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 on the Interim Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement, August 7, 1972. The amendment mandated equality in U.S. and Soviet strategic arms.

⁵ Secret.

⁶ On June 2, Reagan flew to Paris, where he attended the Versailles G-7 Summit from June 4–6. On the morning of June 7, Reagan flew from Paris to Rome, where he met with Pope John Paul II. That evening, he flew from Rome to London, where he met with Thatcher, Queen Elizabeth II, and delivered a speech to the British Parliament, scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. On June 9, Reagan flew from London to Bonn, where he met Schmidt, addressed the Bundestag, and attended a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. On June 11, he flew from Bonn to and from West Berlin, before returning to Washington. (White House Daily Diary, June 2–11).

and to the UN in June. This is clear in view of the political challenges of the freeze movement in the US and the peace movement in Europe. We must keep this in mind in choosing a negotiating approach.

The State proposal seeks to strike a balance between cosmetic arms control such as SALT II (which would allow the Soviet buildup to continue) and an approach which would offer little hope of success and thus provide an easy target for those who argue that we are not serious about arms control.

The State approach would focus on the most easily understood indicators of strategic power: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Specifically, this approach would:

- require both sides to reduce to a common ceiling of 5000 *ballistic missile warheads* and a sublimit of 2500 *ICBM warheads* (SALT II placed no direct limits on warheads);

- limit *missile launchers and bombers* to 1500 (the SALT II ceiling was 50% higher at 2250);

- focus on the most destabilizing Soviet systems by requiring reductions in the heaviest Soviet ICBM the SS-18, which could be linked to an offer to forego MX deployment.

This approach has several advantages:

- It would keep US military options open to shape our forces to meet future threats.

- We would be able to verify these limitations with confidence.

- It would be a major step forward from SALT II but would not be seen as a total rejection of years of SALT negotiations. It would place the President center stage as a man of peace and vision, committed to negotiating seriously on an end to the arms race, thus allowing us to seize the high ground on an issue of intense public concern.

A major strength of the State approach is that it accomplishes the same military objectives as other approaches without the attendant political difficulties. In particular, the State approach would require major reductions in Soviet missile throw-weight without the problems associated with explicit limits on throw-weight. These include the following:

- Direct limits on throw-weight would be less verifiable than limits on missile warheads or launchers.

- Direct limits on throw-weight would create an impression of unfairness, as the Soviets would be required to make major changes in their forces without the US having to do so. This could reduce pressures on the Soviets to accept reductions, undermine public and Congressional support for the strategic modernization program, and weaken the allies' support for US nuclear policy and their confidence in our ability to do business with the Soviets.

—Negotiations on throw-weight could lead to a ceiling considerably above US levels, creating only a cosmetic equality which would have no benefits for the US and which could diminish Congressional support for an agreement.

In sum, the State proposal offers the best hope of securing real arms reductions for our adversaries, while providing a politically attractive START position which will gain the solid support of our friends and establish the President's position as an advocate of serious arms control.

Tab A3

Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency⁷

Washington, undated

ACDA View: Limitation on the Number and Destructive Power of Ballistic Missile Warheads

Our START approach should significantly reduce missile destructive capability, and therefore should reduce the number and destructive power of ballistic missile warheads. The essential elements of this approach can be described clearly and succinctly: A cut of roughly half the total number of missile warheads, and a substantial reduction in their destructive power as well. Reductions should be phased over five years.

Warhead number. One key measure of destructive capability is the number of warheads. As missile accuracy improves, most targets can be destroyed by a single reliable warhead of nominal size. The US should press for substantial reduction in the total number of missile warheads, to an equal level of perhaps 4000 on each side, which would be roughly one-half the present numbers. A sublimit would permit no more than 2500 warheads on ICBMs. Such an approach would force the Soviets to dismantle more than half of their present ICBM force. Substantial Soviet ICBM reductions are essential if we are to achieve our objectives of enhanced deterrence and stability.

Destructive power. Limits on warheads alone would not be sufficient for an equitable agreement, since some warheads are substantially larger and more destructive than others. Soviet warheads are on average larger than US warheads, and if only warhead numbers were

⁷ Secret.

limited, there would be an incentive to increase missile and warhead size. To constrain such increases, and the corresponding breakout capability, there should be limits on warhead size.

A straightforward way to accomplish this would be to place limits on the weight of RVs. Any RV with a weight above the ceiling would be counted more than one, in proportion to its weight. In the long run, the weight threshold should be low, e.g., 200 kilograms (roughly the size of the MM-III RV); in the near term transitional period, the threshold could be higher, e.g., 450 kg. The low warhead ceiling could be phased in over a number of years to give the sides time to adjust their forces, and transitional arrangements could be made for existing systems. In order to limit breakout potential, the throwweight of missiles could be limited to no more than twice the weight of their RVs. The essential point is that the unit of account for START should measure destructive capability of strategic forces, and should therefore constrain the number and size of warheads. Such an RV weight limit would force the Soviets to reduce their ICBM throwweight by half in the near term, with further reductions when current systems are replaced.

Negotiations should focus attention on reductions in missile forces, rather than on bombers and cruise missiles, which do not pose the same first strike threat, and face unconstrained defenses. In the context of Soviet agreement to substantial reductions in missile forces along the lines of the U.S. proposal, the U.S. could accept a separate limit of 250 heavy bomber aircraft.

Tab A3

Paper Prepared in the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks⁸

Washington, undated

VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN, START DELEGATION

The head of the START Delegation believes that a combination of significant reductions of ballistic missile warheads and throwweight provides the most effective overall constraint on the destructive capability of Soviet forces. In order to enhance negotiation of a successful agreement, the United States should seek reductions in ballistic missile warheads over the first five years of an agreement to a level of perhaps

⁸ Secret.

6000 with ICBM warheads limited to one-half of that total. How the reductions are phased over time is not only important to our security but to the negotiability of an agreement. Deeper reductions, down to a level of perhaps 5000 ballistic missile warheads, should be sought over a longer, 10-year period. The final warhead level should ensure U.S. ability to carry out its military objectives against Soviet forces and preserve a viable triad.

The U.S. START position should also include an initial limit on aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight set at approximately one-half of current Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is the only significant measure which completely identifies the capability of the missiles and which prevents the Soviets from exploiting the destructive potential of their heavier missiles. Limits on launchers or on reentry vehicle size, without limits on throw-weight, would allow the Soviet warheads on their existing missiles if there were a breakout or termination of the treaty. A throw-weight/warhead weight ratio would require the parties to agree, in effect, to a throw-weight aggregate, but adds another element of complexity to negotiating an agreement.

Reducing Soviet warheads and throw-weight to these levels would put significant bounds on the ICBM survivability problem we now face, would make it easier to deploy MX in a survivable mode, and would be readily understandable. Although the Soviets would initially retain a throw-weight advantage, the U.S. should make clear its objective of bringing Soviet throw-weight down to the U.S. level in ten years.

Any agreement entered into must be effectively verified. This includes as a minimum access to unencrypted telemetry and going beyond national technical means. Two additional important issues related to effective verification are the refire capability and ground mobility of ICBMs.

Tab A3

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁹

Washington, undated

Defense Department Views

The Department of Defense believes that a Reagan Administration START proposal should depart clearly, in form and substance, from the SALT I and II agreements in order to achieve real arms control.

⁹ Secret.

The Department of Defense proposes sharp reductions in the two principle units of account—*ballistic missile warheads*, which we would reduce by about 50% to 4,000 on each side, and *ballistic missile throw-weight*, which we would fix equally at a level slightly below the current US level (and 40% of the current Soviet level). We believe that this proposal, which deliberately departs from the flawed approach of the past, offers our best chance to negotiate a stable equilibrium with sharp reductions.

SALT I and II gave the appearance, but not the reality, of significant limits on Soviet strategic power. A START proposal that parallels the structure of SALT II, as recommended by agencies that would limit *warheads and launchers alone*, would drive the Administration into a repetition of past mistakes and produce a START treaty that would resemble the SALT II treaty against which it campaigned successfully. Such a SALT II style proposal would increase pressures to proceed with ratification of SALT II while we negotiate START, thus, undercutting efforts to negotiate substantial reductions. Indeed, a SALT II style proposal would leave the Administration with no credible argument for resisting ratification of the existing SALT II treaty.

The principal failure of the SALT II treaty was its perpetuation of a 2½-to-1 Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw weight. So fundamental was this inequity that the Senate Armed Services Committee, in opposing the treaty as “not in the national security interests of the United States,” listed first among the changes it proposed “remedying such inequalities as the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw-weight . . .”

Now we find the Department of State opposed to a US START proposal calling for equal throw-weight at sharply reduced levels. Indeed, the Department of State wishes to remain silent on the subject of throw weight, even though it is here that the Soviets enjoy their most dramatic margin of superiority. We believe that a failure *even to ask for equal sharply reduced levels of ballistic missile throw weight* would be inconsistent with PL 92-448, a Public Law passed following SALT I that called on the President to achieve strict equality in any future treaty.

The Department of State argues that we can obtain equal throw-weight as an indirect consequence of other features of a new START proposal. But without articulating the principle of equality in throw weight and incorporating that principle prominently in our START proposal, we believe that equal throw weight will inevitably be sacrificed in the give-and-take of bargaining as we head down the familiar path of a SALT II type treaty—limiting only the number of warheads and launchers.

The Defense Department emphasis on sharp reductions to a low and equal level of warheads and throw-weight would distinguish the

approach of the Reagan Administration from its predecessors, meet the requirements of PL 92–448, throw the spotlight on the area where the Soviets have (and have insisted on retaining) an immense advantage, and provide a principled position that we could sustain effectively in the face of Soviet and other hostile opposition.

Among the arguments advanced for not proposing equal throw-weight the least convincing is that equal throw-weight will prove difficult to negotiate. In SALT I and II, the US effort suffered from the tendency to compromise our goals even before the negotiations got underway—with the inevitable result that we found ourselves concluding agreements that reflected *Soviet* objectives, permitted the Soviet build-up to continue and protected and legitimized the Soviet margin of superiority. We must have the courage to make proposals that are defensible, fair and balanced, even if they will be somewhat more difficult to negotiate. Enshrining the principle of equality throughout is the most effective way to do so.

8. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, April 21, 1982, 10:30–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Mr. Richard Burt, Director, Politico/
Military Affairs

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Under Secretary Fred C. Ikle

OMB

Associate Director William Schneider

ACDA

Director Eugene V. Rostow

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Admiral John M. Poindexter

Mr. Richard G. Darman

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00046 RWR 4/21/82 START. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

CIA
Director William J. Casey
USUN
Ambassador Kenneth Adelman
JCS
General David C. Jones

The Vice President's Office
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
NSC
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Lt Col Robert Linhard

Minutes

Judge Clark: Mr. President, today we will beginning final preparations in the NSC process to develop the U.S. negotiating position for START. There are divergent views on many of the complex issues involved. That is healthy. We will begin today with a presentation by Richard Burt (Department of State) on the START interagency process thus far.

Mr. Burt: Mr. President, the START IG has been at work for over a year. I am here as Chairman of the IG, not representing the special interest of State. With the help of these charts,² I will be reviewing the framework for the U.S. negotiating approach.

Our central purpose today is to begin discussion on the framework of an opening START position. Our central question is what element of strategic nuclear forces we want to reduce. A corollary question is to what levels we want to reduce. The basic objectives of a U.S. position, we believe, should be those of: (1) military sufficiency (NSDD-13)³; (2) strategic stability; (3) significant reductions (military useful and politically necessary); (4) politically plausible; and (5) verifiable.

The question of what should be reduced is the question of “units account.” Different options and combinations of options have been examined in the START IG. The units include: (1) ballistic missile warheads; (2) launchers; (3) missile throw-weight; (4) warhead weight; (5) bombers; and (6) bomber armament.

Criteria for selecting units of account include: (1) easily understood (to gain wide support); (2) deal with important asymmetries (especially heavy missiles); (3) tough but plausible; (4) protect Allied interest; (5) generally consistent with INF; and (6) flexible and durable framework for negotiations.

The strategic balance in 1982, as the chart shows, is roughly as follows. In deployed missile warheads, the USSR is slightly ahead (7500 to 7100). In SALT-accountable missile warheads (including Poseidon), the U.S. is slightly ahead (9500 to 8800). In strategic nuclear delivery

² Attached but not printed is a series of charts prepared in the Department of State.

³ NSDD 13, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLV, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

vehicles, the Soviets have a substantial lead (2763 to 1944). In missile throw-weight, the Soviets have a very substantial lead (5.1 to 1.9 kilogram). In bombers, including Backfire, the Soviets lead 415 to 347; however, the U.S. leads in numbers of bomber weapons.

In terms of agency approaches to the units of account issue, all agencies favor radical cuts in the number of warheads to levels of 4,000 or 5,000. On launchers, State favors a limit of 1,500; other agencies do not favor launcher limits. On throw weight, State favors reductions in heavy missiles and ICBM warheads; ACDA favors a warhead weight limit; and OSD favors reductions to U.S. level. On bombers, all favor levels of about 250. The Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Rowny, has his own proposal and will make some comments later. We understand that JCS will also be expressing their own views.

In terms of our analysis, we have sought to evaluate the different units of account and their possible combination in terms of the criteria we identified above. As a focus for our discussion, we have proposed seven questions as follows: (1) How does our choice of units of account help us to achieve significant reductions and also protect our military requirements? (2) How does our choice of units of account build or undercut support for the President's strategic modernization program and for the defense program as a whole? What is the political environment surrounding START? (3) How does the choice of units of account build or undercut support of the U.S. position: with the the public, in Congress, and with our Allies? (4) Is continuity with SALT I and SALT II good or bad? (5) How does verification bear on the choice of the U.S. negotiating proposal? (6) Are some proposals more resilient than others? What is the relationship between our negotiating position and the likely course of the negotiations? (7) Do we require equality in every important measure of strategic capability? What are the requirements of Public Law 92-448 (the "Jackson Amendment" to SALT I).

Judge Clark: General Jones, would you care to say a few words on the JCS views?

General Jones: We have a problem with our ability, should we achieve "significant" reductions, to certify military sufficiency of our remaining assets in terms of the policy guidance we have received, as in NSDD-13. Our guidance has given us very severe requirements on destroying the Soviet target structure. We would require 13,000–15,000 strategic weapons vice the 9,000 we have today to carry out this guidance, and these weapons would need to be of much better quality. We actually need increased and better weapons.

Mr. Meese: What policy guidance do you mean?

General Jones: NSDD-13 and the SIOP, etc. Such guidance might be adjusted; for example, with a launch-on-warning strategy. But our guidance requires more than the 9,000 weapons we have today against

the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. I have brought three charts⁴ with me which demonstrate what I mean:

—The first chart, on the U.S. weapons Five-Year Defense Plan, shows that we will be going from our current 9,000 weapons to some 17,000 by 1991.

—The second chart, based on the latest NIE, shows that the number of Soviet warheads will increase from present levels, close to ours, to some 17,000 by 1991, and that these will be heavily missile-oriented (i.e., first-strike weapons), whereas ours will contain a large bomber weapon (second strike) element.

—The third chart shows that if the different agencies' START proposals are fully implemented, the U.S. warhead numbers and requirements do not drop, but actually rise, as will be the case when we deploy B-1 and Trident.

This leaves us with two dilemmas. In terms of the guidance we have, the agencies' proposals focus on missile warhead reductions, while we will actually need to grow in number of bomber- and submarine-force weapons. But in that case, we may be perceived as not seeking significant reductions. We in the JCS do not have the answer to these dilemmas, but we certainly feel that the issues are considerably more complex than the chart presented by the State briefer.

Secretary Weinberger: General Jones' statement is very important.

Mr. President, we need a proposal to be complete and ready before the European Summit.⁵ We need something like a Memorial Day T.V. address, which will drive the process, will dominate the Summit, and will demonstrate to all the Administration's seriousness about arms control. As for the criteria of being politically plausible, we should not hesitate to ask the Soviets to reduce more than we do, since to do otherwise, would be to freeze their superiority. You made the same point prior to your November 18 speech,⁶ when some told us that the public here and in Europe would not buy it. But the Soviets have not refused to negotiate, and your proposal still enjoys high public support in Europe and here.

General Jones pointed out some problems with reductions. Let me make some points. Our approach should not build on SALT; launchers will not be the basic units of account. The SALT launcher emphasis permitted an enormous Soviet buildup. Warheads are not the proper

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 7.

⁶ Reference is to Reagan's speech of November 18, 1981, in which he called for "START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks." (*Public Papers of the President: Reagan*, 1981, pp. 1062–1067).

measure, since they do not account for the effectiveness of deterrence or include categories like accuracy, yield, or hard-target capability. We believe throw weight is the overall measure of effectiveness, and that we need to reduce it to achieve real reductions. As for NSDD-13, I believe it does not really apply if we realize Soviet restraints under a new agreement. I believe it applies if there are no Soviet restraints. One other point is that your proposal will probably demand on-site verification, and this will put the Soviets on the defensive, since the public generally supports the idea.

Dr. Rostow: I want to back up Cap (Weinberger) about the issue of being fair to the Soviets. We should not negotiate for them; they do a good job for themselves. The ACDA approach is best for the U.S.; it is serious and plausible. I am helping prepare Soviet and U.S. public opinion for the June speeches, and I am getting a good response. Our approach is plausible and is based on INF experience. Then we asked for asymmetrical reductions, explained our rationale, and had our positions accepted by U.S. and European opinion. Our rationale is that we must have deterrence, and that we must limit, or eliminate, the first-strike systems. Our mistake in the 70's was to think that the Soviets, like we, did not want first-strike capability. Now we must insist on equal deterrence to the bulk of their threat. At present, the Soviets can knock out our ICBMs with one-fifth of their forces. Our proposal would take away two-thirds of their first-strike capability. A first-strike would no longer be plausible, and we would greatly reduce the nightmare paralyzing our people.

The anti-nuclear movement is important. But, perhaps, more troubling is what I sense to be a return to isolationism. There are more people now, who in the face of the Soviets' buildup, want to pull U.S. troops out of Europe and to fold the U.S. inward. Note Congressman Rhodes' recent speech⁷ and the McNamara/Bundy article.⁸ Also, Henry Kissinger said in Brussels that great powers don't commit suicide for other nations.⁹ We have real problems; I think we really need to restore our credibility.

The ACDA proposal involves a simple formula. It involves a limit on the number of warheads that can kill, and it limits the measure of

⁷ Reference is to Congressman John Jacob Rhodes, "The Defense of Our Country," 97th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 128 (April 20, 1982); H 7138-7143.

⁸ Reference is to McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 753-768.

⁹ Reference is to Kissinger's speech, "NATO—The Next Thirty Years," which he delivered in Brussels on September 1, 1979. A text of the speech can be found in Yale University, Manuscripts and Archives, Henry A. Kissinger Papers, part II, Post-Government Career, Speeches and Writing, Box 691, Folder 19.

destructive power for the most rapid and most accurate weapons. Our proposal meets all of the criteria. ACDA right now is focusing on limiting the weight of the warheads, but we are not hard on this way of limiting warheads.

There is a mistake in Rick Burt's chart. ACDA does favor an explicit limit on the number of ICBM warheads, even though this would be asymmetrical reductions. We reject State's position of limiting the number of deployed launchers. State's position has overtones of SALT, which would be damaging, and which could also interfere with future U.S. force developments. *[less than 3 lines not declassified]* It could be 4, 5, or 6 thousand or whatever.

General Jones: Let me correct something stated earlier (by Secretary Weinberger). *[2 lines not declassified]*

Dr. Ikke: But the reduced Soviet numbers in a START environment would in the longer term not include the large Soviet first-strike forces. Therefore, U.S. requirements would be different. Wouldn't they?

Dr. Rostow: Let me get back to the deployed launcher issue. Such a limit would in time block potential U.S. multiple aim-point systems, which could become much more feasible with a smaller missile force. It could also require a change of definition from SALT II in terms of U.S. M-X deployments. Also, we may want to move to more smaller weapons to provide for deterrence, especially if we eliminate MIRVs and eliminate first-strike systems. In sum, we feel the U.S. approach should include limitations on the number of warheads, especially ICBM warheads, and limitations on the measure of destructive power, such as throw weight.

Mr. Casey: I will limit my comments to the U.S. ability to monitor the specific units of account. Details are provided in the paper we have submitted.¹⁰ I believe the units of account should be decided on the basis of security requirements. The specific units of accounts have not been worked out yet. Once we have decided what they are, we will need to see how these affect Soviet capabilities and how these need to be limited. One needs to look at problems of refires, telemetry, concealment, etc.

Dr. Schneider: I am concerned about the emphasis in these options on warhead count. I know the concern on the Hill, from Senators who criticized SALT II, will not be met with a focus on warheads. I favor an emphasis on throw-weight limitations.

¹⁰ Not found.

The President: I agree that we should not have a negotiation position taking an approach linked to SALT. It's obvious that if we do, some will push us to ratify SALT II, which we think is lousy.

Isn't one of the problems with limiting warheads that we cannot easily verify their numbers? That is really an important issue.

Secretary Haig: The thing most difficult to verify would be throw weight, also accuracy.

Dr. Rostow: Ambassador Dobrynin and Premier Brezhnev (in his *Spiegel* interview)¹¹ agreed to go beyond national technical means of verification to other measures, in an appropriate START atmosphere.

The President: The land-based missiles are certainly the most important of all. Are they difficult to verify?

We have to reduce the first-strike sudden threat of the missiles. The bombers take 12 hours to arrive and are easier to spot. The submarines are not so accurate; and both the submarines and bombers can be attacked before they shoot their missiles. The ICBM is different. The greatest psychological factor has to be an emphasis on the land-based missiles and their special threat.

Ambassador Rowny: You are absolutely right. Those missiles are the most destabilizing weapons. SALT II allowed them to build and deploy more.

Dr. Rostow: That's right. They are the most destabilizing weapons.

Judge Clark: Secretary Haig, I believe you wanted to address some of the political aspects.

Secretary Haig: Your decision on the framework of our START position will probably be the most important of your Presidency.

In the past, we let the Soviets build up. McNamara constrained and froze our systems. Then the U.S. let the Soviets go beyond our numbers and never challenged them. Now the Soviets have caught up with us in technology, and they are ahead of us in throw weight.

It is important to remember that the START arms control does not occur in a vacuum. It is related to our overall defense policy, including especially, our strategic modernization program, especially the M-X. The Administration must move quickly, vis-a-vis the Hill, with an agreed deployment mode. This issue is intimately interrelated with START.

All agencies' proposals mark a clear departure from SALT II. All require substantial and asymmetrical Soviet reductions. The real question is whether we are going to have a real, credible, and plausible position. The JCS charts are most revealing. One of them shows that

¹¹ See footnote 4, Document 3.

the span of differences among the proposals are not so wide. What really matters is how plain and simple our proposal is. The greatest strength of the November 18 proposal was its simplicity.

I am not impressed by specific numbers, unless these are geared to our own defense requirements. That means we have to preserve the M-X at all cost.

On limiting throw weight, I am worried about verification. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We need a dramatic proposal to reverse the momentum over the peace movement and put you on the side of the Angels. We need to take a look higher than that of the IG at the issues. The IG's work so far has been superb. We have heard the IG Chairman, Rick Burt's, presentation. The remaining questions center on the units of measure and on ceilings. You can be proud of your IG.

Finally, I agree with Cap (Weinberger); you need to make your announcement on START before you go to Europe.

The President: It's too bad we cannot do in START what we did in INF, or what Ike (Eisenhower) proposed on all nuclear weapons. First, we need to restore the balance.

Judge Clark: By the May 3 NSC meeting,¹² we will need to work on these issues.

Secretary Weinberger: On the M-X, we had to make a decision involving interim basing. We wanted to get the M-X into existing silos, which was better than to leave them in warehouses. Congress rejected that. Now Congress wants us to decide on a defense basing mode and a permanent one by December 1. That's like asking NIH to come up with a cancer cure by December 1. Dense Pack looks promising for M-X, but we need to do further studies.

The President: How many Titan missile silos do we have (for M-X)?

Secretary Weinberger: There are 52 Titan silos. The Titans are an older generation system. Generally, the Soviets have deployed fifth generation missiles, with the sixth generation follow-on coming down the road, while we are in the fourth generation.

The President: What about those SS-16's? Are they in Kamchatka? I am concerned about our West Coast and Alaska.

Secretary Weinberger: They are very hideable.

Judge Clark: We will be meeting again the week of May 3.

The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

¹² See Documents 11 and 13.

9. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones), and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Rostow)**¹

Washington, April 23, 1982

SUBJECT

Preparations for START

In the wake of the National Security Council meeting of April 21, the President has directed the following analyses as a basis for reaching decisions on the United States negotiating position for the START negotiations.

The work of the START Interdepartmental Group has been extremely worthwhile and well done. This work should now be elevated to the Senior Interdepartmental Group co-chaired by the Departments of State and Defense, which should undertake analyses forthwith and produce a paper containing the following elements:

—Options for the Units of Account.

—Interim restraints to which we might subscribe without risk to our security interests.

—Other issues, e.g. refires, mobiles, ICBM sublimits, etc.

As an important basis for the SIG's analyses, the Department of Defense should forward to the SIG the results of an analysis of absolute weapons requirements essential to the support of the national strategy under alternative START outcomes.

The required paper should be forwarded by the SIG to the National Security Council not later than COB May 1, 1982. This paper will form the basis for an NSC discussion and for subsequent decisions on START during the week of May 3.

William P. Clark²

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00046 RWR 4/21/82 START. Top Secret.

² Clark signed the memorandum "William Clark" above his typed signature.

10. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 1, 1982

SUBJECT

START: The Global Political Context

The decisions you will make in the next few days on our position for strategic arms negotiations may be the most important defense and foreign policy steps of your Administration. Succeed or fail, the START negotiations will affect America's defenses into the next century. START will also profoundly influence our foreign relations, not just with the Soviets, but with all those nations who depend upon America's strength and wisdom for their security.

The preeminent criterion for selecting a position for START must be whether, if successfully negotiated, the resultant agreement would enhance our security. All the alternative positions which have been developed by the interagency group meet this criterion. They all involve significant reductions, particularly in the most dangerous and destabilizing systems, down to equal levels.

In selecting among these alternatives, we also need to consider the impact of each upon American public and Allied opinion, both when announced, and as negotiations progress. We need to secure firm Allied and public support for our arms control policies, not only to reinforce our START negotiating position, but also to ensure Congressional approval of our defense budget, and maintain support for the firm foreign policy line we have taken with the Soviet Union across the board.

In its approach to START the Soviet Union will seek to capitalize upon our unwillingness to ratify SALT II. The Soviets will be quick to note to Allied and American publics that their opening position in this negotiation, which will be SALT II or something close to it, has been accepted in its essentials by two successive American Administrations, and endorsed by every European leader from Helmut Schmidt to Margaret Thatcher. This must not deter us from putting forward a position very different and very much better than SALT II. We do need to ensure, however, that the alternative we propose is widely viewed not

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Subject File: Records, 1981–1985, Nuclear-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) (05/01/1982–05/07/1982). Secret.

just as more advantageous to the United States, but as a fair and reasonable basis for a better agreement.

Our Allies are looking forward to the opening of START negotiations as a demonstration that the United States is serious about arms control. They very much hope that we will come forward with a proposal which they can endorse at the June Summit. Their reaction to our START proposal will also in large measure depend upon their appreciation of its likely effect on the INF talks now under way in Geneva. Although START and INF are separate negotiations, they are linked technically and politically. If European leaders believe our START approach retards prospects for INF, they will render, at best, lukewarm public support, and are likely to undercut us in private. This will quickly play back into the American debate.

Following the European Summits, you will visit the UN Special Session in New York. Here too the reaction to our START proposal will strongly affect the quality of your reception, and the broader world response to US arms control policies.

Back home we face a situation where an increasing number of Americans are proving anxious to halt the growth in nuclear arms even by means of agreements they recognize to be inequitable, such as a freeze at current levels. If we are to reverse this trend, we will need to persuade the American people that a truly equitable agreement is also realistically attainable.

As we did before your November 18 speech,² we will want to move rapidly, once you have made your decisions on START to brief Allied leaders. This will help ensure a uniformly supportive reaction when our proposal becomes public, and before the predictable Soviet criticism can begin to take hold.

We will also want to consider selective Congressional briefings, once your decisions have been made. Again, this can help secure an early and, to the extent possible, bipartisan endorsement of our approach, when it becomes public.

To achieve and sustain such public and Allied support for our START proposals we will need to choose an approach which the public will find comprehensible, fair, and reasonable. We need a proposal which is sustainable, which will stand up to prolonged Soviet critique, and which will continue to receive public support even in the face of predictable Soviet counter-proposals. We will need, above all, to set objectives which the American and European peoples will find both attractive and attainable.

² See footnote 6, Document 8.

If we fail in this task, if we lose the support of our public and our Allies in this endeavor, then the Soviets will have won a major victory, whether we abandon our position or maintain it.

11. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 2, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting, Monday, May 3, 1982

Issue: What should be the basic elements of the US negotiating position on START?

FACTS/DISCUSSION: The IG has prepared a paper (Tab D)² forwarding agency views on: 1) the units to be limited; 2) Interim Restraints to be applied or sought during the negotiations; and 3) Other Issues.

The issues of Interim Restraints and Other Issues will need to be addressed in the weeks ahead before we begin negotiations. No decisions on these can or should be made prior to deciding the unit of account issue. The main issue and focus of today's meeting will be on what the basic units to be limited by a START agreement should be. Decisions will be incorporated in a draft NSDD.

All agencies are agreed that the START units of limitation should be radically different from the launcher focus of SALT. All are agreed that there should be a ceiling of 5,000 warheads (about a $\frac{1}{3}$ cut from today's US levels) with possible further reductions down the road. All are agreed that bombers should be treated differently from missiles, and that there should be an eventual ceiling of some 250 bombers on each side. All are agreed that there must be limits on throwweight as a vital component of military capability and as the category which most clearly gives the Soviet Union strategic advantages. There is disagreement on how throwweight should be limited, with some favoring

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00049, RWR 5/03/82 START. Top Secret. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "PRESIDENT HAS SEEN."

² Not attached.

direct limits (e.g., an overall ceiling), and others favoring indirect limits, as on ICBMs, warhead weight, etc. There is also disagreement on how the individual agency proposals meet your arms control criteria.

At Tab A is a chart³ summarizing the various agency approaches on the unit of limitations issues. At Tab B is a chart⁴ comparing the agency positions in terms of their impact on the throwweight limitations question.

A final issue, is what should be said in your May 9 speech about the US position and the initiation of START. The draft insert at Tab C,⁵ prepared by the START IG, appears to offer an appropriate approach.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated chart entitled "Agency Views on START Negotiation Position."

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated chart.

⁵ Attached but not printed is an undated draft paper entitled "President's May 9 speech—START Insert."

12. Memorandum From the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, May 3, 1982

False Arguments Against OSD Approach

1. Slippage in Negotiation.

Argument: Soviets are unlikely to accept 2 million kg throw-weight limit; if a compromise is reached at, say 3.5 million, US won't be able to reach Soviet throw-weight.

Answer: Slippage might be even more likely with *State's* approach: Soviets may not accept all the collateral constraints and insist on higher launcher number, as a result of which Soviet throw-weights could far exceed ours.

2. "Unverifiability" of Throw-weight.

Argument: There is a 20% uncertainty of throw-weight verification, which could cover the entire SS-18 force.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00049, RWR 5/03/82 START. Secret.

Answer: The uncertainty level in throw-weight might be even more pronounced with State's indirect approach if the complicated collateral constraints don't quite work as supposed to.

Also, OSD not opposed to a collateral verification constraint limiting launchers.

3. Throw-weight Better Approached Indirectly.

Argument: Direct approach offends Soviets, or is not comprehensible to public.

Answer: Soviets fully understand throw-weight and have recently indicated they expect us to propose throw-weight limits. Also, there has been a great deal of Congressional and expert debate, so that public will readily receive a clear explanation on the basis of the media reaction.

To aim *indirectly* at throw-weight restrictions will be *more* confusing to public; it will lack simplicity because of all the collateral constraints about "new types" of missiles that are prohibited, etc., and will seem rather disingenuous. (Are the Soviets supposed not to notice that they are being asked "indirectly" to cut back sharply on throw-weight?)

Fred C. Ikle²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

13. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 3, 1982, 9:45 a.m.

[State absent when President arrives]

Pres: tells stories . . . \$120 tickets—12,000 pennies

Judge Clark: units of account & insert to be discussed today—hold on verification—90% agreement . . . do we limit TW directly or indirectly—Bud McF will review charts²

Bud McFarlane: criteria = (1) carry out strategy (2) deep cuts (3) equality (4) easily understanding (5) satisfy allies (6) allow for stability—all agree (1) substantial difference from SALT II (2) 5000 warheads (3) focus on ICBM (4) treat bombers differently . . . ultimately 250 on each side (5) limit TW, but how ??—STATE & JCS . . . 5000 W/H → substantial cut in TW (down to 2–3 M kg)—easily understandable, deep reductions—cons w/WH = breakout (even w/only modest TW advantage) . . . penails . . . accuracy or yield advantage—cons w/TW = understandability . . . verifiability . . . Soviets alone called to reduce to 2M (we'd increase) . . . Soviets may also wish to limit bomber P/L

Adm Inman: cannot give certainty w/o onsite inspection, but can give high confidence—(reviews factors that allows high confidence)—moderate-to-high w/ mobile ICBMs, high w/ fixed, for W/Hs . . . (review other measures)

high = <10%
moderate = 25–50% } *confidence*

Judge Clark: roundtable discussion

Haig: (praise Bud's summary) . . . must focus on both military and political aspects . . . all agree on BM 5000 W/Hs (= ⅓ reduction from current levels—no more than half could be ICBM W/Hs—require Soviets to do 60% reduction in their best systems)—3 major problems w/TW: (1) TW above current levels . . . 1.3 to 2 . . . paper equivalence but real disparity (2) 65% cut for Soviets in TW . . . not credible (3) hard to verify TW . . . 1M kg uncertainty equivalent to 180 SS-18s—ceiling of 850 missiles is most significant guard against breakout—go beyond satellites for verification, *but* wait on decision *after* fix position

¹ Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, NSC00049 05/03/1982 [START]. Top Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. Brackets and ellipses are in the original. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the note is Appendix A. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at 10:52 a.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found.

² Not attached.

5000/2500

850/250

Weinberger: vital disagreement (passes out chart)³—if we just limit warheads, we’d play into hands of Kennedy & Hatfield—not the relevant measure, since yield is the real measure, and one gets at yield through TW—it can be easily understood—not relevant that Soviets wouldn’t like proposal . . . (analogy to) what Soviets are doing at INF now—verification uncertainties affect every proposal—*speech should be specific

Hayward: should I discuss certification *and* position? (A = . . . do both . . .)—T/W important, but JCS think we should get at it indirectly . . . combination of (2500 ICBM ? or 5000 BM) W/Hs & 850 missiles gets our big cut—if you take T/W as principal indicator, you’ll end up less . . . we’ll end up w/ imbalance in T/W, no matter what our position is

Rostow: important difference in principle remains—recommend in speeches you talk about # of warheads and their destructive capacity, w/o going into detail on how we measure that—we essentially agree w/OSD position . . . (refer to Chart) (slight confusion as people shuffle paper) . . . most fundamental objection to State/JCS position is that it would be profoundly destabilizing (fewer aimpoints would encourage larger warheads) . . . press in direction of smaller warheads, which would decrease attractiveness of 1st strike—Committee on the Present Danger’s experience was that people had strong views on reaching agreement, but did not understand details . . . that’s not the function of the American people—cites (—?) that Soviets prepared to negotiate on T/W—my former memo was that unless we restore . . . —START & INF are *not* the centerpiece of our foreign policy—Soviets will have no motivation to enter into agreement unless we convince⁴ course carries substantial risk—we haven’t solved the MX problem, established a strong mil presence SWA, etc.—we’re all recommending the same goal of equal deterrence

(Jean Kirkpatrick leaves)

Gen Rowny: are the goals understandable & can we negotiate?—my preference is that we set goals and then phase—are goals plausible? . . . set goals, then do the “possible” first—will they come down? . . . we’re giving up SLBMs later on . . . they fear D-5 . . . we give up something in long run, ask them to give up something in the short run

³ Not attached.

⁴ One line was cut off in the copy of this document in the file.

Judge Clark: evidence is in for your later decision—move to START insert for May 9th⁵

Weinberger: 3 quick points—U.S. cut vs. add to get to parity—Soviets did negotiate in INF where only they cut

Judge Clark: insert . . . comments?

Rostow: add consultation w/ Cong'l leaders (. . . to allies)

Weinberger: add onsite verification

Haig: disagree . . . not before we agree on what to verify

Rostow: save verification for later speech

Hayward: Chiefs don't have issue that onsite should be in or out of speech . . . more worried select choice where only onsite would work

Baker: are we checking on prior statements by Pres Reagan re: verification, etc.

Inman: sooner or later you'll have to decide what degree of confidence you want

Haig: you're faced w/sharply divergent views—campaign statement for longterm goal excellent (don't pose threat to one another)—add to that now that we'll proceed over time to that goal—taking 2500 warheads away will drive them to smaller missiles—put equal T/W forth at a *later* stage—capture essence of both positions but in a more realistic way—Soviets won't negotiate T/W

Weinberger: on phased approach, comment that comes to mind is that in long run all will be dead—Soviets will negotiate TW

Judge Clark: (cites Gelb article of yesterday . . . rendition of 16 Apr 16 mtg. *et al*)⁶—compulsion to give argument to press a mystery to me

Rostow: another mtg?

Clark: yes, on interim measures, after Pres. decides.

Pres: if W/Hs, do you not automatically achieve ↓ TW? (*Haig:* almost same—*Weinberger:* no—*Rostow:* no . . . *Haig:* require they do all, we do nothing—*Wein.:* INF . . . never get them to table)

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 11.

⁶ Reference is to Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Forging a New Concept For Curbing Strategic Arms," *New York Times*, May 2, 1982, p. 1.

14. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 3, 1982

SUBJECT

START—Follow-Up Actions

Following today's meeting, certain steps should be taken with all deliberate speed.

Frame a Presidential Decision Package. All the basic arguments are now in place. We should expect a flurry of follow-up memoranda from Agency heads to the President late today/early tomorrow. What we need most, certainly prior to the President addressing himself to the issue and deciding, is some short, but essential, amount of time for internal NSC staff reflection leading to the preparation of a Presidential recommendation/decision package.

Such a package should lay out the most basic arguments once more in their simplest form. It should also provide a short summary of the JCS assessment of military sufficiency, which was never briefed to the President, and does impact on some of the proposals.

Such a package could be available for your review and to support internal NSC staff discussion as appropriate by COB Tuesday.² It could then be made available to the President early Wednesday to support his decision on Wednesday or Thursday.

Until such a package has been developed, we should discourage situations or discussions that may precipitate premature Presidential action.

Recommend that you authorize the internal NSC staff preparation of such a recommendation/decision package.³

Speech Insert. Only one change needs to be made to the insert prepared for the May 9 speech⁴—the inclusion of a reference to consultation with Allies “and Congressional leaders.” This change should be made, and the speech insert released to the speechwriters.

At the same time, we must take steps to make the consultations come true. State should immediately be tasked to prepare a plan for

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00049, RWR 5/03/82 START. Top Secret. Sent for action.

² May 4.

³ McFarlane initialed approval on behalf of Clark.

⁴ See note 5, Document 11.

contacting Allies. The NSC staff should develop a similar plan for Congress. Both are needed for approval by May 5, if we are to have sufficient time to implement them prior to the speech.

Recommend that you approve the tasking necessary to accomplish the above.⁵

Loose Ends. At the “special SIG,” chaired by NSC staff on Saturday, General Rowny posed three questions for further study:

- (1) How do we explain the looser constraints on bombers?
- (2) What do we do with TLAM–N?
- (3) How do we explain our approach to ALCMs?

All agreed that these questions need attention, but action on them was deferred until after the NSC meeting. All other follow-up tasking leading to the NSC meeting (i.e., developing the charts that were used and redrafting the paper as necessary) was accomplished under NSC lead. State took the position that the SIG/IG work on the paper was complete when provided to the NSC on Thursday, and that it was now an NSC Staff paper. To ensure rapid and thorough treatment of the remaining three questions above, we should treat them as “loose ends” still under NSC control.

With your approval, we will call a Working Group-level meeting, chaired by NSC, on Wednesday⁶ to address these remaining three questions.

Recommend that you authorize us to proceed as outlined above.⁷

⁵ McFarlane initialed approval on behalf of Clark.

⁶ May 5.

⁷ McFarlane drew a curved line downward from the “approve” option, and wrote: “Task as part of NSDD RCM.” Linhard wrote to the right on McFarlane’s note: “All actions completed May 20 RL.”

15. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

START

Issue: What should be the basic units of account selected for the U.S. START negotiating position?

Discussion: After extensive preparation and two NSC meetings on this subject, the relevant arguments have been made. Additional time is unlikely to increase the clarity of the arguments, only their volume.

The attached paper summarizes the relevant material on this issue in a format that should support your decision making. Areas of agreement and disagreement are identified. Alternative views and options are provided, with a set of pros and cons for each. Four options are provided for your decision. A supporting alternative draft NSDD is provided for each (Tabs 1–4 corresponding to the options)² for your signature.

The paper recommends that you adopt an approach that *combines both the direct constraints on throw weight supported by OSD, ACDA, and Ambassador Rowny and the indirect constraints proposed by State and JCS in a phased approach to negotiations.*

The idea of approaching the negotiation in phases builds on the “compromise” proposal offered by Al Haig, but it changes some of the substance to enhance U.S. leverage in a second phase of negotiations and to better protect our slow-flying, second-strike systems.

Recommendation

OK NO

- | | | |
|-------|-------|---|
| _____ | _____ | 1. That you review the paper and select one of the options suggested. ³ |
| _____ | _____ | 2. That you sign the appropriate NSDD to record and implement your choice. ⁴ |

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—078, NSDD 33 [START Negotiations]. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer.

² Attached but not printed are the four alternative draft NSDDs.

³ An unknown hand initialed approval on Reagan's behalf.

⁴ An unknown hand indicated Reagan's preference for option 4. See Document 19.

Tab A**Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵**

Washington, undated

*START—THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT ISSUE**Areas of Agreement*

The US proposal should focus on the most threatening aspect of the nuclear equation, the growing instability of nuclear forces. It should address on a priority basis significant reductions in the most destabilizing elements of the nuclear balance, ballistic systems, and especially ICBMs.

The US proposal should include reductions on both the number of ballistic weapons and the overall destructive potential of ballistic systems.

The asymmetry in throw-weight between the US and the USSR must also be reduced, both to control/limit “breakout” potential and to avoid real or perceived “inequalities” in the resulting balance.

The US will continue to require the essential contribution of effective US strategic nuclear forces to meet our own legitimate security requirements and, given the advantage in non-nuclear forces enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its allies, to fulfill our commitments to allies and friends.

We will need relatively increased emphasis on an improved bomber leg of the TRIAD, which is clearly a second-strike capability and not destabilizing, to: (1) maintain a level of nuclear capability required for US security while (2) permitting significant reductions in destabilizing strategic nuclear systems. This explains the “looser” constraints proposed for bombers. It also provides an avenue for the Soviets to likewise meet their legitimate requirements for strategic nuclear capability and maintain their deterrent, but in a less destabilizing manner.

Specific Points of Agreement

The United States should call for a significant reduction (25–30%) in the number of ballistic missile warheads. The agreed goal for these START negotiations is a reduction to an equal level of 5,000 total ballistic warheads for each side. Further levels of reductions could be possible at some later time, but lower equal levels of ballistic warheads

⁵ Top Secret.

would clearly hinge on the overall strategic environment at that time and a reassessment of US security requirements in light of that environment.

The United States is prepared to accept equal limits on the total number of bombers permitted to both sides, provided that BACKFIRE is included. As progress is made on the issue of ballistic systems, the United States is prepared to accept reductions in the total equal number of bombers permitted to each side from current US levels (343 B-52 and 62 FB-111) to as few as 250 modern bombers.

Areas of Disagreement

The chief area of disagreement involves how best to contain throw-weight and the breakout potential it provides. Some (OSD, ACDA, and the Chief, US START Delegation) favor direct limits on throw-weight (with some technical differences about how those limits are applied). Others (State and JCS) favor capturing throw-weight by limits on the numbers of ballistic warheads and missiles. The positions are summarized and the Pros and Cons of each provided on the next page.

There is also disagreement on whether the US should call for a sublimit on the total number of ICBM warheads (set at 50% of the total limit, or 2,500). This is, to some extent, linked to the decision on the throw-weight issue. Most who oppose such a sublimit do so because they prefer a direct limit on throw-weight. They feel that if such a direct limit is used, the ICBM sublimit is unnecessary, cuts US flexibility, and adds complexity. This same group, however, also feels that if a direct limit on throw-weight is not applied, they would prefer the additional indirect constraint applied on Soviet throw-weight by the proposed ICBM sublimit.

Specific Points of Disagreement

View A—Apply a *direct constraint on throw-weight* calling for an equal limit of 2 Mkg of ballistic missile throw-weight on each side.

This is above current US levels [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and would be above the US ballistic throw-weight total in a force complying with the warhead limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]

PRO

- Clearly different from SALT II approach, less opportunity to slip into old, ineffective SALT patterns criticized by Administration and Congress.
- Directly attacks Soviet advantage in throw-weight.
- Simple, no complex network of ceilings and subceilings.
- Avoids tendency to trade-off systems for systems, thus creating “bargaining chips” out of systems like MX and D-5.

- Constraint on throw-weight indirectly constraints Soviet improvements in yield, accuracy, terminal guidance, penetration aids, maneuvering RVs, orbital trajectories, depressed trajectories, large missile footprints, etc.

- Keeps US flexibility and “freedom to mix” systems.
- Meets legislative and Congressional requirements.

CON

- More uncertainty in verification, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]—enough for 130 SS-18s.

- Not a mutual reduction; Soviets must do all cutting.
- Could cause Soviets to call for restriction on bomber payload which we could not accept.

- Would cause us in the near term to negotiate a level that the US would never reach.

- If negotiated, would provide for a legitimized Soviet advantage [*less than 1 line not declassified*] while permitting only cosmetic equality.

- Hard for public to understand.
- Could permit an increase in the number of smaller missiles.
- Given improvements in accuracy, some feel throw-weight is no longer a good indicator of strategic capability.

View B—Capture throw-weight by limits on the number of ballistic missiles and ballistic warheads.

Rough estimates are that limits on 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and 850 total missiles would reduce Soviet throw-weight to between 3.3 to near 2 Mkg.

PRO

- Easily understandable; most people think of missiles and weapons.

- Would represent a mutual reduction *vice* only a call for Soviet reductions, therefore be perceived as fairer.

- Would provide a substantial reduction in throw-weight.
- Would cut Soviet advantage in total number of missiles.
- Could be verified with high confidence, aid overall verification.

CON

- Too close to SALT II approach, would lead to a slip into the pattern of ineffective constraint developed in SALT.

- Moves US in the wrong direction by less effective limit on total throw-weight and pressure to reduce the number of US missiles—fewer aimpoints for Soviets to strike.

- Constrains US option to proliferate small missiles to solve ICBM vulnerability problem.

- More complex agreement, requires network of ceilings and subceilings.

- Will erode during negotiations as limits get higher, thus not imposing the intended indirect constraint on throw-weight.

- Doesn't consider all factors, not all missiles and warheads are alike.

- Will lead to trading specific systems, making "bargaining chips" out of needed systems like MX and D-5.

- Poor constraint on breakout since if large throw-weight missiles are retained, they can rapidly be armed with more weapons.

- Lets Soviets retain throw-weight and replace weapons with penetration aids and other devices to improve overall missile performance.

Options for Decision

Option 1—Direct constraint on throw-weight

- *Limit at 2 Mkg*—direct OSD and ACDA to work out their differences on specific approach.

- *ICBM Sublimit*—direct the Interdepartmental Group to reevaluate the need for sublimit in light of decision.

- *Data Base*—direct Interdepartmental Group to develop specific system data base provisions to permit adequate verification to support throw-weight limit.

PRO & CON: Already provided, on page 2.

IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 1.

Option 2—Use missile and weapon limits to capture throw-weight.

- *Limit total ballistic missiles to 850.*

- *Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.*

PRO & CON: Already provided, on page 3.

IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 2.

Option 3—Use both direct and indirect constraints. Do not use a phased approach.

- *Limit throw-weight directly at 2 Mkg.*

- *Limit total ballistic missiles to 850.*

- *Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.*

PRO:

- Adds flexibility in negotiations.

- Avoids identifying an interdepartmental "loser."

- Picks up advantages of both Options 1 and 2, while avoids most of the disadvantages of selecting one or the other.

- Builds consensus over selection of Options 1 or 2 (indications are that State and JCS could accept throw-weight add-on, and OSD would prefer this to a clear selection of Option 2).

CON:

- Adds complexity to initial position.

- Allows Soviets to gain negotiating leverage by trading elements of the direct throw-weight constraint for lower missile totals; could permit Soviets to erode commitment to direct throw-weight constraints over time.

- May simply defer interdepartmental disagreement until the Soviets react to the initial US position.

IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 3.

Option 4—Use both direct and indirect constraints, but use phased approach.

Phase I: (Focus clearly on ballistic missiles, as in INF.)

- *Limit ballistic missiles to 850.*

- *Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.*

- *Set internal US negotiating goal of ensuring a reduction of Soviet throw-weight in this phase to below 2.5 Mkg through these indirect limits. State this in NSDD but do not make this specific goal public nor directly negotiate it with Soviets.*

- *Set down the principle that we expect the limits on missile warheads and missile numbers to result, in effect, in a significant reduction in the total missile throw-weight available to either side as a result of Phase I, and that we intend to negotiate direct throw-weight limits at equal and further reduced levels during the second phase of negotiations.*

- *Explain to Soviets our intent to focus on ballistic systems during this phase. Agree to equal limits on bombers at roughly current levels, but defer reductions on slow flying systems (bombers, cruise missiles) to later phase. (This will ensure leverage to get at throw-weight later.)*

- *Declare our intent in the second phase of negotiations to seek: (1) further reductions in ballistic systems, (2) direct equal limits on throw-weight, and (3) reductions and further constraints on slow flying systems.*

- *Agree on effective verification procedures.*

Phase II: (Negotiations begin as soon as Phase I is complete.)

- *Seek equal, reduced limits on throw-weight.*

- *Accept reductions to equal ceilings on bombers at 250 on each side.*

- Security requirements permitting, *seek further reductions in ballistic missile warhead levels.*

- *Be prepared to discuss direct constraint on SLCM.*

PRO:

- Cuts initial complexity of negotiations.
- Keeps initial focus on ballistic systems.
- Consistent with INF approach, could permit combined negotiations.

- Avoids letting Soviets choose between US Option 1 and 2 approaches (by letting the Soviets emphasize what they choose in negotiations).

- Does not defer interdepartmental disagreement while providing the seeds for consensus.

- Changes from State “consensus” position both avoid the impression of simply selecting State solution and, in fact, improve basic State proposal by adding substantial leverage to US Phase II position.

- Provides a way to handle the SLCM issue—defer to Phase II.

- Gets throw-weight asymmetry down to closer levels before demanding equal limits.

CON:

- May never get to second Phase.

- Largely deferring bombers may cause Allies concern over the treatment of BACKFIRE—only initial constraint, little initial reductions.

IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 4.

Military Sufficiency

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to evaluate the various approaches to ensure that they provided the US the opportunity to develop and deploy sufficient military force, relative to that permitted to the Soviet Union, to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.

The JCS evaluation⁶ concludes that to fully execute the national strategy outlined in NSDD 13, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (which was recently revalidated in the NSSD 1–82 strategy review),⁷ a force composed of approximately 8,000 ballistic missile warheads and 350 modernized bombers (carrying an additional 7,000 weapons) will be

⁶ The paper, “JCS Assessment of Unit of Account,” dated May 1, is in National Security Council, Box SR—101, NSC 00046 RWR 4/21/82 START.

⁷ NSSD 1–82, February 5, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

necessary to achieve the degree of deterrence associated with even moderate confidence damage goals. Additionally, *this force must be fully modernized* to include MX and the TRIDENT II D-5 ballistic missiles and a modernized bomber force capable of employing Air-Launched Cruise Missiles.

The JCS further concludes that “therefore, *negotiated outcomes at lower levels of ballistic missile warheads would involve a degree of risk, even with the corresponding reductions in Soviet systems.*”

Having provided this assessment, the JCS did, however, support a proposal of reductions of ballistic missile warheads to the 5,000 level, and an ultimate reduction of bomber forces to an equal 250 bomber ceiling (providing an additional 5,000 weapons).

The NSC Staff draws the following conclusions from the above:

- While there is some risk involved in proposing reductions in ballistic missile warheads to the 5,000 level, the risks are acceptable, if in an environment of mutual constraint. While further reductions may be possible at some future time, we should not stress this point without adding the *caveat*, “providing our security requirements and world conditions permit.”

- Modernization of a smaller US total force is absolutely essential. The early deployment of the MX (late FY 86/early FY 87) *must* be maintained. B-1B, Advanced Technology Bomber, ALCM and TRIDENT II D-5 are all critical to assuring that the reductions proposed can be made within acceptable bounds of risk.

- As we attempt to reduce destabilizing ballistic systems, especially ICBMs, the contribution of the bomber force and planned ALCM deployments will become much more important. As a result:

- We must avoid grouping these clearly second-strike systems into aggregate limits with ballistic systems, and must continue to stress the critical differences between slow flying and ballistic systems.

- We must not be pressured to make corresponding reductions in slow flying systems to match the reductions made in ballistic missiles and missile warheads.

- Direct limits on total bomber weapons or payload, or constraints on the planned ALCM program must be avoided.

- For the foreseeable future, an equal limit of 250 bombers must be regarded as the *lowest* long-term bomber force acceptable to the United States.

Discussion

Based upon all of the above considerations, Option 4, which combines direct and indirect limits on throw-weight in a phased approach to negotiations, appears to be the best available approach for the United States.

- This phased approach, which largely defers discussion of slow flying systems, allows us to establish the distinction between second-strike systems and those more destabilizing ballistic systems which should be of primary concern. It protects the US bomber force. It keeps discussion focused on the area of primary concern.

- The approach provides an easily understandable rationale for largely deferring the discussion of slow flying systems. It protects us from Soviet charges that all we want to do is force reductions in their area of strength, ICBMs.

- It provides that since both direct limits on throw-weight and treatment of reductions of slow flying systems (to include constraints on SLBM) are to be addressed in Phase II, the Soviets have an incentive to move into Phase II and negotiate in good faith.

- It exactly parallels our approach in the INF negotiations, where discussion of aircraft is also deferred. This will provide us the option of combining START and INF talks, should this be in our interest, without undercutting our own positions in either arena.

Recommendations

(1) That you choose Option 4.

- Combines both direct and indirect constraints on throw-weight.

- Approaches negotiations in phases.

- Largely defers discussion of slow flying systems to second Phase.⁸

(2) That you sign the NSDD provided at Tab 4 to record and implement your choice.⁹

Attachments

Tab 1 Draft NSDD supporting a choice of *Option 1*, direct limits on throw-weight.

Tab 2 Draft NSDD supporting a choice of *Option 2*, indirect limits on throw-weight by limiting numbers of missiles and missile warheads.

Tab 3 Draft NSDD supporting a choice of *Option 3*, combining direct and indirect limits on throw-weight.

Tab 4 Draft NSDD supporting a choice of *Option 4*, combining direct and indirect limits on throw-weight in a phased approach to negotiations.

⁸ Reagan did not indicate his preference.

⁹ Reagan did not indicate his preference.

16. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, May 7, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to address a question of critical importance to our two countries and to the world—negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war and the burden of nuclear armaments. It is entirely appropriate that this question has been one of the central issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship throughout the post-war period. Indeed, the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons imposes on our two countries both the practical necessity and the moral imperative to do everything in our power to reduce and even eliminate the possibility of their use in war. This has been the thrust of my country's approach to nuclear arms control negotiations over the past thirty-five years.

As we look back over almost three decades of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear arms control, we can identify a number of notable achievements, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the ABM Treaty. These agreements have laid the basis for new efforts in the nuclear arms control process. We can take considerable inspiration from the statesmanship of leaders in both countries, which made these agreements possible. At the same time, we must also recognize that certain international events, such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, have undermined prospects for reductions of nuclear arms.

We now stand at another historic juncture in the effort to reduce the threat of nuclear war and the burden of nuclear armaments. One of the highest priorities of my Administration has been to undertake a thorough review of these issues in order to ensure that our approach to the problem of strategic arms reductions is fair, equitable, and understandable to the American people. We have proceeded deliberately to avoid the mistakes of the past. We are now prepared to move forward. Therefore, I propose that U.S.-Soviet negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms begin in Geneva by the end of June, and that we immediately begin exchanges in diplomatic channels to fix an exact date.

Our objective in the negotiations will be substantially to reduce the numbers and destructive potential of strategic nuclear weapons, in the framework of equal and verifiable limitations on both sides. As

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State Files, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290289, 8290342). Secret. The letter is also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 166.

you know, it is my view that our previous efforts at limiting strategic offensive arms did not adequately meet the standards of reductions, equality, and verifiability. I am particularly concerned by the failure of previous agreements sufficiently to limit the deployment of those systems that, because of their capability to destroy the other side's land-based systems, heighten the risk of nuclear war. An important task in START must be to address more effectively the problem of these destabilizing systems.

In pointing out these deficiencies, I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing positive that can be learned from previous SALT agreements. It does mean, however, that we must go well beyond those efforts in START. If we set our sights too low, we will fail to make a meaningful contribution to the goals of enhancing strategic stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war. In such circumstances, it will be difficult to obtain the support of the American people and Congress for a new strategic arms agreement. We owe it to both our peoples, and to the World at large, to do better.

I believe that the goals set forth above provide a positive and constructive basis for progress in the forthcoming negotiations. At the same time, the lessons of the past teach us that the arms control process cannot be insulated from the overall state of relations between our two countries and the international atmosphere in general. This is a reality of political life.

Our two countries have begun a dialogue on a number of sensitive regional problems. What is now needed, if we are to move toward resolution of these problems, is concrete action on the part of the Soviet Union indicating that it is prepared to exercise restraint. Only in this way can an environment conducive to progress on strategic arms reductions be created and sustained.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that my Administration has no higher priority than reducing the threat of war. I will personally spare no effort to achieve this objective, and I hope that I can count on a similar personal commitment from you. Nothing less will meet the obligations imposed upon us by the responsibilities of leadership in the nuclear age.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

17. Editorial Note

On May 9, 1982, President Ronald Reagan delivered the commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College. "Since the first days of my administration," the president said, "we've been working on our approach to the crucial issue of strategic arms and the control and negotiations for control of those arms with the Soviet Union. The study and analysis required has been complex and difficult. It had to be undertaken deliberately, thoroughly, and correctly. We've laid a solid basis for these negotiations. We're consulting with congressional leaders and with our allies, and we are now ready to proceed." These negotiations would be the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, volume 2, page 584)

"At the first phase, or the end of the first phase of START," President Reagan elaborated, "I expect ballistic missile warheads, the most serious threat we face, to be reduced to equal levels, equal ceiling, at least a third below the current levels. To enhance stability, I would ask that no more than half of those warheads be land-based. I hope that these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in missiles themselves, could be achieved as rapidly as possible. In a second phase, we'll seek to achieve an equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic nuclear forces, including limits on the ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current American levels. In both phases, we shall insist on verification procedures to ensure compliance with the agreement." (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, volume 2, page 585)

"I have written to President Brezhnev and directed Secretary Haig to approach the Soviet Government concerning the initiation of formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, START, at the earlier opportunity," Reagan went on to say. "We hope negotiations will begin by the end of June." (*Ibid.*)

18. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 11, 1982

SUBJECT

Secretary's Appearance Before the SFRC on Arms Control, 11 May 1982

—Senator Percy opened the hearing by highlighting the historic nature of the arms control discussions before the SFRC in the past weeks. He commented at length on his own role in urging an early resumption of arms control discussions and commented most favorably on the President's Eureka College speech of Sunday May 9.²

—Speaking for the minority, Senator Pell greeted the President's May 9 speech with mild enthusiasm, and he commended the nuclear freeze movement which he believed led the Administration to open START talks. Pell noted that the American people are frightened and that while the May 9 proposals go part of the way, he believes it is necessary to impose an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and to publicly announce observance of SALT II pending a new agreement. Senator Pell was also highly laudatory of the Secretary's efforts in the Falkland crisis.

—The Secretary began his opening statement at 9:44 and finished at 9:57. His reading was somewhat listless, but the statement itself was rather listless.

—Percy's questions related to the question of verification and how we might adequately insure Soviet compliance with a START agreement. The Secretary replied that the United States would probably need to go beyond purely national technical means. Percy was also quite vocal in his support of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). He stated that for 16 months he has been asking for the Administration position on these two treaties and has as yet received no reply. The Senator believes that the signing of TTBT and PNET would add to the means by which we might verify Soviet compliance with a START agreement. The Secretary replied that these two treaties were broader than simple bilateral treaties between the US and the Soviets and for that reason a number of other factors needed to be considered.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Haig Papers, Day File, Box CL 77, May 11, 1982. No classification marking. Drafted by Schuette. Haig's opening statement is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 44–45.

² See Document 17.

—Senator Pell was most interested in the links between Phase 1 of the new nine proposals and Phase 2;³ i.e. is an agreement on launchers and missiles a prerequisite for a subsequent agreement on throw weight? The Secretary noted that the two were linked and that he hoped to proceed toward a Phase 1 agreement with some degree of alacrity, which would then serve as the basis for a Phase 2 agreement. Pell also asked about adherence to SALT II and went so far as to suggest that it be resubmitted for ratification. The Secretary said that frankly SALT II was dead and we had told the Soviets this on many occasions. It therefore made little sense to reintroduce it. As far as adherence to SALT II limits was concerned, to the best of our knowledge the Soviets have adhered.

—Senator Hayakawa asked if we were adequately communicating to the Soviets the desires of the American people for peace, stability and harmony. The Secretary replied by noting that we are in a competitive relationship and that our values clash rather sharply with those of the Soviets. He thought that it would be a great delusion that by merely improving the atmospherics we could improve this underlying competition. In this sense the Secretary noted detente in itself was an illusion. On the other hand, an accurate realization of the nature and depth of the competitive relationship does not mean that we cannot speak with and deal with the Soviets on an equal basis.

—Senator Biden joined Senator Pell in his praise for the Secretary's efforts on the Falklands. He noted that he very often disagreed with the Secretary but that he was proud of his contribution in the current situation. Biden then began a fairly lengthy refutation of the Secretary's statements about SALT II. He used the eight points cited in the opening statement to show that in his opinion SALT II was a good arms control agreement. He challenged the Secretary to use his own eight points to counter this argument. The Secretary in his reply chose to focus on Point 3, i.e. "A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of US strategic forces." The Secretary explained that a major flaw in SALT II was the fact that it allowed the Soviets to retain a significant hard-target kill capability and that it offered dangerous break-out potential upon its expiration in 1985 had it been ratified.

—Senator Lugar was interested in the timing of the Administration's announcement on START, particularly its relationship to Poland. The Secretary noted that owing to the tremendous stakes involved arms control was something of a "special category" in relation to linkage, but that it is impossible to completely divorce arms control prospects from Soviet global behavior.

³ For the nine elements of Phase 1 and four elements of Phase 2, see Document 19.

—Senator Glenn was concerned with the Secretary's statement that SALT II is now dead and that the Soviets had been so informed. The Secretary noted that no formal announcement had been required, but that we had repeatedly told the Soviets over the past 16 months that SALT II could not pass the US Senate and that this Administration would not reintroduce it. Senator Glenn then raised the issue of Phase 2 limitations and how Phase 1 limitations would affect throw weight. He seemed concerned that the Soviets could retain a substantial throw-weight advantage under Phase 1 provisions which applied only to numerical limits. The Secretary responded by saying that there was an indirect relationship between numerical limits on launchers and warheads and throw weight. He then attempted to explain to Senator Glenn how this relationship would come to pass, but was unable to persuade the Senator. The Secretary noted that in a closed format the Senator would be assured that significant reductions in throw weight would occur when numerical limits were applied. (FYI: The Secretary offered to have Rick Burt brief Senator Glenn and any others who chose on the technical details of our proposal, but it was fairly clear that Senator Glenn with a bit of help from Senator Percy expects the Secretary to offer this briefing himself.)

—Senator Mathias was primarily concerned with the issue of verification, and the Secretary again noted that we would probably have to go beyond purely national technical means. Mathias also raised the question of the focus of Phase 1 on ICBMs. The Secretary said that this was the case because the Soviet land-based ICBM force was the most destabilizing element in the current balance and therefore must be the first priority on any START agreement. The Secretary cautioned, however, that the opening of START talks must not in any way detract from support for the President's defense modernization program.

—Senator Sarbanes discussed the relative merits of SALT II vis-a-vis START, and pressed the Secretary on the President's statements on Soviet superiority. The Secretary said that it is unanimously agreed in all Executive Branch agencies that the US is in an increasingly disadvantageous position in a number of key areas in the strategic balance. The Secretary also added that he saw three major flaws with SALT II: 1) Its reliance upon Soviet-supplied telemetry information as a means of verification; 2) its provisions to allow growth of the destabilizing land-based ICBM force; and 3) termination break-out potential when the treaty would have expired in 1985.

—Senator Helms appeared briefly to raise the issue of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. He pressed the Secretary on the question several times, and the Secretary said that he was willing to rest on the intelligence community's assessment that no such weapons existed, in so far as one can rest at all on an intelligence community assessment.

The Senator also asked if the British task force near the Falkland Islands was armed with nuclear weapons. The Secretary explained that he did not know the answer to this and would not give it in this forum if he knew it. Helms hence suggested moving into executive session, but was refused by Senator Percy, at which time Helms left.

—Senator Tsongas was primarily interested in the intramural politics behind the START proposal, noting that Team A, Burt, Haig and the Joint Chiefs had won out over Team B, Perle, Rostow and Weinberger. Tsongas wondered if we might now see attempts to sabotage the agreement by the defeated Team B. Tsongas was also interested in the effects of Brezhnev's expected passing on the negotiations.⁴ The Secretary brushed off the questions about intramural disputes, and regarding Brezhnev noted that we must be prepared to deal with whatever Soviet leadership is in power.

—Senator Kassebaum urged rapid action on Phase 1 of START, since it had taken 16 months for us to get this far.

—Senator Dodd posed some technical questions about force level measurements and our future ability to monitor compliance with a throw-weight agreement.

—Senator Specter, a guest of the Committee, raised some closing questions about his resolution calling for an early Reagan-Brezhnev summit. (FYI: This resolution is tacked on as an amendment to the DOD authorization bill, a fact which appears to upset Percy and other members of the SFRC.) The Secretary noted the noble sentiments behind Specter's proposal, but said that he generally prefers to be without such resolutions. The Secretary felt that the President would have a summit with Brezhnev as soon as it was feasible and worthwhile to do so, and that Congressional resolutions urging a more rapid approach could send the wrong signals to the Soviets.

Summary

This opening hearing on the May 9 START proposals was largely non-contentious, though it is clear that a great deal of explanatory work needs to be done. The Secretary acquitted himself admirably and seemed confident of and comfortable with the broad structure of our new START policy, though understandably not yet fluent in detail. Attached to this memorandum are notes which identify more specifically those problem areas which will need to be dealt with in our START explanatory efforts.

Keith Schuette⁵

⁴ Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982.

⁵ Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.

Attachment

Memorandum for the Record⁶

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Secretary's Testimony Before the SFRC 5-11-82

This morning's SFRC testimony was most useful in identifying some of the "soft spots" in the new START proposals in terms of public affairs strategy. Given that we are working from an entirely new arms control framework such soft spots are expected and understandable.

The topics/observations below, drawn from today's testimony, are suggested areas for early public affairs attention:

A) *Verification:*

A number of influential Senators took refuge behind the verification problems associated with SALT II when it was presented during the previous administration. It seemed obvious today that verification is still an important issue, and that it could again serve as a focal point for the opposition.

B) *Linkage: Phases I and II:*

Understandably so, the relationship between Phases I and II is currently vague. As the administration position emerges in more detail this linkage will attract more attention, i.e. is Phase I a necessary/automatic prerequisite for Phase II? Are Phases I and II continuous? distinct?

C) *SALT II:*

Much mention was made today of SALT II—are we adhering? Will we continue to abide by its provisions? The most important question raised however was "What is wrong with SALT II?" Some eloquence and detail need to be added to the discussion of SALT II's shortcomings.

D) *Throw Weight:*

As with Senator Glenn this morning, some observers will question the effect of numerical limits on launchers and warheads on overall throw weight. The Secretary promised a classified explanation to Senator Glenn but an unclassified version would be worthwhile.

Keith Schuette

⁶ Confidential. Drafted by Schuette.

19. National Security Decision Directive 33¹

Washington, May 14, 1982

U.S. Approach to START Negotiations

The main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance. This is due to the increasing destructive potential and numbers of warheads delivered by the most inherently destabilizing Soviet systems, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs. The clear and primary focus of U.S. efforts should be to achieve a significant reduction in these systems, the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential.

At the same time, the U.S. will continue to require the essential contribution made by effective strategic nuclear forces to deter conflict and to meet our own legitimate security requirements. In addition, given the advantage in non-nuclear forces enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its allies, U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be required to fulfill our commitments to our Allies and friends.

The U.S. Goal in Negotiations

Therefore, the goal the United States sets for itself in strategic arms negotiations is to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, while maintaining an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, underwrite our national security, and meet our commitments to Allies and friends.

The U.S. Approach

To achieve this goal, the U.S. approach will emphasize the basic difference between slow-flying, clearly second-strike systems, and the more destabilizing ballistic missiles. The U.S. proposal will include significant reductions in the number of ballistic missiles, the number of warheads carried on these missiles, and their overall destructive

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-078, NSDD 33 [START NEGOTIATIONS]. Top Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Jones, Rostow, and Rowny, under cover of a May 25 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-33). In view of the special sensitive of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-33 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

potential. It will use both direct and indirect means to reduce, and then eliminate, the Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw-weight.

At the same time, the U.S. will propose separate constraints on slow-flying systems. The differences in treatment of bombers and cruise missiles will provide us a means of maintaining sufficient nuclear force to meet U.S. security requirements, even while significantly reducing our ballistic missile capability. It should also encourage the Soviet Union to turn to less destabilizing systems to meet its deterrent requirements.

The United States will propose a phased approach to the START negotiations. During the first phase, as in the INF negotiations, we will focus on the most threatening systems, in this case ballistic missiles.

Elements of the U.S. position during Phase I will include:

- Limit ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 for each side.
- Limit ICBM warheads to one-half the overall warhead total.
- Limit total deployed ballistic missiles to 850 for each side.

—Establish an *internal* U.S. negotiating goal of ensuring a reduction of Soviet throw-weight as a result of Phase I to below 2.5 Mkg, using indirect limits. Hold this goal as sensitive information on a strict need-to-know basis and not for public release.

—Direct throw-weight limits will not be demanded of the Soviets during the first phase. However, we will clearly lay down the principle with the Soviets that we expect the limits on missiles and missile warheads to result, in effect, in a significant reduction in the total missile throw weight to either side as a result of Phase I. Building on this, we intend to negotiate direct limits on throw-weight at equal and further reduced levels as a major portion of the second phase of negotiations.

—Explain our intent to focus on ballistic systems during the first phase. Stress the basic difference between ballistic systems and slow-flying, clearly second-strike systems.

—Agree to equal limits on bombers at roughly current levels with BACKFIRE included, but defer further reductions or discussion of constraints on slow-flying systems (i.e., bombers and cruise missiles) until the second phase.

—Declare our intent to seek in the second phase: (1) direct reductions in throw weight to equal levels; (2) further reductions in missiles, and missile warhead levels if conditions permit; and reductions and other constraints on slow-flying systems.

—Assure effective verification procedures for the above.

Elements of the U.S. position in Phase II, which should begin as soon as possible after completion of Phase I, include:

—Direct limits and reductions to equal levels of ballistic missile throw weight below current U.S. levels.

—Reductions to equal levels of bomber forces with a goal of 250 total bombers on each side.

—Discussion of further reductions in missiles and missile warhead levels, security requirements permitting.

—Discussion of other constraints on slow-flying systems.

Additional Study Required

The START Interdepartmental Group will prepare recommendations on interim restraint measures and other elements of the U.S. approach needed to complement the decisions reached on the basic proposal. These will be provided for NSC review not later than May 18, 1982.

Ronald Reagan

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START—May 21, 1982

Issue: What should be the U.S. position on additional issues related to our START position?

Facts: The purpose of the May 21 NSC meeting is to address issues not covered in the units of account decisions contained in NSDD-33.²

Discussion:

NSDD-33 directed the Interdepartmental Group (IG) to provide its recommendations on interim restraints and other elements of the U.S. START approach for NSC review by May 18.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

² See Document 19.

The IG has now provided papers on: (1) interim restraints; (2) the treatment of mobile ICBMs; and (3) a collection of related topics upon which we have interdepartmental consensus. In addition, there is some confusion about the relationship of the phases of our approach to each other. This topic, for which there is no IG paper, needs immediate discussion. Additional work on certain other critical issues is not complete and must be clearly tasked for early IG completion.

We recommend the agenda below for the NSC meeting. For each item on the agenda, we have provided for your review both my intended talking points and the material generated by the IG to address the subject. We have not suggested any specific talking points for your use at this NSC meeting.

Proposed Agenda:

- Interim Restraints (Tab A)
- Issues Upon Which Interdepartmental Consensus Exists (Tab B)
- Treatment of Mobile ICBMs (Tab C)
- Necessary Additional Work (Tab D)
- Relationship of the “Phases” of Negotiation to Each Other (Tab E)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—INTERIM RESTRAINTS

Issue: What should be the US position with respect to “interim restraints” proposed while negotiations begin?

Facts:—US policy has been that while the US review of arms control policy continued, the US would take no action to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised similar restraint.

—The ambiguity of this policy as to what constitutes undercutting existing agreements was intentional.

Discussion: There are three options offered in the attached paper:

1. Continue the policy of not “undercutting existing agreements.”

³ Secret.

2. Add to the “no undercut” policy a “cap” on the number of ballistic missile warheads at the total number currently deployed by either side.

3. Change policy to one of respecting those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President’s program of strategic force modernization.

—The attached Interdepartmental Group-developed paper adequately frames the issue.

Suggested Talking Points

—Unquestionably we need to have a position on interim restraints included in our START proposal, and we need to identify that position as quickly as possible.

—Without it we remain vulnerable to criticism from those who advocate a nuclear freeze and to those supporting ratification of SALT II.

—Three alternatives have been suggested.

—Some, notably State, advocate that we continue the policy of not undercutting existing agreements as long as the Soviets show similar restraint.

—The main arguments against this are that some feel that such a policy does not sufficiently distance us from SALT and makes it difficult to support not ratifying SALT II.

—In addition, some argue that the ambiguity of this policy with respect to what is meant by the phrase “not undercut” will lead many to interpret it as complying with agreements and will cause us difficulty when we move to deploy MX.

Option 2

—The JCS have suggested that there may be military merit in proposing that we “cap” the number of ballistic missile warheads at the total number currently deployed by either side.

—The main arguments against this are that it would appear to be a freeze, which we reject, that it could lead to an unacceptable Soviet counter-proposal (i.e., including bomber weapons) and to an ensuing distracting negotiation on what should be capped; it would be difficult to verify, and it would be inconsistent with our approach in INF (i.e., sounds too much like the Soviet moratorium proposal).

—These arguments have been compelling enough to move the JCS to support Option 1. No agency supports Option 2.

Option 3

—Others, notably Defense, suggest that we distance ourselves from SALT II by arguing that it conflicts with the President’s moderni-

zation program, a program necessary to achieve the US goal of enhanced strategic stability. They advocate a policy that the US will continue to respect those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President's modernization program which is essential to protecting the US deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms reductions.

—The main argument against this is that while it does explicitly permit the US to proceed with planned modernizations, it opens the door to the Soviets to do likewise—and therefore it may make us vulnerable to the criticism of having no real policy for interim restraint.

—The various positions and arguments are provided in much more detail in the paper submitted by the Interdepartmental Group.

—Given our full agenda for today, perhaps we could simply hear briefly any additional views or arguments not captured in that paper at this time.

—Al Haig, would you like to begin?

Contingency Point If No Consensus Develops (as is likely)

—The main objections that remain for continuing the policy of not undercutting existing agreements remain that (1) it doesn't sufficiently explain why we simply don't ratify SALT II, and (2) that it may cause us problems when we take action to deploy MX.

—Would an alternative formulation of the no-undercut policy along these lines help us overcome these difficulties?

[Pass out copies of the attached formulation prepared by NSC staff.]

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG⁴

Washington, undated

BACKGROUND

It has been U.S. policy during the Reagan Administration to take no action that would undercut existing SALT agreements pending the completion of our START policy review provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint. With our policy review nearly completed, we must now decide what kind of interim restraints would best serve our interests after START negotiations begin. There will be substantial interest

⁴ Secret.

in some form of interim restraint from the Congress, our Allies, and the public as we proceed with START negotiations. A decision on interim restraints must be consistent with our position on units of account and therefore has been delayed until now.

IMPACT OF CURRENT POLICY

Under SALT I Interim Agreement (IA) restraints, both sides would be required to dismantle submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers; the U.S. would dismantle retired Polaris launchers while the Soviets would dismantle deployed submarine launchers.

To comply with SALT II provisions, the Soviets are observing its limit of 820 multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the 30 per year production restriction on the Backfire bomber. Without this restraint, the Soviets could deploy over 160 additional MIRVed ICBMs by 1985.

SALT II limitations affect U.S. programs in the following ways:

- the planned U.S. MIRVed missile deployments would put the U.S. over the combined MIRV limits of 1200 and 1320 before the end of 1985;

- those MX basing mode alternatives that would build new fixed launchers would violate the SALT II (and IA) ban on such construction. We have made no basing decisions, however, and any impact would be several years away.

INTERIM RESTRAINT OPTIONS

There is general agreement that this Administration should adopt some form of interim restraint. This is especially important if we are to avoid new pressures for ratifying SALT II, which would surely cause a contentious and ultimately harmful debate. There are two broad approaches available:

- 1) *Continuation of our current policy* ("Not undercut existing agreements"): This would continue the current restraints on Soviet and U.S. forces if the Soviets continue to adhere to the same constraints. For two to three years there would be only modest impact on U.S. strategic plans. The impact on Soviet strategic forces, as indicated above, would be more significant: the Intelligence Community believes they would deploy MIRVed ICBMs well beyond the constraints of SALT II. The limitations of the SALT II Protocol would have applied only through the end of 1981 and thus would not be a part of this policy. The SALT I IA restraints would require both sides to continue dismantling old missile firing submarines as new ones were deployed; a SALT II restraint alone would not. Continuing our present policy would, however, permit substantial warhead growth on both sides.

It is the view of the agencies that support Option 1 that it represents the most effective means of avoiding a prolonged and divisive debate

over the future status of the SALT II treaty. There are a number of valid reasons why we do not wish to ratify or renegotiate SALT II, including its unequal treatment of heavy ICBMs, its failure to capture Backfire, and its deficiencies with respect to verification. None of these major problems can be addressed in the context of an interim restraint regime without opening a new negotiation with the Soviets—which would inevitably divert us from the priority task of strategic arms reductions to which the President has committed his Administration.

On the other hand, to reject any form of interim restraint—or to declare a policy to which the Soviets would not adhere—would free the USSR to take steps, such as the deployment of additional MIRVed ICBMs, which the Intelligence Community considers likely, and which we could not match in the short term. The intentional ambiguity in our current policy—which does not assert that we will “adhere to” existing agreements—provides flexibility to continue our own strategic force modernization while both inhibiting possible Soviet moves and most effectively defusing the SALT II issue politically.

An option which seeks to pick and choose among existing particular SALT provisions would in effect leave the Soviets unconstrained and thus would heighten debate in the U.S. and Europe over the wisdom of not ratifying SALT II. In addition, this approach would suggest that the Administration’s opposition to SALT II stems primarily from the concern that the treaty would inhibit MX basing options—which is not the case. *In so narrowing the basis for our opposition to SALT II, the approach would undercut our ability to make our case against ratification, while at the same time stimulating increased opposition to the eventual MX basing scheme.*

2) *A new but temporary restraint that would supplement our current policy.* The U.S. could initiate START negotiations with a public proposal not to increase the total number of ballistic missile warheads beyond the number currently deployed by either side, provided the Soviet Union exercised the same restraint. This proposal to “cap” ballistic missile warheads could allow the Administration to capture the political initiative, respond to the groundswell of demand for real arms control, and allow us to distance ourselves from SALT II.

Under such a missile warhead cap, modernization within existing ballistic missile warhead numbers would be permitted. We would continue to deploy new SLBMs on Trident submarines; and after 1986, MX would begin to be deployed. Without a cap, these deployments would be a net addition to currently deployed systems; but under a missile warhead “cap”, old systems would be replaced with more survivable new systems.

The Soviets would, however, be unlikely to accept such a proposal; in all probability they would reject it as inequitable or make a counter-

proposal which could, for example, include a cap on bomber weapons. In addition, this could require extensive negotiations which would distract from the principal negotiating effort.

3) *A new policy that expresses U.S. determination to achieve strategic stability by a combination of modernization and arms control, and that distances the Administration from acceptance of SALT I and II.* OSD has provided the following rationale:

This policy would be stated as follows: In order to enhance strategic stability the United States will modernize its strategic forces while negotiating for substantial reductions. It will continue to respect those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President's program of strategic force modernization which is essential to protecting the U.S. deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms reductions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that the proposal of some other agencies to extend the policy adopted during the Administration's review of START policy runs a significant risk of committing us to abide by SALT I and II for the indefinite future. This would leave the administration vulnerable to the charge that despite the argument that it is seriously flawed, it had tacitly accepted SALT II after all.

In the event a START treaty has not been concluded by 1984, critics will argue that the stubborn refusal to ratify SALT II has doomed the prospects for an arms limitation treaty, stimulated a world wide anti-nuclear movement affecting the U.S. and its allies, and yielded the arms-control initiative to the Soviet Union.

The argument that, "Since we are abiding by SALT II, why not ratify it and cause the Soviets to make the 10% reduction the treaty requires?" has broad (and growing) appeal to which we will lack a simple but persuasive answer unless we clearly establish the basis on which we continue to oppose the SALT II treaty.

OSD believes that there is a simple, coherent basis upon which to distance the Administration from SALT II: it may conflict with the President's modernization program. The most important example is the deployment of a survivable MX missile. If it entails the construction of new, fixed ICBM launchers, as "Dense Pack" may well, deployment of the MX would almost certainly violate SALT II.

Once the Administration has adopted a post-review policy of adhering to SALT II there will be no turning-point opportunity to alter that policy. The initiation of START may well be the last logical opportunity to establish a policy we can sustain through 1984.

A policy of adherence to SALT II so long as the Soviets show "similar restraint" has the additional unfortunate connotation that current Soviet behavior does in fact exhibit "restraint." The fact is that the Soviet strategic build-up continues relentlessly. We ought not to contribute to the legitimacy of their claim to moderation or restraint.

It is difficult for anyone not a proponent of SALT II to argue with the formulation we propose. It does not say that we will depart from the SALT II limits. It does say that we will be guided by the requirements for modernization, stability and arms control. And it implies, quite properly in our view, that if those objectives cannot be reached within the confines of SALT II, we will depart from SALT II. Such a formulation would protect the MX no matter how based. And it would give the Administration a far more plausible argument than it now has for refusing to ratify SALT II.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After considering the merits of these three interim restraint options, the START Interagency Group was unable to reach a consensus. OSD and the START Negotiator believe that our policy should be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA support Option 1, agreeing that this policy should be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains in the U.S. interest.

The Option 2 cap on warheads would have some military advantages over Option 1, if the verification, negotiating, and political drawbacks could be overcome. It is the opinion of the Interagency Group that these drawbacks outweigh the military advantages.

Recommendations:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 1, *continuing our current policy of not undercutting existing SALT agreements provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint.*⁵

OSD and the START Negotiator recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 3, *distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements.*⁶

⁵ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of either recommendation.

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of either recommendation.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

INTERIM RESTRAINTS—ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE

As we seek to achieve a more stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of forces, the United States will take no actions, for the time being, which would undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.

This policy, however, is conscious of the fact that SALT II is not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal, and verifiable arms reductions agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union. For reasons cited on many occasions in numerous fora, we believe it would be a major mistake and a diversion from arms reduction efforts to attempt to formalize the SALT II Treaty agreement's high ceilings and serious inequalities.

At the same time, we believe that increased nuclear stability at reduced force levels is the most basic of U.S. objectives, and that actions necessary to ensure the survivability of our ICBM forces are fully consistent with existing agreement. Protecting the survivability of our ICBM force was a goal in previous negotiations, and remains an essential prerequisite to our security at reduced force levels.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—CONSENSUS POSITIONS

Issue: Should the consensus positions listed in this paper be approved for use in formulating the US START position?

Facts: There is full Interdepartmental consensus on the group of issues listed in the attached paper.

Discussion: None.

⁷ Secret.

⁸ Secret.

Suggested Talking Points

—Turning to the paper entitled “Consensus START Issues,” I think that if there is consensus, we should approve the recommendation of the paper without further discussion.

—Does anyone have any further difficulty with the positions recommended in this paper?

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG⁹

Washington, undated

CONSENSUS START ISSUES

There is interagency consensus on the following positions for inclusion in the US position on START.

1. *Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)*

The US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to restrictions beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers. All agencies agree that the US should not propose limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber in our START proposal. (Some believe that we might eventually consider accepting such limits consistent with our force requirements in return for significant Soviet concessions.)

2. *Access to Flight Test Data*

Access to flight test telemetry is essential to the verification of certain START limitations. All agencies agree that the US should seek a ban on all telemetry encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems. Additional measures to ensure access to relevant flight test data may also be required. Decisions on additional measures should be made after the provisions of a START agreement become more clear. Such decisions should balance the value of additional information for monitoring Soviet START-limited activities against the impact of reciprocal measures on US flight test practices.

3. *Missile Flight Tests*

The US should not seek a limitation which would set an annual quota of missile flight tests.

⁹ Secret.

4. *Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability*

One potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban on “depressed trajectory” SLBM flight tests. However, because of verification problems and the possible implications for certain US systems (e.g., flight tests of Trident II), we should not propose a ban on such testing pending further review.

5. *Limits on Air Defenses*

We do not envisage air defense limitations in a START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferential treatment of US bombers and their weapons in START.

6. *Limits on Civil Defense*

Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more active civil defense program than the US, we should not seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could inhibit US civil defense programs.

7. *Limits on Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities*

As there appears to be no compelling US security requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be included in our START proposal.

RECOMMENDATION: All agencies recommend that these positions be approved for use in formulating the US START position.¹⁰

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹¹

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—MOBILE ICBMs

Issue: What should be the US position with respect to the treatment of mobile ICBMs?

Facts:—The MX program currently does not require a fully land-mobile missile transporter-erector-launcher for any of its deceptive basing options. The transporter being designed could not erect and launch the missile.

¹⁰ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

¹¹ Secret.

—The National Intelligence Estimate¹² notes that the Soviets do possess land-mobile ballistic systems (i.e., the SS–16 and the SS–20) and it projects a new land-mobile ICBM under development.

—Some feel that the US should keep open its option to develop and deploy a small, mobile ICBM in the future as a means of ensuring the survivability of the land-based ICBM force.

Discussion: While four options are discussed in the paper developed by the Interdepartmental Group, only two are supported by agencies.

1. All agencies recommend that we make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position. All feel that we should wait at least until we are more certain about the final MX basing options.

2. The Chairman of the START Delegation suggests that we should propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility that would exclude deceptive basing options from prohibition.

—The advantages and disadvantages of both positions are included in the attached paper.

Suggested Talking Points:

—The paper provided on this issue indicates that everyone except Ed Rowny supports the position that we make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position.

—Ed suggests that we draw a distinction between the transportability that is needed to protect a deceptive basing option for MX and the true mobility of an SS–16 type, land-mobile ICBM.

—He would like us to propose a ban on SS–16 type land-mobile ICBMs and permit the transportability needed for deceptive basing.

—The paper does provide a full treatment of this issue. Once again, are there any additional arguments or points that need to be made?

¹² Not further identified.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG¹³

Washington, undated

Mobile ICBMs

Background Considerations

The US was unable to gain Soviet acceptance of a land-mobile ban in the 1972 Interim Agreement, but stated unilaterally that it would regard Soviet mobile deployments to be inconsistent with the Agreement.

Mobile ICBMs were banned for the duration of the SALT II Protocol, but would have been permitted under the Treaty itself after expiration of the Protocol. Toward the end of the SALT II negotiations, the US put the Soviets on notice that it intended to deploy mobile ICBM launchers in the MPS deceptive-basing system then under consideration.

Until final decisions are taken on MX basing, which are not likely before the opening of START, we will not know whether the US will be required to deploy mobile ICBMs. Some MX deployment options may call for transporting the missile in its cannister between permanent hardened facilities. In addition, we may wish to protect the option to deploy systems in the future for other new ICBMs.

The Soviets have developed and will probably soon test a small, solid-propellant ICBM that would be suitable for off-road mobile deployment (similar to the SS-20 IRBMs basing arrangement). They have also developed a medium, solid-propellant missile that could conceivably be deployed as a mobile, perhaps deceptively based. And unlike the US, the Soviets do not face public opinion constraints on their mobile programs.

Even with intrusive verification measures, there could be substantial uncertainties in our estimates of the number of Soviet mobile ICBMs. The degree of monitoring uncertainty would depend on such factors as the basing arrangement employed, the number of mobiles deployed, and the effectiveness of agreed collateral constraints and cooperative verification measures.

¹³ Secret.

Options

1. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs.

Among the *advantages* of a mobile ban are that it would avoid the verification difficulties associated with counting mobiles; it would close off a deployment option that the Soviets were in a much better position to use than the US; and it would make it easier for us to disrupt Soviet ICBM refire operations by targeting (fixed) ICBM launchers.

Among the *disadvantages* are that it would close off future US mobile options for MX or a smaller ICBM; it would prevent the Soviets from moving to a more survivable land-basing system which it can be argued would have a destabilizing effect; and, by constraining Soviet efforts to promote the survivability of their ICBM force, it could make them reluctant to accept significant reductions.

2. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility that excluded deceptive basing from the prohibition.

Among the *advantages*, this would define mobility and transportability so as to ban SS-20-type deployments of ICBMs while permitting the kind of basing approach we might wish to employ. Among the *disadvantages*, it would legitimize Soviet deceptive basing which, depending on the cooperative measures worked out, might be difficult to verify. And given previous US treatment of deceptive basing as a mobile concept, it would be difficult to gain acceptance of the proposed definition.

3. Propose that mobiles be permitted, but only in accordance with certain requirements designed to facilitate verification.

Under this approach, the Treaty would have to specify criteria for permitted mobile deployments (e.g., central basing, data exchanges) and call for additional collateral constraints and cooperative measures to promote verifiability.

The *advantages* of this option are that it would give us flexibility for MX or future mobile ICBM basing; it could provide for stringent measures to count Soviet mobiles; and it would enable the Soviets to move to more survivable ICBM basing which could have a stabilizing effect.

The *disadvantages* are that it would involve greater verification uncertainties than a ban; it would provide an option that the Soviets are more likely to exploit; and it might lead to disagreements on what is verifiable. It could also complicate the serious problem of dealing with refires and reconstitution.

4. Make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position.

The main *advantage* of this approach is that it would hold open our options for dealing with mobiles in START at least until after a

final decision is made on MX basing and until we know about possible US requirements for a new mobile ICBM. Otherwise, on the one hand, by opting for a ban on mobiles we could be ruling out a system needed for national security. On the other hand, by choosing to allow mobiles, we could be allowing the Soviets freedom to deploy systems which would pose severe verification and refire problems.

The main *disadvantage* is that it foregoes the opportunity to lay down a strong position from the outset.

Conclusion: All agencies recommend that the US adopt option 4. However, the Chairman of the START delegation supports option 2.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁴

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—REMAINING WORK

Issue: How will we, and when should we, complete the remaining work necessary to formulate and approve an initial US START position?

Facts: There are items of significance that have yet to be addressed. These include:

- What package of collateral constraints should we propose?
 - Should we ban heavy ICBMs like the SS-18?
 - Should we propose that heavy ICBMs be reduced first in meeting other constraints?
 - Should we limit SS-19/M-X size ICBMs?
 - Should we ban new systems larger than the SS-19/M-X?
 - Should we limit each side to one new ICBM and one new SLBM?
 - Should we ban the construction of new silos (and if so, how do we permit Closely Spaced Basing for M-X)?
 - Should we propose counting and type rules in the agreement?
 - Should we limit fractionization of missiles?
 - Should we propose qualitative constraints on new systems (e.g., warhead weight restrictions)?
- How should we address the issue of ICBM refire/reconstitution?
- What should we propose with respect to the duration of the agreement or agreements reached?

¹⁴ Secret.

—What is the relationship between the phases of negotiations which we have proposed?

Discussion: As a minimum, a majority of the items listed above must be resolved before we can develop a US first round negotiating position. It would be best if they could be resolved prior to further public discussion of START.

Suggested Talking Points:

—We have a number of significant issues yet to address before we can claim to have a USG position on START.

—Among these we have the issue of what types of additional collateral constraints should we propose—for example, should we attempt to ban heavy ICBMs like the SS-18?

—We also must decide what we wish to propose or not propose with respect to refire missiles.

—I think that we should once again task the Interdepartmental Group to provide for NSC review recommendations on:

—collateral constraints,

—treatment of ICBM refire/reconstitution capability,

—desired duration,

—and any other issues upon which they feel they need senior level guidance prior to the formulation of the initial US START position.

—I think we need this input within the next three weeks at the very latest.

—Are there other items that we should specifically mention in this tasking, or different views on the proper suspense for this work?

Tab E

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁵

Washington, undated

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PHASES TO EACH OTHER

Issue: How should we characterize the relationship between the phases of negotiation proposed in our approach?

Facts:—NSDD-33 intentionally did not address the relationship of the phases of negotiations to a single or a series of agreements. This

¹⁵ Secret.

was done to permit Interdepartmental and NSC discussion of the alternatives prior to decision.

—The SIG-level group that developed the press guidance for use prior to the President's speech specifically discussed this point and agreed *not* to announce or imply that in proposing *phases*, we were proposing a series of sequential *agreements* at this time.

—However, Secretary Haig suggested that we intended a sequence of agreements in his remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 11.¹⁶ Further, Rick Burt briefed the ambassadors of several nations on May 8¹⁷ that the US “would be prepared to sign an agreement incorporating first-phase objectives, without waiting for full negotiation of phase two objectives.”

Discussion: Since Defense, Rowny and others favor a single agreement involving different phases, they are upset by State's seeking to preempt this issue without waiting for Interdepartmental discussion and NSC decision.

Suggested Talking Points

—The final item on today's agenda has to do with the relationship between the phases of our announced approach.

—NSDD-33 was intentionally silent on this topic to provide us some time to discuss the implications of a phased approach before deciding the issue.

—Since we have already been pressed on this issue in many quarters, I think it's important that we use the time remaining to discuss this issue today, even though we do not have the benefit of an IG option paper.

—Could we have your views on this issue? Cap, perhaps you would like to begin?

¹⁶ See Document 18.

¹⁷ The Department reported on Burt's May 8 meetings with the ambassadors to the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Italy in telegram 128088 to Bonn, London, Paris, and Rome, May 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820004-0544)

21. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 21, 1982, 9:43 a.m.

Bud McF: review earlier decision—here today to cover 5 remaining agenda items—(1) interim restraints (substantive & public affairs context—to ratify SALT II would legitimize buildup, legitimize gross inequalities, delay getting on w/reductions—review pros & cons—any comments? [no]

Pres: what's good, if anything, in SALT II?

Bud: counting rules

Haig: preclude breakout they could do—we're *not* abiding by SALT II per se—political element

Meese: strategic planning not constrained

Weinberger: densepack/ALCM—I don't think the Soviets could do more than they've done now—if we say we'll abide by SALT II, I don't think we'll get on with START

Meese: I was assuming that what the Pres. said earlier—we'll not be constrained in planning

Rostow: for the moment, it's in our interest to abide—no advantage to change policy—SFRC

Weinberger: I'm not advocating public announcement—we need to be clear internally

Meese: but when we advance basing moved for MX, we must be prepared

Haig: problem at moment is a *political* problem—getting on w/START will resolve issue—if we raise issue now, it will complicate MX

Weinberger: ensure our budget planning

Inman: answer question (1) DELTA III testing—have to take out YANKEES—168? (2) at least 2 new ICBMS underway, can only test 1 (3) BACKFIRE production less than it could be (4) SS-18 MIRVs (5) future verification—encryption of telemetry

Reagan: are they going ahead w/new sub programs

Inman:

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. The original text is handwritten. Brackets and ellipses are in the original text. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix B. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at approximately 10:45 a.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found.

Meese: I think we're agreed (1) no [change] in public formulation (2) resist any attempt to revive SALT II (3) as a matter of policy, no constraints . . . when

Rostow: don't violate until deploy . . .

McFarlane: we have words that capture this—IG—get back to you

Rowny: whatever we say, distance ourselves from SALT II—help negotiate

McFarlane: 2nd issue

Weinberger: would hope paper not intended for dissemination—"some believe . . ."

Murphy: does this paper assume we're satisfied w/ telemetry we're getting now

McFarlane: isn't intended to—next issue mobiles—propose we reserve judgment in our position although Rowny wishes to build in from start

Rowny: everyone's agreed we want to keep open options re MX—issue is *true* mobile—if we don't want, time to decide is now

McFarlane: you have paper to consider—move on—do we want to ban heavies first, etc.—number of issues—to IG, w/ your approval, for report within two weeks

Weinberger: I thought original paper did include banning of heavies

Pres: MXs?

Weinberger: less than heavy

Pres: Titans—trading chip?

Ikle: Soviets don't worry about Titans

Pres: heavier than MX?

(chorus): 18s

Pres: 18 heavier than 19?

(chorus): yes

Rostow: comment

Pres.: if we go for heavier 1st, don't we have negotiation problems

Ikle: it's like SS-20/zero-option

Hayward: get at 18s indirectly

McFarlane: final issue—phasing—single or two agreements

Weinberger: Phase II as important as Phase I—worried procedurally—would argue for *single* treaty, *one* process, because of strong importance we attach to TW as only way to achieve equality at lower levels—if treaty w/ Phase I, doubt get them back

Haig: thought this was issue you decided last time, Mr. Pres—if we can get objectives in I, sign Treaty—I read decision memo that

way & briefed on Hill, allies briefed that way—easy matter—have, for instance, 5 year review tied to good faith on Phase II—must keep credibility

Weinberger: no one intends to undercut credibility

Haig: must be clean or clear

Weinberger: I'm worried—5 years/ ALCMs . . .

Haig: if achieve everything in Phase I, then don't sign, we'd be laughed out of court

Hayward: if you get Phase I, substantial cut TW

Rowny: *announcement* of whether or not we seek agreement in Phase I should be kept open, from negotiating point of view (discuss Soviet tactics)

Pres: when we talked about it, I didn't think we meant 2 separate treaties—when we achieve 1st, then see what's needed in phase II, where we stand (asks question)—am I being Boy Scout

Haig: you said it better than anybody

McFarlane: will you sign

Meese: can't you reserve question until then

Haig: it's already been asked: Congress, allies—don't want to reverse decision already made, via this esoteric discussion

Weinberger: don't bind us because we've briefed w/o clarification of decision

Rostow: explain as in INF, depends on how Soviets play it—don't create impression we're out to get one treaty quickly

Haig: great danger is that it looks like you waffling on what you said: Phase I warheads—if bureaucracy's confused, will emerge

Pres: couldn't part of negotiations be this

Haig: yes, call it interim, or whatever

Meese: Phase I—reserve decision

McFarlane: precedent—conclude,

Bush: do we then go to Senate, ask ratify I?

Ilke: do like test bans

Weinberger: procedural matter—don't tie hands by saying that once Phase I done, go to Senate

Pres: until completed on Phase I, don't know what TW problem is in Phase II

Haig: want to be careful of what has been bureaucratic hassle—don't undercut Phase I unit of measure

Pres: continuing negotiation

Rostow: don't fix on 2 agreements

Meese: think we're agreed

McFarlane: yes

Baker: on last, prepare written guidance

Pres: consensus items

McFarlane:

22. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

Brezhnev's Reply to the President's May 7 Letter

Soviet Chargé Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today gave Walt Stoessel Brezhnev's reply to the President's May 7 letter.² The May 20 letter³ neither accepts nor rejects our proposed late-June date for beginning START. After self-righteously chastizing us for a year and a half of footdragging, however, Brezhnev does agree that diplomatic discussions should begin "in the near future" on the questions of time and venue for the talks. The Soviets probably do not want to appear to have jumped at our proposed date, but we expect they will ultimately agree to begin talks in the June-July period. Moscow may want to drag things out to permit a formal announcement when and if Gromyko and Secretary Haig meet in New York during the SSOD (probably the week of June 21).⁴ Bessmertnykh told Walt Stoessel that he hoped to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US—USSR) Jan.—May 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Scanlan, Burt, and Stoessel.

² See Document 16.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 171.

⁴ Haig met with Gromyko in New York on June 18. A record of their conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 186. Prior to the meeting, Haig informed Reagan that, regarding arms control, he would "put Gromyko on the defensive" by building on Reagan's UNSSOD speech. "The message will be that we have a sensible and comprehensive program for negotiating improved security for both sides through significant reduction," Haig added, and that "the Soviets cannot be serious when they accuse us of not being sincere; and that it is up to them to demonstrate in negotiations that they really favor arms control." (*Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 185)

have further instructions on Monday⁵ concerning a START starting date.

The bulk of Brezhnev's letter is devoted to an attack on our START proposal as presented in the President's Eureka speech,⁶ followed by a pitch in support of Brezhnev's May 18 proposal⁷ for a US-Soviet strategic weapons freeze. Brezhnev declares flatly that our proposal "is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement." He claims that our approach, by singling out one aspect of the strategic equation (land-based missiles), would mean substantial reductions only for the Soviet side. He fails to acknowledge the President's subsequent assertions that "everything is negotiable," including bombers and cruise missiles, and the fact that the U.S. would have to make substantial cuts in sea-based missiles.

On the question of a freeze, Brezhnev makes the predictable argument that such an agreement would create "favorable conditions" for START negotiations, and calls on the President to give his proposal careful consideration. He makes clear that the proposal would limit modernization and not just freeze the number of strategic systems, which makes it all the more one-sided in the Soviets' favor.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

⁵ May 24.

⁶ See Document 17.

⁷ Reference is to Brezhnev's May 18 speech to the Komsomol, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 34, no. 20, June 16, 1982, pp. 1–23. In a May 19 memorandum to Reagan, Haig described the speech as "clearly aimed at public opinion in the United States and especially Western Europe. It emphasizes grand gestures, both in START and INF, but gives little insight into the Soviet negotiating approach." (See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 173)

23. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 24, 1982

SUBJECT

Additional Guidance on START

Issue

Should you issue an NSDD reflecting the decisions reached as a result of the May 21 NSC meeting² on START?

Facts

The NSC meeting on May 21 provides the basis for you to issue additional guidance on the U.S. START position.

Discussion

Formalizing your decisions as a result of that meeting in an NSDD, will best ensure their clear transmission and timely implementation.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ That you approve and sign for release the
proposed NSDD at Tab A.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 078, NSDD 36 [START Negotiations II]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "signed."

² See Document 21.

³ Reagan initialed his approval. The NSDD is printed below as Document 24.

24. National Security Decision Directive 36¹

Washington, May 25, 1982

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—II

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33² and provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START.

Interim Restraints

The United States will not depart from current policy with respect to existing arms control agreements at this time. At the same time, we must recognize that continuing current policy prompts the argument that we are complying with SALT II and should, therefore, ratify it, even though it is seriously flawed. In addition, we must keep in mind that continuing our current policy may present problems for certain U.S. force modernization options, particularly for M-X basing.

The following amplification of policy is provided to deal with the above considerations:

—As we seek to achieve a more stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of force, the United States will continue its policy of taking no actions that would undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.

—This policy, however, consciously recognizes the fact that SALT II is not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal, and verifiable arms reduction agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union. For reasons cited on many occasions in numerous fora, we believe it would be a major mistake to attempt to formalize the SALT II agreement's high ceilings and serious inequalities.

—At the same time, increased nuclear stability at reduced force levels is the most basic U.S. objective. In particular, protecting the survivability of our ICBM force is an essential prerequisite to maintaining our security at reduced levels of forces and has consistently been

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 078, NSDD 36 [START Negotiations II]. Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Jones, Rostow, and Rowny under cover of a May 25 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-36). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-36 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

² See Document 19.

a goal in previous negotiations. We believe that actions necessary to ensure the survivability of our ICBM force are fully consistent with existing agreements.

This description of U.S. policy, which expands upon the current formulation, is approved as the U.S. position on interim restraints. It is an explanation of, rather than a change from, previous policy.

Phases and Agreements

The United States has proposed a phased approach to the START negotiations. Whether the results gained through this approach will be implemented in a series of agreements or in a single, comprehensive agreement will depend upon the progress made, and the condition of the ongoing negotiations as the first phase of these negotiations is completed. If the Soviets were to agree to the terms we have proposed for Phase I, then we would be willing to implement such an agreement. However, we should take no action to restrict our flexibility by prejudging the decision to be taken at that time.

Treatment of Mobile ICBMs

The U.S. will make no proposals with respect to mobile ICBMs in its initial position. We should continue to explore the possibility of drawing a distinction between the degree of transportability needed for deceptive basing of M-X and the full mobility associated with an SS-16-type ICBM. If that distinction is supportable, then we should reconsider the issue of proposing a ban on SS-16-type ICBMs. This review should take into consideration both current and projected Soviet deployments of such systems, and the potential contribution that a small mobile ICBM could make to improving the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force.

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

The U.S. should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to restrictions beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers. The U.S. should not propose limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber in our START proposal.

Access to Flight-Test Data

The U.S. should seek a ban on all telemetry encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems. Additional measures to ensure access to relevant flight-test data may also be required. Decisions on additional measures should be made after the provisions of a START agreement becomes more clear. Such decisions should balance the value of additional information for monitoring Soviet START-limited activities against the impact of reciprocal measures on U.S. flight-test practices.

Missile Flight Tests

The U.S. should not seek a limitation that would set an annual quota of missile flight tests.

Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability

One potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban on “depressed trajectory” SLBM flight tests. However, because of verification problems and the possible implications for certain U.S. systems (e.g., flight tests of TRIDENT II), we should not propose a ban on such testing, pending further review.

Limits on Air Defense

We do not envisage air defense limitations in a START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferential treatment of U.S. bombers and their weapons in START.

Limits on Civil Defense

Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more active civil defense program than the U.S., we should not seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could inhibit U.S. civil defense programs.

Limits on Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities

As there appears to be no compelling U.S. security requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be included in our START proposal.

Additional Work

The START Interdepartmental Group will provide for NSC review by June 4 its recommendations on a package of complementary collateral constraints, on the treatment of ICBM refire and reconstitution, and on any other items upon which it feels guidance is required.

Ronald Reagan

25. Paper Prepared in the Soviet Foreign Ministry¹

undated

The letter of L.I. Brezhnev to President Ronald Reagan² states the position of principle held by the Soviet Union with regard to the negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

Having in mind what was said by the Secretary of State in the conversation with the Soviet ambassador on May 7, 1982³ we would like to present some additional considerations on the substance as well as on the organizational aspects of the matter.

As should be clear from L.I. Brezhnev's letter, the Soviet side cannot agree with the assertion that the U.S. proposals on the substance of the problem of limitation and reduction of strategic arms, as formulated in the President's speech of May 9,⁴ are of a realistic nature and that they are feasible and suitable as a subject of negotiations.

We gather a quite definite impression, and so do others, that the administration is approaching the negotiations with a clearly unacceptable, one-sided position. Although it must be understood that to declare a slogan of "radical" reductions is not enough, what is required is such a basis for the negotiations which would ensure achieving lower levels of opposing nuclear forces—and this is precisely what we stand for—but without upsetting the existing balance, without disrupting the strategic stability. In other words the sides must be strictly guided by the principle of equality and equal security, and must take into account the interests of each other.

We are convinced that the interests of both sides would be served if from the very beginning the negotiations were set on the right track, if they opened a realistic way for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. And it would be erroneous to believe that one side were more interested than the other in having such an agreement. The issues involved here are too great and sensitive for that. Their resolution will determine not only the state of future Soviet-American relations but

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretary, S/S-I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. A handwritten note in the upper right-hand corner reads: "From Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh to Stoessel, 5/25/82." For a record of the conversation for the meeting at which Bessmertnykh stressed this document, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 175.

² Brezhnev's May 20 letter to Reagan is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 171.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 167.

⁴ See Document 17.

also the prospects of preserving peace throughout the world. We are for the negotiations to be conducted in a serious manner and not to become a cover for continuing the policy of the arms race.

We are prepared to agree on the organizational aspects of the Soviet-American negotiations. We find Geneva acceptable as the venue for such negotiations. We propose to begin them on June 29, 1982.

The USSR delegation will be led by Ambassador V.P. Karpov.

As to how these negotiations should be referred to, we propose to call them “negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms”. This reflects in a more complete and correct way the subject of the negotiations since they will deal not only with quantitative reductions but qualitative limitations as well.

We propose that the following draft text of a joint statement on the beginning of the negotiations be published on June 1, 1982:

“On the Soviet-American negotiations.

In the course of the exchange of views between the USSR and the USA the question of holding negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms was discussed.

It was agreed that the specially designated delegations of the USSR and the USA will begin such negotiations on June 29, 1982 in Geneva. The Soviet delegation will be led by Ambassador V.P. Karpov, the U.S. delegation will be led by . . .”

It is also necessary to agree to inform the Swiss authorities on the forthcoming negotiations one or two days prior to the announcement thereof, as was done on similar occasions in the past.

26. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 24, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Working Lunch on START—June 25, 1982, 12:00 P.M.

Issue: How should we handle Soviet heavy ICBMs (SS-18s) in the U.S. START proposal? Instructions to the U.S. Delegation?

Facts: The purpose of this NSC working lunch is to allow agencies to provide you their views on the heavy missile issue and on the instructions for the U.S. Delegation for the first round of negotiations.

Discussion: The IG has provided papers on: (1) how to constrain Soviet ICBM reconstitution capability,² (2) draft instructions to the U.S. Delegation,³ (3) a number of additional proposed collateral constraints,⁴ and (4) additional indirect limits on throw weight to include the question of how to handle Soviet heavy ICBMs.⁵

There is consensus on how to address the first two papers and all but one of the constraints proposed in the third paper. The discussion of these items should move quickly. The critical issue is the treatment of Soviet heavy ICBMs.

We recommend the agenda below for the working lunch. For each item on the agenda, we have provided for your review a summary of the issue/paper, my intended talking points, a decision section for your use following the meeting's discussion, and the IG paper developed to address the issues involved. We have not suggested any specific talking points for your use at this lunch. After you have indicated your decisions, we will incorporate them into the instructions to the START

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-101, NSC 00052 RWR 6/25/82 START. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. A stamped notation at the top of the document indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a June 14 paper prepared in the START IG, "ICBM Reconstitution," along with a decision recommendation: "That we accept the IG recommendation granting them additional time on this issue." Also attached but not printed is another undated paper prepared in the NSC, "Background/Talking Points—Reconstitution/Refire," on which Reagan initialed his approval of "the IG recommendation granting them additional time on this issue."

³ Attached but not printed are draft instructions to the START delegation, June 21.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

delegation and draft an NSDD for your signature which formally records your guidance.⁶

Agenda:

- ICBM Reconstitution and Refire (TAB A)
- Instructions to the START Delegation (TAB B)
- Additional Collateral Constraints (TAB C)
- Indirect Limits on Throw weight (and Treatment of Heavy ICBMs) (TAB D)

⁶ According to the President's Daily Diary for June 25, Reagan participated in a National Security Council working luncheon in the Cabinet Room from 12:23 to 1:13 p.m. No minutes of this meeting were found. On July 8, Clark sent Reagan a memorandum, "Draft NSDD Reflecting Decisions Made at June 25 NSC Luncheon," printed as Document 28.

27. Letter From President Reagan to the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks¹

Washington, June 25, 1982

Dear Ambassador Rowny:

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age—the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, USSR—START 2/2. No classification marking.

deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.

I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.

I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us. For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.²

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have my personal attention.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

² In telegram 6759 from Geneva, June 29, Rowney reported that he read portions of Reagan's letter during the opening heads of delegation meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Karpov. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820339–0328)

28. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 8, 1982

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD Reflecting Decisions Made At June 25 NSC Luncheon

Issue: Should you sign and document your decisions reached at the NSC luncheon on START on June 25?²

Discussion: The attached draft National Security Decision Directive reflects the decision that you announced at the NSC luncheon on START held on June 25. This would be the third NSDD on this subject. It continues the chain of documentation on decisions reached concerning the U.S. approach to the START negotiations.

Recommendation:

OK No

_____ That you sign the draft NSDD.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 078, NSDD 0044 [START Negotiations III]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kramer. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "signed."

² No minutes were found. See Document 26.

³ Reagan did not indicate his preference. The decision directed is printed below as Document 29.

29. National Security Decision Directive 44¹

Washington, July 10, 1982

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—III

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33² and NSDD-36.³ It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START.

Indirect Limits on Throw-weight

The following additional indirect limits on throw-weight are approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:

—A limit on the combined total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit on the total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs of 210.

—A sub-limit on the number of heavy missiles permitted. This proposal would limit the Soviets to proportionally no more heavy missiles in their force structure at reduced levels than exists today. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit of 110 deployed heavy missiles.

—A ban on *new* heavy missiles.

A ban on *all* heavy missiles is approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the second phase of negotiations.

Other Collateral Constraints

The following additional collateral constraints are also approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:

—A limit on the weight of reentry vehicles (RVs) on new missile systems of approximately 200 kilograms.

—A limit on the number of RVs that can be tested or deployed on classes of missiles to 10 RVs on ICBMs and 14 RVs on SLBMs. The

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 078, NSDD 0044 [START Negotiations III]. Clark sent the decision directive to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Jones, Rostow, and Rowny under cover of a July 13 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-44). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-44 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee."

² See Document 19.

³ See Document 24.

U.S. START Delegation is authorized to “grandfather” the number of RVs associated with the SS–18.

—Agreed rules governing the phasing of reductions to establish equal intermediate ceilings at agreed intervals.

Constraining ICBM Force Reconstitution

The U.S. START Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that we intend in the negotiations to deal with the problems posed by non-deployed missiles. The Delegation should point out that non-deployed missiles have the potential to augment the strategic capability provided by deployed missiles. Pending further guidance, the Delegation can use discretion to discuss the problems noted above (e.g., reconstitution, refire, rapid reload, and breakout). However, the Delegation should not discuss specific proposals for resolving these problems, or take actions which could prejudice U.S. options for dealing with these problems, without specific additional guidance.

Additional Work

The START Interdepartmental Group will provide for NSC review by July 23 its recommendations with respect to constraining Soviet ICBM force reconstitution and addressing the problems posed by non-deployed missiles.

Ronald Reagan

30. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, July 29, 1982

SUBJECT

Timing of the Next NSC Meeting on START

On Wednesday, July 28, we recommended that the Friday, July 30, NSC meeting not focus on START as planned. We requested that the topic of START be rescheduled to August 5. That request was

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Sent through Boverie.

approved, and the meeting is currently rescheduled for August 5. The purpose of this memo is to provide the background and rationale surrounding that recommendation.

The specific topic to be discussed is the control of ICBM reconstitution capability and the associated issue of whether we should seek inventory limits on non-deployed (i.e., spare, test, refire) missiles. NSDD-44² directed that the START Interdepartmental Group provide recommendations on this topic to the NSC by July 23. The interagency community has been working on this subject on a fairly constant basis for the last two months. As of last Monday, July 26, while there was still a split between State and OSD/ACDA on how to resolve this issue, the interagency process had produced a reasonably credible paper on this subject. It was on this basis that an NSC meeting on July 30 was scheduled.

Unfortunately, as the week progressed and agencies continued to maneuver for leverage on the main issue, the Interdepartmental Group continued to revise their paper. With each revision, distribution to the NSC and to NSC principals was delayed and the likelihood of key principals being well prepared to discuss this issue diminished. In fact, it reached the point that the JCS would not have had time to formally consider the paper prior to the NSC meeting, had the Friday schedule been maintained. As a result, we requested a one-week slip in the NSC meeting to August 5th to provide adequate time for the paper to be finalized, once and for all, and for the principals to review this rather complex issue prior to discussing it in an NSC meeting.

Subsequently, some in OSD (Ikle) and in ACDA (Timbie) have called to ask, given the current START round is now coming to a close on August 7, why we need to hold an NSC meeting on this topic at all at this time. The NSC staff and the Chairman of the START IG strongly feel that it is important, after the considerable effort made to get this far with this paper, that the NSC consider this issue. If it does not, we risk losing the momentum of the interagency work program. Additionally, a number of other significant issues are, in effect, bottled-up on the interagency START work program agenda behind this subject as we continue to tie up limited staff talent reworking this one topic. We need its timely discussion if only to remove the bottleneck that currently exists.

The central issue in this case is one that is appropriate for senior-level review and likely cannot be resolved at a lower level no matter how much further work is undertaken at this time. It involves a political call as to how much capability to verify a proposed constraint is abso-

² See Document 29.

lutely required by the President to support our policy of “effective verification.” As Agencies see the views shifting towards or away from their own position, interest in moving or deferring decision waxes and wanes.

At this point, as a minimum, the Interdepartmental Group should provide a suitable issue paper reflecting their work. Once this IG product is complete and is provided, if the NSC principals feel that we are still not at an appropriate point to decide the issues involved, the NSC can consciously choose to defer decision and direct whatever additional effort is needed to move us to the point of being prepared to decide. We can’t afford to reinforce the habit of deferring the consideration of hard issues or of ignoring Presidentially directed suspenses.

Recommendation

That you support our position with respect to the necessity of discussing this issue in an NSC meeting on or about August 5.³

³ Clark indicated his approval.

31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 4, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START—August 5, 1982

Issue

How should we constrain “non-deployed” ballistic missiles, and should we propose an overall inventory limit on such missiles? This issue is addressed in the Interdepartmental Group discussion paper attached.²

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. Brackets are in the original. A stamped notation indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is the Interdepartmental Group Paper.

Facts

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union maintain extra missiles to serve as maintenance spares and to be used in training and flight testing. These “non-deployed” missiles were not effectively constrained in the SALT agreements and are not constrained by the U.S. START proposal, which currently limits only “deployed” missiles (i.e., missiles in/on their operational launchers).

There is great uncertainty in the intelligence community about the number of “non-deployed” missiles the Soviets may have (as many as 1,000 +), and concern that such Soviet missiles could be used to reload silos or permit the Soviets to rapidly break out of treaty constraints in a crisis.

The U.S. delegation has been instructed to tell the Soviets that we intend to deal with “non-deployed” missiles, but not to propose any specific approach without additional instructions. They have done so.

Discussion

The problems caused potentially by these extra missiles are:

—*Rapid Reload*: Could be used to reload launchers within several hours of initial use;

—*Reconstitution*: Could be used to reload launchers later in a protracted war;

—*Soft Launch*: Could be set up to be launched from simple, above ground-launch sites and augment a silo force in a crisis; and

—*Breakout*: Could provide the basis for quickly breaking out of constraints.

Three groups of constraints have been developed to address all four aspects of the “non-deployed” missile problem.

—The constraints are discussed in the long paper provided by the Interdepartmental Group (Tab C).

—They are summarized for your review at Tab A,³ and the agency position on each is provided at Tab B.⁴

We have Interdepartmental agreement on all constraints in Group A. There is disagreement on two of four constraints in Group B, and there is disagreement on the constraint in Group C. Thus, three of the total of nine proposed constraints will require discussion.

While the specific topic appears technical, the basic issues upon which the discussion of the three contentious constraints will hinge are:

³ Attached but not printed is the IG Summary of Constraints.

⁴ Attached but not printed is the IG Summary of Agency Positions.

—How much monitoring confidence do we need before proposing a constraint (especially in light of your emphasis on not just “adequate,” but “effective,” verification)?

—Can we claim that we can “effectively verify” a network of constraints if some elements can be monitored only with low confidence?

—How serious are we in going beyond National Technical Means of verification, and are we ready to negotiate such measures?

—Are we really going to constrain missiles, or by only limiting “deployed” missiles do we fall into the pattern of a SALT-type launcher limit? [*FYI: The SALT agreements’ failure effectively to constrain the large inventory of Soviet missiles produced, but not “deployed,” was viewed as a major flaw by Senate critics and by Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny.*]

My talking points (which frame the issues for the meeting) are provided at Tab D⁵ for your review. We have not provided any talking points for your use.

*Recommendation*⁶

OK	NO
_____	_____

That you read the Talking Points at Tab D, then the summaries at Tabs A and B, and scan the long IG paper at Tab C (especially pp. 14–18), time permitting, prior to the meeting.

⁵ Attached but not printed are Clark’s Talking Points.

⁶ Reagan initialed his approval.

32. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, August 9, 1982, 3:10 p.m.

Bud McF—introductory remarks [VP joins . . . Baker, Deaver, Darnon still out—Poindexter not present] . . . missiles above 850, nondeployed—4 groups of constraints—Group A (1) development of capabilities, (2) missiles & equipment at sites, (3) activities to develop reconstitution—recommend adoption, any agency comment?

(nobody comments)

group B, procedural constraints on non-deployed missiles—disassembling/destroying missiles that are taken out of inventory . . . comment on caveat for SS-9/Titan for space launch [Pres comments: but warheads could be destroyed]—some spares, but stored at designated sites—propose adopting measures “1” & “3” of B if no objection

(nobody comments)

as for “2,” there’s still a question on ability to verify (i.e., for old missiles intended to serve as space launch vehicles) . . . agency remarks.

Shultz—difference of opinion within State—question for Bud: verify if tested . . . test to sustain confidence in system

Bud—true you must test to sustain confidence . . . Gen Vessey?

Gen Vessey—based on tests, Soviets can have graph of degradation over time

Pres—what about int’l group responsible for dismantling or destroying—how do you destroy? shoot it off?

Bud McF—Soviets have dismantled SS-7s & 8s

Ikle—we can verify if destruction’s where we can see it

McMahon—we’ve not observe dismantling of a large number of missiles

Shultz—the reason I raise the issue is that verification is at the heart of agency disagreement . . . and of whether or not you want an agreement

McFarlane—if you could even find one instance of cheating, the knowledge that this may happen has some deterrent value

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix C. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at 4:11 p.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found. All brackets are in the original, except those indicating the omission of material.

Weinberger—analogy to laws against bank robbery—we’ve always offered on-site verification—we should go in with best set of conditions, even if we can’t verify w/on-site *or* don’t get in negotiations

Shultz—inclined to go along w/ this . . . but what disturbs me is that if we get an agreement & find they’ve cheated after several yrs, we’re left w/ a serious imbalance

Weinberger—high moral ground, and we should keep it

Shultz—approach on grounds we can’t trust them . . . assume that if we can’t verify, they’ll cheat—evaluate the importance to ourselves on this grounds that it will be done . . . how essential is it to our purpose?

President—[rewords . . . discussion ensues on what the generic issue involves . . . covert]

McMahon—web of verification/network of constraints—Soviets will worry about getting caught

Shultz—but what will they have done over the 5 years

Pres—alternative is we’d have to do it also

Gen Vessey—we don’t want to do certain things . . . can’t go to Congress because we can’t verify

Weinberger—we should go in w/what we want to get—like laws—importance to us a valid issue, but not here

Pres—[discusses zero option]

Grey—we should have opportunity to raise in SCC . . . basis for challenge

McF—agreed to adopt #2?

[no comments]

McF—final one . . . designated locations for storage . . . verification again the issue—comments

Pres—our attitude has to be that of preacher in church who let the only one-armed man pass the basket

McF—last group of constraints . . . question again is verification

Shultz—same arguments apply—I’m not convinced it’s a good thing to go with . . . logic troublesome

Weinberger—reconstitution favors Soviets now . . . again, argues for on-site inspection . . . hollow & shallow w/o it

Shultz—makes it hollow & shallow . . . means if we don’t get this, we don’t have much

Pres—is it easier to verify if we close down production facilities?

McMahon—put inspectors at choke points

Shultz—why don’t we aspire to have a reconstitution capability?

Weinberger—(expensive . . . several reasons)

Pres—30% & 50% worry me . . . how do we explain to nuclear protestors?

Gen Vessey—(explains function of spare launchers)

Pres—I see . . . w/o warheads

Weinberger—anything we can do to get onsite inspection

McF—even w/spares, below SALT II

Gray—(makes point of SCC again)

Meese—isn't key issue whether to have onsite verification (discussion, briefly)

Adelman—our problem over the years has been calling violations—treaties may have provisions (e.g., re: yellow rain) but we've been poor in calling

Pres—challenge immediately, and if we find even one, we're back in an arms race and we'll outbuild you

McF—(summarize . . . include in instructions) . . . Middle East

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.]

33. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 13, 1982, 1754Z

8375. Subject: (U) End-of-round report: START

1. This is START-091. Secret-Entire text.

2. Our primary objective during the opening round of START which ended on August 12 was to set forth the US proposal as outlined by President Reagan on May 9 in Eureka.² We explained the major criteria on which our proposal is based: stability, equality, reductions, and effective verification. We pointed out that the Soviet buildup of highly accurate ICBMs capable of a disarming first strike against US ICBMs has brought about a destabilizing situation. It is our intention in START to encourage force structures in both the US and the USSR which are more stabilizing. We made it clear that we are not seeking identical force structures, but rather equality in the most significant measures of strategic capability. We rejected the Soviet concept of

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820421-1039. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to DOD, USIA, the White House, JCS, Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

² See Document 17.

“equality and equal security” as a basis for START agreement because they use it to justify Soviet claims to a right to a greater strategic capability than ours. Throughout, we stressed that our proposal calls for substantial reductions to equal and verifiable levels.

3. Once we had laid out the US criteria, we presented the detailed elements of the US proposal:

- A phased approach; highest priority on the most destabilizing strategic systems—namely, ballistic missiles.

- First phase

- 5,000 warheads on deployed ballistic missiles, no more than 2,500 of which would be ICBM warheads.

- 850 aggregate ceiling on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.

- Three collateral constraints:

- No more than 110 heavy ICBMs;

- A ban on new heavy missiles;

- No more than 210 heavy and medium ICBMs.

- If the Soviets accepted substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and counted the backfire, we could agree to equal numbers of heavy bombers in the first phase.

- Ceiling of approximately 200 kg on the mass of reentry vehicles on new ballistic missile systems and limits of 10 warheads on ICBMs and 14 on SLBMs.

- Effective verification is essential including, whenever necessary, going beyond NTM.

- Stressed the importance of data exchange and proposed a ban on all encryption of telemetry during flight-testing.

4. The Soviets presented three sets of proposals:

- First, a freeze on the numbers and modernization of strategic arms, which we rejected.

- Second, phased reductions in ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to a level of 1,800 by the year 1990. (They conditioned their proposal on no increase in so-called “FBS.”) They said they would reduce the aggregate level of nuclear weapons on systems limited by their proposal, but refused to specify the number pending “resolution” of the cruise missile issue. They also called for a ban on all cruise missiles and ASBMs over 600 km.

- The reductions would be accompanied by restrictions on modernization, focusing mainly on sea-based systems. Their proposal would prevent most of our programs but allow most of theirs to go ahead.

- Third, a series of confidence-building measures as part of a START agreement.

—Second phase

—A direct and equal limit on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current US level.

—Consider, in the second phase, reductions in heavy bombers and other constraints on slow-flying systems.

5. The Soviets did not call for compensation for British and French forces in START. They did, however, indicate they would, under some circumstances, seek compensation for Chinese nuclear forces. We told them that third country forces would not be included or compensated for. As in the past, the Soviets said there should be a non-circumvention and non-transfer provision. We responded in post-plenary that we would not change existing patterns of cooperation with our allies.

6. It is evident that there are considerable differences between the US and the Soviet positions. We told the Soviets that the basic deficiency of their approach is that it contains no objective and coherent concept for enhancing the stability of the US-Soviet strategic relationship. In contrast to our approach, theirs provides no incentive to move away from reliance upon destabilizing systems. We told the Soviets they fail to recognize: (1) the destabilizing nature of ICBMs, (2) the distinction between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, (3) the importance of ballistic missile throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability, and (4) the current asymmetries in destructive capability cannot be allowed to continue.

7. The Soviet proposal calls for reductions of only 20 percent from the high aggregate level of SALT II (2250). Moreover, by failing to use proper units of account, their reductions would not have a major impact on the destructive capabilities of strategic forces. Finally, the Soviet proposal would not channel modernization in a way that promotes stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war.

8. We told the Soviets that our proposal, by contrast, promotes stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war through substantial reductions to equal levels in the most significant measures of strategic capability. We said both nations would stand to benefit from the US proposal. Under our proposal we would both have to reduce ballistic missile warheads by about one-third. The US would have to reduce its deployed ballistic missiles by about one-half. The Soviets would have to reduce more deployed ballistic missiles and more ICBM warheads, but this simply reflects the fact that the Soviets have built up more. We will have to reduce more SLBM warheads, but the ongoing Soviet programs to deploy new MIRVed SLBMs on Delta and Typhoon Class submarines will allow the Soviets to build up to the 2,500 level.

9. Although there are some tentative signs of similarity in our positions, the differences between us are serious and fundamental. In contrast to the early rounds of SALT, however, the Soviets came prepared to get into specifics early in the talks. The Soviet delegation adopted a businesslike tone and, for the most part, avoided polemics. As a result, we are considerably further along in understanding each other's position than we were at an equivalent stage in the SALT negotiations. I attribute this to three reasons. First, the Soviets, in my opinion, want (and may need) an agreement. Second, they were caught off-guard by the boldness and appeal of our START proposal outlined by the President in Eureka on May 9. And third, Karpov and I know each other and have debated most of the issues in SALT II.

10. We have proposed to the Soviets a sound and equitable approach to achieving a strategic arms reduction agreement. We have spelled out, in detail, the advantages of the US proposal. We have pointed out that our proposal requires substantial reductions in the more destabilizing systems. We have adopted meaningful units of account and called for equal quantitative and qualitative limits on ballistic missiles. We told the Soviets we have serious problems with their proposal and at the close of the round we strongly urged them to reevaluate their position.

11. In conclusion, I think there are three courses of action we must pursue simultaneously if we are to preserve our security and move toward a satisfactory START agreement. First, and most important, we need to keep our defense programs intact. Nothing will impress the Soviets more than the knowledge that we have the will and resolve to fund the programs we need for force modernization. Therefore, only when the Soviet leadership is convinced that we will match them will they sign an agreement. Second, we need a sustained public information campaign which keeps before the public the fact that our proposal is better than theirs. The Soviets must not be allowed to recover their traditional propaganda edge. Third, we need to maintain a firm, reasonable and patient posture at the negotiating table.

12. The US position is a reasonable one. It seeks to reduce the risk of nuclear war by focusing first on the most destabilizing weapons. The Soviet position, by contrast, would simply preserve current destabilizing Soviet advantages. The essence of any negotiation is to build on common ground. Nevertheless, it is entirely premature to believe that the Soviets have presented us with sufficient positive points for us to begin making concessions. Experience in past arms control talks has shown that when the US seeks points of compromise prematurely the Soviets simply dig in their heels and then raise their demands. During the next round, which opens in Geneva October 6, I think we should continue to elaborate, in a firm and patient manner, the US position

and to demonstrate how it benefits both our nations. But in the final analysis my success will depend on the maintenance of our defense programs and on holding our current advantage in the public relations arena.

Rowny

34. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, August 23, 1982

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD on Non-Deployed Missiles (S)

I received a call today from John Poindexter, who relayed a question that you had with the draft NSDD² on non-deployed missiles. He told me that you had asked why the numerical range of 30–50 percent was not included in the discussion of the quantitative limit on total inventory. He asked me to talk to you about this so that we could resolve this issue and get the NSDD signed.

We intentionally did not include the 30–50 percent number in the draft NSDD even though it had been discussed at the NSC meeting.³ Our rationale was that the essence of the President's decision was to place an inventory limit on non-deployed missiles. The interagency paper clearly identified the fact that we had in mind a limit of about 30–50 percent; however, if we were to include that number in the NSDD, we felt we would be unnecessarily restricting the implementation of the President's decision. For example, if on further review the community were able to agree on a limit set at 25 percent, given the President's remarks, we are sure that such a limit would be preferable to the President.

All agencies are aware that the 30–50 percent number was included in the interagency paper supporting the NSDD. Simply put, we thought

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 079, NSDD 053, START IV. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Boverie, who did not initial the memorandum.

² Not found.

³ See Document 32.

the President would be best served by not locking the interagency into those specific limits as tightly as would be the case if those numbers were included in the NSDD. This approach and rationale were discussed with both State (Howe) and Defense (Perle); both agencies agreed.⁴

Recommendation

That the NSDD be approved as written.⁵

⁴ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

⁵ McFarlane initialed his approval. NSDD–53 is printed as Document 36.

35. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 30, 1982

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD Reflecting Decisions Reached at August 9 NSC Meeting

Issue

Should you approve/sign the attached NSDD?²

Facts

The attached draft NSDD (Tab A) does the following:

- reflects the decisions reached at the August 9th NSC meeting on START;³
- provides guidance on verification measures associated with those decisions (with the guidance drawn from the Interdepartmental Paper developed to support the NSC meeting); and
- tasks additional Interdepartmental work.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 079, NSDD 053 [START IV]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

² See Document 36.

³ See Document 32.

Discussion

We have discussed this draft NSDD with State and Defense, and we feel it is ready for your approval and signature.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you approve and sign the draft NSDD provided at Tab A.⁴

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

36. National Security Decision Directive 53¹

Washington, September 1, 1982

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—IV (U)

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33,² NSDD-36³ and NSDD-44.⁴ It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START. (S)

The existence of non-deployed Soviet ICBMs poses a potential threat to the United States since, under certain conditions, those spare missiles could be used to augment the strategic capability provided by deployed Soviet forces. The principal threats posed by non-deployed missiles are as reserve forces for use in a protracted nuclear war or for large-scale breakout through new deployments should a treaty expire,

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 079, NSDD 053 [START IV]. Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Jones, Rostow, and Rowny, copying Armstrong, under cover of a September 3 memorandum (which McFarlane signed on Clark's behalf): "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-53). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-53 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

² See Document 19.

³ See Document 24.

⁴ See Document 29.

or be violated or abrogated. The following additional constraints are designed to minimize the threats posed by non-deployed ballistic missiles and should be added as elements of the U.S. START position. (C)

Limits Applied at ICBM Complexes (U)

The following constraints, to be applied at ICBM complexes, are intended to ensure that refire missiles are not readily available near launchers and that a rapid refire capability from fixed launchers cannot be developed or tested. (U)

- Ban the development, testing or deployment of rapid reload capability for fixed launchers. (S)

- Ban the storage of ICBMs or hardened missile storage facilities for ICBMs at ICBM complexes in excess of the number required for normal deployment plus a small additional allowance of one or two spare missiles per ICBM complex for maintenance and training. (S)

- Limit the ground support equipment on ICBM complexes to the quantity and type required to support normal deployment and maintenance. (S)

- Establish in the treaty the principle that activities aimed at providing for the reconstitution of expended ICBM launchers with refire missiles are not acceptable. (S)

Non-Quantitative Constraints on Non-deployed Ballistic Missiles (U)

The following constraints are intended to apply non-quantitative limits on the “non-deployed” ballistic missiles possessed by both sides. (U)

- Require that all deployed missiles retired to achieve the limit of 850 deployed missiles must either be directly accounted for and limited by constraints on the total inventory of non-deployed missiles, or be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures. (S)

- Require that non-deployed missiles of types that are no longer deployed must be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures. (S)

The intent of the above constraints is to assure that only non-deployed missiles for which there exists a legitimate training, testing or maintenance requirement are allowed. Special provisions may need to be negotiated for space launch boosters using retired missile types or booster components from retired types, and for new types of missiles requiring development testing. Special provisions may also need to be negotiated so as not to restrict the limited possession of new types of missiles produced pending the availability of a launcher permitting their deployment. (S)

- Require that all empty launchers associated with missiles retired to meet the limit of 850 deployed missiles, be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures. (S)

- Require that, with the exception of the one or two non-deployed missiles permitted per launch complex to support training and maintenance, all non-deployed missiles be stored at a limited number of designated facilities located at a specific distance from operational missile complexes. (S)

Quantitative Constraints on Non-deployed Ballistic Missiles (U)

The following constraint is intended to place a direct limit on the quantity of non-deployed ballistic missiles (both ICBMs and SLBMs) possessed by both sides. (S)

—Require a numerical limit be applied to the total number of non-deployed ballistic missiles possessed in the inventories of both sides. Non-deployed missiles above the allowed limit would have to be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures. (S)

Data Exchange (U)

The U.S. should require the exchange of data, to include periodic updates as needed, to support the proposed constraints on non-deployed missiles. (S)

Verification and Monitoring (U)

In proposing the above constraints on non-deployed missiles, it is recognized that, with respect to certain of the constraints, effective verification will require that we go beyond National Technical Means alone, by incorporating means including active cooperative measures to monitor compliance. (S)

With respect to the constraints proposed at ICBM complexes, the United States should seek access to ICBM complexes to ensure compliance, especially with the limits placed on the number of non-deployed missiles permitted at such facilities. This should be undertaken to the extent that reciprocal access to U.S. ICBM complexes is consistent with U.S. legal and security requirements. (S)

With respect to the non-quantitative constraints proposed, the following guidance applies: (U)

—The U.S. should seek both active and passive measures including on-site presence as a means of obtaining high confidence in our ability to monitor the destruction of missiles and launchers as required by the constraints. (S)

—The U.S. should also seek access to the areas surrounding ICBM complexes to determine that there are no non-deployed ICBMs in the immediate vicinity of these facilities. This should be undertaken to the extent that reciprocal access is consistent with U.S. legal and security requirements. (S)

—The U.S. should consider the possibility of the right to a limited number of inspections in other areas if such an option shows promise of increasing our overall monitoring confidence or decreasing the Soviets' confidence in successfully avoiding detection over time, should they choose to store covertly additional or banned missiles at other than designated storage sites. (S)

With respect to monitoring the quantitative limit set on the number of non-deployed missiles permitted to either side, the U.S. should seek

active and passive measures to include access to count the number of missiles actually stored at designated storage locations. We should also consider applying these measures to production facilities and consider the possibility of a right to a limited number of inspections outside of designated areas, consistent with U.S. legal and security requirements associated with reciprocal access. (S)

Even with highly intrusive verification to include on-site inspection, the monitoring confidence of some of the individual elements of this total package of constraints will be low. However, the network of constraints developed by the entire package of proposed measures provides us greater confidence in both our ability to limit the threat posed by non-deployed missiles and to monitor overall compliance, than if the individual elements of the package were applied separately. (S)

Limits on Soft Launch Capability (U)

Limits on testing of ICBMs from fixed, surface sites in order to constrain the development of a combat soft launch capability were considered but rejected. (C)

The Intelligence Community should closely monitor Soviet programs for evidence of the development of a combat soft launch capability. If such evidence is detected, U.S. options in this area will be reassessed. (C)

Additional Work(U)

The refinement of the U.S. negotiating position should continue as planned by the START Interdepartmental Group. In addition, the following guidance is provided: (U)

—The START Interdepartmental Group shall conduct a detailed review of both the Soviet negotiating position and the Soviet criticism of the U.S. negotiating position as presented by the Soviet delegation during the first round of negotiations. The results of this review should be provided to the NSC by September 17, 1982. (C)

—The START Interdepartmental Group shall develop recommendations concerning the details of specific verification measures that the U.S. should propose to monitor compliance with the constraints on non-deployed missiles. The recommendations should be based upon the guidance with respect to verification measures contained in this directive. This product should be provided to the NSC by December 1, 1982. (C)

Ronald Reagan

37. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 13, 1982

SUBJECT

START and INF

Nuclear negotiations with the Soviets will return to center stage over the next several months, what with the resumption of the talks themselves, your meeting with Gromyko,² UN and NATO diplomatic activity, and “freeze” politics at home. I want to share with you and Ken my thoughts on the issues we will face in this period and beyond.

START

The Soviet proposal is not, in my opinion, warmed-over SALT II, as our chief negotiator suggests. Rather, it is roughly what might have been expected from them in SALT III, had SALT II been ratified—an offer of significant, but not deep, reductions linked to restrictions on US forces of chief concern to Moscow, cruise and theater (INF) missiles. The Administration’s approach has thus produced dividends:

—By convincing the Soviets that we’re committed to US nuclear force modernization, we’ve induced them to offer more than they’ve offered before in order to restrain our programs.

—By adopting a politically appealing deep reductions proposal, we’ve caused them to follow suit, albeit in lesser measure, in order to deny us sole possession of the high ground.

—By saying, in effect, we’ll respect SALT II limits, we’ve convinced them to move on to more ambitious arms control instead of concentrating on bringing SALT II formally into force.

The main differences between us and the Soviets concern: (1) the level of reductions; and (2) the fact that the Soviets do not share our interest in concentrating reductions in ballistic weapons. They haven’t accepted our view that *fast* (i.e., ballistic) weapons are more destabilizing than *slow* (i.e., bomber and cruise) weapons. Moreover, concentrat-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1982 START. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Dam. In a handwritten covering memorandum, Eagleburger wrote: “GS—I don’t claim to be a disarmament expert (with good reason). But the ramifications politically—particularly in Europe and here at home—are substantial. Thus, I’ve done the attached to try to give some sense of the complexity of the issues. LSE.” (Ibid.)

² Shultz met with Gromyko on September 28 at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. A record of their conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 217.

ing on ballistic weapons would require major changes in their ballistic-oriented force posture while leaving us free to produce in great numbers the weapons about which they are most concerned: cruise missiles.

To be sure, there are other obstacles: whether or not the Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted as a strategic delivery vehicle; whether and how to limit non-deployed missiles; and whether the Soviets will accept intrusive verification measures. But these should prove manageable if a deal could be struck on the central issues of how far and what to reduce. (I address below the Soviet demand that a START agreement be accompanied by abandonment of our INF deployment program.) All in all, it is not unrealistic to contemplate a START agreement within the next two years, provided both sides make a determined effort.

I happen to believe that a START agreement somewhere between the current US and Soviet positions would be very much in our strategic interest, not to mention a major success for the President and proof that our approach to nuclear arms control and dealing with Moscow has been correct. I'm convinced that there will be no agreement if we do not go a reasonable distance to meet Soviet concerns about cruise missiles, especially the air- and sea-launched versions, where our growth potential is greatest, and that the pay-off of cutting the Soviet ballistic force would more than justify placing our cruise programs under limits.

Others will argue that an agreement is in our interest only if it is based on our opening position. They claim that the survivability of our land-based missiles would not be enhanced by a START agreement permitting the Soviets significantly more land-based missiles than our proposal would allow. They point out that our air- and sea-launched cruise missiles are strictly retaliatory forces and that constraining them would therefore weaken deterrence. Finally, some will argue that a START agreement is almost certain to undercut popular support for sustained growth in defense spending, so we'd better insist on an agreement that cuts Soviet forces drastically. While I'm not persuaded by these arguments, they are serious and deserve your consideration.

The question of whether to make a serious effort to get an agreement should also be viewed in the context of what relationship we want with Moscow. The Soviet move suggests to me that Moscow still wants to do business with this Administration. The Soviets will draw conclusions from how we handle START about whether we want to do business with them in areas of potential common interest.

If, in this succession period, the Soviets conclude that the Administration is not interested in progress in what has always been treated as an area of strong common interest, they will have to wonder whether there is any point in showing moderation in other areas. Again, there

are other ways to look at it. We have said that progress in arms control should be accompanied by progress toward settling international problems caused by Soviet misdeeds. Some would argue—and I'm not altogether unsympathetic—that a US effort to yield progress in START would lead the Soviets to conclude that all the talk about linkage was just that: talk. My own view is that, even with tight linkage, we won't find it easy to use Soviet interest in restraining our nuclear programs as a lever to alter Soviet international conduct—but what leverage we have will be removed if the Soviets think we want arms control progress no matter how they and their proxies behave.

Assuming we want to go for an agreement—unless the Soviets embark on new foreign adventures—timing can be crucial. On the one hand, if, say, a year passes from the time the negotiations began (this past spring) and the US has not budged, the Soviets are likely to dismiss the idea of an agreement with this Administration. On the other hand, if we leap too quickly, the Soviets may conclude that they can get an agreement closer to their current position than to ours if they just stand pat. We might therefore think in terms of a substantive move early next year, perhaps signalled in a January meeting between you and Gromyko. This would leave a full year for give-and-take before getting so close to the American election as to create an appearance of using START for electoral purposes.

INF

Differences between us and the Soviets in this negotiation are more profound. The prospects for convergence are poor: we lack negotiating leverage (our missile deployments don't even start until late next year); our demand that the Soviets dismantle their entire long-range missile force is not remotely realistic; and we and the Soviets disagree sharply over whether to include aircraft (we say no, they say yes), French and British forces (we say no, they say yes), and Soviet forces opposite China (we say yes, they say no).

Through two negotiating rounds, we haven't budged. The Soviets have made cosmetic changes and are likely to make substantive concessions in order to pin blame for the lack of progress on us, induce the Allies to pressure us to soften our position, and, most importantly, erode support for our missile deployment plan. The Allies will want us to show that we are making every effort to get an agreement before deployments begin, even if they realize that an agreement may be unobtainable.

In considering the possibility of changing our INF position, the most important question is what impact it would have on Allied support for modernization. If European publics perceive the sides to be far apart because of US intransigence, they will be susceptible to the

claim that we are using the negotiations as a cover to permit the deployments—then we'll be in trouble. If they see the sides far apart because of *Soviet* intransigence, we can make the argument that the deployments must begin before the Soviets will have sufficient incentive to negotiate in earnest. At the same time, if we make a move, we could create a sense of progress and put the Soviets in the position of moving further themselves while warning that hopes for an agreement would evaporate if deployments commence. It's important to bear in mind that much of the European support for deployments is based on the argument that the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate unless they were convinced that we will proceed with deployments absent an agreement. Faced with new hope that success in negotiations might make deployments unnecessary, combined with a fear that commencing deployments might damage the negotiations, large segments of European opinion might be drawn to the idea of delaying deployments "to give arms control more time." It's hard to forecast how "Europe" will react to INF negotiating developments. But it's clear that managing these political dynamics will require great skill and close consultations with key Allied leaders, especially the German Chancellor.

My own feeling is that we should be prepared to alter our INF position if and when it becomes clear that failure to do so will jeopardize support for modernization. That said, we should not stray from our insistence on equal limits and significant reductions. Nor should we get drawn into a deal that would allow both us and the Soviets to maintain INF missiles outside of Europe while banning them in Europe; this would suggest a "decoupling" of the US from Europe without eliminating the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Rather, we should consider such possibilities as offering limits on aircraft (which the Joint Chiefs would oppose) and proposing equal missile limits greater than zero (but well below current Soviet and planned US force levels). We might also think about the possibility of offering limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) as part of an INF agreement. The Soviets will insist that these weapons be treated either in START or INF; if we put them in START the Allies will see us using the negotiating leverage of our SLCM program to limit the threat to us instead of the threat to them. There are those who argue that we shouldn't put SLCM's on the negotiating block at all—and, indeed, I would recommend considering a numerical ceiling, not a ban.

The START-INF Link

The Soviets have said they will not go along with strategic reductions if we are left free to build up forces that can strike the USSR from Europe. While they may soften this stance, they will at least want to

have an INF agreement more or less in hand before accepting a START agreement. For vastly different reasons, the Allies will insist on the same link. We'd face a violent political storm—especially in Germany—if it appeared that we were making a more serious effort to reduce the nuclear threat to the US than to reduce the nuclear threat to Western Europe.

The link works in reverse as well. An INF agreement would be largely irrelevant without a START agreement, since the Soviets would be free to add "strategic" forces and target them on Europe instead of on us. In practice, however, we're unlikely to find it easier to reach an INF agreement than a START agreement.

There are a range of possibilities for linking START and INF: separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at separate times; separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at roughly the same time; separate negotiations leading to a single agreement with separate limits on strategic and INF systems; merged negotiations leading to a single agreement with integrated limits on strategic and INF systems. It's too early to say which approach is best. One option we don't have is going for a START agreement without at least being prepared to try for movement in INF. Ultimately, we may face the dilemma of what to do if we and the Soviets are ready to settle on strategic limits but are still far apart on INF limits. For now, we'd be wise to accompany any move in START with an equally significant move in INF, lest we trigger a German anxiety attack.

"Freeze" Politics

The Administration stayed ahead of the freeze movement this past spring by beginning START and making the argument that a freeze would remove the Soviets' incentive to agree to strategic reductions. Of course, posing the issue as a choice between a freeze and reductions only works if reductions are believed to be achievable. It won't be long before the critics start asking (rhetorically) where the progress is. If the Administration responds that we are making progress, it will be admitting that the Soviets have made an important proposal, in which case pressures will increase to alter our own START position. If the Administration wants to avoid giving the Soviets credit for their move, it will have to claim there has been little progress, in which case interest in a freeze will grow. One advantage of a US move in START is that it permits us to cite progress without crediting the Soviets and adding to the pressure on ourselves. That said, I for one would not favor a move until early next year.

The Interagency Problem

I haven't tried to convince you to follow a particular course; you'll want to get others' views and do some thinking of your own. But I

hope I have convinced you that success—however defined—will require agility. Unfortunately, the existing interagency process relies on bottom-up thinking and is plagued by philosophical differences so severe that those who have good ideas that might produce progress are afraid to float them. Unless the process is made more responsive, those opposed to movement will prevail by default. At a minimum, the initiative in these negotiations will shift to the Soviets, and we'll find it hard to manage the politics of INF in Europe and the politics of the "freeze" at home.

Altering interagency procedures—e.g., setting up a new group chaired by NSC staff—won't solve the basic problem. What is needed is for everyone to have a clearer sense of where the President wants to see these negotiations go. If he wants progress, he will need to make known that he wants to consider options that would produce progress. If he wants to sit tight, we shouldn't worry that the system is unresponsive. My hunch is that he would at least want to consider what might be done to get movement. The way to find out is not by asking him to react piece-meal to specific negotiating issues that cannot be settled in the bureaucratic trenches, but rather by offering him your broad ideas directly and getting a reaction.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger³

³ Eagleburger initialed the memorandum "LSE" above his typed signature.

38. Letter From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 20, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your May 13 tasking,² several members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have been meeting regularly to examine the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor and assess SALT/START compliance and verification issues.

We applaud your recent decisions which have provided additional policy guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations and which have addressed the important initial issues raised in our Semi-Annual Report to you.³

To implement your decisions and to focus activities of the START teams, we believe that certain actions, if taken promptly, will allow the Intelligence Community to better fulfill their responsibilities. We recommend four actions directly related to START, and one that is indirectly related:

1. *A Draft Treaty be Prepared.* Past arms control negotiations demonstrate conclusively that until very specific options and provisions are stated in written, treaty form, one cannot come to grips with the critical aspects and details regarding verification. Indeed in the past, the Soviets have explicitly made the provisions ambiguous in order to circumvent the intentions of the treaty rather than agreeing to specifics that would constitute a violation. The vagueness and lack of comprehensiveness in the language of SALT I, the interim agreements, and of SALT II have caused much of the uncertainty connected with the question of Soviet compliance with those agreements.

It is not possible to make informed judgments as to the adequacy of the START proposals without reviewing the legal language codifying these proposals. For this reason, it is important that draft treaty lan-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, CVG (Consolidated Verification Committee) December 1982. Top Secret.

² According to an undated paper titled "Tasking for PFIAB Review of START monitoring," Reagan told the PFIAB at a May 13 meeting: "I would like you to examine the intelligence community's capability, methodology, and organization for monitoring, assessing, and acting on SALT/START compliance issues. What are the scope and limits of the intelligence community's ability to monitor possible violation and to pursue compliance issues." (Ibid.) [TS] Minutes for the May 13 PFIAB meeting were not found.

³ Not found.

guage be developed as soon as possible so that the requirements for verification and avenues for circumvention can be addressed.

2. *A Verification Monitoring Mechanism Be Created.* At present there does not exist within the Executive Branch a high level interagency group entirely devoted to all aspects of the verification problem. In our view, this is a serious deficiency. We believe that such a group should be formed (chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security) and turn its attention to the following issues without delay.

—First, it should establish a “Red Team” whose function would be to anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets (viewed from their perspective) might try to cheat on a START agreement.

—Second, as a closely related matter, a critical and detailed study should be undertaken of possible Soviet Cover, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D) activities directly related to strategic arms. [4 lines not declassified] This may require a carefully chosen team of both government and non-government experts.

—Third, the group should study intensively the utility of on-site inspection in careful detail. Our impression is that, as important as National Technical Means of verification are, and will remain, on-site inspection may be essential to START for two reasons: a) to provide the necessary level of assurance of Soviet compliance; and b) to enhance deterrence of the Soviet temptation to cheat.

3. *A Set of Compliance Actions be Generated.* A range of specific appropriate and credible actions should be developed which the U.S. could take if violations were detected. The current Soviet activities regarding the SS-16, a mobile ICBM system, illustrate the dilemma which we face when a possible violation occurs in the absence of a predetermined alternative set of responses. [7 lines not declassified]

We recommend that an effort be initiated to develop alternative actions (possible “measured responses”) to respond to Soviet actions which would constitute violations of the treaty (trade, public information programs, U.S. military developments, foreign aid, etc.). We do not imply that abrogation of existing agreements should be excluded as an option, but rather that it, together with other possible responses, should be assessed *before* we enter into another arms control agreement with the Soviets. Only in that way can we judge what the practical political inhibitions and consequences will be to drawing a conclusion that a violation has occurred.

4. *An Analysis of Military Balance be Performed.* There is an implicit presumption that the U.S. position in START, if eventually accepted by the USSR, would be manifestly in the strategic interest of the U.S. This may well be the case. The matter is directly relevant to verification in at least two important respects:

—Depending upon what the strategic analysis demonstrates about the reduced capabilities on the two sides, verification of violations may

be of greater or lesser significance. If, for example, the strategic balance which emerges from START is a delicately balanced one, then obviously, cheating could change that balance and vitally affect our national interests. If the resulting balance is grossly stable within reasonable assumptions on a possible US-USSR nuclear exchange, then cheating at the margin could still have major political implications but might not fundamentally impinge upon U.S. military security.

—If, however unlikely, the analysis should demonstrate that an acceptance of START would be strategically disadvantageous to the U.S. then the issue of verification takes on a very different meaning. We would presumably take little comfort from an assured capability of virtually perfect verification of an agreement which resulted in a fundamentally unstable military balance.

We wish to underline as clearly as possible that we have no *a priori* assumption about the nature of the strategic logic underlying START. We do recommend, however, that you request the DoD prepare a report assessing the consequences for the military balance of an acceptance of the U.S. START position and likely alternatives with, as a subsidiary point, the sensitivity of this balance to possible Soviet cheating.

5. *A Study of ABM Treaty Compliance as it Relates to START be Initiated.* As you know, the ABM Treaty requires a review every five years; 1982 is a review year. The possible utility of an ABM defense for U.S. security requires closest scrutiny.

The Soviets have used the 10-year period of the Treaty to pour enormous resources into their ABM effort while we have permitted ours to atrophy. The danger exists that if we do not reverse our present course, permitting the Treaty to continue without modification and our own programs to languish, the Soviets will come even closer to choosing an optimum point for abrogating the Treaty and execute a major strategic “breakout.” Such an action could make START and its verifiability irrelevant. [5 lines not declassified]

While several efforts are underway within the government (including an Intelligence Community estimate on Soviet ABM activities) to consider our policy with regard to the upcoming ABM Treaty review, none seem to have the urgency, high-level policy direction, or coordination with START which is warranted.

We suggest that a senior level group under the NSC be tasked to pull together on-going efforts on an urgent basis. The report should include, but not be limited to, the following points:

—What do we understand about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and what actions might be deemed inconsistent with the spirit or letter of the Treaty?

—How could continued adherence to or abrogation of the ABM Treaty relate to U.S. START objectives?

—What would be the consequences if the Soviets choose an optimum time to abrogate the Treaty and effect a strategic “breakout”?

—How good are our verification and compliance capabilities against the possibility in 3 above?

Mr. President, the Board plans to continue to pursue this subject and will report again in the next few months. In the interim, we would be grateful for any reaction you choose to provide.

Sincerely,

Anne Armstrong
Chairman

39. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 1, 1982, 0644Z

10874. Subject: (U) Basic elements of a START agreement.

1. This is START II–031. Secret Entire text.

2. This message (and attached draft basic elements of an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms) represents the delegation's judgments on matters which need priority attention. It outlines the likely course of events in future negotiating sessions and maps out a strategy for moving the negotiation in a direction favorable to the United States.

3. The US delegation is continuing to present the merits of the US proposal and to lay out additional details. We are stressing the importance of crisis stability as the main reason to reduce the destabilizing Soviet ICBM force. The Soviets continue to claim that the US is seeking one-sided reductions in the backbone of the Soviet force and they charge the US with lack of "comprehensiveness," in failing to limit US slow-flying systems.

4. The two sides are thus speaking on different conceptual planes and focusing on different limitations. Each concentrates on what it views as the central strategic problem which an agreement should resolve. The US is focusing on the current destabilizing disparity in ICBM capabilities. The Soviets are focusing on what they claim to be the destabilizing potential of US bombers and cruise missiles.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820565–0400. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

5. We will continue to advocate the fundamental rationale for the US position. Particularly the focus on destabilizing ICBMs. We can expect the Soviets to continue to charge that the US proposal is not comprehensive because it fails to address cruise missiles. In response we will emphasize that, in fact, it is the Soviet approach which lacks comprehensiveness because it fails to address a major indicator of strategic capability, that is, ballistic missile throw-weight. The delegation believes, however, that by the end of the current round, our strategy of continuing to focus exclusively on the constraints the US envisions for the first phase of reductions will have largely exhausted its usefulness in terms of achieving our broader objectives.

6. At the same time the delegation recognizes—and would like to exploit—the fact that the Soviets have shown an intense interest in limits on cruise missiles. This offers us significant leverage with respect to achieving both our phase one and phase two goals. Thus, the delegation believes that we should be in a position by the beginning of round three to discuss the entire range of constraints the US envisions in both phases of reductions. This would include direct limits on throw-weight. A ban on heavy missiles, etc., as quids for further constraints on slow-flying systems. Such an approach would be conditioned on a Soviet willingness to discuss all elements of the first and second phases comprehensively.

7. The delegation believes that apart from its more fundamental merits, the approach outlined above would also mitigate potential political risks for the United States. At some point the Soviets can be expected to go into a high gear propaganda campaign, claiming that the United States is obstructing efforts to reach an agreement in START. Brezhnev may have previewed such a campaign on October 21st by claiming that “difficulties” in the talks are caused by US unwillingness to move toward an agreement based on equality and equal security. The Soviets may also table a draft treaty at an early stage in round three in an effort to put us on the defensive.

8. Under the circumstances it would be to the US negotiating advantage if we were in a position to table the basic elements of an agreement early in round three. Such a document could place our proposed first phase reductions up front in specific terms and indicate comprehensiveness by listing the elements of the second phase specifically where we can, or where appropriate, in a conditional manner or, finally, where desirable, by tabling the document with blanks. An illustration of the type of document which the delegation envisions follows in paragraph 10. Variations of suggested treatments are shown by brackets.

9. Accordingly, it is recommended that Washington complete its current studies on the nature and extent of second phase limits and

constraints as soon as possible, so that its conclusions will afford the delegation the option of tabling, early in round three, a refined version of the following basic elements of an agreement.

10. Basic Elements of an Agreement
On the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms

I

Each party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms to equal levels and complete the reductions required to achieve these levels within (a specified period of time) after the entry into force of the agreement. Specifically, each party will:

A. Limit to no more than 5,000 the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles;

B. Limit to no more than 2,500 the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

C. Limit to no more than 850 the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;

D. Limit to no more than (blank) the aggregate number of its non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;

E. Limit to no more than 110 the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs and to no more than 210 the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs; and

F. Limit to no more than (blank) the number of its heavy bombers.

II

Each party will carry out the reductions called for in section I in accordance with agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at two-year intervals following the entry into force of the agreement.

III

Neither party will begin bracket develop, end bracket produce, flight-test, or deploy new begin bracket types of end bracket heavy ballistic missiles.

IV

Neither party will flight-test or deploy ICBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles nor test or deploy SLBMs with more than 14 reentry vehicles.

V

Neither party will flight-test or deploy reentry vehicles with a mass greater than approximately 200 kilograms on new ballistic missile systems. Begin bracket for new types of ballistic missiles the combined weight of the maximum number of reentry vehicles assigned thereto

must be greater than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight. End bracket.

VI

Each party will undertake constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles in addition to the numerical limit on non-deployed missiles in Section I. These will include a ban on ICBM rapid reload capability. A ban on excess ICBMs and hardened storage facilities at ICBM complexes and limits on the quantity and location of ground support equipment. In addition, each side will destroy missiles that have been retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, destroy missiles of non-deployed types, dismantle or destroy launchers associated with deployed missiles retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, and store all non-deployed missiles in designated storage facilities.

VII

Begin bracket beginning on (blank) end bracket or begin bracket following completion of the reductions called for in Section I end bracket, each party will carry out additional reductions and limitations. Specifically, each party will:

A. Limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ballistic missiles to no more than (blank) kilograms;

B. Destroy all its heavy ICBMs and dismantle or destroy all its launchers for heavy ICBMs.

C. Limit to no more than (blank) the number of its heavy bombers;

Begin bracket D. Adopt other limitations. If determined appropriate, with respect to further reductions in missiles and missile warhead levels" and "other constraints on slow-flying systems end bracket.

VIII

Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section VII of this document in accordance with agreed dismantling or destruction procedures and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at specified intervals.

IX

All of the preceding provisions will be carried out in accordance with agreed definitions counting rules, and type rules, which would specify for the purposes of the limitations set forth in the agreement:

—The definitions of systems to be limited.

—The relationship among deployed ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, ballistic missile warheads, and ballistic missile throw-weight;

—Criteria to distinguish between deployed and non deployed missiles;

—Physical and performance criteria to distinguish between existing types and new types of ballistic missiles;

—Criteria for inclusion of aircraft as heavy bombers;

—Criteria for inclusion of begin bracket cruise missiles end bracket or begin bracket Slow-flying systems pursuant to Section VII of this document end bracket; and

—Agreed numerical values for the definitions of light, medium, and heavy ICBMs.

X

For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the preceding provisions each party will use national technical means of verification, supplemented by specific, agreed cooperative measures. Interference with agreed verification measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement by agreed measures or by national technical means. Encryption of telemetry during flight-testing of systems limited by the agreement will be banned and specific provisions regarding access to flight-test data will be adopted. Prior to signature of this agreement, each party will provide data to the other for the purpose of establishing an agreed and substantial body of data concerning their strategic arms subject to limitation by the agreement. These data will reflect specific numerical values for all of the characteristics of weapons systems covered by agreement. This agreed data base will be established upon signature of the agreement and thereafter will be updated every six months. Begin bracket the standing consultative commission will be used, pursuant to regulations to be agreed, to promote implementation of the provisions of the agreement. End bracket.

XI

The agreement embodying these provisions will be of (blank) duration subject to review at specified, regular intervals and will be subject to withdrawal after six months' prior notification if a party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each party will be free to propose amendments at any time which, like the agreement itself, will be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party.

Rowny

40. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 10, 1982

SUBJECT

PFIAB Recommendation on START Verification and Arms Control

Issue

Should you sign the attached NSDD which responds to the PFIAB recommendations?²

Facts

Anne Armstrong has forwarded PFIAB's examination of the adequacy of the intelligence community's capability and organization for assessing SALT/START compliance issues (Tab C).³ Key PFIAB recommendations include:

- Creation of a high level policy mechanism to oversee review and assess all aspects of verification and compliance, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

- Creation of a "Red Team" to anticipate Soviet cheating scenarios.

- The development of range of measured action responses short of treaty abrogation which the US could take if violations were detected.

- Drafting of precise treaty language to prevent ambiguities and loopholes in verification of provisions.

- A critical review of Soviet cover, concealment and deception (CCD) actions related to strategic arms.

Discussion

The PFIAB recommendations are sound. Some progress is being made, but the interagency process has not worked properly in the verification area. Creation of a high level Verification Committee reporting to the NSC is a sine qua non for serious consideration of all aspects of compliance. The attached NSDD for your signature establishes the Verification Committee.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 080, NSDD 0065[Arms Control Verification Committee]. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed as Document 41.

³ Attached but not printed. See Document 38.

A letter to Anne Armstrong⁴ acknowledges the recommendations, and requests that PFIAB undertake the review of Soviet CCD in cooperation with Bill Casey.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	1. That you sign the attached NSDD. ⁵ (Tab A)
_____	_____	2. That you sign the letter to Anne Armstrong. ⁶ (Tab B)

⁴ Printed as Document 42.

⁵ An unknown hand indicated approval on Reagan's behalf.

⁶ An unknown hand indicated approval on Reagan's behalf.

41. National Security Decision Directive 65¹

Washington, November 10, 1982

*ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION COMMITTEE (U)*

Compliance with the provision of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success and therefore to US national security. Effective verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect possible violations of an agreement and provides timely warning of threats to our national security arising under an arms control treaty regime. Verification is also necessary to assure the confidence of the Congress and the public at large that specific arms control measures are compatible with our security. (U)

Effective verification may involve a number of policy judgments in addition to judgments about intelligence monitoring of the technical

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-080, NSDD 0065[Arms Control Verification Committee]. Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive under cover of a November 10 memorandum to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, Rostow, and Armstrong: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive establishing a Verification Committee. (Ibid.)

provisions of specific arms control agreements. The government must be organized and prepared to deal with all aspects of arms control monitoring, verification, and compliance issues in a systematic, orderly and timely manner. The degree of verifiability of proposed agreements must be adequately described for policymakers and judgments of effective verifiability must be fully integrated into the arms control planning and decision process. (U)

In the past, considerations of verification issues, especially allegations of violations and/or deceptions concerning various agreements, have proved to be unusually complex and difficult to resolve. In order to address issues of arms control verification and compliance more effectively and as an integral part of the arms control policy process, it is essential that an appropriate mechanism be established to deal with them comprehensively, in an integrated fashion, and on a continuing basis. (C)

Establishment of the Verification Committee

Therefore, in order to provide a focus for national arms control verification and compliance policy, a Verification Committee is established. The Verification Committee shall report to the National Security Council and shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

Membership of the Verification Committee

Membership shall include: senior representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (U)

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee shall include the following: (U)

- Development of US Government policy relative to verification and compliance. (C)

- Formulation of strategies for dealing with compliance problems. (C)

- Review of all arms control provisions or agreements developed in the interagency process with a view to assessing their verifiability, including START, INF, MBFR, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)

- Monitoring on a continuous basis the compliance situation in all arms control areas. (U)

- Review of requirements and threats to US monitoring capabilities and recommendations for assuring the required capabilities. (C)

—Overseeing preparation of periodic and special reports on compliance issues for the NSC and the President. (U)

—Overseeing United States Government preparation of periodic reports to Congress on verifiability as mandated by Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. (U)

Support of Interagency Groups

Appropriate interagency groups shall report to and support the Verification Committee on arms control verification issues as required. (U)

Immediate Tasks

The Verification Committee will undertake the following immediate actions: (U)

—Ensure the integration and prioritization of ongoing START and INF verification and monitoring work programs into a single coherent program of work. (C)

—A comprehensive review of current compliance issues with respect to all existing arms control agreements, particularly SALT, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)

—Creation of a permanent “Red Team” to challenge US verification capabilities, assumptions and policies. This team would anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets might try to avoid compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. START and INF should have highest priority. (S)

—A detailed examination of the benefits and limitations of cooperative verification measures, including “on-site” inspection. (S)

Implementing Procedures

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish procedures to implement this Decision Directive. (U)

Ronald Reagan

42. Letter From President Reagan to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong)¹

Washington, November 10, 1982

Dear Anne:

Let me thank you once again for the Board's outstanding work on your recent recommendations to me² on START/verification. I know the long hours that the Board has spent on this, especially your efforts and those of Johnny Foster's and his Task Force and consultants. Your letter was extremely helpful to me, and I am moving to implement a series of actions based upon your timely advice. I consider the review which led to your recommendations an absolutely first rate piece of work. As you know, I have asked Judge Clark and my staff to carefully review these recommendations and that process is continuing.

There is one recommendation, however, which I believe the Board itself might properly undertake for me. I strongly concur with your recommendation for a detailed review of Soviet cover, concealment, and deception activities related to strategic arms. Because this may require a carefully chosen team of both government and non-government experts, I would like to ask the Board, in cooperation with the DCI, to develop and conduct such a thorough review. I believe it is imperative that we ask ourselves the difficult questions about these Soviet practices as we move forward in the strategic process.

Once again, I appreciate the time and effort that the Board has given to its important mission of improving our intelligence capabilities. Please continue to work closely with Bill Clark on these matters and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Ron

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-080, NSDD 0065[Arms Control Verification Committee]. Top Secret.

² See Document 38.

43. Telegram From the Mission to Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, December 3, 1982, 1726Z

12018. Subject: (U) Assessment at end of round two—START. Ref: START II-063.²

1. This is START II-073. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Summary. During this round we continued to elaborate the US proposal. The Soviets presented little new. While their behavior continued businesslike, they clearly stalled. Their strategy is to link agreement on reductions in START to agreement that no P-II's or GLCMs will be deployed. They will probably not make such linkage public but claim that it is the US which is stalling and not negotiating seriously, largely because we refuse to discuss cruise missiles. We have pressed for reductions which will redress the current strategic imbalance and improve crisis stability. The Soviets argued that parity exists and that our modernization programs, especially cruise missiles, create instability and continue "the arms race." Our strategy should be to demonstrate progress by pressing for a separate agreement on confidence-building measures. Further, we should be prepared to break the conceptual log-jam by tabling our basic elements of an agreement early in round three. This would demonstrate US willingness to discuss the full scope of Phase Two constraints, including cruise missiles. Finally, Washington should step up its diplomatic and public information efforts and prevent significant cuts in our modernization program.

3. What did we do this round? We continued to elaborate the rationale of the US proposal and to lay out additional details. We also tabled President Reagan's confidence-building measures. For details, see our NAC briefing (Reftel).³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820627-0847. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of Defense, the United States Information Agency, the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

² Reference is to telegram 11715 from Geneva, November 24, which transmitted the draft text of a briefing to be given by Rowney to the North Atlantic Council on December 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820611-0805)

³ According to the draft briefing transmitted in telegram 11715 from Geneva, November 24, (see footnote 2, above), the U.S. delegation proposed confidence building measures in three areas: advance notification of all ICBM launches, a measure that "would equalize current practice for advance notifications, since all US ICBM launches extend beyond US borders, while relatively few Soviet launches do," as well as advance notification of all SLBM launches; advance notification of major military exercises; and "exchange of information on strategic nuclear forces," which was not only "an integral element of the US START position," but would build "confidence since it could reduce the risk that actions involving strategic forces could be misinterpreted," and "enhance understanding of the capabilities and limitation of each nation's forces."

4. We emphasized that the core of our proposal is to enhance crisis stability and lessen the risk of nuclear war through substantial reductions to lower equal levels of strategic capability.

5. We indicated that reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads in a first phase would substantially reduce the 3:1 Soviet advantage in ICBM warheads and their 4–1 advantage in ICBM throw-weight. In a second phase we would reduce throw-weight to equal levels below the current US level. We emphasized that all elements of our proposal are based on equality.

6. When we explained that the large Soviet ICBM advantage put our ICBMs at risk, the Soviets said they too faced an increasing threat to the survivability of their ICBMs. They implied they would solve their problem by making ICBMs mobile. We told them that mobile ICBMs—if permitted at all—would need to be effectively verifiable.

7. Following President Reagan's announcement on November 22 of the US intention to deploy MX in a closely-spaced basing mode,⁴ the Soviets said it would be a violation of SALT I and II. We refuted the charge, stating that MX/CSB would not require "new fixed launchers."

8. What did the Soviets do? Very little. They rehashed what they said in the first round, attacked our position, and defended their own. The Soviets continued to propose reductions to 1800 missile launchers and heavy bombers (SNDVs) by 1990. While repeating that their proposal calls for an equal aggregate number of warheads, they consistently refused to divulge what that number is. The Soviets repeated their proposal to ban all long-range cruise missiles and proposed a number of constraints on modernization, including limiting to 4–6 the number of Ohio-and Trident-class submarines.

9. The behavior of the Soviet delegates continued to be businesslike and—compared to SALT II—relatively non-polemical. Informally they welcomed our laying out the details of our proposal but did not follow suit. They stalled; their only new element in this round was that the treaty should last ten years.

10. Although we had some limited success—in contrast to SALT—in getting the Soviets to discuss concepts, our concepts remain far apart. We argued that the current ICBM disparities are destabilizing. They replied that parity currently exists and that all weapons have an equal effect on stability. They accused us of seeking strategic superiority through our US programs. They argued that the existing strategic relationship does not need correcting and that the way to achieve stability

⁴ On November 22, Reagan spoke to the nation from the Oval Office on the subject of "Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence." See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, vol. II, pp. 1505–1510.

is to curb the arms race.” They refused to join us in a factual discussion of the existing strategic relationship.

11. The main theme of the Soviets was to charge that our proposal is not comprehensive because it does not include cruise missiles. We repeated President Reagan’s statement that “everything is on the table.” We said that provided there is agreement on substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and on counting Backfires, we would limit heavy bombers to equal numbers in the first phase. Additional constraints on slow flying systems could be considered in a second phase.

12. The Soviets continue to claim that Backfire is a medium bomber. Although they provided us with no technical data. They tabled a flight profile “to demonstrate” that Backfire has only a 2200 kilometer radius. When we asked questions about the assumptions on which the profile was constructed they did not respond.

13. There has been limited convergence in one area: Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Although Soviet CBMs differ from ours and some are clearly designed to place unacceptable constraints on US forces, there are some areas of similarity. The Soviets indicated a willingness to move ahead in this area.

14. What is the Soviet strategy? The Soviets have linked agreement on reductions in START to agreement that no P-II’s or GLCMs be deployed in Europe. This provides them great flexibility and a number of ways to tactically exploit such linkage. The most likely way would be to stone-wall in START while shifting the blame for delay on us. Another might be to hold out promise of major achievements in START if “reason” prevailed in INF. At the same time, they will probably deny publicly that any linkage exists.

15. Moscow can be expected, however, to continue to claim that it is the US which is not negotiating seriously. They will complain that we are asking them to disarm unilaterally and to dismantle the backbone of their force—their ICBMs. They will claim that they need “equal security” and cannot settle for equality. Further, that the US is not willing to “curb the arms race” because we refuse to ban cruise missiles or to freeze modernization and thus seek strategic superiority. At some stage they may press for their 1800 proposal as a “way station” to our 850 proposal.

16. What should be our strategy? First, we should demonstrate progress by pressing for a separate agreement on CBMs. Next, we should be in a position to table the basic element of an agreement early in Round Three, a recommendation we made on November 2 (START II-031).⁵ The Soviets have made it amply clear that no US proposal

⁵ See Document 39.

can be seriously considered if it does not include cruise missiles. The Soviets argued that leaving out cruise missiles would allow us to deploy 4000 cruise missiles, while cutting ballistic missile warheads to 5000. They do not acknowledge that air-launched cruise missiles are bomber weapons needed to make our retaliatory force effective in view of their formidable air defenses. Rather, they argue that cruise missiles are first-strike weapons. Unless we are in a position to discuss the full scope of US Phase Two constraints, including slow-flying systems, the Soviets will continue to charge us with a lack of comprehensiveness. We could break the conceptual log-jam and lay out the scope of our proposal without in any way falling off from our proposed reductions or our priorities for dealing with them.

17. President Reagan's speech of November 22 was very helpful. Now, Washington needs to step up its diplomatic and public information efforts. It should stress US commitment to arms control and continue to call for deep reductions as a way to enhance crisis stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Administration officials should vigorously refute any Soviet charges that it is the US which is stalling or not negotiating seriously.

18. At an appropriate time Washington should announce that the US START delegation has categorically rejected Soviet linkage of START to non-deployment of GLCMs and P-II's on substantive and procedural grounds. US officials should rebut Soviet assertions that our proposal is one-sided; it calls for reductions on both sides to equal levels. They should emphasize that the current imbalances are destabilizing and urgently need to be corrected. Further, that our proposal is comprehensive and will address other systems once the priority task of dealing with the current destabilizing situation has been resolved. Meanwhile, that the US will continue the necessary modernization of its US programs so as to maintain deterrence and enhance stability. Finally, US officials should be prepared to expose the hollowness of the Soviet 1800 proposal on grounds that it could lead to little or no reductions in Soviet strategic capabilities or the current strategic imbalance.

19. We should resolutely adhere to President Reagan's Eureka proposal. However, significant cuts in our modernization programs including the MX/CBs system will seriously jeopardize our ability to achieve a strategic arms agreement. It is not enough simply to have a good proposal. Soviet leaders, including Andropov, understand military power and will not give us something for nothing.

Rowny

44. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament (Rowny) to Acting Secretary of State Dam¹

Geneva, December 13, 1982

SUBJECT

Short-Run Tactics and Long-Range Strategy on START

1. *What is the situation in Geneva?* We finished the second round of START on December 2 and resume the third round on February 2. During the second round the United States laid out most of the remaining details of President Reagan's Eureka proposal. The Soviets proposed little new and essentially stalled.

2. *What is the situation in Moscow?* Andropov has moved in rapidly,² is in complete charge, and is putting younger protégés into key positions. He apparently struck a deal with the military and will not reduce the momentum of buildup in strategic arms. Andropov has shown he is well aware of the Soviets' serious economic and foreign policy situations and will tackle them energetically. In arms control he will be more sophisticated and clever than Brezhnev. He will seek to appear flexible and reasonable while in actuality he will be tougher than Brezhnev. Andropov will exploit public opinion sentiment in the West, giving priority to Europe.

3. *What is the situation in Washington?* President Reagan achieved a victory in the November elections by keeping intact the Senate majority but suffered a defeat by losing 26 Republican seats in the House. Since the economy has yet to show a conclusive turn-around, defense cuts are the prime objective of an increasing number of legislators. The deletion of funds for MX on December 7 by a substantial majority (and the less publicized deletion of funds for the Pershing II) are severe blows to our defense programs and will have grave implications for START and INF. Meanwhile, the freeze movement and highly publicized Catholic Bishops' activities, although cooled off somewhat, are still very much alive and need to be actively countered by prominent Administration officials.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File, USSR (12/08/1982–12/13/1982). Secret. From December 7–19, Shultz traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

² On November 12, 1982, two days after Brezhnev's death, the Communist Party's Central Committee selected Andropov to succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary. (John F. Burn, "Ex-Chief of K.G.B: New Communist Leader Emphasizes 'Invincible Might' of Military," *New York Times*, November 13, 1982, p. 1)

4. *What is the situation in Western Europe?* We are, unfortunately, faced with a tired and weary Europe, reluctant to face up to the threat and the needs of their own security. Europeans are increasingly skeptical about the direction of US foreign policy and about US sincerity in arms control. They show increasing resentment over US role in Europe but at the same time are unwilling to take care of their own needs. The Soviets have skillfully exploited this European malaise and Andropov can be expected to work harder to split us from Europe.

5. *What will be the Soviets' strategy and tactics for START?* The Soviet strategy and long-term goals will *not* undergo any major change. Andropov, while seeking to improve the internal economic and social situation and the external international situation, will continue to rely heavily upon military power to back up Soviet foreign policy objectives. Tactically, he will make arms control proposals and foreign policy moves which will make him appear moderate, flexible, and reasonable. In Geneva the Soviets have linked any reductions in START to no deployments of GLCMs and P-II's in Europe. While Moscow will probably not make such linkage public, it will undoubtedly publicly accuse the United States of lack of flexibility in INF, and of stalling in START. Dobrynin will attempt to establish the back-channel as a way of exploiting US internal differences and influencing US arms control policies.

6. *What should be our long-term strategy and short-term tactics?* Our long-term strategy should be to continue the two-track approach of modernization of US programs and arms control. Without a strong defense posture US foreign policy goals will not be achieved. At the same time, only an improved military posture will provide the Soviets incentives for entering into arms control agreements. Most importantly, we need a strong and steady public relations campaign. The President, although the most important player, cannot carry this program alone. Other officials should carry the main burden of the stepped-up public relations program. I would suggest that the President shift his rhetorical style and let others point out that the Soviets lie and cheat. Andropov wants, more than anything, respect; he will react sharply to being humiliated.

As for START, we should do the work now in Washington which will allow us to lay out the full scope of our proposed agreement in Geneva early in round three. This will do much to blunt Soviet criticism that we expect them to "disarm unilaterally" without the US accepting constraints on cruise missile and other modernization programs. Beyond this we need to "show progress" on arms control by pursuing a separate and early agreement on confidence-building measures.

7. *What should be our course of action in 1983?* 1983 will be a critical year for arms control. Since Andropov will engage in a more dynamic Soviet diplomacy, we should be in a position to initiate action in US-Soviet relations, not just react. Otherwise, the Soviets will be perceived as setting the East-West agenda, not us, and scoring diplomatic gains at our expense. The last full year before the election year of 1984 affords us opportunities to get beyond the stage of tactical skirmishing in START before domestic pressures and Soviet hedging of bets begins to set in. The next year may also be the last chance to achieve a truly effective deep-cuts agreement since the USSR is on the threshold of production and deployment decisions. Allowing START negotiations to stall could mean lost opportunities. From many vantage points, therefore, 1983 could be an excellent time to draw the Soviets into a real bargaining situation.

As for timing, it is too early to make any shifts or take any major initiatives. We should stick to our basic position and extol its virtues. We should see how MX/CSB Peacekeeper fares in Congress, and see how our defense authorizations stand up. We should also wait to see what the Soviet leadership does during the next several months. In April, at the end of round three of START, we will be in a position to evaluate whether it would be in our national interest to move to get an agreement by the end of 1983. This decision should not be tied to domestic politics. Nevertheless, it should be obvious that if we take no initiative by the summer of 1983 nothing will happen until after the elections in 1984. On the other hand, if we decide next spring, after careful evaluation, to move to get an agreement by the end of 1983, it will take us at least six months in Geneva to work out the details. Such an agreement would probably have to settle for:

- Reductions in warheads and deployed missiles to figures higher than our proposed levels of 5000/2500/850.

- Reductions in throw-weight less than could be achieved through reductions to the Eureka levels.

- Limits on the number of ALCM-carrying bombers. We should explicitly link any willingness to constrain cruise missiles to Soviet willingness to agree to substantially lower levels of ballistic missile throw-weight.

Thus, while some current US goals, such as equal throw-weight, reductions to low levels of missiles and warheads, and limits on the number of non-deployed missiles, might not appear achievable the *near-term*, we would want to retain them as *long-term* objectives and continue negotiations toward these ends. We would need to retain sufficient leverage with which to achieve our long-term goals.

However, these are not decisions we need to make now. By round three we need only be prepared to table our Basic Elements and certain definitions.

8. *Relationship of INF and START.* As the time for INF deployments draws nearer, Soviet agitation will act on Allied nervousness to make our political position in these negotiations less secure. The Soviets can be expected to make their major propaganda efforts in Europe. They will contrast their supposed flexibility with our unwillingness to consider any possibility other than zero-zero. They may also indicate a willingness to move ahead in START if we show “reasonable” in INF. In my view this is the time to be firm and patient. The United States should adhere to zero-zero and not reevaluate it until after the German elections in March.

9. *What surprises might we expect and how should we react?* As indicated above, Andropov will be energetic and clever; he can be expected to deal us some surprises. We should anticipate these and make preparations now to head them off or turn them to our advantage. These surprises can be grouped under three clusters: (a) The Soviets may try to appear more reasonable and forthcoming; (b) The Soviets may opt to play hard-ball; and (c) The Soviets may seek interaction between INF and START.

a. *The Soviets may try to appear more reasonable and forthcoming.* Soviet leaders and negotiators in Geneva may make new proposals, such as offering to include missile throw-weight if we include bomber “throw-weight,” may make new proposals on warhead and cruise missile limitations, or may try to show that the 1800 proposal is a good “way station” on the way to further cuts. *Counter:* We should be prepared to table our Basic Elements, to demonstrate that bomber throw-weight is not the same as missile throw-weight, and that the 1800 proposal (in the absence of limitations on missile warheads) could lead to little or no reduction in Soviet strategic capability.

b. *The Soviets may opt to play hard-ball.* This could cover a number of actions. They might charge that since we are deploying MX/CSB, the Soviets need not be limited by SALT. This could be followed by decisions to build new systems and to cease to dismantle older systems, for example, Yankee submarines, as newer systems are deployed. The Soviets could stop their current “moratorium” and begin deploying additional SS-20s or SLCMs against Europe. They could also announce a decision to deploy Soviet GLCMs against Europe and offer to trade them for US GLCMs. They could carry out Brezhnev’s threat to place the US in an “analogous” position should INF deployment proceed by deploying SS-20s or cruise missiles in Cuba or by stationing SLCM-carrying submarines off the US coasts. *Counter:* We should make the necessary preparations now so that we can play hardball in return.

c. *The Soviets may seek interaction between INF and START.* They could play this card in a number of ways. For example, they could

offer us concessions in START if we offer them concessions in INF, walk out of INF because we are not being “flexible and reasonable,” and offer to fold INF into START. *Counter:* We should insist that intermediate and strategic systems are separate, that no concessions can be made for so-called “FBS,” and that no compensation can be made for UK and French systems. We should fold INF into START only when it is in our interest to do so.

Whatever happens, the Soviets can be expected to intensify their propaganda efforts that the US is stalling while they are moving ahead. This could take the form of renewed calls for a freeze, saying we are fueling the arms race, exploiting the Bishops’ movement, etc. We must start now to devote the time and effort to our public affairs planning and implementation. The effort at the negotiating table could be won or lost depending on whether we succumb to public pressures or turn public opinion around.

10. *Back-channel.* The use of the back-channel by Dobrynin or others in Washington should be discouraged. It can only lead to a repetition of past exploitation of US internal differences and cause confusion and erosion in our negotiations in Geneva.

11. *Conclusion.* The above is a realistic approach to continuing the bold initiative in START announced at Eureka. Now is not the time to compromise on START. Now *is* the time to get MX/CSB and defense expenditures approved. It is also the time to step up the public affairs effort and prepare to react to surprises. Now is the time to invigorate the Washington bureaucracy.

45. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey), the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Rostow), and the Chairman of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Delegation (Rowny)¹

Washington, January 10, 1983

SUBJECT

Preparation for Round III of START (U)

Prior to the beginning of Round III of START, the President desires to schedule a National Security Council meeting to review the basic elements of the U.S. START position and the U.S. approach to this round of negotiations. We are currently planning to hold this meeting on or about January 25.

The specific issue papers currently being completed by the START Interdepartmental Group (IG) should form the basis of both a summary paper to be prepared by the START IG on the basic elements of the U.S. position and of draft instructions to the U.S. Delegation for Round III of negotiations. These two documents prepared by the START IG will serve as the focus for the NSC review on January 25. The START IG should complete its current workplan on a priority basis and should provide these documents (along with supporting, more detailed issue papers as available) to the NSC in sufficient time to provide for their processing and distribution prior to the meeting.

Military sufficiency remains an essential criterion to be addressed. Any approach or alternative approach recommended to the National Security Council should, as a minimum, permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union to execute U.S. national military strategy (if necessary) with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be prepared to certify the military sufficiency of proposed alternatives to be considered by the NSC on January 25th.

William P. Clark²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: NSC Meeting Files, NSC 00072 25JAN83 [3/3]. Secret.

² Clark signed the memorandum "Bill Clark" above his typed signature.

46. Editorial Note

On January 12, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the resignation of Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Eugene Rostow and his nomination of Deputy Representative to the United Nations Kenneth Adelman as successor. ("Letter Accepting the Resignation of Eugene V. Rostow as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," January 12, 1983, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, vol. I, p. 41.) Later that day, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "This was an extraordinary day, because this was the day that the Administration chose to seek the resignation of Gene Rostow as head of ACDA. There has been a long series of difficulties between Rostow and the Administration, stemming from many different factors, some political, some psychological, and some inexplicable. Without going into all of the reasons, it was desirable that this be done rather than what appeared to have been the previous strategy of trying to force him out by indirection. The result, however, is an extraordinary situation, because Rostow's letter of resignation, which was asked for this afternoon at 3:30 and announced publicly at 5:30, is effective immediately. This means that the next person in charge is Bob Grey, who for two years has not been able to obtain a confirmation in the Senate and has never been confirmed and therefore is not an appropriate person to head ACDA. As a result, ACDA is essentially rudderless at the present. The discussion this evening was that I might serve as acting director of ACDA until Kenneth Adelman, Rostow's successor, can be confirmed. The alternative of letting Adelman act, even if legally possible, is that he might then get into trouble for any actions and statements he might make in the interim, and this might lead to his having difficulty with confirmation. The politics of arms control is exceedingly stormy, with the right headed by Senator Helms staunchly against any arms control agreement. It will be interesting to see how all this works out. There was in fact an arms control meeting this morning in the Secretary's office. The Secretary is now working very hard to get up to speed on all of the INF and START issues. It's a good thing, too, because the INF issue is turning white hot in Europe, and we will be under great pressure very soon to have a new START position. Moreover, the Rostow affair is certain to hype the issue enormously." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

In a news conference on January 13, Secretary of State George Shultz announced that Reagan had named Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency James George Acting Director

of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pending Adelman's confirmation, adding that Dam would "provide day-to-day policy guidance" to George and aid "in assuring that A.C.D.A.'s crucial responsibility in implementing the President's arms control policy is fulfilled." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Says Policy Won't Be Affected By Rostow Ouster, *New York Times*, January 14, 1983, p. A1)

On January 14, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "I had my first meeting today in my role as the overseer of ACDA. I met with the senior staff for an hour. The latter part of the hour was a discussion of the IG group dealing with the instructions to the INF delegation. It will be interesting to see how this works out. Starting next week, I'm going to try to go to ACDA twice a day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. It will be hard to stick to that schedule." He also noted: "We had an excellent briefing at 3:30 on START issues for the Secretary. One has to go over these issues time and again to get them fully in one's mind. It certainly is a difficult and technical area, and unless one has a good grasp of the technical materials, it is hard to handle the interagency negotiations, which are in some ways more difficult than the negotiations with the Soviets." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

On January 17, Dam dictated a personal note about a meeting of his discussion group on arms control that morning. "Bud McFarlane and General Boverie were there from the NSC, General Paul Gorman (JCS), Fred Ikle and Richard Perle (OSD), Admiral Jon Howe (PM), and Harry Rowan (CIA) were also there. This is getting to be a first-class seminar. We talked today about the compliance problem in arms control. Even though verification may identify a violation, there is still the question of how one enforces compliance. The history has been that the United States has tended to back down and not force the issue on possible violations situations. On the other hand, there apparently has not been in recent decades any example of a clear-cut violation. The evidence is always ambiguous or, more often, the Soviets are simply exploiting a loophole that they negotiated into an arms control agreement. In short, the Soviets, recognizing what they want to do in the future, have been able, by getting nasty in the endgame as the negotiations come to a close, to get enough running room so that they can do what they want to. This in my mind raises the question whether the United States, being an open society, is really in a position to negotiate an arms control agreement that does not favor the Soviet Union far more than ourselves. I had two meetings at ACDA today in my new role of giving day-to-day policy guidance. One was in the morning when I attended the staff meetings, and the second was in

the afternoon when I got several briefings, one on what is going on in the interagency group on START and the other on the administrative structure and budget of ACDA.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

On January 19, Dam dictated a personal note about a two-hour meeting that afternoon in Shultz’s office to discuss the U.S. position in the START negotiations in Geneva. “We spent quite a long time talking about the specifics of arms control and gradually getting back to the basic theoretical and philosophical issues about arms control. Is the purpose of arms control to reduce the state of armaments, and if so, is it possible? Or is it only possible to prevent unlimited growth in particular areas? History does seem to show that arms control agreements are quite unsuccessful in reducing existing armaments, except possibly in areas where the arms are outmoded, and are rather more successful in limiting what countries don’t want to do anyway. The fact of the matter is that the drive for arms control agreements is largely political, and while it may have some economic sense (and even that is limited by the fact that the armaments subject to control are only a small percentage of total defense budgets), the military achievements of arms control over the last dozen years have been relatively restricted. Nevertheless, the drive for arms control agreements in most democratic countries is very strong, and the psychological results may be good or bad depending upon the political temper of the individual countries. On the one hand, arms control agreements may lead to reduced international tensions, but on the other hand, they may, as critics have charged, lead to a lulling of one’s critical senses and indeed to a kind of unilateral disarmament attitude. Specifically, critics have charged that the arms control negotiations of the 1970s led the United States unilaterally to reduce its spending on defense while the Soviet Union went steaming ahead with expenditures on defense that increased by about 5% a year in real terms, a rate which compounded over time has resulted in a massive Soviet buildup at the very time when U.S. Government expenditures have fallen in real terms. Moreover, the Soviets have very modern weapons, whereas the United States has strategic weapons that are, on the whole, quite old. One statistic that I have seen says that over half of Soviet strategic weapons are under five years of age, whereas over half of U.S. strategic weapons are more than fifteen years of age. As President Reagan has said, our bomber force is on average older than the pilots that fly the planes.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

On January 20, Dam dictated a personal note about a meeting on START that morning with President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle, and Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Jonathan Howe. "Ikle came in with an odd proposition. He suggested that if we didn't get into a fight about this round, perhaps we could make some private arrangement on the START position which wouldn't have to go through the IG process. However, what he was really suggesting is that we could postpone any movement at all in our START position until next winter. Under a little pressure, specifically the suggestion that that would make it impossible in this term to have any START agreement, he suggested that maybe the movement could come next summer. He gave lots of reasons why no movement was possible in the IG process, but the real argument was that we shouldn't try to have a START agreement at all, or if we did have one, it should be of a completely different kind than that in the President's decision of last spring. Bud McFarlane, speaking for the NSC, made it clear that the President did want to have a START agreement. I'm not sure where we came out, but I found it one of the most curious examples of the kind of maneuvering that goes on at the top level of government." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

47. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy (Lehman) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 18, 1983

SUBJECT

Senator Cohen's Arms Control Proposal

Senator Cohen's two for one reduction proposal is ambiguous, but, however interpreted, works against the US largely because of differences in modernization requirements of the superpowers and the impact of counting rules and categories.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, Nunn-Cohen Proposal (1). Secret.

The newspaper article by Senator Cohen² does not make clear whether or not the 2 for 1 reduction applies to warheads and bombs or delivery systems. Because SALT II does not contain a direct aggregate limit on warheads and bombs one could assume that his proposed reductions in “the level of strategic *weapons* contained in the SALT II treaty” means missiles and bombers rather than warheads. If so:

- the actual number of warheads could increase dramatically as it does under SALT II as both sides replace non-MIRVed systems with MIRVed systems. Remember, much of the increase projected in real Soviet RVs comes from placing 10 RVs (or 12 or 14 if they cheat) on SS-18s which under SALT II rules are already credited with having 10 RVs.

- The US would face by far the greatest reductions because we have a greater need to modernize our forces (MX, D-5, C-4, B-1, ATB) whereas the Soviets could do quite nicely with their newly modernized force of SS-17s, 18s, & 19s. They have many old non-MIRVed SLBMs which could easily be sacrificed for MIRVed Typhoons. Backfire addresses their bomber program.

- A two for one trade in delivery systems hurts the US most because we have more modernization requirements and work from a smaller base. Depending on whether or not we get credit for retiring mothballed B-52s, we could end up with 500 to 1000 fewer delivery systems than the USSR in implementing the President’s modernization program.

If Senator Cohen means warheads and bombs when he says “weapons” the situation is just as bad. Because of the counting rules I’ve mentioned and because we have far more older RVs and bombs which need to be replaced we would suffer significantly as the attached paper shows.

Please feel free to call me if you have questions.

Ron Lehman

² Reference is to Cohen’s proposal that the United States “agree with the level of strategic weapons contained in the SALT II treaty and then insist that for every new weapon added to the force by either side, two older, less stabilizing weapons must be eliminated. (William S. Cohen, “A Guaranteed Arms Build-Down,” *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1983, p. A13)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy³

Washington, undated

The following is a rough, but revealing, analysis of the impact of Senator Cohen's Build-Down proposal.

1. *The Bomber Force:*

- With the B-52D phase out, the bomber force without modernization would carry:

—SRAM	1,128
—GRAV[G]	604
—GRAV[H]	360
—GRAV[FB-111]	120
	<hr/>
	2,212 weapons

- By 1984 the FYDP calls for 1,080 ALCM, so as 2 for 1 phase out would eliminate 2,160 gravity and SRAM weapons, roughly the entire force.

• As a result non-ALCM modified aircraft would have no weapons available for loading, i.e., the 60 B-52Gs not due to be modified, the 90 B-52Hs not yet modified, and the entire FB-111 force. The soon to be deployed B-1 force would complete with the B-52Gs for the few ALCM available, and would not be a penetrator since no weapons would be available.

2. *The SLBM force:*

- With six Tridents scheduled by 1985, the new weapons would be:

$$6 \times 24 \times 8 = 1,152$$

- A 2 for 1 build down demands elimination of 2,304 warheads, or 15 Poseidon C-3 boats by 1985.

3. *The ICBM modernization:*

- The ICBM modernization would replace the approximately 2,100 Minuteman warheads with 1,000 MX warheads.

³ Secret. Brackets are in the original.

4. *USSR force:*

Except for a small amount of medium solids by 1984, the USSR ICBM force is a modified force, not a *new* system. Their bomber force is relatively constant in this timeframe. Deployment of the Typhoon with the SS-N-20 would be impeded: by 1986 the Typhoon, with 980 warheads, would demand a 1,960 reduction, but current Soviet SLBM warheads are roughly 1,500, so only 5 rather than 6 Typhoons could be built.

As can be seen, the U.S. modernization of the SLBM and bomber force in the early years, needed to offset the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force, would result in a near-disarmament in the day-to-day alert scenario in terms of survivable warheads. The U.S. would lose 500 alert bomber warheads and about 1,200 alert SLBM warheads as a result of the proposal.

If Senator Cohen was referring to delivery vehicles, the U.S. in deploying 20 Tridents, 100 MX, and 250 modern bombers would deploy 830 new vehicles, and need to give up 1,660 in a 2 for 1 draw down. Depending upon which delivery vehicles count (i.e., those B-52s in the boneyard, the U.S. has from 1,929 (with no B-52Ds) to as high as 2,273 as accountable by SALT II. The U.S. could keep 613 older systems plus the 830 newer ones for a total of 1,443.

The Soviets begin at a higher base of around 2,400. Since their force is already modernized, they could freeze at the current level while the U.S. reduced to nearly half that level.

48. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 24, 1983

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START—January 25, 1983

Issue: Can we table a "Basic Elements" paper during Round III? (S)

Facts: Ambassador Rowny feels very strongly that the US should table a paper which reflects the basic elements of the US position for both phases of START. This purpose would be to blunt the Soviet criticism that the US position is not comprehensive. In order to be able to table such a paper with the Soviets, decisions will be needed on the following questions:

—Would tabling such a Basic Elements paper change the US "phased" approach to negotiations?

—What should be the US position on key remaining elements of the US position (i.e., limits on bombers and cruise missiles and direct limits on throw-weight)? (The paper at Tab A addresses these questions.)

—Does the specific "Basic Elements" paper proposed (at Tab B)² meet US requirements? Should it be tabled?

—What latitude should be provided in the Instructions to the Delegation (Provided at Tab C)³ on using the Basic Elements paper? (S)

Discussion:

The most fundamental issue involves making absolutely clear what impact tabling the Basic Elements paper is intended to have on the current "phased" approach to negotiations.

—One agency (State) feels that by tabling such a paper we would simply "show a little ankle" on the phase II issues of cruise missiles and direct throw-weight limits. State would not authorize the delegation to begin negotiating these phase II items until completing phase I. This

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-103, NSC 00072. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. McFarlane initialed the memorandum on Clark's behalf. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Clark saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is an undated paper prepared in the START IG, "Basic Elements of an Agreement on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms."

³ Attached but not printed is a January 20 draft message, "Instructions for Round Three of START."

would keep the existing US position and maintain our emphasis on working the most destabilizing elements (ballistic missiles) first.

—Others (OSD, Amb Rowny) feel that if we are to be effective in tabling such a paper we must be prepared to collapse the phases of negotiation. In their view, the Basic Elements paper puts the major elements of both phases on the table. Having done so, they argue we should be prepared to step away from the current US position favoring phases (in which cruise missile limits and direct throw-weight limits are deferred until later) and undertake to negotiate on cruise missiles as long as the Soviets are also prepared to negotiate on direct throw-weight limits. This critical difference over the impact of tabling a basic elements paper on the basic US phased approach to negotiations is the first issue discussed in the Basic Elements paper at Tab A. (S)

We anticipate that NSC principals will elaborate on their agencies' positions and that new alternatives or possible compromises may be offered at the meeting. Given the complexity and interrelationships among the issues involved, we would recommend that you use this meeting to hear all the arguments. Based upon the discussion, the NSC staff will provide you a decision paper for your consideration following the meeting. (S)

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you use the NSC meeting to familiarize yourself with the issues and hear the agencies' arguments, but that you postpone an immediate decision until you have reviewed the NSC staff decision paper which will be provided after the meeting.⁴

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation.

Tab A**Paper Prepared by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Interagency Group⁵**

Washington, undated

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES FOR THIRD ROUND OF START

This paper summarizes key points regarding issues for the next round of START negotiations. Where options refer to limitations under consideration, the proposed alternatives should be considered as internal guidance and not necessarily as recommendations for proposals to be tabled in the third round. For the implementation of these options, this paper should be considered in the context of the draft Basic Elements paper and third-round instructions.

I. Phasing

All agencies agree that, as recommended by the US START delegation, we should move away from our current approach of negotiating Phase I issues before Phase II issues and that we should be willing to discuss all issues comprehensively, but only on the condition that the Soviets are willing to be equally comprehensive by addressing seriously all of what are now described as Phase II issues (e.g., direct limits on throw-weight) and not merely the issues of greatest interest to the Soviets (e.g., cruise missile limits).

There is disagreement over whether the US should propose to implement START reductions in two discrete phases, or whether there should be a single phase of reductions. Whether to retain our ultimate goal of equal levels of throw-weight at below the current US level is not at issue.

Option 1: Single Framework for Discussion of All Issues

We should give up the notion of phases, whether in the sense of negotiations or reductions, and prepare a comprehensive, integral position for the third round. This option could be implemented by tabling a Basic Elements document. Such a procedure would have a number of advantages.

First and foremost, it maximizes the leverage which we possess by virtue of the Soviets' interest in limiting cruise missiles. If we were to propose constraints for cruise missiles, even without indicating any

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

numbers, without linking them directly to our second phase goals, we must expect the Soviets to “pocket” our willingness to discuss cruise missiles and to import the proposed constraints into the first phase. Indeed, it would hardly be credible to maintain that the US be allowed to build now a cruise missile force that would exceed the ceiling we would be willing to accept eight or ten years hence. The Soviets would attempt to move our proposed cruise missile constraints into the first phase, thus depriving us of the necessary leverage for achieving our second phase goals. Were this to happen, we would duplicate the mistake we made in allowing the ABM restraints of SALT I to take precedence over the restraints on strategic offensive arms, a procedure which virtually guaranteed that we would not achieve the goal of limiting the Soviet strategic offensive build-up to non-threatening levels.

By proposing a single set of restraints, we would obviate the need to address the question of whether we can, consistent with military requirements, propose ballistic missile and ballistic missile warhead limits below the 850 and 5000 level. The possibility of proposing further reductions in these categories now appears remote. In any case, it would hardly seem a realistic use of our time and energy to concern ourselves with the preparation of such a proposal.

This procedure also serves our political interests in that it permits us to come forward with a new position that is conducive to progress in the negotiations while retaining maximum negotiating leverage. It rebuts Soviet criticism of the US proposal as a non-comprehensive, non-serious proposal, which concentrates on US concerns while relegating Soviet concerns to a meaningless second phase. By explicitly addressing ballistic missile throw-weight, an area of Soviet advantage, we help explain the priority the US has placed on ballistic missiles in general, and on heavy ICBMs in particular. Otherwise, concentration on such demands as preferential constraints on heavy ballistic missiles risk appearing as an arbitrary attack on the way in which the Soviets have happened to structure their forces. The required Soviet reduction in throw-weight (65%) is comparable to the reductions the Soviets would have to make in ICBM warheads (58%), ballistic missiles (64%) and heavy ICBMs (65%), under our current Phase I proposal.

In the context of a single proposal, we should table both our proposed framework for constraints on ALCMs and our second phase goal of a direct throw-weight limit of approximately 1.8 million kg in order to make explicit our right to a ballistic missile force equal to that of the Soviet Union in destructive capacity. Our emphasis on throw-weight at this point will facilitate the negotiation of an agreement which accommodates our requirements in the bomber/cruise missile area. The importance of throw-weight as a measure of the destructive

capability of a ballistic missile has been emphasized by the recent debate concerning the survivability of CSB. The sole unit of account which captures the ability of the Soviets to adapt their ballistic missile force to the task of threatening CSB is throw-weight. A direct limit on throw-weight would considerably simplify our current approach by allowing us the option of eliminating current indirect constraints on throw-weight (i.e., 210 heavy and medium ICBMs, with a sub-limit of 110 medium ICBMs).

While we would propose a unified set of constraints on strategic forces, we could, of course, take into account the practical problems of effectuating large reductions in forces by providing for gradual reductions in all units of account, in accordance with a schedule of agreed, equal intermediate ceilings.

Option 2: Separate Phases

Combining Phases I and II would establish a direct limitation on throw-weight (specifically the 1.8 million kg ceiling) as a US objective with the same weight and visibility as our other goals of equal ceilings on deployed ballistic missiles and warheads. To propose that the Soviets reduce their current throw-weight level by 65%, while the US reduces little or not at all, would be construed by the Administration's critics, both here and in Europe, as a new and non-negotiable demand. These critics would invoke the throw-weight limit as evidence of a lack of seriousness and responsibility in the President's arms control policies. Thus, collapsing the phases would undermine US credibility at the very moment when our objective should be to sustain the support of the US public and our Allies. Any decrease in political support for the Administration's arms control policies would undercut our position and leverage at the START negotiations.

The first phase of the US START proposal focuses on destabilizing systems by seeking equal ceilings in the most easily understood indicators of strategic power: ballistic missiles (particularly ICBMs) and their warheads. Through specific limitations on heavy and medium ICBMs, the Phase I proposal is intended to reduce Soviet throw-weight to no more than 2.5 million kg (one-half the current Soviet level). Therefore, the ceilings in Phase I would provide a dramatic reduction in Soviet throw-weight as well as missiles and warheads. Moreover, because we are seeking in Phase I direct limits on the most destabilizing systems themselves, this approach is easier to explain and defend than direct limits on throw-weight, which is not a clearly understood concept outside the strategic community.

Furthermore, it is questionable whether direct throw-weight limits deserve the same prominence in our START proposal as the other limitations which we seek. Because of improvements in accuracy and

yield-to-weight ratios, throw-weight is a factor of declining importance as a measure of strategic power. Despite their 250% advantage in throw-weight, no one claims that the Soviets are two-and-a-half times stronger than the US. In addition, throw-weight is more difficult to verify than limits on deployed missiles and warheads and is even difficult to define and to count.

As a Phase II objective, an equal throw-weight ceiling of 1.8 million kg is easier to understand and to defend. Achieving our Phase I objectives would result in a major reduction in Soviet throw-weight and would make such a ceiling a more realistic goal for future reductions. Seeking a direct throw-weight limit at the same time as our other Phase I objectives, however, would make it more difficult to achieve our more immediate and important goals of limitations on deployed missiles and warheads.

For these reasons, the President decided last year against including a direct throw-weight limit in the first phase of START. The result was a START proposal which, because of its fairness, ambitious objectives, clarity and coherence, has won the support of Allied governments and most of the US public. The phased framework of our proposal was an important element in gaining that support. Moreover, phasing is a source of negotiating leverage which we hope to utilize—through the Basic Elements approach—to draw the Soviets out on such as ballistic missile warhead limits. Combining the phases would be a major departure from our present framework which is not warranted by any developments in the negotiations; it should not be undertaken without careful consideration of our overall position in the START talks.

Options	IG Participants				
	ACDA	JCS	OSD	State	Amb Rowney
1. Combine the phases	X		X		X
2. Separate phases	X			X	

II. *Limits on Heavy Bombers and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles*

A. *Bomber Limits*

Current guidance sets a goal of a ceiling of 250 heavy bombers in Phase II. This ceiling, however, would limit US flexibility in responding to unconstrained Soviet air defenses, possible modifications in US ballistic missile programs and the outcome of negotiations on ballistic missile limits. All agencies, therefore, agree that we cannot now propose a heavy bomber limit below 350, either under a single-phase approach or in the second phase of the alternative approach.

Option 1: Limit of 350 Bombers

This limit would provide the US and the USSR additional flexibility to meet bomber requirements. It would preclude any proposal to reduce

below 350 heavy bombers in Phase II at this time. Because of the relationship between heavy bomber requirements and the permitted level of ballistic missile systems, this limit may be reassessed on the basis of the ballistic missile warhead ceiling. The bomber limit, however, would still be affected by the need to take into account unconstrained Soviet air defenses and the proposed limitations on ALCMs.

Option 2: Missile/Bomber Aggregate

This would set a combined limit on the heavy bombers and deployed missiles (1200) and a sub-limit on deployed missiles (850). Both sides would be allowed to trade ballistic missiles for bombers, but not vice versa. This approach could be adopted for either a single-phase approach or for both phases of a two-phase approach. It could also accommodate a higher Phase II bomber ceiling as in Option 1.

Option 2 would provide additional flexibility to expand the US bomber force in response to future challenges (at the expense of ballistic missiles), without necessarily increasing the proposed bomber ceiling. However, the adoption of a combined bomber/missile aggregate would involve a significant change in the framework of our position and would be viewed by some as movement toward the Soviet proposal and SALT II. The Soviets may use this step to support their proposals for total freedom to mix (i.e., to trade bombers for missiles as well) and a single warhead aggregate (including bomber weapons).

Option 3: Phase II Goal of Further Reductions

Conditional upon the decision regarding phasing, the US would, under this approach, abandon the internal objective of 250 heavy bombers but would not set an alternative level. As indicated under Option 1, our Phase II bomber requirements would depend upon several factors which cannot be predicted at this time, such as the permitted level of ballistic missile systems and improvements in Soviet air defenses. Rather than specify a Phase II limit of 350 bombers at this time (which would preclude Phase II reductions), Option 3 would treat heavy bombers (internally and with the Soviets) in the same way as Phase II limits on ballistic missiles and warheads, i.e., we would be willing to discuss further limits and reductions in Phase II if national security requirements permit.

B. Limit on ALCM Loadings

Current guidance is that the US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves, that ALCM carriers should not be subject to limits beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers, and that we should not propose limits on the maxi-bombers, and that we should not propose limits on the maximum number of ALCMs which could be carried

on a heavy bomber. In the START negotiations, the USSR has pressed for limits on cruise missiles. Moreover, the Soviets and our other critics have charged that, without limits on cruise missiles, the US START proposal is not “comprehensive.” The issue, therefore, is whether to maintain current guidance or to set a limit on ALCM loadings. These limits would apply in the second phase of a two-phase agreement, if we should adopt the approach involving two phases of reductions.

Option 1: No Specific Limits at This Time

This option would limit ALCMs in the same way that we propose to limit other bomber weapons, i.e., by limiting the number of heavy bombers. This would provide more flexibility to adjust ALCM deployments to respond to improvements in unconstrained Soviet air defenses and reinforce our negotiating emphasis on more destabilizing ballistic missiles. Proposing an ALCM limit at this time could move the US closer to including bomber weapons in an overall nuclear weapon ceiling. In addition, the Soviets would probably attempt to bargain downwards any US-proposed limit on ALCMs.

This option would not, however, provide additional US leverage in the negotiations and would make achievement of a START agreement much more difficult. It would also leave our proposal open to criticism for a lack of “comprehensiveness.” In addition, Soviet ALCM deployments would be similarly unconstrained.

Option 2: Average Loading of 28 ALCMs per Heavy Bomber, Maximum of 20 ALCMs on Existing Bomber Types

This option is consistent with currently planned US ALCM deployments. The Soviets have already accepted this loading limit once on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (in SALT II), so this option would be less likely to be the subject of serious public criticism than some alternative options. It would, however, draw the US into negotiations on one type of bomber weapon, which the Soviets would seek to expand to limit all bomber weapons.

Options	IG Participants				
	ACDA	JCS	OSD	State	Amb Rowney
<i>Phase II Bomber Ceiling</i>					
1. 350 Bombers	X	X			X
2. Missile/Bomber Aggregate	X				
3. Goal of Phase II Reductions	X			X	
<i>ALCM Loadings</i>					
1. No Limits			X		

- | | | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| 2. Avg. Loading of 28, | X | X | X | X |
| Max of 20 on | | | | |
| Existing Types | | | | |

III. *Limits on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)*

[*Less than 3 lines not declassified*] The USSR has deployed more than 1300 SLCMs, most of which are under 600 km range and can carry either nuclear or conventional payloads. In addition, the Soviets are developing a long-range SLCM (with a range above 2500 km) for land attack.

Current US guidance is to defer discussion of constraints on “slow-flying systems” other than heavy bombers (i.e., possibly including SLCMs) until Phase II. In the START negotiations, the USSR has proposed a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles (including SLCMs) over 600 km range, which all agencies agree is unacceptable to the US. The issue, therefore, is whether to propose a Phase II limit on SLCMs which is more acceptable to the US.

Option 1: No Limits

This approach would permit the US unlimited flexibility to deploy SLCMs. The primarily tactical roles of US SLCM platforms would prevent our nuclear SLCMs from being committed to the SIOP (although they could perform a strategic reserve role), so it may not be appropriate to limit them in START. Moreover, this approach recognizes the significant monitoring and verification problems associated with the other options. The alternative approaches, therefore, could have the effect of constraining the US while the USSR may be able to evade the limitation.

On the other hand, a refusal to discuss SLCM limits would give the Soviets a propaganda opportunity to attack the US position for leaving a “loophole” which would allow a major increase in strategic capability. Also, the Soviets could exploit the lack of SLCM limits to deploy a large number of long-range nuclear SLCMs for land attack. If the US were to argue that SLCMs should not be limited because of their tactical (as opposed to strategic) role, this would undermine our position that weapons should be subject to limitation on the basis of their capabilities, and not their missions.

Option 2: Ban All Nuclear SLCMs

This option would exempt from limitation the large majority of US SLCMs (which will not be nuclear-armed) and would ban the Soviet nuclear SLCM threat to the US and to surface ships. This option would require the Soviets to dismantle some portion of their SLCM force. (We do not know how many Soviet SLCMs are nuclear-armed.) This option

is the most consistent with our INF position and would be the most politically appealing to domestic and international critics of US arms control policy.

However, our ability to distinguish between nuclear and conventional SLCMs with NTM alone is poor. Even with intrusive verification measures, the US could abandon its nuclear SLCM program with little assurance that the Soviets would comply with the ban or that we could detect Soviet cheating.

Option 3: Numerical Limit on All SLCM Platforms

This option would establish a relatively verifiable indirect limitation on SLCM deployments by setting a ceiling on SLCM platforms. Presuming that all submarines would have to be counted as SLCM platforms (for verification reasons), this option would also indirectly constrain the Soviet submarine fleet. Those surface ships with a SLCM capability (as determined by NTM) would also be counted. As the Soviets would have a greater number of SLCM platforms than the US, this option would allow the US considerable flexibility to expand deployments of nuclear and conventional SLCMs.

However, as a simple platform limit would contain no limit on SLCMs themselves, this approach would appear to be a purely cosmetic limitation. Moreover, a permissive limit (e.g., 300 or more vessels) would lead critics of US arms control policy to add the high number of permitted SLCM platforms to our proposed ceilings on bombers and deployed missiles in order to undercut our public focus on significant reductions. Also, because of the asymmetry in platform numbers, a platform limit would be difficult to negotiate.

Option 4: Limit Nuclear-Armed SLCMs to Equal Levels on the Basis of Average Loading per Platform

The number of platforms and the average loading limit could be set to accommodate planned US SLCM deployments. There are major uncertainties in our estimates of the number of Soviet nuclear SLCMs. However, to the extent that the Soviets comply with such a limit, this option would capture a large number of existing Soviet SLCMs and would presumably constrain the future Soviet threat to the US.

This option would be the most difficult to verify, as it would combine requirements to monitor SLCM payload (nuclear/conventional) and average loading per platform. Moreover, because maximum potential SLCM loadings would be significantly greater than the average loading limit, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential. (However, if the agreed loading limit is consistent with US deployment plans, the net national security impact would probably not be less favorable to the US than the absence of SLCM limits.)

Option 5: Seek More Meaningful and Effective Limit

As indicated above, there are significant military, political and verification problems with the various SLCM limitations under consideration. On the other hand, a refusal to limit SLCMs would undercut the seriousness of the US START proposal and would leave the Soviets with a major capability to circumvent an agreement.

Under this approach, the JCS would take the lead on a study of the military and verification problems associated with SLCM limits, with a view to proposing more meaningful and effective SLCM limits to the NSC by the middle of the third round. If this option is approved, we would need to decide how to treat the issue of SLCM limits until the NSC decides on an approach. There are two major alternatives:

a) The US would express (publicly and to the Soviets) a willingness to accept SLCM limits but would defer a specific proposal.

b) The US would not express a willingness to accept SLCM limits until the difficult problems associated with this issue are resolved. If the Soviets raise the SLCM issue in the third round, the US delegation would confine its discussion to verification issues, without committing the US to limit SLCMs in START.

<u>Options</u>	<u>IG Participants</u>				
	<u>ACDA</u>	<u>JCS</u>	<u>OSD</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Amb Rowny</u>
1. No limits					
2. Ban all nuclear SLCMs					
3. Limit all SLCM platforms					
4. Limit nuclear SLCMs on basis of avg. loading per platform					
5. Seek different approach					

IV. Limits on Mobile ICBMs

The Soviets have implied in the negotiations that they intend to deploy mobile ICBMs. At least one of their ICBMs in development would be suitable for mobile deployment. Soviet development of mobiles could have a positive impact on crisis stability (by reducing Soviet ICBM vulnerability) and could reduce the Soviet throw-weight potential. Counting Soviet mobile ICBM launchers, however, is much more difficult than for fixed launchers, and Soviet deployment of mobiles would greatly complicate US targeting requirements.

The IG recommends that we neither propose to ban nor to permit mobile ICBMs at this time but continue our current position that mobile ICBMs, if allowed in START, must be accompanied by measures to ensure effective verification. We are developing a comprehensive verification package to enhance our ability to monitor Soviet mobile deployments, and this verification package should be an intrinsic part of our position. Furthermore, the US delegation would use Soviet interest in mobiles as leverage to achieve our other negotiating objectives.

V. Phase II Throw-Weight Ceiling

The US proposal for Phase II limits includes direct limits and reductions to equal levels of ballistic missile throw-weight below current US levels. The current US throw-weight level is approximately 1.9 million kg.

The IG recommends that we adopt a Phase II objective of an equal throw-weight ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles of just below 1.9 million kg, consistent with the throw-weight definition and counting rule described below. This level is consistent with projected US force structures under START.

VI. Throw-Weight Counting Rule

The IG recommends that, for existing types of ballistic missiles, throw-weight should be determined on the basis of the maximum throw-weight demonstrated in any flight test. There is concern, however, that in the future the Soviets may attempt to circumvent direct limits on throw-weight by testing their missiles with less throw-weight than they are capable of carrying.

The IG therefore recommends that, for new types of ballistic missiles, the maximum demonstrated throw-weight should be compared to potential throw-weight for a reference range, and that the larger of the two values should be assigned to the particular missile. This approach would be accompanied by collateral constraints which would result in less than 10% uncertainty in monitoring Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight.

49. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, January 25, 1983, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Preparations for Round III of START

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 The Vice President
 Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
State
 Sec George P. Shultz
 Dep Sec Kenneth Dam
 Adm Jonathan Howe
OSD
 Sec Caspar W. Weinberger
 Dep Sec Paul Thayer
 Dr. Fred C. Ikle
 Mr. Richard Perle
OMB
 Mr. Joseph Wright
CIA
 Mr. William J. Casey
 Mr. Douglas George
USUN
 Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

ACDA
 Dr. James George
 General Edward Rowney
JCS
 Gen John W. Vessey, Jr.
 Lt Gen Paul F. Gorman
WHITE HOUSE
 Mr. Edwin Meese III
 Judge William P. Clark
 Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
NSC
 Gen Richard T. Boverie
 Col Robert Linhard
 Mr. Sven Kraemer
 Col Michael O. Wheeler

Minutes

JUDGE CLARK

Mr. President the next round of START will begin on February 2nd. We have a number of issues to be decided, however, most are driven by an essential decision to table a basic elements paper. (Judge Clark then used the Talking Points at Tab A² provided by NSC staff to introduce the meeting. After the introduction, Judge Clark left and transferred the chair for the meeting to Robert McFarlane and Richard Boverie.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points provided to frame the issue of phasing. See Tab B.)³

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-103, NSC 00072. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Council Room.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed.

SECRETARY OF STATE

I was not Secretary of State when the idea of two phases of negotiations was developed. However, I have studied the idea and it seems to be a reasonable way to proceed. Nothing has happened in negotiations to alter the basic U.S. decision. I support the desire to draw out the Soviets by talking a bit about all the elements of the U.S. approach as proposed by Amb Rowny. However, if the only way to do this is to collapse the phases, I feel that we should not do this. I think that we should be able to approach this issue as suggested by Option 2⁴ and to table the Basic Elements paper without necessarily changing the U.S. position on phases.

MR. McFARLANE

Mr. President, the logic of the current U.S. position is to focus on the most destabilizing systems, ballistic missiles and especially ICBMs. We consciously decided to defer negotiation of both slow flying systems and throw-weight until a later phase. The Soviets now feel that they may have found a weakness in the U.S. position by criticizing us on the grounds that it is not comprehensive. Therefore, the intent in tabling a Basic Elements paper is to show that all things are on the table and will be discussed ultimately, and thus undercut Soviet criticism of the U.S. position.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The only way to achieve the basic U.S. goal in these negotiations is to get a direct handle on the throw-weight. Today the Soviets have [*amount not declassified*] metric tons of throw-weight as compared to [*amount not declassified*] metric tons for the U.S. The two phases of negotiations should be collapsed. Unless this is done, a direct limit on throw-weight will never be negotiated and we will certainly never get the Soviets to talk seriously about the reductions to below the existing U.S. levels of throw-weight. Some argue that if we place direct throw-weight limits on the table, they will not be negotiated seriously by the Soviets in any case. This is basically the same position taken by those who refused the zero position in INF. They were wrong, and the Soviets are negotiating the zero position with us today. Our negotiators themselves feel that we should get rid of the artificial distinction between the phases, and I agree with them. Failing to request direct limits on throw-weight, ignores the best way to get to parity.

⁴ Option 2 involved keeping separate phases. See Tab A, Document 48.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I have concern that in collapsing the phases we would be expected to be able to fill in all the blanks in the U.S. position, and some of those blanks are simply unknown at this time. SLCMs are especially a problem. The JCS do not want to lay out a Basic Elements paper with blanks in all the numerical limits. They are not sure that its in the U.S. interest to let the Soviets fill in the blanks. They are prepared to defer to the negotiators on how to tactically use blanks, but they are reluctant to start down the road until we internally have filled in all the blanks.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We should be in a position soon to fill in all the blanks. What we are talking about now, however, is whether to table a basic framework. We will certainly need the JCS views on what the specific numerical limits should be, and this of course should be driven by the targets we need to hit. Some items we need not immediately raise. The Soviets have not yet asked us about SLCMs. We need only be able to talk about SLCMs in general terms at this time.

THE PRESIDENT

Do the Soviets exceed us in the number of SLBMs?

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Yes they do, but we have more SLBM warheads then they do. Also the Soviets have more SLCMs deployed today than we do.

AMB ROWNY

All the members of the U.S. Delegation agree on the need to capture the high ground in the negotiations by tabling a Basic Elements paper. We can table this paper with blanks rather than specific numerical limits. All agencies generally felt this was a good idea. The idea of collapsing the phases is a step further than simply tabling a Basic Elements paper. Deciding on whether or not to collapse the phases is a more difficult problem but to do so may help me now in negotiations. You can always instruct me not to give anything away, and I certainly don't intend to anyway. I lean towards the idea of collapsing the phases, but whether you do this or not I really want to table a Basic Elements paper.

In tabling such a paper, a direct limit on throw-weight would be included, but the number can be left blank. We would make it clear that we would not agree on cruise missile limits unless we also agreed on direct throw-weight limits. The idea of collapsing the phases as a necessary part of tabling a Basic Elements agreement was not part of my original idea. However, it expanded my horizons and is attractive to me now, and we will eventually have to table everything at some point.

SECRETARY OF STATE

If you start negotiating Phase II issues you certainly do collapse the phases. The basic idea we have with respect to the Basic Elements paper was to talk about but not negotiate Phase II items. We want to maintain our concentration on Phase I.

The Soviets will likely come back to us on the issue of cruise missile limits. Cruise missiles are our strong suit. We should not deal on this issue unless we absolutely have to. The implications that cruise missiles have for improving our conventional war-fighting capability are just too great. We are way out in front in this area. I would resist strongly to moving Phase II items into Phase I.

If we got the Phase I limits we have proposed, we would make a drastic reduction in throw-weight. As a technical matter I have to ask if throw-weight really is that important. I recognize that it is an important measure, but with improvements in accuracy and other items, it isn't the only important measure.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

If you put Phase II items on the table at this time and negotiate on them, you should recognize that you are putting on the table the toughest items to verify.

THE PRESIDENT

I need this oral session to understand the material that I have read. Is the obstacle that we face here that we need to have a treaty on all items before we can have a treaty on any items? Can't we say that we will accept a treaty on Phase I items only if there is a commitment to negotiate seriously Phase II items?

AMB ROWNY

That is one of the concerns of the Soviets on our phased approach. The Soviets claim that the U.S. just wants them to cut down in areas where the Soviets have strength. They are in effect telling us that they will not agree to talk in these terms until the U.S. is prepared to talk to them about cruise missiles.

SECRETARY OF STATE

If, however, the Soviets accepted our Phase I approach would it not be in our interest to agree to them and pocket them immediately? Is it possible that the Soviets fear U.S. technology and that if we go to our Phase I limits leaving cruise missile technology unconstrained we will be superior to the Soviets?

AMB ROWNY

The Soviets fear that we won't really cut anything in Phase II.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

If in fact we get to limits on SLCMs, the Soviets will not be able to accept the verification measures we will require. If we ignore direct limits on throw-weight until the end (Phase II) it will be hard to get it back into a treaty at that point. We need to introduce direct limits on throw-weight from the very beginning in any discussions about a treaty. If we do not, we risk getting agreement without equal ceilings on throw-weight. I agree that we should table a Basic Elements paper, but with collapsed phases. The issue of multiple agreements or order of agreements are matters for later discussion.

THE PRESIDENT

You mention SLCMs, don't we also have SLBMs?

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

All our SLBMs are already covered in negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT

Couldn't we negotiate a limit on total throw-weight agreement for both sides and then have that limit divided up between SLBMs and SLCMs?

(NOTE: The intent of the President's question apparently was to ask whether we could not have an aggregate ceiling which includes ballistic missile throw-weight and cruise missile throw-weight/payload. Further, his intent apparently was to ask whether we could have a total limit in which we consider ballistic missile throw-weight (an area of Soviet advantage) and bomber and cruise missile payload/throw-weight (an area of U.S. advantage). If this is a correct interpretation of the President's question, it was never directly understood or answered.)

AMB ROWNY

Yes, Mr. President we could, but this would get us directly into a negotiation over throw-weight. To get the Soviets to talk about direct limits on throw-weight, I need to offer some limits on something that bothers them. That something is limits on ALCMs. And I need to offer limits on cruise missiles to cut the threat to MX that the large amount of Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight provides.

SECRETARY OF STATE

I disagree. I am not sure a full scale discussion of cruise missiles would be in our interest. We need to nurse along the current U.S. cruise

missile programs. The phased approach that is in our current position makes good sense today. It would effect throw-weight (although indirectly).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The fact that cruise missiles could be discussed does not mean that we should agree to immediate limits on cruise missiles. All things are on the table, and the fact that cruise missiles are on the table is not a serious problem.

ROBERT McFARLANE

Mr. President, when we began these negotiations the Soviets were at [*amount not declassified*] MKG of throw-weight while we were and are at [*amount not declassified*] MKG. To ask the Soviets to go to an equal ceiling at or below our current level (*amount not declassified*) MKG) would be a real problem. Your original decision which was reflected in our phased approach, was to get to this low equal ceiling indirectly at first. Our Phase I goals would move the Soviets from about 1400 ballistic missiles to 850 ballistic missiles. This would cut their overall ballistic missile throw-weight significantly. The idea of tabling the Basic Elements paper was to undercut Soviets criticism that our position is not comprehensive.

Ed Rowny wants to put all items on the table. What should Ed say with respect to cruise missiles and throw-weight?

SECRETARY OF STATE

I think he should say vague things and keep all numerical limits blank.

AMB ROWNY

That was my original idea.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

We must remember that SLCMs are different from ALCMs. ALCMs are clearly strategic. While they could be launched from a number of different type of aircraft, we are planning to deploy them as strategic systems. The Soviets will be able to recognize them as such. SLCMs are a different problem. They are not obviously strategic weapons. Verification will be a really big problem with respect to SLCMs.

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

The U.S. SLCM is not a strategic weapon; it really is an INF weapon. I don't propose putting SLCM in the INF negotiations, but it is important to see the difference between SLCM and ALCM. We certainly don't want U.S. SLCM lumped into agreement packages, especially in overall weapons or throw-weight agreements.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We do not suggest putting SLCM in the negotiations at all at this time. But like throw-weight, we can't keep it off the table.

I don't believe we will get to meaningful limits on throw-weight in an indirect way.

THE PRESIDENT

Is it correct that the Soviets have not brought up SLCM?

AMB ROWNY

They have only addressed ALCM, not SLCM. However, they know we plan to buy 4,000 ALCMs. [3 lines not declassified]

THE PRESIDENT

(If this is true) would they not want to focus on (total numbers of) bombers?

AMB ROWNY

Yes. And that is why I think we should be prepared to negotiate to 350 total bombers plus some loading limits on the ALCMs on the bombers.

ROBERT McFARLANE

If I may summarize, it appears that all agree that we should table a Basic Elements paper as suggested with all elements included (cruise missiles and throw-weight). We disagree on whether to collapse the phases of our current position and negotiate on all issues at this time.

Could we now turn to a discussion of the specific limits involved (on slow flying systems and throw-weight) if you were to decide to negotiate.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points provided to frame the issue of bomber and ALCM loading limits. See Tab B.)⁵

Are there any agencies who wish to change or elaborate on their positions on these issues as listed in the paper?

If there are none, can we move to a discussion of the issue of SLCM? (Used Talking points provided to frame the SLCM issue. See Tab B.)⁶

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

SECRETARY OF STATE

I, of course, must defer to the Joint Chiefs for guidance in this area. The cruise missile area is one in which we have a lot going for us. I feel it is a little premature to include this in any final position. I think we should stay very vague on SLCM.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that we should go into negotiations with no limits on SLCMs at this time. In other words we support Option 5.⁷ But to admit that sooner or later we may wish to negotiate some limits soon is okay.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We feel we shouldn't limit ourselves. Now is not the time to put numbers in on this issue. This question takes me back to the issue of throw-weight. If we propose SLCM limits, the Soviets will seize the high-ground by noting the potential high cruise missile numbers that we will need to counter the Soviet advantage in throw-weight.

AMB ROWNY

I am loath to enter discussion on this area without knowing where U.S. interests lie. I agree that we should remain very vague on this point.

I am concerned, however, and wish to alert you to the fact that the Soviets may try to put SLCM in the INF negotiations. This would certainly hurt us in our dealings with the European allies. If we give certain allies the option of putting missiles at sea rather than on shore it would be very attractive to them. I also don't want to sabotage Nitze by putting this problem into his INF negotiations.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Verification of SLCMs will, of course, be very difficult.

THE PRESIDENT

What is the state of the art in Soviet defenses against cruise missiles? Are they capable of defending against them?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

They are developing defenses.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Soviets are spending a lot in this area. It is an easier problem than defending against ballistic missiles.

⁷ Option 5 involved a JCS-led "study of the military and verification problems associated with SLCM limits, with a view to proposing more meaningful and effective SLCM limits to the NSC by the middle of the third round." See Tab A, Document 48.

THE PRESIDENT

What happens if we find out later that it's not in our interest to be as dependent upon cruise missiles as we may be?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

They will certainly show up on Soviet radars.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

But the answer to your concern, we think, is stealth technology. Stealth is the counter.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

We estimate the Soviets will not have a capability until into the 1990s.

ROBERT MCFARLANE

I think that issue is illuminated. Couldn't we go on to the remaining issues in this paper.⁸

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points to frame the remaining issues noting that the IG had provided consensus recommendations on each of these. He recommended that the IG consensus recommendations be accepted. See Tab B.)⁹

(General Boverie then turned to the Basic Elements paper¹⁰ and used the Talking Points provided to frame a short review of that paper. See Tab C.)¹¹

Ambassador Rowny would you care to describe how specifically you would see using the Basic Elements paper.

AMB ROWNY

I would use it to show that we are in earnest in negotiating all aspects of this problem. In no case would I fill in the blanks with our bottom line position before getting approval. In any case I would initially table higher numbers before tabling our bottom line. In summary I would use the paper with all blanks or with a few key blanks.

⁸ The remaining issues, on which the START IG had come to a consensus, were limits on mobile ICBMs, Phase II throw-weight ceilings, and throw-weight counting rules. See Tab A, Document 48.

⁹ Attached but not printed.

¹⁰ Attached but not printed.

¹¹ See Tab A, Document 48.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Am I correct in assuming that we need more work on the bracketed language?

ROBERT MCFARLANE

Yes, the language will have to be reconciled with our decisions.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points to frame a discussion of the draft delegation instructions. See Tab D.)¹²

AMB ROWNY

I really need the guidance provided in paragraph 6 of the instructions concerning CBMs. I specifically need to be authorized to table a CBM providing for the notification of major military exercises. We still have problems concerning the criteria to use within the CBM. We need resolution of these technical problems as early as possible.

VICE PRESIDENT

Do the CBM proposals you are discussing or negotiating relate to the proposals made by Senators Jackson and Nunn?

AMB ROWNY

We are not discussing the proposed crisis center. The crisis center idea is being studied in the Pentagon.

VICE PRESIDENT

To me it seems like a good step forward. Where does it stand?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We see some promise in the CBMs area. We are studying the Senators' ideas along with other items which we have proposed, for example, improvements in the hotline. We need to move out ahead on such measures.

VICE PRESIDENT

The more we can do in this area the better.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We will be sending over papers on this subject soon. We have no problem with some of the new twists introduced by Senator Jackson, and we are considering some alternatives.

¹² Attached but not printed.

ROBERT MCFARLANE

The Department of Defense has tackled the problem well.

Mr. President we will give you time to reflect on these issues and provide you a decision document soon. I guess all that is left is to wish Ed Rowney well in his negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT

I guess that's all we have done today, because I don't think that up to this point we have helped you much.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I will solve the exercise problem for you this afternoon.

NOTE: The meeting ended at 1230. No specific decisions were reached during the meeting.

50. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, January 25, 1983

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

We had an important NSC meeting today² to determine the instructions to the delegation returning to the START negotiations. The crucial issue was whether or not to collapse the two phases of the negotiations into a single phase. This has to do with the question of cruise missiles and throw-weight, the two principal topics in the second stage. Secretary Shultz argued forcibly that it would be a mistake to collapse the two phases, because we did not want at this time to give away anything on cruise missiles, whereas if we pushed on throw-weight, as DOD, which is proposing the collapsing of the stages, wishes, we would inevitably find ourselves negotiating away something on cruise missiles. The cruise missile discussion had largely to do with SLCMs, since almost everybody agrees that some negotiations about ALCMs can be undertaken without foreclosing conventional options for the future,

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on January 25.

² See Document 49.

which is the principal reason why one would be reluctant to enter into these discussions now anyway.

On the whole, I found the discussion not very well conducted. It kept slipping off the track, particularly as Cap Weinberger argued what I considered quite unreasonable lines of analysis (even though his conclusion was not so controversial). In short, I found his approach totally illogical, although I do not find it illogical to want to collapse the two stages. Essentially what he was saying was that we could get the Soviets to negotiate on throw-weight without them getting us to negotiate at all on cruise missiles. I think this is totally unrealistic and makes one wonder whether the true purpose of the DOD proposal is not simply to make negotiations, or at least any agreement, impossible.³

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

³ On January 31, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "My arms control discussion group met this morning at 10 a.m. We discussed the concept of negotiability in arms control agreements. Richard Perle is of the view that the State Department is too prone to table solid, justifiable proposals in arms control negotiation on the grounds that they are unnegotiable. His view is that posture is neither necessary nor desirable. First, it is not desirable, because it does not give any room for settlement of the negotiation by proposing something that could be bargained away. In any event, the issue comes up in connection with verification because of the fear that anything that is proposed on verification that is not achieved will be difficult to justify in the Congress at the time of ratification. But Perle argues that in connection with SALT and the problems that created the greatest difficulty on Capitol Hill—the Backfire and heavy missiles—the negotiators did not even raise the issues with the Russians, and their failure to do so did not protect the SALT agreement. We also began a discussion, to be carried on next time, of the issues in connection with onsite inspection." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983.)

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 29, 1983

SUBJECT

Decisions Needed Concerning the START Basic Elements Paper

Issue

What specific decisions should you make on the issues raised at the January 25 NSC meeting.

Facts

The U.S. START Delegation is scheduled to resume negotiations on February 2. They require specific instructions on how to conduct Round III.

The finalization of instructions now awaits your decisions on the issues listed in the paper at Tab I.

The issues involved were discussed both in papers drafted for your use by the START IG (Tabs A and B), and the major issues were discussed in detail during the NSC meeting on January 25.

Discussion

The paper at Tab I is an internal NSC Staff paper which recommends to you specific decisions for your approval.

Using the paper, if you will indicate those recommendations with which you agree and those with which you do not, we will incorporate your decisions into an appropriate NSDD for your final approval and signature.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you use the paper at Tab I to record your decisions on specific issues.²

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-081, NSDD 0078, US Approach to START V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer.

² Reagan initialed his approval.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

DECISION PAPER

ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE TABLING OF A BASIC
ELEMENTS PAPER IN ROUND III OF START

PURPOSE:

The paper provided by the START IG (Tab A) adequately frames most of the issues for decision. Between the paper and the NSC discussion of these issues, all the salient arguments have been made. The purpose of this short paper is to present NSC Staff recommendations (and the rationale for those recommendations) to support the President in his decisions.

TABLING A BASIC ELEMENTS PAPER:

The purpose of tabling a Basic Elements paper during this Round would be to undercut Soviet criticism that the U.S. position is not comprehensive. There is no objection by any agency to taking this action at this time to achieve the purpose stated. The JCS initially had some reluctance to table such a document based on the fact that we still have more work to do before we can finalize the U.S. position on cruise missiles (specifically on SLCM), but we have means available to protect their interests on this subject.

Recommendation:

OK NO

_____ _____ That we authorize the START Delegation to
table a Basic Elements paper.⁴

U.S. PHASED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS: OSD (and others) argue that if we are to table a Basic Elements paper, then all items contained in both phases will be squarely on the table for discussion. They argue that the distinction between discussion and negotiations will be impossible to enforce. Therefore, they continue, we should recognize that the likely effect of tabling the Basic Elements paper will be to collapse our phased approach. They conclude that we should therefore discard the arbitrary distinction of phases now, before the

³ Top Secret; Sensitive.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

Soviets use it to cause us to discuss (and ultimately negotiate) limits on cruise missiles while using references to later phases to relegate discussion/negotiation of direct limits on throw-weight to some distant and uncertain future.

State argues that our purpose in tabling the Basic Elements paper is as stated above, i.e., simply to undercut Soviet criticism. *State* argues that it is premature for us to negotiate about our strong suit, i.e., cruise missiles. *State* also argues that it would be counter-productive to place direct throw-weight limits (with a U.S. goal of ceilings below existing U.S. levels) on the table for negotiation at this time. Therefore, *State* concludes, we should not alter our phased approach now since it protects us from being dragged into specific negotiations of either cruise missile or direct limits on throw-weight at this time. *State* feels nothing has changed sufficiently to cause us to move away from our phased approach.

Recommendations:

OK No

_____ _____ That we not change our phased approach at this time (noting that we may need to change at some future time).⁵

_____ _____ Given our purpose in tabling the Basic Elements paper, the text of the Basic Elements paper tabled should reflect the U.S. framework for both phases and general approach to specific items to be limited, but should not provide additional specific numerical limits (i.e., “fill in the blanks”) beyond what we have already provided at this time.⁶

Additionally, the instructions to the U.S. Delegation should provide the following guidance:

_____ _____ (1) The Delegation is authorized to discuss but not negotiate on Phase II items.⁷

_____ _____ (2) Such discussions should not be permitted to divert desired emphasis on Phase I items and on our focus on the most destabilizing systems first.⁸

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁶ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁷ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁸ Reagan initialed his approval.

- _____ (3) That U.S. readiness to engage in further discussion of Phase II limits on cruise missiles (consistent with item 2) is contingent upon Soviet readiness to equal and reciprocal discussion of direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight. The Soviets should not be permitted to isolate the discussion on only one Phase II item and break the linkage we envision between them.⁹
- _____ (4) The Delegation will attempt to keep the discussion of limits on Phase II items as general as possible so as to protect U.S. options while achieving our stated purpose in tabling the Basic Elements paper.¹⁰
- _____ (5) The level of specificity in the discussion of limits in one Phase II item (i.e., direct throw-weight or cruise missiles) will not exceed that used in discussing the other Phase II item.¹¹
- _____ The START IG should be directed to provide a paper addressing the issues of if, when, and how the U.S. should move away from its current phased approach. This paper should be completed by March 1.¹²

TREATMENT OF BOMBERS

The IG issue paper (Tab A), which was discussed during the January 25th NSC meeting, did note that all agree we cannot accept a numerical bomber limit below 350 at this time. Three alternatives were offered:

- (1) Shift the current Phase II U.S. goal for a bomber limit from 250 to 350;
- (2) Shift our basic approach to a missile/bomber aggregate (a change in the basic U.S. approach to negotiations; or
- (3) Abandon the current goal of 250 for Phase II but set no alternative level.

Alternative 2 would involve a substantial change in the basic U.S. position (moving us away from distinctions between fast and slow

⁹ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁰ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹¹ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹² Reagan initialed his approval.

flying systems and close to SALT-type aggregates). Alternative 3 would leave us with an unnecessarily vague internal position.

Recommendations:

OK No

- | | | |
|-------|-------|---|
| _____ | _____ | That we approve option 1, raising the internal U.S. Phase II goal from 250 to no less than 350 heavy bombers. ¹³ |
| _____ | _____ | That we direct the START IG to provide an analysis of the potential benefits shifting to missile/bomber aggregate limits in the future (and especially should we at a later time decide to abandon the current U.S. position on the phasing issue.) ¹⁴ |

TREATMENT OF ALCMs

All agencies except OSD are prepared to accept an approach to limits on ALCMs which involves average loading limits and a maximum loading limit of 20 ALCM per existing types of bombers. OSD argues that we should propose no limits on ALCMs at all at this time (other than the indirect constraints provided by bomber limits.)

Recommendations:

OK No

- | | | |
|-------|-------|---|
| _____ | _____ | That you approve option 2, establishing the U.S. position on limiting ALCM by loading limits associated with heavy bombers and establishing specific numerical limits as internal U.S. goals. ¹⁵ |
| _____ | _____ | That you direct the START IG to determine how best to present this decision in the context of the Basic Elements paper consistent with other decisions reached on the tabling of that paper. ¹⁶ |

TREATMENT OF SLCM

The START IG paper (Tab A) provided a number of options for limits on SLCM. Based upon the discussion of this issue at the NSC meeting on January 25, it appears that there is general consensus that we need to study this issue further before proposing any limits.

¹³ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁶ Reagan initialed his approval.

Recommendations:

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve option 5, which would direct the JCS to take the lead in a more detailed study of the military and verification problems associated with SLCM limits. This study, vetted through the START IG, should be provided by March 15.¹⁷

_____ _____ That until this study is complete, the U.S. Delegation should not raise the issue of limits on SLCM. If raised by the Soviets, the Delegation should confine the discussion to the problems associated with verification of SLCM and not imply any commitment to limit SLCM and not imply any commitment to limit SLCMs in START at this time.¹⁸

LIMITS ON MOBILE ICBMs

The START IG has reached a consensus recommendation that we neither propose to ban nor to permit mobile ICBMs at this time but continue our current position that mobile ICBMs, if allowed in START, must be accompanied by measures to ensure effective verification.

Recommendation:

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the IG recommendation on this issue.¹⁹

PHASE II THROW-WEIGHT CEILING

The START IG has reached a consensus recommendation that we adopt a Phase II objective of an equal throw-weight ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles below 1.9 million KG, consistent with the throw-weight definition and counting rules selected. The START IG has also reached a consensus recommendation concerning how to define throw-weight and concerning what counting rules will be necessary to measure it.

¹⁷ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁸ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁹ Reagan initialed his approval.

Recommendation:

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the IG recommendations in this area.²⁰

HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITION

The paper at Tab B was developed by the START IG and submitted for decision in December, 1982. It was decided at that time to include the issue as a part of this decision package. At issue is whether to propose specific performance criteria as a part of the U.S. definition of a heavy bomber for START purposes. This issue was not discussed at the NSC meeting on January 25.

All agree that at a minimum we should define heavy bombers in START using a system-specific approach for existing aircraft, as in SALT II, adding the BACKFIRE and BLACKJACK-A to the list of heavy bombers. Future bombers for both sides would be added to the list if they were capable of performing the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner comparable to those included on the original list. Either side would be free to identify future bombers that would be the subject of discussion about whether they should be included.

The remaining issue for decision is whether, in addition to the general criterion of performing the mission of a heavy bomber, the agreement should also specify criteria that would be used in making determinations regarding future bombers. A future bomber meeting *any* of those specific criteria would qualify as a heavy bomber, but bombers not meeting any of them could still be so classified if they met the general criterion mentioned above. The following specific criteria are appropriate such that any future bomber meeting at least one of the criteria would be identified as a “heavy bomber” in START:

- Maximum gross takeoff weight greater than 100,000kg;
- Maximum unrefueled range of at least 8000km, carrying a payload of 6000kg, using a full fuel load and a flight profile designed to provide maximum range; or
- Empty weight greater than 45,000kg.

The OSD and Ambassador Rowny favor the inclusion of specific criteria. As stated in the paper, they feel this would facilitate future U.S. bomber program planning, provide for specific compliance criteria for both sides, and avoid debate over whether new aircraft are heavy bombers. The specific criteria would be those listed in the IG paper at Tab B.

²⁰ Reagan initialed his approval.

State, JCS, and ACDA argue against inclusion of criteria. They argue the criteria will permit the Soviets to deploy systems designed to be just below the specified levels, that monitoring of aircrafts performance against the criteria will be difficult, improvements in technology may make the criteria invalid over time, and may slow the negotiating process or lead to negotiated criteria not in the U.S. interest.

Recommendation:

OK No

_____ _____ That you permit the U.S. Chief Negotiator to propose the criteria and that we review the U.S. position after we have a clear picture of the Soviet reaction to the criteria proposed.²¹

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²²

Washington, undated

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES FOR THIRD ROUND OF START

This paper summarizes key points regarding issues for the next round of START negotiations. Where options refer to limitations under consideration, the proposed alternatives should be considered as internal guidance and not necessarily as recommendations for proposals to be tabled in the third round. For the implementation of these options, this paper should be considered in the context of the draft Basic Elements paper and third-round instructions.

I. Phasing

All agencies agree that, as recommended by the US START delegation, we should move away from our current approach of negotiating Phase I issues before Phase II issues and that we should be willing to discuss all issues comprehensively, but only on the condition that the Soviets are willing to be equally comprehensive by addressing seriously all of what are now described as Phase II issues (e.g., direct limits on throw-weight) and not merely the issues of greatest interest to the Soviets (e.g., cruise missile limits).

²¹ Reagan initialed his approval.

²² Secret; Sensitive.

There is disagreement over whether the US should propose to implement START reductions in two discrete phases, or whether there should be a single phase of reductions. Whether to retain our ultimate goal of equal levels of throw-weight at below the current US level is not at issue.

Option 1: Single Framework for Discussion of All Issues

We should give up the notion of phases, whether in the sense of negotiations or reductions, and prepare a comprehensive, integral position for the third round. This option could be implemented by tabling a Basic Elements document. Such a procedure would have a number of advantages.

First and foremost, it maximizes the leverage which we possess by virtue of the Soviets' interest in limiting cruise missiles. If we were to propose constraints for cruise missiles, even without indicating any numbers, without linking them directly to our second phase goals, we must expect the Soviets to "pocket" our willingness to discuss cruise missiles and to import the proposed constraints into the first phase. Indeed, it would hardly be credible to maintain that the US be allowed to build now a cruise missile force that would exceed the ceiling we would be willing to accept eight or ten years hence. The Soviets would attempt to move our proposed cruise missile constraints into the first phase, thus depriving us of the necessary leverage for achieving our second phase goals. Were this to happen, we would duplicate the mistake we made in allowing the ABM restraints of SALT I to take precedence over the restraints on strategic offensive arms, a procedure which virtually guaranteed that we would not achieve the goal of limiting the Soviet strategic offensive build-up to non-threatening levels.

By proposing a single set of restraints, we would obviate the need to address the question of whether we can, consistent with military requirements, propose ballistic missile and ballistic missile warhead limits below the 850 and 5000 level. The possibility of proposing further reductions in these categories now appears remote. In any case, it would hardly seem a realistic use of our time and energy to concern ourselves with the preparation of such a proposal.

This procedure also serves our political interests in that it permits us to come forward with a new position that is conducive to progress in the negotiations while retaining maximum negotiating leverage. It rebuts Soviet criticism of the US proposal as a non-comprehensive, non-serious proposal, which concentrates on US concerns while relegating Soviet concerns to a meaningless second phase. By explicitly addressing ballistic missile throw-weight, an area of Soviet advantage, we help explain the priority the US has placed on ballistic missiles in general,

and on heavy ICBMs in particular. Otherwise, concentration on such demands as preferential constraints on heavy ballistic missiles risk appearing as an arbitrary attack on the way in which the Soviets have happened to structure their forces. The required Soviet reduction in throw-weight (65%) is comparable to the reductions the Soviets would have to make in ICBM warheads (58%), ballistic missiles (64%) and heavy ICBMs (65%), under our current Phase I proposal.

In the context of a single proposal, we should table both our proposed framework for constraints on ALCMs and our second phase goal of a direct throw-weight limit of approximately 1.8 million kg in order to make explicit our right to a ballistic missile force equal to that of the Soviet Union in destructive capacity. Our emphasis on throw-weight at this point will facilitate the negotiation of an agreement which accommodates our requirements in the bomber/cruise missile area. The importance of throw-weight as a measure of the destructive capability of a ballistic missile has been emphasized by the recent debate concerning the survivability of CSB. The sole unit of account which captures the ability of the Soviets to adapt their ballistic missile force to the task of threatening CSB is throw-weight. A direct limit on throw-weight would considerably simplify our current approach by allowing us the option of eliminating current indirect constraints on throw-weight (i.e., 210 heavy and medium ICBMs, with a sub-limit of 110 medium ICBMs).

While we would propose a unified set of constraints on strategic forces, we could, of course, take into account the practical problems of effectuating large reductions in forces by providing for gradual reductions in all units of account, in accordance with a schedule of agreed, equal intermediate ceilings.

Option 2: Separate Phases

Combining Phases I and II would establish a direct limitation on throw-weight (specifically the 1.8 million kg ceiling) as a US objective with the same weight and visibility as our other goals of equal ceilings on deployed ballistic missiles and warheads. To propose that the Soviets reduce their current throw-weight level by 65%, while the US reduces little or not at all, would be construed by the Administration's critics, both here and in Europe, as a new and non-negotiable demand. These critics would invoke the throw-weight limit as evidence of a lack of seriousness and responsibility in the President's arms control policies. Thus, collapsing the phases would undermine US credibility at the very moment when our objective should be to sustain the support of the US public and our Allies. Any decrease in political support for the Administration's arms control policies would undercut our position and leverage at the START negotiations.

The first phase of the US START proposal focuses on destabilizing systems by seeking equal ceilings in the most easily understood indicators of strategic power: ballistic missiles (particularly ICBMs) and their warheads. Through specific limitations on heavy and medium ICBMs, the Phase I proposal is intended to reduce Soviet throw-weight to no more than 2.5 million kg (one-half the current Soviet level). Therefore, the ceilings in Phase I would provide a dramatic reduction in Soviet throw-weight as well as missiles and warheads. Moreover, because we are seeking in Phase I direct limits on the most destabilizing systems themselves, this approach is easier to explain and defend than direct limits on throw-weight, which is not a clearly understood concept outside the strategic community.

Furthermore, it is questionable whether direct throw-weight limits deserve the same prominence in our START proposal as the other limitations which we seek. Because of improvements in accuracy and yield-to-weight ratios, throw-weight is a factor of declining importance as a measure of strategic power. Despite their 250% advantage in throw-weight, no one claims that the Soviets are two-and-a-half times stronger than the US. In addition, throw-weight is more difficult to verify than limits on deployed missiles and warheads and is even difficult to define and to count.

As a Phase II objective, an equal throw-weight ceiling of 1.8 million kg is easier to understand and to defend. Achieving our Phase I objectives would result in a major reduction in Soviet throw-weight and would make such a ceiling a more realistic goal for future reductions. Seeking a direct throw-weight limit at the same time as our other Phase I objectives, however, would make it more difficult to achieve our more immediate and important goals of limitations on deployed missiles and warheads.

For these reasons, the President decided last year against including a direct throw-weight limit in the first phase of START. The result was a START proposal which, because of its fairness, ambitious objectives, clarity and coherence, has won the support of Allied governments and most of the US public. The phased framework of our proposal was an important element in gaining that support. Moreover, phasing is a source of negotiating leverage which we hope to utilize—through the Basic Elements approach—to draw the Soviets out on such as ballistic missile warhead limits. Combining the phases would be a major departure from our present framework which is not warranted by any developments in the negotiations; it should not be undertaken without careful consideration of our overall position in the START talks.

<u>Options</u>	<u>ACDA</u>	<u>JCS</u>	<u>IG Participants</u>		
			<u>OSD</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Amb Rowny</u>
1. Combine the phases	X		X		X
2. Separate phases	X			X	

II. *Limits on Heavy Bombers and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles*

A. *Bomber Limits*

Current guidance sets a *goal* of a ceiling of 250 heavy bombers in Phase II. This ceiling, however, would limit US flexibility in responding to unconstrained Soviet air defenses, possible modifications in US ballistic missile programs and the outcome of negotiations on ballistic missile limits. All agencies, therefore, agree that we cannot now propose a heavy bomber limit below 350, either under a single-phase approach or in the second phase of the alternative approach.

Option 1: Limit of 350 Bombers

This limit would provide the US and the USSR additional flexibility to meet bomber requirements. It would preclude any proposal to reduce below 350 heavy bombers in Phase II at this time. Because of the relationship between heavy bomber requirements and the permitted level of ballistic missile systems, this limit may be reassessed on the basis of the ballistic missile warhead ceiling. The bomber limit, however, would still be affected by the need to take into account unconstrained Soviet air defenses and the proposed limitations on ALCMs.

Option 2: Missile/Bomber Aggregate

This would set a combined limit on the heavy bombers and deployed missiles (1200) and a sub-limit on deployed missiles (850). Both sides would be allowed to trade ballistic missiles for bombers, but not vice versa. This approach could be adopted for either a single-phase approach or for both phases of a two-phase approach. It could also accommodate a higher Phase II bomber ceiling as in Option 1.

Option 2 would provide additional flexibility to expand the US bomber force in response to future challenges (at the expense of ballistic missiles), without necessarily increasing the proposed bomber ceiling. However, the adoption of a combined bomber/missile aggregate would involve a significant change in the framework of our position and would be viewed by some as movement toward the Soviet proposal and SALT II. The Soviets may use this step to support their proposals for total freedom to mix (i.e., to trade bombers for missiles as well) and a single warhead aggregate (including bomber weapons).

Option 3: Phase II Goal of Further Reductions

Conditional upon the decision regarding phasing, the US would, under this approach, abandon the internal objective of 250 heavy bomb-

ers but would not set an alternative level. As indicated under Option 1, our Phase II bomber requirements would depend upon several factors which cannot be predicted at this time, such as the permitted level of ballistic missile systems and improvements in Soviet air defenses. Rather than specify a Phase II limit of 350 bombers at this time (which would preclude Phase II reductions), Option 3 would treat heavy bombers (internally and with the Soviets) in the same way as Phase II limits on ballistic missiles and warheads, i.e., we would be willing to discuss further limits and reductions in Phase II if national security requirements permit.

B. Limit on ALCM Loadings

Current guidance is that the US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves, that ALCM carriers should not be subject to limits beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers, and that we should not propose limits on the maxi-bombers, and that we should not propose limits on the maximum number of ALCMs which could be carried on a heavy bomber. In the START negotiations, the USSR has pressed for limits on cruise missiles. Moreover, the Soviets and our other critics have charged that, without limits on cruise missiles, the US START proposal is not "comprehensive." The issue, therefore, is whether to maintain current guidance or to set a limit on ALCM loadings. These limits would apply in the second phase of a two-phase agreement, if we should adopt the approach involving two phases of reductions.

Option 1: No Specific Limits at This Time

This option would limit ALCMs in the same way that we propose to limit other bomber weapons, i.e., by limiting the number of heavy bombers. This would provide more flexibility to adjust ALCM deployments to respond to improvements in unconstrained Soviet air defenses and reinforce our negotiating emphasis on more destabilizing ballistic missiles. Proposing an ALCM limit at this time could move the US closer to including bomber weapons in an overall nuclear weapon ceiling. In addition, the Soviets would probably attempt to bargain downwards any US-proposed limit on ALCMs.

This option would not, however, provide additional US leverage in the negotiations and would make achievement of a START agreement much more difficult. It would also leave our proposal open to criticism for a lack of "comprehensiveness." In addition, Soviet ALCM deployments would be similarly unconstrained.

Option 2: Average Loading of 28 ALCMs per Heavy Bomber, Maximum of 20 ALCMs on Existing Bomber Types

This option is consistent with currently planned US ALCM deployments. The Soviets have already accepted this loading limit once on

ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (in SALT II), so this option would be less likely to be the subject of serious public criticism than some alternative options. It would, however, draw the US into negotiations on one type of bomber weapon, which the Soviets would seek to expand to limit all bomber weapons.

Options	ACDA	JCS	IG Participants		Amb Rowny
			OSD	State	
Phase II Bomber Ceiling					
1. 350 Bombers	X	X			X
2. Missile/Bomber Aggregate	X				
3. Goal of Phase II Reductions	X			X	
ALCM Loadings					
1. No Limits			X		
2. Avg. Loading of 28, Max of 20 on Existing Types	X	X		X	X

III. *Limits on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)*

[*Less than 3 lines not declassified*]. The USSR has deployed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] SLCMs, most of which are under 600 km range and can carry either nuclear or conventional payloads. In addition, the Soviets are developing a long-range SLCM (with a range above 2500 km) for land attack.

Current US guidance is to defer discussion of constraints on “slow-flying systems” other than heavy bombers (i.e., possibly including SLCMs) until Phase II. In the START negotiations, the USSR has proposed a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles (including SLCMs) over 600 km range, which all agencies agree is unacceptable to the US. The issue, therefore, is whether to propose a Phase II limit on SLCMs which is more acceptable to the US.

Option 1: No Limits

This approach would permit the US unlimited flexibility to deploy SLCMs. The primarily tactical roles of US SLCM platforms would prevent our nuclear SLCMs from being committed to the SIOP (although they could perform a strategic reserve role), so it may not be appropriate to limit them in START. Moreover, this approach recognizes the significant monitoring and verification problems associated with the other options. The alternative approaches, therefore, could have the effect of constraining the US while the USSR may be able to evade the limitation.

On the other hand, a refusal to discuss SLCM limits would give the Soviets a propaganda opportunity to attack the US position for leaving a “loophole” which would allow a major increase in strategic capability. Also, the Soviets could exploit the lack of SLCM limits to deploy a large number of long-range nuclear SLCMs for land attack. If the US were to argue that SLCMs should not be limited because of their tactical (as opposed to strategic) role, this would undermine our position that weapons should be subject to limitation on the basis of their capabilities, and not their missions.

Option 2: Ban All Nuclear SLCMs

This option would exempt from limitation the large majority of US SLCMs (which will not be nuclear-armed) and would ban the Soviet nuclear SLCM threat to the US and to surface ships. This option would require the Soviets to dismantle some portion of their SLCM force. (We do not know how many Soviet SLCMs are nuclear-armed.) This option is the most consistent with our INF position and would be the most politically appealing to domestic and international critics of US arms control policy.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Option 3: Numerical Limit on All SLCM Platforms

This option would establish a relatively verifiable indirect limitation on SLCM deployments by setting a ceiling on SLCM platforms. Presuming that all submarines would have to be counted as SLCM platforms (for verification reasons), this option would also indirectly constrain the Soviet submarine fleet. Those surface ships with a SLCM capability (as determined by NTM) would also be counted. As the Soviets would have a greater number of SLCM platforms than the US, this option would allow the US considerable flexibility to expand deployments of nuclear and conventional SLCMs.

However, as a simple platform limit would contain no limit on SLCMs themselves, this approach would appear to be a purely cosmetic limitation. Moreover, a permissive limit (e.g., 300 or more vessels) would lead critics of US arms control policy to add the high number of permitted SLCM platforms to our proposed ceilings on bombers and deployed missiles in order to undercut our public focus on significant reductions. Also, because of the asymmetry in platform numbers, a platform limit would be difficult to negotiate.

Option 4: Limit Nuclear-Armed SLCMs to Equal Levels on the Basis of Average Loading per Platform

The number of platforms and the average loading limit could be set to accommodate planned US SLCM deployments. There are major

uncertainties in our estimates of the number of Soviet nuclear SLCMs. However, to the extent that the Soviets comply with such a limit, this option would capture a large number of existing Soviet SLCMs and would presumably constrain the future Soviet threat to the US.

This option would be the most difficult to verify, as it would combine requirements to monitor SLCM payload (nuclear/conventional) and average loading per platform. Moreover, because maximum potential SLCM loadings would be significantly greater than the average loading limit, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential. (However, if the agreed loading limit is consistent with US deployment plans, the net national security impact would probably not be less favorable to the US than the absence of SLCM limits.)

Option 5: Seek More Meaningful and Effective Limit

As indicated above, there are significant military, political and verification problems with the various SLCM limitations under consideration. On the other hand, a refusal to limit SLCMs would undercut the seriousness of the US START proposal and would leave the Soviets with a major capability to circumvent an agreement.

Under this approach, the JCS would take the lead on a study of the military and verification problems associated with SLCM limits, with a view to proposing more meaningful and effective SLCM limits to the NSC by the middle of the third round. If this option is approved, we would need to decide how to treat the issue of SLCM limits until the NSC decides on an approach. There are two major alternatives:

a) The US would express (publicly and to the Soviets) a willingness to accept SLCM limits but would defer a specific proposal.

b) The US would not express a willingness to accept SLCM limits until the difficult problems associated with this issue are resolved. If the Soviets raise the SLCM issue in the third round, the US delegation would confine its discussion to verification issues, without committing the US to limit SLCMs in START.

<i>Options</i>	<i>IG Participants</i>				
	<u><i>ACDA</i></u>	<u><i>JCS</i></u>	<u><i>OSD</i></u>	<u><i>State</i></u>	<u><i>Amb Rowny</i></u>
1. No limits					
2. Ban all nuclear SLCMs					
3. Limit all SLCM platforms					
4. Limit nuclear SLCMs on basis of avg. loading per platform					
5. Seek different approach					

IV. *Limits on Mobile ICBMs*

The Soviets have implied in the negotiations that they intend to deploy mobile ICBMs. At least one of their ICBMs in development would be suitable for mobile deployment. Soviet development of mobiles could have a positive impact on crisis stability (by reducing Soviet ICBM vulnerability) and could reduce the Soviet throw-weight potential. Counting Soviet mobile ICBM launchers, however, is much more difficult than for fixed launchers, and Soviet deployment of mobiles would greatly complicate US targeting requirements.

The IG recommends that we neither propose to ban nor to permit mobile ICBMs at this time but continue our current position that mobile ICBMs, if allowed in START, must be accompanied by measures to ensure effective verification. We are developing a comprehensive verification package to enhance our ability to monitor Soviet mobile deployments, and this verification package should be an intrinsic part of our position. Furthermore, the US delegation would use Soviet interest in mobiles as leverage to achieve our other negotiating objectives.

V. *Phase II Throw-Weight Ceiling*

The US proposal for Phase II limits includes direct limits and reductions to equal levels of ballistic missile throw-weight below current US levels. The current US throw-weight level is approximately 1.9 million kg.

The IG recommends that we adopt a Phase II objective of an equal throw-weight ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles of just below 1.9 million kg, consistent with the throw-weight definition and counting rule described below. This level is consistent with projected US force structures under START.

VI. *Throw-Weight Counting Rule*

The IG recommends that, for existing types of ballistic missiles, throw-weight should be determined on the basis of the maximum throw-weight demonstrated in any flight test. There is concern, however, that in the future the Soviets may attempt to circumvent direct limits on throw-weight by testing their missiles with less throw-weight than they are capable of carrying.

The IG therefore recommends that, for new types of ballistic missiles, the maximum demonstrated throw-weight should be compared to potential throw-weight for a reference range, and that the larger of the two values should be assigned to the particular missile. This approach would be accompanied by collateral constraints which would result in less than 10% uncertainty in monitoring Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight.

(S) All agree that at a minimum we should define heavy bombers in START using a system-specific approach for existing aircraft, as in

SALT II, adding the BACKFIRE and BLACKJACK-A to the list of heavy bombers. Future bombers for both sides would be added to the list if they were capable of performing the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner comparable to those included on the original list. Either side would be free to identify future bombers that would be the subject of discussion about whether they should be included.

(S) *Issue for Decision.* The remaining issue for decision is whether, in addition to the general criterion of performing the mission of a heavy bomber, the agreement should also specify criteria that would be used in making determinations regarding future bombers. A future bomber meeting *any* of those specific criteria would qualify as a heavy bomber, but bombers not meeting any of them could still be so classified if they met the general criterion mentioned above. The following specific criteria are appropriate such that any future bomber meeting at least one of the criteria would be identified as a “heavy bomber” in START:

- Maximum gross takeoff weight greater than 100000kg;
- Maximum unrefueled range of at least 8000km, carrying a payload of 6000kg, using a full fuel load and a flight profile designed to provide maximum range; or
- Empty weight greater than 45000kg.

(S) A comparison of these criteria with characteristics of relevant, existing US and Soviet bombers is given on the attached table. The criteria are such that, according to current intelligence estimates, the Soviet Backfire bomber would be identified as a heavy bomber, while the US FB-111 would not.

PROS for the addition of specific criteria

—The US would have specific criteria that would facilitate future bomber program planning.

—The US and the Soviet Union would be obliged to comply with the same criteria; in contrast, for cases where obligations are vaguely worded (as in certain limitations in the ABM Treaty), the US imposes objective criteria on itself, but is unwilling or unable to enforce the same standard on the Soviets.

—This approach would avoid future debate of the type that occurred regarding the Soviet Backfire bomber; as a consequence, this approach would include a follow-on Backfire as a heavy bomber.

—Establishment of specific “precise” criteria will present the United States with a “two-edged” sword concerning heavy bombers. The United States will not produce aircraft designed to avoid classification as a heavy bomber while preserving heavy bomber capabilities. We cannot be sure that the Soviets will have the same goal. Planned Soviet improvements (such as upgraded production engines, external weapons pods and covert aerial refueling capability) could give an

aircraft previously determined to be a medium bomber “heavy” bomber capabilities. The specific criteria will not be conclusive in determining whether an aircraft, designed in this manner, with characteristics below the criteria, is a heavy bomber. The specific criteria will, however, provide the Soviets with the ability to claim that without regard to the treaty, the United States desires to include this medium bomber in the heavy bomber totals, attempting to undercut Soviet force structure. Attempting to “stretch” the area below the criteria to capture all bombers that might become heavy bombers merely diminishes the value of the criteria and, except for aircraft clearly covered or not covered by the criteria, makes the classification subjective. Furthermore, improvements in technology may eventually make any criteria invalid.

—[1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]

—The establishment of specific criteria could slow the negotiation process, and may well actually weaken the definition of a heavy bomber, depending on where the final criteria fall after the give and take of negotiations. We may well end up with criteria which limit US bomber programs, and allow the Soviets latitude in cheating.

—Use of specific criteria doesn’t really give our designers assurance, because they could design to the criteria but have the resulting bomber identified as a heavy bomber because it conformed to the general criterion.

Agency Positions

(S) OSD and the Chairman of the START Delegation favor including the specific criteria in the definition of a heavy bomber in START. State, JCS and ACDA do not favor including the specific criteria. CIA has taken no position regarding the issue of specific criteria in a heavy bomber definition.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²³

Washington, undated

*Comparison of Bomber Criteria
and Specific Characteristics for Certain Aircraft*

	Maximum Weight (kg)	Empty Weight (kg)	Unrefueled Range (km) Payload of 6,000kg
Proposed Threshold	100,000	45,000	8,000
[4 lines not declassified]			
ATB	115,000	Not Avail.	Not Avail.
FB-111	52,000	22,000	4,100
Bear	166,000	70,200 (C Mod)	16,300
Bison B/C	181,000	71,700	11,000
Blackjack	241,000	92,000	14,800
Backfire	136,000	54,200	10,700
Badger	79,000 (C&G Mod)	38,700 (G Mod)	3,940
Blinder A/B	92,000	43,200	4,630 (B Mod)
A-6E ²⁴	27,400	11,600	4,400
A-10A ²⁵	21,500	9,200	1,000
F-18 ²⁶	20,000	7,500	3,700

(Soviet data estimated)

(US data rounded off)

²³ Secret; Noform.

²⁴ Data on these aircraft are shown for comparison only. [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁵ Data on these aircraft are shown for comparison only. [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁶ Data on these aircraft are shown for comparison only. [Footnote is in the original.]

52. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 1, 1983

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD Reflecting Decisions Reached on START following the January 25th NSC Meeting

Issue

Should you approve/sign the attached NSDD?

Facts

The attached draft NSDD (Tab A)² does the following:

—reflects the decisions reached following the January 25th NSC meeting on START which you took in the paper we sent you last Saturday³;

—provides guidance on the issues addressed by those decisions and on the tabling of a Basic Elements paper; and

—tasks additional Interdepartmental work.

Discussion

We have discussed this draft NSDD with State and Defense, and we feel it is ready for your approval and signature.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve and sign the draft NSDD provided at Tab A.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, Box SR 081, National Security Council Institutional Files, NSDD 0078, US Approach to START V. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed below as Document 53.

³ January 29. See Document 51.

⁴ An unknown hand indicated approval on Reagan's behalf.

53. National Security Decision Directive 78¹

Washington, February 1, 1983

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—V (U)

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33,² NSDD-36,³ NSDD-44⁴ and NSDD-53.⁵ It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START and specific guidance concerning the tabling of a Basic Elements paper during the third round of negotiations. (S)

Basic Elements Paper (C)

The U.S. Delegation is authorized to table a Basic Elements paper during the third round of negotiations if and when it considers it tactically advantageous to do so. The specific purpose for tabling such a paper at this time is to establish clearly that the U.S. approach to the START negotiations is comprehensive and, thus, undercut Soviet criticism of the U.S. position implying that it is not. The Basic Elements paper, therefore, should present the full U.S. framework for negotiations. At the same time, the treatment of specific limits presented in the paper should be kept as general as is possible so as to protect U.S. negotiating and programmatic options while still achieving our stated objective in tabling the document. (C)

In finalizing the specific language and content of the document, the delegation has the flexibility, unless otherwise formally instructed, to include either general formulations or formulations of limits with blank spaces included when treating areas about which no U.S. position has as yet been tabled with the Soviet Union. No additional specific numerical limits should be added to the U.S. position as presented to the Soviets by the tabling of this document without specific additional instructions. (C)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-081, NSDD 0078, US Approach to START V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, and Rowny under cover of a February 1 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision (NSDD-78). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-78 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

² See Document 19.

³ See Document 24.

⁴ See Document 29.

⁵ See Document 36.

The U.S. Phased Approach to START (C)

The tabling of the Basic Elements paper does not alter the basic U.S. phased approach to the START negotiations. (C)

Discussion of Phase II Issues (C)

The delegation is authorized to discuss, but not to negotiate, Phase II issues subject to the following additional guidance: (C)

(1) Discussion of Phase II items should not be permitted to divert emphasis from, or delay work on, critical Phase I issues. (C)

(2) Until instructed otherwise, in discussion of Phase II issues the treatment of specific limits should be kept as general as possible so as to both protect U.S. options with respect to these issues and maintain the focus on Phase I limits. (C)

(3) The Soviets should not be permitted to isolate discussion on only some Phase II issues (i.e., cruise missile limits) and thus break the linkage that we envision between the negotiation of cruise missile limits and the negotiation of direct limits on throwweight. (S)

—U.S. willingness to engage in continued discussion of Phase II limits on cruise missiles will remain contingent upon continued Soviet willingness to engage in equal and reciprocal discussion of direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight. (C)

—The delegation will ensure that the treatment of these two Phase II issues remains balanced in the context of continued discussion. For example, the general level of specificity used in discussing cruise missile limits will not exceed that used in discussing direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight. (C)

The Definition of a Heavy Bomber (C)

The U.S. will propose the following method for defining a heavy bomber for START: (C)

(1) For existing bombers, a system specific approach to definition should be used. (C)

(2) For future bombers, specific bomber aircraft would be added to the list of heavy bombers if they were capable of performing the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner comparable to those bombers already identified as heavy bombers or if the bomber aircraft meet any of the following specific criteria: (C)

- maximum gross takeoff weight greater than 100,000 kg; (C)
- maximum unrefueled range of at least 8,000 km (carrying a payload of 6,000 kg, using a full fuel load and a flight profile designed to provide maximum range); or (C)
- empty weight greater than 45,000 kg. (C)

Bomber Limits in Phase II (C)

The internal U.S. goal of a reduction of bomber forces to an equal level of 250 in Phase II established in NSDD–33 is rescinded. There exists a clear relationship between U.S. requirements for heavy bombers and the number of ballistic missile warheads we anticipate to be permitted in the context of a final START agreement. Given our current proposal which would limit ballistic missile weapons to an equal level of 5,000 total warheads for each side: (TS)

(1) the U.S. will not accept limits which constrain the U.S. to less than 350 heavy bombers; and (TS)

(2) the U.S. will not propose reductions to equal limits below this level for consideration in either Phase I or Phase II at this time. (TS)

Limits on Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) (C)

The U.S. is prepared in Phase II to constrain ALCMs via loading limits to be associated with their carriage on heavy bombers. The internal U.S. position is that it would be willing to accept the following specific limits: (C)

(1) an average loading of 28 ALCMs per heavy bomber; and (S)

(2) a maximum of 20 ALCMs on existing bomber types. (S)

Limits on Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) (C)

Additional study is required before a position with respect to limits on SLCM can be determined. Such study will be accomplished on a priority basis. (S)

Until the necessary study is completed, the U.S. will not raise the issue of limitation of SLCMs. If raised by the Soviets, the U.S. delegation will note that possible limitation of SLCMs must be accompanied by measures to ensure effective verification and that before such limits can be discussed, we must understand how they could be verified. If pressed further, the delegation will state that the problems associated with the verification of possible limits on SLCMs are currently under study in Washington, and that until that study is complete, it has nothing further to say about this issue. (S)

The U.S. position remains that, if limited at all, SLCMs should be limited within the context of START, but the U.S. will not imply any commitment to limit SLCMs in the future at this time. (S)

Limits on Mobile ICBMs (C)

The U.S. will neither propose to ban nor to permit mobile ICBMs at this time. If the issue is raised by the Soviets, the U.S. will maintain its current position that mobile ICBMs, if allowed in START, must be accompanied by measures to ensure effective verification. (C)

Direct Limits on Ballistic Missile Throwweight (C)

The U.S. goal remains direct and equal limits on deployed ballistic missile throwweight below current U.S. levels to be achieved in Phase II. Using the proposed U.S. definition of ballistic missile throwweight and associated counting rules, the numerical goal is an equal limit on deployed ballistic missile throwweight in Phase II at a level below 1.9 mkg. (S)

Throwweight Definition & Counting Rule (C)

The U.S. will propose the following definition and associated counting rule for the treatment of ballistic missile throwweight within START. (C)

(1) For existing types of ballistic missiles, throwweight should be determined on the basis of the maximum demonstrated in any flight test. (C)

(2) For new types of ballistic missiles, the maximum demonstrated throwweight will be compared to the missile's potential throwweight (for a specific reference range). The larger of the two values will be assigned as the throwweight of the particular missile. (C)

The intent in the treatment of new ballistic missile types is to avoid the possibility of circumvention of a limit on demonstrated throwweight by the practice of testing new missile types with less demonstrated throwweight than they are capable of carrying. (C)

Provisions requiring the additional exchange of specific data should also be applied as necessary to ensure effective verification. (C)

Additional Work (C)

The START Interdepartmental Group shall conduct a detailed review of progress in START to this point and the likely developments over the next year. The Interdepartmental Group should address, as a part of this review, the following two questions which were raised in the context of the Interdepartmental Group papers submitted prior to the January 25 NSC meeting:⁶ (C)

(1) Should the U.S. alter its phased approach to START? (TS)

(2) Should the U.S. shift to a single aggregate limit including both ballistic missiles and bombers? (TS)

In addition, the Department of Defense, with the assistance of other agencies as appropriate, will conduct, on a priority basis, a detailed study of the military implications and the verification problems associated with limits on Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs). The objec-

⁶ See Document 49.

tive of this study is to determine whether more meaningful and effective limits on SLCMs than those previously proposed by the existing Inter-departmental Group papers can be developed and whether any such limits are in the U.S. national interest. An assessment of the net balance between the potential benefits to the U.S. provided by no, or minimal, limits on SLCMs and the existing or potential threat to the U.S. and to U.S. forces posed by similar weapons in Soviet hands must be provided as a integral part of this study. This study should serve as basis for the determination of the U.S. position on the limitation of SLCMs in START. (TS)

The above studies should be completed and provided for review by the National Security Council no later than March 15, 1983. (C)

Ronald Reagan

**54. Telegram From the Delegation to the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks in Geneva to the White House¹**

Geneva, February 7, 1983, 1700Z

361. To: Admiral Dan Murphy, Office of Vice President, White House. From: Amb Rowny, Chairman, US START Delegation. Subject: Meeting of VP Bush with Amb Karpov, 4 FEB 83.

Summary: VP Bush (accompanied by several of his staff and Ambassador Rowny) met with Ambassador Karpov (accompanied by two of his delegates) for 45 minutes Friday afternoon, FEB 4. The VP said he was not in Geneva to negotiate but to express the President's sincere interest in reductions and reaching agreement on an equal and verifiable agreement. He said we should focus first on the most destabilizing systems: the ICBMs. He said we are serious about reaching agreement on CBMs to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Karpov, in a 40-minute response, said the US is asking the Soviet Union to reduce by 2500 ballistic missile warheads but plans to increase by 5000 cruise missile warheads. Karpov said the the US plan would leave the US with close to 600 heavy bombers vice 150 for the USSR and thereby give the US a 1.5 advantage in overall number of launchers. Karpov disputed that ICBMs are more destabilizing than cruise missiles. He

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: CABLE FILE: Records, 1982–85, Privacy IN (01/22/1981–07/26/1983). Secret.

characterized the Soviet position as one which would reduce to 1800 systems and at the same time “block all channels of the arms race.” Karpov confirmed that Soviets were interested in CBMs but said that US ignores CBMs of interest to USSR. The VP closed by emphasizing US interest in an agreement which reduces the most destabilizing systems, and said that the Soviets should pay attention to our concerns and that we would be ready to reciprocate. He said he welcomed the Soviet interest in CBMs. Verbatim record of conversation follows.

PARTICIPANTS

US

Vice President Bush
Ambassador Rowny
Admiral Murphy
Mr. Richard Burt
Commander Dennis Blair
Mr. Muromcew, interpreter

USSR

Ambassador Karpov
Mr. Osadchiyev
Mr. Obukhov
Mr. Borovskiy, interpreter

Time: 3:40–4:30 p.m. Place: US Mission, Geneva

Date: 4 February 1983

Vice President Bush greeted Ambassador Karpov and his party and thanked him for accepting his invitation to come to this meeting to discuss various topics of interest. Karpov replied that he was very glad to have the opportunity to meet the Vice President and to discuss various items of mutual interest.

Bush stated that he wanted to discuss several items, but as it was publicly announced, he was here not in the role of a negotiator, he only wanted to discuss issues pertaining to INF and to START. He assured Karpov that the President of the United States was sincerely committed to arms control, especially to reductions in the strategic area. He added that Ambassador Rowny, whom Bush had known for a long time, enjoyed the President's and his full support on a wide front. Bush recently met with the President, who outlined two fundamental criteria of interest to the United States, namely, the criterion of equality and the criterion for a verifiable agreement, which were most important to the United States. The US side was encouraged to hear that the Soviet side was also interested in reductions; however, the President and Vice President felt it important to focus attention on the most destabilizing systems, namely, on land-based ICBMs, because of their devastating power. Another point Bush wanted to bring up was confidence-building measures in which, as he understood, the Soviet side was also interested. He assured Karpov that the US side was very serious and wanted to come to an agreement on confidence-building measures and, in thanking him for coming to this meeting, expressed his readiness to listen to the Soviet side's views.

Karpov thanked the Vice President for this opportunity and wanted to start with the topic closest to his heart, namely, his talks with Ambassador Rowny here in Geneva. They were now in the third round and ready to come up with an appraisal of these negotiations. Karpov would also like to answer all of the Vice President's questions. Karpov stated that, in his view, the results of the negotiations were truly saddening. He wanted to speak first about the essential shortcomings of the US proposal. He felt that the first deficiency of the US proposal was that it would not stop the arms race, but would actually provide a plan for continuing an arms race. To be exact, the US proposal called for a reduction to 2500 warheads for ICBMs, but put no limits on heavy bomber with their armaments, and would not even consider cruise missiles. Karpov knew that there were plans to deploy 5000 long-range cruise missiles and, by doing so, there will be twice as many warheads on the long-range cruise missiles as the level of reductions proposed by the US called for. It was also noteworthy, by the way, that the US proposal does not even touch on such strategic programs as Trident-II, MX, or cruise missiles. At the same time the Soviet Union was expected to limit and reduce its weapons, which would mean the dismantling of Soviet strategic potential. If one would accept the US proposal on ICBMs, then only 100 modern Soviet ICBMs would be left and the rest would have to be destroyed. In the US proposal the concept of equality is often mentioned, but Karpov suggested that if one took a closer look at it, it would mean that the Soviet Union and the United States would get 850 ballistic missiles each. It is well known that the US has about 600 heavy bombers, while the Soviet Union had only about 150 such bombers. As a result, the US will find itself with a ratio of 1.5 times more means of delivery than the Soviet Union. To Karpov, in a word, this meant inequality. Thus, even after the reductions the US would still have more warheads and means of delivery than the Soviet Union. It was not enough just to proclaim equality, it was necessary to demonstrate it. The embodiment of this principle should not give one side an advantage in weaponry at the expense of the other side.

Karpov reminded the Vice President of his desire to focus on land-based ICBMs because the US considers them the most destabilizing systems. From the US point of view, there were certain advantages to this approach, as Karpov would try to demonstrate. The US proposal to reduce the number of land-based ICBMs would mean the destruction of the Soviet strategic potential, because the Soviet potential consisted of 70 percent land-based ICBMs. Meanwhile, 80 percent of US strategic potential consisted of SLBMs and heavy bombers. Thus, the US proposal was selective, namely, being aimed at Soviet ICBMs. At the same time, however, the US was going to deploy new ICBMs, such as the land-based MX. To say that land-based ICBMs are the most destabiliz-

ing weapons, Karpov continued, would not stand up to criticism. Main characteristics of ICBMs were: short flight time, great throw-weight, constant readiness and the ability to hit hard targets. These characteristics, however, were not at all unique to ICBMs for the following reasons: while the flight time for ICBMs was 30 minutes, the new Trident-II SLBMs could reach targets in the Soviet Union in half that time. As for cruise missiles, although they were slower than ICBMs and SLBMs, they were highly accurate and could penetrate undetected to the chosen targets. It was not the flight time, but the warning time that was the decisive element. A cruise missile would give no warning time at all, because it could approach undetected and hit a target with high accuracy. Karpov could present other elements in detail, but the point was that the cruise missile was very accurate, the Trident-II will equal the MX in accuracy. Therefore, these characteristics would equalize the greater yield of ICBMs, but Karpov did not want to bore the Vice President with all these details. All it meant was that ICBMs were not all that unique. Other developments were no less dangerous to the balance in the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

What worried Karpov a great deal were US weapons programs, especially US strategic land-, air-, and sea-based systems that could be used as first-strike weapons. Therefore he had discussed these issues with Ambassador Rowny, but the US side chose to ignore these issues, the solution of which would stop the arms race without harming the security of the sides and would lead to a true reduction of strategic weapons. It was unacceptable to have a reduction in one place and a buildup elsewhere.

What does the Soviet side propose? asked Karpov rhetorically. The proposal was to reduce ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to the 1800 level for both sides. The Soviet proposal also required a simultaneous closing of channels that would foster competition in any area and to prohibit long-range cruise missiles, while destroying already deployed cruise missiles in a verifiable manner. The proposal also includes a ban on air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Taking it altogether, these measures would give the Soviet Union and the United States, by the year 1990, 1800 means of delivery of strategic weapons and not one more above that. At the same time, equal levels would be established for nuclear warheads that could be used on remaining carriers of the two sides.

Karpov then turned to confidence-building measures which the Vice President had mentioned earlier. Karpov said that CBMs were a Soviet proposal, going back to the first round. That proposal included measures to reduce the danger of a surprise attack, to lessen the danger of a nuclear war and would involve areas closed to aircraft carriers

and to flight of bombers in regions adjacent to the borders of the given power, the establishment of zones on oceans and seas where anti-submarine activities would be prohibited, and also called for provisions for notification of imminent bomber flights and of missile launches. However, the US side failed to give this matter any serious thought; in fact, rejected it off hand. In spite of that, Karpov hastened to assure the Vice President, this Soviet proposal was still on the negotiating table.

In conclusion, Karpov asked the Vice President not to forget that the Soviet side was very serious about negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. The Soviet side was interested in reaching an accord, but such an accord will have to be based on provisions that would preserve the security interests of the two sides. He added that he could not say that the Soviet Union was more interested in these negotiations than the US. As long as the US maintained such a position, US security will not gain from it. Should the US continue its planned buildup, the Soviet side would take adequate measures to counter any new US advantages, which would mean a continuation of the arms race and general instability. But there was another path that the two sides could take, namely, the path proposed by the Soviet Union, involving a limitation and reduction embodied in a firm accord that would be subject to verification.

The Vice President thanked Karpov for the clear and eloquent presentation and asked him to convey to the Soviet leadership the sense of urgency with which the US side is viewing this matter. The Vice President agreed to convey Soviet views to the President. The Vice President said that it was important for the Soviet to pay attention to our concerns and that we would be prepared to reciprocate. Vice President Bush regretted the necessity to leave, saying that he could not be late to his appointment with the President of the Swiss Confederation.

55. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, February 28, 1983

[Omitted here is material not related to START.]

At 10 o'clock my arms control discussion group met.² General Scowcroft attended. He is currently heading the MX Commission.³ We discussed what the Commission might report and what impact it might have on arms control. It is clear that the interest in arms control is very high on Capitol Hill, although the content of the concerns and hopes appears to be low. Part of the reason is that the Republicans are concerned about the 1984 election and feel that the President needs some breakthrough on the arms control front, but the Republican Members fear that the Administration is not serious about arms control negotiations. Recently there was a test of a new Soviet missile, giving rise to concerns about the possibility that the Soviets might be in violation, at least in spirit, of the provision in the SALT II agreement providing for only one new missile. Meanwhile, it is expected that the MX Commission will recommend deployment of MX missiles, perhaps only 50 as opposed to the 100 originally planned, in Minuteman silos with development and eventual deployment of a new small mobile missile system. That would mean that the United States would have two new types. Obviously this recommendation, which is an alternative to closely spaced basing and in particular to the dense pack approach, will run into objections that it is in violation of SALT II. This will be true even though the small mobile missile cannot be deployed until long after SALT II would have expired by its terms.

[Omitted here is material not related to START.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on February 28.

² No other record of this meeting was found.

³ Reference is to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, which Reagan established on January 3 to "review the strategic modernization program with particular focus on our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile and basing alternatives for that system." ("Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman," *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, vol. I, pp. 4–5) Documentation pertaining to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

56. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 1, 1983, 1858Z

1991. Subject: Basic Elements of an Agreement on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms.

1. This is START III-042. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Following is the language handed over to the Soviets during the 1 March plenary.

Basic Elements of an Agreement
on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms

I

Beginning on (blank), each party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms to equal levels and complete the reductions required to achieve these levels within (a specified period of time). Specifically, each party will:

A. Limit to no more than 5,000 the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles;

B. Limit to no more than 2,500 the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

C. Limit to no more than 850 the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;

D. Limit the number of its heavy bombers to no more than 400;

E. Limit to no more than 110 the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs and to no more than 210 the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs;

F. Limit the aggregate number of its non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs to no more than (an agreed) per cent of its allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

II

Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section I in accordance with agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at two year intervals following the entry into force of the agreement.

III

Neither party will develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy new heavy ballistic missiles.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830113–0042. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

IV

Neither party will develop, produce, flight-test or deploy ICBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles or develop, produce, flight-test or deploy SLBMs with more than 14 reentry vehicles.

V

Neither party will flight-test or deploy reentry vehicles with a mass greater than approximately 200 kilograms on new ballistic missile systems.

VI

Each party will undertake constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles in addition to the limit on non-deployed ballistic missiles in section I. These will include:

- A. A ban on ICBM rapid reload capability;
- B. A ban on excess ICBMs and hardened storage facilities at ICBM complexes;
- C. Limits on the quantity and type of ground support equipment at ICBM complexes;
- D. Destruction of ballistic missiles that have been retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit;
- E. Destruction of ballistic missiles of types which are no longer deployed;
- F. Dismantlement or destruction of launchers associated with deployed ballistic missiles retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit; and
- G. Storage of all non-deployed ballistic missiles in designated storage facilities.

VII

Beginning on (blank), each party will carry out additional reductions and limitations. Specifically, each party will:

- A. Limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ballistic missiles to an equal level less than the current US level.
- B. Destroy all its heavy ICBMs and dismantle or destroy all its launchers for heavy ICBMs;
- C. Limit its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on heavy bombers according to rules establishing an average ALCM loading limit of (blank) per heavy bomber and an ALCM loading limit of (blank) for existing heavy bombers.

VIII

Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section VII of this document in accordance with agreed dismantling or destruction procedures and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at specified intervals.

IX

All of the preceding provisions will be carried out in accordance with agreed definitions, counting rules, and type rules, which would specify for the purposes of the limitations set forth in the agreement:

- The definitions of systems to be limited;
- The relationship among deployed ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, ballistic missile warheads, and ballistic missile throw-weight;
- Criteria to distinguish between deployed and non-deployed ballistic missiles;
- Physical and performance criteria to distinguish between existing types and new types of ballistic missiles;
- Criteria for determining ballistic missile throw-weight;
- Criteria for defining a heavy bomber; and
- Agreed numerical values to distinguish among and define light, medium and heavy ICBMs.

X

For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the preceding provisions each party will use national technical means of verification, supplemented by specific, agreed cooperative measures.

—Interference with agreed cooperative measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement by agreed cooperative measures or by national technical means.

—Encryption of telemetry during flight-testing of systems limited by the agreement will be banned and additional specific provisions regarding access to flight-test data will be adopted.

Prior to signature of this agreement, each party will provide data to the other for the purpose of establishing an agreed and substantial body of data concerning its strategic arms subject to limitations by the agreement.

—These data will reflect numerical values and characteristics of weapons systems covered by the agreement.

—This data base will be agreed during the course of the negotiations and established upon signature of the agreement and thereafter will be updated every six months.

XI

The agreement embodying these provisions will be of an agreed long-term duration subject to review at specified, regular intervals and will be subject to withdrawal after six months' prior notification if a

party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each party will be free to propose amendments at any time.

Rowny

57. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 18, 1983

SUBJECT

The Two-Phased U.S. START Proposal

NSDD-78² instructed the START IG to examine new START developments. One issue remains unresolved and will go to the NSC shortly for decision: whether or not to retain the two-phased structure of the U.S. START proposal.

As you know, last May the President decided on a two-phased approach for our START position whereby the U.S. is seeking direct limits on deployed ballistic missiles and ballistic missile warheads in a first phase of the negotiations. In the second phase we will seek direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels, i.e., 1.9 million kilograms (mkg). Throw-weight is to be limited by indirect constraints in the first phase: a ceiling of 210 heavy and medium ICBMs, of which no more than 110 can be heavy ICBMs. These constraints are designed to reduce Soviet throw-weight from its current level of 5.1 mkg down to below 2.5 mkg. The second phase would also limit cruise missiles.

The IG identified four options for dealing with phasing at this time:

- Option 1: Maintain the current phase distinctions.
- Option 2: Combine the phases with a direct limit on throw-weight below the current U.S. level of 1.9 mkg
- Option 3: Combine the phases but propose a higher throw-weight ceiling (e.g., about 2.5 mkg)

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, March 16–23, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by MacDonald; approved by Dean.

² See Document 53.

- Option 4: Move ALCM limits into Phase I now, but defer direct limits on throw-weight until Phase II; defer decision on SLCM limitations until after current studies are completed.

JCS supports Option 1 at this time, although we understand that after decisions are made on M-X and SLCM they would be ready to support Option 4. OSD and Ambassador Rowney support Option 2. ACDA supports both Options 2 and 3 but leans more toward Option 3.

We support both Options 1 and 4 for substantive and tactical reasons. At this juncture it is important to preserve the phased structure of our proposal, both because the Soviets have done nothing this round in Geneva to justify such a major structural change to our proposal and because it is important to be able, via a phased approach, to prevent the thorniest START problems from blocking agreement on the rest. We believe it is inevitable that a selective blending of the limitations in each phase will occur as the negotiations evolve (e.g., bringing ALCMs forward in return for Soviet agreement to tight indirect limits on throw-weight).

Tactically, however, the time does not seem ripe to seek such blending now (as JCS seems to agree), with decisions pending on M-X, the current round ending in two weeks, and the current political climate. Backing both Options 1 and 4 supports the principle of phasing, allies us with JCS on Option 1, and gives us the bargaining flexibility to back away from Option 4 at the NSC.

Accordingly, we plan to recommend this approach in the decision paper sent to the NSC.

**58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)¹**

Washington, March 23, 1983

SUBJECT

START Issues Paper

The START IG has prepared the attached decision paper regarding the issue of possible U.S. initiatives in the START negotiations. It specifically focuses on the question of phasing in the U.S. START proposal, an issue that the IG was unable to resolve. Included with the decision paper is the START Developments Report, upon which the decision paper is based. All participating agencies concur in the contents of the decision paper and the report. The IG will report its recommendations on SLCM as soon as possible.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

Washington, undated

Decision Paper on U.S. START Developments

In response to NSDD-78, the START IG has examined the issue of U.S. START developments, specifically, the issues of both a single aggregate for deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and phasing. The IG has prepared the attached START Developments Report,³ which addresses:

- A. Developments in START to date (pp. 2-6)
- B. Should the U.S. alter its phased approach to START? (pp. 7-18)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 081, NSDD 0078, US Approach to START. Secret.

² Secret.

³ Attached but not printed is the START Developments Report.

C. Should the U.S. shift to a single aggregate limit, including both ballistic missiles and bombers, with one-way freedom to mix? (pp. 19–23)

D. Possible developments in the Soviet START position (pp. 24–30)

E. Timing considerations (pp. 31–32)

There were no issues associated with sections A, D, and E. The IG reached a consensus on Section C, the single aggregate issue, and *recommends that a decision on this issue be postponed until after the issuance of the report by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and a Presidential decision thereon.*

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to alter the current U.S. phased approach in its START position and, if so, how.

BACKGROUND

Last May the President decided on the present U.S. position in the START negotiations. A key feature of the position is its two-phased approach whereby the U.S. will seek direct limits on, *inter alia*, deployed ballistic missiles and ballistic missile warheads in a first phase of the negotiations and on ballistic missile throw-weight (at less than current U.S. levels, i.e., 1.9 million kg) in a second phase. Throw-weight is to be limited by indirect constraints in the first phase: a ceiling of 210 heavy ballistic missiles and medium ICBMs, of which no more than 110 can be heavy ballistic missiles. These constraints are designed to reduce Soviet throw-weight from its current level of 5.1 million kilograms (mkg) down to below 2.5 mkg. More recently, the President has decided that the second phase would also address direct limits on ALCMs.

As instructed by NSDD-78, the START IG has examined the question of phasing in the light of nearly three rounds of negotiations with the Soviets at START and the continuing evolution of U.S. strategic force modernization plans. Four options related to phasing were identified by the IG:

- Option 1: Maintain the current phase distinctions
- Option 2: Combine the phases with a direct ceiling on throw-weight below current U.S. levels (i.e., 1.9 mkg)
- Option 3: Combine the phases but propose a higher throw-weight ceiling (e.g., about 2.5 mkg)
- Option 4: Move ALCM limits into Phase I now, but defer direct limits on throw-weight until Phase II; defer decision on SLCM limitations until after current studies are completed

It should be noted that these are internal USG decisions. Should any decision be reached to modify the current U.S. position, the question of how and when it should be presented to the Soviets in order to

maximize our tactical advantage could be determined by the U.S. Delegation in light of developments in the negotiations.

DISCUSSION

The following discussion presents the arguments of the supporters of each option:

JCS supports Option 1, maintaining the current phase distinctions. Under this approach, the U.S. would not alter the phased framework of our START proposal. The first phase would continue to focus on the most destabilizing systems by seeking equal ceilings on ballistic missiles (particularly ICBMs) and their warheads. Through specific indirect limits on heavy and medium ICBMs, the goal of the first phase would be to reduce Soviet throw-weight to 2.5 mkg. Limits on cruise missiles and a direct ceiling on throw-weight would be deferred until the second phase, during which we would seek a direct limit on throw-weight below 1.9 mkg, the current U.S. level. The phased framework is a source of negotiating leverage based on a probable Soviet desire to move cruise missile limits into the first phase, leaving direct limits on throw-weight for the second phase.

Tabling the Basic Elements document demonstrated that everything is on the table and that we are prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement meeting the legitimate concerns of both countries. Modification of this negotiating framework should not be considered until the USG has determined its SLCM position, resolved the strategic modernization issue (i.e., MX), and has decided that developments in the negotiations warrant consideration of such a move. Given the fact that the Soviets have not responded in any meaningful way to US concerns nor been forthcoming on their proposal, movement on our part at this juncture is not a prudent course of action.

OSD and the START Negotiator support Option 2, combining the phases with a direct ceiling on throw-weight at below current U.S. levels. *ACDA favors combining the phases and could support either Option 2 or Option 3*. These agencies believe that we should give up the notion of phases, whether in the sense of negotiations or reductions, and prepare a comprehensive, integrated position. Option 2 is such a position that would allow us to achieve our START objectives.

First and foremost, it maximizes the leverage which we possess by virtue of the Soviets' interest in limiting cruise missiles. Since we have now proposed constraints for cruise missiles, even without indicating any numbers, we must expect the Soviets to attempt to "pocket" our willingness to discuss cruise missiles and seek to import the proposed constraints into the first phase. Indeed, it would hardly be credible to maintain that the U.S. be allowed to build now a cruise missile force that would exceed the ceiling which we would be willing to

accept eight or ten years hence. The Soviets will probably attempt to move our proposed cruise missile constraints into the first phase, thus depriving us of the necessary leverage for achieving our second phase goals. Taking such a step unilaterally (Option 4) would be a drastic mistake and would virtually guarantee that the U.S. would never achieve its goal of limiting Soviet destructive capability and potential through a direct limit on ballistic missile throw-weight. Were this to happen, we would duplicate the mistake we made in allowing the ABM restraints of SALT I to take precedence over the restraints on strategic offensive arms, a procedure which virtually guaranteed that we would not achieve the goal of limiting the Soviet strategic offensive build-up to non-threatening levels.

By proposing a single set of restraints, we would obviate the need to address the question of whether we can, consistent with military requirements, propose ballistic missile and ballistic missile warhead limits below the 850 and 5000 level. The possibility of proposing further reductions in these categories now appears remote. In any case, it would hardly seem a realistic use of our time and energy to concern ourselves with the preparation of such a proposal.

This approach also serves our political interests in that it permits us to come forward with a new position that is conducive to progress in the negotiations while retaining maximum negotiating leverage. It rebuts Soviet criticism of the U.S. proposal as a non-comprehensive, non-serious proposal, which concentrates on U.S. concerns while relegating Soviet concerns to a meaningless second phase. By explicitly addressing ballistic missile throw-weight, an area of Soviet advantage, we help explain the priority the U.S. has placed on ballistic missiles in general, and on heavy ICBMs in particular. Otherwise, concentration on such demands as preferential constraints on heavy ballistic missiles risks appearing as an arbitrary attack on the way in which the Soviets have happened to structure their forces. The reductions which would be required through the direct limits on throw-weight (65%) is comparable to the reductions the Soviets would have to make in ICBM warheads (58%), ballistic missiles (64%), heavy and medium ICBMs (69%) and heavy ICBMs (65%), under our current Phase I proposal.

In the context of a single proposal, we should table both our proposed framework for constraints on ALCMs and our current second phase goal of a direct throw-weight limit of approximately 1.9 mkg in order to make explicit our right to a ballistic missile force equal to that of the Soviet Union in destructive capacity.

Our emphasis on throw-weight at this point will facilitate the negotiation of an agreement which accommodates our requirements in the bomber/cruise missile area. The sole unit of account which captures the ability of the Soviets to adapt their ballistic missile force to any

change in the strategic situation is throw-weight. The recent debate concerning the survivability of CSB provides an example. A direct limit on throw-weight could considerably simplify our current approach by allowing us to eliminate, at a tactically advantageous time, the indirect constraints on throw-weight (i.e., 210 heavy ballistic missiles and medium ICBMs, with a sublimit of 110 heavy ballistic missiles).

While we would propose a unified set of constraints on strategic forces, we could, of course, take into account the practical problems of effectuating large reductions in forces by providing for gradual reductions in all units of account, in accordance with a schedule of agreed, equal intermediate ceilings.

ACDA favors combining Phases I and II in the US START proposal and could support either Option 2 or 3. Option 3 is essentially a modification of Option 2 that contains a higher proposed ceiling on throw-weight. A throw-weight ceiling at about 2.5 mkg would be consistent with the President's original decision on the framework of the US START position which set an internal objective of reducing Soviet throw-weight to 2.5 mkg in the context of our Phase I approach. The goal of a 1.9 mkg throw-weight ceiling was originally set for Phase II, which included possible further reductions in RV and missile numbers (which now appears remote, as noted above). If accepted, this option would lead to deep reductions in Soviet throw-weight from their current level of about 5.1 mkg. Ceilings on throw-weight below the 2.5 mkg level, such as 1.9 mkg, would likely be perceived by the Soviets as a step backward by the U.S. from our current Phase I proposal. This option could make the U.S. position more attractive to the Soviets and increase their willingness to negotiate on the basis of our proposal.

State supports the Administration's current policy of maintaining a phased approach to the START negotiations, and thus could support either Option 1 or Option 4. State believes that a decision to combine the phases is neither warranted nor desirable at this time.

The Soviet reaction thus far to the U.S. draft "Basic Elements" suggests that the main substantive differences between the two sides are in areas that would not be significantly affected by a decision to combine the two phases. In terms of perceptions, however, a proposal establishing direct limits on throw-weight at below current U.S. levels as an initial START objective (Option 2) would be seen by the Soviets and Western publics as a hardening of the U.S. position, particularly when linked to proposed ALCM loading limits that would have no effect on U.S. deployment plans. Raising the throw-weight level to 2.5 mkg (Option 3), while substantively similar to retaining our current indirect constraints on throw-weight (Options 1,4) would mitigate this perception only marginally. Moreover, both Options 2 and 3 would have the drawback of establishing throw-weight as a principal unit of

account from the outset, which could create perceptions of U.S. inferiority if, as some believe, an eventual START agreement establishes a throw-weight level higher than 1.9 or 2.5 mkg.

State notes that Option 4 (like Option 1) would in no way alter the President's throw-weight objectives or offer additional constraints on U.S. strategic programs, and thus could not be characterized as a unilateral U.S. concession; we would continue to seek to reduce Soviet throw-weight to below 2.5 mkg in the first phase and to below current U.S. levels in the second; at the same time, both Options 1 and 4 would have no impact on projected U.S. military requirements. In addition, by maintaining the principle of phasing, Options 1 and 4 would preserve the option to defer the difficult issue of SLCM limits until Phase II. Finally, a decision made now to combine the phases and seek a 1.9 mkg throw-weight limit could prejudice the outcome of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, which could require us ultimately to achieve throw-weight levels higher than 1.9 mkg (e.g., if the recommendation is for a sizable number of small mobile missiles).

In sum, State believes that in view of the Soviets' intransigent stance in the latest round of the negotiations, we should not make any adjustment to our position that could be interpreted as a unilateral concession to the Soviets. But neither should we alter our proposal in a way that would be seen as a hardening of the U.S. position.

59. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, April 14, 1983

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

After a quick attendance at a Situation Room meeting chaired by Judge Clark on public diplomacy, I attended a lengthy meeting that the Secretary had with Ambassador Dobrynin.² This was a meeting devoted to probing whether there was a possibility for making some progress in the START negotiations. Ambassador Rowny was present.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on April 14.

² The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 42.

(Incidentally, Kenneth Adelman was confirmed by the Senate 57 to 42 just before the Dobrynin meeting began.)

Secretary Shultz asked Dobrynin three questions. One had to do with whether or not some compromise was possible between the Soviet number of 1800 strategic delivery vehicles and our number of 850 missiles and 400 bombers. The second question had to do with whether the Soviets were prepared to back off of their position that there could be no ALCMs; the Secretary referred to this as the Soviet zero option. The third question had to do with how the Soviets were prepared to meet our security concern raised by their heavy and medium-weight missiles. This is an attempt to put some life in the START talks. Dobrynin agreed to get back to us with an answer from his government.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

60. Editorial Note

In an address from the East Room of the White House on the morning of April 19, 1983 President Ronald Reagan endorsed the recently submitted report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and summarized its recommendations: "First, the Commission urges us to continue the strategic modernization program which I announced in October of 1981. It reaffirms that the need remains for improvements in the command, control, and communications of our strategic forces, and continuation of our bomber, submarine, and cruise missile program. Second, the Commission urges modernization of our ICBM forces. We should immediately proceed to develop and produce the Peacekeeper missile and deploy 100 in existing Minuteman silos near Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. At the same time, the Commission recommends that we begin engineering the design for a small, single-warhead missile. If strategic and technical considerations warrant, this missile could be ready for deployment in the early 1990's. Incidentally, this modernization program will save about \$1.5 billion in 1984 and even more than that in each of the next 2 years. Third, the Commission recommends major research efforts in strategic defense and a thorough research program of hardening, making our land-based missile systems more secure. This modernization effort is the final component of our comprehensive, strategic program. It will mean a safer, more secure America. And it will provide clear evidence to the Soviet Union that it is in their best interest to negotiate with us in good faith and with seriousness of purpose. That adds up to an important

incentive for both arms control and deterrence, for peace and security now and far into the future. Finally, the Commission underscores the need for ambitious arms control negotiations, negotiations that would lead to agreements that are balanced, promote stability in time of crisis, and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. These are precisely the objectives of our arms control proposals now on the table in Geneva. These are—well, I want to reemphasize that we’re in Geneva seeking equitable, reliable agreements that would bring real reductions.” (“Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,” *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 555–557)

In a letter of April 29, 1983, Senator William Cohen, Senator Samuel Nunn, and Senator Charles Percy wrote President Reagan expressing support for the report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, in particular “the Commission’s recommendations to work vigorously toward development and deployment of systems which are collectively more survivable and individually less valuable as targets for a would-be attacker” and the “emphasis on a new direction in arms control as an essential component in its recommended program.” They went on to say: “The present debate in the United States provides an opportunity to develop a widely supported, long-term framework for arms control and weapons modernization—a policy that would put the United States in a position to move forward resolutely on strategic force improvements, while giving the Soviet Union strong incentives to bargain earnestly in ongoing arms reduction negotiations.” As such, the Senators urged Reagan to commit to three initiatives: “A reformulation of the U.S. START position to incorporate the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission”; “A proposal in the appropriate arms control context that the Soviet Union and United States should adhere to the principle of a guaranteed mutual build-down of nuclear forces in which each country would eliminate from its operational inventory two nuclear warheads for each one newly deployed. This agreement would ultimately be linked to warhead ceilings established in the relevant negotiations, and would be subject to mutually agreed procedures and verification”; and “An immediate start on research and development of a new, small, single-warhead ICBM, with an assurance that the program will retain a high priority despite probable constraints in the overall defense budget.” (Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, Nunn-Cohen Proposal (1))

61. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 20, 1983

SUBJECT

Comments on Ed Rowny's Memo Regarding Dobrynin's Likely Responses to Our Three Questions on START

You will have seen Ed Rowny's April 19 memo in which he ventures some predictions as to Dobrynin's likely answers to your three questions on START (copy attached). As I am leaving today for Europe, I wanted to give you my reaction to Ed's paper, and offer some suggestions regarding next steps in the informal dialogue in the event you should meet again with Dobrynin on START prior to my return.

Dobrynin's Likely General Approach

The extent to which Dobrynin parrots the official Soviet line will depend, in part, on the course of the discussion at the next meeting. But I do not believe his replies will be as deliberately disputatious or polemical as Ed Rowny predicts. This is likely if for no other reason than the fact that Dobrynin's first priority will be to nurture this new channel along to ensure that the real negotiation takes place in Washington rather than Geneva.

Moreover, with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations now public,² and with the Administration in need of demonstrating progress in arms control at a time when the INF talks are thoroughly stalemated, the Soviets probably believe the U.S. is on the threshold of making changes in its START position. They will thus see the Shultz-Dobrynin channel as a means of encouraging changes in the direction of the Soviet proposal. As in the past, the Soviets will be reticent in offering specific ideas of their own, and seek to bargain on the basis of proposals advanced by the U.S.

Question 1—Overall Force Levels

On the question of the gap between 850/400 and 1800, I doubt Dobrynin will lay down *formal* preconditions for Soviet movement as Ed Rowny predicts, since this would risk transforming the back-channel

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM, 1979–1989 The Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents, April 16–30 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

² See Document 60.

into another sterile, confrontational forum. Dobrynin *will* cite the well-known Soviet desiderata (the need to limit bombers and missiles in combination; the increased significance for the strategic balance of “forward-based systems” as forces are reduced below the Soviet-proposed 1800 level). But he may hint at Soviet willingness to consider somewhat lower numbers if the U.S. is prepared to be flexible on the questions of separate missile/bomber limits and sublimits on medium/heavy ICBMs. He may pose a counter-question as to whether U.S. concerns about limiting ballistic missiles can be met in other ways, such as through sublimits on MIRVed systems as proposed by the Soviets.

Assuming Dobrynin does take a “problem-solving” approach to this question, you should *not* state categorically that the U.S. cannot abandon its approach of separate limits on missiles and bombers (as Rowny recommends). Your response last time was just right—“we can talk about structure”—and we should neither open nor close the door any further to the possibility of a single aggregate encompassing ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. In fact, the issue of whether to move to a single aggregate will be on the agenda for an NSC meeting on START prior to the opening of round four.

Question 2—Cruise Missiles

On cruise missiles, Ed’s prediction is closer to the mark, in my view: that Dobrynin will probably indicate willingness to move off the blanket cruise missile prohibition—at least in regard to ALCMs—but argue for inclusion of cruise missile warheads in an overall weapons ceiling (our proposal would directly constrain ballistic missile warheads only; ALCMs would be constrained indirectly through limits on the average number of missiles permitted per aircraft).

If Dobrynin moves away from a cruise missile ban, we should, as Ed Rowny suggests, indicate that ALCM numbers are negotiable, but also argue for the need to treat cruise missile warheads differently from ballistic missile warheads (this is because only a portion of our cruise missiles could actually reach their targets, as a consequence of the Soviets’ extensive air defense network.)

Thus, in your next meeting you should stress that the limits on the numbers of ALCMs per bomber must be higher than the limits on the number of warheads permitted per ballistic missile (pointing to Soviet agreement to this principle in SALT II), and that cruise missiles cannot be lumped together with ballistic missile warheads on the basis of full “freedom-to-mix.” This latter point would leave the door open to an approach under which there would be “one-way” freedom to mix—i.e. an overall limit on ballistic and cruise missile warheads, with a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads—further on down the road.

On SLCMs, we could be slightly more forthcoming than Ed suggests, expressing agreement that SLCMs need to be limited in some

fashion, while soliciting Soviet ideas as to workable and verifiable approaches other than a flat ban on these systems.

Question 3—Heavy Missiles/Throw-Weight

Ed correctly predicts that Dobrynin will criticize our 210/110 limits on medium and heavy ICBMs, and what the Soviets consider to be “illegitimate” U.S. demands to restructure Soviet forces. In addition to expressing in vague terms Soviet willingness to reduce heavy missiles, Dobrynin may argue that MIRV sublimits and limits on warheads should satisfy U.S. concerns about ICBM counterforce capabilities. I would agree with Ed’s view that we should sound out Dobrynin on whether Moscow could agree to the principle of reducing heavy and medium missiles by the same proportion as reductions in overall force levels (our current proposal goes well beyond this principle). A more difficult question—one which will need to be addressed at the next NSC meeting on START—is whether we will be prepared to raise our throw-weight objectives by the same proportion as we increase the limits on ballistic missiles.

Other Counter-Questions: Dobrynin may not be content simply to respond to our three questions, but may also pose some questions of his own. For example, he may ask what we are really after in proposing numerical limits on each side’s inventory of non-deployed missiles, and press us to come up with a more “realistic” approach to Backfire (i.e. agree to limit Backfire and other medium-range aircraft in INF). He may also ask why we refuse to consider some of the Soviet CBM proposals.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz³

Washington, April 19, 1983

SUBJECT

Expected Answers from Dobrynin

I would like to predict the answers I think you will probably get from Ambassador Dobrynin to your three questions on START you asked him on April 14.

³ Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent through Dam, who did not initial the memorandum. Copied to Burt.

While these answers may not be what he gives you, I think some “guesstimates” will help you respond in a way which will help move the process forward without sacrificing our basic objectives.

If Dobrynin responds in ways other than the ways I predict, you may be able to channel your responses along the lines I have indicated. If the Soviets propose new ways of doing things which will accomplish our objectives we should be ready to explore them.

Our basic objective should be to get the Soviets to engage in a dialogue which will break the current logjam. If there is sufficient time for further turn-arounds of questions before June 1 you should attempt to arrange it.

At any event, I recommend you seek Soviet commitment to a further dialogue by Karpov/Rowny in Geneva along the lines we have begun in this back-channel. The US and Soviet governments should agree to instruct the START negotiators to produce by the end of Round IV (early August) a set of “Vladivostok-type guidelines” which could serve as the basis for a Shultz/Gromyko mini-summit. The ideal place and time for this would be in New York at the UNGA meeting in late September. We have no time to lose if we are to reach a meeting of minds on a set of guidelines which might result in an agreement before the election process goes into higher gear.

Throughout your dialogue with Dobrynin you should stress that everything you discuss with him is of an exploratory nature.

Question 1: Would the Soviet 1800 figure come down if the US number went up?

Dobrynin will probably reply that Moscow continues to reject the US differentiation between missiles and bombers. He will argue that the problem is not whether the US and Soviet figures can converge but whether the US will abandon its approach of trying to separate fast-flying and slow-flying systems into separate categories. The USSR believes all weapons systems are converging in capabilities and can participate in a first-strike.

Accordingly, he will probably avoid a specific reply as to whether the Soviets would consider reducing their 1800 number. Instead, he will likely say that the US should meet three conditions before the Soviets could consider flexibility:

- (1) Aggregate ballistic missiles and heavy bombers into a single figure.
- (2) Refrain from deploying GLCMs and PII's in Europe.
- (3) Agree to equal totals of all nuclear weapons, that is, ballistic missile warheads, bomber weapons and long-range cruise missiles.

I recommend that you answer that the US is willing to adjust its 850 deployed ballistic missile aggregate upwards to meet the concerns

the Soviets have expressed about reducing to this level, provided the Soviets recognize some of the concerns the US has expressed. Specifically, the US cannot abandon its approach of separating ballistic missiles and bombers. This is a fundamental principle for the US. We believe that both sides will benefit from improving crisis stability. This can be best approached by imposing specific and separate limits (without freedom to mix) on fast-flying destabilizing systems and on slow-flying systems, which can only be used in a retaliatory role.

The US rejects any linkage of progress in START to deployments in INF. These are separate negotiations which should proceed on their own merits.

Aggregating ballistic missile warheads and cruise missiles is simply another way of lumping fast-flying destabilizing weapons systems with bomber armament. The US cannot abandon this basic principle.

Nevertheless, to repeat for emphasis, the US is willing to raise its 850 number if the USSR agrees to consider deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers separately.

Question 2: Is the USSR ready to negotiate with us seriously on ALCMs?

Dobrynin will probably reply that the USSR is prepared to reconsider its proposal that all long-range cruise missiles be banned. However, his offer will be made on the condition that cruise missiles be included in an equal level of total weapons on both sides.

Recommend that you answer that cruise missiles cannot be aggregated for the same reasons that ballistic missiles and bombers cannot be aggregated. Ballistic missiles with their inherent capabilities as first-strike weapons simply should not be equated with slow-flying retaliatory weapons such as bomber armaments. Current Soviet testing of advanced long-range ALCMs indicates either that they desire to deploy them or that they will use them for negotiating leverage. The US is offering the USSR a way of constraining ALCMs by placing limits on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. This is consistent with the approach which the USSR has previously accepted. The numbers are negotiable.

Dobrynin may reply that since US programs call for a buy of 4000 ALCMs, the total number of weapons under the US proposal would not be reduced to 5000 but could actually increase to 9000 or more.

Recommend you not get drawn into this line of argumentation but stick to the US approach of separating destabilizing ballistic missile weapons from bomber armament. You could reiterate that numbers are negotiable.

Dobrynin may insist that all cruise missiles, including SLCMs, be limited.

Recommend that you reply that the US will entertain any serious Soviet proposals. As for SLCMs, we would want to know how the Soviets would propose to verify SLCM deployments.

Question 3: How would the USSR reduce medium and heavy missiles to alleviate the concern of the US that these Soviet missiles threaten US deterrent forces?

Dobrynin will probably reply that the 210/110 collateral constraints are unacceptable to the USSR. He may say that the Soviets accept the principle that reductions in weapons systems would require reductions in heavy missiles as well. He may add that the Soviets object to being dictated to as to *how* their reductions would have to take place.

Recommend you tell him the US does not intend to place overly severe restrictions on Soviet force structuring. But if the Soviets will accept the principle of reducing their medium and heavy missiles in proportion to the overall level of reductions, this would be a step in the right direction. In this case, or if the Soviets have any other serious proposal for significantly reducing the threat to US ICBMs, the US would be prepared to drop its collateral constraints.

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 28, 1983, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary, Kenneth W. Dam
START Negotiator Ambassador Edward Rowny
Politico-Military Bureau Director Jonathan T. Howe
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy

The Ambassador stated he knew how busy the Acting Secretary² was and thus proposed to proceed directly to the replies to the questions the Secretary had earlier posed on START.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, "Memoranda of Conversation." Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by McManaway and Dam. The meeting took place in Dam's office.

² Dam served as Acting Secretary of State from April 25–May 7, while Shultz traveled throughout the Middle East in an attempt to broker peace in Lebanon.

The Ambassador then read the following, translating into English from a Russian text which was later passed to the Acting Secretary:

“Our conversation with the U.S. side on April 14 touched upon questions related to the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks.³

We had already presented our evaluation of the status of the negotiations to the U.S. side earlier and had outlined our approach. The questions raised by the U.S. side in connection with the conversation have been discussed repeatedly and in detail by the U.S.S.R. and U.S. delegations during the three rounds of negotiations in Geneva.

The sum total of the Soviet proposals makes it possible to ensure a truly fair and effective solution to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic arms. We are convinced that it is only by strictly complying with the principle of equality and equal security, which prevents anyone from acquiring unilateral advantage, that the nuclear arms race can be halted and real reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation between our countries can be achieved; in this connection it is necessary that military-strategic parity between them be maintained.

The Soviet Union is in favor of moving ahead based on a continuing process of stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to the lowest possible level.

How far and how fast we can proceed on this path depends upon the United States.

It is well known that the United States has at its disposal numerous forward-based nuclear systems near the Soviet Union; these systems have a very important impact on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the strategic relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. It goes without saying that the U.S. nuclear systems which have been moved up to our borders are of strategic significance for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has no such systems near U.S. territory.

In view of the presence of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems, the Soviet Union needs to have no fewer than 1800 strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems in order to reliably ensure its own security under the present conditions. And this is on the understanding that the U.S. will at least refrain from building up its forward-based nuclear systems.

It cannot be denied that as the sides reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the relative importance and significance of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems would become increasingly greater.

Nonetheless, even in light of this circumstance, which is unfavorable for the U.S.S.R., we have put forward far-reaching proposals which provide for major reductions—by one-fourth—in the sides’ strategic

³ See Document 59.

arsenals. If the U.S. is truly prepared to agree, not in word but in deed, on an even more significant reduction of strategic arms, it must also create the necessary conditions for this.

In this connection we would ask the following question: since the U.S. Government is interested in the possibilities for lowering the level of strategic arms we have proposed, is it prepared to seriously consider how the strategic situation will develop in the future and to examine the question of an appropriate solution regarding the U.S. forward-based nuclear systems?

Furthermore, it is important that the levels of strategic arms of the sides reflect the whole complex of these systems, including not only ballistic missiles but heavy bombers as well. Moreover, within the composition of these arms it is precisely strategic arms which must be considered and limited, and not some totally unrelated systems. Is the U.S. side prepared for such solutions? Is it also prepared to withdraw the totally contrived question of the Soviet Backfire medium bomber?

Let us take the question of cruise missiles. Here the Soviet Union is proposing a serious, fundamental solution. But the U.S. takes a different position. The U.S. proposals in this regard permit the deployment of 8,000 to 11,000 long-range cruise missiles on 400 bombers, not to mention the fact that the U.S. approach does not provide for any limitations on long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles. Thus, this involves a buildup in strategic arms, and a large-scale one at that. Is this really consistent with the objectives of the current negotiations?

The Soviet side continues to be convinced that the best solution to the problem of long-range cruise missiles would be to ban these missiles, regardless of basing mode. At the same time, in an effort to create possibilities for progress at the negotiations, we would also be prepared, depending on the course of the discussion of other questions, to consider the possibility of limiting rather than banning air-launched cruise missiles, of course on the understanding that long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles would be prohibited. Of course, the nuclear warheads on deployed cruise missiles would be included in the overall maximum level for nuclear warheads on strategic arms.

Mr. Secretary, you asked what would happen to Soviet ICBMs if the sides reduced their strategic arms. If one takes into account the composition of Soviet strategic forces, it is clear that during reductions to the 1800 level, missiles will also be dismantled. Moreover, we could say that the principal portion of the reductions provided for under the Soviet proposals would involve land-based ICBMs. Each side could determine specifically which missiles or other delivery vehicles would be destroyed, within the framework of the additional limitations provided for in the agreement, of course.

We would like to repeat: progress at the negotiations on these and other questions depends upon the United States.

We expect a positive response from the U.S. side to the questions we have raised."

On the conclusion of this presentation, the Acting Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his careful answers.

He noted that in answering our first question, the Soviets had posed two questions of their own for us to consider.

In regards the second topic, he welcomed the Soviet willingness to consider the limitation of numbers of ALCMs. With regard to a ban on SLCMs, however, this was a position we could not adopt. We could discuss SLCMs if there were a way to handle the verification problems involved. We would be prepared to discuss Soviet ideas in this regard, but the problems involved would be major.

With regard to overall warhead ceilings, the Acting Secretary went on, cruise missile warheads were very different from those of ballistic missiles. In SALT II these two were approached on an entirely different basis.

In regards the Ambassador's response to the third question, however, the Acting Secretary stated he did not quite grasp what had been meant in connection with the "composition of forces" and ballistic missiles.

The Ambassador replied that depending on the level ultimately agreed upon, the Soviet Union would have to reduce its land-based missiles given the structure of its forces.

The Acting Secretary asked that with regard to ballistic missiles, was the Ambassador saying that heavy and medium ICBMs would be dismantled?

The Ambassador replied yes, subject to agreement.

The Acting Secretary asked whether Ambassador Rowny had any questions.

Ambassador Rowny stated that he would like to study the Soviet statement.

Ambassador Dobrynin noted that the Secretary had made clear he was discussing only ALCM limits and nothing else. If, however, this would be the only cruise limitation for the whole treaty, why raise additional questions about SLCMs?

The Acting Secretary noted that in discussing ALCM limits, the Ambassador had given the impression these would depend upon a ban on SLCMs.

The Ambassador responded no—ALCM limits would be contingent on agreement on other issues.

The Acting Secretary noted his point had not gone to the question of verifying ALCMs.

The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. was prepared to propose specific figures on ALCMs.

The Acting Secretary stated yes, we would study this and make a comment soon.

The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. would set forth a number today.

The Acting Secretary replied no. He concluded that we would study the Soviet reply carefully.

The meeting ended on this note.

63. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 29, 1983

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin—April 28, 1983

Ambassador Dobrynin came in April 28² to pass on Moscow's answers to the various questions on START-related issues which the Secretary posed in their April 14 meeting.³ Ed Rowny was present. The following is a preliminary report.

In response to our first question concerning Soviet flexibility in their proposed ceiling of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, Dobrynin stated the 1800 figure was the minimum possible to meet Soviet security requirements and was itself contingent on no increase in U.S. Forward-Based Systems (This apparently means traditional FBS such as aircraft carriers and those nuclear delivery systems based outside the U.S. within range of the Soviet Union such as our proposed Pershing II and GLCM deployments). In this regard, he posed two questions—whether, to the extent we want them to go below 1800, were we prepared to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (04/22/1983—04/29/1983). Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 62.

³ See Document 59.

“resolve” this FBS question and whether we were ready to drop our insistence on including the Soviet Backfire as a strategic bomber.

In answering our second question about their willingness to drop their call for a ban on cruise missiles, Dobrynin noted that although a complete ban on all long-range cruise missiles was still the best solution, the Soviet Union was nonetheless prepared to discuss limitations on Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). The Soviets would continue to insist, however, on prohibiting Sea-Launched and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs and GLCMs). ALCM warheads, moreover, would have to be counted along with those of ballistic missiles into any overall warhead ceiling.

Our third question dealt with how many Soviet heavy and medium ICBMs might be reduced under the Soviets’ own START proposal. Dobrynin’s answer was equivocal, stating the “basic part” of Soviet reductions would consist of ICBMs. The specific missiles and systems to be dismantled “could be determined by each side in the framework of additional limitations foreseen in the agreement.”

In sum, the Soviet response was mixed. On the 1800 missile and bomber ceiling, we received a negative answer, one in which Dobrynin reiterated familiar, tough Soviet positions on FBS and Backfire. On heavy/medium ICBM reductions, the Soviet response was ambiguous, suggestive of some eventual reductions, but offering us no specific numbers. On ALCMs, however, Dobrynin’s response did represent a modest and specific move beyond their current position in Geneva toward us. Although the Soviet willingness to drop their insistence on a complete ban on ALCMs and to discuss limitations along the lines we have proposed essentially gets us back to only a SALT II position, it is a step they have not taken previously during the past year of negotiations in Geneva. This suggests they wish to continue this dialogue.

We will be assessing Dobrynin’s statement over the coming days and will be making further recommendations on how we might best proceed in this discussion.

Attachment

Non-Paper Prepared in the Soviet Foreign Ministry⁴

Undated

In the discussion of April 14 with the American side, several questions were touched upon, connected with the negotiations about the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

Our estimates of the situation in the negotiations has already been conveyed to the American side and our approach has been underlined. The questions put by the American side in connection with the (April 14) discussion have been discussed in detail by the Delegations of the Soviet Union and the USA in the course of three rounds of negotiations in Geneva.

Taken together the Soviet proposals present the possibility of guaranteeing a genuinely just and effective solution to the problems of limiting strategic arms. We are convinced that with the strict observance of the principles of equality and equal security, which excludes the acquisition of any one-sided advantage, we could limit the race in nuclear arms, achieving a real lowering of the levels of nuclear forces between our countries in accordance with requisite support of parity between them in strategic arms.

The Soviet Union is for moving ahead on the basis of an uninterrupted process of step-by-step lowering of the nuclear levels between the Soviet Union and the USA to the very lowest possible level.

How far and how fast it is possible to move along this path depends on the United States.

It is well known that the United States has near the Soviet Union many nuclear means forward based, which have a fundamental influence on the quantitative and qualitative sides of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The American nuclear means close to our borders unquestionably have strategic significance for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not have analogous means close to American territory.

Taking into consideration the presence of nuclear means forward based, it is necessary for the security of the Soviet Union in the existing circumstances to have no less than 1800 strategic nuclear means and

⁴ No classification marking. Typewritten notes at the top of the paper read: "Non-Paper Delivered by Dobrynin April 28 on START" and "Rough Translation by Mark Palmer."

this is with the understanding that the US at least would not increase its nuclear means forward based.

It is impossible to deny that as the sides reduce ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the relative weight and significance of means forward based will increase. Nonetheless, even in the light of the aforementioned, unfavorable conditions, the Soviet Union presented far-reaching proposals, which envisage a major, by one quarter, reduction of the strategic arsenals of the sides. If the United States is genuinely ready not only in words but in deed to reach agreement about still more significant reductions of strategic arms, they must guarantee for that the necessary conditions.

In that connection we ask: to the extent that the United States is interested in the possibility of lowering the level of strategic arms presented to us, is it with all seriousness prepared to look at the development of this strategic situation and analyze the question about the corresponding question of American nuclear means forward based?

Further, it is important that the levels of strategic arms of the sides reflect the totality of all means, including not only ballistic missiles but also heavy bombers. Included in this composition of arms must be considered and limited namely strategic arms, and not such means which have no relationship to them. Is the American side, prepared for such solutions? Is it prepared to remove the entirely made up question about the Soviet medium bomber "Backfire"?

Let us take up the question of cruise missiles. Here the Soviet Union is proposing a serious fundamental solution. But hear the position of the United States is different. The proposals of the United States in this area permit the deployment of 400 bombers with from 8 to 11,000 cruise missiles of long range, not even talking about the absence in the American approach of any limit on sea based and land based cruise missiles of long range. Thus, there would be an increase in strategic arms of massive proportions. Does this really agree with the goals of these negotiations?

The Soviet side is convinced that the best solution of this question of air-launched cruise missiles of long range would be a ban of (such) missiles of all types of basing. However, trying to guarantee the possibilities for forward movement in the negotiations, we would be prepared depending upon the course of discussions of other questions to consider the possibility of limiting, and not banning air-launched cruise missiles with the understanding, naturally, that sea and ground based cruise missiles would be banned. It is understood that nuclear warheads on cruise missiles would be included in the general list of nuclear warheads of strategic arms.

You, Mr. Secretary, asked about what would happen with Soviet ICBMs in reduction by both sides of strategic arms. If one takes into

account the composition of Soviet strategic forces, then it is clear in reductions to the level of 1800 and that there would take place dismantling of ballistic missiles. More than that, we could say that the basic part of reductions, foreseen by Soviet proposals, would consist of ICBMs. Concretely, which missiles or other systems would be destroyed could be determined by each side, of course, in the framework of additional limitations, foreseen in the agreement.

We would like to repeat: movement forward in the negotiations, including on the above mentioned questions, depends on the United States.

We expect from the American side a positive answer to the questions we have presented.

64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 6, 1983

I am sending on to you Ed Rowny's memo on "Continuing Current Discussions in Geneva." Rowny recommends that the informal Shultz-Dobrynin channel be shifted to an informal Rowny-Karpov channel in Geneva and that, in any event, the Shultz-Dobrynin channel on START ought not to operate unless Rowny is present. Rowny also outlines the specific changes in our START position that he would like to discuss with Karpov outside the formal Geneva negotiations.

Larry is opposed to Rowny's ideas on procedure.

I recommend that you arrange for a complete review of our START position and negotiating procedures as soon as you have time. Rowny's recommendations can be considered in the context of that review.

Kenneth W. Dam²

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS."

² Dam signed the memorandum "KWD" above his typed signature.

Attachment**Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz³**

Geneva, May 3, 1983

SUBJECT

Continuing Current Discussions in Geneva

As we approach the opening of the next round of START (June 8), we need to consider how to make the transition from informal discussions with Dobrynin to the talks in Geneva. At the same time, we should recognize that the report of the Scowcroft Commission presents us with an opportunity to streamline the US position in a way which furthers serious negotiation toward an agreement.

Once the talks resume the focus of negotiation should shift to Geneva. The informal exchanges we have begun with Dobrynin should be continued through private, one-on-one discussions between me and my Soviet counterpart, Viktor Karpov. We should use these discussions to propose a number of changes in the US position in return for changes in the Soviet position which would bring us closer to an agreement. If, for some reason, discussions with Dobrynin need to be continued in Washington, I should be brought back from Geneva to participate.

I recommend that I be instructed to put a deal to Karpov along the following lines: The US would indicate its willingness to raise the 850 ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles to a number more acceptable to the Soviets. We would also agree to drop some other provisions to which the Soviets have strongly objected, specifically the division of the negotiation into phases, the 2500 ICBM RV subceiling, and the 210/110 subceilings. In return, the US would require that the Soviets accept a separate ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile RVs and a direct ceiling of 2.5 million kg of ballistic missile throw-weight. We would indicate our willingness to consider equal and verifiable limits on cruise missiles which would allow us to accomplish current plans at lower levels than those theoretically possible under the current US position. We would insist that the Soviets drop efforts to aggregate launchers of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and to drop efforts to aggregate cruise missile warheads with ballistic missile warheads.

³ Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Dam. Copied to Burt and Howe.

We will need to inform Dobrynin that I will be instructed to continue these informal discussions with Karpov in Geneva. This approach would require that a set of instructions be provided me separately from the basic Round IV instructions which are drafted by the inter-agency group.

65. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 7, 1983

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START—Tuesday, May 10, 1983

ISSUE

What are the implications of the Scowcroft Commission report and of related Congressional recommendations for our START position and our arms control policy?

FACTS

At the same time as Interdepartmental work has continued in preparation for the next round of the START negotiations, the Scowcroft Commission has recommended a reassessment of our START negotiation² position focused on raising or deleting the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles. (Tab G)³ The Commission urges that instead of a missile limit (to which our position added limitations on missile warheads), the focus should be on "equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield." The Commission argued further that the current 850 limit was "incompatible with a desirable evolution toward small single-warhead ICBMs." Subsequent letters to you from Senators Cohen, Percy and Nunn and from Representatives Dicks and Gore endorsed these

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-103, NSC 00079 16 May 1983 START PROPOSALS + SCOWCROFT COMMISSION. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kramer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Clark wrote below Reagan's initials: "directional—no dec/ bipartisan consensus / June hearings on GBD/ Paul I." No formal minutes of the May 10 NSC meeting were found; see, however, Document 66.

² Clark underlined "a reassessment of our START negotiation."

³ Attached but not printed, at Tab G, is Part VI of the April 1983 Report on the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, "Arms Control."

recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and added other recommendations favoring the adoption of the Cohen-Nunn two-for-one “Guaranteed Build-Down” concept and for the creation of a major new arms control advisory commission. (Tab F)⁴

BACKGROUND

Congressional Interest: In their letters to you, the Senators and Representatives indicate that their support of the Administration’s MX program will be substantially affected by the extent to which they gain satisfaction on their own recommendations. The scheduled votes on the MX in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on May 11 and May 12 highlight the importance and urgency of a senior-level review of the issues involved. You will be meeting with the Congressional leadership and with the Congressional authors of the correspondence on the afternoon of May 11,⁵ to discuss these and related issues with them at that time.

DISCUSSION

There are major national security, diplomatic and political implications to the Scowcroft Commission and the Congressional recommendations. The issues involved are complex and require further interdepartmental study. However, in order to meet urgent requirements for highest-level discussion prior to the Congressional votes on MX, the START Interdepartmental Group has prepared a discussion/decision paper on the Scowcroft Commission recommendations relating to the 850 missile limit and to the related question of whether we should keep indirect limits, or should now seek direct limits, on the throw-weight of the missiles involved.⁶ (Tab C). On these subjects we believe that we should retain limits on ballistic missiles as a part of the⁷ US position while we would support moving in the direction of increasing the numerical limit on missiles (to perhaps 1150). We also believe that we should *not* increase our emphasis on direct limits on throw-weight but that we retain indirect limits on throw-weight at this stage of the negotiations.⁸

⁴ Attached but not printed, at Tab F, are Cohen, Nunn, and Percy’s letter to Reagan, April 29 (see Document 60) and Dicks and Gore’s letter to Reagan, May 2.

⁵ According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan held several meetings with congressional leaders between 1:05 and 6:20 p.m. on May 11. No minutes of the meeting were found.

⁶ Attached but not printed, at Tab C, are a May 7 START IG paper and an undated START IG paper.

⁷ Clark drew two vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this sentence and the previous sentence, and underlined “we should retain limits on ballistic missiles as a part of the.”

⁸ Clark underlined “also believe” and “indirect limits.”

Advisory Commission: Concerning the Congressional recommendations for a new and far-reaching Presidential advisory commission on arms control, we do not have a formal interagency paper, but all agencies are agreed that this proposal involves very major pitfalls.⁹ As you know, we already have a General Advisory Committee chartered to advise you, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Secretary of State on these matters.¹⁰ Creation of the proposed new bipartisan commission with terms of appointments reaching beyond any given administration and essentially empowered to review all arms control issues, raises substantial problems including Executive/Congressional powers and intelligence sources and methods, and could be quite counterproductive to effective arms control deliberations within the Government as well as for the conduct of negotiations.¹¹ Although we do not have a formal interagency paper on this subject for the NSC meeting, we are prepared to summarize the issues involved, and agency principals are also prepared to discuss the proposal, at the meeting. (Tab D)¹²

Guaranteed Build-Down: On the very complex subject of the “two-for-one” Guaranteed Build-Down proposed by Senators Cohen and Nunn, we do not have a formal interagency paper, but we are prepared to brief this at the NSC meeting with the help of charts to show the importance (as well as the difficulty) for national security of devising proper counting rules if major dangers in this concept are to be avoided as we undertake essential modernization of our deterrent forces. (Tab E)¹³

Procedure: We anticipate that NSC principals, or their representatives, will elaborate their agencies’ positions on each of the items to be addressed and that possible consensus or compromises may emerge at the meeting on several issues. In view of the extensive and complex agenda, we have not provided specific Talking Points for your use, but have attached for your review the Talking Points I propose to use to frame the discussion at the meeting. (Tab B)¹⁴ We believe the NSC

⁹ Clark underlined “pitfalls.”

¹⁰ Clark underlined “General Advisory Committee chartered to advise you, the Director of the,” and “on these matters.” He also placed a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this sentence.

¹¹ Clark wrote “no” in the left-hand margin beside this sentence.

¹² Attached but not printed, at Tab D, is an undated paper prepared in the National Security Council, “Senator Nunn’s Proposal for a Bipartisan Presidential Commission on Arms Control.”

¹³ Attached but not printed, at Tab E, is an undated paper prepared in the National Security Council, “Cohen-Nunn Two for One Build Down Approach.”

¹⁴ Attached but not printed, at Tab B, are talking points for Clark to use in the May 10 meeting.

discussion should provide a sound basis for the meeting which you will have with Congressional figures on Wednesday.¹⁵ We recommend that you use the NSC meeting to hear all the arguments so as to determine the general direction to be taken for the Wednesday meeting. However, while some initial decisions may be possible concerning elements of our START position, we believe the specific problems of adapting a Guaranteed Build-Down and of possible variants on a new arms control advisory commission will need substantial further evaluation¹⁶ before decisions can be made regarding them. In addition we will need to schedule an NSC meeting on other START issues (including a proposed Treaty text) before the negotiations resume on June 8.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that you review the following attachments prior to the NSC meeting:

- Tab A: Meeting Agenda¹⁷
- Tab B: My Talking Points
- Tab C: IG Summary and Paper on Scowcroft
Commission and START position
- Tab D: Informal paper on new Arms Control Advisory
Commission
- Tab E: Informal paper on Cohen-Nunn "Guaranteed
Build-Down"
- Tab F: Congressional correspondence
- Tab G: Arms Control section of Scowcroft Commission
Report

Based on the discussion at the meeting, NSC Staff will prepare a decision memorandum for your consideration.

¹⁵ May 11.

¹⁶ Clark circled "further evaluation."

¹⁷ Attached but not printed.

66. Editorial Note

On May 9, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam held meetings on the Reagan Administration's approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Later that day, Dam dictated a personal note describing a meeting of his arms control discussion group on "the relationship between INF and START. The general opinion was quite hostile to any merger, at least until such time as the INF deployment schedule is essentially completed, of INF into START. One of the main disadvantages was that the problems of negotiating START would become unmanageable once Europeans had a direct stake in START outcomes, because it would be impossible to carry on the kinds of consultations on START that we have been carrying out on INF, especially in view of the complexity of the START issues. Kenneth Adelman was something of a supporter for merger, and Rick Burt was not present, but the rest of the group, including Larry Eagleburger, were very dubious about any benefits to be derived from such a merger. This was an interesting outcome of the discussion in view of the fact that there seems to be a strong, though abstract, interest in the arms control community in some merger of the two negotiations. It is, of course, true that except in political terms involving the linking of the United States to the defense of Europe, there is no special significance to any 'Euro balance,' and therefore, it does not make analytical sense to think of the two negotiations separately. But from the political point of view, including getting things done and having a position that could be explained publicly, there is not too much to be said for merging the two negotiations. That, at any rate, was the view held right across the spectrum of positions from Richard Perle on the one hand to Larry Eagleburger on the other." Dam also described an hour-long meeting with Adelman "to discuss what changes we should be making in our START position, particularly in view of the Scowcroft Commission Report. Adelman was strongly for dropping launchers entirely and concentrating on warheads and throw-weight. This is also the position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (especially Perle). It makes a lot of sense in terms of trying to move in the direction of single-warhead missiles, which is the current rage in the arms control community. On the other hand, it merely means that we would have to have extensive discussions about throw-weight, and such discussions would almost inevitably lead in the direction of making an agreement more difficult, because throw-weight would be very difficult to negotiate, and the Soviets have shown no interest in doing so. I also had a pre-brief on the same subject, in view of the fact that the question of dropping launcher limits or increasing them above the present 850 position will be up for discussion in the NSC meeting tomorrow morning." (Depart-

ment of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

On May 10, Dam dictated a personal note in which he recounted a National Security Council meeting that he attended that day on behalf of Secretary of State George Shultz, who was in Paris. The meeting considered "to what extent we should modify our START agreement in view of the Scowcroft Report. Defense has used the Scowcroft Report to come down hard on moving away from deployed missile limits toward throw-weight as the principal unit of account in the START negotiations. All sides agree that warheads should be the second unit of account. In fact, Scowcroft does not support the notion of moving out to throw-weight. I argued as persuasively as I could that moving to throw-weight now would be counterproductive. It would be very difficult to negotiate, not simply because the Soviets are not interested in throw-weight as a unit of account, but also because it is hard to define and harder to verify (with an error margin of 10 to 25 percent). Moreover, I said, I thought that a movement to throw-weight right now would simply confirm in the minds of critics of the President the view that he was not serious about arms control, because it would slow down or eliminate any possibility of agreement in the near term with the Soviet Union. Ken Adelman came down strongly on the side of OSD, and General Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I were basically in agreement, although he would have held the limit on deployed missiles to 850, whereas I was willing to see them rise somewhat." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983) No formal minutes of the May 10 NSC meeting was found.

In identical May 12 letters to Senators Charles Percy, Samuel Nunn, and William Cohen responding to their joint letter of April 29 (see Document 60), President Ronald Reagan wrote: "The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission's approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek

stability at the lowest possible level of forces.” The president also addressed the Senators’ advocacy of “a ‘guaranteed build-down.’ The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.” After discussing how such a build-down could work, Reagan wrote: “My Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.” (“Letter to Three Senators Concerning the Strategic Modernization Program and Nuclear Arms Reduction, May 12, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, volume 1, pp. 696–697)

67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 6, 1983

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START—Tuesday, June 7, 1983

Issue

To what degree should the US negotiation position on START be changed at this time in view of the Scowcroft Commission report and the Cohen-Nunn “mutual build-down” concept? With regard to the Scowcroft Commission, should the US retain, raise, or delete the current 850 limit on deployed missiles, and should we retain, alter, or drop indirect and/or direct limits on throw-weight? Concerning a build-down, what possible alternative options could be implemented or rejected now, which require further study, and what stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option can be developed?

Facts

The Administration needs to address the above issues prior to the resumption of the START negotiations on June 8 and prior to the MX-

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-103, NSC 00081 07Jun1983. Secret. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

related Senate vote on the 1984 Authorization Bill during the week of June 13. Following the last NSC meeting on START, on May 7,² you indicated to the appropriate members of Congress that the Administration's START position would reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and would seek to develop a flexible approach to the "build-down" concept for START (letter at Tab H).³ Subsequently, the START Interdepartmental Group (IG) undertook an intensive work program on these issues and has produced two papers on Scowcroft Commission implications and options (Tab D)⁴ and on mutual build-down implications (Tab G).⁵

In addition to the IG's work to be considered at the June 7 NSC meeting, the meeting will also provide an opportunity to hear directly from General Scowcroft (arms control recommendations at Tab E)⁶ and from the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee Arms Control and Disarmament, Dr. William Graham, who has forwarded a separate proposal for a START package (Tab F).⁷

Discussion

We believe the most useful means of framing the discussion of the Scowcroft Commission issues relating to the number of deployed missiles and the issue of direct or indirect limits on throw-weight, would be through a focus on the two charts on: (1) the Agenda and (2) alternative START "packages," as briefed to you by NSC staff on June 1.

On the *deployed missile number*, the current 850 missile limit would permit the US to deploy MX and Trident missiles as planned and still field some 300 new small ICBMs or Midgetmen. We feel that it may be prudent to raise the 850 number at this time, but that we should probably not eliminate the number entirely at this time. A number remains an understandable counting and verification principle (although similar to SALT), offers some protection against direct limits on US bomber weapons, and may be necessary if, as is likely, we cannot agree now on the nature of a substitute approach focused entirely on warheads and direct throw-weight limits.

² Apparent reference to NSC meeting on May 10. See Document 66.

³ Attached but not printed, at Tab H, is Reagan's letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy.

⁴ Attached but not printed, at Tab D, is the IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues.

⁵ Attached but not printed, at Tab G, is the IG paper on Mutual Build-Down.

⁶ Apparent reference to Tab F. Attached but not printed, at Tab F, is the Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control.

⁷ Apparent reference to Tab E.

Concerning *throw-weight*, we believe further discussion and study are probably required before a major shift should be undertaken. In this regard, special consideration should also be given to verification and build-down factors.

Concerning *build-down*, we do not believe it is possible at this time to define any one or two clear options for our START position. However, the IG believes that, with a comprehensive IG work program currently underway, we will be in a position to brief appropriate members of Congress on possible alternative approaches before the August recess.

NSC Package

For your use at the NSC meeting and for background information, we have prepared the comprehensive package attached with the following items:

Tab A—Agenda;⁸

Tab B—My suggested Talking Points at the NSC meeting inviting discussion of the agenda issues; copies of two IG charts;⁹

Tab C—The Scowcroft Commission-related Talking Points that we provided for your information earlier for your June 1 briefing;¹⁰

Tab D—The IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues;

Tab E—GAC Chairman William Graham's letter to you proposing a specific START package related to the Scowcroft Commission;

Tab F—The Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control;

Tab G—The IG paper on Mutual Build-Down;

Tab H—Your letter to Senators, Cohen, Nunn, and Percy on a build-down; and

Tab I—The proposed draft text of a START treaty, to be updated on the basis of decisions to be made.¹¹

Following the NSC meeting in the morning, you are scheduled to have consultations with appropriate Senate and House members later, in the afternoon, to be followed by a meeting the next morning with the Congressional leadership. Based on the NSC meeting discussion, we will prepare recommendations and alternative decision memoranda for your consideration prior to your meeting with the leadership.

⁸ Attached but not printed, at Tab A, is the agenda.

⁹ Attached but not printed, at Tab B, are suggested talking points and copies of two IG charts.

¹⁰ Attached but not printed, at Tab C, are Scowcroft-related Talking Points.

¹¹ Attached but not printed, at Tab I, is a proposed draft text of a START treaty.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ That you review the attached package, particularly the summary Talking Points and charts for the NSC meeting at Tab B, the comprehensive Talking Points prepared for your June 1 briefing by NSC staff at Tab C, and the START IG papers on Scowcroft Commission at Tab D and on the “Build-Down” at Tab G.¹²

_____ That you not announce any decisions at the NSC meeting, pending consideration of the afternoon’s Congressional consultations and of alternative decision directives to be prepared by NSC staff.¹³

Attachment

Letter From the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (Graham) to President Reagan¹⁴

Washington, May 26, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

For several months, the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament has been analyzing the arms control implications of the U.S. strategic modernization program. We have met several times with ACDA Director Adelman; the Chairman of your Commission on Strategic Forces, General Scowcroft; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey; the Vice President; and with other knowledgeable persons both in and out of government. Their views have been invaluable, and while the following opinions and recommendations are those of the General Advisory Committee, we would like to acknowledge the counsel provided by these persons.

For more than a decade, the U.S. has deliberately avoided deploying any ICBM system that would severely threaten Soviet land-based ICBMs, even though such systems were well within our ability

¹² Reagan did not indicate a preference.

¹³ Reagan did not indicate a preference.

¹⁴ Secret.

to develop. This restraint was exercised in the hope that the Soviet Union would conduct its missile system development activities with equal restraint.

Unfortunately, our unilateral restraint has not been reciprocated. Because of the central role ICBMs have in our strategic policy, the greatest threat to strategic nuclear stability today is the increasing vulnerability of this leg of the triad. This vulnerability has come about not through some inevitable process, but through deliberate, long-term, large-scale Soviet efforts to threaten the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force.

As you have so clearly stated, it would be both irresponsible and dangerous to world peace for the U.S. to further delay responding to this threat.

The recommendations of your Commission on Strategic Forces have major implications for arms control. It is the consensus of your General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, itself a bipartisan body, that the Commission's arms control recommendations be vigorously pursued. To support and add specificity to your Commission's recommendations, we suggest that the following be incorporated in our START position.

U.S. START Position

Combine Phase I and Phase II;

Retain the limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and the 2,500 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

Limit both sides to 1.9 million kilograms of ballistic missile throwweight and a .5 million kilogram sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight;

Limit future ballistic missile warheads to approximately 300 kilograms per warhead (payload) weight;

Bombers should be treated separately; limits on bombers and ALCMs should take into account Soviet air defenses.

1. Retain the 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit. This unit of account and level, when combined with a throw-weight limit, moves both sides toward greater strategic nuclear stability while preserving flexibility for structuring forces.

2. Eliminate the 850 limit on deployed missiles and seek a phased build-down, over a specified period of time, to direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight at 1.9 million kilograms. A direct limit on throwweight is paramount to a sound START agreement. In contrast to limits on deployed missiles or launchers, throwweight limits would move both sides away from less stabilizing deployments of large MIRVed missiles toward more stabilizing deployments of small single warhead missiles. Throwweight remains the key indicator of strategic missile capability and strategic missile potential. As U.S. and Soviet

technologies converge, a Soviet throwweight advantage would permit the Soviets to deploy accurate warheads with greater destructive capability than U.S. warheads.

Direct limits on throwweight would also limit Soviet breakout potential, that is, the ability to deploy more warheads clandestinely or following abrogation of an agreement. The 1.9 million kilogram limit would be based on the decision to combine the two phases of START; this level provides negotiating flexibility for seeking this major reduction in throwweight. Finally, a throwweight limit would permit dropping the collateral constraints on Soviet heavy and medium ICBMs, thereby simplifying our approach.

3. Direct limits on throwweight should be accompanied by seeking direct limits on future warhead weight or payload. Such payload limits would prevent the Soviets from deploying missiles having a relatively large amount of throwweight with a relatively small warhead, which could give them a substantial breakout capability with such deployed missiles.

4. A sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight at .5 million kilograms should be sought in order to limit these most destabilizing Soviet weapons as we make the transition from MIRVed missiles to less lucrative targets, single warhead missiles. Such a limit would encourage a transition to smaller missiles as both sides' forces are reduced.

5. The sublimit of 2,500 ICBM warheads should be retained as this limit makes the important distinction between ICBM and SLBM warheads. It would also aid in the transition to lower warhead levels, and it would bound the Soviet ICBM threat to U.S. ICBMs. In addition, it would limit Soviet counterforce potential, when combined with the throwweight limits.

6. Limit both sides to a 20 per cent margin above the throwweight limit to cover logistics, flight test missiles, and maintenance requirements. This should be the U.S. internal position.

7. Bombers should continue to be treated separately from ballistic missiles. There should be no bomber equivalent payload aggregated in a missile throwweight ceiling. The aggregation of bombers and ballistic missiles would blur the important distinction between first-strike weapons (Soviet ICBMs) and second-strike retaliatory weapons (U.S. bombers).

8. Numerical limits on bombers and ALCMs should be addressed in the context of limits on Soviet air defenses. The Soviets have the most extensive air defense system in the world while the U.S. has minimal air defenses. U.S. bombers and cruise missiles that survive a Soviet attack must be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Limits on U.S. bombers and air-launched cruise missiles without corresponding

limits on Soviet air defenses would reduce the effectiveness of our bomber force in an inequitable manner.

The General Advisory Committee believes this package of limitations would meet our objectives of seeking deep reductions in strategic forces, equality in capabilities, and greater strategic stability. These limits could be verified with appropriate cooperative measures. And this package preserves flexibility for both sides to design future strategic programs within these constraints. We hope you find this useful in your deliberations concerning the arms control aspects of the strategic modernization program and START.

Respectfully yours,

William R. Graham
Chairman

68. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, June 7, 1983

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

A crucial meeting on START was held in the White House under NSC auspices.² The President foreshadowed two decisions that he was to make clear the next day. One was that he was prepared to go up on the number of deployed missiles from the 850, which is our present position. The second one had to do with the throw-weight issue, which has become such a source of excitement within the Administration and in the press. Rather than going to the OSD/ACDA position of direct limits on throw-weight, the President decided to stay with the State Department position, which was that indirect limits should be our position, which would take the form of collateral constraints on heavy missiles, particularly the SS-18. On the other hand, if the Soviets would

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated by Dam on June 14.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting, which started at 9:37 a.m. and ended at 10:25 a.m., took place in the Cabinet Room. Handwritten notes on this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, START: 06/04/83–06/06/83. No formal minutes of the meeting were found.

prefer to negotiate direct limits in the form of overall weight limitations on throw-weight, then we would be prepared to negotiate on that basis.

It was an excellent meeting, which is quite surprising, in view of the fact that so many people were in the room, including even the head of the advisory group and General Scowcroft, and in view of the severe differences of views at the lower levels of the State and Defense Departments. My own view was that direct limits on throw-weight would be far from the disaster that some State Department people have suggested. Everything turns on the level of that throw-weight. In view of the fact that the Soviets presently have nearly three times the throw-weight of the United States, any demand for equality at levels at or below the U.S. level would simply be asking more than one could reasonably ask the Soviet Union and would signal to the world that we did not want a START agreement with the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

69. Memorandum From Clayton McManaway of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 8, 1983

Mr. Secretary:

We have the following information on follow-up to the NSC meeting on START:²

—The President will make a statement in the Rose Garden at 1100 today (5 PM our time).³ The latest draft of his statement, based on

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM, 1979–1989 The Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents, June 1983 #22, Box 2 #88. No classification marking. Not for the System. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Shultz was traveling to Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting June 9–10.

² See Document 68.

³ During his June 8 remarks from the Rose Garden, Reagan said that the previously-tabled U.S. START position "would have limited each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful or important a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft commission report specifically suggested that it should be reassessed, since it could constrain the evolution we seek towards small, single-warhead ICBM's. Acting upon the Commission's recommendation, I have now directed our negotiators to adjust our position on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing our current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit." ("Remarks Announcing Changes in the United States Position at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks," June 8, 1983, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, volume I, pp. 832–833.)

guidance from the President, is at Tab 1.⁴ The final will be sent to other Cabinet members this morning in Washington. This is an advance sent Eyes Only to you (in theory, no one in the Department has seen it). I have given Jon and Rick copies and they will be prepared to discuss it with you when you are ready. As you will see, the President has opted for indirect limits on throwweight. If we have comments, we should get them back this morning; the speechwriters are already working on it.

—Congressional leaders, NATO ambassadors and other dignitaries will be present in the Rose Garden. Ken will represent the Department. If the arms control booklet is ready in time, the President will give copies to the Congressional leaders, embargoed.

—Earlier, there was thought that the President would call in and brief the NATO ambassadors. While not entirely clear, it would appear he will not do that. We have received proposed talking points for use by our Ambassadors at NATO posts and Tokyo in briefing host governments on the President's statement. They have been cleared by the NSC. We are asked to review them and send them on from here ASAP. Tab 2.⁵

—We are expecting Q's and A's but do not have them yet.

—The NSDD on START will be signed this morning Washington time.⁶ It is not clear that we, or others, will have an opportunity to comment prior to its signing. This could be troublesome, depending on the degree of detail included. However, if it is general in nature and follows the substance of the statement as we have it, we should be okay.

—Rowny is not being given any advance word on the decisions. The NSC has been adamant on this point. His instructions will be prepared during the week. At this point we have no sense of when he would be told to make his presentation.

⁴ Attached but not printed is telegram 158248/ToSec 60022 to Shultz's delegation, June 8, which transmitted the penultimate draft of Reagan's statement.

⁵ Attached but not printed is telegram 158247/ToSec 60021 to Shultz's delegation, June 8, which transmitted a draft cable containing instructions to multiple posts. In telegram 158301 to multiple posts, June 8, the Department instructed addressees to brief host government officials in advance of Reagan's Rose Garden statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830324-0761)

⁶ The NSDD was in fact not signed until June 14. See Document 71.

70. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, June 10, 1983

SUBJECT

Amb Rowny's Comments on Draft NSDD

Late this morning we received a call from Amb Rowny's staff who wished to pass on his comments on the draft NSDD² concerning changes to the U.S. START position. The changes suggested are as follows:

—Delete any reference to the retention of 2500 warhead subceiling on ICBMs.

—In discussing direct limits on throwweight delete any addition reference to a U.S. goal of achieving direct and equal levels *below current U.S. levels*.

—In describing the range of options that the U.S. negotiator may explore with the Soviets in an attempt to get a handle on throwweight, include an explicit reference to a direct limit at 2.5 mkg as one of those options.

The revised draft NSDD³ that we provided this morning does incorporate the 2nd of Amb Rowny's two suggestions. We would recommend that we do not incorporate the other items he suggested at this time.

This morning's phone call also raises other problems. It appears that the draft NSDD, circulated for comment on a close-hold basis, may have received rather wide distribution in certain agencies. For example, the call for Rowny's staff was the result of their obtaining a copy of Ken Adleman's previous comments⁴ on the draft. If this is the case, it is unfortunate not only because of the precedent it sets but also because of the increased risk that the draft may leak.

In terms of precedent, in the past we have been very careful to hand carry draft NSDDs to selected individuals for their personal comment and not to permit them to have copies of the drafts. Setting a precedent that a wider range of "agencies" will have the opportunity

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-084, NSDD 0098. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not found.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

to comment on draft NSDDs prior to their signature may not be useful in the long run.⁵ Especially if, as evidenced in this case, many of the comments generated are not directed at clarifying the decision contained in the NSDD, but at explicitly or implicitly altering it.

The risk of a leak of this draft is also worthy of concern. For example, should the draft that agencies were provided for comment leak, it includes language that fairly clearly sets an ultimate U.S. goal to be direct limits on throwweight at or below current U.S. levels. This may be too stark a presentation of our current position and contains language no longer in the final draft.

Our older procedures provided more protection against leaks since the drafts were never out of NSC control and, once signed, the control procedures for START NSDDs have been tighter than most documents.

RECOMMENDATION

That we do not further revise the draft NSDD based on Amb Rowney's comments.⁶

⁵ Clark wrote "agree" in the margin to the left of this sentence.

⁶ Clark indicated his approval of the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "good points! WPC."

71. National Security Decision Directive 98¹

Washington, June 14, 1983

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—VI (U)

Three full rounds of negotiations on START are now behind us. It is my judgement that these rounds have been useful and have permitted

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-084, NSDD 0098. Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, and Rowney, under cover of a June 14 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-98). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-98 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.) (S)

us to cover necessary ground. However, due largely to Soviet rigidity, we have not yet made meaningful progress on the central issues. I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement which involves significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals and which promotes the national security interests of both sides. Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of forces in order to reduce the risk of war. All of our efforts in START must be guided by this principal objective. (U)

The report of the Commission on Strategic Forces headed by General Scowcroft offers us a new opportunity for progress. It has provided a consistent and coherent framework to guide our thinking about the fundamental elements of our national security policy, deterrence, defense and arms control. But, more than that, it has provided the basis for renewed, bipartisan support for that policy. To capitalize on this critical opportunity, I have decided upon the following additional guidance. The purpose of this guidance is to change the U.S. START position to bring it more into line with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations and to provide additional flexibility to our negotiator in pursuing basic U.S. goals in these negotiations. (U)

LIMITS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES

Our primary aim and most immediate focus is to reduce the threat posed by the most destabilizing systems, namely, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs. To achieve that aim, measures that constrain the number and the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads remain the most valid units of account. Our proposed limit of 5,000 total ballistic missile warheads with no more than one-half of these on ICBMs remains the central element of the U.S. START position. (S)

Our current START position includes an associated constraint which limits each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft Commission report suggested specifically that it should be reassessed since the Commission felt it not to be compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs.

However, there are other considerations which argue for a retention of some limit on deployed missiles. The Soviets are in a better position to deploy large numbers of additional small missiles than we. Elimination of such limits would also impact upon our ability to constrain Soviet refire capability and may make the pursuit of a greater emphasis on the contribution of strategic defense more difficult. Additionally, having limits only on missile warheads, and not on the missiles carrying

those warheads, would establish certain precedents that may not be in the U.S. interest with respect to the treatment of bombers and bomber armament. Also, the Soviet Union continues to show an interest in deployed missiles as a unit of account. (S)

Acting upon the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation, the U.S. will adjust our position with respect to limits on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing its current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit. The U.S. will propose, during the next round, a new limit on deployed ballistic missiles at a higher equal level (up to 1250), and will indicate to the Soviets that the U.S. has some flexibility with respect to agreement on the specific level. (S)

THROWWEIGHT

It remains the firm U.S. position that the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads must be addressed in START. Constraints on ballistic missile throwweight provide an appropriate mechanism for limiting this destructive capability and potential. Our current position includes a network of collateral constraints immediately applied to address this issue, leading later to the application of direct limits on throwweight. (U)

Some have complained that this network of collateral constraints (including the limits on ICBM warheads at 2500, on heavy ICBMs at 110, and on the total of heavy and medium ICBMs at 210) is designed to dictate Soviet force structure according to U.S. standards. This is not the case. I believe, as does the Scowcroft Commission, that stability can be increased by limitations on heavy ICBMs. However, the purpose of the network of collateral constraints that we have proposed is to find an appropriate way to reduce the large asymmetry in ballistic missile throwweight, and thus in the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads, that now exists between the ballistic missile forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I intend this to later lead to direct and equal limits on ballistic missile throwweight. (S)

I do not wish to alter our objectives in this area at this time. However, it is essential that our negotiator make absolutely clear the legitimate concerns we hold and the intentions behind the specific constraints that we have proposed to date. Further, the U.S. negotiator should flexibly explore with the Soviets all appropriate avenues for meeting our objectives in this area. (U)

To support this process, the START Interagency Group should conduct a short study focused at answering the following two questions:

- (1) What contribution to the constraint of ballistic missile destructive capability and potential could be made by various possible restrictions imposed on ballistic missile modernization? For example, what

would be the impact of limiting new or modernized ballistic missile reentry vehicles for MRVed or MIRVed missiles to less than 225 kg in weight and those developed for single RV missiles to 400 kg in weight? How quickly would the impact of such restrictions be felt on the Soviet Union? (S)

(2) If the various alternative approaches to constraining ballistic missile throwweight on both existing and future forces were applied beginning in 1984, what would be the effect on estimated U.S. and Soviet throwweight levels on a year by year basis? This analysis should be based on a comparison of current U.S. force planning against two Soviet force structures: one which represents our best estimates of current Soviet plans, and one which estimates Soviet force structures should they attempt to maximize their ballistic missile throwweight under the alternative approaches in question. (U)

This study should be completed by July 15. (U)

In addition, the detailed study on the treatment of Sea Launched Cruise Missiles initially tasked by NSDD-78² should also be finalized and provided by July 15. (U)

THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT

The work currently in progress exploring how the build-down concept can be best applied within the U.S. approach to strategic arms reduction must continue on a priority basis. A final version of the paper previously tasked on this subject, and suitable to support an update briefing to Congress, should be completed by July 8. (U)

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33, NSDD-36, NSDD-44, NSDD-53, and NSDD-78. (U)

Ronald Reagan

² See Document 53.

72. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 14, 1983

SUBJECT

Treating Build-Down as a Friend

On July 9, the START IG completed and forwarded to the NSC its technical assessment of alternative build-down proposals (Executive Summary attached).²

The original Cohen build-down concept³ involves the reduction of two warheads for every new one added. Bomber weapons would be lumped with missile warheads, without distinction, in a total aggregate, along the lines of the current Soviet START proposal. The objective is a separate interim agreement, on the assumption that conclusion of START is far in the future. The IG examined the Cohen approach as well as several more modest proposals:

- a 2-for-1 build-down covering missile warheads and bomber aircraft;
- a 2-for-1 build-down on ICBM warheads, 3-for-2 on SLBM warheads, and 3-for-2 on bomber aircraft;
- a 3-for-2 build-down on missile warheads and bomber aircraft;
- a 1-for-1 cap on missile warheads and bomber aircraft; and
- a percentage annual reduction (5–7%) that is not linked to modernization.

The President and others have made supportive comments about the build-down concept and Congressional proponents believe they have an Administration commitment to make a build-down proposal in some form to the Soviets. Nevertheless, there was little interagency enthusiasm for any of the options, either as a part of START or as an interim approach to START. The IG is concerned that a build-down proposal would divert negotiating attention from the reductions and other important measures called for in START and could result in reductions without the protections and guarantees that would come with a full treaty.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1983 Arms and Arms Control. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Eagleburger, who did not initial the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is the Executive Summary of a paper prepared by the START IG, "Technical Assessment of the Build-Down Concept."

³ See Document 66.

The IG paper also reports that while the original 2-for-1 concept is unworkable, several of the more modest options would fit within the existing START proposal. However, as part of a START agreement the build-down approach does not appear to offer any military or negotiating advantages over the schedule of reductions the U.S. has proposed in Geneva.

A Possible Compromise

Despite the possible START diversions that could result from a build-down proposal and specific problems associated with most options, build-down has become an important issue in the current strategic debate. Its supporters allege that MX support will evaporate unless there is a build-down, some other alternative, or prospects of a near term agreement in START. While there is strong support for build-down in the Senate, a careful analysis of attitudes is needed to better determine our degree of latitude on this issue.

Although we may have room for maneuver, we should consider trying to craft a workable but scaled-back version of the build-down, wrapping it in the spirit of compromise. To reject a build-down outright risks the defeat of MX, the adoption of an unfavorable arms control resolution in the Senate, and the loss of the bipartisan consensus on arms control that we have been trying to construct.

One possible compromise would incorporate the build-down concept both within START *and* as a precursor to START. The precursor could be a cap on the number of missile warheads and bomber aircraft—permitting a 1-for-1 replacement of older systems with modernized systems. While not a build-down *per se*, a cap could halt the growth in number of warheads on both sides and could be seen as a positive initiative as we continue with START and the modernization of strategic systems.

A cap on missile warheads and bombers would have minimal impact on our force structure and would allow deployment of MX (by withdrawing older weapons). However, a cap may be difficult for some to accept since it has some features in common with the nuclear freeze. The important distinction is that modernization is permitted. There is also some risk that if parallels are drawn to the Soviets' proposed INF moratorium, adopting a cap could undercut our INF position. Nevertheless, of the alternatives available to us, a cap could offer a meaningful limitation on warhead growth and be a strong signal of our commitment to move forward with arms reductions. It is not clear, however, that such a minimal step would appease build-down advocates.

Since a cap is significantly less than what the build-down advocates hoped for and does not itself result in reductions, we could at the same

time embrace a build-down proposal *within* the START framework. One option would be for a mutual, annual percentage reduction in missile warheads. While the precise figures and time period for the reductions require detailed analyses, reductions of 5–7% per year for eight years would essentially match the reduction schedule now envisioned in our START proposal. Although percentage decreases do not explicitly link reductions with modernization (and thus some would claim they are not a build down), in practice we would both modernize and substantially reduce our forces.

A variation, currently being studied, would be a smaller percentage reduction over a shorter period of time (for example 2% per year for three years). This could have merit as a precursor (*before* START). The reductions are small and the time period short enough to minimize the risk associated with build-down without a full START agreement. Since these reductions would be more modest than START, this approach would not necessarily reduce incentives to reach a full agreement.

In sum, one approach might be:

- cap on missile warheads and bomber aircraft
- 1-for-1 replacement to accommodate modernization
- small percentage reduction (2%) while START being negotiated (maximum of 3 years)
- acceptance of the build-down concept in any START agreement with the Soviets. (The optimal would be equal percentage reductions of 5–7% per year to an agreed floor, although more explicit build-downs such as the 3-for-2 approach would be feasible.)

Another alternative would be to consider these or similar interim concepts if a year-end assessment indicated the Soviets were unwilling to move in START. This would allow time for testing Soviet reactions to our latest START initiatives, would follow initial INF deployments, and could possibly buy some time for MX.

It should be recognized, however, that these minimal approaches are unlikely to satisfy either strong advocates of build-down on the Hill or critics in the interagency community.

Next Steps

In proposing a minimal alternative to the Cohen concept, we must avoid being disingenuous with build-down supporters by suggesting that a cap (as a precursor) plus a percentage reduction has met their concerns. On the other hand, with sufficient Presidential support, such a compromise may be acceptable to advocates of some interim initiative, not necessarily build-down in a pure form. If we pursue this approach, we should be up front with Senator Cohen and others on why the 2-

for-1 outside a START framework is not feasible in our view but be prepared to give them public credit for the development of the *concept*.

As Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy told you,⁴ they believe there is need to show some positive movement fairly soon and have our policy decisions made before September. Senator Percy hoped their staffs would have a chance to study our counter proposal during the August recess. The MX Commission has been given access to the IG paper. Therefore, there should be internal high-level discussions in the near future of how to approach build-down. An NSPG might be an appropriate forum to vet the issue without forcing the President's hand. The IG needs some guidance on whether its relatively unfriendly treatment of "build-down" fits other objectives. We also need to develop a coordinated gameplan (including MX Commission activities) on consultations with the Senators and their staff.

⁴ Not further identified.

73. Telegram From the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva to the White House¹

Geneva, July 14, 1983, 0708Z

395. To: Judge Clark, the White House, Wash DC. From E. Rowny, US START Delegation, Geneva. Note: Deliver during duty hours.

1. I am certain you saw the Washington Post article on me a week ago.² The article was completely erroneous. I have the highest confidence in my delegation and believe that feeling is reciprocated. I have had no shouting matches with the Soviets and my relations with Nitze are excellent.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Cable Files, Privacy IN (01/22/1981–07/26/1983). Secret.

² Reference is to James McCartney, "START Sessions 'Acrimonious,'" *Washington Post*, July 6, 1983, A1. The article began: "Serious problems have developed in the seven-man U.S. delegation to the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva, according to administration officials directly involved and others have closely monitored the negotiations. The problems range from internal dissension in the delegation to extreme tension between the head of the delegation, retired Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, and other key figures in the administration's arms-control apparatus, officials say."

2. While I am inclined to dismiss it as a personal attack on me, the timing of the article was such that it has blunted the impact of what we are doing in Geneva. The article was reprinted in the International Herald Tribune on 7 July, the very day we tabled our draft treaty.

3. As you know, I urged the President to give me authority to be flexible in Geneva and worked hard to achieve compromise language so I could table a treaty. It remains my strong conviction that tabling a treaty was essential. If we had failed to do so the Soviets could have continued to claim that our flexibility was all words and no deeds. Tabling a treaty took away that Soviet argument.

4. Nevertheless, the fact that the Reagan Administration has shown flexibility and that I am carrying it out, has been deflected by the Washington Post article on 6 July and others which have directed attention elsewhere. It would be helpful, therefore, if in background talks with newsmen you (and perhaps VP Bush and others) could weave in some comments on what is going on here in Geneva. For example, you could say that we have been negotiating flexibly and that Rowny has been part of the process of displaying more flexibility. I believe it is necessary to counter the erroneous impression that the Reagan Administration is not seriously striving for an arms control agreement and is not competently represented in Geneva.

5. In addition to backgrounding newsmen, our new flexibility in START could be the subject of a presidential speech or a statement he would read prior to a news conference.

6. In short, the new flexibility expressed by the President on June 8 was a big step in the right direction. In fact, it has brought about some movement (although not on central issues) in the part of the Soviets. I have demonstrated that flexibility in concrete terms by tabling the treaty. We should not let personal attacks and other stories cause us to lose the high ground gained by the President's new initiatives in START.

7. Warm regards.

74. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Build-down Paper

NSDD-98² tasked the START Interagency Group to build upon the previous paper³ that it provided to us early in June and explore a number of alternative build-down options to see if any were feasible and in the US interest at this time. The START Interagency Group has completed its work and produced a long, detailed technical assessment.

Attached is the executive summary and observations sections of the longer paper for your review.

As indicated by the executive summary and observations sections, the paper provided is *not a comprehensive evaluation of all aspects of the build-down concept*. As I mentioned earlier, it is intended to supplement and extend the work of the broader paper previously submitted in early June 3 to support NSC discussion of this issue at that time. It does not address the generic problems associated with the build-down concept. Rather it attempts to see if a set of specific options (out of an almost infinite range of possible options) could be made to work in a manner supportive of US interests.

It does provide a technical assessment of a range of build-down options. It also provides an evaluation of the merit of these selected options as both precursors to a START agreement and as integral parts of such an agreement. I think that you will find the discussion of this last point most useful.

We are continuing to staff the full paper.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you read the sections of the paper provided at Tab A for your information.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, NSC Box SR084, NSDD 0098. Secret.

² See Document 71.

³ See footnote 3, Document 67.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

Attachment

Excerpts From a Paper Prepared by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks⁵

Washington, July 8, 1983

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents]

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper extends the work of the previous IG build-down study of June 3 and examines the problems and issues associated with developing a build-down proposal. A large number of options were reviewed; this paper assesses and makes observations on six of them. Additional work is needed to resolve some of the problems identified in the paper.

A. *Introduction* (Section II)

In response to Presidential direction, the START IG has intensively studied the guaranteed mutual build-down concept over the last three months. In the IG paper sent to the NSC on June 3, the following characteristics were identified as minimum requirements for any acceptable build-down approach: a missile warhead floor; approximate equality during the build-down process; verifiability; consistency with START ceilings, counting rules, and treatment of bombers only on a platform basis; inclusion of bombers currently in storage; and required reductions even if no modernization takes place. These are reflected in this paper's conclusions.

B. *Problems Associated With the Build-Down* (Section III)

The earlier interagency paper pointed out the problems of linking modernization with reductions in a manner that is not inherently linked to our concept of stability or military requirements. Implementation of a build-down would require, *inter alia*, resolution of the following problems:

—*Modernization.* Implementation of the build-down concept would require definitions for new or modernized types of missile warheads, bomber weapons (if included), and strategic delivery vehicles. There would be many problems associated with defining a new warhead and new types of missiles. While a build-down would clearly mandate reductions in U.S. force levels, there would be no guarantee that the

⁵ Secret; Noform; Wnintel.

Soviets would be similarly affected. Some modernization would not be constrained by this approach, such as guidance system improvements and increases in warhead yield. Soviet upgrades of their existing ICBMs (e.g., significant accuracy improvements in or new variants of the SS-18) could be difficult to verify and therefore the build-down requirement might not be triggered. This paper assumed that a build-down would be required when: an existing warhead was replaced on an existing missile by a detectably different new type of warhead; a new or modernized missile was deployed; or when old or new missiles were deployed in or on new launchers.

—*Weapons Counting Rules.* Counting rules are needed to credit each type of missile or bomber with the proper number of weapons. In general, missiles were assumed to carry the maximum number of warheads ever flight-tested on that missile. A variation on most options was run where Poseidon SLBMs were counted at 10 warheads rather than 14. Both Soviet Strategic Air Force Backfires and U.S. B-52's in storage were counted as bomber platforms. Bombers were assigned nominal loadings where bomber weapons were counted.

—*Monitoring Considerations.* The Intelligence Community's monitoring capability for a build-down is estimated to be best for fixed launchers, less for airframes and mobile launchers, and weakest for the warheads and bombs themselves. Cooperative measures and agreed counting rules (e.g., a specific number of warheads per missile type) would help ameliorate such problems. The Intelligence Community would have very low confidence in detecting removal and replacement of warheads on existing missiles, or bomber weapons on deployed bombers, unless such changes involved visible launcher/aircraft modifications. The Intelligence Community would have high confidence in monitoring the destruction of fixed land-based launchers and submarines, and of mobile missile launchers, aircraft, and missiles themselves with agreed destruction procedures and open display periods. While the actual destruction of the warheads themselves would be difficult to monitor, the destruction of the delivery vehicles would permit moderate Intelligence Community confidence that the warheads or weapons were no longer part of the normal deployed Soviet strategic forces. Because of the uncertainty at present in the determination of a build-down requirement, there is a potential significant risk of Soviet efforts to cheat, i.e., to upgrade significantly portions of their deployed forces without triggering a build-down requirement.

—*Soviet Reactions.* The Soviets would be skeptical, if not hostile, to a U.S. build-down proposal. However, they would likely neither accept nor reject a U.S. build-down proposal outright. A more probable Soviet reaction would be to try to exploit the general concept within START and the larger political arena to promote their START negotiating posi-

tion and strategic objectives more generally. They would agree to a U.S. build-down proposal only after a lengthy negotiating process, and even then only in return for appropriate U.S. concessions. Possible specific responses would be to propose: build-down of bomber weapons as well as missile warheads; a build-down ratio higher than we would want; exclusion of our B-52's currently in storage; and their old freeze proposal, possibly in modified form.

—*Implications for INF.* Changes in the conceptual basis for our approach to limits on strategic arms could well lead to demands from various segments of European opinion (and some governments) that we undertake a similar re-examination of our approach to INF. In particular, changes to our START position in the direction of a precursor agreement could prompt our Allies to press for comparable changes in our INF position, e.g., postponement of Pershing II and GLCM deployments in exchange for limited SS-20 reductions, or other quick fix ideas that could undercut our insistence on U.S.-Soviet equality in LRINF missile warheads. The Soviets could make similar proposals in INF.

—*Negotiating Problems.* Many of the same factors responsible for the deliberate pace of negotiating any comprehensive arms control treaty such as START would still be present in a build-down proposal. The differences with the Soviets on such fundamental issues as the separate treatment of missile warheads and bomber platforms, inclusion of Backfire, verification, and others make it unlikely that progress on a precursor agreement consistent with our START approach would be any more rapid than in START itself. In addition, an acceptable build-down ratio itself would not be easy to negotiate because it is closely linked to other factors, including: a build-down floor, starting warhead levels, projected modernization requirements, and definitions and counting rules for warheads.

C. Build-Down Issues (Section IV)

—*Modalities.* This paper addresses two conceptual ways of presenting a build-down proposal in view of the ongoing START negotiations: a build-down in a START context only, or an interim precursor agreement.

The argument for a precursor agreement assumes that a START agreement will take several years to negotiate, while a precursor could be negotiated more quickly. As described above, this assumption is questionable. A build-down in a START agreement would probably not appreciably delay the current negotiations and would be compatible with our proposed reductions schedule. However, this approach would not satisfy pressures for a precursor agreement. If it could be quickly negotiated, the precursor approach could strengthen our

interim restraints regime and prevent the current Soviet warhead lead from increasing. However, it could also delay and even undermine both our past arms control achievements (e.g., tighter constraints on ballistic missiles than on bombers) as well as our current START efforts, particularly our requirement to achieve equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight.

—*Intermediate Ceilings.* Any build-down approach which included a build-down ratio other than 1 for 1 must have a mechanism for requiring mutual reductions even in the absence of modernization. With newer systems now deployed, the Soviets would be better able than the U.S. to slow their modernization plans to draw out their reductions and thus to increase their warhead lead over the U.S. They would, however, forego the advantages they would otherwise gain from modernizing. To prevent the Soviets from drawing out their reductions, some form of equal intermediate ceilings should be incorporated into any build-down approach.

—*SLCM.* Including nuclear SLCMs in a build-down would require us to dismantle SIOP-committed weapons as non-SIOP SLCMs are deployed. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to distinguish nuclear from conventional SLCMs. Therefore, until the U.S. develops a START position on SLCM, we should not include SLCM in any build-down. We nevertheless would not rule out the possibility of later constraining Soviet SLCM's in a build-down regime if they are also limited in START.

D. Options (Section V)

Six major options were studied in detail by the IG, as shown in Figure 1. The first four explicitly link modernization and reductions in the general manner prescribed by S. Res. 57. Option 5 specifies an equal warhead and bomber platform ceiling which offsets modernization by required reductions on a one-for-one basis. Option 6 (percentage annual build-down) requires reductions independent of modernization. This option closely parallels the reductions schedule we have tabled in START when a five percent annual reduction is used and Poseidon C-3 is counted at 10 warheads, or with seven percent and the C-3 counted at 14.

E. Conclusions⁶ (Section VI)

A brief qualitative assessment of the options is presented in Figure 2.

⁶ These conclusions were based on the U.S. START proposal as of early July. They would need to be re-examined and possibly modified if our current START position is changed. [Footnote is in the original text.]

It is important that any build-down proposal supplement, and not replace, our basic START position, making consistency with START essential. To be acceptable as part of a START agreement, an option must be capable of achieving the reductions we seek in START. To be considered as a precursor, an option should be simple enough not to interfere with the negotiating process or undercut our fundamental START objectives, such as reductions in throw-weight and our focus on destabilizing systems and verifiability. At the same time precursor agreements are not substitutes for the kind of results that are only available through the careful negotiation of a full treaty containing appropriate verification and other safeguards.

Build-down options may be conveniently broken down into two categories: those appropriate to our current START proposal and those that lend themselves to an interim approach.

As either a precursor agreement or as part of START, Option 1 (2 for 1 missile warhead and bomber weapon build-down) was found to undermine our current START negotiating position by aggregating missile warheads with bomber weapons. Moreover, the floors that some seek under such an approach may not meet our basic military requirements. Option 1 is therefore unacceptable either as part of START or as a precursor and should be excluded from further consideration.

Build-Down Options As Part of START. If a build-down is to be included in a START agreement, Option 6 (percentage annual build-down) would be preferred. With five percent annual build-down, an eight year build-down period, and the Poseidon C-3 counted at 10 warheads, this option is most compatible with our START proposal, including our proposed reductions schedule. However, analysis has revealed several difficult issues associated with incorporating a build-down ratio into an acceptable proposal. Since as of January 1984 the Soviets are expected to have about 8990 START-accountable missile warheads while the U.S. will have less than 7500, and it is very unlikely that the U.S. and Soviet modernization schedules will coincide, it would be difficult for the U.S. and USSR to agree on a mutually acceptable build-down ratio. Thus we have determined that any acceptable build-down must incorporate intermediate ceilings. Where and how to establish these intermediate ceilings would undoubtedly become the focus of the negotiations, since the intermediate ceilings, and not a build-down ratio, would probably determine the true rate of reductions.

The percentage annual build-down proposed in Option 6 would provide a logical basis for establishing mutually acceptable intermediate ceilings, and thus would avoid some of the difficulties associated with Options 4 and 3. Although Option 6 does not explicitly link modernization to reductions, a link would certainly exist because the

introduction of new weapons would force the destruction of old ones. If a build-down ratio of greater than 1 to 1 explicitly tied to modernization is deemed essential, Option 4 (3 for 2 warhead build-down) and Option 3 (2 for 1 ICBM and 3 for 2 SLBM warhead build-down) are preferred, in that order.

While Option 1 treated bombers on a weapons basis, the other options built down bombers on a platform basis at a 2 for 1 ratio. As long as stored as well as operational bombers are counted and a floor of 400 is used, many build-down ratios for bombers would be acceptable.

Option 2 (2 for 1 missile warhead build-down) allows some negotiating flexibility if the Poseidon C-3 is counted at 14 warheads. However, counting the C-3 at 10 warheads (our current START approach) provides insufficient negotiating flexibility. Until an intermediate ceilings approach is identified that would have the effect of modifying the effective rate of reduction, Option 2 is unacceptable.

As part of a START agreement, the build-down approach does not appear to offer any technical advantages over the schedule of reductions that the U.S. has proposed in Geneva.

Build-Down Options As Separate Precursor Agreements

A build-down proposal in the context of START is clearly preferable to a precursor approach. However, if a precursor is mandated, Option 5 (the 1 for 1 warhead cap) would have the least impact on our force structure and would fully accommodate MX deployment within current warhead levels. While this option is not the same as the Soviets' INF moratorium offer, there is the risk that adoption of Option 5 could undercut our INF position.

Option 6 is more objectionable because it would give the Soviets an incentive to prolong START negotiations and thus avoid all our desired START constraints except the 5000 RV and 400 bomber limits, which would be part of Option 6. Although time constraints precluded a detailed evaluation in this study, it might be useful to examine an excursion of Option 6 which applied a much lower percentage annual build-down. Such an approach might lessen objections to this option because it would greatly extend the time period required to reach the 5000 warhead floor and thus continue Soviet incentives to negotiate a full START agreement. Full analysis and evaluation would be required before this excursion could be seriously considered. The other options would not be acceptable as precursors.

Negotiating an acceptable precursor agreement would present many of the same obstacles as negotiating our START proposal and thus should not be viewed as offering a quick and easy way to reach an interim agreement. Indeed, the Soviets would likely respond to any U.S. precursor proposal by seeking to include bomber weapons—a

situation that would clearly contradict the U.S. START position and thus be unacceptable to the U.S.

Implementation. Implementing requirements, such as the structure of intermediate ceilings, would need to be developed before a specific build-down option could be proposed.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper]

75. Editorial Note

On July 19, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I attended a meeting of an arms control group in the White House at 5 o’clock today. The purpose was to set up a new group chaired by Judge Clark with the same people who have been in my arms control discussion group. We will be meeting primarily on the political aspects of arms control, including the timing for INF negotiations this fall. It will be interesting to see how this group evolves. It is essentially my arms control working group with decision-making responsibility.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

On July 22, Dam dictated a personal note in which he noted: “I attended the first substantive meeting of the new senior arms control group chaired by Judge Clark. We discussed the calendar for the rest of the year and our priorities for the difficult August period when the President will be on vacation for two weeks and many other people are planning vacations. We also discussed the build-down, and a consensus was reached that the build-down was not a good idea and that what we needed to do was to come up with a very anodyne version of it that corresponded as closely as possible with our present START position—that we have in fact been building down both in Europe and in the United States for a long period of time, and we would continue to reduce to the 5000-warhead level now in our START position as we continue to modernize, provided, of course, that the Soviets agree to our START position. In short, the consensus that arose, though it may turn out to be a shaky consensus as further meetings are held, is that our START position is a build-down position.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983)

On August 1, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “We had a long and interesting meeting with the Secretary this afternoon on START. Some new studies have been done which tend to show that negotiations on throw-weight don’t make much difference at all so long as we get the 5000-warhead limit. Of course, we then discussed how hard it would be to get the 5000-warhead limit, which may mean that throw-weight is extremely important. Nevertheless, Jon Howe came up with some suggestions as to how we could change the way in which we present our basic position in order to make it possible to negotiate more effectively with the Soviets. The basic idea was to move more toward the SALT framework of negotiating on missiles, MIRVed and non-MIRVed, and then requiring a translation of that approach into a set of warhead figures. This will, of course, not set too well with those who want a distinctively Reagan approach to our START position. Rick Burt argued strenuously that our present position was so one-sided that we would not be able to come even close to an agreement with the Soviets without some major changes. He pointed out, for example, that in the area where the Soviets have an advantage—namely, land-based ballistic missiles, we are seeking major decreases, whereas in the area where we have the technological advantage—air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles—we are proposing major increases.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

76. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 10, 1983

SUBJECT

Basic Elements of the U.S. and Soviet START Positions

This memorandum summarizes and compares the U.S. and Soviet START positions as they stand at the end of Round IV of the negotia-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 24, 1983 (CHRON BY WEEK, YR). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hall and Gordon; cleared by Dean and Dobbins.

tions. It is designed as a companion piece to a separate paper² which suggests how the two positions might be combined.

In brief, the U.S. position focuses on achieving large reductions in ballistic missile warheads—to equal levels—and, by a network of constraints, on reducing the large Soviet missile throw-weight advantage. With separate limits on bombers, the U.S. seeks to protect our bomber capability and capture the Soviet Backfire bomber in the agreement. The Soviet position places priority on delivery vehicle (as in SALT II) and weapons limits, although they have yet to propose a specific ceiling on weapons. By providing an overall limit on delivery vehicles, insisting that there is no real difference between missiles and bombers (or their weapons) and refusing to discuss limits that would reduce throw-weight, they seek to protect their advantage in ICBMs.

The following sections discuss the positions in terms of *warheads*, *delivery vehicles* and *throw-weight*. Attached are charts describing the current balance and comparing the two positions to SALT II.³

WARHEADS

The USSR has proposed to aggregate all ballistic missile re-entry vehicles (RVs), ALCMs, and bomber weapons—gravity bombs, SRAMs—into a (so-far unspecified) single limit on nuclear weapons. The purpose of this aggregate limit is to force the U.S. to give up ballistic missile RVs in return for our bomber weapons and any ALCMs we wish to deploy.

The central feature of the U.S. START position has been a separate limit of 5000 ballistic missile warheads along with a sublimit of 2500 on ICBM RVs, aimed at the strategic systems with the greatest first-strike potential. We also have offered to limit ALCMs at a level lower than in SALT II, but we have rejected the Soviets' attempt to combine armaments for slow-flying systems with those of ballistic missiles.

In sum, the main *weapon limits* in each proposal are:

- | USSR | U.S. |
|--|--|
| • Limit of X on sum of:
—Missile RVs
—ALCMs
—Other Bomber Weapons | • Limit of 5000 on missile RVs
—Sublimit of 2500 ICBM RVs

• Limit of 20 ALCMs per bomber |

² Not further identified.

³ Attached but not printed are two charts: "Comparison of START Proposals" and "The 1983 Strategic Balance, July 1983."

The key difference between the proposals is the issue of aggregation. The Soviets insist that a weapon is a weapon; the U.S. points out that bombers, unlike missiles, must face unconstrained Soviet air defenses and therefore we cannot equate a gravity bomb to a missile RV. There are, also, important verification issues with bomber weapons. Other important issues related to limits on weapons include:

—The Soviets have told us that the 2500 sublimit on ICBM RVs is unacceptable since it would force them to massively restructure their forces. For our part, we could probably drop the sublimit without consequence since under the 5000 total RV ceiling the Soviets would reduce their ICBMs to somewhere in the 3000 RV range. However, if in the course of the negotiations the 5000 RV limit is raised, we may wish to have such a sublimit. Moreover, it may prove to be of value as negotiating coin.

—We will eventually need to refine the ALCM limit we have proposed. With no other restrictions on our bombers, we could theoretically deploy some 7000 ALCMs (350 bombers \times 20 ALCMs per bomber). Yet our production plans only call for a buy of about 3000. And our plans through the early 1990s do not call for ALCMs to be deployed on more than about 200 bombers. (We are therefore considering limits that are closer to our actual requirements, such as 200 bombers \times 20 ALCMs per bomber.)

—While the Soviets have not tabled their specific weapon limit, we would expect it to be in the range of 11,000 or so deployed weapons on all strategic systems.

The U.S. and Soviet positions also differ significantly with respect to SLCM. The Soviets have told us that their willingness to limit rather than ban ALCMs is conditional upon our agreeing to ban SLCMs (and GLCMs) of greater than 600 km range. The U.S. has offered no SLCM position in Geneva (we respond to SLCM questions by asking the Soviets how they would verify their proposed ban). Development of a U.S. position on SLCM limits is a high priority task in the START community.

DELIVERY VEHICLES

The central feature of the Soviet position is a set of interlocking limits on bombers and ballistic missile launchers. The structure is that of SALT II, although the numbers are somewhat smaller, in line with the Soviets' proposal to decrease the overall limit on missiles and bombers to 1800 from the SALT II level of 2250.

The chief problem with such a framework is that it aggregates ballistic missiles, potentially the most destabilizing systems, with slow-flying systems which we consider unsuitable for a first strike and

therefore far less threatening. We also have argued that the 1800 overall limit is not low enough, although in the round just past we have indicated our willingness to raise that number. This brings our position closer to the Soviets' and accommodates the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation that MIRVed ICBMs give way to larger numbers of smaller, single-RV missiles.

The basic provisions related to *delivery vehicles* are:

USSR	U.S.
• Sublimit of 680 on MIRVed ICBM launchers	
• Sublimit of 1080 on MIRVed SLBM launchers + MIRVed ICBM launchers	• Limit of 850–1250 deployed missiles
• Sublimit of 1200 on ALCM bombers + above	• Limit of 400 (actually 350) bombers
• Limit of 1800 on total missiles and bombers	

While we have not offered an alternative to our original 850 limit on ballistic missiles, it is generally understood that we will accept anything up to approximately 1250. This plus 400 bombers (350 is nearer our bottom line) would give a total of 1650 delivery vehicles, close to the Soviet number of 1800. Closing the gap would require more than just splitting the difference, however, since the question of aggregation separates the two positions.

THROW-WEIGHT

The U.S. seeks to reduce the great disparity in throw-weight arising from the large Soviet force of medium and heavy land-based ICBMs. We have tabled a series of specific restrictions on both heavy and medium ICBMs which are designed to reduce Soviet throw-weight to the 2.5 million kilogram range (down from their current 5.6 Mkg and above the 1.9 of the U.S.). In the recently tabled U.S. draft treaty, however, we left the provisions blank, telling the Soviets that we were flexible on the means of achieving the desired reductions.

The Soviets, on the other hand, wish to retain maximum flexibility to structure their forces. They have rejected throw-weight as a strategic indicator of any major significance.

The basic provisions related to throw-weight are:

- | USSR | U.S. |
|---|--|
| • Future ICBMs limited to one “light” type only | • Ban on future heavy ICBMs |
| • No increase in silo volume or conversion of light ICBM launchers to heavy | • Sublimit of 110 heavy ICBMs ⁴ |
| | • Sublimit of 210 on medium ICBMs + heavy ICBMs ⁵ |
| | • RV weight limit on new missiles |
| | • Limit of 5000 ballistic missile warheads |

With regard to throw-weight, the U.S. and Soviet positions have no commonality other than that the Soviet modernization limits would have the same effect as our proposed ban on new heavy ICBMs. They have rejected our “collateral constraints” on heavy and medium ICBMs as well as our suggestion that these limits could be replaced with direct limits on throw-weight. They have also rejected all limits which would explicitly reduce the number of SS-18s below current levels. Since the Intelligence Community believes the Soviets will, in the future, emphasize SS-19 class missiles (comparable to the M-X) rather than heavy ICBMs and the Soviets themselves have indicated that the SS-18s will eventually reach the end of their useful life, the Soviet insistence on no SS-18 limits (beyond those in SALT II) may be an attempt to preserve negotiating capital.

As you know, however, the START IG’s throw-weight study has shown that the most important limit on the Soviet throw-weight is the 5000 ceiling on ballistic missile RVs. This, combined with the Intelligence Community’s initial view that the Soviets are themselves moving toward lower throw-weight systems may mean that our differences can be eventually resolved.

⁴ To demonstrate flexibility, these sublimits were not included in U.S. draft treaty. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ To demonstrate flexibility, these sublimits were not included in U.S. draft treaty. [Footnote is in the original.]

77. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Howe START Group

Each of the departments and agencies recognizes that pressures to alter our START position will build in the weeks ahead as Ed Rowny prepares to return to Geneva for Round V in early October. Each sees the politics of MX and the build-down accelerating this process. At present the formal interagency work is focused on flexible approaches to throw-weight and on SLCM. However, State, ACDA, and DoD are all developing more far reaching proposals in house.

In order to insure that some of the basic analysis is completed on components of some of these far reaching approaches, Jon Howe has set up a special sub unit of the interagency working group to analyze such concepts as special MIRV ceilings and rules, weapons or platform aggregation, etc. All of which serve as building blocks for some of the department options. The working group consists of one senior person from each agency.

Ken Adelman believes that, despite the care taken by Jon Howe, such a working group would lead to leaks. Instead he proposes that someone from State or the NSC be designated to sit in on the various agency and department discussions of their own proposals and then, when the time is right, prepare a paper with options.

I am sympathetic to Ken's concerns, but I don't believe that it will fill the bill. The danger with Ken's proposal is that we will be faced with unnecessary conflict as departments and agencies rally behind their own proposals whose components have not been subjected to vigorous analysis. I believe that Jon's group can safely handle this potentially volatile material as long as we keep the analysis to concepts and components rather than complete packages. I think it would be dangerous to enter the highly politicized month of September without the discipline of the interagency process. When you return, these building blocks will be useful to you in focusing the Senior Arms Control Policy Group on START options right away. It is not in the President's interest to see agencies locked into positions in a manner which will

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-084, NSDD 0098. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copied to Kimmitt.

inevitably spill into the press as an example of internecine warfare. In the end, I would like to see us work both START and the build-down the way we handled the recent INF package.

RECOMMENDATION

That Jon Howe be permitted to proceed with a special working group to examine concepts and components of possible changes in our START position, but that no formal packages be prepared in that group. Instead, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should meet when you return to discuss possible changes in START building upon Jon's work.²

² Kimmitt initialed his approval on Clark's behalf.

78. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 9, 1983

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Build Down—Saturday, September 10

Issue

What should be the final Administration position on the build down concept and how should we reveal that position in our dealings with Congress over the coming weeks?

Facts

Key legislators expect the Administration to provide its position on the implementation of a build down during hearings which begin on September 14 and lead to a series of votes involving arms control, the freeze and MX.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-103, START/LEBANON 10 Sep 83. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum; a typed note below the stamped notation reads: "per NSC."

Discussion

As reflected by the suggested agenda provided at Tab A, the September 10 NSC meeting is designed to ensure that you can decide on the proper Administration stance on this critical issue before Administration officials begin to testify before the Congress.

The paper at Tab B was developed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group to support the NSC discussion. The paper is organized to provide the following:

- an introduction and overview of the problem;
- a review of the current US basic START position;
- a preferred stance on the build down that incorporates it into our START position;
- a suggested strategy for presenting this stance on build down to the Congress and the public;
- a review of possible Soviet reactions;
- a series of items that we could consider adding to the basic build down position if needed; and
- a discussion of associated changes to our basic START position that some may propose.

The main judgment you will have to make following the meeting will be whether the basic position on build down recommended in the NSC discussion paper, and the associated strategy for presenting it, go far enough to provide the political support needed to protect the modernization program and avoid unhelpful alternative Congressional arms control proposals. We recommend that you read the attached paper and use the NSC discussion to frame your judgment. After the meeting, we will provide to you the appropriate decision package and staff recommendations on this issue.

Recommendations

OK No

- | | | |
|-------|-------|---|
| _____ | _____ | 1. That you approve the suggested agenda provided at Tab A and use the NSC meeting to frame your judgments on this issue. ² |
| _____ | _____ | 2. That you not announce your decision on the Administration position on the build down at the NSC meeting, but use the decision package which NSC Staff will provide after the meeting to make your final judgment. ³ |

² Reagan did not indicate his preference with the respect to this recommendation.

³ Reagan did not indicate his preference with the respect to this recommendation.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

*AGENDA
FOR
NSC MEETING ON BUILD-DOWN*

- A. Introduction—Judge Clark
- B. Build-Down—All Principals

Discussion of the basic approach and strategy implementing the build-down concept outlined in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group discussion paper. Discussion should focus on the following questions:

1. What should be the Administration's final position on implementing the build-down concept? When and how should the full bottom-line be revealed?
2. Given the current political environment, what should be the thrust and level of detail of the Administration presentations made at Congressional hearings scheduled for the week of September 12?
3. What additional steps need the Administration be prepared to take prior to key votes later in the month?

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group⁵

Washington, undated

START Discussion Paper

I. Introduction

There has been interest in the Congress in seeing modifications to our START position—combined with a build-down proposal—as evidence of the Administration's seriousness on arms control and as the quid pro quo for support of the President's strategic modernization program. The signals from the Hill, however, are mixed and in many

⁴ Secret.

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

ways contradictory. Moreover, the current US negotiating position is fundamentally sound and the Soviets have given us little ground for believing that additional modifications at this time will result in progress.

On balance, we see no need at this time to adopt fundamental changes to our current START position. However, our current understanding of the situation on the Hill is that some form of a build-down proposal must be forthcoming from the Administration to assure support for defense programs in the upcoming appropriations cycle.

It is apparent, moreover, that there is not a good understanding of our current negotiating proposal—on the Hill or with the public—or of the magnitude and significance of the changes made in the last round to bring the US position into line with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. Therefore, we should undertake a major educational effort on the Hill, stressing that in fact our current START position is commensurate with and responsive to the recommendations of the Commission and that it offers a solid chance for making progress toward reaching agreement with the Soviets—provided they are interested in reaching agreement.

The issue for decision is what form of build-down we should propose, and how, if at all, it should be augmented by changes in our START position. This decision must be based on an assessment of our national security requirements and of the actual political situation on the Hill—a situation which is fluid and subject to change over the next two weeks. This paper presents a basic build-down proposal within the START negotiations as well as elements that are more extensive with respect to build-down and some possible adjustments to our current START position.

II. *Basic Position*

A. *Current US START Position*

Prior to Round IV President Reagan announced a number of fundamental changes to the US START position. These changes reflect the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and respond to concerns the Soviets had expressed during the first three rounds of the negotiations. During Round IV⁶ the US tabled a draft treaty which embodies this new, more flexible approach while,

⁶ In telegram 7316 from Geneva, August 3, Rowney provided an end-of-round report that described the U.S. tabling of a draft treaty on July 7 as the major event of Round IV and summarized the major changes to the U.S. positions later included in the START Discussion Paper. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830442–0566)

at the same time, preserving the central element of the US START approach—mutual reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

Following are the major changes to the US position introduced in Round IV:

- We relaxed the limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles in order to allow the deployment of additional single-RV ICBMs, as recommended by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

- We proposed a single-phase agreement, in place of our previous two-phase approach, to make it clear that all systems, including ALCMs, would be limited from the outset of an agreement.

- We proposed limits on heavy bombers (400) and on ALCMs (a maximum of 20 per heavy bomber) which are well below SALT II levels.

- On throw-weight, we offered to withdraw the collateral constraints (the 2500/210/110 subceilings) in favor of a direct limit on aggregate missile throw-weight, if the Soviets prefer. We told the Soviets that we are not insisting on reductions to US levels, but made clear that the level would be a matter of negotiation. We also discussed a variety of other possible approaches to resolving the throw-weight issue and said we would be receptive to any serious Soviet proposals.

- We made it clear to the Soviets that the substantial reductions we seek in the strategic forces of both nations would be implemented over time. We stressed—in accordance with the recommendation of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces—that our objective is to channel the modernization of both sides in a direction which will enhance stability and reduce the first strike threat.

- One of the ways we seek to do this is by reductions in the weight—and hence the destructive power—of warheads on new ballistic missile systems. We have proposed separate weight ceilings for RVs on MIRV and single-RV systems. We left the specific ceilings blank in our draft treaty in order to demonstrate our desire to take into account Soviet views on what the levels should be.

During the last round, the Soviets also modified some of their previous proposals which were so obviously one-sided that it was clear that they had been made primarily for negotiating purposes: the Soviets expressed a willingness to drop their proposed ban on all ALCMs while maintaining a ban on “long-range” GLCMs and SLCMs, and to modify provisions whose effect would have been to stop deployment of Trident submarines and the D-5 missile. We welcomed these Soviet moves.

However, the Soviets did not respond to our flexibility with any equivalent willingness to modify the central elements of their position. Moreover, they tabled subceilings for MIRV missiles under their 1,800 SNDV aggregate which would, if fully implemented, allow them to deploy over 11,000 ballistic missile warheads and 6,800 warheads on MIRV ICBMs; substantial increases over the already high Soviet levels.

B. Basic Build-Down Position

Within the context of START, the US could seek a guaranteed mutual build-down of ballistic missile warheads (to a floor of 5,000)

as a means of achieving reductions. The US could accept ballistic missile warhead reductions of approximately 5% per year (based on entry-in-force warhead levels) which equates to a certain, constant number of warheads guaranteed to be retired each year during the treaty's period of reduction. The US would propose to count warheads according to SALT counting and type rules. This would mean that the starting level for US and Soviet forces would be approximately equal. (The Poseidon C-3 would be credited with 14 RVs.)

From equal accountable entry in force levels, both sides could reduce to a 5,000 floor in slightly over eight years, a guaranteed annual build-down of approximately 440 accountable warheads.

There is an apparent contradiction between the actual deployed warhead figures we have used (7,300 for the US and 7,900 for the Soviets) and the accountable warheads on which the build-down would be based (8,800 on both sides). This could cause the credibility of this approach to be questioned; i.e., the charge could be leveled that we were proposing to build-down 1,500 non-existing warheads (the difference between 8,800 US SALT accountable warheads and 7,300 now deployed). The contradiction would be explained as follows:

—For existing types of missiles the maximum number of warheads tested must be used to enable verification, and to deny the Soviets any possibility of actually increasing their current advantage over the number of US deployed warheads during the reduction period.

—This counting method would be consistent with figures and counting concepts used in the past with the Soviets and should be relatively easy to negotiate.

—Our START position has as its focus achieving a reduced number of actual deployed warheads. This is consistent with the build-down formula. The issue is not how we get to 5,000, but actually achieving the goal of 5,000 deployed RVs.

—Finally, using the 7,300/7,900 figures would expose us to charges that the Soviets were obliged unfairly to build-down at a faster rate than the US, or that the Soviets were permitted a longer period to reach the floor level.

C. Strategy for Pursuing Basic Build-Down Position

Packaging the incorporation of build-down in our START position will be key to its acceptability by the Congress. This will involve a clear exposition of how our START position, modernization program and build-down fit into a comprehensive approach to a more secure strategic environment. We would make clear that our approach to build-down represented a seriously considered, firm Administration position.

- The US strategic modernization program and the US arms control position as modified during the last round of negotiations to fully incorporate the recommendations of the President's Commission on

Strategic Forces are designed to complement each other in an overall framework designed to promote long-term strategic stability.

- Our modernization program includes modernizing our aging bomber forces and ALCMs, the B-1 bomber and the Stealth bomber, to achieve greater survivability and penetration of Soviet air defenses. Modernization of the SLBM force with Trident II will permit greater use of wide-ocean areas so as to reduce the effectiveness of Soviet ASW against the SSBN fleet and, thus, ensure its long-term survivability. All of these changes are designed to promote long-term stability of our strategic forces.

- Our modernization program also includes a limited number of MX missiles designed to counterbalance Soviet hard-target kill capability and, thereby, to increase near-term stability. It also serves to encourage, in combination with the D-5 SLBM, Soviet movement from large silo-based ICBMs toward smaller mobile ICBMs while we, ourselves, pursue, on an urgent basis, development of a small single-warhead ICBM adaptable to a number of more survivable basing modes, to replace Minuteman. Again, the goal is maintaining and enhancing the contribution of the ICBM force to deterrence and long-term stability.

- Complementary to this program, our START position focuses on deep reductions in the destructive capability and potential of the strategic forces of the US and Soviet Union and to channel residual deterrent capability into more survivable and, thus, more stable systems, that is, toward greater dependence on small single-RV ICBMs, on SLBMs and on second-strike bomber forces.

- This position has as its central element reduction by roughly one-third in the numbers of deployed ballistic missile warheads of both sides, a key measure of destructive capability.

- It also calls for significant reductions in the throw-weight of Soviet missiles. Throw-weight is an important measure of destructive capability and potential because in an agreement limiting both sides to equal numbers of warheads, the side with the greater throw-weight can deploy larger warheads or in a breakout deploy more warheads.

- We have also indicated wide flexibility on the ceiling for deployed ballistic missiles, which, in combination with our proposed missile RV and throw-weight reductions, should further encourage Soviet movement toward more survivable and, thus, more stabilizing single-RV missiles.

- To this position we now intend to add a new major element suggested by the US Congress—a mutual, verifiable, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads.

- We have studied the concept intensively over the past months to see how it could be integrated in and complementary to our START

position and the US objectives in START. These objectives include significant reductions leading to increased stability, equality in key measures of destructive capability and potential, and verifiability. A number of alternatives were examined and discarded because they failed in one way or another to meet these essential objectives.

- The build-down we will propose will be an integral part of our START proposal, taken in concert with reductions in all other elements of our proposal.

- Specifically, it will call for both sides to reduce from their approximately equal current levels by about 5% per year (about 440 warheads) over an eight-year period to a level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

- We have chosen percentage reductions in ballistic missile warheads to an agreed floor rather than tying it to modernization because of the obvious and serious verification and compliance problems we have with regard to differentiating Soviet modernization of existing systems from new systems, a key element in any build-down tied to modernization.

The percentage reduction formula has the same effect on ballistic missile warheads as a two-for-one build-down but would ensure a guaranteed Soviet build-down.

- We believe that this significant addition to our current highly-flexible START position involving deep reductions in strategic destructive capability and potential provides a sound and fair basis for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, one that promotes long-term stability while allowing each side great latitude to configure its forces to meet its strategic needs.

- This modified position, in combination with our planned strategic modernization program, form the two key building blocks upon which, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, we can build a more secure and stable strategic environment, one that reduces the risk of war.

- Given this overall framework and a consensus of the Congress and the US public behind this coordinated and comprehensive approach to arms control and national security, we provide the clearest mandate to the US negotiating team to seek an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement at lower, more stable levels. We can only hope that the Soviet Union can exhibit equal flexibility and desire to achieve such an agreement.

D. Soviet Reaction to Basic Build-Down Position

1. Initial reactions

The initial Soviet reaction to the build-down is likely to be negative mainly on the ground that it does not address bomber weapons in aggregation with ballistic missile warheads. A second objection to the

proposal, possibly not voiced, is that the Soviets have indicated that they desire to retain significantly more than 5,000 warheads in their ballistic missile inventory.

However, it is unlikely that they will either accept or reject the proposal outright. They have been following closely the internal US debate on arms control policy and could possibly see advantage in encouraging Congressional advocates of the proposal by evidencing some interest in it.

The initial Soviet reaction will also be influenced by the current state of US-USSR relations, especially the public flavor, which does not appear to provide a climate for, much less allow, the Soviets to compromise on central issues. Moreover, we know of no apparent internal pressures on the Soviet leadership to negotiate seriously.

2. Possible Soviet Actions—After Round V

In the absence of an outright rejection, the Soviets at least may attempt to modify a build-down proposal to minimize its effect on their force modernization programs. Some actions the Soviets could take to protect their forces while appearing to accept the basic build-down concept include (in each case the Soviet proposal would include all strategic offensive systems):

- proposing an agreement where modernization triggers build-down; this would enable them to defer modernization for a number of years since their strategic forces are generally more modern than ours;

- proposing an agreement in which modernization of existing deployed systems was exempted; this would allow them to deploy follow-on systems without triggering build-down;

- proposing an agreement where modernization restrictions apply only to those systems first flight-tested after the agreement goes into effect; this would protect weapons like the SS-X-24, PL-5 and SS-N-18 follow-on, which are in a late stage of development.

The Soviets may chose to make a direct counter build-down proposal rather than negotiate a US proposal. Some key elements of proposals they could make to promote their START position while undermining ours include:

- aggregating bomber weapons and cruise missiles with ballistic missile RVs;

- proposing a build-down ratio higher than the US would accept;

- proposing different rules for a build-down that impact more heavily on the US.

It is possible that after a lengthy negotiating process, and then only in return for appropriate US concessions, the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for the reductions required in a negotiated START agreement.

III. *Modifications to the Basic Build-Down Position*

If it is decided that we must augment the basic build-down position, the following elements could be considered. Adoption of these elements should be avoided if possible.

A. *Percent Reductions "Build-down" Tied to Modernization*

This variant would add the link between modernization and force reductions to the percentage annual build-down in START. Under this concept, there would be two mechanisms for reductions. First, a percent annual reduction would be in effect. Second, for every new, modern warhead deployed, a certain number would have to be withdrawn. The preferred formulation would require 1.5 older warheads to be withdrawn for each new warhead deployed. This would represent a 3:2 across-the-board build-down for ballistic missile warheads. An alternative of 2:1 build-down for ICBM warheads and 3:2 build-down for SLBM warheads could also be considered, if necessary. In any event, the actual reductions would be the greater required by *either* the modernization schedule *or* the specified percent annual reductions.

The central problem with linking the build-down to modernization is the difficulty in defining, negotiating and effectively verifying "modernization". A build-down with modernization would also be particularly sensitive to the definition of new warheads. The ambiguities inherent in this approach would prolong negotiations and bedevil an actual build-down.

B. *Inclusion of Heavy Bombers in Build-Down*

This variant would build-down heavy bombers in addition to ballistic missile RVs by reducing heavy bombers in the force on the basis of a negotiated schedule. As long as retired B-52s (in storage) are counted as well as operational bombers and a floor consistent with our current position in START (400/350) is used, a variety of build-down ratios for bombers would not adversely affect our force plans. A reduction schedule that is similar to that proposed for missile warheads would be easiest to negotiate and explain publicly. A build-down of bomber weapons would not be acceptable to the US.

IV. *Adjustments to the START Position*

Some believe that pressures on the Hill to adopt build-down and to change our START position are deeply held and transcend the current international political circumstances. This is clearly not the time for fundamental changes or major initiatives in our START position. Nevertheless, pressures may be such that we will need now to take the steps which could propitiate the condition for achieving progress in START in the coming months.

On the other hand, it is a widespread interagency view that since our position is fundamentally sound and that recent significant changes have not been adequately responded to by the Soviets, changes to our START position are now unnecessary and would be perceived by the Soviets as a lack of resolve. Moreover, the Soviets are unlikely to make major moves in START until the situation in INF becomes more clear.

The following adjustments to the current US position could be added to the basic build-down proposal to demonstrate additional flexibility in our negotiating stance. Additional analysis on each of these changes would be needed before a decision is made to adopt any of them.

1. *Unconditionally Drop 2,500 Sub-Limit on ICBM Warheads.* This could be seen by some critics of the current START position as a major move in our START position. Under the current 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit, the Soviets probably would not deploy more than about 3,400 ICBM warheads in any event.

2. *Adopt 2,500 MIRV ICBM Sub-Limit.* This change could be portrayed as an additional step toward consistency with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. It would represent an intermediate step between our current position and unconditionally dropping the 2,500 sub-limit as discussed above.

3. *ALCM Limits Close to Our Requirements.* The current US position would theoretically permit 8,000 ALCM warheads, well over twice the size of current US force plans. We have not proposed sub-limits on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. We could propose a direct limit on ALCMs of 3,000–4,000, in line with current US plans. This could be implemented by offering a sub-ceiling of 200 on ALCM carriers. Proposing either of these limits would undercut critics' charges that the US is not willing to discuss reasonable limits on its bomber forces.

4. *Ban New Types of MIRVed ICBMs.* A ban on new types of MIRVed ICBMs would be consistent with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces that encourage greater reliance on single-RV missiles. It would also insure that future types of mobile ICBMs are single-RV missiles. Presumably, this ban would allow no new MIRV ICBMs beyond the MX and the SS-X-24. The US would need to decide first whether it needs to protect the option of a new type of MIRV ICBM after the MX. This type of ban would also raise the difficult problem of rules concerning modernization of existing types.

79. Editorial Note

On September 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan convened a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The meeting lasted from 11:02 a.m. to 12:03 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary). No formal minutes were found. National Security Council staff member Ronald Lehman sent President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark a briefing package for the meeting under cover of a September 9 memorandum; Clark made a number of handwritten notes on the talking points provided for his use. (National Security Council, Box SR-103, START/LEBANON 10 Sept 83) Participants spent most of the meeting discussing Lebanon: a transcription based on handwritten notes of Howard Teicher of the National Security Council staff is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XVIII Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984. In his handwritten notes of the meeting, which otherwise describe the discussion of Lebanon, Admiral John Poindexter of the National Security Council staff wrote: "Brent feels that build-down should not be handled separately from other possible changes to START." (National Security Council, Box SR 084, NSDD 0098) The reference is to Brent Scowcroft.

On September 19, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "I had lunch with Eagleburger and Scowcroft today to discuss the general situation on the START negotiations and the build-down. Then at 5 o'clock in the afternoon I went to a meeting of the Clark group to discuss our position on START and the build-down, looking to a meeting with six key Congressmen, three Senators (Cohen, Nunn, and Percy) and three Representatives (Aspin, Dicks, and Gore) on Wednesday. The idea is to come to some sort of a bipartisan consensus on the arms control position." The meeting took place on Wednesday, September 21. After discussing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations, Dam continued: "The Clark group is clearly becoming a decision-making group, and in fact things are moving very rapidly now. Unfortunately, the Clark group does not always meet as a group, and too much is left to Ron Lehman, Judge Clark's defense programs assistant, who really does not have the stature that Bud McFarlane had. He is quite substantive, but he is young and has not got the clout that Bud had. Clearly the use of Bud as a negotiator in the Middle East has been a big loss for the coherence of our arms control position." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

The next day, Dam dictated another personal note that read in part: "The most important meeting of the day was the Clark group,

which met on arms control at 5:30. We went through our position on START and on build-down with a view to meeting with the so-called Gang of Six, three Senators and three Representatives, of whom the most important are Senators Nunn and Cohen for these particular purposes. We essentially agreed on our position by the end of the meeting, and there will be a meeting tomorrow with the six Members of Congress.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

On September 23, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I spent much of the afternoon on arms control. I received a briefing from the Rand Corporation on the new double build-down idea, where the briefing was given by its creator, General Kent, and on the Rand summer study on defense against ballistic missiles. The latter project grew out of the star wars speech of the President last March. Thereafter, I went to the Situation Room for still another meeting of the Clark group. This was strictly procedural. Clark gave a briefing on his meeting with the Group of Six on Wednesday and showed us the letter that had been sent back on Thursday promising a position on build-down within a week. We then agreed that it was necessary to come up with a formula for how we were going to respond. We did arrive at the heads of agreement, so to speak, and an agreement that we would work on it over the week. We will have four parts to our response, Clark decided, based upon a suggestion by Rick Burt. First, we will get a resolution next week through an NSC meeting of the outstanding START issues. Second, we will have a build-down proposal of some kind. Third, we will work on the build-down within START through a special working group, which we will propose to the Soviets, as well as a proposed build-down annex. And finally, we will expand the membership of the General Advisory Committee (frankly, to bring in some members more agreeable to the Hill and, from my point of view, additional members of greater stature) and announce that there will be a public member of the START delegation (who, it is already decided, will be Jim Woolsey, who is a Democratic member of the Scowcroft Commission).” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

80. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 29, 1983

SUBJECT

Clark Group Meeting on Build-Down

Today's Clark Group meeting, which followed your NSPG,² focused on a presentation which the NSC staff will make to the Scowcroft Commission and the six congressmen who have advocated build-down and other changes in our approach to START. The attached charts are designed to explain our START strategy and the concessions we have made thus far in the negotiations. It also contains the Administration's version of the so-called eight congressional principles. Suggested changes to these charts³ have been provided to the NSC staff.

The charts on build-down and other START changes are not included in the attached package, but were presented as slides, and became the main focus of discussion during the meeting.

BUILD-DOWN

The changes in build-down are essentially as follows:

—Establish a working group within the START negotiations to work out the details of build-down.

—Develop a build-down annex to our draft treaty.

—With regard to missile warheads, there will be a percentage annual build-down in START *and* a build-down based on agreed ratios derived from the modernization program, encouraging stabilizing systems. The rule used will be that resulting in the lowest warhead number. (What this means is that modernization would only drive build-down,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1983 START Sept. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only. Copied to Dam and Eagleburger. A typed note at the top of the memorandum reads: "Pouched to NY 9/30. bdf."

² According to the President's Daily Diary, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 2:12 to 3:02 p.m. No minutes of this meeting were found. An agenda, draft talking points, and background papers are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, START (9/29/83) (1/2). Later that day, Reagan wrote in his diary: "P.M. Margaret Thatcher arrived. She & I had an hours talk before lunch mainly about the Soviets & what it would take to get back into some kind of relationship. Then we continued on a number of subjects at lunch. I don't think U.S.-U.K. relations have ever been better. After she departed we had a Nat. Security Planning Group meeting re the START talks. We agreed on some strategy as Gen. Rowley prepares to leave for Geneva." (Reagan Diary, September 29, 1983)

³ Attached but not printed are draft briefing charts.

if the required modernization reductions were greater than the mutual annual percentage reduction.)

—Bombers—We will limit platforms and ALCMs in the treaty and discuss a platform build-down.

—Destructive Potential—We will explore destructive potential build-down once we know the Soviet build-down position. (To some “destructive potential” means missile throw-weight; to others it includes bomber capacity.)

—Continue the work program on build-down.

There were two contentious points. Ambassador Rowny was extremely upset at the prospect of having to negotiate terms of reference for a working group. He prefers simply to present a build-down concept and have the latitude to determine in what way it is handled. He fears that the Soviets will seize on the working group idea to block discussions of other ideas. NSC intention had been to convey the impression of putting the build-down concept into effect immediately, while protecting the main START elements by relegating build-down to a working group. I anticipate the working group idea will fall out of the final product.

The other issue of concern was the idea of a modernization trigger for build-down. Most are opposed because of the verification, definitional and conceptual problems with this approach. While I am not enthusiastic about the idea, we can probably surround it with adequate protective qualifications as long as it is kept within the START treaty concept. However, some would disagree. Apparently the NSDD will have a number of qualifications that will make the modernization provision seem less forward leaning and Rowny will have the flexibility to initiate discussion with the percentage annual build-down idea. (I understand that the choice was among some idea of a modernization “trigger” and some rather dramatic alternatives.)

OTHER START CHANGES

Although there allegedly have not been any final decisions on the three main issues discussed at your NSPG, we anticipate changes in our START position will be part of the presentation. In addition, the briefing will indicate that a “delegate at large” will be added to the negotiating team (current focus is on Jim Woolsey, who was Deputy Secretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration and is a very active member of the Scowcroft Commission). Reportedly, there has been no decision on the proposal to modify the GAC structure and membership, but that is likely to be part of the package.

Finally, the presentation pledges continuing pursuit of progress in START by:

- Pressuring the Soviets in Geneva.
- Pressuring the Soviets in high diplomatic channels.
- Exploring with the Soviets more explicit trade-offs between the areas of US interests and the areas of Soviet interests to balance destructive capability within asymmetrical forces. The latter point apparently is designed to reflect a desire for further development of diverse concepts such as the framework bridging plan and the Kent proposal. Reportedly, it is the President's own formulation, and reflects his interest in this issue sparked by your discussion on Sunday.⁴) It was emphasized that in pursuing these concepts we would not abandon our principal START objectives. There will probably be some modification of the words "exploring with the Soviets more explicit trade-offs" since it worries Rowny and we must first do the necessary homework.

It is anticipated that the Scowcroft group will endorse the general concept and either write a report or a letter back to the "six" on these issues and the problem of conducting negotiations within a democracy. There was some discussion about how to obtain a commitment of support for MX and our approach to arms control from the six congressmen. During the course of the deliberations, principal focus will be on sustained support for MX.

⁴ September 25.

81. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 4, 1983

SUBJECT

Decision Package on START & Build-down Issues for Round V of the START Negotiations

Issue. Does the draft NSDD (Tab A)² reflect your decisions concerning START and the build-down initiative?

Facts. The paper provided at Tab B³ reflects a position on build-down that was used to gain the support of both the Scowcroft Commission and the "group of six."

Tab C is a more detailed description⁴ of the recommended U.S. build-down initiative and the related modifications to our START position. It was developed by the NSC staff and is not necessarily concurred in by all Departments and Agencies.

Tab D is an NSC staff analysis⁵ of each of the elements of the recommended build-down initiative and the modifications to our START position. It identifies:

- the specific elements of the build-down initiative;
- the other START related issues discussed at the September 29th NSPG⁶ and requiring decision;
- the views of those who would argue against each of the elements of the U.S. package recommended in the draft NSDD; and,
- NSC staff recommendations.

Discussion. The various issues are summarized best at Tab D. This summary recommends a build-down initiative along the lines of the guidance you previously provided and the establishment of a working group to discuss the initiative during Round V. It also recommends that you approve the two items upon which there was consensus at

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 0106 [START]. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed as Document 82.

³ Attached but not printed is an October 3 paper, "START—Preparation for Round V."

⁴ Attached but not printed is an October 3 paper, "NSC Staff Internal Description of the START/Build-Down Package."

⁵ Attached but not printed is an undated paper, "NSC Staff Analysis of the START/Build-down Initiative."

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 80.

the September 29th NSPG (further ALCM limits and a ban on ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads), but recommends that you defer decision on the two more controversial items (SLCM limits and elimination of the 2500 ICBM RV sub-limit) until a later time.

The draft NSDD provided at Tab A reflects the recommendations.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the draft NSDD provided at Tab A.⁷

⁷ Reagan initialed his approval. In a statement from the Rose Garden the same day, Reagan declared: "When the START negotiations resume tomorrow, the United States delegation will again have sustained flexibility. Within the framework of the basic principles that have guided us throughout these negotiations, I am directing Ambassador Rowny to offer the following new initiatives. We're incorporating into START a series of build-down proposals. The United States will introduce a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down, designed to encourage stabilizing systems. The proposal will include specific provisions for building down ballistic warheads and, concurrently, for addressing a parallel build-down on bombers." ("Remarks to Reporters Announcing New United States Initiatives in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks," *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, vol. 2, pp. 1411–1412).

82. National Security Decision Directive 106¹

Washington, October 4, 1983

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—VII (U)

We are about to enter the fifth round of START negotiations with the Soviet Union. During the last round, while remaining firmly focused

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 0106 [START]. Secret. Clark distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, and Rowny under cover of an October 5 memorandum: "The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD–106). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD–106 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (*Ibid.*)

upon our principal objective, a stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of forces, the United States made a number of important initiatives designed to increase the flexibility concerning the details of the U.S. negotiating position and to incorporate the major recommendations of the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Modernization. As a result, Round IV was, by far, the most useful to date. (U)

Even so, in the face of Soviet rigidity, we still have not yet made meaningful progress on the central issues involved in this critical negotiation. The Soviet Union has not yet shown any significant movement in response to the considerable flexibility displayed by the United States in Round IV. In addition, as we approach the period in which NATO will likely have to implement the deployment track of the 1979 NATO dual-track decision, Soviet tactics in opposing the implementation of NATO's decision will likely cause the climate of the START negotiations during the upcoming round, Round V, to deteriorate. (U)

Despite these facts, however, I remain fully determined to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement which involves significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals, which increases stability, and which, as a result, promotes the national security interests of both sides. Therefore, during Round V, the United States will continue to press for progress and build upon the positive elements noted during the last negotiating round. (U)

In Round V, the U.S. Delegation will attempt to extract a more positive response to the flexibility demonstrated by the United States in the last round and will propose a number of additional initiatives, including additional initiatives concerning the limitation of ALCMs, and a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down. (U)

Additional Limits on ALCMs (U)

During Round V, the U.S. delegation will be instructed to: (U)

a. Inform the Soviets that the United States is prepared to explore ways to further limit the size of ALCM forces in the context of reciprocal Soviet flexibility on items of concern to the U.S. The intent is to make it clear that the U.S. is willing to discuss ALCM limits which are more in line with U.S. programs and that the U.S. START proposal is not aimed at protecting some 8,000 ALCMs as asserted by the Soviets. (U)

b. Propose a ban on ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads. (U)

Build-Down Initiative (U)

The United States will introduce into the START negotiations in Round V a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilizing systems using variable ratios linked to modernization and a guaranteed annual percentage build-down (approx-

mately 5% mandatory build-down). Build-down will be paced by that rule which produces the greatest reductions on a yearly basis. At the appropriate time during the round, the U.S. delegation will also propose a concurrent, parallel build-down on bombers from agreed SALT II levels and will negotiate limitations on the destructive capability of bombers in frameworks that also address the destructive capacity of missiles and which relate the two in an appropriate manner. Finally, during Round V, the U.S. delegation will propose the establishment of a working group to discuss the U.S. build-down initiative. (U)

The Elements of the U.S. Initiative (U)

The following elements will compose the U.S. build-down initiative: (U)

a. The U.S. delegation will propose 5% annual reduction in the total number of ballistic missile warheads from existing levels to an equal level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads on each side. (C)

b. The U.S. delegation will initiate discussion of additional build-down provisions which are designed to encourage movement to more stabilizing systems and which are tied to the modernization of the ballistic missile forces of each side using variable ratios. Discussion can begin on a concept involving a network of variable build-down ratios, with 2 existing warheads reduced for each new MIRVed ICBM warhead introduced and 3 existing warheads reduced for each 2 new SLBM warheads introduced. (C)

c. Definitions and verification rules will have to be developed and finalized before a specific, detailed build-down provision tied to the modernization of ballistic missile forces is added to the U.S. position. Work on developing such definitions and verification rules should continue on a priority basis so that the United States is in a position to offer such a provision before the end of Round V. (C)

d. The U.S. delegation will propose that when the additional build-down provision tied to ballistic missile modernization is agreed, if such a provision would result in a greater reduction in a specific year than the 5% annual reduction, then the additional provision would set the level of required reduction that year for the side involved in the modernization activity. (C)

e. At the appropriate time, but during Round V, the U.S. delegation will propose a concurrent, parallel build-down provision based upon the number of bombers (not the number of bomber weapons) as a mechanism for reducing that number from existing agreed (SALT) levels down to the limits on bomber numbers proposed by the U.S. in START. (C)

f. The specific details of the bomber provision need not be immediately placed on the table in Geneva. However, we must expect that

the Soviets will ask how we would apply the U.S. build-down concept to bombers. In response to this Soviet action, the U.S. delegation must be prepared to offer a specific provision. To ensure this is the case, work will continue on a priority basis to finalize the details of such a provision so that it is available for use before the end of Round V. (C)

g. The U.S. delegation will initiate discussion/negotiation of an appropriate parallel build-down provision which addresses the destructive capacity of ballistic missiles. The U.S. delegation will also initiate discussion/negotiation of appropriate ways for addressing the destructive capacity of bombers in frameworks that also address the destructive capacity of missiles and which relate the two in an appropriate manner. (C)

Trading Areas of Advantage to Reach Agreement (U)

Reaching an agreement in START ultimately will involve trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage and areas of Soviet interest or advantage. Such trade-offs can be accomplished by a number of approaches, but any such approach must be made in a way which enhances and maintains stability and protects the vital interests of the United States and its allies. The United States will continue to explore the asymmetries that exist between U.S. and Soviet forces to look for appropriate ways to trade our advantages and interests for Soviet advantages or interests, providing each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces. (U)

Additional Guidance on the Treatment of Bombers (U)

Bomber delivered weapons are clearly retaliatory weapons and inherently more stabilizing than rapidly arriving, non-recallable ballistic missile warheads. Encouraging a greater dependence on more stable systems is a basic U.S. objective and an essential element in the basic U.S. position. (U)

The U.S. has placed both bombers and ALCM limits on the table in START as a part of the basic U.S. package in a manner fully consistent with the basic U.S. objective of encouraging stability. Within the context of the build-down initiative outlined above, the approach to bombers directed also supports that objective. However, the U.S. remains firm on the point that we will not treat the weapons carried by our slow-flying bombers which have to penetrate extensive Soviet defenses, defenses which are not being negotiated on the table in Geneva, in the same way that we treat more destabilizing ballistic missile warheads. (C)

Importance of Verification (U)

Current issues of non-compliance reinforce the requirement that effective verification is an essential part of START and the build-down

initiative incorporated into the U.S. START position during Round V. (C)

Previous Directives on START (U)

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD–33,² NSDD–36,³ NSDD–44,⁴ NSDD–53,⁵ NSDD–78,⁶ and NSDD–98.⁷ (U)

Ronald Reagan

² See Document 19.

³ See Document 24.

⁴ See Document 29.

⁵ See Document 36.

⁶ See Document 53.

⁷ See Document 71.

83. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 11, 1983

SUBJECT

Framework for START

You have discussed with the President the concept of tradeoffs which take into account U.S. advantages in bombers and Soviet advantages in large missiles. The President has now publicly endorsed this idea, and included it in the recent START NSDD.²

Now we need to follow up with a way to implement this approach that is simple, practical, and builds on our present proposal. The approach³ suggested by General Kent is too complex to be the basis for an agreement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 2, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. Secret. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

² See Document 82.

³ Not further identified.

The attached paper outlines a logical way to proceed. It implements the guidance in the recent START NSDD, and does so in a way that emphasizes simplicity. Additional features could be added, for example, to further discourage land-based MIRV missiles, at a cost of additional complexity.

Larry Eagleburger has reviewed this approach and believes it makes sense. We would like a meeting with you to discuss these ideas.⁴

I am also giving copies to Jon Howe and Rick Burt for their comments.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

FRAMEWORK FOR START

The President has recently decided that the United States is prepared to:

- make tradeoffs that take into account U.S. advantages and interests and Soviet advantages and interests, providing each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement toward a more stable balance of forces;
- explore ways to further limit the size and capability of ALCM forces; and
- address the destructive capacity of bombers as well as missiles.

This memorandum outlines a framework for a START agreement that implements these concepts. It would require substantial reductions to equal levels of forces, and discourage destabilizing systems such as large, MIRVed ICBMs. It is based on the current U.S. proposal, but also adopts features of the Soviet proposal.

Consideration of equitable tradeoffs between missile and bomber forces is complicated by substantial differences in speed, in the defenses they face, and in their potential for a first strike. The challenge is to find a formula that allows considerable flexibility in structuring forces, but recognizes these differences and discourages destabilizing systems such as large, MIRVed ICBMs.

⁴ Shultz drew a downward-facing arrow in the right-hand margin beside the first paragraph of the memorandum pointing down to this paragraph, drew two short vertical lines to the right of this paragraph, and wrote: "Yes G."

⁵ Secret.

Elements of a START Agreement

- Limit on the total number of missile warheads plus ALCMs.
- Sublimit on missile warheads (e.g., 5,000).
- Constrain destructive capability by limits on the number of heavy and medium missiles and bombers.
- Limit on the total number of strategic missiles and bombers (e.g., 1800).

The *combined limit on missile RVs and ALCMs* excludes other bomber weapons (short-range missiles and bombs) as part of the compensation for air-defenses and other factors. To ensure that ALCMs are treated in a different manner than missile warheads, there would be a sublimit on missile warheads, and ALCMs would be counted on a two-for-one basis. Such a constraint on ALCM numbers would permit our planned ALCM deployments, and would be consistent with the President's decision to explore ways to further limit the size and capability of ALCM forces.

The *sublimit on missile warheads* recognizes the differences between missile warheads and ALCMs, and would prevent Soviet allocation of all of their total to missile warheads. Additional sublimits could be added (e.g. on MIRVed ICBM warheads) to further constrain destabilizing systems, at a cost of increased complexity.

Since equality in warhead numbers does not result in equality in strategic forces if there are gross disparities in warhead size, there must also be constraints on *destructive capability*. In addition, the President has directed that we consider constraints that address the destructive capacity of bombers. One way to accomplish these objectives would be to expand our collateral constraints on large missiles to include bombers as well. The 110/210 limits in our current position could be raised (e.g., to 150 heavy ICBMs and 400 heavy and medium ICBMs), and a third category added that included bombers (e.g., 550 heavy and medium ICBMs and bombers). Inclusion of bombers would recognize the destructive capability of bombers, and give some flexibility to choose between large missiles and bombers. The U.S. could have a large bomber force and 100 or more M-X missiles; the Soviets could have 400 SS-17/18/19/24 ICBMs (about half their current total) and a smaller bomber force. In order to place meaningful constraints on destructive capability, such indirect limits need to be supplemented with modernization constraints such as the limits in our present position on the warhead weight of new missiles.

The limits on destructive capability will be controversial both within the U.S. Government and with the Soviets. Other alternatives for accomplishing this objective can be explored, such as limits on warhead weight, as well as complex formulas for measuring the destructive capacity of missiles and bombers.

Finally, while *limits on the number of missiles and bombers* would add little to the constraints on warheads and destructive capability, and the Scowcroft Commission recommended against low limits, both sides have proposed such limits. The Soviet proposal for a total of 1,800 missiles and bombers is consistent with the approach outlined here, and U.S. acceptance could be a quid-pro-quo for Soviet acceptance of other elements of our proposal.

The approach suggested here would give both sides freedom to choose—within limits—the mix of missile and bomber forces, with additional constraints on destabilizing systems. There is no magic formula. Definition of equitable tradeoffs between missiles and bombers is somewhat arbitrary, and agreement on such tradeoffs will be difficult to achieve both within the U.S. and with the Soviets. As the President has directed, this is a necessary step toward the achievement of significant reductions. There is no prospect that either side will agree to mirror image the other's forces.

84. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Ambassador Rowny's End-of-Round Report on START

In the attached letter (Tab A) from Ambassador Ed Rowny, Rowny provides a report on the fifth round of START, which ended on December 8 without a new date being set for resumption of the negotiations.

Rowny reports that while the US elaborated on the build-down concept and explored means of narrowing differences remaining between the US and the Soviet Union on such issues as destructive capability of bombers and missiles, "the Soviets essentially marked time and added virtually nothing new, probably because they wanted to wait and see how INF came out." The only new development was

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Kraemer Files, Chron File—December 1983. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer. Copied to Bush. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

Soviet agreement to form a working group on Confidence-Building Measures, but here Soviet views are very narrow.

Rowny recommends that you and other officials speak out on the merits of our START proposals so as to gain credit for an effort that is serious, energetic, flexible and patient, and ready to resume negotiations as soon as the Soviets are ready to resume. We agree with this recommendation, and we will be developing more such statements. Following the holiday period, we will schedule a brief visit with you for Ambassador Rowny so that you can review these and other perspectives directly with him.

Tab A

Letter From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to President Reagan²

Geneva, December 12, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

My efforts in Round V of START were devoted chiefly to laying down the build-down concept you announced in the Rose Garden on October 4 and to further fleshing out and explaining our START proposal.

The Soviets marked time and added virtually nothing new, probably because they wanted to wait and see how INF came out. During the round, they made more references to the impact that US PII and GLCM deployments would have on START. Thus, they have laid the groundwork for keeping their options open for including US so-called FBS in START should they finally decide not to return to the INF negotiations.³

We made repeated attempts, both in formal and informal sessions, to get the Soviets to explore how we might narrow the differences that remain between our two positions. In particular, we said we could relate the destructive capacity of our heavy bombers and the destructive capability of their ballistic missiles in some appropriate manner. How-

² Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Shultz and Adelman.

³ In telegram 10843 from Geneva, November 23, Nitze reported that, following the vote in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany to allow for the deployment of Pershing II missiles, the Soviet delegation to the INF negotiations had declared the current round of talks over and not set a date for their resumption. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830689–0709)

ever, the Soviets gave no indication that they were interested in moving ahead at this time.

The only new development was Soviet agreement to form a working group on confidence-building measures (CBMs). However, they have focused on their CBMs, which they would include only in a final treaty, and have made it clear they will resist entering into a separate agreement even on those CBMs where theirs and ours are similar.

Now that INF deployments have begun, and the NATO ministers have stayed firm, it may be that the Soviets will agree to resume START so as to show their seriousness and commitment to arms control. On the other hand, it may take them some time to sort out how to proceed, especially if Andropov's health affects their decision-making process. We need to resist the pressures that will inevitably develop to make substantive concessions simply in order to bring the Soviets back to the table.

In any event, with INF "discontinued," and START resumption not agreed, public attention will inevitably shift to START. Accordingly, I recommend that the President and other high officials speak out more often on START. Our proposal, which calls for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to an equal level of 5000 and for reductions in heavy bombers and ALCMs well below levels allowed by SALT II, has stood the test of time. Further, we should stress the flexibility we showed in meeting the main Soviet concerns and their lack of willingness to address our concerns.

The Soviets will continue to claim publicly that the US proposal is not a suitable framework and that our flexibility is in words and not deeds. Our best response is to insist that the US had an even-handed position on the table and is willing to continue to be flexible by examining carefully any serious Soviet proposals. We are asking the Soviets to reduce their ballistic missile warheads by a third but we, too, would reduce ours by a third. By reducing their 3-to-1 advantage in ballistic missile destructive capability, the Soviets would reduce their forces capable of a first-strike and thereby enhance stability. This is in both nations' interest. Soviet attempts to lump all nuclear weapons in a total aggregate is a disingenuous and unsupportable effort to claim that all weapons are equal. In no way can a bomb on a heavy bomber be equated to an SS-18 warhead.

In short, we should portray to the public a President and an Administration which is seriously, energetically, flexibly and patiently pursuing the goal of reaching an agreement on strategic offensive arms. It is the Soviet leaders who must bear the onus for failing to set a date for the resumption of START. In contrast, we are ready to resume as soon as the Soviet reassessment is completed.

For my part, I have a START delegation which is a highly professional, responsible, hard-working and dedicated team. We are leaving no stone unturned in trying to reach an equitable and verifiable agreement.

Respectfully yours,

Edward L. Rowny⁴
Chairman
US START Delegation

⁴ Rowny signed the letter “E. Rowny” above his typed signature.

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 17, 1984

SUBJECT

Trade-Offs in START

I recommend we quickly follow up Vice President Bush’s meeting with Chernenko² through further high-level discussions on START.

The purpose of such discussions should be to inform the Soviets that we are prepared to discuss alternative approaches to trade-offs at resumed START negotiations in Geneva. We should indicate to them that these approaches are based on codifying asymmetrical and off-setting limits between US and Soviet forces. Further, and more specifically, we should state that we are prepared to trade off limits on ALCMs

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–I Files: Lot 92D52, Box 9, 1984 Super Sensitive [CHRON]. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Dam and Adelman. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Shultz wrote a note that he affixed to the memorandum: “Jon Howe, Rick Burt, I would like to discuss this—with you two + Larry,—then with ER. G.” (Ibid.)

² Reference is to Bush’s February 15 meeting with Chernenko at Andropov’s funeral. A memorandum of conversation for this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

we could deploy for limits on the destructive capability of Soviet ballistic missiles. The concept of trade-offs will appeal to the Soviets because of its simplicity and because it meets many of their concerns. I believe their failure to engage in a serious discussion of trade-offs at the last START round was related to their tactic of responding to INF deployments and did not reflect a disinterest in trade-offs.

Recent interagency work in Washington has focused on changes to the “framework” of the US position. This is a US fixation, based on the erroneous theory that the Soviets are more concerned about the framework of an agreement than the forces themselves. The Soviets are realists. We should deal in trade-offs and let the framework accommodate trade-offs and not vice versa.

The three specific approaches I would like to explore with the Soviets, summarized below, are described in greater detail in the attached memo.³

Approach I maintains the principal features of the current US position: reductions to 5000 warheads and separate limits on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Tradeoffs are accomplished by allowing the US more ALCM-carrying bombers and the Soviets more throw-weight.

Approach II combines one element of the Soviet position: an implicit ceiling of 1800 delivery vehicles, and one element of the US position; a separate ceiling of ballistic missile RVs—set at 6000. In contrast to the Soviet approach, however, ballistic missiles and heavy bombers would continue to be limited separately, with the US being allowed more of the latter and the Soviets more of the former. Trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of 200 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs, which would result in offsetting asymmetries in these systems.

Approach III is similar to Approach II, except that aggregation of the 1800 delivery vehicles would be allowed. As in Approach II, trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs.

From a negotiating point of view there is considerable merit in initially presenting only Approach I, since it is consistent with our current position. Therefore, in contacts with the Soviets prior to resuming negotiations I recommend that we present Approach I as an illustrative example of how the concept of trade-offs might be applied to the US position. However, in order to draw the Soviets into a dialogue on trade-offs, we will also need to make it clear that we understand their problems with our present position and are prepared to move forward

³ Attached but not printed is Rowny's February 17 memorandum elaborating on his three proposals.

provided the Soviets are prepared to move with regard to our concerns. If the Soviets say they could not accept the deep reductions of Approach I, I would explore Approaches II and III with them, but, of course, again, only after evidence that they would move toward us.

The Soviets have said that P-II and GLCM have strategic significance for them. A major question—which cannot be answered definitely until we discuss the matter with the Soviets—is whether they will be attracted to trade-offs made purely within the START context, without some solution to the INF problem. The Soviets will most likely strive to incorporate P-II and GLCM into START as a result of their reassessment. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that attempting to introduce INF issues into START would pose some tricky problems for them. It is possible that drawing them into a substantive discussion of START tradeoffs could actually preempt possible Soviet moves to fold INF issues into START.

There is increasing talk around town about appointing a special emissary to open up a dialogue with the Soviets. I think bringing in someone from outside the established framework would be short-sighted and would hurt us in the long-run. The Soviets will come back to the negotiating table when they calculate it is in their interest to do so and not simply because of a dialogue in a new channel.

I would appreciate discussing this matter with you at an early date.

86. Editorial Note

On March 5, 1984, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I attended a quite unsatisfactory meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group talking about START. Because OSD is out to sabotage any movement on START, the meeting was carried on at a high level of abstraction. Indeed, it is not too clear why McFarlane held the meeting at all except to try to get some additional work done so that a decision could be taken by the President to produce some movement in our START position in the direction of implementing the tradeoff ideas that were first surfaced last October. The basic problem is that OSD is extremely suspicious that something may be going on that they don’t know about, and I found it interesting that Richard Perle said absolutely nothing during the meeting today. Apparently he believes that if he does not take part in the discussion, he will not be bound by any decisions that the President takes.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary

Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

On March 17, Dam dictated a personal note about a March 16 meeting: "Today was a busy day, even hectic, although there is not too much to report in terms of accomplishments. For example, I spent an hour and a half at a Senior Arms Control Policy Group talking about START, but essentially nothing happened, because Richard Perle disrupted any substantive conversation by repeatedly coming back to the point that we should be extremely careful about making any new move at this time, because it would be a move toward SALT II, and it would embarrass the President during an election year if he were to be put in the position of the Soviets responding with an attractive offer which would leave the President in the position of either accepting a SALT II-like agreement or refusing to accept an attractive Soviet offer because it was too much like SALT II. Clearly Perle is out to prevent any movement on START and is even prepared to try to manipulate the analytical agenda to achieve that result." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

On March 22, Dam dictated a personal note describing: "a meeting of the Strategic Arms Control Policy Group this afternoon which was devoted to Richard Perle's exposition as to why we should hunker down and defend our record on arms control rather than undertaking any new initiatives this year. Apparently the outcome was that Perle's memorandum, which he merely summarized and did not show us, will be sent to the President under Cap Weinberger's signature. Bud McFarlane has been implying to us that this is merely an exercise to allow Perle a chance to sound off. I am somewhat worried that he is implying to the Defense Department that the analytical exercise that we are going through is merely designed to keep State busy. It is not clear where McFarlane is on this issue, and I suspect that the President hasn't decided either." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984) For Perle's memorandum, see Tab B1, Document 87.

87. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 26, 1984

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Nuclear Arms Control in 1984, Tuesday, March 27

Issue

What are Soviet interests in START and INF in 1984 and how should the political context in this election year affect US actions in these areas?

Facts

On next Tuesday, we have scheduled an NSC meeting to discuss two main items:

- (1) Soviet interests in pursuing START and INF in 1984; and
- (2) the political context for US nuclear arms control activity during 1984.

The Intelligence Community has developed a short paper addressing its estimate of Soviet interest in arms control in 1984. That Intelligence Community paper is provided at *Tab A* for your review. The paper has also been made available to all NSC principals for their study prior to the NSC meeting.

Due to the sensitivity of the discussion of the political context for US nuclear arms control in 1984, rather than develop an interagency discussion paper, we have invited NSC principals to provide their thoughts directly to you via individual memoranda prior to the meeting. Those that we have received to this point are attached at *Tab B*. We will forward others as they are received. *These memoranda have not been circulated to other NSC principals for review.*

Discussion

While Soviet intentions in 1984 are an important consideration, the primary focus of this NSC meeting should be on the issue of the political context and how it affects US options and decisions in 1984. The central point for discussion will be views expressed in Secretary Weinberger's letter to you.

Secretary Weinberger argues that we should assess whether there is now any likelihood of Chernenko being more accommodating in

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC00104. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard.

START and INF before the election. If the answer is no, given the US political context and Soviet understanding of that context, the Secretary feels that we should immediately implement a strategy that permits you to set the terms for the arms control debate and establish the foundation for defending our last three years of activity in rearmament and arms control *before* such actions could be seen as evidence of the Administration being on the defensive in a political campaign. *The main purpose of Tuesday's NSC meeting should be to examine carefully the validity of this argument.*

Having asked Secretary Weinberger to pull together this argument in a memorandum to you for your reading prior to the NSC meeting, we extended the invitation for other principals to also offer you their personal views. The memoranda received do address Secretary Weinberger's argument to some degree. Unfortunately, however, most appear to have used the opportunity to argue for a range of specific initiatives in START, INF and other areas—many of which require more detailed analysis and discussion before being seriously considered for implementation. We would recommend that you read and note the memoranda provided by others prior to the NSC meeting but that:

(1) we maintain the focus of Tuesday's meeting on the validity of Secretary Weinberger's argument; and

(2) that you avoid comment on and not endorse any of the other specific arms control initiatives proposed in the various memoranda until we can provide to you additional analyses of these initiatives.

We will return to a consideration of various options in START, INF and other fora at a later time based on the results of Tuesday's discussions and with the benefit of additional preparatory analyses.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you review the Intelligence Community paper (*Tab A*) and the memoranda from NSC principals to you (*Tab B*) with special attention being given to the argument made by Secretary Weinberger.²

_____ _____ That we maintain the primary focus of Tuesday's NSC on a discussion of the validity of the argument offered by Secretary Weinberger drawing upon the Intelligence

² Reagan initialed his approval.

paper and the other memoranda to support that discussion.³

————— That at Tuesday's NSC meeting you avoid extensive discussion or endorsement of any of the range of specific arms control initiatives cited in the various memoranda to you at *Tab B*.⁴

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵

Washington, March 23, 1984

*Summary*⁶

The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviet Calculus

1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need to keep the

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁵ Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Prepared in the Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with input from other SOVA analysts.

⁶ This memorandum was prepared by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from other SOVA analysts. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, Current Support Division, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] [Footnote is in the original]

deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet political position in Europe—including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment—and calculations regarding the US election campaign. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches at this level, as well as public commentary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as their “gains” from detente. Moscow might further try to court West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French into direct discussion of INF and their own forces’ role. It appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the villain’s role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-basing countries—

particularly the Social Democrats in West Germany—to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed missiles—along with announced basing sites—will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided movement. Moscow’s efforts in this area probably will be tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures. Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks

6. Following Chernenko’s accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition of Moscow’s demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In talks [*less than 4 lines not declassified*] the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation could resume unless NATO’s new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn from Western Europe. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a solution to INF the “walk-in-the-woods” formula. By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential avenues which some Soviets had speculated as recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first secretary and presumed KGB officer at the Soviet embassy, who apparently has been used to float trial balloons in the past, also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]

9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in discussions with correspondents than the general line would indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed. [*portion marking not declassified*]

10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R & D programs provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis for improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and Black-jack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further, the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a "modernized" SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far insisted that long-range SLCMS and GLCMS be banned, they are [*less than 1 line not declassified*] well-positioned to deploy them in the absence of a ban on them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition, they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its technological capabilities into systems such as space-based lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic missile defense. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects for Progress on Other Issues

12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary—particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the demilitarization of space—could prepare the way for a "dramatic breakthrough" in US-Soviet relations

despite the impasse in START and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions. *[portion marking not declassified]*

13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals and public positions:

- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, suspended by the US;
- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said conditions for an accord are “beginning to ripen.”

He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there would be effective control of the “whole process of destruction—from beginning to end.” *[3 lines not declassified]*

14. *[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]*

15. Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:

- a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly Pershing IIs;
- an agreement to take into account UK and French systems; or
- an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems the Soviets consider most threatening—SLCMs, ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.

The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed,

but this line is doubtless intended in part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to specific US initiatives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on “norms” to govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown.⁷ Chernenko, however, raised this possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could lead to a “breakthrough” in relations, perhaps to signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable significance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early breakthrough. [*5 lines not declassified*] This view probably has been strengthened by Western press reports of differences between the US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them on more substantive issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore

⁷ Reference is to the September 1, 1983, shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007.

appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among them could be part of a package to improve bilateral relations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics

20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General Staff—through its Main Operations Directorate—coordinates the flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the arms control policy-making process. Information and policy proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the International Department and International Information Department. Individuals from the Academy of Sciences and probably the personal secretariats of Politburo members can also inform Soviet leaders on arms control issues, but do not have access to the details of military plans and programs. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov's death.⁸ [*portion marking not declassified*]

23. We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo on US–Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture. [*portion marking not declassified*]

24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on significant arms control issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

⁸ February 9, 1984.

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan⁹

Washington, March 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control Strategy

In the last eleven months of his Administration, President Carter abruptly changed his policy towards the Soviet Union, withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, instituting sanctions in response to the invasion of Afghanistan and proposing 5% real growth in defense spending. But the change came too late to regain the confidence of the American people: the voters in large numbers ignored the new policy by voting against the old. Indeed, Carter's shift seemed to vindicate the criticism that led up to it: by abandoning his established policies and appearing to embrace new and contradictory ones, Carter himself seemed to acknowledge that he had been weak in the face of Soviet strength. Candidate Reagan's steadiness of purpose stood in sharp and winning contrast.

There now remain fewer than five months until the party conventions and only eight before the election. Strategic decisions bearing on our conduct of East-West relations, especially arms control negotiations with the Soviets, must be made soon if President Reagan is to appeal to the electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent philosophy of arms and arms control.

Between now and November it must be a central element of Administration strategy to convey in a consistent manner a sense of the President's approach to East-West relations—an approach based on the strength of our re-armament coupled with a continuing search for militarily significant, balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreements that diminish the threat to our security and that of our allies.

This Administration has rightly rejected Soviet proposals that would codify their monopoly of intermediate missiles, freeze U.S. forces in urgent need of modernization, and permit the continued growth of

⁹ Top Secret; Sensitive. Weinberger sent the memorandum to Reagan under cover of a March 23 memorandum: "As agreed by Bud McFarlane's Senior Arms Control Policy Group, I am forwarding a paper, prepared at my request, to form the basis of Tuesday's NSC discussion. It should elicit a spirited exchange. It is deliberately straightforward. I believe it important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered-down consensus." (Ibid.)

Soviet strategic forces. And while we must continue to probe the attitude of the new Soviet leader toward arms control (and his ability to shape Soviet policies), we must not abandon the properly demanding standard for agreement that has distinguished the approach of this administration from that of its predecessors. Above all, we must not permit the merit of our security policy to be tested by whether we achieve an arms control agreement or bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. For try as we might, the Soviet leaders may well seek to deny President Reagan a fair agreement, precisely so that his "failure" to achieve one will damage his re-election prospects and bring into office a Democratic administration, ready to agree to terms more favorable to the Soviets and certain to slow the rebuilding of our defenses.

After all, it is only this President's strategic modernization program that promises to restore America's strategic strength and dissuade the Soviet leadership from the attempt to reach decisive superiority. Opposition to that program has become a central theme of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. And opposition to much of our modernization program and arms reduction philosophy, together with support for SALT II, the freeze and other arms control measures rejected by the President, has already become a campaign theme of the Democratic Party and its leading candidates. While an agreement manifestly tilted in the Soviets' favor might lure them from their current intransigence, it is most likely that Moscow will do nothing that might help re-elect a President who has mounted the most effective challenge to Soviet power in more than a decade: "Better to wait—and hope—for Mondale or Hart."

The Soviets are tough bargainers, even in adversity. If they sense that the Administration is negotiating with one eye on the ballot box (and there will be plenty of commentators to suggest that we are) they will be tougher still. They have shown no sign of letting up on the demand that we remove (or at least halt) INF deployment in Europe as a precondition for a return to the START/INF talks. (In recent days they have repeated this demand to Senators Cohen and Biden, to Brent Scowcroft and the Dartmouth group, and to SPD leader Vogel). Even if they were to return to Geneva, or agree to a summit, it would be risky in the extreme to take such a tactical move as a softening of their basic unyielding position. An acrimonious summit, or an October breakdown of renewed talks might well figure in a Soviet strategy to undermine the President's re-election. (Even Khomeini, who had every reason to believe he had Carter over a barrel, preferred to hold the hostages until Inauguration Day).

It is important for the Administration to make an early judgment as to whether the Soviet government under Chernenko is likely to be

more accommodating between now and the election than it has been since President Reagan took office. Our strategy since January has been predicated on the assumption that there is at least a fair chance for an improvement in the U.S.–Soviet relationship, including an arms control agreement on terms that the Reagan Administration could defend. Private diplomatic activity, public pronouncements and our approach to the compliance issue have all been aimed at coaxing the Soviets along a path of accommodation. The result has been disappointing. And while we must explore any genuinely promising opening, we must not drift toward November in the hope that a late break-through will obviate the need for a re-assertion of this Administration's record and philosophy.¹⁰

If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will become more tractable in coming months, we should develop *now* a strategy reflecting that judgement. And, far from using a muffled voice on the need for firmness and perseverance in dealing with the Soviet Union, the President should stress the continuing validity of his rearmament program and his approach to arms control. With respect to arms reductions, we should elaborate the themes that have guided our policy for the last three years: insistence on sharp reductions, the need for full verification (especially in light of Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements), the flexibility inherent in our willingness to "build down" and to "trade off" our advantages against theirs, and dissatisfaction with the past approach to arms control in which agreements like SALT I and II actually led to a startling increase in nuclear weapons. We also should be more assertive (although moderate, almost clinical in tone) on the issue of Soviet violations and their walk-out from the Geneva talks.

The Administration's handling of two important issues illustrates the dilemma of the policy choice the President now faces. Until now the Administration has deliberately down-played the Soviet walk-out from Geneva and the Soviet record on compliance. In both cases we have, for the last four months, taken pains to encourage the Soviets to return to the negotiating process by withholding criticism of their actions. "Not justified" is about the strongest comment we have made on the Soviet withdrawal from the Geneva talks. And a dispassionate *sotto voce* bill of particulars has been the extent of our comment on the Soviet record of noncompliance, with the single exception of our wholly justified, two-year long attack on "yellow rain."

¹⁰ Needless to say, we must be prepared, on short notice, to engage the Soviets in negotiations should they resume. Our current approach to START—and in particular, our willingness to "trade-off" reductions in our potential advantages for reductions in theirs—is broad enough to permit rapid negotiations should they be willing. It is unlikely, however, that we could achieve closure on a complete draft treaty before November. [footnote is in the original]

It is now time to ask whether this policy of restraint, which has been met by an unrelenting Soviet attack on the President and his policies, will achieve its intended effect of eliciting an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If we conclude that it is unlikely to move the Soviets to constructive negotiations, then it is fair to ask whether we are wise to forfeit a more assertive argument centered on the facts and merits of these two issues.

These are not only issues on which the Soviets are vulnerable; they are also issues the American people can understand.

Every poll conducted on the subject confirms that the American people believe that the Soviets will, if given an opportunity, cheat on their international obligations. The fact of their record of violating SALT II, the ABM Treaty and other agreements could be profitably amplified to support the President and diminish the weight of the Mondale/Hart appeal for new “quick fix” agreements even less verifiable than the present ones—the freeze, the threshold test-ban, ASAT, and the like.

The same holds true of the Soviet walk-out. With the Democratic National Committee running television spots that portray Ronald Reagan as the first President since John Kennedy who is not presiding over a nuclear arms negotiation, surely we can begin to drive home the point that the Soviets have broken off the Geneva talks because we would not accept a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles. However conscious we in Washington may be of the Soviet walk-out and their compliance record, they’ll forget it in Kansas if we continue to be inaudible on the subject.

It may be argued that we can go on with our current strategy, watching and waiting, adopting neither an approach that is appropriate to Soviet recalcitrance and stalling through November, nor one that assumes a breakthrough before the election. The trouble with this view is that time is passing—days and weeks are going by in which we are not mounting a defense of the President’s three-year record in the conduct of East-West arms control—with all the ammunition at our disposal. As we approach the national conventions there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that vigorous explanation of our policies mounted in the aftermath of the Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus unpersuasive.

A more assertive defense of our record and philosophy need not—indeed should not—sound strident, hostile, or pessimistic. Nor would it rule out a continuing private effort, through the President’s correspondence with Chernenko or the Shultz-Dobrynin channel, to probe for signs of Soviet flexibility. We have a good story to tell, an admirable record to explain and defend, and we should get on with it.

In the nearly 15 years since the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, the Soviets have added some 7,950 medium and long-range

nuclear missile warheads to their arsenal—an increase of 515%. *Fully 3,850 of these warheads, an increase of almost 65%, have been added since the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979.* And despite the permissive terms of the agreements between us, the Soviets have resorted to circumvention and violation to sustain a fifteen year strategic build-up of unprecedented proportions.

This dismal history would be reason enough for a new President to try a different approach. And Candidate Reagan's criticism of SALT II, echoed by the Senate Committee on Armed Services which declared it contrary to our national security interests, set the stage for this Administration's effort to obtain sharp reductions, better verification and, in general, agreements that, while more difficult to negotiate, would yield results of military significance.

The "zero option" was one such proposal. And while it was unacceptable to the Soviets, its embrace by the President turned a tide of opinion that had been running against us and helped to sustain a successful U.S. INF deployment. Above all it was a concrete expression of our desire for an agreement that offered the reality, and not merely the appearance, of a significant and understandable reduction in nuclear arms.

Similarly, our proposal for START, which departed in fundamental ways from SALT II, was—and remains—a sound expression of the arms control objectives that this Administration has put forward as an alternative to the cosmetic results of its predecessors. The 10 major changes that we have subsequently made to the 1982 START proposal, including the "build down" and the offer to balance U.S. against Soviet advantages in the reductions process, has positioned us well to argue that we have been fair, flexible and responsible. We have negotiated on a broad front, adjusting the elements of our position to encourage the give and take of negotiation. At the same time, and it is this that distinguishes the President from his critics, we have properly refused to travel the path of the Soviet approach—an approach that would allow a 45% increase in ballistic missile warheads and that is structured along the lines of SALT II.

For some weeks a number of experts drawn from the departments have been exploring new "frameworks" that might be put to the Soviets in the hope of advancing towards a resumption of negotiations and possible agreement. Adoption of a new "framework" or "structure" that parallels SALT II would almost certainly entail abandonment of this Administration's attempt to break out of the SALT II mold. And since it is only prudent to assume that any such framework we might table would form the basis for further negotiation, it is likely that, in due course, we would find ourselves negotiating largely within the SALT II structure. Were this to happen, we could face the election with something like the SALT II Treaty on the table in Geneva.

Given the history of the conduct of the negotiations thus far, the Soviet walk-out, the broad Congressional support that our current position has attracted (particularly the build down feature) and the flexibility inherent in the President's willingness to trade off U.S. for Soviet reductions, it is fair to ask whether a new "framework" at this stage would serve our interest. It would certainly create confusion. It would almost certainly run counter to the underlying logic of the position we have taken from the beginning. And it would diminish the clarity of the President's position as we enter a period in which the defense of that position will be crucial to our domestic politics.

The Soviets have recently adopted a strategy of pressing for concessions on arms control issues other than START or INF. Most of these—chemical weapons, anti-satellite weapons and nuclear testing—entail multilateral negotiations, under United Nations auspices, where serious negotiation is difficult and the opportunity for propaganda is great. Moreover, all are complicated by extreme, if not insurmountable, verification problems. And taken together, this new Soviet agenda seems aimed at obscuring their Geneva walkout.

The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption about likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a U.S. strategy on unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the President's record and philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets desire, should form the keystone of our public policy. We should move quickly to put such a policy in place, and to develop a broad strategy for its implementation.

With all of the above being said, it is still desirable, I believe, to try to secure Soviet agreement at least to consider some or all of the following:

- (a) Renegotiation of the TTBT *with* effective verification;
- (b) A ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site inspection for purpose of verification;
- (c) Notification to the other side of *all* ballistic missile tests;
- (d) Agreement *not* to encrypt test parameters;
- (e) Notification of all *major* military exercises.

Some or all of the above, even though it is not "arms reduction," might help us hold the Aspin-Dicks types who voted for MX last year "if we would be more forthcoming on arms reduction," and could help us with the public opinion of the world, and would not hurt us if the Soviets agreed. It might put them on the defensive—or they might agree to talk with us. Either result would be good.

I'd be glad to develop further details if you wish.

Attachment**Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Adelman) to President Reagan¹¹**

Washington, March 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control Possibilities in 1984

We cannot be sure of Soviet intentions or of what the Soviets might do. But the odds are against serious negotiations, much less any breakthrough, in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations this year. The Soviets will likely (1) wait out our elections, (2) work vigorously against our strategic modernization programs, and (3) increase the heat on us in multilateral arms control areas like nuclear testing, chemical weapons, antisatellite weapons, and MBFR.

While the Soviets stonewall on START and INF, political pressures will still quicken over the coming months for progress in nuclear arms control. Political advertisements already portray the Reagan Administration as the only Administration since World War II without a significant arms control achievement. This concern could well affect our strategic modernization programs, especially the MX.

We can and should make moves that will demonstrate our interest in arms control, without prejudicing our substantive positions and without asking the Soviets to “eat crow”. Five possible initiatives come immediately to mind, with INF heading the list.

1. Although the INF negotiations are probably “dead” for now, INF offers opportunities for unilateral initiatives and fewer risks than new steps in START. In particular, we could *offer to halt US INF deployments* in Europe at the end of 1985, which would give us 236 warheads, *if the Soviets* by that time had *reduced* their SS-20s to a comparable level in Europe. (We would have to adjust the mix and location of PIIs and GLCMs in Europe. We would retain a right to match Soviet deployments outside of Europe, but could clarify our intention not to exercise that right by deployments in Asia.)

This would be consistent with our basic INF position, ease some Allied concerns, and show our readiness to work for nuclear arms control. At the same time, it would not depend on the Soviets returning to these talks. It merely requires performance—reductions—on their

¹¹ Secret.

part. In the unlikely event that they wanted to negotiate, we would welcome it. Whatever the Soviets did would not detract from the benefits of such an initiative.

2. A second initiative will be our *tabling a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons* next month in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This could most effectively be done by the Vice President, to give high visibility to the beginning of negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

3. Our tabling an initiative on *outer space* in the CD would also be viewed as a positive, welcome step. We could propose a multilateral agreement prohibiting any attack on satellites, together with some related confidence building measures. Such undertakings would *not* adversely affect any US space programs, including our anti-satellite weapons program and your Space Defense Initiative. The interagency process could shortly complete its work on such an outer space agreement.

4. We could seek a *US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation*. The US and the Soviet Union have a common interest here and have, for many years, cooperated in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We have initiated regular and more extensive bilaterals with them in your Administration. They agreed to the last meeting in February despite their breaking off INF and START.

As part of a further initiative, we could formalize this process and might obtain some substantive movement as well. Thus, we could seek a bilateral understanding that would reflect already agreed principles and policy objectives and bring the Soviets a few steps closer to your comprehensive safeguards initiative.

5. We could take steps now to try to move toward a posture of greater conventional deterrence in NATO, to reduce over time the role and our dependence on nuclear weapons. This long-term goal could perhaps be furthered by planning, with our NATO Allies, to structure our conventional and nuclear forces in order to eliminate the need for using nuclear weapons at the outset of a European conflict. We could, after laying the groundwork, declare a policy *objective of no early first use of nuclear weapons*, if that would help move the NATO Allies toward this approach. This topic could be broached at the anniversary meeting of NATO this May in Washington.

Kenneth L. Adelman¹²

¹² Adelman signed the memorandum "Ken" over his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny)¹³

Washington, undated

START NEGOTIATOR'S IDEAS ON HOW TO "MAKE PROGRESS"

Question: Will the Soviets return to START before fall?

—Difficult to predict; but they will do what is in their interest.

—Soviets have been adamant on not coming back to INF but have not shut the door on START.

—On balance they will see it in their interest to come back in START by June.

—Because they want to influence our defense programs which they cannot do as easily if they are refusing to negotiate.

—Because they believe they can move toward a better deal from a Candidate Reagan than from a reelected President Reagan with a four-year mandate.

—They may be interested in nailing down some progress and the outlines of an agreement this year.

—Soviet walk-out of INF and refusal to resume START undercuts their propaganda campaign.

—Soviet reluctance to return to START may be a tactic to extract concessions.

Question: Is it in our interest to get them back to the table?

—Yes, if we do it in a way which does not jeopardize a good agreement.

—But the President must be perceived as being firm, consistent, and not making concessions to get them back.

—Moreover, the President must show that he is committed to arms control, is serious, and was willing to go the extra mile rather than sitting back and waiting.

Question: How best to bring the Soviets back?

—We let them know that they stand to gain through the President's offer of October 4, 1983 for trade-offs of our bombers and ALCMs for their ballistic missile capacity.¹⁴

¹³ Secret; Sensitive. Rowny sent the paper to McFarlane, copying Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, Adelman, and Casey, under cover of a March 23 memorandum: "Here is my submission for the President's reading package this weekend." (Ibid.)

¹⁴ See footnote 7, Document 81.

—We offered to explore trade-offs in Geneva but they showed no interest, probably to influence us in INF.

—We should describe in more detail that our current position lends itself to trade-offs, to relaxation of the 5000 ballistic warhead limit (to 6000–7000), and to further reasonable compromises.

Question: How do we do it?

—Shultz should initiate broad discussions with Dobrynin to be followed by private Rowny/Karpov meetings on details.

—If the Soviets don't accept Rowny/Karpov meetings; then Rowny could follow up with Dobrynin.

Question: What are the pitfalls?

—Avoid a SALT II framework which creates impression we are reversing our opposition to SALT II and that we have wasted two years.

—Avoid being over-eager and showing our bottom-line at the outset; only if they move in response to our moves should we move.

—Avoid a special envoy from outside the Administration; it could look like election-year gimmickry, not serious negotiations.

—Avoid talk of a START/INF merger. A formal merger is not in our interest and Soviets have said they don't want one.

—Soviets need a face-saving solution in INF which will allow them to climb down from their opposition to *any* US INF deployments. We should not design such a face-saver for them but US START initiative should leave open such a possibility along lines of Soviet "solutions" on FBS in SALT I and II.

Question: If they do come back, what is our goal this year?

—Stress mutual benefits of a "break-through" this year on basis of trade-offs.

—Avoid an interim agreement this year because it would be unverifiable, could become permanent like the 1972 Interim Agreement, would need Congressional approval, and would use up leverage.

—Suggest to them the best solution would be initialing a Vladivostok-type aide memoire this fall on a set of guidelines which codifies progress to date and lays out what still needs to be done.

—Be prepared to permit them force structuring flexibility by allowing more than 5000 warheads and offering further limits on ALCMs.

—But we *must* get reductions in warheads (not only launchers) and avoid weapons aggregation (no mixing between ballistic missile warheads and bomber missile weapons).

Question: What should we do in the meantime?

—President should in factual but measured way explain virtues of START proposal and his personal commitment to arms control, not

wait until Democratic candidate puts him on defensive. He can convince public we have a good offer because we were flexible and met many of the Soviets' main concerns. He should stress we have reached the stage where we can now engage in trade-offs to mutual advantage.

A draft of what I think the Vladivostok guidelines could look like and negotiating tactics to get Soviets back to the table was submitted by me to Bud McFarlane on March 16. A copy is attached.¹⁵

Rowny¹⁶

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations (Nitze) to President Reagan¹⁷

Washington, March 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Thoughts on an Arms Control Initiative

The following thoughts come to my mind with respect to an arms control initiative in the INF/START field.

An initiative should make no substantive concessions to the Soviet side; it should not in any way adversely prejudice the final outcome of the negotiations. It should, however, demonstrate that the United States is not frozen into immobility in the INF/START field. I believe the reactions in Europe, the Congress and U.S. public opinion would all be negative if there were any indication that we were rewarding the Soviets for having broken off the negotiations. Neither do I believe it would improve our relations with the Soviet Union; they would look upon it as weakness on our part. It is, however, probable that over the next five months we will appear frozen and immobile if we do nothing.

I believe we can develop an initiative which would help our friends in Europe (the Dutch, in particular, could use and would appreciate such an initiative). Such a move could also help our friends on the Hill

¹⁵ Attached but not printed is a March 16 memorandum from Rowney to McFarlane, Dam, Ikle, Moreau, George, and Adelman forwarding an undated paper, "Guidelines for a START Agreement."

¹⁶ Rowny signed the paper "Ed Rowny" above his typed signature.

¹⁷ Secret.

who are having difficulty resisting pressure from their constituents for a demonstration of U.S. movement on arms control.

I believe it is better that such an initiative be in the field of INF than in the field of START. INF is of central importance to the Europeans, is the focus of Soviet recalcitrance, and must be gotten out of the way before, if progress is to be made in START.

At the present time the pressure for an initiative is not strong either in Europe or in the Congress. I believe it would be much better to move prior to such pressure building up either here or abroad. An initiative taken later may well be viewed as being the result of the pressure and thereby induce further pressure rather than result in mitigating it. Furthermore, it should not be reactive to anything done by the Soviets. It should be an initiative taken by the President in pursuit of U.S. objectives.

If it were decided to take an initiative along these lines it would be prudent discreetly to sound out some of our allies and some of our friends on the Hill in advance.

As a general principle it appears to me to be risky to conduct serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in an election year. The Soviets will consider that U.S. public opinion pressure is uniquely subject to exploitation by them at such a time. Our allies will suspect that the U.S. initiative is motivated as much by the electoral considerations as by the long-term interest of the West. Skeptics on the Hill and in the media will be looking for any opportunity to be critical on these grounds. It therefore seems to me that an initiative should be in the form of spelling out in more specific terms past policy lines and should be formulated in such a way that it could be advanced unilaterally and not necessarily require actual negotiation.

I have given to Bud McFarlane a memorandum¹⁸ on a specific INF initiative which could, in my opinion, satisfy the criteria I have outlined.

In conclusion it seems to me to be unlikely that the Soviets will in fact agree to any proposal which fits within and makes more precise existing U.S. INF policy. The Soviets have demonstrated to us, however, that nonsubstantive moves can give an impression of flexibility and mobility.

Paul H. Nitze

¹⁸ Attached but not printed is an undated paper, "Possible INF Initiative: US Deployment HALT at End 1985."

88. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on START/INF, March 27, 1984

Tuesday's NSC meeting will focus on two main items: (1) Soviet interests in pursuing START and INF in 1984; and (2) the political context for US nuclear arms control activity during 1984.

We have previously provided to you both the Intelligence Community paper addressing its estimate of Soviet interest in arms control in 1984; and a series of memoranda² sent to you by NSC principals providing their personal views of the political context and US options. Attached is a short summary, developed by the NSC staff, of the Intelligence Community paper and the various memoranda designed to help you prepare for the NSC meeting.

While the issue of Soviet arms control intentions in 1984 is an important consideration, the primary focus of this NSC meeting should be on the issue of the political context and how it affects US nuclear arms control options and decisions in 1984. The central point for discussion will be an examination of the validity of the argument expressed in Secretary Weinberger's memorandum to you.³

As noted in our previous package to you on this subject, the memoranda from NSC principals to you argue for a range of specific initiatives in START, INF and other areas—many of which require more detailed analysis and discussion before being seriously considered for implementation. We would recommend once again that:

(1) we maintain the focus of Tuesday's meeting on the validity of Secretary Weinberger's argument; and

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC00104. Top Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Discussed w/ Pres 3/27 RCM." Linhard sent the memorandum and attachment to McFarlane under cover of a March 26 memorandum recommending their use in preparing Reagan for the March 27 NSC meeting. Linhard also recommended that McFarlane authorize Perle's attendance at the meeting, as "it would be most useful if Richard Perle could hear, first-hand, the discussion of the political context issue." McFarlane approved the use of the attachment to prepare Reagan, but disapproved the proposal to authorize Perle's attendance. He also wrote on Linhard's memorandum: "Good paper." (Ibid.)

² See Document 87.

³ See attachment, Document 87.

(2) you avoid commenting on and not endorse any of the other specific arms control initiatives proposed in the various memoranda until we can provide to you additional analyses of these initiatives.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PAPER: Soviet Interests in Arms Control Negotiations

Soviet Strategy. The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing a willingness to move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent so as to rally support for NATO's policies or demonstrate that they are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations.

Soviets are deeply pessimistic about the prospects for significant US concessions in START and INF. They are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection of the Administration, but apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep. They appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests.

The Soviets are trying to heighten pressures on the US to alter its current stance. They are using various channels, including direct appeals to West European leaders. It appears more likely at present, however, that they will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multi-national forums such as MBFR, CDE, and the CD.

The Soviets will continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before US elections. They will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains for the USSR are at hand.

⁴ Top Secret; Sensitive.

Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks. There have been several recent indications (the latest being the Dartmouth Conference trip) that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations.

A number of statements have been made that they will not return unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In the context of the Dartmouth trip and in talks with German SDP, Soviet representatives rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some implying and others asserting outright that neither the INF or START negotiations could resume unless NATO's new missiles were withdrawn. They also rejected the "walk-in-the-woods" formula as a solution for the INF problem. The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF.

On the other hand, some Soviets have hinted recently that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployments and to taking UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has also taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects of negotiations in discussions with correspondents. He may be under instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed.

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEMORANDUM. The Secretary argues that:

Only 5 months remain prior to the party conventions. Strategic decisions bearing on East-West relations, especially arms control, must be made soon if the Administration is to appeal to the electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent philosophy of arms and arms control. To do so, it is important that we make an early judgment as to whether the Soviet government is likely to be more accommodating between now and the election than it has previously.

Our strategy since January has been predicated on the assumption that there is at least a fair chance for an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship, including an arms control agreement on terms that the Reagan Administration could defend. Private diplomatic activity, public pronouncements and our approach to the compliance issue have all been aimed at coaxing the Soviets along a path of accommodation. The result has been disappointing.

If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will be more tractable in the coming months, we should develop now a strategy that reflects that judgement. The Administration should stress the continuing validity of its rearmament program and its approach to arms control. With respect to arms control, the Administration should elaborate the themes that have guided policy over the last three years:

- insistence on sharp reductions;
- the need for full verification;
- the flexibility inherent in our willingness to “trade off” with the USSR;
- dissatisfaction with past approaches to arms control.

We should also be more assertive on the issues of Soviet violations and the Soviet walk-out from Geneva. These are not only issues on which the Soviets are vulnerable; they are also issues the American people can understand.

Time is passing, time in which we are not mounting a defense of the Administration’s three-year record. As we approach the national conventions there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that vigorous explanations of our policies mounted in the aftermath of the Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus unpersuasive. We have a good story to tell, an admirable record to explain and defend, and we should get on with it.

Adoption of a new “framework” or “structure” that parallels SALT II would almost certainly entail abandonment of this Administration’s attempt to break out of the SALT II mold. We could face the election with something that looks like SALT II on the table. We must not abandon the demanding standard for agreement that distinguishes this Administration from its predecessors.

We should try to secure Soviet agreement on some of the following:

- renegotiation of the TTBT with effective verification;
- ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site inspection;
- notification of all ballistic missile tests;
- agreement not to encrypt; and
- notification of all major military exercises.

The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption about the likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a US strategy on unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the Administration’s record and philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets desire, should form the keystone of our public policy.

AMBASSADOR ADELMAN’S MEMORANDUM. Amb Adelman argues:

The odds are against serious negotiations, much less any breakthrough, in INF and START. The Soviets will likely (1) wait out our elections, (2) work to block our modernization program, and (3) increase the heat on us in multi-lateral negotiations.

We can and should make moves. Five possible moves come to mind:

1. As unilateral initiative, offer to halt US INF deployments at the end of 1985 (236 warheads) if the Soviets reduce their SS–20s in Europe to a comparable level.

2. Have the Vice President table a draft treaty banning chemical weapons next month in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

3. Table an initiative on outer space in the CD.

4. Seek a US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation.

5. Move NATO towards a posture of greater conventional deterrence and less of a reliance on nuclear weapons. After laying the proper groundwork, declare a policy objective of no early first use of nuclear weapons.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY'S MEMORANDUM. Amb Rowny argues:

The Soviets have been adamant on not coming back to INF but have not shut the door on START. On balance, they will see it in their interest to come back in START by June. It is certainly in our interest to get them back if we do it in a way that does not jeopardise a good agreement. The Administration should be perceived as willing to go the extra mile, but not making concessions to get them back to the table.

The best way to get them back is to let them know that they stand to gain through our offer of trade-offs made on October 4, 1983. We should communicate this message via Shultz-Dobrynin discussions followed by private Rowny/Karpov meetings.

In doing so, we should seek a goal for this year of the initialing of a Vladivostok-type aide memoire this fall on a set of guidelines which codifies progress to date and lays out what still needs to be done. We should avoid: a SALT II framework, use of a special envoy, talk of a START/INF merger, and attempting to get an interim agreement this year. While pursuing this goal, the Administration should explain in a factual but measured way the virtues of our START proposal and not wait for the Democrats to put us on the defensive.

AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEMORANDUM. Amb Nitze argues:

If we do nothing over the next five months, we will appear frozen and immobile in the INF/START field. It is better that an initiative be in INF than START. INF is of central importance to the Europeans, the focus of Soviet recalcitrance, and must be gotten out of the way for progress in START. The initiative should make no substantive concession, nor adversely prejudice the final outcome of negotiations. It should not appear to be rewarding the Soviets for their behavior. And, since it is risky to conduct serious negotiations in an election year, the initiative should be in the form of spelling out in more specific terms past policy formulated in such a way that it could be advanced unilaterally. One such possible US initiative would be for the US to indicate a readiness to halt deployments at the end of 1985 (236 warheads) if

the Soviets agreed to reduce their LRINF missile force in Europe to an equal level and make collateral reductions in Asia.

89. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Points to be Made at Today's NSC Meeting on Arms Control

Today's meeting will be highly charged philosophically. While Cap's position (which is not supported by the Joint Chiefs) is subtle, it masks a proposal to "hardline it" by not exploring even internally in our own government more flexible positions on START or INF. It would place emphasis on condemning the Soviets for their violations and their walkout in Geneva. I would not argue for ignoring those problems, but it is a matter of emphasis. If we do that and nothing else, we risk having you cast in the image of being inflexible and responsible for the breakdown. Frankly, I think Cap understands this but his advisors would assure that background briefings would carry a much tougher line if you give them any encouragement.

To set the course at today's meeting, I recommend that you listen to the alternative approaches but at the end of the meeting, you intervene with some very explicit guidance for our conduct in the weeks and months ahead. It would include several points:

How you see Soviet Strategy Towards Arms Control this year.

- They want to avoid the onus for having walked out of Geneva.
- They will do this by diverting attention from START and INF to other arms control issues (MBFR, Chemical and ASAT).
- They are unlikely to give us anything which would appear to be progress on START and INF.

What this is designed to do.

- Make us appear as footdragging while they are peacemakers.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC00104. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

- Create pressure on us through the Congress (with the collateral benefit of defeating MX) and private citizens/businessmen.

What are your policies?

- You want a good agreement but are not concerned with how long it takes.

- You do not intend to make unilateral concessions to get them back to the table.

- You believe we must have a full credible agenda on arms control.

- It should focus on MBFR, Chemical, Confidence Building, notification of all ballistic missile tests, agreement not to encrypt and CDE.

- But we cannot let them off the hook on START and INF. We must keep the pressure on.

- To do that, we need solid flexible positions on both START and INF.

- You do not intend to fall into the trap of SALT II but we also cannot ignore those things which were good simply because they were also part of SALT II.

- For example, having a launcher limit isn't wrong so long as it is matched by warhead and throw-weight limits.

- In short, we need a position which takes part of their approach and melds it with ours so that they have a figleaf for coming off their position.

Next Steps

- I want a letter drafted to Chernenko. It must be substantive and positive by laying out the agenda I have touched upon above plus stressing the obligation to resume START and INF talks.

- We should offer to have Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze engage in private talks if the Russians wish. We should make clear that we are prepared to be flexible.

- To assure that we are ready to do business we must accelerate our efforts in several areas.

- I want a draft chemical treaty on my desk before I leave for China.

- I want the Senior Arms Control Group to accelerate their efforts to present options for new START and INF positions to me within two weeks.

- Against the chance that the Russians remain intransigent, I will consider a speech within two months time at which I will lay out the record of our efforts for all to see.

- In the area of public affairs, I want the Secretary of State—and he alone—to be my spokesman on arms control. Leaks and gratuitous backgrounders must cease now.

90. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1984, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Arms Control Discussions (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State

George P. Shultz

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Director William J. Casey

JCS

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth L. Adelman

Chairman, U.S. INF Delegation

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

Chairman, U.S. START Delegation

Ambassador Edward Rowny

White House

Robert C. McFarlane

NSC

Ronald F. Lehman

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by focusing the discussion on two questions: (1) what is the Soviet strategy toward arms control, and (2) what does that imply about our behavior for arms control, for dealing with our allies and for handling Congress? The CIA paper indicates that the Soviet Union is following a two pronged strategy aimed at diverting attention away from their walkout of START and INF and yet permitting them to keep the high ground by treating other issues such as ASAT, CDE, “no first use,” etc. The Soviet Union has been implementing that strategy through private groups and Congress to get the United States to engage on the Soviet agenda. We also have a positive agenda: CBMs, Hotline, MBFR, CW, and others. (S)

The United States can compile a positive agenda as well. We have the community of advisors looking at CIA study and asking how we should deal with the Soviet Union in arms control. Mr. President, you have received from your advisors and have read a number of papers expressing views as to how best to proceed. Overall, there is much agreement. For example, everyone agrees that we should reject the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–104, NSC00104. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting, which took place in the Cabinet Room, is identified in the minutes as that of a National Security Planning Group but listed in the President’s Daily Diary as that of the National Security Council. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

Soviet agenda and establish our own agenda. However, there is also some disagreement on what should be our positive agenda and how we should deal with negative Soviet behavior such as non-compliance and the walk-outs. In short, we do not have complete agreement on how we validate the record of three years of effort. Today, we will hear from the President's key advisors. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that his paper begins by asking the question, "What is the interest of the Soviet Union in reaching an agreement this year?" and it concludes with the answer that there is very little evidence that they are interested in an agreement. We need to focus on the content of an agreement, not on agreement for agreement's sake. The Soviet Union has little interest in giving the President a victory. They would only give him an agreement for which he could not take credit. What are they interested in then? A SALT II agreement that did not provide for reductions. To get an agreement, they will require us to make major concessions. Those who talk of a new framework are really talking about going back to SALT II ½. The Soviet Union has walked out of three talks. We should make our case based on the merits. The zero option was very popular and the only reason it was rejected was because the Soviet Union wanted a monopoly. They walked out because we would not agree to their having a monopoly. We want more than a piece of paper; we want real reductions. They are violating SALT II; SALT II means we won't worry about throw-weight. We should be vigorously defending our proposals and pressing the Soviet Union to return to the table. That doesn't mean that there are not things we can negotiate now. We should press to renegotiate the TTBT. We can negotiate a full ban on chemical weapons with full verification. We can negotiate notification of ballistic missile tests and Hotline improvements. If we become too eager, the Soviet Union will sense weakness. And even if we get them back to the negotiations, they can set you up for a later walkout when it will hurt most. The reality is that no one across the table is in charge—they have a collegial organization. Chernenko is not only not responding, he wouldn't even receive the letter that Scowcroft carried. We should emphasize our proposals, we should make clear that we are ready, and we should speak out on the compliance issue. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded with ten do's and don'ts, really, six don'ts and four do's. (1) Don't base policy on speculations about the Soviet Union. (2) Don't negotiate with ourselves or Congress. (3) Don't make concessions for the purpose of getting Soviets back to the table, but we can reorganize our positions to make them more presentable. (4) Don't get into the position where you need an agreement. (5) It is a mistake to change our positive posture on arms control into a negative one because this risks loss of publics, the Congress, and our allies.

(6) Don't rest on past work; let's keep working to be prepared. The process is veto prone and therefore we can't let fear of leaks delay the effort. (7) We must continue to set positive messages that we are prepared to deal across the board—look at START and INF for better ways to present our position. (8) We should be prepared to take parts of the Soviet position and shouldn't be against everything in SALT. The Secretary of Defense uses the word "framework" as if it were a swear word. We need to move on MBFR and we need to go further, depending on the Soviet response. We should move quickly on the CW Treaty and the Hotline. We should move on CDE and we could move on TTBT if we could manage a decision to take it on forthrightly. (9) We should look at the fundamental differences between us and the Soviets in START. You can debate over whether START or INF is more important, but I don't see how you can move on START without considering INF. (10) We should look to see what is important for us, and with all due respect to the CIA analysis, they could be wrong. (S)

Director Adelman said that he agreed with much of what had been said. *Adelman* reminded the President that he worked with the campaign during the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran and he saw the dangers of setting oneself up for an agreement—the risks are great. To answer the mail, we must show that we have sound policies and are serious about arms control. We need to identify areas where movement is possible. In INF, *Adelman* and *Nitze* have identified a proposal that would have the Soviets reduce to a level which we would stop at. We could negotiate such a step or it could be a declaratory policy. We could attempt to reach a US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation. We could develop rules of the road or proper behavior through space-CBMs in the CD. We should work with our allies to set the stage for a policy of no early use of nuclear weapons—we can look at different ways to package this and move slowly and cautiously. (S)

General Vessey put forth a military view. We must maintain the momentum of our defense build-up at the highest levels possible. We must protect the President's strategic modernization program. We must keep the Alliance together, and we must cap or reverse the Soviet military build-up—Soviets can't or won't negotiate until after elections. The Scowcroft coalition and support on the Hill need tending. Allies are not carrying the load. (S)

Director Casey agreed that we must make judgments about the Soviets but argued that we have a fair amount of history. We can assume that Moscow is not anxious to help the President, but they don't want to appear intransigent. They believe that treaties in START and INF are out of reach. Clearly, the prospects for getting an agreement are remote. We should continue to assess our own interest. We can accomplish something on second order issues. At CDE, we can trade Western confidence building measures for a non-aggression pact. (S)

Ambassador Rowny recognized that there was not a consensus on how to get the Soviet Union back to the table, but believed that they might even return on their own. The Soviet Union didn't really explore what was in the trade-offs for them. They may come back when they see that there is really something in it for them. If we show a little ankle, maybe a little thigh, then you can get movement. There is no chance for a full START agreement this year, and speculation on an Interim Agreement is dangerous. Vladivostok is a better precedent, and aide memoir is safest. The Soviet Union never closed the door on START; they still want to limit D-5 and ALCM. (S)

Ambassador Nitze agreed that we should seek US objectives, but we are already clear on that. The issue is tactical. It is not impossible to get an agreement, but 90% chance you won't. It is wholly unlikely that Moscow will negotiate seriously in an election year. What does one do? One does the CW treaty—that is a perfectly solid thing to do. There is no chance the Soviets will agree to that. But it is dangerous to be solidly engaged in START or INF in an election year. (S)

Secretary Weinberger commented further that he didn't disagree with Secretary Shultz's ten points, only with the interpretation of them. At this time, we will have to pay a very high price to get an agreement. We have all agreed that we shouldn't make any concessions to get them back to the table. All agreed that we don't want to get into a position where we must have an agreement. We can keep up our work, but we don't want to further weaken our proposals. We can keep sending messages that we are ready to negotiate, but that is hard to do in an empty room. I agree that we should do what we can do in lesser areas, but I'm very worried about space arms control. Also, talk of a START "framework" is a codeword—I'm opposed. (S)

The *President* suggested that we are all not as far apart as it might seem. There is no question that the Soviet Union is trying to make us look non-cooperative. I believe the Soviets want to avoid the onus for having walked out of Geneva. In my answer to the letter from Chernenko, we should recognize that we have opposite views on who is threatened. We should cite their quotations that are threatening to us; we should cite their build-up. Then we could cite the fact that in the 1940's, we proposed to do away with all these systems and they said no. Nineteen times since then, we have tried to reach agreements, for example, Eisenhower's open sky proposal. We can't go on negotiating with ourselves. We can't be supplicants crawling, we can't look like failures. I've read the papers and made some notes. Let me share them with you. They want to avoid the onus of walking out, therefore, it is unlikely that they will give us anything in START and INF right now. We want an agreement, but we want a good agreement. I do not intend to make unilateral concessions to get them back to the table, but I

believe we must have a full credible agenda on arms control. Maybe we could build a record. Mitterrand believed that they would give us the cold shoulder for several months, therefore, we will need to do lesser things, MBFR, chemical weapons, confidence building, notification of all ballistic missile tests, agreement not to encrypt, and CDE. But we shouldn't let them off the hook on START and INF; we must keep the pressure on. To do this, we need solid, flexible positions on both START and INF. (S)

The *President* continued, I don't want to fall into the trap of SALT II, but if there are some things that are good, then we shouldn't ignore them simply because they are a part of SALT II. For example, having a launcher limit isn't wrong, so long as it is matched by warhead and throw-weight limits. In short, we need a position which takes part of their approach and melds it with ours so that they have a fig leaf for coming off their position. I think my letter to Chernenko should be substantive and positive along these lines, and stressing that they have an obligation to resume START and INF talks. Perhaps we should offer to have Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze engage in private talks with the Russians. I would like to table the chemical treaty before we set off for China. I think the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should accelerate their work and present me with options for new START/INF positions within a few weeks. This is for us, not for the public. Maybe we should consider a speech in a few months to bring out our record. George (Shultz), I want you to be our public spokesman on arms control. Leaks and gratuitous backgrounders have got to stop. I understand we have procedures for dealing with clearing testimony. I think we should work in private channels, but we will not crawl, we will build a record. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we have our instructions and now we have to get down to work. (S)

The *President* asked if anyone had any disagreements. (S)

Secretary Weinberger expressed concern that the President's guidance not be misunderstood. In a few days, the *New York Times* may be reporting that the President has ordered new proposals on START and INF. Aren't we talking about what we didn't say, but could say, about our proposals? (S)

Ambassador Rowny noted that the Soviet Union has not listened to all that we had to say in Geneva. (S)

Ambassador Nitze volunteered that what we were really talking about was fleshing out our positions. (S)

The *President* said that Director Adelman had a good idea on INF about their reducing to a level which we would reach at the end of 1985. Something like that might be an option worth looking at. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that some of our allies might use this as an excuse not to do what must be done on deployments. (S)

Director Adelman agreed with *Secretary Weinberger*. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that we should agree that we will fill out our position. (S)

The *President* noted that his letter to Chernenko offers an opportunity to get their attention. Have we given enough attention to the fact that they have a climate of insecurity? (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we will press on with the guidance, noting that we will make no pre-emptive concessions, flesh out our positions and be ready if they return, and prepare to table a chemical weapons treaty before the China trip. (S)

91. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, March 30, 1984

I attended a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group this afternoon at 4:30.² The subject was continued work on INF and START. The way we are putting this is that we want to have our options clearly delineated so that we will be in a position to negotiate in the event that the Soviets express an interest in returning to either talks. There seems no possibility that they will be prepared to return to the INF talks as such, but it does seem that they have dug themselves something of a hole by saying they won't return to the START talks until we withdraw the INF missiles from Europe. The President has authorized some probing of the Soviets on START, including the possibility of being able to lay out to them what we have in mind when we say we would be prepared to discuss trading off areas of advantage to us for areas of advantage to them.³ Thus we now have a green light to do additional work in both areas, but the work on START is what is particularly important. In addition, we are looking at ways in which INF might be brought into the START negotiations in some fashion,

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. Secret. Dictated on March 30.

² No formal minutes were found.

³ See Document 90.

not necessarily by means of the so-called “merger” about which there has been so much public discussion.

I attended a meeting in the Secretary’s office at the end of the day in preparation for his meeting with Dobrynin next week. We now have had an exchange of letters between the President and Chernenko,⁴ and that leaves the possibility of some progress in discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the purpose of the discussion with Dobrynin next week will be to explore how our talks can be moved ahead. One can say that outside of the nuclear area, there is a good deal going on, including CDE, MBFR and chemical weapons, as well as boundary talks in the Bering Sea, upgrade of the hot line, consulates, exchanges (which was previously called “cultural agreement”), and other related areas.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

⁴ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 190 and 197.

92. National Security Decision Directive 137¹

Washington, March 31, 1984

US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984 (U)

After giving the matter considerable thought, I have reached the following conclusions concerning how we should deal with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control during this year. (C)

First of all, I believe that we have the opportunity to deal with the Soviet Union from more of a position of strength than in previous years. This is due to the progress that we have made over the last three years in a number of areas. Perhaps of greatest importance is that we have established the basis for a national, bi-partisan consensus in support of our strategic modernization program. Based on this consensus, this critical modernization program is now moving from the discus-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 137. Secret.

sion stage, where it had been stalled for a number of years, to the deployment of fielded capability. (C)

With the continued help of all those involved, steady progress in implementing our strategic modernization program will help us gradually to reverse the existing adverse trends in certain key indicators of the strategic nuclear balance. In doing so, it will provide us the basic leverage we need to do more than simply negotiate arms control agreements. It will, over time, generate the incentives to the Soviet Union needed to put us in a position to negotiate meaningful and effectively verifiable agreements, agreements that both enhance world stability and our security, and that permit significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (C)

In addition, over the past year it has become clear that the Soviet Union has failed in its attempt to drive a wedge in the linkage between the United States and our NATO allies. Over the last few years, we have had nearly continuous, intensive consultations with our NATO partners. This process has also added to our strength. Our allies have not only stood squarely by us as we implemented the negotiation track of the 1979 NATO "dual track" decision. They have also sustained the NATO LRINF modernization decision and deployments are currently in progress in the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. (C)

As a result of this Soviet failure, the Soviet Union is now in the difficult position of seeking means to avoid their clear responsibility for walking away from both the START and INF negotiations. However, no matter what they now choose to do, the legacy of their actions will continue to haunt them and the mantle of responsibility will sit heavy on their shoulders. (C)

Given this situation, I believe that the United States should stay firmly on the high road that it has traveled thus far in pursuit of meaningful, equitable, verifiable arms control involving significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. This means that we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement. We will not entertain proposals which involve preemptive concessions to attempt to entice the Soviets back into negotiations before they sincerely wish to sit with us and solve problems. And, we will not reward Soviet intransigence, thus turning their policy failure into victory and dissipating the strength we have accumulated due to the principled, yet flexible stance that we have taken over the last three years. (C)

On the other hand, maintaining the high road does mean that, while we avoid the pitfalls cited above, we will continue vigorously to conduct a sincere, positive effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. While encouraging the Soviets to return to the START and INF tables in Geneva, we will remain ready to talk at any time and in any

place without preconditions. We will take every appropriate opportunity to explain patiently the virtue of our sound, flexible positions in both START and INF. We will use every appropriate avenue to explore ways of finding appropriate ways to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union. We will remain prepared to discuss means of trading areas of U.S. advantage of concern to the Soviet Union for areas of Soviet advantage of concern to the United States and our Allies. And, we will make full use of time during which we wait for a positive Soviet response to fully prepare ourselves to exploit opportunities that may present themselves for making progress towards meaningful agreements that meet our criteria. (C)

Toward this goal, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) will complete, on a priority basis, its current efforts toward identifying and evaluating for me the full range of potential U.S. options in the START and INF areas under likely alternative scenarios. This work should address options which flesh out and enhance our current position. However, it should also identify the key differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and identify options that could, under certain conditions, bridge those differences. I do not intend nor will I permit us to repeat the mistakes made by previous arms control agreements. However, if elements of previous agreements put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them. Finally, the SACPG work should also address likely Soviet initiatives and prepare us to appropriately respond to them. (S)

This SACPG activity should serve as the primary clearing house for the various ideas that have been suggested about these topics. This work will have the priority support of all agencies and should be completed with a report submitted to me by May 5. (S)

It is essential that the task given to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group be accomplished promptly, thoroughly, and on a close-hold basis and without the unauthorized disclosure of the nature of the work or the various options being studied. Taken out of the proper context, the unauthorized disclosure of this task could be misinterpreted with severe consequences to the fundamental interests of the United States. The National Security Advisor will clear in advance any statements used in Congressional testimony, in consultations with our Allies, made on the record or on background with the press, and made publicly as related to this task of the Senior Policy Group. (S)

We will exploit opportunities as they present themselves to provide the Soviet Union further information about the flexibility that is inherent in the U.S. START and INF positions. To this end, I would like a letter drafted for my signature to the leader of the Soviet Union. This letter should note that I recognize that the United States and the Soviet

Union do hold opposite views on who is threatened. It should explain fully the basis for the U.S. concern, citing Soviet statements threatening to the U.S. and the record of Soviet arms build-up. It should note the history of U.S. initiatives aimed at reducing tensions. It should make clear the continued, sincere U.S. interest in meaningful, equitable and effectively verifiable agreements which would reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. It should highlight the flexibility in the current U.S. positions and our readiness to find appropriate ways for trading U.S. areas of advantage that are of concern to the Soviet Union for Soviet areas of advantage that are of concern for the U.S. and its allies. Finally, it should make clear the readiness of the U.S. to resume both the START and INF negotiations and should encourage the Soviets to reopen a constructive dialogue with us on these matters. (S)

A draft of this letter should be available for my review by April 7.² (S)

We will move forward in those other areas in which there may be prospects for progress toward meaningful agreements. For example, the U.S. draft Chemical Warfare Treaty will be tabled before the end of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. (S)

Ongoing work on the full range of the U.S. arms control agenda (to include additional confidence building measures, nuclear testing, and space related issues) should be reviewed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group. This work should be brought to a timely conclusion.

In addition to these actions, we will intensify our efforts to explain publicly the principled positions we have taken in the various nuclear arms control negotiations over the last three years. We have established a record about which we should be proud. We must ensure that that record is known and understood. (C)

A detailed plan for accomplishing the task of publicly explaining our positions in START and INF should be developed. This plan should outline the major themes to be stressed and the mechanism for most effectively presenting these themes. This plan will be prepared and submitted for my approval by April 14. (C)

Finally, as we implement the steps I have directed, it is essential that clarity and coherence of this Administration's position on arms control be maintained. To that end, the Secretary of State will serve as the Administration's chief spokesman on arms control. Congressional

² Shultz sent Reagan the draft letter under a covering memorandum of April 6. (Ibid.) Reagan edited the draft and wrote a handwritten postscript in the April 16 final version, which is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

testimony and all major statements on arms control will be cleared in advance through the National Security Advisor. (C)

Ronald Reagan

93. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, April 12, 1984

[Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Files, System II files—INT 8490035–88902478. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only. Sent for information. 2 pages not declassified.]

94. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

I attended a meeting in the Situation Room this afternoon chaired by Bud McFarlane of the Strategic Arms Control Policy Group.² The question was options for entering into negotiations with the Soviets in space arms control. This issue has come front and center in public attention on arms control, because the Soviets, having chosen to stay away from the table in the nuclear talks, are now demanding that the United States open talks on ASAT. As typical, Richard Perle and OSD generally are opposed to any movement (beyond the harmless idea of an agreement on incidents in space, so named by analogy to the Incidents at Sea agreement entered into with the Soviets in the early 1970's). As Perle said, there was no harm in the incidents in space notion, but

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. Secret. Dictated on June 14.

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

there was no problem that had to be solved because there were no incidents in space. We in State are now pushing for some kind of a negotiation with the Soviets, because we believe that it would solve a serious political problem at home and might possibly be of benefit to the United States. The great public argument is, of course, that we ought to do something to limit military competition in space before it is too late. Frankly it appears too late already, because both countries have a great deal going on in space, including some “black” programs, I suspect, of which I am not even aware. But there is still something to the point, and the United States may be more dependent upon satellites than the Soviet Union, and therefore there is something to be said for limiting competition in ASAT weapons. But of course, there is always the problem that we can limit our own developments, but it is hard to limit Soviet developments, even with an arms control agreement, because of the possibility of Soviet cheating.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

95. National Security Decision Directive 142¹

Washington, July 5, 1984

ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, SEPTEMBER 1984

*The Official Response to the Soviet Proposal of May 29.*² I have authorized the following response to the Soviet proposal made on May 29, 1984.

“The United States Government has taken note of the statement by the Soviet government proposing a meeting of delegations in September to begin negotiations on preventing the “militarization of outer space.” The militarization of space began when the ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed. The United States Government, therefore, draws attention to the pressing need for the resumption of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 142. Confidential.

² This NSDD incorrectly dates the Soviet proposal to meet in Vienna for negotiations on preventing the “militarization of outer space.” The Soviet offer was made on June 29. Shultz’s memorandum to Reagan describing his meeting with Dobrynin that day, during which the offer was made, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 233.

negotiations aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals on a balanced and verified basis.”

“Therefore, the United States Government has informed the government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet the Soviet Union in September at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union and to the government of the country where the meeting is held for the following purposes:

(1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed; and

(2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches, which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

We will also be prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or other matters of interest to both sides.”

“We will continue contacts with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on arrangements for these September talks.”

Implementation. The U.S. will be prepared to begin discussions in Vienna on September 18, 1984. However, the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin well prepared and serious discussions. The U.S. agrees to the discussions proposed without preconditions, but based on a commitment by both sides to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before both the United States and the Soviet Union.

We should attempt to shift the continuing discussion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concerning these talks out of the public arena and into private diplomatic channels. To do this, we should seek Soviet agreement to join us in refraining from further public comment.

Preparations for Discussions. No matter what the initial Soviet response, the United States will be prepared to begin the discussions as outlined above on the dates initially proposed by the Soviet Union.

—Initial priority must be given to completing those papers which have been already tasked as a part of the ongoing program of work in the ASAT, START and INF areas. The prompt completion of this work is essential to providing the detailed, substantive foundation needed to support the final development of a U.S. approach to the discussions in September. This work program should be completed and its results delivered for my consideration no later than August 1.

—Based upon this work, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop and coordinate the necessary strategy and position papers needed to support the generation of instructions for the team representing the United States at the discussions beginning in mid-September. These papers will be provided for my review and approval no later

than August 31. At that time, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will also recommend a plan for timely consultations with the Congress and our Allies as appropriate.

—Within the next few weeks, the National Security Advisor will provide the Senior Arms Control Policy Group with additional guidance as needed to sequence, develop, and coordinate other aspects of U.S. preparations.

Ronald Reagan

96. Editorial Note

On July 6, 1984, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note describing a meeting that afternoon on “our approach to the talks that appear to be shaping up for September in Vienna with the Soviets on ASAT. Our approach is to include the subject matter of START and INF in those talks, whereas the Soviets are claiming that our desire to talk about ballistic missiles means that we are imposing preconditions to any negotiation on what they call the ‘militarization of outer space.’ This is a rather delicate war of words, because we are saying that we have accepted the Soviet proposal to talk about the militarization of outer space and that all we want to do is to talk about the whole picture, which includes ballistic missiles passing through space, and in any event the overall subject matter cannot be limited simply to weapons originating in space or used against space objects. The full richness of the possibilities from a definitional and rhetorical point of view became obvious, and a good number of papers are going to be written as a result of this meeting. Our first step will be to get a sound approach. The second will be to get it through the interagency process, and the third will be to sell it to the Soviets, assuming that the Soviets do not try to back out of what they have already offered.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

On July 9, Dam dictated a personal note in which he recounted a meeting “in the White House with Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter to discuss next steps on the meeting that the Soviets have proposed for September in Vienna on ‘the militarization of space.’ The meeting went on for an hour and half, and so we covered many topics, but we came down to the conclusion that the President should, in a week or so, respond to a letter received on Saturday from Chernenko attacking

the U.S. position that we must discuss not only space but also associated offensive systems. The general situation is that the Soviets are most interested in talking about our strategic defense initiative, whereas we, partly for internal reasons within the Administration, have no interest in negotiating away the SDI in any way at this time, but we do want to talk about offensive systems. Actually, Dam continued, "there are several aspects of the current situation. First, we would obviously like to have a series of meetings in Vienna in September, both because it would provide a substantive opportunity and because the President and his closest campaign aides would like to see some arms control negotiations restarted before the election. On the other hand, the Soviets understand this and are using that fact to put the negotiations on the basis which is best for them substantively. Second, we have the problem of knowing what it is that we are prepared to negotiate about. On the one hand, we have been going through an exercise in the interagency process which no doubt dictates being cautious about being able to negotiate about very much at all at this point. On the other hand, the President is very interested in having a heart-to-heart broad discussion with the Soviets about how to get into a posture where how we can negotiate very broadly about all kinds of offensive and defensive weapons." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984) Chernenko's July 7 letter to Reagan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 240.

On July 10, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "I attended a Senior Arms Control Policy Group meeting this afternoon in the Situation Room. Bud McFarlane chaired the meeting, which was on space arms control, and kept it well off the procedural question of how we tie the Soviets down to a broad-based discussion in Vienna and well onto the substance, with heavy emphasis on the procedures for getting the substantive work done. It became clear that the major problem is going to be how to protect the strategic defense initiative. This is important primarily from the standpoint of preventing DOD from vetoing participation in the Vienna talks in September, because Cap Weinberger is prepared to go to any lengths to protect that initiative from being limited in arms control negotiations at this time and will probably be able to count on the President to back him up in view of the fact that the President views the strategic defense initiative as a path to a future free from the threat of nuclear weapons (an expectation that I find groundless). The upshot was that the SACPG meeting was usefully boring. We will be able to handle in a smaller group the preparation for agreement with the Soviet Union on an agenda."

(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

On July 26, Dam dictated a personal note in which he noted: "The Soviet Charge Sokolov came in today to deliver a letter from Chernenko to President Reagan. The subject was the proposed Vienna space negotiations. The Soviets took a pretty hard line. It is clear that they are trying to back away from negotiations. Tonight at 7:00 we met in the Secretary's office to consider our reply. We came to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to prepare a letter or other document in response that could be released to the public if the Soviets chose to release their letter. The Soviets in the letter seem to be making a record for justifying their refusal to go to the Vienna talks. We settled on an approach which would allow us to go back and show that we really were accepting their proposal without preconditions, although we would not accept all of their exact language and we would make clear that from our standpoint, their phrase 'militarization of outer space' included the use of offensive nuclear arms that passed through space, such as ICBMs." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984) Chernenko's letter to Reagan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 252.

On July 31, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: "The most important meeting of the day was one with Soviet Charge Sokolov, who came in to deliver a further letter from Chernenko to Reagan. Here again, the Soviets are saying that we are failing to accept their offer, and therefore, they won't talk in Vienna on space. This is getting to be a kind of cat-and-mouse game with the Soviets, but it is very apparent the Soviets do not want to go forward with the talks. We now have a major choice to make. Do we on the one hand cut off the possibility of space talks in Vienna, or do we try to find some way to begin discussion of the issues in diplomatic channels? This is a decision that will have to be made over the next day or so, and it is difficult because the Administration is strung out across the country, with the President, the National Security Adviser, and the Secretary of State being on the West Coast but not even in the same place." Dam continued: "We had an interesting meeting this afternoon as part of our 'forward look' exercise, which is a way of defining policy issues and positions for a second four-year term. The discussion today was on the Soviet Union. The general conclusion that we should look more for continuity than for change was one that I challenged in the sense that I thought we also had to see what might be happening if there

were a generational change in Soviet leadership in the near future. There was also a vigorous debate about whether arms control had to be the centerpiece of our policy toward the Soviet Union. Bill Schneider made the point that it might very well be the case that there was no overlap between what kind of arms control agreement might be in the U.S. national interest and what kind of arms control agreement the Soviets might be prepared to agree to. If that were the case, he argued, we had to look at some other form of negotiation with the Soviet Union, rather than a nuclear arms control negotiation, as being the centerpiece of our interaction with the Soviet Union. This is a highly complex subject involving internal U.S. politics and attitudes of our allies, and no resolution was obviously possible in the space of a meeting that lasted about an hour and a half." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984) Chernenko's letter to Reagan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 257.

97. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 17, 1984

I attach a memorandum by Jim Timbie of my staff on "Arms Control in the Second Term" as well as a short personal note he put on top.

I highly commend this memo for your careful review. Despite its length, it is by far the most refreshing and cogent piece that I have read on the process of arms control negotiations.

Timbie has worked on arms control matters in the U.S. Government since he left Stanford at the beginning of the 1970's (with a Ph.D. in physics). I found him during the period prior to the Adelman confirmation when I was working with ACDA on a daily basis. He was the ablest fellow I found in ACDA, and so I brought him onto my staff.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 2, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. Secret. Not for the System.

Not all of his ideas are popular in OSD but I find his views, especially on process questions, refreshing and stimulating.

Kenneth W. Dam²

Attachment

Memorandum From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State Dam (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)³

Washington, July 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control in the Second Term

Permanent Features of the Landscape

—Arms control will continue to be a difficult and complex subject. Major problems include (1) finding a way to define equality despite differences in forces and geography, (2) securing Soviet agreement to significant reductions in modern weapons, (3) devising effective verification measures, and (4) treatment of third-country forces.

—The Soviets will be difficult to negotiate with, will continue to oppose our interests around the world, and will periodically act in a manner contrary to all civilized norms. The Soviets consider relations with the U.S. important, but subordinate to their perceived security needs.

² Dam initialed the memorandum “KWD” above his typed signature. Shultz wrote below this line: “KD for discussion next week G.”

³ Secret. Not for the System. Timbie sent the memorandum to Dam under cover of an August 17 note, attached but not printed: “KWD: I wrote the attached while you were in Mexico. I put it aside when the Vienna excitement broke, because no one concentrates on long-term issues when there is a hot subject to work instead. Now that Vienna has receded over the horizon, I offer it as a thought for approaching the next term. You will notice right away the big role for GPS. I am skeptical of the notions I see in the looking ahead exercise of turning this all over to a band of outsiders. The few months after November 7 offer a rare opportunity for an experienced Secretary to make a fresh effort with the Soviet leadership. It would be a waste to use that time educating a set of loose cannons so they could set out to discuss a common strategic policy with the Soviet Union. That is clearly impossible. What may be possible are practical steps. The only way to find out if they are possible is to propose some and see what happens. JT.” November 7 was the day after the presidential election.

—There will be no consensus in Washington on our objectives in pursuing arms control. There will be articulate opposition to all plausible agreements as contrary to U.S. interests.

—There will be broad public support for arms control, but practical steps will be controversial. Opposition to agreements comes from many quarters—levels too high, not verifiable, unduly constrains U.S. programs, does not end the arms race, etc.

Success in overcoming these obstacles will require substantial measures of hard work, imagination, and good luck. There is considerable room for improvement within the Administration and within the State Department in preparing ourselves substantively and organizationally to deal with this challenge.

Setting Priorities

Fifteen years ago there was only one major arms control forum—SALT—and major agreements were produced in 2½ years of concentrated effort. Today arms control efforts are spread over at least six major subjects, and nothing of consequence has been accomplished over the last five years, and only one significant agreement—SALT II—has been concluded in the last ten years. There are, of course, many reasons for this, but one is a lack of what in business is called strategic planning—setting priorities and focussing effort and resources in areas of highest potential payoff. Agreements are possible only with the direct and personal intervention of the leadership in both countries, a scarce resource that should be concentrated on one or two subjects at any one time.

START (including INF) should obviously be the top priority. It deals with the essential subject of our time, and substantial agreements in other areas are not likely in the absence of accomplishments in START.

The other subjects (MBFR, nuclear testing, space, CW, and CDE) all have rationales and should be nursed along. From time-to-time it may make sense to briefly focus some high-level attention on one of them, and some (e.g. space) might be packaged with START. But START should have top priority, and we should recognize that concrete accomplishments require great concentration of resources to surmount obstacles large and small. If this seems unfair to people with personal stakes in the other subjects, it should be kept in mind that success in START would give a large boost to the other subjects, and conversely without a START agreement prospects for most of the others are poor.

Leadership-to-Leadership Exchanges

Delegations in the field have a role to play, especially in working out the language of formal Treaties. Delegations, however, are exten-

sions of bureaucracies, and the U.S. and Soviet bureaucracies are incapable of significant arms reductions agreements. The basic elements of all significant arms control agreements have without exception been worked out in direct exchanges between the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Direct exchanges also have potential for overcoming the procedural obstacles which have prevented negotiations for the past six months.

Experiment and Exploration

There is usually more than one way to achieve a given objective. Our ignorance of the Soviet decision-making process is such that it is extremely difficult to predict which approach is the most promising. It is therefore useful to have a mechanism for informal experiments and exploration. Each side could try out ideas, objectives, and tentative proposals on the other. Such informal probing and testing is a common negotiating technique, but has become rare in arms control negotiations. Such exploration would be conducted with the knowledge and approval of the White House, but the President would reserve the right to review any tentative results.

The risk of such a procedure is that a tentative bargain could be overruled by the White House, which would discredit the U.S. officials involved, would add to the U.S. reputation as an unreliable negotiating partner, and could cause political problems for the White House. This actually happened in January, 1976, when a SALT II deal worked out by Kissinger in Moscow was rejected by President Ford.

The potential benefits, however, outweigh the risks. Reliance on the existing interagency process has three drawbacks: (1) It is extraordinarily time consuming. (When we tabled our draft INF Treaty in February 1982, we told the Soviets the accompanying verification procedures would be tabled shortly. Two and one-half years later, these procedures are still being worked out.) (2) The inevitable result is a compromise between conflicting agency views, which may be justifiable on bureaucratic grounds but which usually lacks substantive rationale and has little value for advancing negotiations. (The recent "move" in MBFR is a typical example.) (3) Once such a position is arrived at and blessed by the President, it becomes very difficult to change. Informal exchanges would allow testing of ideas on the Soviets without the delays and distortions of the interagency process, and without locking us into a position.

One example of a subject that could usefully be explored with the Soviets is the possibility of a new interim restraint regime to replace SALT II after 1985. (This, in fact, is next year's number one priority.) A second example is the new START framework.

Mutual Benefit

In order to conclude an agreement, both sides must perceive benefits in the bargain. This elementary notion is not reflected in our START approach to date, which calls for dismantling two-thirds of the Soviet ICBM force in return for marginal constraints on U.S. forces. More generally, our arms control approaches tend to be most popular with the least informed, regarded skeptically by the well-informed, and of little interest to the Soviets.

We have, however, been extremely successful in deriving public relations benefits from the fact of START and INF negotiations and from the positions we have taken, notwithstanding their small prospects for success. Both INF deployment and the M-X program have been greatly facilitated by our approach to the negotiations, and the Soviets are not likely to cooperate further in unproductive negotiations which benefit us without corresponding benefits for them. Predictions that the Soviets will return to the negotiations after the election are probably optimistic. More likely, they will return when they perceive that there is some prospect for a result that would be in their interest. They are not likely to be interested in talking for the sake of talking. From this perspective, the Soviet walkouts are not so much a pressure tactic as a refusal to cooperate in a process that is working against their interests, even though this refusal has serious costs, especially in Europe.

If this analysis is correct, introduction of new U.S. ideas is more likely to lead to resumption of START than the passage of time or the occurrence of the election.

Substance

Lack of substantive ideas is not a serious problem. The proposed "framework" should be the basis for the next substantive exchanges on START. It would implement the U.S. objectives (reductions, equality, enhancement of stability, and verification), meets the Soviets half-way on the central issue (aggregation of warhead limits), combines the best features of our position with the least objectionable elements of the Soviet position, and represents a vast improvement over SALT II in unit of account, levels, and structure. This approach has the potential to reduce the negotiations on the basic provisions of a START agreement to haggling over numbers.

The most difficult problem in strategic arms negotiations is the treatment of INF and third country systems. This has been the case since 1969, and while the separate INF negotiations have obscured this fact for the last few years, it will be obvious when talks resume. The problem arises from the clash of fundamental goals—the United States needs U.S.-Soviet equality, the Soviets need constraints on all comparable forces facing constrained Soviet forces. The long-term solution is a

five-power arrangement. The short-term solution is to isolate strategic force reductions from INF to the maximum extent possible, and create an outcome which permits each side to claim victory.

It will not be easy to isolate a START agreement from INF. In the past this has been done by keeping the levels of strategic forces high (so INF is relatively insignificant) and granting the Soviets an offsetting asymmetry (heavy missiles). Our objective of significant reductions well below SALT II, our continuing deployment of LRINF missiles, and British and French plans to expand their number of missile warheads by about an order of magnitude all ensure that INF will be a very difficult problem for START. The one positive note is the possibility of “tradeoffs”, which the U.S. could consider to be a balancing of U.S. and Soviet strategic advantages, but which the Soviets could consider to include an element of compensation for FBS.

Another major problem will be future ballistic missile defenses. While development and deployment decisions will not be made for many years, if ever, the Soviets will not be interested in constraints on offenses if there is a serious prospect of large-scale defenses. It is possible that a simple provision making a START agreement contingent on continuation of the ABM Treaty would suffice. But it is also possible that the future of defenses will need to be addressed and resolved again before a START agreement can be concluded. Properly handled, there is leverage here; the Soviets respect our defensive technology.

Once a basic framework for a START agreement begins to take shape, a large number of other problems will come to the fore—verification measures, Backfire, definitions, counting rules, and many more. This is the way the negotiating process proceeds—as central issues are resolved, new layers of problems previously perceived as too obscure and technical for senior-level attention present themselves for senior-level decision and negotiation. These need to be considered problems to be resolved rather than reasons why agreements are impossible.

Form

Most of our efforts are directed toward formal Treaties. Treaties are, however, only one part of a spectrum of possibilities, and we should consider other, less formal concepts as well. One possibility would be a new interim restraint arrangement to replace SALT II when it expires next year. Such an agreement could, for example, cap certain parameters near current levels. A follow on could lower these levels. Such a simple arrangement would produce substantively and politically useful results long before negotiations on a complete Treaty were concluded.

When we attempt to breathe life into START next year, our immediate objective should be to work out a new interim restraint regime to

replace SALT II in 1985. The expiration of SALT II is an action-forcing event, and the best solution would be to have in place by December 31, 1985 a replacement regime based on our preferred unit of account—warheads and ALCMs. Absent this, we would face a tough choice—continue to abide by SALT II, which would require dismantling of large numbers of Poseidon and MM-III as Trident boats are deployed, or be the first nation to breach the central provisions of the Treaty (which we have criticized as setting levels that are too high).

Since a new interim restraint regime would set a precedent for the follow-on agreement, and since the interim restraint arrangement would be most defensible as a temporary measure pending a more comprehensive agreement, our proposal for temporary, informal restraints should be consistent with and advanced together with a more comprehensive proposal (e.g. the framework). Once direct exchanges have produced a replacement interim restraint formula and an agreed framework analogous to the one produced for SALT II at Vladivostok, the stage would be set for useful work by the delegations.

Proposals and Objectives

When we make proposals, we should adopt the practice of advancing both our position and the objectives we seek to achieve. Giving our objectives equal weight with our position has advantages:

- Sometimes the Soviets agree with the objective but not the position, and can propose an alternative way to achieve it.

- Keeping our objectives clear can help avoid inflexible adherence to a particular means rather than the intended end result. (For example, our single-minded emphasis on a ban on encryption of telemetry, which is not plausible, is impeding our ability to pursue other ways to verify missile characteristics.)

Organization

Serious negotiations would require the State Department to carry out the following tasks, all more-or-less simultaneously:

- Conduct of informal exchanges with the Soviets, including formulation of ideas and tactics, coordination with the White House, etc.

- Management of the interagency process for analysis of ideas, problems, options, etc. Most of the groups formerly chaired by NSC are now chaired by State or co-chaired by State and OSD.

- Support of the Delegation in Geneva. ACDA plays a big role here, but needs State's help where there are interagency differences.

- Take the lead in dealing with compliance problems and interim restraint.

- Consult with the Allies and Congress, engage in public diplomacy, etc.

PM. The PM bureau has over the last few years put together a small group of people highly skilled in arms control analysis. They spend the great majority of their time writing interagency papers and attending and presiding over interagency meetings. They think of themselves primarily as members of the interagency community, and when they do think about State's interests, it is usually in terms of which option in an interagency paper State should support.

This deep involvement in the interagency process has advantages: PM has taken over much of the management function once carried out by NSC, and much of the technical analysis function once carried out by ACDA. PM, and Admiral Howe in particular, have earned the respect of the other agencies. The down side is that after devoting 60 plus hours a week to their interagency work, PM analysts have little additional time or energy for supporting the Secretary. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that a PM analyst considers his job is finished when he has successfully negotiated interagency clearance on a paper hundreds of pages long analysing a dozen or more options.

General Chain should be encouraged to reorient PM to play a larger role in State's internal efforts to find solutions to problems, explore possibilities with the Soviets, etc. General Chain needs a few more people, especially at the working level, in order to devote more resources to this task while continuing to discharge State's interagency obligations.

EUR. EUR has also put together a small group of highly skilled people, and they have been the source of most of the innovative ideas in START, INF, and other subjects over the last few years. EUR has a flare for initiative and action, and many of their suggestions which were controversial at the time are now widely considered to have been successful (e.g., the INF moves in 1983, the CW Treaty draft, and the Dublin offer on NUF). EUR is well positioned to support serious negotiations conducted on several levels.

The Seventh Floor. The Seventh Floor has played a small role in START and other arms control negotiations to date. A serious negotiation conducted on several levels will require much more participation by the Seventh Floor principals. The Secretary himself would have major responsibilities as the principal point of contact with the Soviets and with the President. He could use substantial support, however, in such tasks as management of the process (planning, analysis, tactics, etc.) supporting the private exchanges, liaison with the White House, coordination of the positions State representatives take in interagency meetings and papers, and senior-level discussions with other agencies. These functions are best carried out at a level between the bureaus and the Secretary. Such a role would (if the negotiations go anywhere) require a major commitment of time and energy, and would involve

engagement in this issue on a day-to-day basis. I, of course, think D would be a good place for this responsibility, but other possibilities are P or a new Seventh Floor principal.

The traditional entree for the Deputy Secretary into this subject was the SIG. There would be no point in resuming meetings of the SIG, however, since there is no need for a group between the IG and the SACPG. While the interagency analysis is necessary, and in some cases even useful, it will never resolve the major problems and is not the place where additional effort should be expended.

ACDA. The ideal ACDA would consider itself to be *de facto*, if not *de jure*, a branch of the State Department. ACDA retains significant capability for technical analysis, and would be a useful ally. In the past ACDA has at times worked closely with State, and at other times opposed State. Today it is somewhere in between. ACDA's problems include uneven staffing, a mandate that overlaps State's, and a subject matter that is too important and too bureaucratically difficult to be left to a tiny and bureaucratically weak agency. Once serious negotiations began, ACDA would want very much to be involved. State could benefit from access to ACDA's technical analysis capability. If handled carefully, there is therefore the basis for closer cooperation than in the recent past.

Conclusion

The combination of smart but largely procedural U.S. moves and dumb Soviet moves has worked well to date in gaining support in Congress and elsewhere for our arms control approach. The build-down episode illustrates that a surprising amount of short-term political gain can be extracted from an initiative with no substantive content whatever. But as time goes by, more will be demanded of our arms control policy than statements that arms control is difficult, the Soviets are hard to deal with, and everything is under study. Without either tangible results or evidence of innovative efforts, the perception will grow that while our stated goals are laudable, little is being done to achieve them. This will have an increasingly negative effect on support for the defense program, on the Alliance, and on overall support for the President.

It is possible that even with our best efforts nothing worthwhile can be accomplished. The Soviets may or may not be prepared to make the major changes in their approach that will be necessary. The only way to determine how the Soviets would respond to a more equitable proposal is to suggest one and see what happens.

98. **Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)**¹

Washington, September 18, 1984

I attended the NSPG meeting² with the Secretary today. The ostensible subject was preparations for Vienna negotiations. The actual subject which surfaced more or less during the meeting from time to time was what the President and the Secretary should say to Gromyko in their upcoming meetings.³ I found the discussion rather appalling. It was clear that the President wanted to take some steps in his meeting with Gromyko and particularly to hold out some prospect of real movement on our arms control position. But except for the Secretary of State, all of the agencies appeared implacably against anything significant. Only Ken Adelman was prepared to see any movement and very slight at that. Bob Gates from the CIA handed me a note near the end of the meeting saying that the President was out in front of all of his advisers, and that was certainly true, with the exception, of course, of Secretary Shultz. Somehow or the other everyone seems to believe that we can keep the "high ground" without making any concrete moves. It is certainly true that we don't want to make public concessions designed to bring the Soviets back to the table, but at the same time, if we are not prepared to unveil even informally to Gromyko what we would be prepared to do in Vienna negotiations, there aren't going to be any ASAT negotiations nor any START or INF negotiations either. The State Department's approach has generally been to feel that the Vienna forum is a good one, because it would allow us to link offense and defense and involve negotiations on offensive systems with the Soviet Union without forcing the Soviets to admit that they were coming back to START and INF negotiations. That is a principal advantage of the Vienna forum over a Geneva forum. But everyone seems to be frightened that we might make a mistake, and Cap Weinberger seems so concerned that something might be done which would in some way compromise the strategic defense initiative, that no one else is willing to move. That said, it is of course true that almost anything that we might negotiate in the ASAT area or on defensive systems generally would hold out the possibility that we would in some way restrict the

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984). Secret. Dictated on September 18.

² The minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 277.

³ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 284, 286, 287, and 288.

strategic defense initiative. The problem, of course, with that kind of concern, quite aside from what anyone may think about the SDI program, is that we are not going to be able to get funding from the Congress for a strategic defense initiative unless we are shown to be willing to deal with the Soviets on arms control.

[Omitted here are discussion not related to START.]

99. Editorial Note

On October 12, 1984, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note describing a meeting that day “with Paul Nitze to discuss where we should be trying to go in arms control in a second Reagan term. (I was Acting Secretary because the Secretary was in Mexico and then briefly in Puerto Rico to meet with the transiting Pope.) Paul was in an exceedingly pessimistic mood. His view was that the odds were against reaching any arms control agreement that would be in the national security interests of the United States. At the same time he thought it was necessary to reach an agreement that would be in our interests, and he specifically said that he thought that the walk-in-the-woods agreement would have been in our national interest, and indeed anything close to it would have been (since he is firmly of the view that the Soviets did reject it and under any circumstances would have rejected it at the time). At the same time he liked the idea of negotiating on a twenty-year perspective and we discussed the reasons why that might be a good idea. I tended to emphasize the fact that it was easier for the Soviet Union, not to speak of the United States, to agree to phase out some system that was not yet in production. Paul, on the other hand, tended to emphasize the fact that it was desirable to engage the Soviets on grand principles, not so much because he thought there was any chance of agreement, but because he thought it was necessary from the standpoint of public opinion in the United States and of relations with the Allies to be engaged with the Soviets in arms control discussions. To induce the Soviets to engage in such discussions, it was necessary to be open to pragmatic and practical arrangements that might be possible. But he warned strongly against interim agreements and moratoria, which he felt would almost certainly be disadvantageous to the United States and which the Soviets had shown an ability to benefit from unilaterally in the past. For example, he attacked in the most outspoken manner the 1972 interim agreement on offensive weapons. On another point, he thought that it was

unquestionably a fact that the Soviets had nuclear superiority over the United States. I asked him why he was so convinced that that was true, in view of the fact that we had the advantage in sea-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. He said that he thought so because he had done the analysis along with an interagency group for Bill Casey in 1981 and said nothing had fundamentally changed. We agreed that it would be desirable to bring that analysis up to date to see what the situation was like today and how it would project out into the future.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985) The 1981 analysis was not further identified.

On October 26, Dam dictated a personal note recounting “a lengthy meeting on arms control held the previous day” with Secretary of State George Shultz: “We discussed the fundamental question of how an unconstrained situation would affect United States security policy. There was general agreement that we would not fare well in a situation in which the Soviet Union was not constrained, even though the United States was also not constrained, because the Soviets had the technical and economic ability to build large numbers of nuclear weapons systems and no need to phase out the old ones, even though they might choose to do so. This is different from the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of ACDA Director Adelman, who seem to believe that any arms control agreement we would be likely to negotiate would be harmful to U.S. national security interests. The Secretary stated forcefully that this was likely to be the fundamental foreign policy issue of a second Reagan term.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)

Also on October 26, Dam dictated a second personal describing a meeting that day to prepare Shultz for a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. “This is the follow-up to the Gromyko meeting. We did not plan to reveal any particular substance on arms control to the Soviets, but we did plan to review the current state of play on all the issues and to interpret the President’s remarks in the meeting between Gromyko and the President. I later learned that Dobrynin did not bring any substance to the table either and indeed did not appear to be instructed on what he could say. However, yesterday the Counselor at the Embassy invited the Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Soviet and Eastern European Affairs to lunch, at which he suggested that Gromyko did see his visit to Washington as an opening and hoped to follow up but was constrained by various things, including the strong statements that the Soviets had made on not being

willing to negotiate on arms control until the Euromissiles were withdrawn from Europe. One implicit suggestion was that we might negotiate formally in Vienna on space while doing the negotiations covering START and INF in diplomatic channels (i.e., in foreign minister meetings), which was the pattern for much of the Carter administration." (Ibid.) The memorandum Shultz sent to President Ronald Reagan about his meetings with Dobrynin is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, January 1983–March 1985, Document 296. For Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's visit to Washington, see footnote 3, Document 278.

Also on October 26, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive Number 148, "The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal," which stated that the United States was "prepared to begin discussions aimed at exploring mutually acceptable approaches to initiating negotiations on the limitation of the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides and the more general topic of the militarization of space, and to resuming negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals." The decision directive instructed Shultz "to solicit a Soviet position concerning the U.S. proposal," and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane "to conclude promptly work already in progress and any additional work needed to support the conduct of these talks." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 148)

On November 6, President Reagan defeated Democratic presidential nominee and former Vice President Walter Mondale to win a second presidential term. In the period between Election Day and Inauguration Day, January 21, 1985, Reagan convened his national security team in a series of meetings to formulate U.S. positions on the Umbrella Talks in advance of Shultz's meetings with Gromyko, scheduled for early January 1985.

On Friday, November 30, 1984, President Reagan chaired a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in the Situation Room from 1:45 to 2:45 p.m. to discuss Soviet strategy on arms control, the current status of Soviet forces, and projections of future Soviet capabilities. Principals agreed to the importance of pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and obtaining Congressional support for production and deployment of the M-X missile. Toward the end of the meeting, Reagan asserted "that the Soviet goal is to protect the motherland while developing military power that they can use to blackmail the West." The minutes of this meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 322.

The following Wednesday, December 5, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. McFarlane

introduced the agenda as a discussion of U.S. and Soviet objectives in the arms control talks set to start in January in Geneva and summarized a paper prepared by the Senior Arms Control Group. "Our goal is to get a useful process going and to achieve formal negotiations on offensive systems while we discuss the relationship of defense to offense," McFarlane said. Midway through the meeting, President Reagan "noted that we could build on the Soviet preoccupation with protecting the homeland by making clear that we have no intention of starting a nuclear war" and "have no objections to their having defenses, but we have to look at defenses for ourselves and we need to look at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons." After meeting participants discussed anti-satellite weapons and other advanced technologies, the President concluded: "SDI gives us a great deal of leverage on the Soviet Union." The minutes of this meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 326.

The National Security Planning Group met again on December 10, in the Situation Room from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. McFarlane introduced the agenda as a discussion of six questions concerning the U.S. position in Geneva: (1) "Do we want separate START and INF negotiations or should they be merged?"; (2) "What shall we do about Space—negotiations or discussions only?"; (3) "Should Space issues be dealt with separately or merged with START and INF?"; (4) "Should we combine everything together in one large negotiation, perhaps having separate working groups?"; (5) "How do we deal with the objectives of Umbrella discussions?"; and (6) "Should we view these as 'Umbrella Talks' or perhaps 'Stability talks?'" The President and his team debated these questions yet did not arrive at definitive answers. At the close, Reagan "noted that the situation today is like a duel between two gunfighters. Our policy of MAD could get us both killed. It is just too dangerous." The minutes are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 331.

On December 17, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. Deliberations centered on how to preserve domestic and allied support for SDI under sustained pressure from the Soviet Union, and the possibility of the Soviets' walking out of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations if the Reagan administration proceeded with research into strategic defenses. McFarlane encouraged the other principals to participate in a public diplomacy campaign emphasizing the benefits of SDI toward reducing the risk of nuclear war. Participants also considered whether or not SDI would rely exclusively on non-nuclear technologies, and the advantages of approaching the Soviets

with specific numerical proposals. The minutes of this meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 334.

On January 1, 1985, the President signed National Security Decision Directive 153, which enumerated six specific goals for Shultz's meeting with Gromyko: (1) "Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals"; (2) "Keep START and INF issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible"; (3) "Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by: a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate; b. avoiding a 'space only' forum; c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and d. providing for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses"; (4) "Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to: a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a 'failure' of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S."; (5) "Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union"; and (6) "Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position." NSDD 153 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 348.

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9 p.m.

The Secretary's Telephone Call to the President at 2100 January 8, 1985 from Geneva

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1985 Arms Control, Geneva. No classification marking. Shultz spoke to Reagan, who was in Washington, by telephone. According to the President's Daily Diary, the conversation began at 3:04 p.m. EST and ended at 3:20 p.m. EST.

The Secretary: I am here in Geneva with Bud McFarlane. I can report to you that we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union to begin new negotiations on the questions we came here to discuss; nuclear and space arms.² We will announce this at 11:00 pm here which is 5:00 pm your time. We agreed to a set of points that are consistent with and supportive of your instructions. I think this is an opportunity for a good beginning. There is a wide difference of opinion on important topics and the negotiations will be long and tumultuous. It will require patience but we have an agreement.

The President: When will the talks start?

The Secretary: We agreed that we would work through diplomatic channels to set a time and a site within one month. We will drive for Geneva and I doubt that that will be a problem. We will start probably in March or April.

The President: Congratulations. It sounds great.

The Secretary: Well, it's a relief to have it over with.

The President: Congratulations to everybody on the delegation. Well done. We have gone over a real hurdle.

The Secretary: A few hours ago, I was not sure we would make it. I want to tell you that this big delegation worked very well. Everybody was included and everybody made comments on all of the drafts. This afternoon we had the whole delegation set up in the room next to where we were meeting and we went back and forth. They all signed off on this agreement. We have come out with a unified delegation that represents everyone's point of view. The JCS had Admiral Moreau here. Richard Perle told me tonight that he wanted to go out and tell the press that we are unified and that he fully supports the agreement. So the broad participation that you and Bud engineered paid off. I would like to read the statement to you. I want to report to the press that I spoke to you and gave you the agreed statement.

(Note: Secretary reads text of statement)³

² Memoranda of conversation for the January 7 and 8 meetings between Shultz and Gromyko are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355, 357, 360, 362.

³ The U.S.-Soviet joint statement, which was released on January 8, noted that "the sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability." The text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, p. 30.

The Secretary: We tip our hat to you, Mr. President. It's your positions and your mandate that got us here. I want to put Bud on the phone now.

Bud McFarlane: Mr. President, you know what you can thank for this? You have got an iron-ass Secretary of State. He has done a marvelous job. This is as unified as this community of people has been in four years time. We appreciate your support. Your victory in the election has made an impression on Moscow, that's for sure.

The Secretary: I will be back tomorrow by about 1:00 pm. I hope to see you and give you a personal report. We will send a suggested statement for your press conference on Wednesday. You will also have the transcript of my press conference tonight⁴ and Q's and A's and briefing material.

The President: This sounds great. You all have my congratulations.

⁴ The transcript of Shultz's press conference is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, pp. 30–32.

101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 24, 1985

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD on Preparing for Negotiations with the Soviet Union

ISSUE

Should we issue the draft NSDD² at *Tab A* which provides guidance for preparing for the upcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union?

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-088, NSDD 160. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Attached but not printed is the draft NSDD, which contains several minor handwritten corrections. The final version of NSDD 160 is printed as Document 102.

DISCUSSION

The NSDD formally identifies the U.S. negotiators for the upcoming negotiations, tasks the SACG to provide draft instructions for the U.S. delegation for your approval by March 1, 1985, and establishes the backstopping mechanism needed to support the U.S. delegation once negotiations begin. In addition, it identifies Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze as Special Advisors to the President and Secretary of State and outlines the terms of reference of their activities.

The NSDD also reaffirms the guidance issued in NSDD 3–82 (March 3, 1982)³ that the JCS certify the military sufficiency of positions submitted to you for approval. This guidance was critical during the development of the initial U.S. START position—and, may be even more important as we move into this next phase of activity. It drives the professional military community to provide a much needed input.

Finally, the NSDD strengthens provisions for the assessment of verifiability and calls for a study (by March 15) of how the policy generation process could be improved with respect to verification issues. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have expressed concern about the process by which verification considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms control policy and specific U.S. positions. The tasking included is designed to address these concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the draft NSDD at *Tab A*.⁴

³ See Document 6.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

102. National Security Decision Directive 160¹

Washington, January 24, 1985

PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (S)

The success of the U.S. delegation at the recent Geneva meetings in gaining Soviet agreement to join us in renewed negotiations demonstrates the soundness of the basic U.S. approach to arms reductions. The U.S. delegation, building upon the work of many over the last four years, has provided us an opportunity to pursue, once again, our national security objectives through direct, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. I want to ensure that the United States is in a position to capitalize fully on this opportunity. (C)

Organization of the U.S. Delegation. Senator John Tower will take charge of the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms. Ambassador Maynard Glitman will have responsibility for negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Ambassador Max Kampelman will lead the overall U.S. delegation and also the U.S. side in the negotiations on Defense and Space. (U)

Developing U.S. Positions. The Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) will coordinate the development of the general U.S. approach to the negotiations, the specific U.S. positions in each of the three substantive areas of negotiation, and the instructions to the U.S. delegation for the upcoming round of talks. The SACG will be supported by the existing Interagency Groups on START, INF and ASAT issues. The responsibilities of the ASAT IG will be expanded to address the full extent of the Defense and Space issues associated with the upcoming negotiations. The SACG will provide draft instructions to the U.S. delegation for my review and approval no later than March 8, 1985. (S)

In the START and INF areas, the majority of the work needed to support the upcoming round of negotiations has already been accomplished. The SACG should draw upon that work in completing its preparations in these areas. In the area of Defense and Space issues, more preparation is necessary. Appropriate priority should be given to ensuring that the U.S. position in this substantive area is finalized and thoroughly vetted in a timely manner. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Box SR-088, NSDD 160. Secret. McFarlane distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, Rowny, Nitze, Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman under cover of a January 24 memorandum: "The President has decided upon the following guidance concerning US preparations for upcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union." (Ibid.)

Support for the Delegation. Once negotiations begin, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will chair an interagency backstopping group here in Washington to provide support for the U.S. delegation in implementing its instructions on a day-to-day basis. Should issues arise that cannot be resolved within the backstopping group or by the appropriate Interdepartmental Group, they will be referred to the Senior Arms Control Group and through the SACG to me as needed for resolution. (C)

Special Advisors. Ambassadors Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze have already made a major contribution to the U.S. effort to achieve equitable and verifiable agreements which would lead to equal and reduced levels of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear offensive forces. Their experience and judgment are a unique asset to me and to the nation. As we move into the next phase of negotiations, their advice and counsel on our broader range of issues under active negotiation will be greatly needed. Therefore, I have asked Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Nitze to continue their long and distinguished records of service to this nation with the titles of Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters. (U)

In their new capacities, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will provide advice and counsel on the arms control policy decision making process in general, on the development, formulation, and implementation of negotiations on the full range of nuclear, conventional, defense and space issues, as well as on the integration of arms control policy into U.S. national security strategy. To support their charter, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will be provided the information relevant to these subjects, attend NSC, NSPG and SACG meetings on these areas, and, have access to me, through the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss these matters. (C)

Military Sufficiency. As we start this next phase of negotiations, I wish to reaffirm the guidance initially issued in NSSD 3-82 (March 3, 1982) to the effect that any approach or alternative approaches recommended for my approval should, as a minimum, permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union to execute U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to comply with this guidance and submit their timely assessments of approach(es) under consideration in terms of this criterion to the Senior Arms Control Group and Interdepartmental Groups as appropriate for use in developing and refining U.S. arms control positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will certify to the military sufficiency of any approach submitted to me for my approval. (S)

Verification. The national security of the United States also requires the effective verification of arms control agreements. The Director of

Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have expressed concern about the process by which verification considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms control policy and specific U.S. positions. In consideration of the above, it is directed that the following actions be taken:

—As the instructions for the upcoming negotiating round are developed, and subsequently as U.S. arms control positions are considered, the SACG will assure that comprehensive assessments are made of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. The Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the SACG in this effort. These assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. The Arms Control Verification Committee will work with the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups and advise the SACG on the verifiability of the general approaches and the specific positions recommended to me by the SACG for approval as part of the instructions to the U.S. delegation.

—Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, are requested to forward to the National Security Advisor a report providing: (1) a more detailed assessment of the handling of verification issues in the policy development process; and, (2) specific recommendations as to how the process can be strengthened. This report should be available for my review by March 15. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Chapter 2, January 1985–October 1986

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

Washington, March 10, 1985, 0614Z

72684. Subject: (S) Instructions for START Negotiating Group.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following is guidance as approved in NSDD-165² for the START negotiating group to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms beginning March 12, 1985. This guidance is based on NSDD-153³ and, except as modified below, guidance for previous rounds of START remains in effect.

3. Overall approach. The President has given high priority to seeking equitable and verifiable arms control agreements. Negotiating group should, therefore, press for early progress in START consistent with the basic principles we have repeatedly enunciated:

(A) Any agreement reached must provide for equality between the US and USSR.

(B) Any agreement should provide for substantial reduction in strategic nuclear arms of each side to lower equal levels below current levels as a first step toward our ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

(C) Any agreement should promote stability and enhance security by placing special limitations on those nuclear forces which are the most destabilizing.

(D) Any agreement should provide for effective verification.

(E) Any agreement, once reached, must be clearly complied with.

—Delegation should present and expand on the substantive objectives above, as appropriate.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850194-0129. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Adelman, Nozenzo, McFarlane, Gordon, and in S/S-O and S/S; approved by Adelman.

² The full text of National Security Decision Directive 165, "Instructions for First Round of US/Soviet Negotiations in Geneva," March 8, is in National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 088, NSDD 16.

³ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985, Document 148.

—In particular, delegation should note that recent Soviet violations and probable violations of arms control agreements undermine the arms control process and make achievement of new agreements very difficult. Confidence that agreements will be complied with is central to arms control. Delegation should stress that we will continue to raise compliance concerns with the Soviet Union, seeking their resolution as fundamental to the prospect of genuine arms control.

4. The Negotiating Group should present and expand on the substantive principles above in paragraph 3, as appropriate. In particular, the Negotiating Group should, as appropriate, discuss the relationship of reductions in strategic offensive arms to the US strategic concept as set forth in NSDD–153.

5. SDI: The offense/defense relationship and START. Prospects for early progress in START may well depend to a significant degree on whether, and for how long, the Soviets adopt the tactic of impeding progress as a means of putting pressure on SDI. A central task in these negotiations, therefore, will be to encourage the Soviets to deal with their concerns about the future offense/defense relationship in separate discussions devoted to that subject, (i.e., in the Defense and Space Group), but at the same time to get down to serious work on START issues in the START Negotiating Group. The Negotiating Group should point out, in this connection, that leaders of both sides have recently reaffirmed the importance of reducing existing arsenals. The first-strike potential of existing strategic offensive forces poses the most immediate threat to stability and, therefore, deserves the highest priority. The Negotiating Group should also explain to the Soviets that reductions in strategic offensive arms are important to enhancing stability, and over the longer term they would complement a transition to a strategic balance characterized by greater reliance on strategic defenses.

6. Trade-offs. During the last START round preceding the Soviet walkout, the US indicated its willingness to explore various means of trading off US and Soviet strategic advantages. In particular, we stated that we were prepared to explore means of limiting the size of ALCM forces (below the 8,000 ceiling implicit in the US draft treaty), in exchange for Soviet flexibility regarding areas of Soviet advantage of concern to us (e.g., ICBM capabilities). Probably because of Soviet preoccupation with INF issues in Fall 1983, the Soviet delegation expressed little interest in such trade-offs. START Negotiating Group should probe Soviet receptivity to trade-offs, indicating to the Soviets that we have flexibility with respect to both the structure and content of such trade-offs.

7. In the area of strategic forces, the primary focus must remain on achieving significant reductions in the most destabilizing forces, ballistic missiles, and especially MIRVed, land-based ICBMs. In doing

so, the US will continue to place its emphasis on reducing the numbers of warheads and the level of destructive capacity and potential associated with these systems.

(A) The US certainly recognizes the Soviet interest in dealing with strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). The US is prepared to entertain Soviet alternatives to our own position in this area. However, we remain convinced that appropriate reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and destructive capacity and potential are the central issues that we must mutually address.

(B) The outcome that the US continues to seek remains a reduction for the period of this agreement to an equal limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads which applies to the forces of both sides. During the past year, we have studied a number of ways to reach this point. Some involve relatively fast reductions. Others would move more slowly to accommodate normal force planning and an improved confidence in the reduction activity over time. The mechanism finally chosen to accomplish the reduction must provide for the national security of the US and its allies. It must also enhance stability. But, given these conditions, it is the outcome that is of primary importance.

(C) With respect to ballistic missile destructive capability, the US remains flexible on how reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability are achieved (i.e., through direct or indirect limitations) as long as an appropriate outcome results. However, of equal importance to reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and ballistic missile destructive capability, is the quality of stability that results from the specific reductions. In that context, the US continues to believe that moving away from high concentrations of land-based MIRVed ballistic missiles is in everyone's interest.

(D) The US is prepared to explore trade-offs between areas of relative US advantage and areas of relative Soviet advantage. The US feels that the relative US advantage in bomber forces and the relative Soviet advantage in land-based ballistic missile forces offers the grounds for such a potential trade-off.

(E) The above builds upon US proposals previously made and constitutes the foundation of the US position. The START Negotiating Group should draw upon the above as appropriate in presenting the US position to the Soviet side.

8. The START Negotiating Group should probe in the areas of potential trade-offs, the pace of reductions, and methods of addressing ballistic missile destructive potential. It should listen to Soviet views on alternative SNDV limits. Findings should be reported to Washington, including recommendations for future US actions.

9. The START negotiator is also authorized the following contingent authority. As a function of the degree of Soviet interest in making early

progress as reflected by specific Soviet proposals, or as a result of significant exploratory conversation, you are authorized to state that:

—The US is willing to consider Soviet proposals which involve associated limitations on ballistic missile warheads and air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), so long as the resulting outcome would result in significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads, improved overall stability, and equality in the aggregate.

—In the context of an agreement in which US concerns about the destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles were met, the US is willing to consider Soviet proposals which could involve associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers with the total of both in the range previously proposed by the Soviet Union (i.e., around 1800).

10. Any specific aggregate numbers proposed by the Soviet Union should be referred to Washington. However, in accordance with the criteria stated, any levels proposed that would not result in a reduction in the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads should be rejected at the time proposed.

11. Draft treaty. START Negotiating Group should indicate in an appropriate manner that our draft treaty and annexes put forth in the previous negotiations remain on the table, and we see no need for formally retabling them in the context of the “new” negotiations. As we present new or modified elements of our position, we may want to incorporate them into our treaty text. As in the past, draft language for such provisions should be sent to Washington for approval.

12. Confidence-building measures. START Negotiating Group is authorized to seek to reconvene the CBMs Working Group and to press for progress on the basis of existing US proposals, in accordance with previous guidance. If Soviets should seek to have START and INF CBM proposals considered in Single Group, Negotiating Group should say we prefer to keep START and INF discussions separate.

Shultz

Note: Telegram downgraded to EXDIS per state 079619.

104. Memorandum From William Wright and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 26, 1985

SUBJECT

Last Week in Geneva (22–26 April 1985)

Round I concluded this week and the three U.S. negotiators briefed the NAC before returning home on Thursday.² Twenty plenary sessions were conducted; five full delegation and five each for the three negotiating fora. A summary of this week's activities is at *TAB A*.

Ambassador Kampelman has provided his end of round assessment at *TAB B* in which he concludes that it was not a very productive round largely because the Soviets chose to infuse it with a large propaganda content. The clear Soviet target throughout was SDI, against which they employed the dual tactic of calling for a ban on research while tightly linking it with the prospects for radical reductions in offensive arms. The overlay of both public and negotiating proposals for moratoria in all three areas provided little indication of Soviet flexibility. Indeed, there seemed to be general Soviet frustration with our side's ability to question inconsistencies with the details of the Soviet moratoria proposal without rejecting it outright.

For the next round Kampelman counsels consistency and patience if we are to be successful in convincing the Soviets that we will not abandon our SDI research and will accept no preconditions on achieving reductions in START and INF.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Crisis Management Center, SDI (147–151). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Concurrence by Linhard. Copied to Matlock, Lehman, and McDaniel.

² April 25.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

LAST WEEK IN GENEVA (22–26 APRIL 1985)

—*Defense and Space*: The fifth meeting of this group took place on April 22. Kvitsinskiy assumed the “bad cop” role in delivering a sharp diatribe on U.S. START and INF proposals as well as the now common attacks on SDI. Kampelman rebutted his attempt to ridicule the U.S. proposals, suggesting that between rounds the Soviet negotiators should take a more serious look at what the U.S. had said. In post plenary discussions Kvitsinskiy has made the false charge that our Thule radar was an ABM Treaty violation due to its location. He was laying the ground work for a counter to our Krasnoyarsk concerns. This issue is under active discussion in the SCC.

—*April 22 Heads of Delegation Luncheon*: During the course of a three hour luncheon the two delegation heads had a candid discussion on procedures for the next round and major differences. On the former, both agreed that fewer full delegation plenaries and more contact in the three negotiating groups would be required. On the latter, Kampelman opined that two major issues divide us: (a) agreement in one area hostage to agreement in another, and (b) the differences of opinion on the intent of SDI. Karpov responded that he could envision the building of “models of agreements” in the three areas but that if two or more of the areas were “organically” related there could be no finalization. With regard to the intent of SDI, he reiterated the Soviet view that SDI was part of the U.S. offensive planning to cope with a Soviet retaliation to a U.S. first strike.

—*Final Plenary Round I*: The fifth and final full delegation plenary session of Round I took place on April 23. Both sides used the occasion to review the bidding. Karpov kept to the standard line that no reductions in offensive arms would be possible until the question of stopping an “arms race in space” is resolved and then, both criticized the various U.S. proposals on the table and touted the Soviet moratoria. Indeed, in content this statement was very similar to the one he delivered at the beginning of the round. Kampelman contrasted the flexibility and forthcoming approach by the U.S. in all areas with Soviet stonewalling tactics involving preconditions and freezing the very conditions that

³ Secret; Sensitive.

the sides should be working to improve. He pressed for development between rounds of the basis for a serious dialogue on the offense-defense relationship and for movement toward radical reductions in offensive arms.

—*Next Rounds*: In various meetings last week, general agreement has been reached on the term of subsequent rounds; Round II—May 30–July 16, and Round III—September 29 through early November. Agreement emerged that there would be at least one plenary session per week for each of the sub-delegations; START, INF and Defense and Space. There would be joint plenaries scheduled for the beginning, middle and end of the round with the caveat that either side could call for additional meetings as it saw fit.

Attachment

Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State⁴

Geneva, April 24, 1985, 2042Z

3777. Subject: NST: Ambassador Kampelman's End-of-Round Assessment.

1. This is NST-1-036, Secret—Entire Text.
2. Addressees will have received end-of-round assessments from each of the three negotiating groups. The following is my personal assessment of the first round of our negotiations as a whole.
3. It was not a very productive round, largely because the Soviets chose to infuse it with a large propaganda content. The six-week session did, however, give us a chance to lay out our own positions and to draw some conclusions about where Soviet priorities lie. Clearly, SDI is the main Soviet target, and they tried in several ways to test and erode our firmness on proceeding with the research program.
4. Early on, Karpov indicated that the Soviet interpretation of "interrelationship" in the January 8 joint statement⁵ was that progress in the offensive area had to be connected with banning "space-strike" weapons. This pre-condition was most visible in the Soviet description of the linkage between SDI and START. From the beginning to the end of the round, they left little doubt that agreement in START had to be

⁴ Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 100.

preceded by agreement on SDI.⁶ In fact, in START there was a double link—both to SDI and to INF, agreement on which also had to precede agreement in START. The linkage was weaker between SDI and INF; the Soviets indicated that in principle they were prepared to accept a separate INF agreement (on their own terms, of course).

5. In both offensive negotiations, for which a negotiating history exists, the Soviets showed little or no flexibility.⁷ In INF, their bottom line was familiar: zero U.S. missiles in Europe. In START, the Soviets even went backwards by broadening their 1983 ban on cruise missiles to include ALCM's.⁸ In the Defense and Space Group, for which there is much less of a negotiating history, the Soviets sought from the outset to ban SDI research and thus gut the program.

6. To sum up, the Soviets used a dual tactic to get at SDI—both through a ban on research and through a tight link to the strategic area where we have proposed radical reductions. To this tactic they added a venerable propaganda ploy—moratorium proposals in each of the three areas. These, too, had an SDI component: research on “space-strike arms” was to be stopped. An old chestnut waiting for a public blossoming, the moratorium idea seems to have had only a brief efflorescence in Europe following Gorbachev's April 7 interview.⁹ In Geneva, we sought to wither it with probing questions exposing its blights.¹⁰

7. It seemed to me a bit strange that Gorbachev should have chosen the moratorium for his first major foreign policy initiative. Perhaps this transparent and unproductive exercise indicates that, however flexible Gorbachev may eventually prove to be, he is at least for the moment aligned with the rigid elements of Soviet foreign policy which have predominated in the past few years.

8. Karpov's final statement yesterday sounded very much like his remarks in the very first plenary at the beginning of the round. I suspect the similarities were not accidental. The Soviets seemed to be saying that they were not ready to show any flexibility at all. It is difficult to tell whether they have set the tone for a continuing period of rigidity

⁶ Linhard drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.

⁷ Linhard underlined “the Soviets showed little or no flexibility” and drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.

⁸ Linhard underlined “went backwards by broadening their 1983 ban on cruise missiles to include ALCM's.”

⁹ Reference is to Gorbachev's April 7 interview with *Pravda* on U.S.-Soviet relations. Excerpts are printed in the *New York Times*, April 8, 1985 p. A10.

¹⁰ Linhard bracketed this section and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Key.”

or whether they have simply felt compelled to go through a compulsory exercise in toughness and propaganda.

9. Whatever the Soviet motivation, I have no doubt that they will take back to Moscow with them the firm conviction that the U.S. will not abandon its SDI research or accept preconditions to serious negotiation on offensive weapons. There was indeed some tangible, if minor, improvement in tone during the last few days of the round—an indication, perhaps, that the Soviets had finally read our message, but I expect continued toughness during the next round.

10. The Soviet negotiating position in Round II and onward will inevitably be heavily influenced by the political environment outside Geneva. The Soviets will undoubtedly look carefully at—and indeed do their best to influence—European views toward SDI, the actions of the United States Congress in funding SDI research, the INF situation leading up to the Dutch deployment decision, and possible signs of Allied disarray or disunity in the runup to and aftermath of the Bonn Summit. The Soviet negotiating position may also be affected by the approaching Gorbachev-Reagan summit and by the increasing likelihood that Gorbachev will unveil a major Soviet arms control initiative at the UN early this Fall.

11. As we return to Washington, we will be looking at ways to deal with new approaches which the Soviets may throw at us. Without prejudging what may be decided in the next several weeks, I am firmly convinced that we need two qualities above all others—consistency and patience. The Soviets have shown us very little flexibility and have evinced very little interest in the flexibility that we have told them we possess. They have no doubt been testing the adage that Soviet intransigence can provoke American concessions. This is a good period to prove them wrong.¹¹ The best way to force them into a genuine negotiation is to let them know that they can't intimidate or stampede us. The ineffectiveness of the Soviet tactics we encountered in Round I should be grounds for confidence that they cannot use Geneva to weaken either our strategic position or our ties with our allies.

Kampelman

¹¹ Linhard underlined "two qualities above all others—consistency and patience. The Soviets have shown us very little flexibility and have evinced very little interest in the flexibility that we have told them we possess. They have no doubt been testing the adage that Soviet intransigence can provoke American concessions. This is a good period to prove them wrong." He drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside the last sentence.

105. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 3, 1985

Mr. Secretary—

As tasked at the April 26 SACG meeting,² Jack Chain circulated a set of talking points³ to SACG principals that would be the basis for your presentation to Gromyko on arms control (I understand a copy has been sent to you).

I believe those points constitute a good basis for your discussion with Gromyko—taking him to task for the lack of forthcomingness in the Soviet approach in Round I, for Soviet backtracking from previous positions, and for their distortion of the January 8 joint statement⁴ by making agreement to their “space-strike” arms ban a precondition for movement on offensive arms reductions. The points also reiterate the flexibility our negotiators have on START and INF.

However, I believe you should be authorized to make some stronger points on defense and space, and that you should have contingency authority—if the situation in Vienna warrants—to give Gromyko some elaborations on our positions on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms reductions. I understand that EUR takes a similar view on these three areas.

SACG principals were asked to comment to McFarlane’s office by COB Monday, May 6 on the talking points circulated by Jack. Attached is the memorandum I have sent in response to that request.

Paul H. Nitze⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, May 85. Secret; Sensitive.

² Handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SACG—Prior to Round II/Interim Restrain (Apr–May 1985 (1)).

³ Not found.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 100.

⁵ Nitze signed the letter “Paul” above his typed signature.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)⁶

Washington, May 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Views on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and NST Round II

SACG principals were requested to submit their views on the arms control talking points circulated by General Chain for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, and on new guidance for the delegation for the second round. My views are presented below.

Shultz-Gromyko Meeting. The talking points circulated by General Chain are a good basis for the Secretary's presentation to Gromyko. However, I believe he should be given authority to make some additional points on defense and space, and should have contingency authority—for use *if* the situation in Vienna warrants—to flesh out the START and INF positions we introduced in Round I. This contingency authority would take the form of elaborations of our existing positions on offensive arms reductions.

With regard to the *defense and space* points circulated by General Chain, the Secretary should also:

—Call for a commitment to comply fully with the ABM Treaty, in the context of resolution of outstanding compliance issues.

—Propose to work out means to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty, including ways to maintain clear distinctions between ABM and non-ABM systems.

—State our intention that, should new defensive technologies prove feasible and desirable, we would negotiate as to how such systems could be developed, tested and deployed in accordance with procedures jointly agreed pursuant to the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

I recognize there is some unease over offering to “negotiate.” However, we are committed by the ABM Treaty to negotiate any amendments. Moreover, one of the four points agreed with Mrs. Thatcher at

⁶ Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Ikle, Perle, Moreau, George, Adelman, Cooper, Burt, Chain, Rowny, Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman.

Camp David—and one of our strongest public themes—is that deployment of new strategic defenses would be a matter for negotiation.

On *INF* the Secretary should have contingency authority to elaborate our current position along the following lines:

- A global ceiling on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads at a level of 600.

- A limit on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe at a level of 300.

- US readiness to agree to a specific limit on the number of P-II missiles deployed in Europe (though he would not offer a specific level).

On *START* the Secretary should have contingency authority to indicate that—in the context of an equitable agreement entailing significant cuts in ballistic missile warheads and meeting US concerns about the destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles—the US would consider:

- Associated limits on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs at a level of about 8000 (8000 fully protects our planned ALCM deployment of 2880).

- Associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers.

The Secretary would determine whether to use these contingency points depending on his reading of Gromyko. If Gromyko's presentation merits their use, we could derive several advantages. The elaborations on *START* and *INF* could:

- provide a concrete manifestation of the flexibility in our approach and perhaps a stimulus for some real give-and-take when negotiations resume in Geneva;

- serve the tactical objective of having fleshed-out US positions on the table to counter the Soviet moratoria and "space-strike" arms ban proposals and to shift the public away from SDI to our arms control agenda;

- better position ourselves for maintaining public, Allied and Congressional support for our negotiating effort; and

- in the admittedly unlikely case the Soviets pick up on our ideas, provide the basis for a joint declaration on negotiating guidelines for a possible fall summit.

Moreover, it is unclear how US intentions and positions described in Geneva were read in Moscow. Giving Gromyko a more specific presentation could ensure the message gets through to the Politburo that we do indeed have serious proposals that take account of Soviet interests. Finally, there is a chance, albeit small, that Gromyko may come to Vienna with a more reasonable position. At a minimum, the Secretary should have some specifics to play in that event.

I would not envisage a lengthy arms control exchange in Vienna, but recommend the Secretary have authority, if the situation warrants, to put these ideas to Gromyko and ask him to take them back to Moscow for consideration in developing the Soviet delegation's guidance for Round II, making clear we continue to view Geneva as the main channel for detailed negotiation.

Second Round Guidance. I recommend the Delegation be given instructions along the above lines for the second round.

106. Memorandum From the Special Counsel to the Head of the Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Mobbs) to the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Kampelman)¹

Washington, May 21, 1985

SUBJECT

Tiger Team Report

Attached is a report of even date by the "Tiger Team" on the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms.

This report generally represents a consensus of views among the members of the team except as otherwise noted. There has been no effort, however, to obtain formal agency clearances on the views expressed in the report.

Michael H. Mobbs
*Special Counsel to the
Head of the Delegation and
Representative of the Secretary of Defense to
the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms*

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 7, DOD. Secret; NoFORN. Kampelman sent Nitze a copy of the memorandum and attached paper under cover of a May 30 memorandum, in which he wrote: "I thought you would want to see this." (Ibid.)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense²

Washington, May 21, 1985

I. Scope and Purpose

This “Tiger Team” was convened at the request of Ambassador Kampelman to prepare a report anticipating the likely Soviet approach in the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms through the end of 1985, assuming that the possibility of some sort of major US-Soviet meeting this fall will significantly influence what the Soviets do in Geneva.

For the purposes of this report we have assumed that a fall “special event” will take place, although the general conclusions we have reached remain valid even if it does not. This report considers possible Soviet objectives and strategy over the coming months that could lay the foundation for a fall “peace offensive.” The report addresses both the private and propaganda aspects of the likely Soviet strategy. We also discuss certain considerations for US handling of possible Soviet approaches.

This report supplements the Tiger Team report of 15 February 1985 on the same subject.³ The present report does not alter the key judgments of the earlier one.

II. The Importance of the Fall

We believe the fall will be an important period for the current arms control negotiations. A number of events, including the US interim restraint decision, the fall UNGA session, NATO ministerial meetings, the Dutch deployment decision, the Belgian election, and a possible “summit”, will combine to create an atmosphere of rising public expectation for progress in arms control, pressures for conciliatory gestures by the West, and intense propaganda moves by the Soviets. There will be tremendous pressure for the United States to make concessions and little or no such pressure on the Soviet Union. With some minor adjustments to their current position the Soviets could pressure the United States for this type of movement.

Such pressure is likely to be even greater if any high-level meeting on the fringes of the UNGA or a summit between President Reagan

² Secret; Noform.

³ Not found.

and Secretary Gorbachev takes place. Public expectations will be high and politicians in Europe and elsewhere will be anxious to demonstrate to their publics that they are doing everything possible to improve East-West relations. The Soviets will try to promote the view that a fundamental improvement is possible if only the United States is prepared to be flexible, especially by placing limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Such an environment obviously will be a risky one in which to conduct arms control negotiations.

III. Soviet Objectives and Strategy

We expect Soviet strategy to be primarily political and propagandistic in this coming period. US experience in Round One with the Gorbachev moratorium proposal and the numerous Soviet breaches of confidentiality support this view. Soviet Round Two activities will be consistent with their strategy to use the fall for a major "peace" offensive.

We expect the Soviets to step up their propaganda activity in the coming months in support of three main objectives:

First, the Soviets will seek to present the USSR and its new CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev as peacemakers. The primary audiences for this propaganda campaign will be the European and US publics and elites and the international media. The Soviets probably believe that the SDI and INF issues give them a strong opportunity to play this role. Moreover, if a summit meeting is in the offing, public expectations for a breakthrough in arms control will be high. The Soviets will attempt to exploit those expectations and use that opportunity to portray Gorbachev as a progressive, peace-loving leader.

A second Soviet objective will be to exert pressure against US defense funding. The Soviets will do this by attempting to influence Congressional and US public opinion. Key appropriation votes for major weapons systems under discussion in Geneva will be cast this fall. Recent votes on the defense budget, and particularly on SDI, should buoy Soviet expectations.

A third, related objective will be to concentrate maximum pressure on the US negotiating position in Geneva. The Soviets will continue to portray US positions as intransigent and counterproductive while hailing their own positions as constructive and flexible. It is unlikely, in our view, that the Soviets will do anything in this period that would lead to a sound agreement.

IV. Soviet Tactics

A. Round Two

The Soviets will likely adopt one of two main approaches vis-à-vis Round Two negotiations as part of their posturing for the capstone

events of September. Whichever option the Soviets take, we should not expect anything bold in Round Two that would steal Gorbachev's (or Gromyko's) thunder at the UNGA or at a possible summit. Instead, the Soviets will seek to set the stage for the fall by promoting the appearance of Soviet flexibility and US intransigence.

Under one possible approach the Soviet delegation would return to Geneva with similar instructions and the same intransigent style they demonstrated in Round One. The result of the May 15 Shultz-Gromyko meeting⁴ appears to be consistent with this option. They would continue to press the SDI issue, the necessity of banning research into "space-strike arms", and the "linkage" between limitations on "space-strike" arms and reductions in offensive nuclear forces. They might seek to take the offensive on the compliance issue by continuing to elaborate their view that SDI is a violation of the ABM Treaty and might also suggest that both sides work to draw a clearer distinction between research and development in the ABM Treaty. This theme could resonate in allied capitals and in Congress. In fact, Senator Gore has already proposed, at the recent Carter forum on arms control in Atlanta, that the United States and the Soviets clarify the distinction between research and development.

This approach would entail few or no substantive Soviet initiatives in Geneva, even though the Soviets might outline some "new" initiatives prior to the UNGA. Such initiatives would be followed by a Soviet challenge to the United States that would urge "constructive" consideration of Soviet proposals in the negotiations. For example, the Soviets might, in keeping with past practices, table a statement of basic principles to set the stage for a draft treaty in a subsequent round.

Under another possible approach the Soviets might return to Geneva with instructions for more active negotiations in order to set the stage for their fall "peace" offensive. For instance, they might move their negotiating stance back toward their 1983 positions in both START and INF (i.e., falling off the various regressions that emerged in their negotiating position). They would then attempt to portray such steps as major Soviet concessions. The Soviets also might single out INF, and expand on the suggestion that a separate agreement is possible. For example, the Soviets might say that they could live with some level of US INF deployments without actually tabling anything concrete.

In Defense and Space, the Soviets could alter their strategy toward SDI slightly by probing the US concept of the transition and the offense-defense relationship. This would allow them to tell the world that they

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 29.

have “seriously” studied the US program and have had their worst suspicions confirmed, i.e., that the United States is planning to make itself immune to retaliation in preparation for a first strike against the Soviet Union and its allies. They could also claim that the United States is withholding vital information about SDI and that, therefore, President Reagan’s promise to share technology with them is a fraud.

Under another variation the Soviets might back away from their proposed ban on research to bring themselves more into line with Western criticism of SDI and to lay the groundwork for a major space initiative in the fall.

We think the Soviets will view START as the most attractive area for a “new” initiative. Such a move could involve a tabling of some concrete elements of their position, including perhaps a number for their SNDV aggregate, SNDV sublimits, a specific overall warhead limit, or a proposal to count (instead of ban) all long-range cruise missiles under such a limit. An initiative along these lines would create the impression of Soviet flexibility, would not involve a concession on principle, and would be easier to condition on US concessions in SDI than would a move in INF.

B. Round Three and the Fall

Irrespective of which option the Soviets choose in Round Two, their posture will be crafted to take full advantage of their fall initiatives. We anticipate that a more “substantive” Soviet effort could emerge in Round Three as the Soviets attempt to convert their “peace” offensive into real negotiating leverage. The Soviets will use the major events of the fall to place the weight of public expectations squarely on the United States and thereby attempt to put the United States on the defensive.

Leading up to and including his U.N. appearance, Gorbachev will attempt to wrap himself in the mantle of peaceful statesman and dynamic world leader. A Soviet peace offensive culminating in an arms control initiative in the fall will help maintain his relatively positive public image.

The Soviets have a number of options for creating a “splash” this fall at the U.N. We can expect that old Soviet U.N. initiatives—no-first-use, nuclear freeze, ratification of TTBT/PNET, etc.—will form the window dressing for any new initiative. Dull and uninspiring Soviet initiatives, however, will be insufficient to generate the public and allied pressure necessary to advance Soviet objectives.

We expect any Soviet initiative to contain a number of “nuggets” that would superficially demonstrate Soviet flexibility without substantive concessions on any major US concern. This tactic would seek to keep the United States on the defensive without compromising the Soviet position. If the United States did not respond positively, the

Soviets would label it as intransigent. If the United States did respond positively, the Soviets would attempt to pocket any substantive concession in the US response. US responses would continue to be scrutinized more closely for their “fairness” by the media and the Allies than would any Soviet initiatives.

An example of the type of initiative the Soviets might propose is an agreement or mutual understanding which would prohibit the development and use of new technologies for military purposes, proposing instead that new technologies be used only for “peaceful” purposes. This would strike a responsive chord with some elements of Western public opinion. This is a minor refinement of the Soviet theme in START which holds that qualitative improvements in offensive weapons should be limited to the utmost. This might be coupled with a small unilateral concession in the START or INF area which would not impact on the Soviet force posture but which would reinforce the image of a Soviet Union interested in arms control.

Gorbachev can be expected both to reaffirm his Geneva moratorium proposal and to issue an urgent appeal to halt the “militarization of outer space,” perhaps embellishing his appeal with additional features. Considering the generally negative Western response to the Soviet moratorium’s proposed ban on “research”, the Soviets may recast their proposal in a way calculated to win greater political support. One such change could be to propose a moratorium on the testing of weapons against objects in space (as in the earlier Tsongas amendment).

Another possible proposal would invite the United States to join the USSR in reaffirming the ABM Treaty. The Soviets realize that such a reaffirmation would be effectively binding only on the United States and that it would, in any case, be unacceptable to the United States because it would engender political complications for the SDI. The Soviets might make a cosmetic move on verification to give the appearance that the USSR is taking into consideration some US concerns on compliance. Dobrynin’s “offer” to consider on-site inspection of the Krasnoyarsk radar may be part of such an approach. In general, however, the Soviet approach to US compliance concerns will probably remain the same: absolute denial of any wrong-doing and recrimination of the United States for alleged arms control violations. The Soviets will also charge that the United States is using the compliance issue to block progress in arms control, a view that will find sympathy with some Allies who are already questioning US conclusions on Soviet non-compliance.

The Soviets will undoubtedly use a US decision to abandon interim restraint as proof of US duplicity toward the arms control process. The Soviets probably also consider the continuation of interim restraint as more beneficial to themselves than to the United States. This is

particularly true given that many of the key provisions of SALT II have already been violated by the Soviets. In either case, however, the Soviets will seek to demonstrate US insincerity toward the arms control talks. Whatever the decision on interim restraint, the US should stress publicly, and in all three negotiating groups in Geneva, the profound implications of Soviet non-compliance with SALT II and the ABM Treaty.

Finally, we believe it likely that Gorbachev or his representative will announce at the U.N. his intention to table a new, comprehensive arms control initiative or treaty in Geneva. This move will be designed to demonstrate Soviet efforts to advance the negotiations, but will probably not include a detailed presentation of the treaty terms. The Soviets might, however, provide some numbers and specifics without revealing their entire position. A statement hinting at reductions in Soviet heavy missiles, however unlikely such reductions may in fact be, in exchange for US agreement to limit SDI could be particularly troublesome. We would then expect Soviet negotiators to table a comprehensive proposal that would be consistent with their UNGA announcement, but incompatible with US objectives.

V. US Responses

It would be unrealistic to discuss detailed US responses to every possible Soviet initiative. A general consensus, however, did emerge within our group regarding US negotiating strategy.

We drew a sharp distinction between US responses to genuine Soviet negotiating initiatives and the need to resist being pressured into making concessionary responses as a result of spurious Soviet propaganda activities.

Our basic conclusions and recommendations are based on the premise that the United States has specific objectives and principles that it seeks to achieve, and that these objectives and principles must remain largely independent of Soviet negotiating tactics and propaganda ploys.

A. In Geneva

The United States has clearly outlined its negotiating objectives and strategy in applicable NSDDs. US negotiating positions should not be made hostage to tactical Soviet initiatives such as those described in this report. Moreover, it would be tactically unwise to respond to Soviet propaganda initiatives with US movement in the negotiations because such a response would encourage the Soviets to believe that real concessions will follow "cosmetic" US initiatives. Regardless of Soviet negotiating ploys, the US side should insist on the maximum degree of specificity and request time to study any Soviet proposal without detailed initial comment.

Since US negotiating capital remains thin in all three negotiating areas, our near unanimous recommendation is that the United States maintain its course by continuing a steady, but flexible negotiating style. In accordance with this approach, the United States should reemphasize earlier US proposals which the Soviets have yet to address.

One team member advanced the view that the United States should adopt a more active negotiating approach by proposing minor, non-concessionary initiatives that might offset Soviet propaganda efforts and put the Soviets on the defensive by highlighting their intransigence. For example, presenting more detailed illustrative START and INF outcomes in line with current US principles would create the impression of “development” in the US position and help keep Allied and Congressional attention focused on offensive arms reductions, which are the primary near-term US arms control objective.

Other members believed that it would be unwise for the United States to appear to respond to Soviet intransigence in the talks or Soviet propaganda efforts in the public arena with US initiatives in the negotiations. Even a more detailed elaboration of illustrative outcomes in START or INF, for example, would require the United States to make difficult internal decisions on various negotiating options—decisions that so far have not been made because the Soviets have shown insufficient interest in US ideas. Once such decisions were made, even for “illustrative” purposes, they would only be the starting point for further negotiation and hence should not be undertaken merely for the sake of creating a favorable public impression.

Since current US negotiating instructions allow for substantial flexibility, including contingent authority for use in response to indications of Soviet interest in the US approach, the majority of team members foresaw no likely Soviet initiatives in Geneva during the period covered by this report that would require substantial change in current US negotiating strategy, style, or written guidance.

B. In The Public Arena

In the public arena, the United States should be prepared to counter the anticipated Soviet propaganda offensive by means of a coordinated and active public diplomacy campaign. To supplement existing public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the NSC organize an *ad hoc* task force devoted exclusively to creating and implementing a US public diplomacy strategy through the fall period.

The US approach should emphasize the US negotiating agenda, exploit vulnerabilities in Soviet arguments and negotiating positions, highlight the bases for Western positions, and rely squarely on a presentation of the facts. For example, in START and INF, US proposals are aimed at reducing the number and destructive capacity of nuclear

weapons; Soviet proposals are not. US negotiating positions remain flexible; Soviet positions have regressed from their December 1983 and January 1985 stance in some areas. The United States is strictly adhering to existing arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty; the Soviet Union is not. US modernization programs now and in the past have consistently demonstrated restraint; Soviet military procurement and deployment has been excessive and well out of proportion to defensive requirements.

Without question the Soviets will seek to exploit all key political events through the Fall. The United States can and should expose the Soviet “peace offensive” not only for its lack of substance but also for its irrelevance to meaningful arms control negotiations.

THE TIGER TEAM

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107. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 10, 1985

SUBJECT

NST Package Solution

The Soviet attitude during the initial sessions of Round II at Geneva appears as uncompromising as during the first round. The prospect of a deadlock in the negotiations, of an eventual Soviet walk-out, or of Soviet confrontational moves at various points along the Soviet perimeter significant enough to create a serious crisis should not be ignored. On the other hand, Gorbachev may be interested in an NST package solution *if* he can justify it to his military and his more aggressive Party associates.

It may, therefore, be timely to consider an NST package proposal that we could live with, if the Soviets were to prove interested, and that, in the event they turned it down, would persuasively demonstrate that it was the Soviets, not we, who had blocked agreement.

The key to such a package could be a trade of deep and meaningful reductions in offensive forces, both START and INF, on both sides, phased over a ten-year period, in return for reliable assurances by both sides that they would forego development, testing and deployment of ABM systems—particularly space-based systems—not otherwise permitted by the ABM Treaty. This would delay SDI actions that might contravene the ABM Treaty until 1995 (under the current program, such actions could take place at an indefinite point in the early 1990s).

The agreement would be self enforcing; either side could avail itself of its supreme interest right to withdraw from the treaty if it believed the other side had not lived up to its obligations. It is therefore important that there be an improvement in our security at each phase of implementation of the agreement.

A number of problems must be overcome in designing such a package.

The first is to assure that in each stage in the reductions US security is improved over what it is now and over what it could be expected to be in the absence of the agreement. Moreover, we would want to assure that at the end of the ten-year period the situation would con-

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 16D0355, James Timbie Files, Box 1, NST 1985–1992. Secret; Sensitive.

tinue to be stable for an indefinite period in the future. The prompt hard target kill capability of permitted Soviet forces in 1995 would continue to be somewhat greater than that of the US but MPS deployment of our ICBMs and the introduction of our Trident II missiles should leave them with no net advantage.

To make the offensive package plausibly attractive to the Soviets, it would be advisable to combine radical reductions of warheads, with comparable reductions in the various ceilings on SNDVs provided by SALT II and generally reflected in the Soviet START proposals of 1982–1983. To prevent instability rather than stability being induced by these concurrent reductions, one should add special provisions limiting the RV weight of new ICBM systems and allowing an increase in the number of permissible silos per missile. In order to improve the verifiability of limits on mobile ICBMs, it would be wise to limit their deployment to predesignated operational areas. I have also differentially increased the percentage reduction in heavy ICBMs (SS–18s). This may greatly decrease the negotiability of the package; it does not help us that much, however, and we could probably drop it.

The more difficult problem is to design provisions giving the sides adequate assurance against breakout in ABM systems, whether land-based or space-based. We would need to satisfy ourselves that we would know what they are doing beyond laboratory research and experiments. They would have a much easier time knowing what we are doing, but are not apt to agree to US programs to build and test major components or sub-components in laboratories or underground or in technology demonstrations carried out in space (such programs could be within—but would be seen as stretching—the bounds of the ABM Treaty). Negotiation of more precise demarcations between permitted and prohibited ABM activities would require extended discussions, but if the Soviets would wish to work it out, I believe it would not be an impossible task.

The attached paper entitled “NST Package Solution” deals with the above option.

There is also attached a second paper entitled “Joint Statement between the United States of America and the USSR on the Basic Principles of Limitation and Reduction of Nuclear and Space Arms.” It deals with a much more limited problem. It may be advisable some time during Round II or Round III to introduce a statement comprehensively setting forth a position consistent with the instructions to our Geneva negotiators. There is little prospect that it will advance our negotiations with the Soviets. It would, however, enable us to give a

positive answer to questions as to whether we have put forward a concrete and comprehensive proposal at Geneva.

Paul H. Nitze²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, June 10, 1985

NST PACKAGE SOLUTION

The following relates to a possible US package proposal covering all three areas of the nuclear and space arms talks. Its essence would be agreement on annual cuts in strategic nuclear and LRINF missile weapons by an aggregate of 50% by the end of 1995, contingent upon agreement by the sides not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty as it currently stands. If at any time one of the sides were to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty—or fail to make the reductions in offensive systems or otherwise violate the provisions of the agreement called for by the package proposal—the other side would be relieved of its obligations.

Defense and Space Arms

The sides would agree to resolve those compliance issues currently outstanding with regard to the ABM Treaty and do nothing further to erode confidence in that agreement. In this regard, the sides would reach an understanding on the demarcation between research which is permitted, and development and testing which is prohibited.

The sides would agree that neither would develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty *as long as* both sides comply with the reduction schedules spelled out below for strategic and LRINF arms.

START

Yearly reductions in strategic arms would commence in 1987. In the interim, the sides would take any actions necessary to ensure that they would not exceed the following levels (i.e. these would be the starting points for yearly reductions to be taken through 1995):

² Nitze signed the memorandum “Paul” above his typed signature.

³ Secret; Sensitive.

- Ballistic missile RVs: 9000
- Ballistic missile RVs plus ALCMs: 12,000
- SNDVs: 2400
- MIRVed ballistic missiles plus ALCM-heavy bombers: 1320
- MIRVed ballistic missiles (SLBMs and ICBMs): 1200
- MIRVed ICBMs: 820
- Heavy ICBMs: 308

Initial SNDV levels are from SALT II; the limits on RVs and RVs+ALCMs were derived as follows: the current total of Soviet RVs is 8800, round to 9000 and add 3000 for the US ALCM program.

RV/ALCM Reductions. The limits on RVs and RVs+ALCMs would be reduced annually so that on 31 December 1995 they would be one-half of the initial levels, i.e. 4500 and 6000.

One way to achieve such RV and RV+ALCM reductions would be asymptotic reductions of 7.5% per year (with some rounding).

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
RVs	9000	8325	7700	7120	6590	6100	5640	5210	4820	4500
RV+										
ALCMs	12000	11100	10270	9500	8780	8130	7520	6950	6430	6000

Alternatively, we could apply constant annual reductions (500 RVs and 650 RVs+ALCMs per year) to obtain the same end-1995 levels.

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
RVs	9000	8500	8000	7500	7000	6500	6000	5500	5000	4500
RV+										
ALCMs	12000	11350	10700	10050	9400	8750	8100	7450	6800	6000

SNDV Reductions. We would also reduce the SNDV ceilings and subceilings each year. There are several possibilities for doing this, e.g. reductions at a constant or asymptotic rate.

An important question would be how low we would want to lower the SNDV limits by the end of 1995, e.g. to 75%, 60% or 50% of the end 1986 level. The lower the SNDV limits, the smaller the opportunity for de-MIRVing each side's ballistic missile forces. However, given that each side in 1995 is projected to be dependent on highly-MIRVed systems for the bulk of its modern weapons (Trident in our case; the SS-18, SS-24 and MIRVed SLBMs in the Soviet case), unless the sides radically restructure their forces to less-MIRVed or single-RV systems, the 4500 RV-level may drive both to such low levels of launchers that either side's force could fit within even the lowest SNDV limit.

One alternative for SNDV reductions would be straight-line cuts to end 1995 levels that are 75% of 1986 levels, except for a 50% reduction in heavy ICBMs, which would be justified on the basis of the particularly destabilizing nature of such systems.

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
SNDVs	2400	2335	2270	2205	2140	2075	2010	1945	1880	1800
MIRVed										
BM+										
AHBs	1320	1285	1250	1215	1180	1145	1110	1075	1040	1000
MIRVed										
BMs	1200	1165	1130	1095	1060	1025	990	955	920	900
MIRVed										
ICBMs	820	795	770	745	720	695	670	645	620	600
Heavy										
ICBMs	308	290	275	255	240	220	205	185	170	150

This alternative would leave great room for de-MIRVing. (These 1995 outcomes could be reached by asymptotic reductions of approximately 3% per year.)

A second alternative would reduce SNDV ceilings at end 1995 to about 60% of their 1986 levels. This would result in greater reductions in SNDVs, but would allow less room for de-MIRVing than the first alternative. There would be asymptotic reductions of 5% per year for all SNDV ceilings and subceilings, with a 7.5% reduction for SS-18s (again based on that system being particularly de-stabilizing).

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
SNDVs	2400	2280	2170	2060	1950	1860	1760	1680	1590	1500
MIRVed										
BM+										
AHBs	1320	1250	1190	1130	1080	1020	970	920	875	825
MIRVed										
BMs	1200	1140	1080	1030	980	930	880	840	800	750
MIRVed										
ICBMs	820	780	740	700	670	630	600	570	540	520
Heavy										
ICBMs	308	285	260	245	225	210	190	180	165	150

A third alternative would reduce the SNDV levels at end-1995 to about 50% of their 1986 levels, using asymptotic reductions of 7.5% per year for all SNDV ceilings and subceilings. This would result in greater reductions in SNDVs than either of the first two alternatives, but would allow little room for large-scale de-MIRVing. (Both the second and third alternative endpoints could, of course, also be reached by straight-line reductions.)

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
SNDVs	2400	2220	2050	1900	1760	1630	1500	1390	1290	1200
MIRVed										
BM+										
AHBs	1320	1220	1130	1040	970	890	830	760	710	650

MIRVed										
BM's	1200	1110	1030	950	880	820	750	700	640	600
MIRVed										
ICBM's	820	760	700	650	600	560	510	480	440	410
Heavy										
ICBM's	308	285	260	245	225	210	190	180	165	150

Illustrative 1995 US Force Structure. Assuming no radical reorientation of US strategic forces toward a less MIRVed force, US levels would be driven primarily by the 4500/6000 weapons ceilings. Resulting US launcher levels could be so low as to fit under all three sets of end-1995 SNDV levels outlined above. The following illustration shows US forces designed to meet the lowest alternative SNDV limits (i.e. 50% of the end-1986 levels).

<u>System</u>	<u>SNDVs</u>	<u>RVs/ALCMs</u>
MIRVed ICBMs:		
MX	50	500
MM-III	<u>50</u>	<u>150</u>
	100	650
MIRVed SLBMs:		
Ohio-class SSBNs ⁴	<u>384</u>	<u>3072</u>
	484	3722
ALCM heavy bombers:		
B-1/B-52H ⁵	<u>160</u>	1920
	644	
Other systems:		
MM-II/Midgetman	350	350
Non-ALCM B-1/ATB	<u>150</u>	—
	1144	
Subtotal missile RVs		4072
Total RVs+ALCMs		5992

Relaxing the SNDV ceilings would allow us to deploy a few more single RV systems, but unless we were prepared to deploy single-RV missiles in place of Trident, MX or ALCM heavy bombers, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings would severely constrain our ability to take advantage of the higher SNDV levels.

Illustrative 1995 Soviet Force Structure. Assuming no radical reorientation of Soviet strategic forces toward a less MIRVed force, Soviet forces would likewise be driven primarily by the 4500/6000 weapons ceilings. Resulting Soviet launcher levels could fit under all three sets

⁴ [1 line not declassified]

⁵ [1 line not declassified]

of end-1995 SNDV levels outlined above. The following shows Soviet forces under the lowest alternative SNDV limits.

<u>System</u>	<u>SNDVs</u>	<u>RVs/ALCMs</u>
MIRVed ICBMs ⁶		
SS-18	100	1000
SS-24	<u>130</u>	<u>1300</u>
	230	2300
MIRVed SLBMs:		
SS-N-20/SS-N-23	<u>192</u>	<u>1536</u>
	422	3836
ALCM heavy bombers: ⁷		
Bear H/Blackjack	<u>125</u>	1500
	547	
Other systems:		
SS-25	400	400
SS-N-8	240	240
Non ALCM bombers	<u>10</u>	—
	1197	
Subtotal missile RVs		4476
Total RVs+ALCMs		5976

As with the US, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings are the primary factor driving down the Soviet SNDV levels. Relaxing the SNDV ceilings would allow them to deploy a few more single-RV systems, but unless they were prepared to deploy single-RV missiles in place of the SS-18, SS-24 or MIRVed SLBMs, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings would severely constrain their ability to take advantage of the higher SNDV levels. On the other hand, as long as throwweight and RV weight limitations could be agreed upon, the higher SNDV levels would provide an incentive for de-MIRVing, both before and after 1995, at little cost in terms of breakout risk.

Post-1995 Reductions. After 31 December 1995 reductions could be scheduled to continue indefinitely (in this event it might be better to adopt a formula based on asymptotic reductions). An important question is: at what point would we invite the British, French and Chinese to “join” in the negotiations? It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would go beyond 1995 levels—even if they agreed to go that low—without inclusion of third-country nuclear forces. This is a sticky point; by 1995 when the US and USSR will be “low” on forces, the other nuclear states

⁶ Soviets might choose to alter their mix of SS-18s and SS-24s within an aggregate of 230, without exceeding the limit of 150 for SS-18s. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ Assumes a counting rule ascribing 12 ALCMs per bomber. [Footnote is in the original.]

could be relatively “high,” particularly in view of British and French modernization programs. The end of 1995 might be an appropriate point for a “pause” in reductions while the third-country issue was tackled.

Other Provisions. Dismantling and destruction of excess systems would be in accord with procedures to be agreed in the SCC. Reports would be made of the status of dismantling, destruction and replacement of strategic offensive arms, by category, as of 31 December 1986; and numerical data reported to certify the number of such arms in each category to be identical to the agreed levels outlined above. Both such reports would be made to SCC Commissioners on 1 January 1987.

Subsequent reports would be made of the status of dismantling and destruction of strategic offensive arms, by category, as of 31 December of each year. Such reports would be made in the SCC at its first regular session after 31 December, beginning in 1987.

Modernization of strategic offensive arms would be permitted. However, any new-type ICBMs developed, tested or deployed after 31 December 1985 would be of a single-warhead type whose RV would weigh no more than 200 kg, whose throwweight would be no more than 400 kg, and whose launch weight would be no more than 15,000 kg.

Mobile or transportable ICBMs could be deployed, but only in agreed deployment areas under agreed procedures.

The SALT limitations banning new or additional silos would be relaxed, thus permitting an MPS deployment of ICBMs.

The primary means of verification would be by NTM. Additionally, the sides would agree on cooperative measures both to enhance and supplement verification by NTM.

The maximum number of warheads for each missile type would be as follows:

SS-11:	1	Minuteman II:	1
SS-13:	1	Minuteman III:	3
SS-17:	4	MX:	10
SS-18:	10	Midgetman:	1
SS-19:	6		
SS-24:	10		
SS-25:	1		
SS-N-6:	1	Poseidon:	10
SS-N-8:	1	Trident I:	8
SS-N-18:	7	Trident II:	8
SS-N-20:	8		
SS-N-23:	8		

The maximum number of ALCMs for each type of heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs would be as follows:

Bear H:	12	B-52:	12
Blackjack:	12	B-1:	12

Missiles and bombers would not be tested or deployed with larger numbers of warheads or ALCMs, or tested in a manner which would demonstrate a capability for carrying more warheads or ALCMs.

INF

The sides would agree to an approximate 50% cut in their LRINF missile warheads from the current Soviet level and the planned US level by 31 December 1995. This would parallel the 50% reduction in strategic weapons by 1995.

These reductions would result in a global LRINF missile RV level of 600 for both sides (roughly one-half the current Soviet global total of slightly over 1200 RVs on 400+ SS-20 missiles). Further, each side would be limited to 300 LRINF missile RVs in Europe (roughly one-half the planned US deployment of 572 RVs in Europe).

In addition, while the US would retain the right to deploy outside of Europe up to the global total of 600 warheads, it would declare its current intention not to deploy LRINF missile systems in Asia.

The sides could work out a reduction schedule paralleling those suggested for START. Given the lower numbers involved, it might be feasible to set intermediate levels for end-1989 and 1992 as opposed to yearly. The US might further agree that it would not go above 300 RVs in Europe at any point (even though the end-1989 and 1992 limits for Europe could exceed 300).

Reporting and verification would be as with START.

Each side would be allowed 150 LRINF aircraft in Europe.

Further reductions after 1995 would be consistent with offense/defense criteria and eventual total elimination of nuclear arms.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁸

Washington, undated

Joint Statement between the
United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Basic Principles of Limitation and Reduction
of Nuclear and Space Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Reaffirming that the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms shall be considered and resolved in their interrelationship,

Reaffirming their objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability,

Reaffirming their ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere,

Recalling the commitment to the non-use of aggressive force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972,

Recognizing that the numbers of nuclear arms have risen to unacceptable levels,

Proceeding from the premise that effective [non-nuclear] defenses could enhance deterrence and provide a more stable strategic situation,

Recognizing the contribution to stability that can be made by an evolutionary transition from an offense-dominant strategic posture to a defense-dominant strategic posture,

⁸ Secret. All blank underscores are in the original text.

Recognizing that radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons can reduce the numbers of defensive weapons needed in a defense-dominant environment,

Agree to the following guidelines for the negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

ARTICLE I

The two Parties will continue to negotiate reductions in, and limitations on, nuclear and space arms, with the objective of concluding a comprehensive agreement resolving the entire complex of questions concerning such arms by December 31, 1985.

ARTICLE II

With regard to strategic nuclear forces:

1. The Parties shall reduce the total number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 5000.

2. The parties shall reduce the aggregate of air-launched cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers, plus warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 8000.

3. The Parties shall limit the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1800.

4. The Parties shall agree, in the negotiations referred to in Article I, to constraints resulting in substantial reductions in the destructive capability of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs with an emphasis on the most destabilizing of such weapon systems, that is, silo-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

5. The Parties shall implement the above reductions at a rate of _____ percent per year commencing on _____.

ARTICLE III

With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces:

1. The Parties agree to the goal of eliminating the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In the interim, the Parties agree to the limits set forth below.

2. The Parties shall limit the total number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range to a level not to exceed 600.

3. The Parties shall limit the number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range in Europe to a level not to exceed 300.

4. The United States of America shall limit its deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe to the level currently deployed.

5. To the extent that reductions in weapon systems currently deployed are necessary to conform to the above limits, the Parties shall implement such reductions at a rate of _____ percent per year commencing on _____, and reductions of such weapons in Europe and on a global basis shall be made in proportion to the levels currently deployed in Europe and on a global basis.

ARTICLE IV

With regard to defense and space arms:

1. The Parties are conducting research on effective defenses against various delivery systems for nuclear weapons consistent with existing agreements. The Parties shall cooperate with each other in examining the feasibility of a possible future defense-oriented strategic posture and in managing any transition from an offensive-dominant to a defense-dominant strategic posture.

2. Each Party shall inform the other fully of its plans, programs and activities in the fields of nuclear offensive and strategic defensive arms.

3. The Parties agree that deployment of defensive systems must contribute to stability. To that end, the Parties agree that any such deployments must be phased with reductions in offensive nuclear weapons to insure that one Party does not obtain a unilateral advantage over the other Party. The Parties agree to refrain from activities which would lead to the attainment of strategic superiority involving either offensive or defensive systems.

4. Should either Party's research lead to a conclusion that new defensive systems (including systems based on "other physical principles" referred to in Agreed Statement (D) of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) could enhance security and stability, the Parties agree to discuss how such systems could be developed, tested and deployed in order to enhance the security of both sides and strengthen the stability of the strategic relationship. Such development, testing and deployment would be carried out in accordance with procedures jointly agreed and authorized pursuant to Articles XIII and XIV of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

ARTICLE V

With regard to anti-satellite weapons:

1. Neither Party shall test an anti-satellite interceptor weapon against a space object any part of whose orbit is located at an altitude greater than _____ kilometers above the earth's surface.

2. Each Party shall be limited to one operational anti-satellite weapon system. For the United States this shall be _____ and for the Soviet Union this shall be _____.

ARTICLE VI

With regard to verification:

1. The Parties in the course of the negotiations referred to in Article I shall establish measures which, in conjunction with national technical means, permit effective verification of compliance with the provisions of such an agreement.

2. The Parties shall refrain from activity impeding or interfering with verification of compliance with the terms of this Statement.

ARTICLE VII

With regard to existing treaties:

1. The Parties shall comply fully with all provisions of existing treaties limiting arms in outer space, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In particular, the Parties shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, carry out any nuclear explosion in outer space or develop, test or deploy space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or components.

2. The Parties shall make new efforts to resolve all outstanding issues of compliance relating to past agreements. In particular, the Parties shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent the further erosion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Parties shall agree to means to assure the strict implementation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, including provisions to maintain clear and unambiguous distinctions between non-anti-ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile radars, interceptor missiles and launchers.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the Parties shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

2. The Parties agree to continue further negotiations after the completion of the negotiations referred to in Article I, with the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

3. The Parties shall not take any actions contrary to the objectives and provisions of this statement.

4. This Statement shall remain in effect until the entire complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms is resolved in the negotiations referred to in Article I.

108. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, July 11, 1985

MILESTONES IN DEVELOPING "MONDAY"
PAPER FOR SUMMIT

Our principal arms control objective for the Summit would be to obtain a joint communique specifying guidelines for the NST delegations' negotiation of an agreement(s) on the lines of the Monday paper.² The more details that can be agreed prior to the Summit and incorporated into the communique (and/or into subsequent guidance to the negotiators), the better. Outlined below is a timetable working toward such a Summit communique.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event/Action</u>
July 16	Second round of NST talks concludes
July 31	Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting(s) in Helsinki; outline and discuss trade in general terms, i.e. deep and continuing offensive arms cuts in return for no development, testing or deployment of ABM systems in contravention of ABM Treaty as it currently stands
August	Exchange messages regarding Moscow/ Washington reactions to Helsinki discussions; by end of August we should know whether Soviets are seriously interested in deal
week of Sept 16	In preparation for Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting at UNGA, pass to Soviets (through Dobrynin) non-paper regarding the sorts of reductions we have in mind for strategic and LRINF systems
Sept 19	Third round of NST talks begins (NST delegation not to address Monday package)
late Sept	Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting(s) at UNGA; specific discussion of numbers of offensive arms and of strict agreed interpretation of ABM Treaty (including ABM Treaty compliance issues and demarcation between permitted research and prohibited development)

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 16D0355, James Timbie Files, Box 1, NST 1985–1992. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 107.

	Shevardnadze in Washington for further discussions with Shultz and meeting with President
early-mid Oct	Follow up September meetings through messages
week of Oct 21	Presidential letter to key Allied heads of government advising of Monday discussions; SCG looks at emerging INF position (presented as possible new US proposal vice reference to Monday discussions) Sides exchange draft Summit communique language for consideration at Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting
week of Oct 28	Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow to tackle remaining large issues and work communique language
early November	Continuing work on large issues and communique language (Shultz-Shevardnadze channel)
November 19–20	Summit meeting in Geneva

Two further issues need to be addressed:

—when the President/McFarlane should inform Weinberger, Vessey, Casey, Adelman and NST negotiators of Monday discussions; and

—the NST delegations' role (running two channels would be difficult and, while we should include the NST negotiators in the decision-process, we may prefer they not directly address the Monday discussions with the Soviets; however, whatever they do should be fully consistent with and supportive of the Monday discussions end-point).

109. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)¹

Geneva, July 17, 1985

SUBJECT

ROUND II ASSESSMENT

The Delegation is preparing various reports and summaries of Round II. Attached is a brief memo containing my personal appraisal of the discussions with the Soviets on strategic offensive arms, together with some thoughts on where we might go in both Round III and the Summit.

I am also attaching a short paper on the status of the negotiations which I prepared for the Delegation. You might find it useful in presenting briefings on the state of play. Also attached are the rather interesting recent comments of a Soviet adviser made to Sid Drell, who conveyed them to me.

I would be happy to discuss these and any other matters with you in greater detail at your convenience.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

Geneva, July 16, 1985

*NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
ROUND II*

Atmosphere

Overall relations between the U.S. and Soviet components of the Negotiating Group continued to be good. A reasonable degree of rapport has developed at all levels as people have more or less settled in with regular “partners” from the other side. The atmosphere within

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round II July 85. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Burt.

² Secret; Sensitive.

the U.S. Negotiating Group continues to be excellent and work is accomplished efficiently. Given the generally low expectations most people had for Round II, we made a modest amount of progress.

Substantive Developments

The Soviets continue to stand on their double linkage to both space weapons and INF. The price on space weapons which they will demand for progress on START is unclear, but appears to be dropping somewhat. The INF outcome appears actually to influence what START levels they will accept, but exactly how the Soviet calculus connects INF and START is still a mystery. Some form of merger could still be the ultimate solution. It is interesting that the Soviets emphasized the need to resolve the INF situation much more than they talked about space weapons during the last two weeks of the round.

In the final Tower-Karpov meeting on July 15, the authority to accept “associated limits” on SNDVs was implemented. This is the only actual change to the 1983 U.S. position we have made thus far. Now that the Soviets are hinting at SNDV levels below 1800, we should get authority to accept any level in the range 1500–1800, so as to avoid the awkward position of advocating *higher* levels than the Soviets.

The major new development in Round II was, of course, the Soviet offer to accept an obligation that no single component of the Triad could exceed an agreed sublimit in the weapons aggregate. This was a rather clever move on their part. It responds to U.S. concerns that they will place too great an emphasis on one leg (ICBMs) rather than having the more “balanced” Triad we prefer. It also avoids the pejorative nature of sublimits which single out a particular component for special limits because it technically treats all components equally.

Of course, whether the proposed sublimit has any teeth in it depends upon the number—70 percent would be almost meaningless. In addition, a sublimit on a single component is not a sufficient answer to U.S. concerns about ballistic missile warheads, which involve two components. However, the *concept* provides an important opening which could lead to the agreed common framework we have been seeking. It is important to note that the Soviets have stated informally that they would consider U.S. counterproposals for additional sublimits, as well as on the specific numbers involved.

Next Steps

In my opinion, our major effort during the recess should be directed toward figuring out how to turn this Soviet offer into a framework we can accept, rather than agonizing over exactly what numbers the Soviets may have in mind. An outline of how we might approach this might be as follows:

—We accept the basic concept of separate aggregates on SNDVs and weapons.

—The SNDV aggregate consists of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (the missile limitation could be expressed in terms of either *launchers* or *deployed missiles* with a 1-to-1 correspondence between the two established by counting rules).

—The Soviets drop cruise missile carriers *per se* from the SNDV aggregate.

—The SNDV ceiling is set in the range 1500–1800.

—The SNDV aggregate contains a sublimit on heavy ICBMs. This is set as low as possible—150–250 seems a logical goal. We might also want to preserve the option for additional SNDV sublimits until we see how the weapons side comes out, but this is probably not necessary.

—The weapons aggregate consists of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs only (the Soviets drop attempts to include gravity bombs and SRAMs in the aggregate).

—The weapons aggregate ceiling is set in the range 7000–9000.

—The weapons aggregate contains *either* a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads (set at about 75 percent) *or* separate sublimits on any *one* and any *two* components of the Triad (set at perhaps 55 percent and 75 percent), respectively. An alternative even closer to the old State framework would be to have a single sublimit on MIRVed ballistic missile RVs set at about 75 percent.

—The Soviets would agree to let SLCMs run free or to limit them separately somehow.

Such a framework would involve a balanced set of compromises from where the two sides stand today. It is a logical extension of the opening the Soviets have provided and could be portrayed, for negotiating purposes, as a major move in their direction. At the same time, it is remarkably close to the “State framework” we have advocated for some time. The detailed numbers and whether we need one or two sublimits in the weapons aggregate require some careful analysis.

As usual, we face a potential conflict between seeking tight constraints on Soviet forces and allowing sufficient flexibility for our own forces. The current Soviet weapons percentages are roughly 65 percent ICBMs, 27 percent SLBMs and 8 percent heavy bombers. We might be able to achieve a more balanced 1995 force of something like 55 percent–25 percent–20 percent. Projected 1995 U.S. forces are highly sensitive to a number of factors, especially the number of MX and the counting rules used for ALCMs. However, attempts to drive the percentage of weapons in any two components of the Soviet force below about 75 percent would conflict with our own projected force.

It is not too early to begin to think about what might be realistic goals for the November Summit. Although numbers are obviously

crucial, my own feeling is that getting a common framework in place will (and probably should) precede agreement on specific numbers. An agreed framework is precisely the sort of thing that could be achieved by the Summit. This could be embodied in a relatively short document along the lines of the Vladivostok Aide-Memoire. The Delegations would then fill in the details, which would be no small task, during 1986. An immediate issue is how the Helsinki meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze could begin to lay the appropriate groundwork.

Two other important questions arise which are beyond the scope of this brief report:

1. What role should be played by the Delegation (as opposed to a back channel) in Round III to support the Summit goals and what instructions does this require?
2. What is it desirable or necessary to do in the space and INF areas at the Summit in order to achieve the breakthrough we seek in strategic offensive arms?

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Geneva, July 12, 1985

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Modalities

- Round I ran from March 12 to April 23
- Round II began May 30 and ends July 16
- Pursuant to the January 8 Joint Statement worked out by Shultz and Gromyko, each side has one Delegation divided into three Negotiating Groups:
 - Strategic Nuclear Arms
 - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms
 - Defense and Space Arms

We call the overall negotiations the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms or the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) for short.

³ Secret. Drafted by Ifft.

Developments to Date

—Atmosphere thus far has been businesslike—many veterans of earlier negotiations on Soviet side.

—Few surprises so far in Soviet approach—heavy stress on need to ban “space-strike arms,” and on linkage between this, an INF solution and possible reductions in strategic offensive arms.

—In Round II, the opening and closing plenary meetings, plus a mid-round session, were organized as meetings of the overall Delegations. Seven formal plenary meetings of the Negotiating Group on Strategic Offensive Arms—essentially one per week—were held. In addition, there were occasional meetings of Heads of Negotiating Groups and other informal contacts.

U.S. Position

—1983 Draft Treaty remains on the table and the United States is prepared to build upon this approach.

—In addition, U.S. Delegation has broad authority to explore alternative means of achieving greater stability at substantially reduced levels. We made clear to the Soviets that what matters most is deep and real reductions carried out in a manner which enhances stability. To achieve that outcome, we are prepared to be quite flexible.

—We believe trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet interest and advantage provide most promising approach to a mutually advantageous compromise (e.g., U.S. heavy bomber capabilities vs Soviet ballistic missile capabilities). We have sought to initiate a dialogue with Soviets on this idea, making clear that our concept of trade-offs encompasses a broad range of issues, including the structure of an agreement and specific levels.

—In Round II, we presented discussions of specific issues, such as the deployment of mobile ICBMs, methods of constraining ALCMs and ballistic missile throw-weight. On all of these issues, we suggested that various approaches are possible and sought Soviet ideas and proposals.

—We have also pressed the Soviets to get down to dealing with specifics such as numerical limitations, rules for counting systems, verification provisions, etc. We have also sought, with little success, to learn the details of the Soviet approach, especially the specific numbers they propose.

Soviet Position

—While not formally withdrawing their 1983 Treaty, the Soviets have made clear it does not apply to these new negotiations.

—In Round II the Soviets began to reveal elements of their position, while continuing to insist that an agreement on strategic offensive arms

is contingent upon a ban on space weapons. They also claim that such an agreement must take into account the situation regarding INF systems, implying that the levels to which they will be willing to reduce intercontinental systems will be influenced by the level of U.S. INF deployments.

—As in 1983, Soviets propose two aggregates—one on SNDVs and another on weapons on these SNDVs. The most original development in this position during Round II was an offer to accept an obligation not to have more than an established percentage of any one “kind” of strategic arms. Informally, this was explained as a sublimit in the weapons aggregate which could not be exceeded by any one of three components—ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads or heavy bomber weapons. No numbers were offered, so this remains an unknown percentage of an unknown aggregate number of weapons.

—Thus their “model of an agreement” contains three important numbers—an SNDV aggregate, a weapons aggregate and a sublimit on any one of the three force components in the weapons aggregate.

—Just as Round II began, Gorbachev expressed a willingness to go “even deeper” than the one-quarter reductions offered previously (apparently a reference to the 1983 Soviet position of reducing to 1800 SNDVs). Karpov echoed this Gorbachev formulation. Extensive probing by the U.S. Negotiating Group produced little additional hard information, but there were informal hints that “deeper than one quarter” may mean 30–40% reductions. This would translate into an SNDV total in the range 1500–1750; the implications for the weapon total they have in mind are not clear. It is important to bear in mind that these numbers are thus far only informal hints, not a formal proposal.

—Soviets claim that both ICBMs and throw-weight would be reduced under this approach, but extent and predictability of these reductions remain unknown.

—Soviet proposal for a ban on all cruise missiles over 600 km remains on the table.

—Soviet proposal for a moratorium was raised by them several times in Round II, but in a rather *pro forma* way.

Prospects

—Soviets clearly holding back in our area, hoping to put pressure on SDI and, to a lesser extent, INF. However, compared to Round I, there was some forward movement in their position and they appear to view their linkages to space and INF less rigidly.

—Soviets appear sensitive to the criticism that they are establishing preconditions, that they have regressed from their 1983 position, that they are not making specific proposals, and that they are not meeting U.S. concerns.

—We expect that Soviets will drop their ban on ALCMs and return to some method of counting ALCMs and ALCM carriers in the weapon and SNDV aggregates. They have stressed the need to deal with SLCMs, but recognize, at least informally, the formidable verification problems inherent in constraints on SLCMs.

—Thus far it is not clear to what extent Soviets are prepared to address substance of U.S. concerns on strategic offensive arms until U.S. accommodates their position on space arms. In our view, this is not recognition of “interrelationships,” but attempt to impose preconditions.

—Round III will begin September 19 and continue until just before the Summit. How next round unfolds is obviously strongly dependent upon the Summit and what both sides see as its goal in terms of arms control. It should clearly be a very busy and important session.

Attachment

Memorandum for the Record⁴

Geneva, July 12, 1985

SUBJECT

Comments of V.P. Pavlichenko

I had lunch with Professor Sidney Drell at his initiative on Friday, July 12, 1985. He was in town for a few days visiting CERN. Mr. Pavlichenko had become aware of this visit and had invited Drell to lunch on July 11. The following reports the comments of Pavlichenko which Drell conveyed to me:

—It is now a new ball game because of the U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. What we will now see from the Soviet Union is “confrontation everywhere.” This is the reason why Gromyko was “kicked out.” (Comment: I asked Drell whether this meant that Gromyko had been removed because of a failure to prevent the deployment of Pershing IIs or because he opposed a policy of “confrontation everywhere.” Drell replied that Pavlichenko had not made this clear.)

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 15 by Ifft. Copied to Kampelman, Tower, Giltman, and Zimmermann.

—The Soviet Union will decide following Round III and the Summit whether to walk out of the negotiations. Thus Round III and the Summit will be crucial.

—Drell raised the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar with Pavlichenko. Pavlichenko apparently gave the usual response but also mentioned the difficulties associated with constructing a radar in the permafrost region. He then said that the United States is violating its commitments in three areas:

First, it is violating its commitment to equal security.

Second, it is violating its commitments through deployment of the Pershing II.

Third, it is violating its commitments because of the massive deployment of cruise missiles. In this connection he mentioned the familiar number of 18,000 nuclear weapons (5,000 ballistic missile warheads, 8,000 ALCMs and 5,000 SLCMs).

He then said that the Soviet Union knows what President Reagan said to the Prime Minister of Canada. It will be “very devastating” to the U.S. position on compliance issues.

—Although the Soviet Union went along with the United States in listing the SS-18 as having 10 RVs in the earlier data exchange, as the United States knows very well, the SS-18 is deployed with many fewer warheads. Some are deployed with one RV, some with 2 RVs and so on. The highest number mentioned by Pavlichenko was 8 RVs.

—The point which seemed most important to Pavlichenko concerned a recent interview given by General Abrahamson to the “Frankfurter Allgemeine.” According to Pavlichenko, Abrahamson said that, even if the Soviet Union were to reduce its strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, it would make no difference as far as the U.S. SDI program is concerned. Pavlichenko said that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer 30 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. However, if even 50 percent reductions would have no effect on the U.S. position regarding space-strike weapons, there seems little point to such an offer, and the situation seems hopeless.

—Pavlichenko was anxious that the United States understand how helpful the Soviet Union had been during the recent hostage crisis.

As a separate matter, which apparently did not come up in the conversation with Pavlichenko, Drell reported that Academician Velikhov had called his attention to the recent letter from Gorbachev to the Union of Concerned Scientists.⁵ This letter contains the following sentence: “At the Soviet-U.S. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

⁵ For the text of Gorbachev July 6, 1985 letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists: Limits on Outer Space Weapons, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 376–443.

in Geneva we are striving to reach agreement on completely banning the development, testing and deployment of space-strike systems." Velikhov especially called Drell's attention to the fact that the word "research" was not mentioned. Velikhov said this was significant and stated that he personally had played an important role in this formulation.

Drell said that he would report his conversation with Pavlichenko in full detail through the usual channels upon his return to California.

110. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 17, 1985, 1829Z

NST Geneva 06819. Subject: NST: Overview of Round II.

1. Secret—Entire text. (This is NST II-020).
2. Below is my personal evaluation of the second round of our negotiations.
3. Round II was disappointing but not surprising. The essential element of the Soviet position was the continuation of a "hostage" situation among the three areas of negotiation. START was a double hostage—to resolution of INF and to a [garble] on space research. INF was a hostage to space. And progress in the Defense and Space Group was a hostage to the unacceptable Soviet demand that SDI research be banned.
4. There was some contrapuntal movement in Soviet tactics in START and INF. In INF the movement was backward: from the Round I statement that an INF agreement could be negotiated and implemented on its own to the Round II insistence that INF must await the resolution of the SDI issue. In START the movement seemed to be in the direction of greater flexibility, although the Soviet framework idea is clouded with ambiguities—as Ambassador Tower has called it, an unknown percentage of an unknown number.
5. Except in INF, the Soviets approached us with fewer polemics and a more businesslike approach during Round II. But they clearly

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850507–0850. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO. Sent Priority for information to USNMR SHAPE and Moscow.

were not ready for serious negotiations; the rigidities of their March opening position remained intact throughout. Nevertheless, in addition to the START framework, we saw some hints in the Defense & Space Group of where they think the negotiations could go. Kvitsinskiy put great emphasis on the Gorbachev letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists² and even quoted the relevant parts of it in a plenary statement. It pointed to a joint reaffirmation of the ABM treaty and an agreement on ASAT. Both Karpov and Kvitsinskiy have disclaimed any special meaning in Gorbachev's omission of research from the ABM treaty's strictures; but that, too, may be a later direction for Soviet movement.

6. One cannot help but conclude that the changes in the Soviet Foreign Ministry have played a role in the spiritless Soviet conduct in Geneva over the past few weeks. In START they began putting caveats to their previous flexibility, and in the other areas they seemed to be on hold. At lunch with me the day before the round ended, Karpov refused to be drawn out on any of the areas where possible movement had been hinted, offered no speculation on the role of the approaching summit meeting, and noted that he had never met Shevardnadze. His final plenary statement the next day was short and cautious—apparently an effort to change no positions but close no options pending a review this summer by the new leadership.

7. The rigid Soviet negotiating position has been helpful to us. My visits during the round to several NATO capitals confirm my impression that in neither Europe nor America is there pressure on us to give up SDI research. The effect of the Soviet demand that INF and START be linked to space is thus greatly muted. In any case, no concessions have been offered in INF or START even if we give up SDI, which of course we will not do.

8. Gorbachev's threat of a walkout has been played back in Geneva, but in a very minor key. Karpov continues to talk of continuity, though he calls the current situation "alarming." In light of the obvious disadvantages that a walkout would have for the Soviets, the hints of one at this stage are probably another Soviet effort at public pressure. But our eyes and ears should be open.

9. I see us as well positioned for whatever the Soviets might spring on us in the near future. It is their position, not ours, which is unreasonable—and in all three negotiating groups. They have so far failed to divide us from our allies, our Congress, and our publics. And they have not stampeded us away from the calm and flexible approach with which we entered the negotiations in March. Our watchwords thus remain patience and perseverance.

Kampelman

² See footnote 6, Document 109.

111. Note From the Special Assistant to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Clyne) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (McKinley)¹

Washington, August 9, 1985

Attached is a copy of the MemCon of the Nitze/Kvitsinskiy dinner conversation in Helsinki. As you recall, the Secretary spoke to Paul about the dinner.

Before distribution is made, Paul wanted the Secretary to take note of paras 13 and 15 regarding the “walk-in-the-woods.”² These paras are factual in recording the events; however, if the paras cause any discomfort to the Secretary, they can be omitted from the final distribution—and recorded only for posterity. It could be perceived that Nitze is again pushing something that some believe to be long dead, thus undercutting his credibility in assisting the Secretary. If Mr. Shultz has no problem, we can let it fly as written. Please check this out for us.

Best regards,

Norman G. Clyne³

P.S.⁴ Suggested distribution would be:

7th Floor

EUR/Hartman

PM

ACDA

NSC/McFarlane/Ron Lehman

DOD/Weinberger

/Ikle

/Perle

S/DEL/Kampelman/Tower/Glitman

ACDA/Rowny

JCS/Vessey

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 91D257, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM/RMD Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Box 1, Eggplant I June, July, August [1985]. Secret.

² McKinley underlined “Paul wanted the Secretary to take note of paras 13 and 15 regarding the ‘walk-in-the-woods.’”

³ Clyne signed the note “Norm” above his typed signature.

⁴ McKinley drew a slash through the postscript and wrote to the right of it: “13/8 Full memcon to S, D, P, S/ARN, Ridgway, and Holmes.” He also highlighted Ridgway and Holmes and wrote “EO” beside their names. He indicated below that an “expurgated version” would go to Clyne’s original distribution list.

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation⁵

Washington, July 31, 1985

SUBJECT

Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Dinner Conversation, Helsinki, Finland, 31 July 1985

1. As Kvitsinskiy's guest, Ambassador Nitze had dinner with his former Soviet colleague at the Restaurant Tapiola Linnunrata, 31 July 1985. Norman Clyne from Nitze's staff and Pavel Palazhchenko on the Soviet side also attended. Below are the highlights of the substantive conversation during dinner.

2. Nitze noted that three possible types of outcomes for the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in November had been discussed that afternoon between Shultz and Shevardnadze.⁶ These were outcomes dealing (a) merely with the easy issues; (b) with somewhat more difficult issues; and (c) with the really substantive issues of security, particularly those involving the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. Nitze said it was his understanding that the Ministers had agreed that the third category of issues should receive paramount attention by both sides prior to the summit. Kvitsinskiy agreed; he said it was the Soviet view that, while this third category contained the issues most difficult to resolve, it nevertheless contained those issues whose resolution could make the summit an unqualified success. Kvitsinskiy asked Nitze's opinion as to how we should prepare for the third category of issues.

3. Nitze said the first thing would be to clarify definitions and concepts. For example, the Soviet definition of what it calls "space strike arms" is based on an unacceptable criterion of intent; that is, according to Gromyko (and Kvitsinskiy) those systems stationed in space created or developed *for the purpose* of attacking objects in space or on land, and those stationed on earth *for the purpose* of attacking objects in space. Kvitsinskiy pointed out that the President had stated that the purpose of the U.S. SDI program was to develop such arms. Nitze emphasized that statements of intent were not pertinent, whether one was speaking of offensive or of defensive arms. Rather, systems must be dealt with on the basis of objective judgment of their capabili-

⁵ Secret. Drafted on August 8.

⁶ Shultz and Shevardnadze met in Helsinki on July 31 from 2–5 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 71.

ties derived from observable characteristics. If one looks at the Soviet definition on the basis of capabilities, the Galosh system around Moscow as well as all ICBM systems would be included in the ban. This is not desired by either side. Nitze emphasized the need for precise agreement on what is to be included in the agreements between us and what is to be excluded. We will find it necessary to stay away from generalities such as the Soviet demand for a ban on "space strike arms" based on an ambiguous and misleading definition.

4. Changing the subject, Kvitsinskiy asked if the U.S. would live up to the ABM Treaty. Nitze replied that the U.S. would do so and had made that point clear in Geneva; the real question is whether the Soviet Union will do likewise. We need first to agree on what it means. For example:

(a) the meaning of "development" with regard to permitted research. Nitze said the negotiating record is clear on this subject. He cited the paper Harold Brown had given to Karpov explaining the U.S. view on the demarcation between research and development. Brown's paper was not contested by the Soviet side. Article V was drafted on the basis of the definition of "development" contained in Harold Brown's paper. Kvitsinskiy responded by citing Gerard Smith's testimony in which Kvitsinskiy contended Smith had described the demarcation between research and development in a different way; Smith had used the term "breadboard model" to describe the point beyond research which included development. Nitze contested that, saying that while Gerard Smith's testimony was not inconsistent with the Brown paper, Brown's paper, not Smith's, was basic to the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty. This paper pointed out that full scale development started with observable testing of a prototype model, that is, a piece of equipment of the type which would ultimately be deployed. In any event, it is unambiguous that neither side included unobservable research in banned development. This point was made clear not only by Brown's paper but also by Smith's testimony. In fact, Nitze pointed out, the Soviet side also confirmed its similar interpretation that research would be permitted by the ABM Treaty when former Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, explained to the Supreme Soviet that the Treaty imposed no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work toward defending the "national territory." Kvitsinskiy corrected Nitze, saying that Marshal Grechko made no mention of "national territory;" rather, he made reference to defending "the country" against nuclear missile attack. (Kvitsinskiy laughed heartily when he "corrected" Nitze). Nitze said it seemed ludicrous in the context of the ABM Treaty to draw a distinction between "the country" on the one hand and "national territory" on the other; one could not walk history back with some simple-minded joking distinction.

(b) Returning to the Brown/Smith discussion, Kvitsinskiy insisted there was a distinction between Smith's definition of "development" and Brown's. Smith's testimony exempted only Department of Defense research and development line items 6.1 and 6.2, while Brown's would have the cut-off point be within 6.4, he referred to 6.4(a) and 6.4(b).

(c) Nitze brought up the Krasnoyarsk radar. He said that everyone on the U.S. side, in and out of Government, is convinced that this is a violation of the Treaty. Kvitsinskiy asserted that the U.S. radar at Thule, Greenland, violated the Treaty. Nitze emphasized that while the U.S. believes there is nothing here that is contrary to the ABM Treaty, the main point he was making was that the issues should be talked out frankly and settled—not limiting the discussion to stereotype assertions such as those to which the Soviet side has limited itself.

(d) Nitze cited the Soviet laser program being conducted at Sary Shagan as an example of Soviet "SDI-type" research. Nitze said this is germane to the ABM Treaty and thus pertinent to the defense and space negotiations. He asked rhetorically why can't the Soviet side discuss its SDI-type programs; the U.S. is willing to do so and, in fact, has discussed its programs at Geneva in some detail. Kvitsinskiy responded that it (the Soviet laser) is not pertinent since it cannot damage a satellite. Nitze noted that in any event, it is permitted because it is at a test range. Nitze maintained Kvitsinskiy had apparently missed the point; on any issue where there was not coincidence of views, it should be discussed frankly and resolved—not swept under the rug by assertion of one side or the other. Kvitsinskiy then noted the testing of a U.S. laser on Maui (in connection with a recent space shuttle flight). He asked rhetorically if that laser could substitute for a radar and if Maui was part of the Kwajalein test range. Nitze replied that the U.S. would be willing to discuss the issue frankly and constructively.

5. Referring to the Geneva negotiations, Kvitsinskiy asked when the U.S. side was going to propose something concrete on space. Nitze replied with a question of his own: "Which should come first, working on what the Soviets want on space, or on what the U.S. wants on limiting offense?" Nitze said that the Soviet form of linkage is unacceptable; this amounts to preconditions. Preconditions need to be forgotten and replaced with constructive discussions of the issues.

6. Nitze continued by asking what specifically are the Soviets suggesting with respect to limitations on the offense. Kvitsinskiy said that the Soviet side cannot be more specific until and unless it knows the outcome for space. He added that the Soviet side had made a specific proposal in the recent round just completed. Nitze replied that with what the Soviet side had given at Geneva, one could only *speculate* on possible methods of aggregation consistent with what they had said, coupled with various applicable percentages. For example, as to the

Soviet form of aggregation, Nitze asked what was to be included in the Soviet term “nuclear charges.” This form of aggregation appeared to include gravity bombs and SRAMs. Nitze said Kvitsinskiy knew the long-held U.S. view on this issue; namely, that it was improper to constrain such bomber loadings without corresponding constraint on air defenses. Nitze went on to explain that the two sides had to work out specific and equitable counting rules to have an effective agreement. He emphasized the unacceptability of aggregations which equated “elephants with flies;” SS-18 RV’s cannot be equated with gravity bombs.

7. By way of example, Nitze said that if one were to assume that counting rules had, in fact, been worked out, what could be made of the so-called Soviet “model” surfaced in Geneva? Continuing, Nitze said that low overall SNDV limitations could become meaningless or counter-productive at low levels of RVs, or even of “nuclear charges”. Continuing his example, Nitze said that if one were to assume a base level of 10,000 “nuclear charges” with an agreed reduction of 40%, this would result in a ceiling of 6,000 such “charges” at the end of a given period. If one were then to combine this figure with the Soviet suggestion of a percentage limit on the number of “charges” in any one leg of the deterrent, and assume that this limit was 50%, then the Soviet side would be able to retain 3,000 highly capable RVs on its ICBM force. This is more than a sufficient number to launch a highly successful attack against the land-based portion of the U.S. retaliatory force. Without other compensating provisions, such an outcome would be insufficient to meet the needs of the U.S. side.

8. Nitze suggested that we should abandon all the propaganda play with numbers and get down to discussing a comprehensive and substantive end result. Nitze said the U.S. needs protection in an agreement against the Soviet capability for an effective strike against its land-based retaliatory forces; if that can be worked out, all kinds of things become possible.

9. Kvitsinskiy responded by saying that the U.S. was threatening Soviet land-based forces with Trident missiles. Nitze replied that the Trident I offers no such threat and the D-5 will not be along for some years. The point was, Nitze emphasized, that if the Soviets relieve the U.S. of the threat to the survival of its land-based assets, the U.S. could comparably relieve the Soviet side of such a threat to its forces. The sides should talk constructively about this and resolve the issues necessary to a mutually acceptable agreement.

10. Continuing on sea-based systems, Kvitsinskiy insisted that SLCMs be banned. Nitze said that both sides were fully aware of the difficulties in verifying the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs and in verifying the range capabilities of given types of SLCMs.

Kvitsinskiy said a complete ban would meet many of these problems. Nitze recalled a discussion with McClain, Director of the China Lake Naval Weapons Laboratory, who had put together a cruise missile capable of hitting a ship in the China Sea from Hainan Island with parts bought from a Montgomery Ward catalogue. SLCMs had become widely dispersed. The U.S. Navy was not going to let itself be without SLCMs when Argentina had them. Kvitsinskiy said: "But who gave the Argentines their SLCMs?" Nitze replied: "The French, but Col. Qaddafi and Castro got theirs from the Soviet Union."

11. Returning to the space issue, Kvitsinskiy asked: "What about space strike arms?" Nitze replied that if the ground-based threat is relieved, then the need for defenses diminishes. Accordingly, we should first agree to limit offenses to relieve the ground-based threat; then we can agree to appropriate limitations on defenses. Kvitsinskiy said that limitations should be made in the reverse order. Nitze said he would compromise: "Let's work toward both concurrently."

12. Kvitsinskiy alleged that some people on the U.S. side (otherwise not identified) in Geneva have said the sides can discuss establishing a ban on ASAT systems. Nitze replied that he had not heard of such. In any event, this would involve banning ABM and ICBM systems; therefore, the better course would be to discuss how we can make communications and other such satellites survivable.

13. Kvitsinskiy then asked about INF. Nitze said personally he continued to think that the "walk-in-the-woods" formula had merit, but he emphasized that that was his personal view. Kvitsinskiy said the "walk-in-the-woods" formula was not acceptable to Moscow; it provided no compensation for British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy added that Nitze had once suggested indirect compensation for the British and French. (Kvitsinskiy, to support his argument that Nitze had suggested indirect compensation for the British and French, referred to a piece of paper Nitze had given him on November 19, 1983. That paper to which Kvitsinskiy referred consisted of points Nitze had been instructed by Washington to make. The paper does not make Kvitsinskiy's case but, in any event, the episode is reported fully in the attached telegram INF-739⁷ (Geneva 0722). Nitze denied the allegation; he told Kvitsinskiy that the "walk-in-the-park" proposal included partial compensation but that was Kvitsinskiy's proposal. Nitze reminded Kvitsinskiy that he, Nitze, had never made an equal reductions proposal. Kvitsinskiy then said that it was Nitze who had made the computation

⁷ Not attached. In telegram 10722 from Geneva, November 19, 1983, the Mission reported on Nitze's discussion that day with Kvitsinskiy concerning INF. (Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 5, Aug–Sept 85)

concerning equal reductions of 572, resulting in 122 to 127 SS–20s for the Soviet side. Nitze accepted that; it was simple arithmetic after Kvitsinskiy had suggested he look at equal reductions of 572. Nitze reminded Kvitsinskiy that during their “walk-in-the-park” it was he, Kvitsinskiy, who said that the Soviet Government would accept equal reductions of 572 if the U.S. Government would propose such. Kvitsinskiy nodded and did not challenge the point. Continuing, Nitze said that in any event, the Soviet Union is not entitled to compensation for the British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy’s only comment was to note the French had deployed another submarine; hence, the Soviet side was “now entitled to more than 122.”

14. Kvitsinskiy said he would have to report to his superiors that Nitze had no proposal on space strike arms, no proposal on limiting ASATs, on limiting SLCMs or any proposals on offenses, generally. Nitze replied that his purpose during the evening had not been to make proposals. Rather, as he had said at the outset, he wanted to have a serious, frank discussion with Kvitsinskiy on how the two might work together to prepare for a substantive summit rather than an easier one. Kvitsinskiy replied, “We should talk further.”

15. The next morning, while Clyne was having breakfast in the dining room of the Intercontinental Hotel, Kvitsinskiy and Detinov entered, “nodded” to Clyne, went through the buffet line and took a table on the opposite side of the dining room. Immediately after they took their seats, Kvitsinskiy left Detinov and came to Clyne’s table. After exchanging pleasantries on the previous evening, Kvitsinskiy asked: “Was your boss serious about the ‘walk-in-the-woods’; would you really give up your Pershings?” Clyne repeated a Nitze comment of the previous evening, namely that his view on the “walk-in-the-woods” was a personal one. Clyne said that Nitze’s view at the time was that the formula the two had worked out was to be an “end result” of the negotiations. But to answer Kvitsinskiy’s initial question as to whether Nitze had been serious during dinner, Clyne said: “Nitze is always serious.” Kvitsinskiy replied: “We (he and Nitze) should talk again.”

112. Editorial Note

On August 8, 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 183, in advance of his November 19–20 summit with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, establishing a White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting, chaired by Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff, charged with the following mandate: “1. To monitor and ensure consistency of substantive preparations for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group.”; “2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues related to the meeting in Geneva”; and “3. To provide guidance to the White House Advance Office and other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting.” (Reagan Library, Matlock File, Matlock Chron August 1985 (3/6) NSDD–183 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 73.

In August, Ronald Lehman and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff prepared a package to send to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert “Bud” McFarlane that included an August 27 memorandum, a draft memorandum from McFarlane to Reagan, and an NSDD that would create a White House Arms Control Coordinating Group, chaired by NSC staff, in preparation for the Geneva Summit. (Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Geneva Mtg: Arms Control Negotiations Nov. 18–20, 1985)(S) Before sending it to McFarlane, Linhard sent the package to Matlock, who responded: “Bob—As I mentioned to Ron orally, I’m not sure an NSDD is the best vehicle for this. It could result in some confusion and also some unwelcome attention to the mechanism. I agree that a group is needed, but feel that a less formal tasking (perhaps by Bud in the SACC) would be a preferable way to proceed.” (Note from Matlock to Lehman and Linhard, undated; *ibid*)

Lehman subsequently sent McFarlane an undated memorandum entitled “Strawman Arms Control Management Plan,” in which he expanded on an idea he and Linhard had discussed in the August 27 cover memorandum noted above. Lehman recommended that McFarlane approve a proposal for a “baseline concept as to how we might play out arms control events through November,” while recognizing “that many decisions are yet to be made by the President and the decisions and circumstances may go in directions different than the concept presented here.” McFarlane approved the attached plan, which was dated August 29 and listed key questions and contingencies for the summit, and wrote “Maybe don’t waste time on engaging the community in building a plan; instead begin tasking them to implement

our (your) plan.” (Reagan Library, Lehman Files, NST—Gorbachev Disarmament Plan, 1/27/86–1/30/86)

McFarlane convened the Strategic Arms Control Group (SACG) on September 20 and September 27 to discuss preparations for the Geneva Summit as well as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s meetings with Secretary of State George Shultz and Reagan in advance of the President’s first encounter with Gorbachev. Memoranda and handwritten notes are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, SACG—09/20/85/Shevardnadze, MBFR Debrief, ETC., and the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SACG Meeting Sept 20, 1985, Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SACG Meeting Sept 27, 1985, and Reagan Library, Kraemer Files, Geneva SACG—September 27, 1985.

113. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 28, 1985

Mr. Secretary:

I asked Jim Timbie to do a preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposal² (attached). Two bottom lines: (1) reductions in the Soviets’ own forces are real, but the deal is inequitable as our forces would be affected even more; (2) the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs would increase; we could not go mobile with our existing ICBMs as new types are barred.

However, as Bud commented last night, this is the Soviets’ ingoing position and there are elements we can work with.

Rozanne L. Ridgway³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1985 Sept Mtg w/ Shev. Secret.

² Reference is to Gorbachev’s letter of September 12, which Shevardnadze handed Reagan in a September 27 meeting in the White House, following a meeting with Shultz on September 25. In it, Gorbachev proposed that “the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (851009)) The letter and memoranda of these conversations are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 84, 99, and 105.

³ Ridgway signed the letter “Roz” above her typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, September 28, 1985

Preliminary Analysis of the Soviet Proposal

From the outlines of the Soviet counterproposal that Shevardnadze has sketched, it is possible to make preliminary assessments of the forces on both sides that would likely result from such an approach:

Soviet Forces

The Soviets would probably allocate their 6000 “charges” roughly as follows:

- 3500 ICBM warheads. This would represent a substantial cut from the current level of about 6500 and projected levels of 10,000–12,000 by the mid-1990’s.
- 2000 SLBM warheads. This is a bit below current levels, and about half the projected 1990’s level.
- 500 bomber weapons. Again below current (750) and projected (1200) levels.

So the reductions would be real. The character of the force, however, would not change. It would continue to be dominated by large ICBMs. The Soviets would no doubt keep and modernize a large number of SS-18’s, and continue deployment of SS-24’s and SS-25’s (despite the freeze on new systems).

As for INF, the Soviets probably project British and French missile forces will have 1000–1200 warheads when their MIRV programs are complete, so they could keep up to 400 SS-20’s.

US Forces

The 6000 limit is probably intended to apply to US theater-nuclear forces (GLCM, P-II, F-111, carrier-based aircraft, etc.) as well as strategic forces. Since there is no chance the US would accept this approach (which the Soviets have advanced off-and-on since 1969), it would be pointless to include such forces in an illustrative US total. It should be borne in mind, however, that the apparent Soviet proposal would count such forces against the 6000 limit.

⁴ Secret. Drafted by Timbie.

Even confined to strategic forces alone, a ceiling of 6000 charges would squeeze the US much harder than the Soviets, because we rely much more on bombers, and the bombers need large numbers of weapons to overcome defenses. A representative US force might be:

- 1000 ICBM warheads ($\frac{1}{2}$ the current total and $\frac{1}{3}$ the projected total with 100 M-X)
- 3000 SLBM RVs (about $\frac{1}{2}$ the current total)
- 2000 bomber weapons (ALCMs, SRAM, bombs). This would be less than half the current total. There would be no constraints on modernization or expansion of the defenses bombers face.

The modernization constraint would preclude the small ICBM, the D-5 SLBM, and possibly the M-X. GLCM and P-II would either be withdrawn from Europe or counted against the 6000 limit.

The net result of the use of charges as the primary unit of account, and inequitable treatment of theater forces, is that the Soviet proposal would force much deeper reductions for the US than for the Soviets. We could keep a substantial force of SLBMs (but could not give them hard-target capability), but only at the expense of drastic ICBM and bomber reductions. Our confidence in bomber penetration would be reduced.

Other Comments

Some elements of the Soviet proposal (SLCM ban, ASAT ban) would be extremely difficult to verify, and many other important provisions would require cooperative measures for verification.

The Soviet strategic defense program would continue. The US strategic defense initiative would be drastically curtailed.

114. Notes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 22, 1985

- Pres sent a proposal by Sovs 3 weeks ago
 - 2 purposes: (1) sound good
 - (2) self surviving [unclear]
- Lumped in many systems not strategic
- Paper this weekend gave 5–6 approaches
 - 3 for discussion today
- 2 issues
 - (1) substance—what should say?
 - (2) if yes, when how present—when, how, where?
 - in UN
 - in Sec mgt with Shev
 - round on *Nov 19*
- Turned to chart
 - col 2—Current US position
- EXAMPLE A²
 - 1800 figure is figure Sov Union posed previously
 - 4500—Sovs have 8900 RVs now—it 50%
 - 3000—50% of 6K figure suggested in offer
 - 1500—ALCC
 - 6000—4500 + 1500 ALCM
- EXAMPLE B
 - do 50% across board
 - 1250 is 50% of what sovs
 - 280 is 50% of SALT Acct bombers

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, NSPG 10/22—NST. Secret. Drafted by Linhard. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix D. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Situation Room from 11:19 a.m.–12:29 p.m. Linhard's notes from meetings of the Senior Arms Control Group on October 1, October 8, and October 21, are in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, NSPG 10/22—NST. In a diary entry for October 22, Reagan discussed that day's meeting: "N.S.P.G. meeting on how we reply to the Soviets Arms proposals. We're still working on that. My own idea is that we undermine their propaganda plan by offering a counter proposal which stresses our acceptance of some of their figures—such as a 50% cut in weapons & a total of 6,000 war heads etc. Those are pretty much like what we've already proposed." (Reagan, Personal Diary, October 22, 1985)

² See footnote 2, Document 113.

- 4500 is 50% now
- 3000 either 50% of 6K or 60% of 6K
- 1500—needed to get 6K of 4500
- Tuffened up by a—50% cut in TWT³
 - 50% cut in size of new RVs
- BAN ALL Ballistic, land based missiles
(SS-24 and SS-25s, NOT [unclear])
- This numbers—can we get views?
- SEC STATE⁴
 - need to make counter and things in A or B mod are sensible
 - launchers from Scowcroft—fewer warheads on launchers 1800 figure better
 - [less than 3 lines not declassified]*
 - MIRVed mobiles ban—not just mobile missiles
 - MIRVed not all mobiles if choice
 - Make a proposal—either OK
- RCM—There are defense and space on SDI, strat def,
 - EXAMPLE A—would say reductions are linked to defense—reductions tied to adhere to ABM Treaty—work talks on research & test
 - EXAMPLE B—no *commit* to ABM
 - 0—0: not a proposal but a ploy if no ballistic missiles, no need for SDI—not a proposal
- SECSTATE—set it up so reductions tied to SDI
 - an insurance policy, if Congress cuts SDI undercuts support for reductions
 - clarifying what research is be permitted from negotiator asked what mean by that—must explain
 - research means also that manner of testing needed to answer your questions
 - we are already exploring coop trans
- Pres
 - we start from position that they have more than we—they are more modern
 - would we stop MX
- Cap—we would be banned from MX D5 Midget ATB under their proposals

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

- most import decision of your term
- got paper on Sunday, revisions today
- no decision today, no change at UNGA, if move, do it just prior to Geneva
- why not just repackage current position
- both A&B are insufficient—too many hard targets
- 1995 date assumption that Congress will permit us to mod.
 - Sov can tell what they do
 - We cant guarantee
- spend more time on developing proposal both A&B are insufficient
- RCM—what insufficient⁵
- Cap—total weapons/targets
 - Chiefs can show
 - Actions in D&S invite all arguments said would not make
 - clarification will not help us
 - I feel that phase 0–0—we will abandon SDI—never suggest abandon SDI
 - all research is permitted
 - any oral reaffirmation bad
 - stay out of D&S in counts
 - if 50% cut is made in TWT—still Soviet ahead
 - INF—SS-20s has 3 warheads
 - if 1 off, [unclear] hit US
 - any freezes etc can still move Asia—Europe
 - not cant do something, but *not now* 2–3 days before [unclear] to respond
 - repackage what we have on table now
- SecState—a lot more uncertainty on our Congress, then what they can deploy
 - get theirs down now
- Pres—need to replace older missiles
 - [1 line not declassified]
- Cap—[less than 1 line not declassified]
- Pres—in an agreement, Congress will have to commit to cold, hard facts of numbers
 - if we are serious arms, inability to compromise etc—need to sound like their proposals to appear to meet

⁵ October 20.

-I don't think there's any way to restrict SDI—keeping your gas mask

-SDI only meet them on is being willing to share with world—
[unclear] willing to get rid of off

-if able to modernize, A or B offer potential to legit arms reduction

-no way we can match great expanse of Sov—cant hit all

Crowe—fundamental assym is in target base

-they have fewer targets to hit

-look at what \$\$ does via our strat

-easier for them to have sufficiency

-worked on (B) overnight—1995—all modernization—ban all
MIRVed *only*—simplifies targeting and verification

Pres—agree to ban all mobiles

Cap—may make targeting may increase verification—may neve[r]
know

Pres—need *heavy* verification

-what *does 1580* mean

Rowny—mistake

RCM—Sovs want 1800

take 280 from 1800 1520

1250 is 50% of today

-a range

Crowe—on mobile missiles

we have net advantage if no mobile missiles

-on (B) reasonable deter

about 1600 weapons short

500 RV short

-11% off on time request—Economic short-out of missiles

-no *RESERVE*

-if 175 KG a problem for D-5

avoid make jump to hurt

Ken—avoid

Cap—that's why we need more time to study

Crowe—modest toying can be done but hurts presentation

Ken—try to use 4 pts of Sovs

-50%, 3600 (60%),—6000K, ban on modernization—mobile MRV
and RV weight

-turn these

-agree with mod of #'s as Shultz

- agree with JCS toying
- in public diplomacy—if margin small put up #'s
- any tie to SDI before reductions bad
- reductions good before SDI came along
- we should clarify research, our job, no negotiate
- can see how wait tell before Geneva but shows seriousness to have Shev—neg—table
- Ideas to Shev
- concept at Geneva
- details in ltr prior to summit

TIMING

Shultz—if do something, should say so at UN—that told to put something forward

- good idea to give Shev an idea of plan
- table this in detail before end of round—don't hold back
- if leaks out—fine

Cap—2 problems

- (1) if you refer to in UN, loose all else lot of press on proposal
 - (2) not quite worked out—tuff for Nov
- better time after Nov 1—a few days before Summit
 - consid arguments too soon
 - elements could be put together
 - not today
 - not ready before 1 Nov
 - 2/3 weeks to chew it up

Pres—what is advantage of telling in advance advantage is what say
 Shultz—If we want agreed to, adv to have it set out in detail by negotiators

- you can get broad

Pres—Another idea, Sovs have presented

- in UNGA—have Sovs provided #'s

Ken—given #'s

Shultz—all in domain

Pres—What if simply say, that after numerous proposals they have mad[e] specific, we will shortly present to negotiators some of aspects acceptable

Meese—from these proposals, sees of negotiation

- details handled by negotiators not you
- ask the negotiators to stay an extra week—shows move

Cap—if ready, Pres statement OK

-not acceptable, basis for negotiation

-still need to study

Pres—dont put in idea of not acceptable

-got to remember that Gorb must take back something to show he's "Big sht McGuire"

-if we simply indicate an area here, General, he will have to come to [unclear] in meeting but he can see elements and pocket

-lets not go in and again drive him to yet give him something he can claim will

-give him (not concede) must be in US interest—but must play game need to compromise

Meese—need to talk up verification issue

you need raise

no problem for us

a plus for us

Cap—yes

Ken—dont think you should worry about Sovs like this—close to 1982—not need to study

-not wise to overpromise at UN make mgt all arms control

-largely an SDI summit—Soviet aggression overseas

Pres—arms control a sideline issue if remove hostility

-they have gone public, if can use their numbers—give an *OUT* to Gorb

-if we fall into trap of arms control summit—weaken selves

-PFIAB made report—we are planning for any contingency that could happen—Soviet Union is planning a *WAR*—a surrender or die ultimatum—SDI changes rules, need to reevaluate whole war scenario

CIA—reductions not militarily significant

-to layman—Soviets not very far apart [therefore] only reason not do it is US insistence on SDI

-the *latter* the proposal made the better

-game is on SDI—more we talk about ABB

Pres—ans must be if we get it, we then, must say we will share it with world

Casey—need to think when on table

-Sovs want to use *ABM* to undercut SDI

Ken—agree, need counter-counter focused on offense-offense

Cap—adv in many things—TWT—50% still leaves them up on us

-goal is parity

-pt. is it is a defensive weapon, share it with world—cut ground
out of RCM—2/3 lines on UN

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, undated

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. and Soviet drafts of a Geneva Summit communiqué.]

The gentleman on Shevardnadze's right observed that the Soviet side had not yet seen the revised and completed U.S. draft; nor had the U.S. side seen the Soviet draft. He said it would be counter-productive to read the drafts out point by point. He said the Soviets were prepared to discuss substantive matters and to start as the U.S. had proposed by talking about the Geneva negotiations. Each side could outline its considerations. There would be an opportunity perhaps at a second meeting today or even tomorrow. In sum he suggested not to read the texts, noting that from the start the Soviet side had thought to approach things in this way.

Shultz observed that this was their first agreement.² He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union's recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a rela-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 1, Secretary's Conversations in Moscow Nov. 4–5, 1985. No classification marking. The meeting took place on November 4 at the MFA Guest House. Shultz visited Moscow November 4–5 to discuss the upcoming Geneva Summit. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 134.

² Reference is to the suggestion that Shevardnadze and Shultz not read aloud the U.S. and Soviet draft Geneva Summit communiqués.

tionship exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. did not agree with. He said the U.S. must insist that numbers and percentages to which reductions would apply be used for the correct categories. The U.S. side could not agree with a definition of "strategic delivery systems" that includes a category of delivery system on the U.S. side while it excludes that system on the Soviet side.

Further, the U.S. cannot agree to limits on the number of gravity bombs and SRAMs on heavy bombers in light of the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet air defenses which the U.S. retaliatory bomber force must face.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under a common ceiling such dissimilar items as ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and which are at present, at least, unhampered by defensive systems, with cruise missiles, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses on their way.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to make limits on offensive systems contingent on restrictions on the U.S. SDI program beyond the limits imposed by the ABM treaty. He noted that the President has seen that the U.S. SDI program proceed on the basis of a relatively narrow definition of the ABM treaty, despite the fact that the U.S. believes that a broader definition of that treaty is justified given the history and wording of the treaty.

Shultz said that the U.S. has proposed to apply the 50 percent reduction to the strategic weapons of the two sides in the following way: Each side would reduce the number of re-entry vehicles carried on its ICBMs and SLBMs to a level of 4,500, i.e., a reduction of roughly 50 percent by each side in this category of weapons. Each side would reduce the number of RVs on its ICBMs to 3,000, i.e., about a 50 percent reduction from the current Soviet level and this more or less splits the difference between the limit of 2,500 previously proposed by the U.S. side and the limit of 3,600 previously proposed by the Soviet side.

This would also include a 50 percent reduction in the maximum throwweight of strategic ballistic missiles of ICBMs of either side, i.e., 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM throwweight.

Then, if this were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to an equal limit of 1,500 on long-range ALCMs on the heavy bombers of each side. This would represent about a 50 percent reduction of the ALCMs currently planned by the U.S.

On the basis of arithmetic, it is possible to come to the conclusion that the sum of the numbers of ballistic missiles RVs and ALCMs on each side would be the 6,000 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

Concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicle reductions, it is somewhat less than the reductions proposed for weapons in order to encourage both sides to rely more on single-RV systems which are more stabilizing.

U.S. proposes that each side reduce its number of ICBMs and SLBMs to a level between 1,250 and 1,450, which would be a reduction of about 40–45 percent from the current Soviet level.

In the context of agreement on ballistic missiles reduction, the U.S. could agree to reduce the heavy bombers of each side to equal levels of 350. That would represent about a 40 percent reduction from the current level of U.S. SALT-accountable heavy bombers.

The U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under one common limit heavy bombers and ballistic missiles. However, it is possible to mention that arithmetic shows a sum of between 1,600 to 1,800 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, if agreement were reached on the delivery vehicle reductions that the U.S. proposes.

Concerning constraints on modernization, the U.S. has two other points to propose: First, since heavy ICBMs are especially destabilizing because of the threat they pose to the retaliatory capabilities of the other side, the U.S. proposes to ban all new missiles of this category. This would include a ban on modernization of existing SS-18 ICBM forces. Second, to reflect the difficulty of verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, the U.S. proposes a ban on all land-mobile ICBMs.

Shultz noted that the President had been struck by Shevardnadze's emphasis on verification, and Shultz noted the problem of verification is a particularly difficult one.

He said the U.S. believes there should be an agreed build-down schedule which shows how to achieve the reductions.

The U.S. believes that the aggregate result of its proposed reductions and limitations would be a more stable world, where the number of arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, and the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished; there would also be better opportunities and prospects for verification.

Turning to the area of intermediate range nuclear arms, Shultz said the U.S. proposed an interim step toward the goal of complete

elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Here, U.S. proposal develops further certain ideas advanced by the Soviet side.

The U.S. is prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe at 140, i.e., the number employed as of 31 December, 1985, in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed on 31 December, 1985. The exact mix of these systems would be subject to discussion.

The U.S. would also need Soviet agreement to reduce the number of SS-20s launchers located in Asia in the same proportion as the reductions of SS-20 launchers within range of NATO Europe.

The end result would be that both sides would agree to equal numbers of LRINF missiles on a global basis.

It would also be necessary to agree on constraints on INF missiles with shorter range. After achieving agreement on such an interim stage, the U.S. envisages follow-on negotiations leading toward the complete elimination of this type of missile worldwide.

In the area of defense and space, the U.S. is committed to conduct its strategic defense programs as permitted by and in full compliance with the ABM treaty.

As is known to the Soviet side, the U.S. is fully aware of extensive research programs and of massive efforts conducted by the Soviet Union in the area of strategic defense.

So, the U.S. would expect a reciprocal commitment from the USSR regarding its strategic defense programs. Furthermore, the U.S. would also expect the USSR to take action to correct those instances where the Soviet SDI program is not in compliance with the ABM treaty.

Regarding the area of compliance with the ABM treaty, the U.S. urges the Soviet Union to join it in an "open laboratory" initiative, whereby the two sides would provide each other briefings similar to the one the U.S. gave the Soviet side in Geneva in the summer of 1985.

In addition, each side would also give the other an opportunity to visit laboratories and research facilities connected with strategic defense research, so each side would know what the other was doing in that area.

The U.S. furthermore proposes that the two sides begin exploring new means for a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defensive systems. If the research of either side should indicate that defensive systems are feasible, the sides should begin to plan now for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defensive systems.

These are the elements of the U.S. approach to bridging the past positions of the two sides.

Critical considerations here are the issues of verification and compliance, which will require particular attention and effort in the future.

Shultz again noted that the President had been impressed during Shevardnadze's visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister's emphasis on questions of verification.

Shultz continued that activities which corrode the confidence necessary for the arms control process must stop if existing accords are to be preserved, and if new arms control agreements are to be created between the U.S. and the USSR. Verification and compliance are today pacing elements if the sides are to achieve progress. The U.S. believes that more effective and meaningful approaches to verification are necessary. This may mean putting up technical devices and on-sight inspection on Soviet and U.S. territory.

The U.S. is prepared to work diligently with the Soviet Union to develop such approaches as are necessary.

Regarding compliance, the U.S. must continue to insist that the Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct those of its actions which do not correspond to existing agreements. The U.S. has identified those actions for the Soviet Union in the SCC and in demarches in diplomatic channels.

For example, the Soviet Union should alter its current practice with regard to telementary encryption and revert the practices that it followed at the time of signing the SALT II Treaty.

In sum, the U.S. has designed an approach which could provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of a range of nuclear and space-arms issues, taking into account the relationship between offense and defense, and while also addressing those areas which the Soviet side has described as having great significance for it.

If acceptable to the Soviet Union, this approach could provide the basis for an understanding between the sides that could provide direction to the future efforts of the two delegations in Geneva to work out effective and durable agreements on all these issues.

Shultz said that in the new draft communique, the Soviet side would find language implementing all this, and he added jocularly that if the Soviet representatives would initial the document immediately, it would then be possible to go on to other business.

There was considerable joking at the table from the Soviet side to the effect that they would initial the U.S. draft if the U.S. would initial the Soviet draft.

Shultz continued that there were many other issues concerning security and bilateral and regional issues, but he said he believed both sides agreed that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to this cause.

He noted that the U.S. would be willing to discuss whatever subject the Soviet side should desire. He noted that the U.S. regarded as con-

structive the fact that the Soviet side had agreed to prolong the third round of the Geneva talks so there could be consideration in Geneva of the U.S. proposal by those Soviet representatives who work directly with these issues.

Shevardnadze suggested that perhaps Shultz would continue and present U.S. views on all the relevant questions so as to know how much time would be necessary for discussions.

Shultz poured himself more water so as to continue, and Shevardnadze observed that the situation in the USSR was fine with mineral water, but otherwise with wine.³

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

³ The meeting concluded at 2:05 p.m.

116. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985, 3:30–6:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Matlock
Mr. Palmer (EUR)
Mr. Parris (EUR/SOV) I
(Notetaker)
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy FM
A.F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
V.G. Komplektov, Deputy FM
A.A. Bessmertnykh, Chief, USA Dept
A.C. Chernyshev, Principal Aide to
Shevardnadze
Yu.A. Kuitsinskiy, Soviet Rep to NST
INF sub-group
I.A. Khripunov (Notetaker)
N.N. Uspenskiy (Interpreter)

The Secretary suggested he continue his presentation of the rationale behind the language of the U.S. draft communique. He started with the Soviet suggestion in New York that a joint communique include

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 1, Secretary's Conversations in Moscow Nov. 4–5, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the MFA Guest House.

references to the inadmissibility of nuclear war. Our consideration alternative language was based on the consideration that the Soviet concept was not broad enough. Non-nuclear wars could lead to nuclear war. It was also important to make clear the steps our two sides were willing to take in order to lessen the risk of war. Our language was preferable because it described how arms control could contribute to strengthening strategic stability and reducing the risk of war.

The Secretary noted that we had also raised the idea of centers which could explore ideas for reducing the risk of military confrontation. Senators Nunn and Warner had mentioned their ideas along this line to General Secretary Gorbachev and we had noted with interest his response that such ideas could be considered. The Secretary suggested that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to explore this and other ideas which could reduce the risk of military confrontation.

The Secretary noted that he had already outlined the new U.S. NST proposal and observed that he would not comment further on it, other than to refer the Soviet side to the appropriate paragraphs in our draft communique.

Following up on the Soviet suggestion in New York for language on SALT II interim restraints, the Secretary indicated that we had carefully studied the Soviet proposal. There was agreement that mutual restraint in the area of strategic weaponry could add stability and improve the atmosphere for the Geneva negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that President Reagan had clearly expressed this view in his June 1985, announcement that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting the Treaty to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the NST talks.

The United States, he observed, had scrupulously observed its arms control commitments. We expected no less of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union knew, we had recently dismantled a Poseidon submarine in accordance with our policy. We continued to insist that the USSR take the necessary steps to correct actions not in compliance with existing agreements. In this regard when the President announced the USG's policy, he indicated his willingness to go the extra mile and invited the Soviet Union to join in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Secretary had to say we were disappointed with the Soviet response. He called attention once more to the need for resolving U.S. concerns over telemetry encryption, the Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS-25 new type. To demonstrate our commitment to make progress in the Geneva negotiations while we worked to resolve our differences, however, we were willing to note our policy in a joint communique.

Turning to non-proliferation, the Secretary noted that our respective ambassadors had developed language on which we could both

agree. There were some minor discrepancies in the language included in the two sides' drafts on NPT, but these probably reflected technical errors and could be worked out. *Ambassador Dobrynin* interjected that he had called Ambassador Petrovskiy to be certain the Soviet version was correct. The *Secretary* repeated that this problem should be resolved at the working level.

On chemical weapons, *the Secretary* stated that two things needed to happen. The first was a global treaty on the possession and use of chemical weapons. There was a U.S. proposal on the table in Geneva and we hoped it would be possible to realize progress. At the same time, a bilateral dialogue could be desirable with respect to proliferation and [illegible]. As an example, in the Iran-Iraq war there had been a [illegible] case of CW use and there was a danger of further use. In his September 27 meeting with Shevardnadze,² the Foreign Minister had indicated the Soviet side had no information on the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war. The Secretary handed Shevardnadze a 1984 UN report on the subject which left no doubt whatever of the facts. The Secretary restated our earlier proposal for experts discussions on CW use in the Iran-Iraq context. Such talks could be useful in their own right, and, if successful, could lead to a broader discussion on CW non-proliferation.

While on the subject of the Iran-Iraq war, the Secretary recalled that we had in the past agreed that the war served neither U.S. nor Soviet interests. The U.S. continued to believe that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev should discuss the issue in Geneva. The two sides had also previously shared the view that Iran was the intransigent party. That being the case, we again urged the Soviet Union to take steps to restrict arms flows from Soviet friends to Iran, so as to deny Iran the means to continue the war.

On the Stockholm CDE talks, the Secretary noted Shevardnadze's remark in New York that the U.S. appeared to be dragging its feet. We had carefully examined our feet and they seemed to be moving. The President's Dublin offer on non-use of force (NUF) stood. The other side of the coin must be concrete CSBM's. We hoped that the informal exploratory phase which the conference began just before the end of the last round would be fruitful in narrowing differences on the specific content of the concrete CSBM's we have proposed. In frankness, a more constructive Soviet approach would be needed. There was nothing to be gained by reopening previously settled issues or by trying to change the Madrid mandate. If we could agree on the general outline of an agreement consisting of genuine CSBM's falling within the mandate,

² See footnote 2, Document 113.

excluding independent naval and air activities, combined with a reaffirmation of our non-use of force commitment, we could agree to give our ambassadors parallel instructions to commence drafting. This would be a signal we were beginning to make headway. We had agreed this was an area where a push could be helpful; the U.S. was ready to push if we could agree where the push should come.

On MBFR we continued to regard the Vienna talks as an important part of our work on arms control. We continued to study the Soviet February 1985 proposal. While it had inadequacies, we were closely consulting with our allies on ways to move forward. The Secretary had nothing to say of a specific nature today, but he indicated that there could be a positive Western initiative at some point in the future which he felt the Soviets would find forthcoming. He asked Shevardnadze not to ask what he meant by “near future”. *Shevardnadze* quipped that perhaps he meant the year 2000.

The Secretary then raised a number of issues relating to Berlin, pointing out that the city had in the past been a source of U.S.-Soviet tension. He first touched on the problem of Berlin air corridors: an issue, he noted, he had discussed earlier with both Gromyko and Dobrynin. The Secretary noted that the problem was one of safety. There was currently a 10.5 mile reservation-free area; we wanted 17 miles. We knew the issue was being discussed at a technical level in Berlin. But the Soviets’ technicians needed to have a signal that their mileage was too small and that they should give greater consideration to our proposal.

Also with respect to Berlin, the Secretary raised Soviet conduct toward U.S. military liaison missions (MLM’s). The killing of Major Nicholson³ remained a sore point. A positive Soviet gesture to the family would be very much appreciated. It was well that U.S. and Soviet military staffs were working to prevent further incidents. But we would welcome learning what steps the Soviet military was taking to prevent use of force against MLM personnel.

The Secretary expressed the USG’s view of the desirability of enhanced military contacts, observing that U.S. proposals remained on the table both in the context of expanded exchange activities and on their merits. In this connection he welcomed the rescheduling of the Incidents-at-Sea annual review for the following week in Washington. In last year’s session the Soviets had raised the idea of reciprocal ship

³ Reference is to the killing of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, USA, who was shot and killed by a Soviet guard while on patrol in East Berlin on March 24, 1985. For more information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 12, footnote 1.

visits. We considered this an excellent idea that should be pursued in this year's review.

Turning to regional issues the Secretary indicated he would be brief in view of his extensive treatment of the subject in New York. He first recalled the U.S. proposal for regularization of regional experts talks. These exchanges had been frank and useful. But we had yet to hear a Soviet response to our regularization proposal. Reviewing the history of the talks, the Secretary observed that the original idea had come in the President's 1984 UNGA address. Subsequently, Ambassador Dobrynin had proposed a cycle of discussions of regional issues, which we had now completed. The world had not changed as a result, but the talks had been useful and might achieve more if continued.

We had in mind a schedule of meetings on all of the areas we had discussed this year, at the same level and in roughly the same sequence as in the past. The Secretary suggested that we might start in March 1986 with the Middle East. Southern Africa, Afghanistan, East Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean could also be discussed. The details could be worked out in diplomatic channels. The exact sequence would, of course, be a function of the availability of personnel on both sides, as well as the course of events in the regions themselves.

Komplektov intervened to clarify the meaning of the Secretary's reference to "East Asia". *The Secretary* indicated that the term referred to all of East Asia, including Southeast Asia.

Beyond our regional experts talks, the President had put forth in New York an initiative on resolving problems in certain areas. The Secretary noted that he had discussed these proposals with Shevardnadze at some length in their last meeting. We had noted the Foreign Minister's response that the U.S. and Soviet Union could not become international judges and that not everything depended on the two countries. We agreed with that assessment. The President's proposal was meant to build on existing mechanisms, not supplant them. The Secretary solicited Shevardnadze's thoughts on the President's regional conflicts proposal.

Noting that they had discussed the topic at lunch, the Secretary raised terrorism, noting that the phenomenon affected both countries. He welcomed the good news that Soviet citizens had been freed in Beirut, noting, however, that one diplomat had been lost. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. still had six hostages in Lebanon and that British and French had also been seized. We all had interests in combating terrorism. We thought consideration should be given to discussing the problem at the Geneva meeting. An additional possibility would be a jointly sponsored resolution in the U.N. General Walters had been discussing this option in New York.

Concluding his presentation on the U.S. draft communique, the Secretary noted that we had agreed that attention should be given in

Geneva to an agenda for the future. Agreement on the things we had discussed would have great importance for the future. So would the tone of the Geneva meeting. We also felt it important that the leaders state their readiness to meet again. Whether their statement would be limited to that or should be more specific was up to them. We had provided some language in our draft and would be interested in the Soviet reaction.

Noting that the next page of his briefing book was blank, the Secretary indicated that he had concluded his presentation and invited comments from Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for his thorough remarks on all matters on which both Governments were focusing as subjects for discussion in Geneva. The Secretary had commented at length on the new U.S. Geneva arms control proposals. Shevardnadze had had a chance to review those proposals and had two questions on which he would like the Secretary's response. After that, he would ask Ambassador Kvitsinskiy to comment very briefly on the U.S. proposals. Shevardnadze recalled that Ambassador Nitze had during a previous meeting given an extensive lecture on the Soviet position. Shevardnadze would permit no such lectures from the Soviet side this time.

Shevardnadze's first question was: How does the U.S. proposal address the problem of the interrelationship of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth?

His second question: How do the U.S. proposals take into account the double threat posed by nuclear weapons located both on the territory of the U.S., and outside the U.S. but capable of reaching the Soviet Union?

The *Secretary* indicated that he would offer a preliminary response and then allow Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Nitze to comment. The Secretary said that to understand the interrelationship one had first to take each of the negotiating groups by itself and then reunite them. The U.S. had proposed radical reductions in the START and INF areas. The Soviet proposal also called for reductions, so we were going in the right direction. In the space and defense field the fundamental objective of strategic defense was to eliminate the first-strike threat, and, perhaps ultimately, the utility, of nuclear missiles. It might be possible to get them to zero—something both sides have stated is a long-run objective.

What the U.S. was doing in its research program reflected a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We would like to hear from the Soviets that their extensive work was similarly restricted. Of course the key question was: what if research is successful? What about deployment? Once again, we proceed in accordance with the Treaty, but we believed the subject should be addressed now—in its interrela-

tionship—both philosophically and operationally so that we have some idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

Korniienko interrupted to ask a clarifying question “to facilitate” the Secretary’s reply. What the Secretary had said, *Korniienko* stated, was not a reply to the question that had been posed. The Secretary was talking about numbers, but there had been no reply on stopping the arms race in space. *Korniienko* recalled that the January 1985 agreement had two parts: to prevent an arms race in space; and to terminate it on earth. The Soviet question had addressed the first part of the agreement. Perhaps Mr. McFarlane could as well in his comments.

The Secretary indicated that he thought his comments on the interrelationship between these two areas were clear, but asked McFarlane to make his comments. Regarding the interrelationship, *McFarlane* acknowledged that there ought to be one. One had to recognize, however, that certain systems—offensive systems—exist today while defensive systems do not (*Korniienko* interjected: “and should not”) except on the Soviet side. McFarlane indicated he would like to comment on how to reduce offense while maintaining the capability to exploit defensive systems.

Regarding our offensive forces, it was possible until now to bound the problem by counting the number of forces the other side possessed and building a corresponding force of one’s own for deterrence. But new Soviet systems could no longer be counted. The U.S. was thus driven to defensive systems because there was no adequate counter. Further, non-nuclear systems held the promise of a safer means of deterrence.

Regarding Shevardnadze’s second question, with respect to strategic and INF systems, McFarlane pointed out that the issue had been debated for ten years, and resolved at least twice. There was no reason to reopen it again. A final historical point: the Soviet deployment of SS-20’s, while primarily a threat to our allies, caused them to ask us to deploy LRINF to counter the Soviet actions. It was still possible, however, to limit, and ultimately eliminate, all these systems through negotiations.

Ambassador Nitze asked to say a few words with respect to *Korniienko*’s question. The negotiators of the ABM treaty had sought carefully to define their terms and definitions so as to be able to determine whether components, as we then knew them, were being tested in an ABM mode. Nitze cited the rigorous definition on radar power-aperture to illustrate his point that, while it had been possible to define adequately components based on existing technology, the same was not true for unknown technology. The Soviet side had at the time argued in principle against limiting things which could not be defined. When pressed as to how to cover such situations, the Soviets had

suggested consultations. When asked what recourse there would be should consultations not resolve possible disagreements, the Soviet answer was that the disagreeing side could withdraw from the treaty.

The U.S. felt that this was an extreme remedy and that measures short of this were needed. The result was Agreed Statement D which calls for consultation pursuant to Article XIII and agreement pursuant to Article XIV in the event such a situation arose. To date, systems of the type he had described had not been created. We have proposed not only to comply with the provisions of Agreed Statement D with respect to consultations, but to begin discussions now to determine what should be done if such systems were to be developed.

Nitze noted that, at Soviet insistence, an article had been included in the treaty which allowed for modernization. Agreed Statement D made clear that only deployment was limited by the treaty. It makes no sense to speak of an arms race in research.

Korniyenko cut in to state that Article V forbids not only deployment but development and testing as well. He stressed, however, that his question had to do with not the ABM treaty but the January 1985 statement. The Geneva Talks dealt with preventing an arms race in space; SDI was a clear contradiction of the 1985 statement.

Nitze protested that his remarks addressed that question. The ABM treaty involved not research but deployment. Research was permitted. *Korniyenko* was confusing the intent of research with the outcome of research. One of the best ways to reduce the need for defense in space, he added, was to radically reduce offensive systems.

The Secretary commented that Ambassador Kvitzinskiy was shifting in his chair and appeared anxious to make his comments. We wanted to hear him out, but the Secretary had one additional comment.

The U.S. was a part of the NATO Alliance. We were legally and morally bound to help defend the Alliance against attack. In addition the U.S. had a physical presence on the ground in Europe. When the USSR aimed its SS-20's at European targets, it aimed at us. In that sense there was a double threat to the U.S.: a threat to the U.S. itself; and a threat to our role vis-a-vis our European allies. It should not be surprising, therefore, that our allies asked for U.S. deployments in response to Soviet deployments aimed at Europe. Thus, if the USSR was exposed to a double threat, so were we. In any case, we have separate negotiations on INF. We think this is appropriate. We think there should be an interim agreement as we have proposed. But we also think that this class of weapons should be eliminated entirely.

After being motioned to do so by *Shevardnadze*, *Kvitsinskiy* began his presentation. *Kvitsinskiy* observed that detailed comments on the new U.S. proposals would be premature since they were still being

presented in Geneva, and required careful study. He allowed that there were some similarities between the recent Soviet counter-proposal and newly presented U.S. ideas. There were also some very big differences which made the U.S. proposal, unlike the Soviet, “unbalanced and unfair.” He had three main points in this regard.

First, the U.S. proposal did nothing to limit the strategic arms race. The limits it envisaged omitted SLCM’s and its bomber limits left a large “hole.” The 1,500 ALCM’s provided for could be carried on 75 aircraft; that left 285 bombers. What would they carry? SRAM’s? Bombs? This was not included in the 6,000 limit; it was something totally different.

Second, the U.S. proposal ignored the FBS threat to the Soviet Union. In addition to its strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s), the U.S. has more than 800 forward based systems (FBS). After deep cuts, using the 1250 to 1450 figures, the U.S. would increase SDV’s by 1,000: a two-fold increase in the significance of such systems. Kvitsinskiy asked how this tallied with the U.S. intention to eliminate Soviet heavy ICBM’s and to cut throwweight by more than half. This cut is a “bargain” in the wrong direction.

On a more general plane, radical reductions in missiles would increase the significance of FBS and aircraft—a major advantage to the U.S. Nor was there any mention of British and French systems. This was a further attempt to obtain one-sided advantages for NATO. The U.S. proposal for dealing with INF, moreover, did not provide for the suspension of missile deployments. The U.S. now had 209 warheads. Under its proposal that figure would climb to 420. The Soviet Union would meanwhile have to reduce. Kvitsinskiy also protested the U.S.’s call for reductions in Soviet Asian LRINF, noting that this issue had not arisen in some time.

As for space, the U.S. proposal did nothing to block the arms race. The U.S. draft communique referred only to programs which are permitted by and in compliance with the ABM Treaty. It did not ban space strike weapons. This implied an arms race in space and a violation of the ABM Treaty. Article I, paragraph 2, of the Treaty prohibited the establishment of a territorial defense; the U.S. sought to protect its territory and that of its allies. Article V clearly prohibits development of the kinds of systems the U.S. plans to create. Kvitsinskiy could not agree with the U.S. interpretation of Agreed Statement D, since no Agreed Statement can take precedence over the basic articles of the Treaty. Therefore, Agreed Statement D must be read in the context of Article III of the Treaty, referring to permitted types of equipment within permitted areas. If not, the ABM treaty would “collapse”.

The Geneva negotiations had two goals: to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth. The two were interrelated. To

try to focus only on the problem of nuclear arms would be to solve only half of the problem. Thus, the U.S. proposal was unbalanced and unconstructive. If there were no decision on space, there would be no decision on nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet Union very much wished to hear the constructive part of the U.S. proposals on space—if it existed.

The Secretary noted that we had had a fascinating re-run of arguments we had heard for some time. SLCM's were a good example. They had been discussed a lot but no one had answered the question of how they could be verified. We had invited the Soviet Union to address this question and had received no reply. It did not seem sensible to agree to limit something if one could not verify it. As for Kvitsinskiy's point on aircraft, if it were true that aircraft become more important as missiles were reduced, so did the role of air defenses—an area in which the USSR had an advantage. *Kvitsinskiy* questioned whether Europe did not have air defenses. *The Secretary* replied that the Soviets' were more extensive. They should not be complacent, said the Secretary, he meant it as a compliment. His point was that if bombers face defenses, those defenses needed to be taken into account.

Korniienko countered that, applying the SDI analogy, air defense should make aviation unnecessary. *The Secretary* replied that both conventional and nuclear forces had to be considered. But that did not reduce the importance of the nuclear threat.

The Secretary noted that Kvitsinskiy had referred to 140 in his comments on the U.S. proposals. That figure, the Secretary clarified, referred to the number of U.S. LRINF launchers to be deployed by December 31, 1985. The U.S. had to that degree adopted the Soviet freeze idea.

Korniienko noted that Kvitsinskiy had been speaking about warheads. How did the U.S. get 420 warheads? The U.S. had 209 warheads now; would it reach 420 by January 1? *McFarlane* noted that the confusion was a function of the U.S. proposal's provision that the mix of Pershing II and GLCM warheads would be a subject of negotiation. *Kvitsinskiy* alleged that that was not what the U.S. delegation was saying in Geneva.

Nitze indicated that by December 31 there would be 108 P-II and 32 GLCM launchers in Europe. We would, under our proposal, discuss the mix between these two systems with the Soviet Union. We wanted an equal outcome of from 420 to 450 on each side, i.e. about 90 GLCM and 50 P-II's. The mix could be changed as needed after such a discussion. The right to alter the mix would be retained. *Kvitsinskiy* replied that the mechanics of the U.S. proposal were clear to him. It was equally clear that when the U.S. indicated it would suspend deployments of missiles in Europe, it would continue to deploy warheads.

Nitze asked *Kvitsinskiy* if he would prefer 236 warheads and a corresponding number of warheads on the Soviet side. Were they prepared to reduce their SS-20 launchers to a third of that number? *The Secretary* interjected that we would be prepared to go down to zero.

Komplektov asked to inject a historical note with respect to long-range cruise missiles. He recalled that in SALT II GLCM's and SLCM's had been limited. That Treaty did not fail to come into force through the fault of the Soviet Union. The weapons which its provisions had limited started to appear first on the U.S. side. Now the U.S. complained that it was impossible to verify SLCM limitations. The same was true for mobile missiles. *Nitze* pointed out that *Komplektov* was referring only to the SALT II protocol—a document of short term because of uncertainties as to the systems it covered. *Komplektov* acknowledged this, but stressed that it was aimed at a solution to the cruise missile problem.

McFarlane remarked that the conversation had begun by addressing the January 1985 statement's linkage of offensive and defensive systems. He noted that offensive systems had been a threat for years and that there was, therefore, considerable experience in reducing them in a stable fashion. We should continue to do so. As for defense, there was no experience except on the Soviet side. But two factors gave cause for confidence, or at least hope: defensive systems could be non-nuclear, and therefore preferred; and we had the time to talk about the role they may or may not play before they become a reality. Since some defensive systems already existed on the Soviet side, we had a double interest in discussing them. But it was hard to limit something that didn't exist.

Komplektov suggested in English that the same point could be made with respect to SLCM's. We didn't know what to do with them before they existed; now they exist.

The Secretary threatened jocularly that, if the other participants didn't stop to allow for a translation on behalf of Mr. Shevardnadze and himself, the two would throw the others out and talk among themselves.

Continuing, the Secretary noted that British and French systems seemed to be brought up every hour and a half. He described his view of the problem. The five permanent members of the Security Council were the countries with nuclear weapons. The scale of these countries' nuclear arsenals varied, but all regarded themselves as sovereign in having weapons. What other nuclear powers might do in the future with their weapons was their decision, but the U.S. had to compare itself to the USSR, not to the others.

At the same time, the U.S. and USSR had in January agreed that their objective was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. If the two countries

were to reduce to 4500 reentry vehicles on each side, then the ratio of our forces to those of other nuclear powers would be reduced, especially as third country forces were being built up. Thus, if we were developing a schedule for reducing to zero, it would be important at some point to bring in other countries, so as not to leave them with nuclear weapons. We should call that card. They have said they would join. We have said we want radical reductions. We have said we want zero. We should handle this by doing the reductions and then involving not only the British and French but the PRC as well.

The Secretary then offered a procedural suggestion. We were prepared to stay and talk as long as the Soviets wished or thought it worthwhile. But we needed to keep in mind that the meeting between our leaders would occur in mid-November. It was our job to get the discussion focused. It was useful to have the preliminary Soviet reaction to our Geneva proposal, and to have that reaction described as “preliminary”. We would relay the gist of Soviet remarks to our negotiators in Geneva.

In the meantime we needed to figure out how to give focus to our work; how to accomplish as much as possible so that our leaders can have useful discussions. In that connection, we should try to make as much progress as possible on a communique. The leaders should not have to waste their time arguing in Geneva. We should settle what we can. If there are some arguments which haven’t been decided before the leaders meet, they can write that down. But there should be a structure. We need to answer the question: are we to have a lengthy communique like the one the U.S. tabled, or not? The answer will depend on whether we can get the necessary substance. We need to pin this down a bit.

In addition, the Secretary indicated, it would be important to have a clear idea for our leaders of the flow of subjects in Geneva—how they should allocate their time. This could, of course, change if they chose to do so. But we could provide a loose structure. It is also true that there are a number of unanswered questions beyond the communique. We need to get them to gell. We had tried to set out our views on these items in our own presentation. As Shevardnadze had pointed out, we had not seen the Soviet draft communique, and vice versa.

Shevardnadze agreed on the need to find formulas or procedure for organizing further discussions. Why had this situation arisen? The Soviets had not planned a detailed discussion of the U.S. proposal. But since the Secretary had provided the gist of the U.S. approach and criticized that of the USSR, the Soviet delegation had felt obliged to respond in equal detail.

Shevardnadze did not wish to suggest that the Soviets saw only negatives in the U.S. proposal. The very fact that the proposal had

been made was positive. However, having come on the eve of the summit, it left little time for detailed study. He did not, he stressed again, exclude that the U.S. position had positive elements—a “grain of rationality”. But with each successive explanation from the U.S. side, the grains became fewer and fewer. At the end of the day, there might be no grains left at all.

Returning to procedure, Shevardnadze pointed out that the Secretary had done all the talking, and suggested it was now his turn. He indicated he would need an hour and a half to two hours to make his remarks adequately. If the U.S. side was prepared to continue this evening, there could be a break and then the discussion could proceed. Alternatively, the delegations could meet again the following day at 2:00 p.m. The Soviets would frankly prefer the second option, as it could allow for both sides to read the other’s draft. The only negative was that the Secretary would meet the General Secretary without hearing the Soviet side’s views. But the Soviets were not in a hurry. They were at home. They could work tonight, tomorrow, or even over the coming holiday.

The Secretary noted that in the Minister’s line of work there were no holidays. While he feared there might be frowning faces, he suggested the side’s meet the following afternoon. There were some substantive items and some communique-related items to discuss.

The Secretary offered a suggestion. The delegations could allow a couple of hours to read the communique, and then ask a sub-group to meet and compare notes in a preliminary way. The Secretary personally wanted to focus his thinking on his meeting the following morning with Gorbachev.⁴ He would ask Matlock, Palmer and Linhard to meet with the Soviet group. They would make no decisions, but could compare notes with the Soviet team and scout the ground.

Shevardnadze agreed to the Secretary’s suggestion and nominated Komplektov to lead the Soviet sub-group. He suggested the groups meet at 8:30 p.m. The next morning they could inform the Secretary and Shevardnadze of their impressions.

The Secretary agreed to Shevardnadze’s scenario. He indicated he had a few additional thoughts to transmit to Shevardnadze that evening, indicating that McFarlane and Ambassador Hartman should stay behind. Shevardnadze agreed to continue the discussion, designating Dobrynin and Korniyenko to remain with him. A one and a half hour private meeting followed (separate memcon).⁵

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 138.

⁵ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 136.

117. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)¹

Geneva, November 7, 1985

SUBJECT

Round III Assessment

It is rather difficult to produce my usual end-of-round assessment this time, given the fluidity of the current situation. The fast-moving preparations for the November Meeting,² to which the Delegation has not been a party, may make such a report OBE before it is written. Nevertheless, a Geneva perspective, particularly on the Soviet approach and where it seems to be heading, may be helpful. You are, of course, in a better position than I to judge how best to bring these observations to bear on the U.S. position for the November Meeting and beyond. Clearly we will want to revisit many of these issues after the November Meeting is over.

I am also attaching a short paper on the status of the negotiations which I prepared for the Delegation. I would be happy to discuss these and any other matters with you in greater detail at your convenience.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Geneva, November 7, 1985

*NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
ROUND III*

Overview

Round III was the best and most productive round thus far. The dominant early event was, of course, the tabling of the Soviet proposals

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round III. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Ridgway, Hawes, and Dean. Tower reported on Round III, which ran from September 19 to November 7, in telegram 10590 from Geneva, November 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850801–0094)

² Reference is to Reagan and Gorbachev's meeting, November 19–20. See Documents 119–122.

³ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ifft.

on September 30 and October 1. For most of the Round, our efforts were devoted to seeking clarification of the Soviet proposals, criticizing their unacceptable aspects and attempting to pocket desirable features. Soviet efforts seemed much more focused on the November Meeting, and the need for some sort of agreement in principle, than were ours. The last few days were devoted to presenting the new U.S. proposal. Overall relations between the U.S. and Soviet components of the Negotiating Group continued to be good.

Where Are the Soviets Going?

The Soviet proposal of September 30 contained deeper reductions in almost every category than had been expected. If one looks only at the constraints and reductions offered on *Soviet* forces, it is truly remarkable:

- reductions to something close to the U.S.-proposed ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile RVs (6000 total weapons minus weapons on heavy bombers),

- 1250 SNDVs (the 1982 U.S. proposal was 850 ICBMs and SLBMs plus 400 heavy bombers),

- a ceiling of 3600 ICBM RVs,

- a 50 percent reduction in throw-weight (close to the original internal U.S. goal),

- a halt in construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar (until fairly recently the U.S. position in the SCC).

Anyone willing to bet even three months ago that the Soviets would make such an offer *at any price* could have made a great deal of money. The problem, of course, lies in the unacceptable constraints on U.S. forces—not only the continuing condition of a ban on space weapons, but in the INF area—which are tied to the offer. The important question is, what is their strategy and where is their bottom line?

It may be useful to consider this proposal as the Soviet equivalent of the U.S. March, 1977 proposal.⁴ The parallels are interesting—a new team (Gorbachev and Shevardnadze) arrives on the scene, finds a deadlocked negotiation, wishes to put its stamp on the situation and makes a flashy proposal, elements of which it knows are non-negotiable, but which contains deep reductions which it believes will put it in a favorable position, both with respect to public diplomacy and with respect to subsequent moves in the negotiations. The Soviets had to live for three years with the disadvantage of a specific U.S. START proposal on the table containing deep reductions, while they had essentially nothing specific of their own. Their new proposal cor-

⁴ Reference is to Carter's "deep cuts" proposal and Vance's trip to Moscow. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 13–23.

rected this tactical disadvantage, at least temporarily. In the larger sense, they have finally done what we have been predicting for all of 1985—that is, offer very deep reductions in their offensive forces, in exchange for constraints on U.S. defensive programs.

What many did not anticipate is the half-merger of START and INF contained in their proposal, and this now becomes a new obstacle to progress. The Soviets clearly recognize that their proposal in its present form is not negotiable. With respect to INF systems, they must go in one of two directions:

1. Begin to *remove* U.S. INF systems from the strategic equation, or
2. Begin to *add* Soviet INF systems to the strategic equation.

The first course seems definitely the more likely in the near term, although a *complete* separation of what we consider intercontinental- and intermediate-range systems may now be more difficult. The Soviets probably assign the following priorities to INF systems in terms of their “strategic” potential:

- P IIs
- GLCMs
- land-based aircraft
- carrier-based aircraft

Based upon numerous hints they have provided us, the Soviets see clear qualitative differences between INF missiles and INF aircraft. If this is an accurate reflection of their priorities, they will soon agree to drop carrier-based aircraft and perhaps all medium-range aircraft from START, but will fight hard for banning PIIs or, failing that, counting them in START. A separate INF agreement which took care of all these systems would undoubtedly simplify things greatly and might well take the INF systems off the table entirely in START. One hopes that such an agreement would also remove the issue of UK/French systems from the negotiations.

It seems clear that a number of other aspects of the current Soviet position are soft. As negotiations progress, they will probably be prepared to:

- Drop their ban on ALCMs and return to some method of counting ALCMs and ALCM carriers.
- Move their 6000 ceiling upward and their 60 percent sublimit downward.
- Drop SRAMs and gravity bombs from their weapons aggregate.
- Ease their proposed restrictions on modernization.
- Accept a ceiling on heavy ICBMs substantially below the current level.

On the other hand, there are at least three other difficult areas in which they will probably hold firm for *some* solution which requires changes in the current U.S. position:

—Some compromise on space weapons/ASAT—perhaps partial and interim—but one which assures them that a U.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty is not imminent.

—Some solution to the SLCM problem.

—A solution to the Backfire problem which does not classify it as a heavy bomber.

One plausible theory regarding how the Soviets expect things to unfold is that they are not particularly enthusiastic about the low SNDV and weapons numbers they have proposed and expect them to rise in the course of the negotiations. They may have anticipated that such a rise would come about as a result of several factors:

—When the United States drives FBS off the table, they could say that such deep reductions in central systems are no longer possible.

—When the United States refuses to halt SDI, they could say that deep reductions are no longer possible.

—When the United States insists that large numbers of ALCMs be allowed, this would drive the SNDV and weapons numbers up.

—When the United States refuses to ban SLCMs, or to include direct limits on SRAMs and gravity bombs, they could say that the numbers of those other weapons which *are* limited must go up.

Our counterproposal does in fact drive the SNDV number up from 1250 to 1600–1800. However, in the areas of ALCMs and overall weapons, we have called the Soviet bluff, if that is what it was, although the fact that gravity bombs and SRAMs are in the Soviet 6000 ceiling and not in ours does confuse this aspect of the problem. This leaves the issue of how the resolution of the issue of INF systems will affect the ultimate intercontinental numbers, and this remains an open question.

The new U.S. proposal is an effective counter to the Soviet approach and puts pressure on them to make further concessions. What some of these might be has been noted above. The next section considers what additional moves on our part might be necessary or desirable at the November Meeting and beyond. How best to bring these to bear upon our pre- and post-November Meeting work is beyond the scope of this paper.

Where Should We Be Going?

Any attempt at a comprehensive look at this question would probably be OBE before this paper reaches Washington. Nevertheless, a few observations on what I see as major problem areas, most of which will probably still exist regardless of the outcome of the November Meeting, might be useful:

—In the September 30 Plenary, we used earlier guidance and told the Soviets we could consider “associated limits” on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and also on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. Thus we were somewhat surprised to receive the next morning the

new U.S. proposal which continued to propose *separate* limits on these elements. However, if my understanding is correct, the new proposal does inch us closer to two major aggregates with appropriate sublimits—a structural compromise State has advocated for a long time. What does not seem logical in the new U.S. position is the presence of separate limits (or sublimits) on heavy bombers and ALCMs. The effect of these two sublimits is to erect an unnecessary negotiating obstacle and to limit our own options to have more than 350 heavy bombers/1500 ALCMs in the future. One could view our current SNDV position as an aggregate of 1600–1800 with sublimits of 1250–1450 ballistic missiles and 350 heavy bombers. What is the rationale for the latter sublimit, which is on a system we have consistently described as stabilizing, in an overall aggregate we have said is of secondary importance? In fact, what we should do is move to an SNDV aggregate with a sublimit only on heavy ICBMs at as low a level as we can achieve. This would not only be more consonant with our own rhetoric and possible future needs, but would also ease a serious negotiating problem—the Soviets do not want 350 heavy bombers. The second pillar of the agreement should be an aggregate of 6000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, with sublimits only on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads. This is essentially the current U.S. position with the sublimit which unnecessarily limits our flexibility to have more than 1500 ALCMs in the future removed.

—The ban on all mobile ICBMs came as a complete surprise to both the U.S. and Soviet Delegations, and looks like a non-starter with both the Soviets and with Congress. If verification problems are the primary rationale for the ban, it will be difficult to explain why we can count SS-20s, which our INF position allows, but cannot count SS-25s, which seem to employ essentially the same basing scheme. If this is a tactical ploy which succeeds in causing the Soviets to be more forthcoming on verification, perhaps it will turn out to have been useful, but it strikes me as a dangerous gambit. It could not only weaken Congressional support for our negotiating position, for MX and Midgetman, but also provides the Soviets with arguments they can turn against us in several areas (INF, SLCMs, our stated desire to move toward more survivable forces, etc.).

—We have made remarkable progress with the Soviets on the issue of reductions in throw-weight. We should strongly resist any attempt within the USG to insist that an aggregate throw-weight number must appear in the Treaty. The Soviets have offered 50 percent reductions, but have consistently refused to accept throw-weight as a unit of account—a subtle distinction of considerable importance to them and of little significance to us. We can transform this offer into a quite acceptable legal obligation without rubbing their noses in the unit of account issue in at least two ways:

1. There could be a sublimit on heavy ICBMS, plus appropriate additional restrictions to control “throw-weight creep” in other missiles, *or*

2. There could be a treaty obligation that they will reduce throw-weight by 50 percent, plus a data exchange which establishes agreed throw-weight values for all current missiles. This would give us the aggregate throw-weight at entry into force, as well as at every stage of reductions, without any need for such a number in the Treaty itself.

The throw-weight of future missiles would be declared in the usual way, along with other data, in the SCC.

—Our position that intercontinental-range and intermediate-range systems should be kept completely separate is certainly a correct and sensible one. At the same time, assuming the issue is not resolved at the November Meeting, we should not close the door completely to an eventual merger of some sort. We should also probably not rule out the possibility of some sort of facesaving (for the Soviets) solution involving some allowance for some INF systems in START. One possibility, which might allow us to move ahead in START even if a separate INF agreement cannot be achieved, would be to count only the U.S. INF missiles in the SNDV and weapons aggregates (perhaps on a discounted basis), but allow the United States a numerical advantage in these aggregates to compensate for the asymmetrical composition. Although the latter solution would have sounded highly improbable prior to Round III, the Soviets themselves have opened the door to such a possibility by proposing unequal SNDV numbers which favor us. The basic point is that there do exist possible outcomes which allow us to achieve “equality” in “strategic” systems, but also allow the Soviets to say U.S. FBS has been “taken into account” in the strategic equation. Naturally, if a separate INF solution could be achieved soon, the problem would probably disappear from START and this would clearly be the best solution.

—For both public diplomacy purposes and substantive reasons, we should have a counter to the Soviet proposal for a limit on new types. We should not be in the position of allowing the Soviets to pose as the only side interested in stopping the “arms race,” while we appear to oppose almost all constraints on modernization. An annual quota on ballistic missile flight tests would be ideally suited to serve our interests in this area and should be studied.

—As noted above, the SLCM problem has not gone away—quite the opposite. The SLCM loophole looks even larger in light of the deep reductions now proposed by both sides and we need to redouble our efforts to solve this problem, which could soon become a major obstacle to progress.

—We should aim for a document to be agreed at the November Meeting which establishes an agreed framework and clarifies the problem of “interrelationships” which has made implementation of the January 8 Joint Statement⁵ difficult. The Vladivostok *aide-memoire* remains a good model, but we should probably be thinking in terms of something less ambitious.

—The ACDA lawyers have already prepared a draft Treaty incorporating our new position, which has been circulated within the U.S. Delegation, but not tabled with the Soviets. This draft represents minimum changes to our 1983 draft Treaty, which is widely acknowledged to contain serious deficiencies. After the November Meeting, we should prepare an entirely *new* draft Treaty, based upon whatever the state of play is at that point, for possible tabling in Round IV. We have a golden opportunity to correct a number of problems with our 1982–83 position which should *not* be wasted.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 100.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

Geneva, November 5, 1985

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Modalities

- Round I ran from March 12 to April 23.
- Round II ran from May 30 to July 16.
- Round III began September 18 and ends November 7.
- Pursuant to the January 8 Joint Statement worked out by Shultz and Gromyko, each side has one Delegation divided into three Negotiating Groups:
 - Strategic Nuclear Arms
 - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms
 - Defense and Space Arms
- We call the overall negotiations the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST).

Overview

—Atmosphere thus far has been businesslike—relations with our Soviet counterparts are generally good.

—We typically have one formal plenary session per week, as do the other two Negotiating Groups. The opening and closing sessions of each round generally include the overall Delegations and a few additional overall plenaries are sometimes held as needed. In addition, there are occasional meetings of Heads of Negotiating Groups, as well as a number of informal contacts at other levels.

—After two rounds of evading specifics, Soviets tabled major new counterproposals September 30/October 1. Several weeks were devoted to understanding the implications of these new proposals and gathering information which could be a helpful input for the November Meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. On November 1, the major new U.S. proposals were tabled.

—Both the substance and the timing of future rounds will obviously be influenced by the results of the November Meeting. As things stand now, we expect Round IV to begin in mid-January.

⁶ Secret. Drafted by Ifft.

Soviet Position

—While never formally withdrawing their 1983 draft Treaty, the Soviets made clear it does not apply to these new negotiations.

—In Round II the Soviets began to reveal elements of their position, while continuing to insist that an agreement on strategic offensive arms is contingent upon a ban on space weapons. They also consistently maintained that such an agreement must take into account the situation regarding INF systems, implying that the levels to which they will be willing to reduce intercontinental systems will be influenced by the level of U.S. INF deployments.

—The September 30 proposal establishes a framework similar to that put forward in 1982–83. There would be two aggregates—one on SNDVs and another on all the nuclear weapons on these SNDVs. However, a major new and unacceptable feature of the new proposal is that these aggregates would include all systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of the other side. The current SNDV totals were said to be:

U.S.

2215	ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
209	Medium-range missiles in Europe (PII and GLCM)
560	Carrier-based aircraft (evidently 14 carriers with 40 nuclear-capable aircraft each)
380	Medium-range aircraft in Europe and Asia
3360	TOTAL

USSR

2504	ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
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—These alleged current totals, which exclude Soviet IRBMs and medium-range aircraft, would be reduced by 50 percent, so that the United States would be allowed 1680 SNDVs and the USSR 1250 SNDVs.

—Nuclear weapons on these delivery vehicles would be reduced to no more than 6000 for each side.

—No one component of delivery vehicles could have more than 60 percent of the allowed weapons total (i.e., no more than 3600 weapons on ICBMs, SLBMs or aircraft).

—Cruise missiles of all basing modes over 600 km range would be banned.

—New types of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers would be banned or limited to maximum extent. New types would be those flight tested after an agreed date.

—Soviets said their throw-weight “would be” (informal)/“could be” (formal) reduced by roughly 50 percent.

—Verification is important and cooperative measures to supplement NTM, where justified, could be considered.

—Soviets also proposed October 1 a list of other measures they suggested could be agreed in connection with November Meeting:

A. Halt all work on development, testing and deployment of space weapons; terminate development, testing and deployment of new kinds/types of nuclear arms; freeze existing nuclear arms at current levels with maximum limitation on their modernization.

B. In framework of freeze in (A), stop deployment of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

C. Each side could agree to remove from “combat alert status,” and dismantle by an agreed date, certain percentage or number of nuclear arms—for example, 200–300 ICBMs.

D. Refrain from deploying nuclear arms in states where none now exist; refrain from building up stockpiles, or replace with new weapons, nuclear arms in countries where such weapons are already deployed.

E. Establish mutual moratorium on nuclear explosions; subsequent actions of the two sides would take into account actions of other nuclear states.

(C) was originally described as requiring agreement to a ban on space weapons. Later informal statements by Karpov indicated that it could be agreed independently of such a ban.

U.S. Position

—1983 draft Treaty remains on the table.

—Major new U.S. proposal tabled November 1. It builds upon positive aspects of the Soviet proposal, adopts an overall theme of 50 percent reductions and contains the following major provisions:

—Ceiling of 4500 on ICBM and SLBM warheads,

—Ceiling of 3000 on ICBM warheads,

—Reduction of 50 percent in Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight,

—Ceiling of 1500 on long-range ALCMs carried by heavy bombers (contingent upon the ballistic missile warhead and throw-weight reductions above),

—Ceiling of 350 heavy bombers,

—Ceiling of 1250–1450 ICBMs and SLBMs,

—Ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles, including a ban on modernization of Soviet SS–18s,

—Ban on mobile ICBMs,

—Reductions to be carried out in accordance with the “build-down” concept,

—No direct limits on SRAMs or gravity bombs,

—No inclusion of intermediate-range systems in strategic offensive arms negotiations.

—United States cannot agree to abandon its legitimate right to SDI research.

Areas of Divergence

—Soviets continue to link any agreement on strategic offensive arms to a ban on space weapons

—Soviet introduction of over 1100 U.S. intermediate-range missiles and aircraft into U.S. half of the strategic equation, while excluding comparable Soviet systems from their half, is out of the question. Acceptance of such a scheme would be devastating to U.S. forces, probably lead to U.S. inferiority in both intercontinental-range and intermediate-range forces, and reduce security of U.S. Allies.

—Soviets continue to propose a ban on cruise missiles of all basing modes with ranges over 600 km. U.S. proposal allows 1500 ALCMs and contains no constraints on SLCMs or ICCMs.

—Soviets want to aggregate diverse systems and include SRAMs and gravity bombs in the weapons aggregate. U.S. proposal is opposed to this.

—Soviets have not yet offered formally to reduce heavy ICBMs or accept a legal obligation to carry out predictable reductions in throw-weight.

—U.S. proposal bans modernization of SS-18s, while Soviet proposal would allow some modernization.

—Soviets propose stricter overall constraints on modernization than United States is prepared to accept.

—U.S. proposal bans mobile ICBMs; Soviet proposal allows mobile ICBMs.

—U.S. proposal allows 350 heavy bombers. This is probably far more than the Soviet Union wants (excluding Backfire).

—Some other areas—for example, verification—probably contain serious U.S.-Soviet disagreements, but discussions have not advanced to the point at which these can be clearly identified.

Areas of Convergence

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ballistic missile warheads, plus ceiling on long-range ALCMs, equals 6000. Soviet weapons aggregate ceiling is also 6000 (although, as noted above, it includes additional weapons not included in the U.S. number).

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ballistic missile warheads (4500) is not too different from the comparable effective ceiling in Soviet proposal.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ICBM warheads (3000) is not too different from the effective ceiling on ICBM warheads (3600) in Soviet proposal.

—U.S.-proposed reduction in Soviet throw-weight is 50 percent. Soviets have said that their proposal would result in reductions in Soviet throw-weight of about 50 percent.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ALCMs (1500) is not too different from what we estimate Soviets will deploy.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ICBMs and SLBMs, plus ceiling on heavy bombers, equals 1600–1800. This is within the range of SNDVs contained in Soviet proposals.

—Soviet proposal calls for aggregates of SNDVs, and weapons on SNDVs, with some sublimits. We have said we are prepared to consider “associated limits” on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and also on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs.

—Although the unacceptable linkage to space weapons remains and the INF linkage has been made even more objectionable, Soviets are now willing to make specific proposals and discuss details without *a priori* U.S. agreement to their goals in the other Negotiating Groups. This is in sharp contrast to their stated position earlier this year.

—Informally, Soviets have indicated that they have flexibility in a number of areas—specifically, the numbers 6000 and 60 percent, ALCMs, throw-weight, modernization constraints, inclusion of intermediate-range systems (especially aircraft), and inclusion of SRAMs and gravity bombs. Whether they are really prepared to move toward us in these areas and, if so, at what price, must await further negotiations.

118. Editorial Note

On November 8, 1985, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane convened a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Group from 4–5 p.m. in preparation for the Geneva Summit scheduled to commence on November 19. A draft agenda, talking points, and handwritten notes of the meeting are in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SACG Meeting—November 8, 1985. No formal minutes were found. On November 12, President Ronald Reagan convened a meeting of the National Security Planning Group, from 11:12 a.m. to 12:13 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Reagan Library,

President's Daily Diary) An agenda and handwritten notes are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, Summit (Geneva) (8 of 8). No formal minutes were found. Reagan convened another meeting of the National Security Planning Group on November 14, in the White House Situation Room, from 11:05 to 11:56 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) An agenda and draft talking points for McFarlane are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, NSPG: 1985. No formal minutes were found. Preparatory memoranda and studies in advance of the summit are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986. On November 16, President Reagan flew to Geneva, where he visited the meeting facility and called upon the President of Switzerland, before meeting Gorbachev for the first time on November 19. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

119. Notes of a Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985

SUMMARY RECORD

President Reagan:

—When we last met (this morning),² we agreed you (Gorbachev) would have the floor when we returned.

Gorbachev:

—I would like to respond to your remarks of this morning. During our preparations, we talked more than once prior to this meeting about what we should devote time to—whether we should focus on the causes of tension or focus more on solutions, keeping in mind that both sides have said a lot about causes.

—Today, too, if we were to try to make a list of our mutual objections we would not be able to make headway towards normalization, trust, respect and understanding—and most importantly, to give some impetus to the Geneva process which is at a crucial stage.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Geneva Summit Records Nov 19–21, 1985 [2 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive.

² Memoranda of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev's private and plenary morning meetings are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150 and 151.

—I think that it is reasonable, therefore, that we avoid a big debate over your remarks. But, as I told you in our one-on-one, the Soviet leadership is free of any primitive approach. It is not as you feel that all (our policy) is based on some global plan for supremacy by the Soviet Union, the building of an Empire.

—We have discussed this many times. Your side has raised regional issues, but in doing so, you mentioned our “expansion” in Afghanistan, Angola—even Yemen.

—We can agree hotbeds of conflict do cause problems in our relationship—but we can not agree with your view of their cause—because you feel USSR “expansionism” is responsible.

—This is either a disillusion or deliberate distortion.

—If U.S. policy is developed based on this view, it will be hard to find a way out.

—An assessment of our policy in the Third World based on such a misconception can only lead to undermining international security.

—I’d like to give you our fundamental view on developing countries:

—First of all, we have no monopolies in developing countries using their resources and manpower. We seek no commercial concessions. We rely on our own resources 100%. Therefore, we have no selfish interest in the third world. We need no bases or platforms there.

—Secondly, if you were to look at the developing world in unbiased way, it is the product of a long-term objective process which began after WW II involving liberation wars trying to add political freedom and to permit countries to use their resources and manpower as they see fit. This is the root of what is happening.

—You overemphasize the power of the Soviet Union. We are a pragmatic and realistic people. We are categorically opposed to impose solutions from outside. However, we are against counterrevolution, and support the struggle for liberation because we want free rights. Some wanted to crush the revolutions in the US, in France, and in the USSR.

—The idea that a small number of people (like the USSR) could turn the world into tension is unreal.

—In India, Algeria, and Korea there are millions of people.

—In Afghanistan and Ethiopia, you feel that we stirred the pot, but we first heard of the revolution in Afghanistan on the radio.

—We traditionally had good relations with Haile Selassie in Ethiopia.

—It is wrong to ascribe to us plotting—no this is not right. All we ascribe to is freedom. We support freedom—and make no secret of it.

—We have no secret plans for world domination—this is unrealistic. Regional problems are due to the struggle evolving over many stages. Some time you support one side or the other. We can also play a role—and in some areas, already do.

—We support a settlement of Afghanistan, a political settlement under the UN, if you help us. You accuse us of deploying troops but you work against us. You want our troops there, the longer the better.

—We are prepared for a package involving a non-aligned Afghanistan, with guarantees of no outside interference, Soviet troops withdrawn and refugees returned. There are possibilities for a political reconciliation.

—We are ready to promote this package if you are ready. Afghanistan is also ready to work, but wants the cooperation of all groups.

—I think we can reach a political settlement. Once again, we have no plan for using this to gain access to a warm water port, to the Persian Gulf, or to infringe on U.S. interests—no such plan exists.

—We could use this situation to improve the overall relationship—pursuing the cooperation of conflicting sides with our support—but not interfering.

—This is an area to us to explore.

—You have said the USSR builds and the U.S. lag behind. You say that we are committed to an arms race. The characteristics of the future situation will depend on today and tomorrow—this is the central issue.

—You said that while the U.S. was showing restraint, the Soviet Union was building military potential. But 20 years ago, there was no balance in the strategic area. The U.S. had more than four times the number of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, plus nuclear Forward Based Systems. Maybe that was acceptable to the U.S., but it was not parity nor stable.

—You now trying to assure that no agreements are violated—but 20 years ago you had four times Soviet power. Soviet leadership had to offset your advantage, so that it would not be possible for you to manipulate us.

—But since 1960, the U.S. has increased its warheads, its nuclear charges three times, and even now is greater than the USSR.

—The negotiations began as we approached parity. We are not trying not to lag behind, or to get ahead. We can't have unequal security, even if the imbalance is in our benefit, because this is not the basis for strategic stability.

—The IISS and JCS reports show that parity exists. The forces are different, but they support different strategies.

—We need to reduce parity to lower levels. We are moving toward each other. Neither side can be superior to the other. We are all for equal security at lower levels of forces.

—We have engaged in new Geneva negotiations, with all subject taken in their interrelationship. I would like to list all the steps that we have made to start movement and to outline the political concept we have adopted.

—The time has come for us both to muster the political will and realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun other side.

—Even now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in space. But we can match any challenge—though you may not think so.

—Why not take the obvious next step? SDI can lead to an arms race in space which is not only defensive but offensive. Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust.

—Scholars tell us that any shield can be pierced. SDI will not save us, so why is SDI necessary? The only logical rationale is to cope with a weakened (Soviet) retaliatory strike. Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first, it would be bad. If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the world, feeding mistrust. We can't believe your rationale.

—You said that a defense was possible. Since it appeared the President is committed, we studied your idea seriously. The answer that we came to is that it will lead to an arms race on earth and in space.

—We will not help you in your plans. We will need to make them impractical, and we will buildup to smash your shield.

—You say that the USSR is already doing this (similar defense). That is not true. The USSR and US are involved in research related to outer space, some joint research, and studying fundamental research for peace without setting a goal of defense. We are not trying to put the research to military use. That goal would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Testing is also inconsistent with the Treaty. This can only exacerbate mistrust.

—The President and his advisors are pressing forward and this can only lead to no reductions, rather a qualitative upgrading of our systems, potentially to counter your defense and an effort on our part to find a response. This response would not be a mirror of your program, but a simpler, more effective system.

—What will happen when you put in your seven levels and we put in ours? It will just destabilize the situation, generate mistrust, and waste resources.

—All of your schemes are based on computers monitoring 1000's of targets with us in some bunker while the computers are deciding.

—You know, we could have collisions, from meteors.

—If we get dragged into this, not only do we face an arms race and a waste of resources, but also mistrust and no way to negotiate.

—You have concluded SDI is needed to avoid the madman using the bomb. Well for years we have had a level of deterrence. Other states will join us and aid in verification. Your actions are not consistent with US interest.

—If you were to agree, then the USSR and US proposals could be used. If we could agree on avoiding an arms race in space, then as heads of political leadership we could meet on reductions.

—It will be a different process if we leave Geneva without any agreements or, after attempting agreement, we have to rethink the current situation.

President Reagan:

—We are divided by suspicions. Even during the WW II experience, we face this. I could never understand suspicion which blocked the 8th AF from using airfields in the USSR and caused our bombers to return to UK vice landing in USSR. They could have flown their bombing run, refueled and rearmed in the USSR, and returned on another bombing run. This was blocked by your suspicion.

—There is no parity today. Yes, we had nuclear superiority in the past, but even with us having a nuclear monopoly, we tried to reduce weapons. [The President then read a list of U.S. nuclear initiatives starting from June 14, 1946].³

—In 1969, we still had superiority as we entered into the SALT negotiations. However, since the signing of SALT II in 1979 alone, you have added some 3800 warheads. Since that time, we pulled 2400 from Europe unilaterally.

—NATO's INF deployments were due to your SS-20 deployments. Our NATO allies asked for our help.

—Now today we both sit with MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction. We don't have as much as you (nuclear power), but we have sufficient force to deter. However, this is totally uncivilized.

—After WW I, nations met in Geneva and drew up accords to protect civilians. Have we gotten more uncivilized, since now our weapons are trained against civilians.

—SDI is my idea. There has never been a weapon without a defense. I'm talking about a shield. We don't know if we will get one, we are researching the possibilities now.

—If our research results in such a weapon, and you are doing the same research, it would not do to put this with offense (add to our offensive forces). If a defensive system is found, we would prefer to

³ Not found

sit down and get rid of nuclear weapons, and with them, the threat of war.

—With regard to Afghanistan, the man heading the country was delivered by the USSR, not elected. The first one you provided didn't work so you demoted him. As I suggested in my proposal at the UN,⁴ I think we need a mutual withdrawal of all outside forces, then a coalition of Muslim states to help put in an elected government.

—In Cambodia, we signed a peace treaty with North Vietnam and after we left Vietnam swept across Laos and Cambodia. We are all for elections there.

—In Nicaragua, you have provided war material far in advance of their own defense needs. Additionally, Nicaraguan leaders have stated their commitment to spread revolution to other states. We have been appealing for both the Contras and the government to lay down their arms and talk under Church supervision.

—We laid off when the revolution replaced Somoza. In fact, the OAS asked our help in getting Somoza to step down thus allowing writing, free press, etc. Somoza stepped down, but one faction ousted all others. The Contras are trying to reset goals of the original revolution.

—All this is behind the mistrust.

—Yes, we need to eliminate weapons. Any military assessment of Soviet power indicates it is offensive—not defensive. We are ready to agree to switch from offense to defense. SDI will never be used by us to improve our offense.

—We believe these are things we could do to remove mistrust. Our goal is not an arms race. We can return to parity in one of two ways. Either we both reduce, or we can build up and use defense to offset. We do not seek superiority, but will do what is necessary for peace/freedom.

Gorbachev:

—What are we to say to our negotiators?

President Reagan:

—We could give them guidelines that call for 50% reductions leading to parity for all and instruct them to go forward.

Gorbachev:

—What about the objective as announced in January⁵—no arms race in space—what about that goal?

⁴ Reference is to Reagan's address to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly on October 24. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II*, pp. 1285–1290.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 100.

President Reagan:

—I don't see the defensive shield as arms race in space, rather as a means to eliminate weapons. We are going forward with research.

—Our UN Ambassador Walters was asked by some Chinese, what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate anything meets a man with a shield that is impenetrable? He responded that he didn't know, but that he did know what happens when a man with no shield meets that same opponent who has the spear. Neither of us want to be in situation of having no shield.

—We can have agreement that we all share, or that neither deploy ahead of the other, or with *offense* still to be protected.

—I would like to propose that we (Reagan & Gorbachev) walk together now.

[At 3:44 pm, the President and the General Secretary left for a short walk.⁶ Others moved to a smaller room and continued the conversation.]

Meeting While Leaders Walk

Shultz:

—Do you wish to talk on guidelines? No need to let the time pass. There are some points of intersection. We could try to narrow it down. President Reagan is doing that. Do you have suggestions?

Shevardnadze:

—The General Secretary has outlined our approach: a ban of space weapons, and an exploration of the gap between our two proposals.

Dobrynin:

—This would provide short, good guidelines.

Shultz:

—We will not stop our research. President Reagan is ready to talk about what we can do if progress is made—and we are ready to talk about this now.

Shevardnadze:

—I can't understand the purpose of this.

Shultz:

—Our purpose is to move the concept of deterrence into a more stable and humane posture. It will also serve to deal with unstabiliza-

⁶ The memorandum of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev's private meeting in the Pool House of the Maison Fleur d'Eau is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 153.

tion of offensive arms brought about by increasing accuracy and mobility. Those developments bring us to the need for a shield. Stability can be enhanced if it is not a race, but is a cooperative effort. Unilateral actions are not stable. A negotiated transition would be more stable.

Shevardnadze:

—What you are proposing, cooperating in unknown area, is more like science fiction. The General Secretary has said if we can agree on a ban, then on that basis, and on proposals put forth by both, there is a realistic way forward. You have said that what is destabilizing today is offensive forces, but I say it is your SDI. But for this program, we could have serious progress in Geneva. One more point, not mentioned earlier, you have been saying in the context of explaining your SDI program that the USSR has similar research and that we are somewhere ahead of you. This is being asserted by your press and your official spokesman. If that is so, why are we now proposing a ban on a space strike?

Shultz:

—I am confident your research is parallel to ours, and I can tell you why we feel it exists.

Nitze:

—In the area of lasers, there is no doubt.

Shevardnadze:

—If you have invited us to talk to convince us of the utility of SDI, I doubt you can do it. As the General Secretary has said, our arguments are not made of thin air. We have worked this issue with our experts. As a result, we hold deep convictions that the development of space strike arms will usher in new era of the arms race. Any talk of regulating this process by treaty is not realistic. In fact it is most unrealistic. The right decision is not to allow a new cycle of the arms race.

—We may not be informed on your data, but can one say that any guarantee that defense weapons will not be used for offense is no guarantee. Any defensive weapon can be used for offense.

—Let me ask, President Reagan and others have said that after you find out if development is feasible, and before deployment, you will share the benefits of the research. But, the research to get to that point will take many years. Will President Reagan have the same policy and objectives ten to fifteen years from now? In 10–15 years, when your weapons are developed, we will have own objectives. In the process, treaties will be thrown away. How can we be assured we can trust your actions that are 10–15 years in the future?

Shultz:

—[Interrupting] That is a good question. We have proposed an “open laboratories” approach calling for visits back and forth to eliminate surprises. Our scientists could visit each others’ laboratories so they can get a sense of what is taking place.

—Secondly, it is in our interest to maintain such a policy, not a matter of goodwill or trust. It is in our interest to have a cooperative development rather than unilateral defensive deployment. Unilateral action creates instability. It creates concern in the mind of the side not deploying. It is simply not in our interest to create instability, therefore, it is not in our interest to handle the transition differently than President Reagan has proposed.

—Third, our two sides are finally discussing reductions. This has been a long time coming. Our agenda, agreed here in Geneva, put both offense and defense on the table. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev both have said they aspire to go to zero. The more you get down to zero, the more a defensive shield is an insurance policy vice a device to let offensive forces strike without risk. So if we stay on this path, and get others to join, we will change the nature of the situation.

Shevardnadze:

—If you would permit, I would like to respond and ask a question. We are now discussing deep cuts in offensive strategic weapons, cutting all by 50% as we look for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If we are serious in following this path, and others join us in this, why do we need the shield? What is it for, since we will not only eliminate the weapons but also take measures to ensure none retain them?

Shultz:

—Good point, verification is needed.

McFarlane:

—Your question is reasonable. Treaties are broken. However, the history of actions by democrats provides a basis for judgment. Recent evidence demonstrates that, even if we have no treaties but only agreements, we have continued to observe them beyond expiration when we had no reason to do so. This should provide some basis for confidence.

—Did you intend to propose a question about the period of time while we are under ABM Treaty?

Korenynko:

—Another point, this may seem strange but I do think it applies here.

—President Reagan began his explanation of mistrust by asserting that US pilots died because the USSR did not allow US planes to land—but this is inconsistent with the truth. The truth is that, as soon as sufficient territory was liberated to get within range for planes, a huge Soviet air base at Poltava was opened in 1944. They used this airfield as much as needed.

—I personally was a citizen defending that air base, and was injured. Many died there. I know the US general in charge. Everyone knows about that.

—Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has said that Stalin and FDR did not have misconceptions on this.

—What kind of information is being given to President Reagan? Who does this, and what do they inform him of?

Shultz:

—If President Reagan is wrong, I will tell him.

—Let us turn to different subjects.

—Three important things were said today. Two by the General Secretary, and one by Shevardnadze.

—You said we should be working on a way of expressing the results of our meeting since we found many areas of agreement. That's true.

—This afternoon, the General Secretary spoke of Afghanistan, noting that a political settlement is highly desirable. We agree.

—The way the General Secretary made his comments is new to me. Maybe something can be worked out.

—We agreed beyond so-called expert talks and that at the foreign minister level we should continue to have meetings on our agenda, and on processes that we should consider.

—I put this down as a plus. Then I added something else said this morning. The General Secretary laid out an outline for a desirable process for our two countries involving meetings at varied levels, down to citizens. We agree this is desirable.

—This brings me to the question of how to report results of our meeting to our countries and publics at large.

—I gave Dobrynin a statement that we agreed on drawn from your previous document. I added a paragraph that refers to areas of agreement as listed on the following pages:

—we already have some items agreed, like NPT language.

—If you want to work on this. Fine. I propose we use the meeting at 9 p.m. this evening for this purpose.

Dobrynin:

—But what is following page?

Shultz:

—That depends on what is agreed upon. I showed Dobrynin in Washington only one page. This is a way to prepare to add on to this as appropriate and tell the public we met—did not agree on all but made some progress—and here's what we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Not really clear what kind of issues would follow.

Dobrynin:

—In addition to guidelines, what should be there?

Shultz:

—What we can agree:

- NPT
- Cultural agreement
- No PAC
- Regional talks and FM impetus to them
- Arms control—not only guidelines
- Try to find things we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Today the General Secretary has mentioned a political mechanism that should function.

Shultz:

- We agree and have said we endorsed this.
- It is reflected in this approach.

Shevardnadze:

—We have mentioned this because the mechanism has components: the Summit; foreign minister's meetings; Geneva negotiations; political consultations on regional matters; negotiations on Civil Air, etc.

Shultz:

- Also people exchanges.
- We had all of this in mind.

Shevardnadze:

—We should record the facts of this meeting to give political impetus to this meeting.

- What we need is serious and sound documentation.

—Ridgeway and Sokelou will meet tonight.

[1654 PM. At this point the President and Secretary General returned and the meeting ended.]⁷

⁷ The memorandum of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev's dinner at the Soviet Mission is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 155.

120. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 11:30 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

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Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Reyk Mtg—Geneva Mat. Oct 12–13 1986 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Parris. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission, where Reagan and Gorbachev met privately from 10:15–11:25 a.m. The memorandum of conversation for that meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 156.

After the press had been ushered out of the meeting room, *Gorbachev* invited President Reagan to lead off.

The President noted that he wished to address a number of items which there had not been time for the previous day. He would open with a few words on the Geneva arms control negotiations.

The President observed that our peoples were particularly concerned by nuclear missiles, which, if the button were pushed, could kill millions in a matter of minutes. It was important to show our people that we were concerned.

We had therefore shaped our proposal on strategic offensive systems so as to achieve deep reductions, focusing in particular on what we think are destabilizing weapons. Our proposals dealt with a number of delivery systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, etc. It built upon the fifty percent reduction concept contained in the Soviet counterproposal. It also incorporated reductions to 4,500 ballistic missile warheads and a limit on ALCMs of 1,500; the overall sum would be the 6,000 figure that the Soviets had proposed.

The U.S. had to insist, however, that the reductions be applied to the proper categories of systems. We could not agree to the Soviet's proposed definition of "strategic delivery systems" or any definition that included within a common limit a category of delivery systems on the US side while excluding it on the Soviet side. The two sides, of course, had a long negotiating history on this issue, so the President would not repeat the U.S. rationale, but rather restate its insistence on the definition agreed upon in past strategic offensive arms agreements as to the categories of systems to be included in limits on strategic offensive arms.

The aggregate result of the reductions and limits we proposed for strategic offensive arms would be a more stable world in which the number of these arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished, and the prospects of verification would be enhanced. The President stressed that verification was vital if we were to reduce suspicion between our two governments.

In the area of intermediate-range nuclear arms, the U.S. proposal built, in part, on Soviet ideas. The U.S. was prepared to cap US LRINF missiles in Europe at the level deployed as of December 31, 1985, in return for your agreement to reduce your LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same launcher number. The U.S. would be prepared to discuss with the USSR the exact mix of these systems. The U.S. proposal included reductions in the number of SS-20 launchers located in Asia and outside range of NATO Europe. The end result, the President stressed in conclusion, would be that both

sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number.

Before moving onto other issues, the President offered Gorbachev a chance to respond.

Gorbachev indicated that he did, in fact, have a few comments. The Soviets had carefully assessed the U.S. NST proposal. They welcomed the U.S. agreement to accept 50 percent reductions in nuclear strategic arsenals. It was of fundamental importance to note any basis for moving ahead in the search for mutually acceptable proposals which could be components of possible agreements.

But Gorbachev also had some critical observations to make regarding practically all the elements of the Soviet proposal. He did not wish to dramatize this. He believed that this approach coincided with the President's own in welcoming the basic thrust of Soviet proposals for radical reductions, while not welcoming other elements. Both sides now had proposals on the table. There was plenty to work with.

Reiterating that he did not want to dramatize differences in the two sides' approach, Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union truly desired a serious search for mutually acceptable proposals. He stressed that the Soviet Union was not proposing elements which would be unacceptable to the U.S., which could jeopardize U.S. security, since this would make it impossible to reach agreements in the future. But the Soviets expected the same treatment from the United States. If the U.S. advanced proposals which sought to undermine Soviet security, it would make agreement impossible and complicate future work in this area.

There were elements in the U.S. proposal, however, which clearly departed from the January 1985 U.S.-Soviet understanding² on the goals and subjects of the Geneva talks. On the one hand, the President and his colleagues asserted that the U.S. had not departed from this understanding, that the U.S. was in favor of radical reductions in defensive nuclear weapons and in favor of preventing an arms race in space.

The President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was regarded by the U.S. as consistent with the January understanding. This was a "revelation" to the Soviets. No matter under what flag the U.S. chose to cover it, SDI amounted to placing weapons in space, to spreading the arms race to space. This view devalued the remaining elements of the U.S. proposals. What purpose could be served by radical reductions if the U.S. contemplated deploying weapons in space—with all the attendant consequences.

² See footnote 3, Document 100.

When the Soviets had proposed that the two sides agree to close the door to deployments of weapons in space, it was consistent with both the U.S. and USSR's security interests. Gorbachev noted that the U.S. had claimed the Soviet Union was ahead in scientific research on space questions; if so, the U.S. should want to stop the process now. As the U.S. did not, Soviet superiority in space research did not appear to be the problem.

Gorbachev felt he had to say that he did not know what lay at the bottom of the U.S. position. How the U.S. had come to its position was not important to him, however. What was important to him was the position itself. Gorbachev was concerned that the position was fed by an illusion that the U.S. was ahead in the technology and information transfer systems on which space systems would be based, and that a possibility therefore existed to obtain military superiority over the USSR. The U.S. might even consider it possible to obtain a first-strike capability, or, under certain circumstances, to launch a first strike. The Soviet Union needed to consider worst cases in developing its policies.

Gorbachev told the President that he had recently observed to a Soviet scientist that he could see no reason why the President should be committed to SDI. Gorbachev had wondered why the President could have any interest in injecting a new element of instability into the relationship, in further exacerbating U.S.-Soviet relations. The scientist had said that she had done research into the matter and found the explanation: SDI would produce from 600 billion to a trillion dollars in new military expenditures. That was the reason.

With mounting urgency, Gorbachev said he must return again to the problem of SDI, even at the risk of injecting some tension into the discussion. He did not want to do this. But he could not ignore the importance of the problem. Gorbachev expressed regret that the U.S. appeared determined to depart from the January agreement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. If the U.S. departed from that road, Gorbachev did not know when it would be possible for the two countries to meet on it again. Everything at the Geneva NST talks would come to a halt. For its part, the Soviet Union remained committed to the goals of the January understanding, and was prepared to do everything possible to achieve them.

The President stated that the scientist Gorbachev had referred to was dealing with a fantasy. She reminded the President of the scientists who had told President Eisenhower that ICBMs would never work.

The President underscored that SDI was not a weapons system or a plan for conducting a war in space. It was an effort to find a more civilized means of deterring war than reliance on thousands of nuclear missiles which, if used, would kill millions on both sides. Never before in history had the possibility existed of a war which would bring about the end of civilization.

Even if the two sides reduced offensive arms by 50 percent, there would still be too many weapons. The U.S. did not see in SDI a means of obtaining military advantage over the Soviet Union. The benefits of SDI research would be for the USSR as well as the U.S. If defensive systems could be found, they would be available to all. This would end the nuclear nightmare for the U.S. people, the Soviet people, all people. The Soviet Union and the United States had the capability to move beyond simply aiming weapons at each other with the risk of ending the world as we know it. As to the argument that the U.S. sought to build an offensive arsenal, the U.S. objective was that whoever developed a feasible defensive system would share it, so that any threat to the other side would be eliminated. If there was opposition to that concept, the President speculated it might be based on the assumption that nuclear weapons might, at some point, be used. The U.S., on the other hand, was seeking a security system based on “shield,” not “spears” or missiles. Under the current system of deterrence, it would be impossible to tell the winner from the loser in the event of war.

Gorbachev replied that he understood the President’s arguments but found them unconvincing. They contained many emotional elements, elements which were part of one man’s dream. *Gorbachev* did not wish to suggest that the President did not want peace. But the fact was that SDI would result in the appearance of weapons in space. They might be built as anti-missile weapons, but they would have the capability of striking earth. The USSR could never know for sure. The Soviets had agreed on 50 percent reductions in nuclear weapons. But the President was advocating a whole new class of weapons. Describing these weapons as a shield was only packaging. They would open a new arms race in space. The President would be held responsible.

Gorbachev said that there were dreams of peace and there were realities. He did not believe the President saw him as a blood-thirsty person who wanted to drag his country into conflict. The Soviet Union was for reducing the number of weapons. History would remember the President, as well as the Soviet leader, for having begun to eliminate nuclear weapons. But agreement had not yet been reached. And now SDI threatened to open a new arms race.

The President observed that, under the U.S. open laboratories concept, scientists from both sides could satisfy themselves that SDI research was not being directed toward the development of an offensive capability. *Gorbachev* shot back his agreement that laboratories should be opened, but only if the development of space weapons had first been banned. *The President* reiterated that Soviet scientists would be able to verify by visiting U.S. laboratories whether the U.S. was building destructive weapons or a shield. The U.S. was after a shield.

This got to the point that it was necessary for the two countries to get beyond suspicions. The President asked whether he would not be

justified in suspecting that, under certain circumstances, the Soviets would use their missiles against the U.S. Words could not reduce the idea of a threat from one side to another. The Soviet interpretation was that SDI would lead to the development of new offensive weapons. The U.S. was trying simply to see if there was a way to end the world's nightmare about nuclear weapons. The President emphasized that the U.S. would share its research with the Soviet Union; attempts to develop destructive weapons would be discovered.

Gorbachev asked the President with some emotion why he would not believe him when he said the Soviet Union would never attack. Before the President could respond, Gorbachev repeated the question. He again interrupted the President's answer to insist on a response.

The President stated that no individual could say to the U.S. people that they should rely on his personal faith rather than on sound defense. *Gorbachev* questioned the sincerity of the President's willingness to share SDI research, pointing out that the U.S. did not share its most advanced technology even with its allies.

Gorbachev called for a more realistic discussion. The Soviet Union was prepared to compromise. But the U.S. had the impression that the USSR was weak and could be painted into a corner. That was no illusion. There would soon be a disillusionment; perhaps not in the President's time, but ultimately. The President would be held responsible. SDI would open a new sphere for the arms race. Why was this necessary?

The Soviet Union had said it would agree to a separate INF agreement, to deep cuts. These had not been easy decisions. The Soviets had their concerns. But they felt that if steps were not taken in the next year to 18 months, the consequences would be grave. The President wanted to catch the "Firebird" of SDI by using the U.S. technical advantage. There would be disillusionment, but it would come too late, as the "infernal" train would already be moving.

Gorbachev observed that perhaps his remarks had grown a bit heated. He had meant only to convey to the President the depth of Soviet concern on this issue.

The President replied that, with all due respect, Gorbachev's concerns were based on a false premise. Overcoming several interruptions from Gorbachev, the President reaffirmed that the U.S. would be prepared to reduce nuclear weapons to zero and ultimately to eliminate them. The fact was, however, that they still existed. A defensive shield was therefore necessary. He compared nuclear weapons to chemical weapons. Conventions had been negotiated to ban the use of chemical weapons, but gas masks had been retained. With a defensive shield against nuclear weapons, people would have an additional guarantee against their use. The President could not see how SDI research could

be interpreted as threatening to human life or targets on earth. Moreover, he repeated, the ultimate idea was to share SDI research; neither nation would be able to use it to develop a first-strike capability.

Gorbachev alleged that the U.S., under the guise of a shield, intended to introduce weapons into space. The Soviet Union must base its policies on this fact. The Soviets could not be sure what the U.S. ultimately had in mind. The fact was that to destroy weapons other weapons were necessary. The President countered that no one was sure whether SDI would work; the U.S. effort was designed only to find out if a defense was possible. *Gorbachev* said that this meant only that the U.S. was seeking to determine if space weapons were possible.

The President explained that his instructions to those responsible for SDI research had been to find out if there were a means to stop nuclear missiles. He had said that if such a means existed, the U.S. would share it with other countries so as to make nuclear weapons unnecessary. He was aware that SDI research dealt with systems such as lasers and particle beam devices which had weapons applications. These systems, however, were designed not to kill people, but to stop nuclear missiles from reaching their target. The President noted that the Soviet Union already had the world's most developed ABM system.

Gorbachev said he felt it inappropriate in their conversation to inject banalities more in keeping with press conferences. The Soviet ABM system was in compliance with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had chosen to place its system around its capital; the U.S. had placed its near missile fields. The USSR was scrupulous in complying with treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. It was too dangerous to engage in deceptions in this area. *The President* agreed, noting that the U.S. had raised the question of Krasnoyarsk radar and its possible battle management role. He asked *Gorbachev* whether the U.S. expression of willingness to share its SDI research did not adequately deal with Soviet suspicions.

Gorbachev indicated that the President already had the Soviet assessment of the U.S. position. *Gorbachev* wanted to emphasize it because it was the key question of their meeting. It would define the future political dialogue between the two countries, the nature of the Geneva negotiations, the outcome of important decisions on domestic policy in both countries. It appeared that the President was very committed to the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons. The Soviets would have to consider and base their policy on this fact. The Soviets had heard similar views expressed by many of the President's advisers. But these were only advisers. The President had the ultimate responsibility. *Gorbachev* sometimes had felt that the President's advisers feared the President's prestige would suffer if he gave up SDI. *Gorbachev* was "500 percent" convinced that the President would in fact benefit from such a decision.

The President expressed concern that the discussion had gone too far and suggested a more reasonable approach. The two sides had agreed to a reduction in strategic offensive weapons of 50 percent. It was unfortunate that this was being frustrated because the Soviets objected to an attempt to determine if there was a defense against nuclear missiles. It would be years before this was known. We had made clear our willingness to share SDI research. There was no reason why such research should prevent us from going ahead with reductions in nuclear forces.

The President did not know whether or not Gorbachev believed in reincarnation. Perhaps the President in a previous life had been the inventor of the shield. In any case, the President believed that trust and prospects for peace would improve if both sides began to rely more on defense, with offensive weapons being reduced.

Gorbachev asked rhetorically what was the result of the Geneva talks thus far. There had been negotiations, with the objectives and subjects clearly determined: to stop the arms race on earth and prevent its spread to space. The Soviets had felt that the work done thus far in Geneva would enable the two leaders to give an impulse to the process in their own meeting. The leaders had now met and it seemed clear that the President felt that weapons could be introduced into space. *Gorbachev* feared the negotiations would go by the wayside in this case. What, he asked, was to be done.

The President replied that, where *Gorbachev* saw a threat, we saw an opportunity. We should both seek to reduce offensive arms by 50 percent and to determine if defense was possible. We could then sit down and decide if deployment was desirable. We would share our findings. Was that not a fair deal? The Soviet Union would be aware of our arms program. We would look at the Soviets's. We were talking about several years. Would people not, the President asked, be more confident that a defense would work if both sides reduced by 50 percent.

Gorbachev asked that the President not treat the Soviets as "simple people." *The President* replied that he did not see how he had in any way shown disrespect or charged the Soviets with naivety. He had explored the various issues with *Gorbachev* as openly as possible. He could see no logical argument against going ahead with research when we have made clear that we will not have a monopoly on defense if a feasible solution is found.

Gorbachev questioned why it was necessary to conduct research when nuclear weapons were being reduced—and by 50 percent as a first step. SDI was torpedoing the possibility of steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to lock the door against space weapons—to bar it or even drive in nails—and then begin reductions.

The Soviets did not know what weapons might be developed by researchers. If the past was any guide, they would find things they had not expected to find. The Soviets had repeatedly shown in recent months their willingness to seek reasonable solutions. The U.S. approach could only lead to an expansion of the arms race on earth and in space.

The President denied this. He stressed that the U.S. was prepared to open its laboratories to demonstrate that it was not seeking a new offensive potential. Gorbachev interrupted to state that the Soviets were looking for a way out. They were serious. The President countered that the way out was to reduce and not to miss the opportunity to develop a defense because of fear that it might have an offensive potential.

Gorbachev asked if the President had money to spare. *The President* replied no. *Gorbachev* said he knew that. The President had in the past expressed the view that SDI could be used to prevent “some madman” from using a nuclear weapon. The U.S. and USSR should reduce their own weapons by 50 percent and then have other countries join them. More could be done with the NPT Treaty. Ways could be found to prevent madmen. Because of one madman, should we have an arms race in space?

The President again wondered why the Soviets should object to research. At this point, we were only talking about a theory. We were also talking about safeguards. If the problem appeared to be solvable, then we could talk. But both sides would for the moment retain nuclear weapons. Reductions would make it possible to save considerable expenditures, e.g., for modernization.

Gorbachev expressed his regret that the two leaders would have so little positive to say on the Geneva talks. The President replied that the U.S. would have to tell people that the possibility of reducing nuclear arms by 50 percent had been destroyed by suspicion of ulterior motives. Gorbachev noted that strategic defense was the President’s idea; it was hard to dispute the notion that the Geneva negotiations were based on the January understanding, which deal with two elements: stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. After his discussion with the President, it was clear that the U.S. was determined to develop and introduce weapons into space.

The President said that the U.S. side would tell a different story. We would say that current effort to develop a system that would not kill people, but only stop missiles, was the cause of Soviet suspicions which had prevented reductions of nuclear weapons. An opportunity was thus being lost. The President felt that public opinion would find that difficult to understand.

Gorbachev said that this was the U.S. assessment. But it was important the leaders deal in substance not propaganda. The Soviet side had

expected that, when the two leaders met, after months of preparation, it would be possible to reach solutions and to clarify what had been agreed to in January.

Noting that they had already run over the allotted time, *the President* urged Gorbachev to consider further the safeguards the President had mentioned. It would reassure publics in both countries if the leaders could agree on this and go forward with reductions in nuclear weapons. The President had no further elaborations other than to repeat his inability to comprehend how, in a world full of nuclear weapons, it was so horrifying to seek to develop a defense against this awful threat, how an effort to reduce nuclear weapons could break down because of such an attempt.

Gorbachev for his part, questioned how, in such a difficult situation and with the threat that the arms race would expand in the absence of restraints, one could contemplate a new arms race in space. It was not even possible to reduce armaments on earth. What could be done when weapons were orbiting the globe? How could one verify this? Gorbachev could not commit himself to developing such systems.

The President said it was necessary to give each side the freedom to look at what the other was doing. He recalled President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal in expressing disappointment at the Soviet Government's one-sided approach to verification.

Gorbachev suggested that the two sides think about and analyze the thorough discussion which had taken place. It might be possible to return to the subject that afternoon. He reiterated that he saw no obstacles to movement towards a solution which might serve both sides' interests. The President urged Gorbachev to consider the verification ideas he had shared. Gorbachev indicated his willingness to do so, but stressed that what was being verified was important. The Soviets would be prepared to verify an end to nuclear testing; they would not be willing to verify a continuation of such tests. They would be similarly willing to verify a prohibition of space-strike weapons, but not a process by which such weapons would be developed, whether through open laboratories or other means. But in principle, they were open on the question.

The President again urged Gorbachev to consider whether he could not accept the idea of a shield.

Gorbachev did not respond, proposing that the meeting end and resume at 2:30 PM.

Prepared by:

Mark Parris
Department of State

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 2:45–3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

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Gorbachev opened the meeting by remarking that just days before the two leaders had been moving toward Geneva. They were now moving toward the completion of their meeting. *Gorbachev* understood that this would be their last official session. He invited the President to start the session.

The *President* began by noting that he would like to summarize his discussions with *Gorbachev* over the previous two days. He had a few points to make and would be interested in seeing if *Gorbachev* could agree.

There had been two days of candid conversation on a wide range of issues. There were clear differences on such questions as nuclear weapons, on the political philosophy of the two countries. It was important to be realistic and to have no illusions regarding our differences.

But there were some common concerns as well. Both sides had expressed their commitment to deep reductions in nuclear armaments

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Reyk Mtg—Geneva Mat. Oct 12–13 1986 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Parris. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission.

and their hope to eliminate such weapons entirely some day. Both would like to intensify discussions on how to increase strategic stability and reduce the dangers to either side.

The President repeated his conviction of a need for a shift from deterrence based on strategic arms to a greater reliance on defensive systems. If our research was borne out it would be necessary to discuss how to introduce defensive systems. There was also a need for greater mutual trust through compliance with obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements from arms control to the Helsinki Final Act.

In addition to creating a safer strategic environment, it was necessary to end tragic regional conflicts. The two sides differed on the causes of regional tensions, but the President believed both saw the need to intensify the consultative process on local conflicts. As he had said in his October UNGA speech,² the United States was prepared to associate itself with bold initiatives to resolve conflicts which had damaged U.S.-Soviet relations and aggravated international tensions. This was behind our proposals for military disengagement and to end outside involvement in regional struggles. The people of the various regions must be able to solve their own problems.

There were a number of bilateral questions which could be resolved if the necessary political will was there. The two sides should be able to agree to a fundamental expansion of exchanges in the areas of culture, science, and athletics as a means of promoting greater mutual understanding.

The President described his discussions with Gorbachev as rich and constructive. He was pleased that the two leaders would continue the process by visiting each others' countries. He looked forward to the pleasure of Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. in 1986, and to his own visit to Moscow in 1987. The results of the Geneva meetings would be clear only in the months and years ahead.

The President then read the following statement on the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) for the Soviets' consideration as a joint statement of what might be accomplished in those discussions:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed that work on these negotiations should be accelerated with a view to accomplishing the tasks assigned in the Joint US-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985,³ specifically to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

² See "Address to the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York," October 24, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1985, vol. II, pp. 1285–1290.

³ See footnote 3, Document 100.

Offensive nuclear arms will be significantly reduced applying the general concept of 50% reductions to equal ceilings on specific, comparable categories. There will be a separate interim agreement resulting in reductions and limitations on land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missile systems as a step toward the total elimination of this class of missiles. To insure effective verification of compliance, meaningful measures to this end will be negotiated concurrently with limits on weaponry and incorporated in all agreements resulting from these negotiations.”

After first confirming that the President was finished, *Gorbachev* indicated that he would like to sum up the meeting from the Soviet perspective.

Gorbachev felt that the very fact of the meeting should be considered a positive development, since it demonstrated a joint understanding of the significance of U.S.-Soviet relations and of the two sides’ responsibilities and role in the world. He agreed with the President that the meeting had taken place in an atmosphere of frankness, which permitted the two leaders to outline in detail their positions on the full range of bilateral and international questions.

Gorbachev concurred further that the discussions had revealed deep differences in the two sides’ assessments of the causes of certain bilateral and international differences. The talks had allowed both sides to understand one another better; this was of some importance, even major importance. Gorbachev felt, however, that the discussion had shown that the two sides were unable to build a joint concept for dealing with the broad range of bilateral and international questions. Nonetheless, they had agreed to continue their political dialogue. It was in this context that the two leaders had agreed on an exchange of visits at a time to be arranged.

For its part the Soviet side would have to say in describing the meeting that questions of war and peace had been at the center of the meeting in one way or another both during private discussions and in plenary sessions. He felt that the people of both countries, as well as the world as a whole, were concerned by the number of nuclear weapons and the need to stop the arms race and to proceed to disarmament. Unfortunately, it was impossible to report to our peoples and to the world that there had been a rapprochement of positions.

The Soviet side had tried in the meetings to make an extra effort to explain its views. Discussions had been held, but it would be a distortion of the truth to say that there had been progress. Such progress as had been achieved was limited to a detailed discussion and exchange of positions. Gorbachev hoped that this was not the last word. Both sides would take into account the frank discussions which had taken place. Joint efforts should be continued.

The Soviet Union was in favor of continuing negotiations on the basis of the January 1985 Joint Statement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. Serious work lay ahead. Gorbachev felt that movement was possible. The Soviet Union was committed to the spirit of the January 1985 understandings and prepared to act in accord with them, on the clear understanding that it was against the arms race on earth. The USSR was prepared as a first step to seek to implement the idea of a 50% reduction of offensive nuclear forces on the basis of both sides' proposals. But this was based on the understanding that neither side would take steps which would open up an arms race in space. On the basis of this understanding the Soviet Union was open to further movement toward deep reductions in nuclear arms.

Gorbachev agreed that it was possible to intensify bilateral relations. This would contribute to greater trust between the two countries. The USSR would be ready to work to expand exchanges in the economic, cultural and scientific fields.

On regional problems (which he at first forgot to mention), Gorbachev acknowledged that both sides attached importance to the problem and shared a desire to seek political settlements of regional disputes to relieve tensions on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He agreed that bilateral regional expert consultations should be continued.

Noting that the President had raised the possibility of a statement summarizing the results of their discussions, Gorbachev asked if this would be justified. The *President* indicated that we had hoped to get to the subject, and called on Secretary Shultz to outline the options as we saw them. *Gorbachev* commented that the Soviets did not insist that there be a statement. If there was nothing to report, it was better to say so. The *President* felt nonetheless that it would be useful to share views on how to handle the question of reporting the results of their meetings.

Secretary Shultz outlined a number of options, noting that one could envision an outcome involving all, some, or none.

—First, there could be a written compilation of all items which had been agreed during the leaders' meetings or in the preparations for their meetings. There were quite a number of these, of varying importance. There was a possibility of developing joint language on certain arms control questions: e.g., on the Stockholm conference and chemical weapons proliferation. Agreed language existed on nuclear non-proliferation. The President in the statement he read had raised the possibility that NST might be treated, although that morning's conversation had shown the depth of differences on that set of issues. There could also be agreement on a range of regional and bilateral questions, and on a process for the future. In this connection the Secre-

tary had been struck by Gorbachev's references the day before to a mechanism for regulating U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus, it might prove feasible to develop a package which would register areas of agreement reached in Geneva. Disagreements would not be registered except to acknowledge that they existed.

—A second possibility would be to sign some sort of document. The general exchanges agreement was already agreed at the technical level and could be signed if the leaders wished.

—A third element would be separate statements by leaders at a common site. While each leader would say what he wished, the U.S. felt there should be some coordination to avoid surprises. The Secretary speculated that statements could refer to differences but could also include parallel language where appropriate. For example, on NST there were issues on which U.S. and Soviet views coincided, and others where they did not. The kind of statement he had in mind would make clear both areas of agreement and disagreement.

—A fourth option would be to release a short joint report saying, essentially, that the leaders had met and agreed to meet again. Both sides could then issue statements of their own.

—Finally, the two sides could make individual statements at different sites. The Secretary speculated that both leaders would, in any case, be reporting publicly to their peoples in their meetings.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the U.S. would be willing to consider some sort of joint ceremony on the next morning, but was prepared to go in a variety of ways. He was aware of the great responsibility each leader had before their own people and the world to report on their discussions. A dignified ceremony at which areas of agreement could be reported and differences laid out in a modulated fashion would seem to be an appropriate way to proceed. In such a context, the President's statement on NST could be either included in a joint statement or used unilaterally.

Gorbachev, noting that the issue required some thought, indicated that he was nonetheless prepared to respond. If he understood correctly, both sides wanted to continue the dialogue that was begun in preparations for the Geneva meeting, which had been expanded in Geneva, and which would be continued in the future. Even if one were subjectively against such dialogue, objectively it was necessary to continue contacts and exchanges, and to deepen the process of searching for solutions in the interests of U.S. and Soviet peoples and of the people of the whole world. The Soviet Union, therefore, welcomed Secretary Shultz's expression of willingness to continue work in the future.

On how to document the Geneva meeting, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accommodate a U.S. desire

for a joint document, whether a communique or simple statement. Noting that the Soviet Union had originally advocated a communique, but had dropped the idea when it appeared the U.S. was not interested, he outlined his assessment of how to proceed. If a communique incorporated the fundamental results of the meeting, there would be no need for separate statements. If such a communique were impossible, the Geneva program should end with the present meeting.

Gorbachev felt that it would be inappropriate to seek simply to list minor agreements in a joint document. This would not be understood in our two countries or internationally. A more substantive statement would be necessary. Gorbachev wondered whether the two leaders should reassess the problem and perhaps deputize senior members of their staffs to propose a solution. He joked that he and the President might take a walk, leaving Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to work on the problem.

More seriously, Gorbachev recalled that the Soviets had always been prepared for a communique; indeed at one point they had thought the U.S. had agreed to such a document. He felt that there was still time to work out an acceptable document if both sides were willing. He repeated his suggestion that the Foreign Ministers should study the problem and present their findings to the leaders.

The *President* observed that he might have been to blame for any confusion the Soviets had felt with respect to a communique. In considering the question before the Geneva meeting, the President had been concerned about how a prearranged communique might be perceived. He had been similarly uncomfortable early in his presidency with the practice at the OECD summit meeting of having one leader read a pre-cooked document on behalf of the others. His concern for Geneva was that a document emphasize that the meeting was part of an ongoing process. In this context, a document might be worthwhile. The President felt, however, that such a document should include bilateral issues already worked out.

Gorbachev said he shared the President's view. After seven years without a U.S.-Soviet summit, the President was probably right in being somewhat apprehensive about how the meeting would develop. Now that the meeting had taken place, it might be possible to compile "a joint approach in a fundamental way." Gorbachev again suggested that the Secretary and Shevardnadze consult and report to the leaders.

The Secretary commented that U.S. and Soviet representatives had been at work since 11:30 that morning to explore possibilities of developing acceptable joint language. It would be necessary to check with them before he and Shevardnadze could begin work. *Gorbachev* agreed. He proposed a break and quipped that the most important task facing the Foreign Ministers now was to find their subordinates.

Secretary Shultz confessed jocularly that he and Shevardnadze had agreed in a September dinner conversation that they should let their leaders carry as much of the burden in Geneva as possible. Until Gorbachev had given the Foreign Ministers their current assignment, they thought they had succeeded. *Gorbachev* suggested that the Secretary was simply trying to turn his joke about a walk around on him. *The Secretary* told him not to worry, that he (the Secretary) had a thick skin.

The President and Gorbachev agreed to adjourn the meeting and, after a ten minute conversation in the Mission reception room, retired to a separate area for an extended private conversation.

Prepared by:

Mark Parris
Department of State

122. Editorial Note

Following the final plenary session between the U.S. and Soviet delegations the afternoon of November 20, 1985, President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan hosted Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Raisa Gorbachev for dinner at the Maison de Saussure in Geneva, from 8 to 10 p.m. After-dinner conversation among President Reagan, Secretary General Gorbachev, Secretary of State George Shultz, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko focused on the content of the joint communique to be issued the following morning. According to the memorandum of conversation, "Gorbachev said he thought he did not completely understand all the differences with all of the documents, but in any event he spoke to his people to the effect that he wanted everyone to get his act together and somehow iron out these last minute difficulties in regard to these issues. President Reagan said that he and Gorbachev were meeting for the first time at this level. They had little practice, since they had never done it before. Nevertheless, having read the history of previous summit meetings he had concluded that those earlier leaders had not done very much. Therefore, he suggested that he and Gorbachev say, 'To hell with the past,' we'll do it our way and get something done. Gorbachev concurred." (Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1)) The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 159.

Throughout the night of November 20, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway and Soviet Foreign Ministry official Aleksandr Bessmertnykh negotiated the substance and wording of a joint statement. No formal memorandum of conversation was found. According to Shultz's memoir, this negotiation lasted until approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 21. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 605) Later that morning, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan delivered remarks to reporters upon issuing the "Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva," which noted their earlier agreement "to improve U.S.—Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole," and "to meet again in the nearest future." The statement also noted: "The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.—Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon." (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1985, vol. II, pp. 1407–1410)

On November 21, President Reagan flew from Geneva to Brussels to brief North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies on his meetings with Gorbachev, and then to Washington that evening. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

123. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 26, 1985

SUBJECT

NST Issues

It is not too soon to begin to sort out our approach to the NST issues looking forward to a second summit meeting. I suggest the following main lines of attack:

1. That we fully develop and exploit the line you took with Mr. Gorbachev on British and French systems. Britain and France are important countries for the reasons you outlined; they are entitled to consider their nuclear systems to be their ultimate guarantee of security, as does the USSR, the US, and China; their nuclear forces today are relatively small in relation to those of the superpowers and smaller as a percentage of US and Soviet totals than they were some years ago.

We must recognize, however, that British and French forces will not only grow in numbers as they catch up in MIRVing but also increase in significance as US and USSR forces decline pursuant to an appropriate 50% reduction agreement. Therefore, we should support the participation of the British, French and Chinese in future negotiations toward reductions below 4500. Each of these countries has expressed such an interest, in one way or the other; and, most importantly, it would be imprudent for us to go below our proposed force level without participation of the other nuclear powers.

2. If British and French SLBMs are thus put into the category of "START-type systems", they should be logically excluded from consideration in the category of INF or "medium range" systems. This would remove the principal boulder which has stood in the way of negotiating an INF deal. There are many other important issues in the INF field, but the major and most difficult element in the Soviet INF position has been compensation for British and French SLBMs.

3. With "medium-range" and "FBS" systems having been dealt with in the INF negotiations, the START negotiations would be purged of them and the major boulder blocking progress in START would

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 3a Arms Control. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Another stamped notation reads: "Treat as Original." An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: "See GPS comment p. 3."

have been removed. Numerous and difficult issues regarding START will remain, however. Among these would be the problem of convincing the Soviets to defer inclusion of British and French systems. Also, we should review the ban on all mobile ICBMs and reconsider banning only MIRVed mobile ICBMs. There may be other such issues where we might wish to come up with new approaches where pertinent, e.g., revisit the SLCM issue.

4. No overall progress is possible unless we're prepared to deal in some intelligible way with the defense and space issues. In this regard, I see no way of making progress on defense and space unless we are prepared to get into a discussion aimed at agreement on what is permitted and not permitted in the field of research, development and testing. The problem is not merely one of defining research. One must also define the cutoff between permitted and nonpermitted development and testing. When we negotiated the ABM Treaty it was not intended that the parties limit the development and testing of subcomponents such as chips, sensors, propulsion units, etc; precise distinctions are essential in sorting out this area. Some in DoD do not wish us to get into any discussion of such precise distinctions. They say they are afraid our negotiators will negotiate improvidently. This battle must be won if we are to achieve overall progress in Geneva.

A second issue is that we must find a concrete way to deal with Gorbachev's concern that space-based systems designed for boost phase, or post-boost phase, intercept could lead to systems able to penetrate, or re-enter through, the atmosphere to attack objects on earth. We should work hard to come up with measures which would support a verifiable ban on space-based systems able to attack objects on earth while not foreclosing boost and post-boost phase intercept systems.

A third issue is what specifically we have in mind when we speak of a cooperative, phased transition. I drafted a paper on this subject during the spring, but it was bottled up in the NSC and has not been exposed to interdepartmental review. The Defense and Space IG developed a paper on what should be said about transition to effective defenses, but that paper did not really address the substantive issues and was never acted upon by the IG.

A fourth SDI issue relates to what happens in the event the "research" comes up with a positive result and the Soviets refuse to join in a cooperative program. The President rightly insists that we should not give the Soviets a veto. But the Soviets are understandably unwilling to hazard their basic security on some statement on or agreement calling for good intent on our part. The formula that we had in the "Monday Package,"² making continuation of the program of

² See Document 107.

offensive reductions contingent, at each step, on continued adherence to agreed limits on strategic defenses, was an attempt to meet that problem. We should give alternative solutions to this issue our concentrated attention.

6. We should also insist that the issues involved in the verification annex which has been hung up in the interdepartmental process for several years be promptly resolved. Perle, Ikle and Adelman would like to make verification the centerpiece of our post-Geneva NST program. I believe this is wrong and would be viewed as a transparent attempt to block progress towards an NST agreement. However, as one of five avenues of approach, I think it is necessary and appropriate that we get at sorting out the decisions required to achieve an approved draft verification annex.

7. After having sorted out the line we wish to follow on substance, there should be another, perhaps separate, exercise on the tactics, including meetings with the Soviets and their timing, and the Public Affairs, Congressional and allied consultation programs best designed to get on with the job.

8. If you agree with the thrust of these ideas, we will put them in a form appropriate for a memo from you to the President.³

³ An unknown hand drew a vertical line beside this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin: "GPS: I agree—Do a memo."

124. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz)¹

Washington, January 2, 1986

SUBJECT

"Red Team" Analysis on NST Round IV

With respect to the very fine Red Team analysis on Round IV which has just crossed my desk, I certainly agree with its essence. Round IV is likely to be relatively uneventful and certainly not one during which we will receive any serious concessions from the other side. I will give copies of the paper to John and to Mike.²

The reason for this memorandum is to inject an additional rationale not spelled out in the analysis. Gorbachev has demonstrated that when he takes over a ministry, he does so with his own people and has no hesitation in removing incumbents on a number of working levels. Other than Shevardnadze, he has not done this in the Foreign Ministry. He will want to control that ministry with his own people as will Shevardnadze. I suspect that significant changes in personnel at the Moscow level will take place following the 27th Party Congress.³ There will be no significant change in policy until the new people have an opportunity to get their feet wet and develop that policy with Gorbachev.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 93D592, Executive Secretariat, Program Files for Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, Box 8, Soviet Tactics (Secret). Secret; Noform.

² Tower and Glitman.

³ The 27th Party Congress was held February 25–March 6, 1986.

Attachment

Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead⁴

Washington, January 2, 1986

SUBJECT

“Red Team” Analysis on NST Round IV

As we had informed you, INR has led a “Red Team” to analyze what we can expect from the Soviets at the NST negotiations. Our first analysis focuses on Round IV, which commences on January 16.

In brief, we expect Round IV to be an interim round. Round III appears to have been an unusually active round; Round V will presumably be dominated by the impending summit, should that remain scheduled for June. At this next session we believe that both Parties will be seeking greater details on the other’s proposals. We do not expect much movement from the Soviets, certainly not until the latter stages of the round if at all.

—In START, the Soviets will likely stress the superiority of their proposed 50% reduction, arguing that it results in deeper cuts of current forces and controls more types of weapons.

—In INF, we expect them to pursue discussions on a separate interim agreement but not to make additional concessions at least in the early stages of the Round.

—On SDI, while at some point the Soviets will try to “draw the line” on acceptable SDI activity, we expect them to hold fast on SDI hoping that European and US domestic pressure will constrain the program.

We hope this analysis will be useful to those responsible for formulating NST policy. We will be making this analysis available to the Delegation Ambassadors, as well as to Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny, Ridgway, and Holmes. INR analysts have worked closely with members of these offices, and have benefited from their contributions. These offices are in basic agreement with the views in this analysis.

Soviet Tactics in NST Round IV

Summary

The attached paper was put together by State’s Red Team to examine likely Soviet tactics at the next round in Geneva. In brief we conclude that:

⁴ Secret; Noform. Drafted by Lowenthal, Walpole, and Puschel; cleared by Hawes, Palmers, Thomas, and Zimmerman; approved by Kahan. Abramowitz did not initial the memorandum.

—The Soviets are not likely to make any significant changes in their current proposals although we should expect an active dialogue in all three areas. To the extent that they do introduce new ideas, it would likely occur later rather than early in the round given the upcoming Party Congress and Soviet interest in first sounding out the US.

—On START, the Soviets will likely stress the superiority of their proposed 50% reduction, arguing that it results in deeper cuts of current forces and controls more types of weapons. There may be some movement on FBS or INF inclusion in START, but this remains highly dependent on how the Round goes overall, especially the INF talks.

—Regarding INF, we expect the Soviets to pursue discussions on a separate interim agreement but not to make additional concessions at least in the early stages of the Round.

—While at some point the Soviets will try to “draw the line” on acceptable SDI activity, we expect them to hold fast against SDI in toto, hoping that European and US domestic pressure will influence Washington or that the program will run into budgetary or political constraints.

—While the latest compliance report and any US decision to abandon interim restraint could serve to reheat Soviet rhetoric toward the US, we do not expect them to change the Soviet approach to the NST talks. Nevertheless, a US decision to abandon interim restraint would raise Soviet concerns about the worth of the NST process, and might create domestic political problems for Gorbachev.

* * *

Introduction

In the wake of the summit, Gorbachev has clearly tried to put the burden for further arms control progress on the US. At the upcoming NST round, the Soviets will likely reinforce this posture, probing the US side for any changes in the US proposals tabled at the end of Round III rather than introducing any significant changes of their own. At the same time, the Soviets will likely argue that their proposals are more equitable and suited to genuine arms control. The Soviets will not want to appear intractable or responsible for blocking progress, however, and are thus likely to engage in an active dialogue. They might also push for movement on peripheral subjects, such as Krasnoyarsk or a token dismantlement of 300 ICBMs.

The Soviets probably see this as an interim round and are likely to reserve any significant concessions for Round V, which they probably calculate will be more pressured if the next US-Soviet summit is still held in June. To the extent that the Soviets do come forth with any new ideas or changes in their proposals during Round IV, it would

likely occur later rather than early. One consideration in this regard will be the February Party Congress, which is likely to occupy most of Gorbachev's attention. To the extent that there appears to have been some skepticism from conservative party elements and the military about Gorbachev's venture into summitry, he would be reluctant to force a policy debate on the eve of the Congress, or to force internal Soviet power centers to swallow significant, albeit necessary, concessions at this time.

The areas of movement analyzed below are based on Soviet perceptions of US movement they wish to encourage, or fertile areas for propaganda. As noted, we would expect them to come in the latter part of the round, if at all.

START

The Soviets consider a possible START agreement as giving them the most leverage at NST, as they have linked a START agreement to resolution of INF and space issues. In general, we expect the Soviets to stress that their 50% reduction is superior to ours, *i.e.*, that it results in deeper cuts and helps stop the arms race by stricter controls on modernization. The Soviets will benefit here from the way in which they have structured the forces in their proposal, allowing them to claim that more forces are limited and therefore better arms control results. They will presumably try to exploit this in and beyond Geneva. On the other hand, they must eventually deal with the fact that their proposed inclusion of US INF systems in the strategic balance (while excluding equivalent Soviet systems) has received no significant political support in the West and has been widely criticized as inequitable. However, this realization will not necessarily translate into changes in the Soviet position at Round IV. They will also show that their proposal is more inclusive and seeks to ban more destabilizing systems, such as long-range cruise missiles.

Potential areas for some limited movement include:

—Removing some INF systems from the START aggregate, but only if they can somehow be captured in INF.

—Hinting at the removal of some FBS systems (carrier aircraft, FBS aircraft) from the aggregate, but implying that they will be captured in the overall framework of any eventual agreement. (However, they will probably remain adamant in their demand for compensation for British and French systems in INF.)

—They may suggest a willingness to reduce their heavy ICBM (SS-18) force, but probably without offering any specific numbers. Rather, they would hope to elicit further US concessions before getting specific on SS-18. However, major and concrete proposals on the SS-18 will remain linked to the status of SDI—both at NST, and in Washington

and Western Europe. The Soviets are unlikely to reduce a force that is then subject to interception by a US SDI defense.

—One potential “major” Soviet concession would be to agree to the deployment of ALCMs. While this undercuts the strength of their overall ban on cruise missiles, they could give in here without heavy cost. Their own Bear H/ALCM deployments suggest as much, and they have previously hinted at counting rules that imply acceptance.

Their earlier positions in SALT II and the initial START talks also suggest eventual acceptance of some ALCM deployment. The issue of how to count ALCMs would remain. If included in the Soviet aggregate of 6000 weapons, ALCM deployment would simply force the US to reduce further other systems. If the total were raised as a result of ALCMs, the Soviets could charge that these higher levels were the fault of the US. However, concessions on gravity bombs and SPAMs are not expected in this round.

The Soviets likely want to see signals of US responsiveness to *their* START concerns before going too far in hinting of Moscow’s flexibility.

—The Soviets are extremely unlikely to accept a ban on mobile ICBMs; they have developed two such systems, one of which is already deployed. They may attack what they view as a US negotiating inconsistency on mobile missiles. Among other things, the new US START proposal bans mobile ICBMs because of verification, yet the US has been negotiating on the SS-20 IRBM for years, a system that has virtually the same verification requirements as the SS-25 ICBM. Further, the US opposes limits on SLCMs because of associated verification problems.

—If the Soviets are willing to make any specific moves within START on the SS-18, they may suggest compensating areas of Soviet concern, such as the US Trident II/D5 hard-target capable SLBM system. At present the SS-18 is the only Soviet hard-target capable system.

—The Soviets would like to see the US clarify and soften its position on the modernization of heavy missiles. They have been working on an upgrade to the SS-18 for several years, probably to improve its accuracy and overcome some range limitations.

INF

The Soviets are likely to reiterate their November 5, proposal for a separate interim INF agreement, although it is still unclear exactly how “separate” or “interim” such an agreement would be. While the joint statement at the summit made reference to such an agreement, the Soviets appeared reluctant to include it and did not reiterate that an agreement would be separate.

We expect them to at least pursue discussions on a interim agreement. They are probably not, however, ready at this stage to make

further concessions and instead will be probing US thinking on the subject, particularly regarding UK/French nuclear forces, SRINF and PIIs. They are likely to cite Gorbachev's recent announcement that they have fulfilled their promise to remove from operational status SS-20s to a level of 243 as evidence of their sincerity. They could also express renewed interest in the global warhead limit concept, perhaps reverting back to the 1983 US proposal.

In addition, the Soviets are likely to intensify their out-of-Geneva INF agitation and diplomacy. However, NATO's success in getting positive decisions from all five basing nations may temper Soviet efforts in this area.

—The Soviets will likely resume SS-4 and perhaps SS-N-5 dismantlements, low cost gestures of goodwill.

—They will continue to probe Britain and France for separate negotiations.

DST

The President's steadfastness on SDI at the summit undoubtedly disappointed the Soviets. Nevertheless, their decision to give a positive assessment to the meeting and to commit themselves to continued negotiations suggests the Soviets still hope to use the arms control process to pressure the President into compromising on SDI and to encourage opposition to funding it. The Soviets probably calculate that public expectations for progress on arms control will grow with future Gorbachev-Reagan meetings and are trying to reinforce in the public's mind that only SDI is stopping progress.

With regard to the negotiations, they have essentially two options at this point:

1. They could continue to hold fast on a ban on all SDI, including research, hoping that European and US domestic pressure will influence Washington or that the program will run into budgetary, political or technological constraints.

2. The Soviets may at some point seek to negotiate a compromise that would trade Soviet acceptance of certain research, development, and limited testing activities as permissible in return for a US commitment that both parties would have to consent to full-scale testing and SDI deployment. In view of the recent US legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty regarding limits on systems based on "other physical principles," (which diverges from the Soviet interpretation), the Soviets could seek mutual clarification of the ABM Treaty as it affects SDI. The Soviets could also craft a deal involving acceptance of SDI research in return for an ASAT ban and ABM Treaty reaffirmation.

Of the two courses, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would move at this early stage to negotiate a "line" better defining permitted and

prohibited SDI activities, since that would imply Soviet acceptance of a degree of legitimacy for the program at a time when they still hope to limit the program through political pressure. This is more likely to change in Round V or at the next summit. On the other hand, Embassy Moscow was recently informed by a US journalist that Soviet NST negotiators were about to receive new instructions on SDI. Whether or not they change their official position in Geneva on SDI, they are likely to stress publicly that they do not seek to ban fundamental research but only out-of-laboratory work.

External Factors

The 1986 Presidential compliance report and any US decision on whether to continue interim restraint are worth noting because of the public effect they may have. While, we do not believe these would significantly alter the Soviet position at Geneva, tension evident within the Soviet delegation—and presumably in Moscow—could be exacerbated by US decisions.

If the US decided not to continue interim restraint in the next few months, the Soviets would attack the change in policy as undermining the progress of the NST negotiations, and would try to bring world pressure upon the US. They might view such a decision as tantamount to a US walkout from the negotiations. Soviet actions beyond NST, such as halting compensatory dismantlements for new ICBM and SLBM deployments, thereby exceeding SALT limits, also would be likely.

As in the past, the Soviets will be unlikely to react at NST to the President's Report on Compliance. They will probably keep their responses at the public propaganda level and print a reciprocal list of alleged US violations. If the subject were raised at NST, they would almost certainly defer it to the next SCC session (beginning in March) as a more appropriate forum for such discussions.

Beyond Round IV

Round IV may prove to be only a way station between an unusually active Round III and Round V. A number of extraneous events—the latest Compliance Report, the February Communist Party Congress, the upcoming US decision on interim restraint, congressional activity—will all influence Round V, as will the Summit that follows it.

125. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 13, 1986

SUBJECT

Instructions for Round IV—Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)

Our negotiators will be returning to Geneva this weekend to begin Round IV of the talks on January 16 covering START, INF and Defense and Space. Recall that just before your summit and at the end of Round III, the U.S. provided a detailed counter-proposal involving the principle of 50 percent reductions. The Soviet delegation has not had the chance to really address our proposals yet. Our task during this upcoming round will be to focus on the areas where we have the most common ground (START and INF reductions) and press the Soviets for an early, constructive response to our new proposals.

With regard to Defense and Space we will concentrate on the offense/defense relationship and explain the nature of SDI and your open laboratories initiative. The instructions to this delegation contain the main points which you have used personally with General Secretary Gorbachev on SDI. These have been drawn from both the dialogue in Geneva and your subsequent letters and are provided for the delegations' information at *Tab E*.²

The SACG has met on the individual instruction cables at *Tabs B through E*,³ and there are no outstanding issues. I believe it is appropriate for you to issue an NSDD (*Tab A*)⁴ to further emphasize your involvement and desires for Round IV of the negotiations.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you sign the draft NSDD at *Tab A* approving the instructions for Round IV of the Nuclear and Space Talks.⁵

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 092, NSDD 206. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Wright. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed, at *Tab E*, are the draft DST Instructions.

³ Attached but not printed, at *Tabs B, C, and D*, are draft NST, START, and INF Instructions.

⁴ Printed below as Document 126.

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

126. National Security Decision Directive 206¹

Washington, January 14, 1986

*INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FOURTH ROUND
OF THE US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA (U)*

This negotiating round will be unique compared to past rounds in that it follows the summit meeting during which General Secretary Gorbachev and I called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. (U)

The Soviets have not yet provided a formal response to our November 1, 1985, proposals. Since those proposals, in part, reflect elements of Soviet proposals, the U.S. Delegation should emphasize my personal hope that the Soviet Delegation will be prepared to react constructively with an early, positive response to the U.S. proposals tabled at the end of the last round. (U)

In seeking to move the negotiations forward, the U.S. delegation should take the position that the Joint Statement of November 21, 1985, reflects the agreement of both sides that the negotiations should give priority to areas of convergence, and that progress in one area should not be held hostage to a resolution of issues in other areas. In this regard, the delegation should take special care to resist Soviet attempts to link progress in the three negotiating groups, in order to permit each group to make progress on its own subject matter as rapidly as possible. In addition, the delegation should also resist any Soviet attempt to erode the separate status and roles of the three negotiating groups, making clear that each group is fully competent both to explore policy issues and to commit governments on subjects within its responsibility. (S)

Specifically, the U.S. Delegation should explain, reinforce and elaborate on our November 1 initiatives,² seeking to engage the Soviets in a discussion of those proposals with the aim of looking for areas of flexibility on the Soviet side; reducing the barriers to progress on the key

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 092, NSDD 206. Secret. Poindexter distributed the security directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, Nitze, Rowny, Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman under cover of a January 14 memorandum: "The President has decided upon the following instructions for the fourth round of US/Soviet negotiations set to begin in Geneva on January 16, 1986. In view of the sensitivity of this directive, please limit access to those with a strict need-to-know." (Ibid.)

² See Attachment 2, Document 117.

issues; and finding additional, or widening existing, areas of potential convergence. (S)

While noting the agreement in the Joint Statement that, “during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon”, the U.S. Delegation should continue to emphasize the importance to the future of arms control of compliance with existing arms control agreements and the corresponding need for Soviets to correct non-compliant behavior. (C)

With regard to the issue of regional reductions and limitations in the INF negotiating group, given the range capability of the SS–20, systems deployed at all Asian bases must be judged to be within range of portions of NATO European territory. The missiles stationed east of the Urals at Novosibirsk and Barnaul are of special concern because they can strike a significant portion of NATO territory from the bases themselves. However, in the interest of movement toward an agreement, I am prepared not to count the SS–20s deployed at existing bases east of the Urals, including the bases at Novosibirsk and Barnaul, toward the European 140 launcher limit. The INF negotiating group should state, however, that the U.S. is prepared to take this step only in the context of a Soviet agreement to reduce remaining overall deployed Soviet LRINF missile systems in proportion to the reductions in such systems taken in arriving at the 140 launcher limit. The specific numerical reductions and limitations inherent in the U.S. proposal have been calculated on the basis of this step. (S)

In order to give concrete form to our new positions in START and INF we should be prepared to table draft treaties reflecting the November 1 proposals, as appropriate, before the end of the round. Accordingly, work on these draft texts should be completed no later than February 15, for the SACG consideration. (C)

Within the Defense and Space area little convergence emerged at the summit meetings. The Defense and Space negotiating group has been provided the points I made personally to General Secretary Gorbachev regarding SDI in order that our constancy of approach will yield some positive elements in this area also. (S)

I have approved the cables of instruction,³ recommended by the SACG, for the conduct of the fourth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks by the U.S. Delegations which expand upon the specific direction above. (U)

Ronald Reagan

³ See Document 125. The Department transmitted the overall instructions for Round IV in telegram 12556 to NST Geneva, January 15, 1986 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860165-0344)

127. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz received from Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin a letter from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to President Ronald Reagan calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In his memoir, Shultz describes a telephone conversation he then had with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter: "I have just received an extremely important letter to the president from Gorbachev," I said. 'Dobrynin says that Gorbachev will go public with the content in Moscow in a few hours. This is very different from anything we have seen before and is a matter of high priority. I will have a restricted group take a look at it. A messenger will hand-deliver it to you for the president in five minutes.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 699)

In his letter, dated January 14, Gorbachev called on Reagan to "agree on a stage-by-stage program which would lead to a complete nuclear disarmament everywhere already by the turn of the next century. The Soviet Union envisages the following procedure of the reduction of nuclear weapons—both delivery vehicles and warheads—down to their complete liquidation." Gorbachev went on to lay out three stages: the first would last 5–8 years, during which time the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce by half their nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territories and leave no more than 6000 warheads on delivery vehicles; the second, to begin no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years, would include the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China and lead to the reduction of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons of all of the nuclear powers; the third, to begin not later than 1995, would feature the liquidation of any remaining nuclear weapons and the verification of their destruction via national technical means and on-site inspections." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690024, 8690124)) The full text of Gorbachev's letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 177.

On February 3, President Reagan chaired a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in the Situation Room from 11:15 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. to discuss General Secretary Gorbachev's proposals. Poindexter characterized the letter as "subtle and clever, making some points that would appeal to certain domestic US and Soviet audiences, some that would attempt to drive wedges between the US and Allies," and noted that the "the thrust of Gorbachev's letter was seen by some as a purely publicity ploy, while others viewed some areas as unique opportunities

to move arms control negotiations forward.” After a discussion of whether to adjust U.S. arms control positions, Reagan “argued that we need to make the Soviets expose the fact that they are not really serious about reductions negotiations. The US should go to the negotiations, point out that the Soviets have made a general, overall offer, and agree on the overall aims of the process.” The President called for emphasis on the fact “that what the US seeks now is a *practical* way forward: a way to achieve verification in a concrete agreement, even if such involves a proposal we have already made,” and “the point that we are trying to find a practical way to move forward in implementing the agreed eventual goals.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Meeting File, NSPG 0127, 3 Feb 1986, Arms Control—Responding to Gorbachev.)(declass) The minutes of the National Security Planning Group meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 188.

On February 4, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 210, “Allied Consultations on the US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev’s January 14, 1986, Arms Control Proposal,” which included this section: “*Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)*. I am not inclined to change our November, 1985, positions in those areas in which the Soviet Union has failed to indicate any motion on their part, nor even addressed fully our most recent proposals. Therefore, I do not envision new U.S. initiatives in either the START or Defense and Space areas at this time.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/05/1986–02/06/1986))(declass) The full NSDD can be found in National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 092, NSDD 210.

128. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 3, 1986, 1623Z

962. Subject: (U) START—Tower-Karpov Post-Plenary Conversation, January 29, 1986.

1. This is NST/START Memcon IV-M-008. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: January 29, 1986

Time: 12:40–2:40 P.M.

Place: U.S. ACDA Building, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.
Ambassador Tower
Dr. W. H. Hopkins (INT)

USSR
Ambassador Karpov
Mr. A. Bratchikov (INT)

4. Subject summary: Soviet condolences on Challenger tragedy;² Karpov's assessment of status of negotiations; lengthy review of Gorbachev's January 15 program;³ the "principle of ability to reach the territory of the other side" evolved as a result of the Soviet September 30/October 1 proposals for deep reductions; Soviets insist that potential areas of "convergence" and common ground are as recorded in the January 8 joint statement;⁴ according to Soviets, the U.S. proposal has only "superficial resemblances" to the Soviet proposals; Ambassador Tower's personal assessment in para 41 of this cable. End subject summary.

5. Highlights: Karpov presented a lengthy commentary on the current status of the START negotiations, commenting on the intransigence of the U.S. position on SDI and noting that such an approach does not contribute to progress in other areas. He said that today's START plenary statement reflected similar negativism and that the U.S. lacks interest in the security considerations of the Soviet side as evidenced by the U.S. side ignoring significant numbers of U.S. forces which will remain after reductions. He claimed the Soviet September 30 proposal was equitable in the context of new conditions, i.e., through application of the principle of a weapon's ability to reach the territory

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860324-0547. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Round IV of the Nuclear and Space Talks took place January 16–March 4.

² Reference is to the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, which occurred on January 28.

³ See Document 127.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 100.

of the other side. Karpov said that new conditions, including locations of deployed systems and the range of those systems, now assume greater importance and observed that Soviet medium-range systems constitute no threat to U.S. territory. Tower challenged that assertion and emphasized the existence of the separate INF forum mandated with discussion of non-central strategic systems. He noted that the U.S. side had never agreed to definitions of systems based on the principle of a weapon's ability to reach the territory of the other side and challenged the realism in equating carrier-based systems and ICBMs. Tower asked Karpov to identify areas of common ground and suggested establishing working groups in those areas. Karpov expressed the fear that in working groups there would only be a repetition of U.S. positions stated elsewhere in the negotiations. The search for areas of seemingly common ground should not eclipse the search for real solutions to the major issues at these negotiations; thus far the Soviet Union had observed no possibility of resolving those major issues in the START framework or elsewhere.

6. The two ambassadors debated the past record of defining strategic systems and Karpov noted that SLBMs had been included in earlier agreements precisely because of their ability to reach the territory of the other side; he said there are new conditions now that demand consideration of geographic placement of weapons. Tower observed that the Soviet proposal would have the United States give up certain conventional capabilities since it includes conventional systems. Tower asked Karpov several times to identify areas of convergence, whereupon Karpov said that areas of convergence are recorded in the January 8, 1985, joint statement. He continued, before anything else there must be agreement on those basic principles. Tower, after a lengthy discussion over the role of carrier-based aircraft, noted that in this forum it is appropriate to discuss weapons specifically and uniquely designed for nuclear roles. Karpov noted that in his plenary statement he had pointed out areas of "superficial coincidence" in the positions of the sides; upon analysis, however, the respective approaches of the sides are different. Karpov noted the Soviet Union welcomes any convergence in positions but emphasized that there are profound differences in the sides' positions. See Ambassador Tower's personal assessment in para 41. End highlights.

7. Tower thanked Karpov again for his expression of sympathy on behalf of the Soviet government on the occasion of the Challenger tragedy. He noted that there had been 24 successful shuttle launches and that this was the first time astronauts had been lost in flight; in addition, there had been the tragedy with the Apollo crew on the launch pad. Karpov observed that the exploration of space has its risks, and he agreed with Tower that despite this tragedy, the main lesson to be learned is how to ensure future safety in space.

8. Karpov said he wished to continue with the discussion which the two had just had following the U.S. plenary statement, as well as to give the Soviet side's evaluation of the status of the fourth round of the negotiations so far. He said he understood the U.S. side needs time to study and formulate its opinion about Gorbachev's January 15 proposals. He explained that during the present round there have been a joint plenary meeting, two space and defense plenaries, two START plenaries, an INF plenary and unofficial meetings between Glitman and Obukhov—enough meetings to allow for a preliminary evaluation of how things currently stand at the negotiations. Karpov said he did not want to engage Tower in discussions of the topics of the space and INF groups, since he appreciated the fact that Tower does not like to talk about those subjects. Nevertheless, he said, to fill in the picture it would be necessary for him to refer to what has been going on in those groups.

9. Karpov said that in the Space Group the Soviet side hears that the SDI is untouchable, and that there can be no negotiation on limiting or changing it. He said Tower must understand that such an approach, one which rejects the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the question of preventing an arms race in space, does not expedite negotiations in the other groups which are concerned with related areas of preventing any further arms race. Such intransigence is not a method to help progress in the other groups. When assessing the current status on the space issue, it is difficult to believe that the U.S. side does not understand the importance of getting a mutually acceptable solution there, so as to facilitate radical reductions of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet side must conclude that this U.S. approach is a conscious, deliberate attempt by the Space Group to close the door to any deep reduction of nuclear weapons.

10. Karpov said that as he had listened to today's start plenary, where the most frequently used word seemed to be something like "unacceptable," he could not help but compare the content of that statement to what is said in the Space Group. That comparison had caused him to reach the conclusion he had expressed at the plenary table. He continued that in the Space Group, the U.S. was closing off the road to solution of the issues discussed there, and in the START group the U.S. side had also come out against equitable reductions of nuclear arms when viewed from the point of view of the security concerns of the other side. He noted that concern for the other side's security is precisely expressed in the principle of the ability of a weapon to reach the territory of the other side. He asked how the U.S., in proposing reductions of nuclear systems only in the categories of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and at the same time ignoring the fact that it has 1400 effective nuclear delivery vehicles capable of reach-

ing Soviet territory, would demonstrate consideration of equality and show respect for the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. He said that although the U.S. formally talks about equality in terms of weapons remaining after reduction, in essence the U.S. proposal ignores the Soviet Union's security interests and, in reality, it does not guarantee equality in terms of Soviet security interests.

11. Karpov said there was no need to expound further on the lack of balance in the U.S. proposal. It ignored significant numbers of U.S. forces, despite suggesting the implementation of reductions of both U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons. He said that contrary to the U.S. contention that the Soviet September 30 proposal is not equitable, such is not the case; reductions proposed therein are equitable under the new conditions which would be created if the U.S. and USSR reached agreement on deep reductions on nuclear arms.

12. Karpov noted that since 1969 when negotiations began on limiting strategic offensive weapons, the direction has been from lesser to greater limitations. First, for example, limitations had been placed on land-based ICBMs and SLBMs and aviation systems had not been included; later, the SALT II agreement included limitations on strategic aviation. The ceilings for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers were originally lower than those finally agreed on. However, earlier arms agreements had not foreseen the destruction of 50 percent of the sides' arsenals, as the USSR was now proposing. Under those conditions, the residual nuclear weapons which can reach the territory of the other side, whether having a longer range and being deployed on one's own territory, or having a lesser range but being deployed closer to the territory of the other side, now assume a different dimension. They cannot be ignored while proposed reductions are being formulated and developed. If the USSR were to propose that each of the sides retain 1250 deployed strategic weapons, while preserving the right to keep 1400–1500 nuclear delivery vehicles deployed close to Soviet territory, then an asymmetry would result in the strategic potential of the sides and erode Soviet security interests.

13. Karpov said that Soviet proposals which take into consideration possible asymmetries due to the deployment of U.S. INF systems close to Soviet borders cannot be termed "inequitable." To assert that the Soviet Union has many systems of comparable range that are not covered by limitations has nothing to do with the essence of the discussion, since the matter under discussion is the potential capability of one side in terms of the security interests of the other side. He said a bilateral agreement is what is being discussed, and it should be evaluated by the yardstick of mutual security. Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces pose no threat to the United States.

14. Karpov continued, the Soviet Union has put forward a far-reaching program for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.

A most important facet of that program is its first stage, which corresponds to implementing 50 percent reductions of relevant Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. He said the Soviet Union, in the first stage of this program, is prepared to agree on the total elimination of both sides' intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet Union desires that this solution be implemented in the next 5–8 years, together with other measures for the reduction of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. In this connection the Soviet Union seeks only the following guarantees: (1) the U.S. not give intermediate-range nuclear missiles to other countries, and (2) England and France agree not to build up their nuclear arsenals, and that Britain, France and China also proceed with reductions of their respective nuclear arms.

15. Karpov asked that the United States, and Tower personally, once more weigh what has been said and what will be said by the U.S., and that it examine the comments of the Soviet side as to where and how the two countries can proceed toward achieving mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet Union is prepared for businesslike discussions of any and all aspects of its program and on all stages of that program, particularly the first stage which involves the two nuclear powers. Such discussions should lead to practical solutions for the elimination of nuclear arms; in this respect, the Soviet Union and the United States should set an example for all countries.

16. Karpov apologized for taking so much time in giving what he said was a very detailed exegesis of the status of the negotiations. However, he wanted to be sure that the U.S. understood how the Soviet side perceived this round so far, and what bothered the Soviet side.

17. Tower said that Karpov knew that the U.S. side agreed to the main objective stated in the three-phase Soviet program, namely, to achieve a non-nuclear world. He noted, however, that it would be inappropriate at present in this forum to discuss the out-year aspects of the Soviet program. He noted that Karpov himself had said that the Soviet proposals of September 30 and October 1 were embodied in the first phase of the program, and that this first stage must be the focus of discussion in this forum.

18. Tower pointed out that it would be inappropriate to discuss the negotiations concerning non-central strategic systems here. He noted that the example cited by Karpov in his remarks after delivery of the U.S. plenary statement reinforced the U.S. argument. Specifically, in the interim agreement, ICBMs had been defined as land-based ballistic missiles with a range of 5500 km. That was the distance between the northwest portion of the USSR and the northeast portion of the U.S., and thus the criterion was based on an absolute range value. Nevertheless, there was never agreement about the specific principle of a weapon's ability to reach the territory of the other side. Conse-

quently, it is not realistic to equate and to aggregate systems that can be carried on carrier-based aircraft—particularly when that carrier might be located, for example, in Norfolk, VA or on the west coast—with ICBMs, which are very accurate and have short flight times. These are the most threatening weapons because of their almost 100 percent alert rate and the fact that they can be launched at any time without marshalling large forces that might be detected.

19. On a different topic, Tower said that the November 21 statement⁵ indicated that there is agreement between the two nations' leaders concerning certain areas of common ground or convergence. He noted that the U.S. side here had attempted to identify areas of convergence and said that he hoped the Soviet side would identify those areas which it considered to represent common ground; it would be useful to know whether or not those areas were the same.

20. Tower said that the U.S. side is prepared to agree to set up working groups to focus on areas of convergence and areas of common ground that could be developed. It would then be possible to see what progress could be made on specific points in the two sides' proposals.

21. Karpov responded to Tower's remarks by addressing the last issue first. He agreed that it is important to identify areas of convergence even if they do not fully coincide and also to develop common ground. Were such work to be conducted, it would have to be done so "actively", but he wondered how much the current positions of the sides would allow for any truly active work. He wondered further whether these working groups might not simply be fora for repetition of the very same positions that are stated at D&S, INF and START plenaries and post-plenaries. He wondered what guarantees there might be that the positions of U.S. representatives at the working groups would be any more realistic than the positions presented by the U.S. side at official meetings, and whether U.S. representatives at working groups would be more willing to consider the security interests of the Soviet side.

22. Karpov said he thought talk about areas of convergence should not eclipse consideration of the important issues which relate to the search for solutions that correspond to the principle of equality and equal security. Such a search would be consistent with the objectives of the negotiations and close off the possibility for continuing the arms race on Earth, and would, in fact, contribute to the termination of the arms race.

23. Karpov said that if the sides agree, e.g., in the strategic group, that both sides will be prepared to work out a solution that would

⁵ For the text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 7–11.

shut off all channels of the arms race—not just some of them, thereby leaving others open for its continuation—and if the sides could agree to scale down nuclear arms and not allow for the possibility of their continued buildup in other areas, then perhaps it might be possible to agree to establishing working groups in order to look for solutions. So far, however, he said, he saw no possibility for such an advance in the START group or in any of the other groups. He said this, he noted, on the basis of what the Soviet side knows about the U.S. position thus far. Frankly, he said, creating illusions where they have no place is far worse than healthy skepticism. The latter is something good if it contributes to the objective of working out mutually acceptable solutions.

24. Karpov next addressed Tower's remarks about ICBM "range." He said that Tower was incorrect in asserting that absolute distance had been a criterion for ICBMs. The 5500 km figure had been established precisely by measuring the distance between specific points in the USSR and the U.S. Military specialists had performed such a measurement on a globe to determine the shortest distance between the two points in the respective countries and the 5500 km figure expresses that distance precisely. He said that in light of this fact, Tower's arguments had not changed his mind, and that he was standing his ground in this respect. Furthermore, Karpov said, apart from ICBMs, SLBMs had also been included and considered "strategic," although their range was only 2500–3000 km. SLBMs had been included precisely because they were capable of reaching the territory of the other side, despite the fact that their range was less than 5500 km.

25. Therefore, said Karpov, he would continue to maintain that the principle of the ability of a system to reach the territory of the other side lay at the heart of agreement as early as the first stage of SALT I. He noted, however, that not all systems that were capable of reaching the territory of the other side had been included in that agreement. It had been decided that since drastic reductions were not envisioned at that time, that probably other systems could be dealt with later, one step at a time. Such a decision had been made at that time, and it had been agreed by the sides.

26. Karpov said that now, however, the situation is different. The present problem is to ensure the security of both sides and prevent an arms race. This is to be done under conditions of deep reductions of the nuclear weapons of both sides. Therefore, as compared to past situations, the current situation demands a more radical and practical approach, one which takes into account not only ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, but also other systems which, due to their geographic deployment, are capable of reaching the territory of the other side. These considerations provide some of the basis for the proposal on such systems, if there is to be radical reductions of nuclear arsenals.

27. Tower said it seemed that the Soviet Union was suggesting that in order to get radical reductions, the U.S. must give up a portion of its conventional capabilities; this was due to the fact that the Soviet proposal includes U.S. systems whose primary function is conventional, not nuclear. If the Soviet proposals were implemented, the U.S. would be at a big disadvantage. Tower remarked that obviously there was at present no convergence on this point, and he again asked Karpov to identify in the START context those areas where the USSR sees common ground.

28. Karpov said that only a few minutes had elapsed since he had pointed out that it is first necessary to get agreement on a few basic principles, call them “points of departure.” This would open the path to achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. Specifically, those points are the objectives of the current negotiations, and they are stated in the January 8 joint statement—namely, agreement on no arms race in space, terminating it on Earth, reducing nuclear weapons, and enhancing strategic stability.

29. Karpov said all the above needs to be accomplished, as recorded in the joint statement as the common view of the two sides. The task at hand now is how to resolve all of this through these negotiations. The Soviet Union has come up with proposals for the entire range of problems, and they are consistent with the objectives stated in the January 8 document. They also take into account the realities of the military balance between the USSR and the U.S. Moreover, the Soviet proposals make it possible to approach other measures contained in the Soviet program, in particular, with reference to other nuclear powers. The program presented by the Soviet Union has a time frame, and the USSR is prepared to agree about all of this with the U.S. as soon as possible and on as wide a range of questions as possible.

30. Karpov continued that the USSR wants agreement on the first stage of its proposed program as soon as possible. The Soviet Union is prepared to get agreement this year so as to begin its implementation next year, or even this year for that matter. If the two sides agreed, it would be possible to transform this approach into genuine, concrete agreement. However, a “bookkeeper’s approach” to areas of convergence is not fruitful. What is needed is real effort, including work to establish genuine points of convergence, and it is not possible to do that only through the efforts of one side. The efforts of both sides are required, but in terms of converting these negotiations into realistic agreement, U.S. efforts are lacking.

31. Saying that he had perhaps not understood the interpreter properly, Tower asked if Karpov were saying that it was necessary to agree in principle to the three-phase Gorbachev plan before proceeding in other areas. Karpov sought to clarify that point, saying there was

common ground recorded in the January 8 joint statement. The common objectives and the subject of the current negotiations are clearly set forth there. Those common objectives and subjects are precisely the areas which should be translated into specific agreement. Karpov said that was all he meant to say by his previous remarks.

32. Karpov said he did not understand what Tower meant when he implied that the Soviet Union wants the U.S. to abandon some of its conventional capabilities. He said if Tower could be more specific in this respect, he could clarify things for Tower. However, at present, he simply did not understand at all what the U.S. had in mind here.

33. Tower responded that in this forum there should only be discussion of systems which are designed specifically and uniquely for a nuclear role. He said carrier-based aircraft, e.g., are not primarily intended for nuclear land attack. Further, given what Karpov had said earlier about “range” in geographic location of weapons, Tower wondered why the Soviet Union was not willing to include SS-20s in reductions.

34. Karpov tried to explain why carrier-based aircraft should be included in the strategic equation and Tower again pointed out that their primary role was not nuclear land attack but rather fleet defense. Karpov said that an aircraft carrier can have 40 nuclear delivery vehicles, i.e., half of the systems on the carrier are designed to be nuclear capable. He said if one compares kill capability of non-nuclear aircraft weapons with nuclear ones, the comparison is not in favor of the non-nuclear weapons. Therefore, he wondered how it was that Tower could contend that such aviation should not be included in the nuclear balance. He pointed out that some years ago, such aircraft had been under strategic air command. Though, they have now been removed from that command, for many years those planes were considered part of U.S. strategic forces—and no change of name can camouflage their strategic nature.

35. In response to a question from Tower about whether Karpov was contending that carrier-based aircraft are just as threatening as ICBMs, Karpov said he was making no comparisons; rather, he was simply talking about the role of carrier-based aviation in the strategic equation. As for Tower’s statement that ICBMs constitute the main threat, Karpov said that, as always, he would have to disagree. He said that the USSR believes that the greatest threat to its security comes from the suddenness of an attack, e.g., from Pershing II missiles. The U.S., however, does not even want to consider that.

36. Tower said Karpov appeared to be conceding that fast-flying missiles are more threatening than slow-flying aircraft, and therefore, ICBMs are more threatening than bombers. Karpov said he was reminded of the Greek syllogism about the swift-footed Achilles never

being able to catch the slow-moving turtle. He did not, however, want to engage in an exercise like that. Tower said he, too, could see they were not going to get anywhere on the present topic. He asked whether the only areas of convergence, then, were those in the January 8 joint statement signed by Shultz and Gromyko.

37. Karpov said that that document should be the point of departure. In it the basic elements which are to be developed and translated into practical agreements are clearly recorded. He noted that in its plenary statement today, the USSR had also indicated other seemingly similar elements identified in the sides' positions. However, analysis indicates that these superficial resemblances hide deep differences—for example, the apparently similar 6000 nuclear-weapon figure in both positions. If one looks at the respective approaches of the sides, those figures represent very different things. Consequently, it is more appropriate to talk about superficial resemblance than about genuine common ground. He added that when he had talked about the danger of illusions regarding common ground, he had been thinking precisely about the fact that one should not put on blinders. The reality is that these superficial resemblances hide profound differences. The sides must attempt to eliminate those differences. This would facilitate working out solutions corresponding to the tasks and objectives common to the sides and recorded in the joint statement.

38. Tower countered that the coincidence of figures was nothing accidental. The U.S. had acted on Soviet suggestions and attempted to accommodate Soviet concerns. He cited, for example, the fact that the U.S. had moved from its earlier 2500 figure to a figure of 3000 ICBM Rvs in order to move closer to the 3600 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

39. Karpov said the Soviet Union did not deny that such movement was useful, if it were in the direction of achieving mutually acceptable solutions. Further, he said that when he had referred to the 6000 figure, he had had in mind the fact that the Soviet proposal of 6000 nuclear weapons represented the maximum number of weapons the sides could have, whereas the 6000 figure proposed by the U.S. represents a limitation on only a part of the strategic arsenal, leaving other parts to develop unrestrained. This would lead not to a reduction of the nuclear arsenals, but rather to an increase of the arsenals in other areas. That, he said, is a basic and substantive difference between the respective 6000 figures. That difference should not be obscured by the seeming similarity of the two numbers, for their content is indeed very different.

40. Tower said he thought they had gone as far as they could today. He expressed the hope that they would have an opportunity for an additional informal discussion the following week. He told Karpov he would be in touch with him about it. Karpov said he was always ready to meet and talk about the business of this group—or topics beyond this group—if necessary.

41. Ambassador Tower's personal comment: It is my view at this time that the Soviets have no interest in making significant negotiating progress in START during this round. It would appear that their tactic is to stall through this round to put the pressure on the U.S. side to come up with concessions in the fifth round for purposes of producing something for the summit, which they seem to sense there will be growing pressure on the President to do. End comment.

Kampelman

129. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 25, 1986, 0915Z

1796. Subject: (U) NST—Summary report of third joint plenary meeting of Round IV, February 24, 1986.

1. This is NST-IV-016. Secret—Entire text.

2. Begin summary. Ambassador Kampelman presented the formal U.S. response to the Soviet program at a joint plenary meeting February 24;² Ambassador Glitman presented the INF part of the response at an INF negotiating group meeting immediately following (Septel). Emphasizing that the elimination of nuclear weapons had long been an objective of the United States, Kampelman said certain conditions must first be fulfilled, among them the correction of conventional and other force imbalances, the establishment of effective verification regimes, and the achievement of full compliance with treaty obligations. Kampelman said the United States must view the Soviet program in light of, *Inter Alia*, the commitments undertaken at the summit. In this regard, the United States continued to advocate the pursuit of common ground, as the November 21 joint statement committed both sides to do, by taking the first steps involved in appropriately implementing the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of both sides, and in promptly negotiating an INF agreement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860443-1024. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.

² The Delegation transmitted Kampelman's statement in telegram 1795 from NST Geneva, February 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860443-0123)

3. Regarding the three areas of negotiation, Kampelman said that Ambassador Glitman would present a major new U.S. proposal in the INF Negotiating Group meeting immediately following the joint plenary. Kampelman expressed U.S. disappointment that the Soviet proposal had not altered its approach in START, in particular the continued linkage of a ban on “space-strike arms” to reductions in offensive nuclear systems, and the continued inclusion of non-central U.S. nuclear systems in the strategic category, even though they could not be compared with Soviet strategic systems. In the defense and space area, Kampelman said the United States regretted the continued Soviet demand for a ban on “space-strike arms”, which was an attempt to block SDI. He said the United States’ rejection of this proposal remained firm. Kampelman also presented arguments to demonstrate why the Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons did not remove the rationale for effective defenses. He concluded by welcoming the stated Soviet position on verification and noted that the United States would be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to specific weaponry limits, and reminded the Soviet side that political trust in verification and compliance must be restored.

4. Karpov replied by reading from a prepared text. Purporting to be giving a “first-look” assessment of the U.S. response, he said it appeared to be a repetition of the U.S. proposal of November 1. Kampelman noted his surprise that Karpov had apparently prepared his “first-look” assessment before having a first look. End summary.

U.S. Statement

5. Kampelman reported that he had been instructed by the President to provide a formal U.S. response to the Soviet proposal. He said that the response had been prepared in keeping with the joint statement of November 21, in an attempt to find and expand areas of common ground, and in light of extensive consultations with U.S. allies. Emphasizing that the elimination of nuclear weapons had long been an objective of the United States, Kampelman said that objective must be pursued in fashion consistent with the overall U.S. requirements for security and stability. Moreover, certain conditions must be fulfilled: conventional and other force imbalances must be corrected, future agreements must have effective verification regimes, and there must be full compliance with treaty obligations. In general, Kampelman said, the two sides must not, in the search for this objective, miss opportunities for more immediate and attainable goals. He added that there were elements of the Soviet proposal dealing with subsequent steps with which the United States could not agree at this time.

6. Kampelman said that these factors increased the importance of the joint statement of November 21, which focused on the realistic,

near-term prospects for agreement and committed the two sides to pursue areas of common ground. The United States continued to advocate agreement on first steps through the implementation of the principle of a 50 percent reduction in the nuclear forces of both sides appropriately applied, and the prompt negotiation of an INF accord. When these reductions were achieved, and additional reductions were under discussion, the U.S. could envision subsequent steps involving the other nuclear powers in a balanced and stable movement to zero nuclear weapons.

7. With respect to the three negotiating groups, Kampelman said, Ambassador Glitman would respond to the Soviet proposal on INF in the meeting of the INF negotiating group which would immediately follow this joint plenary. At that time Glitman would introduce a major new U.S. proposal. In the START area, the United States was disappointed by the failure of the Soviet Union to substantively change its START position after the presentation of the U.S. proposal in early November; the Soviet approach was inconsistent with the summit agreement to accelerate the negotiations and find common ground. Kampelman noted that the Soviet position retained unacceptable linkage between reductions in offensive nuclear systems and a ban on so-called "space-strike arms" and also continued to include non-central U.S. nuclear systems in the category of strategic systems, even though they could not be compared with Soviet strategic systems. This condition was also unacceptable.

8. In the defense and space area, Kampelman said that the United States regretted first and foremost the Soviet Union's failure to alter its ban on the development, testing and deployment of so-called "space-strike arms." The proposal was clearly an attempt to block the treaty-compliant SDI, and the U.S. rejection of the ban remained firm. Additionally, the United States regretted the continued linking of the ban to a radical reduction in offensive arms. Kampelman noted that the Soviet January 16 proposal, in asking whether it would not be more sensible to abolish offensive nuclear weapons than to develop defenses, had implied a Soviet recognition that defenses could play an effective role as long as some offensive nuclear weapons existed. He said that effective defenses would diminish the military utility of nuclear weapons and facilitate further reductions. Moreover, when nuclear weapons levels approached zero, defenses could provide insurance against cheating, breakout, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states.

9. Noting that the United States was pleased that the Soviet Union recognized that verification of agreements was critical, Kampelman said the United States would be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits we sought. He stated

that, in this context, it was essential that political trust in verification and compliance be restored through demonstrated changes in Soviet testing practices which impeded verification, and through the correction of other forms of Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements.

Soviet Statement

10. Karpov read from a prepared statement which emphasized that on January 8 and November 21, 1985, leaders of the two countries had elaborated objectives for the negotiations, i.e. to reach effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. In November, the two leaders had provided reference points for the negotiations by declaring that a nuclear war must never be fought and that neither of the two nations would seek military superiority.

11. Concerning today's U.S. response to the Soviet proposal, Karpov said the Soviets would carefully examine it and assess its value from the standpoint of its consistency with agreed objectives. Appearing to briefly depart from his prepared text, Karpov said that even "a first look" at the U.S. response revealed that the U.S. continued to evade the task of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. He said he had heard nothing which constituted a constructive element in the U.S. position.

12. Karpov then returned to his prepared text to assert that the U.S. response appeared to be a repetition of the November 1, 1985 proposal. While reserving their final conclusion until after Ambassador Glitman's presentation, Karpov continued, the Soviets had already given their assessment of the November 1 proposal. They had done this at the summit, at the end of Round III, and on several occasions during Round IV. Moreover, the Soviet delegation had also presented concrete measures for the implementation of the Gorbachev proposal. Karpov concluded by reaffirming his delegation's willingness to work on these measures in a practical manner.

13. Kampelman expressed his appreciation for Karpov's expression of willingness to examine the U.S. response, but noted for the record that as he looked across the table he could see that Karpov had been reading from a prepared text what he had characterized as a "first look" at the U.S. response. The text had obviously been prepared before the U.S. statement was read. Karpov replied that there was no need to explain to Ambassador Kampelman that it was "not good to peek into an other's notes." It was in any case up to him how he prepared his statement, or derived the basis for it. This, he repeated, was his preliminary assessment.

14. Participants:

U.S.: Kampelman, Tower, Glitman, Aldridge, Barry, Bartek, Burns, Cooper, Einhorn, Farr, Gallington, Hanmer, Hansen, Ifft, Kincaid, Korobovsky, Kramer, Kunsman, Lawson, McConnell, Reddy, Riveles, Spahr, Suchan, Van Inwegen, Woodworth, Zimmermann, and D. Arensburger, interpreter

USSR: Abdullayev, Alexandrov, Detinov, Grinin, Ivanov, Kardahev, Karpov, Khamidulin, Khripunov, Khromov, Kryuchkov, Kurlanov, Uznetsov, Lugachev, Masterkov, Medvedyev, Obukhov, Pavlichenko, Pimenov, Prokof'ev, Starodubov, Strel'tsov, Shemyakin, Yefimov, Zaitsev, and Bratchikov, Interpreter

Kampelman

130. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 6, 1986, 0903Z

2233. Subject: (U) Strt-end of round report. Ref NST/START-III-026 (85 Geneva 10590)²

1. This is NST/START-IV-024. Secret entire text.

Summary

2. The expectation that Round IV would be a productive one for the START group, given the groundwork laid at the November meeting between Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, was not realized. The Soviets were not receptive to seeking areas of convergence between the U.S. and Soviet proposals, as mandated by the November 21 joint statement, which called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, in particular, the principal of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms appropriately applied.

3. The Soviet approach to reductions in strategic offensive arms as presented on September 30, with its inherent inequities, remained fundamentally unaltered by the Soviet January 16 program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The Soviets

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860531-0847. Secret; Immediate. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

² See footnote 1, Document 117.

took no steps this round to remove any of the most important obstacles to agreement, such as the precondition of a ban on “space-strike arms” or the unacceptable and artificial composition of forces which would include U.S. INF missiles, most dual-capable aircraft in Europe and Asia, and carrier-based aircraft in aggregate of forces to be limited in a strategic offensive arms agreement. The Soviets chose to hold progress hostage to these areas of continuing disagreement rather than carry out the mandate of the November 21 joint statement.

4. We believe that the Soviets decided to put START essentially on hold for Round IV, focusing instead on their January 16 program and on the new INF proposals contained therein.

5. Paragraphs 6 through 10 contain background information on the round and the January 16 Soviet program. Our analysis of the Soviet approach to Round IV begins with Paragraph 11. A summary of the U.S. approach to the round begins with para 21. Prospects for Round V are contained in paragraphs 30 through 33. Finally, recommendations for interagency group work between rounds and public diplomacy are contained in paragraphs 34 through 38.

Setting

6. NST Round IV ran from January 16 through March 4. There were six weekly start plenary meetings, as well as four “joint” plenary meetings of the entire NST delegations. These were supplemented by heads of negotiations group meetings, post-plenary conversations, and several other informal meetings.

7. At the opening joint plenary on January 16, the Soviet delegation tabled its new “program” for the complete elimination of nuclear arms before the end of the century. This would be achieved in three stages. This new program did not change the Soviet START proposal of September 30, 1985 (now incorporated into stage one in the new program), except to propose a duration of 5 to 8 years. (See reftel for details of the September 30 Soviet proposal) The U.S. NST delegation provided the formal U.S. response to the “Gorbachev program” on February 24.³

The January 16 Soviet Program

8. Stage one:

—Within 5 to 8 years, the United States and the USSR would reduce by 50 percent those nuclear arms capable of reaching each other’s territory. Each side would retain no more than 6000 nuclear weapons on the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind.

³ See footnote 2, Document 129.

—The United States and the USSR would ban “development, testing and deployment of space-strike arms.”

Soviet and U.S. medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in the European zone would be eliminated.

The United States would assume an obligation not to supply strategic or medium-range missiles to other countries.

The United States and the USSR would agree from the outset to stop all nuclear explosions.

9. Stage two:

—Would begin no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years.

Other nuclear powers would begin to take part, initially assuming an obligation to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them on the territory of other countries.

The United States and the USSR would continue first-stage reductions, take further measures to eliminate medium-range nuclear arms and freeze tactical nuclear systems.

After completing their 50-percent reductions, the United States and the USSR would eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons (up to 100km range.)

The ban on “space-strike arms” would become multilateral, with leading industrial powers required to participate.

All nuclear powers would stop nuclear weapons tests.

The development on non-nuclear arms based on new physical principles whose kill capabilities come close to those of nuclear or other systems of mass destruction would be banned.

10. Stage three:

—Would begin no later than 1995.

All remaining nuclear arms would be eliminated.

By 1999, no nuclear arms would remain on earth.

Soviet Approach

11. The Soviets spent considerable time during Round IV touting the virtues of their new program. Korniyenko’s February 20 speech to the CD and Gorbachev’s February 25 speech to the Party Congress provided additional support for these efforts. The Soviets did not, however, push hard for stages two and three and acknowledged that our negotiating mandate remains unchanged from earlier rounds.

12. Soviet linkage of 50 percent reductions in START to a ban on “space-strike arms” remained very strong and appeared unchanged from earlier rounds. However, at one point Karpov said that the Soviet side had not considered what level of reductions would be possible in the event of an agreement that did not ban “space-strike arms” completely.

13. Soviet linkage of START to INF was less clear. On the one hand, they continued to take a hard line on the importance to them of the principle of taking account of all systems which are capable of reaching Soviet territory (the “reach criterion”). On the other hand, they placed more emphasis on the principle than the numbers. In addition, Karpov stated that “an effective solution to the problem involving U.S. medium-range nuclear systems capable of reaching USSR territory would do much to clear the way for deep reductions in nuclear arms in General.” In this connection, some Soviets hinted that an INF agreement could help resolve the composition of forces issue, presumably by eliminating some or all of the U.S. non-strategic forces now included in the Soviet aggregate. However, it is not at all clear that resolution of INF issues would settle this matter, especially if the agreement covered only INF missiles because the Soviets could continue to insist on counting U.S. medium-range and carrier-based aircraft in START. Informally, the Soviets hinted that IIs and GLCMs rather than aircraft, and said informally that their proposal to eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles in the European zone had been intended to narrow differences in START.

14. While the Soviets continued to insist on including SRAMs and gravity bombs in their strategic weapons aggregate, Khromov, speaking personally, raised informally the possibility of applying a “threat coefficient” to discount bomber weapons relative to ballistic missile RVs in the aggregate.

15. The Soviets seemed to adopt a more forthcoming attitude regarding verification. In contrast to earlier vague references to “cooperative measures,” they stated formally that “with respect to the arms to be destroyed and limited, verification would be carried out by both by NTM and through on-site inspection. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.” Numerous informal Soviet comments support the possibility that a change has indeed occurred in the Soviet approach to verification, but we have yet to see how this new Soviet posture, including the reference to OSI, will be applied in practice to systems to be limited.

16. The Soviets showed little interest in the U.S. November proposal, essentially dismissing it with little detailed analysis. They took the position that the November proposal had been overtaken by the November summit meeting, by the Soviet January 16 program, or both. Criticisms of the U.S. position dealt primarily, as before, with the absence of limits on SLCMs, SRAMs, and gravity bombs, lack of aggregation, and the failure to take account of INF systems and “space-strike arms.” After a period of silence on mobile ICBMs, they attacked our proposed ban in a mid-round plenary statement.

17. Despite the fact that it is not part of the NST negotiating mandate, the Soviets devoted noticeable effort to subject of a ban or morato-

rium on nuclear testing. Informally, they suggested this subject could be negotiated in the START negotiation group. They did, however, make clear that Soviet proposals related to nuclear testing are not a precondition to progress in START.

18. Karpov raised the idea of working out a “model” (or framework) of an agreement. Informally, others described this as a set of principles to guide the later formulation of an actual treaty text which would include the standard Soviet preconditions. In an informal conversation the model was said to be something that could be signed at the next summit meeting. No further explanation was provided and no draft was tabled.

19. Although the Soviets claimed they wanted to begin practical work, their behavior during this round belied this claim. The Soviets seemed deliberately to emphasize differences rather than common ground, but, as the round progressed, they did increasingly, although critically, address the U.S. agenda.

20. The Soviet proposal of October 1 to reduce 200–300 ICBMs was briefly discussed. When it became apparent that a ban on “space-strike arms” was a precondition and that the United States was not prepared to make a counteroffer, the subject was dropped.

U.S. Approach

21. In accordance with Round IV instructions, we made no substantive changes in the U.S. START position as tabled in the November proposal. (See reftel for details of the November proposal.)

22. The central theme of our approach in Round IV and the subject of our first plenary statement was the mandate to seek areas of convergence between the U.S. and Soviet proposals. To that end we reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the goals in the November 21 joint statement, which called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, in particular, the principle of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms appropriately applied.

23. The areas in which there appeared to be potential for convergence included:

Reductions in ballistic missile warheads (the U.S. proposes an equal limit of 4500. The number the Soviet Union might deploy under its proposed ceiling of 6000 weapons would appear to be in this vicinity);

Reductions in ICBM warheads (the U.S. proposes an equal limit of 3000. This represents a compromise between the original U.S. proposal of 2500 and the current Soviet offer which, in effect, caps ICBM warheads at 3600);

The magnitude of reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight (the U.S. proposes reductions to a level that is no more than 50 percent of

the higher of the levels currently possessed by either side. The Soviet proposal “will lead automatically to the reduction of approximately one-half of the throw-weight of Soviet ballistic missiles”);

The levels of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers (the U.S. could accept an equal limit of between 1250 and 1450 ballistic missiles). The U.S. has also offered an equal limit of 350 on heavy bombers. These limits would result in a reduction from current levels to an equal total of 1600-1800 delivery vehicles, which falls within the range of limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles previously and currently proposed by the Soviet side.

The Soviets showed little interest in seeking convergence and minimized the existence of areas of common ground.

24. We also addressed in plenary the issue of the composition of forces that should properly be discussed in START. We noted this had been a contentious problem since 1969, the sides have never shared a common definition of the term “strategic,” but this has not precluded the sides from reaching agreements. We urged the Soviets to return to the approach agreed in SALT II, and which appeared in Soviet START proposals until September 30. The Soviets, however, continued to press their definition of “strategic,” which includes U.S. INF missiles, most dual-capable aircraft in Europe and Asia and carrier-based aircraft, along with ICBMS, SLBMS, and heavy bombers, in their proposed U.S. “strategic” aggregate.

25. In plenary we formally refuted Soviet linkage of START and defense and space issues. Regarding procedural linkage, we noted that the November 21 joint statement should set to rest the proposition that progress in one negotiating group should be tied to progress in another. Regarding substantive linkage, we rebutted both notions that deep reductions and the deployment of defenses are incompatible, and the suggestion that reductions cannot begin as long as even the option of deploying defenses in the future has not explicitly been renounced. Soviet substantive linkage remained as firm as in previous rounds.

26. We pressed the Soviets to provide detailed reactions and a counterproposal to our November proposal. Although the Soviets did not present a point by point rebuttal, the nature of Soviet objections to this proposal is now clear, and centers on the issues of the composition of forces in START, long-range SLCMS, and whether to limit directly all bombers weapons.

27. We explored the Soviet January 16 program, noting that stage one is essentially their September 30 proposal and that stages two and three are beyond our negotiating mandate. We also emphasized that any agreement must stand on its own merits and not depend upon later agreements to rectify its deficiencies.

28. We informally raised the problem of RV counting noting that previous solutions may not be adequate, and suggested either informal discussions or the establishment of a working group to discuss the issue. The Soviets rejected the idea of a working group. They gave conflicting signals regarding their willingness in principle to discuss the issue informally, but in fact no meaningful discussion of the problem was achieved.

29. Because of the negative Soviet attitude in Round IV, our concluding plenary statement emphasized that if this negotiating group's mandate is to be fulfilled, the Soviets must approach Round V in a different spirit. We urged the Soviets:

To reconsider their approach of linking strategic offensive arms reductions with defense and space issues, and to recognize that the two sides can proceed now, when possibilities for deployment of effective defenses are still years away, to conclude and implement an agreement deeply reducing strategic offensive arms without closing off future options for meeting their perceived security requirements.

To return to the composition of forces to be limited in a strategic offensive arms agreement that was agreed in previous negotiations and that the Soviets themselves has proposed until September 30;

To focus genuinely on the first phase of their long-term program and to narrow the differences between the two sides' proposals for achieving 50 percent reductions;

To study carefully the U.S. November proposal, and return prepared to respond in depth to each of its elements; and,

To develop revised elements of its own September 30 proposal so as to narrow differences between the sides, just as the U.S. November proposal narrowed differences between the earlier U.S. proposal and the Soviet September 30 proposal.

Prospects

30. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets will be willing to reconcile the converging proposals of the two sides on the ballistic missile RV numbers issue, the ICBM RV numbers issue, and the throw-weight issue, until there is resolution of the composition of forces to be included in START.

31. The Soviets are unlikely to fall off their "reach criterion" for the composition of forces until a solution is found in the INF negotiations. Even then, there is no guarantee that a mutually acceptable solution on INF missiles would cause the Soviets to abandon their "reach criterion" (including its application to U.S. medium-range and carrier-based aircraft). And the major problem posed by the Soviet linkage of progress in START to a ban on "space-strike arms" would, of course, still remain.

32. We believe there may have been a positive change in the Soviet approach to verification. However, testing and exploiting this possible change will be difficult until specific constraints are under discussion and until we are in a position to present specific verification proposals of our own.

33. Given these circumstances, the current deadlock in START could well continue in Round V. This pessimistic assessment is consistent with Soviet statements indicating INF and a nuclear test ban are their priority issues for the next summit.

Recommendations

34. Given the negative Soviet approach in Round IV, completion of the START draft treaty is not now a priority task. However, interagency work needs to continue on this project. The START negotiating group has discussed the ACDA draft treaty at length and welcomes the draft as a useful step to focus attention on important unresolved substantive issues, but generally believes many of the issues in the draft treaty require more study before decisions can be reached. In particular, we need to consider carefully how the new ideas proposed in the draft treaty would limit the Soviets. In order to facilitate discussion within agencies and in the interagency group, an informal paper has been prepared commenting on several of these issues. START negotiating group members will have this paper for reference in Washington.

35. Prior to Round V it would be desirable for two previously tasked interagency group papers to be completed in order to flesh out U.S. positions:

Details of the U.S. proposal banning modernization of SS-18s need to be finalized.

An acceptable option or options for RV counting, suitable for presentation to the Soviets, should be completed.

36. Additional papers will also eventually be needed and would be helpful in Round V:

Developing our definition of throw-weight. This is needed before we can discuss with the Soviets how their proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight by 50 percent, including the baseline figure to be used.

ALCM issues: The negotiating group needs guidance on ALCM range and armament. Eventually, in the context of a decision on a START framework, the ALCM counting issue also will have to be resolved.

37. To better counteract Soviet arguments in Geneva, two additional papers would be helpful:

An analysis of the Soviet “reach” criterion which clearly develops the U.S. position on how medium-range aircraft, including carrier-

based aircraft, should be handled by the START and INF negotiation groups. The purpose of this paper, which would be coordinated with the INF interagency group, would be coordinated with counterarguments to the Soviet “reach criterion.”

A paper providing counterarguments to the Soviet position which seeks to ban all cruise missiles of a range greater than 600km. This paper should differentiate issues involving ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs, e.g., range, armament, and verification for each. This paper would also have to be coordinated with the INF interagency group.

Public Diplomacy

38. A very important aspect of the START negotiations which requires attention is our public diplomacy effort with the congress, the allies, the news media, and directly with the public. In particular, the inequities built into the composition of forces in the Soviet proposal need to be highlighted. We have been doing so with the congressional observers in Geneva, in backgrounders of the press and briefings of allied officials; but much more needs to be done and this requires priority high-level coordination in Washington.

Kampelman

131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

Washington, May 2, 1986, 2322Z

138815. Subject: (S) instructions for US/Soviet nuclear and space arms talks. Ref: (A) State 012556;² (B) State 54772;³ (C) State 55895;⁴ (D) 85 State 288127.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870011-0780. Secret; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Mahley, Nosenzo, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Adelman. Sent Immediate.

² See footnote 3, Document 126.

³ In telegram 54772 to NST Geneva, February 22, the Department transmitted instructions for a response to Gorbachev's proposals of January 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860139-0610)

⁴ In telegram 55895 to NST Geneva, February 23, the Department transmitted its preference that experts' talks on Risk Reduction Centers be held in Moscow or Washington. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860431-0685)

⁵ In telegram 288127 to NST Geneva, September 19, 1985, the Department transmitted overall guidance for Round III of Negotiations with the USSR on Nuclear and Space Arms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860048-1039)

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following is guidance for US delegation for the fifth round of negotiations with the USSR on nuclear and space arms, beginning May 1986. Guidance for previous rounds (Reftels) remains in effect, except as modified below. Specific guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being provided septel.

3. Principal objectives for Round V include:

- Maintaining focus and priority on executing the mandate agreed at the last summit to pursue areas of common ground—50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied and an interim INF agreement;

- Seeking elimination of Soviet linkages and preconditions, including their linkage of progress in START to an unacceptable ban on so-called “space-strike” arms; their inclusion of US non-strategic forces under limits on US strategic forces, and limits on UK/French modernization and US cooperation with allies as preconditions for an INF agreement;

- Focusing the discussions on the substance of US proposals;

- Achieving progress on verification concurrent with progress on reductions; and,

- Emphasizing the problems for the arms control process created by continuing Soviet non-compliance.

4. Importance of Geneva process: the delegation should again make clear to the Soviets (as in para 5 of reftel D) that the confidential Geneva talks are the appropriate forum for making progress on bilateral arms control issues.

5. While again noting the agreement in the joint statement that, “during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification will be agreed upon”, the delegation should continue to emphasize the importance to the future of arms control of compliance with existing arms control agreements, the need for the Soviets to correct non-compliant behavior, and US intent to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the absence of such corrective action.

6. Delegation should continue to resist strongly Soviet attempts to link progress in the three negotiating groups. In this regard, US del should also resist any Soviet attempts to erode the separate status and roles of the three negotiating groups, making clear that each group is fully competent both to explore policy issues and to commit governments on subjects within its areas of responsibility.

Whitehead

132. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Geneva, May 23, 1986

Last week, shortly after the Fifth Round² opened, Ambassador Karpov signaled to me what the Soviets will want in the Defense and Space component of an overall Geneva agreement. He told me at lunch that Moscow understands the United States is not ready to accept “a ban on space strike arms” and was suggesting “partial measures” as a way to find a formula for progress. When I pressed him, he acknowledged that even though the total ban would remain part of long-range Soviet policy, the partial measures would be in lieu of that ban for purposes of a Geneva agreement and would satisfy their condition for substantial START reductions (undefined).

Karpov listed three “partial measures”: (1) agreement by both parties not to exercise, for a period of 15–20 years, their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (Kvitsinskiy, during the Second Round, told me 10 years); (2) agreement on what the ABM Treaty means so as to clarify ambiguities (Karpov, for the first time, stated he agreed with Harold Brown’s statement for the U.S. at the ABM negotiations defining where prohibited activity under the Treaty begins); and (3) a provision reflecting President Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev that we are not and will not be working on offensive weapons under the SDI Program. (They clearly want to limit SDI to ground-based activity and to prohibit space-based components capable of attacking missiles in the boost phase or attacking other space, air, or ground assets.)

It is interesting that an ASAT provision was not included in the above list of Soviet requirements. I also believe that giving me three requirements now does not mean the Soviets will require all three in an end game. Karpov has been arguing that his aim is to obtain assurances, before the Soviets agree on reductions, that the ABM Treaty will continue and will limit U.S. SDI behavior for a substantial period of time.

My instructions permit me to consider Soviet proposals on partial measures “seriously and on their merits.”³ I can also “probe or question” those Soviet initiatives. I am asked, however, “to discourage the Soviet side from believing” that those proposed partial measures are

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round V. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Nitze, Ridgway, and Holmes.

² Round V of the Nuclear and Space Talks lasted from May 8–June 28.

³ See Document 131.

acceptable to us and “should continue to criticize them on their merits.” I can live with that and do not want to change those instructions. I urged Karpov to understand that the best way to proceed is first to fashion a detailed framework of START reductions with Ron so that we together arrive at the kind and extent of those reductions. When these are agreed upon, I can more easily explore Defense and Space solutions designed to meet both of our needs.

* * * *

[less than 3 lines not declassified]

—The USSR could possibly accept SDI if it were implemented “solely” as a “territorial defense system” rather than space based relating to boost phase interception.

—The USSR is still researching “whether mutual deployments of SDI systems could be stabilizing,” but they don’t see how that is possible, given the potential ability of SDI to attack “the other side’s shield.”

—The Soviets may be reconciling themselves to SDI “as long as it stops somewhere short of weapons testing,” with some suggestions this means research should be confined to the laboratory.

—The Soviets are concerned that an all-out technological effort by the United States will inevitably result in an abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which would leave the USSR at a disadvantage. Its negotiating objective, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* is to avoid this outcome. There will, therefore, not be any substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons so long as they are persuaded abrogation is the likely direction in which the United States is moving.

—At least one senior Soviet official indicated that the USSR might be interested in cooperating with the United States in one or more space projects, not necessarily linked to U.S. concessions on SDI.

[less than 1 line not declassified] we, of course, know that they might be *bona fide* messages, they might be disinformation, or they might be expressions of personal opinion of either the Soviet informant or the American reporter.

133. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 6, 1986, 0932Z

5248. Subject: Kampelman June 5 Message to Poindexter.

I am sending you for the Secretary a copy of the message I have sent to Poindexter at the NSC (with a copy to Linhart). Please share also with Paul Nitze, Allen Holmes and Roz Ridgeway.

Begin text:

Dear John:

You will recall that during the first two rounds of our negotiations, Bud or you telephoned me weekly to get my judgments on where the Soviets were heading. This pattern stopped as we both realized that the process here would be a long one. Instead, I occasionally met with Bud or gave him a memorandum of my personal observations, and you and I recently had one such lengthy exchange in your office.²

In that spirit, I am sending you the following memorandum of my reactions to the most recent developments in Geneva. The newspaper leak was regrettable and has created, in some cases, erroneous impressions. I hope the following summary of my analysis, which I am back-channeling to you, will be helpful. I am sending a copy to Bob Linhart. I will also share this with George Shultz.

Begin text.

1. On May 29 the Soviets formally presented us³ with what appeared to be the first substantive change in their position in the Defense and Space Negotiating Group since the talks began. There had been informal soundings in a similar vein since early in the negotiation. Their most recent plenary statement of June 3⁴ has cast some doubt on the significance of their move. But on balance, I continue to believe the move is important. We are still analyzing these recent developments, but I wanted to let you know my own thinking and my thoughts on how we should proceed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860446-0623. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Not further identified.

³ The Delegation transmitted a report of the Soviet position in telegram 4990 from NST Geneva, May 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860418-0581)(S)

⁴ The Delegation transmitted a report of the June 3 plenary session in telegram 5150 from NST Geneva, June 4. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860431-0537)

2. There were two parts to the formal Soviet proposal of May 29. First, they called for a commitment—to be embodied in a protocol to the ABM treaty—not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for an agreed period of time (i.e., 15–20 years, with indications of some flexibility). Secondly, they proposed that we reach agreement on definitions of terms related to the treaty’s prohibition (in Article V) on the development of space-based ABM systems and components.

3. In return it was suggested, with varying degrees of specificity, that U.S. agreement would open the way to radical reductions. The plenary statement used such a formulation. Two Soviets (one in response to a direct question) said explicitly that acceptance of this new Soviet proposal would make possible fifty percent reductions in strategic offensive forces. You will recall that Karpov had told me much the same thing at lunch the previous week.

4. In our post-plenary discussions the following week, the Soviets were much more evasive about what would be required for radical reductions. While some denied they had ever said strengthening the ABM treaty would be sufficient to bring these about, Karpov privately reaffirmed it to me.

5. As it stands, the Soviet proposal of May 29 is far from the answer to our dreams. The net effect of the new Soviet-proposed definitions would be to constrain SDI activities even more closely than the “restrictive” interpretation of the ABM treaty. They differ significantly from those discussed in the ABM treaty negotiations. In effect, they amount to amendments to the treaty. In addition, the Soviet non-withdrawal proposal would preclude us from going beyond the treaty for that period, even if SDI research demonstrates that effective defenses are feasible.

6. The potential significance of the proposal lay in the implicit hint that a “strengthening” of the ABM treaty might replace a comprehensive ban on “space-strike” arms as a prerequisite for substantial reductions in offensive arms. This was the implicit indication, too, from my earlier conversation with Karpov. However, the June 3 plenary withdrew whatever hint had been dropped the previous week. The Soviet statement of that date decomposed its longstanding ban on space-strike arms into two components: a ban on space-to-earth weapons and a ban on ASATs. These were lumped together with the May 29 proposal for strengthening the ABM treaty as the steps necessary to prevent an arms race in space, with only the most desultory reference to reductions.

7. In short, the Soviets have pulled back at least for the formal negotiating record. Several explanations are possible:

—There never was a change in the Soviet position. The May 29 proposal was merely a cleverly packaged feint to reflect Karpov’s May

19 luncheon conversation with me but primarily aimed at the Senate Observers Group⁵ who were here at the time and who quickly seized on it as significant. I do not accept this.

—The move was real, but for tactical negotiating reasons the Soviets are trying to shroud it in ambiguity (to prevent our pocketing the move, to oblige us to show interest before they proceed further, to cover their tracks if the move leads nowhere).

—The initial move was real, but Moscow had a change of heart and ordered the pull-back (possibly reflecting broader policy considerations or as a response to the President's interim restraint decision).

Only time will tell. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the May 29 proposal was significant and that the Soviets have shown us the shape of what they would be willing to accept at an "end game" as the price for substantial reductions. (We should note they did not publicize the May 29 proposals.) There is, of course, a long road still to travel.

8. Leaving aside the larger question of whether the approach outlined by the Soviets could be reconciled with our broader strategic objectives, there is no question that the Soviet proposal as it now stands is not acceptable. The new definitions proposed by the Soviets in their May 29 statement are intolerably restrictive. However, the Soviets, in my opinion, will be flexible on this point at the end game. They do not put down their final positions at this stage of a negotiation. Ten days before tabling this proposal, Karpov told me at lunch that he personally did not disagree with the 1971 Brown statement, which established the distinction between "research" and "development" and which forms the basis for the "restrictive" interpretation of the treaty.⁶ Similarly, the 15–20 year time-frame is clearly outlandish, contrasts with Kvitsinskiy's statement to me in the second round of "at least 10 years," and is not the Soviets' last word.

9. If the Soviets follow up this ABM treaty initiative with a more serious approach in START which meets our requirements—and only under this condition—we might in the end be able to find an accommodation, especially if—as my conversations with Senate observers strongly suggested—SDI funding will be significantly below adminis-

⁵ Senators Stevens, Gore, and Rockefeller visited the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva from May 28–31. (Telegram 5105 from NST Geneva, June 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860428-0532)

⁶ In telegram 5407 from NST Geneva, June 11, Kampleman wrote that he had intended to end this sentence with "development," and to have deleted the phrase: "and which forms the basis for the 'restrictive' interpretation of the treaty." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860006-0230)

tration requests for some time to come, with an inevitable impact on the pace of the program's progress.

10. Moreover, as the President has indicated, the United States has a national security interest in hanging on to the ABM treaty for the near term, provided the Soviets bring their activities into compliance, negotiate seriously toward a 50 percent reduction, and our SDI exploratory activities are allowed to continue. The Soviets have near-term advantages in deployable land-based ABM systems, which, while presumably less effective than the systems under consideration in SDI, could be available much sooner. Also, if an accommodation results in significant START reductions in our interest, the job of defending against nuclear weapons in the future might well be made easier and safer.

11. These are long-term considerations which would come into play only in a situation which does not yet exist, that is, if the Soviets make us a START offer which it is in our interest to accept. We are not there yet, and in my view our task over the short term must be to make clear to the Soviets that we could consider their approach in D&S (not its substance) only if the inducement in START were sufficiently great—and even then not in the specific terms which they have proposed. We also, of course, cannot forget that Krasnoyarsk must be dealt with. In the meantime, however, it is very important not to close the door.

12. My specific thoughts for now are the following:

—We should not reject the Soviet proposal, either publicly or privately. Publicly, we should stick to the line that we are studying the Soviet proposal and avoid characterizing it. Avoiding the presumption of a negative U.S. response—particularly to a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty—will be especially important to the Congress and in Europe, coming on the heels of the U.S. decision on interim restraint.

—Privately, we in Geneva should, at least for the remainder of this round, confine ourselves to asking questions and seeking clarification. We should focus on the May 29 proposal, while remaining critically noncommittal on its merits. My existing instructions are adequate for this purpose. I neither need nor want new instructions for now.

—We should continue to press the Soviets on START, as Ron and the START group have been energetically doing. With respect to the proposed strengthening of the ABM treaty, we should state that the dismantling of Krasnoyarsk and other steps to bring Soviet activities into compliance would do that. A no-withdrawal commitment and new definitions (which we should not hesitate to call amendments) are something which the Soviets want but for which we do not see a need. We should contrast our own treaty-compliant activities with Soviet violations. We should also make clear that it is up to them to

demonstrate why the Soviet approach should be in our interest—and to make it worth our while.

—Once again, it will be important to make the START point to our allies and the Congress that there has been no change in the Soviet START position (the Senate observers were in Geneva when the proposal was made). The Soviet proposal may well generate the usual pressures on us to show flexibility in response. We need to stress that the Soviets have shown no flexibility on the central issue of fifty-percent reductions and that, even if the May 29 proposal is reaffirmed, unless the Soviets tell us more clearly what they are prepared to offer in START, we would be buying a pig in a poke (and an expensive pig at that).

—Finally, the President may wish to think about an early private communication to Gorbachev designed to keep some momentum going. In addition, some public statement which, in effect, makes points for us with the Congress and allies might also be considered.

Warm regards.

Kampelman

134. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to Steven Steiner, Ronald Sable, Rodney McDaniel, and Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 11, 1986, 8:59 a.m.

SUBJECT

New Soviet Proposal in Geneva

At joint plenary today (11 June),² Soviets tabled new proposal on START. Full details unclear as yet, but the framework of the proposal as follows:

—1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) ceiling for each side; includes Subs carrying SLCM's. Includes Strat Bombers.

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration. Secret. Copied to Mahley, Brooks, and Kraemer.

² The Delegation transmitted the Soviet plenary statement in telegram 5436 from Geneva, June 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860452-0717)

—Number and type of Subs carrying SLCM's would have to be agreed; SLCM banned from surface ships; each bomber or SLCM-carrying sub would be ASSUMED to be carrying a "standard loading" (presumably "standard loading" to be agreed, not clear.)

—8000 warhead limit on ALL SNDV's—including bomber and SLCM loadings.

—No more than 60% of SNDV's or Whds of any one type. (e.g. ICBM's, etc.)

—Forward-based systems are not included in the agreement, EXCEPT that there is an associated OBLIGATION not to build up FBS—defined as medium bombers, medium-range missiles (i.e. LRINF or SRINF), or aircraft carriers.

—US must also pledge not to deploy additional medium-range missiles (i.e. LRINF) in AREAS THAT COULD REACH THE USSR.

—The Soviets also pointed out that this agreement would be reachable in the context of an agreed extension to the ABM treaty. They said their proposal to ban space-strike arms was still on the table, but this agreement was not linked to that—the ban on space-strike arms was linked to the 50-percent reductions proposal they had tabled previously. This is a preliminary reading from ACDA. More details will no doubt be filtering in later today. We will provide you additional information as it is available and significant.

135. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, June 13, 1986, 6:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz Meeting with President

Shultz made presentations on two issues (Middle East and strategic arms control) and mentioned two brief items at the end (Cuba and South Africa).²

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration. No classification marking. Copied to McDaniel.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan and Shultz met from 1:39–2:16 p.m. in the State Dining Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation was found.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Middle East.]

On arms control, Shultz said he wasn't sure he was effectively communicating his view of the issue so he wanted to go over again what he had said at the NSPG.³ The key aim, he said, was "how to lock in SDI" for succeeding administrations. He felt the Soviets had "reopened the bazaar" in both START reductions and in conceding SDI research. He thought we could live with a 5–6 year pledge not to withdraw from the ABM treaty since it would be 5–6 years until a deployment decision; the Soviets have also said it would take 5–6 years to phase in deep reductions. We could match these up, link the two, and "turn SDI into a compliance mechanism that keeps the reductions going." The President said this seemed "akin" to what he had said at the NSPG: Both sides could keep on with SDI research and, at the moment of a deployment decision, share the knowledge, observe each other's tests, and deploy based on the elimination of ICBMs. A treaty to this effect would lock SDI in. Shultz interpreted this as consistent with what he had said, and told the President he was "reassured" by this conversation. I made no comment, but told Shultz afterwards that you too thought these concepts could be merged and that you would have a paper next week.

[Omitted here is a discussion of topics not related to START]

³ Minutes of the National Security Planning Group meeting of June 12 are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, January 1985–October 1986, Document 243.

136. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz's Delegation¹

Washington, June 24, 1986, 2346Z

199602/Tosec 110162. Subject: Soviet Ambassador Dubinin's call on the President; Gorbachev's letter.

1. (S–Entire text).

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860006-0461. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow. Drafted by Evans; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Parris. On June 24, Shultz was traveling from Bandar Seri Begawan to Manila to attend an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting.

2. There follows for your information the text of the memorandum of the President's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin on June 23, as well as the text of the letter from Gorbachev to the President that Dubinin delivered.

3. Begin text of memcon:

Date: June 23, 1986

Place: White House Oval Office

Time: 4:55–5:35pm

US Participants

Soviet Participants

President Reagan

Ambassador Dubinin

Chief of Staff Reagan

VADM Poindexter

Ambassador Matlock

Deputy Assistant

Secretary Simons

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan's Glassboro speech,² and its tone. Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to

² See Reagan's "Remarks at the High School Commencement Exercises in Glassboro, New Jersey," June 19, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986, vol. I, pp. 806–811.

improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinina said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19. The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other. Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinina continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President's assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through Secretary Shultz and Dubinina. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation.

Dubinina indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinina then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks

between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the summit.

Dubinina said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinina handed Gorbachev's letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the summit. The President had never given up belief in a summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world communist state. Could the US ignore this and think that it was

not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan's knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador's time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubinina thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubinina did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev's letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the Foreign Ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

Dubinina concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

4. Begin text of Gorbachev letter, in informal Soviet translation:

Dear Mr. President,

In your letter of May 23, 1986³ you note that a full six months have been lost, which could have been used for resolving important problems in the relations between the USSR and U.S. In principle it is difficult not to agree with that. Indeed, the months which have passed since our meeting have turned out to be a kind of a period of missed opportunities.

Speaking frankly, without diplomatic contrivances we are disappointed by the developments after Geneva, and we have serious grounds for that. Last November it was our assumption that through the efforts of both sides—joint or, if you will, simultaneous—the shift of our relations to a more stable, solid basis would be practically implemented. In other words the period after Geneva was supposed to become a time for intensive work to prepare the next, higher stage of Soviet-American relations.

This, however, did not happen. The reason is not that the real opportunities for such a shift were lacking. It is that the American side did not join the constructive efforts made by the Soviet Union, and even resisted them.

I am saying this not for the sake of polemics which would substitute a businesslike discussion, but in order to set the record straight. The fact remains that it is precisely the Soviet Union who, following the joint commitments undertaken at the Geneva meeting, has prepared and introduced the proposals which, should they be taken up by the other side, would ensure a weighty material content of agreements on the main directions which you and I, Mr. President, have chartered. They constitute a sufficiently comprehensive system of possible solutions on the main aspects of the problem of security. I am speaking about space, strategic offensive, nuclear medium-range, nuclear operational—tactical, chemical and conventional weapons. At the same time we have worked out a new a broad spectrum of measures to strengthen verification and enhance confidence-building measures.

Unfortunately, so far our initiatives have not generated a real reciprocal movement on the part of the U.S. Yet, in fact, each of those proposals contains as an integral element an opening for cooperation with the United States.

³ Reagan's May 23 letter to Gorbachev is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 235.

The American side has responded by unwillingness to give thought to the essence of our ideas, unpreparedness to get down to their specific discussion or, at best, by calls to return to its proposals introduced even before the November summit. The latter looks strange, to say the least, if one is to take into account that you and I agreed in Geneva to accelerate the process of negotiations, that is, to move forward, not backward.

Judging by your latest letters, you, too, recognize the importance of the atmosphere shaping up around Soviet-American relations. Understandably, the political climate is determined not only by the public utterances on either side, though this factor cannot be discounted completely, but, mainly, by the practical actions. In this connection it must be stated out-right that many American actions, for example, the attack against Libya, renunciation of compliance with the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT-II treaty, were of an extremely negative, dangerous nature. This, naturally, has a direct bearing on the evaluation of the intentions of the U.S. on the international arena and cannot but affect our perception of the attitude of the American leadership to the conduct of affairs with the Soviet Union. Clearly, such a line of action of the U.S. does not make things more definite also in so far as a new summit meeting is concerned, our attitude to which, as I have already told you, is in principle positive.

Nothing should be left unsaid on this subject, however. We are deeply convinced—and we sincerely say that—that with no confidence that actual agreements will be reached there would be no point in holding such a meeting. A sterile meeting would only mislead the public opinion, would have the opposite effect.

Preparing and holding a productive meeting between the leaders of two countries is, naturally, a mutual endeavor. You and I should be equally interested in a positive outcome. Accordingly, an equal degree of readiness to make a tangible contribution to ensuring a positive outcome should also be manifested. In the language of the political practice, that means the willingness and ability to reach mutually beneficial compromises.

I admit, the thought appeals to me, which you expressed in the conversation with Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the effect that the practical possibilities of agreements can lie somewhere between the optimum requirements of both sides. Certainly, it would be, nevertheless, good to resolve the vital problems at one stroke, radically. The critical moment we are going through requires that. But since so far in practice it doesn't work out that way, let us begin by taking the path of searching for solutions leading to that.

Should the search show that pragmatic agreements are within the realm of our possibilities, then the necessary efforts could be exerted to make them a positive core of our meeting.

In our view, there are several areas where, given mutual willingness, forward movement could be achieved, which could take the shape of agreements at the summit. Given the work which we continue to conduct to create a basis for such agreements, I would like to suggest that now attention be focused on the following:

First: Space and strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet side, as you know, introduced in Geneva the other day a compromise version of a possible agreement on this subject. As a key element we propose to come to agreement on strengthening the regime of the ABM treaty, among other things, by adopting the obligation not to use for a certain agreed period of time the right to withdraw from the treaty. A more solid degree of strategic stability and confidence resulting from such a step could be enhanced by agreement to ban “offensive weapons” in space, that is, weapons capable of striking targets in the earth’s atmosphere or on the surface of the earth, and to prohibit anti-satellite systems, including the liquidation of the existing ones. We would be also prepared to clarify on a mutual basis the boundaries of the activities in the ABM field permitted and prohibited under the treaty.

A forward movement on these problems would undoubtedly permit to resolve as a practical matter the problem of a substantial reduction in strategic offensive arms. On this subject we have outlined two versions of agreements, so to speak, for the American side to pick and choose. One—involving the inclusion of the American medium-range nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR among the weapons to be reduced, the other—without the inclusion of such systems.

I have noted with satisfaction your assessment of the new Soviet proposals as “undoubtedly serious”, which will be “intensively and carefully studied” in Washington, which was transmitted to me by Secretary George Shultz through Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin. I see in that an encouraging sign and expect that you will instruct your delegation in Geneva to get down to a businesslike and specific discussion. Our representatives have all the necessary instructions for that.

Second: Medium-range missiles in Europe. Though we have agreed in Geneva, among other things, to conduct a search around the idea of an interim agreement, the American side has never departed from its old “zero option”, the lop-sidedness of which is obvious to everybody. Some later procedural additions to that American position do not change things, of course. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we are able to find a mutually acceptable version. The best of them would certainly be agreement on the complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and U.S. in the European zone, reinforced by the appropriate obligations not to circumvent it, both on your and on our part. But, I repeat, we are also prepared for partial measures.

I think, there is merit in starting exploring them without delay. If the American side, too, has concrete considerations on this score, it would be good for our representatives to exchange ideas on this subject.

Third: Cessation of nuclear tests. You, Mr. President, have spoken frankly enough about the motives the American side is guided by in continuing to conduct underground nuclear explosions. And yet, I place the question of restraint in that area in the category of political rather than military decisions.

This issue attracts universal attention in the world. Taking unilateral actions in this area and inviting the United States to come along, we by no means are seeking "to drive the other side into the corner". We would like Washington to have a correct perception of this policy of ours.

I have carefully thought over again the considerations outlined by both sides, including the recent ones, concerning the talks of experts in the field of nuclear explosions. I am also inclined to think that such discussions, conducted without any preconditions, should touch upon the entire range of questions—both the questions of verification and the obligation to define the conditions and ways leading to complete renunciation of nuclear weapon tests.

Taking into account a certain convergence of attitudes we suggest that such talks, which you also spoke about, start in the nearest future, say, in early July. The level and place for these bilateral discussions, I presume, could be worked out soon through diplomatic channels.

All in all, it would certainly make sense for both of our sides to show a realistic approach to this set of questions, which touch upon the nerve centers of security of both the USSR and U.S.

There are, we think, possibilities for joint work, including in the context of the summit, also on such problems as the strengthening of the safety regime for nuclear power plants, cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space as well as in a number of areas of concrete bilateral contacts. It is our understanding that the American side is also interested in such cooperation.

Thus, Mr. President, the Soviet side does not slacken its efforts directed not only at the normalization of our relations and strengthening of international security, but also at a practical preparation, by deeds, of the summit meeting. I hope that you will view in this light also the considerations about the substance of the issues stated in this letter.

Now, a few words about how our further work could be organized. First of all the already existing FORA and channels, including the contacts of our embassies in Washington and Moscow, should be made more active. We attach, as I already have said, great significance to the

intensification of efforts of the Soviet and American delegations at the Geneva negotiations on space and nuclear weapons.

Along with those traditional FORA it would be useful as a practical matter to conduct several working meetings at the level of experts, who could consider in a purely businesslike manner a number of problems of importance for the development of our bilateral dialogue. For example, in this format the possibilities could be discussed of bringing closer together the positions of the USSR and U.S. on conventional forces and armaments, on confidence-building measures in Europe, some points of contact could be additionally explored in the positions of the sides on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We think it is necessary to have a comprehensive exchange of views—in conceptual as well as practical terms—on the whole on the issues of a peaceful settlement in the regions torn by conflicts. Soviet-American bilateral relations could be the subject of special consideration at a similar level.

Such a blueprint of the preparatory work, if it suits you in principle, could be set in motion already in the near future (if necessary its details could be discussed at the ambassadorial or deputy minister level.) The results of such work could be then jointly analyzed by our foreign ministers, who could at the same time pick out several questions for a more in-depth consideration at their level. As a result, it could be finally determined how things are shaping up as far as the summit is concerned.

In conclusion, I would like to say: in the complex dynamics of the contemporary international life, ideal moments, indeed, as you write, are hard to find. But to create moments enriched by our mutual constructive efforts, leading up to important results is well in our power. In fact, this is the key to the implementation of that decisive turn in the relations between the USSR and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End Text of letter

Whitehead

137. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to Rodney McDaniel and Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 26, 1986, 9:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Wrap-up of today's events

Admiral,

Have accomplished visits to Adelman, Nitze, Rowny and Crowe on the Basic Sage Papers. All sessions went well—especially Adelman and Crowe. Will see Bill Casey in the morning on Friday.² Will provide a more detailed debrief after that. Quick look report is as follows:

Adelman—No show stopper. Would like to offer an alternative approach involving the banning of testing against targets on Earth. Doesn't think the Soviets will bite on the current formulation but supportive.

Nitze—Feels that earlier formulation more correct. Pressed me hard for a more precise definition of testing etc. Told him "watch this space." Not happy with current version.

Rowny—More concerned that he not get cut out than in substance. Wants to work START & INF alternatives. No show stopper.

Crowe—Spent about 1 hour with him. Need to give you a full debrief. Feels that approach too conservative. Is supportive of effort—no problem. Intends to review JCS position on testing to get the "historical" position changed. Good session.

Will see Casey at 09:00 tomorrow.

On the Dubinin gambit, feel that we should take our time to ensure that we fully understand what has gone down here. No reason to rush. I have only had the benefit of Ron's initial brief—but it fits into a pattern of Soviet actions (i.e., separate approaches to all our allies). They may have seriously miscalculated if trying to drive a partisan wedge in U.S. politics. If this is the case, the President needs to decide who he wants to paint as the bad guys since this will rouse Joe Six-Pack if he should choose to use it and we play it carefully. Recommend taking no action until additional information being collected is available tomorrow.

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration. Secret. Copied to Gantt, Thompson, and Kraemer.

² June 27.

Finally, the Soviets (Starodubov) have called on General Ellis (our SCC Commissioner) to hold a special session on the SCC beginning on 22 July to discuss the US SALT II decision, its implementation, and the future of the SCC. I see this as a real opportunity for us—and certainly as something that we can't turn down anyway. This could be a mechanism for showing that we are interested in a legit interim restraint regime and ready to bargain for it. We should expect OSD to lobby hard early for a quick turn down. Will provide a plan to address this which integrates it into our overall strategy by the weekend. Soviets do have a master plan—we must be careful.

Really finally, State has now proposed in writing³ the setting up of a Kennedy group to handle the nuclear testing experts discussions—and that we accept and schedule the meeting beginning on 21 July. I intend to block this until we can do more thinking about who should lead the group and when we should begin. As to timing, the Soviet moratorium is scheduled to end on August 6. I would rather start this discussion on August 10th or so—so that the talks don't start in the few weeks “left to solve the moratorium” but rather the moratorium ends with us able to point to the opening of new discussions on testing.

³ Not found.

138. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, July 25, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have taken careful note of the proposals your negotiators made during the recent round in Geneva. I have also continued to ponder our discussion in Geneva last November and our subsequent correspondence, including your June 19th letter.² As you may have guessed from our earlier exchanges, I heartily agree with the statement you made in your address to the last plenary session of the CPSU Central

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev 8690529. No classification marking.

² See Document 136.

Committee about the need to “search for new approaches to make it possible to clear the road to a reduction of nuclear arms.” That is certainly the most urgent task before us.

In Geneva, you expressed to me your concern that one side might acquire the capability to deliver a disarming first strike against the other by adding advanced strategic defenses to a large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons. The United States does not possess the numbers of weapons needed to carry out an effective first strike; nor do we have any intention of acquiring such a capability. Quite the contrary, you well know my strong view that we both should immediately and significantly reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, since this remains a particular concern from your point of view, I agree that the “new approach” you have called for should address this concern directly. Neither side should have a first strike capability.

We have both focused on the issue of advanced systems of strategic defense in connection with a “new approach.” Research and exploration on the feasibility of such advanced strategic defenses is a subject we have discussed together. I want to address it now, at the very outset of this letter, because I am aware that this is a matter of great concern to both of us. We both agree that neither side should deploy systems of strategic defense simply to augment and enhance its offensive capability. I have assured you that the United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage in this area. To ensure that neither of us is in a position to do so, we would be prepared immediately to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. Once a plan is offered to

this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

(c) If, following the initial five year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side.

You also continue to express concern that research on advanced defensive systems could lead to the deployment of spaceborne systems designed to inflict mass destruction on earth. This is certainly not our intention, and I do not agree that such an outcome is a necessary result of such research. We already are both party to agreements in force that address this subject. And, quite the contrary to your concern, U.S. research into advanced defenses is focused on finding ways to defend directly against offensive ballistic missiles that transit through space and are specifically designed to produce such mass destruction. However, in the context of the approach outlined above, I would also be prepared to have our representatives discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth.

I believe you would agree that significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses would make sense only if made in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Toward this goal, I believe we also share the view that the process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the area of strategic offensive nuclear forces, we remain concerned about what we perceive as a first-strike capability against at least a portion of our retaliatory forces. This is a condition that I cannot ignore. I continue to hope that our efforts in pursuit of significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals will help resolve this problem. I remain firmly committed to our agreement to seek the immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The central provision should be reduction of strategic ballistic missile warheads.

However, if necessary, I am prepared to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure. In this context, along with specific limits on ballistic missile warheads, we are prepared to limit long-range air-launched cruise missiles to below our current plan,

and to limit the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level in the range suggested by the Soviet side. Such reductions should take into account differences among systems in a manner which enhances stability. These reductions should begin as soon as possible and be completed within an agreed period of time.

At the same time, we could deal with the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by agreeing on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide, which is consistent with the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, and by agreeing on immediate steps that would lead toward this goal in either one step, or, if you prefer, in a series of steps. Your comments regarding intermediate range nuclear missile systems suggest to me that we were heading in the right direction last November when we endorsed the idea of an interim INF agreement. While an immediate agreement leading to the elimination of long range INF missile systems throughout the world would be the best outcome, an interim approach, on a global basis, may prove the most promising way to achieve early reductions.

Both sides have now put forward proposals whose ultimate result would be equality at zero for our two countries in long range INF missile warheads. If we can also agree that such equality is possible at a level above zero, we would take a major step towards the achievement of an INF agreement.

We should seek such an interim agreement without delay. I would be interested in any specific suggestions that you may wish to offer towards this end. It is important that reductions begin immediately and that significant progress be achieved within an agreed period of time.

Of course, I hope that we can also agree now that once we have achieved a fifty percent reduction in the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals and make progress in eliminating long-range INF missiles, we would continue to pursue negotiations for further stabilizing reductions. The overall aim should be the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

I will be instructing our negotiators to present these proposals, along with appropriate implementing details, when the next round of negotiations begins in Geneva in September. I hope that your negotiators will be prepared to respond in a positive and constructive fashion so that we can proceed promptly to agreement.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope that you will notice that I have tried explicitly to take into account the concerns you expressed to me in Geneva and in our correspondence, as well as key elements of your recent proposals. I believe you will see that this approach provides assurance that neither country would be able to exploit research on strategic defense to acquire a disarming first-strike capability, or to deploy weapons of mass destruction in space. The framework I propose

should permit us to proceed immediately to reduce existing nuclear arsenals as we have agreed is desirable, and to establish the conditions for proceeding to further reductions toward the goal of total elimination.

With respect to nuclear testing, as you know, we believe a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent requires testing. Thus, while a ban on such testing remains a long-term U.S. objective, I cannot see how we could move immediately to a complete ban on such testing under present circumstances. We are, however, hopeful that with the initiation of discussions between our respective experts, we can make progress toward eliminating the verification uncertainties which currently preclude ratification of the treaties signed in 1974 and 1976.

Upon ratification of these treaties, and in association with a program to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, we would be prepared to discuss ways to implement a parallel program to achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing in a step-by-step fashion. The immediate next step needed is our agreement on verification procedures which would permit ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. I would hope that the exchanges between our experts will permit us to take this step promptly.

With regard to conventional and chemical forces, I fully agree that the existing fora and channels should be used more actively. As you know, it is our view that the correction of conventional and other force imbalances is one of the vital requirements for achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Confidential exchanges between our negotiators and experts, away from the glare of publicity, might be useful. I would suggest that such discussions could first profit by preliminary exchanges to clarify and focus the agenda of such meetings. When we have been able to make some preliminary progress on this point, we may wish to consider having our respective ambassadors to the negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm, and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, get together in capitals for bilateral exchanges.

It will be particularly important to ensure a successful conclusion of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe before the CSCE review conference convenes in Vienna. We are seriously considering your recent proposals for limiting conventional weapons in Europe. A more forthcoming response by the Warsaw Pact to the NATO proposal of last December in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna would be helpful.

Regarding other issues, I agree with you that a number of possibilities exist for joint action. You have my earlier message regarding nuclear power plant safety, and I am pleased that our representatives are working actively in the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop more effective means of international cooperation. The exploration of space is also a potentially fruitful area for U.S.-Soviet coopera-

tion, and I would propose that our specialists meet soon to discuss the possibilities of an agreement in this area.

Your proposal for organizing our work in the coming weeks seems sound to me. We have already agreed on several meetings by specialists, and we look forward to consultations with one of your Deputy Foreign Ministers shortly. Should either of us consider other meetings by specialists desirable, we should be able to arrange these, as needed, through normal diplomatic channels. Thus, it would appear that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have a well prepared agenda when they meet in September.

There are, of course, a number of important questions in addition to those I have mentioned in this letter which we must continue to address if we are to create the most propitious conditions for your visit to the United States. I believe we have now established a framework to deal with them, and I hope that we can move rapidly toward that “decisive turn” in relations between our countries which we both agree is overdue.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1986, 3:40 p.m.

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

EUR/DAS Thomas Simons
Ambassador Paul Nitze
COL Robert Linhard (NSC)
SOV Director Mark Parris
SOV Dep Dir Bruce Burton (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
DCM Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Victor Isakov
Counselor Vadim Kuznetsov

Simons opened by welcoming Bessmertnykh to Washington and congratulating him on his appointment as deputy foreign minister. Simons then handed him the signed original of the President’s letter² and said it was being delivered nearly simultaneously in Moscow.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.

² See Document 138.

Bessmertnykh and company took about 15 minutes to read the letter. After doing so, Bessmertnykh said he had an “urge to say something but I think I won’t”. He commented that this was a crucial time in U.S.-Soviet relations and we would discuss the letter later, but he thought the main point of the President’s proposal seemed to be to allow testing of space-based systems without limitations.

Nitze answered that this interpretation was incorrect. The President is saying that testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, will continue. Nitze continued that some testing and development is permitted by the treaty, and some is not; both sides can do what is permitted. Bessmertnykh asked if that meant we could “test and develop only what is permitted,” and Nitze answered that was correct. Bessmertnykh then commented that “it comes again to the question of defining what is permitted by the treaty.”

Nitze emphasized that the President intends to advance the process of discussions and believes that it is important to make a move forward. He said the President had tried to take into account the concerns of both sides. The proposal itself demonstrates the President’s desire to address the issues broadly. Nitze added that it also our intent to move forward on the purpose of Bessmertnykh’s visit, i.e., to organize the work ahead. Simons added that we want a thorough discussion of all areas in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Bessmertnykh, referring to the passage in the President’s letter which said the U.S. would present the new proposal at the NST negotiations, then asked if there was any chance for a “working” meeting on NST before the round formally opens on September 18. He suggested a meeting of a small group of three or four experts on each side, not necessarily at the Karpov-Kampelman level, since that would give the appearance of formal talks. Bessmertnykh said he realized that we were not going to develop a treaty in the next few months but we need to examine the issues closely. Simons, referring to the President’s conversation with former Ambassador Dobrynin in April,³ said Bessmertnykh’s suggestion made sense and that we saw Bessmertnykh’s visit as a chance to initiate such discussions.

Bessmertnykh, turning to Linhard, asked the origin of the references in the President’s letter to banning space-based weapons of mass destruction. Linhard started to answer that this was a subject raised at the summit and in the Geneva talks, but Bessmertnykh broke in to quip that since the U.S. and Soviet Union already had a treaty [i.e., the

³ Reference is to Reagan’s meeting with Dobrynin on April 8. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 212.

Outer Space Treaty] on this, the presence of so many references in the President's letter to space-based weapons of mass destruction began to make him nervous.

Simons then said that the American press was aware that Bessmertnykh was here. We intended to answer queries by noting that Bessmertnykh was in Washington for a review of U.S.-Soviet relations and that we hoped the visit would provide new energy to our discussions. If the media sought to portray the visit as a special event, we would say it was special only because it was being held at the deputy foreign minister level, but that it was a part of a process of exchanges the two sides had agreed to and had been conducting for some time.

Bessmertnykh, laughing, then said he had something to bring up. At the May talks on nuclear risk reduction centers [NRCC], the U.S. had proposed that a second round be held at the end of July. The Soviets, he said, would like to propose that the NRCC experts meet in Geneva on July 29–30—and the Soviets needed an answer that evening. Linhard answered that, at the May meeting, the two sides seemed to agree that the experts talks were intended to explore the concept of risk reduction centers and that we would not rush the issue. In any case, the U.S. had offered to host the next meeting in Washington, although we were flexible on venue. It was pointed out that a meeting next week would pose difficulties but that we would get back to the Soviets as soon as possible. Bessmertnykh seemed to indicate that one factor in the Soviet suggestion was that Ambassador Obukhov will be in Geneva next week.

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 26, 1986, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Ridgway
DAS Simons
Ambassador Matlock (NSC)
Mark Parris (SOV)
Bruce Burton (SOV) (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
DCM Sokolov
Second Secretary Vitaly Churkin

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret; Sensitive.

Ambassador Ridgway welcomed Bessmertnykh to Washington. She recalled the all-night negotiating session with Bessmertnykh at the summit and hoped we wouldn't have to go through that again. The purpose of the meetings in Washington was to organize our work and set the stage for a meeting between ministers and ultimately by our leaders at the summit. The Soviet side has said it wants a summit with concrete results. So do we. We understand the Soviet side has some detailed ideas on how to organize efforts in the weeks ahead. We're eager to hear them and have some ideas of our own.

Bessmertnykh said he was glad the two sides had come to the same conclusion on preparations for a good meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev's June 19 letter² had suggested steps for moving ahead, and the Soviet side very much appreciated U.S. acceptance of these ideas for arranging meetings. It was good to have talked with Ambassador Hartman and to have come to agreement on this point.

Bessmertnykh continued that it was important to arrange meetings over the next few weeks so that time is not wasted. There can be a number of meetings in Washington and Moscow on a number of subjects. The Soviets are quite open to U.S. suggestions. "We want to finish the job with you here so we have a complete program."

[NOTE: At this point, the two sides then covered, in order, Security and Arms Control, Regional Issues, and Bilateral Affairs.]

SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear and Space Talks

Bessmertnykh said this subject was paramount and we should not wait until the opening of the next NST round to discuss it. Thus, the Soviets want a "working-type meeting" between representatives of the two sides. This should not simply be a repetition of Geneva plenaries; there is no time for that. The idea is to get together in small groups, not delegations. One person should be in charge, and have two or three others with him. These representatives would, in effect, say: We know each other's principled positions. Do we have any common ground? Are there grounds for a summit? Their slogan should be: "Let's be practical". If they find there is no common ground, they can say, well all right, let's not trouble with it at a ministerial meeting. If they agree that ministers "should dwell on it," they would recommend more formal treatment.

Saying she wanted to make sure we were clear about the Soviet proposal, it was her understanding that this small group would get

² See Document 136.

together and make recommendations to foreign ministers. Would the group recommend further work?

Bessmertnykh replied, "Yes." The group could look at possible communique language, or foreign ministers could declare they would like the subject worked out in the negotiations, through diplomatic channels or through other means.

Ridgway said that, on the matter of a communique, we would be under "the same injunction as of last fall." The Secretary had told Dubinin that one thing the Secretary and Shevardnadze should take up is how to record the results of a summit.

Ambassador Matlock said that, speaking ad referendum, there would probably be no particular problem if we were at the point of exchanging language, so long as we don't call it a communique. The President has indicated that he doesn't want staffs pre-negotiating an outcome, which he wants to determine. But this may be a matter of semantics or form. We can work at recording what both sides are discussing.

Bessmertnykh agreed that it might just be a matter of form. We could try to develop a joint statement or perhaps separate language on individual issues. This is a matter for consideration after September.

Ridgway and Matlock agreed.

DAS Simons said there was a third possibility: having a piece of paper that is something between a communique or individual elements. Ridgway commented that the President knows perfectly well that the language of the Geneva joint statement wasn't done in one night.

Bessmertnykh said the working meetings should be confidential. Matlock asked if that applied just to the NST working meeting; Bessmertnykh answered, all working meetings.

Parris asked if Bessmertnykh meant the existence of the working meetings was to be confidential, or their content? Bessmertnykh said he recognized that the existence of the meetings was likely to become known, so he was referring to their content.

Bessmertnykh continued that the representatives should have a mandate to explore ideas, "not be frozen into known positions." If the U.S. is prepared, the Soviets would like to give them freedom to explore—"How about this? How about that?" He said the meetings should not be prolonged. The groups would meet for two or three days, go back to Ministers, then meet again. If they go too long at one sitting, such as two weeks or so, they would become like negotiations, with the representatives requesting instructions from capitals. The working meetings should decide how to handle further meetings. "This will create a flow of business."

Ridgway asked where the meeting might take place. Bessmertnykh said he would go through that.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets envision one person in the chair, with perhaps one expert for each of the broad NST subjects, space, strategic arms, medium-range arms.

Matlock asked if Karpov would head the Soviet team. Bessmertnykh said this was possible, but he personally had in mind someone else.

Simons asked if the groups would be of equal size on both sides. Bessmertnykh said they should not be terribly asymmetrical, with three or four on one team, and a dozen on the other.

Ridgway said she could not say much today about the Soviet suggestion, since we are looking over ideas. To recap, the Soviets have in mind a small group, with one person in charge, but not necessarily “experts” in the technical sense.

Bessmertnykh said that’s right. Four representatives would be the maximum. He said the Soviets do not exclude having heads-of-delegation, but Bessmertnykh personally believes that is not a good idea. We shouldn’t close the door to other arrangements.

On time and venue, Bessmertnykh said the talks should be held in Moscow or Washington between August 10–15. The Soviets are prepared to host the U.S. group in Moscow; the second round would be in Washington.

In answer to a question from Simons, Bessmertnykh said they want to hold the sessions in Moscow or Washington, and not in Geneva or some other capital, because they do not want cable traffic on the discussions.

Matlock said we will try to have an answer to Bessmertnykh on Monday or before he departs Washington.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

141. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to Rodney McDaniel and Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 5, 1986, 8:03 p.m.

SUBJECT

NST Experts Meeting—Final (I hope)

Admiral,

Summary: Seven dwarfs go to Moscow: Nitze, Kampleman, Perle, Lehman, Giltman, Linhard and—Rowny—.

This has been one long day! As previous notes indicate, at about 10am I got wind of a session² with SECSTATE in which Paul would recommend that, given the composition of Soviet delegation (heavy on negotiators, and Ron Lehman's counterpart, Obukov present), we should include Ron Lehman. In short, the composition of the US team would be opened up. I sent you a profs³ outlining the options that existed prior to the session.

At about 11:45, I got a secure call direct from SECSTATE who wanted to know our views on options. He said he had two: (1) keep the agreed 4; or (2) go to six by adding Ron and Mike. It was clear that he felt that 6 was right. He said that he didn't want to undercut Ron, and that since we wanted to move in INF, we should have Mike too. As he put it, we are so serious we are sending both our Geneva team and our Washington team. I raised Rowny, and he didn't bite at all. I told him that I would like to talk to you, but that I'd get back to him by mid-afternoon at any case.

Chaired a prep session at 2pm. After it, explained to Timbie my specific concern about the developments, and why Rowny now should go. On the one hand, once the SECSTATE upped the anty to 6, Rowny would surely go ballistic is not included. Given the current voting on the defense bill in both the House and the Senate, and that Rowny is spring-loaded to make a stink, it wouldn't take much to have 5 or 6 on the right (Coulter, Laxalt, Kemp, etc.) to come up on the net in Rowny's defense at this critical vote time to really catch the attention of the L&L community and the President. (We just defeated the Bennet-Johnson and Exon amendments on SDI by one vote each.) If there is

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration. No classification marking.

² No memorandum of conversation was found.

³ Not found.

any risk that we would cave to this, better to avoid the situation and have Ed participate now. On the other hand, given that we don't like the Soviet mix of delegates anyway (Karpov, Obukov, Chervov and Detinov), if we add 3 they may add one or two to make the mix more interesting. In any case, at 6 the issue of adding 1 more is different than at 4—and while there is a clear risk of not having Ed, the argument against adding him eroded to simply that “he has nothing to add.”

Asked Timbie to ensure that SECSTATE understood my concern about Ed and my arguments—especially my fear of unnecessary extra grief right in the middle of the Hill defense program battle.

Shortly got a call from Nitze's staff telling me that if Ed went, then Paul doesn't want to go. I told his staff that he should discuss his personal travel plans with SECSTATE—not me.

Act IV. At about 6:30pm, SECSTATE called and simply said that he had heard both my concerns and the views of others in State and felt that we were right—that he preferred 7 go (with Rowny) and that if we agreed, that would be the deal. He said that this will need extra management, and that he would have a problem with Paul, but that if I'd help on the management, he'd handle Paul. I gave him a prompt aye-aye.

We may still see the Soviets balk at the Magnificent Seven—and Paul may throw a fit—but I think that we are down on this one. We need to work the Rowny issue once the dust clears. We need to give him the Medal of Freedom and a retirement ceremony.

Hope all this is ok. Boy is this fun!

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 11, 1986, 10:15 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS*U.S.*

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
 Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
 Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
 Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman
 Ambassador Ronald Lehman
 Asst. Secretary Richard Perle
 Colonel Robert Linhard
 Mr. Norman G. Clyne
 Mr. Bruce Burton
 Ms. Priscilla Clapp
 Mr. Steven K. Pifer
 Ms. Carolyn R. Smith (Interpreter)

USSR

Ambassador V. Karpov
 Ambassador A. Obukhov
 General N. Chervov
 General N. Detinov
 Mr. Tarasenko
 Mr. Nagradov (Interpreter)
 Mr. Zolotov (Interpreter)
 Mr. Skulkov (Interpreter)

Ambassador Karpov welcomed the U.S. Delegation, saying he hoped the weather at this meeting would be sunnier than the weather outside. The Soviet side chose this quiet place in the Moscow countryside so that the discussions could take place in a location away from the noise and distractions of the city. He said that Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State Shultz had agreed that this working meeting should be a confidential one, not for propaganda purposes but to facilitate substantive solutions to lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between them in September. The Soviet side wished to hold these meetings in such a spirit. It saw these working meetings not as a continuation of the NST negotiations, but as a free exchange of opinions conducive to finding solutions that could make possible agreement on various specific issues within the context of nuclear and space arms. Karpov proposed that these discussions be ad referendum, and that results be reported to the authorities who would make the final decisions. Karpov said that the Soviet side was disappointed in the first working meetings, including those on nuclear weapons in Geneva, conventional weapons and issues related to the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.

Vienna negotiations.² Frankly speaking, the Soviet side was disappointed. Karpov noted that the U.S. representative to the Vienna talks, Blackwill, had come to Moscow last week empty-handed. Blackwill brought only arguments supporting the U.S. proposal of last December 5 and nothing else. Karpov hoped that today's discussion would not be in support of U.S. proposals already submitted, but that it would look to the future and find solutions which could be passed on to the Foreign Ministers. He said the Soviet side was convinced that the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze³ would largely determine the decision of when and if there would be a meeting between the U.S. President and the Soviet General Secretary. For this reason, he continued, the sides should approach the meetings today and tomorrow with a view to the summit. He then gave the floor to Ambassador Nitze.

Nitze said he was very glad to be in Moscow again and to meet with such old friends as Karpov, Obukhov, Chervov and, in particular, Detinov. The entire U.S. Delegation was happy at this opportunity to meet. It also saw this meeting as a way of contributing to the success of the projected meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze. As Bessmertnykh had said during his recent Washington visit, he did not see this meeting as a continuation of the Geneva talks, but as a freer exchange of opinions, *ad referendum*, which could contribute to the Foreign Ministers' meeting. The U.S. side agreed with this general objective of the meetings. Nitze continued that Bessmertnykh had also said he did not see this meeting as an opportunity to renew recriminations about the past, but to look to the future. For this reason, Nitze was surprised by Karpov's mention of Blackwill's meeting on MBFR. From the report Nitze had read on this meeting, he thought it was the U.S. side that should be disappointed, not the Soviet side. The U.S. side had made significant movement forward with respect to the Vienna talks, had given up its previous position on data exchange and accepted the Soviet position to agree to reductions before verifying the resulting numbers. There had been no progress on verification from the Soviet side. Of course, Nitze noted, verification was not everything, but it would be an important part of the agreement. He thought this

² In telegram 13605 from Moscow, August 8, Blackwill reported on the U.S.-Soviet experts' meeting on MBFR in Moscow, August, 6–8, to Shultz: "Despite my strong request that they reevaluate at a senior political level here NATO's December 5 proposal before your September meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, my Soviet interlocutors said bluntly again and again that the current stalemate in MBFR could not be broken unless NATO abandoned its 'dubious and inflated' verification regime. They repeatedly stressed that Moscow certainly had no intention of changing its present position. So if the West also held to its current view, 'it was not possible to reach an agreement in Vienna, ever.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, No Film Number)

³ Shultz and Shevardnadze met on September 19, 20, and 23. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 283–290.

was a very poor example of movement forward. But he did not wish to get into recriminations; he wished only to say this was not an appropriate way to begin today's meeting.

Karpov said that Nitze had incorrectly interpreted his remark about Blackwill's visit. He had referred to Blackwill's meeting with Mikhailov, not to the negotiations in Vienna. Blackwill had indeed come to Moscow empty-handed and had talked only of the past, not wanting to look to the future for solutions. Karpov did not want today's meeting to go like Blackwill's meeting had gone.

Nitze replied that he had also been referring to the meeting between Blackwill and Mikhailov. He understood that Mikhailov had been empty-handed, although he, Nitze, had not been there. Had Karpov?

Karpov answered that Mikhailov had not come empty-handed but had proposed a possible solution for the talks. Blackwell had reacted strangely, although later he had corrected himself and said he would report the Soviet proposals. The Soviet side was now awaiting a response. Karpov said the sides here should not be distracted by the Vienna talks, but should focus on NST issues.

Nitze replied that, according to Karpov, Nitze's impression about Blackwill's visit was not correct; but, Nitze said, there was no progress in the Soviet position on verification in MBFR, but since he was not at the meeting he did not have first-hand knowledge and would not persist.

Nitze continued by saying that it was appropriate to begin this discussion with a few words about how to proceed today and tomorrow. He would suggest exploring general ideas first and then proceed from there. They could also discuss details. The Soviet side had, of course, given this some thought since it was the one to propose this meeting. Nitze suggested that Karpov begin this discussion.

Karpov agreed that the Soviet side had indeed given thought to the subject matter of this meeting, and hoped the U.S. side had, too. Since Nitze preferred that he go first, he would. He suggested beginning with space weapons. He would not repeat proposals made by the Soviet side or analyze the U.S. position as elaborated at the talks. He wanted the sides to try together to come up with a realistic picture of how things stood in this area today, and then on the basis of this joint analysis to choose the most promising directions for discussion. He noted that new elements in the sides' positions had recently appeared which could serve as points of departure in seeking solutions that would be in the interest of both sides. The Soviet side, of course, still preferred a most radical solution preventing the militarization of space and an arms race in space—in other words—a ban on space-strike weapons. The Soviet side could also consider partial solutions which could lead to preventing an arms race in space. In this connection,

there was some common ground in the U.S. and Soviet views that one of the most important elements in preventing a space arms race was to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty regime. The Soviet side had proposed that both sides agree not to use their right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. As Karpov understood the U.S. position, it also provided for a certain period, but a shorter one. He suggested discussing this issue today. Observing the ABM Treaty was a question of the boundaries permitted and prohibited in working under the Treaty. This problem could also be discussed today. He thought they also could discuss the issues on which the sides' positions are close and where they are different, with a view to eliminating the differences or at least bringing the positions closer together. There were also other issues related to preventing an arms race in space, such as the issue of ASAT weapons. The Soviet side was in favor of a complete ban on all ASAT weapons, including the destruction of existing systems. If there was any development in the U.S. position on this question, it, too, could be discussed. If the U.S. side was still not prepared to discuss this, they would put this off for the time being, as it meant this issue was not yet ripe for reporting to Ministers.

Another problem, Karpov continued, was that of banning the class of space-to-earth weapons. This question has been with us in various combinations in the past, including issues of offensive arms in space, and specifically offensive arms which could strike the earth or the earth's atmosphere from space. Karpov said there are certain points in the U.S. position that are somewhat unclear, particularly in what the U.S. side now means when talking about additional guarantees of not stationing new types of weapons of mass destruction in space. The Soviet side would appreciate clarification of this. On the basis of this clarification the sides could perhaps find common ground to report to Ministers. Such were the issues the Soviet side was ready to discuss at the meetings today and tomorrow.

Nitze said he wished to make some preliminary comments on Karpov's remarks and would ask his colleagues to address some aspects in detail. He said the U.S. side was interested in and willing to discuss questions of space defense because this is an important part of these talks. However, he thought the most important and basic issue preceded that of space defense, i.e., effective and stabilizing reductions in offensive arms, particularly intercontinental systems. It was obvious that the U.S. position on space was contingent on making real progress in this area. The U.S. side was not, however, insisting on discussion of one question before the other. Nitze merely thought it was important to say this at the beginning.

Nitze also wished to mention Karpov's phrase, "prevention of the militarization of space," as he thought such wording was misleading.

This seemed to imply that there are no military objects in space now, and this is contrary to fact. Outer space is full of military objects; most of them are Soviet, but the U.S. also has many. Since outer space is already in part militarized, the idea of preventing the militarization of space is a tendentious formulation. In particular, Nitze continued, almost all ballistic missiles traverse space and therefore use it, and this is part of the militarization of space which causes such concern. If no ballistic missiles traversed space, there would be a different situation.

Nitze stated that the U.S. side believes very strongly that the ABM Treaty should be maintained and carried out. The U.S. position is consistent with the ABM Treaty and its strict implementation. Karpov had raised a number of problems to discuss and Nitze agreed that the sides could and should discuss them all. He now wished to ask Assistant Secretary Perle to offer some general conceptual ideas about the relationship between defensive space weapons and offensive weapons.

Perle began by saying that the U.S. side welcomed and took seriously Bessmertnykh's invitation to come to Moscow and engage in fresh thinking rather than to rehearse positions already well known. It seems appropriate to think in broad terms in order to see if there are Soviet concerns the U.S. side could allay by clarifying the concepts behind its thinking. On the issue of defensive weapons, the notion that it is completely appropriate to develop and deploy defensive arms has long been accepted by both sides. This is clearly seen in the area of air defense, in which the Soviet Union, more than the United States, has developed, deployed, and continued to modernize its air defenses to protect Soviet territory from aircraft. As for the strategic offensive weapons both sides have, both sides go to considerable effort and spend considerable sums to protect these systems. The United States puts missiles on submarines and hides them in the ocean to protect them from attack, the Soviet Union builds mobile missiles to make them safe from attack. The Soviet side has systems to defend against ballistic missiles. So, Perle noted, the legitimate concept of defense is understood and agreed in all areas except the area of advanced defense against ballistic missiles. All these efforts in the area of defense over the years have been accompanied by the development of offensive weapons, now numbering tens of thousands on both sides. These offensive weapons are a burden to both sides. They are costly and need continuous modernization to counter the possibility of becoming vulnerable to the other side. There are two categories in offensive weapons. First is the one the United States sees as presenting the greatest threat to peace and stability, ICBMs—fast, accurate systems that cannot be recalled. The second category also presents a threat, but is air-breathing, slower and can be recalled. Such weapons cannot be used for a disarming first-strike. Both sides increase their arsenals to protect against the vulnerability of their forces.

Perle noted that President Reagan was describing this situation when in 1983 he first initiated work on advanced strategic systems. They were not intended to threaten the Soviet Union or to gain advantage, and still less to achieve superiority over it, but to introduce into the balance between the two sides another element of defense in addition to what already existed. The President believes that this could be an important source of stability and could pave the way to diminishing the burden on both sides in connection with the constant evolution of offensive weapons.

Perle said that the U.S. side had carefully listened to the Soviet side's concerns regarding strategic defense. These concerns fall into two categories: first, that strategic defense systems might be used offensively. Perle said he would not say much about this. Nitze (and Karpov, too) had said the sides should seek ways to remove this concern. It was not the U.S. intention to use these systems in this way. Perle would try to respond to the second category of concern. As he understood the Soviet side, the combination of many offensive systems on both sides plus defensive systems could create a situation in which stability is diminished because the possibility exists of an offensive strike followed by the interception of the retaliatory strike. Both sides' leaders speak of eliminating nuclear weapons. Perhaps there is a way to build on this area of agreement in relationship to questions and concerns raised regarding defensive systems. In broad conceptual terms this is very simple. If we look at defense in the context of eliminating the ballistic missiles the defense is intended to intercept, the implications for stability and the balance are very different from the implications of how we usually think of defense when combined with large ballistic missile forces. The concern expressed by the Soviet side would look different if we assumed that the elimination of ballistic missiles is the goal of defense. Then the role of deployed defenses is to protect against violations, against third countries that have or might acquire ballistic missiles, and against accidents. The U.S. side feels it is necessary to recognize that there will be concerns even if nuclear ballistic missiles are eliminated. In short, Perle continued, defenses would have no targets and therefore would not represent a threat to either side. In this conceptual framework the United States is ready to set aside some rights, such as the right it now has under the ABM Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon six months' notice. It would do so for a specific period during which it would move to eliminate the offensive arms which concern it and which led to the desire to deploy defenses, and would work in such a manner as to give stability to the elimination of nuclear ballistic missiles. This puts a context to the President's idea of sharing. If there are no ballistic missiles, there is less risk in sharing advanced technology. Both sides would be better off in relation to the

third countries, and there would be more confidence in the relationship between the two. Of course, this is a radical solution, but, in Perle's view, it was fresh thinking and he hoped the Soviet side would give it very serious consideration. In summary, he said that this represented a concept for achieving stability which takes into account the underlying logic of the Soviet concerns as the U.S. side understands them.

Karpov replied that this was an interesting subject with many aspects that could be discussed both in detail and generally, but it was better to discuss things in more practical terms. Based on what the U.S. side said, he wished to ask the following question: Is it possible in practical terms to consider the question of the sides' obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time which would be sufficiently long? If so, what was the U.S. view on what this agreed period could be? Karpov's second question was how both sides could ensure confidence that the ABM Treaty was being fully observed, and whether both sides had the same view of limits placed on their ABM activities under the Treaty.

Ambassador Kampelman said that he had found the discussion so far constructive and interesting. Karpov had suggested an agenda of questions to discuss in the area of outer space. Perle had tried, and Kampelman thought successfully, to place this question within the context of reducing offensive nuclear ballistic missiles. He thought it would be useful during this first meeting to hear more from Karpov about his suggested agenda on START so that the U.S. side could get an idea of the issues in their totality and then address specific points. He thought this was the best approach, given that there was an interrelationship between the issues.

Karpov agreed that there was an interrelationship. The sides had discussed this many times at the negotiations. At the beginning of today's meeting he had raised a theoretical discussion of the relationship, but he wished to explore the practical side of the issues. He wished to look at a range of questions and how to deal with them. He thought it best to go through all these issues, beginning with space, strategic offensive arms and medium-range arms, so as to see what the sides would be able to do. If the U.S. side wished to hear the Soviet view on other questions, he could discuss this briefly now. The Soviet side had in mind examining strategic offensive arms strategic offensive arms along with the issue of outer space and, above all, the issue of ABM. The sides could explore the possibility of reducing strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was in favor of more radical reductions; the United States was familiar with the Soviet proposal to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. The Soviet side believed that such reductions must necessarily cover medium-range weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other country. Based on all he

had heard from various channels, Karpov had the impression that the United States was not prepared to agree to this kind of solution now. The Soviet side was prepared to take into account U.S. objections to including reductions in this context, as well as its objections to banning long-range cruise missiles completely. In this case the Soviets had a more modest but still significant proposal to reduce strategic offensive arms by 30 percent. It was Karpov's understanding that the U.S. side is prepared to work in this direction. He said there are some unclear points in the U.S. position regarding the composition of arms to be limited and reduced within the framework of the 30 percent option. The Soviet side would be interested in discussing this today after lunch or tomorrow. As for medium-range systems, the Soviet side is still interested in the most radical solution which provides for the complete prohibition of medium-range missiles and other medium-range systems within the context of the disarmament program. The Soviet side is also willing to explore different solutions, i.e., U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. In the course of various negotiations, Karpov continued, remarks have been made concerning the possibility of looking for a still narrower interim solution to the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss in practical terms the question of what interim or temporary solution the U.S. side has in mind. What specific parameters could be discussed for reporting to Ministers?

Kampelman said he wished to ask a question. The Soviet side in START had proposed reductions of 30 percent. Karpov had said he had questions about some unclear points in the U.S. points. What specifically were these questions?

In response Karpov asked what the U.S. side would do with sea-launched cruise missiles. So far in the negotiations the U.S. side has been silent on this. The Soviet side has raised the question of how the U.S. intends to incorporate heavy bombers in the 30 percent reduction option—would there be an overall ceiling or a separate one? What about the weapons carried on these bombers? Karpov said he also had other minor questions.

Nitze said he wished to make a general remark. He had been led to believe that this meeting was intended first of all to explore new ground and general ideas. Perle had begun by doing just that, but the Soviet side evidently did not wish to continue this discussion. This, Nitze said, raises a serious question: is this meeting to be a continuation of the Geneva talks or something new and different? The location was new and would indicate that things are different, but Nitze was not sure.

Karpov replied that was why he urged the U.S. side to speak in practical terms of new solutions which could be offered to the Foreign

Ministers. What Perle had stated today contained no new ideas. Karpov had discussed these ideas many times at the negotiations with Kampelman. If the sides get distracted by theoretical questions, they would spend all the allotted time on this, and then what could they offer the Ministers who were to consider their ideas and then, in turn, provide suggestions for the summit meeting. If the discussions here are theoretical, they will not lead to specific results or proposals for a summit meeting and, therefore, Karpov urged that the sides focus on new ideas in practical terms. Otherwise, no one would understand what they had been doing. Of course, if they wanted they could form a theoretical club; this would be most interesting.

General Chervov added that a theoretical viewpoint was completely contrary to everything Perle had said. What was important now was to deal with practical issues.

Nitze said he wished to call on Perle to speak on the relationship between a conceptual approach and practical details.

Perle said that the point was not to discuss abstract theory. The positions of both sides, as well as the systems they have or want to deploy would follow from their concept of security. It is necessary to have a context in order to examine specific proposals. The distinction between the practical and the theoretical is close. For example, the United States is prepared to waive its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on six months' notice for a period of years. This idea is given in the context of a concept that the main source of the problem, i.e., ballistic missiles, would be eliminated. The sides could discuss the period of non-withdrawal, and have already begun to do so. The Soviet side must understand that context gives coherence to each side's views. Perhaps the difference in context would make it impossible to resolve the differences, although Perle hoped not. The period of non-withdrawal is based on the concept of which direction it is in the interest of both sides to take the evolution of strategic forces. Perle said he should add that there is a difference between Karpov's new ideas and new numbers. Karpov spoke of new numbers, while the U.S. side speaks of new ideas.

Karpov rejoined that he also spoke of new ideas, but in practical terms, because of the need to report possible solutions to the Ministers. What Perle had said about concepts was important and interesting, but one month from now in mid-September Shervardnadze and Shultz would meet and would ask what the sides produced at this meeting. Are we to say, Karpov asked, that we discussed theoretical concepts and due to differences between us put off dealing with concrete issues until we had resolved the theoretical differences?

Ambassador Obukhov said he had two brief questions, but first he wished to say to his U.S. colleagues that the sides would not agree

on specific conceptual issues and should therefore turn the discussion toward practical solutions. In this connection, how did the U.S. side envisage a ceiling on the number of nuclear weapons on strategic offensive arms under the possible interim option which it has been agreed to call the 30% solution? Obukhov's second question was addressed to Perle. In its concept of non-withdrawal from the Treaty, how does the U.S. side take into account the relationship between eliminating strategic missiles and the fact that third nuclear countries possess nuclear arms, including ballistic missiles?

Nitze wished to remark on the relationship between what Karpov was calling theoretical and practical. Frankly, he did not understand the word theoretical. The idea of the total elimination of nuclear arms is part of the Soviet program—not a theoretical part, but a real one. The concept of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is not a theoretical proposal but a real one. The U.S. side sees it as a specific limitation on a right which was worked out under the Treaty, and the Soviet side proposes to limit it. Therefore, this is a change from the ABM Treaty, a practical change. Nitze said he thought it was appropriate to make this remark. When the U.S. side speaks of an interim agreement, it means interim in the context of long-term objectives. Nitze did not think it possible to work out agreements short of the full schedule of events which would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This is a practical issue because it would be part of any agreement. This has no impact on the issue, but it is practical and must be discussed and agreed between the sides. It is connected to immediate steps by both sides toward long-term objectives. Nitze thought the sides were caught in a seamless web of ideas and it was appropriate to discuss them now in this forum. He did not see how they could get away from it. They must discuss both long-term and interim possibilities and practical measures.

At the beginning of the meeting Nitze had said that the U.S. side is prepared to discuss the specific questions raised by Karpov and Obukhov. He wished to make clear that he was not closing off the possibility for the Soviet side to discuss any general ideas it might have. The U.S. side tried to begin with general ideas but the Soviet side apparently does not wish it to continue. If the Soviet side wishes to turn to specific questions, this could be done, but the sides would return to the relationship between short-term and long-term questions and the foundation beneath them, for without understanding the foundation it would be hard to work out a long-term solution with any possibility of success.⁴

⁴ See Documents 139, and 140.

Ambassador Rowny said that it was important to set forth the U.S. side's concept and hear the new Soviet concept. Other problems which are very specific and complex, for example, verification of SLCMs, could perhaps be discussed during a coffee break or at lunch by Generals Chervov and Detinov or anyone else. If the sides took up these issues now, discussion of details could take up a great deal of time and drag out this meeting.

Karpov said he wished to share a secret with the U.S. side. Last Saturday⁵ he had a lengthy talk with Shevardnadze at the MFA. The Foreign Minister's main question was: as a result of these working meetings what specific and practical solutions could emerge that could be discussed at the September meeting with Shultz? Karpov said that this evening Shevardnadze would ask him what specifically Karpov could propose, after a full day of talks, for discussion at the upcoming meeting with Shultz. If he couldn't answer, Karpov continued, the Foreign Minister would be most displeased with the way in which the meeting had been conducted. Karpov said he did not know what instructions Nitze had received from Shultz or the President, but these were his own instructions on this matter. He said he was not opposed to combining, when appropriate, the search for practical solutions with more long-term objectives of the sides in the context of exploring these practical solutions. If necessary to find practical solutions, this is all right, but if the sides make a discussion of broad concepts their main goal at this meeting and put a discussion of practical solutions in last place on the agenda, they would not accomplish the task agreed upon by Shultz and Bessertnykh.

Nitze said he had two remarks to make. The first concerned the initial discussion held between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Helsinki.⁶ As he recalled, they discussed the possibility of reaching a "class A" solution in which substantive progress led to important results at the arms talks, and "class B" solutions, or minor issues which moved ahead only a little way and for a short period. Both Shultz and Shevardnadze were in favor of achieving a "class A" solution.

Secondly, Nitze continued, he was present for much of the discussion during Bessmertnykh's recent visit to Washington and so had a clear impression of what took place there. It had been agreed at that meeting that the present discussions would not duplicate what has been done before at the Geneva negotiations on the three aspects of NST which are of concern. It was agreed that these discussions should

⁵ August 9.

⁶ Reference is to Shultz and Shevardnadze's meeting in Helsinki, July 31, 1985, from 2–5 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 71.

be free-ranging and informal. Nitze thought that his impression of what Shultz and Bessmertnykh had agreed to was different than Karpov's.

Nitze stated that he was not insisting on how to move these discussions forward, but he wanted them to be as fruitful as possible. He wanted to be sure not to deny the Soviet side the possibility of expressing any general considerations. He wanted to be sure that when the sides go into more practical and narrow issues, the U.S. side would hear the practical and new ideas of the Soviet side. So far the Soviet side had only asked the U.S. side for new ideas, but Nitze thought that when more immediate questions were discussed, the Soviet side would also present new ideas.

Karpov replied that the sides were speaking of the same thing but perhaps using different words. At the beginning of the meeting, Karpov had said that this discussion should not be a repetition of what has been discussed in Geneva. Since Nitze was present at the Washington meeting, he was aware of the context in which today's meeting was proposed, i.e., to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. Therefore, Karpov suggested that this discussion be more focused in order to lay the groundwork for the Ministers' meeting. Today's discussion should be creative but practical. As Rowny likes to say, it takes two to tango. It also takes two to have ideas, Karpov said, and only then can there be a thorough discussion of ways to bring the positions of the sides closer together and arrive at practical solutions. He said the Soviet side is prepared for the discussion to move in this direction. He had begun the meeting in this way, identified areas for discussion, and it would be good to continue in this way in order to discuss each question and any other questions the U.S. side might wish to raise.

Nitze repeated his earlier comment that the U.S. side sees this meeting as directed toward assisting the work of the Ministers in September. There is no difference between the sides on this question. The question of where there are differences became clear during today's discussion. It was one of the first practical issues raised by Karpov regarding whether the U.S. was willing to forego its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Perle had set forth the fundamental considerations on which the answer to this question is based, and so it was pertinent to the practical discussion. Karpov had elected not to comment on Perle's remarks, and Nitze could not fail to draw a lesson from this. He had a degree of doubt as to how seriously the Soviet side considered the U.S. side's remarks.

Karpov said the issue is not whether the Soviet side considers Perle's remarks seriously or not seriously. The issue is in which context, terms, or plane the sides should examine questions in order that they be useful at the upcoming Ministers meeting. Karpov stated that Perle had raised a number of questions which had already been discussed.

For example, Karpov and Rowny had spent a year-and-a-half discussing the issue of more or less destabilizing systems. Neither of them had convinced the other. Should we now spend another year-and-a-half discussing this, Karpov asked? We could do so, he said, but the real issue is what practical measures we can take in the area of limiting and reducing nuclear arms. He did not want the U.S. side to interpret this remark as a desire to brush aside fundamental issues. He only wanted the discussions at this working meeting to be directed toward a specific objective so that they would not lose sight of the concrete and practical questions to be worked out and proposed to the Ministers. This was his only concern and this was why he had proposed to explore ways of bringing the sides' positions closer together and to look for solutions based on what they already knew of each other's positions. Karpov said he could have started the meeting by setting forth the Soviet concept of banning space strike weapons. The sides could have discussed this all morning but this was not necessary because they were instructed to direct their efforts toward the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. The Foreign Ministers were awaiting practical solutions, and the sides should propose some.

Nitze reminded Karpov that Obukhov had raised two questions for the U.S. side to answer. He wished to call on Ambassador Lehman to provide a response.

Lehman stated that the questions were not addressed to the U.S. side but were specific and deserved a reply. Obukhov's question concerned the U.S. view on a ceiling on nuclear weapons under the interim 30% reduction. Lehman said that in a sense the U.S. reaction was one of disappointment. Our two leaders had already agreed on far-reaching objectives, including the total elimination of nuclear weapons. A first step in this direction was a 50% reduction with appropriate application. However, conditions for the total elimination of nuclear weapons are not near, so it is necessary to do two things: consider the necessary conditions and take possible measures to bring them nearer. How far the sides can go if they can reach agreement at all depends on whether they can deal with the question of stability to the satisfaction of both sides. In the U.S. view the conditions must permit a reduction to 50%. Obviously, different conditions are required to go further, and it is clear that one important condition is the elimination of the threat of ballistic missiles. However, if the Soviet side feels we cannot reach agreement on a 50% reduction, the U.S. side is prepared to seek a mutually acceptable framework for a less than 50% reduction. The U.S. side wants to make the deepest possible reductions, but this would require taking into account our concerns about stability. Lehman said that when he last met with Chervov, he told Chervov that it is clear each side has a different force structure. The U.S. side believes that

achieving and enhancing stability in an arms control agreement requires differentiation between systems so as to eliminate the threat of a disarming first strike. Lehman had also told Chervov that the U.S. side feels that it is necessary to go beyond past agreements in order to enhance stability. The U.S. side's analysis shows that it is possible to accommodate both U.S. and Soviet concerns and force structures. The U.S. side is flexible in how it sees various elements of the force structure, but the results must provide stability. Lehman said he had requested Chervov to raise this question again on the Soviet side, and Chervov had promised to do so. It is clear that the most important question being discussed at this meeting is the question of how to enhance stability. Concrete discussions are required on the distinctions between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, heavy missiles and mobile missiles, and the structure of the ICBM force. But the real question, Lehman stated, is whether both sides can, on a mutually acceptable basis, take into consideration each other's concerns about stability. In short, the U.S. side prefers 50% reductions, but if the Soviet side believes that only reductions less than 50% can be achieved, the U.S. side is ready to explore this. It prefers the deepest possible reductions which maintain stability.

Chervov wondered how it was possible that withdrawal from the SALT II treaty could enhance stability. He said he was hearing this argument for the first time. Perhaps there was something behind it he did not understand.

Lehman responded that Chervov should have no doubt that the U.S. side is prepared to maintain the balance on a one-sided basis if necessary, but it prefers to do this in the context of an equitable agreement. If the agreement is not equitable, it will not enhance stability.

Nitze wished to add that of course the U.S. side strongly prefers to maintain the ABM Treaty in full. The ABM Treaty includes provisions for withdrawal upon six months' notice in the event that either side feels its supreme interests are prejudiced. In May 1972 the U.S. side stated that the absence of a treaty parallel to the ABM Treaty, a treaty comprehensive and indefinitely limiting offensive arms, could be grounds for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. has not withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, but it still believes that appropriate limitations of indefinite duration are necessary for both offensive and defensive weapons. The U.S. side wants to have limitations on offensive weapons, and this is one of the main objectives at the negotiations.

Karpov reminded the group that Bessmertnykh was expecting them for lunch at one o'clock. He proposed that the discussion be continued after lunch and adjourned the meeting until then.

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 11, 1986, 2:15–6:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Ambassador Paul Nitze
 Ambassador Max Kampelman
 Ambassador Edward Rowny
 Ambassador Mike Glitman
 Ambassador Ronald Lehman
 Assistant Secretary R. Perle
 Colonel Robert Linhard
 Mr. Norman Clyne
 Mr. Bruce Burton
 Ms. Priscilla Clapp
 Mr. Steve Pifer
 Ms. Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

Soviet

Ambassador V. Karpov
 Ambassador A. Obukhov
 General N. Chervov
 General N. Detinov
 Mr. Tavasenko
 Mr. Zolotov, Interpreter
 Mr. Skulkov, Interpreter

Ambassador Nitze began the second half of the day's meeting by noting that there were a number of questions outstanding from the morning meeting. He said Ambassador Obukhov had raised two questions of which the U.S. side had responded to only one. Ambassador Lehman had asked two questions of the Soviet side which were not yet answered. Nitze thought this would be a good place to start, if Karpov agreed.

Ambassador Karpov said this was fine. Since Obukhov had been the first to ask his question, it should be responded to first.

Nitze asked Obukhov to repeat his question. Obukhov said he would repeat both of them. Nitze said the U.S. side had already addressed one of them. Karpov interjected that Obukhov did not agree.

Obukhov said he wished to repeat both questions because Lehman's response had gone astray from the substance of his question. Obukhov said this not in order to criticize but to remind Lehman of his questions. His first question was: what specific number of nuclear warheads on strategic offensive arms does the U.S. intend to establish after reductions under the interim 30% solution? Obukhov's second question was addressed to Assistant Secretary Perle: in considering the possibility of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. links it to the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.

elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles. In the U.S. concept, what is the place of the nuclear systems of third nuclear powers? Does the U.S. consider this problem in its approach at all?

Lehman responded that he thought he had stated clearly that the U.S. prefers reductions to approximately 50% but is willing to consider lesser reductions. The key issue is how the specific elements of an agreement enhance stability. The issue is not one of numbers, but of how to deal with the most destabilizing systems. The sum is less important than knowing the interrelationship of the parts. This, Lehman said, is part of his question to the Soviet side. The U.S. side is willing to explore a range of approaches, but it does not see how an undifferentiated aggregate could contribute to stability. The sides must take into account differences in systems.

Obukhov replied that he could understand that the U.S. intends to establish a ceiling on nuclear warheads on systems after reductions of strategic offensive arms. Establishing this ceiling is important in itself to prevent a continuation of the arms race in this area.

Lehman responded that he understood this Soviet position that had been stated so many times and in the same way in Geneva. The U.S. position is clear: the U.S. is flexible on the form of an agreement and on the interrelationship of the parts, but in the end it must differentiate between the systems which enhance stability. Lehman hoped this answered Obukhov's question.

Lehman continued, saying that he had two questions himself. He was prepared to listen to and discuss the Soviet side's responses. His first question was whether the Soviet side had any new thoughts on how mutually to take into account each side's concerns regarding stability. He had not asked this question of Chervov at the last meeting. Lehman's second question was actually several specific questions. Did the Soviet side have ideas on how to take into account U.S. concerns over fast and slow flying systems? Was the Soviet side prepared to limit warheads on ballistic missiles, heavy missiles or their warheads? Lehman said these were questions of a specific nature and he wished to hear the Soviet side's specific ideas on them.

Chervov replied that the basis for stability at present is and should be the existence of agreements and treaties. The U.S. side now says that the SALT I and SALT II treaties are unfair and do not maintain stability. But it is most strange that although negotiations have been going on for 15 years, the U.S. side has only now understood this. This means that three U.S. administrations and the Soviet government have not understood for 15 years what stability is. But now, Chervov said, the U.S. has "discovered America"—it has discovered a new concept of stability, namely, Soviet heavy missiles. In the '70s when the U.S. had numerical superiority in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles,

the Soviet side also had heavy missiles, but this issue was not raised then. Now that there is parity in missiles, Chervov continued, the issue is raised. He said that Soviet heavy missiles are like U.S. Trident I and II missiles and like the MX, so the sides should look at all of them. From a military standpoint there is no difference between Soviet heavy missiles and the Trident I, Trident II and MX. The U.S. has already put the MX on alert status. The U.S. side knows the Soviet 30% position—a total number of 1600 delivery vehicles, including heavy missiles. Objectively speaking, they are also subject to reduction. Chervov said the Soviet side would agree to reduce by 30% or 50%, providing there is a ban on space weapons and that the ABM Treaty is strengthened. If missiles exist, the sides should decide the question: would the U.S. agree to preserve the ABM Treaty for a period of 15 years, or does the U.S. side have in mind another time period? Obukhov's second question concerned the SALT I and SALT II treaties which the U.S. now rejects. Only the ABM Treaty is left. Keeping in mind that treaties and agreements are an important measure of stability, what treaties and agreements does the U.S. side want to see in place of SALT I and SALT II?

Karpov said that the issue of enhancing or not enhancing stability as a result of agreements between the sides is a question of fundamental importance. Of course, the sides must look at what kind of agreements are to be worked out. By itself, the subject of enhancing stability cannot exist in isolation from specific agreements limiting and reducing arms. The Soviet side proposes exploring a specific system of limitations and reductions that meets the objective of enhancing strategic stability. The Soviet 50% reductions proposal, together with a ban on space strike weapons, is the best way to accomplish this.

Chervov stated that this is a fundamental point. The U.S. side always neglects to address the relationship between these two aspects, as if no relationship existed. Without it, he said, no reductions are possible. He warned the U.S. side not to pretend that it is in favor of 50% reductions while the Soviet side is against them. On the contrary, the Soviet 50% proposal (with clarifications to be made later) shows that the Soviet side favors reducing by 50% the number of delivery vehicles, including medium-range systems capable of reaching the territory of other countries, and categorically limiting to 6000 the number of warheads on the delivery vehicles that would be left. The Soviet side sees no possibility for either side to have more than 6000 warheads, but this cannot be said of the U.S. position. The U.S. proposal allows each side to have 15,000 or even more warheads, while at the same time the U.S. speaks of a 50% reduction. This, said Chervov, is strange but true. The sides should not speak of a 50% reduction but of what is realistically possible, including the prospects for enhancing stability.

He suggested looking at the Soviet 30% reduction proposal from the viewpoint of whether or not it enhances stability. This new Soviet proposal was submitted on January 11, 1986, and provides for measures which in their totality would lead not only to lowering the level of nuclear confrontation between the sides, but would also enhance stability. One of the ways to substantively ensure strategic stability is to ensure compliance with the ABM treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years. Another element of the Soviet proposal is to reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by 30%, that is, to 1600, while reducing nuclear warheads on them to 8000.

The Soviet side is exploring ways of effectively limiting cruise missiles, Chervov continued, so that there would be no channel for an unchecked buildup of these weapons in the future. This would ensure equal limitations on the arms of both sides and foreclose a channel for building them up, thus enhancing strategic stability in the relationship between our two sides. When we speak of stability, Chervov said, we should speak of it in practical terms. He noted further that the Soviet side does not agree to differentiate systems as more or less destabilizing. This is an artificial and unjustified distinction. The Soviet position is that all strategic weapons pose a threat and therefore limitation must mean reducing them to the lowest level possible. It would be best to reduce them to 50%, but the U.S. position makes this impossible. For this reason the Soviet side is willing to agree to reductions of 30%. Chervov suggested that the sides discuss specific measures for implementing such reductions. The Soviet side proposes establishing clear-cut limits on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while permitting a certain number of submarines with long-range cruise missiles. This proposal is made with a view to providing for the most effective kind of verification that the Soviet side can imagine. Chervov repeated his assertion that the Soviet side did not agree to break down arms into more or less destabilizing systems. However, in order to consider U.S. concerns, it is prepared to establish limits on individual types of weapons so that no more than 60% of warheads be permitted on a specific type of weapon, for example, ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers or submarines with cruise missiles.

Karpov stated that the U.S. side tends to pick on Soviet heavy missiles as a *bete noir*. Chervov added that these missiles are in no way different from Trident I, II and MX, and the Soviet side is prepared to agree not to exclude heavy missiles from the reductions. If the U.S. claims there are 308 heavy missiles on the Soviet side, they would be permitted to carry no more than 3000 nuclear warheads out of a total permitted number of 8000 warheads. Chervov said the sides cannot leave only heavy missiles and not other types of arms.

Karpov noted that the limit for delivery vehicles is 1600, not 300. Therefore the question of stability involves a specific agreement provid-

ing for a precise combination of enhancing the stability of the ABM treaty over a sufficiently long time period and limiting strategic offensive arms. This would ensure true stability and establish real limitations, ones which were firm and could not be exceeded or gotten around. This would be a practical and reliable way to ensure stability.

Chervov added that this would be included in a specific agreement, not in a general conversation about stability. Nitze said he wished to give Ambassador Lehman an opportunity to speak.

Lehman remarked that Karpov had eloquently repeated the details of the subject matter they have discussed in Geneva. Was Lehman therefore to conclude that Karpov had no new practical thoughts on how to resolve the differences between the sides, and should he report this?

Karpov replied that he did not know what Lehman should report to his government. He suggested reporting that today he, Karpov, had discussed a new approach to which the U.S. had given no response, either in Geneva or elsewhere. He wanted the U.S. side to report this approach to Washington once again, in case Washington had not studied it seriously enough.

Chervov said he had a question to ask Nitze.

Nitze replied that first he wished to speak. He said he was very troubled by Karpov's and Chervov's remarks. First of all, Nitze was confused by the references to the MX, Trident I and Trident II as heavy missiles. He had lived through the problem of defining heavy missiles from 1971 down to the present. The U.S. side thought agreement had been reached on a definition at SALT I, but this had been upset by the Soviet side. Then it thought agreement had finally been reached at SALT II. According to this definition, it is clear the MX, Trident I and Trident II are not heavy but light missiles. Karpov claimed that these U.S. missiles perform the same functions as Soviet heavy missiles, but, stated Nitze, this is also incorrect. They are not heavy missiles according to the most recent definition that is in effect. Is there now a change in this definition, Nitze asked? The Soviet side seems to assert that there is no definition of a heavy missile other than a subjective one. Karpov said he would respond by asking a question in return. Now that the U.S. has abandoned the SALT II treaty and the Interim Agreement, is it selectively preserving this one aspect of the treaty?

Nitze said he would respond to this later and continue with what he had been saying. As he understood it, Karpov's remarks were intended as a response to Lehman's question. If this was so, Nitze could find no substance in the remarks that resembled a response. They were merely a restatement of positions elaborated in Geneva that had already been discussed and understood in the past. There was

nothing new and no change from statements about the Soviet position made in the past.

Nitze recalled Karpov's question regarding how the U.S. side envisages treaties in the future, apart from the ABM treaty. Nitze said this would depend on what the sides work out. President Reagan has proposed space defense and has proposed developing a treaty now. It is clear that this depends on what the sides are able to work out at the negotiations. Nitze could envisage developing an agreement on space defense, INF and START. He saw no problem in the sides negotiating to find ways to maintain continuing valid agreements between them.

Referring to Perle's remarks at the morning meeting, Nitze said that Karpov had violently attacked the concept of stability, including tendentious remarks about the year-and-a-half he had spent discussing the concept of stability with Rowny.

Karpov interrupted to say that this was not a concept, but aspects the U.S. side was trying to impose. Nitze rejoined that the Soviet side was trying to impose certain aspects of its own on the issue of stability, and this was one-sided. Over the years a clear understanding has emerged regarding stability. At SALT I there was a clear understanding between the sides on the concept of stability. Nitze agreed that the word "stability" can be used in many senses, but it still has a meaning on the basis of which it can be understood. He thought it was not correct to contend that it is a plaything that can be interpreted in any way. Nitze said he was disappointed at the lack of a response to Lehman's question.

Karpov replied that he had responded exhaustively to Lehman's question, contrast to Lehman, who had not answered the Soviet side's question about the number of nuclear warheads that would be left after 50% reductions. Nor had the U.S. side answered the question of how it would take into account the nuclear weapons of third countries if U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles were eliminated completely in accordance with U.S. plans for strategic defense.

Nitze replied that he had not yet gotten to this point, but that Perle would answer it. He wished to ask Karpov whether he had initiated the discussion of heavy missiles in order to indicate that a possible agreement would involve a new definition including Trident I on the U.S. side and Soviet missiles of comparable throw weight.

Karpov objected that he had not been the one to bring up the question of heavy missiles.

Nitze said he understood this, but nonetheless wanted an answer from Karpov.

Karpov replied that he had spoken of heavy missiles in connection with Lehman's questions. Heavy missiles would be affected by reduc-

tions to either of the proposed levels, i.e., 50% or 30%. Chervov had pointed out that there was no need to single out this one category of terrible Soviet missiles. The USSR has heavy missiles which in their combat effectiveness are no different from the MX and Trident II, and Karpov agreed with him. Karpov had not spoken of a definition of heavy missiles.

Chervov added that the sides were speaking of two different things.

Karpov continued, saying that he had mentioned the definition of heavy missiles because the U.S. had abandoned the SALT II treaty. He did not know what the definition might be in the future or whether there will be one in future agreements. But since the U.S. has left the SALT II treaty, it must be aware that the definition of heavy missiles will no longer exist as a treaty formulation that took so long to work out. Karpov said he thought the sides were not doing what they should be doing here; they kept getting away from their main task. For four hours this morning and for an hour now they had been talking, but could they say that they had even a handful of material to present to Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze? Had the sides really scraped together any material or not?

Chervov offered the opinion that they had not.

Karpov said the sides would not accomplish their objective if they forgot why they were here. He proposed focusing on specific aspects of the subject matter so as not to digress and not to get into discussions which are not practical. Frankly, what could he report to Shevardnadze about today's meeting without getting scolded?

Chervov remarked that Karpov would surely be scolded.

After agreeing to Karpov's suggestion that the discussion continue until six pm, Nitze asked Lehman to take the floor.

Lehman said that he had answered Obukhov's question when he said that the U.S. preferred reductions to 50%. The Soviet side also has proposed 50% reductions, as well as lesser ones. As Lehman had stated, the U.S. is willing to examine lesser reductions, but what is important is not the total number of nuclear warheads, but the parts and relationships of differentiated systems. For this reason Lehman had asked the Soviet side to share new thoughts on how to resolve the differences on this issue. He hoped the Soviet side was ready to address this issue.

Karpov replied that Lehman's answer was addressed to a different question than the one he had asked. The Soviet side's question concerns the so-called 50% reduction, but actually what is involved is a build-up of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles. It is clear, Karpov said, that this proposal provides for an arms race and cannot be the basis for an agreement. It is not possible to enhance strategic stability by whipping up an arms race, and Karpov thought the U.S. side would

agree with him. When the Soviet side asks what specific level of nuclear warheads would be left after a 30% reduction, it means the following: If the U.S. 50% option permits deployment of 15,000 nuclear warheads after reductions, what number is envisaged after 30% reductions? Perhaps the U.S. side is considering 20,000 nuclear warheads or perhaps 8,000. Karpov was asking how the U.S. side would increase or decrease weapons under its reductions option.

Nitze asked whether there wasn't a misunderstanding here. As he understood what Karpov had said, Karpov had stated that Lehman was speaking of 50% reductions. In fact, he was speaking of 30% reductions.

Karpov rejoined that Lehman had been speaking of both. He had mentioned 50% when he stated that the U.S. side prefers a 50% reduction. However, a 50% reduction in the U.S. interpretation means not a reduction but an increase in the number of nuclear warheads on the delivery vehicles that would be left after reductions. This was in the U.S. proposal of November 1, 1985. Karpov continued that the U.S. side had proposed that each side have 350 heavy bombers. The U.S. side, he said, needs 75 heavy bombers in order to have 1500 cruise missiles deployed on them. This means that the U.S. has 275 heavy bombers left without anything counted against them.

Nitze interjected that this was because the USSR has air defense systems that are not covered at all.

Karpov noted that the U.S. has 5,500 nuclear warheads that are not counted toward the ceiling. The U.S. is not inclined to put any limitations on SLCMs. Karpov had heard that the U.S. has plans to deploy 3,000–4,000 SLCMs. By adding up the various systems, i.e., 6,000 plus 5,000 plus 3,000 or 4,000, the total number would come to 15,000 or more. The arithmetic is quite simple.

Nitze replied that this related to Lehman's question.

Karpov asked whether the U.S. proposal provided for a definite ceiling that neither side would surpass. He had asked Lehman whether the U.S. envisages a definite number that neither side would exceed.

Nitze responded that this was very clear from the U.S. proposal—there would be limits on warheads and ALCMs.

Karpov asked where the SLCMs were.

Lehman said that each side was familiar with the other side's position as discussed at past meetings. The purpose of this meeting was to make progress. He had stated how to resolve the problem raised by the Soviet side. A solution could be found if the Soviet side was prepared to differentiate nuclear systems. But the Soviet side had said no to this, had it not?

Karpov replied that if Lehman reduces all problems to this aspect, his willingness to discriminate between systems means that he is putting the wrong emphasis on the wrong problem.

Lehman replied that this is the U.S. side's emphasis. Karpov had said that he had no flexibility on this question.

Karpov said that he did. The Soviet side is ready to be flexible, although it cannot accept discrimination between systems. The Soviet side proposes to reduce some of the same systems the U.S. side wants to reduce.

Lehman rejoined that this was not flexibility, but merely the current position of the Soviet side.

Karpov responded that it was indeed flexibility because the Soviet side was willing to accept a reduction of these systems together with other systems. It had even proposed a 60% level.

Lehman asked whether the Soviet side had something beyond this?

Karpov said that it had the 30% option, i.e., 8,000 warheads and 16,000 delivery vehicles. Specific systems should be included within this. In such a context, what is wrong, where is the fault?

Lehman asked whether there were no limits on the number of ballistic missile warheads. This number could be 8,000.

Karpov replied, "60%."

Lehman said that this was a major setback from SALT II.

Nitze asked whether it would be possible to have 4,800 ICBM RVs and 4,800 SLBM RVs.

Lehman said, "Or 32 additional systems, all RVs."

Nitze said there could be 8,000 ballistic missile RVs.

Lehman said that the Soviet side seemed ready to change its position on this.

Ambassador Rowny had a suggestion to make ad referendum to Nitze. He suggested setting a limit in the new agreement at 60% of the original ICBM warheads, i.e., 3,600. Was the Soviet side willing to reduce to 3,600?

Karpov said it was willing to reduce within the context of its 50% reduction proposal.

Nitze said that Rowny's question was specific within the context of 30% reductions. Under the Soviet definition, forward-based systems, which the U.S. has but the USSR does not, would be included. The U.S. has FBS because the Soviet Union has comparable systems that threaten the territory of U.S. allies. If the Soviet side is interested in reducing by 50%, it must be prepared to reduce by not more than 60%, i.e. to 3,600 systems. Karpov has said no to 3,600 in the context of 30% reductions, using a definition that does not involve either U.S. or Soviet FBS.

Rowny wondered whether the sides should speak of U.S. so-called FBS that are matched by Soviet FBS. He suggested discussing 3,600 ICBM warheads and taking away the restriction.

Karpov asked what Soviet FBS were.

Nitze said that Rowny had explained that certain Soviet systems are comparable to U.S. FBS, for example, medium-range systems. Rowny added that they could strike U.S. troops in Europe.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1987.]

144. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 12, 1986, 10:15 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Mike Glitman
Ambassador Ronald Lehman
Assistant Secretary R. Perle
Colonel Robert Linhard
Mr. Norman Clyne
Mr. Bruce Burton
Ms. Priscilla Clapp
Mr. Steve Pifer
Ms. Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

Soviet

Ambassador V. Karpov
Ambassador A. Obukhov
General A. Chervov
General N. Detinov
Mr. Tarasenko
Mr. Nagradov, Interpreter
Mr. Zolotov, Interpreter
Mr. Skulkov, Interpreter

After an exchange of pleasantries about the weather, Karpov proposed that the sides continue yesterday's discussion. He said he would sum up where the sides had left off yesterday. The Soviet side had called attention to the need to prepare for the upcoming meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.

It had also called attention to the possibility of moving the sides' positions closer together with a view to finding mutually-acceptable solutions for the meeting of ministers. In this connection, the Soviet side had touched upon the issue of enhancing the ABM treaty regime, both by providing for an obligation not to use the right of withdrawal for a sufficiently long period, and by ensuring the confidence of the sides that all treaty provisions are understood and are being carried out in the same way. In this connection, the sides could explore the possibility of achieving a common understanding about the boundaries of those activities that would be permitted and those that would be prohibited under the treaty. They could choose as a guideline the boundary between work done in the laboratory and work done outside it. Regarding offensive arms, the Soviet side had stressed its desire to make the deepest possible cuts in strategic offensive arms—specifically, reductions of 50% with a ban on space-strike weapons. Taking into account the fact that the U.S. side is not prepared to make such deep reductions, the Soviet side is willing to examine the possibility of 30% reductions. It believes that the U.S. side is also prepared to explore ways of bringing the positions of the sides closer together. The Soviet side had proposed these specific questions for consideration at these discussions. Given the fact that there are certain difficulties involved in finding a cardinal solution to the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet side had stated that it was willing to consider the possibility of an interim solution which would provide for keeping some U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe for a certain time. In this connection, the Soviet side is willing to consider some elements of the U.S. proposal regarding an interim solution. The sides could hold an exchange of views on these issues in order to contribute to preparations for the September meeting of Foreign Ministers. Karpov said that unfortunately the U.S. side had not taken advantage yesterday of possibilities which the Soviet side proposed. The U.S. side preferred to focus the talks on questions of a conceptual nature related to the general inter-relationship between offensive and defensive arms and to a certain classification of arms which the U.S. side believes is related to working out an agreement on strategic offensive arms. While the Soviet side does not deny the importance of discussing concepts, it believes that in view of the objective of providing productive ideas for questions related to NST at the meeting of Ministers, it would be advisable in the time left today to focus on practical aspects of the questions under consideration. The Soviet side had offered specific new considerations on how to approach these issues, and it hoped the U.S. side would present new ideas aimed at finding mutually-acceptable solutions to them. Karpov had one procedural question to ask first. Since both delegations were invited to return to Moscow for

lunch at the home of DCM Combs at 1:30, would they meet again after lunch or limit themselves to this meeting and discussions during lunch?

Ambassador Nitze replied that he thought the sides could finish their work this morning and then go to lunch. However, they could leave open the possibility of meeting again after lunch if this would be useful.

Karpov agreed.

Nitze said the sides should also discuss whether or not they wished to meet in Washington before the Ministers' meeting in September. The U.S. side was prepared to invite the Soviet side to Washington on September 8–9 if this were convenient.

Karpov thanked Nitze for the invitation. Judging by yesterday's meeting, the sides would hardly be able to make the necessary headway at today's meeting and therefore would need to hold a second meeting in Washington. Karpov only wondered whether the dates suggested by Nitze were too late, considering that the Ministers' meeting is slated for September 19–20, and that the next round of the NST negotiations opens on 18 September. Given that the meetings of this working group are aimed at making easier the talks between the Ministers as well as the work of the delegations at the negotiations, Karpov thought it would be advisable to meet earlier, say, in late August or early September, so as to leave enough time to examine all the issues.

Nitze took note of Karpov's suggestion and said the U.S. side would be in touch about how to accommodate this suggestion. As a result of yesterday's conversation, the U.S. side had worked out some questions it thought were appropriate for consideration by Foreign Ministers and certainly appropriate for consideration by this group when it meets in Washington in preparation for the Ministers' meeting. These three questions concerned space and defense, START and INF. Nitze then read the following prepared text:

"1) Can we jointly envision an agreement now that places the eventual deployment of defenses, after an interval during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect, in the context of the elimination of both sides' ballistic missiles and the sharing of the benefits of such defenses? If yes, how long should the interval be during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect without amendment?

"2) Can we recognize and deal with the differences in strategic systems in the context of an agreement which significantly reduces existing nuclear offensive arsenals in an equitable and verifiable manner while increasing stability?

"3) Can we promptly reach a separate, interim agreement on INF missiles which results in equal levels on LRINF missile systems in Europe at some level above zero, while also making proportional reduc-

tions elsewhere in the world, resulting in an equal worldwide ceiling on LRINF warheads worldwide.”

Chervov asked whether Nitze was talking about a zero level in Europe. Nitze replied that the first clause of the question regards levels on LRINF systems in Europe, the second clause speaks of also making reductions elsewhere in the world, and the last clause concerns the goal of equality in the level of warheads worldwide.

Karpov asked whether the U.S. side could lend this paper to the Soviet side for a minute so that it could be copied.

Nitze said he would send over a copy this afternoon. The questions raised by the Soviet side were somewhat different from these three questions, but Nitze thought these three questions were more pertinent to the issues at hand. He thought the Soviet side would wish to study them. He asked Karpov for suggestions on how to proceed further.

Karpov replied that the Soviet side would take these questions as homework and would compare them against the questions it had raised itself. He thought a discussion of these questions could continue in Washington at the next working meeting. As for the questions raised by both sides yesterday, and by Karpov today, they could continue discussing them in an attempt to find new possibilities for bringing the positions closer together. There was also the question of the regime of restraint which Karpov had mentioned yesterday. The Soviet side might have questions to ask that could clarify the three questions Nitze had just read. In addition, Chervov wished to comment on the statement made by Assistant Secretary Perle yesterday.

Nitze noted that the U.S. side owed Ambassador Obukhov a response to a question he had asked yesterday. Nitze suggested doing this first so as to clear the books of unanswered questions. He said Perle would answer Obukhov's question.

Perle noted that this was a very pertinent and important question and he welcomed it because the sides need to discuss and understand the implications for both sides of the transformation not only of the security relationship between them, but of relationships with other countries of the world in the fortunate event that ballistic missiles could be eliminated. Firstly, in relation to the nuclear arms on both sides which would exist after the elimination of ballistic missiles, even the largest third-country arsenal would be modest by comparison. The U.S. cannot speak for third countries, but some countries who have nuclear weapons have already stated that within a context of radical reductions of the weapons the two sides are discussing here, they would reexamine their own requirements. It is clear that they are prepared to reduce their capabilities. Perhaps more important in the U.S. concept is the fact that the elimination of the nuclear missiles both sides have and the sharing of defense technology would lead to both

sides having formidable capabilities by comparison with the small ballistic missile forces held by other countries. In other words, the U.S. and USSR would be well defended. Indeed, Perle continued, the presence of these defenses would be a powerful disincentive to third countries to build ballistic missile systems which would effectively be nullified by the defenses. For this reason, the sides could anticipate that other countries might decide that it was in their interest to eliminate their ballistic missiles. Perle thought the most important element here was the change for the positive of the security relationship between the U.S. and USSR. A world in which offensive systems exist in great numbers on both sides has important consequences for the reactions of the world as a whole. After eliminating these systems, the sides could anticipate deployment of defenses on a modest scale. The political changes would be of great benefit to both sides. Both sides recognize that it would be difficult to achieve this, but the benefits are important enough to try it. Perle had hoped yesterday that the sides could discuss this concept seriously today, but it is a new concept and needs to be considered. Since the two sides will meet again, he hoped it could be discussed at the next meeting and perhaps even today.

General Detinov described the model that he pictured as Perle outlined his thoughts. In this model, relatively minor defensive systems, i.e., ABM, would be deployed by both sides, subject to conditions under which both sides would give up their ballistic missiles. Third countries would probably also choose to give up their own ballistic missiles. Detinov wished to know how all the other nuclear weapons that the sides possessed would look, i.e., heavy bombers, cruise missiles of all basing modes, nuclear FBS and others? What would be their place and role in Perle's model?

Perle replied that it was clear that the objective of the sides in all negotiations is to try to achieve a balance that leaves them secure, with the least burden of armaments. This principle applies in the situation envisaged here. Neither side would want more heavy bombers or cruise missiles than were necessary to ensure its security, and the balance would be maintained at lower levels. Perle thought both sides recognized that they were not now at a stage in their political relationship where they were ready to give up their arms. There are third countries which would make them pause before they could do this. However, they could make significant reductions in weapons of different types. This would still leave both sides in a strong position with regard to other countries and a stable position with regard to each other. Perle did not mean in this model that the entire burden of disarmament would be carried in the area of ballistic missiles. He expected considerable parallel reductions in other weapons in order to achieve a balance ensuring greater security. One characteristic of this balance was that

systems which cannot be recalled and are therefore more subject to cause terrible accidents would be eliminated. Diminishing the level of anxiety resulting from the inability to recall them would contribute to the confidence of the sides in reducing arms in other areas. This would be the first time in recent history when the sides could relieve the severe psychological burden of a terrible accident leading to consequences that neither side wants. Perle added that this process would take place in a period sufficiently long so that both sides could plan effective defensive systems in agreed categories. Much of the discussion that had taken place over the years regarding the effectiveness of one type of weapon versus another would be much simplified if the sides were dealing with a category of weapon which continued to be permitted.

Obukhov thanked Perle for his clarification, but said he had an additional question. As far as he understood Perle's comments, Perle meant that the process of destroying the ballistic missiles of both sides as envisaged by the U.S. proposal would not happen in isolation, but would be accompanied by limitations and reductions in other areas of nuclear weapons. As Perle had said, such reductions would have as their objective the establishment of a balance ensuring greater security for the sides. Was Obukhov correct in thinking that Perle is suggesting that in a process of limitation and reduction, a leveling out of the capabilities of the sides would take place regarding the nuclear FBS of the U.S.?

Perle replied that he must be frank and say that this is a broad concept which would lead to major changes in the strategic relationship as it has existed between the sides since they first deployed ballistic missiles. The U.S. side has not yet thought through all the implications. The sides had come here to exchange fresh ideas, and must examine broad concepts together. Perle said Obukhov's question was a fair one, and the best general answer Perle could give now was to say that in trying to establish a balance, the U.S. is not seeking nuclear advantage. The Soviet side well knows the nature of U.S. FBS—they are essentially conventional weapons. It also knows the nature of U.S. commitments to its allies. It is clear that this question must be resolved and dealt with. It is a more tractable question in this context because what is meant is a fundamental change that would lead to fresh thinking. Agreements concluded in the past were based on different strategic concepts and growing numbers of effective weapons. Now there is a shift in direction that must have political and psychological consequences that are beneficial to both sides. Problems which the sides have been unable to resolve heretofore may now be resolvable in this new and unprecedented situation. Perle did not have a more specific answer and suggested that the sides discuss this together.

Detinov wished to ask a question to help him better understand. Returning to the model Perle had spoken of in which neither side

would have ballistic missiles and a modest ABM system is deployed, what sequence of events would follow in this situation? Would deployment of the ABM system preceed elimination of ballistic missiles or would ballistic missiles be eliminated first and defensive systems then be deployed? Or would this process take place in parallel?

Perle replied that he had no fixed notion. This is an important and complex question. A process was envisaged where the sides would refrain from deploying defensive systems for a certain time. During this time they would try to negotiate a new situation, and at the end of the time they would hope to proceed on a cooperative basis to the deployment of agreed levels of defense. Because there is a clear understanding of the reduction of ballistic missiles, the threat seen by the Soviet side in deploying defensive systems would not arise in this situation. Both sides would want to be satisfied that the sequence of events was correct and did not prejudice their security. Perle thought the sides could ensure this. The schedule of work on defensive systems in conjunction with sharing the benefits of defense technology in the absence of ballistic missiles would become a common defense against other countries having ballistic missiles. Perle thought both sides needed to examine this question further. The U.S. side has no monopoly on wisdom here. The U.S. side's intention is that both sides have greater security at all stages of the process than they did at the previous stage.

Chervov asked whether Nitze could clarify the questions he had raised at the beginning of today's meeting. Regarding the first question, Nitze had spoken of maintaining the ABM Treaty for a certain interval. The Soviet side was proposing an interval of non-withdrawal from the treaty of 15–20 years. The U.S. side has taken note of this interval, yet in the U.S. press there are articles interpreting Reagan's letter to Gorbachev² to mean an interval of 5–7 years. Could Nitze comment on the specific time interval envisaged by the U.S. side?

Nitze replied that the U.S. side's question stated that during this time the ABM Treaty would remain in effect without amendment. The U.S. side had in mind Agreed Statement D which provides that if weapons are created based on different physical principles, the side that created them would hold consultations with the other side in accordance with Article XIII with a view to developing appropriate limitations on such systems which could be included in the agreement by amendment, as provided for in Article XIV. This is not stated in the formulation of the treaty, but it was in the minds of those who, like Nitze, had worked out Agreed Statement D. If the research of either side during the interval of five years or more persuaded it that

² See Document 138.

defense would meet the necessary criterion of effectiveness and it wanted to deploy a defense, there would also be consultations under Article XIII as provided for in Agreed Statement D, with a view to developing appropriate provisions for transition to another regime. Perle had referred to this. The U.S. side had in mind that after 5 years it would not wish to use the right which exists in the ABM Treaty for either side to withdraw on six months' notice if it feels its supreme national interests are prejudiced. If at some time 5 or more years after the agreement entered into force a side decided that its research was complete and it wanted both sides to have the benefits of advanced defenses, both sides would begin discussions to work out a new regime. These discussions might continue up to two years. Only after two years could the sides consider a return to the present situation, i.e. where either side has the right to withdraw upon six months' notice for reasons of supreme national interest.

Chervov asked whether the 5–7 years cover only research or whether testing is also included.

To avoid misunderstanding, Nitze said he would read the relevant paragraphs of Reagan's letter to Gorbachev. He quoted: "I have assured you that the United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage in this area. To ensure that neither of us is in a position to do so, we would be prepared immediately to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

"(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures."

Chervov interrupted to ask whether such testing is in accordance with the ABM Treaty. The letter claims that it is.

Nitze replied that certain testing is permitted. Testing on the basis of the technology as understood in 1972 is permitted at test ranges in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. It is also permitted to test non-components. There are a number of things on which testing is permitted. Agreed Statement D provides for the creation of systems, and this implies testing them. Nitze wished to continue quoting the President's letter.

"(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either

party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

“(c) If, following the initial five-year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side.”

Chervov said that basically the Soviet side understands. It is clear that under the U.S. proposal the ABM Treaty has 5–7 years left to live. He wished to comment on the concept offered by Perle today. One of the many points Perle had made was to try to prove the legitimacy of defenses, suggesting that SDI is a new stage of defense for the sides. Perle even went back in history, saying that defense has always been a part of military science and is therefore justified now. In general, Chervov noted, Perle is correct because there is no offense without defense and no defense without offense. All of military history shows this. What can be concluded from it? Perle seems to conclude from this undisputed historical fact that SDI is legitimate and justified. Chervov himself, however, came to a different conclusion. In his view, all military history is the history of conflict between offense and defense. These two military phenomenon are inseparable. The history of war is the history of the shield against the sword, armor against weapon. This can be traced as far back as the Greek military leader Epaminondas. Now Perle is bringing this conflict into a qualitatively new area of confrontation, i.e., creation of a qualitatively new weapon. Perle is afraid to say so, but this is exactly what the U.S. side is trying to do in outer space. These are not harmless systems, but deadly weapons, weapons which the U.S. wants to put into space. A qualitatively new era of conflict is beginning. The U.S. side claims that SDI will help eliminate nuclear arms and this will bring benefits and peace to all. However, Perle found it difficult to answer the question of which comes first: is SDI deployed first or does the elimination of nuclear weapons come first? The U.S. side asserts that SDI is not an offensive system. However, the most important mission of SDI is to counter satellites of other countries, that is, these weapons are aimed at blinding the other

side. Let us call things by their proper names, Chervov said. This is the first and most important mission of the systems. SDI creates systems with a range of 4,000 kilometers and more. What kind of defensive weapon has a 4,000 kilometer range, Chervov asked? This is a multi-purpose system that can carry out offensive and defensive missions, but is being played up by one side as defensive only. Along with SDI, the U.S. is now carrying out an accelerated buildup of its strategic nuclear potential, especially strategic offensive arms, giving them a first-strike capability. The U.S. is creating systems that overcome ABM defenses. Why is the U.S. creating these systems if it advocates elimination of nuclear weapons? This also applies, Chervov continued, to the accelerated work being carried out on Stealth technology. Is this really a defensive system? The U.S. side speaks of the concept of fast- and slow-flying strategic systems, but this concept cannot stand up to criticism. A first strike is not a single launch of a weapon, but a system of nuclear strikes. It begins with a launch of an ICBM, then an SLBM, then a long-range cruise missile from a heavy bomber. It is the sum of actions of the entire strategic triad and not simply a single fast- or slow-flying system. Having deployed Pershing II's under the Soviet Union's own nose, the U.S. does not talk of them as destabilizing systems, but tries to assert that they are stabilizing. The U.S. proposes first of all to eliminate ballistic missiles. The Soviet side understands this to mean that the entire threat to U.S. territory would be eliminated, but the threat to Soviet territory would remain. Is this really equal security, Chervov asked? If ballistic missiles are eliminated, the U.S. will have security, but there will be none for the USSR. This is the root of the issue. The U.S. side thinks the Soviet side will develop SDI and that third countries will destroy their missiles. The U.S. speaks of third-country missiles as negligible and insignificant, but this is not so. These are nuclear weapons and they cannot be compared to any other kind of weapons. Even the UK government understood this when it wrote in an official white paper that Britain has a nuclear capability which the Soviet Union takes account of in its planning. The U.S. side has lost sight of this official statement of the British government. Chervov said he could not help but ask himself where the U.S. side is trying to lead the Soviet side. It is forcing the Soviet side to create a space shield just as the U.S. does in its star wars. As a military man who has devoted his life to military science, Chervov could only say that if both sides create a space shield, this will lead not to peace, but to war. The U.S. concept elaborated in the past and at present of establishing a space shield is based on one thing—an unlimited arms race. The U.S. is attempting to pull the USSR into an arms race and to exhaust its economic resources. Then, by means of SDI, the U.S. intends to dictate its will to the Soviet side. But this is an illusion, Chervov said, and he would say, frankly, that this course is hopeless but extremely danger-

ous. The Soviet Union and the United States are two countries which cannot possibly dictate their will and policies to each other. They can reach agreement only as equals and not by unleashing an arms race, but by preventing one and by banning an arms race in space.

Chervov said that Nitze did not agree with the term “militarization of space.” Nitze has said that the use of this term is not the substance of the issue. The substance, Chervov stated, is that at present there are no weapons in space, nor should there be any. This is the fundamental issue. The U.S. side is pushing the Soviet side to create space systems, while at the same time protesting against the militarization of space. The U.S. is pulling the USSR directly into a space arms race. In conclusion, Chervov wished to repeat the Soviet concept of stability. The essence of this concept is the enhancing of treaties, agreements and the ABM Treaty regime. The ABM Treaty should not be made hostage for 5 years, after which time it could be scrapped. The period of non-withdrawal from this treaty should be 15–20 years or longer. This is a treaty of indefinite duration, and the longer it lasts, the better. The Soviet side is prepared to make radical reductions in arms, and what is more, is prepared to take into account all of the U.S. side’s concerns.

Karpov noted that there was not much time left and perhaps the sides should designate the questions they still wished to address today. Karpov had raised some questions this morning which had not yet received a reply from the U.S. side. He had also not received clarification on his question regarding the proposed regime of mutual restraint.

Nitze said that it was clear that he strongly disagreed with Chervov’s remarks, but to save time he would turn to the question of interim restraint. He asked Colonel Linhard to take the floor.

Linhard said that President Reagan has always maintained that the SALT II Treaty is unacceptable as a long-term U.S.-Soviet arms control arrangement. Both sides have gone beyond the treaty as real reductions have been made in their existing arsenals. For some time, the U.S. side had avoided undercutting the provisions of the treaty, hoping that we could use it as an interim framework for mutual restraint while negotiating a START treaty. Judging from Karpov’s question, Linhard did not need to repeat why the President had made his decision of 27 May.³ Linhard did not wish to describe what had happened in the past, but preferred to look to the future.

³ Reference is to Reagan’s statement of May 27, in which he announced that “in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty, which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.” (“Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” May 27; *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 678–681)

Karpov said that this is what he wanted, too—not a repetition of what has happened in the past, but what an interim regime of mutual restraint means.

Linhard continued that the President had clearly stated that the U.S. would continue to exercise considerable restraint. He had stated that as long as there is no change in the threat, the U.S. would deploy no more warheads on offensive ballistic missiles or more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than the USSR has.

Karpov noted that he had already read the President's statement and did not need Linhard to repeat it. He was looking for a clarification of the substance of the U.S. proposal on restraint. He could also ask some specific questions. The U.S. President had spoken of a number of warheads and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but not of long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes. Why this discrimination, Karpov asked? In the particular category of arms discussed here, it is clear that only the Soviet side is being asked to show restraint. Other categories are passed over in silence. The U.S. side leaves much room for a buildup and race in the systems that it favors. It can increase nuclear systems without limit. However, the Soviet side cannot increase its strategic weapons, but must exercise restraint.

Linhard replied that this is a valid question. He had tried to explain the measures proposed by the President indicating why the U.S. was exercising restraint and would continue to do so. The U.S. side calls attention to ballistic missile warheads because it sees them as an essential element of the equation. It also calls attention to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles because they are covered in the expired SALT Treaty. Perhaps there are other systems which could also be discussed, but the U.S. side believes it is proper to look at reductions of those weapons that it is considering. If in a regime of mutual restraint the sides move the negotiations away from reductions, this would be tragic.

Karpov asked how, in a regime of restraint where competition in the military area is an important element, a moratorium on nuclear testing fit in.

Linhard replied that if Karpov had any doubt why the U.S. has serious reservations about a moratorium, he would be happy to clarify this, but he did not think the U.S. position needed to be explained. Briefly, as long as the U.S. requires nuclear weapons for defense and security (and the Soviet side also has such weapons), it would not understand how the Soviet side could forego testing as a requirement to ensure the security, effectiveness, survivability and reliability of its weapons.

Karpov noted that, unlike the U.S., the USSR has not tested any nuclear weapons for one year, and the Soviets are still alive. As he

understood it, the U.S. proposal on mutual restraint does not provide for a moratorium or end to nuclear testing during the period of restraint.

Linhard agreed that the U.S. position on a moratorium is firm. It was, of course, clear that the measures proposed by the President for the U.S. to exercise restraint are not necessarily what we would propose for both sides together. The U.S. side had hoped to maintain the SALT II framework, as the President had stated in June, 1985, but this was not possible. Linhard said that the two elements he had mentioned were examples of the restraint the U.S. side would continue to exercise.

Karpov said he concluded that the U.S. regime of restraint does not provide for restraint from perfecting new types of nuclear weapons. How does the U.S. side envisage the regime of restraint—is it a one-sided statement by the U.S. calling for the Soviet Union to act with restraint, that is, not to increase its numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles, while at the same time leaving the U.S. free to increase and develop new nuclear systems? Or should there be mutual agreement on parameters of this restraint?

Linhard remarked that we are here *ad referendum* to discuss new concepts. The U.S. side had explained at the special session of the SCC and elsewhere what it was prepared to continue to do in the absence of mutual agreement. The main focus was the negotiations regarding the reductions being discussed here. However, if it would be useful to discuss other areas, the U.S. side is prepared. Linhard thought he had answered Karpov's question about a moratorium.

Karpov said that the reason he asked his question was because the Soviet side had not received a reply to this question in the SCC. Was he correct in concluding from Linhard's remarks that the U.S. does not want to agree on a regime of mutual restraint?

Linhard replied that the U.S. side had explained what it would do, taking into consideration actual conditions. Now it is ready to hear the ideas of the Soviet side regarding such a regime. He wished to repeat that during such discussions as these we should not divert from the primary task of discussing reductions.

Chervov said he had one more question regarding the regime of restraint. Does the U.S. side envisage recording this regime as a formal document or as a verbal political commitment?

Perle said he wished to comment. Chervov is well aware of U.S. military programs and plans, as is Karpov. These plans had been developed throughout the current Administration in accordance with a treaty which it did not like. Despite criticism of the treaty, the President had instructed the Department of Defense to proceed with these plans in accordance with the treaty. This decision which was prompted by our sense of what the Soviet side was doing with respect to the SALT

Treaty, has changed but we have not begun any new weapons systems. As the Soviet side knows, a change in plans leading to new systems and creating conditions for an unlimited arms race is neither feasible nor desirable. If the sides are creative and expeditious in their work today, the direction of a new regime can be determined before the question of practical U.S. action not in accord with the SALT II Treaty arises. The U.S. side has not yet taken any such action. While it might be useful to discuss the question of uncontrolled competition, Perle feared to do so. We are ready, as Linhard had said, to explore ways to record and express this regime by any means the Soviet side suggests, although the shortest distance between the two points is the rapid completion of an agreement to replace SALT II. We have taken this view from the very beginning of this process. Some agreements last long after they are meant to, including SALT II, which was meant to expire last year. Perle thought that both sides knew that the only thing at issue here in the future was the introduction of weapons systems one side did not anticipate or a change in the schedule of dismantling. Perle did not think the Soviet side would find that a change in the destruction schedule has a major impact on the strategic relationship between us.

Nitze recalled that there was one outstanding question left regarding INF that Obukhov had asked. He would ask Glitman to answer it.

Karpov noted that it was time to leave for lunch at the DCM's Residence.

Ambassador Glitman repeated Obukhov's question regarding whether the U.S. is seeking a free hand in Asia while attempting to limit Soviet missiles. He said Obukhov's question is related to the concept of a freeze on the Soviet part because the statement made in Vladivostok by the General Secretary concerning the Soviet position on the increase or non-increase of SS-20s in Asia said that this is not conditional on anything. Therefore, the question of a free hand relates to the context of reductions on the part of the USSR in the non-European part of the Soviet Union.

Obukhov said he had asked a question about the U.S. position and was still awaiting an answer.

Glitman agreed. He said that in a situation where the Soviet side reduces its systems worldwide, the U.S. is prepared to limit its LRINF missiles globally. This would lead to limits on the capability to deploy systems elsewhere than in Europe. On the other hand, lower numbers on the Soviet side for systems outside of Europe would lead to lower numbers for the U.S. systems which could remain. Now Glitman would turn to the specific question of the so-called free hand for the U.S. In the context of an agreement assuring equality for both sides with respect to LRINF missiles in Europe, the sides should work together to allay

each other's concerns regarding LRINF missiles in Asia. Glitman said he was speaking of missiles, not of other nuclear delivery vehicles. He thought he should go no further than this in today's discussion, but the sides could return to this at their meeting in Washington.

Karpov said that as he understood Glitman, Glitman meant that if the Soviet Union reduces its missiles in Europe and Asia, the U.S. will reduce its deployments, including those in Asia. Does Glitman mean U.S. missiles in Asia? If so, does the U.S. take into account only its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union or also its strategic relationship with the Chinese People's Republic?

Glitman replied that the U.S. would be ready in the context of the agreement being discussed here to limit total numbers of U.S. LRINF missiles regardless of their location. This number would depend on adding the number of systems the sides agree upon for Europe to the reductions taken by the Soviet side outside of Europe. The sum of these two would comprise the global ceiling. The lower the number on the Soviet side, the lower the number for the U.S. side. Glitman thought this also provided an answer to Karpov's second question.

Karpov replied that it did not do so completely, but he thought now was a good time to stop. He asked how Nitze thought they should proceed—should they continue the discussion after lunch or end it now and go to lunch?

Nitze suggested continuing the discussion during lunch⁴ and then concluding the two days of talks. The U.S. would be in touch through diplomatic channels about the date for resuming these discussions in Washington. It would be important to work hard in the time left between now and then.

Karpov asked Nitze to keep in mind the time frame he had proposed for the Washington meetings.

Nitze said he would do so.

Karpov thanked him and adjourned the meeting.

⁴ No memorandum of conversation was found.

145. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 13, 1986

SUBJECT

Meeting with Secretary of Defense Weinberger On the Moscow Trip, August 13, 1986

I had an hour-long meeting with Secretary Weinberger. He was assisted by Ikke, Gaffney and Hanmer.

Two principal issues in the discussion related to his interpretation of the President's letter² versus my reading of what the letter, in fact, says.

Weinberger envisages that the offer immediately to conclude an agreement implies that that agreement will set up a regime beginning immediately which would differ radically from the regime provided for by the ABM Treaty; he thinks, this would promptly open the door to testing and development going beyond that permitted by the current ABM Treaty. I said that, as I read that portion of the President's letter, the contemplated agreement including "a treaty now" was to deal with the situation which would arise in the event the research program of either side reached a point (after a minimum of five years) at which that side had come to the conclusion that it wished to deploy an advanced SDI system; the contemplated treaty would obligate it to initiate negotiations for an agreement covering such deployment concurrent with an agreed program for the total elimination of ballistic missiles.

I further pointed out that the U.S. space/defense proposal in the letter was made contingent upon a concurrent agreement to begin radical and stabilizing reductions immediately and was not contingent upon either side's SDI research program being successful; it was for that reason I thought it essential that we concentrate promptly on our preparatory work concerning the agreement on the immediate reductions of offensive missiles and warheads.

There was a similar dispute between the two of us as to what was implied by the President's letter concerning "interim approach" to INF. He asserted that any such interim approach must include agreement

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret.

² See footnote 2, Document 139.

on an end point of zero/zero globally and a step-by-step program to attain that end point; in that context Cap claimed that “interim INF approach” referred to the initial steps of a program, all steps of which would have been agreed upon. I said I interpreted the word “interim” to imply that both sides would have stated an end objective of total elimination of LRINF missiles, but that the “interim approach” would deal only with the initial one or a few stages of reductions without requiring agreement on the specifics of the final step or steps to zero.

Otherwise our meeting was warm and friendly. Weinberger said that he had received a very favorable report from Perle³ on the conduct of the Moscow meeting.

³ Not found.

146. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 14, 1986

SUBJECT

Informal Conversations with Soviet Arms Control Experts Team

1. During consultations with arms control experts in Moscow on 11–12 August 1986, I held several informal conversations which are summarized below.

2. *Karpov.*

a. Karpov was friendly and forthcoming. He greeted me warmly at the opening of the talks. I sat to his immediate right at the Soviet official luncheon on 11 August. After exchanging pleasantries Karpov said the Soviets were sorry they had to fall back in START from the 50 per cent reductions goal to 30 per cent in order to accommodate the United States. I said his statement was a rationalization since we always were and still are committed to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Karpov asked how we could claim this when

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret. Drafted by Rowny. Rowny sent the memorandum to Nitze under cover of an August 14 handwritten note: “Paul, Here's a copy of my MFR. After you've had a chance to read it I'd like to talk to you. Ed.” (Ibid.)

we were proposing an agreement to accommodate a force of 15,000–20,000 “Zaryade” (nuclear weapons). I told him I didn’t know what he was talking about. He said that we were trying to create loopholes in a new START agreement, one of which would permit us to deploy 3,000 to 4,000 SLCMs and not have them counted in any way.

b. I told Karpov we were ready to place limits on nuclear SLCMs, but I consider the Soviet SLCM proposal seriously flawed. Asked why, I said that for openers the Soviets had said nothing about how a SLCM limit could be verified.

c. Karpov said the Soviets insist there must be some sublimit on SLCMs. I repeated that we were willing to limit nuclear SLCMs in one way or another but that the next step was for the Soviets to clarify how the limits would be verified. I reminded him of his talk with Senator Glenn who said he and many other senators would oppose any agreement which could not be verified. I asked Karpov if it would help if I talked to Generals Chervov and Detinov about SLCMs. He said, yes it would be useful, and that I should talk to both.

3. *Chervov.*

a. I sat next to Chervov at the US luncheon on August 12 and raised the question of SLCMs. At this point Perle sat down next to Chervov on the other side. Chervov immediately switched to a discussion with Perle about the offense-defense relationship. He asked Perle what the US expected the USSR to do if we went ahead with SDI deployments and the Soviets did not. Perle answered that what the Soviets did was their choice, but that strategic defenses were certainly nothing new to the Soviet Union. Chervov asked how we expected the development he described at the dacha to contribute to stability. Perle said that the simple reduction, and certainly the elimination, of ballistic missiles would strengthen strategic stability. As for other arms control aspects of SDI deployment, Perle said that I was better equipped to answer. I said that one of the principal US objectives is to seek a stable relationship at every step of the way in moving towards an offense-defense mix. I said this could be worked out during the two-year period following a decision, if it were made in or after 1991, that going along the path leading to the deployment of SDI was a good idea.

b. Chervov turned back to Perle and said that the US and USSR have different security needs and therefore require different weapons systems. Perle said he recognized this full well and that so long as there was an overall balance, the two sides did not need to mirror image one another. But a good place to start, Perle said, would be to drastically reduce ICBMs. Better yet, he said, we should agree on a schedule to eliminate ICBMs entirely.

c. Chervov asked Perle what he had meant earlier during his peroration when he referred to a modest deployment of SDI. Perle

explained that when ballistic missiles were reduced or eliminated, all either side would need was a modest defense to hedge against the possibility of a rapid breakout or as a defense against the small nuclear forces of third countries. At this point Detinov, who had been kibbitzing, said he wanted to talk to me.

4. *Detinov.*

a. Detinov immediately raised SLCMs. He parroted Karpov's theme that we were trying to create loopholes for building up to a level of 15,000 to 20,000 nuclear charges, and that one major loophole is for SLCMs. I told Detinov we were in no way trying to create any loopholes and that we were perfectly willing to limit nuclear SLCMs. Detinov asked how we proposed to verify such limits. I said we were expecting the Soviets to answer that question since they were the ones who had made the proposal.

b. Detinov asked if the US would agree to a sublimit on SLCMs. I said that I didn't understand in what context he meant his question, but if he was asking if the US was willing to limit nuclear SLCMs to a specific number we were certainly willing to do so.

c. Detinov shifted to SRAMs and bombs. "Were we willing to limit them, too?" I said, "yes," but certainly not by counting a SRAM or bomb carried by a heavy bomber as the equivalent of an SS-18 warhead. He asked me how I proposed to limit SRAMs and bombs. I said we needed to talk this one out; we might be able to limit them indirectly by limiting the number of heavy bombers. But, I said, there could be no progress at all, in my opinion, if there was any freedom to mix SRAMs and bombs and other nuclear weapons being limited. Time ran out. As he was leaving Detinov said he was looking forward to returning to the subject of SLCMs, SRAMs, and bombs when we meet in late August or early September in Washington.

5. *Tarasenko.*

I had several brief conversations with Tarasenko, who sat opposite me during the meetings. I told him he looked familiar. He reminded me that we had crossed paths in 1974 when I had been sent during a break in SALT II to negotiate TTBT and PNET in Moscow. He said he now was a special assistant to Shevardnadze. When I complimented him for attaining such a responsible position at such a young age, he told me he was over 50. I told him truthfully that he didn't look a day over 40.

6. *Obukhov.*

I had several short, non-substantive conversations with Obukhov. As we were leaving the luncheon on August 12, Obukhov said he was sorry we had not found time to talk substance. I said I too was sorry

about this since the first time I had heard the idea of an interim INF agreement was from him during the summit last November in Geneva.

147. Memorandum From the Chief Negotiator for the Defense and Space Talks (Cooper) to the Head of Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman)¹

Washington, August 14, 1986

SUBJECT

August 11, 12 Experts Meeting

I have reviewed the NODIS cables from the two-day meeting in Moscow. They only summarize the sessions; hopefully, the interpreters kept notes and will provide a more complete record of the conversations. Perhaps those records will clear up some of my misgivings about the implications of what transpired for our next round—but I'm sure they won't clear up all of them.

Non-withdrawal Framework

On the first day, Karpov commented that the U.S. appeared to have in mind a shorter period of time than the Soviet-proposed 15–20 year period of an agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This comment suggested that we had accepted the Soviet “non-withdrawal for n years” framework for an agreement and were only bargaining over the details. Chervov reinforced this suggestion on the second day.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, PREPARATION FOR 7 DWARVES—II, AUGUST/SEPT 1986. Secret. Cooper sent the memorandum to Linhard under cover of an August 15 handwritten note: “Bob—As you can see from the attached memo, I was not very impressed by the performance of the Seven Dwarfs—Even Richard is reported to have signaled acceptance of the Soviet framework. When last we met, I said I was not too concerned about ‘transition’ for Geneva next round. That has changed. Richard’s conversations have moved the ‘transition’ ball considerably and Detinov will likely probe further on the new items introduced by Richard. Given OSD’s leadership in moving ahead in this area—where they have previously resisted all efforts of enlightenment—perhaps you can prevail upon them to be a bit more forthcoming in the interagency activity so that the US Government can benefit from the wisdom accumulated behind their closed doors. Who knows, even the Seven Dwarfs might find it helpful to have a US Government position to back them up—Or, on the other hand, maybe you prefer ‘winging it.’ Hank” (Ibid.)

From the cables, it does not appear that we responded in any way to suggest the contrary. In fact, Perle is reported to have reinforced this perspective with his unfortunate formulation that “the U.S. was prepared to set aside—for a specified time period—its right of withdrawal under the ABM Treaty.” He is reported to have suggested this in the context of eliminating the ballistic missile threat, but not in the form of a condition—and that is not the President’s formulation for the first phase anyway. In response to Chervov’s questions on the second day, Nitze is reported to have reinforced Perle’s formulation that, for five years *after agreement* (the President’s letter says through 1991) “the U.S. would not exercise its right of withdrawal.” Nitze is reported to have then gone on to say that “only after two years of negotiation would there be a *reversion* to withdrawal on six months notice. He did clarify that the first five years would be under the Treaty without amendment.

New Formulation of the President’s Proposal?

On the second day, Nitze raised a specific question for the Soviets to consider with respect to each of the negotiating groups. (The Soviets said they would address them at the next “experts meeting.”) The DST question was:

—Can we jointly envision an agreement now that places the eventual deployment of defenses, after an interval during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect, in the context of the elimination of both sides’ ballistic missiles and the sharing of the benefits of such defenses? If yes, how long should the interval be during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect without amendment?

The formulation of this question captures the gist of the framework of the President’s proposal as formulated in his letter to Gorbachev,² but goes further to explicitly suggest that the timelines are negotiable. The President’s proposal is limited in time by his statement that the first phase would last “through 1991.” Why are we suggesting that the timetables are negotiable? I thought you agreed those in the President’s letter were already too long—and we now demonstrate that we cannot even hold the line for three weeks, even with Richard in the room.

Transition

Richard Perle has suddenly had great insights on “transition.” I hope OSD will now share with us the thoughtful analysis that they must have done to support his pronouncements that I am sure were not lost on Detinov. He has apparently thought through and has answers for the obvious questions relating to, among others:

² See Document 138.

- nth country nuclear arsenals;
- the role of forward-based systems;
- requirements for the conventional balance;
- the evolving role of heavy bomber cruise missiles and their associated defenses.

I would also welcome elaboration of the analysis supporting his novel idea that “the sharing of defenses that would accompany elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles would provide a formidable capability and powerful disincentive for others to keep ballistic missiles.”

Richard is reported to have acknowledged that all implications had not been thought through and then demonstrated this fact by giving the curious assurance that the “U.S. had no fixed notions but would refrain from moving to deployment while negotiating to achieve a cooperative move towards defenses—at each stage of the process both sides would have to be assured that their security was enhanced.” This assurance of a Soviet veto over our decision to deploy is notably different from and in contrast to the President’s proposal which calls for deployment after two years of negotiation and six-months warning if no agreement is reached.

Definitions

It is reported that Karpov also raised a question on the delineation between permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty. No response to this question is reported. It would have been helpful if someone had reinforced the negotiators’ (in Geneva) position that this is already well understood from the 1971 negotiating record; the Soviets are free to make new proposals, of course, but we consider the definition from the record to be quite adequate.

Space-based weapons of mass destruction

Karpov noted that there might be some common ground with respect to the U.S.-suggested guarantees on preventing offensive (i.e., space-to-earth or space-to-atmospheric) weapons in space and asked for specifics on what we had in mind. The cable does not indicate we responded in any way to clarify that the President’s letter referred to advanced space-based weapons designed to inflict mass destruction on the surface of earth—a much narrower subject then suggested by Karpov. Was there a tactical reason for not responding or were we just not prepared?

Conclusion

As you can see, I have my doubts that this recent meeting served our overall interest. I believe it demonstrates a real lack of preparation and coherence on our part. It gave the Soviets signals inconsistent with

the President's letter and pointed us toward negotiations in Geneva that Washington has not prepared us for—worse, that Washington has sought to direct us away from, claiming the U.S. Government was unprepared to discuss them.

If someone knows what we are trying to do (assuming there is a plan) I hope they tell me soon. We are a month from returning to Geneva. I don't think I am without creative abilities, but I am not clairvoyant—and from my vantage point, the scene is getting ridiculous.

148. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Preparations for Next Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round

Issue

To provide guidance for preparing for the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Facts

NST negotiations resume on 18 September. The United States will be expected to amplify on the proposals outlined in your recent letter to Gorbachev.² To preserve confidentiality, we have not distributed the letter to the agencies. In order to ensure adequate preparations for the NST talks, therefore, separate guidance from you is needed.

Discussion

The attached draft guidance NSDD draws on your letter to General Secretary Gorbachev and on the guidance for further development of nuclear testing alternatives contained in NSDD-233³ (which was never

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 093, NSDD 232. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Linhard. Copied to Bush and Regan. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner.

² Reference is to Document 138.

³ NSDD 233, "Consultations on a Response to General Secretary Gorbachev," which Reagan signed on July 31, was mainly comprised of the draft text for the arms control portion of Reagan's July 25 letter to Gorbachev (see Document 138). The NSDD also called for two studies on testing to be completed by August 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 233)

distributed since it essentially contains the letter's text). To ensure a coordinated approach, the NSDD also provides guidance to ensure you are informed in advance before any actual breach of SALT II limits occurs.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you sign the NSDD providing guidance for preparing for the next NST negotiating session. ⁴

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval. The NSDD is printed as Document 149.

149. National Security Decision Directive 232¹

Washington, August 16, 1986

PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) are scheduled to begin on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. This National Security Decision Directive provides guidance to assist in completing preparations for this upcoming negotiating session. (U)

START

In the area of strategic offensive nuclear forces, I remain firmly committed to seek the immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The central provision should be reduction of strategic ballistic missile warheads.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 232. Secret. Poindexter distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman, under cover of an August 16 memorandum: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the development of detailed instructions for the next round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks. Due to the sensitivity of this subject, this NSDD should be restricted to those who must have access in order to complete preparations for the upcoming negotiations." (National Security Council, Box SR 093, NSDD 232)

However, if necessary, I am prepared to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure. (S)

In this context, along with specific limits on ballistic missile warheads, we should be prepared to limit long-range air-launched cruise missiles to below our current plan, and to limit the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level in the range suggested by the Soviet side in June 1986. Such reductions should take into account differences among systems in a manner which enhances stability. These reductions should begin as soon as possible and be completed within an agreed period of time. (S)

INF

We should seek to deal with the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by agreeing on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide and by agreeing on immediate actions that would lead toward this goal in either one step, or, if the Soviets prefer, in a series of steps. Soviet reactions regarding intermediate range nuclear missile systems suggest to me that General Secretary Gorbachev and I were heading in the right direction last November when we endorsed the idea of an interim INF agreement. While an immediate agreement leading to the elimination of long range INF missile systems throughout the world would be the best outcome, an interim approach, on a global basis, may prove the most promising way to achieve early reductions. (S)

Both sides have now put forward proposals whose ultimate result would be equality at zero for our two countries in long range INF missile warheads. If we can also reach agreement that such equality is possible at a level above zero, we would take a major step towards the achievement of an INF agreement. We should seek such an interim agreement without delay. It is important that reductions begin immediately and that significant progress be achieved within an agreed period of time. (S)

DEFENSE AND SPACE

The United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage from its program of research into the feasibility of advanced strategic defenses. To ensure that neither the United States or the Soviet Union is in a position to do so, I would like to be prepared to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could

include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures. (S)

(b) Following this period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years. (S)

(c) If, following the initial period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side. (S)

The Soviets continue to express concern that research on advanced defensive systems could lead to the deployment of spaceborne systems designed to inflict mass destruction on earth. This is not our intention, nor is such an outcome a necessary result of such research. Although both nations are already party to agreements in force that address this subject, to further allay Soviet concerns I wish to be prepared, in the context of the approach outlined above, to have our representatives discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth. (S)

Significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses make sense only in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

ACTION

Instructions for the next round of NST negotiations shall be prepared based on the foregoing guidance. In addition, it is important that we ensure our progress in related areas is consistent. The following additional guidance is therefore provided: (C)

Nuclear Testing

In the area of nuclear testing, it is the long-standing U.S. position that a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent requires testing. Thus, while a ban on such testing remains a long-term U.S. objective, I cannot see how we could move to a complete ban under present circumstances. Our immediate objective remains prompt agreement on verification procedures to permit moving forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I believe, however, that following ratification of these treaties, we should be prepared to consider further limitations on nuclear testing in parallel with actual reductions in strategic nuclear arms. (S)

In order to be prepared for such consideration, I request the Department of Energy, assisted by the Department of Defense and other agencies as appropriate, to conduct a technical review, based on the work recently completed by the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG), of how a scheme involving a decreasing numerical quota of nuclear tests could be structured to preserve flexibility to conduct essential U.S. testing and provide for an acceptable level of verification. At the same time, I request the Department of Defense, assisted by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to resolve the policy issues associated with this scheme, as identified in the ACSG work, and to assess its potential impact upon the ability of the United States to meet its national security requirements. Both studies should be conducted on a close-hold basis and completed by September 8, 1986. Guidance on this point supercedes the suspense directed for such studies in NSDD 233 (distributed on a limited basis only). (S)

SALT II Numerical Limits

I remain fully committed to my May 27 decision² that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement was unequal, has expired and is also being violated by the Soviet Union. (U)

I indicated on May 27 that I intended to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response, without dismantling additional U.S. systems

² See footnote 3, Document 144.

as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Since the United States is retiring two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until that event near the end of this year. (U)

The Secretary of Defense is requested to inform me in advance of the exact timing of any action which would result in exceeding SALT II limits. (S)

SCHEDULE

In order to permit time for review and allied consultation as appropriate, specific proposals for instructions to the NST delegation, based on the foregoing guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

Ronald Reagan

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1986, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Ambassador P. Nitze
Ambassador M. Kampelman
Ambassador E. Rowny
Ambassador M. Glitman
Ambassador R. Lehman
Assistant Secretary R. Perle
Colonel R. Linhard
Mr. N. Clyne
Mr. M. Mobbs
Mr. B. Burton
Mr. P. Afanassenko, Interpreter

Soviet

Ambassador V. Karpov
Ambassador Y. Dubinin
Ambassador A. Obukhov
Colonel General N. Chervov
Lieutenant General N. Detinov
Mr. S. Chuvakhin
Mr. Y. Zolotov, Interpreter
Mr. A. Voytenkov, Interpreter

Ambassador Nitze opened the Friday, September 5 discussions by welcoming the Soviet delegation and its head, Ambassador Karpov.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

Before proceeding with the discussions Nitze allowed a group of press people to come in for a few minutes for a photo session.

Once the press had departed, Nitze welcomed the Soviet side to Washington, expressed his hope that the Soviet delegation had had a good trip from Moscow and thanked the Soviet side for the hospitality it had accorded the U.S. delegation on its last trip to Moscow.² Nitze said he looked to productive discussions in the next two days and hoped that it would allow for possibilities for progress at the next NST session in Geneva. Nitze said that as had been the case at the Moscow meeting, the U.S. side saw this meeting as an opportunity to assist the two Foreign Ministers when they met for the next time in September in Washington. Nitze said he did not see any need for going over old ground and explaining old positions. He said that at this session the sides were exploring the opportunity to achieve progress. Nitze said the U.S. side had carefully reviewed the record of the Moscow discussions and it believed that it had answered questions posed to it by the Soviet side. However, some of the questions that the U.S. side had asked of the Soviets, he believed, still remained to be answered. Nitze said he proposed the sides proceed with the program of today. Nitze said he wanted to stress the importance of these two days of discussions and of the next round which was to begin in Geneva on September 18. At this point, he turned the floor over to Ambassador Karpov.

Karpov thanked Nitze and said that the Soviet side was counting on U.S. hospitality to help in the Washington talks so that results could be achieved in this round of consultations, unlike the Moscow round where the Soviet side had offered practical solutions but which had not resulted in any agreement. Karpov said that, from the beginning, he would not set a tone but merely wanted to say that he could not agree to Nitze's assessment that results had been achieved at the previous meeting. He said that if the U.S. side's silence was meant to assure the Soviet side that progress had been made, this would not be sufficient. He said that the questions that the Soviets had posed in Moscow were still unanswered. Karpov said that the Soviet side had made very truly concrete suggestions as to ways of looking at the possibilities of preparing practical solutions for the upcoming September 19 meeting of the Foreign Ministers. He said that the Soviets had suggested ways of looking at comprehensive solutions in the following way: First, for the sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years while reducing by approximately 30% strategic offensive arms. Karpov said that this Soviet proposal had not met with any positive reaction from the U.S. side and it left the question of how the U.S. side

² See Documents 142, 143, and 144.

was going to view in a practical way this Soviet proposal in preparation for the next meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet side had expressed its willingness to look at all of the details involved in the non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years, as well as looking at the details of strategic offensive reductions. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss possible compromises and it had told this to the U.S. side. Practically speaking, the three questions asked by the U.S. side at the last session were not truly questions in their essence. In fact, said Karpov, this was merely a way of setting forth U.S. positions in the form of questions on issues of interest to the U.S. side. Karpov proceeded to formulate the premises for the U.S. approach to various issues as the Soviet side perceived them. Karpov said that essentially the U.S. side presented the relevant concepts in the same way as they were approached by the U.S. side in the NST. Karpov said that the sides could continue speaking about each of these concepts; that the sides could discuss large concepts at length; that the sides could discuss each in detail; however, he said that we would like to discuss in general terms these large issues and how they appear today.

Regarding the ABM Treaty, Karpov said he would like to think that the sides were rather close in their attitudes on treaty compliance. In this regard, he said the Soviets' suggestions were set forth when it proposed non-withdrawal for a period of 15–20 years from the ABM Treaty, meaning that the sides would assume an obligation for such a non-withdrawal. Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to view such an obligation in the context of all of its details and from the perspective of limits on allowed and disallowed activities in the ABM Treaty area if such a detailed review were called for. He said the Soviet side believed very strict compliance with the ABM Treaty included avoiding those prohibited actions such as work on systems such as space-based systems and implementing the reductions of offensive weapons which had been a prerequisite of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, the Soviet side was ready to discuss with the U.S. side a solution that would detail such an obligation on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Karpov said that he meant that the sides would not carry out activities outside of laboratories—activities not allowed by the ABM Treaty with respect to prohibited systems. Karpov said that it was the Soviet side's desire that the sides take upon themselves the obligation not to exercise the right to withdraw from the Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. Karpov said that in this context the sides could discuss reductions in strategic offensive arms and agree to reduced levels in a way that the security interests of both sides would be assured. Karpov said that on June 11,³ the Soviet side had made appropriate proposals

³ See Document 134.

in the NST and that these proposals were still in force and he would not repeat them. He said that the U.S. side was aware of these Soviet proposals. Karpov wanted to add that the Soviet side was ready to explore possibilities within the framework of those proposals in order to take into account the views of the U.S. side if the U.S. side wishes to have its views taken into account. He said that he wanted to note that the June 11 proposals took into account two U.S. objections to early versions of Soviet proposals: first was the Soviet side's acceptance of the idea that medium-range missiles capable of reaching the territory of the other side be discussed separately; second, the Soviet side willingness to take into account the U.S. objection to a full ban on all types of cruise missiles of any basing mode. Karpov said that the Soviet side had agreed to allow for a limited deployment of long-range ALCMs and SLCMs. Long-range ground-based cruise missiles could be discussed along with other issues in INF. Karpov said that in this manner the Soviet plan could be discussed in order to move the sides closer together on specific elements. Karpov said that, for example, the Soviet side was ready to review the possibility of limiting ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to 1600 units. It was ready to limit the weapons on ICBMs, SLBM, and heavy bombers to a total of 8000 units. Karpov said that in such a case the question of concern to the Soviet side of long-range SLCMs could be discussed separately. However, the limit on these types of systems is needed in order to provide for stability in the strategic relationship and in order that agreements not be circumvented. He said that this was necessary in order that limits of future agreements not be exceeded. Karpov said that there was a need to provide strict verification to assure that provisions of future agreements would be met and that the sides would be confident that agreements are complied with.

With respect to medium-range missiles, Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to discuss a separate solution for U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe—a solution not tied to ABM Treaty compliance or agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. He said that here, the Soviet side was ready to consider a temporary interim solution which could set up an agreement for a limited period of time with equal limits on the medium-range missiles in Europe of both sides. Karpov said that such a version of an interim solution could be discussed where the U.S. and Soviet sides, for a limited period of time, could have 100 nuclear weapons on their medium-range missiles in Europe. In this manner, the U.S. side could have 25 weapons on their cruise-missile launchers and the Soviet side could have 33 weapons on their SS-20 launchers. The Soviet missiles in the Asian portion of Soviet territory would be frozen at the current level. The question of significantly reducing shorter- range missiles could be dealt with later.

Karpov said that such a practical agreement could be achieved in the soonest possible time and the Soviet side would be prepared to discuss this with the U.S. side. Karpov said that the Soviet believed such an agreement could be arrived at now, in time for the September 19 Ministerial meeting. Karpov said that these were the practical answers to the U.S. sides questions posed at the last session.

Karpov added that one other issue of the greatest importance should be discussed in order that the Foreign Ministers meeting could be a success. He said that the cessation of nuclear testing was what he wanted to raise. He said that the U.S. side knows full well that the Soviet Union once again announced an extension of its moratorium on nuclear testing to January 1, 1987 and that it had asked the U.S. to join it and follow its example in stopping testing. Karpov said that he had a direct instruction from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that he, Karpov, raise this issue at today's meeting. Karpov said that Shevardnadze attaches the greatest importance to the discussion of this issue and intends to discuss it also in his meeting with the Secretary of State. Karpov said that the Soviet side is prepared to come to an agreement with the U.S. regarding a joint agreement on a bilateral basis which would provide that the sides take upon themselves the obligation not to test nuclear weapons. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss all verification measures to assure that all of the provisions of such an agreement are being carried out. Karpov said that at the start of the first round of consultations, the U.S. had spoken of new approaches, new solutions, and that the test ban could be such a solution. Karpov said that verification systems could include things like: national technical means, seismic means, and international measures of checking on compliance. He said that the Soviet side had even agreed to a proposal by the Delhi Six countries to help verify a nuclear test ban. Karpov said that they were prepared to establish an experts group which would include the U.S., the Soviet Union and the Delhi Six countries to consider verification measures in detail. He noted that such a test ban had been a subject of discussion in bilateral talks as well as in the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet side, for example, believes that it is important that progress be achieved in the exchange of seismic data to assist in the verification of a test ban. The Soviet side is also ready to proceed in the direction of setting up a dependent verification system. The Soviet side proposes to agree even now in order to come up with an agreement in principle assuming that the U.S. and USSR are both prepared to find a solution in which the test ban would be carried out under the strictest international verification measures.

Karpov said that the U.S. side knows very well that General Secretary Gorbachev, in his discussions with President Reagan, had expressed his willingness to sign a relevant agreement on this issue.

Therefore, said Karpov, the Soviet side is proposing to discuss this issue in order to recommend it to the Foreign Ministers for discussion. This was the whole range of issues that the Soviet side wanted to discuss in Washington for these two days in order to work out practical recommendations for the Foreign Ministers. Karpov said that in the Soviet view the meeting of Foreign Ministers was a key element of the discussion of questions that would come up at the summit. Karpov said that today's meeting was key in the preparation of subjects for the summit between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The Soviet side attaches great meaning to success at the summit and wishes to reach an accord on this important question. Karpov said that the Soviet side is prepared to work, and told Nitze that this was what he wanted to say in his opening remarks.

Nitze responded by stating that he was not surprised but disappointed by what he heard from Karpov. He said that the Moscow meeting foreshadowed this Soviet approach in the sense that the Soviet side says it wants to take practical steps in these negotiations by starting with Soviet proposals and not U.S. proposals. He said he had heard nothing about U.S. proposals; that there was no reference to the President's letter. Incidentally, were there going to be answers from General Secretary Gorbachev to the President's letter?

Karpov said that indeed there would be an answer to the President's letter and, to a significant degree, the nature of the answer would depend on how the present consultations ended up.

Returning to the substance of the talks, Nitze wanted to comment on Karpov's statements. He said that Karpov's words contained very little in addition to what had been contained in previous presentations and the discussions that had been held previously in Geneva. There was nothing new with respect to a nuclear test moratorium and he suggested that the sides could return to this question later. Nitze said that on the issue of START, there was nothing new; on Defense and Space there was nothing new; whereas, on INF, there was something new mainly the number of 100 weapons not mentioned previously. Nitze said that at first glance what the Soviets were proposing was 100 RVs on cruise missiles for the U.S. and 100 RVs on SS-20 missiles for the Soviet Union. He said he heard nothing at all concerning missiles in Asia. Regarding the ABM Treaty he understood the Soviets to be proposing maintaining the ABM Treaty and not making any changes in the Treaty, but there would be an agreement not to withdraw from the Treaty for 15 years, an issue which Article XV of the Treaty is aimed at addressing. This, said Nitze, would be a change in the Treaty. Nitze proposed that the way to proceed would be to break the discussion into parts, starting with INF, an area of great interest and an area where he said he detected something new.

Karpov said that apparently Nitze had not listened carefully to what he said either on the ABM Treaty or on START. Karpov said that he had spoken about reaching an agreement on full compliance with the Treaty for a period of 15 years by the sides' assuming an additional obligation of non-withdrawal—not changing anything in the Treaty the way it is now. Regarding strategic offensive arms, Karpov wanted to point out that the Soviet side was offering 1600 units of delivery vehicles to include ICBMs, SLBM, and heavy bombers where the number of weapons on these would be limited to 8000 units. This would include RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as weapons on heavy bombers, including long-range cruise missiles. Karpov said that a separate agreement to limit sea-based long-range cruise missiles could be arrived at. Such an offer took into account the U.S. position where it objected to the idea that the total number of weapons also include sea-based cruise missiles. Karpov said that the Soviet side had made a large concession to the U.S. side. He said that it was not clear to him why his presentation contained nothing new.

Ambassador Glitman said that in posing its question on INF in Moscow, the U.S. side was not attempting to repeat our position, but to determine from the Soviet answer whether the sides were in the same ball park on this question. He wanted to answer Karpov's comments in that light. He said that since the question was short he would repeat it. At this point Glitman read the INF question as stated at the Moscow meeting:

Can we promptly reach a separate, interim agreement on INF missiles which results in equal levels on LRINF missile systems in Europe at some level above zero, while also making proportional reductions elsewhere in the world, resulting in an equal worldwide ceiling on LRINF warheads worldwide?

Glitman said on the plus side both sides were now speaking of a separate and interim agreement on LRINF and with an equal level of warheads on the number of their LRINF systems in Europe. The Soviet proposals on limiting or freezing Soviet LRINF in Asia at current levels follows a $\frac{1}{2}$ plus, $\frac{1}{2}$ minus category. There is a $\frac{1}{2}$ plus because there is a recognition that Soviet missiles in Asia do have an impact on a possible INF agreement and there is a $\frac{1}{2}$ minus because there still appears no readiness to reduce these missiles. Glitman said that the Soviet suggested interim solution would be for a limited time and as he wanted to better understand the suggestion he would like to know at what level the Soviet side would freeze its missiles in Asia. In addition, he wanted to better understand what period of time the Soviet side has in mind when it talks about "limited time." Glitman also asked what Karpov had in mind when he said short-range INF missiles were to be dealt with later. Here Glitman said he had no more questions,

simply other points to make. The first, noting that Karpov had mentioned verification in regard to START but not in regard to INF, was to confirm that the Soviet side would treat verification in the area of INF with the same importance as START. He said he hoped it would, as verification is an important issue for the U.S. Secondly, for now he wished to put aside the question of the mix of systems that Nitze had referred to.

On the question of overall limits or a freeze on missiles in Asia, Karpov said that now the Soviet missiles in Asia have been frozen for some time and will not be raised in number above today's level. He asked what sense it made to discuss SRINF missiles now if the sides were ready to discuss SRINF systems with a range of less than 1000 kilometers after a decision on an interim agreement had been reached. He asked whether Glitman could clarify this for him. On the issue of verification, Karpov said that the Soviet side proposed verification in the interim agreement and would be prepared to review in detail and with great care verification in other areas in the same way as it deals with verification in START.

Karpov continued by saying that he would also like to address the interim agreement on INF since the U.S. has expressed its desire to discuss the question of INF limitations in Europe as well as equalizing the number of RVs on medium-range missiles. Karpov said that if the U.S. is ready to reach an agreement on INF in Europe, he would be ready to discuss the idea of not going above the number of missiles capable of reaching the territory of the other side and that the U.S. would have the right, in terms of the numbers of RVs, to have medium-range missiles not greater than the number of Soviet missiles in Asia. However, these U.S. missiles would have to be located on the territory of the continental U.S. but not in Alaska.

Glitman went back to the first issue that Karpov had raised, the question Karpov had not answered. He told Karpov that the question he had not answered was at what levels the Soviet side would be willing to freeze its Asian missiles. He said it would be useful to know this Soviet level to evaluate the Soviet proposal.

Karpov interjected by saying that the Soviet freeze would be at today's level and if necessary he would provide the specific number at a later time. He said it was really more important now to say that the Soviet side was prepared not to increase the number of SS-20s in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union. Glitman retorted that, of course, this could be discussed when appropriate, however he wanted to ask the same question one more time because this was an appropriate moment. He said that Karpov had the specific number and that if the U.S. side is to have a better understanding of global limits, it would be very useful to have this number. He said that if Karpov could not

provide the specific number now, he should say so, and we could go on with the discussions.

Karpov said that he simply did not bring this number with him from Moscow and wondered if it was really that important. He said that in principle the sides could get along without this number at this stage of the game. Glitman said he understood and went on to say that the U.S. proposal was based upon proportional reductions. Moving to the shorter-range INF issue, Glitman said he wanted to know what Karpov meant by his phrase "after an interim agreement." He said that this caused a serious problem because, although the U.S. side believed in constraints on shorter-range INF missiles, it wanted to impose such restraints concurrently with those on longer-range INF missiles. He added that the Soviet side knew the reasons for this very well. Basically, Glitman said, this was aimed at not undercutting the effectiveness of a future agreement. Speaking personally, Glitman said that if the sides are able to arrive at such an agreement, there could be follow-on negotiations that included these systems and he added that without additional agreements on SRINF constraints the effectiveness of the interim INF agreement would be undermined. Glitman said the U.S. side had offered two ways of reaching a solution. If the Soviet Union was ready to discuss reductions at a later date it should also be ready to agree to constraints on them now. Glitman said that for the U.S. side this was a fundamental point.

Karpov said that he thought the Soviet solution for an interim agreement was a sufficiently weighty contribution without also bringing in other things such as shorter-range issues. Glitman said we were not seeking to complicate the issue, but SRINF missiles were part of the INF problem and could not be dealt with "later."

At this point Nitze announced a 5–10 minute coffee break, during which time various groups of participants spoke in an informal fashion.

Nitze returned to the discussions by saying that he felt that some progress had been made in clarifying INF issues. He then invited Ambassador Lehman to talk on the subject of START. Lehman said that our two countries had discussed many issues for many years and the U.S. side understands that discussions can be held in a long or short form while presenting each side's points of view. He said he would like to continue the business-like tone in which the discussions were proceeding and would like to get to specific questions. He said that there are big questions and specific questions. At the last meeting in Moscow, the sides had asked big questions. He said that it was possible to reach agreements on arms reductions that recognize and take into account differences in weapons systems and that such recognition can enhance stability. He said that he wished to go from this way of speaking to more specific questions before the sides today. Lehman

said that when the sides talk to each other they often talk in shorthand or in other code in order to be efficient in their discussions. For example, he said that in the June 11 proposal, the Soviet proposal on SLCMs was expressed in a short, brief fashion. He wanted to apologize for the way in which he asked his question in a shorthand manner but said that he would return to it later.

Lehman said that the Soviet side knew the U.S. position on SLCMs, that they were not central to our dealings at the negotiations. The question of verification, however, is serious. Lehman said that he did not want SLCMs to become an obstacle to reaching an agreement on offensive forces. He said it was not necessary that the sides talk about SLCMs at this time. Of all nuclear systems mentioned above, said Lehman, the SLCM issue could be eliminated. Lehman recalled that the Soviets separately said that now certain systems should be put off until later but must be included ultimately to avoid circumvention of a possible agreement. He asked for a clarification of this.

Karpov said that if one were not to limit long-range cruise missiles then there was a chance that they would grow and be deployed in an unrestrained manner. This would include the unrestrained growth and deployment of weapons on nuclear delivery vehicles. Therefore, it was the belief of the Soviet side that limits on long-range SLCMs are a substantial element in any START agreement. That is why the Soviet side had early on offered to include these types of SLCMs in the numbers allowed for each side. Karpov said that since the U.S. saw difficulties with this situation, the Soviet side agreed to discuss and reach agreement on long-range SLCMs separately, on the premise that each side have levels numerically equal and that both sides agree to discuss them.

Lehman asked whether it was correct that the number of 8000 in the June 11 proposal was still in force. Karpov responded in the affirmative. Lehman then asked whether or not a separate SLCM agreement would be on numbers outside of the 8000 units. Again Karpov said that that was correct. In regard to intermediate-range systems in the June 11 proposal, Lehman said that INF talks had been carried out; however, there were no specifics in the June 11 proposal that our side would freeze these missiles unilaterally based on the levels in effect on September 1, 1985. Here Lehman asked for a clarification from the Soviet side. Karpov queried as to what Lehman specifically meant when he talked about the U.S. freezing LRINF missiles at the level of September 1, 1985, to which Lehman said that this was a date suggested by the Soviet side. Karpov explained that the Soviet side used the date of September 1, 1985 as a date from which to count the numbers of units capable of reaching the territory of the other side. He said that when the Soviet side talks of 50% reductions it takes an arbitrary figure

of 3300 units which include the intermediate-range nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side and from that ends up with a number of U.S. units equivalent to 1650. He said the Soviet side spoke of the number of units based on the September 1, 1985 date and separately spoke of those U.S. systems deployed after 1985. These post-1985 units would also be reduced but would be reduced, so to speak, even beyond the first series of reductions, namely, the pre-September 1, 1985 units. Overall, the reduced level would give the U.S. 1650 units.

Further, regarding the non-increase in INF systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side, Karpov said the June 11, 1986 proposal did not choose a date, but called only for not increasing the numbers that actually existed at that time. Lehman asked whether or not those elements of the Soviet proposal remained unchanged and asked for a comment. Karpov said that, in fact, this is what the Soviet side maintains and it continues to speak on behalf of the following two proposals. First, that the 50% reductions would proceed from the counts of September 1, 1985 and second, that the June 11, 1986 proposal on an interim START agreement and an agreement on INF would presuppose, say, approximately 30% reductions. In discussing both of these propositions, Karpov said that, yes, the Soviet side is talking about the same thing.

Lehman said that the Soviet side understands the U.S. position and there is no need to repeat it at the present time; the U.S. side believes our systems are in Europe to defend NATO and not to act as offensive systems. He added that it is our hope that the Soviet Union would show the same kind of constraint in regard to its own systems aimed at NATO. Lehman said that U.S. efforts in the START negotiations are not encumbered by these systems and that there is no productive way of dealing with this question within START. For this, we have the INF talks which are ongoing. Lehman quoted the Soviet side as having said that limits on heavy bombers would include limits on the cruise missiles on such heavy bombers. He asked whether or not this was a specific limit on ALCMs.

Karpov said that the role of U.S. medium-range missiles needs no comment. He said that the U.S. side knows the Soviet position on this role and that he would not spend time discussing it. However, Karpov said that the Soviet side cannot close its eyes to the fact that they are in Europe and cannot accept the claim that such missiles are needed in carrying out U.S. obligations to NATO. Karpov said that NATO obligations and other claims have no bearing on the Soviet side. Facts remain facts and the fact is that these missiles are still there. He suggested that the sides go on to discuss how these missiles would affect the solution to strategic weapons.

Moving on, Karpov said that Lehman had asked a specific question on the number of cruise missiles. In response to the question Karpov said the Soviet side did not want a separate sublimit on ALCMs. There should be no more than 60% of the total of nuclear weapons on any category of strategic offensive arms. Karpov said that this was also true of ALCMs. But, bearing in mind the U.S. side's request to set strict limits on ballistic missiles and on their warheads, the Soviet side is prepared to say that regarding ICBMs and SLBMs no more than 80–85% of the total number of warheads would be on them.

Lehman continued by asking whether he understood Karpov correctly when the latter spoke of SLCMs and nuclear delivery vehicles. He reiterated Karpov's contention that 1600 would be the limit on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and he asked whether this applied to SLCM carriers or other systems. Karpov agreed that the 1600 number referred to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and that the overall number of 8000 units was the ceiling on the weapons on such delivery vehicles. Lehman continued by saying that was it not true that the 60% sublimit would stay on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers but that an added limit of 80–85% of warheads would apply only to the sum of RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs. Karpov said that this was correct. Lehman asked whether or not the 60% figure applied to ALCMs, to which Karpov replied that the ALCMs would be included in the overall number of warheads that were carried on heavy bombers.

Lehman said that, as Karpov knew, the U.S. position on gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles was that they should not be included. He said that the differences in military capabilities of these as opposed to ballistic missile warheads would in fact have some implication. He said that the U.S. side was ready to discuss the issue of ALCMs but that the U.S. side felt that differentiation of weapons systems in past arms control agreements was based upon real military considerations. In SALT I there was no inclusion of heavy bombers and the weapons on such heavy bombers were not dealt with at all. In SALT II there was an agreement on specific limits on heavy bombers but no limits on bomber loading. He said this was true also with regard to strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits. Lehman said that where we get into trouble is when we begin to compare short-range attack missiles with the capabilities of defensive systems designed to defend against them. He said that the short range missiles were slow just like bombers but that their yield was much different than the yield of warheads on ballistic missiles. He said that he could go on at length discussing this, but military people know the differences between these systems.

Karpov said that he did not want to get into a theoretical discussion at the present time and would not argue with Lehman. He simply

wanted to correct Lehman. Karpov said that SALT I had not discussed heavy bomber limits. SALT II had discussed heavy bomber limits, but the overall number of nuclear weapons on such bombers was not the goal of the SALT II agreement. Now, however, the sides must discuss all strategic systems and strategic systems must include ballistic missile weapons as well as heavy bomber weapons. Lehman said that he did not disagree on what the previous treaties included. Each side understood the position of the other side. However, as an example, he wanted to look at short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs versus the capabilities of slow bombers. Lehman said that there were elements such as alert rates, dual missions, defenses and different payload ranges. He said that in this regard the question of verification becomes complicated. Lehman said that, in the past, ways had been found to deal with these questions and these ways are still appropriate. Lehman said that Karpov had gotten to the big questions which lie ahead and which were raised at the last meeting. However, he did not want to stop Karpov from continuing his analysis, namely, how to find practical ways to consider differences in systems in our agreements.

At this point, General Chervov entered the discussion by saying that it was not possible to use arguments such as "slow-flying" or "slow-falling," or by using short-range missiles, which are super-fast, as examples. He said that we cannot allow the huge number of warheads that exists today not to be counted. Chervov said that military men know about nuclear attacks and how these can be used as a first strike; they know each type of strategic weapon and the capabilities of each, including short-range missiles, nuclear bombs, and other weapons currently used to equip heavy bombers. He said that it would not be correct to use the differences in planning a strategic situation. He said that one could not but take into account such things as heavy bomber loading. Chervov said that there are also military actions that do not use nuclear weapons. In such a case, heavy bombers with all of their payloads would now become very crucial. Chervov said that one cannot avoid taking such things into account. He added that for military people it is inconceivable how such weapons could be excluded from an arms control agreement. He said that if Lehman had some weighty arguments, the Soviet side could listen. However, for instance, short-range missiles are intended to overcome air defenses in a first strike. It is simply not an argument to say that short-range missiles have no meaning. He said that to deal with these carelessly would be out of the question. Lehman concluded by saying that he had many such questions that he would like to discuss but due to the press of time he would give the floor back to the chairman.

Nitze said that it was his recollection that in discussing the questions and answers earlier, Karpov had said that one cannot ignore the

long-range INF missiles in Europe within the START negotiations and that since the missiles were there they must be accounted for. Nitze said it seemed to him that Karpov was making the argument that, within the START context, these missiles must be included. However, said Nitze, Karpov was excluding the Soviet weapons that Amb. Lehman had referred to. Nitze said that this was a one-sided approach. Nitze continued that if Karpov said that LRINF missiles were there then let's admit it but so are the Soviet missiles. That cannot be denied. Nitze said that such argumentation was not pertinent in these consultations. He said that the real issue was that both U.S. and Soviet weapons should be dealt with and they should be reduced radically, maybe even to zero. Both sides had expressed such an intention. But to say that the weapons of only one side should be counted seemed typical of Karpov's line of argumentation. Nitze referred then to another point of logic in General Chervov's presentation when Chervov had commented on the fact that one cannot ignore short-range missiles and gravity bombs on whatever number of bombers there were. Nitze said that no one denies the fact they do exist. However, neither can one deny the reason for them. The reason, said Nitze, was to penetrate air defenses. He said that it was true that air defenses had not been limited. In SALT I, the U.S. said that air-defenses must be limited, in addition to bombers and weapons. Nitze said Chervov had a legitimate concern when he said that bombers could be used in strictly conventional situations. Circumstances might arise where the U.S. and USSR were not in conflict; we then agreed that there might be other needs for air defenses than protecting against strategic attack. Nitze said that the Soviet Union would not agree during SALT I that air defenses should be limited. They said that strategic attacks are not necessarily the same as tactical attacks. Nitze said the fact remains that the sides never had an agreement to limit air defense. The U.S. continues to maintain that in the absence of limitations on air defenses, weapons that are necessary to penetrate air defenses should not be limited. Nitze said that in order to bring his second point to a conclusion he was not proposing to ignore bombers and bomber weapons. The sides do need to discuss numbers of bombers. More importantly, other armaments on bombers are more affected by air defenses than are ALCMs. Nitze said that we need to establish strict limits on ALCMs. The U.S. side proposes a limit 50% below its planned ALCMs.

Nitze said that going back to Lehman's points, the differences between weapons is important. He said he strongly believed in that argument. He said that it was not a good argument to point to the increasing importance of short-range missiles and gravity bombs. Nitze said that the U.S. side does not equate the capabilities of a Titan missile with the capabilities of warheads on Poseidon submarines or on bomb-

ers. They have capabilities that are quite different. The difference between Poseidons on submarines and missiles on our newer submarines is significant. Nitze said that the U.S. side does take into account differences. In an agreement the sides will have to grapple with this. Nitze asked Karpov if the Soviet side would be willing to let the U.S. select the types of Soviet weapons that would come under discussion for reduction. He said he would be amazed if the Soviet side would agree to this. The U.S. side would certainly never agree to something like this. Differences in capabilities must be taken into consideration. Nitze told Karpov that he thought the Soviet side would believe the same thing.

At this point, Amb. Nitze closed the morning discussions and turned the floor over to Mr. Clyne who outlined the plans for lunch and the logistics for the afternoon session.

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1986, 3–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Maynard Glitman
Ambassador Ronald Lehman
Assistant Secretary R. Perle
Colonel Robert Linhard
Mr. M. Mobbs
Mr. Norman Clyne
Mr. Bruce Burton
Mr. D. Arensburger

Soviet

Ambassador Y. Dubinin
Ambassador V. Karpov
Ambassador A. Obukhov
Col. Gen. N. Chervov
Lt. Gen. N. Detinov
Mr. S. Chuvakhin
Mr. Ye. Zolotov (Int.)

Ambassador Nitze offered Ambassador Karpov the opportunity to open the discussion this afternoon. Karpov said he wanted to continue

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Drafted on September 6 by Arensburger.

where we had left off in the morning, that is, on the U.S. side's remark that it was opposed to selective arms limitation. Karpov liked that thought very much. This was precisely what the Soviet side was suggesting. It was consistent with the Soviet thesis that we should aim not at selective arms limitation but at halting the arms race, that is, at achieving genuine arms reduction and limitation with respect to both strategic and medium-range arms, accompanied by guarantees that there would be no arms race in space. Karpov asked the U.S. side to adhere to this standpoint in examining the proposals tabled by the Soviet side at NST, as well as the additional proposals which the Soviet side had presented today.

Karpov said that he also wanted to draw Nitze's attention to the Soviet side's statements about the feasibility of, and the need for, halting nuclear arms tests by way of the first of those measures which could be considered and agreed upon at the upcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers. At the present negotiating round, consultations or working meetings—he did not think it was important what he called these discussions, as long as they were productive—the Soviet side was ready to prepare results of the kind which could be recommended for use by the Foreign Ministers on September 19, 1986. Moreover, the Soviet side was ready to discuss in specific terms how to prepare that kind of recommendation to our Foreign Ministers. Therefore, Karpov suggested that we view everything discussed today from that standpoint, and that we take a look at what could be considered by the Foreign Ministers, i.e., that, where possible, we provide recommendations on solutions to questions.

Karpov, turning to the question of the ABM Treaty, said that perhaps we would be able to recommend to our Foreign Ministers not to avail ourselves of the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a minimum of 15 years. In this connection, we were not talking about any change to the Treaty. Rather, we had in mind an additional agreement not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the understanding that this period of time would be used for carrying out major reductions in strategic nuclear arms in such a way that the two sides would have the necessary guarantee of stability in the strategic situation.

Nitze wished to say a few words with respect to Karpov's overall proposition, after which he would turn to Karpov's specific question. He thought he might also ask Ambassador Glitman to deal with the same area from the standpoint of the INF negotiations and Ambassador Lehman from the standpoint of the START negotiations. With respect to Karpov's overall introductory sentence, Nitze welcomed the Soviet side's objection to a selective approach to arms limitation as opposed to what Karpov had termed real reductions and guarantees of no arms

race in space. We believe that this was inherent to the approaches of both sides and coincided with the agreement between Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki. Nitze believed that we should deal with our subject in this way. It was our firm position that reductions should be real and that they should expand over time. The U.S. side was prepared to consider interim reductions, but interim reductions should constitute an interim step toward deep reductions. The U.S. position was geared toward that very concept, namely, deep reductions, leading eventually to a situation in which all nuclear arms could be eliminated.

Nitze went on to say that the U.S. side would regret it very much if we were to concentrate on extraneous “practical measures” which failed to take into account the long-term objective. To repeat, the U.S. was not opposed to interim measures, but such measures had to be directed toward the long-term objective. In particular, Nitze would note that the President’s letter had set forth our side’s views on what the Soviet side called an arms race in space. The President’s letter suggested a way in which we could move forward together toward a world in which ballistic missiles could be eliminated and in which there would be no need for substantial defenses in space. Defenses in general would be geared to preventing others from upsetting the regime we had established, that is, a regime in which we would be moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. Nitze suggested that we discuss the question of nuclear testing raised by the Soviet side later and that we first continue with questions related to the NST negotiations per se. Specifically, Nitze wanted to turn to Karpov’s direct question concerning the ABM Treaty and the Soviet side’s suggested provision on not exercising the right of withdrawal from that Treaty while concentrating on deep reductions of strategic arms. Referring to a prepared text, Nitze said:

“When I addressed this subject at our Moscow meeting, I initially indicated that the President’s letter provided, in effect, that the U.S. would set aside its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five or more years. Subsequently, to avoid misunderstanding, I read the relevant sentences from the actual letter. It refers to a time when, if a number of events have earlier taken place, each side would be free to deploy advanced defenses.

“Those events are: First, passage of the year 1991; second, that one of the parties has decided that advanced defenses are feasible and that it wishes to proceed toward deployment; third, that that party has offered a plan for sharing the benefits of this system and eliminating the offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides. If there were no agreement by the two sides after two years of negotiation on such a plan, either side would be free to deploy unilaterally after giving six months’ notice.

“Thus, the President’s letter does not contemplate any change or restriction in Article XV of the Treaty. It contemplates an additional treaty negotiated now which would look forward, after 1991, to a negotiation looking toward the elimination of all ballistic nuclear missiles and a transition to the introduction of advanced defenses.”

Nitze then asked Ambassador Glitman to discuss INF.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1987.]

Nitze suggested that serious differences remained. In his introductory remarks, Karpov had referred to consensus between the sides on a temporary or interim agreement. Nitze thought that both sides favored an interim agreement, but the U.S. side did not wish a temporary agreement. The U.S. side was in favor of an agreement of indefinite duration until it was superseded by an agreement on more radical reductions. Next, there were serious differences with respect to SRINF. This was not a new issue, though Karpov had suggested that it introduced a complication. As he recalled, this had been a serious part of the INF negotiations since 1980. We needed a solution here even before an interim agreement was concluded. The question of mix also needed to be discussed. Nitze suggested that the Soviet side think about these matters overnight; we could return to them for a short period of time tomorrow and then go on to other questions which also needed to be discussed.

Karpov, noting Nitze’s departure at this point, expressed the hope that Nitze, as well as the other members on the U.S. side, would also give some thought to what had been presented today by the Soviet side, specifically, on what the Soviet side had said about the possibility of concluding an interim agreement with respect to medium-range missiles. Today the Soviet side had taken a number of steps forward and expected reciprocity on the U.S. side.

Ambassador Kampelman, who had taken Nitze’s seat, said that in a way he was in the process of demonstrating the difference between an interim agreement and a temporary agreement. He, Kampelman, was not an interim chairman but a temporary one. Nitze would be resuming the chairmanship. Kampelman suggested that we look more toward an interim agreement which would provide for greater stability. Of course, the U.S. side intended to review and ponder all that had transpired today though, of course, the day was not yet over. He thought that the sides had engaged in a fruitful exchange. With respect to the last point made by Karpov, he would suggest that the Soviet side consider whether its refusal to freeze shorter-range missiles might not lead the U.S. side to conclude that the USSR had plans for building up its systems beyond their current numbers, and if that might not

cause us concern. He suggested that the Soviet side assess our proposal with this in mind.

Kampelman wanted to use this occasion to refer to Karpov's earlier comments about the ABM Treaty and a treaty on space and defense issues. He did not want his silence to be misinterpreted. He thought that this subject could be discussed further tomorrow but he did wish to give a provisional response now. Kampelman wanted to say at the outset that the U.S. side was a bit inhibited in providing its response because it has not as yet received a response to the President's letter. Thus, we did not have everything on the table to permit a full assessment.

Kampelman went on to say that he had noted with interest and approval Karpov's statement about the importance of precise compliance with the ABM Treaty. He considered it important for the U.S. side to tell the Soviet side clearly today that this was an area of major concern to us, as explained many times in Geneva. We had reached the conclusion that with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar the Soviet Union was indeed acting contrary to the spirit of compliance. This was of major importance to us. Kampelman had not wanted to remain silent on this score and thus mislead Karpov, his delegation, or his authorities that this issue might be of lesser importance to the U.S. than it actually was.

Kampelman realized that Karpov had addressed this issue in a different context, that is, he had referred to a possible need for precise definitions of what was permitted under the ABM Treaty and what was not permitted, that is, what was prohibited. Kampelman would note that we did not believe that there was any ambiguity on this question as far as the Treaty was concerned. Of course, this subject needed to be discussed further in Geneva, but not here. It was Kampelman's perception that the Soviet side was attempting to move toward amending the ABM Treaty so as to restrict what was currently permitted under the ABM Treaty. He was referring to the Soviet side's proposal to limit research to laboratories. He had to say that he did not see the ABM Treaty imposing any such restriction on testing to laboratories: this was also borne out by the negotiating history of the treaty. Of course, the Soviet side had every right to try and amend the ABM Treaty in order to change provisions that had been agreed upon in 1972. In any event, Kampelman had wanted to make note of this area of disagreement between us.

Finally, Kampelman continued, he wanted to share with his Soviet interlocutors his view that we would need to discuss in Geneva what the Soviet side called not exercising the right of withdrawal under Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Kampelman suggested that this issue could be resolved. Nevertheless, he had a concern because Article XV

referred to extraordinary events related to the supreme interests of the countries. These are precise and troubling considerations which involve the countries' actions to defend themselves. Kampelman did not believe that Soviet or U.S. interests would be served if our hands were tied should such circumstances occur. Of course, he was thinking of circumstances other than the U.S. SDI. We needed to find words which would provide assurance to both sides that we would not be significantly interfering with each other's sovereign rights of the two countries.

Kampelman, referring to the reception at his house, mentioned the late hour and said that he did not wish to irritate his wife unduly. He suggested that the meeting be ended now, recognizing that there would be ample opportunity to continue the discussions tomorrow. We had not yet heard from Ambassador Lehman, and he thought that tomorrow we might start the discussion with Lehman's remarks. If necessary, there would be no problem in continuing the discussions tomorrow afternoon. This might very well be necessary in light of what Kampelman considered to be a fruitful exchange today. Upon Nitze's return, Kampelman yielded the chair and pointed out that this only confirmed that he had been a temporary chairman rather than an interim one.

Karpov noted that since we were approaching the end of the present meeting he was happy to agree with Kampelman's suggestion about continuing the discussion tomorrow. Moreover, he wanted to mention one question by way of homework, a question that should be given further thought. Karpov noted that Kampelman had touched on the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Karpov remarked that the Soviet side, for its part, had repeatedly raised the issue of the construction of a radar in Thule, Greenland as well U.S. plans to construct a radar in Fylingsdale, in Great Britain. These two radars were radars of the kind whose construction was prohibited under the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, the Soviet side would suggest that the U.S. give serious thought to halting construction in Thule and not commencing it in Fylingsdale. As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, it had nothing to do with the obligations assumed under the ABM Treaty.

By the same token, Karpov continued, bearing in mind the repeatedly stated U.S. concern on this score, if the U.S. was prepared to halt construction at Thule and not begin construction in Fylingsdale, the Soviet side would also be prepared to halt construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet side would suggest that the U.S. side also consider an alternative variant: since the United States believes that the Krasnoyarsk radar was contrary to the ABM Treaty while the Soviet Union believed that the Thule radar was contrary to the ABM Treaty, the two sides might agree to leave these radars alone, but not to build other such radars in these areas, with the understanding that construction would not begin at Fylingsdale. Karpov suggested that the U.S.

side ponder this matter and we could continue discussing it tomorrow. He recognized that he had not touched on what Kampelman had said, but he thought that this discussion could be continued tomorrow.

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1986, 10 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador P. Nitze
Ambassador E. Rowney
Ambassador M. Glitman
Ambassador R. Lehman
Assistant Secretary R. Perle
Colonel R. Linhard
Mr. N. Clyne
Mr. M. Mobbs
Mr. B. Burton
Mr. P. Afanassenko, Interpreter

Soviet

Ambassador V. Karpov
Ambassador Y. Dubinin
Ambassador A. Obukhov
Colonel General N. Chervov
Lieutenant General N. Detinov
Mr. S. Chuvakhin
Mr. Y. Zolotov, Interpreter
Mr. A. Voytenkov, Interpreter

Prior to beginning the meeting, Ambassador Nitze introduced Secretary of State Shultz to the Soviet delegation and gave him the floor.

Secretary of State Shultz said that he wished to stop in at the beginning of today's meeting in order to extend his personal greetings to the Soviet delegates. Shultz said he had four points to make. First, he said that he knew some of them, and expressed a belief that they were all here today to discuss an issue of great importance. He said that the subjects discussed today had an important significance as recognized in Geneva by both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Today's effort would be an important contribution toward movement forward in the upcoming meetings in Geneva and in preparing for his own meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

said that it was in this spirit that he had stopped in to stress the importance of the discussions.

Second, he asked the Soviet delegation to extend his personal greetings to Shevardnadze, whom he now knew somewhat, and with whom he has good personal relations which are very valuable in the ups and downs in the relations between the two governments.

Third, Shultz wanted to make sure that it was clearly understood how disruptive the Nick Daniloff case² could be. He said that such things take place from time to time in the relations between our two countries and that they have a potential to disrupt everything. He said that he is saying this only in order that the Soviet side can find a formula to release Nick Daniloff and send him back home.

Fourth, Shultz said that he wanted to impress upon the Soviet side the importance that is attached in this country to the question of emigration. He said that he recognized that this was not a topic here today for the Soviet delegation and that it had other issues to deal with. However, the Secretary stressed that emigration from the Soviet Union had almost gotten down to zero and was the lowest in decades. He said that this had a deep impact in the U.S. and in other countries. The Secretary said that when one considers the atmosphere, it becomes central to us and it becomes important also for the Soviet Union. He said he must call attention to the important significance of this matter.

Shultz said that he wanted this meeting on arms control to be productive and again wanted to send his personal greetings to Mr. Shevardnadze. He said that the best contribution he could make was to leave the meeting and let the delegations proceed with their work.

Ambassador Karpov responded by saying that the Soviet side wished to express their best wishes to the Secretary and they would extend the Secretary's regards to Mr. Shevardnadze. Karpov expressed the hope that the success of the current negotiations would not hinge upon the two points that Secretary Shultz had made which were not related to the arms control talks.

Secretary Shultz responded by saying success depends upon all points; he said the Soviet side could read U.S. newspapers, and watch U.S. television and could even read about what the U.S. side says about itself. He said that the Soviet side knows how important these issues are. He said that he did want to stress that the U.S. wants very much to see reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Karpov said that the Soviets read newspapers but hope that their friends across the negotiating table do not judge progress by what is

² Reference is to American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, who was arrested in Moscow on September 2.

said in newspapers and on television. Karpov said that it is the Soviet side's intention to follow the instructions it is given and not what others claim it is doing or is supposed to do. He said that the Soviet side would be proceeding in a manner that would take into account the interests of both countries. He said the Soviet delegation came to Washington precisely with these intentions in mind and with instructions from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Karpov said that their mission was to prepare materials that would be used by both Shultz and Shevardnadze on September 19. He said the Soviet side had done everything it could to accomplish this; unfortunately, for today it could not say that the results of the discussions could lead to positive results or that there will be a possibility to come up with something for the Ministers. Frankly, said Karpov, the Soviet side views the ongoing consultations as a form of litmus test of the U.S. side's seriousness and its desire to do everything possible to arrive at something for the respective leaders, both the Foreign Ministers and the President and the General Secretary.

On this note Secretary Shultz bid farewell to the Soviet delegation and left the conference room.

Ambassador Nitze took the floor by suggesting that the talks resume and maybe some progress could be achieved. He then called on Ambassador Lehman to continue with his presentation.

Lehman said the two new ideas the Soviets had tabled yesterday could be summarized as the issue of SLCMs and ballistic missile warheads. Lehman said, in regard to SLCMs, the Soviet side said it was prepared to treat these separately and it had expressed the concern that SLCMs could be used to circumvent an agreement on strategic arms. He said that we agree that SLCMs are not central to an arms control agreement and we are ready to deal with them in a separate agreement as long as they do not become an obstacle to an agreement to central systems. Lehman said he did not believe that SLCMs would be used to circumvent an agreement, at least at the levels the sides were currently discussing. He said he did not want the issue of SLCMs to become an obstacle to a START agreement. He said that both sides have many numbers to suggest but because of the ranges, numbers and payloads of SLCMs, these would be very hard to verify. He said that he was not confident that the proposals of either side were such that they could assure verifiability and stability for both sides.

Turning to the limits on ballistic missile warheads, Lehman said the U.S. side emphasized that concrete results were more important than the form which such limits might take, even though both were related. He said that this was clear from Soviet ideas expressed yesterday. Lehman said he first wanted to start from the substance of limitations. If the U.S. side applies the 80–85% limit on the overall number of 8000 warheads this would mean that warheads on ballistic missiles

would be limited to between 6400 and 6800 units. He said that if we applied the Soviet 60% proposal related to warheads on any one category of delivery vehicles, that would mean that it would be 4800 RVs on ICBMs. Lehman said that this is much higher than what should be permitted under an agreement. He said that, as the Soviet side knows, the U.S. side had previously proposed that a limit of 4500 and 3000 be set respectively on these categories of warheads. Previously the Soviet side had proposed limits of 6000 and 3600 respectively while the U.S. proposal of 5000 warheads on ballistic missiles, proposed earlier, is still on the table and is still in force. As a result, Lehman said the new Soviet proposal would be from 1400 to 2300 units more than the ballistic missile warheads proposed by the U.S. side. He said that, according to Soviet proposals, there would be 1800 units more on ICBM warheads than what the U.S. side proposes. Lehman said that the U.S. would be prepared to establish higher levels than it is currently proposing in the hope that the Soviet Union could compromise and bring their own proposed levels down to a much lower level. He said that this might provide for some progress.

Having addressed the concrete numbers, Lehman wanted to move over to the form of the various limitations. He said the U.S. had looked at the Soviet approaches bearing in mind the interests of the sides in setting limits on different systems. It had looked at other approaches, some of which were even better, including some of the proposals that the two sides had agreed on previously. Lehman expressed the idea that concrete numbers would be better because they were more predictable. He said that the U.S. side liked an alternative approach which provided a hierarchy of sublimits—something it had spoken of before. Lehman said that the U.S. side is most concerned about ballistic missile RVs in terms of their range, capabilities, and potential. He said that limits on these RVs would be a central core around which other pieces of an agreement could be structured. It is the belief of the U.S. side that concrete agreements reached at these consultations in this area are central. Lehman noted that instead of working on aggregate totals, it would be better to work on sublimits, to agree to them, and in turn they would result in a total aggregate. Lehman said that we could not see how the Soviet side's proposals presented here would address the distinctions in ballistic missile capabilities or how they would provide for predetermined limits on throw-weight. Lehman maintained that the Soviet side said that all weapons are alike, yet it called for specific limits on heavy bombers. It seemed to him that this was one-sided. Lehman said that if all weapons are alike, arriving at restrictions should not be too tough. He also said the Soviet side did not like the distinction between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, yet in the INF talks it had raised this issue to the U.S. Lehman said Soviet proposals should con-

tain definitions and limits on slow-flying and fast-flying systems. In short, said Lehman, the U.S. continues to believe that undifferentiated aggregates of nuclear weapons are one-sided, dangerous, and destabilizing. He said that to avoid differentiation would be a step back in arms control. Lehman said that the U.S. knows of the new Soviet proposals and they are only one step away from calling for undifferentiated aggregates. The U.S. recognizes that if significant stability is to be achieved, limits could be arrived at for nuclear weapons using, for example, hierarchical limits. He said the U.S. side could accept some sort of aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and that the 1600 number which the Soviet side had mentioned might be appropriate in order to set up proper limits on ballistic missile RVs and ICBM RVs. Lehman also said that the U.S. side remains concerned about bomber and ballistic missile weapons and that it finds them to be different. However, the U.S. side said it would consider ALCMs. In the interest of moving ahead to set up a proper hierarchy of limits on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads, the sides might want to set a specific limit on the total number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. Lehman said that there were many issues that could be discussed in the current negotiations but he thought it would be good to answer the two new ideas the Soviets had raised and to transmit the U.S. side's thinking on our own ideas today.

Ambassador Obukhov said he had one question to ask and that others might arise later. He said that at the end of Lehman's talk, it was mentioned that the U.S. side would be ready to move ahead in setting up a total aggregate level on ballistic warheads and on heavy bomber weapons, more properly called ALCMs. Obukhov said that he wanted to know more specifically what would be the structure of the limits that the U.S. side was proposing. Would it be a total limit or would it be a mechanistically combined sublimit. In addition, Obukhov wanted to know whether they understood Lehman to say that, as before, the U.S. side is against counting aggregate levels of nuclear delivery vehicle as in the case of heavy bombers equipped with short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs.

At this point, General Chervov said that SLBMs such as the Trident I and II missiles, in their military capability (power, accuracy, range), were exactly equivalent to ICBMs. He asked why there was a need to set a separate limit on ICBMs.

Obukhov went back to his line of questioning by saying that since we are talking about such items, it seemed to him that Lehman correctly started presenting a tentative, approximate form describing the approach of the U.S. side on strategic offensive arms limitation as applied, as Obukhov understood, to an interim option. He asked how the U.S. approach would take into account the issue of preventing an

arms race in space. So far, said Obukhov, existing arms reductions agreements had been closely tied to the issue of not extending the arms race into space. How did the U.S. side see this new agreement tying into this question. Additionally, Obukhov wanted to know the U.S. side's reaction to the Soviet proposal that there be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. He said that such a non-withdrawal would be needed if strategic defensive arms limitations were to be arrived at in an interim agreement. Obukhov said that since time was short, it would be helpful if Lehman could give some specific values or numbers in his approach to limitations. He was asking not for general comments but for specific numbers. He wondered if there was anything new or different in the U.S. numbers as compared to the numbers the Soviet side had already heard about. Obukhov said that from the Geneva negotiations the earlier numbers were already known. As a final question, Obukhov asked what it was on which Lehman was basing his idea of small-scale SLCM deployments when he said that he did not want it to be a way of circumventing a strategic arms agreement. Obukhov said he was bearing in mind the U.S. plans to deploy several thousand such SLCMs on surface ships and submarines.

Lehman said that if his count was correct he had seven Soviet questions to respond to and apologized in advance if he missed any. He asked the Soviet side to help remind him of their questions. Lehman first moved to the question of weapons in outer space. In answering, he said the President, Ambassador Kampelman and Ambassador Nitze had all spoken about weapons in outer space and that this was not really a START issue. Moving to other questions, Lehman said that the U.S. side had proposed a total limit on ballistic missile RVs and on ALCMs and could see a possibility of supplementing this limit in a number of ways. One way to do this, said Lehman, would be to set up a hierarchy in which there would be one way freedom to mix, the same type of way that had been used in previous agreements.

Secondly, regarding gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles, Lehman said there would not be a limit on these other than through a limit on heavy bombers within the framework of overall limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Obukhov asked whether short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs would also have a total limit in the same way that the U.S. had proposed limits on other types of weapons. Lehman came back by saying these would not be limited in the way that ALCMs and ballistic missile warheads were being limited. Chervov asked the same question of whether there were no limits, no specific limits, on these types of weapons. Lehman reiterated that short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs would not come under a total aggregate limit, except indirectly through limits on heavy bombers.

Chervov said that if one were to limit, say, bombers to 300, and if cruise missiles on these bombers were to come under a separate limit,

would not the short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs have no limits of their own. Lehman said that this was correct—that gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles would have an indirect limitation only through the limits placed on heavy bombers. Chervov referred to Karpov's clarification that these types of weapons would really be limited only through the loading of heavy bombers. He asked if this was correct or did the U.S. side deny this also. Lehman said this was correct, and there was a good reason for it—reasons that had been developed through past practice and which were helpful in reaching an agreement. He recalled that General Chervov had asked why the U.S. differentiated SLBMs and ICBMs. Lehman said in response that the U.S. hierarchy established real differences in the military capability and in the stability that these two systems provided. He said that both in SALT I and II this had been recognized. Lehman said that he wanted to try to reduce the differences and set new precedences as a way of finding a compromise solution to make progress. Chervov retorted that SALT I & II really talked about different types of systems, unlike those that exist today. Therefore, Lehman's reference was not quite appropriate. Lehman said in response that proposals under SALT I & II recognized that the sides viewed stability and force structures differently and that this was why the U.S. side was proposing other ways to find solutions since there were indeed real differences between SLBMs and ICBMs. He said that there were things like different alert rates, different capabilities to strike hardened targets and area targets, and differences in the stability these systems provided. On the other hand, ICBMs are fixed points that can be viewed as provocative systems or vulnerable systems. But these are all complex issues, said Lehman, and we are not here to resolve differences in strategic outlook, but to find specific steps that can remove our differences in the way we view force structures. Lehman said that his approach was intended to bring the sides closer together, to remove the differences of the past and to find solutions.

Assistant Secretary Perle said there was an additional point about not counting gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles in the aggregate numbers. He said it seemed to him as he listened, that the U.S. was being told that the U.S. was the only one that had bombs and cruise missiles. That was not true. He said that any freedom in an agreement would apply not only to the U.S. side but also to the Soviet side. He said that even though the sides wanted to achieve equality, this was not quite so, simply because the Soviet side had an air defense system, while the U.S. has virtually none. Gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles mean a lot more to the Soviet Union than they do to the U.S. as a result of this situation. He said that since the Soviet side will not encounter any air defense systems against Soviet heavy

bombers, an equality in the number of bombers, with gravity and short-range attack missiles, would certainly favor the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Perle said that SLCMs were referred to by the Soviet side as nuclear weapons when, in fact, U.S. SLCMs were mostly non-nuclear. For many reasons (many of which it is too late to change) launchers capable of launching different types of cruise missiles are identical. He said that the dilemma that the U.S. was facing might mean that it would be impossible to get an agreement or, by simply recognizing that this dilemma exists, the sides could go ahead and achieve an agreement anyway. He said that the number of SLCMs with nuclear weapons is small in relation to the total of U.S. SLCMs. It would be hard to imagine a situation where U.S. SLCMs would have any significance in a conflict between the U.S. and USSR, let alone a decisive impact. Perle said that it was quite true that the U.S. is planning to deploy a large number of SLCMs, however, most of these are non-nuclear and are designed to support the fleet or to be used in conventional warfare. Perle said that it was correct when General Chervov pointed to the significance in the number of launchers that could be used to launch non-nuclear cruise missiles. However, this did pose a dilemma. Rhetorically, he asked the question of what would be the reaction in Moscow if the U.S. proposed that, in order to reach an agreement on nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union withdraw a large percentage of its Soviet naval forces. He answered his own question by saying that there would be the same answer in Moscow as there would be from our own Navy. He said he was saying all of this only to urge the Soviet side to keep these issues in perspective in the same way that we do—the fact that the impact on both sides would be similar. Perle said that the U.S. cannot carve out a portion of its conventional naval forces to reach an agreement and that, in fact, the Soviet side is posing such a problem for the U.S. by asking for a limitation on SLCM launchers. He said that, given the fact that launchers for all sorts of weapons are identical, they could be used to launch nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. By the way, said Perle, there are not only non-nuclear cruise missiles but there is a variety of missiles around which our forces are structured. He said that he was sure that the Soviet side could see our problem. Perle said that the U.S. was not trying to carve out a portion of its forces to keep them outside of agreed limitations but is merely trying to solve a real problem.

At this point, Lehman said Perle had already answered the Soviet question on SLCMs. Therefore, he would move to the last two Soviet questions which were related. He said as he understood it, one of these two questions had to do with whether or not the new U.S. ideas apply to the existing proposals on the table or to a new interim approach. Lehman said that they could apply to the ideas expressed today, for

example, in regard to a regime which called for less than 50% cuts. Going further, Lehman addressed General Chervov's question on specific parameters. He said that he had already mentioned 1600 as the number of total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and the conditions under which it would be acceptable. Lehman said that if we took some of the new ideas and applied them to proposals already on the negotiating table, they might lead to some good possibilities. He said that the U.S. side could see the possibility of applying a number of 6000 as a total number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, of which no more than 4500 could be on ballistic missiles and of which no more than 3000 could be on ICBMs. Lehman said that as far as other limits were concerned, in order to reach our objective of achieving 50% cuts in throw-weight, both sides had already agreed on the appropriateness of reaching that level. Lehman said that he believed that this was a good way to go, however, it was clear to him from Soviet statements yesterday that the Soviet side preferred much higher levels for ballistic missile warheads and much higher for ICBM warheads. Lehman said that the U.S. side was ready to negotiate on these but that the levels mentioned yesterday by the Soviet side were too high. As he had mentioned earlier, Lehman said that this was an area where good progress could be made if both sides showed flexibility.

Obukhov said that from Perle's words it was clear that one could assume that SLCMs could be dangerous in terms of circumventing a strategic arms control agreement. He said that Perle's words confirmed this possibility, and that the sides should avoid this. Obukhov said that another question arose in his mind when Perle said that there was almost no possibility of reaching an effective agreement on SLCMs—at least that was Obukhov's impression. On the other hand, said Obukhov, Lehman had previously spoken in a way which suggested that a separate solution for SLCMs could be found. He asked, in order to clarify the approach of the U.S. side, what the U.S. side was in favor of—reaching a separate agreement on long-range SLCMs or not? Here Karpov chimed in and asked what kind of an agreement could it really be?

Lehman said that the Soviet side proposes that limits be set on SLCMs; the U.S. side does not believe that such are needed at the levels of reductions that we are talking about. We do not want the SLCM issue to divert us from the important task of limiting central systems. Lehman said that he could imagine the possibility of a separate agreement but we do not believe that it is necessary, especially in view of the fact that it is hard to see how limits can be formulated so that they are equitable, stable, and verifiable. If the Soviet side can find a way to do so, we could consider such limits. That would be all right, said Lehman, but he did not consider it necessary, and did not want it to become an obstacle.

Speaking on the issue of circumvention, Perle said that he was not addressing this question in order to defend the U.S. negotiating position, but in order to look at the military logic. He said that the dilemma this poses is not one of circumventing the limits but of circumventing the purposes of an agreement. Perle said we agree on the fact that the purpose is to achieve stability and security at lower levels for both sides. One could say that after an agreement is reached, it would be possible for the Soviet side to make large improvements in their air defense system as it is now in fact doing. That in itself, said Perle, could circumvent the purposes of an agreement. Stronger air defenses could neutralize bombers—one of the elements of our security and an element which helps provide our two sides with stability. Yet, air defenses are something which we are not discussing under our limitations. Similarly, said Perle, he believed that SLCMs would be outside of an agreement since they do not pose a threat to stability and security. Their number is small and their role is neither primary, nor secondary, but in fact tertiary. The Soviet Union also has cruise missiles. That, said Perle, is the heart of the matter. He said that the Soviet side knows U.S. military doctrine, sees U.S. exercises and knows that neither side's security would be affected if both sides had a modest number of cruise missiles. He said that the Soviet side must judge for itself and might not believe his words. Perle said that the Soviet general staff have people that know how to count the systems and what they mean. He said that we must dispassionately look at the question of reducing the possibilities of circumvention. He said that SLCMs would not help a side to circumvent in any big way.

Here Rowny added to Lehman's earlier statement that we are ready to listen in detail and hope that the Soviet side will lay out its answers in great detail, especially on the issue of verification.

Detinov joined the conversation by saying that he had listened carefully and would like to ask Lehman whether it was possible that the U.S. positions on arms control were different from what the U.S. had said at earlier rounds. Lehman said that this was not correct, and apologized for possibly not being clear in his explanations. He said that there were many new ideas and numbers on the table that were different but that were aimed at achieving a first step toward an agreement which was our purpose. Lehman said that we spoke about different numbers, about different forms, and about other new issues. He said that this was in response to the ideas that the Soviet side had raised and obviously there were many more significant steps that could be taken.

When Karpov asked Lehman whether he could summarize all of the new U.S. positions made today, Lehman said he would gladly do so and hoped that the Soviet side would study his remarks carefully

since he had prepared carefully to help the process. In highlighting the new ideas, Lehman said that the U.S. side had offered new aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; that it had said that, in the right context, the number could be approximately 1600, that again, in the right context, the U.S. side would be prepared to consider the aggregation of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, that is, that the U.S. side could agree to a total number on ALCMs and ballistic missile RVs; that it could agree to a stabilizing hierarchy of sublimits and that those sublimits would have a one-way freedom to mix. With regard to specific numbers, Lehman said that we were ready to increase our levels above those that were on the table now, but that the Soviet numbers were too high. Lehman said that he hoped that his summary did not detract from his earlier detailed words. He hoped that this summary would be helpful.

Obukhov referred to Lehman's earlier statement that the central element of strategic arms limitations in the U.S. approach should be limits on ballistic missile warheads. If he understood Lehman correctly, all other issues were on the sideline but that this was central. To assess what was new in the U.S. approach, said Obukhov, one needed to know what those limitations really were, and it would be important for Soviet understanding. Obukhov said that he could still not understand, no matter how many words were said by the U.S. side. It was true that the answer Lehman had given earlier to Chervov's question on the numbers did not in substance differ from what Lehman is saying now. Obukhov said that in Geneva the Soviet side had said that the U.S. November 1, 1985 proposal was basically flawed, that it was basically a disruptive proposal from the point of view of Soviet strategic forces, and that it called for the continuation of the build-up of U.S. strategic forces in those areas that the U.S. sees as important to itself. Obukhov said that the new U.S. proposals provided for higher levels of ballistic missile warheads by thousands of units than the November 1, 1985 proposal. It would provide the U.S. with a unilateral advantage. However, since Lehman chose this as an example of what the U.S. considers appropriate levels, Obukhov asked if he could assume that today's new proposals will have the same deficiencies and flaws as did the U.S. November 1 proposal.

Lehman addressed the last point first, by saying that there were no deficiencies in the proposals since the U.S. has differing force structures and differs with the Soviets on concepts and philosophy. He said that what he mentioned today was designed to see if a way could be found to take into consideration differences in structure and differences in numbers. Lehman said his intent was not to force his views on the Soviet side, but to reach a compromise. Going back to the first of Obukhov's questions, Lehman said that the U.S. seeks to limit items

other than ballistic missile warheads and the Soviet side is seeking to do so as well. However, it would seem to be a possible compromise to begin with something in order to build an agreement. Lehman said that the sides differ on many things, but have been discussing numbers. For instance, in terms of ballistic missile warheads, the Soviet Union has been talking about levels of 6000–6400, while the U.S. has been using the numbers 4500–5000. On ICBMs the Soviet side is using limits of 3600 to 4800 while the U.S. side is talking about 2500 to 3000. In each of these categories, said Lehman, there should be a way to set a number that would be agreeable to both sides and that would be acceptable. Lehman said that maybe, if agreement could be reached in this area, that it would make for better progress in other areas. Point-blank, Lehman asked whether or not the Soviet side was authorized to discuss in Washington numbers of ballistic missile warheads at levels smaller than those that were in earlier Soviet proposals.

Karpov said that the Soviet side had stated yesterday that it was prepared to talk about what Lehman had begun earlier, i.e., stricter limits on ballistic missile warheads. The Soviet side had already said that it was prepared to set a limit of no more than 80–85% of all warheads allowed on all strategic nuclear delivery systems. Karpov said that they came to Washington with this new proposal. He said he didn't understand why it was the U.S. side wanted to talk about everything except this.

Obukhov added that the U.S. side expected the Soviets to have a precise understanding and not an indirect understanding on sublimits. He claimed that the U.S. side did say that it was in favor of sublimits but did not say what sublimits. Obukhov said that if we can clarify these things here, the Soviet side will understand what the U.S. approach really is.

On the question of the U.S. Nov. 1, 1985 proposal having separate heavy bomber limits, Obukhov said that now the U.S. side is not setting a limit. He wondered what would be the new approach of the U.S. side or would these limits come out in some other guise.

Lehman said that he had answered Soviet statements from yesterday with the aim of finding ways to narrow the differences between us. In some ways the Soviet proposals of yesterday were helpful and in some ways they were destructive. Lehman said that there was no doubt that the Soviet delegation was authorized to discuss higher limits, but can it discuss lower limits—limits within the range of what the two sides had been proposing, namely, on ICBM warheads. On specific numbers, Lehman said that he had given numbers in the hope that it would lead to a compromise solution and he had intended this for a first proposal.

Regarding Obukhov's question on heavy bombers, Lehman said that it is the Soviet position that there are no distinctions and the Soviet

proposal said nothing of distinctions. Lehman said that it was for that reason that he had offered an aggregate on strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits. But as the Soviet side knew, previously, there had been reached an agreement on heavy bombers at a figure of 350. Lehman said that, if the Soviet side sees no distinctions, the sides could use this figure of 350 as a first-step approach. Lehman then wanted to turn the floor back to Nitze.

Karpov said, before going to other questions, he felt compelled to say that Lehman was confusing the issue of numbers. He said that the Soviet side was ready to talk about any number as long as this led to a cessation in the arms race and as long as it would bring the sides to a real solution as the Soviet side had said yesterday. Karpov said the Soviet side had offered 50% cuts on nuclear arms and narrower cuts of 30%, taking into account U.S. statements that 50% cuts were too large. Now we are looking at these types of cuts. Karpov said that the U.S. side should not try to make it look like the Soviet side is in favor of high levels and the U.S. side is in favor of low levels. This is a barrel with double bottoms where one bottom appears to have lower levels but hides another bottom with higher levels of nuclear weapons. Karpov said that the U.S. side does not want to seriously deal with reductions in nuclear arms. He said that what was needed was to cut off all channels leading to the possibility of an arms race and to concentrate on reducing nuclear confrontation. Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to talk about each and every number, even in addition to those he had already mentioned.

Lehman said he could not agree, but that the sides had discussed this many times before, that what was needed was practical steps and compromise solutions in order to provide help to the Geneva negotiations and to our leaders. Lehman said that he used shorthand explanations and if the Soviet side had any other areas to discuss, the U.S. was ready.

At this point, Nitze closed the morning discussions and the delegations broke for lunch, agreeing to what Karpov made appear as a suggestion from Nitze to resume talks at 4 pm.

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1986, 4:05–6:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Soviet NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS*U.S.*

Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Maynard Glitman
Ambassador Ronald Lehman
Assistant Secretary R. Perle
Colonel Robert Linhard
Mr. M. Mobbs
Mr. Norman Clyne
Mr. Bruce Burton
Mr. D. Arensburger (Interpreter)

Soviet

Ambassador Y. Dubinin
Ambassador V. Karpov
Ambassador A. Obukhov
Col. Gen. N. Chervov
Lt. Gen. N. Detinov
Mr. O. Sokolov
Mr. S. Chuvakhin
Mr. V. Kuznetsov
Mr. Ye. Zolotov (Int.)

Ambassador Nitze expressed the view that the principal item on today's agenda should concern an exchange of reports which we intended to submit to our superiors regarding what had transpired at these experts' talks. On the U.S. side we had just completed a draft of such a report containing individual talking points which had only now been sent to the typewriter and which we expected to receive back in a few minutes. At that time Nitze was prepared to go over that report and he would welcome the Soviet side's comments thereon. However, in view of the fact that it would take a little time before we had received that report from the typewriter he wondered how Karpov thought we might spend the intervening time most productively.

Karpov responded that, frankly, the Soviet side had thought that the most productive way to spend the time after 4:00 PM today would be to summarize the results of the discussions held thus far. Toward that goal the Soviet side had expected to hear the U.S. side's responses to those comments and questions to which it had yet to provide positive responses. In this connection Karpov would recall that the U.S. side still owed the Soviet side a response to the question the latter had posed in connection with the possibility of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime and of using this as a basis for resolving the question pertaining to strategic offensive arms. Noting what had been said by

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Drafted on September 7 by Arensburger.

the Soviet side today, and what had been proposed by it yesterday, Karpov said that he again wanted to ask the U.S. side to consider in concrete terms the relationship between the issues of strategic arms and a stable ABM Treaty regime.

Karpov went on to say that naturally the Soviet side would prefer to exclude all possibilities for an arms race in space and to achieve this goal, reach an agreement with the United States on a complete ban on space-strike arms. However, taking into account that the U.S. side was not prepared for such a radical solution, and desiring to seek out possibilities for at least a partial solution to the issue of space, the Soviet side was prepared to pursue partial solutions to outstanding issues. Strengthening the ABM Treaty regime was only one available option; there could be other options. The Soviet side had proposed that the sides agree to ban offensive arms in space. This proposal remained on the table and pertained to the "space-to-earth" class of weapons, i.e., those which could be employed to strike targets in the earth's atmosphere and on the surface of the earth from space.

Karpov went on to say that the President's letter mentioned here by the U.S. side referred to the possibility of discussing a problem which, though not worded very clearly, appeared to be related to the Soviet side's approach to some sort of guarantees against the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in space. Perhaps there were some common elements here that could be utilized by the two sides in order to find a joint solution. Unfortunately, the Soviet side had not heard any comments from the U.S. side on the subject.

Karpov went on to say that there was also another subject, namely, a ban on ASATs. The relevant Soviet proposal on this score has been transmitted to the U.S. side. Regrettably, on this question, too, the U.S. side has not voiced any positive judgment at these consultations. Perhaps the Soviet side would yet have an opportunity to hear the U.S. side say something positive on such a specific issue as that of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime. Thereby the U.S. side would be able to make its contribution to limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms. Speaking of strategic offensive arms the Soviet side had submitted a proposal which should make it easier to make progress toward a mutually acceptable solution. Taking into account the U.S. side's objections and concerns, the Soviet side had proposed to look for a separate solution on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. That is, the Soviet side had taken into account the U.S. side's objection to including SLCMs within the aggregate level of strategic offensive arms to be limited or reduced.

Karpov went on to say that instead of a businesslike approach to the Soviet proposal on SLCMs, the U.S. side in effect was trying to convince the Soviet side that even though there was a great number

of SLCMs and masses of SLCMs launchers, launchers which could be used for nuclear, conventional and every other kind of cruise missile, there was really no need to limit this system, that one should turn a blind eye to SLCMs and act as if they were non-existent and not part of the balance. Karpov said that in his view the Soviet proposal took into account the U.S. side's desires. Nevertheless, today Karpov had heard something to the effect that the Soviet proposal was irrelevant and that it did not in the least meet the desires of the U.S. side. Efforts by Ambassador Lehman to present the U.S. position as coming closer to the Soviet position were totally unjustified in the Soviet side's opinion. In effect, Lehman had merely repeated what the Soviet side representatives had heard before from him and his predecessor in Geneva. Thus the Soviet side was concerned that even on the question of strategic offensive arms—the question which as repeatedly said by the U.S. side was of particular interest to it—there also was no U.S. effort to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Karpov, turning to medium-range missiles in Europe and in broader terms, said that at one time the U.S. side had claimed that the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe was a temporary undertaking and that if agreement could be reached on their prohibition or withdrawal, the U.S. would warmly welcome an opportunity to do so. Yet, when the Soviet side suggested the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. missiles in Europe, it did not for all intents and purposes receive any sort of positive response. Instead, the Soviet side has been hearing talk about the desirability of discussing not a complete elimination of missiles in Europe but the establishment of some sort of levels above zero.

Considering the above, Karpov continued, the Soviet side had proposed a solution which would provide for the retention of a limited number of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Next, the Soviet side heard talk to the effect that a solution regarding Europe would not be complete without equal limits on U.S. and Soviet medium-range missile warheads globally. Even though the Soviet side did not agree with the motives advanced by the U.S. side in support of such an approach, desiring to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, it had found it possible to meet the U.S. half way and to propose equal levels on medium-range missile warheads in Europe along with overall equal medium-range missile warheads globally. That is, the U.S. would retain the right to have within the continental United States a number of missiles which in terms of their warheads would correspond to the number of warheads on Soviet missiles in the Asian USSR. However, instead of giving positive consideration to this Soviet proposal the U.S. side has taken a position which in essence amounts to seeking ever new complicating elements and to advancing additional elements of that sort instead of attempting to resolve the issue.

Thus, Karpov went on, in all three negotiating areas dealing with nuclear and space arms the U.S. side has failed to move forward in such a way as to permit preparation of mutually acceptable solutions which could be recommended for consideration at the upcoming meeting of our Foreign Ministers. Finally, with respect to what the Soviet side had said about nuclear testing, a matter which it considered to be of major importance, here, too, there was no positive response from the U.S. side. Thus, in his report about the results of his two days of talks in Washington, Karpov would only be able to say that he had presented the Soviet position to his U.S. interlocutors and that it was presently on the table. Karpov had been directly instructed by Minister Shevardnadze to seek constructive and fruitful discussions in the area of nuclear and space arms, including on the subject of nuclear testing, which could subsequently be taken up at Shevardnadze's meeting with the Secretary. Unless something extraordinary were to happen during the remaining part of this discussion, Karpov would have to report that the Soviet side had not succeeded in carrying out its mission. This was not because the Soviet side had not applied every effort to achieve positive results.

Karpov added on a personal note that the U.S. side was making a major mistake if it believed that the issue of nuclear and space arms was separate from other major issues of international life and international policy. Among the latter, he was including preparation of a summit meeting. He suggested that if the participants of the present meeting had been able to make a contribution toward progress on the issues entrusted to us, that would of course have had a major impact on preparation for that event. Conversely, absence of progress at these consultations on the overall subject of nuclear and space arms, including nuclear testing, will have an impact on the prospects for a summit meeting. Karpov wanted to conclude his remarks on that note.

Nitze pointed out that Karpov had raised a number of serious issues. He thought that many of them merited a comment. Karpov's first point had dealt with the issue of enhancing the ABM Treaty regime. As Karpov knew, the U.S. side was very much in favor of strengthening compliance with the ABM Treaty. There had been some discussions with regard to that regime but it was perfectly clear that the two sides had different views with respect to the meaning of the Treaty as it applied to such radars as the one in Krasnoyarsk or the radars in Thule and Fylingsdale. Our view was that the radars in Fylingsdale and Thule were grandfathered by the ABM Treaty. We thought that the work underway in Thule was perfectly legitimate under the ABM Treaty and that the same would be true if we were to commence work in Fylingsdale. We knew that the Krasnoyarsk radar was identical to other early warning radars but that it was not located on the periphery of

the Soviet Union as required by the Treaty. Therefore, this was a clear violation. This matter had been discussed extensively but we have encountered difficulty in coming to a meeting of the minds on the meaning of the Treaty in this respect.

Nitze went on to say that when Karpov referred to enhancing the Treaty regime, he was addressing development and testing in the context of Article V and Agreed Statement D. That subject had been discussed extensively at NST and elsewhere. Again, the U.S. side was clear on what the Treaty said and on what was contained in the negotiating record. It was perfectly clear that the Soviet side had rejected Para. VI.3 of the U.S. draft which would have prohibited devices that were capable of substituting for ABM launchers, missiles and radars. The Soviet side would not accept such a prohibition on testing, developing and deploying devices that were capable of substituting for such components. Moreover, with respect to systems based on other physical principles at that time no joint understanding had been reached on such components because the Soviet Union would not agree to including components that could not be defined. Finally, the sides settled the matter in Agreed Statement D.

Nitze remarked that the typed text of the report he had referred to earlier had just been brought in to him and though he could continue commenting on Karpov's remarks, it might be wiser to turn now to the report which he suggested might be a more constructive way of proceeding. Karpov replied that Nitze was entitled to do whatever he wished. Nitze remarked that he would read the report and subsequently might return to one or two of Karpov's other points.

Nitze, noting that the text was entitled "Draft Report of Experts' Discussions," remarked that this constituted a draft of his report to the Secretary. Nitze next read the following text:

"The Experts Group on Nuclear and Space Arms met during the periods of 11–12 August and 5–6 September to explore the potential for U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area. As a result of these discussions, the following points emerged, ad referendum:

"1. With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces:

"a. The sides agree to the goal of eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

"b. As an interim step, the sides agree to limit the total number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in Europe to an equal level above zero. The Soviets have proposed a ceiling of 100. This is acceptable to the U.S., if the Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Asia are also reduced to 100 or less.

"c. The Soviet side has proposed that the U.S. LRINF missile deployments in Europe be restricted to GLCMs. The U.S. proposes that

the mix between its GLCMs and Pershing IIs be a subject for further discussion.

“d. The sides agree that, in the context of the European limit, the USSR shall limit the number of warheads on its LRINF missiles deployed in Asia. The Soviet side proposes that the U.S. be entitled to an equal number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in the U.S. This is agreeable to the U.S. if the Soviet levels in Europe and Asia are acceptable to it.

“e. As a result of the limits stated in paragraphs b. and d. above, the sides would be limited to an equal number of warheads on LRINF missiles on a global basis.

“f. The sides agree on the need for constraints on SRINF missiles. The U.S. insists this issue be solved concurrently with the establishment of ceilings on LRINF missiles.

“g. The U.S. believes that such an interim agreement should remain in effect until superseded by a later agreement providing for further reductions.”

Nitze suggested that it was appropriate for him to interrupt his reading at this point to see whether Karpov might want to say something with respect to the INF issue. The U.S. side had tried to capture the precise positions of both sides and this text reflected our understanding of where there was a meeting of the minds and where additional work was required. He wondered whether, in Karpov's view, we had recorded the facts correctly.

Karpov responded that he hesitated to edit the U.S. report to the U.S. Secretary. He would only say that the Soviet side had devoted two days to presenting its proposal and its position with respect to medium-range missiles in Europe which opened avenues for resolution of this issue. In Karpov's view the Soviet proposal was clear enough. In the course of these two days the Soviet side had answered numerous questions and had made every attempt to clarify its proposal. Accordingly, there was hardly any need to reopen the discussion on this subject now.

Nitze noted that he certainly did not want to report to the Secretary the existence of agreement where there was no agreement and thought that important points of differences should be presented in the report. But if Karpov preferred not to make any comments Nitze would have no objections.

Karpov responded that if he were to prepare a report to the Secretary he would write it differently. He would set forth how this issue was viewed by the Soviet side, how it had been discussed, and the direction in which, in his view, work should continue. But since Nitze was avoiding these elements, what would be the point of Karpov's arguing with Nitze about Nitze's report to his Secretary?

General Chervov wondered out loud what need there was in discussing a paper that was to be presented to the Secretary. He thought that there was no need for this.

Nitze agreed that there was no need for such a discussion but it would be helpful if we could have a common understanding regarding the accuracy of that report.

Chervov responded that for all intents and purposes Karpov had already summarized what he, Karpov, would be reporting to the Soviet Foreign Minister. Nitze had a different report for the Secretary. In fact, these two reports were completely contradictory.

Nitze pointed out that clearly the report he had read was only a draft, moreover, he had only read the part dealing with LRINF missiles. He had thought that it would be a constructive approach to try and determine the evolution of areas of agreement, items on which additional work was required as well as those on which there were differences. At this point Nitze continued reading his report:

“2. With regard to strategic nuclear forces:

“a. The sides have agreed to the early implementation of the principle of a 50% reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of their existing strategic arsenals.

“b. As an immediate first step toward this objective, both sides have agreed to a ceiling on the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers at a level of 1600. The U.S. reaffirmed that it was prepared to accept a sublimit of 350 on heavy bombers.

“c. The U.S. proposed to reduce the aggregate number of RVs and ALCMs on the delivery systems listed in paragraph b. above to an equal ceiling. The Soviet side has not agreed that gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers should be excluded from this ceiling. The U.S. noted that these weapons would be limited as a consequence of the sublimit on heavy bombers specified in paragraph b. above.

“d. Both sides agree to a sublimit on the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at an equal level.

“e. Within this sublimit, both sides agree to limit the number of warheads on ICBMs to an equal level.

“f. Both sides agree that these reductions, and others to be agreed, shall result in significant reductions in ballistic missile throwweight. The U.S. believes that throwweight reductions should be codified.

“g. The sides agree that agreed reductions will be completed within five to six years.

“g. The Soviet side proposed to limit SLCMs separately outside central Treaty limits. The U.S. believes that limits on SLCMs entail difficulties and has invited the Soviet side to address these problems.

"3. The sides agree, upon concluding agreements on relevant systems, to continue to pursue negotiations for further reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

Nitze suggested that we might now return to some other points made previously by Karpov. Perhaps Colonel Linhard could at this point deal with the question of weapons of mass destruction in space.

Chervov interrupted to say that the U.S. report had completely failed to mention the most important problem of "star wars." What was to be done with SDI and with space-strike arms? Unless these issues were dealt with everything written down in the U.S. report would be impossible in reality and would be non-existent. He wondered whether this was a deliberate omission or whether the U.S. side had some particular designs or plans.

Nitze remarked that the way he had understood it the Soviet side had not intended to comment on our report. He said next that there had been much discussion of the ABM Treaty and some discussion of the President's letter² which basically presented the U.S. position on how to deal with this issue. The President had not received a response to his letter and we had been told not to expect a reply before the meeting of our Foreign Ministers. Therefore, it was difficult to summarize the position on this score. The U.S. position, Nitze repeated, was set forth in the President's letter and had been discussed by us. Assistant Secretary Perle had discussed certain aspects extensively in Moscow while other aspects had been discussed here today and yesterday.

The next point, Nitze believed, involved an assessment by our side of the discussions related to the question raised by Karpov when he had said that the President's letter referred to a discussion of additional guarantees against deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. He asked Linhard to make a few additional remarks in connection with Karpov's question.

Linhard said that Karpov in his remarks had referred to the President's letter. A section of that letter dealt with the President's view that the General Secretary continued to be concerned that U.S. research into advanced defenses would lead to deployment in space of weapons of mass destruction on earth. This was not our intention. The President did not believe that our research had to lead in that direction. It was also noted in the President's letter and repeated by Linhard when he was delivering the authentic copy of the letter to Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh, that both sides were already party to agreements in this area. Contrary to the concerns expressed by the General Secretary,

² See Document 138.

U.S. research on advanced defenses was focusing along the lines of providing a direct defense against existing weapons which transmitted through space and were specifically designed to cause mass destruction. Thus there should be no concern here but the President had said that if there was such a concern we were prepared to discuss additional assurances, beyond those which existed today, regarding the prohibition on the deployment in space of weapons of mass destruction on earth. He thought that this was a fairly clear statement that we understood the Soviet concern and were offering to deal with it.

Karpov responded that the Soviet side had been suggesting something different while the U.S. side was switching concepts. Instead of referring to offensive arms, that is the space-to-earth class of arms, the U.S. side was referring to non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction. But the very idea of some sort of additional guarantees on the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space was not understandable. Linhard had hardly any grounds to advance such a thesis. After all, we had a relevant international treaty which prohibited the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in space and placing them in orbit around the moon and celestial bodies. Both the U.S. and the USSR were party to that international treaty which was in force. It went without saying that the provisions of that treaty must be complied with and, to Karpov's knowledge, so far it had been complied with. Thus, what sort of additional proposals was the U.S. making, or did it envisage something entirely different from what was contained in the 1966 treaty.³ Linhard noted that as he had explained earlier the President had tried to deal in his letter with the concerns of the General Secretary. If, in fact, the General Secretary did not have any concerns in this area—and Linhard confirmed the existence of the relevant treaty which had also been mentioned in the President's letter—then he would be happy to tell the President that there was no such concern in the USSR. Perhaps we had misinterpreted the existence of concern. As for additional guarantees, as mentioned by the President in his letter, we were cognizant of the existing treaty in this area and that we are surprised at what we perceive to be the General Secretary's concern but we are prepared to discuss the matter further. If there were no such concerns, then there was no problem. In that event, Linhard would be happy to tell the President that there was no such concern.

Karpov responded that there was a limit to how naively one could act. But Linhard had really gone too far. Karpov could not believe that

³ Reference is to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967.

Linhard, a member of the National Security Staff at the White House, was ignorant of the history of the subject under discussion. Linhard would know that the President had said that he was not pursuing plans of putting offensive arms in space and that the U.S. was prepared to discuss this subject with the USSR. This was the issue raised in the President's letter to the General Secretary a year ago.⁴ In response, the General Secretary had written to the President that he agreed to discuss this problem with a view to exploring ways of ensuring a ban on offensive arms in space,⁵ that is, on weapons of the space-to-earth class. Somewhat later the President came up with a new version; he began to refer to weapons of mass destruction. To be specific, the President had first mentioned this to the departing former Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.⁶ Subsequently this new formulation was incorporated in the President's July 25 letter. All this had occurred not because of some Soviet expression of concern but because there had occurred a shift in concepts. This was not the idea that had been originally conveyed to the Soviet Union. Karpov remarked that he did not know who was responsible for this change; Linhard could determine this for himself. The fact remained, however, that in the July 25 letter the wording referred to possible additional guarantees for the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. That was the wording used by the President in his letter. Thus, the Soviet side would seem to have legitimate grounds to inquire what meaning the U.S. side was attaching to this proposal. Or was one to assume that the President did not know what he was signing but that would be highly surprising.

Linhard suggested that perhaps the most constructive response on his part would be simply to note that he did not care to comment on the evolution of the issue but that he had tried to reply to Karpov's question in connection with the President's letter. If the Soviet Union had no concern in this specific area, he, Linhard, would be happy to report that to the President. On the other hand, if the Soviet side had a concern regarding possible offensive characteristics of our research or regarding other aspects of that research, we are prepared to discuss this in Geneva as well as in Moscow; we were not ignoring these problems. We had tried to provide straightforward answers. But we would be happy to put the matter to rest if there were no concerns. Conversely, if there was a concern, we were prepared to discuss it further, specifically to a view of additional guarantees. If the Soviet

⁴ November 28, 1986. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 163.

⁵ December 5, 1985. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 166.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 139.

side wished to pursue additional aspects of this matter, Ambassador Kampelman and the U.S. Delegation would be happy to do so.

Karpov said that he had drawn the conclusion that the wording in the President's July 25 letter referring to his offer to discuss with the Soviet Union additional guarantees on the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space was meaningless, or else Linhard was thoroughly concealing its meaning.

Linhard wanted to say that if there was no concern in this area, he would certainly be happy to report this to the President.

Karpov interjected that he had heard Linhard say this before but he had not heard anything concrete. Linhard should say what he was referring to unless he was unable to explain what he was saying.

Linhard suggested that he said at least three times already what the President had meant. But if there was some concern in this area, he would be glad to report to the President that there was no concern in this area.

Perle added that since he was expected to know everything there was to know about U.S. plans for placing weapons of mass destruction in space, he could say that the U.S. had no such plans. We have not even studied this subject. When we hear the Soviet side's concern we will be pleased to respond. If these discussions are to be carried any further it would be helpful if the Soviet side were to identify the systems it had in mind. We did not know of any.

Ambassador Kampelman suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union was engaged in this kind of activity and that the results of its research might have suggested concerns in the event that we were to pursue a similar path. In that event it would be helpful to us if the Soviet side were to discuss and explain what had generated its original concern, if it were to tell us what it had achieved in this respect. Perhaps this would help us to discuss this issue.

Karpov remarked that Perle was clearly smarter than Linhard but had sidestepped the issue. Chervov added that Kampelman on the other hand confused the issue. Karpov agreed with Chervov, noting that after what he, Karpov, had said about the history of the issue, Kampelman had evaded the entire subject.

Nitze suggested that it might be appropriate to contemplate adjourning.

Karpov agreed because he did not think that further discussion of weapons of mass destruction in space would lead toward any sort of mutual understanding. Still, he wanted to express his gratitude for several minutes of fun.

Nitze thanked the Soviet participants for participating in these discussions and expressed the view that more progress had been

achieved than the Soviet report to Shevardnadze would indicate. Be this as it may, what progress was made, was made, and what difficulties were encountered, were encountered. He was looking forward to new opportunities for making further progress.

Perle remarked that if Karpov, upon his return to Moscow, were to find it possible to submit a more optimistic report than the one he had cited today, this would not be held against him.

Karpov thanked Perle for his remark which he valued. But he would be able to follow up on Perle's suggestion only if upon arrival in Moscow he were to find a cable from Perle or Nitze indicating genuine movement in the U.S. position on the questions discussed these two days. He would be grateful for such a cable.

Ambassador Lehman wanted to remind Karpov that much of what he knew about negotiating had been learned by observing Karpov. He wanted the record to show that yesterday the Soviet side had offered two new ideas in the START area while today Lehman had offered seven; thus, the Soviet side owed us five.

Karpov countered that the Soviet ideas could be clearly seen with naked eye whereas the U.S. ideas could not be observed through the most high-powered microscope.

Ambassador Rowny wanted to conclude on a simple and serious note. He suggested that on a number of points important progress had been made with respect to reducing strategic arms. Both Ministers have told us to pursue our work in this direction and Rowny thought that there had been real forward movement. He saw some positive aspects on which we should build.

Karpov remarked that it was always useful to be serious, especially in the positive terms expressed by Rowny. Of course, he, Karpov, too, was in favor of developing positive trends and of studying the positive elements in the sides' positions. Still, in his view, the two sides had not carried out the principal task of these discussions, that is, to provide quality material for the upcoming Ministerial meeting. This, despite the fact that the Soviet side had done everything in its power.

Kampelman remarked that given the conclusions he had drawn, his most constructive comment might be not to make a comment.

Nitze said in conclusion that it would be appropriate, he thought, if the participants of this meeting were to maintain a policy of no contact with the press. Karpov said that he expected to maintain contact with the press by reading what the press publishes but he agreed that the substance of these discussions should not be disclosed.

Nitze thanked the Soviet participants for coming to Washington and said we were looking forward to subsequent meetings, in particular the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze as well as to

progress of a different kind between the delegations in Geneva at the coming round of negotiations. Nitze suggested that the Soviet side had moved on a number of points as had the U.S. side though it might not be necessary to count the number of these points which might be of a different order of magnitude. Still, some progress had been made even though both of us wish that the progress would have been more extensive.

Karpov said that he did not want his last words to express disappointment; and thus he preferred not to comment. He thanked Nitze for his hospitality and expressed regret that so little had been achieved in practice. Hopefully, more would be achieved as a result of his upcoming negotiations with Kampelman in Geneva.

154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 13, 1986

SUBJECT

START and INF Instructions

Issue

To approve instructions for the sixth round of START and INF negotiations in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on September 18. This will be the first opportunity to formally elaborate on the proposals set forth in your July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Discussion

Negotiating instructions for START (*Tab A*) and INF (*Tab B*)² have been prepared by the normal interagency process. I have attached a summary sheet for you to record your approval on each set of instructions. The START instructions are agreed to by all agencies. A substan-

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 093, NSDD 240. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copied to Bush.

² Attached but not printed are an undated NSC paper, "INF Instructions—Round VI," and a draft telegram.

tive disagreement exists with respect to the INF instructions; this disagreement and my recommendation are noted on the attached summary sheet.

In addition to START and INF, instructions are also under preparation for the Defense and Space negotiations. Since approved INF instructions are needed to permit routine pre-round NATO consultations, we request you approve these two sets of instructions now. We will document your approval of *all* instructions with a single NSDD to be forwarded when we forward the Defense and Space instructions.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the proposed START and INF negotiating instructions.³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

START Instructions—Round VI

Background

Our most recent START proposal is a fifty percent reduction, as agreed to by you and General Secretary Gorbachev at last November's summit. In your July letter to Gorbachev, you expressed willingness to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure.

Discussion

The attached START instructions are agreed to by all agencies. They authorize a new proposal with the following key features:

—A ceiling of 1600 strategic nuclear deliver vehicles (SNDVs) (ballistic missiles plus heavy bombers)

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁴ Secret. Prepared by Brooks. Attached but not printed is a draft telegram transmitting the instructions to the START negotiating group. Poindexter wrote at the top of the draft, "Mr. President, you do not have to read this draft cable. John. Next, go to Tab B." The Department transmitted overall guidance for Round VI in telegram 291634 to NST Geneva, September 17 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860704-0990)

- A limit of 350 heavy bombers
- 7500 total RVs plus ALCMs, with sublimits of:
 - 5500 ballistic missile RVs
 - 3300 ICBM RVs
- Mobile ICBMs banned

—A new ICBM RV sublimit of 1650 RVs on ICBMs other than silo-based medium or light ICBMs which carry less than 6 RVs. This would capture the systems of most concern to us: heavy ICBMs, highly-MIRVd ICBMs, and, should they be permitted by future negotiating movement, mobile ICBMs.

- 50% throw-weight reduction
- Reductions to take place over 5 years

—Sea-launched cruise missiles not included, although we would be willing to consider a side agreement if verification problems can be solved.

Our existing 50 percent reduction proposal remains on the table. To ensure consistency between old and new proposals, the START instructions also include modification of our 50 percent reduction proposal by the addition of:

- An SNDV ceiling of 1600
- Limits of 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs, 4500 ballistic missile RVs and 3000 ICBM RVs.

—A new sub-limit of 1500 RVs on ICBMs other than silo-based medium or light ICBMs which carry less than 6 RVs.

Finally, the instructions note the importance of agreeing on effective verification procedures and explain why the Soviet proposal of June 11, 1986 is unacceptable.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the proposed START negotiating instructions.⁵

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

155. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD Providing Instructions for Round VI of the Nuclear and Space Talks

Issue

Should you sign the National Security Decision Directive at *Tab A*, formalizing the instructions you have already approved for the NST Delegation?

Facts

The directive instructs the delegation to follow instructions developed on an interagency basis for presenting your July proposals to Gorbachev and other issues.

Discussion

You have already reviewed and approved these instructions,² and based on your previous approval, they have been released to the US delegation. This NSDD simply records your decision for the historical record.

As you will remember, Secretary Weinberger has, once again, raised the idea of changing our approach in the INF area from one of being prepared to negotiate an interim agreement to one of negotiating an agreement which commits both sides to the total elimination of LRINF missiles and reaches that goal in a series of intermediate stages or steps to be completed by a date certain. We have studied this idea a number of times during the past two weeks. We have also considered the tactic of initially pursuing the type of agreement that Secretary Weinberger suggests and then falling back to an interim agreement if and when needed. However, we have tried *both* these approaches before. In our February 1986 position, which called for the total elimination of all LRINF missiles in 3 years (with intermediate levels each year), we attempted exactly the approach that Secretary Weinberger proposes. In your private correspondence with General Secretary Gorbachev, we have moved beyond this position. To move back to this

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 093, NSDD 240. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Tobey and Linhard. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 154.

approach now would be viewed as a conscious step away from “common ground” by both the Soviets and our allies.

In addition, Secretary Weinberger argues that any missiles retained in the US to offset Soviet residual missiles in Asia would have no purpose. However, we would suggest that a moderate number of such missiles could be retained in the US to deal with contingencies currently covered by other US forces and to complicate Soviet military planning. As one example, in Cuba there are a number of runways that could support the recovery of Soviet bombers. There is also at least one major Soviet intelligence facility which could pose problems should hostilities erupt. Certainly a useful military mission can be given to a reasonable number of US Pershing II or GLCM retained in the US, and the Soviet Union no doubt considers this fact of some importance.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you sign the NSDD at *Tab A*.³

³ Reagan initialed his approval. Attached but not printed is National Security Decision Directive 240, “Instructions for NST Round VI,” comprised of the guidance Reagan approved on September 13. Poindexter distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman, under cover of a September 18 memorandum: “The President has issued the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-240) providing guidance for the United States delegation during Round VI of the Nuclear and Space Talks.” (Ibid.)

156. Editorial Note

In a statement to reporters in the White House Briefing Room on September 30, 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz announced: “This morning the Eastern District Court of New York accepted the application of Gennadiy Zakharov, a Soviet citizen assigned to the U.N. Secretariat, to plead *nolo contendere* to all three counts of the indictment filed against him. The court has remanded Mr. Zakharov into the custody of the Soviet Ambassador to the United States for the purpose of effecting his immediate departure from this country. It is expected that Mr. Zakharov will leave the United States this afternoon.” Shultz also announced that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had “informed me that Yuriy Orlov, one of the founders of the Helsinki Monitoring Group and a giant of the Soviet human rights movement,

will be allowed to leave the Soviet Union." Mr. Orlov and his wife were expected to depart the Soviet Union by October 7 and come to the United States. ("Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Remarks by the President on Soviet-United States Relations," *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986 vol. II, pp. 1292–1299) Shultz's statement came one day after the departure from Moscow of Nicholas Daniloff, who had been arrested and charged with espionage on August 30. Documentation on the negotiation of Daniloff's release is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

Following Shultz's statement, at approximately 10:06 a.m., President Ronald Reagan announced that "General Secretary Gorbachev and I will meet October 11th and 12th in Reykjavik, Iceland. The meeting was proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev, and I've accepted. And it will take place in the context of preparations for the General Secretary's visit to the United States, which was agreed to at Geneva in November of '85." ("Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Remarks by the President on Soviet-United States Relations," *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986 vol. II, 1292–1299)

157. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 6, 1986, 1018Z

8905. Subject: START—IFFT-Roslyakov luncheon conversation, October 9, 1986.

1. This is NST/START Memcon VI-M-025. Secret—Entire text.

2. Meeting date: October 9, 1986

Time: 12:30 p.m.—2:30 p.m.

Place: Ambassador Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

USSR

Dr. Edward Ifft

Mr. Yu. I. Roslyakov

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860759–0072. Secret; Priority. Sent priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

4. Subject summary: Reykjavik; Summit; U.S.-USSR Relations; heavy ICBMs and improving delegation procedures. End subject summary.

5. Highlights: Roslyakov and Ifft had a wide-ranging discussion on possibilities for the summit, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the Moscow bureaucracy. Roslyakov said that the Soviet START delegation had not had instructions to table the ideas discussed by the experts, but had gotten permission to do so from Shevardnadze personally. He said he found procedures in Geneva, especially in the post-plenaries, too formal and little more than scoring debating points. He made a plea for greater informality, trust and discretion, and noted the inhibiting effect of having additional people, including interpreters, in the discussions. End highlights.

6. Roslyakov invited Ifft to a get acquainted lunch and the discussion was wide-ranging and pleasant. Roslyakov moved into substance immediately by asking whether Ifft thought progress could be made at the Reykjavik meeting. Ifft said that he had no special insights as to what might happen at the meeting. Setting a date for the summit would be the single most useful result that he hoped to see. He hoped that progress would be made on arms control, but noted that the agenda was broader than arms control and that the time available for discussions was not great. In addition, since the meeting was a Soviet initiative, one would anticipate that the Soviet side would have some moves to make.

7. Roslyakov replied that he likewise had no special insights into Soviet plans for the meeting, although he had seen Gorbachev's letter to President Reagan² and was convinced of the sincerity of the thoughts expressed therein. He asked Ifft whether a "framework agreement" was a likely outcome. Ifft replied that he personally thought that a framework or basic elements type of document would be a logical next step in our work. Roslyakov asked whether such a framework would include the subjects being discussed in all three negotiating groups. Ifft replied that he was thinking particularly of START, although his impression was that INF might also be ripe for agreement. Roslyakov noted that today's "Herald Tribune" had reported that Petrovsky had stated that progress on a test ban and on INF were considered prime summit topics by the Soviet side. This led to a brief discussion of Gorbachev's moratorium proposal in which Roslyakov said that there is strong opposition to the continuation of the moratorium among the Soviet military, but that the MFA supports it. Ifft remarked that the Soviet side had been quite stubborn on this subject and that the morato-

² Presumably a reference to Gorbachev's June 23 letter to Reagan. See Document 136.

rium had continued longer than he would have expected. If Gorbachev had thought originally that the United States would accept either a moratorium or a CTB, he had gotten bad advice. Rather than surprising us with the dramatic move of a moratorium, if he were eager for some progress on the nuclear testing issue, he should have explored the subject privately with the USG to see what might have been possible. Instead it had become an area of conflict in US-USSR relations. If the same degree of Soviet restraint had been shown in some other area, there might have been a big payoff. Roslyakov basically agreed with this and said that Gorbachev had had very little experience in international relations and was still learning. Nevertheless, the moratorium had not been a propaganda move but a reflection of Gorbachev's personal and sincere conviction, which Roslyakov compared to that of President Carter when he sought a CTB early in his administration.

8. Continuing on the summit theme, Ifft again noted the importance of setting an early date. He saw no reason to believe that further delay would lead to better results and the current window of opportunity could not last indefinitely. He then said that he had personally believed for a long time that summits should be more or less regular events, without great fanfare and inflated expectations. Roslyakov said he did not disagree with this, but the next summit is "different." Because of the special circumstances and background surrounding this summit, it must produce concrete results. These results must be in arms control, since the military situation is the focal point of U.S.-USSR problems. Human contacts and exchanges are fine, but peripheral.

9. Ifft asked Roslyakov how, as a newcomer, he viewed the negotiations in Geneva. Roslyakov said that the procedures here were quite different than what he had been used to at the United Nations. He was not used to working under such strict control as seemed to prevail on this delegation. In particular, it seemed to him that the post-plenary discussions, which should be opportunities for informal exploration of issues, were little more than sterile exchanges and attempts to score debating points. They should be made much more informal. In particular, it seemed to him that the custom of keeping detailed notes of these discussions had to have an inhibiting effect on the exchange of views. As an example, during a recent post-plenary discussion, he had, in response to a U.S. question, ventured his personal view that the number of SS-18s would naturally come down in the course of agreed reductions. When he noticed the U.S. notetaker writing all this down, he became very uncomfortable, in view of the fact that what he had given as a reasonable personal view was not reflected anywhere in the Soviet side's formal instructions. He thought that Colonel Koltunov had also been uncomfortable at this point. Ifft said that he could sympathize with much of what Roslyakov was saying. Our procedures had not

always been so formal. However, the alternative would be to rely upon someone's memory some time after the conversation had occurred and this might not be desirable either.

10. Roslyakov continued in the same vein, noting that he had chosen Colonel Koltunov to accompany him in post plenaries and had the highest respect for him. Nevertheless, he had to feel somewhat inhibited in the presence of Colonel Koltunov. He knew for a fact that Ambassador Obukhov, and perhaps even Ambassador Karpov, felt somewhat inhibited by the presence of interpreters at their conversations. Ifft remarked that there is absolutely no problem regarding the U.S. interpreters, who are both highly professional and discreet. It was his impression, however, that the presence of a Soviet interpreter did sometimes inhibit Soviet delegates. Roslyakov appeared quite uncomfortable with this observation but did not contest it. Ifft then suggested that one way to deal with Roslyakov's problem would be for him to distinguish clearly between times when he was expressing an official position and occasions on which he was expressing a personal view. Ifft himself did this and respected this distinction scrupulously when made by Soviet delegates. Roslyakov nodded but was clearly unconvinced.

11. Roslyakov remarked that, on the Soviet delegation, there were individuals who insisted upon a very strict following of instructions and others who were willing to be more "creative" in implementing these instructions. The former, in referring to the latter, were always saying in effect, "look what those bastards are up to now" He assumed that a similar division existed on the U.S. side. In this connection, he noted that he had been unable to give Ifft a straight answer to his earlier question regarding Soviet positions as put forward in the experts' discussions, because this had not been specifically provided for in the Soviet side's instructions. Ifft noted that the Soviet side had in fact tabled the ideas discussed by the experts. Roslyakov explained that this became possible because Shevardnadze personally approved this and it had not been necessary to go all the way to the Politburo and the Soviet equivalent of the NSC.

12. Roslyakov then gave some negative personal observations on the Reagan administration along familiar lines. However, he said he did not want to give the impression that current problems were all the fault of the U.S. side. For example, in retrospect, the Soviet Union should have helped Secretary Vance, who was a good man. He said that it would not come as any surprise to Ifft to learn that there are two schools of thought in Moscow. One said that the situation was hopeless and the Soviet Union should wait for a new U.S. administration. The other, with which he associated himself, thought that efforts could and must be made to reach an agreement. Ifft said that he thought

that a real opportunity now exists to make major progress toward an agreement, but that the sides do not have unlimited time to accomplish this. In this connection, Ifft was disturbed at the obvious ploy of the Soviet START delegation in refusing to credit U.S. moves or to recognize the considerable common ground which exists. Ifft said that he interpreted this as a tactic to put pressure on the defense and space negotiators but that this was a serious mistake. Roslyakov said that the Soviet side had been marking time, not knowing what might come out of the Reykjavik meeting. He hoped new instructions would be received after this meeting and that things would begin to move.

13. Noting that Roslyakov had worked at both IUSAC and IMEMO, Ifft asked how he compared the two institutions. Roslyakov said that IUSAC is the stronger of the two, especially since the end of the Inozemtsev era at IMEMO. Ifft then asked whether Arbatov was in or out of favor, noting that he had seemed to be in eclipse but then had re-emerged. Roslyakov said that Arbatov had good relations with Gorbachev, although he would not say that they were close personal friends. Gorbachev was the sort of informal man who would call upon anyone with expertise regardless of bureaucratic considerations. Arbatov's problem was not so much that he was in disfavor. Under the Brezhnev and Chernenko regimes, Arbatov had appeared as a star when compared to the others around these two leaders. Now Gorbachev had surrounded himself with very impressive people, such as Dobrynin and Yakovlev, and Arbatov was no longer the brightest person in the room. He remained, however, a formidable debater and pamphleteer. Roslyakov then noted that there had also been a change of the guard in the MFA with smart younger people (whom Americans might call "yuppies") coming into positions of influence. Ifft observed that he had the feeling that Arbatov's career might have suffered because he had made some major incorrect predictions in the past. Roslyakov agreed that this was a factor. Both Arbatov and Inozemtsev had gotten caught up in a euphoria regarding US-USSR relations at an earlier time. In addition, Arbatov had made major errors, for which he should be punished, regarding the possibilities of US-USSR trade. Specifically, the favorable effect of the importation of western technology had been greatly overestimated, when the real need was for structural economic reform. While the Soviet Union would not become isolationist, it would, in the future, rely more on its own resources. Although both Arbatov and Inozemtsev had become full academicians in the economics division of the academy of sciences, neither of them knew any more about economics than he or Ifft and this had been part of the problem. IUSAC remains very weak on economic affairs but IMEMO is stronger in this area. Academician Varga (IMEMO) had been a truly outstanding economist. Roslyakov added that another problem with Arbatov is

that, although he had been too euphoric about U.S.-USSR relations earlier, he had now swung to the other extreme and become a hard-liner and was opposing a summit meeting.

14. Ifft noted the recent Soviet references to more detailed work on verification and asked whether Roslyakov could provide any clarification regarding what specifically the Soviet side has in mind. Roslyakov did not seem well-informed on the subject, but said he did not think his delegation had in mind anything dramatic, such as formally establishing a verification working group.

15. Roslyakov fished briefly for Ifft's views as to whether the experts would be reactivated after the Reykjavik meeting. Ifft said he knew of no plans to do this but could not predict the future. Roslyakov cautiously expressed the view that it was better to use the delegates here in Geneva than to have further experts' discussions, since this tended to confuse matters and create problems as to what is or is not an official position.

16. Roslyakov sprinkled the conversation with praise for Gorbachev. He came back to his point that Gorbachev bears some resemblance to President Carter. Like Carter, Gorbachev is highly intelligent, sincere and holds high principles, but will make some mistakes due to inexperience. Roslyakov said he sometimes reads in the U.S. press that Gorbachev is not in firm control. This is not correct. Gorbachev is in firm control, but there is some opposition and some sniping by the old guard. He also said he is reading Raymond Garthoff's book "Detente and Confrontation" and is favorably impressed. He said this book is not well known among his colleagues, but he is recommending it to them. It lays out very well exactly how earlier negotiations were conducted. He seemed to imply that this would be a good model to follow if we want progress here in Geneva.

17. As the conversation was drawing to a close, Roslyakov said he had forgotten to ask one question. What sort of framework agreement did Ifft think could be achieved in START? Ifft then outlined the structural similarities between the current U.S. and Soviet positions. This area of common ground is already considerable and our leaders might perhaps be able to resolve some of the remaining problems. In Ifft's personal view, this could get recorded in a document, which could guide the delegations in their work later on. Roslyakov asked whether such a document could be agreed at Reykjavik. Ifft replied that he thought that would be most welcome, but that it was more realistic to think in terms of the real summit meeting, which he hoped would take place later this year in Washington. Roslyakov agreed.

18. Roslyakov ended the conversation with a plea for a greater level of informality and trust between the two delegations. He noted

that progress would be difficult if individual members of the two delegations could not rely upon each other's discretion and goodwill.

Kampelman

Chapter 3, October 1986–December 1987

158. Editorial Note

On October 9, 1986, President Ronald Reagan traveled from Washington to Reykjavik, Iceland, to meet with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Air Force One departed from Andrews Air Force Base at around 9:45 a.m. and landed at Keflavik airport at 7:05 p.m. The President then proceeded to the United States Ambassadorial Residence, where he stayed that evening. Throughout the following day, Reagan met privately with senior advisors, including Secretary of State George Shultz, reviewed preparatory material, and called on Icelandic President Vigdis Finnbogadottir and other senior Icelandic officials from 4:30 to 5:10 p.m., before returning to the Ambassadorial Residence to dine with Shultz, White House Chief of Staff Don Regan, and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 1)

On October 11, Reagan received briefings from his senior staff and a team of experts, before departing for Hofdi House at 10:15 a.m. and arriving shortly before Gorbachev and the Soviet delegation. From 10:40 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., Reagan and Gorbachev met with an interpreter and a notetaker, with Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze joining them at 11:30 a.m. Gorbachev proposed a draft agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of both sides; a draft agreement eliminating U.S. and Soviet long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) in Europe; to initiate negotiations on shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) in Europe; to limit Soviet LRINF in Asia, and to agree that the United States and Soviet Union would adhere to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for ten years and, during this period, confine to laboratories any space-based elements of potential missile defense systems. The President described the General Secretary's proposals as "very encouraging," while noting outstanding differences—most notably the restriction on testing of defensive systems should further development of promising systems necessitate testing beyond the ABM Treaty. After several exchanges, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to break for lunch and consultations with their respective teams, and then continue discussions of nuclear arms later that afternoon. The memorandum of this first conversation between Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 301.

Reagan and Gorbachev met again in Hofdi House from 3:30 to 5:40 p.m. The President offered detailed responses to the General Secretary's

morning proposals, laid out his case for the Strategic Defense Initiative, and called for two meetings of experts' groups to commence at 8 p.m. that evening and report back to the two leaders by the following morning. One group would discuss nuclear arms, while the other would discuss regional and bilateral affairs and human rights. Gorbachev accepted this negotiating framework. At the conclusion of this meeting, Reagan returned to the U.S. Embassy, where he met with Shultz, Regan, Poindexter, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Ambassador Max Kampelman, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff, to review the afternoon conversations with Gorbachev and provide instructions for the evening's nuclear arms negotiations. Reagan then had a private dinner with Shultz, Regan, and Poindexter, after which he retired for the evening. The memorandum of conversation of Reagan and Gorbachev's second meeting at Reykjavik and that of the experts' group meeting on regional and bilateral affairs are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 302 and 303.

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986, 8 p.m.–6:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

Ambassador Nitze
 Ambassador Kampelman
 Ambassador Rowny
 ACDA Director Adelman
 Assistant Secretary Perle
 Colonel Linhard
 General Moellering
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Gaffney
 Dr. Timbie
 Bruce Burton (notetaker)
 Mr. Afanasenko (interpreter)

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Binder—Bkgn'd For Vienna Mtg. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Hofdi House.

Soviet Side

Marshal Akhromeyev

Ambassador Karpov

Mr. Arbatov

Mr. Falin

M. Velikov

Mr. Groshev (interpreter)

Ambassador Nitze opened the discussion by expressing hope that this working group could solve specific problems. He suggested that the group consider issues in the following order: START, INF, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Nuclear Testing, and Defense & Space.

Marshal Akhromeyev replied that he would like to address START, INF, Defense and Space and Nuclear Testing, and NRRCs.

Nitze asked whether the Soviet side saw nuclear testing and Space and Defense as separate issues. *Akhromeyev* said Defense and Space and nuclear testing were separate, and could be discussed in that order.

Akhromeyev said that the General Secretary that afternoon had given the President a draft agreement, and that the working group could also discuss the content of this document. As a result of the proceedings, the group could have a document to report to the President and General Secretary.

Nitze said he hoped that would be the case, but there were a number of issues to resolve before then. He understood that the document the group prepared would be in the form of draft instructions to foreign ministers. To clear the way for this, it would be wise to be clear on each issue—so that each side understood the other's proposals, the differences between the two, and how to solve them.

On START, *Nitze* continued, the two sides appear to agree that:

- there would be deep cuts in ballistic missile RVs;
- reductions on the order of 50% would apply, to be pursued by negotiators;
- within the 50% cuts, neither INF nor FBS would be included;
- the central ceiling on strategic weapons would be on ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles (RVs);
- there would be limits on ALCMs, and separate limits on SLCMs apart from the central aggregate limit;
- since both sides' forces have evolved differently, there must be trade-offs. The Soviets were willing to make "considerable" or "significant" reductions in ICBMs.
- there would be effective verification, and the Soviets were willing to negotiate such procedures concurrently with other elements of an agreement.

—There would be an aggregate limit of 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev responded that there were many areas of common ground, but we have to discuss differences. He agreed that the reduction of strategic offensive arms is the most important one, and the Soviets aimed to reduce them significantly, by 50%. It was possible to have a document.

He continued that the Soviets agree that they would not include FBS and medium-range missiles. This does not mean that the Soviets have given up taking FBS into account, but they would agree to put them aside for now. However, SLCMs must be limited; the two sides must seek a solution beyond the triad of forces—ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers—and the two sides must reach agreement on limitations on these systems.

Akhromeyev agreed that verification is one of the most important subjects and that there should be a single ceiling for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. In other words, to deal with the triad as a single whole. He suggested the ceiling should be 1600. Gorbachev had suggested 50% reductions from present levels in each type of weapon—ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers—both in delivery vehicles and cruise missiles. What, he asked, did the U.S. side think of this?

Nitze said we would disagree. The President had made clear the vast difference between armaments on ballistic missiles and those on heavy bombers and cruise missiles. A single aggregate which included them as comparable would be inequitable, so the U.S. had difficulties with a single limit.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet side did not consider that some specific features of heavy bombers and ALCMs are less destructive than other systems. Soviet views remained the same, that is, that reductions should be carried out as a single whole.

Nitze answered that the U.S. agreed to limit ALCMs, but not gravity bombs and SRAMs. In an environment of unrestricted Soviet air defenses, we cannot agree to limit heavy bomber weapons.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets could agree to treat heavy bombers with ALCMs differently than heavy bombers with bombs and SRAMs, but there must be agreement to constrain both types. The approach can be different, but it must be specified.

Nitze answered that we can accept specific limits on heavy bombers—a kind of indirect cap on the number of weapons that heavy bombers can carry.

Akhromeyev asked whether we envisioned a sublimit on ALCM-carriers in the SNDV totals, or would heavy bombers be included in the aggregate?

Nitze replied that the ceiling of 1600 delivery vehicles would cover ICBMs, SLBMs and the total of heavy bombers. There would be a sublimit of 350 heavy bombers within the 1600 ceiling. The U.S. thus was proposing substantial reductions in the aggregate of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. There would be 50% reductions in RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs, and various sublimits on specific categories. The negotiators at Geneva could consider these sublimits.

Akhromeyev said there is a difficulty. The Soviets cannot agree to separate heavy bombers from ICBMs and SLBMs. The triad must be treated as a single whole, and all three legs of the triad must be included.

Nitze answered that the U.S. is including all three legs. But there is a difference between the legs. He understood that the General Secretary and President Reagan had reached an understanding that bombers would not be equated with, for instance, SS–18 RVs.

Akhromeyev said he did not think Gorbachev had agreed to this. The Soviets see the difference between heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles and those armed with bombs and SRAMs. But both are heavy bombers and must be included, although they might be counted differently.

Nitze said the U.S. agreed to include heavy bombers, but not to include gravity bombs and SRAMs.

Akhromeyev said he understood the U.S. position was that there would be 350 heavy bombers with ALCMs, which would be limited, but the rest would not be included.

Nitze replied that was incorrect. All heavy bombers would be included in the total. The U.S. has approximately 500 heavy bombers and would come down to 350. Some would have ALCMs, others gravity bombs and SRAMs, but all would be included.

Akhromeyev asked, all heavy bombers? Each side would get 350? Or could there be exchanges for other types or weapons? The USSR, he stated, was not going to build heavy bombers. Could they have an equalizing number of ICBMs or SLBMs?

Nitze said yes, the 350 is a sublimit within the 1600 level.

Akhromeyev asked if each side would have freedom to mix?

Nitze said he understood *Akhromeyev*'s question and agreed that they would have freedom to mix.

Akhromeyev then said that *Nitze* had not mentioned the amount of nuclear charges each side could have.

Nitze said there would be no direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs. There would be a limit on ALCMs; the U.S. had proposed to set this level at less than a half of planned U.S. deployments.

Akhromeyev said he understood the side with fewer bombers could have more ALCMs on heavy bombers. Each side would be allowed to set its own levels on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

Nitze explained that, for example, if the U.S. had 350 heavy bombers and the Soviet side had 250, then the Soviet side could have 100 more ICBM RVs. (Note: This was an incorrect portrayal of the U.S. position, which *Nitze* later corrected, see page 7.)

Akhromeyev said that each side, then, would be able to define its own requirements within the overall limit.

Nitze answered that, for example, the Soviets could have 1500 ALCMs on 250 heavy bombers, and the U.S. could have 1500 ALCMs on 350 heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet Union would not have so many cruise missiles, so it could have more RVs on ICBMs?

Nitze said the Soviets have very large air defenses. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev recognized the historical differences in the evolution of each side's forces. The working group's job was to recognize and deal with those differences. So what the U.S. is proposing is very equitable. We would be going too far if we started talking about air defenses in detail. The reason we have deployed ALCMs is because of the need to keep our bombers outside of the range of Soviet air defenses.

Akhromeyev said that the operational capabilities of long-range cruise missiles are no less than those of ballistic missile RVs. The Soviet Union must deal with them.

Nitze said that is why the U.S. had agreed to limit ALCMs. He then asked how the Soviet Union planned to limit heavy missiles?

Akhromeyev said that Gorbachev had explained to the President that the Soviet Union would make "considerable" or "significant" reductions in heavy missiles.

Nitze asked, By what method? A reduction in aggregate throwweight? Reductions in numbers of missiles? A sublimit?

Akhromeyev repeated that there would be a significant reduction in heavy missiles. The number of RVs would be significantly reduced.

After some discussion among each delegation, *Akhromeyev* asked whether the two sides could begin drafting. *Nitze* then read the following text:

"a. The sides reaffirm their commitment to the early implementation of the principle of a 50% reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of their existing strategic arsenals. As an immediate first step toward this objective, the sides agree to interim reductions including the following.

"b. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600.

“c. Within this ceiling, the sides shall limit the number of deployed heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 350.

“d. The sides shall reduce the aggregate of the number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the number of long-range air-launched cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000.

“e. The sides shall limit the aggregate number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 4500.

“f. The sides shall limit the number of warheads on ICBMs to a level not to exceed 3000.

“g. Within that level, the sides shall limit the total number of warheads on ICBMs, other than those silo-based light and medium ICBMs that carry 6 reentry vehicles each or less, to a level not to exceed 1500.

“h. The sides agree that Soviet ballistic missile throwweight will be reduced by 50% from the current level, establishing a new throwweight ceiling which will not be exceeded thereafter by either side.

“i. The sides shall agree to a reductions schedule such that the above reductions will be completed within five years.

“j. The sides shall agree that once the above provisions are agreed and their implementation begins, the sides will again enter negotiations within six months, the goal of such negotiations being further reductions toward ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.”

After reading the text, Nitze asked whether the two sides should move on to discuss INF.

Akhromeyev said he saw some new questions or items in Nitze’s presentation, which he would like Nitze to clarify. Specifically, what should the two sides do with heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs? Are they to be included in the 1600 ceiling?

Nitze answered, “Yes, they are.”

Akhromeyev said, “Good.” He then asked, if a side has less than 350 heavy bombers, could they compensate with ICBMs?

Nitze answered that, regarding this question, he had misspoken earlier. Neither side could compensate with ICBMs.

Akhromeyev said he did not understand. Each side would get 4500 ICBM RVs only?

Nitze replied that there are separate aggregates. One is the number of SNDVs. Another is the number of RVs and ALCMs. Neither side could take away from one category and add to the other category in the latter aggregate.

Akhromeyev said, then we can't agree. The Soviet side wished to agree on 6000, but each side would decide how to allocate its forces.

Akhromeyev and *Nitze* then agreed to record that there was disagreement on this point.

Nitze asked if there was some way to resolve this? If the 1500 limit on ALCMs were a sublimit in the 6000 aggregate, would that be acceptable?

Akhromeyev said that no sublimit on ALCMs was necessary. The two sides should just agree to 6000, with each side free to decide the allocation of its forces.

Nitze said he thought the Soviet side had agreed to a sublimit on ICBM RVs?

Akhromeyev said no. Each side should be free to allocate its forces. Gorbachev had suggested a good option—to reduce by 50% in ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and ALCMs.

Nitze said he did not believe the President had accepted this.

Akhromeyev said Gorbachev had not so informed his delegation. The President certainly had not declined Gorbachev's suggestion. This was another matter. Gorbachev had not said that the President would agree, but the President did not reject the idea out of hand.

Nitze said, "I wouldn't agree."

Akhromeyev said very well then, the Soviet side did not agree to set a limit on ALCMs or to set sublimits on ICBMs and SLBMs. There would be an overall limit of 6000 with complete freedom to mix. Heavy missiles would be reduced significantly; the number would be set in subsequent negotiations, but the two sides could record now that they would be reduced significantly.

Akhromeyev continued that the Soviet side had come to the working group meeting with clear instructions from Gorbachev that the Soviet position would be considered—that is, to reduce by 50% each type of weapon, including ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and heavy missiles. Everything else is contingent on that agreement. *Akhromeyev* would have to get the General Secretary's approval to change this position.

Nitze said he was not prepared to say that the 6000 proposal was unacceptable. However, the U.S. would have grave difficulty with 50 percent reductions in each category.

Akhromeyev suggested that at this point, the two sides could try to formulate language for instructions to the Foreign Minister and Secretary of State, or they could go on to INF.

Nitze answered they should go on to INF.

Akhromeyev agreed, but then, excusing himself, said there was something else to discuss—how to deal with SLCMs.

Nitze said the U.S. was prepared to say we will consider separate limits on SLCMs outside the 6000 weapons aggregate.

Akhromeyev said that the two sides would record that a solution to SLCMs acceptable to both sides will be sought.

Nitze replied that was correct. The U.S. has very deep concerns about how to verify constraints on SLCMs. That would have to be considered.

Akhromeyev agreed that verification was not a simple matter, but we could not have 50% cuts in one category of strategic weapons and an unlimited increase in another. Both sides should show good will and solve this problem.

Nitze said the U.S. would do its best to find a solution.

Akhromeyev said the discussions could then move on to INF.

Nitze said that in the discussions this summer with Ambassador Karpov, two principles were discussed. If we could agree to a level in Europe, we could agree to a level outside of Europe, with deployments to be limited to the USSR and to the U.S. The longstanding U.S. position was to eliminate the entire class of LRINF missiles globally. *Nitze* understood, however, that a global limit of zero on LRINF missiles was *not* what the Soviets were suggesting.

Akhromeyev stated that we were past the stage of Karpov's discussions. Gorbachev had made a proposal for 0/0 in Europe without taking into account British and French systems. The U.S. must understand what the Soviet Union has conceded for the sake of an agreement. There was a problem with shorter-range systems of less than 1000 km range, and the Soviet Union was willing to enter into negotiations on them. They were also willing to enter into negotiations on medium-range systems in Asia. *Akhromeyev* acknowledged that the President had not accepted the Soviet offer but he had said it was a far-reaching proposal.

Nitze said the U.S. would try to find a solution. As he understood it, it was no longer a part of the Soviet position that an agreement would take into account modernization of British and French systems. This was what Shevardnadze had said in Washington.²

Nitze continued that the U.S. position was that we were ready for 0/0 globally or for something less than 0/0 in Europe. Karpov had suggested 100 in Europe. The U.S. had said this was acceptable provided there were reductions in Asia. The U.S. had talked about proportional reductions in Asia, but we also had said that at a low level, we

² Records of Shevardnadze's September 19–20 meetings with Shultz in Washington can be found in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 283–285.

could accept equal levels in Europe and Asia. It was also a longstanding U.S. position that there must be concurrent constraints on SRINF.

The principal difficulty, Nitze continued, is what level in Asia is acceptable to the Soviet Union. At one time the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze, but that was not satisfactory. We understand there are 500 to 600 deployed SS-20 warheads in Asia. Zero/zero in Europe and 500–600 warheads in Asia would not be acceptable to the U.S. or its Allies. There are other issues, such as the Pershing II/GLCM mix, and duration of an agreement.

Akhromeyev said he was authorized to discuss the proposal advanced by General Secretary Gorbachev. What happened before belonged to the past. Gorbachev suggested eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, without taking into account UK and French forces. The Soviet Union had thus made a great move forward, and the U.S. must respond positively. The Soviet Union had also agreed to undertake negotiations on shorter-range systems. The Soviets had made important moves to accommodate U.S. desires, and the U.S. should respond positively.

Nitze answered that the U.S. was not prepared to accept what the Soviets proposed—0/0 in Europe with no comparable limit in Asia. The U.S. is prepared, however, for what had been discussed in Washington—equal levels of 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads outside of Europe, an agreement of unlimited duration, and constraints on SRINF.

Akhromeyev said the two sides did have a different approach regarding medium-range missiles in Europe. The President and General Secretary could discuss this the next day.

Nitze suggested the two delegations could try to narrow differences. Perhaps they could start with the question of duration of an agreement. Could the Soviets agree that any agreement would last until superseded by an agreement for further reductions?

Akhromeyev said we have one sticking point on missiles in Asia. We could report this to leaders and let them solve it. So we have this sticking point, he added.

Nitze asked if we could agree on constraints on SRINF, namely, a freeze on SRINF at the current Soviet level, which would then be a ceiling on both sides. Thereafter, there would be negotiations on all INF systems other than medium-range systems.

Akhromeyev replied that if the two sides can agree on INF in Europe, the Soviets would agree to freeze shorter-range systems of less than 1000 km at the level that both sides now have, and then start immediately with new negotiations on further reductions.

Nitze said the main question, then, was what to do about systems in Asia.

Akhromeyev said all right, the leaders can try to solve this tomorrow.

Both sides then agreed to move on to discussion of issues regarding the ABM Treaty.

Akhromeyev said he wanted to repeat what the General Secretary had told the President. The Soviet Union was prepared, for the purposes of strengthening the ABM Treaty, to agree that the Soviet Union and the U.S. would, for a 10-year period, undertake not to use their right to withdraw from the Treaty, and to comply strictly with all its provisions. There would be a ban on testing of all anti-ballistic missile space elements except for research and testing in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on testing of fixed land-based components which are allowed by the Treaty. After the 10-year period, there would be a five-year period of negotiations to find further mutually acceptable solutions. General Secretary Gorbachev also had asked the U.S. to exert further efforts for a prohibition on anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. *Akhromeyev* said this was the proposal submitted to the President, and the Soviet delegation was instructed to discuss it with the U.S. delegation.

Nitze said he wanted to ask some questions of clarification. First, the Soviets were talking about a period of 10 years, which we could call Period X. Thereafter, there would be a period of negotiations to find further acceptable solutions, which we could call Period Y. Could the Soviets tell us more about Period Y?

Akhromeyev said the 10 year period would be long enough given the current state of development of arms and science. It is difficult to say what will happen in 10 years. The best solution is not to deploy such a (space-based) system. But the U.S. is not prepared to agree not to deploy, so the Soviets are willing to have this compromise.

Nitze asked if the Soviets were implying that either side had the right to deploy?

Akhromeyev said he was only saying that the sides would have to decide after 10 years what to do, to find mutually acceptable solutions on how to proceed.

Nitze said that the Soviet side had at times said that there should be no testing outside the laboratory, and at other times that both sides should adhere to the terms of the ABM Treaty. *Nitze's* recollection was that the Treaty does not mention research. During the negotiations, the Soviet side had, in fact, taken the position that the Treaty should not limit research.

Akhromeyev said the Treaty was very clear. Each side could test fixed land-based systems and components. As to space systems, Article V says each side agrees not to deploy space-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems. So the Treaty is clear about space-based

systems; therefore, it should be recorded in no uncertain terms that neither side would withdraw from the Treaty, and that each side would comply with all its provisions, including Article V.

Nitze asked, what about Agreed Statement D?

Akhromeyev answered that it could not cancel out Article V.

Nitze suggested the Soviet side go through the negotiating record. The U.S. had suggested a ban on devices based on other physical principles which could be substituted for ABM components as defined by the Treaty. The U.S. tried for many months to get the Soviets to accept this, but the Soviet side rejected it. The Soviet argument was, in fact, intelligent—i.e., that we had spent months trying to resolve the problem of defining the major components to be limited, but that while we knew about then-existing technology, neither side could know about future technology. So to settle the problem, both sides accepted Agreed Statement D, which prohibited deployment of systems and components based on other physical principles, but not research, testing and development, since it contains a reference, “in the event such systems are created. . .”.

In our view, *Nitze* continued, it is clear what is limited by the Treaty, and the U.S. quite disagrees that the Treaty bans all testing other than of fixed land-based systems. When the Soviets are talking of “strengthening” the ABM Treaty, what they really are suggesting is “amending” the treaty to make it something it was not meant to be.

Ambassador Karpov said Agreed Statement D cannot cancel out Article I or III. Systems based on other physical principles can only be tested if they are to substitute for fixed, land-based systems. It is important that both sides understand what is limited. Agreed Statement D only provides clarifying language to these limitations.

Nitze said the U.S. was prepared to continue talking about strengthening the Treaty, but that this is different than amending the Treaty. Article III deals solely with deployment. Agreed Statement D is a ban on deployment—and thus is a reinforcement of Article III. This is an important disagreement between us. The U.S. is willing to discuss what is provided for by the Treaty, but both sides should be clear about the distinction between amending the Treaty and interpreting it to be something it was meant to be.

Karpov asked why argue about some other formulation; there is no agreement on the meaning of the Treaty. The Soviet point is that the Treaty bans for an unlimited duration the deployment of space-based systems. The Soviet formula is no withdrawal for 10 years, and after that, seek to agree on what comes next.

Nitze replied that *Karpov* was right, there had been no agreement at first on “testing in an ABM mode”, but subsequently we did get

agreement. At one point in the negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side suggested that it did *not* mean testing against objects in orbit but against an object in its flight trajectory from earth-to-earth. We agreed, so the Treaty did not include a prohibition on ASAT testing. The Treaty does not mention a ban on ASAT testing, and thus the Soviet proposal goes beyond the Treaty's terms. The U.S. would like to make progress about what the Treaty was intended to mean.

Ambassador Kampelman said that a decision on definitions was very difficult to reach given the realities. The two sides have different perceptions of what did take place and what should take place. The U.S. is prepared to discuss these differences, but we are not encouraged about success. Is Marshal Akhromeyev suggesting that we set aside those differences and agree to abide by the ABM Treaty for "x" number of years without having agreement on what it means to be abiding by the Treaty?

Akhromeyev said the question is not theoretical but rather a practical dispute. We debated in the 1970s, when neither side was ready to deploy a space-based defense, but the situation is different today. It is important that the U.S. is considering testing systems in space, which would be a violation of the Treaty with all the attendant consequences. The Soviet side is concerned. The Soviets have tried to reach an understanding, so they have advanced different proposals.

Kampelman said that if the Soviet side is suggesting that we restrict our research only to the laboratory, except for fixed land-based systems, then the U.S. would not agree since that would be a restriction on what we were allowed legally to do under the ABM Treaty.

Akhromeyev said that research on space-based systems is permissible in the laboratories; outside of the laboratory, it would be banned.

Nitze asked what was meant by the Soviet proposal that "neither side would exercise its right to withdraw"? Is that for all reasons, or did it mean that neither side would withdraw for issues regarding research?

Akhromeyev said the Soviet proposal is quite clear—there would be an agreement that neither side would withdraw for 10 years, and both sides would respect all of the Treaty's provisions.

Mr. Arbatov exclaimed that we were not dealing with abstractions but with a specific package—radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, and the Soviet Union naturally wants some precautionary measures, to know about future U.S. intentions and actions. The Soviet Union and U.S. would be eliminating weapons that were "cast in iron" and which cost both sides lots of money. This was not a theoretical exercise. We are stalemated in the negotiations at Geneva and trying to find a way out. The USSR has to accept radical cuts in its weapons and needs to know what the U.S. is prepared to give up.

Nitze commented that the cuts would affect both sides.

Arbatov rejoined that the Soviet proposal on the ABM Treaty also applies to both sides.

Kampelman said he wanted the Soviets to understand U.S. concerns. The Soviets have suggested non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of time. Article XV of the Treaty refers to extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme national interests. Both sides can anticipate that something might come up, not related to work on strategic defenses but related to supreme national interests. But under the Soviet proposal, the U.S. would not have the right to withdraw. Thus, we should find some language that protects the sovereign national right to withdraw from a treaty if supreme national interests are at stake. *Kampelman* said he would have to explain to the Senate that the U.S. had tied its hands. Therefore, we need to find some other way. Supposing one side had just violated the agreement. Are we to have no remedy?

Karpov suggested that the two sides address this in practical terms. The text of the Treaty is clear cut. The two sides understand it differently, so we are stalemated. The Soviets are trying to find some formula that would move things along. Strict adherence to the ABM Treaty is a critical element of U.S.-Soviet relations.

He continued that the U.S. has stated that both sides need confidence, trust, verification, control. He agreed. But how could there be agreement to carry out reductions of 50% while one side was building an ABM territorial defense? So, the Soviet side needs assurances that such a danger will not come over the Soviet Union in the next 10 years. Only the U.S. and Soviet Union had the capacity to possess such systems; therefore, the Soviet Union needed confidence, including strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the President is not serious about this, then all our negotiations about reducing arms are a myth. Without agreement on this point, there would be no agreement on 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Nitze said he wanted to cast the overall issue in terms that are more manageable, and thus he wanted to pose two problems:

—Whether or not, after the expiration of ten years, the U.S. is permitted to deploy ABM systems that are not permitted by the ABM Treaty?

—Prior to that right to deploy, does the U.S. propose to live up to the ABM Treaty?

On the second question, *Nitze* said, the U.S. very much wants both sides to live up to the ABM Treaty. However, we don't think the Soviet Union is. On the question of deployments, there are different points of view, i.e., whether deployments would take place when agreed by both sides or by some fixed date, but these did not seem insurmountable.

Akhromeyev said the two delegations were getting back onto the road we have been traversing at the Geneva negotiations. The Soviet Union has a proposal. Does the U.S. have amendments, or does the U.S. accept it in principle? This must be solved tonight. If certain particulars are acceptable, all right. But if the U.S. is opposed in principle, then it is destroying everything that the two sides are trying to do today.

The Soviet Union, he continued, will never accept the dangers that the U.S. side is proposing to it. The Soviet Union is fully prepared to reach agreement on any issue. The two sides have been discussing these issues for many years. They have come far on strategic and INF issues. But the Soviet Union needs a clear understanding on where we are. Why not try to formulate where we are?

Nitze said we do have a proposal, and then read the following text:

"To move toward a safer and more stable world, the US and USSR will establish a mechanism to move together toward increasing reliance on defense.

"This mechanism will not eliminate the ABM treaty but will include some new provisions which would take precedence over certain provisions of the ABM treaty.

"This will involve careful management of a transition to a stabilizing balance of offensive and defensive forces, with greater security at each stage; leading to the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

"This will ensure that defenses will reinforce the stability achieved by eliminating ballistic missiles.

"This will involve replacement of offensive ballistic missiles with defenses in a phased manner that provides greater stability at each stage in the disarmament process.

"This will involve agreement to share the benefits of strategic defense in conjunction with the elimination of ballistic missiles.

"With the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, defensive deployments would be adjusted accordingly.

"The two sides will consider the timing and phasing of a transition to strategic defense based on the principles of equity and stability at every stage."

Akhromeyev said he understood that what *Nitze* had just read was a new proposal, but the proposals by the two sides remained far apart.

At this point, the two delegations took a break.

When the delegations returned, *Akhromeyev* said that while many of the members of the U.S. and Soviet delegations had been talking with each other for many years, he was meeting Ambassador *Nitze* for the first time. He therefore wanted to take up the matter of the ABM Treaty, and to give the views of the Soviet military.

It goes without saying that the Soviet military does not discount the dangers of the ABM system of the U.S. because of the possibility it created of the U.S. making a nuclear strike with impunity against the Soviet Union. The state which had a territorial ABM defense could use it to its advantage. But there are realities and illusions. The Soviet Union is aware that the process of developing such a system is a long one. If the U.S. is determined to develop, it will take a certain amount of time. The Soviet Union is concerned and must consider how to respond to the development of such a system.

The U.S. delegation is aware of General Secretary Gorbachev's statement that the Soviet Union will find a response, that it will be adequate, but that it will not be similar to what the U.S. is doing. That statement is true. There are many ways to find a response. If an ABM system is deployed, there will be no reductions in strategic offensive arms. On the contrary, there will be a proliferation and buildup. There are, of course, possibilities for circumventing ABM definitions. It is up to the U.S. how we are going to deal with this. However, the Soviet Union is no less concerned with an unrestrained arms race. If an ABM system is created, who and when in the future will start the process of reducing arms? Thus, we are at an historic moment—either we have historic reductions, or our countries will have to agree in the future under more difficult circumstances.

Nitze said he appreciated *Akhromeyev's* remarks and would take them into account. He suggested that the two sides now move on to the issue of nuclear testing, and wanted to offer some language:

"The U.S. and the Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing."

Nitze said he hoped this language would cover Soviet considerations as well as ours. The language laid out a step-by-step process that could bring progress in the field.

Akhromeyev suggested that we should start negotiations on the prohibition of testing.

Nitze suggested again that we should undertake a step-by-step process. The first step on the agenda would be to resolve verification problems with existing treaties. When this was done, as the text he had read indicated, "the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing."

Akhromeyev said the Soviets have many questions, but he thought the negotiations should start with the issue of the full cessation of nuclear testing. They could proceed on a stage-by-stage basis, beginning with the 1970s treaties. When the two delegations began drafting, he concluded, they would be able to find acceptable language.

Nitze said he had hoped that the U.S. draft language would be acceptable, but if *Akhromeyev* preferred, we could move on to other topics.

Nitze then read U.S. proposed language on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers:

“The two sides will begin negotiations promptly with a view toward reaching agreement on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.”

Akhromeyev said that seemed all right, that the two sides could discuss risk reduction centers in principle. He suggested that the delegations return to the issue of strategic offensive arms and try to develop a common view.

On START, he said the General Secretary had given to the President a draft text of instructions to Foreign Ministers. The Soviets would be glad to listen to *Nitze*’s comments.

Nitze said that he thought the instructions to Foreign Ministers should be more detailed. There was a good deal of common ground on strategic offensive arms, and the sides could thus go further.

Akhromeyev said all right, what are your proposals?

Karpov said that convergence between the two sides was outlined in the General Secretary’s paper, which contains key elements. Specific details could be left to negotiators.

Nitze said the U.S. did not want to agree on a general statement. We were close enough to reflect greater agreement. The U.S. was preparing a new paper, and he asked the Soviet side to hold off discussion for a few moments until it was ready.

Karpov explained that the General Secretary handed over the document with the objective of formulating basic key elements, and leaving the details to negotiators. It is better to reflect common ground. *Akhromeyev* said that, at the same time, fundamental solutions should be reflected in the instructions. The two sides may have differences on details; besides, we should leave something for Foreign Ministers to do.

Nitze said we want to have a clear view of differences. We do not want to agree to a general formula, then find out that the basis for that was fallacious. He continued that there should be agreement on specific verification measures, and wanted to read to the Soviet delegation some U.S. language pertaining to INF verification provisions:

“There will be specific verification measures which include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.”

Akhromeyev said we should not just write verification points into the section on INF. In addition to NTM, there can and must be other measures of verification. This should include exchange of data, and the two sides could work on other measures of verification. He believed the U.S. and Soviet Union would be able to agree. The Soviet side was no less interested in verification than was the U.S.

Nitze said that verification applies to START, too.

Akhromeyev said there should be an exchange of data which the two sides had exchanged in connection with SALT II. Both sides then told each other a great deal of information. There must be mutual confidence. He also believed there should be careful monitoring of destruction of excess arms, and continued controls over inventories and existing forces.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet side had given the U.S. a draft text. Whether it was bad or good, the U.S. should give the Soviet side a piece of paper.

Nitze said the U.S. would give the Soviets a paper in short order. *Akhromeyev* complained about the delay. *Nitze* reminded him that the two delegations were to work out an agreement tonight. The U.S. did not like the Soviet paper, which was not detailed enough, and thought the two sides could do better.

At this point, there was a break. The U.S. delegation withdrew to caucus upstairs at Hofdi House.³

On returning from the caucus, there was a brief exchange whether the instructions to Foreign Ministers should be public or private. The Soviet delegation said it had instructions to agree on a document that could be published. *Ambassador Kampelman* said instructions from leaders to Foreign Ministers generally are private.

Nitze then read aloud the following text on START, saying that the U.S. and Soviet Union should seek an early agreement along the following lines:

—“The agreement will involve 50% reductions in strategic arms.

—“The two sides will place highest priority on reductions in ballistic missile warheads.

—“They will seek reductions of 50% in ballistic missile warheads, to a level of 4500 for each side, to be achieved within_____years.

³ No minutes were found.

- “These reductions will include 50% reductions in warheads on SS-18s and other heavy ICBMs.
- “There will be appropriate corresponding reductions in all ballistic missile systems—including in the US submarine-launched ballistic missile force (SLBMs).
- “There will be codified reductions and limitations on throw-weight to 50% of the current Soviet level.
- “There will be further appropriate sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, for example, on ballistic missile RVs, ICBM RVs, SLBM RVs, on non-silo-based missiles and missiles with more than 6 RVs, and on heavy ICBMs.
- “There will be an overall limit of 6000 strategic nuclear weapons, consisting of ballistic missile warheads and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).
- “As part of such a package, the US and USSR should seek agreement in the following other areas:
 - “There will be a limit of 350 on heavy bombers.
 - “There will be an aggregate ceiling of 1600 on bombers and ballistic missiles.
 - “There will be separate limits on sea-launched cruise missiles.
- “Effective verification is essential to both sides. As agreed at Geneva last year, verification measures should be negotiated concurrently with reductions and limitations. The two sides should seek to apply progress made in INF and other areas to the negotiations on strategic offensive arms.
- “They should work out the details of this agreement as soon as possible.”

Akhromeyev then asked in what way was the U.S. text different than the proposal the U.S. set out in Geneva this year?

Nitze answered that it was a clear statement of our position. It was not materially different from our September proposals.

Akhromeyev said these were U.S. proposals as of September this year. The General Secretary had advanced a new proposal for 50% cuts, with U.S. FBS and medium-range missiles not being taken into account. That was a new proposal.

Nitze said that, substantively, what we had put forward was a 50% cut in strategic offensive arms.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had offered significant reductions in heavy missiles. There should be a package of measures, but instead they were only getting from the U.S. what they had got before. Thus it turns out to be impossible to agree to some kind of joint statement.

Nitze said the U.S. would agree to a joint statement with these points.

Akhromeyev said this is an agreement to the American conditions. The Soviet Union cannot agree to this.

Nitze asked, how would the Soviets change it?

Karpov said that this morning, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had proposed a new solution, which was to cut the strategic weapons of both sides by 50%. The 50% would be applied to all categories of delivery vehicles and weapons. Now, something that is not an absolute cut of 50% is being introduced. The U.S. has some 2200 SNDVs, which the U.S. proposes to reduce to 1600; the Soviets have to ask, where is the 50% cut? The U.S. proposal is a proposal already known to us. It cannot be regarded as constructive compared to the radical proposal voiced today by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, *Karpov* continued, to agree upon or offer amendments to this package, to reach a mutually acceptable directive to Foreign Ministers about 50% cuts being put into effect, turns out to be unacceptable and impossible.

Kampelman said this meeting had begun at 8 P.M. We had had a discussion. We had talked about 1600 SNDVs. The Soviet side had never mentioned any other figure. If the Soviet side had one, then give it to the U.S. side.

Akhromeyev repeated the proposal to reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50%, with the number of delivery vehicles and warheads to be cut by 50%. Under these conditions, it was agreed to cut the number of heavy ICBMs by 50% as well. The U.S. side could not agree to this, at least for the bomber part of it. After that, the Soviet side began to hear out the American proposal. The Soviets asked to get it in writing. It turned out that the U.S. proposal in no way took account of or responded to the proposal by the General Secretary.

Karpov interjected that it was strange that it had taken the U.S. so much time to develop their formulation—it would have been quite sufficient for the Americans just to say that they wished to repeat their proposal of September 18 this year.

Kampelman said the date was irrelevant. The U.S. does refer to 50%. If the Soviets differ, they should tell us where. Everyone on the U.S. side believed we had agreed on 1600. If this were not so, the Soviets should tell us what their number was.

Karpov replied that the U.S. was at about 1100 ICBMs. How many warheads are carried by these systems? The warheads for every category should be cut by 50%.

Kampelman asked, does that mean 1600 is *not* the Soviet position? Are you proposing 1100 SNDVs?

Karpov answered that he had proposed 50% cuts.

Kampelman asked, what number is that, 1100?

Akhromeyev said the U.S. had something in the area of 1018–1020 ICBMs, so after a 50% cut, the U.S. would get approximately 510 ICBMs. The Soviet Union has 1398 ICBMs, which would be cut by one half.

The General Secretary had handed to the President the composition of that reduction.

Assistant Secretary Perle asked, then you are not proposing equal levels?

Akhromeyev answered, that is correct.

Nitze said that this raised a very important point. The U.S. had never agreed to cut to unequal levels. We had not thought there was a significant issue between the two sides on this, either with regard to SNDVs or RVs. The entire pattern of discussions had been that we would wind up with equal levels. When the two sides had begun talking this evening, we were talking about 6000 and how that would work, about 1600 and how that would work, and about a subceiling of 350 on heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev asked if he could ask some questions on INF. In the conversations between the General Secretary and President Reagan, the Soviets had proposed to begin negotiations as soon as practically possible on medium-range missiles in Asia and negotiations on systems of less than 1000 km range. The U.S. side did not agree, so the two delegations would have to let leaders decide on the level in Asia.

Nitze said we could agree to zero in Europe if there were zero globally, in other words in Asia. If not zero in Europe, then an equal level in Asia. What we could not agree to was zero in Europe without zero in Asia.

Akhromeyev said he understood.

Akhromeyev continued that he saw nothing in the American proposal on the ABM Treaty. Perhaps this was an error?

Nitze said that U.S. language on that point was being translated into Russian.

Akhromeyev took note of the U.S. language regarding nuclear testing. He suggested that the delegations agree to take a coffee break to report the situation to their leaders. He proposed they return at 3:00 AM.

Nitze agreed. The meeting recessed at 2 A.M.⁴

The delegations resumed discussions at 3:15 A.M.

Akhromeyev started by noting that since the Soviet side had requested the recess, he wished to say a few words.

He continued that the Soviet team had reported to its authorities the shape of the positions of the Soviet Union and U.S. As a result, he

⁴ During this break, the American delegation met with Shultz in his hotel room. A transcription of Charles Hill's notes of that conversation is printed below as Document 160.

wanted to specify one point of agreement on strategic offensive arms. The point is that the two sides propose to negotiate an agreement on 50% reductions in the strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and Soviet Union, to have equal limits for delivery vehicles and warheads, taking into account the historic four specific features of the force structures of the sides.

At the same time, he said, the Soviets note that as regards the far-reaching proposals made in the meeting between the General Secretary and the President with respect to all questions under discussion—strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles, the ABM Treaty, a total prohibition on nuclear testing—the U.S. side has not provided a reaction, but rather has explained and set forth those proposals which they had submitted in Geneva or in letters between the President and General Secretary. The Soviets had hoped that since they had submitted new proposals, the U.S. would do likewise. That had not happened.

Nitze responded that the first part of what *Akhromeyev* had just proposed was somewhat different from what the Soviet side had been discussing earlier, and *Nitze* welcomed that. The Soviets had said 50% reductions to equal levels on SNDVs and warheads. Was the Soviet side in fact interested in 50% reductions revolving around 1600 SNDVs and 6000 RVs and ALCMs, leaving aside refinements about what might happen below that?

Akhromeyev said that was correct. The two sides would specify the level of SNDVs and warheads, and these would be equal for both sides.

Nitze repeated that he welcomed that, noting that if the delegations were looking for instructions for Foreign Ministers, they could be based on what *Akhromeyev* had just said.

Akhromeyev said that if we were to have agreeable, acceptable accords on this, we could move on to other areas. He repeated that the Soviets had offered an INF agreement with 0/0 in Europe which would not take into account UK and French systems, with later negotiations on SRINF which would be frozen and reductions in the East. As to the ABM Treaty, there were fundamental differences. The two sides understand the problem in two different ways. The same goes for the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear testing.

Nitze asked if it would be agreeable to the Soviet side to specify a level of 6000 on nuclear weapons and 1600 delivery vehicles when we talk about START.

Akhromeyev said that while the numbers could be discussed in the Geneva negotiations, an agreement could be approximately at these levels. That would be subject for negotiation.

Nitze said that, on INF, we still have difficulty with the Soviet position. As *Nitze* had said earlier, the U.S. has no difficulty with 100/

100 in Europe and Asia, or zero in Europe and zero in Asia, but we do have difficulty with zero in Europe and a figure in Asia to be negotiated. The major difference between the two sides is right there on the numbers in Europe and Asia. We saw no reason for the Soviet side to object to what the U.S. was proposing on duration of an agreement or on SRINF. Perhaps the two sides could find some language.

Akhromeyev said that, in this case, he would like to go back to START. The difficulty here is, even now, when we try to outline limits, the U.S. tries to set certain ceilings and limits. In the Soviet draft, we suggest a broader view—outlining principles for Foreign Ministers to work out specific agreements. If the U.S. agrees, the two sides could negotiate principles taking into account U.S. views and suggestions. If the two sides try to consider the numbers the U.S. had suggested, it would be impossible to negotiate a document, since the two sides have great differences.

Nitze rejoined that he did not believe the differences were that great on START, or on INF except for the Asia question. The U.S. would insist on comparable levels and arrangements regarding Asia, but we could not accept zero in Europe and a freeze in Asia. Foreign Ministers could be instructed to consider that question.

Akhromeyev agreed that the delegations could report the question to the General Secretary and the President, but then the question of defensive arms enters the picture. On START, we shouldn't agree on numbers without a general approach. Thus, it was better to outline a general approach on the basis of the Soviet draft, taking into account U.S. views.

Nitze answered that this was a problem we had faced all along—general principles without some idea how they would work. We need to see how general principles would translate into specific results. There were two tentatively fixed points; a level of 1600 SNDVs and, more important, a level of 6000 ICBM RVs, SLBM RVs and long-range ALCMs.

Akhromeyev said that regarding specific limits on the Soviet SS-18, the Soviets could not agree to it now. On the question of throwweight which the U.S. side had raised, the Soviets could not agree to it now. Wouldn't it be possible, if we agreed on the overall approach, that it would be easier for the Foreign Ministers to solve the issue? The two delegations could go on discussing these questions, as the U.S. side was suggesting, and could talk about sublimits—but there would not be agreement tonight. It would be impossible to get agreement in one night.

Nitze asked, suppose we changed the language to read numbers no higher than 1600 SNDVs, and no higher than 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMS?

Arbatov interjected, "That doesn't help; nothing helps."

Akhromeyev said the Soviets would agree to try to formulate language on 1600 and 6000, so long as other limits were not included.

Nitze stated that the U.S. believed sublimits were needed. He added that he had a preliminary question regarding what the Soviets meant when they said "historically distinctive" features of each side's strategic force structure.

Akhromeyev said the sides should not try to break the existing balance in the force structures of each side. If the two sides agree to 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, then each side should be free to determine the mix of systems, taking into account that the sides will reduce heavy missiles. Each side would independently determine the number of cruise missiles and warheads on ballistic missiles.

Nitze said that the Geneva negotiators should address another question: Sublimits that would enhance stability, if they can find them. He then read proposed language for instructions to Foreign Ministers:

"The sides agreed to refocus the attention of negotiators to achieving a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and USSR consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, taking into account historically formed distinctive features of force structures on each side. Within this approach, there would be no more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6000 reentry vehicles and air-launched cruise missiles, and a reduction of 50% in heavy missiles, in addition to other limits and sublimits to be mutually agreed, so that the destructive potential of ballistic missiles is reduced."

Akhromeyev said that he had listened to *Nitze* with hope, and the two sides had been close, but then *Nitze* had mentioned sublimits. Given that the two sides had agreed to such severe cuts, sublimits were unnecessary, and the Soviets wished to decide for themselves how to allocate their forces. Besides, if one removed the sublimit issue, then the Soviet formula had everything present. There was one exception—sublimits—and that had to be removed.

(The Soviet formula, which *Akhromeyev* read, was as follows: "...to reduce by 50% the strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and USSR, to an equal level of delivery vehicles of approximately 1600 units, with no more than 6000 warheads for the sides, taking into account historically formed features of the force structures of each side. Reductions would apply to all types, including significant reductions in heavy missiles. The reductions should include sea-launched cruise missiles.")

Akhromeyev added that a formula should be found for including SLCMs. We just need to get rid of the idea of sublimits.

Nitze said that, regarding SLCMs, one might say "the sides will attempt to find means of effectively verifying and significantly limiting long-range SLCMs." He was not sure how this could be done, but the U.S. was perfectly agreeable to trying to find a solution.

Akhromeyev said Nitze's proposal was not helpful. The 50% reduction would be a specific and binding obligation. What would be the value of 50% reductions if we could not find a specific solution on SLCMs, and each side could deploy large numbers of SLCMs? The obligation on SLCMs should be as binding as limits on other strategic offensive arms. Perhaps the Soviets could just say they could reduce heavy missiles. This is not merely a question of format. The Soviet side suggested that the two delegations find a more binding form, the U.S. side a less binding form. It is a question of whether the two sides assume an obligation to limit SLCMs. The Soviets could not agree not to limit SLCMs.

Nitze proposed language to the effect that the U.S. agreed to limitations, provided agreement could be reached on verifying limits on long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Akhromeyev said the two sides were able to solve problems when they took into account the security interests of the other side, on the basis of equal security. The Soviet side cannot accept that they will assume obligations, that is, for 50% reductions, but obligations that they need on the American side are expressed as a wish.

Nitze said the U.S. had a genuine question about how one would limit and verify SLCMs.

Akhromeyev said that experience indicates that the two sides could solve the most difficult problems, such as how to count and verify MIRVs in SALT. Thus, regarding SLCMs, the two sides should find language that is binding. If it was possible to do so regarding 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms, it should be possible for SLCMs as well.

Perle said he wanted to say a few words about SLCMs. *Akhromeyev's* point about finding a solution was well taken. The problem with SLCMs is that the box launchers used for nuclear SLCMs are those which launch virtually all of American naval armaments. You can go aboard any Navy ship and see these box launchers. It simply is not realistic to ask us to dismantle the U.S. Navy for what is, after all, a very small part of the strategic equation. That is why the U.S. says that limitation of SLCMs is such a difficult issue for us—it is not that a relatively small force is so important for us, but rather because the whole of our naval armament is involved. The Soviet Union is asking us to agree to solve a problem for which we do not see a solution.

Akhromeyev answered that the problem is so serious that we have to find a way to deal with it. The two sides were faced with a similar problem on how to count heavy bombers with cruise missiles. They tried for a year to solve this, and did in the end find a solution. We say that agreements should be verifiable, but no matter how we say it, there must be a certain measure of trust, that given good will we will find a solution. The sides would have to choose the types of ships

on which SLCMs would be deployed and would have to have a type rule. Inspection would be applied as on other systems. Without a solution, there would be no agreement. This is a big problem, not a minor one.

Nitze asked if there is no real solution, what value would be attached to limitations on SLCMs?

Akhromeyev said there was another consideration—a connotation of *diktat*, that there will be no agreement on verification, therefore no agreement on SLCM, therefore no agreement at all. The Soviet side cannot accept 50% reductions unless SLCMs are limited.

Nitze asked, suppose the sides exchanged declarations of their SLCM programs. *Nitze* couldn't envision verification of these, but would such declarations be a way out?

Akhromeyev said the sides would have to define numbers involved.

Nitze said that was all right.

Arbatov said the sides should state that certain numbers of weapons would be deployed on certain types of ships and not on others. Compared with 50% cuts, the SLCMs issue is a relatively minor negotiating problem. But the U.S. wanted an escape clause, not a real effort to find a solution.

Nitze said the real U.S. interest was in conventional SLCMs; thus, he had suggested declarations in which we might describe our nuclear SLCM program. But there might not be high reliability on verification of these declarations. The Soviets would have to rely on our statements, and the U.S. on theirs.

Akhromeyev proposed that both sides undertake an obligation to achieve effective verification measures, so that neither would seek strategic advantage. At the same time, we could not have 50% reductions without dealing with SLCMs.

Perle said that he saw no problem to agreeing to limit nuclear SLCMs to a small number. The U.S. does not plan on large numbers. But he still did not know how to verify these limits since a large number of ships will have launchers.

Perle continued that he wished we did not have the situation we do regarding nuclear SLCMs, since they are not that important a part of the strategic force. He also wished that our armaments program had developed differently than it had. Nevertheless, SLCMs were a unique case—for reasons of standardization and efficiency, it was decided years ago that there would be box launchers capable of launching a variety of systems. If the Soviets could accept a statement on the U.S. SLCM program, we could give one. If it were a matter of dismantling launchers which are crucial to our conventional capabilities, it would be impossible.

The U.S. was prepared to limit nuclear SLCMs provided the Soviets accepted our number. There was an abundant public record on U.S. levels of nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets could read the Defense Department's authorization bill and would thus know that the U.S. does not have more than a minimal number of nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets could accept that number, since they know that there would be no more nuclear SLCMs than Congress had authorized. If the Soviets could accept that number as stated, then they could have confidence in its accuracy. If the Soviet Union could not verify that number, then it would simply prove the point the U.S. had been trying to make about the difficulty of verifying SLCM limits. As Ambassador Nitze had said, perhaps unilateral declarations were the way out. Such a solution would have to be carried out by both sides, and we would try to work out verification.

Akhromeyev said the U.S. should agree to limit the ships on which SLCMs could be placed. The U.S., not just the Soviet Union, would have to work out the verification procedures for limits on SLCMs. Both sides face difficult problems. For instance, the USSR had to deal with the issue of British and French systems, which was not an easy problem for them.

Nitze said the U.S. was doing its best to find a solution, but we did not see measures that are verifiable with high confidence in distinguishing conventional and nuclear SLCM launchers. That was why the U.S. was proposing declarations. We did not want to destroy our capability for conventional SLCMs. That is what the U.S. is trying to protect.

Akhromeyev suggested both sides limit the number of SLCMs and their carriers. If a ship carried only conventional SLCMs, there would be a right of inspection. The Soviets know this would not be convenient for the U.S. and are trying to overcome the problem. Navy ships would be verifiable on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. would have a reciprocal right to verify conventional versus nuclear-armed SLCMs on Soviet ships.

Falin asked whether both sides could not just say that they intended to find a solution to the problem.

Perle said that the Soviet side had asked the U.S. to take into account "historical" differences between the evolution of the forces on each side. The fact is that our SLCM deployments had evolved in a certain way that made a solution difficult. *Perle* suggested that there be language committing each side to "undertake to find" a solution.

Akhromeyev rejoined that finding a solution on SLCMs should be expressed not just as a desire but as an obligation. Perhaps there could be a way to distinguish between launchers, the same solution as was applied to bombers. The Soviet Union was not trying to destroy the

U.S. Navy. It did want to find a functional solution. The sides found a solution once on heavy bombers armed with ALCMs; they could try a similar solution on SLCMs.

Perle said the solution on heavy bombers was made possible because aircraft had to be modified for ALCMs. It was too late for that regarding SLCMs. That was an unhappy fact that we were stuck with.

Akhromeyev suggested that perhaps certain modernization could occur. He continued that the U.S. had suggested that the Soviet Union destroy heavy missiles. This was not easy for the Soviet Union. SLCMs were a similar case. You say it cannot be done, but you should try to find a solution.

Nitze answered that the U.S. was trying to find acceptable language on this point for instructions to ministers. He suggested "both sides undertake to find a solution to the problem of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs."

Akhromeyev reiterated that there must be an obligation, not just an expression of desire to find a solution.

Nitze said the U.S. language involved an obligation to try.

Akhromeyev suggested language which said "the sides will find. . ."

Nitze said we would put the Soviet wording in brackets.

Akhromeyev said he would agree to leave the issue unresolved for now but warned that a solution must be found since SLCMs pose a grave threat to the Soviet Union. He then read the following language:

"On strategic arms, there is agreement by the sides that they are prepared to reduce by 50% the strategic arms of the U.S. and the USSR to equal numbers of delivery vehicles (approximately 1600) and warheads (not more than 6000) for each side, taking into account historically formed features of the forces of each side. Within this framework, reductions will apply to all types of strategic arms, including significant numbers of heavy missiles. A solution [should also be found] to the problem of limiting long-range SLCMs."

Nitze said he had a matter he wanted to be sure of, namely, that the 6000 includes RVs on ICBMs, SLBMs, and ALCMs, but does not include gravity bombs and SRAMs.

Akhromeyev replied that the 6000 figure does not include gravity bombs and SRAMs. A heavy bomber with gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one RV.

Nitze said that he wanted to be sure that the term "nuclear-armed" was placed before the word "SLCM" in the draft language. *Akhromeyev* agreed.

Nitze noted that the language should read ". . .no more than 6000 SLBM warheads, ICBM warheads, and ALCMs."

Akhromeyev repeated that heavy bombers with gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as a single reentry vehicle.

Nitze asked, if we have a bomber with one ALCM and gravity bombs and SRAMs, how do we count it?

Akhromeyev answered that a heavy bomber with gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one delivery vehicle in the 1600 number, and one RV in the 6000 number. He continued that under the hypothetical case Nitze had mentioned, the bomber would count as one delivery vehicle but two warheads. This was simple logic.

Akhromeyev commented that he had been thinking throughout the year about the problem of gravity bombs and SRAMs, and had tried to put himself in the Americans' shoes. So, while this was a difficult decision for the Soviet Union, he was ready to accept that heavy bombers armed with gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as a single RV. He reiterated that it was logical to count a heavy bomber with bombs and SRAMs in the total of delivery vehicles; he was sure the Americans would agree with this. And, in the warhead total, such bombers would count as one RV.

Nitze reiterated that this would have to be spelled out, since it was kind of complicated.

Akhromeyev said we were not formulating a treaty or other agreement for signature now. If Ambassador Nitze had a question, he would try to clarify it. On Nitze's suggestion regarding language on SLCMs, he could agree to language that said "a solution will be found on nuclear long-range SLCMs."

There was then a debate among various participants on both sides about the language on SLCMs. *Akhromeyev* said the delegations should write bracketed language and hand it over to their leaders.

Nitze then suggested that there be language which said "nothing in the above shall foreclose other sublimits that are equal for both sides."

Akhromeyev asked, what sublimits?

Nitze answered that the U.S. wanted to leave this open and that we were not implying that the Soviets were agreeing to them.

Akhromeyev said, if it's not prohibited, it's allowed. The delegations need not put Nitze's suggested sentence down. The Foreign Ministers would discuss this question. In the Soviet viewpoint, however, the issue was solved by virtue of the fact that the two sides had decided on the total number of delivery vehicles and warheads, and that an agreement would take account of the historical development of the force structures of each side. The U.S. proposed language would, in fact, create a loophole that would break the historic strategic force structure of the two sides, so the Soviets were against it.

Nitze rejoined that from what Akhromeyev had just said, it sounds as if any sublimit would "break the historic structure". Nitze didn't understand what that meant.

Akhromeyev said he did not see any need to speak of any sublevels. The two sides have the number of delivery vehicles, number of warheads, and limits on numbers of heavy missiles. He did not see any reason why it was necessary to introduce any sublevels. At this stage, he added, the working group wouldn't be able to finish its work by 10 A.M., since it still had four more issues on its hands.

Nitze said that, regarding SLCMs, the U.S. would agree to drop its brackets on the Soviet proposed language, so long as the Soviet side understood that the only solution the U.S. side foresaw was the one he had described earlier (i.e., unilateral declarations by each side). *Nitze* added that the U.S. also did not want to foreclose other sublimits on strategic forces.

Akhromeyev said that regarding *Nitze's* first remark, the Soviets could not agree. Limits on SLCMs should have a binding character. There would be no value to the sentence if the U.S. did not intend to cooperate with the Soviets.

Nitze said he could not undertake the obligation on SLCMs if he could not find a solution on SLCMs. The only solution he could see was the one he had mentioned earlier. The U.S. was willing to look for another solution, but the only one we knew of was what the U.S. team had described.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had never heard any objection to their proposals.

Nitze said why not put it in the words "mutually acceptable solution"?

Akhromeyev said the language would read, "a mutually acceptable solution shall also be found." *Nitze* agreed.

Akhromeyev then said, regarding sublimits, that each side can raise such questions in the future. There was no need to write it down.

The discussion then moved to INF. *Akhromeyev* said there was agreement on the complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and that the nuclear potentials of Britain and France would not be taken into account. However, the two sides had not solved the problem of medium-range missiles in Asia.

Nitze stated that the sides had not solved the problem either of Europe or Asia, since the two were linked.

Akhromeyev said he understood there was no objection to the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe if the nuclear potential of the UK and France were not taken into account. He would agree to put language on Asia in brackets.

Nitze said this was not agreed. The U.S. had never proposed zero in Europe. We had proposed zero globally. We did not accept zero in Europe, and had never moved away from that position. At any other

level except zero in Asia, the U.S. was not prepared to accept zero in Europe.

Akhromeyev stated that we would have to bracket the entire section on INF.

The discussion then turned to Defense and Space.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had suggested formulas. He suggested the delegations take a look at them.

Nitze said the U.S. had a proposal regarding three questions which the Foreign Ministers could be instructed to discuss:

“How can activities with respect to investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

“Under what conditions and in what general timeframe could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advanced strategic defenses?

“Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?”

Akhromeyev said he could not agree with what *Nitze* had just read. The Soviets had agreed with the U.S. to consider reducing strategic offensive arms by 50%. The Soviets needed assurances regarding the viability of the ABM Treaty. They had suggested a realistic agreement that for a 10-year period, neither side would exercise its right to abandon the Treaty, and that they would abide by all its provisions. All the work on space-based defenses would be banned except for that in laboratories. The U.S. must consider the link to 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Nitze responded that what the U.S. had proposed would meet Soviet concerns and hopes. We understood that the Soviet Union thinks it is desirable to eliminate ballistic missiles. The U.S. had talked of a timeframe and common understandings.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets were skeptical. They did not believe the sides would share technology on space-based defenses and deployments. No reality backed up that offer. The U.S. was not even prepared now to share technology in elementary civilian areas, so it was unrealistic to say it would share technology on defenses. The Soviet view was that space-based ABM defenses should not be developed in the first place. The Soviet Union needed to have assurances on its security, as it was proposing.

Nitze said he had not referred to sharing the benefits of defense research. He could say that the circumstances would be quite different if the two sides were well on the road to eliminating ballistic missiles, rather than the situation of today where competition is virtually unlimited.

Akhromeyev declared that if strategic defenses are developed, all opportunity for offensive reductions would be lost, because the time would come when the Soviet Union would have to deploy additional systems. In Geneva and the SCC, the Soviets have tabled proposals for a complete prohibition. The U.S. did not agree but made its own proposal, which safeguards the Soviets to a degree against certain surprises.

Nitze said that, regarding instructions for Foreign Ministers, the two sides could just characterize their own proposals, but he thought the U.S. approach was more constructive.

Akhromeyev said there were two problems with the U.S. approach. One is that it was not binding. The second was that a territorial defense is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Arbatov said the two sides must face the truth squarely in the face. The Soviets are looking for a way out. The President and Ambassador *Nitze* were speaking in favor of complying with the ABM Treaty. Both sides are looking for a way of signing a treaty for 50% reductions. Ambassador *Nitze* spoke of “synchronizing” and had some thoughts as well on the offense/defense linkage. There was talk of a degree of trust—such a degree that we could eliminate ballistic missiles while the U.S. built this space-based, very costly system. The Soviet Union was not trying to convert the U.S., but the Soviet Union has very firm positions, which have been voiced more than once, as in letters between the General Secretary and the President.

Nitze, commenting on *Akhromeyev*’s earlier remark that the U.S. proposal was not binding, noted that the working group was not dealing with obligations but rather with instructions to Foreign Ministers to find arrangements that would be mutually agreeable and binding.

Akhromeyev said that if the group told the Foreign Ministers there would be binding obligations on 50% reductions, the Soviets would need the same binding obligation towards the ABM Treaty. Thus, he asked the U.S. side to take into account the Soviet proposal and to give a positive reply.

Nitze noted that *Arbatov* had said that the Soviets were good pupils, that both sides were interested in the offense-defense relationship, and that the Soviet side had good proposals on this relationship. *Nitze* said both sides have known these issues for a long time. *Nitze* recalled Gerald Smith’s statement that a failure to achieve offensive reductions would be grounds for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. was searching for greater security and stability. *Nitze* believed that what the U.S. was proposing would lead in that direction.

The Soviet side agrees that defenses are useful—a large percentage of the Soviet military budget is devoted to defenses. The Soviet side says that if all ballistic missiles are gone, defense would be a problem.

That is not how the U.S. side sees it. Defenses would be a guarantee that a stable situation would continue. We are talking about synchronizing defense activities with the agreed goal of eliminating ballistic missiles. What is inherently wrong with what the U.S. is trying to work out?

Akhromeyev exclaimed, what can I say? It is true that the USSR has work going on regarding a ground-based ABM system permitted by the Treaty and is trying to perfect systems permitted in one area. The Soviet Union is not, however, trying to develop space-based systems prohibited by the Treaty. Such development, if carried out by the U.S., would be a violation of the Treaty.

Akhromeyev then repeated the Soviet position. The Soviet Union was trying to agree on 50% reductions, and more significant steps could follow toward eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The ABM Treaty involved an unlimited obligation. The Soviets agreed that there could be fundamental research, but this could not be carried outside the laboratories because it could lead to space-based systems.

Nitze reiterated that U.S. policy was wholly consistent with the ABM Treaty. So, in his third point, he had mentioned that we should seek common understandings on what is permitted. There was not a single thing that the Soviets wished to do that the U.S. was unprepared to discuss.

Akhromeyev said that, as to a ground-based ABM, it was all correct, including research on ground-based defenses based on other physical principles. However, the ABM Treaty prohibits testing and deployment of space-based systems. If the U.S. says it is not going to violate the ABM Treaty, what prohibits the U.S. from accepting the 10-year period as the Soviets had proposed?

Nitze answered that the U.S. is prepared to bridge differences between the sides as to the time the two sides could move to a jointly managed transition.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet position is based on elimination of systems, the elimination of which would make any deployment of space-based defenses unnecessary.

Ambassador Rowney said that defenses would be useful against such contingencies as a break-out or the forces of third countries. Defense was always useful, even if you do not have offensive weapons.

Nitze commented that time was moving on and he wished to return to the subject of INF. He noted that both sides agree to pursue a global zero/zero solution, but if that is not agreed at this time, the sides would seek expeditious agreement on an interim INF agreement with equal ceilings on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe, and an equal ceiling on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads worldwide.

However, there was no agreement on missiles in Asia. Resolution of this issue would have to be found on a priority basis.

Nitze then read the following points from a U.S. draft instructions paper:

"There will be limits and constraints on SRINF missiles to the current Soviet level, taking into account the capabilities of these systems and the need for a nuclear arms reduction agreement to reflect equality between the US and the Soviet Union.

"There will be specific verification measures which include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

"US and Soviet INF missile systems will remain subject to and constrained by this legally functioning treaty regime until the sides negotiate further reductions in these systems."

Akhromeyev said the whole thing hinges on systems in Asia.

Nitze said he took it then that there were no serious problems with the things he had just said.

Akhromeyev answered that *Nitze* had highlighted the problem of Asia systems. Only the Asia problem hampers a solution. Either the leaders will arrive at an agreement today or the problem will remain in Geneva. The two sides had solved the problem of systems in Europe, but cannot solve the whole issue tonight because of the problem in Asia. He could not agree with what *Nitze* had said regarding the other issues, but he thought they would be resolvable if the Asia problem were worked out.

Nitze said that the working group experts could report in writing to leaders that "the sides recognize that what hampers a far-reaching solution is the treatment of LRINF missiles in Asia. They anticipate that leaders will address this issue today."

Akhromeyev suggested the sides report that orally. The leaders will consider it, or the problem would remain to be solved in Geneva.

Nitze asked if the Soviet side had anything to say regarding Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers?

Akhromeyev asked, what about the Soviet proposals on the ABM Treaty?

Nitze answered there were two different positions.

Akhromeyev asked if the Soviets could have the U.S. position in writing? (*Nitze* then gave him a copy of the Defense and Space portion of the U.S. draft of instructions to Foreign Ministers). *Akhromeyev* commented that the working group had established that they have no agreement.

Karpov, turning to nuclear testing, said he did not understand why the U.S. did not accept the Soviet formula. The U.S. statement was

complicated and ambiguous. The two sides should agree to start negotiations to eliminate nuclear testing, and these talks could deal with a wide range of issues.

Nitze disagreed with *Karpov* and said the U.S. text is clear. To do it the Soviet way would be to short-circuit the step-by-step approach the U.S. had laid out. *Nitze* then read aloud the U.S.-proposed text. After doing so, he told *Karpov* that the Soviets want to move the conclusion of the process to the beginning. The U.S. was not prepared to do that.

Akhromeyev said the two sides had to grab the bull by the horns. The Soviet Union had stopped testing for more than a year. If the U.S. were prepared to do likewise, it would be a great step forward.

Nitze stated the U.S. was not prepared to stop testing now, but only to start going down that road.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet Union was not asking the U.S. to stop testing now. It, too, sees a step-by-step approach. But it very clearly sees a complete ban as the objective. The working group should find language that would let each side come away with some necessary characterization of its position.

Nitze said our leaders understood the nature of the problem. Why shouldn't the experts follow their lead? The U.S. is prepared to go for ending nuclear testing but only in the context of eliminating offensive weapons. That is a perfectly logical approach and we stand by it.

Akhromeyev repeated that the two sides could move to a complete ban on nuclear testing, starting off with the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The Soviet Union had tried to set the example by quitting nuclear testing for 18 months. It had agreed to start negotiations, but on what? On an end to testing.

Nitze reiterated that the U.S. was agreeing to this subject matter and to a step-by-step approach.

Akhromeyev said the working group had to report back to leaders, and asked about the anti-satellite (ASAT) issue. He proposed that the two sides agree to exert additional efforts to ban ASAT systems.

Nitze said no.

Akhromeyev said all right. The two sides would have to report back to leaders that there was a difference of view. Summarizing the night's discussions, he said the two sides have agreement on significant reductions of strategic offensive arms and on specific ceilings, but they have completely different views on a prohibition of space-based arms, which makes it completely impossible to reduce strategic offensive arms. Unfortunately, he added, there was no agreement on other subjects.

Karpov noted that on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the two sides had agreed to begin negotiations in late October or early November. These negotiations will be held. The two sides have a common view.

Akhromeyev said the delegations could say they had been working for 10 hours and 15 minutes, but had not produced any great results.

Nitze said he thought the other working group at Hofdi House had developed some language on NRRCs. He wanted to point out that, regarding nuclear testing, the U.S. was not in disagreement on the ultimate purpose and desirability of a complete ban on testing, nor did there appear to be disagreement over the first subject matter of negotiations. The disagreement is over characterization—the title—of the negotiations.

Akhromeyev said there should not be any illusions about deep differences of views.

Perle asked whether the Soviets felt they would rather *not* have agreement on nuclear testing because the U.S. could not characterize the talks as the Soviets wished?

Akhromeyev said any negotiation must have an agreed agenda and objective. Otherwise, it would just be discussions. The Soviets say that it is necessary to ban nuclear testing. The U.S. says continue nuclear testing. So the sides have deep differences.

Perle commented that a ban on nuclear testing was inherent in the negotiations the U.S. was suggesting.

Akhromeyev said all right, let's call them Negotiations on a Complete Ban on Testing.

Perle answered that the negotiations would cover other subjects, not just a CTB. Do we or do we not agree to open negotiations?, he asked.

Karpov said that the experts delegations headed by Ambassador Petrosyants on the Soviet side, and Mr. Barker on the U.S. side, contain two objectives—seeking ways toward the complete elimination of nuclear testing, and seeking solutions to verification. The U.S. side now wants to separate them and just negotiate on verification. The Soviets cannot understand this step backwards.

Perle rejoined that the Barker-Petrosyants talks are expert level talks.

Akhromeyev said he could not understand why the U.S. agreed to the ultimate aim but not to negotiate on it. But, he suggested, it was time for the working group to conclude.

Nitze said he admired Marshal *Akhromeyev's* stamina.

Akhromeyev said he could say the same thing about *Nitze*. He wanted to say that despite tough and complicated negotiations, the two sides had tried to sort out things, to understand each other. Unfortunately, the positions are too far apart, and the sides will have to think where they would arrive at if they stayed this far apart. He noted this was the first time he had taken part in such negotiations, and

wanted to conclude by saying that we have to move our positions closer together.

The meeting concluded.

160. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

Sunday 0200

PN [Nitze] S [Shultz] JT [Timbie] Max [Kampelman], Perle, Gaffney, Linhard

PN—They look at this as generating papers for press

S—produce the paper + then see what to do w it.

PN—I divided into the parts. Akro [Akhromeyev] wanted to change order. I agreed good disc on *START*. on #s. Akro didn't really understand sub-limits.

S—50% w/o the proportion was G's [Gorbachev's] proposal

L—he talked gravity + shrams [SRAMS] w/o b/ms [ballistic missiles] + RVs at 6000

PN—I.e. we got it all done—then it stopped when we *caucused* + it came to putting it on paper. Rowny won't agree w anything.

JT—R wdnt agree

PN—Then Adelman wdnt agree too + Karpov at same time was wkg ag [working against] Akromeyev Then long delay + when Akro went thru it + thru Inf + we resumed. Akro sd how does this differ from yr Sept 18 prop? It wasn't different at all At that pt, Akro sd it differed from G proposal today They wd reduce by 50% in every cat—but we wdn't. They wanted 50% of our SNDVs. I sd it was equal ceilings in all cats. And we cdnt go to unequal in cats when they had more—(bombers)

S—Karpov can't nego G sd.

PN—Akro is 1st class person to nego w. Head of Gen'l staff.

L—In 5 areas we went thru.—Asia still issue on Inf—Def + Space: no closure. After 10 yrs we cd deploy? NO they sd—then we nego.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. Drafted by Hill. The meeting began at 2 a.m. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E.

Max—That's also a Karpov interjection tonight.

PN—here are papers we submitted²

S—But these don't capture G proposal! These are our original positions!

PN—I was opposed by our own deleg.

S—P [Reagan] didn't tell our deleg not to change our START position—he sd [illegible] this 50% idea + what do we do w it.—You're saying they didn't agree, so you didn't get anywhere tonight.

RP—we go back at 3 a.m.

S—P doesn't want to stand on just what we proposed before. He wants to know what 50% means.

RP—*Problem is that w 50% cuts across boards Sovs entitled to more than we are. When we start w more on their side.*

S—They have put something new on table We shdnt just be bound by our old position

RP—Akro was agreeable. They have caucused + Karpov all over Akro for how he departed from G proposal. (50% wd not apply to < equal outcome

S—So mil. reasonable + For Min blocked him.—This paper is our current position.

PN—Areas of disagreement are:—under what conds. cd adv. defenses be deployed—what restrictions during that period.

S—but G sd (1) let us have 10 yrs in which we both agree not to w/d from ty [treaty], (2) let us reduce b/m to 50% Nobody said over what period of time (5 yrs mentioned orally) DR [Don Regan] sd *don't get decision pt located in a US election yr. So 4 or 6.*

RP—JCS thinks 5 yrs too short—need it for [illegible] for residual force.

S—So 10 yrs. was G. idea. He rejected sharing. He sd we want to bring about zero. By 2000. Less than 15 yrs. So P see 2 yrs of negos—then we start eliminating b/ms. That's where *closure* exists.

L—Thats where PN was going.

S—*Why make a pt that we will deploy? Stress the 10 yrs*

RP—*Its a diff betw SDI disintegrating or not. If we say at end we have rt to deploy. Congr cant oppose.*

S—G. said we looking for 10 yrs during which we agree not to w/draw from ABM—testing + Risk red [reduction] in hand? (yes)

² Not found.

L—This looks like our old proposal because we ended by talking about a public paper.

—Akro was asked twice, wd we have rt to deploy at end pd + he sd yes.

RP—we cd characterize differences + agree to discuss them later— + meet what P wants. Forces Sovs to decide if they want to go that far. Wd then be center of Wash. S [Summit] II

L.—we cant close here on Inf. We can pocket 6000 #. We have made pt we can't accept uneq. Limits At end tomorrow we can get P's instructions done.

S—Sum. disc will be less precise, but potentially bolder because P not bargaining w Rowny nor G w Karpov. But P needs boundaries + words to stick to.

L—If we can get text tonight—try to capture lang before you see it at 0900. Then P + G can agree to the document

S—On Inf, can get to pt where we agree on all but Asia? (yes)=

RP—They wd freeze at our level + their's—ours is zero.

L—we at risk politically in START bec they made prop today + we just reiterated ours.

JT—We cd agree on 50% but they talk about how to do deal w asymmetries.

S—your task is to make use of 50% on heavy b/ms.

RP—That's whay they offered, but w that comes 50 in other categories.

JT—There *are* ways of symetrying

S—You apply the 50% rule Then say that equality is their long stdg position You have to get loose from just restating our old position + cut loose the guys who don't want that (Rowny)

L—Akro concerned about 6000 level—as he won't deploy X ALCMs. So we have that spin.

S—You cant have strict equality as there *are* asymmetries in force structure. G. wants zero w/o changing force structure.

RP—He sd a few hundred wpns dont make a diff. If we eq. of principle, then arithmetic can be worked.

S—I thot we were on WH as unit of acct? (yes)—Use warheads in [illegible] table.

PN—They will come back tomorrow + say no deal

S—A shame to lose that.

PN—They are prepared to do it. Propg people there to see how to exploit it. A serious chance it will blow up.³

³ Hill wrote in the left-hand margin beside this portion of his notes: "Note © Doby to Kaul of India (above)"

S—We need to get a structure from you.

PN—I don't know how to do that in space.

S—You need to identify what's involved in way P can work with. Our proposal is no withdrawal in 7 years.

Max—And they want 10. Issue of what ABM treaty has to be done in Geneva. It's 2 days to them.

L—We could identify the critical (the PN Q's above) Q's and hand off to negotiators.

S—P all cranked up on S II. Maybe need language for him that says 2 sides no longer intent in reciprocal summits. 2 sides will meet at Geneva + to hell with summits. If G doesn't want a summit until everything is settled, fine . . . he won't have to go for that.

RP—They see it as public document. How it will play.

S—So we agreed on 50% principle. They have changed with G. proposal—we trying to see how to use it in category [category] we care about.

L—we need to show we're off just restating our position.

RP—we could say let's see if we can agree on 6000 [illegible]

S—apply *principle of 50% and of equality* + get Inf structured on Asia Q. We want in NST to nail down that they agreed not to withdraw for 10 years is the key. We got to get deployment somehow worked in but also get in idea that *reds in off weapons are result of SDI continuing*.

PN—That means agreement on what ABM prohibits (Max: and we'll do that at Geneva)—They'll never agree to right to deploy.

L—do it via language on restrictions that apply during the period.

PN—we can do that

RP—It will be in public document. If we end up stating differences, our philosophy must be shown.

S—We don't want to tell the world we came here to agree on difference.

RP—only in NST is that

L—Lay out the positions

S (to PN)—you meet with your boss. Not a meeting where anybody can veto. You 4 are in control. There's no rule of unanimity on your side.

161. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

0710

S [Shultz] PN [Nitze]

Damn good! (shake hands) What we came for.

PN: Last sent. On SLCMs took 1.5 hours. I sd it cd onl be done if each side made unilat declarations of how many they wd have. Not verifiable I said, because of conventional SLCMs. I sd if that's the way you wd see it, I was prepared to agree on it. They were full of talk about trust, etc.

On Space + def I cdn't get them to buy Linhard's 3 sentences.

Came close to one sent on INF that "*Asia the pt of non agmt.*"

S: give me all the points as you came close so I can prepare the P.

PN: on testing they wanted first sentence on nego a CTB. I sd no—shd be last sentence.

On *Defense* + *Space* our 3 sents were

- how to synchronize investigation of SDI w goal of eliminating all b/ms?

- under what conditions could both [illegible] transition to stratg *defences*?

- until then, what understgs about ABM + advanced defenses?

S—on testing, we have more forthcoming lang in our press release (CH gets)

PN—Risk Red . . . agreed. But don't want to say anything

-ASAT—I cdn't agree to accelerating efforts for an ASAT ban.

S—terrific night's work.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. Drafted by Hill. The meeting began at 7:10 a.m. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix F.

162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 10 a.m.–1:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

The President

Secretary Shultz

Mr. Parris

Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Soviet Side

The General Secretary

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Mr. Uspenskiy

Mr. Paleschenky (Interpreter)

Gorbachev opened the discussion with a quip: the Bible said that first had come the first day, then the second, etc. The two leaders were now on their second day; there was still a long way before the seventh. The *President* said that the two should be resting. *Gorbachev* agreed, as it was Sunday.

Gorbachev suggested that the session begin with a review of the progress achieved by the two groups which had met throughout the night before on arms control and non-arms control issues. After *Gorbachev* declined the opportunity to speak first, the *President* gave his assessment.

The President said that, with a few exceptions, he was disappointed with what had been achieved by the arms control group. With respect to START, the President understood that the sides were able to come to substantial agreement—with give and take on both sides. Of course, there had been substantial work in this area, which had developed a sizeable amount of common ground. It was the President's understanding that the working group had been able to agree on a formulation for the outlines of a 50% reduction of strategic arsenals that should move the negotiations substantially ahead. Both sides should be proud of this achievement.

On INF, the President understood that the sides had discussed a number of issues, including SRINF, the duration of an interim agreement, and verification, and that they had come to the conclusion that these issues could be handled in negotiations. But the group had not been able to solve the issue of reductions of LRINF missiles in Asia. The last issue had been discussed at great length. The question was now fairly simple, not technical at all. We had made clear since the time of our initial zero-zero proposal—a proposal to eliminate all of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Reyk Meeting—Geneva Materials, Oct 12–13 1986 (3). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. All ellipses are in the original text. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 306.

the class of LRINF missiles, worldwide—that we required a global agreement. This was thus not a new issue for us. It was an issue that we could no longer ignore if we were to make progress. The President said he could not and would not accept a situation in which sizeable reductions in Europe, even to zero, were not matched by proportional reductions in Asia. The Soviets knew the reasons for this—the mobility of the SS–20 and the impact such a shift in the balance of SS–20's to Asia would have on our Asian allies. These were not new arguments. However, they were real concerns to the President. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position, in fact they insisted upon it for their own security.

The President reminded Gorbachev that, in his most recent letter, Gorbachev had written that, with regard to Soviet systems in Asia, “a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is a certainty that a willingness can be found to resolve the issue of medium range missiles in Europe does exist.”² This issue, the President continued, must be dealt with on a global basis. The President had felt he and Gorbachev had agreed to pursue an interim, global agreement. They had agreed on an interim INF agreement, with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads on each side of Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles worldwide. We could accept the Soviet idea of 100 in Europe, if other elements could be worked out. The Soviets had proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If agreement were reached on other aspects of an interim agreement, we would have no problem with that number.

The U.S. had long called for proportional reductions in Asia. If we reduced to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduced Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would come out to something like 63. 100 in Europe/100 in Asia was acceptable. In the right context, we could accept 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia. The President suggested he and Gorbachev settle now on 100/100 and instruct our negotiators to work out details.

Gorbachev interrupted briefly to clarify that the President's proposal was for 100 LRINF warheads each for the U.S. and Soviet Union in Europe and an additional 100 for the Soviet Union in Asia. The *President* explained that the U.S., under its proposal, would also have the right to deploy an additional 100 warheads on a global basis. In response to a question, the President confirmed that those 100 would be based on U.S. territory.

² The full text of Gorbachev's September 15 letter to Reagan is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 280.

On defense and space, the President felt he and Gorbachev recognized the basic differences in the two sides' approaches. For his part, the President recognized that Gorbachev at this point was not prepared to agree with him; but the President was not prepared to move from the course that he believed correct. Recognizing this, the President proposed that he and Gorbachev instruct their negotiators to focus on what the President felt to be three critical issues. Of the three, the U.S. believed that only the first two deserved immediate attention, but recognized Soviet concerns about the third and included it to respond to those concerns. The questions were:

—First, how could activities with respect to the investigation of strategic defenses be synchronized with our shared goals of eliminating ballistic missiles?

—Second, what should the conditions and timeframe be for increased reliance on strategic defenses?

—Third, until these conditions are met, what common understanding might be reached on activities under the ABM Treaty on advanced strategic defenses?

At a minimum, the President asked, could the two sides not agree to instruct our negotiators to address these three questions in the hope of using them to move our positions closer together?

Moving to the question of nuclear testing, the President said that here, too, he had been disappointed with the outcome of the previous evening's efforts. He could only hope that that outcome had reflected a simple lack of imagination on the part of one or the other side's representatives.

The President noted that there was agreement in principle on the fact of immediate negotiations, on the agenda, on the order of subjects, and on the ultimate outcome. The President understood, however, that the sides could not get agreement because of an argument on how these negotiations should be characterized. He proposed that the two sides simply record that they agreed to immediate negotiations on testing issues. We were prepared to note that the ultimate objective, which we believed could be reached in association with the elimination of all nuclear weapons, was the cessation of all testing.

We both agreed that the first order of business should be the resolution of the remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this agreement, it was possible to get started and characterize the negotiations in a way which met both sides' needs. But we had to agree on agenda and priority. Was it not possible for the two leaders to instruct their ministers to sort out the language quickly and record this agreement in suitable fashion.

In response to a question by *Gorbachev* as to what language the U.S. proposed with respect to testing, the *President* read from a paper prepared by the U.S. arms control working group the night before.

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing, leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. position was not clear to him.

Turning to the work of the second working group, which had addressed non-arms control matters, the *President* said that its participants had done a fine job. Their breakthrough on nuclear fusion was particularly commendable.

Gorbachev asked to give an initial reaction to the *President*’s presentation, and to ask a few questions regarding the points the *President* had covered.

Referring to the *President*’s expression of disappointment with the results of the arms control working group, despite the fact that it had labored for ten hours, *Gorbachev* said he had also been very disappointed. The Soviets felt the proposals they had brought to Reykjavik had been highly constructive in spirit—and not just in philosophical terms. They had made real concessions to the U.S. in a number of negotiations and had sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. But they had found that, instead of seeking as they had to give an impulse to the discussions, the U.S. was trying to drag things backward.

As *Gorbachev* had said previously, the Geneva negotiations prior to the current meeting had reached an impasse. New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in broad terms, to escape this dead-end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans.

It was possible to record some areas of agreement, e.g., with respect to strategic systems. Both sides had agreed to reduce by 50% all components in this category, both as to warheads and delivery vehicles.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

Prefacing his remarks on the ABM Treaty, *Gorbachev* recalled that the two sides had agreed in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50%. Agreement had also been reached on eliminating LRINF from Europe; on freezing and subsequently starting up negotiations on shorter range INF; and on 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S. to have the right to the same number on its territory. These were unprecedented steps. They required responsible further steps in the implementation phase. This raised the question of verification, an issue which now became acute. The U.S. would find that the Soviets would be more

vigorous than the U.S. in insisting on stringent verification requirements as the two countries entered the stage of effective disarmament. If it proved impossible to agree on such provisions, it would be impossible to reduce strategic and intermediate range weapons.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev expressed his conviction that nothing should be allowed to “shake” the ABM regime or confidence in an ABM Treaty of unlimited duration as deep reductions began to be implemented in strategic weapons. Gorbachev felt the President could agree to this proposition. As Gorbachev had said the day before, but would repeat, once one decided to reduce nuclear arms, one had to be certain that one side could not act behind the back of the other. So it was necessary to strengthen the ABM regime. The Soviet proposal for a ten year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty would be a step forward toward strengthening the ABM regime.

In preparing their position, the Soviets had taken into account the President’s attachment to the SDI program. Thus, under the ten-year pledge, SDI-related research in laboratories would not be banned. This was not a strict limitation on SDI. The Soviets knew where the program stood. The U.S. had scored breakthroughs in one or two areas. Moscow knew which they were. But ten years would enable the two sides to solve the problems of reducing nuclear weapons, and so was necessary. The type of arrangement he was proposing, Gorbachev reiterated, would pose neither political, practical nor technical impediments to the President’s program.

The *President* replied that the U.S. had no intention of violating the ABM Treaty. It had never done so, even though, as the Soviets knew, it believed the Soviet Union had itself done more than was permitted by the Treaty.

With respect the SDI, the President recalled that he had made a pledge to the American people that SDI would contribute to disarmament and peace, and not be an offensive weapon. He could not retreat from that pledge. The U.S. had proposed a binding Treaty which would provide for the sharing of research which demonstrated a potential for defensive applications. This would facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons. The President repeated that he could not retreat from his pledge. We would share the fruits of our research—and out of our own self-interest. If everyone had access to the relevant technology, it would be a threat to no one. The President did not see why SDI could not be made a part of the ABM Treaty. He was dedicated to the establishment of mutual defenses against nuclear weapons. Reaffirming once more that he could not retreat, the President noted that Secretary Shultz wished to make a point.

The *Secretary* observed that both the President and General Secretary had spoken in terms of eliminating nuclear weapons. In what

Gorbachev had said a moment before, the Secretary thought he had heard something a little different. He wanted to be sure he had heard correctly. Gorbachev had seemed to link his 10 year no-withdrawal pledge to the length of time necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Was that in fact the link that the General Secretary had in mind? Would the schedule be linked to what he would be doing on START and INF, so that, at the end of the ten years of which Gorbachev had spoken there would be no ballistic missiles, to set aside other nuclear weapons?

Gorbachev reaffirmed that this was the case. The proposal he had made last January had called for 50% reductions in strategic forces and elimination of INF in the first phase of a process aimed at eliminating all nuclear weapons. Subsequent stages would involve further reductions, including reductions by third countries. But major reductions by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would take place in this period, and so the ten year period Gorbachev had mentioned was of decisive importance. He was not retreating from, but reinforcing, the proposals he had made earlier. If one were serious about reducing nuclear weapons, therefore, there was a need to reinforce the ABM regime. Gorbachev could not agree to anything which would weaken the ABM Treaty. His goal was to strengthen the Treaty, not revise it as the U.S. had proposed. There was no logic to such an approach. Were the Soviet Union to accept it, the world would conclude it was doing so purely out of egotistical self-interest. Gorbachev would be unable to go before the Soviet people or the world with such a proposal. That was why the 10-year commitment he was seeking was necessary if there were to be major reductions in offensive forces.

Research was a different matter. The Soviets had taken into account the President's concerns. They knew he was bound by the pledge he had made to his own people and to the world. Research would continue, and this would show that SDI was alive. But such work should not go beyond the framework of laboratory research. There could be testing, even mock-up in laboratories. And such efforts would ensure against the appearance of a nuclear madman of the type the President had often mentioned.

The *President* countered that in fact it would not. What the Hell, he asked, was it that we were defending? The ABM Treaty said that we could not defend ourselves except by means of the 100 ground based systems which we have never deployed. It said our only defense is that, if someone wants to blow us up, the other will retaliate. Such a regime did not give protection; it limited protection. Why the Hell should the world have to live for another ten years under the threat of nuclear weapons if we have decided to eliminate them? The President failed to see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of safety was the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It would be

better to eliminate missiles so that our populations could sleep in peace. At the same time, the two leaders could give the world a means of protection that would put the nuclear genie back in his bottle. The next generation would reap the benefits when the President and General Secretary were no longer around.

Gorbachev recalled for the President what he described as the long and complicated history of the ABM Treaty. It had not come as a bolt from the blue but after years of discussion by responsible leaders, who ultimately recognized the impossibility of creating an ABM system, and who concluded that, if the attempt were made, it would only fuel the arms race and make it impossible to reduce nuclear arms. No one in the Soviet leadership, nor he personally, could agree to steps which would undercut the Treaty. So on this point it appeared the two leaders would have to report that they had opposite views.

The next item, *Gorbachev* felt, should be negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. When the Soviets had pulled together their current position, they had worked from U.S. proposals to try to see how the two sides' approaches coincided. What was their line of thinking? The two leaders should direct their representatives to start negotiations on ending nuclear testing.

The talks would proceed for a certain period of time. During that period, each side could do what it liked, i.e., tests would be permitted. To take into account U.S. concerns, the Soviets were prepared to agree that the agenda for such a first phase could include: test yields, the number of tests, the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET), and verification.

These were all U.S. issues which the Soviets had incorporated into their approach. In contrast, *Gorbachev* sensed from what the President had said that the U.S. was only considering its own interests. Specifically, U.S. proposals did not adequately deal with the problem of a comprehensive test ban. *Gorbachev* could not agree to a proposal which reflected only American interests.

The conversation, he continued, had reached a point where it was time for the American side to make a move in the Soviet direction on the ABM Treaty and CTB. There was a need for the flexibility which would demonstrate whether the U.S. was in fact interested in finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems. *Gorbachev* had heard it said that the President did not like to make concessions. But he also recalled an American expression which seemed apt: "it takes two to tango." With respect to the major questions of arms control and nuclear disarmament, the two leaders were the only partners in sight. Was the President prepared to dance?

The *President* in response sought to put the U.S. position on testing in an historical perspective. For three years, during the late fifties, there

had been a moratorium on nuclear tests. Then the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium with a series of tests unprecedented in their number and scope. U.S. experts had subsequently determined that the Soviet Union had been preparing for that test series throughout the period of the moratorium. President Kennedy had resumed testing, but because we had made no preparations to test during the moratorium period, we were placed at a severe disadvantage. President Kennedy had vowed we would never again be caught unprepared in this area. But in fact we were still behind. The Soviets had largely completed the modernization of their weapons stockpile before announcing their moratorium.

In any case, a comprehensive test ban would have to follow reductions in nuclear weapons. And there must also be adequate verification. Until now, the Soviets had been unwilling to address this issue seriously. Now that they had done so, the U.S. stood prepared to join them. But, in view of the historical precedents he had mentioned, the President felt Gorbachev would understand why, to quote another Americanism, we were “once burned, twice shy.” Nonetheless, the U.S. had made concessions to Soviet concerns. The President again read the language on testing developed the night before by the U.S. working group, highlighting the statement’s final sentence on a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate goal of negotiations.

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. language was not acceptable to the Soviet side. In their own package, the Soviets had proposed that representatives be instructed to start negotiations on “banning nuclear testing.” In an initial phase, these talks could deal with other issues. But the final goal must be to achieve a CTB on both military and civilian tests. Shevardnadze interjected that the ultimate goal should be stated first. In response to the *President’s* remark that the U.S. language covered the concern *Gorbachev* had expressed, *Gorbachev* complained that the U.S. formulation suggested that it did not want to state directly the subject and goal of the negotiations. Instead, it appeared the U.S. wanted the talks to drag on forever. Under the U.S. formula, talks could go well beyond the ten years during which it would be necessary to find a solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would not help provide the U.S. a free hand to test as much and as long as it wanted. *Shevardnadze* remarked that acceptance of the U.S. formulation would call into question the ultimate goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

The *President* said that perhaps there was some difficulty in the translation, but it appeared to him that the U.S. language met Soviet concerns. (*Gorbachev* quipped that Zarechnak could tell the President that we were indeed talking about totally different things.) The *President* asked *Gorbachev* if the U.S. formulation would be more acceptable if the final sentence were moved to the front of the paragraph.

Gorbachev replied that it would not. Perhaps, he suggested, Shultz and Shevardnadze should be tasked with working out a formula. The problem, he said, was that the U.S. was saying that there could be talks—talks identified as having the “ultimate objective” of a CTB—but focused primarily on other things. Work on a CTB would start only at a later stage. But we should make it clear that we had already “started” work in that area. What was needed were clear-cut *formulae* without side-tracks. What the Soviets were proposing, *Gorbachev* recapitulated, was talks on a CTB, during which testing could continue, and in the first stage of which ancillary issues such as verification could be dealt with. In a second stage of the same talks, there would be movement toward a complete ban on nuclear tests. As a lawyer, *Gorbachev* felt confident that such an arrangement would allow no room for side-tracking.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

The *Secretary* observed that it appeared there was the beginning of a joint statement on strategic weapons. (*Gorbachev* nodded.) On the basis of the two leaders’ discussion, it should also be possible to formulate a similar statement on INF. (*Gorbachev* again nodded.) On Space/ABM/SDI, there had been no agreement, but the two sides had identified and characterized their areas of disagreement. These appeared not to deal with the question of whether or not to adhere to the ABM Treaty, since the U.S. was adhering, but rather over the period involved.

Gorbachev commented that, in the context of what had been agreed to on strategic and intermediate range offensive arms, a statement on adherence to the ABM Treaty would be necessary. That was obvious.

Shevardnadze asked if the approach outlined in the President’s letter to the question of the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty remained valid. The *Secretary* reminded *Shevardnadze* that the President had called for a two-stage approach. That was still on the table. *Gorbachev* asked if that meant the U.S. did not accept a ten year period.

The *Secretary* suggested three points to describe where the two sides were. They could be cast in terms of the leaders’ having instructed their negotiators to explore the following areas to bridge existing differences. The *Secretary* then read the three questions the President had read in his opening presentation.

When the *Secretary* reached the second point, on a “cooperative transition to advanced strategic defenses”, *Gorbachev* interrupted to point out that the Soviets did not recognize the concept. It was the U.S. which intended to deploy SDI. The Soviets would not make such an arrangement possible. Their concept was different. The *Secretary* continued to read the three points, noting that the final point was designed to respond to Soviet concerns.

The President, the *Secretary* continued, had made clear he would not give up SDI. Gorbachev had said he recognized that to be the President's position, and that the Soviets had made an effort to accommodate it. *Gorbachev* nodded, adding with a laugh that some even felt he was trying to encourage development of SDI so as to increase the U.S. defense burden. Thus, as it turned out, he was on the President's side, and the President had not even known it.

The *President* noted that, as the oldest person in the room, he was the only one who could remember how, after World War I, poison gas had been outlawed. But people kept their gas masks. And it was a good thing, because poison gas came back. The same could happen with nuclear weapons: if, after their elimination, someone were to bring them back, we would need something to deal with that.

Gorbachev commented that the preceding conversation had convinced him of the veracity of reports that the President did not like to make concessions. The President clearly did not want to give any concessions on the question of the ABM Treaty—its duration and strength, or on the cessation of nuclear testing.

The *President* replied that he felt we had agreed on testing.

Shevardnadze asked if it would be possible to consider the period during which there would be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It might be possible to reach agreement on this point. *Gorbachev* reiterated that a much more rigid adherence to the ABM Treaty, for a specific period of time—say, ten years—would be necessary to create the confidence necessary to proceed with deep cuts in offensive systems. Returning to the Secretary's earlier point, he underscored that the ten year period would coincide with the most significant reductions on the offensive side. *Shevardnadze* pointed out that there was a question of principle: if the two sides could not agree on a period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it would be impossible to agree on reductions. *Gorbachev* added that the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their proposals must be regarded as a package.

The *President* expressed the view that there should be no such linkage. The U.S., for its part, believed the Soviet Union already to be in violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. had not even built systems provided for in the Treaty.

Gorbachev interrupted to note that, on the first two questions (START and INF) it would be possible to say there were common points. On the second (ABM and testing), there had been a meaningful exchange of views, but no common points.

With that, the meeting could end. It had not been in vain. But it had not produced the results that had been expected in the Soviet

Union, and that Gorbachev personally had expected. Probably the same could be said for the United States. One had to be realistic. In political life one had to follow reality. The reality today was that it was possible to reach agreements on some major, interrelated questions. But because there was a lack of clarity, the connection had been disrupted. So the two sides remained where they had been before Reykjavik.

Gorbachev said the President would now report to Congress. Gorbachev would make his report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. The process would not stop. Relations would continue. For his part, Gorbachev was sorry he and the President had failed to provide a new impulse for arms control and disarmament. This was unfortunate, and Gorbachev regretted it.

The *President* said he did, too. He had thought we had agreements on 50% reductions, on INF, on considering what to do about the ABM Treaty, and on reducing nuclear testing. Was this not so? Were the two leaders truly to depart with nothing?

Gorbachev said that that was the case. He suggested the two devote a few minutes to humanitarian and regional questions, which, he pointed out, had been discussed by the second (non-arms control) working group. The President agreed, and the two briefly reviewed papers prepared by the working group the night before.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

Shevardnadze asked if he and the Secretary were to remain “unemployed,” or if the leaders had any instructions for them.

The *Secretary* said he had tried to formulate some language on INF and space, recognizing that there had been agreement on the one hand, and a lack of agreement on the other. After being invited by *Gorbachev* to proceed, the *Secretary* read the following passage:

“The President and General Secretary discussed issues involving the ABM Treaty, advanced strategic defense, the relationship to . . . ? of offensive ballistic missiles intensively and at length. They will instruct their Geneva negotiators to use the record of these conversations to benefit their work.”

Gorbachev said the statement was unacceptable, and asked that the passage on INF be read. The *Secretary* read the following passage:

.....

Gorbachev said that that was clear. He suggested that, if the President had no objections, the two Foreign Ministers might see what they could come up with while the two leaders took a brief break. Gorbachev didn’t mind waiting an hour or two.

Shevardnadze remarked that it should be possible to come up with agreed language on nuclear testing. That would leave the question of

the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev said that that had been covered in the discussion. A withdrawal pledge was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty so as to justify the risk of reduction strategic and intermediate range offensive weapons.

Gorbachev proposed that, if the President agreed, the two of them meet again at 3:00 pm. The *President* agreed, and escorted Gorbachev from the room, ending the session.

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 2:05–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Sec. Advisor Poindexter	Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Nitze	G. Arbatov
Assistant Secretary Perle	Notetaker
Robert Linhart, NSC	P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	
Others?	

This meeting was decided upon at the very last minute of the previous meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which ended at 1:35 pm. To save time, the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze was conducted in simultaneous (without using equipment), and consequently, I was able to take (some) notes on what Shevardnadze was saying, and none on what the Secretary was saying, since I was interpreting as he was talking. The following is the gist of what I wrote down and recall:

Shevardnadze stressed that the main thing on which the sides would have to agree was the time period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If that could be agreed, a formula for the talks on nuclear testing could be found, and everything else could be agreed. But without

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 1, Reykjavik Conversation Oct. 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in Hofdi House.

agreement on the period of non-withdrawal, there could be no document. The two sides had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic forces, on zero medium-range forces in Europe, and a solution on Asia.

The Soviet side could not agree to less than a 10-year period of non-withdrawal. The U.S. had proposed 5–7½ years, and the Soviet side had proposed 15–20 years initially. Now it had come down to 10 years, and could not go lower.

The *Secretary* indicated that the U.S. could not agree to a 10-year period.

Shevardnadze said that it would take that long to physically destroy the existing systems. It was not accidental that the Soviet side had indicated a period of 10 years. But the U.S. side wanted to create new weapons within the 5–7 year period. The General Secretary was very adamant about this time period.

Shevardnadze mentioned that other nations would have to join the USSR and the U.S. in reducing nuclear weapons at a certain point, and the *Secretary* agreed.

Towards the end of the meeting, the *Secretary* proposed to *Shevardnadze* a draft text which had been worked out during the meeting by Poindexter, Perle and Linhart. The *Secretary* indicated that the text had not been cleared with the President, and *Shevardnadze* should bear that in mind. The text was the following, which was translated simultaneously to *Shevardnadze*:

“Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.”

Shevardnadze seemed not to have any problems with the first parts of the proposal, but immediately seized upon the last sentence, and was very critical of it. The meeting ended as this was being discussed.

164. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 3:25–4:30 p.m. and 5:30–6:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS*U.S. Side*

President Reagan

Secretary Shultz

Tom Simons, Notetaker

Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

General Secretary Gorbachev

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

P. Palazhchenko, Notetaker

N. Uspenskiy, Interpreter

Introductory Explanation

The President and Gorbachev had arrived for this final meeting at 3:00 PM. For an hour before that, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed language concerning arms control. When the President and Gorbachev arrived, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister informed them, separately, about their discussions. The President and Gorbachev then began their meeting, twenty-minutes after the hour.

Gorbachev began by reading a counterproposal of the Soviet side, just worked out, based on the text which Secretary Shultz had transmitted to Shevardnadze, *ad referendum*, during their meeting between 2:00 and 3:00 PM. The text of the U.S. proposal, as read by the Secretary to Shevardnadze, had been as follows:

Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.

In introducing his counterproposal, *Gorbachev* began by saying that it incorporated the positions of the U.S. and Soviet sides and also strengthened the ABM Treaty, while drastically reducing nuclear arms. The counterproposal was as follows:

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 October. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on October 15 by Simons. The meeting took place in Hofdi House.

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of anti-ballistic missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus by the end of 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

Gorbachev said this contained elements of both the Soviet and the U.S. proposals. The Soviets were prepared to agree that day to confirm the situation as it exists with the ABM Treaty and to enrich it by the commitment to eliminate strategic offensive weapons.

The President said this seemed only slightly different from the U.S. position. *The Secretary* noted that there were indeed differences.

The President said he had the following proposal. (He then read the U.S. proposal cited above, under *Introductory Explanation*.)

Gorbachev said his view was that the Soviets had moved forward by adopting the periodization proposed by the U.S.—two five-year periods—while strengthening the ABM Treaty and linking strengthening the ABM Treaty with reductions. With regard to the U.S. side's formula, it does not satisfy Soviet requirements. The Soviets' main objective, for the period when we are pursuing deep reductions, is to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime and not to undermine it. He would thus once again ask the U.S. side to meet this minimal requirement. Their proposal was intended to assure that today's ABM Treaty is confirmed and strengthened, with secure obligations that for ten years it will not be gone around, that there will be no deployment of systems in space, as we go through deep reductions to elimination of offensive weapons.

Gorbachev said he wanted to stress that the ban would not be on research and testing in laboratories. They would be confined to laboratories, but this would open opportunities for both the U.S. and Soviet sides to do all the necessary research in the field of space systems such as SDI. It would not undermine SDI, but would put it in a certain framework. He asked the President for an agreement that met these requirements.

The President said that we had wanted to meet the Soviet need for ten years, and we had done so. He asked why there should be any restrictions beyond that period, when both sides will have gotten what

they claim they want—the elimination of offensive missiles. Why impose restrictions beyond the ten-year period, he asked.

Gorbachev said this was not something that needed to be put down on paper.

The President said he did not see what the basic difference was, unless it was the interpretation of the Treaty.

Gorbachev said that with regard to his proposal he did not know why it could not be accepted. After ten years the two sides could find out what the solutions were through talks. The solution would not necessarily be SDI. The U.S. might find it was SDI, and the Soviets might find it was something else. He didn't see why we need to sign on blindly to SDI at this point. Thus the Soviets had come up with a formula that meets this: in the next several years after the ten-year period the two sides would find solutions in this field in negotiations. This was a broad formula that after ten years the U.S. could continue SDI if it wanted. If the U.S. wanted, this could be discussed in negotiations, after the ten years. Why pledge to SDI right now, he asked.

The President replied that he assumed both sides agreed that verification would assure that neither had ballistic missiles after the ten years. Isn't it necessary to pledge something to assure a defense someone who might come along and want to redevelop nuclear missiles, he asked.

Gorbachev said that at least it was the Soviet view that for ten years, while we proceed to the unique historical task of eliminating nuclear forces, we should strengthen the ABM Treaty regime. Why should we create other problems whose prospects are dim and whose consequences are unknown, that leave one side in doubt about reducing nuclear weapons while the other side retains them under the guise of defensive weapons. Why burden agreement by these weights? It was hard enough to come to this agreement. That is why they link reductions to doing without defensive systems for ten years. Afterwards we can discuss them. But during the ten years there should be only laboratory research. We can see what the situation is while we eliminate offensive weapons, and then discuss what next after that. It is comprehensible and logical to retain the Treaty. The U.S. side would be permitted laboratory research, and of course the Soviet side would too. In the U.S. case this would mean SDI. The Soviets were not trying to bury SDI.

The President said the Soviets had asked for ten years, and we had given ten and a half, because after ten years we would have to give the six-month withdrawal notice. During that period both sides would be able to do the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. If they then decide to go forward with defenses, what objection can there be unless something is being hidden? This provides protection for the future. We will make it available to the Soviet side if it wants it.

If the Soviets felt that strongly about strengthening the ABM Treaty, why didn't they get rid of Krasnoyarsk and the whole defense structure they have built around their capital, the President asked. They have a big defense structure and we have none. It is a peculiar fact that we do not have a single defense against a nuclear attack.

Gorbachev again asked that the President look at the Soviet proposal, which, he said, incorporated both the U.S. and the Soviet point of view. If it were acceptable, the Soviet side would be prepared to sign off on it.

At this point *the Secretary* asked Simons to type up the Soviet proposal, and shortly thereafter Palazhchenko went to dictate an English translation of it to Simons.

The President said that he thought the two sides were very close to an agreement.

Gorbachev noted that an addition should be made to the text which the Soviet side had just transmitted to the effect that during the next few years after the ten-year period the two sides should negotiate a mutually acceptable solution concerning their future course of action. The U.S. side feels that this should be SDI. The Soviet side might want something else. But the Soviet formula would permit finding a mutually acceptable solution for future activity after the ten-year period. Why would this not be satisfactory to the U.S.?

The President replied that if both sides had completely eliminated nuclear weapons and there was no longer any threat, why would there be any concern if one side built a safeguard, a defensive system against non-existent weapons, in case there might be a need for it in the future? The President had a different picture—perhaps after the ten-year period the Soviet side would want to build new missiles, and would not want the U.S. to have defenses against them. But he preferred to see a different formula. Ten years from now he would be a very old man. He and *Gorbachev* would come to Iceland and each of them would bring the last nuclear missile from each country with them. Then they would give a tremendous party for the whole world.

Gorbachev interjected that he thought the two sides were close to reaching a common formula. He did not think the U.S. should suspect the Soviet Union of having evil designs. If it had such designs, it would not have gone so far in proposing reductions of strategic and medium-range missiles.

The President continued to describe his vision of their meeting in Iceland ten years from now. He would be very old by then and *Gorbachev* would not recognize him. The President would say, "Hello, Mikhail." And *Gorbachev* would say, "Ron, is it you?" And then they would destroy the last missiles.

Gorbachev replied that he did not know if we would live another ten years.

The President said he was counting on living that long.

Gorbachev said that the President had gotten past the dangerous period and would now live to be 100, but in his case he was in the most dangerous period of a man's life, especially after negotiating with the President, who was sapping all the strength he had. He had heard that the President did not like to make concessions and wanted only to come out a winner. But he thought both sides ought to be winners. *The President* remarked that he would not live to 100 if he had to worry every day about being hit by a Soviet missile.

Gorbachev replied that they had agreed to eliminate them.

The President repeated that both sides had gotten good results, i.e. a 50% reduction in the first stage and total elimination in the second. *Gorbachev* had pledged to his people back home that he would get a ten-year period, and the President had pledged that he would not give up SDI. He had already agreed to delaying SDI deployment, but he could go back and say that he had not given up SDI, and *Gorbachev* could say that he had gotten the ten-year period. The President thought that the U.S. people and the Soviet people would cheer that they had gotten rid of nuclear missiles, and would be happy for the two of them.

Gorbachev reiterated that what the Soviets said about research and testing in the laboratory constituted the basis and the opportunity for the U.S. to go on within the framework of SDI. So the U.S. would not have renounced SDI on its side. He was a convinced opponent of a situation where there is a winner and a loser. In that case, after the agreement is ratified, the loser would take steps to undermine the agreement, so that could not be the right basis. There had to be an equal footing. The documents should be deserving of ratification as being in the interest of both sides.

The President asked what then is wrong with going by this and then saying that the question of the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty is reserved for their meeting in Washington, that they then could decide whether it is under the ABM provisions.

Gorbachev replied that without that there was no package. He believed the Soviet side had convinced the U.S. side of the existence of an interrelationship between the issues. If we agree on deep reductions in nuclear weapons we need confidence that the ABM Treaty will be observed during the period of the process of eliminating them. This would be a very historic period, improving a dangerous situation after a period of tensions. This decision would also be in the interest of the U.S. during that time.

The President commented that they were not getting anyplace. He proposed they consider why there was an objection to the U.S. formula

if they agreed that ten years down the road there would be no ballistic missiles. He proposed a recess where they would meet with their people, and see what is keeping them apart.

Gorbachev said that a phrase should be added to the text which the Soviet side had transmitted to the effect that both sides should arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, through negotiation, about what to do following the ten-year period. This reflected the President's ideas on SDI.

(At this point the typed version of the Soviet counterproposal was brought in.)

The President said Secretary Shultz would speak about differences between the two texts. *The Secretary* said there seemed to be two differences. The first is how to handle what is permitted during the ten years. The second, if he understood correctly, is that the Soviets see a period of indefinite duration for agreement not to depart from the ABM Treaty, while the U.S. side sees ten years.

Gorbachev said we needed clarity at this stage about whether to undertake real reductions while strengthening, not weakening, the ABM Treaty regime. Thus, the right to withdraw that both sides have now would not be used for ten years, and after ten years we would consider how to deal with the question. Perhaps we would keep to it, perhaps there would be new elements. But in those ten years we would strengthen and not weaken the Treaty regime.

The Secretary asked whether *Gorbachev* was saying that after ten years the aspect about not withdrawing would also be over. *Gorbachev* replied that after ten years the two sides could exercise all sorts of rights. *The Secretary* commented that that helped. *Gorbachev* suggested they add to the text the sentence "In the course of the succeeding several years, the two sides should find in the course of negotiations further mutually acceptable solutions in this field." *Shevardnadze* commented that under the Soviet proposal there would be no limit on research, except that it would be confined to laboratories.

Gorbachev asked the President to recall their meeting in Geneva.² The President was host; it was on the last night; they were sitting on the sofa drinking coffee. They were in a good atmosphere. At that point Shultz came in to report that the Soviet delegation did not agree on certain points. The President had asked him, sitting there on the sofa, what the hell should be done, and suggested banging his hand on the table. He (*Gorbachev*) had gone out, and in fifteen minutes everything was fixed. Now they could go out in the same way, and

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 159.

the President could go out and fix everything in ten minutes. It would be another victory for the U.S. side.

The Secretary said he wanted to be clear about one thing. The Soviet proposal said that during the second five-year period the remaining weapons would be “reduced.” Did “reduced” mean at a constant pace? *Gorbachev* said that the modalities could be written down in the treaty. *The Secretary* noted that the President talked about strategic offensive weapons.

Gorbachev recalled that the day before the Soviets had proposed that all types of strategic forces be cut by half. This was for the first five years. It covered the whole triad. The second five-year period would take care of the rest of the strategic forces.

The Secretary noted that our proposal referred to “offensive ballistic missiles,” and the Soviet to “strategic offensive arms.” These may be different categories. He wanted to be sure.

Gorbachev repeated that the Soviets had made a proposal the day before. He could say frankly it had not been an easy decision. If we try to search for agreements on subceilings, we will never get out of it. He had suggested that they cut through this, and cut everything by 50%, including the SS-18s the U.S. was concerned about. Other missiles which were not strategic would be covered by the separate agreements that have been made.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to take a break to sort out the differences between the two texts. (The break lasted from 4:30 to 5:30 PM.).

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After the break, *the President* said he had been sorry to keep *Gorbachev* so long, but *Gorbachev* knew the trouble Americans had getting along with each other.

The President continued that he had spent this long time trying very hard to meet the General Secretary’s desire for a ten-year situation. This had to be his final effort. The President then read the following text:

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions, while continuing research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will

have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose, unless the parties agreed otherwise.

Gorbachev referred to the text of “research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty,” and noted that reference to laboratory testing had disappeared. *The President* replied that instead the Soviet side now had the line about research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev asked what the purpose of this was. *The President* replied that their people in Geneva must decide what is permitted. The two sides have different views on this.

Gorbachev asked again whether the language on laboratory testing had been omitted on purpose. He was trying to clarify the U.S. proposal.

The President confirmed that it had been left out on purpose.

Gorbachev continued that his next question was that the first part of the proposal talks about strategic offensive weapons, and the second part about ballistic missiles. He asked why there is this difference of approach.

The President said he had received the message while he was upstairs that the Soviets were mainly interested in ballistic missiles. He had thought earlier that they were thinking of everything nuclear, and then he had heard it was ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev said no, they had in mind strategic offensive weapons. He then turned to medium-range missiles.

The President interrupted to ask what *Gorbachev* meant.

Gorbachev said he could confirm that the Soviets are for reducing strategic offensive weapons. Other agreements would cover other weapons, for instance medium-range weapons. That part on what the U.S. side called INF is in the second part of the agreement. There we would also deal with missiles with ranges of less than 1000 kilometers. He was not removing anything from the table, but he wanted to be sure there is identity in the two parts. He was not changing positions. He wished to clarify things.

The President proposed to add “strategic” to our language, making it “strategic offensive ballistic missiles.”

Gorbachev asked where aircraft were. They were in the triad, and we had agreed to reduce the whole triad: land-based strategic missiles, sea-launched, strategic bombers. The two sides had determined long ago what is strategic.

The President said we had proposed reducing all ballistic missiles on land and sea, but he was ready to include all the nuclear weapons we can.

Gorbachev said we should use the whole triad.

The President said then we should take out “strategic.” Then all ballistic missiles would be eliminated.

Gorbachev said we should include land-based, sea-based and bombers.

The President asked if that were the only thing *Gorbachev* objected to in the U.S. proposal.

Gorbachev said he was just clarifying to be sure. He would explain the Soviet position.

The President said if this was a problem we should work on it. We had agreed to the record of the group on reducing all three elements.

Gorbachev said the agreement should be identical for both sides, for the first and second five-year periods. The concept is to reduce 50% for all types. At the same time they had agreed to the American rule, taking into account gravity bombs and SRAMs.

The President said there had been a misunderstanding on our part as to what the Soviets wanted.

The Secretary said he thought we had to be careful when it came to eliminating all strategic offensive arms if we don’t deal with short-range ballistic missiles. He realized we were dealing with it in another place, but perhaps this was the place to deal with it decisively.

Gorbachev said Shultz could write into the text on the second period that all strategic offensive arms will have been eliminated, “including ballistic missiles.” The missiles with ranges shorter than 1000 kilometers are handled in the medium-range agreement. We should write we will freeze them and then negotiate about their destruction. Everything should be encompassed. Missiles of less than 1000 kilometers are being handled elsewhere. Freeze them and then start talks about their destruction.

The Secretary said we are talking about two stages, the first five years and the second five years. Insofar as we deal with intermediate- and short-range weapons, we talked about an agreement to last until it was superseded. But we think of this as a first batch. Presumably, he continued, what we have agreed to on INF will happen within the first five years. All the missiles will be gone.

Gorbachev said yes, including those with less than 1000 kilometers’ range as well. But when you speak about ABM you speak only about strategic weapons. We have a common understanding about what is strategic.

The Secretary commented that the treaty is about anti-ballistic missiles. These are not only strategic. He recognized there may not be much of an argument here.

Gorbachev said he did not think there was a difference between the two sides.

The Secretary suggested that if we add “and all offensive ballistic missiles,” we can come to closure.

Gorbachev asked again why it is different for the two periods. In the first paragraph we speak of strategic offensive arms. He did not think there had to be this contradistinction. We can sort that out when we do the paper.

The President agreed this could be sorted out. He asked whether *Gorbachev* was saying that beginning in the first five-year period and then going on in the second we would be reducing all nuclear weapons—cruise missiles, battlefield weapons, sub-launched and the like. It would be fine with him if we eliminated all nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev said we can do that. We can eliminate them.

The Secretary said, “Let’s do it.”

The President reiterated that he had thought he had gotten a message that *Gorbachev* was interested mainly in ballistic missiles. *Gorbachev* reiterated that there is a contradiction in the first and second periods. In the first part of the U.S. text it is all strategic offensive weapons, in the second only one type of arms, and that leaves the rest out.

The President said that if they could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons, he thought they could turn it over to their Geneva people with that understanding, for them to draft up that agreement, and *Gorbachev* could come to the U.S. and sign it.

Gorbachev agreed. He continued that he now wanted to turn to the ABM Treaty. He was apprehensive about this. If the treaty is of unlimited duration, and there is to be strict observance of its provisions, and the two sides agree not to use their right to withdraw, then it is incomprehensible why research, development and testing should go on and not be confined to the laboratory. The U.S. evidently saw the Treaty otherwise. We should add to its strength.

We will be proceeding on to a broad reduction of offensive weapons, *Gorbachev* continued. This would allow for research and testing in laboratories but not elsewhere. Otherwise one side could do research, development and testing anywhere, while pretending it is not violating the ABM Treaty. This would give the impression that one side was trying to create an unequal situation. He liked to be clear. He wanted to have laboratory-only in. The Soviet side is for strict observance of the Treaty, and only laboratory research and testing. He could not do without the word “laboratory.” If the U.S. side was indeed for strict observance, it should also be for “laboratory.”

The President said that from the beginning of the Treaty there had been this difference. There was a sort of liberal interpretation, and also

one that confined this strictly to laboratories. This was a legitimate difference. But we had gone a long way, and what the hell difference did it make. Ten years down the road some country might come along with a madman who wanted to build nuclear weapons again.

The President said they could be proud of what they had done. We may not build SDI in the end; it might be too expensive, for instance. But he had promised the American people he would not give up SDI. The Soviets now had ten years. We have an agreement we can be very proud of.

Gorbachev asked whether the U.S. side would not have the right to decide on SDI development if it put in that it recognized that work would go on only in laboratories, including SDI-related work. But he had to take a principled position that the work could only be in laboratories. This would mean it could not be transferred outside, to create weapons and put them in space. That was why strict observance meant confining work to laboratories. If the President agreed, they could write that down, and sign now.

The President said that *Gorbachev* talked about deployment as if it meant weapons in space. We already had agreements that prevented that. He thought the Soviets were violating agreements. There is the Krasnoyarsk radar. They should knock it down.

Gorbachev said the U.S. might be testing objects, and say they were not offensive, but there would be suspicions. The Soviet side said testing should take place only in laboratories.

The President said he would not destroy the possibility of proceeding with SDI. He could not confine work to the laboratory.

Gorbachev said he understood this was the President's final position. He could not confine work to the laboratory.

The President said, "Yes." We have said we will do what we do within what we believe are within the limits of the Treaty. But there is disagreement as to what the Treaty proscribes.

Gorbachev said he understood the U.S. wanted a concrete formula that gives the U.S. the possibility of conducting tests not only in the laboratory but outside, and in space.

The President said there is research in the lab stage, but then you must go outdoors to try out what has been done in the lab.

Gorbachev suggested that they write in "experimental." This includes mockups, prototypes, samples. But they needed to write "only in laboratories."

Gorbachev continued that he was not saying what he was saying to be intransigent, or rigid, or casuistical. He was being very serious. If they were going to agree to deep reductions in nuclear weapons, and the U.S. side wanted an interpretation that allowed it to conduct

all sorts of research that would go against the ABM Treaty, and put weapons in space and build a large-scale defense system, then this was unacceptable. But if the U.S. agreed to confine this work to laboratories, the Soviet side would sign. That was why in their draft tests of all space elements in space were banned, except for laboratory work.

The President said he could not give in.

Gorbachev asked if that was the last word.

The President said yes. He had a problem in his country *Gorbachev* did not have. If they criticized *Gorbachev*, they went to jail. (*Gorbachev* interjected during the interpretation that the President should read some of the things being written in Soviet newspapers.) But, *the President* continued, he had people who were the most outspoken critics of the Soviet Union over the years, the so-called right wing, and esteemed journalists, who were the first to criticize him. They were kicking his brains out.

Gorbachev would go home with the ten years, the President went on. He himself would go home with his pledge to stick by SDI, and continue research within our interpretation of the ABM Treaty when it came to research. He was not asking anything unusual.

Addressing the President, *Gorbachev* said he assumed the President was addressing him from a position of equality, as a leader of another country, on a confidential basis, and he would thus be frank.

The President was three steps away from becoming a great President, *Gorbachev* said, if they signed what had been discussed and agreed to. These would be very major steps. But they needed to include strict observance of the ABM Treaty and confinement of research and testing to laboratories, including SDI-related work.

But if this was not possible, they could say goodbye, and forget everything they had discussed. What had been discussed here in Reykjavik was a last opportunity, at least for *Gorbachev*.

He had had the firm belief when he came here—and otherwise he would not have proposed the meeting—that the proposals of the Soviet Union, of the Soviet leadership, were very far-reaching, and built on a huge reservoir of constructive spirit. With the support of the U.S. side, they could solve very important problems.

If they were able to do this, *Gorbachev* continued, and resolve these problems, all the President's critics would not open their mouths. The peoples of the U.S., of the Soviet Union, of the whole world would cheer. Now, if he (*Gorbachev*) saw that the President could not agree to these proposals, the people would say that the political leaders could not agree. What they had discussed would be left for another generation.

Gorbachev continued that the President had not made a single, substantial, major step in *Gorbachev's* direction.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to say just one thing. The two sides were so close to accomplishing a historic task, to decisions of such historic significance, that if future generations read the minutes of these meetings, and saw how close we had come but how we did not use these opportunities, they would never forgive us.

The President said he wished to speak as one political leader to another political leader. He had a problem of great importance to him on this particular thing. He had been attacked even before he came. He had given up a long span of time. He was asking Gorbachev, as a political leader, to do this one thing to make it possible for him to deal with Gorbachev in the future. If he did what Gorbachev asked, he would be badly hurt in his own country. He asked this one thing of Gorbachev.

Gorbachev said he had said everything he had to say, just as the President had.

The President asked Gorbachev to listen once again to what he had proposed: “during that period strictly to observe all its provisions, while continuing research, testing and development which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.” It is a question of one word. This should not be turned down over a word. Anyone reading that would believe that the U.S. is committed to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev commented that he could also say the President was using one word to frustrate a meeting that had promised to be historic. But he would speak seriously. It is not just a question of a word, but a question of principle. If we are to agree to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons, we must have a firm footing, a front and rear that we can rely on. But if the Soviet side signed something that gave the U.S. the opportunity to conduct SDI-related research and testing in broad tests, and to go into space, the testing of space weapons in space, he could not return to Moscow. He could not go back and say we are going to start reductions, and the U.S. will continue to do research, testing and development that will allow it to create weapons and a large-scale space defense system in ten years.

If we say research and testing in laboratories, he could sign it, Gorbachev went on. But if he went back and said that research, testing and development could go on outside the laboratory and the system could go ahead in ten years, he would be called a dummy (*durak*) and not a leader. Ten years of research in the laboratories within the limits of the Treaty ought to be enough for the President. He was not against SDI. But the research had to be in the laboratories.

The President said he had believed, and had said so in Geneva, that he and Gorbachev had the possibility of getting along as no two American and Soviet leaders ever had before. He had asked Gorbachev

for a favor, which was important to him and to what he could do with Gorbachev in the future. Gorbachev had refused him that favor.

Gorbachev replied that if the President had come to him and said things are hard for American farmers, and asked him to buy some American grain, he would have understood. But what the President was asking him to agree to on behalf of the USSR was to allow the U.S.—at a time when they were proceeding to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons—to conduct full-scale research and development, including development of a space-based ABM system, which would permit the U.S. to destroy the Soviet Union's offensive nuclear potential. The President would not like it if Gorbachev had asked that of him. It would cause nervousness and suspicion. It was not an acceptable request. It could not be met. The President was not asking for a favor, but for giving up a point of principle.

The President said there would be no offensive weapons left to destroy, and space defenses could not be deployed for ten years or so. It was not the word, it was the implication. Gorbachev was asking him to give up the thing he'd promised not to give up. All the other language was what Gorbachev had needed. We had said we would comply with the Treaty for ten years. It is the particular meaning of one word. Gorbachev knew how this would be taken in the U.S.

The President continued that if Gorbachev thought the problem was that he wanted some military advantage, Gorbachev should not worry. He did not talk about it much, but he believed the Soviets were violating the ABM Treaty. He was not saying we should tear it down, and we should say nothing outside this room, but we should not stop at one word. Maybe Gorbachev could suggest another word to replace it. The President had met Gorbachev's requirements. What more was needed than that?

The President said he was asking Gorbachev to change his mind as a favor to him, so that hopefully they could go on and bring peace to the world.

Gorbachev said he could not do it. If they could agree to ban research in space, he would sign in two minutes. They should add to the text "The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories," as in the draft. The point was not one of words, but of principle.

He would like to move everywhere he could. He had tried to do so. His conscience was clear before the President and his people. What had depended on him he had done.

(At that point the President stood, and both leaders gathered up their papers and left the room. As they stood together before departing, *Gorbachev* asked the President to pass on his regards to Nancy Reagan.

The President replied that she had decided to keep to her schedule rather than come to Iceland. On the steps outside, they shook hands and parted. Since Gorbachev was formally the “host” of the meeting, the President departed first from the site.)

165. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

1555/CH as notetaker/ G + P banter + argue as Shev ponders + S drafts to try to find a formula

P—were so close. may I suggest

G—a pt of substance. Mr. P draw yr attn.—our prop has such a wdg. after 10 yr pd the sides in negos wd find further must accept solutions in This field, That is, the ABM. Our prop allows us to take acct. of all positions as they [illegible] enough after 10 years. You, SDI: we don’t agree. We put something + y don’t agree.

- to sum up. 10 yr pd w two sides not w/d [illegible]. Can conduct *lab* research. After 10, during 10, we complete elim all stratg wpons.

P—If both elim. nucl wpons, why a concern if one side wants to build def syst just in case? Are y considering starting up ag After 10 yrs again w wpns? I have a diff picture. I have a pic after 10 yrs, yo + I come to Iceland each bring the last 2 missiles in the world + we have the biggest damn party in celebration.

G—Mr. P we close to mut. accep formula Don’t think we have evil designs, we don’t.

P—a mtg in Iceland in 10 yrs. Ill be so old y wont recog me. I’ll say M. you’ll say Ron? + we’ll destroy the 2.

G—I may not be lvg after these 10

P—I’ll count on it.

G—Now y can go smoothly to 100, you passed the tough period. I’m just entering it. Beyond that, I’ll have burden of having gone thru all these mtg w P who doesn’t like concessions, He wants to be a winner. We must both be winners.

P—I can’t live to 100 worrying you’ll shoot one of those m. at me.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. Drafted by Hill. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix G.

- 50%—we both got it. You told yr people 10 yrs + y got it. I told my people I wdnt give up SDI. So I have to go home showing I haven't. Our people will cheer that we got rid of the missiles.

G. well, what can say about r + t in lab constitutes basis + opp for y to go on w/I [illegible] of SDI. So y have not renounced SDI on yr side

—I am conv. oppo of sit where is a winner + loser in our mtg. If that case, then after agrt + ratify, the loser wd take steps to undermine the agrmt. So that cant be basis. Has to be eq. footing. Otherwise you can say agrmt in keeping of US + I cant say its in int of USSR So docs shd be deserving of ratif if in int of both sides.

P—Whats wrong w going by this + then say R, dev of + +g permitted by ABM—we reserved that for our mtg in the *summer* Then testing—we then cd disc whether it under ABM prov.

TS returns

166. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986

SUBJECT

Ambassador Rowny's Conversation with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev at Reykjavik, October 11–12

During the 10-hour plus meeting of experts the night of October 11–12,² I had several conversations of one-half hour or more with Marshal Akhromeyev. On Sunday, October 12, in the anterooms during the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings, I again had several conversations with Akhromeyev.

Akhromeyev said he is among the "last of the Mohicans," one of the few remaining Soviet officers who served in the "Great Patriotic War." He started his career at draft age (17) as a naval infantryman and saw service both on a destroyer in the Baltic and on shore in Riga and Leningrad. He became interested in tanks, transferred to an armor division, and took part in the defense of Leningrad. There he was wounded and evacuated, "starving and half-frozen," to a hospital in

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reykjavik Conversation Oct. 1986. Secret. Drafted on October 22 by Rowny.

² See Document 159.

the south. After the war, he served with armor units in the southern USSR, the “desert,” and on the Chinese border. He rose through the ranks rapidly, “doing more staff duty” than he liked, since his “first love” was command.

Akhromeyev talked to me rather freely about SDI, saying the Soviets oppose it because the USSR does not want to enter into a technological race in space with the United States. He said he believes a mixture of offense and defense is best “in principle,” but that Soviet agreement to the ABM Treaty had changed the situation to an offense-dominant one. As a result, a favorable “correlation of forces” for the Soviet Union becomes dependent upon nuclear offensive arms uninhibited by strategic defenses.

“The real military cutting edge,” he said, “is in conventional forces: ground, sea and air.” Nuclear weapons have primarily political utility, although one could not rule out their actual use if national survival depended upon them. Nevertheless, he said, “we generals” should convince our “political masters” that greater stability lies not only in reducing offensive nuclear weapons since, as President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree, a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought. He added that in avoiding the imbalance of conventional forces they should not be so large that this resulted in an escalation to nuclear conflict during a crisis situation.

Akhromeyev said that “we military men, who have seen the devastation of war in combat and understand the destructive power of nuclear weapons, must insure that our political masters are able to carry out their political objectives without letting nuclear war—either by accident, design or escalation”—ever to occur.

Akhromeyev said this was his first experience as an arms control negotiator. He found such negotiations easier than those he has had to engage in “at home” with inter-service rivalry. He said he understands “it’s the same in the United States.” He found the Reykjavik experience exhilarating, but such jobs, he said, are best left to those who know military hardware, had studied international politics, had traveled abroad, and could speak English.

Akhromeyev said he and other military professionals deplored the over-exaggerated and polemical statements by “our political masters.” However, this he said is unavoidable in the “war of perceptions and illusions.” “We are, after all,” he said, “in a struggle for men’s minds.”

Akhromeyev said the Soviets keep alive the memory of being attacked by the Nazis and never again want to see their very existence threatened with the prospect of annihilation. For this reason most families welcome having their sons, usually an only son, do their “patriotic duty” by serving in the military.

Akhromeyev had many other interesting things to say, some of which are tangential to our negotiations. The environment, he said, must not be tampered with. Therefore, Gorbachev had made the correct decision not to allow the reversal of the flow of the Kama River to take place, even if peaceful nuclear explosions, "as Soviet studies showed," could be done with "negligible nuclear fallout." Peaceful nuclear explosions were nevertheless useful for creating large storage areas for oil and natural gas and for strong nuclear waste material. He said that the number of nuclear power plants in the USSR would need to be expanded, but that safety standards, "obviously need to be raised."

Akhromeyev said that Gorbachev's ideas for higher standards of productivity and better consumer goods were sound. He and other military officers deplore, however, Gorbachev's idea that the military defense industry should make consumer goods. He said: "better TVs and washing machines today will cause us to have poorer tanks tomorrow."

When I inquired about Ogarkov, he said the Marshal had provided the Soviet military with sound strategic thinking and continues to do so. He characterized Ogarkov as "creative" and "imaginative." When I asked if we would see Ogarkov return to a more prominent role, Akhromeyev said he did not think so since the Marshal is, "enjoying his present military command too much."

When I asked about Starodubov, Akhromeyev said he had been ill—probably tired from over-work. He added that Starodubov is much better now, and that if it were not that his cure in Carlsbad had two more weeks to run, he would have been at Reykjavik.

Marshal Akhromeyev at age 63, is highly intelligent, well-informed and non-polemical. Of medium-height, lean and bespeckled, he carries himself with a soldierly bearing. I did not see him smoke or drink. He speaks no English, but reads translations of our contemporary novels so as to "better understand the mind and soul" of Americans. He is highly alert, and exhibited a good sense of humor. He is an engaging conversationalist but a tough negotiator. He demonstrated that he can be reasonable and, for a Soviet, uncommonly flexible.

Akhromeyev said he has a son and a daughter. The son is an officer in the tank corps, married, and has a child—"despite the difficulties Army officers have in raising children because they have to move often." His daughter, a physicist, also is married, but says she has no time in her career for children.

167. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1986, 7:30–9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz and Nitze Meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Nitze
DepSecDef Taft
Admiral Crowe, CJCS
General Wickham, CS Army
General Welch, Dep CS Air Force
Admiral Busey, Vice CNO
General Morgan, Asst Cmdt Marine Corps
Admiral Carter, Dir Joint Staff

1. Secretary Shultz opened by saying that the law provides that as a member of the NSC, he is entitled to the Chiefs' military advice. He would like their reaction to the things the President put on the table in Reykjavik. On both INF and START, they were just about our previous proposals. On Defense and Space, nothing was agreed because of disagreement over permitted testing and other things. But the discussion lifted part of the President's letter² and changed it to ten years. That idea basically came out of the Pentagon. (Taft interjected that it had come from the other part of OSD—the fourth floor.) Another factor was the President's desire for a world less reliant on nuclear weapons. The GNP of Europe is about the same as Japan's and is 60% of the U.S. GNP. Our instinct is that it is nonsense that we cannot stand up to the USSR with conventional forces. He would like to dig in to this question. We must think in terms of bigger increments to the defense budget.

2. Admiral Crowe said that the Chiefs have a review of the proposal under way. They do not know what we would need in a world with zero ballistic missiles or zero nuclear weapons, or what the cost would be. Nitze said there were three alternatives—zero ballistic missiles, zero strategic nuclear weapons, or zero nuclear weapons.

3. Shultz said the Soviets didn't like three aspects of our offer—the concept of deployment of strategic defenses, the change in the second five years from reducing strategic offensive weapons to elimi-

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Background Book for Vienna Meeting. Secret.

² See Document 138.

nating ballistic missiles only, and SDI research. The President has long said that we should abolish all nuclear weapons. He is uneasy with a defense that relies on nuclear weapons. General Wickham said that the public is uneasy with zero nuclear weapons.

4. DepSecDef Taft said that the problem is that all of this would be done in ten years. This is not a different world we are looking at. The Pentagon had made assumptions out into the future on every defense program, e.g. that MX will be pursued. Secretary Shultz said the ideas discussed in Reykjavik were not new. Taft responded that the timing is new.

5. Admiral Crowe said he strongly supports arms reductions. We should compare the future with today. Our position today is dicey. We have been looking at what reductions by both sides would do to our situation. Now we must look at the elimination of a pillar of our defense. Poindexter told us the proposal was zero ballistic missiles in ten years. Secretary Shultz said this was correct; it was designed to cover strategic and short-range ballistic missiles. But in his discussions, the President has made it clear that in his head he doesn't like nuclear weapons.

6. Admiral Crowe said that the Chiefs do have some intuitive judgments. We would be back in the bomb business. [16 lines not declassified]

7. General Wickham said that we had moved in the past to have an air defense capability. [2 lines not declassified] If we go to bombers only, it would mean mutual assured destruction. (Crowe interjected that we would be better off than we are now.) Wickham continued that neither side could achieve surprise attack. As for a world with zero nuclear weapons, he had no insight at present.

8. Secretary Shultz said that a zero-nuclear world was where the President was driving. Mr. Taft said that would require conventional balance. Arms reductions can be very costly; the value of reverting to reliance on conventional weapons can be very high, but the cost is also high. General Wickham said that he is not against reducing nuclear weapons as low as possible, but to eliminate them is costly. There is also the coupling issue, both political and military. [5 lines not declassified] On whether we can generate the necessary political will, his guess is that we cannot. We have brilliant munitions coming into our tank battalions, but not in the next ten years. Allied and Congressional support is dubious. START reductions to 6000/1600 make sense, as does 100 INF warheads, but reductions beyond that are dubious. We have the problems of air defense and the fact that it is more costly to destroy targets with conventional weapons. We have 13,000 tanks, and they have 50,000. They lead us 1,000 to 30 in the production rate.

9. Secretary Shultz said he believes democracies do have the necessary will power. If a nuclear war starts, we are finished. If a non-

nuclear war is fought, we can eventually win. Admiral Crowe said that if we get rid of nuclear weapons we can win. General Welch said that if the Soviets take Europe it would be very tough. Admiral Busey said if ballistic missiles are eliminated, the sides would go to cruise missile forces. We could build a cruise missile capability, but defenses would be costly. SLCMs are a concern. In a conventional balance our Navy can win. General Morgan said that our modernization efforts have made gigantic advances. But we would have large requirements in forward forces, and would have to expand the forces in question. In this case, the number of obligations we could support would be called into question. We have not seen the will in the Central Region to increase the force structure; the problem is in total end strength. We have the same problem in Northeast Asia. We could do a lot in 5–10 years. The Marine Corps structure would raise a question.

10. General Wickham said that elimination of ballistic missiles raises the question of the draft. Also, we do not have chemical weapons; binaries are essential. History does not give us a comfortable feeling about Congressional support. Mr. Taft said in the past we have been forced to save on conventional forces by relying on nuclear weapons. We are spending 80% of the defense budget on conventional forces now. Secretary Shultz said that it is nonsense to assume we cannot afford to spend more than 6% of our GNP on defense.

11. Admiral Crowe said when you get to zero nuclear weapons, everything becomes more important. Verification is critical. The risks are higher in regional conflicts, such as Korea. And General Wickham is right about the draft.

12. Secretary Shultz said the idea of getting rid of ballistic missiles came from the Pentagon, from Weinberger, not from him. He asked if the Pentagon had approved the President's letter. Mr. Taft said they had, but there was nothing in there about getting rid of ballistic missiles in ten years, merely that the sides would agree on a plan in less than seven years. The Chiefs strongly support 50% reductions; OSD probably will.

13. Secretary Shultz said we want to detach INF and testing from the package and that is what will probably emerge in 6 months. The Soviets will keep START hooked to SDI. We have seen the whites of their eyes on START. Gorbachev rejected sharing of defenses; he said, "How can we believe that? Let's get down to business." That does not eliminate the two year period. We might exercise our minds on defense and space if there is a START deal.

14. Admiral Crowe asked if we could walk away from the ten-year deal. Secretary Shultz said, in the case of INF, an agreement would remain in effect indefinitely, unless replaced. The Soviets bought this. In the case of START, the ten-year aspect grew out of his talk with

Shevardnadze on Sunday afternoon.³ We proposed the commitment to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty be consistent with the commitment to offensive reductions. That was when the 10 years and elimination were brought in. Reykjavik brought out many things which would be difficult to take back, we must think about linkages. General Wickham said he likes the 6000/1600 ceilings very much.

16. In response to Admiral Crowe's questions, Secretary Shultz said the mix of remaining LRINF missiles was not discussed. Amb. Nitze said that excess missiles would be destroyed. Mr. Taft inquired about INF verification. Amb. Nitze explained that there was agreement on the three major types of verification measures we thought to be required. General Wickham said verification would not be cheap. Mr. Taft added that he was surprised at how uncertain we are as to what the Soviets have.

17. Secretary Shultz said the concept of SDI as an insurance policy should stay in our minds. We should broaden the application of that concept. Admiral Crowe said we should think about what SDI could do for air defense. Our current budget requests are for \$5B for SDI and \$50M for air defense. General Wickham added that the Army is doing a lot of work, but the funding is low.

18. Secretary Shultz expressed his appreciation for the Chiefs' views. He said that we need to dig into these questions more. He would like to know more about what the Chiefs think before he makes up his mind. He asked if another meeting could be scheduled to go through these questions in a more systematic way and to give him time to be educated. He said he is willing to meet the Chiefs en masse or one-by-one. Admiral Crowe said they should do the same thing for the President. Secretary Shultz said we should pick up on more military-to-military discussions with the Soviets.

³ October 12. See Document 163.

168. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 29, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting, 11:00 a.m., October 27, 1986²

John Poindexter summarized the agreement reached at Reykjavik:

a. 50% reductions in strategic arms to 1,600 SNDVs and 6,000 warheads.

b. INF, 100 warheads globally, 0 in Europe.

c. On Space Defense, 10 years to 1996, no withdrawal, free to deploy after the 10 years; 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within five years; by 1996 zero offensive ballistic missiles.

He then summarized the consultation trips of Secretary Shultz, Ed Rowny, Ken Adelman, and Secretary Weinberger, the visit of Kohl, and mentioned that Mrs. Thatcher was coming.

Secretary Shultz mentioned that the President had told us all to brief fully. Everyone had taken the President seriously; the briefers were well coordinated.

The Allies liked the proposals made on INF. They wish something to be agreed on nuclear testing; it will help relieve their political problems. They are pleased with the breakthrough in START; on zero offensive missiles, they have problems. These highlight the steps that must go with the elimination of missiles. Our Allies have many questions; these need to be recognized; a great deal of work needs to be done.

Secretary Weinberger reported on the NPG meeting. He thought the public statement that emerged from the meeting was fine even though the Greeks and Danes had reservations. Our Allies are worried about a sufficiency of forces for deterrence. They question whether we will have enough ALCMs, gravity bombers, etc. They emphasized we must always maintain forces adequate for deterrence. Weinberger said we assured them we would never give up what was needed for deterrence. They were worried about verification. He said conventional deterrence hinges on being able to obtain adequate Congressional support.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files, 1953, 1972–1989, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

² Formal minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 3.

Secretary Shultz continued that we would be moving into a world where a different kind of deterrence was necessary.

Poindexter turned to the Geneva instructions. He said Karpov has not yet returned to Geneva. Gorbachev is saying there can be no separate INF agreement. The present round of negotiations will end on November 4th. We need to send the remaining instructions tonight. There are two issues:

—On definitions, there are three positions:

- a. We should negotiate on what the Treaty says.
- b. We shouldn't negotiate.
- c. We should make the decision contingent upon prior Soviet agreement to our framework.

—On non-withdrawal: All agree that we cannot fail to respond to Treaty violations.

Secretary Shultz responded that:

a. In the end, understanding with the Soviets on what is permitted and not permitted is necessary;

b. It is well to paw the ground—it is taking a long time to come to grips with an issue of this kind.

c. Our negotiators should be in a position to patiently express what is permitted and not permitted. They would describe it pursuant to the broad definition. They should engage in creative listening; i.e., re laboratory testing (Shevardnadze's suggestion of a box versus Dubinin's suggestion that all outdoors could be a laboratory). He said this is not a time for active negotiations and a lot is to be gained by explaining the Treaty and letting it be known that the Soviets are attempting to change it.

The President said that he had talked about sharing if and when the Treaty came into effect. He said Gorbachev had commented "if I had it I wouldn't share." He said they never respond when he talks about cheating. He referred to a Russian proverb, "trust but verify."

Secretary Weinberger said nothing was to be gained by our negotiators talking about something that we are not willing to negotiate about. Interpretation of the Treaty is not the obstacle; the Soviets don't want us to work on SDI. If we want to deploy we need to decide that that is what we want to do. We can't now define what we need to do to be able to deploy. Our goal is not the Treaty but to deploy. We will never be able to verify limitations in the Treaty. We shouldn't get into this at all. The more we open the subject up the more we do ourselves in. At the NPG, the people were most impressed by his statement that 71% of the US people agree to SDI. If we limit research, we won't be able to deploy in 10 years.

The President said that maybe we were not so far apart. He said he had not read the exact clause in the Treaty but he did not see why we could not lay that on the table.

Secretary Weinberger said that as you get into conversation about these matters, you cut yourself down. Broad interpretation is what we support but he said he worried about talking about it.

Poindexter said we must be in a position to talk about the Treaty.

He thought the group should now talk about non-withdrawal. Weinberger said it was difficult to say we will not withdraw for any reason for 10 years. We can say we will not withdraw for certain reasons.

Somebody commented that in all likelihood we won't be able to deploy within 10 years. Weinberger answered that the Soviets may be able to deploy in that time period. Our goal is not the strict observation of the Treaty, our goal is to get a defense developed and deployed. We need a new Treaty which will let us do so.

Secretary Weinberger said no nation can surrender its right to react to violations.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed that it should be made clear that non-withdrawal does not mean we will not react to non-observance.

The President asked whether we can't just say we are strictly observing the ABM Treaty.

Admiral Crowe said they had done lots of analysis. The Chiefs have constantly been supporting arms control and reduction of ballistic missiles; however, the time-frame for reductions presents a problem; i.e., 50% in five years and 0 in 10 years. In order to do an analysis it was necessary for Captains and Lieutenants to make an assumption what national policy would be under very changed circumstances.

He said with respect to INF, the Chiefs fully agree. With respect to START, the risks increase with 50% reductions in five years. If we can modernize, risks will eventually go away, if we assume no cheating.

If we go to our proposed elimination of ballistic missiles in ten years, the problem is analytically difficult. We will have to shift from a triad to a monad, perhaps to a dyad involving bombers and cruise missiles. We have had to dream up a new strategy. We have assumed certain high-level decisions. We need guidance on whether these assumptions are valid.

We believe that ASW on both sides will undergo dramatic expansion. We need to assure US security at every step not just at the end. If we are to overhaul submarines so they can carry cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles, that will take time. We must give serious consideration to the security of our Allies with respect to the conventional threat they will face. We have no handle on costs. We will have

to build additional bombers, tankers, air defenses, ASW and modern conventional munitions. All this would involve expenses and expenditures.

He said the Soviets will also have their problems. In summary, the Chiefs support the President's position in principle but the name of the game is stability—a host of other steps, rather than merely reductions, are required.

A preliminary conclusion of the Chiefs is that much can be done in 10 years but if we go to zero missiles we could be at a distinct disadvantage at the end of 10 years. There are substantial risks and the Chiefs cannot advise that we move in that direction.

There are questions as to whether a time beyond 1996 would be more feasible, and whether there are work-arounds with respect to some of the problems. Also, in time it should be possible to have a better handle on costs. We also need to elaborate our thinking on the posture of our Allies with respect to the conventional threat. If we can do all these things, we can derive better answers.

Secretary Weinberger said the Soviets had strong air defense while they can rely on gravity bombs because we have none. The Soviets are developing defenses against cruise missiles. He also pointed out that 1996 gives us about 9 years rather than 10.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed with the President's objectives at Reykjavik; however, they give us plenty of ground for thought that more dollars would be needed for an adequate conventional defense. But we would be buying a lot; we would be getting rid of a threat that in 30 minutes all would be gone. We have an economy that is producing \$4.5 trillion a year. We are messing around with a \$3 hundred billion defense budget. We would need something much larger.

Secretary Shultz said he wished to raise another subject. The Soviets are attempting to arrange the debate so it will appear that the President's having suggested getting rid of nuclear weapons was somehow scandalous. We need a unified line to handle what they are trying to do. We have made public the position that the President formally tabled. There was no closure on those positions. If we are asked: "Was the President in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons?" The answer is yes.

Poindexter interjected that in 1983 the President said not only that SDI was intended to make nuclear weapons obsolete but he further stated it was his intention to eliminate nuclear weapons. He has agreed with Gorbachev's goal of eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 but indicated that there were preconditions and that the most urgent problem was to agree on the first phase reductions.

The President said that getting rid of nuclear weapons should be in our favor. The U.S. and NATO are in position then to be superior. The

Soviets cannot go much further than they are in defense expenditures. Gorbachev knows that, if he faces an arms race with the U.S., we can out-strip him. No one can get an advantage regarding a first strike. Gorbachev broached the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. I said I understood. The President then turned to his electioneering in Oklahoma. He said he had gotten the most applause when he said, with respect to SDI, that he had offered to share it with the Soviets, and when he said how proud he was of our 2 million men in the military forces.

Secretary Weinberger said Gorbachev needs an agreement. He said he is worried about the Congress. *Don Regan* asked what were the prospects for a partial SDI deployment. Weinberger answered that the Treaty authorized a limited deployment in one area of the country. *Regan* then went back to the question of the budget. He said the defense budget will grow to \$325–360 billion by 1990. He thought the main consideration should go to the makeup of that budget—it is impossible to go above it; the Congress will not go along. *Weinberger* replied that if the President's goal is a budget no greater than 6% of GNP, it will be 6% but if the goal is security, more will be needed. *Regan* said if we're going to shift, we should move now. It will be a major battle.

Jim Baker asked whether the Soviets don't have similar problems.

Weinberger replied they easily have wide public support. *The President* commented that if Congress knows we have an agreement and must then present the Soviets with a credible threat, we have a good chance Congress will agree.

Ken Adelman said the Europeans were much worried by the prospect of being de-coupled from the nuclear deterrent. *Poindexter* said that is not the question. The question is how we proceed to support the President's policy. *Adelman* went back to his point saying the difficulty is the time period—is 10 years practical; to concentrate on 50% reductions and 5 years is alright, but to agree to elimination in 10 years is not.

Miller commented that Congress will not cut domestic expenditures to provide an increase in defense without raising taxes. *The President* said he will share with the Soviets but if they do not wish that, we will deploy an almost impregnable shield. If we get an agreement with the Soviets, the tone in Congress will change.

169. National Security Decision Directive 249¹

Washington, October 29, 1986

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NST
NEGOTIATING ROUND**

The attached instructions² supplement existing guidance for the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. They set forth in detail the proposals made to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for building on the agreements we reached there.

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

**Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to
the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva³**

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

330271. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks. Ref: State 291634⁴

1.–Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. Washington continues to evaluate how best to build upon positive accomplishments of that meeting and will provide additional guidance

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 094, NSDD 249. Secret. Poindexter forwarded the decision directive to Reagan under cover of a handwritten note of October 28: "Mr. President, As a result of yesterday's meetings on arms control, I signed out the two attached cables reflecting your guidance. The earlier cables went out last week. Request your signature on the attached NSDD for the record. John." (Ibid.) Poindexter distributed the signed decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under cover of an October 29 memorandum: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing supplemental guidance for the current round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks." (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed, at Tab 4, are the INF instructions of October 22.

³ Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

⁴ In telegram 291634 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted overall instructions for Round VI of Negotiations with the USSR on Nuclear and Space Arms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860704–0990)

shortly, including guidance on the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles and its link to obligations with respect to the ABM Treaty. Previous guidance (Reftel) remains valid except as modified below. Guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being provided septel.

3. U.S. objectives for the remainder of Round VI include:

—To build upon the positive accomplishments of Reykjavik by inducing the Soviets to continue the seriousness and flexibility displayed there.

—To present U.S. proposals for amplifying the understandings reached in Reykjavik, as set forth in the instructions to each negotiating group.

—To reject Soviet attempts to mischaracterize the understandings reached in Iceland.

—To reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one negotiating forum hostage to progress in another. Delegation should vigorously object to any Soviet characterization that progress in INF is once again linked to progress in other areas, noting that this contradicts specific understanding reached during Geneva summit to seek a separate INF agreement and to accelerate progress in areas of common ground.

4. Should Soviets raise issue of elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, as proposed by President in Reykjavik, delegation should note that the first step in the elimination of ballistic missiles must be the 50-percent START reductions and significant INF reductions discussed in Reykjavik and that it is more efficient to discuss these steps first. (FYI: Washington anticipates replacing this guidance with detailed guidance on ballistic missile elimination by 27 October.)

5. If the Soviets raise other, non-NST arms control issues, the delegation should respond that these issues should be pursued in the appropriate fora, not NST. Should the Soviets specifically link nuclear testing and progress in NST, as suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, delegation should reply that the United States expressed its readiness in Reykjavik to enter negotiations on nuclear testing issues and that specific Soviet recommendations should be raised in the appropriate channels. The delegation should resist any further Soviet efforts to discuss limitations on nuclear testing in the NST forum.

Shultz

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁵

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0312Z

330273. Subject: (S) Additional guidance for START Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291634⁶ (B) State 290210⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the START negotiating group in Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. Washington continues to evaluate how best to build upon positive accomplishments of that meeting and will provide additional guidance shortly, including guidance on timeframe for 50-percent reductions and on the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles.

3. It is the U.S. understanding that the following was agreed and, therefore, the U.S. START negotiating Group should confirm their acceptance by the Soviets:

—A 1600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers;

—A 6000 ceiling on warheads, to include ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and long-range ALCMs.

—All heavy bombers count against the SNDV limit. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or SRAMs would count as one warhead toward the limit of 6000. Each ALCM carried by heavy bombers would count as one warhead. (FYI: As part of the negotiations on these provisions, accounting rules for implementing them will have to be worked out, and Washington invites delegation's views on such rules.)

—Consideration of appropriate sublimits would continue.

—Heavy ICBMs would be significantly reduced.

—The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. When such a solution is found, it will not involve counting long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000/1600 limits. In this regard, the delegation should seek

⁵ Secret; Immediate.

⁶ See footnote 4.

⁷ In telegram 290210 to NST Geneva, September 16, the Department transmitted the START instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860713–0752)

out details, especially details relating to verification, of the Soviet position that would attempt to meet U.S. concerns.

4. In the context of the above agreement on counting gravity bombs and SRAMs, the previous U.S. proposal to limit heavy bombers to 350 is redundant and is no longer a part of our position.

5. At Reykjavik, the sides understood that other provisions would have to be added to what was agreed in order to make a complete agreement. A number of sublimits were discussed but not agreed; it was agreed the consideration of sublimits could continue. The U.S. START negotiating group should propose that there be sublimits on:

—Ballistic missile warheads;

—ICBM warheads;

—Warheads on all permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads;

—While the preferred numbers for these sublimits remain 4500, 3000, and 1500, respectively, the US START negotiating group is authorized to propose sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on ICBMs except silo-based light or medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. (Note: This proposal results in no RPT no sublimit on ALCMs.)

—The aforementioned sublimits are the U.S. proposal for implementing the Soviet offer in Reykjavik that heavy ICBMs be significantly reduced. The U.S. side anticipates that such an approach will reduce heavy ICBMs significantly (e.g., by roughly half) in an appropriate manner.

—All other elements of the 50-percent U.S. START proposal remain the same (e.g., the ban on mobile ICBMs and the 50-percent reduction in ballistic missile throw-weight).

6. The October 15 Soviet plenary statement cited the Soviet proposal for 50-percent reductions in total SNDVs and weapons as well as in each category of strategic system (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) which was presented in Reykjavik and rejected by the U.S. Should this formulation be tabled in Geneva, the negotiating group should reject the proposal as follows:

—In Reykjavik the sides agreed in principle to 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, specifically to 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads appropriately applied. Certain other elements of the initial Soviet formulation proposed in Reykjavik were determined by the U.S. at the time to result in an inequitable outcome and therefore were rejected. The U.S. proposal for 50-percent reductions builds on those elements mutually agreed at Reykjavik and provides for an agreed equitable outcome.

7. Effective verification is essential to both sides. As agreed at Geneva last year, verification measures should be negotiated concur-

rently with reductions and limitations. The two sides should seek to apply progress made in INF with respect to verification principles (see INF instructions, para 4) to the negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

8. Except as modified above, previous instructions remain unchanged.

9. Paragraph 9a contains the text of the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik the morning of October 11. Paragraph 9b contains the language agreed to by the U.S.-Soviet experts group during the early morning of 12 October. Both are provided only for the information of the negotiating group.

—A. Initial Soviet proposal, AM October 11. On strategic arms. An agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA taking into consideration the historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the parties' strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of offensive strategic arms, including heavy missiles. A solution shall also be found with regard to limiting the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

—B. Experts group agreed language, early AM October 12. On strategic arms. An agreement would be prepared to reduce by fifty percent strategic offensive arms to an equal number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (approximately 1600) and warheads (not more than 6000), taking into account historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the parties' strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of strategic offensive arms, including a significant number of heavy missiles. A mutually acceptable solution shall also be found to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

Shultz

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁸

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

330272. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;⁹ (B) State 29566¹⁰

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI, based on US proposals made to the Soviet Union in Iceland meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev on October 11–12. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for, D&S Negotiating Group of reftels (a) and (b) and previous rounds, except as specifically noted below.

3. The existing US proposal as contained in previous guidance and in the President's July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the table.

4. Paragraph (4a) contains the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik on the first day of the discussions. Paragraph (4b) provides the text of the first US alternative proposal made by the President to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the afternoon of the second day of discussions. Paragraph (4c) provides the text of the Soviet counter-proposal made that same afternoon. Paragraph (4d) provides the text of the second and last US alternative proposal made in writing by the President. These are provided for the information of the Negotiating Group.

A. Soviet proposal, AM October 11. For the purpose of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which is of unlimited duration, an understanding shall be reached that the USSR and the USA undertake not to exercise their right to withdraw from that treaty for a period of ten years, and to strictly comply with all its provisions throughout that period. Testing in space of all missile-defense space elements shall be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. This would not

⁸ Secret; Immediate.

⁹ In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860705–0290)

¹⁰ In telegram 293566 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance to the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860708–0824)

entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM treaty. Subsequently, within several years, the parties shall negotiate further mutually acceptable solutions in this area. The parties deem it appropriate to undertake additional efforts with a view to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

B. First US proposal, PM October 12. Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides would continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of ten year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses.

C. Soviet proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

D. Second US proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

5. Guidance on the US proposals made at Reykjavik is under consideration in Washington, including additional analytical work. In the

interim, the Negotiating Group should avoid discussion of the specifics of either of the US proposals.

6. If questioned about the US proposals made in Reykjavik, the US Negotiating Group should respond that the US intends to build upon the positive accomplishments of the Reykjavik meeting, and that the US will be making a proposal in Geneva based on these accomplishments shortly. If asked whether the additional commitments suggested in the US proposals discussed in Reykjavik depend upon other conditions, the Negotiating Group should note that in Reykjavik it was clear by the terms of the proposals made that the additional commitments included in the proposals tabled by the US were strictly conditioned on the two sides' reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

Shultz

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Arms Talks in Geneva¹¹

Washington, undated

Subject: Additional Guidance for NST Delegation. Refs: (A) State 330271¹² (B) State 291634¹³

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Reftel a provided initial post-Reykjavik guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. This cable provides additional contingency guidance on relationship of SNF to the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles. Previous guidance (refs a and b) remains valid except as modified below. Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group is being provided septel. There will be no additional guidance for START and INF Negotiating Groups this round.

¹¹ Secret. Sent as telegram 336325 to NST Geneva, October 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860817–0492)

¹² In telegram 330271 to NST Geneva, October 22, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860801–0087)

¹³ See footnote 4.

3. The U.S. proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, of whatever range, involves SNF systems of ranges less than those previously the subject of negotiations. Discussion of such systems may require agreement on an appropriate negotiating forum. Only the general concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles should be introduced this round. Should the Soviets raise questions on negotiating forum for SNF missiles in this regard, delegation should note that at this time it is the U.S. opinion that the INF Negotiating Group may provide the most logical forum.

4. Once delegation has reviewed these instructions and supporting instructions to individual negotiating groups, Washington would welcome delegation's views on appropriate ending date for current negotiating round.

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹⁴

Washington, undated

Subject: Additional Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;¹⁵ (B) State 293566;¹⁶ (C) State 330272¹⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI. It supplements the guidance provided in Ref C. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for D&S Negotiating Group of REFTELS (A), (B) and (C) except as modified below. There will be no additional guidance for START and INF negotiating groups this round.

3. In addition to the existing proposal in the President's July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, which remains on the table, the US negotiating group is authorized to present the following elements

¹⁴ Secret. Sent as telegram 336324 to NST Geneva, October 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860817-0491)

¹⁵ In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Defense and Space for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860708-0824)

¹⁶ See footnote 10.

¹⁷ In telegram 330272 to NST Geneva, October 22, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Defense and Space for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860801-0090)

for an agreement which we proposed in Reykjavik as an alternative to the president's July proposal.

—The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

—Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent.

—During the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be eliminated.

—Thus, by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated, and either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chose, unless the parties agree otherwise.

4. The above undertakings would be recorded in a new treaty.

5. In presenting the above proposal, the negotiating group should make clear that the above commitment would be strictly conditioned on the two sides' reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now, as part of a new treaty, on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

6. When presenting the position described in Para 3–5, the US negotiator should make it clear that in not exercising its rights to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, neither side would be forfeiting its right to withdraw for reasons of its supreme national interest, or to respond to a material breach, or other circumstances recognized under international law. He should indicate that:

—A blanket commitment to waive all rights of withdrawal is not acceptable.

—The US is prepared to meet Soviet concerns through a more limited commitment not to withdraw for the purposes of deploying advanced defenses.

—New conditions for withdrawal would have to be negotiated and agreed as part of the proposed treaty described in Para 4 and 5 above. We would expect such conditions to include a material breach of that treaty or linked agreements (e.g., failure to adhere to the schedule of reductions provided in an associated START treaty).

—If the Soviets have other concerns, we are prepared to discuss them.

7. If the Soviets question the use of the language in the President's proposal (i.e., "undertakes for ten years not to exercise their existing

right of withdrawal from the ABM treaty”) the negotiator should note that the President anticipated our finding a solution with respect to the interpretation of the non-withdrawal phraseology that acceptably accommodated both US and Soviet concerns.¹⁸

Ronald Reagan

¹⁸ Reagan signed below the last line of the draft telegram.

170. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Geneva, October 31, 1986

SUBJECT

Admiral Crowe’s Reaction to the Draft Vienna Talking Points

I saw Admiral Crowe at 4:00 p.m., Thursday, October 30th. I said that you were anxious to get his thoughts on the talking points we had prepared for your use in your talk with Shevardnadze on NST issues in Vienna.² He read the talking points and commented as he went along. He said that numbers in the proposal seemed consistent with his understanding of where we were. His concern was specifically with the 10-year period as it affected the elimination of either ballistic missiles, offensive strategic systems, or nuclear weapons. He pointed out that if we abided by the restriction in the ABM Treaty throughout the 10-year period we would be in no position to deploy advanced defenses in less than another 3–4 years even if all the technology would have been proven out earlier. He expressed surprise and resentment that after Reykjavik no one at the White House had asked him for the Chiefs’ view as to whether we had “sold the store.” He said that the

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 8, Binder—Bkgnd for Vienna Mtg. Secret; Nodis.

² The talking points were not found. Shultz and Shevardnadze’s meetings in Vienna, November 5–6, are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 6 and 7.

work that led up to his comments at the NSPG³ had been purely at his own initiative. He said that after the NSPG meeting, Poindexter had telephoned him and had protested that what he had said was not helpful in carrying out the President's decision.

He made a particular point of the fact that today the sole mission of the Soviet's submarine fleet, and in fact of their entire Navy, is to protect their SLBMs. If SLBMs were to be eliminated, their 340 submarines and other Naval assets would be devoted to other purposes, making our Naval tasks complicated. He also emphasized the necessity of preserving deterrence phase by phase.

I asked him whether a longer time-period for elimination of ballistic missiles, say 12 years, would be better from the Chiefs' standpoint. He suggested one might leave the nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty at 10 years and provide for the elimination of ballistic missiles over a somewhat longer period of time—say 12 years. This would leave a lesser gap in time. I suggested that one might also reduce the time gap by proceeding earlier to deploy a limited ABM defense at Grand Forks, ND. This would give one experience with the operational deployment of at least one element of an advanced defense. I suggested one also might proceed with development and deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles, or defense permitted under the ABM Treaty. He thought this was a constructive suggestion.

I asked him whether the Chiefs would approve a program for the second five-years which would result in a further reduction of 90% in offensive strategic systems; i.e., leaving no more than 600 RVs plus long-range ALCMs. He said he was confident that the Chiefs would back such an alternative.

I did not leave the talking points with him.

³ See Document 168.

171. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 12, 1986, 1739Z

10392. Subject: START—End of Round VI Report Part I—Overview.

1. This is NST/START-VI-032. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: This is Part I of the START Negotiating Group's end-of-round report. This cable reviews developments during Round VI. A separate analysis containing the Negotiating Group's recommendations for future interagency work and needed guidance for Round VII is being sent septel.² Round VI ran from September 18 to November 12. Early in the round, the U.S. Negotiating Group sought to stimulate progress and address Soviet concerns by tabling new proposals for both 30-percent and 50-percent reductions. On October 22, following the Reykjavik discussions, we made a new 50-percent reductions proposal. This proposal incorporated the agreements reached in Reykjavik, and offered compromise solutions on the issue of sublimits in the weapons aggregate. On November 7, immediately after the Shultz-Shevardnadze discussions in Vienna, the Soviets also made a new proposal. The Soviet proposal confirmed the 1600 SNDV and 6000 weapon aggregates, as well as the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs agreed to at Reykjavik. However, while the document on "key provisions" handed over by the Soviets in Vienna confirmed the language on finding a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs also agreed in Iceland, their new proposals did not differentiate between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. The Soviets opposed the three U.S. sublimits on warheads, but offered for the first time a specific sublimit on heavy missiles (apparently counting launchers) which would represent a 50-percent reduction in the current Soviet level.

3. Round VI saw major progress in the form of agreement on an aggregate of 1600 SNDVs, an aggregate of 6000 warheads, removal of U.S. "FBS" from the category of strategic arms under 50-percent START reductions, a counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs, and an agreement to seek a solution to the SLCM issue outside of the SNDV and warhead aggregates. A number of outstanding issues, however,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0732. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

² Part II of the START negotiating group's end-of-round report is in telegram 10393 from NST Geneva, November 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0745)

remain at the end of the round. The most significant of these issues include the question of linkage of START to the ABM Treaty, an INF agreement, and negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing; agreement on sublimits in the warhead aggregate; the question of banning mobile ICBMs; a specific solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs; and the precise means of codifying 50-percent throw-weight reductions. END SUMMARY.

4. Schedule

—Round VI ran from September 18 to November 12.

—Eight START plenary meetings were held in addition to two joint plenaries.

—There were also numerous informal meetings at all levels. The two START negotiators continued their pattern of the previous round by having frequent informal one-on-one luncheons.

5. U.S. Approach Pre-Reykjavik

The U.S. Negotiating Group sought to stimulate immediate progress in Round VI by tabling new proposals at the initial joint plenary on September 18. Our objectives for the round were to reach agreement on certain key elements of a START agreement, including specific numerical limits. Our September 18 proposals both modified our preferred 50-percent reduction proposal tabled last fall, and offered a new first-step proposal of 30-percent reductions as a response to the Soviet proposal of June 11. Our modified 50-percent reduction proposal included as its major provisions:

—1600 SNDV aggregate with full freedom-to-mix, subject to Soviet acceptance of our proposed warhead sublimits;

—6000 aggregate on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs;

—4500 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads;

—3000 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

—1500 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with 6 or fewer warheads.

All other elements of the previous U.S. proposal for 50-percent reductions remained unchanged.

Our first-step proposal for 30-percent reductions included the following provisions:

—1600 SNDV aggregate, with full freedom-to-mix;

—7500 aggregate on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, contingent on Soviet acceptance of our proposed weapon sublimits;

—5500 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads;

—3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

—1650 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads;

—Other provisions would remain as in our 50-percent reduction proposal.

Reductions under this agreement would be carried out over a period of five years.

The U.S. proposals represented major moves on our part to meet Soviet concerns and to narrow differences in all areas, including the structure, levels and scope of an agreement. In later plenaries, we also expressed additional flexibility. Specifically, we stated our willingness to accept a mutual sublimit of 350 heavy bombers in the SNDV aggregate as an indirect limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs, and to listen to any serious Soviet proposals on mobile ICBMs that addressed our concerns with regard to verification and stability. In addition, we expressed our willingness to consider a separate treatment of SLCMs under certain conditions. We made clear to the Soviet delegation our belief that our new proposals created additional areas of common ground and laid a foundation on which efforts to reconcile remaining differences could be built.

6. Soviet Approach Pre-Reykjavik

Soviet priorities for the round may have been presaged when delegation lists were exchanged and showed only three Soviet advisors listed for the START Negotiating Group. At the first START plenary on September 24, however, the Soviets did offer for consideration a number of additional elements to their June 11 interim proposal. Several of these elements had been first previewed at the experts meeting in Washington prior to the beginning of the round. They included:

—A new limit permitting a maximum of 80–85 percent of the total weapons aggregate to be deployed on ballistic missiles;

—The question of long-range SLCMs would be subject to a mutually acceptable solution—separate from the aggregate limits on SNDVs and weapons—on the basis of the approach tabled by the Soviets on June 11;

—The question of “medium-range” arms capable of reaching the territory of the other side, including long-range GLCMs, would be resolved separately.

Tabling of the new Soviet elements followed the U.S. presentation of its new proposals on September 18. The Soviets attempted to use this fact to argue that their new elements constituted a response to our September 18 proposals and that the ball was now back in the U.S. court.

Probably for tactical reasons, the Soviets remained largely negative on the U.S. approach to START in general, and our September 18 proposals in particular. They argued that the new U.S. proposals did not fundamentally change the U.S. approach. The Soviets focused, in particular, on the 1500/1650 sublimit which was not a part of our

previous position, and the fact that the ICBM and ballistic missile sublimits under our 30-percent reduction proposal would permit a smaller percentage of the total weapons aggregate in these categories than under our 50-percent reduction proposal, ignoring the fact that the absolute numbers had been raised. In addition, the Soviets continued to object strongly to the U.S. position on the issues of including gravity bombs and SRAMs in the weapons aggregate, the treatment of SLCMs, and whether to ban mobile ICBMs.

The other main development of the pre-Reykjavik period was Obukhov's statement on October 1 that the Soviet side was prepared for substantive work on drafting provisions for the verification of mobile ICBMs and SLCMs. While the Soviets never formally proposed the creation of a verification working group, Obukhov suggested in informal conversations that the Soviet statement constituted a formal offer for such discussions. Over the course of the next week, the Soviets continued to press us on our reluctance to engage in discussions on SLCM and mobile ICBM verification, stating that the U.S. had to be a "participant", not an "observer" or "arbiter" in this process.

In the wake of the Reykjavik meeting, the Soviet delegation argued that a qualitatively new situation had been created. Apparently as a consequence, they did not return either to their September 24 proposals or to their offer that the sides discuss the verification of mobile ICBMs and SLCMs.

7. U.S. Approach Post-Reykjavik

Building upon the Reykjavik discussions, we presented a new proposal October 22 with the following major provisions:

- Aggregate of 1600 SNDVs (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers),
- Aggregate of 6000 warheads (ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and ALCMs; in addition, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as one warhead),
- Within the 6000 warhead aggregate, there would continue to be three sublimits permitting:
 - No more than 4800 ballistic missile warheads,
 - No more than 3300 ICBM warheads, and
 - No more than 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads,

In addition:

- Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would be reduced by 50 percent,
- Mobile ICBMs would be banned, and
- The sides would find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

The U.S. START Negotiating Group did not directly address the time period for achieving these 50-percent reductions, nor what further reductions would come after this first stage. However, on October 28, the U.S. Defense and Space Negotiating Group formally tabled a proposal calling for 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms within five years (by 1991), and the complete elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within ten years (by 1996).

We stressed that our October 22 proposal incorporated the relevant agreements reached at Reykjavik and the compromise nature of our proposals in areas where agreement was not reached at Reykjavik. We pressed the Soviets for a prompt and constructive response.

8. Soviet Approach Post-Reykjavik

Ambassador Karpov did not return to Geneva during the period between the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings, and the Soviet delegation apparently had no substantive instructions on how to proceed in the period prior to the Shultz—Shevardnadze meeting in Vienna. They were, therefore, rather cautious, relying heavily on the Gorbachev press conference in Reykjavik and on subsequent Gorbachev speeches for the substance of their plenary statements and informal discussions. The Soviets focused heavily on the linkage of a START agreement to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and, with some exceptions, steered clear of discussing their interpretation of what was agreed on strategic arms reduction at Reykjavik. In his October 15 plenary statement, Ambassador Obukhov did state that at Reykjavik, “the Soviet side advocated reducing every component of strategic offensive arms by one-half—ICBMs, SLCMs and heavy bombers. The U.S. side agreed with this.” Faced with the contrary U.S. account of what had been agreed in Reykjavik, the Soviet side never repeated, formally or informally, the claim that the United States had agreed with this Soviet proposal. They did continue to refer to their proposal to reduce each component by 50 percent, but only in the past tense as something they advocated at Reykjavik (which is correct).

Prior to the Vienna meeting, the Soviets never confirmed or denied our statements regarding other areas of agreement at Reykjavik—1600, 6000, the gravity bomb/SRAM counting rule or the new formulation on SLCMs. In his plenary statement of November 5, Obukhov criticized our emphasis on the phrase “nuclear-armed” in this SLCM formulation and several Soviets informally put down a marker that any solution to the SLCM issue would have to address verification and circumvention concerns related to the deployment of long-range, conventionally-armed SLCMs.

The public controversy regarding whether “offensive ballistic missiles,” “strategic offensive arms,” or “all nuclear weapons” are to be eliminated at the end of ten years was reflected in Geneva. In his

plenary statement of October 29, Ambassador Obukhov referred to “the agreed goal in Reykjavik of the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the course of two five-year periods.” However, the Soviet delegation did not seem to distinguish clearly between “nuclear weapons” and “strategic nuclear weapons” and often appeared to use the two formulations interchangeably. At least two Soviet members stated informally that Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal remains valid, but that the timetable for eliminating all nuclear arms has been advanced from the year 2000 to 1996.

The Soviets largely avoided addressing our October 22 proposals. They were consistent in opposing the concept of sublimits, sometimes taking their cue from Gorbachev’s statement that sublimits are “moth-eaten trash.”

9. Post-Vienna Situation.

At the Vienna meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and then at the final joint plenary meeting of the round on November 7, the Soviets confirmed the 1600 and 6000 aggregates, and the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs that had been agreed at Reykjavik. While the document of “key provisions” handed over by the Soviets in Vienna confirmed the language on finding a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs that was agreed upon in Reykjavik, the Soviet proposal of November 7 did not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. Instead, the proposal called for limiting deployment of SLCMs of over 600 km in range to two types of submarines on each side and banning their deployment on surface ships. These proposals represented no change from the SLCM proposals the Soviets made on June 11. What was new in the Soviet November 7 proposals was the inclusion of a specific counting rule based on maximum loading capability and their formally providing for limitations on SLCMs outside the SNDV and weapon aggregates, an idea they first [garble] based on a 50-percent reduction from the current Soviet level. In addition, the Soviet proposal incorporated in the START context the verification language agreed to in Reykjavik in conjunction with INF systems. The verification measure providing for on-site inspection of dismantlement and destruction, however, was excluded from the Soviet proposal.

Other key provisions of the Soviet November 7 proposal included:

- The elimination of all strategic offensive arms would be carried out in two stages over a period of 10 years. Reductions to no more than 1600 SNDVs and 6000 weapons on those SNDVs would be accomplished by 1991.

- During the first stage, development, testing and deployment of “new kinds” of strategic offensive arms would be prohibited.

—By 1996 the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive arms would be eliminated. Timing and terms of elimination of these forces would be agreed upon by 1991.

—By 1991 procedures for and timing of the elimination of “operational-tactical” systems would also be agreed upon and appropriate agreements would be reached with other countries that possess nuclear weapons.

—The sides would undertake not to develop, test, or deploy after January 1992 “new kinds and new types” of strategic offensive arms. Qualitative improvements of existing strategic arms would also be prohibited after this date.

—While retaining their previously proposed counting rule for ballistic missile RVS, the Soviets proposed an ALCM counting rule based on the number of cruise missiles a bomber has been “equipped for.”

—The initiation of negotiations on an agreement completely banning nuclear tests was made a prerequisite for working out an agreement on strategic arms.

The Soviet proposal, consistent with the view they have presented since Reykjavik, contained no sublimits other than the one proposed on heavy missiles. A preliminary analysis of the November 7 proposal by the U.S. START Negotiating Group is being provided septel.³

10. Outstanding issues

Round VI saw major progress in the form of an agreement on an aggregate of 1600 SNDVs, an aggregate of 6000 warheads, removal of “FBS” from 50-percent START reductions, a counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs, and agreement to seek a solution to the SLCM issue outside the SNDV and warhead aggregates. The outstanding issues remaining at the end of Round VI are:

—The linkage of START to the ABM treaty, an INF agreement, and negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear testing,

—The question of sublimits in the warhead aggregate,

—A ban on mobile ICBMs,

—A specific solution to limiting nuclear-armed SLCMs, as agreed at Reykjavik, and

—The precise means of codifying 50-percent throw-weight reductions

Minimize considered.

Kampelman

³ See Document 172.

172. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 12, 1986, 1806Z

10396. Subject: START—Preliminary analysis of Soviet November 7 START Proposals.

1. This is NST/START-VI-028. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: The November 7 Soviet START proposals largely confirm our understanding of the agreements reached at Reykjavik on reductions in strategic offensive arms. The one exception appears to be SLCMs where the Soviet proposals to limit deployments outside the aggregates are based on their previous proposals of June 11 and do not distinguish between conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed SLCMs. The Soviet November 7 proposals do not contain sublimits in the warhead aggregate as they have previously proposed. However, they do codify their Reykjavik commitment to reduce significantly heavy missiles by establishing a sublimit (apparently on launchers) on these systems at 50-percent of their current deployment level. While confirming the counting rule agreed at Reykjavik on gravity bombs and SRAMs, the Soviets also proposed a rule for counting ALCMs. This rule would count ALCMs on heavy bombers based on a bomber's capability to carry ALCMs, i.e., the number of "weapons stations", not actual loadings or maximum potential. The new Soviet proposal on modernization appears to be more liberal than previously proposed constraints. It would permit new and modernized types up until the end of 1991. New kinds of systems would be banned during both stages of reductions, and new and modernized types would be prohibited after 1991. The Soviet's linkage of strategic offensive arms reductions to the strengthening of the ABM treaty is as strong as ever, but their new proposal now also links the START negotiations to the commencement of talks on the cessation of nuclear testing and an INF agreement. On the other hand, the Soviet proposal appears to allow for greater independence between the negotiation of reductions in the first five-year stage and the second five-year stage than they had been signaling since we tabled our new proposals in Defense and Space on October 28. End summary.

3. This cable provides the START Negotiating Group's analysis of the Soviet November 7 proposals on strategic offensive arms. It is based

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0801. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

on the text of the proposals handed over to the U.S. at Friday's joint plenary and additional information gleaned from the START Negotiating Group meeting on November 11. We have not had the opportunity to fully explore all aspects of the November 7 proposals in the limited time before the end of Round VI and this should thus be considered a preliminary analysis.

4. The Soviet November 7 proposals, as well as the document on "key provisions" handed over by the Soviets in Vienna, which records their interpretation of what was agreed at Reykjavik, have now confirmed our understanding of most of the major elements of a START agreement agreed to in Iceland. These include equal levels of 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads and the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs. Although the "key provisions" document confirms the language on SLCMs agreed to in Reykjavik, the specific Soviet proposals made on November 7 do not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs.

5. Absence of sublimits: Although sublimits were not agreed to at Reykjavik, the Soviet proposal is notable for the absence of sublimits in the warhead aggregate, which they had previously offered in both their 30 and 50-percent reduction proposals. Their proposal instead explicitly provides that each side will have full freedom to determine the proportions of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers in their force structure with the exception of a sublimit on heavy missiles.

6. Heavy missile sublimit: The November 7 proposals give substance to the Soviet Union's commitment made in Reykjavik to reduce significantly their number of heavy missiles. The Soviet proposal would establish a sublimit on heavy missiles (apparently launchers) at a level representing a 50-percent reduction in the current force. Fifty percent of the Soviet SS-18 force represents approximately 1.2 mkg. in throw-weight. Our preliminary estimates are that, without any other sublimits, the resulting Soviet force under the 1600 SNDV and 6000 warhead limits would have on the order of 3 mkg of throw-weight in 1991. In the longer term, the throw-weight level of the Soviet force will depend on the effect of modernization. The new Soviet proposals would now permit both new types of ballistic missiles, and the modernization of existing types, through 1991.

7. Verification: The Soviet proposals largely incorporate in the START context the language on verification agreed to in Reykjavik in conjunction with limitations on INF systems. However, while the Soviet proposal provides for agreed dismantlement and destruction procedures, it makes no mention of on-site inspection in this context as was contained in the Reykjavik language. The reason for this exclusion is not clear. In applying the other verification language to START, the Soviet proposal does make clear for the first time that on-site inspection

would be relevant to the monitoring of remaining ballistic missiles, aircraft and related facilities.

8. SLCMs: The “key provisions” document handed over by the Soviets in Vienna includes the language on nuclear-armed SLCMs that was agreed in Iceland. It states that a mutually acceptable solution will be found to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. This language is of significance to us in that it explicitly avoided the mention of any constraints on long-range, conventionally-armed SLCMs which will make up the vast majority of our planned long-range SLCM deployments. The Soviet proposals of November 7, however, do not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. Post-plenary conversations on November 11 made clear that this is not an oversight. SLCMs to be limited are defined only by a range threshold. Soviet delegates argued that their proposal is consistent with Reykjavik and Vienna because it is impossible to differentiate between nuclear and conventionally-armed SLCMs and that, consequently, limiting all such systems is the only means of satisfactorily constraining long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. The specific Soviet proposals are based on their June 11 SLCM proposals with the exception that a maximum loading counting rule has now been provided. In addition, the Soviet proposals formalize the offer, first made on September 24, to limit SLCMs outside of the central SNDV and weapon aggregates.

9. The Soviet proposals appear to be formulated in a manner consistent with our estimates of their plans for long-range (defined as over 600 km. in range) SLCM deployments, i.e., deployments of only nuclear-armed variants on a limited number of types of dedicated submarine platforms. Banning long-range SLCM deployments on surface ships, and utilizing a maximum loading counting rule, however, would significantly impact on planned U.S. programs which emphasize limited long-range SLCM deployments on a wide variety of multi-mission platforms, including both surface ships and submarines. Roughly two-thirds of U.S. long-range SLCM deployments are planned for surface ships. Without further clarification of the Soviet proposal, including knowledge of the number of long-range SLCMs that would be permitted, it is difficult to assess the total impact of the maximum capability counting rule. However, this rule would effectively capture all long-range SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Also, depending on both the number of long-range SLCMs permitted and how maximum capability is determined, the possibility exists that this counting rule would significantly overcount actual U.S. SLCM deployments in view of the fact that the SSNs on which we plan to deploy long-range SLCMs are multi-purpose platforms and will carry a variety of weapons in addition to SLCMs. This counting rule could thus indirectly limit the number of U.S. long-range SLCM platforms to a level well below

that planned, a problem not unlike that we face with regard to ALCM counting.

10. The Soviet proposal provides for a limit on long-range SLCMs to “an agreed level for each side.” Interestingly absent from the Soviet formulation is the word “equal” perhaps implying that different levels could be negotiated. Informally, several Soviet delegates stated that the agreed level would be the same for both sides, although they did not preclude other options. The Soviet proposal apparently does not provide for a separate limit on the total number of SLCM submarines other than that which would derive from the interaction of the counting rule and the agreed total SLCM limit. The criteria for determining the maximum loadings of submarines would be the subject of negotiation.

11. ALCM/ballistic missile RV counting rules: The Soviet proposal states that for a heavy bomber carrying long-range cruise missiles, the number of cruise missiles shall be counted for which that bomber “has been equipped.” One Soviet delegate in post-plenary conversations stated that this rule refers to the number of “weapon stations” on a bomber, not to the actual weapons load or to a bomber’s maximum potential capability. Missing from the November 7 formulation was the concept of a bomber type rule. When questioned on this, Soviet delegates stated that the November 7 language is simply shorthand, and that their previous position which did refer to types of bombers has not changed. Similarly, the November 7 formulation on counting ballistic missile RVs apparently represents no change from the previous Soviet position even though simulated releases are not specifically mentioned.

12. Reduction schedule and systems covered: The Soviet proposal calls for the total elimination of strategic offensive arms in two stages over a period of ten years, i.e., by the end of 1996. (Note: The Soviets appear to be using our understanding of the term strategic. The text of their proposal lists strategic offensive arms as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.) The Soviet proposal does, however, appear to provide for some independence in the negotiation of the two stages of reduction. Under the Soviet proposal, agreement on procedures for, and the timing of, the elimination of the remaining 50-percent of strategic offensive arms on both sides must be reached by 1991, or the end of the first five-year reduction period. In the wake of our October 28 proposals in Defense and Space, the Soviets had been emphasizing here the requirement to agree on what would happen in the second five years before agreeing to 50-percent reductions in the first five years. The formulation of their new proposal could make it easier for us to move the focus back to reaching agreement on 50-percent reductions in the first five years.

13. The new proposal also appears to clarify the Soviet position on the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons and all nuclear

weapons, and the time frame for these steps. Under the proposal, all strategic offensive arms would be eliminated in ten years by 1996. The Soviet proposal also calls for agreement by 1991 on procedures and timing for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet nuclear “operational-tactical” systems but does not specify a precise time frame for their destruction. Systems of even shorter range (e.g., nuclear artillery) are not addressed at all. However, the preambular language to the Soviet proposals does continue to state as a goal Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

14. Modernization: The Soviet proposals on modernization add a few new wrinkles to their prior approach. They call for both sides not to develop, test, or deploy new “kinds” of systems in both stages of reduction and, beginning January 1992, the same prohibitions would apply to new “types” of strategic offensive arms. Qualitative improvement of existing strategic offensive arms would also be prohibited beginning in January 1992. The Soviets have previously referred to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers as “kinds” of arms. The prohibition on new “kinds” of arms may be meant as a generic limitation to replace previously proposed Soviet bans on ASBMs, MARVs, sea-bed based ballistic missile systems, etc. It may also be aimed at weapons which could have strategic offensive capabilities but be based on other physical principles. In post-plenary conversations November 11, the Soviets basically confirmed this impression and cited ASBMs and the exotic systems banned in SALT II as examples of new “kinds” of systems.

15. The new Soviet proposal, for the first time in NST, gives a firm effective date for their proposed modernization limits. However, the proposal is vague as to what stage of system development serves as the criterion for defining a new type in 1992. Previous Soviet proposals, for example, used a “first tested after” formulation. Thus, while the new Soviet proposals appear to represent a liberalization of their previously tabled modernization constraints, the impact on planned U.S. strategic modernization programs is not totally clear. Both the D-5 and ATB will have been tested by 1992, and, at least in the case of the D-5 operationally deployed by that time. On the other hand, the end of 1991 cutoff date would fall after the expected IOC of virtually all the new Soviet systems we see on the horizon including the follow-ons to the SS-18, SS-X-24, SS-25, SS-N-23 and SS-N-20.

16. Linkage to nuclear testing: Provisions on nuclear testing were a part of the proposals made by Gorbachev at Reykjavik which he has characterized as a “package.” While the linkage of strategic offensive arms reductions to measures strengthening the ABM Treaty remains clear, the new Soviet proposal imposes a new linkage between START and nuclear testing, stating that the initiation of negotiations on an agreement completely banning nuclear tests is an “indispensable condi-

tion” for the strategic arms reduction “process”. The exact nature of the linkage, however, is ambiguous in a number of respects. For instance, it is not clear whether the U.S. must agree in principle to a comprehensive test ban or whether negotiations on nuclear testing could begin without preconditions. Nor is it yet totally clear what is meant by the phrase “strategic arms reduction process”, i.e., whether this means that any progress in START is linked, or only that a negotiated START agreement could not enter into force, until this condition is met. In post-plenary conversations several Soviet delegates strongly implied that only the entry into force of a START agreement is linked to the nuclear testing condition.

Minimize considered.

Kampelman

173. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)¹

Geneva, November 12, 1986

SUBJECT

Thoughts on NST Round VI

In view of the fact that you have just received the Delegation’s End-of-Round Assessment² and the analysis of the Soviets’ November 7 START proposal,³ both of which were prepared by Jerry Stacy and myself, this memo can be rather brief and taken as a supplement to these other documents.

Progress in Round VI

Although there was understandable disappointment after Reykjavik and a very gloomy report from Vienna, in fact, considerable progress was made in START during the past two months (although

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round VI Oct. 86. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Hawes, Burns, Holmes, Reddy, and Suchan. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See Document 171.

³ See Document 172.

perhaps our Delegation should not claim all of the credit for this!). Agreement on the 1600 and 6000 aggregates, removal of the FBS issue from START, resolution of the issue of gravity bombs and SRAMs and some progress on the thorny SLCM problem are remarkable achievements on issues that had plagued us since 1982. That said, the rest of this memo will deal with remaining problems.

Linkage

The Delegation continues to fight bravely for a separate START agreement with no linkage to the ABM Treaty. While we would obviously welcome such an agreement, it is clear that a truly separate START agreement is not (and never has been) in the cards. My interpretation of the state of play is that we are clearly well into the long-predicted “grand bargain.” The “reverse linkage” between defense and offense created by the October 28 D&S proposal makes this even clearer. While INF perhaps can be spared this linkage, we should stop wasting our energy on advocating a “separate” START agreement—continuing to do so might actually confuse matters. There is no possibility of deep reductions in START without some resolution of the D&S problems, but this need not be a cause for despair. There is, however, a major new linkage threat to the 50-percent reductions we seek. This is the linkage between these reductions and the second five-year reductions. I believe a solution can be found to the ABM Treaty issue, but if 50-percent reductions become contingent upon 100-percent reductions (at least in ballistic missiles), the whole enterprise may well collapse. Because the issues involved in the ten-year reductions are so profound, and involve problems not just with the Soviets, but with the Allies, we must not let these interfere with the 50-percent reductions which are now within reach. The strategy for achieving this, sent in by all three Negotiating Groups (NST-VI-009, Geneva 10019, October 31, 1986),⁴ is a good beginning to dealing with the problem. Fortunately, the Soviets said, in their November 7 proposal, that the details of the later reductions need not be agreed until the end of 1991, after 50-percent reductions will have been negotiated and completed.

The Second Five Years

We must get our thinking clear on this before returning to Geneva. The division of jurisdiction between START and D&S is a good place to start. While it would be attractive for START to keep the issue in D&S, I doubt that this is possible. Probably a host of difficult questions that trouble us in Geneva are already being worked on in the Depart-

⁴ Telegram 10019 from Geneva, October 31, is in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860010-0384.

ment. Chief among these would be the distinction between offensive and defensive ballistic missiles (and the ready conversion of one into the other) and the problem of third country ballistic missiles. A more fundamental problem is the fact that the Soviets will not agree to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles while bombers and cruise missiles run almost free. We have no guidance on what happens to these systems during the second five years. An enormous build up to 1600 heavy bombers and 6000 ALCMs would not be acceptable to either the Soviets or public opinion. The Soviets have essentially said that they will bring FBS back into START if our current position for 1996 stands, which would be a disaster. We certainly cannot accept the Soviet version of 1996, but we need to consider what sort of compromise down the road for the 1992–1996 period might make sense. It should almost certainly consist of further deep reductions in ballistic missiles (but not to zero), along with reductions in bombers and cruise missiles below the 1991 limits.

Sublimits

The Soviets have resisted weapons sublimits since Reykjavik, but their case is weak. We should hold firm on sublimits on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads. The 1650 sublimit, however, should be reexamined. The Soviet offer to reduce heavy ICBMs by half (and therefore heavy ICBM warheads by half) opens up some opportunities. If we accept the offer, it would go a long way toward meeting our demands for both throw-weight reductions and codification of these reductions. Our interest regarding mobile ICBMs would still be protected. If they are banned by the final agreement, no further change in our position would be required. If we decide to allow some deployment of mobile ICBMs, we could introduce a new sublimit on such systems, in addition to insisting upon effective verification provisions related to mobiles. As far as the problem of fixed ICBMs with more than six warheads is concerned, I believe this problem is essentially now taken care of by the agreed ratio of 6000 warheads to 1600 SNDVs, which encourages both sides to deploy lower fractionation systems. Thus, all the concerns represented by the 1650 sublimit would be taken care of and it could be dropped.

Treaty and Basic Elements

Our instructions, and most of the discussions in Geneva, talk about treaties. We probably need to revive the dormant draft START Treaty and use it as a vehicle to resolve a number of issues that have been dangling for years. However, if we intend to sign a document at a Summit in either Washington or Moscow in 1987, it will not be a Treaty but some kind of Basic Elements. The documents exchanged at Reykjavik, and the Soviet draft tabled in Vienna, are of this character.

However, the subject of Basic Elements has been curiously absent from NST discussions since the Soviets seemed to lose interest in their “model” last summer. The form of the document we seek to sign in 1987 and the role of the NST Delegation (as distinct from the Experts or other channels) in negotiating it, should be clarified.

174. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 15, 1986

[Source: Reagan Library, 1986 SYS INT 404256–40450. Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Prepared by the Strategic Issues Group of the Office of Soviet Analysis. 3 pages not declassified.]

175. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, December 5, 1986, 1608Z

11159. Subject: Need for START and INF draft treaties

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We strongly recommend that Washington complete work on a draft INF treaty for tabling during the next NST round in Geneva and a draft START treaty.

3. There are several reasons for this recommendation. First, tabling these treaties would give the U.S. the high ground in the Geneva talks. As the Soviets have revealed again, in their approach to the special NST meeting this week and in their high-level barnstorming around Europe, their primary objective is to portray SDI as the sole obstacle to nuclear arms reductions and the U.S. as retreating from the results of Reykjavik. Tabling draft INF and START treaties in Geneva would provide convincing evidence that it is the U.S., not the Soviet Union, which is attempting to translate the results of Reykjavik into actual

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860011–0350. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

accords. Washington should also bear in mind that the Soviets may try to preempt us by early tabling of their own draft, perhaps a single document covering all three areas designed to tighten linkage.

4. Second, as administration spokesmen have now said publicly, we are running out of time. These treaties, if they are to be sound, durable and ratifiable—and effective in helping to avoid future disputes over compliance—must be carefully negotiated in Geneva. This will take time, especially to work out the modalities for effective verification. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the draft INF treaty under preparation, especially given its multiple verification annexes, could take any less than a year to negotiate in Geneva even if the Soviets engaged actively. The longer we wait to table our verification proposals, the more we will play into the customary Soviet tactic of trying to delay discussion of verification until the end and dealing with verification measures only in vague generalities. The longer we wait to table our treaties, given the new public commentary on the timing question, the less we will be seen as negotiating credibly.

5. Finally, we need to pin the Soviets down. Since the opening of NST in March 1985, the Soviets have zigged and zagged and, as the December 2–5 meeting just illustrated, may now be trying either to slip away from some of their Reykjavik commitments or to sell them twice. A draft treaty would be a highly useful negotiating tool in explaining precisely what the U.S. envisages in an agreement and in pressuring the Soviets to move from abstract principles to concrete provisions.

6. The Soviets are the demandeur in the D&S area, and only if they move toward accepting the framework proposed by the President at Reykjavik do we see any value in tabling a D&S treaty. It will, however, be useful to table a draft START treaty before a draft D&S treaty, thus, reinforcing the U.S. position that a D&S agreement shall not enter into force before the entry into force of a START agreement. By this same logic, if there is to be any hope of achieving a D&S agreement by 1988 reflecting the President's concept of the offense-defense relationship, the U.S. needs to get a draft START agreement on the table by the spring of 1987.

Kampelman

176. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 2, 1987

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament and a U.S. Counter-Strategy

SUMMARY. Since Reykjavik, Gorbachev has been highly critical of the Geneva NST talks. The Soviet leader is concerned about what he sees as our effort to use NST to stress the American arms control agenda: SDI and a possible transition to a defense-dominant world, deep cuts in heavy missiles, and SS-20-GLCM/Pershing II trade-offs. Gorbachev wants to promote his own agenda, and therefore has been trying to bring pressure on us from outside NST, using unilateral initiatives (e.g., his testing moratorium) and direct approaches to President Reagan. In both summits, he encouraged the President to commit himself to certain general principles which would replace the U.S. agenda with a Soviet one. Gorbachev's approach is highly political, but then Gorbachev is above all a politician—not an arms control negotiator.

We need to rebuff Gorbachev's efforts to use unilateral initiatives and high-level meetings to impose his own arms control agenda on NST. This requires developing a modest, sustainable position at Geneva that does not include complete elimination of ballistic or all nuclear weapons, and turning aside Soviet calls for additional high-level meetings (other than a Washington summit). *END SUMMARY.*

Impatience with Arms Control

In recent public statements, Gorbachev has shown a marked impatience with—and perhaps even a contempt for—the Geneva arms control talks. He has disparaged the “tasteless stew” allegedly cooked up in Geneva. He has condemned the complexity and detail of the NST talks and questioned the “need for all sorts of levels, sub-levels and all sorts of calculations.” In an interview with Indian journalists, he referred to the Geneva talks as “spoiled,” but then corrected himself, characterizing them as “not spoiled, but at any rate rendered ineffective.”

Gorbachev's criticisms grow out of what he sees as intransigent U.S. positions at Geneva; but they are also consistent with a broader

¹ Source: Department of State, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron—December 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Van Oudenaren; cleared by Ledsky.

pattern of impatience with “traditional” arms control. The Soviet leader appears neither interested in nor informed about the kinds of protracted negotiations that were a major element of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev. It is noteworthy, for example, that his January 15 plan² for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons made no reference to SALT. Also striking is the fact that Gorbachev gave a major speech in July in the city of Vladivostok,³ but made no mention of the 1974 Vladivostok Accord. In the conventional field, Gorbachev has disparaged MBFR and wants to move the whole question of conventional arms reductions to the more political CSCE forum.

While disparaging traditional arms control, Gorbachev is attracted to sweeping, 1950s-style disarmament proposals. His seeming obsession with the testing issue and his unilateral moratorium are reminiscent of the Khrushchev era, as is the January 15 plan. This attraction for Khrushchev-rather than Brezhnev-era approaches to disarmament should not be altogether surprising. Gorbachev has criticized many aspects of Brezhnev’s *domestic* policy and his own domestic style bears similarities to Khrushchev’s free-wheeling populism. Gorbachev’s formative years as a politician were in the 1950s, and it is not inconceivable that he is in part patterning himself, consciously or unconsciously, on Khrushchev.

Reshaping NST from Without

Gorbachev’s impatience with traditional arms control is compounded by a tactical dilemma that he inherited from his predecessors. Ever since the 1979 NATO dual track decision, the Soviets have been frustrated at the West’s ability to use arms control as a means of maintaining public and parliamentary support for new weapons programs.

At Geneva, Gorbachev is afraid of being trapped in a negotiation that forces him to discuss the U.S. rather than the Soviet arms control agenda. In the Defense and Space Talks (DST), the Soviets are involved in a discussion of SDI, even though they previously claimed that the program was illegal and would undermine the basis for any negotiation. In START, they are talking deep cuts, even though they spurned previous U.S. deep-cut proposals. In the INF talks, they are discussing SS-20/GLCM/Pershing II trade-offs, even though they previously had claimed that the NATO deployments had destroyed the basis for negoti-

² See Document 127.

³ Reference is to Gorbachev’s July 28, 1986, speech in Vladivostok, in which he called for a drawdown of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and better relations with Asian nations. (Philip Taubman, “Soviet Announces Decision to Trim Its Afghan Force,” *New York Times*, July 29, 1986, p. A1)

ation. Moreover, the mere existence of three negotiating forums tends to de-link issues and create pressures for separate agreements, even though the Soviets would prefer a package deal that allows them to hold progress in INF and START hostage to U.S. movement on SDI.

Gorbachev knows it would be foolish to walk out of the talks and thus repeat the mistake of December 1983. But he does not want to remain trapped in a set of talks that the United States is using as a “cover” for programs such as SDI. To get off the horns of this dilemma, he needs to bring pressure on us from *outside* the NST negotiating forum, not only to wring particular concessions from us, but also to publicize *his* version of what NST should be about. He wants to stress that NST should curtail SDI, not legitimize it; that it should eliminate INF from Europe, not legitimize the NATO deployments; and that deep cuts in offensive weapons should contribute to the “new” *Soviet* plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and not fulfill the “old” U.S. demand that the Soviets make unilateral cuts in their heavy missiles.

Gorbachev has followed two approaches in his efforts to bring pressure on us from outside the negotiations. First, he has launched highly publicized disarmament spectacles such as his January 15 plan and his testing moratorium. Second, he has tried to appeal directly to President Reagan to encourage him to affirm a new arms control “mandate” that focuses more on the Soviet than the U.S. arms control agenda. His call for a summit on testing, if possible to be held in Hiroshima, was the most blatant and propagandistic instance of Gorbachev attempting to use summitry to sidestep the NST negotiations.

The Importance of High-level Contact

Although Gorbachev has argued that he and the President need to intervene in the negotiations to “speed them up,” the Soviet leader does not appear to have regarded either summit as an opportunity to “split the difference” or to compromise on particular issues on which the negotiators are deadlocked at Geneva. Gorbachev’s behavior at both summits was in fact rather different from that of Brezhnev at the Moscow 1972 or the Vladivostok 1974 summits.

Gorbachev did not come to Reykjavik prepared to build on what appeared to be the promising results of the Washington expert talks. Rather, he used the meeting to introduce, without warning, a sweeping new package that bore only a tangential relationship to what the Soviets had on the table in Geneva. When the President countered with the contents of his July 25 letter,⁴ Gorbachev strayed even further from NST, and in effect tried to get the U.S. to sign on to his January 15 plan.

⁴ See Document 138.

At both meetings, Gorbachev tried to use direct contact with the President not to eliminate differences which we hoped had already been narrowed, but rather to make sweeping end runs around the NST discussions. At Geneva, Gorbachev attached great significance to the President's signing a joint communique acknowledging that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Soviet officials then tried to portray this statement as a new, high-level "mandate" calling for new approaches to arms control and world security, and above all for an abandonment of SDI, which to his mind implies an effort to "win" a nuclear war.

Subsequently, Gorbachev portrayed his utopian January 15 plan as a response to the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva "mandate." At Reykjavik, Gorbachev again tried to bypass Geneva and to impose his own agenda—complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, a ban on testing, and a "package" approach that re-links issues previously delinked—on the arms control process.

Why Gorbachev Doesn't Want an Agreement Now

Gorbachev probably feels that he has made some progress with his unilateral proposals and his one-on-one meetings with the President. He has, for example, succeeded in making testing a major element of the U.S.-Soviet arms control agenda—co-equal, in a sense, to the three topics under discussion at Geneva.

But Gorbachev has not been able to force us to make the far-reaching concessions that he has claimed are necessary for an arms control agreement. He therefore must decide between waiting us out for a time, or making major concessions of his own. For now he probably believes that he can afford to wait. Although he has had a number of setbacks in the last year (e.g., Chernobyl), he believes that his own position has strengthened. Soviet GNP growth for 1986 is headed for 3½ percent, substantially better than in recent years. Equally important, the political situation now looks more favorable from a Soviet perspective. Shevardnadze has said that the November 1986 U.S. elections were a referendum on SDI. While such remarks are self-serving, the Soviet leaders may believe that political and budgetary pressures will force a slowdown in SDI.

Moreover, while the incentives for moving toward arms control are modest, the costs of *not* concluding an agreement are small. Most new Soviet programs would go forward, albeit at a slower rate, and large savings would not result. An agreement to forgo SDI deployments for a decade would have negligible benefits for the Soviets, since they would still have to conduct a research program and hedge against the possibility—which we would insist remain open—that we would go forward with a deployed system after 10 years.

What Our Response Should Be

Faced with this situation, we need to adopt a strategy that, without foreclosing the possibility of an arms control agreement, shifts blame to the Soviets for the failure to make progress at Geneva. To accomplish these goals, we must first work to stress the centrality of the Geneva forum, even as Gorbachev strives to circumvent it. We should concentrate our efforts on developing a modest, sustainable arms control position that can be aired at Geneva this spring and, if rejected by the Soviets, left on the table for months and perhaps years. In formulating this position, we should stress our goal of enhanced strategic stability. Politically, we should work to maximize alliance cohesion while putting the Soviets on the defensive. (The elements of such a position are outlined in S/P's memo to you of December 8; a copy is attached.)

Second, we should resist Soviet overtures, should they begin again, for summit meetings to “cut through the impasse” at Geneva. Based on the experience of the last two summits, we can conclude that Gorbachev would not use such a meeting to make key concessions on deadlocked issues, but rather as a platform to promote his own interpretation of the NST mandate as a way of putting pressure on us. To fend off Gorbachev's pressures for additional high-level interventions, we should hold the Soviets to their pledge, made at Geneva in 1985, to come to Washington for a summit dealing with all the issues, irrespective of prospects for an arms control agreement.

Attachment**Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz⁵**

Washington, December 8, 1986

SUBJECT

Planning Ahead in NST

SUMMARY. We don't know whether the Soviets' unconstructive NST behavior since Reykjavik is only a temporary pressure tactic or an indication that they have now essentially written off the possibility of agreement during this Administration. In these circumstances, we should adopt an NST negotiating posture that tests Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement meeting our requirements and, at the same

⁵ Secret. Drafted by Einhorn.

time, puts us in a more advantageous, less vulnerable position to promote alliance interests and strengthen domestic support for U.S. defense programs in the event that no agreement is reached in the next two years.

Specifically, while continuing to press for deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive arms and to protect a vigorous program of SDI experimentation, we should:

- pull back from the requirement that all ballistic missiles be eliminated in 10 years as a condition for a 10-year ABM non-withdrawal pledge;

- offer to negotiate a boundary between permitted and prohibited ABM activities, being prepared eventually to accept a limit somewhat less permissive than the “broad” interpretation; and

- drop our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs. *END SUMMARY*

Recent Soviet NST behavior. Soviet post-Reykjavik behavior has been worse than might have been expected. Not only have they done the predictable thing of blaming the President’s commitment to SDI for the failure to achieve agreement; they also treaded water in Vienna, hardened positions in Geneva, reinstated troublesome linkages, and insisted that there be no turning back from the alleged agreement to ban all strategic nuclear arms by 1996 (knowing full well that such insistence would guarantee a stalemate).

We cannot be sure whether the Soviets are interested in reaching agreement on terms acceptable to us and are simply trying to induce U.S. flexibility through pressure tactics or, alternatively, whether they have now concluded that an agreement meeting their requirements (especially on SDI) is unlikely and are therefore trying to use NST to attempt to undermine support for U.S. defense programs and sow discord among our allies.

Between these two alternatives is the possibility that the Soviet leadership has simply not made up its mind—that it is waiting to see the impact of certain developments (e.g., fallout from the Iran affair, Democratic control of the Senate, the Soviet anti-SDI propaganda campaign) before determining whether its interests are better served with an agreement or without one.

Regaining the initiative. Over the past year, we have primarily been in a reactive posture in NST. With the Soviets showing eagerness and regularly altering their positions, this has worked to our advantage. But the time may have come when our interests would be best served by taking the initiative.

- We can no longer count on the Soviets to take the lead. In addition to the possibility that they are in a “wait and see” mode, Gorbachev may be feeling pressure to hold back from those who believe he has already made more than enough concessions.

—By the late spring or summer of 1987, key defense programs—especially SDI—may come under strong attack from the Democratic Congress. We should move while our negotiating leverage is largely intact.

—Gorbachev has recently gotten much of the credit internationally for shaping the content and pace of NST. Especially at a time when questions will inevitably be raised about the Administration's ability to act decisively, there would be value, both for the negotiations themselves and for our standing worldwide, in recapturing the initiative in NST.

—The electoral clock is ticking down to 1988. Unless the basic elements of a deal are put in place by the spring of 1987 (only five or six months away), there is little prospect of finalizing and ratifying agreements under this Administration.

—Unless modified relatively soon, certain elements of our current NST position (eliminating all ballistic missiles, protecting the "broad" ABM interpretation, banning mobile ICBMS) could become liabilities in terms of alliance relations and domestic support for U.S. defense programs.

Modifying the U.S. Position. We should consider modifications in our NST position that would not only test Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement acceptable to us, but would also place us in a better position to sustain our alliance and defense interests in case no agreement is reached.

—*Elimination of ballistic missiles.* Our proposal to phase out ballistic missiles by 1996 has virtually no chance of being accepted by the Soviets. Moreover, it has caused acute concern among our allies. For the time being, we have dealt with allied concerns by saying we would give priority to 50 percent reductions. But as long as we link a 10-year ABM non-withdrawal pledge to a 10-year phase out of ballistic missiles (and as long as the Soviets condition any START agreement on resolution of the SDI issue), 50 percent cuts will not be achievable. Key alliance partners will continue to view the 10-year elimination of ballistic missiles as an integral part of our proposal, and this will remain an irritant in our relations with them.

We should maintain the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles as a stabilizing step in the process of achieving a less-nuclear world. But we can afford to proceed toward that goal more gradually, at a pace with which our allies (and our own military) would be more comfortable. Instead of requiring the elimination of ballistic missiles in 10 years, we should propose either stretching out the 50 percent reductions over a 10-year period or maintaining the five-year schedule for 50 percent reductions and obligating the two sides to pursue negotiations during those five years on follow-on reductions which, if agreed upon, would

be carried out in the second five-year period. The 10-year ABM non-withdrawal commitment would be retained under either alternative.

It may be argued that, if we withdraw the 10-year elimination of ballistic missiles, we should either scale back the ABM commitment to five years (to match the 50 percent reduction schedule) or propose new levels of reductions (e.g., 80 percent cuts) to be achieved in 10 years while retaining the 10-year ABM commitment. But both of these approaches would be harmful to the negotiations:

- Shortening the ABM commitment would be seen by the Soviets as backtracking on the central U.S. concession made at Reykjavik. Moreover, as long as the agreement is not too restrictive on permitted SDI activities, we could live with a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment without jeopardizing essential SDI objectives.

- Agreement now on reductions significantly deeper than 50 percent by 1996 is probably not negotiable and, in any event, is not necessary to achieve our stability objectives. Just because the Soviets proposed eliminating nuclear weapons by 1996 doesn't mean they can accept a low number by then. With the prospect of post-1996 SDI deployments, the Soviets will resist going much below 6000 by 1996. Regarding stability, if the Soviets agree to our proposed sublimits and if we go forward with mobile ICBMs, 50 percent reductions would be sufficient to permit us to deploy survivable strategic forces. Of course, even deeper cuts would be better, but not essential.

—*Broad interpretation.* There is little likelihood the Soviets will accept the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, seeking in an agreement to protect all of the SDI activities permitted by the broad interpretation could add significantly to SDI's difficulties on the Hill, since many there do not accept its legality and believe it impedes agreement with the Soviets. Sam Nunn, in particular, has voiced strong objections to the broad interpretation, and he might well persuade the Congress to impose a ban on U.S. SDI activities inconsistent with the "narrow" interpretation. Indeed, as long as our position on permitted ABM activities is viewed as the cause of the impasse in Geneva, SDI funding levels (even for activities consistent with the narrow interpretation) will be seriously jeopardized.

While reaffirming the legality of the broad interpretation of the 1972 Treaty, we should indicate to the Soviets our willingness to negotiate a new boundary between permitted and prohibited ABM activities that would, in effect, supersede the original one. Tactically, we might not wish to move off the broad interpretation right away. Eventually, however, we should be prepared to accept a compromise between the broad and narrow interpretations. Several options are available. One would be to permit the testing of ABM components based on new physical principles that function as sensors but not those that function as kill mechanisms. In recent discussions with RAND analysts, Roald Sagdeev, head of the Soviet Space Research Institute, suggested the idea

of basing restrictions on this distinction between sensors and kill mechanisms.

Before discussing any new boundary with the Soviets, we would need to study carefully how various constraint options would affect the SDI program. Currently, State lacks much of the information required to carry out such a study—and OSD is not eager to make it available. We should therefore try to work directly with the SDIO managers to develop an approach that could facilitate an NST agreement without unduly constraining the program.

An important reason for modifying our position would be to improve the prospects for SDI funding on the Hill. Accordingly, before presenting any new position to the Soviets, we should consult with key Congressional figures, explain our plans to negotiate a compromise, and try to secure a commitment from them not to undercut our efforts with damaging funding cuts or legislated restrictions.

Any agreement less permissive than the broad interpretation is likely to involve adjustments in the structure and schedule of the SDI program beyond 1991. Some experiments presumably could not be conducted as cost-effectively as originally planned, and target dates for accomplishing certain research goals would probably have to slip. However, in deciding whether to accept such adjustments, several factors should be considered:

- It is essential that the decision on deploying SDI be taken on scientifically-valid grounds, not that it be taken by any particular date. Indeed, some scientists involved in the program have suggested that proceeding at a more deliberate pace would permit a more thorough and scientifically-valid consideration of alternatives.

- Without an agreement bounding and reducing Soviet ballistic missiles capabilities, the technical challenges facing SDI would be substantially greater.

- Unless we are viewed as reasonably flexible in seeking agreement with the Soviets, the SDI program could be in serious trouble. An agreement would not, of course, stop all Congressional opposition to SDI. But an agreement would, in effect, give a legal seal of approval to all activities it permitted (including those outside the narrow interpretation), and this could make a significant difference in support and funding for SDI.

—*Mobile ICBMs.* The Soviets will continue to oppose a ban on mobile ICBMs. Moreover, the Administration's soon-to-be-finalized ICBM report will almost certainly call for mobile basing for both Midgetman and the 50 additional MX. If at the same time we continue in NST to propose a ban on mobile ICBMS, those on the Hill who would welcome a pretext to cut back on our ICBM programs could cite the fact that our own negotiating position would not allow us to proceed with our preferred deployment plans. Congressional supporters of

Midgetman, such as Les Aspin, could well hold funding for MX hostage to a withdrawal of our proposed mobile ban.

To avoid adversely affecting our own ICBM modernization plans and to facilitate progress in NST, we should agree to permit mobile ICBMs in START, although we should seek to limit their numbers and insist on rigorous verification measures.

Timing. We should seek USG approval for taking the steps outlined here as early as possible in NST Round VII, which begins in mid-January. We will therefore need to make a major effort internally over the next month or two to develop a modified position on permitted ABM activities. Unless we move early next year to break the current impasse, we could soon find our hands tied by Congressional pressures and the electoral calendar; and prospects for this Administration completing an agreement would then become remote. And if the Soviets are unprepared to accept reasonable compromises, we are better off learning that fact sooner rather than later.

177. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Rowny to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 9, 1987

SUBJECT

Ban on Mobile ICBMs in START

I believe our current position in START banning mobile ICBMs should remain unchanged for the time being. The basic objective at this point is to obtain Soviet agreement to effective verification provisions for mobile ICBMs. Retention of the ban on mobiles will provide us with a great deal of leverage in negotiating these provisions. Altering our position to allow a limited mobile ICBM deployment under certain conditions, as suggested by some agencies, would eliminate that leverage. It would tell the Soviets that we would be permitting mobiles prior to any agreement on verification provisions.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret. Copied to Shultz.

178. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 10, 1987

SUBJECT

START Instructions on Mobile ICBMs

I believe our ICBM modernization program and arms control positions should be mutually supportive. You have just made an important decision² to proceed with full-scale development of mobiles, and you have just submitted to Congress a budget that includes funding for deployment of Peacekeeper and the small ICBM, both in mobile modes. We should ensure that these programs, which are crucial to a survivable land-based ICBM component of our deterrent forces, *with or without* an arms control agreement, are adequately funded and enjoy support from the America people. We should move now to establish an arms control position consistent with our modernization plans. Continuing to propose a ban would put our arms control position in conflict with our efforts to ensure a survivable deterrent.

I have discussed this matter with Ron Lehman and differ with his views. Ron argues that now is not the time to decide this issue. He says that if we change our position on mobiles, it will be an unwarranted concession to the Soviets; if we consider a change and do not make it, we will be seen as not serious about arms control.

I believe *now is the time* to make a change because, having just announced our mobile ICBM programs, we are being looked to *now* by elements in Congress, the press, and our Allies to restore coherence between our modernization and arms control policies. Since they already expect a change, failing to consider one, as Ron suggests, would be more damaging than making one. In that case, both our arms control position and your modernization decision would be seen as not serious. And we would not be protected from a Soviet propaganda offensive simply because we chose not to consider bringing our arms control position in line with our plans; quite the contrary.

As for the other half of Ron's argument, the way we propose to modify our position could hardly be considered a concession. To date,

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.

² NSDD-252, "ICBM Modernization," which Reagan signed on December 24, 1986, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

we have said we want to ban mobiles due to verification and stability concerns, and we have invited the Soviets to address those concerns. The proposed modification still requires the Soviets to satisfy those same concerns as a condition for allowing mobiles. If anything, it gives us added leverage in getting the Soviets to meet our concerns by providing them a reason to do so. More important than the effect on the Soviets, though, is that we present the coherent policy on mobiles necessary to get support for your programs of ensuring survivability of our land-based deterrent.

**179. Memorandum From the Chief Negotiator on Strategic
Offensive Arms (Lehman) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, January 12, 1987

SUBJECT

START Instructions on Mobile ICBMs

For both political and substantive negotiating reasons, now is not the time to drop our ban on mobile ICBMs in Geneva. Making an “up-or-down” decision now on our mobile ICBM position puts the United States in a no-win situation. If the United States changes its position on mobile ICBMs, we will be making a concession to the Soviets that they have not earned, and we may signal that we are overly anxious because of the current political environment. If the United States again raises the mobile ICBM issue for decision and again maintains its current ban, elements in Congress and the press, who would otherwise be quiet, will now charge that the U.S. is not serious about arms control at a time when the Soviets are about to launch a new propaganda offensive.

As an alternative to a “black or white” decision at this time, I propose a third option which maintains our ban on mobile ICBMs, but gives the START Negotiating Group the authority to probe the Soviets on how they propose to resolve our verification and stability concerns associated with mobile ICBMs. In addition, the United States negotiators would be authorized to state that, if mobile ICBMs are to be permitted, the warheads on Soviet and United States mobile ICBMs

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.

would be included in the third warhead sublimit on particularly destabilizing systems. This approach would leave the United States the maximum negotiating leverage on the Soviet Union.

180. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 13, 1987

SUBJECT

Mobile ICBMs and Arms Control (U)

(S) The Department of State is proposing that you drop at this time the ban on mobile ICBMs which has been a central element of our START proposal for some time. I believe that to do so would be ill-advised. Nothing has happened to alter the requirement for such a provision in a strategic arms reduction agreement: the same problems with verifying mobile ICBMs exist today as existed when we first tabled this proposal. If anything, the Soviets' introduction of *two* mobile ICBMs has made matters worse.

(S) The Soviet Union has a proven capability to hide mobile ICBMs. They did so in the case of the mobile SS-16, where after 8 years we were still only able to determine "probable" deployment. Our alleged ability to count SS-25s is based on the unfounded *assumption* that there will be a garage for each launcher. We have not yet even identified the mobile launcher for the Soviet 10-warhead SS-X-24.

(S) Soviet cheating through covert production of mobile ICBM launchers and additional missiles for refire could largely negate the warhead reductions we propose. Mobile ICBMs are simply incompatible with a 50% reduction agreement, for cheating by the Soviets could give them a highly destabilizing advantage. Without an ability to verify a clearcut treaty violation, the U.S. would find it impossible as a political matter to terminate its obligations under the treaty.

(S) There is absolutely no inconsistency between our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs and the decision to proceed with development of mobile basing for the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM. We seek to ban mobile ICBMs under a 50% reduction agreement because of the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.

instability that would arise from our inability to monitor mobile ICBM production and deployment. Of course, in the absence of a START agreement, we will continue to structure our strategic forces as our security needs dictate including, if appropriate, exercising the option of mobile basing for U.S. ICBMs. Therefore, unless and until an arms reduction agreement is ratified, we must continue our own programs for mobile ICBM basing. Moreover, the existence of these programs gives us leverage in the negotiations with the USSR, even as it assures us our continued security if the negotiations fail.

(S) Clearly, were we to make a concession by allowing mobiles, it would be a major one. Consequently, should we ever choose to make this move, we should not make it lightly. Even if we were to determine that such a major concession is called for, it should not be made when the Soviets are stonewalling—as they are now—but when they are negotiating in good faith, and then only if we get a real quid-pro-quo from the Soviets as part of a bargained exchange.

(S) Finally, I would note that partial changes to the current U.S. position on banning mobile ICBMs would not prove a useful step at this time. We should not go forward to the Soviets with phrases such as “if mobile ICBMs were to be allowed”, for this would only erode our position. I believe that such a move would result in a catastrophic loss of bargaining leverage, for it would strongly convey that we lack confidence in the soundness of our position.

(S) If you agree, I think it would be important for the President to have these views.

181. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 14, 1987

SUBJECT

Guidance for the Upcoming Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round
Issue

To approve instructions for the seventh round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on January 15.

Discussion

Overall negotiating instructions (*Tab A*) and specific negotiating instructions for Defense and Space (*Tab B*), START (*Tab C*) and INF (*Tab D*)² have been prepared by the normal interagency process. I have attached a summary sheet for you to record your approval on each set of instructions. The overall instructions and the Defense and Space instructions are agreed to by all agencies. One major and three minor disagreements exist with respect to the START and INF instructions. Minor issues and my recommendation are noted on the appropriate summary sheet.

The major issue concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for verification and stability reasons. *Paul Nitze* believes that the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our modernization program and negotiating position are inconsistent and that, therefore, we should alter our negotiating position to permit mobile missiles. His arguments are in a memorandum to you at *Tab F*,³ along with contrary views of your other senior arms control advisors.

All other agencies oppose changing position now. I agree. We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the Soviets have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we now accept mobile

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copied to Bush and Regan. Brooks, Mahley, Tobey, Kraemer, and Steiner sent the memorandum and attachments to Carlucci for his signature under a covering memorandum of January 12. (Ibid.) (S)

² Attached but not printed, at *Tab D*, are the INF instructions.

³ Nitze's memorandum and the contrary views expressed by Rowny, Lehman, and Weinberger are printed above as Documents 178, 177, 179, and 180.

missile deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and no progress on verification, we will lend credence to the erroneous view that the Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an agreement to restore its prestige. Therefore I recommend our position remain unchanged.

The draft NSDD at *Tab E*⁴ documents your approval of the instructions to our negotiators. It includes as attachments the individual instructions you have reviewed in *Tabs A through D*.

Recommendation

OK _____	NO _____	That you review and initial each set of the proposed negotiating instructions indicating your approval and sign the attached NSDD documenting that approval. ⁵
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Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

Overall Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached instructions⁷ are agreed to by all agencies. They provide overall guidance not unique to specific negotiating areas. They direct the delegation to:

—Continue to build on past efforts to gain Soviet agreement to the text of documents recording areas of agreement.

—Reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one area (especially INF) hostage to progress in other areas.

—Give priority to 50% strategic reductions and significant INF reductions rather than debate Soviet allegations that the United States agreed in Reykjavik to eliminate all strategic offensive arms.

⁴ Printed below as Document 182.

⁵ Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan, and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Instructions handled at 10:30 mtg w/ President 1/14/87." No minutes of the meeting were found.

⁶ Secret. Prepared by Brooks.

⁷ Attached but not printed is a draft telegram transmitting the overall instructions.

—Stress the importance of verification measures being negotiated concurrently with agreements on reductions.

—Stress the importance of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements.

—Reject Soviet efforts to introduce new areas (especially nuclear testing) into these negotiations.

There are no issues involved with these instructions.

Recommendation

OK	NO	
_____	_____	That you approve the proposed overall negotiating instructions. ⁸

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

START Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached START instructions¹⁰ are agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our existing START proposal, based on your Reykjavik discussions, for a 50% reduction. Our proposal includes the following key features:

—A ceiling of 1600 strategic nuclear deliver vehicles (SNDVs) (ballistic missiles plus heavy bombers)

—6000 total warheads (RVs plus ALCMs plus heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or Short Range Attack Missiles), with sublimits of:

—4800 ballistic missile RVs

—3300 ICBM RVs

—1650 RVs on ICBMs other than silo-based medium or light ICBMs which carry less than 6 RVs.

—Mobile ICBMs banned (DISAGREEMENT: SEE BELOW)

—50% throw-weight reduction

—Verification including:

⁸ Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan.

⁹ Secret. Prepared by Brooks.

¹⁰ Attached but not printed is a draft telegram transmitting the START instructions.

- Data exchange
- On-site observation of reductions
- Monitoring (including on-site inspection) of remaining inventories
- Non-interference with national technical means of verification
- Phased reductions to be completed by 1991
- A mutually acceptable solution to limiting sea-launched cruise missiles which does *not* include them in the 1600/6000 limits noted above.

The instructions stress the importance the U.S. attaches to sublimits, provide for banning heavy ICBMs, and avoid discussion of the complete elimination of ballistic missiles since these initial reductions are our highest priority and because, for tactical reasons, we have determined the complete elimination of ballistic missiles should more appropriately be discussed in the Defense and Space forum.

Issues

The attached instructions are not agreed by all agencies. Two issues exist. The first concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for verification and stability reasons. *State* believes that the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our modernization program and negotiating position are inconsistent and that, therefore, we should alter our negotiating position to permit mobile missiles. *All other agencies* oppose changing position now. We agree.

We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the Soviets have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we now accept mobile missile deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and no progress on verification, we will lend credence to the view that the Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an agreement to restore its prestige.

As a possible compromise, *Ambassador Lehman* has suggested language authorizing detailed discussions of how mobiles might be treated *if* allowed. We believe that sufficient flexibility now exists to do this and that we should retain the existing instructions for now.

The second START issue is minor and involves the wording of a prohibition against concealment. CIA favors a ban on concealment which impedes verification; OSD says that is too similar to SALT II and thus too ambiguous. They favor a ban on *any* concealment of systems limited by START. While the OSD concern is real and will need to be considered when we address treaty text, their formulation is excessive and would impinge on legitimate military practice. Thus we favor the CIA formulation.

Recommendations

OK	No	
_____	_____	That existing guidance to ban mobile missiles be retained. ¹¹
_____	_____	That guidance on concealment accept the CIA formulation banning only concealment which impedes verification. ¹²
_____	_____	That you approve the proposed START negotiating instructions as modified above. ¹³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁴

Washington, undated

Defense and Space Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached instructions¹⁵ are agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our existing Defense and Space proposal, based on your Reykjavik discussions, including the conditions under which we would accept a commitment through 1996 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in return for a 50% reduction in strategic forces in five years, the complete elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996, and the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after that time.

There are no issues involved with these instructions.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you approve the proposed Defense and Space negotiating instructions. ¹⁶

¹¹ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹² Reagan initialed his approval.

¹³ Reagan initialed his approval.

¹⁴ Secret. Prepared by Tobey.

¹⁵ Attached but not printed is a draft telegram with instructions on Defense and Space.

¹⁶ Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan.

182. National Security Decision Directive 256¹

Washington, January 14, 1987

*INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH NST
NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)*

The attached instructions² provide guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which begins on January 15, 1987, in Geneva. They provide guidance for the Negotiating Group to use in building on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Ronald Reagan**Attachment****Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva³**

Washington, undated

Subject: (S) Overall instructions for Round VII of US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Ref: (a) Presidential letter to US negotiators for December 2–5 meeting with Soviet counterparts;⁴ (b) State 336325;⁵ (c) State 330271;⁶ (d) State 291634⁷

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Following is guidance for US delegation for the seventh round of negotiations with the Soviet Union beginning on January 15, 1987. Guidance from previous rounds and special December meeting remain

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret. Carlucci distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman, under cover of a January 14 memorandum: “The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the seventh round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks.” (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed are draft telegrams transmitting instructions for the INF and Defense and Space negotiating groups.

³ Secret. Sent as telegram 13120 to NST Geneva, January 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D87010)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See Attachment 5, Document 169.

⁶ See Attachment 1, Document 169.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 169.

in effect, except as modified below. Specific guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being provided septel.

3. Principal objectives for Round VII include:

—Continue to seek prompt and forthcoming Soviet responses to new US proposals as set forth in applicable instructions for US delegation and each of the negotiating groups, and presented in Round VI and at December limited composition meetings. US del should emphasize, as appropriate, that new proposals represent US efforts to build on areas of convergence and reach agreement based on Reykjavik, to respond to expressed Soviet concerns, to lay out our ultimate goal and to identify practical near-term steps to achieve those objectives.

—Continue to seek Soviet agreement to the text of documents reflected in the specific instructions to the three negotiating groups for Round VII.

—Reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one negotiating forum hostage to progress in another, while, at the same time, making clear those areas where, in the US view, substantive interrelationships exist. In particular, delegation should continue to rebut Soviet efforts to mischaracterize the understandings reached at Reykjavik, to link progress in INF to progress in other areas, or to portray SDI as an obstacle to arms control.

—In countering possible Soviet allegations that the US agreed to eliminate strategic offensive arms in ten years and Soviet insistence on resolution of this issue as a threshold matter, point out that achieving 50 percent reductions in START and significant INF reductions as agreed in Reykjavik are vital first steps in a process leading to the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and are areas where considerable common ground exists and, thus, should be focus of current negotiations.

4. In elaborating on US proposals, delegation should make clear that measures for effective verification conforming to the three principles agreed at Reykjavik must be addressed and agreed concurrently with negotiations on reductions and limitations.

5. If Soviets raise other, non-NST arms control issues, delegation should respond that these issues should be pursued in the appropriate fora, not NST. If Soviets specifically link nuclear testing and NST, delegation should respond as per para 5 of Ref C.

6. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting obstacles place in the path of achieving arms reductions by Soviet noncompliance. If Soviets raise matter of US exceeding SALT limits, delegation should underscore that US policy decisions on the SALT I interim agreement and SALT II in large part resulted from Soviet noncompliance with

these agreements. The delegation should stress that these agreements are behind us, both as a matter of legal obligation and as a matter of policy commitment. The US has made a standing offer of establishment of a new interim framework of mutual restraint for strategic offensive weapons. Our focus, however, should be on progress in NST toward early agreement on radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁸

Washington, undated

Subject: (S) Instructions for START Negotiating Group. References: (a) 86 State 330273;⁹ (b) 86 State 290210;¹⁰ (c) 86 State 138816;¹¹ (d) 86 State 54773;¹² (e) 86 State 12554;¹³ (f) 85 State 288129;¹⁴ (g) 85 State 162424;¹⁵ (h) 85 State 72684¹⁶

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Following is guidance for the U.S. Negotiating Group on Strategic Offensive Arms for Round VII. Except as modified below, previous instructions remain unchanged.

⁸ Secret. Sent as telegram 13118 to NST Geneva, January 15, 1987. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870036–0371)

⁹ See Attachment 2, Document 169.

¹⁰ See footnote 6, Document 169.

¹¹ In telegram 138816 to NST Geneva, May 2, 1986, the Department transmitted instructions to the START negotiating group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860341–0846)

¹² In telegram 54773 to NST Geneva, February 22, 1986, the Department transmitted instructions to the START negotiating group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860431–0640)

¹³ In telegram 12554 to NST Geneva, January 15, 1986, the Department transmitted instructions to the START negotiating group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860034–0235)

¹⁴ In telegram 288129 to NST Geneva, September 19, 1985, the Department transmitted overall guidance to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850665–0241)

¹⁵ In telegram 162424 to NST Geneva, May 29, 1985, the Department transmitted overall guidance to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850371–0061)

¹⁶ In telegram 72684 to NST Geneva, March 10, 1985, the Department transmitted instructions to the START negotiating group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850194–0129)

3. Overall objective. The negotiating group's objective remains an equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing agreement deeply reducing strategic offensive arms. The negotiating group's chief objective for Round VII is to seek agreement to a basic framework, including numerical sublimits. To aid that process, the negotiating group should seek Soviet agreement in Round VII to key elements of an agreement for reductions in strategic offensive arms, as detailed below, based on the areas mutually agreed to during the Reykjavik meeting and the additional U.S. elements tabled during Round VI.

4. Key elements of an agreement. The Negotiating Group is authorized to table early in Round VII the following U.S. proposal for key elements of an agreement.

Begin text of key elements:

Key elements of an agreement for Reductions in strategic offensive arms

Reductions

The sides shall reduce their strategic offensive arms as follows:

1600 SNDVs/composition of forces

—The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600. There shall be constraints on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.

6000 warheads

—The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000. For the purposes of counting warheads pursuant to this limit, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles shall count as one warhead and each long-range ALCM carried by a heavy bomber shall count as one warhead.

Sublimits

—There shall be sublimits not to exceed 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

Mobile ICBMs

—Mobile ICBMs shall be banned.

Throw-weight reductions

—Strategic ballistic missile throw-weight shall be reduced by 50 percent from the highest of the two sides' levels. This throw-weight reduction shall be codified through direct or indirect limits.

Verification

—The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall concurrently negotiate measures which

permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include, inter alia:

- (1) An exchange of comprehensive and accurate data, both prior to reductions and thereafter,
- (2) On-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels,
- (3) Effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection, and,
- (4) Non-interference with NTM and other agreed measures.

Schedule of Reductions

—These reductions will be carried out in a phased manner and completed by the end of 1991.

SLCMs

—The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. When such a solution is found, it will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 SNDV limits.

End text of key elements.

5. In presenting during Round VII the key elements proposal as a document for agreement, U.S. negotiator should stress the importance the U.S. places on the negotiation of appropriate sublimits and state that agreement on the three U.S.-proposed sublimits, could help resolve some of the most important remaining differences between the sides. The U.S. negotiator should emphasize that, in the past, the Soviet proposal would have effectively included sublimits in two of the three categories proposed by the United States. The negotiator should also state that, as previously proposed, the U.S. prefers sublimits of 4500, 3000 and 1500. However, if the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the U.S. approach of these three categories of sublimits, the United States is prepared to accept the higher numbers of 4800, 3300 and 1650 as tabled on October 22 and contained in the key elements document, in an effort to split the difference between the preferred U.S. sublimits and the previously proposed Soviet percentage sublimits that would be applicable to ballistic missile warheads. These higher sublimits therefore represent, together with 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads, a numerical framework on which final agreement should be reached. The negotiating group should present rationale for the U.S. key elements proposal by reiterating the justification for its proposals presented in previous rounds, particularly those in favor of the three U.S. warhead sublimits, as well as arguments against the elements of the Soviet approach that do not provide for an equitable outcome. The negotiating group should vigorously reject as untrue any Soviet assertions that the U.S. agreed at Reykjavik to discard the U.S. proposed sublimits or that the U.S. agreed to eliminate all strategic offensive weapons by 1996.

6. Heavy ICBM sublimits. Should the Soviets raise their proposal for a 50-percent reduction in heavy ICBMs as an acceptable alternative to the U.S. package of sublimits, the U.S. negotiating group should respond by stating that the Soviet willingness to reduce heavy ICBMs is a welcome step that helps to create additional common ground and addresses some of the concerns represented in the U.S.-proposed 1650 sublimit. However, it does not address the question of sublimits on total ballistic missile and ICBM warheads and only partially takes into account U.S. concerns represented in the third U.S. proposed sublimit. The Soviet proposal for a 50-percent reduction in heavy ICBMs therefore cannot substitute for the three U.S.-proposed sublimits.

7. Heavy ICBM modernization. On the question of heavy ICBM modernization, the negotiating group may reiterate that the U.S. position is that the sides shall establish constraints that ban the development, production, flight-testing or deployment of new or modernized versions of heavy ICBMs as well as prohibit production and additional deployments of existing types of heavy ICBMs.

8. Strategic arms reductions in second five years. If the Soviets raise this issue of the U.S. defense and space proposal for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, the Negotiating Group should state that the START group should give the highest priority to the necessary first step in a process leading to the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles—that is, the reductions in strategic offensive arms to 6000 warheads on 1600 SNDVs in the first five years, which is an area where considerable common ground exists.

9. Mobile ICBMs. The Negotiating Group should avoid discussing recent U.S. decisions concerning the future of the U.S. land-based missile forces except to state that the U.S. government still proposes a ban on mobile ICBMs due to verification difficulties and the military implications of such difficulties. The Negotiating Group should make clear to the Soviets our willingness to listen to their proposals on mobile ICBM verification while noting that their proposals to date have been inadequate. Until agreement on offensive reductions is reached and implemented, the U.S. is free to develop and deploy ICBMs in mobile basing modes.

10. START verification regime. The U.S. negotiator may, at his discretion, address the issue of a START verification regime. Recalling the verification principles agreed at Reykjavik, the Negotiating Group should note that these elements are also relevant to START and present the following as elements of a verification regime for START (FYI: these elements are not necessarily inclusive of all verification provisions a START agreement would require):

—An exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both prior to reductions and thereafter;

—On-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels (negotiating group should probe for rationale for the exclusion of this element from the Soviet November 7 proposals);

—Effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection;

—Interference with agreed measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement

—The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of the agreement will be prohibited; and,

—On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM or SLBM.

183. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 1, 1987, 1541Z

2358. Subject: Nitze-Vorontsov Conversation Saturday, February 28, 1987. Ref: Geneva—2356²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Vorontsov began by telling me about Mr. Gorbachev's speech announcing their decision to separate INF from the other subject matters. He emphasized the importance of this decision and their intention concurrently to move forward as rapidly as possible with START and "space-based weapons." I said that Max Kampelman had told me of their discussion at 6:00 P.M. today. I said I thought this was a constructive move and that it was important that it constitute a foundation for more rapid progress in START and Defense & Space as well.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870467-0501. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.

² In telegram 2356 from NST Geneva, February 28, the Delegation reported that Vorontsov had met with Kampelman to inform him "that Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev was announcing on television tonight that the Soviets propose separating the INF negotiations here from the D&S and START talks and that INF proceed 'without delay.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870467-0485)

3. Vorontsov then said he wished me to understand how these matters were viewed in Moscow. They were confused as to what was going on in Washington. They did not know what the President's intentions were; was he really determined to violate the ABM Treaty or was the discussion of early deployment merely meant to bring pressure upon them? They understood what Secretary Weinberger was attempting to do, but they did not know whether this reflected the President's policy. He said that Max Kampelman had been unwilling or unable to enter into a serious discussion of the space-based weapons issue. He understood from the press that Max was under instructions not to have serious discussion on this issue.

4. I interrupted to say that Max Kampelman had the full confidence of the Secretary of State and of the President, and he was fully authorized to discuss and negotiate within the clear meaning of the ABM Treaty. We considered the Soviet position of demanding a ban on research outside laboratories to bear no relationship to the treaty. Neither the word "research" nor "laboratory" was mentioned in the treaty. Max was not authorized to negotiate amendments to the treaty. Vorontsov said they had no intention of proposing any amendment to the treaty.

5. Vorontsov went on to protest that I was consulting with the Congress and with our allies and was not prepared to discuss anything with them. I said that some time ago the President had suggested that I explore ad referendum with somebody nominated by their side the possibility of arriving at some package of mutual concessions which we could recommend to both sides for their consideration. His side had not reacted favorably to that suggestion but instead had appointed him to head their negotiating team and Max Kampelman had the position of being his opposite number. It seemed to me that there should be no confusion as to authorized channels for negotiation. I commented that Velikhov had asked to see me in Washington, and I had so done, on an hour's notice. I gathered that Velikhov was annoyed that I had said that the only approved channel for negotiation at this time was between him and Kampelman, but that was a fact. Vorontsov said that Velikhov had talked his views over with people in Moscow and had been authorized to explore them with me but not to negotiate on the subject. Velikhov had told him that he had been surprised because I had two others with me; I noted that Velikhov had arrived with two others, Rogov and another man from their embassy.

6. Vorontsov asked me whether I ever saw Dubinin. I said I had recently had lunch with him; I found he could ask questions and explain the Soviet position, but that discussion was not very fruitful. Vorontsov said they agreed; Dubinin was not yet deeply acquainted with the business but was learning.

7. He returned to the subject of my consultations with the Congress and our allies. He said they did not understand why we should consult with them rather than negotiate with the Soviet Union. I said we were doing both. I said that in a coalition of democratic countries close consultation was essential. He again referred to talk of early deployment. I noted that the President had decided against early deployment.

8. The discussion turned to Regan's replacement by Howard Baker.³ I said that this was important; you, Max and I all had good relations with Baker.

9. Discussion then turned to INF. He said he saw no reason why a treaty text couldn't be gotten into form so that both sides could sign it reasonably promptly. He said that they foresaw a trip by Secretary Shultz to Moscow. Thereafter, it was possible to foresee a signing ceremony at which an INF treaty text, together with agreements in principle on the other two subjects, could be signed. He said this could be quite an important ceremony.

10. I said that Mike Glitman had been working hard to work out a draft text for early tabling. I thought he should be able to do so shortly. Vorontsov said there were only a few remaining issues to be worked out. I mentioned SRINF systems. He said he had great difficulty in understanding the reasonableness of our position on conversion. He said this should be viewed not just technically but politically. Would it be politically acceptable to have the P-II's removed while in fact nothing changed? I said there would be an important change. There would be a change from LRINF missiles to SRINF. He asked how one could tell the difference. I said there would be two stages, not three. He said it would still be possible to modify those two to give the missile greater range. I suggested that perhaps the solution would be to accelerate the projected negotiations six months later for the total elimination of SRINF missiles. He said this could be considered; in any case, he thought it important to get away from the complexities involved in conversion. I noted that if one were interested in getting away from complexities, one way in which that could be achieved would be to eliminate all the INF missiles rather than retaining 100 warheads on each side. He noted that would please the Chinese; I asked whether that would be too bad. He said, maybe not.

11. We then turned to the subject of START. He said that as they saw it in Moscow, we were interested in restructuring Soviet strategic forces. I said this was not true. The limits would be equal for both

³ On February 27, Reagan announced the resignation of White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan and the appointment of his replacement, former Senator Howard Baker. ("Statement on the Resignation of Donald T. Regan and the Appointment of Howard H. Baker Jr., as Chief of Staff," *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, vol. I, pp. 185.)

sides. He said, “but only we are above some of these limits and therefore the only ones to be affected.” I noted the continuing discussion that Kvitsinskiy and I had had about the comparable INF problem. Kvitsinskiy had argued that only they at that time had INF missiles and therefore our INF proposals were aimed solely at actions by their side. I said that just because the two sides started from unequal positions was no reason why those positions should remain unequal. No agreement would be sound if it were based on inequality between the two sides. Vorontsov indicated that he really didn’t think we were too far apart with respect to START. Their problem was that we were not prepared to deal with what interested them, and that was limitations on space-based weapons. I said it was our view that space defense matters and START were matters which should be addressed concurrently, and that was what we were attempting to do.

12. I said I would discuss these matters with Secretary Shultz when he returned to Washington at the end of the week. He asked whether I anticipated returning to Europe. I said I did. He asked whether I would be prepared to talk to him again when I did so. I said I would be delighted to do so.

13. Below is text of the paper given to Kampelman by Vorontsov at their meeting on February 28, 1987 (reftel): Begin text:

Today on behalf of the Soviet leadership, I am announcing the following decision.

The Soviet Union proposes taking the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe out of the block of issues and concluding a separate agreement on this subject, which should be done without delay. We have more than just a basis for doing it, we effectively have a fully prepared accord. It was agreed at Reykjavik that over the next five years the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all of their medium-range missiles in Europe. Within the same time-frame, the number of Soviet missiles of this class would be reduced in the Asian portion of Soviet territory to 100 warheads, on the understanding that the United States could retain the same number of medium-range missile warheads in its national territory.

As soon as the agreement has been signed on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR will withdraw from the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of these countries, its longer-range operational-tactical missiles which were stationed there in response to the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. As to other operational-tactical missiles, we are prepared to enter immediately into negotiations to reduce and completely eliminate such missiles.

Thus, there exists a realistic opportunity to remove much of the nuclear burden from our common home, which is Europe. This would

be a real and major step toward fully ridding Europe of nuclear arms. We are tabling our proposals at the negotiations with the United States in Geneva.

We were told more than once that if the USSR took the question of medium-range missiles out of the Reykjavik package, reaching agreement on their elimination in Europe would pose no problem. Here is a good opportunity to prove it by deeds. This is what Europeans and nations of other continents desire, this is what should be done in the best interests of today and tomorrow.

While singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet government continues to believe that it is very important to reach an agreement to substantially reduce and subsequently eliminate strategic arms. The conclusion of such an agreement, as was repeatedly stressed, should certainly be contingent on an outcome precluding the stationing of weapons in space in view of the organic interrelationship between these issues.

The Soviet Union is again demonstrating its determination, despite all the difficulties and artificial logjams, to solve the problem of nuclear disarmament. New way of thinking means being able to heed the voice of the public—in Europe and all over the world, —to understand the interests and concerns of other peoples and not to separate one's own security from that of one's neighbors in this interrelated world.

This historic chance must not be missed. We are looking forward to an early and positive response. End text.

13. Moscow minimize has been considered. Nitze.

Kampelman

184. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz's Delegation to the Department of State and the White House¹

Beijing, March 2, 1987, 0348Z

SECTO 4033. Subject: Soviet INF Proposal

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Soviet press reports and Max Kampelman's discussions with Vorontsov indicate the new Soviet INF position is as follows:

—The INF negotiations will be separated from START and Defense and Space, and proceed "without delay."

—Their position will be the one developed at Reykjavik, i.e. 100 INF missile warheads worldwide, with none in Europe. The Soviet 100 warheads would be in Soviet Asia; our 100 warheads would be in the United States.

—They propose to leave the INF Negotiating Groups in Geneva after the scheduled recess on March 4 to begin negotiations on a treaty text.

3. This is a welcome development, and reflects Soviet agreement to our long-held position that progress on reductions in offensive forces should not be held hostage to agreements in other areas such as defense and space. While this is a success for our strategy, the upcoming negotiations will not be easy. Vorontsov is already indicating to Max that there is a "fully prepared accord" on INF, indicating the Soviets will push for quick translation of the Reykjavik outline into a treaty. There remain a number of difficult and important points that must be nailed down, including treatment of shorter-range missiles, verification and inspection, location of the remaining 100 warheads, and the right to convert Pershing II's to shorter-range Pershing IB's. All of these points are currently in dispute in Geneva, and the Soviets can be expected to accuse us of foot-dragging to get their way on them.

4. In addition, Vorontsov has suggested that when the INF treaty is signed, accords also be completed on the elements of agreements on START and Defense and Space, indications the Soviets may continue to link implementation of an INF agreement on constraints on SDI. And, of course, many allies will be ambivalent about these developments, welcoming the success of our negotiating efforts but reluctant to with-

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. On February 27, Shultz departed Washington for Hong Kong. He spent March 1–6 in Beijing, Guelin, Dalian, Shanghai, and Qufu, meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and other Chinese officials. He spent part of March 6 in Seoul, before departing for Tokyo, and returning home on March 7.

draw the INF missiles from Europe that were recently introduced only with great effort. The Germans will also follow closely the handling of shorter-range missiles.

5. We have nearly completed our own draft INF treaty text, and we should table it this week in Geneva. The allies were all given the text over the weekend. With our draft text on the table we will be well-positioned for the stepped-up pace of negotiations.

6. I believe this move by Gorbachev to proceed separately on an INF treaty is the sort of progress we told them was necessary for me to go to Moscow. If arrangements can be made, I think it would be useful for you to announce my trip and its general mandate in your March 9 speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.² If you agree, I will have our charge in Moscow take the timing up with the Soviets right away.

7. We will not want to build expectations too high.

² On March 6, Reagan announced that Shultz would go to Moscow to meet with Shevardnadze from April 13–16. ("Statement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions," March 6," *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987 vol. I, pp. 218–219)

185. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Principals Meeting¹

Washington, March 31, 1987, 5–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary of State Meeting on Moscow Trip—Arms Control (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President's Office

Mr. Donald Gregg

State

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Ronald Lehman

White House

Mr. Howard Baker

Mr. Kenneth Duberstein

Mr. Frank C. Carlucci

General Colin Powell

Colonel Robert Linhard

Captain Linton Brooks

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0150A 03/31/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

Mr. Richard Perle

CIA

Mr. Robert Gates

OMB

Mr. James Miller

JCS

Admiral William Crowe

General John Moellering

ACDA

Mr. Kenneth Adelman

Minutes

The meeting opened at 5:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. *Mr. Carlucci*, referring to the material distributed in advance,² stated that he would not drone on on what was in the letter but move immediately into dialogue. He noted that we have heard from Ken Adelman and Ed Rowny on the proposed draft (which was prepared by the Department of State) but we have not heard from the Department of Defense or the JCS. (Note: Talking Points at *Tab B*³ were prepared for Mr. Carlucci and reviewed by him prior to the meeting, but not used.) In the absence of Secretary Weinberger, delayed by another meeting, Mr. Carlucci asked Assistant Secretary Perle to open the discussion. The following discussion (not verbatim) ensued: (U)

Perle: There are two issues, ABM Treaty interpretation and the question of sublimits. We are worried that if we discuss permitted and prohibited activities we get something other than the ABM Treaty. This will produce a set of constraints which will affect us differently than the Soviets. There will not be comparable restraints. (S)

Carlucci: Are you referring to the recommendation to push discussion of permitted and prohibited activities into the five year ABM Treaty review? (S)

Perle: Yes, we should not do this discussion at all. The ABM Treaty review will be coincident with Defense and Space Negotiations. The form doesn't matter; the idea of discussing permitted and prohibited activities is bad. We can't ignore verification. Discussing permitted and prohibited activities will end up with the Soviets having an SDI and we not having an SDI. (S)

² Tab A, which included the "meeting agenda and associated materials," was not attached.

³ Tab B was not attached.

Weinberger (who had just arrived): I agree completely. We cannot discuss permitted and prohibited activities. Saying that we will do so will inevitably lead to negotiations. (S)

Carlucci (cutting off Weinberger): The DOD position is clear. You do not want to discuss this in any form. (S)

Weinberger: That is correct. (S)

Shultz: The purpose of the idea in the letter was to kick the can. We did not want to prejudge whether we would discuss permitted or prohibited activities. We don't know if discussing permitted and prohibited activities is bad—we have not been allowed access to the relevant material—but we will get hurt on the Hill if we continue not to discuss it. (S)

Weinberger: State has full access starting five minutes after this meeting if you want it. We don't know enough to discuss permitted and prohibited activities. Keeping alive the idea that we are willing to talk on this subject will just hurt us. (S)

Carlucci: Why does this have to come up in Moscow? Do you need new instructions on this subject George? (S)

Shultz: We'll go to Moscow and discuss INF. Beyond that the President wants 50% reductions. In going to Moscow he'll want me to bring back those reductions. Working with Ron Lehman we have developed a new approach. If we are to bring that approach about, we need a legitimate response to questions about defense. Offenses and defenses are related and we've said so. We need to engage the Soviets in discussing that relationship. Some types of defense will proliferate offenses. We have to be able to discuss this. To go with nothing to say is not sensible. (S)

Carlucci: But Ron's formulation is nondeployment. (S)

Shultz: There are two elements: nondeployment/non-withdrawal and pushing the subject of permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty off for awhile. (S)

Carlucci: As I see it there are three issues: (1) the timing of 50% reductions, (2) nondeployment and, (3) interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Shultz: A fourth is sublimits. (S)

Carlucci: But the working group [Note: Arms Control Support Group] is working this. We should push that discussion off here. I would like to deal with the three that I mentioned. (S)

Shultz: The idea of the letter was a way of *not* addressing interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Carlucci: But Defense doesn't agree. Can't we drop this from Moscow and let them discuss it in Geneva. (S)

Adelman: It seems to me there is a lot of emotion here, but less disagreement than it appears. The first issue: do we talk? Of course we do. We did it in Reykjavik and Vienna. The second issue: do we change from the broad interpretation? No one wants to do that. The third issue: where do we talk? They won't accept the answer on the Hill that we aren't going to discuss this in Defense and Space. Thus we can't push this out of Geneva. (S)

Weinberger: But it makes a difference what we discuss. It's OK to repeat our past position but nothing more. (S)

Rowny: I support discussion in the ABM Treaty review. I suggest we hold the review in October and use that to put the issue behind us. We can then move to the broad interpretation. (S)

Carlucci: There's no need to cross that bridge now. (S)

Shultz: But it will come up in the ABM Treaty review. So we're not giving anything up by making that explicit now. We're just blowing smoke. (S)

Carlucci: But what do you gain by putting it in the Treaty review if we can't change our position?

Lehman: We need to watch where we stand on the Hill. The proposal is to put aside obstacles to getting agreement in Geneva. One obstacle is reductions beyond 50%, another is permitted and prohibited activities. Our NST focus is on 50% reductions and nondeployment. We are discussing permitted and prohibited activities in Geneva already. (S)

Weinberger: We should not be doing that. I'd like to know on what authority we are having such discussions. (S)

Carlucci: They talk, we listen. We are not going to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. (S)

Weinberger: But why even list areas of differences? (S)

Carlucci: We must get beyond this issue. Let's turn to 50% reductions. We all agree our primarily focus is 50% reductions. What is a reasonable timeframe to get the 50%? (S)

Crowe: We have problems with 1991. Originally we said we could support five year reductions *if* we got adequate funding for Strategic Modernization, *if* we had the full five years to do it, and *if* we got extra spending for the B-1. We didn't get those things. In our view, the longer the better, in terms of reductions. We would prefer 1996. 1991 is becoming harder every day. We can't certify the military sufficiency of such reductions (*Weinberger* interrupts: "We agree with that.") We can play with 1996 and shave a year or two. (S)

Carlucci: Does 1996 give you a problem George? (S)

Shultz: I work for the President. He wants radical reductions and soon. You'll still have 6,000 warheads when the reductions are over. That's more than in 1972 and more than in 1980. (S)

Carlucci: We all work for the President, George. (S)

Weinberger: But we can't abandon military sufficiency. We need to achieve reductions in a reasonable period. (S)

Shultz: You'll still have 6,000 left and 4,800 ballistic. (S)

Crowe: But there are substantial differences in the target bases. We just don't see how we can get there. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets don't care about 1991. They would prefer longer. If we agree on 50% reductions we can negotiate a time. This is not a big deal. (S)

Carlucci: Do you agree [to Mr. Gates]? (S)

Gates: The Soviets will have problems with 1991. (S)

Shultz: 1991 came out of the discussions on the July 25 letter.⁴ Cap wanted to keep a five year period ending in 1991 to avoid extending any restrictions on Defense and Space. Five years came out of our Defense and Space offer and START became locked into the same period. This was not thought through. (S)

Crowe: The first time 50% in five years came up was at Reykjavik. (S)

Shultz: We are loosening our position from Reykjavik. Why could we not talk in terms of five years from the date of signing? I'd like to keep the phrase "five years" in. (S)

Carlucci: One of the criticisms of Reykjavik was lack of military analysis. We have that now. (S)

Crowe: We had always looked at 50% for ten years not five. The first time five years was looked at was post-Reykjavik. (S)

Perle: Why not appear to be flexible and agree to the Soviet interest in a longer period of reductions? (S)

Baker: Which is more difficult, the Soviet or the U.S. problem with reductions? (S)

Crowe: There is a fundamental asymmetry in the target base which makes it easier for them. They have fewer targets and more weapons. But the Soviets will have problems in five years; they are an inflexible system. (S)

Rowny: The Soviets will not want to change the start timing. Public won't care about the timing. (S)

Lehman: We can portray this as helping the Soviets; making a gesture to help them accept sublimits. The idea was to get reductions done and locked in prior to a SDI deployment decision. That way our SDI decision would not be held hostage to the Soviet pace of reductions. For this reason there is a down side to 1996. (S)

⁴ See Document 138.

Weinberger: There's a worst danger if we can't get forces to cover half the target base. There's no way to do this in five years. We can't certify the military sufficiency in five years. We need to go to ten years. (S)

Adelman: You're saying we need more money to do this in five years (*Crowe* agrees). Congress will expect us to be saving money from 50% reductions (*Miller* agrees). If we say it will cost more it will hurt us. (S)

Shultz: We must make it clear that this program is a program to spend more money. We need more money to get the reductions we want. (S)

Baker: I think, as a political matter, you have a better chance of enhanced funding if you get visible progress in arms control. (*Shultz* agrees; *Weinberger* says we'll never get the money.) (S)

Shultz: I suggest Bob [Linhard] and Ron [Lehman] play around with options for START instructions. They should look at sublimits and timing. The more confining the sublimits are, the harder they are to implement quickly. We should work around the amount of time and try to see if different times give positions that are helpful. (S)

Carlucci: Yes, we can do that. But it's risky for the President to get too far beyond the JCS on this matter. (S)

Crowe: If we move quickly the ATB will not be ready. So we will have to buy *more* B-1Bs. Takes four years from ordering to delivery. I would try to do it, but we may not be able to. (S)

Baker: Let me give you a political assessment. We have to get away from confrontation with the Congress or we will lose \$22 billion. There is no way to do that except by an arms control agreement, or at least a ray of hope of one. That is the only formula for a bipartisan foreign policy. Thus there is some chance of more funding if we get that ray of hope. (S)

Weinberger: OK, but we must have military sufficiency. In five years you will need more money; in ten years we can work the political problem. (S)

Baker: We need an options paper for the President. For the letter I think we should say as little as possible. (S)

Carlucci: OK, we can throw this into the working group. We need to keep the sublimits and to keep close to the JCS position. (S)

Baker: I would like the relative costs of reductions over ten years versus five years. (S)

Carlucci: We can't work all options. Do we need more options George? (S)

Shultz: No, we just need to try to get into position to do something in Moscow. I want to avoid just sitting there like a bump on a log. We

are not likely to make progress but we want to be ready. Remember they are going to have problems. Their SS-20s are going to be gone too. Consider their problems. (S)

Carlucci: Yes, but the SS-24/25s will cover SS-20 targets. (S)

Weinberger: Yes; there will still be a hundred [SS-20s] in Asia. (S)

Perle: We should recall that the START timing will turn out to be the SDI timing. (S)

Carlucci: Yes we need to look at the question of nondeployment. Must it be coterminous with the START reductions. (S)

Weinberger: No. I don't like nondeployment but if it helps I am willing. We should not make an agreement beyond 1994. I.e., we will agree not to deploy as long as we can't deploy, but not beyond. We should not have to ask anyone for permission to deploy. (S)

Perle: It will be difficult to ask to deploy before the period of reductions end. (S)

Carlucci: [To Weinberger] You still like the idea of a treaty which novates the ABM Treaty. (S)

Baker: Why not just a nondeployment promise? (S)

Weinberger: We want to specify that we will be able to deploy. No one should be able to stop deployment. (S)

Shultz: Someone can stop deployment. (S)

Weinberger: Yes, Congress. (S)

Crowe: The draft says that we won't deploy "ABM systems". This gives us problems. We need to be able to deploy the BSTS system [Boost Surveillance and Tracking System, a satellite system which will, among other things, replace the current early warning DSP satellites]. (S)

Adelman: The out is Ed Rowny's formula "not to deploy not currently permitted by the ABM Treaty". (S)

Crowe: I'm not sure that's a way out. (*Shultz* interrupts to ask what BSTS is.) We need BSTS to replace DSP. The Air Force decided to be clever and put the DSP follow-on into the SDI program. It existed before SDI and we need it for warning. Now we put it into SDI when SDI got going. (S)

Nitze: The Soviets have suggested it's OK to deploy such a system provided it's not tested in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S)

Crowe: OK, I just want to make sure that we can deploy. (S)

Weinberger: But this gets us way closer to discussion of permitted and prohibited activities. (S)

Lehman: Max [Kampelman] would like to shift to weapons in space, not systems in space. This would build on the February 1986 Gorbachev statement. (S)

Carlucci: How about just saying “defensive weapons” in space? (S)

Rowny: I agree. The Soviets are already pregnant on this whole issue. They are doing a great deal in space with military application, including things like their expedition to Mars. (S)

Perle: We have to take care. This is a terribly important issue. We are not doing it justice. We need to be very careful. Gorbachev’s *real* problem is that he wants to kill SDI. The distinction between sensors and weapons is a dangerous one. (S)

Carlucci: But we have to protect BSTS. (S)

Weinberger: We need to watch that we don’t alter deployment timing. Verification of any new restrictions is difficult. We are giving in to their agenda. (S)

Shultz: Does the distinction between nondeployment and non-withdrawal help us? If we say non-withdrawal, we don’t have the problem of saying what not to deploy. We won’t deploy. Maybe we should go back to the July formula of five years of non-withdrawal and two years of nondeployment, followed by freedom to deploy. (S)

Carlucci: Does that help solve the problem? (S)

Crowe: I’m not certain. (S)

Perle: BSTS isn’t a part of SDI, but it may be a part of it in the future. (S)

Carlucci: We need the capabilities. (S)

Adelman: One good idea is to avoid new language. I like Rowny’s formulation. The down side is that there has to be caveats to allow us to withdraw under certain circumstances, but they are all in our position now. The Hill will react badly if we change from non-withdrawal to nondeployment. It will be a signal we don’t want to stay in the ABM Treaty. That will be a bad signal to send. (S)

Rowny: The Hill knows that BSTS is in SDI. We need to find a way to protect BSTS. (S)

Adelman: If we have new language we have to explain it. Nondeployment is new language; non-withdrawal is old. (S)

Carlucci: Need to summarize. We will focus on START with some kind of new timeframe for 50% reductions. We will not look at zero ballistic missiles. On the 50% reductions, the JCS say ten years is best. We will look at that timeframe and see if it gives us any flexibility beyond sublimits. We can assume that in a longer timeframe there should be less problem for the Soviets to go to our proposed sublimits. (S)

Crowe (Interjecting): Applying sublimits to SLBMs gives us real problems. (S)

Carlucci (Continuing): Non-withdrawal coupled with some form of nondeployment restrictions is OK. Termination need not be cotermi-

nous with START, but political pressure will drive the time to about 1994. Discussion of permitted and prohibited activities will come up in the ABM Treaty review and in Defense and Space. I don't see any advantage to saying so however. George, is there any need to make this point now? (S)

Shultz: It's something to say. (S)

Carlucci: But it raises a flicker of hope that we will really do something. (S)

Lehman: There is a reason to get discussion out of NST. There is always pressure to negotiate in that forum. (S)

Weinberger: We are under no pressure. (S)

Carlucci: Yes we are. We're under pressure, but this may not relieve that pressure; instead it could raise pressure and raise hopes as well. (S)

Weinberger: It will as long as you have an idiot at the SCC who is unable to read his instructions. (S)

Shultz: We are going to a serious meeting with serious people. Reductions are important. We need to make serious proposals and not back off from them. (S)

Carlucci: I think we have a serious proposal. Our proposal is not to discuss permitted and prohibited activities. You want to temporize; that's OK but we must not raise false hopes while we're temporizing. (S)

Lehman: In Moscow and in NST we say here's our proposal. What do we say when they ask us about permitted/prohibited activities? There will be a lot of pressure. We are not proposing putting this into the SCC, but into a separate ABM Treaty review. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets will not press. They understand that if they want the gains of an arms reduction agreement they will have to deal with this Administration and that means accepting SDI. (S)

Carlucci: That depends on what you believe the Soviets' agenda is. If it is to reach agreement, you are correct. If it is to kill SDI, you are wrong. (S)

Shultz: Well we will try to give them something like non-withdrawal. If they raise other issues in Moscow we will repeat our position. (S)

Carlucci: The President said we were not going to negotiate permitted and prohibited activities. The question is how to temporize. If they raise this, what do we say? (S)

Shultz: We say we are conducting our program in conformance with the ABM Treaty. We just repeat what we said before. (S)

Adelman: Does all this mean that zero ballistic missiles is dead? (S)

Carlucci: Yes, but how we handle it outside this room is very delicate. (S)

Shultz: We still have on the table our ten year proposal tied to zero ballistic missiles. (S)

Baker: The President wants to eliminate ballistic missiles. We must be careful. (S)

Shultz: The President thinks nuclear weapons are immoral and uncivilized. He wants negotiations to eliminate them all. (S)

Linhard: The Catholic Bishops say we are walking away from Reykjavik. We are saying no, the Soviets walked away. They turned it down, we moved on to something new. It is important that we not appear to be walking away in the President's vision. (S)

Nitze: The new deal does not look like a step forward. It may look like a negative move. (S)

Shultz: Fifty percent in five years is alright but the beginning date is shifted. (S)

Weinberger: Reykjavik came right off the wall. Won't have military sufficiency in five years. (S)

Carlucci: We have no problems with ten years. (S)

Perle: We should portray walking back zero ballistic missiles as a major concession to the Soviets. We should not just set it aside. (S)

Baker: The President won't set it aside. He would see it as a radical departure from his position. (S)

Carlucci: Zero ballistic missiles is a desirable future goal in conjunction with conventional reductions and SDI. I suggest we throw this issue to Bob Linhard and his group and ask for an answer by Friday.⁵ We have a meeting with the President scheduled for next Tuesday.⁶ (S)

Shultz: I also need instructions on START, INF, CW, nuclear testing, conventional forces, etc. (S)

Weinberger: I would like to talk venue. There is no way to hold a serious meeting in Moscow. We need to shift it to Geneva. Odom [LTG William Odom, Director, National Security Agency] has made it clear that we cannot be secure in Moscow. (S)

Shultz: NSA says we can do it. We need instructions clear enough to let us discuss things seriously even if we are likely to be intercepted. We may need to fly cables to Helsinki for transmission to California and have the plane wait in Helsinki for an answer. (S)

Weinberger: Why not go to Geneva? (S)

Shultz: There is a home and home tradition for these sessions. It is my turn to go there. There is no reason to break tradition. (S)

⁵ April 3.

⁶ April 7.

Weinberger: But we have no secure enclosure. (S)

Gates: [less than 2 lines not declassified] (S)

Carlucci: We have a separate group working this issue. George, all issues are working. We can meet with the President on Tuesday and can meet ourselves sooner if needed. [Subsequently it was decided to hold another session on April 1, 1987.] (S)

Carlucci then closed the meeting asking the participants to keep the discussions private. (S)

186. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Principals Meeting¹

Washington, April 3, 1987, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Arms Control—Shultz Meeting in Moscow (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Ronald Lehman

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

Mr. Richard Perle

CIA

Mr. Robert Gates

OMB

Mr. James Miller

JCS

Admiral William Crowe

General John Moellering

ACDA

Mr. Kenneth Adelman

White House

Mr. Howard Baker

Mr. Frank Carlucci

General Colin Powell

Colonel Robert Linhard

Captain Linton Brooks

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0150 04/03/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

Minutes

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room. *Mr. Carlucci* began the agenda and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at *Tab B*.² [Note: Other than for this opening session, the talking points were not used directly.] (U)

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued (not verbatim): (U)

Carlucci: I propose to take these issues one at a time. The first issue is should the 50% START reductions be completed by 1994 or 1996. (S)

Crowe: We prefer a fixed time period from ratification, not a fixed date. We can live with 7 years. (S)

Weinberger: One driver is availability of bombers pre-ATB. Seven years lets us work the ATB gap. (S)

Crowe: If we do things earlier we'll need the B1B. (S)

Carlucci: Seven years from 1988 is 1995. (S)

Weinberger: This ought to be driven by military sufficiency. (S)

Carlucci: I agree; that's why I called on the JCS first. (S)

Adelman: This will not be an issue in Moscow and does not need to be in the letter. We should not spend time on this now but deal with it in the negotiations. Let them set the date. (S)

Weinberger: This is a fundamental issue. Mustn't shunt aside. (S)

Carlucci: But we have agreement, don't we George? (S)

Shultz: OK. If they don't want five years, make them pay for it. Reykjavik was a good position. This proposal was initially made in 1982; five years from 1982 is now. (S)

Carlucci: Did you agree with seven years? (S)

Shultz: No. I don't agree. I want the five year concept. Five years is better. We can't get an agreement before 1988. We are reducing to 1980 levels. Posturing to go in 5 years helps us. But sublimits are much more important. Let's try to get off this confrontation with the Congress. (S)

Weinberger: Five years from 1986 is hard; seven is better. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets don't expect to complete the reductions in 5 years. (S)

Shultz: I don't know why you say that, but if it's true we ought to get something for it. We called for reductions in 1982 of 50 percent in ten years. Ten years from 1982 is five years from now. (S)

² The talking points, attached but not printed, are at *Tab A*.

Crowe: We never have done analysis against a fixed date. It has always been in terms of a fixed period after agreement. (S)

Carlucci: We are arguing over something where we are in fundamental agreement. (S)

Shultz: No, I support five years. It's a good position. We want deep reductions soon. If we move from five years we ought to make them pay for it. Sublimits, however, are much more important than the time issue. (S)

Weinberger: Time is important because we want to maintain effective deterrence. As we come down in weapons our requirements must come down in parallel. We can't deny ourselves military sufficiency. (S)

Shultz: But you are moving as fast as you can on modernization. (S)

Crowe: Yes, but look at yesterday; House Armed Services Committee made drastic reductions. (S)

Shultz: Confrontation with the Congress isn't working. It's time to try a different approach like getting some arms control agreements. (S)

Gates: The Soviets will have a technical problem with drawing down in five years because of their ability to dismantle without impacting on other programs. That will be a consideration for their military; I'm not sure about the political leadership. (S)

Carlucci: We'll put these alternatives to the President: The JCS favor seven years and George favors five. (S)

Perle: We should avoid putting a date in the letter. (S)

Baker: I agree. Why do we need to tell him a date? (S)

Adelman: I agree. Why should the President get involved in this at all? Why do we need to bring it to the President? (S)

Baker: We must have a decision, but we don't have to put it in the letter. (S)

Carlucci: I'd like to move now to the Defense and Space area. I understand agencies are coming together. [general undertone of puzzlement] (S)

Linhard: [Reviews agency positions as set forth in *Tab B*,³ noting that agencies differ over issue of non-deployment versus non-withdrawal] (S)

Shultz: I prefer non-withdrawal. Our July 25 letter⁴ was a non-withdrawal offer; we shouldn't go back on that. (S)

³ Tab B, a paper prepared by the Arms Control Support Group, was not attached.

⁴ See Document 138.

Weinberger: At the end of this period, everybody must be able to deploy. Nondeployment is much better than non-withdrawal to ensure that we can. (S)

Shultz: We have the position on the table of non-withdrawal. As we get ready for negotiations we must not harden our position. That's what this would do. One approach is five years non-withdrawal, followed by two years of negotiations during which we would promise not to deploy. We proposed this in writing to Gorbachev less than a year ago. Walking back from it is a mistake. We put these views forward in Reykjavik. Of the options in the paper [Tab B], I think 1C is pretty interesting. Non-withdrawal for five years after entry into force or 1994 is good. But the proposal mixes the time periods. We should review our proposal. Three year nondeployment is good, but maybe it should come after 1994. (S)

Weinberger: If all we are doing is putting forward proposals developed last year under a flawed process, we don't need to meet. We now have a procedure where people's ideas get forwarded and reviewed, unlike last year. We must approach this subject afresh. (S)

Adelman: We need to keep it simple. We should agree to nondeployment in return for the right to deploy. It's important to use words we have used before. What we should say is nondeployment of systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1996. (S)

Rowny: I see merit in 1994. We tell them let's talk about it from 1991 on, then we have the right to deploy. My understanding is that space systems won't be available before 1996 anyway. (S)

Weinberger: We don't need anyone's permission to deploy. We have the right on six months notice. We should not bargain for that. (S)

Adelman: Capitol Hill won't give you the green light without some form of arms control agreement. (S)

[Several simultaneous comments on what three years of negotiations after 1991 would mean. See Tab B.] (S)

Weinberger: We want an automatic thing. We want to avoid requiring a decision still to be made. The best formula is nondeployment through 1994, then deploy. We want the best provision we can get. 1994 lifts the bar, it doesn't mandate deployment. (S)

Perle: I have a much more fundamental problem. We may not be able to make a decision three years prior to deployment. We might put ourselves in a push to make a decision we won't be ready for. We need the broad interpretation to be ready by 1991. Under this non-withdrawal/negotiate plan we will have to signal deployment before we are ready. (S)

Nitze: We have to consult. We have to have a position we can sustain. (S)

Carlucci: You aren't suggesting that we negotiate the broad versus narrow interpretation, are you? (S)

Nitze: Sooner or later we must. (S)

Lehman: Richard's [Perle] problem only exists for five years. Thereafter the negotiations would take care of it. (S)

Weinberger: Our push should be deployment. Paul says it can't sell, but I don't think that's right. We must not preempt ourselves for fear of problems with the Congress or the Allies. (S)

Shultz: Nondeployment has problems. What exactly is it we will nondeploy? (S)

Rowny: After the ABM Treaty review we can go to the broad interpretation. You can't stay with a narrow interpretation until 1991. (S)

Shultz: We have a process going with Congress trying to get a broad interpretation that can be funded. It is very difficult. Paul's [Nitze] consultations with the SASC after the speech went well. It's a slow process. (S)

Rowny: We can sell it. (S)

Carlucci: You're saying nondeployment is more attractive than non-withdrawal. (S)

Nitze: Yes, for Wilson [Senator Pete Wilson], et al. (S)

Adelman: Non-withdrawal and nondeployment aren't really different practically. (S)

Weinberger: That's only true if we have the broad interpretation. (S)

Adelman: Gorbachev will like nondeployment. (S)

Weinberger: This is a new agreement. The only limits should be nondeployment. (S)

Carlucci: That's not the concept. (S)

Shultz: If we have nondeployment we could withdraw from the ABM Treaty for tests. Non-withdrawal is more restrictive. Thus I like a period of non-withdrawal followed by a period of nondeployment. I don't have any details on the program except what I read that General Abrahamson told Maggie [Prime Minister Thatcher]. Abrahamson won't talk to us. (S)

Weinberger: What good is non-withdrawal? (S)

Linhard: Do you believe you will have the political will to withdraw for tests? If you do, nondeployment is better; if not non-withdrawal is the same. (S)

Shultz: I heard the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is not in the security interest of the United States. (S)

Carlucci: I want to draw this to resolution. We need to address Richard Perle's point. Why have this three year period of negotiations? Is anyone for it? (S)

Shultz: It's part of our past proposal. The flaw in the thinking on MAD is the lack of the offense/defense regime. The Soviets reject sharing, so this is another way to try and devise a stable offense/defense regime. (S)

Carlucci: The President still likes sharing. Why not say the President still supports it and wants to discuss it in the three year period? (S)

Weinberger: Sharing is on the table, we should not walk back from it. (S)

Perle: If we must have a period prior to deployment, it must not be triggered by a decision to deploy. (S)

Carlucci: I didn't say that. We would have discussions on sharing in the transition. (S)

Perle: The right to deploy exists. [Remainder of comment garbled.] (S)

Weinberger: This approach is better. (S)

Shultz: Keep things simple. (S)

Baker: Sharing technology is key to the President's vision. (S)

Carlucci: Thus during this three year period we would have ongoing discussions which could include sharing. (S)

Crowe: I want to flag BSTS [Boost Surveillance and Tracking System—a satellite based detection system]. Sensors are a real problem in a nondeployment scheme. (S)

Rowny: We need to have a date by which we will go to the broad interpretation. I spoke to the Republican Steering Committee, fourteen of them. They are ready to wait provided we have a firm date. We will have consensus. (S)

Carlucci: As I see it we have come to two positions. The first is nondeployment through 1994, novation of the ABM Treaty, an automatic right to deploy, and no period of negotiation but a period of discussion before deployment. That I take to be the Defense position. The second position is State's. What is your position, George? (S)

Shultz: I don't know. I'll think it over and let you know before the end of the day. (S)

Carlucci: Last I heard it was five year non-withdrawal. (S)

Adelman: There's a third position. Nondeploy systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1996. (S)

Carlucci: If the President takes the DOD option we have to address what exactly we are promising not to deploy. (S)

Weinberger: Advanced defensive systems. (S)

Adelman: We should place a real premium on using old words. (S)

Crowe: Can we get language that permits sensors? (S)

Rowny: Akhromeyev told Poindexter in Reykjavik sensors were permitted. They don't want to limit sensors. This won't be a problem. (S)

Crowe: Then it's OK to say advanced defensive systems if Ed is right. (S)

Linhard: We can work this language. (S)

Rowny: Akhromeyev also wants to discuss this subject with Admiral Crowe. (S)

Carlucci: We have two other issues. On the notion of a predictability package, I understand no one objects. (S)

Shultz: What does this mean? (S)

Linhard: [Explains predictability package drawing on description in Tab B. Stresses it would be something like an exchange of Arms Control Impact Statements.] (S)

Perle: We should make sure this sounds like Mrs. Thatcher's so she gets the political credit. (S)

Carlucci: I agree. Then we all are in agreement. The second issue is Ken's proposal not to test weapons from space against targets on earth. (S)

Crowe: What good is such a restriction? (S)

Adelman: Such tests are a problem with Gorbachev. There is no ongoing program to do such tests in the United States so we are giving away nothing. (S)

Weinberger: We may need to test against targets on earth due to restrictions against testing in space. We ought not to give up any flexibility now. (S)

Adelman: In two years I've not met anyone who wants to do such tests. In any case it's repealable, it would not be a binding commitment. (S)

Crowe: Once you put something like this in, Congress will never let us get out of it. (S)

Perle: The issue with the Soviets is weapons of mass destruction. (S)

Weinberger: This could be in the back of our briefcase. We could agree at a critical point. Certainly don't want to do so now. (S)

Nitze: The Soviets haven't made arguments like this in months. (S)

Carlucci: We have enough for an options paper for the President. (S)

Shultz: I'm worried about the status of other issues. (S)

Linhard: On CW we have a paper from the IG [Interagency Group]. On testing we expect a paper shortly. All issues are working. (S)

Adelman: What is the subject of Tuesday's⁵ meeting? (S)

⁵ April 7.

Carlucci: To define the options for the President. (S)

Adelman: On what subjects? (S)

Carlucci: Primarily the subjects we have discussed today. (S)

Mr. Carlucci then closed the meeting at approximately 12:20 p.m. (U)

187. Memorandum From the Counselor-Designate of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 3, 1987

I was released from the hospital on Monday² and am feeling well enough to put down in writing for you my observations for Moscow and beyond. These are my personal views and concerns designed to be helpful to you and to anybody you care to share them with. They are not written for distribution, or as an effort to initiate any interagency discussion now for policy review:

I. MOSCOW

A. My doctors have asked me not to accompany you on the April 11 trip. I regret not being readily available to you on the scene, but we are not yet at that final crunch where we will be exercising final judgments.

B. When I was last in the Department, I learned you were seriously considering participating for a brief period at the Monday evening³ Moscow seder services planned by a member of our embassy staff. If so, I would be grateful if you would pass on my best wishes to those of the Moscow Jewish community who attend.

C. It is quite possible that Vorontsov may request an Eighth Round opening date later than April 23. The Soviets may need the time to

¹ Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 MAR.–APR. U.S.-Soviet Mtg. w/Gorbachev. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitiated copy. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. Kampelman sent the memorandum to Levitsky under cover of an April 3 note: "I'd appreciate it if the Secretary could have this for his weekend reading. Note my initial paragraph. I am not anxious for wide distribution so that those with whom the Secretary wishes to share it should keep it close hold." (Ibid.)

² March 30. Kampelman was recovering from a heart attack.

³ April 13.

complete their treaty drafts, or to work on what might come out of your sessions with Shevardnadze. My inclination has always been to avoid arguments on these kinds of peripheral issues. In this case, I would have a strong personal interest in having the opening postponed for at least one week and possibly two. Ron can also use the time to get his treaty draft through our processes.

II. *POLICY*

You may recall my conclusion last summer that we had just entered the beginning of what would be a long and arduous “end game.” That was so. The Soviets want an agreement. Whether Gorbachev “needs” one is beyond our ken and leads us to unnecessary theological discourse. I am convinced, however, that it would be an error to assume that any “need” is free of serious national interest limits.

There is concern in Washington about a “grand compromise.” I don’t share it. This was implicit in your Gromyko discussions. In effect, it means a package deal. This is by no means a danger to us if we keep our requirements always in mind.

A. *INF*

We should keep to the Reykjavik formula of reductions even though we have other preferences. We have a shot at “zero” global limits, or, possibly 100–100 with a global limit of 200, but only if we don’t appear to be demandeurs. Our chief problem here is with the shorter range. I am convinced that a package can include significant reductions in the 12s, 22s and 23s—possibly to zero. Karpov did not drop this thought at lunch without a basis for it. This would eliminate the “conversion” problem and give the Soviets political credit in Europe at very little military cost. I believe this INF issue is tailor-made for summit or pre-summit discussions.

B. *START*

We should inform the Soviets that it would be short-sighted for us not to proceed with our 6,000 warhead and 1,600 launcher ceilings. The remaining sublimit issue can be solved if we remain firm. They can accept our 4,800 ballistic missile sublimit and some modification of our 3,300 ICBM limit. We have the 50% cut in their SS–18s. We will have to drop our mobile ban as part of a deal. Ron has some thoughts as to how to button it all up when the time is at hand. It would be a mistake for us to settle for an INF treaty alone.

C. *DEFENSE AND SPACE*

We cannot obtain the 50% START reductions without an agreement on SPACE. This will have to be made clear to the President. I don’t

believe we have to or should be willing to pay a costly SDI price; and, indeed, if we handle ourselves carefully we can use an agreement to help restore a bipartisan SDI consensus in our country. The crux of the deal can be a 10-year non-deployment commitment, the one attributed to Gorbachev and Dobrynin by Jack Matlock's friend.⁴ (The Senator familiar with these talks is convinced we should hold their feet to the fire here.) Gorbachev's February 28 statement⁵ supports this conclusion. They will try to do better for themselves in the tough negotiations but we can hold tight. We should be willing to bargain on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty within that 10-year period. This package, however, will be difficult to put together if the Soviets believe they can get us to restrict our testing significantly. (My problem here with detailed "quantification" formulæ is that Washington is not and will not be able to resolve this issue in a timely fashion, and we should not lead the Soviets to miscalculate.) That is why I want to kick this can to a follow-up negotiation. I am aware that a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is relative or empty while we differ as to what the Treaty provides. I am, therefore, attracted by Ken Adelman's particular cosmetic proposal that until we resolve the issue in the later negotiations, we pledge not to test weapons in space aimed at targets on earth. We should also try to find a way to reaffirm the President's commitment that SDI is purely defensive.

III. CONCLUSION

You and I know that arms reduction and control are only one aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations. Our ultimate task is to help stabilize these relations so that we patiently and experientially persuade the Soviets that it is in their interest to become responsible members of the international community. Negotiations and agreements between us help, but even should we come to a full Geneva accord in these negotiations, we will still be much nearer to the beginning than to the end of the process.

I have raised with both Karpov and Vorontsov the desirability of arranging for a continuum of arms negotiations between us with one set of agreements relating to a new set of negotiations. You will recall that in Madrid we established a whole series of CSCE discussions leading to Vienna which have proved to be helpful.

As I see it, here is the list of future talks that seem to be evolving:

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ In telegram 02986 from Moscow, March 2, Combs reported on Gorbachev's February 28 announcement that he was "delinking" Soviet pursuit of an INF accord from efforts to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870172–0717)

1. New talks on the shorter range missiles;
2. Reductions in INF to zero worldwide if we don't achieve it now;
3. Negotiations on further cuts in offensive START missiles;
4. In-depth exploration of the offense-defense relationship as we reduce offensive strategic missiles, particularly in the light of rapidly developing technology. (The Soviets will be sensitive about the wording of this task, because we will want to explain to the Congress and our public that this, in effect, strengthens the legitimacy of SDI); and
5. Detailed negotiations to clarify existing differences between us as to what the ABM Treaty means. We can do so under Agreed Statement D, although the Soviets may wish to justify it under their own terms. These talks should be of limited duration, perhaps a year. (If we assume NST treaties effective, after ratification, September or October 1988, the new negotiations should begin with a new administration in February 1989). It is in our interest as well as the Soviet's to deal with these issues and not permit open sores to fester too long.

188. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 7, 1987, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Trip to Moscow

ATTENDEES

The President	Mr. Robert Gates
The Vice President	Mr. Douglas George
Mr. Craig Fuller	Attorney General Meese
Secretary Shultz	Secretary Baker
Ambassador Ridgeway	Mr. William Martin
Ambassador Nitze	Mr. James Miller
Ambassador Rowny	Dr. William Graham
Ambassador Lehman	Mr. Kenneth Duberstein
Secretary Weinberger	Senator Howard Baker
Dr. Fred Ikle	Mr. Carlucci
Admiral Crowe	Colonel Robert Linhard
General Moellering	Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Director Kenneth Adelman	

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0151 04/07/1981. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a list of participants; at Tab B an agenda and undated memoranda from Carlucci to Reagan on the NSPG meeting; and at Tab G additional preparatory materials. All brackets are in the original. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 12:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

- Tab A—Meeting Attendance List
- Tab B—Meeting Agenda and Meeting Memo
- Tab C—President's Opening Remarks
- Tab D—Mr. Carlucci's Arms Control Talking Points
- Tab E—Decision Memo on Nuclear Testing
- Tab F—Mr. Carlucci's Non-Arms Control Talking Points
- Tab G—Preparatory Materials

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room, with the President reading from his Talking Points (see Tab C).²

SHULTZ: The pattern of Soviet behavior is similar to pre-Reykjavik period:

—They are laying back, but filling the air with hints about progress in arms control.

We need to consider what we want from this meeting. The Soviets have signaled that they are ready to delink the INF negotiations. We need to see if they are serious. We have had a lot of activity on bilateral issues since Reykjavik. The Soviets have fulfilled their Reykjavik commitments in the bilateral area. The commitments were made in the all night session on non-arms control chaired by Roz Ridgeway and includes things like a bilateral commission, which has been functioning.

Also, on regional issues, a lot has been done. We believe we should hit both issues heavily. In the regional area, we will hit them hard on Afghanistan. To solve this problem, they need to get out of Afghanistan.

It may be that I can do something on South Africa. I met with Savimbi when I was in Africa. This has never been made public and has not leaked. Now it is likely to be in the paper tomorrow. My intention is to probe on this, especially on Angola.

On human rights, we will have to give credit where credit is due; but the glass in this area is still only seven-eighth full.

The subject of arms control will also play an important part in this meeting. As before, an INF agreement seems near; but our priority should be in the START area. There are a great many arms control issues, but I will leave that for later discussion. We will go to Moscow ready to discuss all subjects in a sober minded manner. I feel under no pressure to come home with any agreements. As with our dealings

² Attached but not printed are Reagan's talking points, which include: "While arms control is certainly important, we must always remember that it is *not* the primary measure of the US/Soviet relationship; and it is *not* in our interest to allow it to appear so. George, I know you will balance your time with your counterpart so that human rights, regional and bilateral issues receive the appropriate attention. The rest of us must make sure that, in talking about our dealings with the Soviets, we don't overemphasize the role of arms control."

with the Soviet Union in the past, the atmosphere can turn up or down on a very short-moment's notice because of what they do. At any point, the snapshot of the situation may be bad, but the overall trend is good. We have had events in the past (i.e., KAL 007, etc.), and now we have the Embassy problem. It does make it difficult to talk to them. Carter said after the Afghanistan affair that he was surprised and learned a lot. We were not surprised by the fact they set up such a hostile environment in Moscow. I will make the Embassy situation the first issue we discuss.

[The President intervenes.]

THE PRESIDENT: At Reykjavik and Geneva, I told Gorbachev that we would never take bows for causing them to improve their human rights. George, you ought to remind them of this.

SHULTZ: When we negotiated about Danilov, Shevardnadze pledged to do a number of other things. About two-thirds of our list has been acted on. I intend to tell Shevardnadze that we are glad to see what has been done, but we still need more.

CARLUCCI: Well, we have a very short amount time; we're going to run over time; let's turn to the arms control area. (Mr. Carlucci read his Talking Points until he got to Nuclear Testing—see Tab D.³ At that point, he noted that the President had a decision package on this, but likely had not read it as yet.

[The President then interrupted.]

THE PRESIDENT: I have the read the package; let me read to you my conclusions. (He then read the recommendation highlighted at Tab E.)⁴

CARLUCCI: That is fine; we will incorporate into Shultz's instructions, and continued on the START area. (Read the Talking Points on START—see Tab D.)

CROWE: The JCS prefer a time period (i.e., seven years) rather than a fixed date for accomplishing the reductions. We prefer seven years versus five years as the time period. And by not having a fixed

³ Attached but not printed are Carlucci's talking points, which include: "In START we agree our main goal is 50% reductions. There are two issues. For military reasons these reductions must be stretched out beyond 1991. Cap and JCS prefer seven years from the date a START treaty takes effect. George prefers five years. If treaty next year, this means reductions complete in 1994 or 1996. There is a separate issue on whether to alter our position on sublimits and mobile missiles, and if so how."

⁴ Attached but not printed is an April 6 memorandum from Carlucci to Reagan forwarding an undated decision paper, "Entering Nuclear Testing Negotiations," which recommended that Reagan authorize Shultz "to propose a sequential negotiation in which discussion of an *agenda* for the second step (i.e. intermediate limitations) could occur during the first step (negotiation on TTBT/PNET verification improvements)." Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation.

date, we avoid the Congress targeting that date and using it to cut our programs.

WEINBERGER: We need more resources to safely make reductions we are committed to. We need time to produce and get delivery of the systems that we need. For example, if we require the B-1, we need to reopen the production line. We strongly recommend a longer time to avoid any degradation in military sufficiency.

SHULTZ: We proposed reductions in 1982; this is not a new idea. It has been five since we made the initial proposal for 50% reductions. We proposed five-year reduction period for 50% in Reykjavik; the public sees our offer as five-year 50% offer. Five years puts a burden on the Soviets also; we shouldn't forget that. The United States should be seen as standing for quick reductions. To accommodate the JCS, I have suggested a change. In Reykjavik, we said 50% reduction in five years through 1991. The recommendation that I make is to keep the five-year commitment, but make it five years from the point when the treaty is entered into force. This, in fact, moves us to seven-year commitment. It's important that we keep perceptions of our position as consistent. Military sufficiency is important, but it important that we keep our perceptions of our position consistent.

WEINBERGER: Military sufficiency is more important than imagery; the Soviets have an easier time of adapting than we do.

PRESIDENT: Are we basing military sufficiency on idea that reductions in nuclear forces will put more of a strain on us than in the conventional area?

WEINBERGER: Yes, we need to adjust our nuclear forces to make sure that we fill in the gaps, and that the asymmetries that remain are properly handled.

CROWE: The main reason that we require this additional time is that there are different targeting requirements (for the US and USSR). We need to make sure that we can cover their target bases with a 50% cut. We should be able to adjust to this, but we need time. For the Soviets, a 50% cut cuts into their reserves, not into their primary targeting assets.

SHULTZ: When you do your military sufficiency calculations, do you factor in China, Japan, and the like as Soviet targets?

CROWE: No, not now—but we are trying to factor this into our future work. It would certainly enlarge their (the Soviets') targeting requirements.

CARLUCCI: Let's move on to Defense and Space, because the intent is not decide an issue but make sure the considerations are on the President's mind. The main issue was whether we should commit not to withdraw or not to deploy something. Secretary Weinberger, you favor nondeployment through 1994. Would you like to open up?

WEINBERGER: No. I favor deployment as early as we can. But due to the political realities in the situation, given the choices we have, I would favor as short and less restrictive constraints on us as we possibly can get. A commitment not to deploy “operational systems” or systems “not permitted” by the ABM Treaty is okay provided that we have the broad interpretation of the Treaty. A commitment not to withdraw gets us into compliance, and I certainly don’t want to give up any of our sovereign rights. Our objective should not be to preserve the ABM Treaty but to preserve our right to deploy. So we should offer the most limited restrictions that we can, and that would be a nondeployment commitment through 1994.

CARLUCCI: In both cases, either nondeployment or nonwithdrawal, we are talking about some type of treaty that would novate the ABM Treaty.

WEINBERGER: That’s absolutely essential.

SHULTZ: In conjunction with our five-year proposals, we would favor taking a similar position in the area of defense and space. We have talked in the past about nonwithdrawal. We’ve talked about nonwithdrawal for five years in the July, 1986, letter, and we talked about nonwithdrawal for 10 years in Reykjavik. A nonwithdrawal commitment does not inhibit our ability to withdraw for certain reasons. For example, for supreme national sovereignty, for supreme national need, or in the face of noncompliance. If we shift from nonwithdrawal to nondeployment, we are signaling that we may wish to withdraw from the Treaty. The JCS has often said that this is not in our interest; it is not in our interest to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. And it’s certainly not in our interest to give Congress the impression that we are prepared to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In our idea, there would be a 10-year period composed of eight of nonwithdrawal, and two of negotiation of transition. We would commit not to deploy during these two years and use the time for negotiation and discussion of ideas like zero ballistic missiles, sharing, and internationalization of SDI. We could do testing during this period under any interpretation.

WEINBERGER: I really don’t care what we said before concerning nonwithdrawal; that was rejected by the Soviets. What we need to do now is make the best case of what we *need* under the current conditions. Given the SDI rate of progress, I would argue nondeployment is more appropriate. In the final analysis, the question is do we want to deploy or not. If we want to deploy, as I believe we do, we should put the minimum number of hurdles in front of us. We need a very clear statement no matter what we do that at the end of the period, both sides are free to deploy. So, therefore, again I’d like a minimum number deployment offer—the idea of first period of nonwithdrawal and then a period of discussion ties us down too much.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, in Reykjavik, the commitments made were associated with zero ballistic missiles and sharing.

SHULTZ: We have never offered to nondeploy. We've always offered nonwithdrawal, both in the letter and in Reykjavik.

THE PRESIDENT: I remember the JCS saying that if the Soviets are released from the ABM Treaty, it's worse for us. And I know they mean that we free them from the letter of the Treaty, because they are clearly doing things that are not consistent with the Treaty now. Freeing them from the letter of the Treaty could cause us risks.

CROWE: We certainly made that statement, and we certainly believe should keep the Soviets under the Treaty as long as we can, but the Chiefs support deployment of SDI as soon when it's ready. Mr. President, I would also like to tell you that we need a DSP follow-on. It is called the BSTS. It is now part of the SDI program, and it will function within that program, but we need for indications and warning now, even though it's associated with SDI. Therefore, we want the maximum protection we can. The Chiefs would support some type of commitment for nondeployment of operational systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty so that we would have some protection for our BSTS deployment.

SHULTZ: A nonwithdrawal commitment avoids any problem with the language, it would certainly not signal any problem in that area.

WEINBERGER: I'm worried about the imagery too. I don't like trying to explain to the public that we're committing to a nonwithdrawal except for conditions A, B, and C. I think that's bad.

SHULTZ: There are a lot of conditions I can think of for exceptions—compliance, supreme national issues, and others.

CARLUCCI: We would certainly wish to accommodate Admiral Crowe and the concerns about sensors, no matter what we do.

SHULTZ: We have no disagreement on this point. That's important.

CARLUCCI: We have one other issue and that's the prohibition of space toward testing. (He read his Talking Points—see Tab D.)

ADELMAN: We need to reassure the Soviets that we are not interested in hitting targets on earth; we could do so by simply committing to reassurances that we would not test things in space against the earth. Such a commitment would be harmless for us and help with public relations. Some argue that we may not want to do this because we may want to do something in this area in the future, but that's true of all arms control. If you keep all your options open, you'll never get any arms control. And, secondly, I'm not proposing anything in a Treaty form; rather unilateral guarantees or mutual guarantees that we could change later.

CROWE: I don't see where we are under any pressure at all to do this. And I'm reluctant for us to make offers in this area unless we

absolutely have to. Many of the areas that we are seeing with respect to space are non-SDI related, and they are very promising; many are conventional. Therefore, I don't recommend that we do this. I don't think it's non-harmless.

WEINBERGER: I also don't see such a gain in doing such a thing, and I'm reluctant to put more hurdles in front of the SDI program.

CARLUCCI: Fine, let's end the arms control part of the discussion at this point; are there any comments?

ADELMAN: If we want 50% reductions, then we need to build up other categories of strategic weapons to maintain military sufficiency. We need to make this clear to everyone in this room and everyone who talks about it. Beyond that, if we need to build up our forces to get to the position where we can survive 50% cut, and if Congress cuts our funds/resources, we ought to make sure that everyone understands that we need the military capability provided by modernization; and it's denied, we may have to break out of any commitments made.

SHULTZ: The stuff that you need (addressing the Chiefs) are those modernization programs in the budget.

CROWE: The President's strategic modernization program permits many of the problems to go away. For example, if we could wait for the ATB to come on board, that would solve some of our problems. Our purpose is not to build weapons, but to keep the equitable risk on each side as we drop the number of weapons, through the modernization of a number of systems. We need to maintain target base coverage. If both we and the Soviets go below 50% reductions, we may be able to share the hurt in some respects. And the seven-year period certainly lets us stretch out the needed modernization to make it more acceptable to Congress and doable.

WEINBERGER: We do know that many of the things are in budget, but we ought to remember that we don't often get everything that we ask for in the budget.

SHULTZ: Let's stop discussing this area before we decide that no arms control is possible.

MILLER: Many on the Hill think that reductions lead immediately to a dividend, a cut in defense spending. We need to make it clear that this idea is not true.

SHULTZ: I have been arguing often and loudly lately that a non-nuclear defense is more expensive. We must make it clear we are going to need more defense funds to go to less nuclear weapons.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree. If my veto challenge doesn't help us get more funds for DOD, I've got another idea—let's pay the Congress in rubles.

CARLUCCI: Let's move on to the non-arms control area. (He used Fritz's Talking Points—see Tab F.)⁵

NON-ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SHULTZ: I will hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan, even though I see some positive signs on Angola. However, I am not sure about Nicaragua and Cambodia. The message on Nicaragua would be "keep your cotton picking hand off Central America." On human rights, we plan to go beyond our usual lines—divided spouses, political prisoners, emigration, and fulfillment of Helsinki—to press on religious prisoners, freedom of mails, international telecommunications, jamming, and other media issues. The Soviets have proposed a human rights conference in Moscow (agreed by all to be an oxymoron); we have been in consultation with our Allies on how to treat this and believe that stating some firm conditions, such as freedom for non-governmental groups to participate openly, would give us leverage.

I am struggling with the right way to phrase a strong protest regarding the Soviet invasion of our Embassy. I have considered a message to the Soviets that states: "You are creating an environment so hostile and difficult that perhaps we shall decide to limit our representation to an ambassador and few other people, limits that would also apply to the Soviets in the US." However, I found this unappealing, but, at the time, was angry and felt that something needed to be done.

THE PRESIDENT: This is an illustration of my argument that military competition springs from mistrust, not the other way around, and here we have a Soviet action calculated to generate mistrust.

SECRETARY BAKER: Is this not the perfect time to cancel the Soviets' claim on their new chancery building on Mount Alto?

WEINBERGER: Our stress must be on complete reciprocity in these matters. There is no security for official Americans in Moscow, and none can be provided by vans and trailers introduced in a hurry.

THE PRESIDENT: Can't advanced technologies nullify Soviet penetrations?

WEINBERGER: This is being explored.

SHULTZ: Efforts are being made to provide secure voice, messaging, and conferencing for my trip to Moscow. I have been told that I can be confident in the security being provided. In fact, if needed, a small plane will be available to fly messages to Helsinki for transmission. At any rate, not going to Moscow would be a political defeat.

⁵ Attached but not printed is an April 6 memorandum from Ermarth to Carlucci forwarding non-arms control talking points.

WEINBERGER: I was merely calling for consideration of alternative sites, e.g., Geneva or Helsinki.

THE PRESIDENT: Again, I'm asking that we look to advanced technology to outfox the Soviets in this business.

SHULTZ: I agree, Mr. President. And in closing, I would like to note that, despite intermittent flaps over espionage and such matters, the President's agenda has dominated the US-Soviet relationship, and steady progress has been made since 1984 in pushing this agenda.

CARLUCCI: This is a good closing point, George. I agree. Mr. President, do you have any more comments?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I thank all of you for coming, and good luck in Moscow.

189. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 8, 1987

SUBJECT

Guidance for the Upcoming Shultz/Shevardnadze Meeting in Moscow

Issue

To document your recent decisions concerning our negotiating positions and provide instructions for Secretary Shultz' impending trip to Moscow.

Background

The Secretary of State departs on 11 April 1987 for meetings in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Discussion

Your review of our arms reductions negotiating position has resulted in adjustments to our positions in the areas of START, Defense and Space and nuclear testing. Attached (*Tab A*)² is a draft NSDD to document and disseminate your decisions.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Box SR 095, NSDD 267. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on April 9.

² Printed as Document 190.

The draft is deliberately brief, simply documenting your decisions without providing extensive details. With regard to nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it includes the safeguards we discussed earlier today and reflects your recognition, following extensive discussions both today and previously, that the issue is primarily political and diplomatic, rather than technical.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you sign the attached NSDD documenting your approval of the instructions for Secretary Shultz' Moscow meeting. ³

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

190. National Security Decision Directive 267¹

Washington, April 9, 1987

*REVIEW OF U.S. ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATING
POSITIONS (S)*

In preparation for the April 13–15, 1987, meeting between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, I have reviewed the current U.S. negotiating position on various arms reductions issues. This National Security Decision Directive documents the results of that review and provides guidance for the Secretary of State's use during that meeting. (C)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 095, NSDD 267. Secret. Carlucci distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Adelman, under cover of an April 9 memorandum: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive reviewing the current U.S. negotiating position on various arms reduction issues and providing instructions for use by the Secretary of State during the April 13–15, 1987 meeting between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the contents of this NSDD, access to this directive should be held to an absolute minimum and only to those who have a direct need for the information contained herein. Agencies will maintain records of all individuals to whom access is granted." (Ibid.)

Our basic positions are sound and require no revision. The Secretary of State should vigorously press the Soviets on our arms reductions agenda, while recognizing that bilateral issues, regional issues and human rights are equally important components of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union. (U)

Based on both an interagency review and my personal review of our positions, I have concluded that no new Presidential guidance is necessary in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional arms or Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). Our positions, as documented elsewhere, remain valid. The Secretary of State should press the Soviets to move forward on the prompt completion of an INF Treaty. (S)

After hearing the views of my senior advisors and reviewing the interagency examinations, I have concluded that modifications to current U.S. negotiating positions are appropriate with respect to strategic arms reductions (START), Defense and Space, and nuclear testing. (S)

START

Achieving broad, deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms remains our highest arms reduction priority. Arms reductions, however, are a means to facilitate national security, not a substitute for it, and our proposals require constant reexamination to ensure the resulting forces will be militarily sufficient. In Reykjavik we proposed 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms to be achieved by the end of 1991. That proposal was sound and, if it had been accepted, could have been implemented in a fashion that enhanced our security and that of our Allies. With the passage of time, however, it has become necessary to modify our approach. (S)

Based on the advice of my senior advisors, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States will propose that the 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms be completed within seven years of the time a START treaty enters into force. The Secretary of State should use his discretion on the manner of conveying this proposal to the Soviets. In so doing, however, he should stress that this altered period for reductions should eliminate any Soviet concern that our proposal—including our proposal for appropriate sublimits—will require unacceptable restructuring of Soviet strategic forces. (S)

With respect to other elements of our START position, I am unwilling to alter our position that mobile missiles must be banned. Because of the need to limit the most threatening and destabilizing Soviet systems, I also believe we must maintain our current requirements for appropriate addressal of ballistic missile throw-weight, reduction of Soviet heavy ICBMs, and a system of sublimits providing for no more than 4800 warheads on ballistic missiles, no more than 3300 warheads

on ICBMs, and no more than 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. (S)

While I am reluctant to alter our sound position on sublimits, I wish to seize every opportunity to use the meetings in Moscow to advance our agenda. The United States should not display any flexibility with respect to the 4800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit, appropriate reductions of ballistic missile throw-weight, or a 50 percent cut in Soviet heavy ICBMs. If, however, the Soviets show constructive movement toward our START position, including accepting the elements just noted, and if the Secretary of State believes it will facilitate further Soviet movement, he may explore raising the ICBM warhead sublimit from 3300 to 3600. Based on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on the fact that sublimits are designed to constrain the most destabilizing systems, I am unwilling to accept applying this sublimit to submarine launched ballistic missiles. The authority to raise our proposed ICBM sublimit from 3300 to 3600 is valid for the Moscow meeting only; I am not prepared to relax important constraints absent some constructive progress on the part of the Soviet Union. (S)

Defense and Space

Our principal goal in Defense and Space remains the preservation of our option to deploy, if we chose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible. I believe this represents our best hope for shifting the basis of deterrence in the direction of increased international stability and security. Because our past proposal was directly linked to a specific START reductions proposal which we have now altered, a revision of our Defense and Space proposal is also appropriate. I am, therefore, approving the following revision to our position, which the Secretary of State should convey to the Soviets in Moscow:

a. *Non-Withdrawal*. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50% as scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty).

b. *Freedom to Deploy*. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

c. *ABM Treaty Restrictions*. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restrictions on both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

d. *Withdrawal/Termination.* The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or to withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized).

e. *Failure to Meet START Reductions.* Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

f. *Entry into Force.* This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50% reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force. (S)

In presenting this proposal, United States representatives must make it clear that (1) such a commitment would not alter our ability to withdraw from the treaty in response to a material breach or because of supreme national interest, and (2) we will continue to insist that the Soviets redress their violation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

In addition, to meet stated Soviet concerns with being able to predict the course of future research, the Secretary of State may propose a "predictability package," based on suggestions raised by Prime Minister Thatcher with me and subsequently with General Secretary Gorbachev. In addition to our previous "open laboratories" proposal and our proposal for reciprocal observation of testing, this package might include a formal annual exchange of programmatic data. It is not my intent that such a predictability package entail any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond those indicated above. (S)

I am not willing to alter current guidance with respect to the negotiation of permitted or prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty. Nor am I willing, pending further understanding of SDI testing requirements and non-SDI related potential future capabilities, to agree to any ban on testing weapons from space to earth. (S)

Nuclear Testing

My highest priority in the nuclear testing area remains obtaining the necessary verification improvements in the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) so that these treaties are effectively verifiable. At Reykjavik, both sides agreed that, in the future, a single negotiating forum could cover TTBT verification improvements, intermediate testing limits, and the question of the eventual total elimination of testing. Our sequential approach

would deal with the necessary TTBT/PNET verification improvements first. Only after our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, would we begin to negotiate ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing. I remain committed to that approach. (U)

Because of these priorities, I cannot accept the recent Soviet suggestion for simultaneous negotiations on verification improvements to the TTBT/PNET and intermediate limitations (such as reductions in yields or numbers of tests), especially since the Soviets persist in characterizing such negotiations as negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban (CTB). At the same time, I wish to build upon the positive elements of the Soviet offer. Therefore, at his discretion, the Secretary of State may attempt to exploit the Soviet movement by repackaging our position with a counter proposal to begin sequential negotiations in which:

- the first step would be TTBT/PNET verification improvements,
- the second step would be negotiations on the step-by-step parallel program we have proposed, but
- discussions on the agenda for the second step could occur in parallel with TTBT/PNET verification improvement negotiations. (S)

Previous Guidance

Previous guidance on U.S. negotiating positions, and previous U.S. offers to the Soviet Union remain in effect unless specifically superseded by this directive. (C)

Ronald Reagan

191. Editorial Note

On April 11, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz departed Washington for Helsinki, where he met with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto on April 12 before arriving in Moscow on April 13. In several private and plenary sessions that day, Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze discussed a range of topics, including Soviet penetration of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, human rights in the Soviet Union, and ongoing efforts at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to craft an Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 38–47.

Shultz and Shevardnadze's third session of April 13 focused on outstanding differences with regard to a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Shultz quoted "his favorite author, the General Secretary," who professed that "radical reductions in strategic weapons remain the root of the problem." The Secretary reiterated the basic principle, discussed at Reykjavik, of a 50% reduction to equal levels, and stated that such an agreement would include 6000 warheads, 1600 missiles and heavy bombers, and a heavy bomber counting rule. He went on to stress the importance the United States placed upon achieving additional sublimits on ballistic missiles, and to emphasize the destabilizing effects of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), in particular Soviet "heavy ICBMs" (i.e., SS-18s). Shultz proposed to limit the number of warheads on heavy ICBMs to 1500, and to pay "special attention" to missiles with more than 6 warheads, which posed "one more invitation to a first strike." An additional concern was mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, which Shultz proposed to eliminate, as part of an overall ICBM warhead limitation of 1650. In response, Shevardnadze expressed support for the basic formula of 6000 warheads and 1600 missiles, while reiterating Soviet objections to ceilings and subceilings. Shevardnadze also called for inspections of vessels carrying sea-launched cruise missiles, and for both sides to adhere to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Upon the conclusion of Shevardnadze's remarks, Shultz offered several rejoinders and proposed that the two sides instruct a working group to discuss strategic offensive weapons and space and report back to the secretary and foreign minister prior to Shultz's departure on April 15. (Shultz and Shevardnadze, April 13, 1987; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87) (declass) The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 39.

192. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 3–7:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev April 14

The Secretary met with Gorbachev in the Kremlin between 1500 and 1925 Moscow time April 14. The Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Paul Nitze, EUR Assistant Secretary Ridgway, EUR DAS Tom Simons (Notetaker), and Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter. Gorbachev was accompanied by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, CPSU CC Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to Washington, Yuriy Dubinin, Gorbachev Chief of Staff Anatoliy Sergeyevich Chernyayev, and P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter. Chief of Staff Marshal Akhromeyev later joined the meeting.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

On resumption,² Gorbachev asked the Secretary to summarize the positions of the two sides on strategic offensive weapons. The Secretary said he was a little disappointed. He felt we had moved a long way at Reykjavik but we did not seem to have moved any further. We agreed that at Reykjavik on limits of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 launchers and we also agreed to cut into the main elements of the various types of forces in the triad. He remembered that Gorbachev had used that kind of expression in Hofdi House.

Gorbachev said we had found a good solution there, of cutting every element by half. Nitze objects, but the President, had not. The Secretary said it was a question of translating the agreement into numbers. They had passed the issue over to Nitze and to Akhromeyev, and in their meetings they had come up with the very important rule on counting bombers. We had come up with numbers that were illustrative of how to cut into the forces. Starting with that idea, we have come down to equal levels, to equality recognizing the force structures that have emerged in different ways. It would be unreasonable for the Soviets to force us, or for us to force them to match structures. But we needed to come down through some process that gave stability

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Graze and Pascoe. The conversation took place at the Kremlin. The full memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 42.

² There was a break in the conversation from 4:45 to 5:10 p.m.

as it went along, recognize the various in force structures, and dealt with important weapons systems. So, in the process of the Akhromeyev-Nitze session³ and subsequently we had changed positions quite a lot to meet ideas that the Soviet side had put forward. He had thought we were getting somewhere, although the night before we had, if anything, gone backward.

Gorbachev asked in which elements the Secretary saw backward movement. The Secretary replied that the Soviet side had seemed to walk away from the concept of sub-limits. Even if we reduced on a mechanical basis, which made no sense, we would end up with sub-limits. We had expressed our view and provided some rationale, and we should argue back and forth.

The Secretary went on to say that within the total limit of 6,000 warheads we thought it important to state a limit on ballistic missile warheads. The reason was that by contrast to weapons delivered by aircraft, they were the most threatening. They were fast, they were accurate, they were non-recallable. The U.S. had suggested a limit of 4,800, derived from the idea of halving. The Air Force felt this would put quite a crimp in its forces since it suggested a limit of 1,200 cruise missiles and might limit the possibilities of the stealth program. It would also limit ballistic missiles on our submarines. It would keep alive our land-based forces, and as they were modernized it would squeeze submarine weapons further up against the ceiling. None of this was easy, but it seemed workable and we had thought that the Soviet side, with more or less the same kind of reasoning, had agreed on it. So we thought it important that there be a ballistic missile ceiling within the 6,000.

Gorbachev said that it seemed to him that we had decided at Reykjavik to do without sub-limits. What did we talk about, he asked. On strategic force structures both the USSR and the U.S. had its own specific features which had emerged historically. Both had all three legs, but the share of each was different in each country. The Geneva talk showed that neither side could agree on sub-limits. At Reykjavik it had been agreed that sub-limits led to an impasse. They were where the devil is, each side insisting on certain points that were not acceptable to the other. So, at Reykjavik the Soviet side had proposed to take what existed, the triad as it was, and to reduce it by 50 percent over the first 5 years. The triad would remain as it was, but with 50 percent remaining for each element. Gorbachev said he had asked himself before what the U.S. was after with sub-limits, and the U.S. had said that this was an acceptable approach. It was simple, it was understandable. If it were

³ See Document 159.

abandoned today, he would suspect the U.S. of seeking an advantage. It seemed to him the simplest and best way.

The Secretary said that it did not work. It did not give the stability, the equality, and equal numbers necessary. The general idea was to respect structures, but the idea of getting to equal numbers required a process that ensured stability. Akhromeyev and Nitze had worked on that. We were looking for more concrete expression of the more general idea. Simple arithmetic would not yield a good result. We were seeking reasonable reflections of our views. (At this point, Chief of Staff Marshal Akhromeyev joined the group.)

Gorbachev said their impression was that the U.S. was trying to make Reykjavik fall apart and blame the Soviets. The Secretary rejoined that we were just trying to make the approach work.

Gorbachev asked if the Secretary considered it correct to state that at present strategic parity existed. The Secretary said the Soviets had a greater number of strategic missiles than we did, that there were variations in structure and that their land-based missiles were awesome, far outstripping us. Developments in other fields were also impressive. The U.S. side thought the Soviets were formidable.

Gorbachev asked whether the Secretary meant to say there was no strategic parity. The Secretary said we would like to feel comfortable that we could give a good account of ourselves, but the Soviets had made an impressive modernization effort. They had many new systems. The number of warheads was growing at alarming rates. This had in fact led to the reinvigoration of our efforts during President Reagan's tenure.

Gorbachev said that by Soviet data numerical equality, even closely calculated, existed. The same held for the overall capability of the two sides. Parity existed at a high level, and reductions were needed, but it existed. The U.S. side spoke of the threat from Soviet land-based missiles. They felt an even greater threat from our less vulnerable and very accurate SLBMs. And as Shevardnadze had pointed, there existed a mechanism, in SALT II, that provided us with limits and reductions, even though it was not ratified. The Soviet side had taken reductions to be in compliance.

We had had a mutual understanding that there is strategic parity, Gorbachev went on. If the structure today provided for strategic parity, then there would be the same balance with a 50 percent cut, but lowered by half. Why not do this? There would not be anything new, and sub-limits would be avoided. Pushing for limits and sub-limits gave rise to mutual suspicions that bad intentions were involved in defining them. We needed simple means, and the Soviet side had thought we had a good one at Reykjavik. He was amazed that this was questioned.

He, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had been there, and the Secretary personally had supported this approach.

Shevardnadze added that when the Soviet side had proposed reductions by one half, it had proposed something it had never proposed before—50 percent reductions of its heavy missiles. Previously the maximum had been 33 percent. Second, a rule counting heavy bombers as one system had been agreed. We know how many weapons there are, so this was a principled question. Third, there was a question they had discussed the day before: it worried the Soviet side a little that the U.S. was adding a new timeframe, going from 5 years to 7 years. This looked like a hardening of the U.S. position compared to Reykjavik, as had also occurred in the space area.

Akhromeyev said he and Nitze had discussed sub-limits for about two hours. It seemed there was agreement at that time that heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one launcher and one warhead. For many years such a solution had not been found, and it had been a great accommodation for the Soviet side. Nitze had said that in that context the question of all sub-limits was removed, except for the sub-limit on heavy missiles. We had agreed on 50 percent cuts in other categories. That was the essence of Reykjavik.

Nitze said that when Marshal Akhromeyev and he had met, they had negotiated from 8:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., and reached no agreement. The reason that there was no agreement whatsoever was that Akhromeyev was insisting on 50 percent reductions by category from the levels then existing, and Nitze would not agree to anything that did not involve equal end levels. At 2:00 a.m. Akhromeyev rose and said he was leaving and would return at 3:00. They both left, and returned at 3:00, and he said he was authorized to agree to equal levels. This resulted in 1,600 launch vehicles on both sides, and 6,000 warheads on each side, including reentry vehicles, SLBMs, ICBMs and a number of long-range cruise missiles. Then the question arose as to how to count heavy bombers not carrying long-range cruise missiles. Marshal Akhromeyev suggested that heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs be counted as one weapon, warhead and delivery vehicle. Nitze had considered this a fair settlement of a difficult question.

Nitze continued that he had suggested a sub-limit of 4,800 for reentry vehicles, but Akhromeyev did not agree. He said he was authorized to reduce heavy missiles to half of what the Soviet side then had, but he was not authorized to agree to either 4,800 nor to 3,300 for ICBMs. Near 6:00 a.m. they began to work out a final set of three paragraphs on the extent of agreement achieved. He had suggested that a sentence be included to the effect that either side in follow-on negotiations was entitled to raise the question of sublimits. Akhromeyev asked that it not be included in the paragraph, and assured

Nitze it was not needed, saying that either side was free in a negotiation to raise what it thought fit. Nitze had asked that Akhromeyev give him his word that this was a situation on which Nitze could rely. He had assured Nitze that this was so, and on that basis Nitze had agreed not to include the sentence.

Akhromeyev said Nitze's account was essentially accurate except for one point. He had told Nitze he was authorized by his leaders to the rule counting bombers as one delivery vehicle and one warhead only on condition that the question of sub-limits thereby be removed. So that if the U.S. now withdrew from that agreement, the bomber counting rule should be withdrawn too.

Nitze said he did not remember this condition, but he was sure of the agreement that we could subsequently raise sub-limits.

Gorbachev said he remembered that Akhromeyev and Nitze had talked and had meetings, but then he had met with the President. They had considered the report of ten hours' work, and what agreements had been reached. He had a record of agreement to 50 percent reductions in ballistic missiles, and agreement to counting bombers with gravity bombs and SRAMs as one launcher and one warhead. There had been no mention of sub-limits.

But if one looked simply at the entire mass of strategic weapons systems reduced by one-half, Gorbachev went on, and the concession on heavy missiles, this was an improvement for the U.S., and a concession on the part of the Soviets. He asked the Secretary to recall that they had agreed and given the matter over to their negotiators. Where we had stumbled was on SDI, on the ABM problem. Now new questions were being raised, and were being used to weaken the Reykjavik agreement. He simply could not accept such an approach. The Soviet side did not want to outstrip the U.S., but to accommodate it. It had thought it could reach an agreement with this concession. Even the President had agreed to it all. The one question that remained was the concession he had asked for on SDI.

Gorbachev said he wanted to turn to the ABM regime. The U.S. had buried SALT, and nothing had been created yet to take its place. The burial was proceeding. Every Administration including the present one had issued reports until 1983 that underlined the one single interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Now the U.S. planned to go into space with weapons, and squeeze the Soviet Union from there. And that was in a context of a situation where chances were emerging to reduce strategic offensive weapons. That made the Soviet side suspicious. When the ABM Treaty limits looked too narrow for U.S. SDI plans, lawyers appeared with a broad interpretation. But so far they have not been able to prove it is correct even to the U.S. people. The Administration was going ahead without looking around. The Soviet Union had

had specific debates with the U.S., where it was hard to find answers. In this situation there suddenly came the idea of the U.S. side's extending the arms race into space. The Soviet side was supposed to look on this as routine, rain today but not tomorrow. But no: what was involved was changing existing ideas of parity and balance. Why should the Soviet side help, Gorbachev asked. He simply did not trust the U.S. side.

Gorbachev said he considered this a very critical moment in the process of reducing strategic offensive weapons. But as he had said on a number of occasions—and this was a position that was worked out—this was a serious matter, not a machine gun, serious. He had the firm conviction that if the U.S. side went to deployment of ABM in space, there would be no agreement between us even on 50 percent reductions.

The Soviet side was not engaged in that kind of research to the extent the U.S., Gorbachev went on. Soviet research concerned the ABM defense of Moscow, one limited anti-missile base. It was hard to predict the success of SDI; they would have to rely on the U.S. But he thought Americans did not invest in things that were not cost-effective, and that meant the U.S. thought it could be done. He thought that since the U.S. was that committed, the Soviet objective should be to take care of its own interest, not to make the U.S. task any easier. The U.S. was trying to impose a choice on the Soviets, and they preferred the U.S. discontinue SDI as unnecessary. But while the U.S. felt it might be able to do something with SDI, to gain advantage, or superiority, this was an illusion. The U.S. side would not achieve it. The Soviet response would be asymmetrical; it would not necessarily be in space; and it would be less expensive.

Gorbachev said that if the U.S. violated the ABM Treaty and deployed SDI, the Soviet side would implement its program to defend its interests. This would create a most dangerous situation. There would be no trust for the U.S., and the situation would not be quiet for the U.S. It would have to watch the Soviets, for they would not sit idly by. Gorbachev asked whether it was responsible policy to destabilize the existing arrangements and SALT at a time when the contours of a strategic arrangement were emerging.

The Administration had painted itself into a corner, Gorbachev went on. The orders had been placed. Industries had been engaged. It expected a technological breakthrough, with computers and information systems. Had it concluded, with President Johnson, that he who rules space rules the world?, Gorbachev asked. Mr. Secretary, he said, this was a grave illusion.

But if the Administration was that committed to SDI, he went on, he proposed to record the Soviet side's agreement to the U.S. side's conducting laboratory research. The SDI program would be preserved.

That was the thought, and they had returned to the idea. They could talk about it if it would help the Administration untie the knot. They were thinking of an interpretation of laboratory not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side could now explain, for the first time, that it consider laboratory work ground-based research in various scientific institutions and research centers, conducted without launching an object into outer space.

Obviously we could discuss in the negotiations which objects would be specifically banned from space, Gorbachev went on. This was a last effort. He had run out of gas for further new proposals. U.S. policy was one of extorting more and more concessions. This was not polite. Two great powers should not treat each other like that. In later years people would look back and wonder at it.

The Secretary said he was crying for Gorbachev.

Shevardnadze noted that the day before the Secretary had proposed a limit of seven instead of ten years for non-withdrawal. He cited the Russian proverb the further you go into the forest, the more firewood you see.

Gorbachev said he wished to end on this topic by saying that the Soviet side was ready to begin the process of working out an agreement to end all nuclear testing, with the understanding that we would begin with the treaties and further limitations.

In sum, said Gorbachev, the Soviet side was ready to work to develop key provisions for all agreements, on strategic offensive weapons, on space, on nuclear testing. These, with the treaty on medium-range missiles, could become the subject and the main result of a political agreement, and this could happen toward the end of this year or in the autumn. And if that happened the two sides could proceed to develop legally binding treaties between the Soviet Union and the U.S. on all three questions.

The Secretary said he would comment on all three areas but only briefly. The U.S. side was dedicated to trying to find agreement with the Soviet side in all three. He was even more aware after that day's discussion of how difficult it would be.

On strategic weapons, the Secretary said, since we were not able to agree on the kind of two-stage approach to vast reductions discussed at Reykjavik, we had concentrated on 50 percent reductions, which would in themselves be a magnificent and unprecedented thing to bring off. Gorbachev commented that this was again a retreat from Reykjavik. The U.S. was afraid to reduce nuclear weapons. Still the Soviet side was ready to proceed. Politics was the art of the possible.

The Secretary rejoined that as he had said to Shevardnadze we had made various proposals and none of them had rung a bell. We

had therefore gone to another one, not as large as the ones the Soviets had rejected. This showed how anxious we were to make an important agreement in this field. 50 percent would be breathtaking. Gorbachev said he agreed.

On sub-limits, the Secretary said perhaps we should not call them sub-limits; we might find another phrase. But we should hold on to the 1,600, the 6,000, the halving of heavy missiles, and we should try to hold on to the bomber counting rule. We should try to see how it was possible to squeeze the numbers to equality in a way that preserved some stability. Our 4,800 number is approximately half the Soviet number, based on the Soviet side's percentage. The point was that numbers are needed to make the principle real. A very strict inspection regime would also be needed. By the time we were through there would not be anything left in either country. We would not need intelligence services because everything would have been discovered.

The Secretary said the American side thought we should keep driving. We hoped to be in a position at the next START round to present a full draft agreement. We had no objections at all to setting out next fall or at some point, as definitively as possible, what a strategic agreement would look like, or what an agreement on space would look like, if we could find them.

We thought it important to recognize defense, the Secretary went on. The Soviets did recognize it, and we should more than we do. The Soviets had extensive air defenses. Like us they poured concrete around silos. They had their Moscow ABM, which we recognized was permitted. They had mobile systems, hard to verify. We both put missiles under the sea; that too was defense. The concept was as old as warfare. It was important to see that it could contribute to stability. This was what the President had tried to do. It would be good to engage at the philosophical level. He had given over a paper,⁴ and even though Karpov had said there was nothing new in it, it might serve to engage us.

Gorbachev said he thought it was a great historic misfortune that the President had met with Teller.⁵ Without that there would be no SDI. As to air defenses, the Soviets were doing them, the U.S. was doing them. But SDI was different. It changed the whole situation. The Secretary would recall the time it had taken us to develop an approach for treating existing arsenals the various commissions, Smith, Nitze. Now it seemed that instead of using that, the U.S. was opening up an arms race in space, all into the unknown, the devil knew where it

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Documentation on Reagan's September 14, 1982, meeting with scientist Edward Teller is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

would lead. Dreams were fine, they were important in politics, but one could not turn politics into dreams. As for strategic defense with an arms race in space, he rejected it. It would be destabilizing.

The Secretary said it was important to keep at work. The ten-year commitment had been offered in the context of elimination of all ballistic missiles. He had to point out that seven years was an eternity in U.S. political time, two Presidents away in terms of U.S. politics.

The Secretary continued that Gorbachev had mentioned nuclear testing. He knew Gorbachev had thought a lot about it. The U.S. placed importance on starting negotiations to deal with it. Shevardnadze and he had discussed finding a measure of agreement. They had talked of various means of verification under discussion by scientists, CORTEX, seismic. These ought to be tried out, to see what works best to try to improve what goes on. So they had assigned people from both sides to draft an agreement to start negotiations. They had reached agreement on all except the last paragraph, the Secretary said, and he had merged some language and brought it over. The way to get started with negotiations was to agree to start. If we had a start to negotiations right away, it should not be difficult to have the two treaties ratified by the fall. If the text he was presenting was agreeable, he would glad to be in touch with the President, and thought he would find it agreeable. They could thus agree here in Moscow and get started.

Gorbachev said he would have the comrades look at the issue as a whole, and would give a reply the next day.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary what he thought of the laboratory testing formulation. He (Gorbachev) saw the possibility of a compromise. The Secretary said he was willing to listen, but wished to give Gorbachev the President's view. This was that we had the ABM Treaty, and had a program conducted in accordance with it. (At the translation, Gorbachev said in accordance up to now, but not in the next stage. The Secretary assured him that it would continue to be.) The program would continue. Questions abounded, and no decisions on them had been made. We were making laborious progress studying them, largely in the Secretary's own department, and the results would be presented to the President, who would look at them and look at the program. Until then, he would see what could be done consistent with the Treaty. He was leery of changes. He was willing to listen, but in candor he had to say that the President's view was that the ABM Treaty gave us guidance. Gorbachev said the Soviets were not saying it should be changed, but observed. The Secretary said the U.S. was saying "let's observe it."

Gorbachev asked why the U.S. delegation in Geneva was avoiding discussion of what was permitted and not permitted under the treaty. The Secretary said he understood Ambassador Kampelman had given

many explanations. Gorbachev said he had his own information, and urged the Secretary to try to develop some new instructions.

Gorbachev appealed to the Secretary to give careful thought to all aspects of strategic offensive weapons across the entire triad and to related ABM Treaty questions. The President should look again at all aspects. The Soviet side thought compromise was possible on all aspects, without prejudice to the President or his interests. There might not be enough time to complete a treaty, but there was time to agree on basic provisions. There had been years of discussion, of clarifications. These were assets that should not be wasted.

The Secretary assured Gorbachev he would give the President a full report when he saw him in California, and would supplement his written report with a sense of how Gorbachev had said it, to give the full impact of Gorbachev's view, as the Secretary had given Gorbachev the President's view.

Gorbachev said he had covered all the ground he wanted to propose, and invited the Secretary to touch on items of interest.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

193. Telegram From the Secretary of State's Delegation to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 2300Z

Secto 6017. Subj: April 14 start working session

1. (Secret—Entire text).

2. Summary: In a two-hour, ten-minute April 14 working group meeting on START, Ambassadors Obukhov and Lehman dealt with sublimits, SLCM limits and deployed/non-deployed ballistic missiles. Obukhov resisted sublimits (beyond a fifty percent cut in heavy ICBM's); called for functionally-related differences and shipboard on-site inspection to distinguish between nuclear- and conventionally-armed SLCM's (but offered no concrete ideas); and said the Soviets were prepared to address the deployed/non-deployed missile issue in a positive manner. End Summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Immediate.

Draft treaty vs. key elements

3. Obukhov noted Shevardnadze's comment (April 13) that the sides should concentrate their efforts on achieving an LRINF treaty and a key elements agreement covering space and strategic offensive arms. Lehman recalled that Gorbachev had termed strategic arms reductions the "root" of the arms control problem; the U.S. intended to table a draft treaty text next round, and saw no reason the sides could not conclude a START treaty this year. Obukhov asked that the U.S. not exclude the possibility of a key elements agreement.

Sublimits

4. In a discussion which dominated most of the meeting, Obukhov dismissed sublimits as "irrelevant" within the context of a fifty percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. They had not been agreed in Reykjavik. The sides could discuss an eighty to eighty-five percent missile warhead sublimit and a sixty percent sublimit on weapons on any one leg of a side's triad, but only in the case that each bomb and SRAM were counted as a single weapon within the weapons aggregate. Obukhov stated that the sides should be free to determine their own force structures; the U.S. proposal—even if implementation of reductions were lengthened from five to seven years—still represented an attempt to restructure Soviet strategic forces, according to a U.S. plan that was not consistent with Soviet security.

5. Lehman rejected Obukhov's assertion that the counting rule for bombs and SRAM's had made a ballistic missile warhead sublimit irrelevant. The U.S. had accepted the bomber counting rule on the assumption that there would be missile warhead sublimits. This U.S. concern was well-known to the Soviet side; it was, moreover, hard to understand why the USSR now would not accept a concept (missile warhead sublimit) or level (eighty percent) that it had earlier itself proposed. This question was not resolved; there could be no START agreement without sublimits.

6. Lehman rejected the charge that the U.S. had agreed to drop sublimits, and said the Soviet proposal to offer the sublimits in the first place had helped with the climate which resulted in the Reykjavik meeting and the progress there. For Obukhov to suggest that dropping sublimits had been the price for the bomber counting rule was to suggest that net progress had not been made at Reykjavik by the two heads of state. Rather the Soviets' had given with one hand while taking away with the other. Furthermore, for Obukhov to suggest that the sublimits question had been closed at Reykjavik would imply that the START joint working document seeking to resolve this and other issues was not being worked in good faith by the Soviet side and that the Soviet side was not negotiating seriously here in Moscow.

SLCMs

7. Obukhov conceded that the Soviets had agreed in principle at Reykjavik to limit nuclear-armed SLCM's only, but the problem was how to distinguish nuclear from conventional systems. The Soviets had thus proposed to treat all SLCM's as nuclear-armed, to facilitate verification. But they had also suggested that non-nuclear SLCM's have some functionally-related differences, and that on-site inspection on each sides' naval vessels would be necessary. These ideas offered grounds for saying that there had been some narrowing of differences on this issue.

8. Lehman responded that the U.S. would not accept conventional SLCM limits. The U.S. was ready to consider the question of limitation of nuclear long-ranged SLCM's, but didn't know how such limits could be verified. In response to Lehman's questioning, Obukhov did not provide any examples of functionally-related observable differences for nuclear vs. conventional SLCM's.

Deployed/non-deployed missiles

9. Obukhov said the Soviets were prepared to approach the question of the terms "deployed" and "non-deployed" ballistic missiles positively. But the sides would have to agree on what was meant by "deployed" and "non-deployed."

10. Obukhov and Lehman agreed to report to ministers on their exchanges.

Shultz

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 15, 1987, 2:10–4:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary Shultz

Amb. Nitze

Amb. Matlock

Amb. Lehman

Amb. Glitman

LTG. Moellering

Mr. Adelman

Mr. Ermarth

Mr. Simons

Mr. Parris

Mr. Stafford (notetaker)

Amb. Ridgway

Amb. Rowny

Amb. Cooper

Amb. Holmes

Mr. Perle

Mr. Linhard

Mr. Mobbs

Mr. Timbie

SOVIET

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Vice-Minister Bessmertnykh

Amb. Dubinin

Amb. Karpov

Amb. Masterkov

Amb. Obukhov

Mr. Mikol'chak

Mr. Tarasenko

SUBJECT

Final Plenary

Summary: The Secretary and Shevardnadze reviewed the results of the three days of discussions, focussing primarily on arms control. In each arms control area, they listed areas of agreement and key remaining issues. In INF, they agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 0/100, with reductions occurring in two or three phases over 4–5 years, and with strict verification provisions. On SRINF, the Soviets proposed immediate negotiations on the elimination of these missiles within one year. Areas of disagreement included conversion of LRINF missiles, the degree of concurrency in the reductions, and the location of the remaining LRINF missiles. On START, the sides agreed on 50% reductions to 1600/6000, on separate limits covering nuclear-armed SLCMs

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Cleared by Graze. The conversation took place in the Foreign Ministry Mansion. The full memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 45.

of longer range, on strict verification, and on the heavy bomber counting rule. Disagreements involved linkage of START to Defense and Space, sublimits, and the timetable for reductions. On Defense and Space, the sides agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. They disagreed on the timeframe for nonwithdrawal, the right to deploy after the period, and testing restrictions during the period. Starting dates for Round VIII of NST were set for April 23 for INF and May 5 for START and Defense and Space. On nuclear testing, the sides agreed to task experts to study alternative verification techniques. On CW, the sides agreed to reciprocal visits of CW destruction facilities. Shevardnadze handed over responses on several human rights cases that had been raised by the Secretary. End summary.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Returning to arms control, *the Secretary* said the sides had agreed to restart INF on April 23. The U.S. side had suggested earlier that the other groups resume May 5, partly because it would give Ambassador Kampelman more time to recover and also because the U.S. side had a lot of work to do to prepare its draft START treaty, which it wanted to present at the next round. If May 5 was agreeable to the Soviet side, the sides could agree to that. The April 23 starting date for INF would indicate the urgency the sides lent to those talks. *Shevardnadze* said he could agree to those dates.

Shevardnadze continued that he should note a few things about START. The sides had agreed to 50% reductions to 1600 delivery vehicles and 6000 weapons. They would limit nuclear-armed SLCMs of longer range to a separate agreed level while assuring proper verification.

The Secretary said it was agreed that SLCMs would be treated separately; the greatest difficulty lay in how to handle verification. *Ambassador Nitze* interjected that the Reykjavik formula on SLCMs was that a mutually agreed solution would be found.

Shevardnadze said that it was also agreed that reductions in strategic offensive arms must be strictly verified. The following elements were unacceptable to the Soviet side: the U.S. attempt to isolate a START solution from an agreement strengthening the ABM Treaty; U.S.-proposed limits intended to disrupt the structure of Soviet forces; and a U.S.-proposed timetable that was not on the basis of the Reykjavik agreement. The sides would need additional study of a mutual restraint regime on strategic offensive arms. Their experts could discuss appropriate restrictions on building up arms while the sides negotiated in Geneva.

The Secretary said there was agreement on 50% cuts and the 1600 and 6000 levels. Also agreed were discussions on the SLCM question

and the need for strict compliance. On the latter, the sides could learn from their INF effort. The sides disagreed about the possibility of delinking START from Defense and Space. On the question of force structures, the sides needed a path to reductions that recognized they had different structures, that neither side can force systems on the other, and that they need an equitable and stable way to come down. The U.S.-proposed sublimits came from the 50% idea, and from ideas the Soviet side had proposed last year, such as the 80–85% proposal. The U.S. had proposed other restrictions within the total. The sides had agreed on 50% reductions in Soviet heavy missiles, to a level of 1500 warheads. He would tell the press that the sides had discussed START issues, but had not made much headway. He would have to go then to the points he had just outlined. These were important markers derived from Reykjavik. The U.S. would continue to pursue its proposal. The General Secretary had said strategic offensive weapons were the root problem; President Reagan agreed, and the U.S. side would continue to work on it. *The Secretary* added that the heavy bomber counting rule had also been agreed.

Shevardnadze said there was not much point in debating these issues now. The General Secretary had said the Soviet side held to its Reykjavik position regarding levels and sublevels. The sides should let their negotiators debate these questions. With regard to Space, he could say that the sides had agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. There was no agreement on a specific timeframe, so the sides would need a general formula for now. The Soviet side disagreed with U.S. plans to deploy large-scale systems by 1994, which signified the collapse of the ABM Treaty by then. Perhaps the two Ministers would discuss the rationale for space-based defense systems next time. He had read the U.S. paper,² it was a fascinating document, but he categorically took issue with it. The Soviet side had a different approach; they wanted to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Space defense should not be deployed. He stood ready to discuss this question with the Secretary at greater length next time. He expected the U.S. side would carefully consider the Soviet proposal on the issue of ABM research, as well as their proposal for a list of devices whose introduction into space would be banned. These were new ideas which required study, and which could be discussed in the future. The Soviet side also expected responses to its proposals on ASATs and space-to-earth weapons.

² Not found.

Summarizing on arms control issues, *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side would table a medium-range missile treaty in the next round. They proposed to accelerate work on a joint paper. He wished to underscore the importance of the paper the Soviet side had provided on Monday³ on key provisions of START reductions and space limitations. The Soviet side considered it possible to reach agreement at the summit level on an INF Treaty. He knew the U.S. side would be tabling a START Treaty, but thought, in practical terms, that there was insufficient time to agree on all strategic issues. The subject was too complex. The key provisions represented a framework scheme to address at the summit level, if a summit were to take place, along with an INF Treaty. The Soviet side also expected an answer to its proposal for a special SCC session at the level of Defense Ministers or deputies. Everything regarding the ABM Treaty had to be cleared out of the way, including the question of violations. The sides might raise the level of SCC negotiations; it would be a good idea for Defense Ministers or deputies to get together to discuss ABM Treaty issues thoroughly.

The Secretary said both sides had said that START was a matter of extra importance; it deserved a great effort. The question of a framework or set of statements on START could be decided at some time in the fall. The approach should be to have the negotiators work on the issues and do a summary statement at that time on where things stood. The sides should try to resolve as many issues as possible and see where they were when the time came. Regarding ASATs, the U.S. side had not heard how limits could be verified and still did not see how this could be done. The Soviet side had the only operational system. On space-to-earth weapons, the U.S. SDI program had nothing to do with this subject. Ballistic missiles that go through space to the earth were all too efficient for this job. The U.S. side had provided assurances about SDI. The SCC idea was interesting. It might be fun to have the Defense Ministers go at it. Weinberger had provided an invitation long ago to meet Sokolov, and had gotten no answer. He was sure Weinberger would welcome a chance to meet.

Shevardnadze suggested the two Ministers make the Defense Ministers get together and quarrel while they watch; it would be a switch in roles. Regarding ASATs, the Soviet side wanted a fundamental decision to ban them. Soviet scientists had come up with interesting ideas for verification as had some U.S. scientists. A decision in principle was needed on both ASATs and space-to-earth arms. On nuclear testing, he thought the Secretary had been a bit too optimistic the previous day. His associates proposed that the sides agree to a single forum

³ April 13. Paper not found.

with a view to limiting and terminating nuclear testing. Taking into account U.S. statements, the name for the negotiations could be Negotiations on the Limitation and Termination of Nuclear Testing. The first order of business would be yield verification and ratification of the existing treaties. The sides had agreed on the need to improve verification and would conduct agreed experiments at each other's test sites.

The Secretary said he had thought, given the discussions and reports he had received from his delegation, that the sides might have the basis for getting negotiations going. He thought it was now too late to negotiate language. What Shevardnadze had said was quite a distance from what the U.S. side was willing to set out. It was important to get an understanding about the process of verification. It would be a good thing, if there were a summit in the fall, to complete the efforts on the two treaties. The sides needed to negotiate to make such an advance. Given the current emphasis on compliance issues, both sides needed to have confidence that verification was assured. The Soviet side had made interesting comments on Monday about CORTEX, its views that seismic methods were better, and its readiness to use these methods at respective test sites to find out. He was willing to say now that both sides agreed that means of verification were important, and the sides would set out now to have experts work on this. He assumed the sides were ready to task experts for cross-testing experimentation. *Shevardnadze* agreed.

The Secretary said he was inclined to tell the press that the sides were prepared to seek the best methods of verification through joint work. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed with this formulation. The sides needed a decision in principle on negotiations. They could let their experts get together and continue in the same vein as in previous experts meetings.

The Secretary replied that he would say that experts will continue to meet on the subject of nuclear testing, that it would be useful to pursue the question of various means of verification and their relative accuracy, and that they would instruct their experts to investigate this subject. *Shevardnadze* said the U.S. experts were tough. *The Secretary* said Barker had been rewarded for his toughness; he had been promoted to ASD.⁴

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

⁴ Reference is to Robert B. Barker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.

195. Editorial Note

On May 4, 1987, the White House released a statement by President Ronald Reagan that read, in part: "Since the early days of my administration, our number-one arms control objective has been the achievement of significant and verifiable reductions of offensive nuclear forces, particularly the most destabilizing weapons—fast-flying ballistic missiles. I have directed our U.S. START negotiator to intensify efforts to reach agreement on reducing strategic offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent. Toward that end, the United States will shortly table a draft START treaty text. This text will reflect the basic agreements on strategic arms reduction reached by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself in our meeting at Reykjavik last October. It will be responsive as well to Soviet concerns expressed subsequent to Reykjavik and will provide ample basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement. Tomorrow marks the opening in Geneva of the eighth round in our negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions and strategic defense issues. With the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces having resumed on April 23, all three negotiating groups of the nuclear and space talks will now be underway. We have made great progress in START. I am firmly convinced that a START agreement is within our grasp, even this year, if the Soviets are prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues. And most important among these is the need, for the purpose of ensuring strategic stability, to place sublimits on ballistic missile warheads. We will likewise be making a new move in the defense and space area. Our negotiators return to Geneva ready to place on the negotiating table the new U.S. proposal, which Secretary Shultz discussed during his Moscow meetings. This new proposal incorporates the following elements:—Both the United States and the Soviet would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;—This commitment would be contingent on implementation of agreed START reductions: i.e., 50-percent cuts to equal levels of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits, over 7 years from entry into force of a START agreement;—The agreement would not alter the sovereign rights of the parties under customary international law to withdraw in the event of material breach of the agreement or jeopardy to their supreme interests;—After 1994, either side could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise." The statement went on to say that the White House was reviewing a Soviet draft treaty text for an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and "important issues remain to be resolved before an INF agreement can be concluded, including verification and shorter range INF missiles." (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, vol. I, pp. 457–458)

On May 7, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 271, "Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating Round." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 271) Principal objectives for Round VIII included: "to continue to seek prompt and forthcoming response to the U.S. proposals in the three negotiating groups, including our new proposal in Defense and Space and our proposals in START and INF"; "—to intensify the schedule of negotiations and seek prompt negotiation of, and agreement to, an INF Treaty based on the U.S. INF Draft Treaty table in Round VII"; "—to table in Round VII a draft START Treaty when it is completed and approved, intensify the schedule of negotiations, and seek prompt negotiation of, and agreement to, a START Treaty based on the U.S. draft"; and "—to continue to press U.S. positions in START and Defense and Space, and to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space, noting that achieving agreement on a treaty providing for deep equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms, along with an INF agreement, should be our highest arms control priority." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870618–0406)

In a May 8 plenary session of the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, Ambassador Ronald Lehman tabled a draft Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. "I will not read the treaty, which I now formally pass to you, both in English and in its unofficial Russian translation, but will instead outline briefly its major provisions" Lehman stated at the plenary session. "The treaty provides for the reduction of strategic offensive arms so that, for each side, the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 1600 and the aggregate number of ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and heavy bomber armaments does not exceed 6000. In this regard, the treaty provides for the necessary provisions for attributing to ballistic missiles the number of warheads associated with them, and similarly, the number of air-launched cruise missiles and other armaments associated with heavy bombers. With the 6000 aggregate, the treaty makes provision for sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, effectively to strengthen strategic stability. Specifically, each side would be limited to no more than 4800 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, 3300 warheads on deployed ICBMs, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on deployed silo-based ICBMs which are not heavy ICBMs and which have six or fewer warheads. The treaty provides for a ban on mobile ICBMs, constraints on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the codified reduction of aggregate throw-weight levels to a level 50 percent below the higher of the levels possessed by the two parties. Effective verification is critical

to a viable START agreement. Therefore, the draft treaty provides the necessary basis for defining the elements of strategic offensive arms relevant to the limitations and reductions of which I have just spoken. It also provides for effective verification of these limits and reductions, including use of national technical means, on-site inspection, and cooperative measures, together with provisions for non-interference with the foregoing. The complete treaty will also eventually include a memorandum of understanding and appropriate protocols to augment and lend further detailed substance to the treaty.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870357–0528)

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, May 13, 1987, 1430Z

145742. Subject. 5/11 Secretary-Bessmertnykh Meeting.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. During a May 11 courtesy call on the Secretary by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, the following points were made concerning the NST negotiations.

3. The Secretary briefly ran through the arms control agenda in the wake of the Moscow trip.

—On INF, things were proceeding, and there seemed little to add at this time to what had been said in Moscow. An intra-alliance discussion was underway on SRINF. On LRINF, we continued to feel it would make most sense to drop the remaining 100 warheads. The Secretary personally was impressed with the importance of residual systems to verification, which would in turn have significance in any ratification debate in this country. We had studied carefully Gorbachev’s strong statements on verification. It was a simple fact that verification would be better at zero than at any finite number.

—On START, both sides seemed to feel it was of central importance, and to agree that the approach hammered out in Reykjavik was a major breakthrough. We wanted to push ahead. Gorbachev had referred to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870004–0336. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McElDowney; cleared by Burton, Holmes, Parris, Clyne, Lekson, and in S/S, S, and S/S-O; approved by Ridgway.

strategic arms in his Prague speech² as the “root problem.” We agreed and were prepared to move the subject along. The U.S. knew the Soviets liked to link START and space. We were prepared to discuss the problem, but in the meantime we should press ahead energetically on START. We had recently tabled a START draft treaty text to this end.

4. The Secretary noted that the Soviets in Moscow had suggested that the two sides be prepared at a possible summit to record areas of agreement on the issues other than INF under discussion in Geneva. We had no objection to this. But it seemed to us that the way to do that was to make progress wherever possible. Perhaps over the course of the summer we could work—possibly in the kind of working group format Bessmertnykh had launched the year before on a range of issues—on these issues, and then take stock. We had, after all, come a long way already from where the two leaders had been when they parted company in Geneva. The Reykjavik meeting had been particularly helpful.

5. Responding to the Secretary’s points, Bessmertnykh said that the Soviets generally shared his assessment.

—The Soviets knew that the U.S. preferred zero LRINF. Bessmertnykh acknowledged that zero would be easier to verify. But the residual 100 would provide a valuable opportunity to test verification techniques. On the other hand, the Soviets could consider zero INF in Asia if the U.S. were prepared to take certain steps with respect to its nuclear forces in Korea and Japan, or, for example, draw a line beyond which its aircraft carriers would not approach the Soviet Union in the Pacific. As the Secretary prepared to interject, Bessmertnykh suggested that, on balance, perhaps it would be easier to keep the 100, noting that an agreed formula seemed to exist on LRINF, with SRINF still being discussed. Bessmertnykh added that there seemed to be differing views in the West as to how long it would take to respond to the Soviet proposal on SRINF. He repeated that one had to keep in mind that time was limited. The Soviets were prepared to work the issue in Geneva.

—As for START, the Soviets had said in Geneva that they were willing to work with the new U.S. draft. They would probably have their own to present at some point. With respect to the “key provisions” idea, Bessmertnykh pointed out that the U.S. had proposed something similar, described as “basic elements,” during Dobrynin’s April 1986 visit to Washington. (The Secretary interjected that we did not object to the idea.) Bessmertnykh suggested that the two sides continue in

² Reference is to Gorbachev’s speech in Prague, April 10, 1987, in which he reiterated his position of advocating large cuts in nuclear stockpiles. (“Excerpts From Gorbachev Talk on Arms and Social Changes,” *New York Times*, April 11, 1987, p. 5)

Geneva to work on a draft treaty. At an appropriate time, they could see where things stood, and decide whether to continue work on a treaty or seek agreement on key provisions.

Bessmertnykh said he doubted on the basis of past experience whether it would be possible to reach agreement on a full START treaty in the time available. Similar circumstances had produced the Vladivostok agreement. Bessmertnykh said he was glad that the U.S. was considering this kind of an approach, because the Soviet concept was as Gorbachev had described it—strategic weapons were the “root” of the problem. Of course, it was equally important in the Geneva negotiations not to lose sight of the need to strengthen the ABM treaty.

Shultz

**197. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the
Department of State¹**

Frankfurt, May 18, 1987, 2132Z

7793. Subject: Dobrynin on arms control issues.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The Dobrynins accepted an invitation from Rebecca and me for a private dinner Friday² evening, and when we rose from the table Dobrynin suggested a tete-a-tete which continued for well over an hour. He was mainly interested in assessing the prospects for arms control agreements, and spent more time talking than listening. We spoke only Russian, since—despite his fluency in English—I sensed that he was more relaxed in his own language and, indeed, his words—delivered in the same clipped staccato characteristic of his English—gushed forth in such profusion that at times I had difficulty finding openings to insert my own comments. In general, his substantive message was consistent with the one you received from Bessmertnykh,³ but the underlying question, to which he returned repeatedly, was: does the administration really want to conclude an INF agreement—

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870004-0417. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² May 15.

³ See Document 196.

and if it does, does it have the political will and political clout to bring an agreement to a successful conclusion?

3. On this point I assured him that the administration is totally serious about concluding real arms reduction agreements, but of course could not accept some of the current Soviet positions. Therefore, if they are serious, the Soviets must take a constructive attitude toward the remaining issues and be prepared to work them out without unnecessary delay.

4. Other comments which Dobrynin offered were the following:

—A claim that the START proposal you brought last month made a “bad impression” on Gorbachev, since it seemed a “retreat” from the Reykjavik formula;

—A statement that he was “astounded” by the allied resistance to their SRINF proposal, since they considered their proposal a major concession to the Western position;

—A preference for working on an agreement on “basic elements” of a START agreement, on the practical grounds that time probably will not permit negotiation of a complete treaty text.

—Repeated assertions that no START agreement could be concluded unless there was a satisfactory resolution of the issue connected with SDI and the ABM treaty.

5. I replied to these comments along the following lines:

—The President is eager to move ahead with sound agreements for fair and balanced arms reduction, but will not sacrifice a viable SDI research and testing program to attain this goal. (To this, Dobrynin commented that Gorbachev understood this fact—and was willing to “let the President have his program.” However, Gorbachev—he said—could not concede an American right to deploy SDI at some time in the future, and had to have some understanding of just where to draw the line between testing and deployment—particularly in space.)

—Regarding our proposal for a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms over a seven-year period, I pointed out that it was an honest attempt on our part to find a compromise solution to the Reykjavik impasse. Dobrynin said he could understand the logic of our move, but repeated that “psychologically” the effect was bad, since it involved a longer-period for the 50 percent reduction than was discussed at Reykjavik, and a shorter period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

—Regarding the position of the allies on SRINF, I reminded him of the very legitimate concerns of the West Europeans regarding the conventional imbalance and potential decoupling. Dobrynin retorted by saying that the decision to offer zero in Europe was a difficult one for them and was made by Gorbachev personally “to avoid unbecoming

and petty haggling over number”—in the full expectation that it would be greeted by the U.S. and West Europeans as a forward move. “However—if you don’t want it,” Dobrynin added—“we can do an INF agreement without it.”

—As for working on a “basic elements” agreement for START, I pointed out that a treaty would be a much better goal, and expressed the hope that Soviet negotiations would deal with it promptly and constructively. Dobrynin said that they have nothing against negotiating a treaty *per se*: it is simply their judgment that we may have time only for something more limited, such as an agreement on basic elements, similar to Vladivostak. I commented that we would hardly consider Vladivostak an encouraging precedent—and indeed it illustrates some of the real pitfalls inherent in an agreement which does not include the details.

6. Picking up on his comment about the “bad impression” left by our proposal for 50 percent START reductions over a seven year period, I asked him if it would be correct to infer that the most important element for the Soviets is the length of time the parties agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty. He avoided confirming this, but commented that they had interpreted our proposal as meaning (A) that we cannot deploy SDI for seven years in any event; and (B) that the U.S. wants to set in motion a process to break the ABM treaty at that time. He then added that it is the latter situation which they cannot accept. I told him that their analysis was not correct—that we are offering commitments which in fact will show the development of SDI, and that it would be quite unrealistic if the Soviets were to demand an ultimate veto over SDI deployment.

7. Comment: There was nothing surprising or new about the points Dobrynin made. However, I was struck by his persistent effort to portray Gorbachev as a man in a hurry to wrap up some agreements. He repeatedly said that Gorbachev dislikes “petty trading” and prefers the grand gesture to nitpicking the details. He also asked repeatedly about the President’s commitment to concluding agreements and (implicitly) his political strength to carry them through, particularly with former President Nixon now critical of our INF position. (He observed wryly, by the way, that we had extracted from them a much better deal for the U.S. than Nixon and Kissinger ever had, and though he could understand Kissinger’s criticism on “egotistical grounds”—(i.e., it was not his idea—he was surprised by Nixon’s criticism.) I assured him that the President’s authority to negotiate such matters has in no way been affected by unrelated matters such as “Irangate,” and that if they were willing to negotiate constructively and fairly they would certainly find the President responsive. I cautioned him, however, that the President does not “need” an agreement for agreement’s sake and would not make one-sided concessions to achieve one.

8. My overall conclusion—based on much more than this one conversation—is that Gorbachev does see it in his interest to wrap up an agreement—at least on INF—this year. They know we are more interested in START, and want to use this interest to bring pressure to bear on SDI. But the bottom line seems to be that Gorbachev has an increasing stake in concluding an agreement he can point to as a concrete achievement of his leadership. The domestic Soviet arena does not offer promising material for quick results, and if he is to claim success in the near term, he has far alternatives to seeking it in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Matlock

198. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 27, 1987

SUBJECT

START in Your Meeting with Shevardnadze²

Having made considerable progress in INF, it is worth a serious effort at the Foreign Ministers meeting to revive START, both because this is indeed the “root problem” and because it will be much easier to make the case for INF if there is an agreement or a reasonable prospect for agreement in START. Our leverage is not likely to be greater in the future than it is today.

We had a similar objective for the April meeting, but accomplished very little. At that time, we made the best arguments for our current position. To be more successful now, we will need a different approach.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Holmes and Burton. Timbie initialed the memorandum on Nitze’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum.

² Shevardnadze visited Washington for talks with Reagan, Shultz, and other U.S. officials from September 15–17. See Document 210. The memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 66–72, 74–76.

Our suggestion is to try to engage on some of the issues of interest to the Soviets that we have been saving for the endgame, if the Soviets are prepared to engage on issues of interest to us. Specifically, you could tell Shevardnadze early in the meeting that you are prepared to discuss and resolve issues they have raised—SLCMs and mobile ICBMs—if they are prepared to discuss and resolve issues of interest to us—sublimits and throw weight. If Shevardnadze is interested, discussion of their subjects and our subjects could proceed in parallel.

If we could get such a negotiation going, we would push for an outcome along the following lines:

- 4800 ballistic missile warheads
- 3600 ICBM warheads³
- 1500 heavy ICBM warheads
- Missile throw weight 50% below the current Soviet level
- Mobile ICBMs (and other survivable ICBM basing modes) permitted subject to numerical and verification constraints
- Declarations by both sides of their deployment plans for long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs
- All of this to be implemented over seven years (e.g., by 1995).

If the Soviets have not given up on START or closed their minds to sublimits, an outcome along these lines may be possible. There would appear to be little to lose in trying.

While such an outcome would receive broad support as achieving our primary objectives at little cost, there will be opposition on both substance and timing. We would need authority to permit mobile ICBMs, settle the SLCM question on the basis of declarations, and drop the 1650 sublimit in favor of the Soviet proposal to cut heavy ICBMs by 50%.

We can anticipate that Shevardnadze will probably counter by proposing to expand the discussion to include a sublimit on SLBM warheads and to include linkage to defense and space. The package could be expanded to deal with these issues in ways that serve our interests, and this would also require new authority. Applying a 3600 sublimit to SLBM warheads as well as to ICBM warheads would permit SLBM warheads to comprise $\frac{3}{4}$ of our ballistic missile force, a slightly larger fraction than in our present force. Such a limit should be acceptable to the United States, but we know from experience that the JCS opposes such a sublimit on grounds that we should keep open the option to deploy most of our warheads in a survivable sea-based mode as a hedge against inability to deploy survivable ICBMs. With regard

³ Shultz drew a horizontal line from this point to the right-hand margin and wrote: "could we live w/o this sublimit so we don't get into the SLBM question?" A typed note on the memorandum dates Shultz's comment as June 29.

to linkage to defense and space, Shevardnadze will probably want to add a provision in START permitting a side to terminate the reductions agreement if the other side breaks out of the ABM Treaty.⁴ Since in this situation a party could invoke the supreme interest withdrawal clause in any event, such an explicit provision would actually add little. However, we can anticipate opposition on this point as well.

We and Max and Ron tried to get comparable ideas approved for use with Shevardnadze in April, with very modest success. This implies we should try a different approach now. One idea would be to put our recommendations together as a package, and try to get the President to make an up or down decision on the package. If you concur, we can work with EUR and PM to assemble a package which you could brief to the President and Max and Paul could brief to Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci. The White House needs to appreciate the advantages of a START agreement to accompany or closely follow INF, so they are prepared to make a serious effort to get one.

There is no need for detailed interagency staffing of these ideas; none of them is novel. Ideally, the President could call a meeting on our package with you, Cap, Crowe, Carlucci, and perhaps Webster and then give you guidance. We can exploit our home court advantage, and not try to anticipate every move with contingency guidance. You can report as the talks progress, and get further guidance as necessary.

We would like to meet with you, Max, Roz, and Allen to discuss these ideas further.⁵

⁴ Shultz underlined “a provision in START permitting a side to terminate the reductions agreement if the other side breaks out of the ABM Treaty” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “elaborate as in your other memos.” A typed note on the memorandum dates Shultz’s comment as June 29. The reference to Nitze’s and Timbie’s other memoranda is not further identified.

⁵ In a June 29 note affixed to the memorandum, Shultz wrote: “I favor trying to get ourselves in a position to do this.” (Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987)

**199. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze and the
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie)
to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, July 7, 1987

SUBJECT

START

This memorandum addresses further the issues you flagged in our memorandum of last week.²

ICBM Sublimit

You asked if we could live without the 3300/3600 sublimit on ICBM warheads to avoid getting into the SLBM warhead question. Our answer is that in the end, the US could forego the 3600 ICBM warhead sublimit provided we get the 4800 ballistic missile warhead and 1500 heavy ICBM warhead sublimits. The Soviets would almost certainly want to keep some SLBMs, so under the 4800 and 1500 sublimits they would likely have 3500–3600 ICBM warheads in any event, about the same fraction of their total force as today.

There are, however, a number of caveats. First, it is important that the START agreement not merely reduce forces but contribute to stability. One way a START agreement can do this is to provide for a survivable US ICBM force. This implies both constraints on the number of accurate Soviet warheads (ICBM warheads and in the long run perhaps SLBM warheads as well), and flexibility for the US to deploy ICBMs in sufficient quantity and in sufficiently survivable basing modes to survive a determined attack. We have commissioned an analysis of the ability of the United States to deploy a survivable ICBM force under constraints of 3600 ICBM warheads and 1600 total launchers, plus an exploration of the effect raising the upper limit on Soviet ICBM warheads above 3600 would have. Our tentative conclusion is that under a 4800 sublimit the Soviets would be unlikely to have substantially more than 3600 ICBM warheads, and we could deploy an ICBM force of our own such that a significant number would survive even if they should do so.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Kampelman, Holmes, and Burton. A stamped notation indicates Whitehead saw the memorandum.

² See Document 198.

Without an ICBM warhead sublimit the START agreement will be more difficult to sell to the Senate. Opponents would argue that the Soviets could have 4800 ICBM warheads to use against some 800 US ICBMs, a 6-to-1 ratio no better than today's situation. While there are counterarguments, this would be a negative aspect to the agreement.

Finally, without the 3600 sublimit the 4800 sublimit becomes absolutely essential. So we should not concede on this point without definitive Soviet acceptance of the 4800 (and the 1500).

All of this leads us to recommend that we initially show flexibility on the 1650 but not the 3300 sublimit. If Shevardnadze objects, as we expect, we can try raising the number to 3600 in the context of Soviet movement on issues of interest to us. In the end, we could agree to drop the ICBM sublimit rather than consider applying it to SLBMs, but only in the context of pinning down the 4800 and 1500. We should not now assume that a 3600 ICBM warhead sublimit is unattainable.

Linking START to the ABM Treaty

The Soviets have recently suggested that their START proposal will permit a side to terminate the START reductions if the other side takes steps to undermine the ABM Treaty. They say this concept will be part of their new START Treaty.

Without an agreement on what testing is permitted and not permitted under the ABM Treaty, such a linkage of START to the ABM Treaty would be imprudent; it would encourage the Congress to enact unilateral constraints on the use of appropriated funds on tests remotely justifying Soviet withdrawal from scheduled START reductions. Such restraints would not be binding on the Soviets.

However, reaching agreement on a START Treaty and getting it ratified by the Senate will probably require addressing ABM Treaty issues. If this is true, it would be better to link START to the ABM Treaty, which already exists, than to hold it hostage to a Defense and Space Treaty whose prospects are uncertain at best and would require the same agreement on what testing is and is not permitted. Max, as you know, believes that it may not be necessary to go beyond non-deployment.

Another point is that the START agreement will permit withdrawal on six months notice if a party judges its supreme interests to be jeopardized, and either party could invoke this clause in any event should the other party break out of the ABM Treaty.

Finally, there is a close relationship between offense and defense, and this is recognized in our Defense and Space position.

Our suggestion is that you let Shevardnadze raise this issue, and at an appropriate time in response say that we recognize that there is a close relationship between offense and defense, and that we believe

we can find ways to record this relationship in a START agreement. This would leave our negotiators quite a bit of leeway on how to implement this concept, and if it should permit Shevardnadze to discuss the substance of START we would be way ahead of the game.

With or without this explicit linkage between START and the ABM Treaty, we will need to clarify what the ABM Treaty permits and prohibits, and resolve the Krasnoyarsk violation.

Other Points

We have discussed these issues with Ron Lehman. He fully supports the linkage approach discussed here. On the 3600, he agrees it could be dropped in the end, but would be very cautious now for fear that if we decide what our bottom line is it will leak, and fear that if we move too quickly, we could find ourselves in a position where the Soviets have what they want (6000 warheads, mobile ICBMs allowed, SLCMs constrained) and we don't have what we need (sublimits and throw weight constraints). This leads him to be inclined to hang tough for now on the 3300/3600, until the Soviets agree to the 4800, 1500, and a limit on the number of mobile ICBMs.

200. Note From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 19, 1987

Mr. Secretary,

Attached is the paper you asked for² describing the principal START issues with pros and cons.

There may well be a package that solves the START problem. It will not be easy to find it and to get there. In this country there is no inclination to reconsider the questions of mobile ICBMs or the relationship between START and Defense and Space until the Soviets show us something on START. The Soviets have no obvious incentive to concede on START sublimits except at the end. In the face of this situation, our best suggestion is to use the period of several weeks in

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the note.

² Shultz's request was not found.

which Shevardnadze is in this country to engage Shevardnadze and the President in a back-and-forth process, using each new idea from one to stimulate a new idea from the other.³

In preparation, the Arms Control Support Group is assembling papers which describe the basic options on all the START issues. That will put us in a position in which we can seek prompt decisions as the situation evolves.

Max Kampelman has reviewed these points; Paul Nitze hasn't but his views are reflected here. Also included are earlier memos⁴ we have sent you on this subject.

JT

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

MAJOR START ISSUES

Sublimits

4800 ballistic missile warheads. Within the 6000 warhead total, we propose a sublimit of 4800 ballistic missile warheads. Without such a sublimit, the Soviets would likely have substantially more than 4800 ballistic missile warheads (because they rely less on bombers than we do). We would have to either cut our ALCMs and bombers well below 1200 or accept a significant Soviet advantage in ballistic missile warheads, a choice we don't want to make.

—The number of ballistic missile warheads is one of the most important measures of strategic force capability. The 4800 sublimit would provide for equality in this key measure.

—Would represent achievement of the objective established by the President at Eureka when START began 5 years ago (5000 ballistic missile warheads).

—4800 is about half the current Soviet number of ballistic missile warheads.

³ See footnote 3, Document 198.

⁴ Printed as Documents 198 and 199.

⁵ Secret. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the paper.

—Would allow 1200 ALCMs and bombers (e.g. 250 bombers and 950 ALCMs). Raising (or eliminating) the 4800 would squeeze our ALCM and bomber force.

—The Soviets once proposed a similar number (no more than 80–85% of total warheads on any two parts of the triad; 80% of 6000 is 4800). In Moscow, Shevardnadze said he could go back to their earlier proposal, which did not include the Reykjavik counting rule. Not a constructive suggestion; designed to neutralize our argument rather than solve the problem.

—The likely minimum acceptable outcome on sublimits (from the US point of view) is 4800 ballistic missile warheads and 1540 heavy ICBM warheads.

—Soviets resist the 4800 sublimit as unnecessary given the low 6000 total warhead limit, and an inequitable and unacceptable constraint on their force structure.

3300 ICBM warheads. If there is a 4800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit, the number of Soviet ICBM warheads would likely be on the order of 3500 in any event. (This would represent about the same ratio of ICBM to SLBM warheads as they have in their current force.) So this proposed sublimit would not substantially change the anticipated Soviet force beyond the effects of the 6000 and the 4800.

—ICBM warheads are presently the most accurate, hence the greatest threat to hard targets. (At present heavy ICBMs are the greatest Soviet hard target threat; in the near term all ICBMs could threaten hard targets; and in the long run all ballistic missiles could.)

—The Soviets once proposed a similar number (no more than 60% of total warheads on one part of the triad; 60% of 6000 is 3600). The Soviet approach would extend to SLBM warheads as well as ICBM warheads, and as with the 80–85% rule it was proposed in a different context.

—3300 represents about half the current Soviet number of ICBM warheads.

—The Secretary had authority in Moscow to propose a level of 3600 in the context of Soviet flexibility on other issues. This was not used.

—JCS would strongly resist application of a 3300/3600 limit to SLBMs, since we may want an option to deploy more SLBMs if deployment of survivable ICBMs proves impossible.

—All of this implies that we should focus attention initially on the 4800. We can try as well for a 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, and raise this number to 3600. If we get the 4800 (and the 1540), we can drop the ICBM warhead sublimit.

1650 sublimit on heavy and highly fractionated missiles. This sublimit was inserted into our position for tactical reasons. It would sharply

constrain the Soviets, with little effect on the US. At an appropriate time, we can drop it in favor of a 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBM warheads. (DOD, however, opposes dropping the 1650 sublimit.)

Heavy ICBMs. Since Reykjavik, the Soviets have offered to cut in half their number of heavy ICBMs (to 154).

—Heavy ICBMs pose the principal current Soviet threat to US fixed ICBMs.

—Such a cut goes a long way toward achievement of the US goal of a 50% cut in missile throw weight.

—The constraint should be expressed in warheads (1540) rather than missiles.

—In this form, we should accept it.

Throw weight. The US proposes to cut ballistic missile throw weight to an equal ceiling at 50% of the current Soviet level. The US, with smaller missiles, is already below this level. The Soviets say their proposed reductions would result in a 50% cut in throw weight, and have offered to make a unilateral statement to this effect. Our task is to get the Soviets to agree to this in a form that represents a binding obligation. (Binding does not necessarily mean in the Treaty text; we could be flexible on how this obligation is recorded.)

—With equal limits on the number of warheads, a gross disparity in warhead size would give the Soviets an advantage.

—For attacking hard targets accuracy is relatively more important than yield (which scales with weight). For barraging areas (e.g. mobile ICBM deployment areas) throw weight is the appropriate measure.

—Reductions in Soviet throw weight would reduce their ability to quickly add RVs beyond the 4800 limit.

Mobile ICBMs

The US draft bans mobile ICBMs; the Soviet draft permits them within the limits on missiles and warheads.

—Mobile ICBMs are potentially much more survivable than fixed ICBMs.

—When dispersed, mobile missiles are highly survivable. In garrisons, they are quite vulnerable. Survivability hinges on the ability to keep a portion of the force in the field in peacetime, and on the ability to disperse the rest of the force rapidly in a crisis.

—Soviet mobile ICBMs can do both. For the US both are more difficult. The small ICBM can probably do both; the rail mobile M-X probably cannot deploy out of garrison in peacetime and would take several hours to disperse in a crisis.

—Mobile ICBMs are difficult to verify.

- The number of mobile ICBMs operationally deployed can be verified with some confidence.
- The problem concerns missiles and launchers which are stored covertly. These could be very hard to find. In this scenario, the crews would train and exercise periodically with overtly deployed systems.

—When we were pursuing a non-zero INF agreement, we worked out a verification approach which involved data exchange; declaration of facilities for SS-20 production, storage, repair, etc.; the right to inspect and monitor these facilities; and the right to inspect other facilities should we suspect covert SS-20 activity there.

—This approach could also be applied to SS-25's, which are deployed in a similar manner. The rail-mobile SS-24 will require a further evolution of these ideas.

—The US small ICBM program is a key element of the Scowcroft package on which Congressional support for M-X is based. The proposed ban on this system is a problem for us in Congress.

—The State/ACDA view is that mobile ICBMs should be permitted subject to verification provisions along the lines of those developed for a non-zero INF agreement, and subject to a stringent numerical constraint (e.g., 1000 warheads) to keep down the mobile ICBM infrastructure. This approach recognizes our need for survivable ICBMs and the substantial commitment the Soviets have made to these systems.

—DOD strongly supports the ban.

SLCMs. Both sides have long-range nuclear-armed land-attack SLCMs. There is no known way to verify constraints on the number of such weapons.

—The Soviets propose a 400 limit on SLCMs, and to confine them to specified classes of submarines.

—In view of the verification problem, the US draft Treaty would impose no limits on SLCMs.

—One possible solution would be for each side to make a unilateral declaration of its SLCM plans. This would not be a constraint, so verification would be less of an issue.

—The US offered to resolve this issue on the basis of declarations in the overnight experts meeting at Reykjavik.⁶ The Soviets turned this down, but it is still the best solution and could be reintroduced at an appropriate time.

⁶ See Document 159.

Offense/Defense

—Soviet START Treaty refers to a defense and space agreement, and would relieve one party of its obligations to reduce offensive forces if the other Party takes steps that go beyond the ABM Treaty.

—Such a clause is unnecessary. A Party can withdraw from START upon 6 months notice if it judges its supreme interests are jeopardized.

—Linking reductions to compliance with the ABM Treaty without clarification of that Treaty risks Congressional restrictions on the SDI program to protect reductions. Such restrictions would not be binding on the Soviets.

201. Notes of a Meeting¹

Los Angeles, August 27, 1987

Meeting Participants

The President, Secretary Shultz, Senator Baker

Personnel—Amb. & ACDA. My views should have special weight.

Next year ahead. Three areas of possible achievement. Others are areas of guarding (?-sp).²

- 1) USSR & Arms Control
- 2) Central America
- 3) Middle East

Immediate attention.

Soviet & Arms Control. Preparing for Shevardnadze meeting. We vulnerable in absence of movement on START. Without START, INF is naked. Soviets can proliferate strategic weapons. Can hit INF targets with strategic.

Through your discussions in R. you have:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987—11/03/1987) [Meeting w/ President—Notes]. Secret. Drafted by Carlucci. Carlucci's original handwritten notes are *ibid*. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at the Century Plaza Tower at 2 p.m. and lasted approximately 20 minutes. Reagan had been based at Rancho del Cielo since departing Washington on August 13; he spent the night of August 27 in Los Angeles and returned to Rancho del Cielo on August 29. He returned to Washington on September 6. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² In the original handwritten notes, "guarding" is spelled "garding."

Agreement to warheads of 6,000
Probably 4,800 ballistic missiles
Good bomber counting rule
Agreement cut by ½ ground based ballistic missiles

Have problem of mobiles to resolve.

Should have additional sublimit, but Crowe opposes SLBM. He would choose 4,800.

Need find way to address SDI problem if going to get START agreement.

P.—I am in favor of working START, but if we get INF. We immediately go to work on strategic. Having achieved the other—me & Gorbachev get together.

G.S.—That is right. Real breakthroughs come in Summit meetings.

F.C. insists on mandate to change G.S. Moscow positions. P. agrees.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

202. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

START Agreement

On August 27, GPS raised START with the President. The President agreed we should make a major push on START, but it was not entirely clear that what George was advocating was a revision of the position he had carried to Moscow. I clarified for the President that this was, in fact, the case and sought from him a specific mandate to work the interagency process to give him options that might enable START to begin to move. He agreed.

The next day I told him he had to phone Cap Weinberger to tell him of his decision. Otherwise, Defense would simply refuse to consider any changes in our position. The talking points the President used were the following:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, ACSG [Arms Control Support Group] September 1 [1987] (2 of 4). Secret.

—Cap, as you know, we are very close to an INF agreement, and I appreciate your cooperation in making this possible.

—I consider it extremely important that we now move on to a START agreement. I believe we have a chance of getting such an agreement in the next 18 months if we play our cards right.

—In order to do this, I have asked Frank to have the interagency group take a fresh look at our position on START, and on defense and space.

—As you know, I am thoroughly committed to SDI and do not want to do anything to hinder our very good progress on SDI.

—But it seems to me it may be possible to make some changes in our position that would get the negotiations moving without damaging SDI. We need to be creative to do this, but I know I can count on your full support.

—Frank can provide you with additional details. I am sure you will be hearing from him soon.

After the President called CWW, I talked to Cap by phone. Cap said it was clear the President wanted a START agreement, but Cap had told him we should not revise our position on defense and space as long as the Soviets continue to link these talks with START. The President responded, according to Cap, that perhaps we could find some cosmetic changes. It was clear from this conversation that Cap would be, at best, a reluctant participant.

On August 29, I told the President of my conversation with Cap. I indicated that it would be very difficult to get Cap to go along with any changes.

I told the President I considered it essential that he make progress on START for three reasons:

a) it was needed on the merits. As he well knew, he needs to bring about some reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

b) without progress on START, ratification of an INF treaty would be in jeopardy. The Soviets could compensate from the SS-20s by building more strategic systems. INF simply could not stand alone.²

c) a START agreement might be the best—possibly the only—guarantee of SDI's long-term survival. SDI was not cost-effective at the margin. For the foreseeable future, a given unit of offense would be cheaper than a given unit of defense. Hence, SDI could be overwhelmed. Somewhat to my surprise, the President seemed familiar

² Linhard wrote in the right-hand margin beside this point: "START NEEDED FOR INF RAT. (RAND ARGUMENT)."

with this point. I added that progress on START could also help SDI on the Hill since it would weaken advocates of arms control amendments.³

I consider it most unlikely that the President could get a START agreement if he stuck to his current position. What did the Soviets want? Kill SDI so they can build their own systems, the President responded. I said that was true, but they were coming to realize they couldn't achieve this. They did have, however, a legitimate concern which we might be able to meet. They wanted predictability on deployment. Their concern was that once we got to the 50 percent reduction level, the U.S. would suddenly deploy SDI and achieve nuclear superiority.

I told the President I thought we could accommodate this concern without doing damage to SDI, and without getting into permitted and prohibited activities. I was not a wealthy man, but I said I would bet every penny I had that SDI would not be deployed until 1996 or 1997 at the earliest. For illustrative purposes, I told him we could come up with a formula that would have a seven year non-withdrawal pledge, a 10 year non-deployment pledge and a three year notification provision. We would have to drop the novation provision in our current position since the USSR would never sign up for a deployment commitment now.

The President seemed receptive to this kind of an approach. I told him we were coming down to the wire. If we were to modify our position in time for the Shevardnadze meeting, this would require his personal intervention. What it was coming down to was a choice between START and not overruling Cap. After I received some help from Duberstein and Nancy, the President indicated he would be willing to overrule Cap.

We then discussed a hypothetical timetable: introduce some flexibility in our position at the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting, move the ball forward with perhaps a memo of understanding at a summit in November (Nancy is absolutely adamant that this be over Thanksgiving) and sign an agreement when the President goes to Moscow next year—a fair amount of enthusiasm was generated for this scenario.⁴

Howard Baker wishes to work with me to bring Cap along. The only way I can see that we can accomplish this is for us to develop a position and present it to Cap. Working with the DOD bureaucracy

³ Linhard bracketed the three points and wrote in the left-hand margin beside them: “—fundamentally disagree with Rand on assessment;—agree to press for START.”

⁴ Linhard wrote in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph: “*instructions to START negotiators.”

seems to me to be hopeless. Please reflect on this and let's talk on Monday.⁵ Perhaps a secure conference call would be in order.

Frank C. Carlucci⁶

⁵ August 31.

⁶ Printed from a copy bearing Carlucci's typed signature.

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 8, 1987, 1:15–2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Review of United States Arms Control Positions (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President	
The Vice President	
<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Secretary George Shultz	Chief of Staff Howard Baker
Counselor Max Kampelman	Frank C. Carlucci
Rozanne Ridgway	Colin Powell
<i>Treasury</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Secretary James Baker	Robert E. Linhard
	Fritz Ermarth

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0165 09/98/1987. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. In a September 4 memorandum to Carlucci, Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard reported that Shultz is thinking in terms of waiting to see what Shevardnadze brings, and then quickly seeking flexibility. We are urging our State contacts to encourage him to discuss *now* what specific flexibility he might seek." "Weinberger," they continued, "will argue particularly strongly against any falling off our positions on mobile ICBMs or ABM Treaty novation. There has been an unusually acrimonious dispute between OSD and the DCI's representative on monitoring mobile ICBMs; OSD asserts the Intelligence Communist is far too optimistic in portraying its judgments." The JCS, meanwhile, had "not yet reached consensus on any position in either START or Defense and Space. They may present some Defense and Space 'guidelines' rather than support an option. In START they will probably support no change in mobile ICBM or SLSM positions but will endorse a slight raising (3300 to 3600) of the ICBM sublimit." Finally, they suggested, Adelman might offer "a whole new approach in some area." (Ibid.)

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Frank Gaffney

Energy

Secretary John Herrington

OMB

Mr. James Miller

ACDA

Mr. Kenneth Adelman

CIA

Mr. William Webster

Mr. Robert Gates

JCS

General Robert Herres

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

OSTP

William Graham

Special Advisors to the President

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Minutes

The meeting opened at 1:15 p.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at *Tab A*.² (U)

Mr. Carlucci: This is a meeting we have all been waiting for; an opportunity to review our options prior to Secretary Shultz's meeting with his counterpart. Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we begin? (C)

The President: For several years we've had consistent arms reduction goals: to get verifiable deep reductions and to preserve our ability to move to a safer world through SDI. It appears we are near agreement in INF. Now we must finish the task in other areas. I don't accept the suggestions of some that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office. I want a START agreement, but *only* if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security. At the same time, I believe fully in our policy of seeking a stable transition to strategic defenses. We must set the stage for one day deploying effective defenses, *and* seek to do so in a manner that will strengthen strategic stability. George's meeting next week is a chance to move toward these two goals. I want your thoughts today on how we can best use that meeting. Are we better served by movement in our position, or are our current positions the best way to gain our objectives? I'm looking forward to your views so we can help prepare George for his discussions. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: We have a host of arms control issues we could consider. I would hope we could resolve some at the cabinet or sub-

² Attached but not printed is the agenda.

cabinet level with paper and we could therefore try to keep this meeting on START and Defense and Space issues. We need to look at all the issues in the context of our overall strategy. We have done papers³ on each of the areas with options. As we go through the upcoming week, we will want to bring many of these options to decision. With that introduction, let me ask Secretary Shultz if he wants to frame the way he intends to approach his upcoming meetings with Shevardnadze. (S)

Secretary Shultz: The President has had success in imposing the full US agenda on the Soviets and we will come into this next meeting with Shevardnadze covering our entire four-part agenda. This will not be an arms control meeting only, and I know, Mr. President, you will do the same in your meeting. Mr. President, you should compare the situation today to that which we faced in 1984 when you invited Gromyko to come down from the UNGA the first time. At that time, there was little going on in any of the areas. Now, however, there is a lot going on in each of the four areas, human rights, bilateral, regional issues, and arms control. (C)

On arms control, with respect to INF, the major points are basically agreed to. We have a verification regime that is more intrusive than any other we have ever negotiated. Even after adjusting that regime to reflect zero-zero, we should be able to move to put the verification in place. However Mr. President, we are not doing right by our negotiators. We need decisions now in the INF areas. There are four or five issues of the second order that are just hanging us up. We need to make decisions and get the Treaty on the table before Shevardnadze gets here. I would like to make sure we have that done so that I can focus the conversations with Shevardnadze on START, not on INF. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: I understand the decision paper is ready but we've just gotten it. (C)

Secretary Shultz: Well, can we have decisions today? I would like to get this behind us so that we can go on further in the agenda. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Reaching quick decisions under the pressure of a meeting is not a good way to proceed. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Cap, I think we can clear the decks by tomorrow. We are close to closure on most issues and we need another day or so to make sure that our staff has a chance to consider the paperwork received. Why don't we go ahead now and discuss START. George, would you like to start? (C)

³ In a September 4 memorandum to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Meese, Herrington, Crowe, Miller, Casey, and Adelman, Powell distributed three papers in advance of the NSPG meeting: "GRIP 23D—Overall"; "GRIP 21H—START"; "GRIP 22G—Defense and Space." (Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987)

Secretary Shultz: No, I think I would rather not. Let's let the others speak. (C)

The President: With respect to INF issues, as I understand it, we are talking about our positions, not a problem with the Soviets. We need to step up to what we need to agree. Maybe we ought to stick in a few give aways at the same time; but we ought to press forward on decisions. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: We will bring a decision paper to you by tomorrow. Now, let's turn to START. Secretary Shultz, would you like to open the remarks? (S)

Secretary Shultz: No, I'd rather listen to others speak. (C)

Mr. Carlucci turned to Fritz Ermarth and asked him to put up the first chart (Tab B), which was on START options. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Looking at the chart, the most momentous decision we face is the one involving mobile missiles. The Soviets have put a heavy emphasis here. The assessments are that we have reasonable verification of mobile missiles if they are in a deployed, peacetime mode, but that it would be very, very low in a non-deployed mode. Bob Gates, isn't that correct? (Mr Webster had not yet arrived in the room and Mr. Gates was acting as the DCI.) (S)

Mr. Gates: Yes. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: I think that the chart correctly reflects the State position. (U)

Mr. Shultz: I don't want to be associated with any position or any views. I don't feel that's it appropriate for me to be associated with any view in a group like this. All that will happen is that it will leak and it will undercut my position with Shevardnadze. I propose, Mr. President, that I will provide you my views privately. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Can someone in the room talk from the Department of State for the Department? (C)

Mr. Shultz: What I am talking about is the problem with the process. You've got to find another way to work the process. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: That's ridiculous. We must be able to meet and discuss issues. (C)

Mr. Carlucci: Can anyone explain the State position? (C)

Mr. Shultz: I have no intention of telling you my position. You know my rationale. And, by the way, Frank, you know the rationale for the State position. Why don't you review it? (S)

Mr. Carlucci at this point started to begin to review the State rationale when he was interrupted by Mr. Weinberger. (U)

Mr. Weinberger: The treatment of mobile ICBMs is the most fundamental issue. Our position now is that we should have no mobiles.

There is no way we can verify them, and to move now would just mean that we would get nothing for it. I think that we should have a firm position not to allow mobiles. We had such a position in the past. Nothing has changed and no one can tell me what we'll get for it. So I have to ask—what is compelling us to move for a change? (S)

Mr. Carlucci: I would note that we are pursuing mobiles ourselves. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: If we could ban them there would be no need for us to move to mobiles. This would be a much better situation. If we move in this general area, once again I don't know what we're going to get for it, Mr. President. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: It may be that it is the necessary step to get a START agreement. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: That may be the case, but then we will get an unverifiable agreement. (C)

Mr. Carlucci: Do you really believe that? I mean is it really that bad? We have some verification on deployed missiles. (C)

Mr. Weinberger: We can verify current deployments but we can't verify total capability. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Let's stop for a second and get the DCI's view. (U)

Mr. Gates: Mr. Webster isn't here yet, but he has written out the points⁴ he wanted to make. (U)

[3 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

Overall, we are able to monitor some aspects of a mobile missile agreement well, and others poorly. The policy agencies must make the judgments of military risk associated with our monitoring capabilities and our uncertainties. The singular question becomes, "How much risk are you willing to take?" (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, I would note that the problems that we face in START are similar to the problems we will face in INF verifying SS-20s. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Obviously I am not speaking for State. (laughter) There is no reason for us to move in mobiles now without getting something in return from the Soviets. We don't need to go unless we get something appropriate. But the negotiators need to know if the situation permits or requires, that you're going to give them some flexibility. I'm not making a suggestion that we decide today, but we ought to know that in return for sub-limits or in view of our interest in deploying US mobiles, that we do want to have the ability to entertain the possibility of moving on mobiles in that context. (S)

⁴ Not found.

Mr. Carlucci: We all agree that no one is proposing that we just put mobiles on the table. Isn't that clear? (S)

Mr. Weinberger: That's good, and I agree, but you've got to remember that sub-limits are not verifiable if mobiles can be produced. A ban is needed, not anything else. If we don't have a ban, nothing is verifiable. We should not give up things to get a Treaty that is not verifiable. (S)

The President: Well, Cap, I think we have to figure that they're going to have mobiles, whether we ban them or not, and we will have to have them too. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: It's a little harder for them to have mobiles if we ban them. If there is no ban, it will be impossible to verify any sub-limits. For example, in the INF area, because there is a ban, if we find any missiles it is a clear, naked violation. If there is no ban, it is easier for them to have violations under the sub-limits to have more missiles that are mobile than those permitted by a treaty. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well, let's concede then that they can or will cheat. The President's point, though, is if they're not banned, we can have some too. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: True, but our exercising the right to make such deployments will be very, very tough with Congress. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Would a situation in which there is no ban be easier, by that I mean no ban and no agreement? (C)

Secretary Shultz: I would note that the only missiles that people want these days are mobile. Ours are mobile at sea and they are survivable. Mobile missiles are less of a threat to bring on a first strike because they are not targetable. The resistance that we are having to MX is not to the missile, it's to a missile that is not survivable. The rail mobility may be an answer for MX, and road mobility for Midgetman. If it were not vulnerable being put in silos, it would be more politically supportable. If you confine us both to fixed ICBMs, you are building a very destabilizing force. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well, doesn't our insistence then on a ban on mobiles drive the Soviets to sea? (S)

Mr. Weinberger: We're at sea already. But we also have many fixed ICBMs today. The Soviets have mobile missiles on land and we do not. It's going to be very hard for us to get mobile missiles on land. Therefore, there is a relative advantage to us if we can get them to agree to a ban. Trading a ban for sublimits is an empty trade because the sub-limits will become unverifiable. (S)

Secretary Shultz: It is very easy for the Soviets to deploy more missiles and it is hard for us. Therefore a START Agreement may be very, very important for us. First of all, INF will look very naked if long-range strategic missiles can replace the targeting that is provided

by INF missiles that will make it an empty agreement. And second, given that they deploy missiles much more easily than we do, an unconstrained world would not be good for us. The numbers that we got at Reykjavik for START are very good, Mr. President—6000, the 1540, which was half of the heavy force and a bomber counting rule that is very, very, good. The Soviets are on-again off-again with the 4800 sub-limit. If we can get those four, that is 6,000, 1540, the bomber counting rule and 4800, those numbers by themselves buy you a very good agreement if we can get them. We shouldn't overlook how important a START Agreement is if these numbers are in. Our problem is that we have a very limited political capability to deploy missiles. When it does come to making deployment decisions, in my view it will be easier if our missiles are mobile. (TS)

Mr. Weinberger: I have no doubt that I agree with you on the need for START. But that is no reason for us to give in to Soviet demands. We've got a good agreement in INF because we hung tough and we can do the same in START. All for sub-limits, but we need what we proposed as a whole. The argument is not only on mobile missiles and verification, but it is also the fact that they have mobile missiles now and we don't. We need to ensure that we will have enough stuff left after an agreement to provide for deterrence. I feel they want a START Agreement and I believe we will get a good one if we'll just hold. As far as giving flexibility to a negotiator, I think that is simply another way of telling him he can give up on the issues. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, I see no evidence at all the Soviets are interested in START. It is very unlikely you are going to get an agreement on this area in this Administration under the terms we are asking. What we need to worry about is thinking about the precedents for the future and for this reason we should not go any further because probably we are not going to get an agreement. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: It's in our interest to push for START now. We can defer the issue of what to do about mobiles very safely. That is not a make or break issue. (S)

The President: You've got to remember that the whole thing was borne of the idea that the world needs to get rid of nuclear weapons. We've got to remember that we can't win a nuclear war and we can't fight one. The Soviets don't want to win by war but by threat of war. They want to issue ultimatums to which we have to give in. If we could just talk about the basic steps we need to take to break the log jam and avoid the possibility of war. I mean, think about it. Where would the survivors of the war live? Major areas of the world would be uninhabitable. We need to keep it in mind that that's what we're about. We are about bringing together steps to bring us closer to the recognition that we need to do away with nuclear weapons. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well where then can we get some motion in this area? (C)

Ambassador Rowny: No motion is needed on mobiles. We may be able to get some motion on sub-limits. The 1650 sub-limit is the problem. If we could get rid of that lower sublimit we may be able to move the Soviets. SLCMs are also not an area that we need to do anything about. The crucial issue is Defense and Space. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: O.K., on sub-limits, let me see if I can at least summarize what I think I have heard. We all agree that 4800 is needed. We've seen some flexibility on the 3300 number before. Everyone has questions on all the others. I guess that's the best summary I can give. Let's move to Defense and Space. (TS)

The President: I have a friend who tells me that in the Soviet Union their right-wingers are starting to call Gorbachev "Mr. Yes" because he agrees with everything that I propose. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Our current position is shown on the chart (Tab C). The options are as listed. (U)

Mr. Weinberger: We have to be very careful in this area, Mr. President, because what we want to do is get rid of nuclear weapons, and if we handle this badly, we will not be able to get rid of them. We can't live with nuclear weapons if they are used. We can't get rid of them because there are no defenses against them. We must do nothing to inhibit our ability to defend against nuclear weapons. We need to defend early; we need to defend our continent, not just a few sites. The Soviets want to insist on a lengthy period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in return for START. If the Soviets want a link, we will have to make sure that there is no inhibition on our rights to deploy without any additional negotiations, or further equivocation. The earliest I think we can deploy is 1995. Some of my friends, like Wallop, feel that might be sooner if we put our systems together from a Tru Value hardware catalogue. We need no further restrictions on our right to deploy. We should make every effort to hold firm. No talks for two years or more, no negotiations, no six month notification, none of that. All we are doing with this type of stuff is blocking ourselves in. Anyone who believes that the Soviets will not deploy as soon as they can when they get their system is wrong. (At this point, the President was basically shaking his head "yes".) All the options are ways to get us to agree but the Soviets have their own objective. Their objective is to block the SDI program. Nothing here is verifiable. And, we can't do anything before 1995, but what the hell, we don't need to do anything before that time period either. (TS)

Mr. Carlucci: You know, Cap, under the current ABM Treaty we are free to move to deployment within six months by simply withdrawing. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: Yes, but withdrawing from the ABM Treaty carries a lot of political baggage. We need Soviet agreement that at an appropriate time they can raise no objection to our deployment. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Do you object to simply giving them six month notice? (C)

Mr. Weinberger: No, not if it's before 1995. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: We had a non-withdrawal for 1996 at one point, you know. (TS)

Mr. Weinberger: Yes, but we're walking back from that, and we're really making progress. (laughter) (U)

The President: Why can't we agree now that if we get to a point where we want to deploy we will simply make all the information available about each others systems so that we can both have defenses. So that if either side is ready to deploy, both agree to make available to the other all the results of their research. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: I don't believe that we could ever do that. (C)

General Herres: Mr. President, there is a great risk in exchanging technical data. Much of our technology is easily convertible into other purposes and into an offensive area. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, that would be the most massive technical transfer that the western world has ever known. We would make the Toshiba incident⁵ look piddling. If they understood our system that well it would be easy for them to move to countermeasures. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: So, let's make sure that we not bind ourselves so that we can get there first. They've been working for 17 years. (S)

Mr. Adelman: It would be O.K. if we both got there together. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: But we need to get to the point where we are talking about deployments not research. (S)

The President: Once we deploy something, won't they know about the system? So won't they try to counter it anyway, so what difference does it make if they get the information and counter it their way or if we simply provide it to them. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: The key here is the price that they are asking for is too high. We ought to just hold tough. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: At this point, Mr. President, I would like to make a pitch for our negotiators. They have been at it for 30 months and they haven't given up the store. In the INF area we have a fantastic agreement, or are on the verge of a fantastic agreement. In START we are at 50% without giving up the store and, in principle, we have what

⁵ Reference is to Toshiba's sale of machinery to allow the Soviets to fabricate quieter submarine propellers.

we want. No one at the table is considering proposals that would jeopardize US security. And, Mr. President, I would note that in my opinion none of the options that are under consideration on that chart would undermine the SDI program. There is nothing there that can give us or will cause us to give up the SDI program. So we have some negotiating room. I'm not arguing that we need to make a move in Defense and Space unless we get something in START. If they come around in START, we may need to move in Defense and Space. We can evolve our position. For example, now at the end of our period of non-deployment we want the Soviets to agree to legitimize deployment for either of us and the Soviets simply say no. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that they may be readier to deploy than we are. And the figure of 1995 assumes that we have full funding for SDI. But, on the other hand Mr. President, we have the right to withdraw on 6 months notice from the ABM Treaty and we don't need any legitimization by the Soviets. At some time we may wish to, simply in emphasizing our right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on six month notice. (TS)

The President: I don't want to make this a part of the START Agreement though. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: START and Defense and Space should not be linked. If the Soviets say O.K. in START, then we could consider options in Defense and Space. We should be able to protect our SDI program. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: All that's fine, Max, except how do you define the SDI program? (C)

Ambassador Kampelman: I see it as an exploratory research program that may allow us at some point to come to the assessment of the feasibility of deploying defenses. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: That's what I thought. That's not the program I see, and we need the unequivocal right to deploy now. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Our proposal doesn't do any damage to that. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Our proposal should include that we intend to deploy as quickly as we can after the end of withdrawals. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Six month withdrawal from the ABM Treaty can still cover that. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: This is going to be a real fun week. We'll get the issue papers to you, Mr. President, this week for decision. (S)

The President: There has to be an answer to all these questions because some day people are going to ask why we didn't do something now about getting rid of nuclear weapons. You know, I've been reading my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction,

I believe, of many cities and we absolutely need to avoid that. We have to do something now. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: We certainly need to avoid Armageddon. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: The answer is SDI. (U)

The meeting ended at 2:06 p.m.⁶ (U)

⁶ In a September 10 memorandum to Carlucci and Powell, Graham shared a comment that the press of time prevented him from making at the NSPG meeting: "The President has reported to Congress that 'compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements.' Therefore, any U.S. Defense and Space position must take this into account. In practical terms this means that violations of the ABM Treaty must be resolved as a condition precedent to agreeing to any extension of that treaty. If we fail to insist on this condition we will be twice penalized. First, we would implicitly legitimize a unilateral Soviet advantage already obtained through deliberate noncompliance. Second, the Soviets would be free to exploit the non-withdrawal period to obtain a military advantage over the U.S. by pursuing technological and programmatic activities, such as the deployment of ABM radars, in violation of the treaty. I raise this issue because I find little work underway addressing the issue of existing and prospective Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. A strong interagency effort in parallel with the pursuit of other Defense and Space issues is strongly needed, and the conclusion of a follow-on agreement would be premature until these matters are resolved." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0165 09/98/1987.)

Attachment**Chart⁷**

Washington, undated

Start Options

OPTION/AGENCY	State	OSD	JCS	ACDA	Others
Mobile ICBMs					
1. Firm Decision to Ban		X			
2. Firm Decision to Allow	X				
3. Defer Decision				X	Rowny, Lehman
Sublimits					
1. Current Position (4800 Ballistic Missile, 3300 ICBM, 1650 Heavy/High MIRV ICBM)		X			
2. Raise 3300 to 3600	X				
3. Raise 3300 to 3600 and Change 1650 to 1540 on Heavy ICBM Only					Lehman
4. Drop 1650 limit					Rowny
5. Drop 3300 and 1650				X	
SLCMs					
1. Defer ANY Initiative		X			Rowny, Lehman
2. Offer Exchange of Statements	X			X	

Attachment**Chart⁸**

Washington, undated

Defense and Space Options

OPTION/AGENCY	State	OSD	JCS	ACDA	Negotiator
A. Current Proposal (non-withdrawal through 1994, right to deploy thereafter)		X			
B. Extend Non-withdrawal Period				X	
C. Six Months Notice of:					
1. Withdrawal from ABMT					
2. Intent to Deploy					
D. Negotiation Period on Transition					
E. Ban Tests Against Targets on Earth				X	
F. Prohibited Activities					

⁷ Secret; Grip.⁸ Secret; Grip.

204. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 9, 1987

President's Meeting with The Vice President, Senator Baker,
Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Ken Duberstein and
Frank Carlucci in Oval Office on September 9, 1987

GPS INF. Me Solved

GPS Importance of Start. You already have key numbers. 6000,
50%, probably 4800.

Do we have room for maneuver? Or is our position immutable?

How I see the 3 big issues that not resolved. Most important have
been resolved.

1) Sublimit on ICBM's. 3300 option before to go to 3600. This
sublimit not important—

We don't want it applied to any leg of our triad. We not confident
of ICBM's in US. Can produce SLBMs. People only comfortable with
stability-mobiles.

Submarine is ultimate in mobile system.

Chiefs say shouldn't have a cap on any leg of our triad.

Soviets will want 1200 at least SLBMs anyway, so why fight for
3300?

2) Sublimit of 1650 on heavies highly fractionated & mobiles. Leh-
man put in to give away. Too attractive if permit mobiles since they
want 1540 heaviest not many mobiles allowed.

We have 25 MX, aspire to 50 rail mobile.

If permit mobiles (Congress wants vote fixed base, nonsurvivable
powerful missile). I agree verifying is difficult.

Since USSR has heavy investment in land based mobiles they won't
agree to mirror our force structure. Worthwhile for us to have triad.
Good to be hedged. Need capability of deploying MX in rail made
important.

If go to mobiles—don't need the 1540. Capture mobiles in an-
other subceiling.

P Sovs want landbased. We shouldn't endanger negot. by
trying reconfigure their force. Let's not waste bargaining power on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987)
[Meetings with President—Notes]. Secret. Drafted by Carlucci, who initialed the top of
the notes. Powell wrote at the top of the notes "CP + REL have seen." Carlucci's original
handwritten notes are *ibid*. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took
place in the Oval Office between 2:33 p.m. and 3:55 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's
Daily Diary)

trying do that. Set our target on reductions, & let them chase. We should put a limitation on mobile.

My worry on Gloching mobile is they going to have them anyway. Let's know we going to give & hold out for strong verification. Cap, my fear about mobiles is that they will have them. Better we not have them cheat.

GPS Need to hold 2 sublimits 1540 (don't merge w/1650) and 4800.

P INF. (I describe GLCM verification issue.) Destabilizing is missile you push button & it blow up. Bomb isn't the same.

GPS Makes case for declaring all GLCM nuclear.

CWW Makes case against mobiles. Destabilizing, can't verify. Nothing to gain except getting them in mood to sign treaty very destabilizing. I agree Soviets have them. Legalizing doesn't deal with them. Need to get rid of them. GPS can listen & bring home w/o committing saying our proposal is on the table.

GPS Argument in US for mobiles and single warhead is that it is stabilizing. Stabilizing because difficult to knock out, like a fixed system does.

Fixed MIRD extremely destabilizing.

CWW Mobile MIRVS more destabilizing!

P Was a flurry when talking MX's on race track wasn't it silly to put in fixed silos? Wouldn't be smarter to move them around?

CWW Mobility ensures survivability!

P What if went with proposal of O? If that is only thing holding agreement. We give in on limited #. They give us the whole deal.

GPS Feel you have is right.

CWW Verification of X# is impossible. Sublimits is not much of a bargain.

P We agree on total # of missiles. It includes mobiles. If we at stalemate (alternative of no treaty unthinkable.) X# can be mobile for both of us.

FC D&S?

GPS Can't compromise SDI. You have put concepts on table.

1) Non withdrawal for X period. (can agree to period that not a constraint.) Sovs have shifted from R. Now say 10 years. In last 2 or 3 years, there discussions. At end of 10 years return to ABM w/ 6 months' notice.

Play with time and whether you novate (which means no longer have 6 months' notice)

From what I know it unlikely be deployed in 10 years. Six months' notice was good thing to have.

CWW Describes merits of novation. Makes it automatic. Also how nifty SDI is.

P Not too far apart—10 years 1995. What if sign agreement would give 6 months' notice after January 1, 1995?

CWW After 6 months' notice either side can deploy (seems to accept!) That is possible formula. I don't want country to reargue.

GPS Going to have to need money.

Have on table concept of nonwithdrawal. Talking about amount—is there flexibility?

At end of time do we give notice?

JCS concerned, because they think Soviets will deploy.

CWW Let's stay agreed upon position.

GPS All I want is sense from P of flexibility. I don't want change in instructions.

CWW Why not argue positions?

GPS I always do.

P If we tie this into Start aren't we opening linkage? We want to talk Start. If want to talk D&S later ok?

GPS No problem with that as a position. Is a rationale for linkage. Offense & defense are related.

205. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, September 10, 1987

[Omitted here is material related to INF, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms]

ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS

START.

a. *Mobiles.* The US will consider permitting mobile ICBMs in a START agreement at/near end-game on the negotiations if needed to conclude an agreement that is otherwise in our interests and provided that the Soviets are prepared to work with us in good faith to agree on acceptable associated verification measures.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (09/10/1987–10/31/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the upper left-hand corner: "OK RR."

While the US should not signal flexibility on mobiles to the Soviet Union at this time, an internal assessment should be done to determine the best possible approaches for verifying limits on road and rail mobile ICBMs.

b. *Sub-limits.* The US will be prepared to respond to Soviet flexibility in START by showing some flexibility on sub-limits. There should be no flexibility shown on:

6000 warheads on ballistic missiles & ALCMs (+ compensation for bomber weapons under the Reykjavik bomber counting rule.)

1600 total ballistic missiles and heavy bombers

4800 warheads on ballistic missiles

1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs

In showing flexibility, the initial move should be the relaxing of our current proposal of a sub-limit of 3300 on total warheads on ICBMs to 3600 warheads on ICBMs. (This sublimit should not be extended to apply to warheads on SLBMs as well).

c. *SLCM.* The best the US can do in this area is to offer to make unilateral statements about the existing and planned nuclear SLCM forces of both sides.

DEFENSE & SPACE

a. *Bottom Line.* Protect the promise of SDI at all costs. Regardless of whether the US forswears its pursuit of active defenses against ballistic missiles, none doubt that the Soviets are now and will continue to dig the massive, deep shelters that they are permitted to build under the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union will defend those things it values most. The issue for the future is whether the US will be permitted to protect what it values. A future effective SDI deployment program (not merely the existence of an SDI research program) is the basis for a more secure future for the US and her Allies.

b. *No Framework Agreements.* We should avoid any “framework agreements” that cover the START and Defense and Space area since they will effectively put in place anticipated restrictions on SDI on us while not being sufficient to allow us to see START reductions begin.

c. *6 Month Notification Prior to Deployment.* As needed, we can add to our current position a provision calling for a “6 month notification of either side’s intent to deploy defenses not currently permitted” after 1 January 1995 when each side can choose to deploy such defenses.

[Omitted here is material related to INF, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms.]

INF

a. *Overall.* The INF Treaty is a major accomplishment. We should resolve the remaining “minor” issues as quickly as possible so that we can get this Treaty ratified and implemented while you are still in office.

b. *Status*. We have resolved most of the critical issues associated with this Treaty. While a lot of details still need to be ironed out (e.g., the schedule of reductions, details of verification, status of flight testing, etc.), the only remaining major issue between the US and Soviet Union has to do with the US warheads provided under an existing program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany for their Pershing IA missiles.

c. *US Warheads for German Pershing IA Missiles*. We cannot undercut the basic principle that such existing programs of cooperation are not subject to bilateral negotiation. Provided that the Soviet Union can be satisfied by the statement made by Chancellor Kohl that the German PIAs will be eliminated, and the subsequent statements by US spokesmen that in such a circumstance, the US warheads would be withdrawn, we should be able to conclude a Treaty in this area this fall. This being the case, we should do what we can to conclude this treaty.

d. *Reduction Schedule*. We wanted to eliminate the missiles involved as quickly as possible. The current plan, proposed by the JCS and agreed by all agencies, would have the missiles destroyed within 3 years. We are about to discuss the details with our allies.

e. *New Draft Treaty*. We hope to be in a position to table a new treaty by next Monday.² To do so, needed to make the following decisions:

1. To clarify that this treaty *only* covers SRINF/LRINF missiles designed to attack targets on the surface of the earth (and not ABM, ASAT or air defense missiles that could fly to similar ranges).

2. No flight testing after treaty is signed. This would include using the launching of these missiles (e.g., US Pershings) to “destroy” them. Therefore, we can’t use Pershings for other testing, spacelaunch vehicles, or as targets for SDI experiments.

3. Permit research and development missiles for other purposes as long as they

- (1) are not existing types of SRINF/LRINF missiles;
- (2) are limited in number; and
- (3) are not used to develop new SRINF/LRINF missiles.

4. Ban all armed ground launched cruise missiles (including those which are conventionally armed) beyond 500 kilometers. This is needed for verification, but it does foreclose future US/NATO options for advanced conventionally armed cruise missiles at these longer ranges. (SecDef objects strongly to this decision and it may cause complaint from some conservatives.)

² September 14.

206. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 14, 1987

SUBJECT

Avoiding Arms Reduction "Framework Agreements"

Last week, as part of the paper² which addressed arms reduction strategy options, I strongly recommended that you should *avoid* any commitment to develop a "framework agreement" covering the START and Defense & Space areas. However, in our subsequent discussions,³ we really didn't spend enough time on this critical point. Shevardnadze may attempt to make a US commitment to a "framework agreement" a precondition for a summit. Additionally, in reviewing our options with George Shultz, my recommendation against making such a commitment seemed to give him some concern.

By a "framework agreement" I mean something that could have the political effect of binding the US to some course of action. It most likely would take the form of a free-standing document, like the "Statement of General Principles" Gorbachev proposed to you in Reykjavik. It would most likely commit the US and USSR to conclude a START Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for some period of time.

We can record progress at a summit without signing a framework agreement. For example, a summit communique could record agreement to instruct negotiators to pursue Treaties incorporating the same outcomes. What we must avoid is any statement, announcement or agreement that can be used by the Soviets politically to bind our hands with respect to the SDI program while not legally binding the Soviets to begin START reductions because:

First, *a framework agreement could block SDI while not getting reductions*. Such agreements are basically political instruments. As such, they can politically block new options (like moving to the deployment of SDI); but neither side would begin reducing existing forces until there is a signed and ratified treaty.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Presidential Arms Control Small Group Meeting, September 9, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Powell initialed for Carlucci. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on September 15. Reagan initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See Document 205.

³ Not further identified.

Second, *a framework agreement at this time could also remove Soviet incentive to conclude a START Treaty*. If the Soviets can block SDI without having to begin the reductions of strategic forces until a START Treaty is signed, what is their incentive to conclude such a treaty on US terms? They could haggle as long as it takes to get a START Treaty on their terms, and simply wait for the next Administration to give them a better START deal.

Finally, *a framework agreement could allow the Soviets to manipulate the US domestic political scene*. As long as there is the prospect of concluding a START Treaty, the political opposition must be responsible in handling arms reduction issues. The Soviets understand this. The Soviets could feed the idea that a framework agreement is all that can be achieved during the remainder of your Administration. This would open you to criticism for not getting a START Treaty, for the terms of the framework agreement, and for signing such an agreement in the first place. This would then increase pressure to conclude a START Treaty *on Soviet terms* during your Administration.

Our primary concerns should be the first two listed above. We should not risk blocking SDI or reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate a *good* START agreement. The third reason is relevant because it could provide Soviet leverage to force you into a bad START agreement.

The Soviets understand that if the meetings with Shevardnadze end without the announcement of a fall summit, the US press will term the meeting a failure. They will use this to get things they want including:

(1) a US agreement to include in the INF Treaty text, or in a document that could be associated with that Treaty, some provision covering the US warheads for German Pershing IA missiles; and

(2) US agreement that we will conclude *both* an INF Treaty *and* a “framework agreement” covering START and Defense & Space at a fall summit.

We must be prepared for the Shevardnadze meetings to come down to the Soviets giving us a choice on Thursday⁴ of either accepting these terms or not getting an agreed announcement of a summit. While a summit announcement would be useful, accepting either of the above terms as the price for obtaining such an announcement would be disastrous over the long run.

⁴ September 17.

207. Editorial Note

On September 15, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz hosted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his private office at the Department of State. In their first private conversation, which lasted from 8 to 10:40 a.m., Shultz and Shevardnadze discussed arms control, bilateral and regional affairs, and human rights. Shevardnadze indicated that “the Soviet side was prepared for a separate START agreement.” Shultz replied that the two sides “should ‘do it.’” Later on in the conversation, Shevardnadze expressed frustration at the slow pace of progress in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, and handed Shultz a letter from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to President Ronald Reagan, dated September 10, calling for the accelerated completion of a draft agreed text on strategic offensive arms. Shultz “agreed that the two Ministers should give some political push to their negotiators and ‘up front’ the arms control group.” After a discussion of the logistics of the plenary session that afternoon, Shultz and Shevardnadze stood for photographs with their respective delegations, and departed to the White House to meet President Reagan. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 15; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87]; Letter From Gorbachev to Reagan, September 10; [Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Meetings File, President’s Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 1987]) The memorandum of conversation and Gorbachev’s letter are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 66 and 64.

At 12:00 noon, Shultz escorted Shevardnadze, along with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh and Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin, into the Oval Office to meet President Ronald Reagan. After an exchange of pleasantries and a brief question from the press corps, Reagan led Shultz and the Soviet delegation into the Rose Garden for the signing of an agreement establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. Following the ceremony, the delegations returned to the White House and entered the Cabinet Room. At approximately 12:30 p.m., Reagan commenced the first plenary session of Shevardnadze’s visit. Present at this sessions were President Reagan, Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Chief of Staff Howard Baker, Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control

Matters Paul Nitze, Counselor to the Department of State Max Kampelman, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State Edward Rowny, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador Jack Matlock, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Simons, Robert Linhard and Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff, Interpreter Dimitry Zarechnak, as well as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh, Ambassador Yuri Dubinin, Head of Information Department Gennadi Gerasimov, Ambassador Victor Karpov, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister Teymuraz Stepanov, Head of the General Secretariat Sergei Tarasenko, and Interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko. After remarks covering bilateral and regional affairs and human rights, Reagan turned to arms control. "The START agreement," he said, "should be our top arms reduction target. Since Reykjavik, there have been some useful procedural steps, such as exchanging draft treaty texts, but on substance, we are about where we were a year ago." The President encouraged Shevardnadze and Shultz to "take a fresh look at the issues and see what can be done to solve them." After some brief exchanges on outstanding disagreements between the two countries, President Reagan led the delegations to a luncheon in the East Wing that lasted until 2:00 p.m. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 15; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87] The memorandum of conversation of Shevardnadze's White House visit is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 67.

From 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., Shultz hosted Shevardnadze and other U.S. and Soviet officials in a plenary session in the Madison Room at the Department of State. After a discussion of arms control topics including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Shultz summarized "the U.S. view of where things stood: We agreed on 6000 warheads and 1600 delivery systems; We agreed on a bomber counting rule; We agreed on 154 heavy ICBM's, and the U.S. side had said this should be expressed in warheads, assuming ten per delivery system; The Soviet side had said that the effect of agreed reductions would be to reduce Soviet throw-weight by 50%, and we thought this should be translated somehow into the agreement." Shultz went on to describe the difficulties of verifying submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and land-based mobile missiles. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 15; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87]) The memorandum of conversation of Shultz and Shevardnadze's afternoon

plenary session is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 68.

208. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Report of the Working Group on the Nuclear and Space Talks

The Working Group met with the objective of narrowing differences where possible, and recording positions of the sides where differences remain. While not all issues between the sides were discussed, the following is a summary of the results of the 15 September discussions.²

[Omitted here is a discussion of INF.]

START

The sides discussed the question of the implementation of 50% reductions in the strategic offensive arms of the two sides.

They noted the following:

—The United States believes a 4800 ceiling on ballistic missile warheads is essential; the Soviet Union believes such a limit is unnecessary.

—The Soviet Union proposes to limit each component of the triad to 60% of the 6000 total warheads (*i.e.*, 3600); the United States believes such a sublimit should apply only to ICBM warheads, and should limit ICBM warheads to 3300.

—The Soviet-proposed 50% cut in heavy ICBMs means a limit of 1540 heavy ICBM warheads.

—U.S. seeks a 1650 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMs except silo-based non-heavy ICBMs with six RVs or less.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with Shevardnadze (09/1987, 10/1987) (1). Secret. Nitze sent the paper to Shultz under cover of a September 16 memorandum: "The arms control working group met this afternoon to compile a joint report to you and Shevardnadze on the results of our discussion of NST issues. This report is attached." A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw Nitze's memorandum. (*Ibid.*)

² See footnote 2, Document 209.

—Soviet missile throw weight will be reduced to 50% of the current level and will not subsequently increase. The U.S. believes this commitment should be codified in the Treaty.

—The Soviet Union proposes that mobile ICBMs be permitted. The United States believes they should be banned.

—The United States proposes that reductions in strategic offensive arms be completed over seven years. The Soviet side prefers five years but is prepared to discuss this question.

—The United States is prepared to complete a START agreement promptly without linkage to other arms control subjects, particularly defense and space which are already constrained by existing agreements; the Soviet Union links completion of a START agreement to a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and gross violation of the ABM Treaty would free the other party from its reduction obligation.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

The Soviet side elaborated the following proposal:

—Agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and either:

—agree on a list of devices not to be put in space and thresholds for associated critical parameters, or

—agree to strictly abide by the ABM Treaty as it was signed and ratified in 1972.

—Under the “list” approach, a device with critical parameters below the specified thresholds could be put into space for any purpose, whether ABM-related or not. Other research on space-based ABM systems would be restricted to laboratories on earth.

—In either case, the ABM Treaty would continue after the 10-year period, but the sides would negotiate on the ABM defenses problem as a whole in light of the strategic situation which would exist by that time, including the 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons.

209. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 16, 1987

SUBJECT

Arms Control Experts Meeting, September 15

In our experts meeting last night, we addressed INF, START, and Defense and Space. We put off discussion of nuclear testing until today.² The Soviets did not suggest experts meetings on conventional forces or chemical weapons, but might in your meeting with Shevardnadze this morning.³

[Omitted here is a discussion of INF.]

We made some headway on START. Karpov indicated the Soviets would be willing to express their offer to reduce their SS-18 force to 154 as a limit of 1540 on warheads with a no-increase commitment. Karpov also confirmed that their proposed 60% limit on any one leg of the triad did not alter their acceptance of the 6,000 warhead limit and of the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik, and that the bomber counting rule would apply to the 3600 sublimit as well. We did not get very far on the 4800 sublimit although, under persistent questioning from Ron, Karpov further acknowledged that at least in theory there was a figure between 6000 and 4800 which would not require the Soviets to “restructure” their forces, i.e., might be acceptable as a sublimit on ballistic missile RVs. The Soviets said they would consider a no-increase commitment on throwweight along with a unilateral commitment to reduce throwweight by 50%. They did not move on the length of the reduction period, although Karpov suggested that the 7-year period we want would be acceptable *if* we accepted their proposal for a 10-year period of compliance with the ABM Treaty.

We clarified somewhat the Defense & Space proposals Shevardnadze made to you. On the list proposal, Karpov several times stated that if a space device fit within the thresholds, the Soviets would not question its purpose; if the device exceeded the thresholds, it could be

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, September 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² The working group met from 10 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. the evening of September 15, and from 4 to 7 p.m. on September 16. Memoranda of conversation are in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.

³ See Document 210.

tested only in the laboratory. This is a change from their current position in Geneva, where they have argued that *any* SDI device would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. (We are having the Soviet list translated—our impression is that at least some of the thresholds have gone up substantially from the list the Soviets tabled in Geneva, and thus might be in the ballpark.)

The situation is less clear on their proposal for a 10-year commitment to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Karpov described the regime that would apply during this period as the “narrow interpretation” or the “original interpretation” of the Treaty. We pointed out repeatedly that there is no agreement between the sides about these. Karpov confirmed that if either party committed a “gross violation” of the Treaty, the other would be freed of its START obligations. Karpov said the Soviets would want the ABM Treaty to continue after the 10 years but would be ready to negotiate on what followed the period.

On the whole, it was a more cordial session than we have had with Karpov in the past. We agreed to reconvene the NST experts meeting today after the morning plenary. Ken will discuss nuclear testing. We do not plan to suggest a CW working group but should be prepared to have one if the Soviets want a meeting.

210. Editorial Note

On September 16, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met from 9 to 10:20 a.m. in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State. After a discussion of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations, Shultz “said he would like to make a few points on START. Reflecting on the reports of the U.S. working group (and he had been told the discussion of START issues was useful), he wanted to take the opportunity to emphasize to Shevardnadze the importance we attached to the concept of an overall limit on ballistic missile warheads, within the overall 6,000 warhead limit which was already agreed.” Shultz’s reasoning, which he described as “straightforward,” was that “weapons carried by airplanes were in a different class from those mounted on ballistic missiles.” “This was obviously true in a descriptive sense,” Shultz went on to say, “and past Soviet proposals had seemed to reflect this. We had taken this into account in suggesting a 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads, applying the Soviet figure of 80% to the 6,000 limit agreed to in Reykjavik. The problem we had with the current Soviet 60%

proposal was that it would allow all 6,000 warheads to be on ballistic missiles. That would be undesirable, as ballistic missiles were the most threatening and destabilizing element of the triad. So we needed to find means of forcing those numbers down.” (Memorandum of Conversation, September 16; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.] The full memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 69.

Shevardnadze responded that the Soviet position was based “on the fact that a strategic structure already existed—the triad, which both sides had configured to meet their specific needs. What the U.S. was proposing would shatter that structure, to the detriment of Soviet security interests.” The foreign minister “had already said the day before that, at this stage, the Soviet Union could accept a 3,600 limit on ICBM’s. That was a significant step in the American direction. The experts could play further with the figures, but that was the Soviet number.” Also, Shevardnadze said “he could not accept the Secretary’s contention that ballistic missiles were more destabilizing and dangerous than bombers. Bombers were very dangerous indeed, as U.S. experts would be able to tell the Secretary. Otherwise, why would the U.S. want to keep so many?” (Ibid.)

Following Shultz and Shevardnadze’s meeting, the Nuclear and Space Talks Experts Group, led by Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) Paul Nitze and Soviet Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, met at the Department of State from 4 to 7 p.m. A memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.

Shultz and Shevardnadze met again in Shultz’s private office the morning of September 17. In a meeting that lasted from 9:35 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., they discussed bilateral issues, INF, START, nuclear testing, and plans for an upcoming summit in Washington. A memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 74. Following this meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze went to the Monroe Room of the State Department, where from 3:15 to 4:45 p.m. they received reports from working groups on nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms negotiations. A memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.

In their joint statement of September 18, Shultz and Shevardnadze announced their “agreement in principle to conclude” an INF Treaty, and “that a similarly intensive effort should be made to achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1987, pp. 39–40).

In a paper he prepared for Shultz’s use in a September 18 meeting with President Reagan, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State James Timbie included three points on START: “—Big issues still unresolved. 4800 sublimit, mobile ICBMs, link to Defense and Space.—Delegation will do what it can, and we will have two more opportunities this fall to discuss START in detail with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Top priority.—Gorbachev said publicly on Wednesday that we should aim to complete START early next year. We have seen already this week that once the Soviet leadership makes the decision to try to accomplish something, people down the line become easier to deal with. We can agree with the objective of completing START next spring.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Sept. 18 Mtg. w/ the Pres.)

211. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1987

PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FRANK CARLUCCI ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1987 IN THE OVAL OFFICE

GS START—Need move. Explains 4800. Mobiles—difficult verify.

Geneva—verification of mobiles—work in parallel—develop—verification issues. (S&G agree to explore verification of mobiles at Geneva!)

S Preservation of ABM Treaty. We have good options. Let’s not add complications. 10 years observe strictly.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987) [Meetings with President—Notes]. Secret. Drafted by Carlucci.

As for R&T,² we have made steps to accommodate you. Third possibility is list of devices banned from space. Have given to your experts.

There will be no retreat from preservation of ABM for 10 years. Otherwise no START.

Situation not hopeless. If want START, a solution can be found.

S Need to prod our delegations—Ministers must intervene.

Must have progress on START before Summit. Ground work for discussion only—Difficulties in Congress re INF ratif if no progress toward START. Can't have GS sign agreement US Congress might not ratify.

GS Sign agreement—fine.

All other areas of R/C, bilateral, regional—broad ranging discussion.

² Research and testing.

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Undated

Insert to 9/24 Memcon:² Arms Control, Moscow Ministerial portion
Shevardnadze joked that last week in Washington he had transmitted to the Secretary a proposal for a Defense Ministers' meeting, so there was a good reason to cancel the trip.

The Secretary answered that we are looking at the Soviet suggestion that the Defense Ministers meet. As *Shevardnadze* was aware, an invitation from Secretary Weinberger to the Soviet Defense Minister had been on the table for sometime. The Secretary felt it would be constructive for Defense Ministers and some of their senior military men to get together.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive.

² Shultz and Shevardnadze met in Walters's office from 3 to 4:24 p.m. on September 24 at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The memorandum of conversation for that meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 78.

Shevardnadze said he agreed. He wanted to confirm October 22–23 as the dates for the Secretary's visit to Moscow, and said the agreement on dates could be publicized. With regard to Iran-Iraq, *Shevardnadze* said that if the ministers could not "quell this fire" in their New York meetings, then they could continue their discussion in Moscow.

He went on that they should instruct their Geneva delegations to produce a finalized text so that the ministers did not have to waste time on INF, and could "really concentrate on START and the ABM Treaty."

The Secretary said his orientation was exactly the same. He had been checking daily with Ambassador Glitman. U.S. demolition experts would be in Geneva the following week. Other materials we needed to get to the INF delegation were getting there rapidly. He understood that the delegations were working through the draft treaty, removing brackets and so forth. So the Secretary hoped he and *Shevardnadze* would not have to spend any appreciable time on INF.

Regarding START, the Secretary said, both sides agreed it was the key, the root problem. We had made great progress at Reykjavik. He did not want to talk too much about it today, but he did want to give *Shevardnadze* a thought. At one point in the negotiations, the Soviet side had suggested an agreement that no two legs of the triad add up to more than 80% of the warheads. Obviously, that would yield, from the 6000 warhead limit, 4800 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. The Secretary had noticed that the Soviet Union seemed to prefer to express such limits in percentages. If this were a formula that fit the Soviet Union's way of thinking—and the fact the Soviet side had suggested it that way indicated that that kind of distribution was desirable—the Secretary just wanted to plant the idea. The U.S. would come to Moscow prepared to discuss START in all its aspects, including the numerical aspects. Of course, he continued, there was a huge verification task, and he knew we both had thought of it. Both sides had expressed being in favor of very strong verification regimes, so he had some optimism.

Shevardnadze said, "Let's say priority attention will be given to strategic arms and questions relating to the ABM Treaty." He also proposed that the two sides exert joint efforts in Moscow to finalizing the mandate on conventional arms in Europe; this was a priority task, since the Vienna meeting should be concluded. The Soviet side had presented some ideas; he did not want to discuss them now but they should be discussed in Moscow. The two sides could also finalize their approach on chemical weapons.

On regional issues, the two ministers should discuss the Iran-Iraq War and subjects they could not get to in their meetings in Washington. He recounted that Prime Minister Peres had expressed surprise that there had been no discussion during *Shevardnadze's* Washington visit of the Middle East peace conference.

The Secretary said they should say they would review all areas—arms control, bilateral; and human rights, which they had discussed extensively in Washington. The Secretary would be prepared to talk about the Middle East peace process and Iran-Iraq. In addition, he and Shevardnadze had agreed in Washington that they would set dates in Moscow for a summit.

Shevardnadze interjected, “It goes without saying.”

The Secretary then gave Shevardnadze a draft statement announcing dates for the Moscow visit (text attached).³ The Secretary read the statement aloud; *Shevardnadze* said he accepted.

³ Not attached.

213. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 14, 1987, 1:45–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Upcoming Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. Donald Gregg (The Vice President’s Office)

State

Counselor Max Kampelman

Rozanne Ridgway

Treasury

Secretary James Baker

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

Dr. Fred Ikle

Energy

Mr. William Martin

White House

Chief of Staff

Kenneth Duberstein

Frank C. Carlucci

Colin L. Powell

Marlin Fitzwater

NSC

Robert E. Linhard

Fritz Ermarth

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group Records, NSPG 0168 14 Oct 1987 [Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings in Moscow]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

OMB

Mr. James Miller

ACDA

Mr. David Emery

CIA

Mr. William Webster

Mr. Robert Gates

JCS

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

OSTP

William Graham

Special Advisors to the President

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

The NSPG meeting, October 14, opened at 1:45 p.m. The President opened the meeting using the Talking Points recommended to him (Tab A).²

Mr. Carlucci: Secretary Shultz is hosting a lunch for President Duarte,³ Mr. President; so he cannot be here right now. Max Kampelman is representing Secretary Shultz. Max, can you give us a setting for the Moscow trip?

Ambassador Kampelman: I talked to the Secretary before I came. He reassured me that he intends to cover the full agenda of US concerns. It is his hope that we'll not spend the full meeting in Moscow on INF. Important issues in the INF area do remain; for example, verification. However, we would like to have to emphasize INF in this meeting again. The Soviets did raise the German issue again, and we may have to deal with it. However, I received a personal message from my counterpart, Mr. Vorontsov who indicated to me that he hopes that we would be able to move to resolve this promptly.

Mr. Carlucci: We may have just seen a crack in the Soviet position on this earlier today.

Ambassador Kampelman: I would expect that because the Soviet negotiators are really not first-drawer. The negotiators may be trying to improve upon the deal that was agreed in Washington. We'll deal with all the issues involved in Moscow. The primary emphasis that we should have is on START, and, Mr. President, Reykjavik provides a good basis for this. The Soviets have come part of the way towards us on things like sublimits and throwweight. The Soviets have said that START is the root problem, and they're ready to seriously work to resolve the START differences. If they are serious, we are ready to see where we can go too. They know for sure that in no way will they be able to block SDI.

The President: I hope they know that.

² Not attached.

³ Reference is to Salvadoran president Jose Napoleon Duarte.

Ambassador Kampelman: After Geneva, they knew that you were serious. They realize that SDI is real, and that they have to learn to live with it.

Mr. Carlucci: That's what Shevardnadze said to me during his visit.

Ambassador Kampelman: We need to tie SDI into a stabilizing process. From this point of view, we can also minimize the domestic problems with respect to SDI. In a sense, we can strengthen SDI out of this stabilizing process rather than weaken it. The Soviets have indicated interest in Chemical Weapons. We have a problem dealing with this area, but we have the same teams ready to deal with it in Moscow as we did in Washington. We will have Working Groups in each area; one of them will be in CW. I don't know if testing will come at this meeting.

Mr. Carlucci: I think we solved that in Washington, at least for the time being.

Ambassador Kampelman: We need to ensure that we keep the show on the road with respect to nuclear testing. We have to sort out who will be the head of the US delegation and be ready for the talks that will start by the first of December.

Mr. Carlucci: Mr. President, we do have some significant issues in the INF area. . . . (The President interrupts)

The President: I'd really [like] to return to SDI. Some group did an excellent film that I saw at Camp David over the weekend. It really refutes the scientific groupies that have it all wrong. I think if the American public saw this film, they would understand a hell of lot better.

Colonel Linhard: Sir, the group was the American Defense Preparedness Agency⁴ Association, a civilian group. They have a regular series of awards for SDI achievement, and you have routinely supported their functions.

The President: Can we help these further?

Colonel Linhard: We have to be careful that we maintain the proper White House involvement, but there's no reason why you can't help this group, and we have been supportive in the past.

Secretary Weinberger: The public really needs some additional information. The public is with us, and the more information we give them, the more supportive they will be.

Secretary Baker: The Worthling⁵ Poll agrees with what Cap just said. However, there is some confusion out there about exactly what SDI is. This film may be able to help.

⁴ An unknown hand crossed out the word "Agency."

⁵ An unknown hand crossed out "Worthling" and wrote "Wirthlin." Reference is to Richard Wirthline, a prominent Republican pollster.

The President: (Speaking to Howard Baker) Can we kind of push this along?

Howard Baker: Yes, we'll get on with it.

Mr. Carlucci: Are there any other comments on INF?

Judge Webster: I have a comment which I think I want to make at this point. I think I need to speak for the technicians. We're very concerned about the verifiability of the INF Treaty and, especially, the current position which does not remove the infrastructure of Soviet INF forces. We should have no infrastructure remaining, although I know there is some price on the NATO side. I think we should forbid all operations in training and have the personnel leave the bases that are being eliminated, and we need strong on-site inspection. But more than anything else, Mr. President, there should be no effort to close on these nut-cutting details in Moscow, but rather come back and work it with the experts who can work on this issue. We need time to look at the issue. (Judge Webster then used the Talking Points attached at Tab B.)⁶

Mr. Carlucci: Mr. President, we've looked at this very issue twice, and there are significant impacts on NATO that have to be considered.

Judge Webster: I understand that we have looked at this before, but I want to make sure that we consider verification in light of the ratification problems we're going to have.

Dr. Graham: I agree with Judge Webster. I understand the Soviets don't want to give us data on their nondeployed missiles anyway.

Ambassador Kampelman: Mr. President, Judge Webster has experts of his on each delegation. It is very clear that we have to work hard on verification, and we'll do so.

Judge Webster: We need to ensure that this is the case.

Admiral Crowe: I agree with the DCI's concerns. I'm more than happy to abide by whatever restrictions we need to ensure that they are met.

Mr. Carlucci: Let's turn to START. The Soviets have offered us a limit of 3600 or 60% of total weapons on each of the three legs of the Triad. The JCS looked at this and found it not to be acceptable. Last time we met we looked at sublimits, and we have a dazzling array of options in sublimits involved. I understand yesterday there was a discussion⁷ on the sublimits issue with the Chiefs and the Secretary of State. I thought perhaps we might have the Chiefs comment on this area.

⁶ Not attached.

⁷ No minutes were found.

Secretary Weinberger: I think that's a very good idea. The JCS examined priorities with respect to sublimits. Bill Crowe, maybe you could speak for the Chiefs.

Admiral Crowe: Our discussion was sparked by the offer of the Soviets to limit each leg of the Triad to 60%. As Mr. Carlucci said, because of uncertainties in the future, we think it's unwise to limit our flexibility by accepting this proposal. However, based on a request by Mr. Carlucci, we did review the priorities involved with the sublimits issue, and I'd like to report on those now. Our number one priority is the 6000 RV limit. Number two is protecting the bomber counting rules achieved at Reykjavik which permits us to compensate for other aspects of the agreement.

Secretary Weinberger: I would note, Mr. President, that Bill Crowe told me yesterday that the finding of Military Sufficiency in the START area rests most heavily on maintaining the bomber counting rule.

Ambassador Kampelman: Mr. President, you got this in Reykjavik. Many people have run Reykjavik down often. This is certainly one of the accomplishments of that meeting.

Admiral Crowe: This was a spectacular accomplishment of that meeting which allowed us possibilities in other areas. But let me return to priorities. Number three, we feel that we should pocket the 1540 limit on heavies. We need to pocket this limit in some way.

Mr. Carlucci: The Soviets have already agreed to the 1540 limit.

Admiral Crowe: Our fourth priority is the 4800 limit on ballistic missile reentry vehicles. Those priorities are the vital priorities. Those are the ones we absolutely have to have. Beyond that we have opinions on the others. Number five, we need to have acceptable counting rules for ALCMs and ballistic missile reentry vehicles. Number six would be the ban on mobiles. Number seven would be the limit of 3300 or 3600 on ICBM RVs. We'd be willing to delete this in order to avoid the 60% being applied to all three legs of the Triad.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets want an INF agreement and a START agreement. We should stand firm and we'll get them. They may try to link this stuff to Defense and Space, but if we can hold in Moscow on no linkage, we can get the progress we seek. I agree with the priorities the Chiefs stated. The ban on mobiles, however, is important. There's a lot of discussion currently about whether we have wavered on this subject. I would note, Mr. President, though, that Congress has not given us funds for either M-X or Midgetman in sufficient numbers. So we need to keep trying to get the ban on mobiles.

Ambassador Rowney: Mr. President, I have one question for the Chiefs. What about throwweight?

Admiral Crowe: Ed, we would very like to see a 50% reduction in throwweight, but it's not clear to us that we can measure throwweight.

For example, we just revised the throwweight estimates for the SS–24 by some 15%. However, that 15% change in throwweight can translate into a 300% change in yield. So the delta is between what we can measure and what we want is just too significant, and we don't understand how we can make those measurements.

Mr. Carlucci: That change on the SS–24—doesn't that put that into the Heavy Class?

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. President, they're ahead of us in throwweight by a significant amount—5.3 to 1 as I understand, and we are concerned about throwweight.

Judge Webster: I agree with the Chiefs though that it's extremely difficult to measure.

Admiral Crowe: We would certainly like it, but as I said, we don't believe we can find a measurable number.

The President: Are all those numbers—are they all counting warheads?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, that's right, Sir.

The President: Therefore, all the 6000 are warheads, and the 1540 are heavy warheads inside the 6000. Isn't that true?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, that's true.

The President: What is the 4800 number?

Admiral Crowe: That's the number of reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs only.

The President: And what is the 3600 number?

Admiral Crowe: That's on the ICBMs, but I would note, Mr. President, that the 4800 is the important one.

Ambassador Kampelman: We feel the 4800 number is essential.

Mr. Carlucci: In light of the Chiefs' discussion, I don't see any point in going through the six substantive options in our paper⁸ and the the two timing options, unless there's someone who wants to talk about them. From what I see, it would be very hard for us to make a move on any option before Moscow. Therefore, I think, Mr. President, we have consensus to stay with the flexibility which you have already provided and you have already given us some flexibility on the 3300 sublimit, and we can work on the remainder of this in Moscow.

Ambassador Kampelman: The Soviets do want a START agreement, and that gives us leverage. There is a time element involved. They know if they want a START agreement during this Administration, they have to move quickly. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

⁸ No minutes were found.

members told me that they expected that the absolute deadline would probably be a March–April time frame for them to have enough time to ratify such a Treaty during this Administration. I told this to the Soviets.

The President: When we started we had the Triad, and they had most land-based things. They had a chip on their shoulders and said that we were trying to restructure their forces. Why couldn't we just get the numbers we want and let them structure their forces anyway they like? Are we really trying to restructure their forces?

Ambassador Kampelman: We certainly are.

Admiral Crowe: We are nice guys, Mr. President, but I agree. We want to affect their force structure.

Mr. Carlucci: Yes, we are trying to affect their force structure.

The President: But if they want the land-based stuff, so what?

Mr. Carlucci: Mr. President, we're after the most destabilizing systems and the most destabilizing systems we've identified are associated with land-based systems. We're trying to affect that now.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets have got air defenses, and they have a heavy investment in heavy missiles. We need to change these relationships in order to give us a level playing field.

Mr. Carlucci: The Chiefs have done a good job on setting priorities; we should be able to build on this. Let's turn to Defense and Space. We have three options which I could summarize as hold firm, extend our nondeployment commitment to 1996, or accept one of the two Soviet positions. The first Soviet position provided was a set of lists and labs; the other would be for us both to agree to abide by the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet version of the Treaty is just as strict as the Senate.

Secretary Weinberger: No, no, it's much worse; it is more strict than the strict interpretation held by the Senate. We also need to force them to delink the Defense and Space area from START.

Ambassador Kampelman: Okay, we do want them to delink, but we may reach a point where having a START agreement in hand, we need to face linkage again. At that point, it may be that we will be able to help ourselves by having something in the Defense and Space area. All I'm asking is we keep this in the back of our minds.

Secretary Weinberger: That's what they did at Iceland to us. We need to delink and not discuss Defense and Space until START is standing alone on its own two feet. I dislike having things in our minds until we need them. We can get a stand-alone START agreement if we just hold firm. I think they want their START, and the Chiefs' priority has given us a way to get there, if we can hold firm.

Ambassador Kampelman: I don't know of anyone offering a different position at this point.

Mr. Carlucci: I understand that ACDA is considering extending the period for 10 years. Dave Emery, would you mind giving us the ACDA view?

Mr. Emery: ACDA thinks that extending the Treaty through 1996 would give us reserve leverage useful in achieving progress in START.

Mr. Carlucci: Well, I'm not sure I understand that completely. But we did have a 10-year position at one time, and we changed and dropped it back to seven years, and the Soviets complained about that, but we do have a good position.

Mr. Carlucci: No one supports moving to the Soviet position. Therefore, Cap, we're spared your speech on lists and labs. Are there any other issues?

Ambassador Kampelman: In Geneva, we are dealing with the lists and labs. We're handling them by asking a lot of questions, and that's very useful. Is there a study of the JCS on the labs and criteria?

Admiral Crowe: No, we received a briefing from Abrahamson and we concluded that the Soviet list of criteria is not in our interest. We could build a list of things that we could accept.

Mr. Carlucci: But would Cap?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, of course, if the list⁹ allows us to do whatever we want anywhere. I want no restrictions. Any restriction on testing is too restrictive. It's just a scientific matter; you're asking me not to think about something. If we would have taken this attitude, we would never have had the auto or the Cinema industry. For example, Mr. President, you'll note that on their list, the electromagnetic masked accelerator is restricted to 1.2 grams per fathom. That's certainly too restrictive (laughter).

Dr. Graham: I second everything that Cap said. Nothing worries the Soviets more than having US technology focused on a problem. They will try to set a framework of constraints on our technology and then gradually tighten it.

Judge Webster: I agree, too. We have less than 10% confidence in our ability to verify any of these restrictions.

Ambassador Nitze: We should have a study on this area and understand why we don't like the Soviets' limits and what we could accept as limits. It's going to be very hard to argue with Congress if we don't have any study. It would be a real morass.

Secretary Weinberger: I can argue very comfortably without a study that no restriction is a common sense position. No study can tell us

⁹ An unknown hand crossed out "is free" after "list."

what we need, and no study can look into the future and determine what restrictions will hurt us or not. This seems fairly obvious to me.

Admiral Crowe: Paul does have a point though with respect to Congress.

Ambassador Kampelman: I agree. It is something we have to be concerned about.

Admiral Crowe: We will be asked about how we looked at criteria. We will look at this.

Ambassador Rowny: I'm very encouraged, Mr. President, by dropping some of the sublimits, and I believe we probably could get a deal on START now that will help with INF ratification and the like.

Mr. Carlucci: Well, this meeting has helped quite a bit. Let's avoid leaks. Leaks would be absolutely fatal to us in our ability to achieve our negotiating aims. Do not debrief your staffs.

Admiral Crowe: On INF, I would make one other point. The Chiefs are very interested in modernization in other areas that will be needed to reorient to the new military situation after INF. We should not look at the INF agreement as a money-saving device. We are going devote that money into other areas. We absolutely need the High Level Group's Montebello Decision to be implemented.

Secretary Weinberger: I fully agree with the Chiefs. We need modern systems; we also need modernization of conventional forces *after* an INF agreement to ensure we have proper deterrence.

The President: I know that we need modernization; we certainly need to replace our older systems.

Secretary Weinberger: Especially modern conventional systems.

Admiral Crowe: And a buildup of modern short-range nuclear forces.

Mr. Carlucci: Thank you very much.

The meeting ended at 2:35 p.m.

214. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, October 15, 1987

SUBJECT

Guidance on Talking Summit with the Soviets

Before we depart for Moscow on Monday,² we need guidance from the President on how to handle the relationship between substantive negotiations, especially INF and START, and setting of the next summit's exact dates and venue. This will require specifying what we absolutely demand (if anything), absolutely reject (e.g., a non-US summit?), and where we can be flexible.

Notwithstanding his reluctance to sign up for whatever reason, Gorbachev has much more to gain at home and abroad from a summit than does the President. Therefore, we must be firm in refusing to pay any price in substance for the summit. What the President has to gain is the image of moving ahead on US-Soviet relations; but this will be a temporary effect. Sustaining that political image will turn much more on substantive developments in succeeding months, especially INF ratification. At the same time, a major danger looms: Any appearance that somehow the event, timing, venue and theatrics of a summit were more important to the President than the substantive outcome, and actually drove the latter—especially the endgame on INF, could be very damaging in ratification. Moreover, while their calculations are somewhat opaque, it is clear that the Soviets are trying to manipulate summit decisions for political/substantive gain. It would be damaging for the President to appear to have been manipulated.

The first danger is rushing the INF Treaty to meet a summit deadline. There are two ways to minimize this. One is to give ourselves more time by opening December, or even early 1988, as a possible period for the next summit. We have not been thinking in these terms, but need to know if this is possible. Secondly, we need to make clear to the Soviets and, as needed in public, that we do not insist on signing anything at a summit. If the Soviets do, then we in turn insist that the products be fully and satisfactorily completed—or within a resolvable issue or two—before the meeting is actually on. Since it is likely that

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, U.S.-Soviet Summit November–December 1987 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum.

² October 19.

the Soviets will retain one or two issues in INF until the summit itself, even this stance will leave us to decide on the eve of the summit whether we can manage their satisfactory resolution at the summit.

A second danger would arise if the Soviets try to condition the US venue of the next summit on “something substantial” beyond INF, leaving it vague at the beginning what this is but then try to get us to buy into a START/Space “framework” as the “something substantial.” In contrast to our interest in getting more time for INF completion, our interest in avoiding the “framework” trap argues for having the next summit as soon as possible. The more time that passes, the closer we might be to a Vladivostok-type accord which the Soviets would urge signing at the next summit. We best manage this issue by simply refusing to consider an alternative to the US as a venue—INF can be signed by other than the top leaders anytime it’s ready, anywhere—and pledge to do no more than work hard on a START treaty and to reference whatever progress has been made by summit time in a communique that entails no obligations.

If the Soviets are themselves open-minded or undecided, do we prefer a “small” summit limited to Washington, a “big” tour-the-country summit (the President’s image apparently), or something in-between? With large downside risks and little upside gain, a “small” scenario is preferable. We suspect the Soviets prefer it too for their own reasons, but may be wrong. No summit scenario will be finalized in Moscow, but we would do well to have our preferences in mind.

The following guidance points emerge:

We shall consider no alternatives to the United States, including Washington, as the next summit venue.

To reduce the risk that important technical details in INF will be negotiated under excessive time pressure, we would prefer to fix the date of the next summit in early-to-mid December, or later. Late November remains a possibility if we are highly confident of our ability to complete the treaty.

If the Soviets insist on signing INF at the summit, its actual occurrence and timing must be considered tentative pending virtual completion of the agreement.

We shall accept no other conditions, e.g., START/Space agreements, as a condition for a summit, but pledge to work all parts of our agenda diligently.

We shall not lobby for a “big” summit in the US, but accept one if that’s what Gorbachev wants.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss these points with the President and Secretary Shultz in a preliminary way this afternoon and plan to bring more

definitive guidance on them to the pre-Moscow consultations in Helsinki.³

³ Powell wrote: “Action Complete” on the “Approve” line.

215. Telegram From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

October 23, 1987, 2307Z

Following is my informal memorandum on today’s conversation with Gorbachev.²

PARTICIPANTS

Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze
George Shultz
Frank Carlucci

Attendees, but not participants

Ambassador Dobrynin
Marshal Akhromeyev
Ambassador Dubinin
Mr. Bessmyrtnykn, Deputy Foreign Minister
Amb. Nitze
Amb. Matlock
Amb. Ridgway
Mr. Parris, Dept of State (notetaker)
Mr. Chernayev, aide to Gorbachev

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (09/10/1987–10/31/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. Sent for information to the White House. Carlucci was aboard an aircraft. Shultz departed the United States on October 15 to visit Jerusalem (October 16–17), Jidda (October 17), Jerusalem (October 17–19), Cairo (October 19), London (October 19–20), and Helsinki (October 20–21), before arriving in Moscow. He and Carlucci met three times with Shevardnadze on October 22 and then again the morning and evening of October 23, in between meeting with Gorbachev. The memoranda of conversation for those meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 80–85. On October 23, Shultz flew to Belgium to brief NATO foreign ministers. He returned to Washington the next day.

² The formal memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986 to January 1989, Document 84.

Introduction:

1. Gorbachev asked Shevardnadze and Shultz to clarify where their discussions stood. Both made a factual report. Gorbachev then commented on the improved atmosphere between our two countries is a result of the post-Geneva period. They had made one more step than we had. (It wasn't clear what he was referring to.) This had generated great expectations. We were now approaching the results stage. If we do not complete an arms control deal there will be political losses for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

2. Gorbachev stated his impression that we can soon complete INF. He agreed that the fundamentals should be solved there & then in Moscow rather than in Geneva. In this connection he proposed a joint moratorium on INF deployments effective November 1.

3. Gorbachev considered START the most important question. "Let's find acceptable solutions." The basic formula of 50 percent and 10 year non-withdrawal was established at Reykjavik. What has happened since then has been "horse trading."

4. He (Gorbachev) had been thinking of what else to do. Putting aside the details, there are two big problems:

- A) Strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and
- B) Optimal formulation of the triad.

5. On the first he had proposed that both sides not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. We then can discuss what can and can't be put in space. He is awaiting our response.

6. On the second question, the key is to have an optimum correlation between the different elements of the triads of both sides. Accordingly, he is proposing a new formula based on distribution levels of the three elements of the strategic triad. Within a level of 6,000 warheads, the number of warheads on ICBMs would be no more than 3,000 to 3,300. The number for SLBMs would be 1,800 to 2,000. There could be 800 to 900 ALCMs.

7. Such movement could propel us very soon to the "key provision," he said. The next step would be to reach an agreement. Gorbachev proposed a 12-month "moratorium" on Krasnoyarsk construction. He expects a similar reaction from us on construction at Thule and Flying-dales Radars.

8. Secretary Shultz welcomed his comments on INF and said we would push the negotiations rapidly.

9. On ABM and related questions, the Secretary wanted to clarify what Gorbachev was proposing. He would restate it without implying the President agreed since this was a sensitive issue:

—10 Year withdrawal, and

—Compliance with the ABM treaty, according to the narrow interpretation (that is, as defined in the March 1985 DOD report).

10. Gorbachev responded that he had told the President at Reykjavik that he would help him deal with the SDI problem. He would do this by defining what can and cannot go into space. But all of this would be subject to the 10 year non-withdrawal provision. Research could be conducted under this option. The idea, however, is that weapons should not be in space.

11. Secretary Shultz asked again to clarify, without inferring that he accepted the proposal: 10 year non-withdrawal. Interpretation as traditionally understood. This would be supplemented by activities in space within the confines of certain thresholds. Nothing would allow deployment. Gorbachev added that there would be no testing of weapons in space.

12. Secretary Shultz then turned to how to make the 50-percent cut operative. Progress has been made. He proposed an alternative to Gorbachev's proposal, recognizing that some limits are a problem. We have agreed on the following:

- 6,000 warheads;
- 1,600 launchers and bombers;
- 1,540 warheads on heavy missiles;
- Bomber counting rule; and
- Throwweight reduced by 50 percent (we are still seeking to codify this).

13. We have proposed to limit ICBM warheads to 3,300. In Washington the Soviets made this 3,600 and applied it to all three legs. We feel the biggest distinction is between ballistic missiles and air-delivered warheads—ballistic versus non-ballistic. We are willing to drop the sublimit involving ICBMs and SLBMs in exchange for a 4,800 limit on all ballistic missile warheads. Each side would have a mix suited to its own force structure.

14. Regarding mobiles. There is a question of having confidence in verification. We are willing to listen. "If we can find a solution on the entire package, then mobiles can be resolved."

15. Gorbachev said the U.S. has concerns. "We do too. We do not want you to feel less secure by forcing too many reductions on you. If we force you to reconfigure your forces, you will find a way out."

16. Secretary Shultz noted that Gorbachev had made the same point in Geneva; that is, one side can't make the other conform to its idea of force structure. Let's put a cap on ballistic missiles, but leave the other side to structure its mix as it chooses. We would have packages that make gains toward stability but don't try to do everything.

17. Gorbachev said we have a basis to work toward "key provisions." This would be the central theme at the Washington summit.

The most important result, he repeated, would be “key provisions.” They would then be used to give instructions to the delegates. When the President came to Moscow next summer, he could sign the treaty. Gorbachev then said, “let me make one point.” Give some thought to it. I recently heard some remarks by Max Kampelman saying that we should come to grips with START. Then we can deal with space. Not so! We have to resolve START and space in the totality of their interrelationships.

18. Secretary Shultz responded that we have shown flexibility on some of the START numbers. Perhaps Geneva can’t do much, but it can lay the groundwork for a fruitful summit. He had several suggestions:

- 1) Geneva could work on verification, particularly mobiles;
- 2) Regarding the positions that have been taken. The Geneva negotiators can clarify them; and
- 3) They should continue to try to eliminate brackets so that a summit would end up with instructions to our negotiators.

19. Gorbachev saw weaknesses in Shultz’s suggestion. He had not mentioned space. If this is set aside then movement in other matters makes no sense. “Why have you avoided discussion on space, particularly our latest proposals?” Let me also say, he added, that I sense an effort to reject our ideas. The key provisions must be developed in time for the summit. Your purpose seems to be vague, and negates the Soviet effort. Some of your people have to work on the key provisions or it won’t make sense. If not, we will have to postpone all this until your administration is out of office.

20. Secretary Shultz responded by reviewing possible scenarios for the summit (1, 2, 5 day trips) and discussing venues. Gorbachev went back to the theme of combining START and D&S, arguing for a push to complete work by next spring.

21. Secretary Shultz asked Carlucci for his comments. Carlucci said that he found linkage totally unacceptable. Gorbachev had described an ABM treaty interpretation that was inconsistent with the President’s goals for SDI. As long as this type of linkage was maintained, he saw little chance for progress. “You are on a course that will constrain SDI and that is unacceptable.” After a somewhat stunned pause, Gorbachev responded, “well, is it all a wasted effort?”

22. Secretary Shultz said that, if he felt that way, perhaps the INF agreement could be signed by the negotiators. You want an agreement on SDI and space. That is the essence of your position. Frank has described the President’s view. You know it as well. Is it possible to find a formulation that gives you the assurances you want on predictability while allowing the President to maintain the thrust of the research program underway?

23. Gorbachev said he was coming back to the agenda not because he didn't want to visit the U.S. He did. But, we have to decide. We can't have a meeting without movement. "I want some movement in America." I hope that in the next month some conclusive proposals can be prepared in Geneva. Perhaps a summit could be held late in December. Such a meeting is necessary, but we must think in terms of results. "I am not maneuvering. I have both a human and a political interest, but the latter is more important." That is why I'm insisting on "key provisions" for START and space. I believe we have an accumulation of quantitative assets that makes a qualitative result possible.

24. I would not exclude the possibility, he went on, that there are certain questions only the President and I can resolve. But, "key provisions" is a worthwhile approach. Any program of further contacts presupposes such an approach.

25. Secretary Shultz responded that it wasn't the format of Gorbachev's suggestions that made us cautious. It was the content. In terms of timing, if we go past early December a visit becomes difficult.

26. Gorbachev responded that many things had become clearer and he needed to do some thinking. The Secretary and Frank Carlucci had only to report to one man, but he had to report "to many." We should report and he would report.

27. The Secretary noted that it would be good if the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. could meet in a normal way for a full round of discussions. Gorbachev agreed but, unfortunately, a lot of expectations had been aroused.

28. The Secretary said we had had quite a discussion on strategic and space issues. But he did not see an immediate prospect for an agreement on space. It was his understanding that under the circumstances the General Secretary would not feel comfortable establishing a time for the visit. In the meantime, he will continue working these areas.

29. Gorbachev agreed, with the added comment that he intended to write the President a letter on all of this. He also noted that he needed to keep the process moving. INF was a distinct possibility. It represented great contributions by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It will also provide a good experience base for START.

30. Secretary Shultz asked, how then should we sign the INF agreement? Gorbachev replied that we still have time to weigh everything, and explore ways toward a compromise on the main problem. We should be able to do this by fall or the end of the year. "I will write to the President. I still think there is time to work this out and then we could have a substantial agenda for a visit to Washington."

31. Secretary Shultz said, "I hope you are right, but I doubt it." Gorbachev responded, if you, Carlucci and Nitze get your heads together, "I will work with the President." It can happen.

32. Secretary Shultz warned that Gorbachev needed to weigh carefully what he meant by saying that everything depends on SDI, because this could well forego further developments as far as this administration is concerned.

33. Shevardnadze responded, “if there is nothing to say about space then tell me.” Secretary Shultz said this was not the case and carefully laid out for Shevardnadze the agreed-upon American position: seven-year non-withdrawal until 1994.

34. Gorbachev concluded that everything was now clear. He would consider it and evaluate it. “Our exchanges on START and space are not over and I will write the President. I still have a month and a half, and I have a desire to come over to the U.S.”

NB: The above summarizes a four-and-a-half hour conversation, but omits Gorbachev’s polemics on a State Department publication which he produced and complained about.³ His diatribe on this subject took approximately one-half hour. Neither Shultz nor I had seen the publication.

Regards.

Frank

³ Reference is to *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987).

216. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 26, 1987, 1554Z

11335. Subject: START: Lehman-Vorontsov/Obukhov conversation, October 23, 1987.

1. This is NST/START Memcon VIII-M-145. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting date: October 23, 1987. Place: Foreign Ministers meeting, Moscow

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870879–0425. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

3. Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Ambassador Lehman	Ambassador Vorontsov
	Ambassador Obukhov

4. Summary: Vorontsov went out of his way, at the conclusion of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting on October 23, to say to Lehman that the U.S. has been “given what it asked for” on sublimits. When asked a direct question, he seemed to agree that this meant acceptance of the U.S.-proposed ballistic missile warhead and ICBM warhead sublimits of 4800 and 3300. Obukhov is supposed to make things clear in Geneva. End Summary.

5. As Ambassadors Lehman and Obukhov were leaving the room following Secretary Shultz’s final meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on October 23² in Moscow, Lehman asked Obukhov if he could explain General Secretary Gorbachev’s proposal on sublimits (septel). Obukhov said that it would be best to discuss this matter in Geneva. Lehman said that he hoped the Soviet side would introduce the proposal quickly in Geneva, because Lehman was not certain that he understood the proposal. Obukhov said that he and Lehman could discuss sublimits in detail as soon as they return to Geneva.³

6. At this point Lehman overheard Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov say “excuse me, I have to talk to this gentleman.” Vorontsov pushed several of his Soviet colleagues aside, and said to Lehman “you owe me for this one. I have arranged for you to get your sublimits. I just wanted you to know that our discussion of sublimits was not in vain. You have received what you wanted on sublimits.”

7. Lehman responded that the proposal was not clear to him. While the numbers proposed by the Soviet side seemed similar to U.S. proposals, the Soviet side’s structure seems to go down a path that strays from the direction both sides seem headed down in Geneva. Vorontsov replied, “no Ron, we have given you what you asked for.” Lehman asked Vorontsov “are you saying that you agree to our proposal of a sublimit of 4800 on total ballistic missile warheads and under that a

² Shultz and Shevardnadze’s concluding session took place in the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry from 5:10 to 6:20 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 85.

³ In telegram 11766 from NST Geneva, November 5, Lehman reported on a luncheon of November 3, where “Obukhov described the recent Soviet sublimit proposal as being a ‘concession’ designed to meet U.S. concerns.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870913–0587)

sublimit of 3300 on ICBMs and on ICBMs only”? Vorontsov responded “yes, you have what you want.”

8. At this point Lehman grabbed Obukhov, who had been standing aside and pulled him into the conversation. Lehman asked Vorontsov whether the Soviet side will make this clear in Geneva. Will Ambassador Obukhov be given precise guidance that the Soviet side is prepared to agree to the 4800 and 3300 sublimits? Vorontsov said, “of course, we will be precise.” Vorontsov then moved on to join Shevardnadze. Obukhov exchanged some pleasantries with Lehman and said that he would see Lehman in Geneva.

9. Comment: The full intent of the Soviet presentation on sublimits is not clear. An announcement in TASS recounting the proposal could be read as being consistent with the U.S. approach of one way freedom-to-mix. Nevertheless, General Secretary Gorbachev’s presentation implies the approach of separate limits on each leg of the triad along the lines of the Soviet Union’s force structure. That would, of course, be unacceptable. Although Vorontsov’s comment is intriguing, he is not an expert and may not understand the Soviet proposal. Vorontsov is also manipulative and may have made his comments as a negotiating tactic. The bottom line remains: the Soviet proposal means that their desired force structure after 50-percent reductions is consistent with the U.S. proposal. We could not live with their proposal if it means separate sublimits, but they could live with our proposal as it is presently structured. End comment.

10. Moscow minimize considered.

Hanmer

217. Memorandum From the Counselor to the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 28, 1987

This afternoon, I met with General Herres. John Howe joined us toward the end of the session. Their interest was to follow up on yesterday’s session with you² and my interest was to stimulate them

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 3, 1987 Oct. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not further identified.

toward some constructive thinking about the Defense and Space problem. I believe we both succeeded.

In effect, their preference would be a provision in the START Treaty under which both parties agree not to deploy for a period of X years (Herres says they would have no problem with the number 10 but believes this would be difficult for Cap to swallow). It would be necessary to define “deploy” so that it does not encompass testing and they agreed to try their hand at that task. They are wary of a formula which ties START compliance to the ABM Treaty since the latter is pregnant with continued argument and accusations making the START reductions too uncertain.

We discussed the idea of kicking the can on the important issue of “permitted-prohibited”, both because of the difficulty of arriving at an administration decision on the issue and also because of a concern that we do not know enough about the new technology to tie our hands. The idea developed, therefore, was for the parties to agree (a treaty is not necessary for this) to enter into a negotiation within a year after the START Treaty goes into effect. The agenda for the negotiations would include: the impact of new technologies on our respective force structures, problems involved in a transition from offense dominant force structures to defense dominant force structures, and ways of interpreting or strengthening the ABM Treaty so as to reflect the national security interests of both parties at this time in light of the new technologies. This would, of course, push that new negotiation into the next administration, but it would dignify a Gorbachev objective and relate it to one of ours.

I suggested that since the above may be inadequate, the Chiefs should consider additional steps we might take that would not hurt SDI. It is clear to me that the Chiefs are prepared to go far in order to obtain a START agreement. One thought that General Herres did discuss and said he was exploring related to the selection of a specifically defined orbit in space which would be looked upon as a permitted test range in space. A limited number of test vehicles could function within that specifically delineated orbit and they could be observed by both parties. Devices outside of the orbit would be prohibited. Herres thinks this might be doable and would be a simpler approach than the quantitative lists which have political and verification problems.

218. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, October 29, 1987

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Shevardnadze—October 30

Attached are your memo to the President² on his meeting with Shevardnadze, recommended talking points, your memo of mid-September cautioning against a "framework agreement"³ (it covers the matter of instructing negotiators and is still valid), and Secretary Shultz's memo to the President.

We have conflicting evidence as to what Shevardnadze will bring regarding the key issue of Gorbachev's conditions for a summit in the US. The Soviets have been deliberately encouraging the expectation that Gorbachev has softened his conditions and will come committed only to signing INF and to discussing thoroughly Defense/Space and START. On the other hand, in Moscow Gorbachev stated the essentiality of a "key provisions" agreement so strongly that we should not assume he has backed off, and the Soviet public line since has disguised but not altered this position. Shevardnadze may open by simply accepting a US summit which yields no more than a signed INF Treaty and continued negotiations on the rest. Or he may take another shot at "key provisions", more artfully than Gorbachev did, and then fall back to INF only. Or we may have essentially a repeat of Moscow, with the Soviets insisting on a non-US venue for signing INF only. He will probably elaborate on Gorbachev's new proposals about START subceilings; he may have something new to say on one or more regional issues.

The public signs indicate Soviet readiness for a late-November or early-December summit on terms we can accept. But recent Soviet tactics and current equivocations make it unwise to assume this. Such uncertainty makes it hard to script the President's line. The talking points are aimed at Shevardnadze trying again for "key provisions" but ready to fall back. We shall have to count on near-real-time recalibration

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 10/30/1987 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is a list of participants for Reagan's 12:30 p.m. pre-brief and 1:00 p.m. meeting with Shevardnadze.

² Printed as Document 219.

³ Printed as Document 206.

from early receipt of the letter, anything you can report out during the morning's meeting, and the 1230 prebrief.

The following considerations suggest that the Soviets will try again for a significant concession on Defense & Space in this round:

SDI remains the paramount Soviet arms control target and Gorbachev's domestic predicament requires him to give it his best shot.

The Soviets know this town is full of influential people prepared to meet him half way or more on SDI.

The evening before you met with Gorbachev, Dmitry Simes dined with Gorbachev's foreign policy aide Chernayev who was very optimistic about compromise on SDI because of Shultz's repeated references to the Reykjavik legacy, which, to the Soviets, means START/Space linkage, not just 50% cuts in START.

It is clear from the detailed memcon of your meeting with Gorbachev⁴ that your intervention on Space/SDI changed the tenor of the meeting by preventing any papering over of differences. Up to that point, Gorbachev had been saying "ABM Treaty/key provisions/ binding/essential for summit"; Shultz was saying "I want to clarify your position/you and the President must argue it out/the summit will have a full agenda." Your intervention forced the Secretary to state what he'd been trying to avoid, that the differences are really profound and that the President won't be sidled into a situation where he has to compromise for or at a summit. The Soviets surely saw this dynamic too.

The Soviets can be forgiven for believing that they have enough allies to warrant continued campaigning for SDI concessions as the price of a US summit. We have to be prepared.

RECOMMENDATION

That you you initial and forward the memorandum to the President (Tab I).⁵

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 215.

⁵ Carlucci indicated his approval.

219. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 29, 1987

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and reach acceptable agreement on summit substance, venue, and dates.

II. BACKGROUND

In effect, the Soviets have asked for overtime on the Moscow ministerial because it went badly for them. Gorbachev attempted to exploit your eagerness for progress on START and perceived eagerness for a US summit to promote a binding "key provisions" agreement to be signed with INF this fall, a mechanism by which he seeks to impose crippling constraints on SDI. At Tab D is an earlier memo² from me detailing the pitfalls of this. We were prepared and rebuffed this attempt. Gorbachev saw our disappointment bordering on anger, which could jeopardize any summit at all and his continued ability to lobby you against SDI. Moreover, his maneuver was criticized widely in the West as blundering or "too clever by half", not an image he wants to endure.

The Soviets appear ready to close rapidly on the remaining INF details in Geneva, although there may yet be end-game ploys. Gorbachev has some inhibitions about coming to a US summit, perhaps for internal political reasons, and he is still reluctant to come for INF alone. In Moscow, even after our differences over SDI and the ABM Treaty were starkly portrayed, he insisted that those differences must be overcome in a "key provisions" pact of some kind that addresses both 50% reductions in START and Defense and Space. The prospect and then occurrence of a summit with you is his best leverage for continuing to pursue that goal. Shevardnadze's sudden visit keeps the game going. Our task is to force it to closure on terms acceptable to you.

George has sent you his view of the meeting and how he plans to handle Shevardnadze (Tabs A and B).³ I agree with it in all essentials.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 10/30/1987 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Ermarth. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand corner.

² Printed as Document 206.

³ Attached but not printed are Shultz's October 29 memorandum to Reagan describing his meeting with Dubinin, and talking points for Reagan's upcoming meeting with Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze will arrive in Washington at 1:00 a.m.; we are trying to get the letter from Gorbachev at that early point. He will meet with George and me on Friday⁴ morning for several hours. I shall try to give you advance notice through General Powell on how things are going. George and I shall brief you around 1230, following which Shevardnadze will come in to meet with you. George has told the Soviets that your departure in early afternoon requires key decisions to be reached by around mid-day and to be promptly announced. We have several press scenarios in mind depending on the outcome, with you announcing success.

My recommendation is that, unless we've already reached agreement, you force Shevardnadze to fish or cut bait with respect to the substance, timing, and venue of the next summit. You should insist that we shall commit to no more substance than a) signing INF, b) a full review of the agenda, including c) as much progress as possible on START and Space negotiations to be recorded in a communique or other document as instructions to negotiators in pursuing final treaties, NOT in a "key provisions" or "framework agreement" which could be seen as a free standing political commitment that constrains SDI without delivering START reductions. The timing is, of course, late fall, as previously agreed. And the venue is, of course, the United States, including a Washington signing of INF.

These important bottom lines are in your talking points at Tab A, which may have to be adjusted on the basis of what Shevardnadze brings and our morning meeting. Time permitting, I believe a word or two on Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan would be in order; they are provided.

Continued Soviet maneuvering about this combination of summit venue, timing, and substance erode your image of being in control of the dialogue, could damage our ability to ratify INF, and could undermine our ability to pursue START sensibly. This ministerial round robin must now end.

III. PARTICIPANTS (See Tab E)⁵

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

Pool photo op in the Oval Office. Post-meeting press plan depends on outcome.

V. *SEQUENCE*

12:30–1:00 p.m. Secretary's pre-brief. 1:00–1:05 p.m. Secretary greets Shevardnadze West Wing. 1:00–1:05 p.m. welcome photo op. 1:10–2:00 p.m. meeting with Shevardnadze in Cabinet Room.

⁴ October 30.

⁵ Attached but not printed is the Participant List.

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan⁶

Washington, October 29, 1987

SUBJECT

Shevardnadze's Visit

Gorbachev's dramatic decision to send Shevardnadze here this week suggests the Soviets may now be ready to fill in the blank on summit dates. But as we have seen, there are no guarantees, so we should maintain the stance that has served us well over the past few months and especially in the last few days: If Gorbachev is ready to come here, fine; if not, the U.S. is ready to keep working on the issues.

We covered arms control, human rights, regional and bilateral matters exhaustively in Washington last month and in Moscow last week. Thus, I see no reason why Shevardnadze's visit this week need go beyond a single day of intense discussions. We will seek to:

- Extract essential Soviet compromises on remaining INF issues, particularly regarding inspection.

- Turn Gorbachev's proposal on START sublimits to our advantage by placing the proposed Soviet numbers into the sublimit structure we prefer.

- Reiterate our willingness to address the concerns they have expressed on the need for greater predictability on strategic defense, without limiting our freedom to conduct a vigorous SDI program now and in the future.

- Depending on what Shevardnadze brings, set dates for Gorbachev's visit to the United States, and discuss in general terms programmatic options for the visit.

The Agenda Beyond Arms Control

We do not need to repeat our in-depth discussions in Moscow on human rights, regional and bilateral issues, but we can use Shevardnadze's visit to tie up a few loose ends.

- I would like to set dates for Under Secretary Armacost and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to review regional issues. This would pave the way for your own treatment of such issues as Afghanistan at a summit.

⁶ Secret; Sensitive.

—I will also try to firm up Shevardnadze's commitment to resolve additional cases on our human rights representation lists and to permit expanded emigration. I will press for resolution of the four remaining cases on your "short list" and the remaining separated spouses cases—especially by the time of a summit.

—The Soviets appear ready to wrap up arrangements for the operation of our Embassy in Moscow in the wake of the withdrawal last fall of Soviet local employees. These understandings would guarantee our Embassy's access to essential services and ensure our ability to get technical personnel in and out of Moscow.

Arms Control

Despite the productive sessions this fall in Washington, Geneva and Moscow, much remains to be done. Shevardnadze will be accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Ambassador Karpov, who are competent to deal with the full range of issues being addressed in the Nuclear and Space Talks. I would welcome Frank Carlucci's active participation in my meetings with Shevardnadze.

On *INF*, our Geneva delegation has been working intensively on the remaining areas, largely in verification, where Soviet movement is necessary. Key outstanding issues are procedures for conducting inspections, and the extent to which the Soviets could destroy their systems by launching them. Ambassador Glitman will update us regularly on developments in Geneva. We will make clear to Shevardnadze that we are not interested in the INF deployment moratorium that Gorbachev proposed in Moscow.

On *START*, the prospect finally exists for engaging on sublimits and a major goal during Shevardnadze's visit will be to turn the Soviet proposals to our advantage. Gorbachev's sublimits suggest the Soviets could live with a force structure that is compatible with the U.S. proposed sublimits. In their current form, however, the Soviet sublimits package would unacceptably reduce and limit our SLBM force, and thus would do to us precisely what the Soviets have complained we are trying to do them, i.e., restructure our deterrent. We will make the case to Shevardnadze that, on the basis of Gorbachev's proposals, a sublimit regime such as we have proposed should be acceptable to them.

On *Defense and Space (D&S)*, I stressed to Gorbachev that this was an issue which ultimately you and he would have to settle. Frank Carlucci succinctly summed up the issue when he told Gorbachev that the question to be faced was: Is it possible to find a formulation which would give the Soviets the assurances they needed while preserving the strength and thrust of your SDI program?

Shevardnadze's mission may be more to assess our seriousness about looking for such a formulation than to identify now what that

formula might be, although he almost certainly will press for a response to the proposals they presented here in September. In his talks this week with Jack Matlock, Shevardnadze also suggested that Gorbachev is softening his demand for a commitment that a summit achieve a framework agreement on START and D&S. We won't know for sure until we see the letter Shevardnadze is bringing.

We should underscore to Shevardnadze that we are interested in a comprehensive agreement at Geneva that encompasses both offense and defense, and which thus gets at the question Frank posed to Gorbachev in Moscow. I hope you will also emphasize to Shevardnadze that you want to take up these issues with Gorbachev personally—that your summit objective is not just to sign an INF agreement, but to use the event to find the way forward on strategic issues as well.

Shevardnadze may repeat Gorbachev's moratorium on Krasnoyarsk construction. We should acknowledge that halting construction is a constructive first step, and that they should now go on to remove this violation by destroying the structure. We should continue rejecting any linkage to our own radars in Greenland and the UK.

Scenario

We have suggested that the Soviets provide us with a copy of Gorbachev's letter upon Shevardnadze's arrival late Thursday⁷ evening, so that we can get as much as possible done the next day. I will open my own discussions at 9:00 Friday morning to get the talks off to a running start.

If all goes well, your own meeting would be the occasion for resolving any outstanding issues, agreeing on summit dates, and getting a discussion going on arrangements and advance work. You and Shevardnadze would then be able to make an announcement on the summit at the conclusion of the meeting. I could wrap up any loose ends that afternoon, working as necessary into the evening. Discussions with Shevardnadze could continue over into Saturday if absolutely required.

If it seems useful, Shevardnadze and I could meet in Geneva before a summit here.

Documentation

Experience indicates that Shevardnadze may suggest—or even present—a draft summit communique, and that it will contain loose formulations or declarations of principles. If he does, our response should be that we can look as we go along this fall at ways to record

⁷ October 29.

the results of a summit, but there is no need for communique drafting at this point. We can also lay down a marker that we have little interest in ambiguous declarations of principles but would be willing to consider documents that describe concrete agreements and aim at guiding the two governments to tackle practical problems in the months ahead.

220. Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 3:00 a.m.

Mr. Secretary:

The Gorbachev letter² is attached, along with a copy of the analytical points³ (drawn on the key points that follow) which the NSC will pick up from Lynn Pascoe at 6:45 this morning. Following the key points, there are also some procedural points you should be aware of: some will need a decision from you early after you get in.

I. The *key points of the letter* are:

—Gorbachev proposes a summit meeting in the first ten days of December. Shevardnadze has authority to work out all aspects.

—At the summit the INF Treaty would be signed and START and Defense and Space would be discussed. If the President's visit to the USSR is to be "crowned" with a strategic arms treaty, it is necessary to reach agreement in principle at the upcoming summit.

—Gorbachev is not wedded to key elements. Instructions to delegations is an acceptable form of recording the results of the summit.

—On Defense and Space, the letter focuses on the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, with nothing new on interpretation or permitted activity. It calls for "observance" (vice strengthening) of the ABM Treaty—although it quotes an April 1985 letter from the President⁴ about strengthening "the role" of the Treaty—and says the principal remaining issue is agreement on a time period.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 3, 1987 OCT. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not attached. Gorbachev's letter to Reagan, dated October 28, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 88.

³ Not attached.

⁴ Presumably, a reference to Reagan's letter to Gorbachev of April 30, 1985, which is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, January 1985–October 1986, Document 23.

—On the link to START, it asserts they want “nothing more” than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—On START constraints, the letter refers to Gorbachev’s Moscow proposal, with a slight hint of freedom to mix. This can be probed in discussions. So can the letter’s argument that with the Soviet sublimit proposals based on the triad, “certain combinations of the numerical parameters we have proposed produce a picture that is close to the one US officials at various levels have recently been outlining to us.” Backfire, the ban on mobile ICBMs and SLCMs are mentioned as artificial complications; verification is mentioned as a “natural” difficulty.

—Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support the negotiations. He suggests Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors “could be” used for this purpose.

—Other arms control subjects (nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional forces) are given cursory treatment.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

Gorbachev’s Letter—Key Points

Summit

—Proposed timing: first ten days of December. Shevardnadze has authority to work out all aspects.

—Proposed agenda: The INF Treaty would be signed; START and Defense and Space would be discussed.

—Additionally, the letter notes that if the President’s visit to the USSR next year is to be “crowned” with a treaty on strategic arms, it will be necessary to reach “agreement in principle” on this score at the summit. Thus, Moscow Summit is not explicitly conditioned to agreements in principle on START/D&S at Washington Summit.

⁵ Secret. Drafted by Simons, Timbie, and Puschel. The English translation of Gorbachev’s letter and analytical points sent to the White House were not found attached.

—What form this START “agreement in principle” would take is “not too important.” Key elements of a future treaty is cited as one possible way to go, but instructions to delegations is also acceptable.

Arms Control

—Notes possibility of finalizing an INF Treaty within 2–3 weeks; cites recent progress made in Moscow on resolving outstanding issues.

—On START, the letter refers to Gorbachev’s Moscow proposal on sublimits, with a slight hint of freedom to mix. Letter argues that the Soviet sublimit proposals, based on the triad, is getting closer to the U.S. proposal. Backfire, the ban on mobile ICBMs and SLCMs are mentioned as artificial complications; verification is called a “natural” difficulty.

—On Defense and Space, the letter focusses on the need to reach agreement overall on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and backs away from previous Soviet insistence that the ABM Treaty be “strengthened.” Now, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to simply “observe” the ABM Treaty. There are no new details on Treaty interpretation or permitted activities: he says they stated their views on observance in Washington.

—On linkage to START, it asserts they want “nothing more” than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Arms Control Channel

—Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support and facilitate the negotiations. He suggests Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors “could be” used for this purpose.

II. Procedural Points

—*Negotiating a Joint Statement.* Shevardnadze told John Whitehead they have a draft, and Roz will be meeting with Bessmertnykh beginning at 8:00. She will start with the brief factual draft you have.

—*Informing your Team.* Lynn will be asking you for a decision on Roz’ suggestion that, as previously discussed, the group that will gather to support you be shown copies of the letter *with the summit dates whited out*. Shevardnadze begged John Whitehead not to leak until he gave the letter to the President; John takes the responsibility personally.

—*Soviet Participation in Meetings.* Shevardnadze has asked to have big teams with him: 7 Soviets including him with you, 8 with the President. (The core, in addition to him, is Bessmertnykh, Dubinin, Karpov, his personal aides Tarasenko and Stepanov, and interpreter Palazhchenko; he wants to add MFA regional expert Mamedov as

notetaker with the President.) Roz should be in a position to tell Bessmertnykh where if at all to cut when he arrives at 8:00.

Tom Simons⁶

Jim Timbie

Karen Puschel

⁶ Simons initialed the paper for all three drafters in the right-hand margin beside their typed signatures.

221. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 30, 1987

SUBJECT

Discussion among Karpov, Kampelman, Nitze and Adelman (and others, at times)—October 30, 1987

ON INF

Karpov said he had a list of 36 unresolved issues. I said we had some 25–30. There was some discussion as to how to proceed to resolve them, but no consensus on a procedural recommendation emerged.

Karpov said the issues of principal concern to him were:

- (a) Our attempt to inspect ICBM facilities;
- (b) A non-circumvention clause; and
- (c) Inspection of facilities on allied territory.

During the discussion of (a), we explained why we were particularly concerned with the SS-25 facilities, the SS-25 final assembly facilities and the SS-25 operating bases. He confirmed that on-site inspection at the portal and around the perimeter of the SS-20/25 production facility could be continuously conducted. He indicated continued Soviet reluctance to permit inspection at SS-25 operational sites.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 3, 1987 Oct. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze, who did not initial the memorandum.

(b) We reviewed our proposed language with respect to non-circumvention. He said they were dissatisfied with the word “obligation.” This would permit an informal arrangement circumventing the provisions of the treaty. I asked whether he would be satisfied with a commitment not to enter into any new “pattern of cooperation” in conflict with the provisions of the agreement. He toyed with that formulation but ended up by not accepting it. We then emphasized the coupled thought of no agreement to their proposal for future negotiations. I think we persuaded him that this was a non-starter but he would not formally drop their proposal.

(c) We asked him whether he would be prepared to limit their insistence on challenge inspection of formally declared facilities on allied territories with the proviso that these be restricted to those that continue to be under U.S. control, that the period of time is limited, and that the inspections not be concentrated on any one country. He continued to insist that inspections should still apply after the U.S. turns the facility over to the host country. We explained that they would have the opportunity for a close-out inspection prior to our turning it over. He remained unsatisfied.

DISCUSSION ON START

We began the discussion by assuming that the letter² solved the sublimits question; it appeared to suggest that they could live within our 4800. Karpov said that was an error. We had asked for sublimits and they were agreeing to sublimits for each of the three legs. There was a certain freedom to choose within the flexibility indicated by the differences between the upper and higher numbers suggested for each of the three legs. They were not prepared to accept the 4800 because they had no need for 1200 ALCMs plus bombers. This resulted in a long and inconclusive debate.

ON SPACE DEFENSE

Karpov confirmed the language in the working group report³ of the September Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting. He had no explanation for Kuznetsov’s adamancy on a different interpretation. He said that if a device is tested in a manner, the results of which are doubtful as to whether they are within the agreed capabilities, the other side can ask for information or for the right to inspect. I commented that the test device would have been destroyed and would be uninspectable. He conceded that this would be a problem where a test was a single

² See footnote 2, Document 220.

³ Not found.

unique test, but if it were a part of a series of tests of a device, their right to inspect should be helpful.

There was extended discussion about how to understand the words “as negotiated and ratified.” Cooper had asked whether they had in mind the March 1985 OSD report to the Congress. Cooper believed that it would be the fullest definition of the narrow interpretation. Mr. Gorbachev had referred to the 1983 situation. Karpov did not clarify the Soviet position on this point.

We discussed the 10-year period of non-withdrawal. I asked whether this might be broken down into two periods, one being the period of START reductions, i.e. 5–7 years, the second being a period for negotiating an intercession regime. Karpov agreed, provided the sum of the two was 10 years with the further proviso that if agreement were reached on an intercession regime, that would govern when the intercession would begin and how long it would last.

222. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, October 30, 1987

Meeting with Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
at the Department of State, October 30, 1987

SCH Basic scheme of further summit contacts. If proceed in good way mtg in D.C. will take place. Have idea of next stage. How envisage visit of P to USSR.—When?

The Goal of Summits. I begin w/visit of P to USSR? We agree it is START and the entire complex related to this question. There are just a few months. Agreement on START & complex is something GS regards as the key objective. Lay groundwork in Washington. We will have INF.

First Agenda Item. Sign INF

Next Question is START

Have good basis for mutually acceptable go between. Next. 50% reduction must be accompanied by strengthening strategic stability.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987) [Meetings with President—Notes]. Secret. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 89.

Emphasize. These reductions create new environment. Must address strategic stability. What are methods?: The one mechanism is ABM treaty. This point is the fundamental thought.

Not asking for anything extraordinary. Not submitting new demands. Am mindful of statements of P that erosion of ABM treaty should be prevented.

In Sept you said in context of 50% have to give up certain rights, i.e. withdraw from ABM treaty. Suggestions on how see operation of ABM treaty.

Our obligations on 10 year are simultaneous with coming into effect of START. I remember periods—you 7—we 5. We can agree.

After completion of 50% reduction—2 or 3 years in advance of expiring of nonwithdrawal both sides negotiation on future obligations on ABM. This corresponds w/50% reduction in strategic arms.

So called violations. Significant. Work at SSC. If violation not removed, and one side continues violate other side free of obligations on reducing strategic offensive arms.

Definition of devices. Parameters below which things are ok remains in effect. All is permitted include testing. Thresholds are to be negotiated. To be discussed.

Period for nonwithdrawal and strict observance. After expiring of 10 years treaty may continue to exist. At R GS & P agreed. After R we removed laboratory testing. In space devices can be permitted by setting a list.

If sign 50% we should work on basis of R understanding.

Another matter to discuss w/delegations. Burners should be removed by common efforts. If it is contrived by negotiators we don't have time.

You made approp point that focus will be on verification. This is reasonable. For START let's set up special group on verification.

Next: Chemical weapons convention. We need short joint statement. Need for detailed discussion at that level.

Next: Much time for regional contacts. Arrive at conclusions on P. Gulf, ME or other.

Next: Humanitarian. They always present. Let us ask deputy ministers to have meeting before summit to review results of work done. Adopt program of further steps.

At DC lay groundwork for START to be signed in Moscow. How shall we complete Washington Summit? That is why discussed key provisions. Even in Geneva President said key elements. President used word instructions to delegations. Perhaps basic positions to give negotiators basis to work on. In R possibility of instr. to For Min discussed.

Is *not* a matter of format. Need lines on which delegations can work.

Gorbo suggesting a mechanism. Machinery of consultation For Min & Carlucci. Ministers could work w/respective Embassies for an operative channel. Inventing new channels not useful now. Welcome fact Carlucci involved & helping find solutions. We have a channel.

After DC Summit will have to meet more than once. G. suggestion deserves support.

We preparing joint announcement of agreement on language can say G. come here on visit. We have tight schedule. Things happening in USSR crucial. Maximum GS can be away is 2–3 days. Have to limit to meetings, conv. negotiations in Washington. Central event will be talks w/P. Several rounds. Protocol events. Mtgs w/Congress. 2–3 days should suffice.

Not mean return visit within that tight schedule. Next visit of GS could be trip around country but this trip has to be business-political leaders here.

Scheme of activities and agenda. Tried address points in fundamental way. Discuss fundamental things now to decide on visit.

Central question is language on ABM treaty. Speak about space or SDI is your program. You believe in it. We don't. No need to discuss now. Thing to speak about is existing treaty. Complicating debate is unnecessary.

All views are that treaty should be preserved, at least for a time. On other hand maybe you can do. I do not want to have for you to see any connection between us and your program. Impt. Take a stand on ABM treaty.

G. pleased with talk w/you and FC. Important thing is to complete this business. Matter of historic importance.

Sublimits—wants instructions to delegations. Expects work out. Mobiles. Complicated but survivable.

SLCM's are problem for us. You worried about ICBMs. Since R. we have this matter. Our experts have a lot to work on:

Numerical correlation
Complex of matters.

Fundamental approach makes it possible discuss sublimits.

GPS SLCM—Problem. Verification immense. Agree mobility adds to survivability and stability. All questioning is verifiability. If can verify there is a lot to be said.

SCH Prepare options for leaders at Summit.

GPS Using Gorb. language I have told you where we think should come out.

SCH I said we have come closer.

B. We accepted concept for levels of distr. on 3 legs. Can work for combinations.

GSP Agree on concept of nonwithdrawal. Haven't agreed on years. In our case the 7 years starts from this year. End point is 1994.

SCH 10 year nonwithdrawal is one question.

2–3 years before end of period negotiations between US & USSR about what to do after 10 years.

This more or less coincides with term of period of 50% elimination. You said 7 we said 5.

Before expiration of 10 year period then negotiations begin.

2nd aspect—What permitted and what not? Should have had discussions. The latest from us is

Whatever is below agreed parameters that agreed will be permitted. That within ABM or some other thing, call it as you may.²

² Following this meeting, Shevardnadze led the Soviet delegation to the White House, where President Reagan hosted them in the Cabinet Room from 1 to 2 p.m. after a brief welcoming session in the Oval Office. The memoranda of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 90. Upon the conclusion of that meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze went to the White House Press Room to release a joint statement that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had agreed to meet in the United States beginning on December 7, and that they envisioned “a further meeting between them in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, where they would also seek progress across the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. Toward this end, both sides will work toward early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50%, which could be signed during the President’s visit to Moscow.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1987, p. 70.)

223. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 4, 1987

SUBJECT

START/Defense and Space Discussion at JCS

Allen Holmes and I had lunch November 2 with General Herres, General Riscassi, and Admiral Howe. During the luncheon we discussed a number of issues, most of them regarding START and Defense and Space.

With respect to START, I described the discussion some of us had had on Friday² morning with Karpov. On the subject of the 4800 ceiling, Karpov had said the only flexibility in the Soviet proposal was within the limits they had suggested for each of the three legs. I had pointed out that their suggested limits demonstrated that they would have no difficulty living within our 4800 ceiling. Karpov had said that that was not so. Such a ceiling would force them to have 1200 long-range ALCMs and bomber weapons as counted by the agreed counting rule. They had no need for more than 800–900 and would wish neither to build up to 1200 or forego part of the 6000 limit.

I suggested at the luncheon that there might be a way around this difficulty. The most general approach to a solution would be to insist on only the ICBM limit of 3300 with sublimits within the 3300 for heavy missile RVs and for RVs on mobile missiles, if permitted. Such a solution would permit full freedom to mix amongst bomber weapons and SLBMs with respect to any excess over the number of permitted ICBM RVs either side desired to deploy. Herres took a negative view of such an option because it would permit the Soviets to have up to 2700 SLBMs if they gave up their heavy bomber force. He did, however, believe that a ceiling of 5000 on SLBM plus ICBM RVs would be acceptable to the Chiefs. Riscassi agreed.

We also discussed the question of the list and thresholds. Riscassi confirmed that he had undertaken a study of this subject within the Joint Staff. Herres was doubtful as to the wisdom of getting into this subject. He repeated his position that he would favor a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty without any clarification of the

¹ Source: Department of State, Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive Nov. 1–16 (1987). Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 221.

Treaty's limits on testing provided one could thereby buy the START reductions. I asked whether it would not be better if we could find limits on testing in space with which we could live. He thought this problem could be handled by defining what one meant by deployment. He suggested three criteria governing deployment in space. One was the number of test objects one could have in orbit simultaneously. The second was the angle of the orbital plane with reference to a plane running through the equator. Any angle below 35 degrees would make it impossible for the orbiting object to pass over the USSR. However, the USSR was so far north that such a plane could not be directly entered from a launching base within the USSR. We agreed, however, that with some expenditure of fuel, the Soviets could place satellites within the prescribed orbit. Herres and I also agreed, however, that having a test vehicle orbit over one's country was not really a serious problem if the number of such devices was limited, say, to no more than six. The third criterion he mentioned was the length of time any such device could be left in orbit.

My final impression was that Herres, Riscassi and Howe were interested in a serious exploration of the list and threshold idea as being potentially better for the SDI research program than leaving the determination of what tests are to be funded up to the Congress.

Subsequent to this meeting, I have given some more thought to how we might move forward on START sublimits. I believe we should pick up on Herres' idea of raising our 4800 sublimit to 5000. This approach has the advantage of partially accommodating the Soviet concern while keeping the basic structure of our position intact and using the original number proposed by the President in 1982. It would be supported by JCS and Ron Lehman. A paper addressing next steps in START in more detail is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, November 4, 1987

NEXT STEPS ON START

During the October 30 Ministerial in Washington, Karpov indicated that we would be mistaken to infer from Gorbachev's recent START

³ Secret.

submits proposal that the Soviet Union could live within our proposed ballistic missile warhead sublimit of 4800. He maintained that the Soviets have no need for more than 800–900 bomber weapons and would not agree to a sublimit that would force them to deploy 1200, as the 4800 limit would do.

Shevardnadze did not put the Soviet position forward as clearly and forcefully as Karpov. But if one assumes for analysis purposes that Karpov correctly reports the viewpoint of Marshal Akhromeyev and the military and that the General Secretary is unwilling to overrule them, is there any way around the problem which could be satisfactory to the US?

There are two considerations that bear on this matter. First, we can assume that 200 additional SLBM RVs are not that much more threatening than 200 additional long-range cruise missiles. Second, it is important to us in a treaty of indefinite duration to have maximum flexibility to adjust to unforeseeable developments in technology and in Congressional support for the various legs of the triad. Given these considerations, a solution along the following lines might be acceptable as a final outcome. The tactics as how best to arrive at this, or a better, outcome should be the subject of a different analysis.

The central limitation would continue to be a ceiling of 6000 on warheads. Within this ceiling, the ballistic missile warhead sublimit would be set at 5000. This adjustment would accommodate the Soviet-desired deployment somewhat; they would have to deploy 1000 bomber weapons. It would also increase our flexibility; we could deploy additional SLBM RVs if we so desired. It would continue to assure that the reductions contribute to greater stability; in fact, 5000 ballistic missile warheads is the limit the President originally proposed in 1982. And it would maintain our principle of treating ballistic missiles differentially because of their destabilizing characteristics.

We would retain the ICBM sublimit of 3300 warheads; Gorbachev's proposal clearly indicates the Soviets could live with that number. And we would propose two additional sublimits. The first would limit RVs on heavy missiles to no more than 1540; the second would limit RVs on ground mobile ballistic missiles, if permitted, to no more than, say, 1000.

In making an effort to settle this issue, we should also push for resolution of the other major START issues—throwweight and SLCMs—as well as a primary irritant, Backfire.

With regard to throwweight, the Soviets have agreed that their throwweight would go down by 50% and not increase thereafter. Our differences are on the means of recording this commitment; we want it codified in the START Treaty and the Soviets want to incorporate it in a separate written statement. The US interest is in ensuring that the

Soviet commitment is a clear and binding obligation. Beyond that, we should not place too much importance on the exact form it takes. Both we and the Soviets have considered the written Soviet Backfire statement of June 1979 to be binding. Given this precedent, we should be willing to consider the Soviet proposal if they will clearly acknowledge that the commitment incorporated in the statement is binding.

With regard to SLCMs, it appears the best we can do is the unilateral statements on planned deployments that we suggested at Reykjavik. We should be prepared to reiterate this proposal.

On Backfire, we should be willing to settle our concerns through an exchange of letters that would incorporate an agreed understanding that Backfire bombers would not be given refueling capability and that no more would be produced.

224. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

Non-deployed Missiles in START

In September 1982 you signed NSDD–53,² establishing the position that in START we should require a numerical limit be applied to the total number of non-deployed ballistic missiles in the inventories of both sides. Non-deployed missiles above the allowed limit would have to be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures.

While this has been our formal position for five years, we have never established exactly what such numerical constraints would consist of. Our current draft treaty says non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs shall be constrained using criteria to be agreed. The current U.S. draft treaty does contain a number of *non-numerical* constraints relevant to non-deployed missiles, such as limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges or restriction on locations where

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START After Shevardnadze, October 31, 1987 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on November 10. Reagan initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See Document 36.

non-deployed missiles may be stored. Under our draft treaty no missiles would be required to be destroyed, and no limit would be placed on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs a side could possess, only on the number of launchers.

An interagency review of our position has been completed. State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence all recommend that we drop the requirement for a specific numerical limit on non-deployed missiles. They believe that (a) such a limit cannot be monitored, (b) it is impossible to predict with precision what U.S. requirements will be, and (c) the additional threat such missiles pose is limited. In contrast, Defense and ACDA favor tabling a specific numerical limit in Geneva. They argue that (a) only in this way can we actually ensure destruction of missiles, rather than launchers, and (b) allowing non-deployed missiles to run free offers the Soviets significant breakout potential.

In my view numerical limits on non-deployed missiles provide only limited constraints on the Soviet threat and are of only limited benefit from a military standpoint. Because of the manner in which the United States procures weapons systems, the limits will have to be set quite high to protect our own programs. If the Soviets choose to use even their legal number of non-deployed missiles as reloads or for breakout, they could gain a significant military capability, especially should we alter our position in the future to allow mobile ICBMs. Further, if they intend to gain such a capability, the limits on non-deployed missiles are almost certainly not sufficiently verifiable for us to prevent such a step.

Despite these arguments, I believe we should not fall off a five year position requiring numerical limits on non-deployed missiles. While the arguments in favor of such a limit are slightly more persuasive than those against it, my judgment is based primarily on domestic political reality rather than strategic nuclear considerations. Given the high probability that we are going to fall off a ban on mobile ICBMs, it is the wrong time to eliminate other constraints strongly supported by Secretary Weinberger and by your conservative supporters on the Hill. I have therefore reaffirmed your 1982 decision and directed our negotiators to propose an aggregate numerical limit on non-deployed missiles. Pending JCS review, we will not specify the actual number, but will simply table the concept.

225. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 12, 1987, 0803Z

11928. Subject: START: Lehman-Obukhov meeting, November 10, 1987.

1. This is NST/START MEMCON VIII-M-158. Secret—entire text.

2. Meeting Date: November 10, 1987

Time: 5:30 P.M.–7:15 P.M.

Place: Hotel Richemond, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Amb. Lehman	Amb. A.A. Obukhov

4. Summary: In a very agreeable meeting, Obukhov confirmed that the Soviet side shares the objective of completing a START treaty by spring for signature in the first half of next year, and that, in order to do this, the sides must take measures in management, manpower, and substance to ensure completion of the task.

5. Obukhov argued that the Soviet position on ABM treaty issues was that the Soviet Union requires some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years. If there is any disagreement about what the existing ABM treaty entails, this would be discussed in the SCC. Obukhov said that the two sides could negotiate a list of parameters, but that this would not be mandatory. When Lehman asked how the Soviet position related to START, Obukhov responded that, if the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years and to deal with any disputes in the SCC, then the Soviet side could agree to a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Obukhov said that if there were a “rude” violation of the ABM treaty, then the parties would be “free” from the START provisions. Aside from some “details” yet to be worked out, such as follow-on negotiations, the Soviet Union is willing to accept such an agreement.

6. Obukhov and Lehman agreed that an NST break beginning before the summit would probably be best. Obukhov thought that Lehman’s personal plans to depart on December 3 with December 2 the last day for meetings was in line with his own thinking. It was

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870903–0824. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

agreed that Lehman would make a formal recommendation on an exact date to Masterkov shortly. End summary.

START Agenda

7. Lehman welcomed Obukhov and said that he appreciated the latter's invitation to dinner, but was sorry that he could not accept. Lehman said that he had a previous black tie commitment this evening in which he was to play an important role. Lehman said that he appreciated the fact that Obukhov was willing to meet to discuss issues. Obukhov observed that he had not had an opportunity to meet privately with Lehman for some time. He thought that these important and useful meetings should occur more often.

8. Lehman proposed to discuss how the two sides could guarantee that all tasks outlined by the foreign ministers could be completed in the time remaining in order that a START treaty could be completed by spring and be signed in the first half of next year. Lehman said that if the sides were to finish by the first half of next year, each side would have to devote more resources to the tasks at hand and be more effective in managing the process.

9. Obukhov agreed and said that this was his thinking as well, although he was concerned about developments in INF. He said that it had been expected that the treaty would be much farther along by now and that this was cause for concern. Obukhov opined that AMB. Glitman was introducing new ideas and also introducing START issues. Lehman countered that no issues were being discussed which did not derive from all issues that were before the two sides. Obukhov asked about the "25th missile" and the "20th missile," asserting that Glitman had produced the problem of missile stages.

10. Lehman said that the Soviet side itself had quite clearly indicated that it understood the problem. Obukhov responded that the Soviet side had acknowledged that the missiles were similar but that they were different missiles and that the only problem derived was with respect to the first stage. Obukhov said that this did not permit the U.S. to propose to eliminate the SS-25 in INF. Lehman said that the intent was nothing more than to guarantee that elimination of SS-20s meant exactly that.

START Organization

11. When Lehman suggested that they move on to START issues, Obukhov said that that was exactly what he had done. Lehman proposed turning to the issue of how to complete a START treaty in time for signature in the first half of next year. He asked whether the Soviet side agreed to this objective. Obukhov confirmed that he did. Lehman said that he had done some calculations and that it was his view that the sides could successfully complete the START treaty and the relevant

integral documents in such a timeframe. Lehman stressed that this would, however, require additional manpower, more meetings, and more working groups to ensure that the process was carried out in the best manner possible. Obukhov said that this was his thinking as well, but that the additional working groups would put a great premium on management. Obukhov stated again that he thought this was the proper way to proceed.

NST Break

12. Lehman ventured that there still remained the question of a break. He observed that there was a trade-off between time to prepare in capitals and time to complete work there. Lehman recalled that he and Obukhov had discussed the issue before and had agreed to discuss it again. Lehman said that in his view the U.S. negotiators would have to leave for Washington before the summit began on December 7. Since the 5th and 6th would be a weekend, and if Lehman were to be in Washington on a week day before the summit, he would have to leave earlier in the week. Lehman added that he could return after the summit, but there was also the question of whether or not the delegations would have instructions quickly after the summit and whether or not the delegation could be usefully engaged during the summit.

13. Obukhov responded that he had been considering this question as well since it was his belief that the round should end before the summit. He wondered whether Lehman agreed, and Lehman said that he was coming to the same conclusion. Obukhov asked whether Lehman had in mind a possible date. Lehman responded that he himself would like to leave Geneva on December 3. Thus, December 2 would be his last day for meetings. Lehman said that he could consider the matter and make a formal recommendation to Masterkov in the next few days if that would help. Obukhov said that was helpful to him and that Lehman's thinking on timing seemed exactly right. Obukhov said that he had one problem which was that he could not guarantee precisely when INF would be finished. Therefore, he feared that the INF negotiating groups might remain in Geneva as late as December 6, but he hoped that the INF groups would complete their work long before in order that the treaty could be carefully reviewed in capitals. However, he clearly recalled the experience of SALT II and cautioned that the sides remain wise and understanding of these matters.

14. Lehman said that the sides should plan to use the time between now and the break and the summit productively and be prepared to return and stay in session until a treaty is finished in time for signature in the first half of next year. Obukhov agreed. Lehman asked what Obukhov thought would be the most productive course in START between now and the summit. Obukhov responded that the sides should continue to refine the draft treaty. Lehman said that the long

pole in the tent would be verification and that it would be important for the two sides to present their verification proposals in detail as soon as possible, and preferably before the summit. Obukhov said that the Soviet side would do its best.

15. Lehman inquired about the status of the Soviet conversion, dismantlement or destruction protocol, and Obukhov responded that the U.S. document was still under review in Moscow. He conceded that he understood what Lehman was saying and that the Soviet side would do its best, but that the sides should make the best use of the time available between now and the summit with whatever is available. Lehman said that this was being done in INF, but that it seemed to him that the sides could move faster in START.

Defense and Space Meetings

16. Lehman said that he was also puzzled by developments in the defense and space group, where Amb. Kuznetsov had cancelled the two meetings for this week. Obukhov said that “he had run into Kuznetsov in the hall” and that the latter had informed him of this action. Lehman asked for an explanation and Obukhov said that all the U.S. side wanted to do is talk—talk about what the U.S. position means and what the ABM treaty means and this could go on forever. Lehman said that he thought that this was what the Soviet side wanted to do. He thought that it wanted to understand clearly the U.S. position and the meaning of the ABM treaty.

Soviet Objectives with respect to ABM treaty

17. Obukhov responded that all the Soviet side really wants is to work some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years. Lehman said that it was not clear at all that that was the Soviet position. Rather, the Soviet side seemed to be proposing the negotiation of complex and technical provisions. Obukhov responded that the two sides could, of course, negotiate a list of parameters, but that this would not be mandatory. Obukhov said that all that is required is a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years, and, if there is any disagreement about what the ABM treaty means, this would be discussed in the SCC. Lehman said that he had not understood this to be the Soviet side’s position. Did Obukhov mean the ABM treaty as it now existed? Obukhov responded, “exactly, word for word.” Lehman said that, if this were the Soviet position, it certainly had not been made clear.

Relationship of ABM treaty issues and START treaty

18. Lehman wondered how the Soviet position related to START. Obukhov responded that, if the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years and to deal with any disputes in the SCC,

then the Soviet side could agree to a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Lehman asked whether this was the entire relationship, and Obukhov responded that it was. Obukhov said that, of course, if there were a “rude” violation of the ABM treaty, then the parties would be “free” from the START provisions. Obukhov said “rude” or, perhaps, “great.” Lehman offered “gross,” and Obukhov thought this was the word.

19. Lehman asked whether this could be negotiated in the Defense and Space Group and thus free the draft START treaty from this problem. Specifically, would the proposal that the 50-percent reductions called for in START be contingent on the ABM treaty proposal be negotiated in the Defense and Space Group? Obukhov said that he did not want to prejudge where it would be negotiated. Lehman said that he did not understand. He thought that the issue pertained to Defense and Space. Obukhov agreed but said that it was also related to START. Lehman asked Obukhov to confirm the Soviet position as being that the 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms would require that the sides commit not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years, exactly as it is worded today, and that, if there is a dispute over the meaning of the ABM treaty, then it would be dealt with in the SCC; if there were a “rude” or “crude” or “gross” violation or something like that, then the parties would be free from the provision of the START treaty. Obukhov confirmed this impression, but added that there might be some other details.

20. When Lehman pressed Obukhov on what he meant by details, Obukhov gave the example of follow-on negotiations. Lehman asked if he meant the follow-on negotiations that the Soviet side proposed at the end of the 10-year period. Obukhov said that this was the type of thing he had in mind. Lehman asked whether, once such an agreement were reached and if there were not any further clarification of what the ABM treaty means, would then the D&S negotiations cease until late in the 10-year period? Obukhov replied that that was his view, but asked whether Lehman was making a proposal. Lehman averred that Obukhov should not play that game with him—Lehman was simply trying to follow Obukhov’s logic. Obukhov then said that, frankly, he had been thinking about this concept (i.e., a hiatus in the D&S negotiations) but that it was not the same as the Soviet position. Lehman asked if the overall clarification of the Soviet position had been made clear or would be made clear to Amb. Cooper. Obukhov said that he was simply summarizing the Soviet position but that perhaps in discussions with Minister Vorontsov, this could all be made very clear.

Sublimits

21. Lehman asked whether it would also become clear that the Soviet side could agree to the U.S. proposal for 4800 ballistic missile

warheads. Obukhov said that surely Lehman knew the Soviet position. Lehman said that the new Soviet proposal was one-sided and could not be viewed as a positive step at this stage unless the Soviet side meant to apply it to the flexibility which Secretary General Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said was there.

22. Obukhov said that he was familiar with this argument because he had read Lehman's statement. (Comment: Obukhov was probably referring to Lehman's November 4 speech in Vienna. Several Soviet and Eastern Bloc diplomats were in the audience and were observed picking up copies of the address. End comment.) Lehman responded that if Obukhov had read his statement, then he must have a view as to whether or not he was correct in his interpretation of the situation. Obukhov said that he understood but that Lehman also had to understand that the ball was in the U.S. court. The Soviet Union had taken a step and now the time had come for the U.S. to take a step. For example, it was time for the U.S. side to take a step on the 1650 level and the Backfire.

23. Lehman responded that his view was entirely different, that the ball remained in the Soviet side's court, and that certainly Obukhov was familiar with the discussions held in Moscow. Lehman asked whether Obukhov had anything to say in this regard. Obukhov replied that this was an issue that Lehman should take up with Vorontsov when he arrives. Lehman asked whether or not he would have an opportunity to meet with Vorontsov on this matter. Obukhov certainly remembered the conversation in Moscow that he, Obukhov and Vorontsov had during which Vorontsov had left a different impression of the Soviet proposal. Obukhov said that Vorontsov intends to meet with all the negotiators.

24. Lehman asked whether Vorontsov would be bringing new guidance. Obukhov responded that Vorontsov would be prepared to discuss all the issues. Lehman asked what the sides could do in Geneva to expedite the work, to prepare for the summit and a final treaty. Obukhov said that he had already answered that question by saying that the sides should stress work on reducing differences within the treaty in anticipation of the summit and, in this regard, he was aware that there would be experts discussions in Washington.

25. Obukhov then complained that Amb Matlock had personally attacked Obukhov in Moscow, charging that he was blocking progress. Obukhov suggested that the next time Amb Matlock wished to attack him personally that he should do so when Obukhov is not in Moscow to defend himself. In fact, said Obukhov, he had been in Moscow when the charge was made and did defend himself.

26. Obukhov continued that efforts could be made to define and resolve differences and, in fact, Masterkov had told him that the U.S.

side was not working at full speed. Lehman proposed that rather than exchange recriminations, he and Obukhov focus on work to be done. Both sides should attempt to present verification details before the break and study the proposals and be prepared to resolve them upon resumption. Obukhov said that he had not been making recriminations, and that he agreed with Lehman's objective. He would do his best but other issues such as the Backfire, SLCMs, and mobile ICBMs needed to be dealt with now. Lehman said that if the Soviet Union wanted the U.S. to take the Soviet position on mobile ICBMs at all seriously, then it should table its inspection protocol so that the U.S. could study the details of how mobile ICBMs deployments would be verified.

27. Obukhov said that the Soviet side would detail its entire verification proposal on all issues, not only mobile ICBMs. Lehman asked whether Obukhov wished to raise any other issues. Obukhov demurred, and Lehman said that, if the sides were to get their work done, they would need to be concise. Lehman said that he would instruct his delegation to seek areas where work could be expedited and to eliminate any possibility for polemics and long-winded repetitions of positions if Obukhov would do the same. Obukhov agreed.

28. The meeting concluded with Obukhov suggesting that he and Lehman and their wives get together again after the Vorontsov meeting.

29. Moscow minimize considered.

Lehman

226. Memorandum From Linton Brooks, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, November 19, 1987

SUBJECT

Summit Preparations

As we understand it there are only two available NSPGs before the summit. Since the most contentious arms reduction issues will be the possibility of movement on START and Defense and Space, we

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, U.S.-Soviet Summit November–December 1987. Secret. Sent for action.

believe Friday's² NSPG should be devoted to that. The basis for discussion will be two compartmented (GRIP) papers. The START paper (GRIP 37)³ is a listing of the available options for movement on major issues. It breaks no new ground, but puts in one place all the things that at least some of the President's senior advisors recommend he consider. In contrast, the Defense and Space paper⁴ is almost entirely options which have emerged from discussion in the past few weeks.

We envision the NSPG as being the opening round in a dialogue which could, ultimately, lead to decisions on what to propose at the summit. In addition, we believe we should consider an attempt to control the summit through the following ploy:

—Send a letter to Gorbachev with a slight variation of our current START and Defense and Space positions.

—Count on the Soviets to recall that, in the past, what we have deployed during senior level meetings has been almost identical to what we send in a letter. Thus the Soviets will make preparations based on our letter.

—Have a second, more radical, option ready to deploy at the summit. This is particularly relevant in Defense and Space, where we are considering several new options.

The object of this approach is to seize the tactical advantage from the Soviets by having them prepare for one option and be faced with another. *We have not shared this approach with the Arms Control Support Group, nor do we recommend overt discussion of it at the NSPG.* First, we need to decide if there are acceptable options, next we need some off line, "family lunch" type discussions to close on this approach. You should, however, read the compartmented papers with this thought in mind.

Attached is a memorandum forwarding the final version of the compartmented papers to the President.⁵ We would have preferred to send these to the President over a weekend, but believe he should have them now in preparation for the NSPG. Because of their length, we suggest you review the Defense and Space options with him briefly during your Friday morning time with him.⁶

If the President has time to read only one paper it should be the Defense and Space paper. On START paper we have summarized agency positions in the cover memorandum. We suggest that he read

² November 20.

³ Not attached. See Tab B, Document 227.

⁴ Not attached. See Tab A, Document 227.

⁵ Attached but not printed is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Carlucci to Reagan. For the signed version, see Document 227.

⁶ No minutes were found.

the Defense and Space and skim the START paper before the NSPG, and that he then include them in his weekend reading in preparation for further discussions.

In accordance with past practice, we have not indicated the Vice President or the Chief of Staff as “copy to” addressees on the memorandum. Copies of the papers for Senator Baker are attached (*Tab III*);⁷ we will provide the Vice President’s office with a copy when we make distribution to Cabinet principals. We suggest you provide Senator Baker his copy directly.

We request you sign the transmittal memorandum at *Tab II*⁸ transmitting the final version of the papers to the Cabinet and have the memorandum returned to us. We will then, as we have in the past, make the numbered copies and arrange for distribution. To make this work we need the signed transmittal memorandum as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at *Tab I*.⁹

That you sign the transmittal memorandum at *Tab II*, and that the signed original be returned to us for packaging and distribution.¹⁰

Fritz Ermath, Don Mahley, Bill Heiser and Steve Steiner concur.

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Attached but not printed is an undated and unsigned memorandum to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Meese, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, Miller, and Adelman.

⁹ Carlucci did not indicate a preference.

¹⁰ Carlucci did not indicate a preference.

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 19, 1987

SUBJECT

Possible Options for the Summit

On Friday, November 20, we will hold the first NSPG to prepare you for your December summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. I intend this meeting to concentrate on an initial review of possible moves you might make in START and in Defense and Space in an attempt to conclude equitable and verifiable treaties by next summer. To facilitate discussion, I have had two papers prepared through the interagency Arms Control Support Group. Because the issues are complex, the papers, which are attached, are somewhat lengthy.

The first paper (GRIP 38) covers possible options in Defense and Space. It includes a number of options which we have not previously discussed, among them:

- Declaring early SDI deployment as a national objective;
- Terminating those portions of the ABM Treaty affecting ABM radars or devices which could substitute for ABM radars;
- Recast, with some modifications, the position in your July 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev;²
- Agree to resolve Defense and Space issues in the START Treaty; and
- Extend the duration of the non-withdrawal period from the ABM Treaty.

The second paper (GRIP 37) covers all major outstanding START issues and provides agency recommendations on which ones are appropriate for movement. In general:

- The Office of the Secretary of Defense favors no movement in any area;
- Most of your other advisors are prepared to make a significant move on sublimits and to tell the Soviets we will accept mobile ICBMs.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 170 11/20/1987. Secret. Prepared by Brooks. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on November 23. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

² See Document 138.

—Some, but not all, of your advisors favor moves on heavy ICBM modernization, the method of recording throwweight limits, sea-launched cruise missiles, Backfire bombers and the length of time during which reductions must be completed. Such moves would be intended to meet announced Soviet concerns.

The most contentious issue will be the possibility of altering our current position that all mobile ICBMs must be banned. This position is driven, in part, by the difficulty of verifying numerical limits on mobile ICBMs. While we are working on such a verification scheme, there is not yet consensus on the details, or even on whether such a scheme is possible.

Despite its length, I recommend you read the Defense and Space paper in its entirety before the NSPG. I believe you need only skim the START paper.

Since the NSPG will be only the beginning of the dialogue we must have on this subject, I recommend that you then include both papers in your weekend reading. You will thus be able to review options having had the benefit of hearing the views (which I expect to be quite diverse) of your senior advisors.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group³

Washington, November 19, 1987

GRIP 38C (S)

I. Purpose. (U)

This paper explores options available to the President should he seek to make a new proposal to resolve several Defense & Space issues. Our objectives in the Defense and Space negotiations are:

- to facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible, should a decision for such deployments be taken;
- to avoid constraints on the SDI program beyond those actually agreed by the parties in the ABM Treaty; and,
- to reverse Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

The options set forth in this paper can be judged on the basis of their contribution toward achieving these objectives. (S/G)

³ Secret; Grip.

II. *Current U.S. Position.* (U)

The current U.S. Defense and Space position is a package including the following elements.

A. *Non-withdrawal.* Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided 50 percent START reductions proceed in accordance with the START Treaty.

B. *Freedom to Deploy.* After 1994, either side may deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

C. *ABM Treaty Restrictions.* If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty, any remaining restrictions associated with the ABM Treaty will be terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

D. *Withdrawal/Termination.* The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or to withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized.)

E. *Failure to Meet START Reductions.* Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

F. *Entry Into Force.* This agreement will be documented in a separate treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering START.

G. *Predictability Package.* In addition to our previous Open Laboratories proposal and our proposal for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing, this package includes annual exchange of programmatic data. It is not the U.S. intent that this package entail any additional restrictions on U.S. programs beyond those outlined above. (U)

As reflected in instructions to U.S. negotiators issued on May 21, 1987, U.S. priorities are, among other things, to “facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible, should a decision for such deployments be taken,” and to “avoid constraints upon SDI beyond those existing under the ABM Treaty.” (S)

In a joint statement,⁴ issued at the conclusion of Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington on October 30, the U.S. agreed that the President

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 222.

and General Secretary Gorbachev will consider thoroughly the development of instructions on a future treaty on 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms and a treaty concerning observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period. (U)

III. *Current Soviet Position.* (U)

During Shevardnadze's September visit to Washington, the Soviets tabled a proposal that the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and either:

- agree on a list of devices not to be put into space and thresholds for associated critical parameters; or,
- agree to "strictly abide" by the ABM Treaty as it was signed and ratified in 1972. (U)

Thus, for the first time since NST began, the Soviets have acknowledged that not all research and experimental work on space-based ABM systems must be restricted to laboratories on earth. The question remains, however, as to what research, development, and testing they would permit outside of laboratories. (U)

The Soviets have repeatedly referred to the "list" approach as being complicated and on at least one occasion have stated there was not time to reach agreement on that basis. Thus the baseline Soviet position appears to be the "strictly abide" approach which they have refused to clarify. They have stated that compliance concerns would be settled in the SCC and by the threat of termination of the START Treaty. They have also asserted a view of the ABM Treaty narrower than the restrictive interpretation. (S)

In any case, the Soviets propose that the ABM Treaty would continue after the non-withdrawal period. Beginning 2–3 years before the end of the non-withdrawal period, the sides would be obliged to begin negotiations on the ABM defense problem as a whole in light of the strategic situation which would exist by that time, including 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. (U)

Despite the appearance of Soviet flexibility in Shevardnadze's recent emphasis on "strategic stability," the Soviets continue to press in Geneva for restrictions on SDI that would cripple the program. Indeed, what appeared to some as "welcome developments" in Soviet rhetoric have been explained in Geneva simply as shorthand for a longstanding approach that is incompatible with the President's SDI objectives. Recent Soviet emphasis on "strategic stability" should be viewed in the context of their logic that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability; SDI is contrary to the ABM Treaty; therefore, SDI is contrary to strategic stability. Thus, rather than indicating flexibility and a move toward U.S. views on stability, recent Soviet statements

only serve to package to their continuing opposition to SDI in a superficially more appealing wrapper. (U)

IV. *Major Differences Separating U.S. and Soviet Positions.* (U)

While the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on certain issues (e.g. a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) each side proposes a different package and set of conditions. Thus, deep differences remain. The most fundamental difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions is that the U.S. seeks to secure a stable transition to effective strategic defenses, while the Soviets seek to constrain the SDI program, even as their own programs continue apace. Indeed, they are holding a START agreement hostage to U.S. concessions in Defense and Space. This difference in approach manifests itself in specific areas of disagreement, including:

- *Type of agreement.* U.S. seeks separate new Treaty of unlimited duration; Soviets seek to supplement the ABM Treaty, ending after the non-withdrawal period, with reversion to the ABM Treaty.
- *Non-withdrawal period.* U.S. proposal through 1994; Soviets propose 10 years from entry in to force, i.e. 1998.
- *Meaning of non-withdrawal.* U.S. requires retention of rights to withdraw from the ABM Treaty under circumstances other than those associated with continuing research; Soviets seek a blanket commitment not to withdraw.
- *Right to deploy.* U.S. seeks unfettered right to deploy advanced strategic defenses anytime after the non-withdrawal period; Soviets seek to continue the current ABM Treaty regime, i.e., a party could “withdraw and deploy” on 6 months notice.
- *Right to test.* U.S. would continue research, development, and testing during the non-withdrawal period which are permitted by the ABM Treaty; Soviets seek more restrictions in a “strengthened” ABM Treaty regime. (U)

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

V. *Options.* (U)

A. *Retain our current position.* Those who support this option believe that the current U.S. position in Defense and Space is sound. They believe that in return for our promise not to exercise our right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty we must secure a future right to deploy defenses, without further reference to the ABM Treaty. They believe it is equally important to avoid constraints on SDI beyond those which the parties agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972, including protecting our rights to test space-based systems based on “other physical principles” (OPP). They note that no move the Soviets have made in Defense and Space would justify a change in our position. (S/G)

This option is supported by OSD, in combination with option B. (S/G)

B. *Declare deployment of Phase I SDI defenses as soon as possible an unequivocal national objective.* Such a declaration by the President would be accompanied by an announcement that the Defense Department is actively developing specific plans to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our rights under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Such plans would detail realistic ABM tests based on other physical principles. (S/G)

Supporters of this option believe that it would eliminate ambiguity in current policy. It would emphasize the urgency of the President's objective of *developing and deploying* effective defenses, rather than research aspects of the SDI program and their compliance with the ABM Treaty, even to the point of observing an interpretation more restrictive than the parties actually agreed to in 1972. They believe this ambivalence undercuts our ability to maintain support for SDI in Congress. They also believe it damages our case that the assumptions of the ABM Treaty are being called increasingly into question by technological progress, Soviet strategic offense and defense activities, and Soviet Treaty violations. (S/G)

Supporters of this option also believe that it would enhance the attractiveness of our current proposal to the Soviets, by giving them a significant incentive to secure from the U.S. a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to join us in a jointly managed transition to defenses. Thus, we could improve our chances of Soviet agreement to an unfettered right to deploy defenses at the end of the non-withdrawal period. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that an announcement now to restructure the SDI program according to the broad interpretation would endanger the compromise on the FY88 Defense Authorization Bill. They also believe that SDI technology is not sufficiently mature to make a decision now to deploy defenses. Finally, they do not believe the option would make our position more appealing to the Soviets; rather, they believe it would likely make a START agreement impossible. (S/G)

Option B. is supported by OSD to supplement our current position. (S/G)

C. *Terminate ABM Treaty provisions affecting ABM radars or devices capable of substituting for such radars.* This option would permit development, testing, and deployment of all ABM sensors, whether based on 1972 technology or on "other physical principles." (S/G)

Those who support this option believe it would resolve Soviet ABM Treaty violation in a logical fashion that furthers U.S. interests

by facilitating SDI progress. They argue that removing restrictions on sensors would help us in three respects. First, we could deploy a fully ABM capable Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) saving time and money and gaining progress toward defenses. We need to deploy a version of this system to improve our early warning capability, irrespective of strategic defense deployments. But, deployment of even a non-ABM capable BSTS for early warning may be jeopardized by misguided Congressional restrictions because it is linked to SDI. Second, sensors and battle management are critical to the solution of the strategic defense problem. Unlimited rights to test and deploy these systems would ease considerably SDI's burdens in developing effective defenses. Finally, it would enable us to deploy ABM cable sensors like BSTS and the Airborne Optical System which could make militarily useful an option for an initial deployment of 100 midcourse interceptors under the ABM Treaty. (S/G)

This option could be implemented by declaration. The United States could charge that the Krasnoyarsk radar, in combination with other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities, particularly involving sensors, constitutes a material breach of the ABM Treaty. As a proportional response to this breach, we could unilaterally suspend or terminate ABM Treaty provisions affecting sensors. In pursuing this approach, we would make clear that the scope of Soviet violation and circumvention of ABM Treaty provisions limiting radars (e.g. Krasnoyarsk, concurrent testing of ABM systems and air defense radars, constructing transportable radars, Gomel etc.) has *irreversibly undermined limits on ABM sensors*. (S/G)

Under this option it would be possible to tell the Soviets that we intend to remove ABM Treaty restrictions on sensors, that this is not negotiable, but that we are willing to discuss with them the details of the new regime to further our goal of stability. (S/G)

Those who support this option believe that Soviet treaty violation can be either a severe liability in our efforts to reach and ultimately to ratify a START Treaty or a valuable asset in our efforts to clear a path toward defenses. Until the Soviets redress their violation, we can influence how it will affect the political debate. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that it would secure no significant advantage for the U.S. not now available to us under the ABM Treaty, while legitimizing the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar. Under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. may place an ABM capable BSTS in space for ABM test purposes. Moreover, they believe the option would necessarily involve negotiation of the type of limits on SDI testing and development that we have previously rejected. Another potential problem with this approach is that it appears to put the BSTS program in conflict with the ABM Treaty. This could

jeopardize future funding for this important program. Some who oppose this option believe that if we have the legal means to pursue the option, we should terminate the entire ABM Treaty. (S/G)

Option C. is favored by Ambassador Cooper. (S/G)

D. *Recast the U.S. Position Drawing on the President's July 1986 Letter to Gorbachev.* With certain new features, this option would entail the following elements:

- Both sides would conduct research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1992;

- After 1992, should either side wish to deploy advanced defenses, the sides would initiate further discussion on the transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses and possible additional measures to facilitate the transition;

- Such discussions would last up to two years. At the end of two years, either party would have an unfettered right to deploy advanced strategic defenses;

- To enhance strategic stability and provide predictability, the sides would establish a Commission on Advanced Defenses, meeting regularly to exchange briefings on each side's strategic defense programs, and facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. (S/G)

Those who support this option believe that it provides the best balance between achieving a Treaty that gives us an unfettered right to deploy strategic defenses at the end of a period we control and at the same time avoiding a statement now that we will deploy defenses at some date certain in the future. They further believe that ongoing talks with the Soviets on strategic issues are inevitable, and that we must therefore shape the mandate for these talks in favor of our agenda. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that it would add a significant political obstacle to the exercise of our right to deploy—i.e. a requirement to negotiate and make proposals for a transition. They believe such a requirement would be inconsistent with our central objectives in Defense and Space. They also note that we have already made proposals for at transition, including 50 percent START reductions and a predictability package. Moreover, opponents of this option believe that a proposal to create a Commission on Advanced Defenses would be premature and ill-advised when we are so far from agreement with the Soviets on basic Defense and Space issues. (S/G)

E. *Resolve Defense and Space issues in the START Treaty.* This option would consolidate key elements of our existing position into one relatively simple package and include the following elements:

- As part of a START Agreement include an agreed period for non-deployment of advanced defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty (to range from 7–10 years);

—While both sides would continue to abide by the ABM Treaty, do not specify broad or narrow as correct; both sides would agree to disagree on this during the period;

—Include some resolution of the Krasnoyarsk radar (preferably dismantlement or at least a moratorium on any further construction or power through the non-deployment period); and,

—Continue for now to push for a green light to deploy after the non-deployment period, with six months notice not related to the ABM Treaty. (S/G)

This option would include the above commitments in a separate protocol or agreed exchange of notes associated with (and thus an integral part of) a START Treaty. (S/G)

Supporters of this option believe that negotiating a Defense and Space Treaty would be enormously complicated and is not necessary to meet (and could be counterproductive to) U.S. interests in this area. They also believe that this simplified approach might have more chances of succeeding while containing key elements of the U.S. position. (S/G)

Opponents of this option believe that it would fail to meet key U.S. Defense and Space objectives. It would accept the Soviet position on a linkage to Defense and Space in the START Treaty, dropping our insistence on a separate Defense and Space Treaty. Also, opponents believe that “agreeing to disagree” on interpretation of the Treaty would leave us vulnerable to Soviet attempts to blackmail Congress into restricting SDI by threatening to reverse START reductions. Finally, opponents of this option believe that concessions on the Krasnoyarsk radar and extending the non-withdrawal period will encourage Soviet recalcitrance. (S/G)

Option E. is supported by ACDA. (S/G)

F. Extend the non-withdrawal period. Under this approach, the United States would propose the following:

—Non-withdrawal through 1996. This would be intermediate between the current U.S. position (1994) and the current Soviet position (10 years from entry into force, i.e. no earlier than late 1998.)

—There would be a period of negotiation in the years leading up to 1996 on the situation after expiration of the non-withdrawal commitment.

—Either side could withdraw from the ABM Treaty after 1996 upon six month’s notice. (S/G)

Under this approach, the current differences regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be put off to subsequent negotiations. The Congress could be expected to apply strict guidelines in approving funds for SDI activities in order to avoid jeopardizing START reductions. However, this is already happening. This approach would protect future options, and would not impose constraints on SDI testing beyond those agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972. (S/G)

Opponents of this option believe that it would compromise critical elements of the U.S. Defense and Space position by failing to obtain an unfettered right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period and leaving SDI vulnerable to Soviet pressure for Congressional restrictions on testing beyond what was agreed in the ABM Treaty. They also believe that extending the non-withdrawal period would simply whet the Soviet appetite for concessions. (S/G)

Option F. is supported by the State Department. (S/G)

G. *Define deployment vs. testing for space-based systems.* The key to the current U.S. Defense and Space position is the distinction between deployment and testing for space-based OPP systems; under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, testing is permitted but deployment is prohibited. This option is intended to facilitate exercising our right to test. There are a variety of ways to draw the distinction between deployment and testing. They could be used singly, or in combination and include: declaring an ABM test range in space; a limit on the number of space-based ABM systems in orbit at any time that would allow full testing but would fall short of the number required for full ABM capability; and, a time limit on space basing of ABM systems. (S/G)

None of the concepts for distinguishing deployment from testing are presently favored by any agency. However, there is general consensus that they warrant further study, including associated verification issues. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁵

Washington, November 19, 1987

GRIP 37D (U)

Purpose. To examine possible START tradeoffs which might be employed during the 7–9 December summit meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. This paper considers what, if any, new flexibility on START issues might facilitate reaching an agreement in the U.S. interest. (S/G)

Background. Of the large number of issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, the following are the most significant

⁵ Secret; Noform; Grip.

(items marked (**) were identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as “artificial impediments” which should be removed, although, despite Soviet claims, all have important policy implications):

—*Linkage to SDI*

—The *Soviet Union* insists on linking agreement in START to restrictions on SDI in Defense and Space.

—The *United States* opposes.

—*Sublimit structure*

—The *United States* proposes sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on heavy or highly MIRVd ICBMs.

—The *Soviet Union* has offered limits of 3000–3300 ICBM warheads, 1800–2000 SLBM warheads and 900 ALCMs, but with no freedom to mix. They have suggested that 3000 ICBM warheads may be acceptable.

—*Allowing mobile ICBMs (**)*

—The *Soviet Union* insists such missiles be allowed.

—The *United States* seeks a mobile ICBM ban.

—*Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) (**)*

—The *United States*, while agreeing in principle that there must be a mutually acceptable solution on SLCMs, knows of no verifiable way to limit such missiles.

—The *Soviet Union* has proposed a limit of 400 SLCMs on no more than two types of submarines (the U.S. also plans deployment of a much larger number of SLCMs on surface ships).

—*Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs (**)*

—The *United States* would ban such modernization and includes a flight test ban on existing heavy ICBMs.

—The *Soviet Union* insists modernization be allowed.

—*Required broadcast of unencrypted, readable telemetry*

—The *United States* requires such broadcasts.

—The *Soviet Union* is opposed.

—*Time frame for reductions*

—The *United States* proposes completion in 7 years.

—The *Soviet Union* prefers 5 years but is willing to consider 7 years.

—*Range cutoff and armament for ALCMs under a treaty*

—The *Soviet Union* seeks a cutoff range of 600 km (as in SALT II) and would count all ALCMs as nuclear.

—The *United States* has not arrived at a position; some advocate a significantly higher range and/or exceptions for conventional ALCMs.

—*Inclusion of Backfire (**)*

—The *United States* insists the Backfire bomber be included in strategic totals.

—The *Soviet Union* is opposed, claiming Backfire is a theater weapon.

—*Limiting throwweight*

—The *United States* seeks a formal treaty commitment to a 50% reduction in Soviet throwweight and a binding commitment not to exceed the revised level.

—The *Soviet Union* is unwilling to agree to treaty provisions, but have proposed a unilateral statement that their proposals will result in such a decrease and will not lead to an increase thereafter.

—*Non-circumvention and Trident II transfer*

—The *Soviet Union*, under the guise of non-circumvention, seeks provisions which would ban transfer of the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile to the United Kingdom.

—The *United States* cannot accept such a limitation.

—*Verification details*

—The two sides differ on a number of important verification details. In many cases the United States has not yet tabled its position (we have not yet put forth an inspection protocol, for example); in other cases (conversion, destruction and dismantlement) the Soviets have not set forth counterproposals.

Approaches at the summit. All agencies agree that (a) since non-circumvention and linkage to SDI are matters of principle, we should display no flexibility, (b) the absence of a U.S. position on ALCM range and armament makes it inappropriate to discuss the issue at the summit, and (c) verification details, including telemetry encryption, are not suitable for summit level discussion. These areas are not treated in this paper. Brief summaries of the positions and available options for other major areas are attached. These summaries include only limited discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of options, under the assumption that the pros and cons of movement are familiar to Cabinet level participants. (S/G)

Verification. In many instances there are no apparent new verification problems introduced by the options discussed in this paper; the different options are neither more nor less verifiable than our current position. Options to change our current position to ban mobile ICBMs, however, raise significant verification and stability issues and would represent much more of a major policy decision. Verification of limits on mobile ballistic missiles is discussed in a separate paper (GRIP 34).⁶

⁶ Not found.

Options to relax our position on heavy ICBM modernization or on throwweight would also have significant verification implications. (S/G)

Agency Positions. Agency positions on each issue are shown in the attachments. The Director of Central Intelligence's representative makes no policy recommendations on these issues. (C)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁷

Washington, undated

Attachment A—Sublimits

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START Treaty states:

"Each party shall . . . limit its ICBM and SLBM warheads . . . so that . . . the aggregate number does not exceed . . .

(C) 4800, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(D) 3300, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

(E) 1650, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs, exclusive of those warheads on its deployed, silo-based ICBMs which are not heavy ICBMs and which have six or fewer warheads."

The Soviets have proposed:

"Each party shall . . . limit its ICBM and SLBM warheads . . . so that . . . the aggregate numbers . . . do not exceed . . .

(C) 3000–3300, for nuclear warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

(D) 1800–2000, for nuclear warheads on its deployed SLBMs;

(E) 800–900 nuclear warheads for its deployed ALCMs.

"Within the aggregate number of 1600 . . . the [Soviet Union] shall reduce its deployed launchers of heavy ICBMs . . . to a level not to exceed 154. . . . this means a limit of 1540 reentry vehicles for deployed heavy ICBMs" (S)

The Soviets have withdrawn an earlier suggestion for a limit of 60% of the total warheads (i.e. 3600) on each Triad leg. (S)

Discussion. The U.S. position on sublimits has been extensively reviewed during the past six months. In April 1987, in preparation for

⁷ Secret; Noform; Grip. Brackets are in the original.

Secretary Shultz' trip to Moscow, the President issued NSDD 267,⁸ in which he noted he was "reluctant to alter our sound position on sublimits." The President did authorize, for the Moscow meeting only, the Secretary of State to "explore raising the ICBM warhead sublimit from 3300 to 3600." The President rejected suggestions to provide additional flexibility on the 1650 sublimit. Since there was no constructive Soviet movement, there was no discussion in April of raising the 3300 ICBM sublimit to 3600. In the October Moscow ministerial, the Secretary of State stressed the importance of the 4800 sublimit, implying the possibility of flexibility in the remaining sublimits. (S/G)

In the past, all agencies have agreed we should not display any flexibility with respect to the 4800 sublimit. We have revised this limit several times, settling on 4800 because it corresponded with an earlier Soviet proposal for a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 80 to 85 percent of the permitted total, while permitting the U.S. adequate flexibility to structure militarily sufficient forces. (S/G)

As a result of past decisions, we have raised all our proposed sublimits. Agencies disagree on the wisdom of further modifications, especially to the 1650 sublimit, which seeks to capture highly fractionated ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, and, should they be permitted, mobile ICBMs. Some consider this sublimit to be primarily a place holder, designed to facilitate agreement on other issues. They note that retention of such a sublimit would encourage development of a 6 RV variant of the SS-19 or SS-X-24 which could be much more capable than current versions of these missiles. (S/G)

Others view the 1650 sublimit as intrinsically important, since it directly limits the ICBMs we find most destabilizing. They note that replacing the 1650 sublimit with a 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBMs alone would result in a 1300 RV increment in allowable modern (e.g., SS-24) Soviet RVs. [*less than 5 lines not declassified*] Those who support this view believe that falling off our position on sublimits, especially in conjunction with falling off our position on mobiles, would dramatically increase the threat we face. (S/G)

Options. Three options currently have some agency support:

—*Sublimit Option 1*—Make no change to our present position. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that our position has already been sufficiently modified to meet Soviet concerns and believe we should await indications of Soviet flexibility before we make further concessions. They also believe the 1650 sub-limit is crucial to stability. Constraining the SS-X-24, they note, is vital in view of the fact it is comparable to MX. Others note that a 6 RV variant of the SS-X-24 or

⁸ See Document 190.

of an SS-19 follow-on, which the 1650 limit would encourage, could be more capable and thus present a greater threat. (S/G)

—*Sublimit Option 2*—Propose sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads and 3300 ICBM warheads (current position), but change the 1650 sublimit to 1540 and redefine it to include “warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs” (thus dropping highly fractionated (more than 6 warheads) ICBMs such as the non-mobile version of the SS-X-24 from the limit). Negotiate a separate mobile ICBM sublimit *inside* the 1540 limit if mobiles are allowed. In return, require the Soviets accept 50% cuts in throwweight. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe this formulation would pocket the 50% reductions in heavy ICBMs as a warhead limit while still retaining leverage on mobile ICBMs, would increase the chance of Soviet acceptance, and, if mobile ICBMs are permitted in the future, would force a Soviet tradeoff between mobile and heavy ICBMs, the two systems we seek to constrain. They believe that our most important interests in limiting destabilizing systems would be adequately protected and that increases in permitted SS-X-24s, given other constraints, would not significantly increase the threat. Some who favor this option also believe that retaining the 1650 limit will encourage the Soviets to build even more capable 6-RV variants of existing missiles. (S/G)

Opponents note that, in addition to effectively pocketing a 50% reduction in SS-18s, the 1650 sublimit places a *de facto* constraint on Soviet ICBM modernization by precluding substitution of SS-24s for SS-19s, a substitution which could result in 1300 additional SS-X-24 warheads, a significant threat increase. They consider the 1650 sublimit is crucial in constraining the most destabilizing Soviet systems and in forcing Soviet tradeoffs between heavy, mobile (if ultimately allowed) and highly fractionated systems, and that eliminating it could result in an almost ten-fold increase in the deployments of SS-24s, an increase they believe is clearly unacceptable, [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] Opponents also believe a trade-off between heavy and mobile ICBMs is illusory since they believe we cannot effectively verify mobile ICBM limits. (S/G)

—*Sublimit Option 3*—Press for the 4800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit as part of the following package which includes a 50% cut in Soviet heavy missiles (the 1540 limit on heavy ICBM warheads only) and a 50% cut in Soviet throwweight. Attempt to pocket the 3300 ICBM sublimit, but be prepared to fall off *if* the Soviets accept the other elements of the package. Negotiate a separate mobile ICBM sublimit *separate from* the 1540 limit if mobiles are allowed. (S/G)

In addition to arguments for and against option 2, those who favor this option believe that (1) with agreement on the remaining items the

3300 sublimit would not add any significant constraint on Soviet ballistic missile capabilities in terms of hard target kill and throw-weight capability, and so we should not spend anything seeking it, and (2) this package approach offers a better chance of getting Soviet agreement to key limits which will actually decrease Soviet capability for a first strike. (S/G)

Opponents note that this proposes dropping a sublimit the Soviets have already indicated they can accept and one which is important to our attempts to drive the Soviet strategic force in more stabilizing directions. They further note that, unlike option 2, this does not force a Soviet tradeoff between mobile and heavy ICBM warheads. Some who oppose this option believe Soviet first strike potential would increase under this proposal even if the Soviets comply with it. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports *Option 1* (current position).

—Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support *Option 2* (4800 ballistic missile RVs, 3300 ICBM RVs, 1540 heavy/mobile RVs, 50% throwweight reduction; mobiles, if allowed, part of the 1540 limit).

—The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency support *Option 3* (4800 ballistic missile RVs, 3300 ICBM RVs, 1540 heavy RVs, 50% throwweight reduction; mobiles, if allowed, constrained by a separate limit; drop 3300 if needed). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁹

Washington, undated

Attachment B—Mobile ICBMs

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START Treaty provides (Art. IV 7.) that “Neither Party shall deploy ICBMs in a mobile mode.” The Soviet treaty explicitly allows mobile ICBMs. This issue has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

Discussion. The United States currently seeks to ban mobile ICBMs on grounds of both verification and stability. In addition, we have no ability to effectively target Soviet mobile ICBMs, nor are we likely to

⁹ Secret; Noform; Grip.

have such a capability in the near future. Finally, there is dispute over the likelihood of the U.S. actually being able to deploy mobile ICBMs of its own, given the cost of the small ICBM, the political opposition to additional MX in any form, and inevitable environmental and political opposition to actual mobile deployments. (S)

Limits on mobile ballistic missiles present some of the most difficult verification problems in the strategic arena. With comprehensive verification measures like those developed for INF missiles we could have [11 lines not declassified] Verification of mobile ICBMs is discussed in detail in GRIP 34; there is as yet no interagency agreement on the details (or even the existence) of an effective verification scheme for mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

The stability concerns arise from the reload capability and cheating potential associated with mobile ICBMs, especially (but not exclusively) large, highly fractionated ones. [9 lines not declassified]

The Intelligence Community senior officials responsible for assessing Soviet strategic force structure, political matters, and arms control policy concur in the judgement that the Soviets will not give up all mobile ICBMs because of such factors as the counterforce threat from all legs of the U.S. triad and the fact that substantial resources have already been devoted to deploying these systems. Only with major concessions on MX/D5 might they even consider such an action. *If* the Soviets were prepared to compromise at all on the issue of mobile ICBMs (which the Intelligence Community considers unlikely), the Intelligence Community assumes that, while they would prefer to retain some of each system, they would be more inclined to insist on retaining the MIRVd rail-mobile version of the SS-X-24 than the single-RV road-mobile SS-25. (S/G)

Some policy agencies disagree with the Intelligence Community assessment and consider cancellation of the PEACEKEEPER and Small ICBM programs could be an adequate trade. They note that many in government had an equally strong belief that the Soviets would neither agree to eliminate their entire SS-20 force nor accept inclusion of SRINF systems in a global agreement. (S/NF/G)

Options. Two basic options exist for the summit:

—*Mobile Option 1*—Continue to reject allowing mobile ICBMs, on the grounds that they are incompatible with an effective and verifiable START agreement, and that, while a less meaningful SALT-style agreement which permitted mobiles could be pursued, a decision to permit such missiles would require substantial revision of our objectives and standards for a strategic arms agreement. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that, given the stability problems and the inherent problems with effective verification, we cannot

consider altering our position as long as we seek an agreement providing for deep reductions. They believe that to permit mobile ICBMs would be a radical departure from our standards for equality and stability in a START agreement and that the *de facto* result of an agreement permitting mobile ICBMs will be a START (deep reductions) agreement for the U.S. and a SALT-like (no reductions) agreement for the USSR. They further believe there are large uncertainties in our own ability to deploy mobile ICBMs in the face of expected public resistance. They also believe that Congress will strongly oppose any START Treaty rendered unverifiable by permitting mobile ICBMs. Finally they note that the verification of mobile ICBMs has been thoroughly studied without a solution being found. (S/G)

—*Mobile Option 2*—In return for appropriate Soviet movement in other areas (which some believe must include accepting virtually all of the current U.S. positions), acknowledge that we are prepared to consider allowing mobile ICBMs in limited numbers if effective verification provisions can be agreed upon, using this movement to facilitate Soviet agreement to sublimits and the necessary verification provisions. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that a START agreement should permit mobile ICBMs in limited numbers and under specified verification arrangements in order to allow the U.S. to deploy survivable ICBMs and to accommodate the Soviet investment in the mobile missiles they have already deployed. Others who favor this option believe that, while a ban on mobile ICBMs may be preferable, the United States may eventually have to yield. The focus should therefore be on determining the price we will extract for modifying our position. Accordingly, they believe a marker should be laid down that limited deployments of mobile ICBMs would only be acceptable in the context of an agreement which incorporates virtually all other elements of the U.S. position. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports *Option 1* (current position).

—The Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support *Option 2* (allow mobiles subject to effective verification) subject to the following conditions:

—The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would allow only single-warhead, road-mobile ICBMs, and would retain a ban on rail-mobile ICBMs.

—Ambassador Rowny would make agreement contingent on the Soviets accepting U.S. positions in virtually all other areas.

—Ambassador Lehman would make agreement contingent on (a) agreement on sublimits and (b) a limit of 300 warheads (within the 1540 sublimit) on mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹⁰

Washington, undated

Attachment C—SLCMs

Current Positions. The current U.S. position is:

“The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. . . .” (Joint Working Document)

The Soviets have proposed (Soviet Draft Art. III.5):

“ . . . each Party shall limit its submarines with SLCMs, so that the aggregate number of SLCMs deployed on them shall not exceed 400. . . . shall install SLCMs only on submarines of the following types [two types maximum] . . . the Parties undertake not to install SLCMs on surface ships.” (S)

Discussion. Several years of study have failed to produce any meaningful SLCM limit that is even remotely verifiable. While we remain committed to finding a solution, some believe that a face-saving fig leaf such as an exchange (one time or annual) of declarations on planned deployments or a unilateral commitment not to exceed certain limits is the best solution. (S)

The Soviets have pressed for specific proposals beyond a general reaffirmation of the Reykjavik commitment to find a solution. Their approach is unacceptable since it (a) would limit both conventional and nuclear armed SLCMs, (b) conflicts with our plans to deploy on surface ships and several classes of submarines and (c) is unverifiable with a high breakout potential. (S)

Options. The following options exist:

—*SLCM Option 1*—Defer any U.S. initiatives to “solve” the SLCM problem. Those who favor this option believe that any movement which suggests a willingness to accept a unverifiable agreement, however phrased, will compromise our position during the remainder of the

¹⁰ Secret; Noform; Grip. Brackets are in the original.

START negotiations. Since unilateral declarations are *all* we can accept, we should hold this card in reserve awaiting the end-game. (S/G)

—*SLCM Option 2*—Reintroduce the concept of an exchange of unilateral declarations on planned deployments as a part of a settlement of principal START issues, including sublimits and throwweight. Those who favor this option believe we should be prepared to address the SLCM issue once the Soviets move on sublimits. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Rowny support *Option 1* (current position).

—ACDA and the Department of State support *Option 2* (reintroduce an exchange of unilateral declarations).

—Ambassador Lehman believes that, if the Soviets first accept our position on sublimits, the President should consider a package in which we accept a unilateral declaration on Backfire (*Backfire Option 2*) in return for Soviet acceptance of a unilateral declaration on sea-launched cruise missiles (*SLCM Option 2*). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹¹

Washington, undated

Attachment D—Heavy ICBM Modernization

Current Positions. The Soviets have offered to reduce heavy ICBMs to a limit of 154. The U.S. draft START treaty provides that neither party shall:

“... produce, flight test or deploy new or modernized types of heavy ICBMs.

“... produce or deploy additional heavy ICBMs of existing types.

“... conduct flight tests of existing types of heavy ICBMs.” (S)

The Soviet treaty contains no restrictions on the throwweight of heavy ICBMs and no restrictions on mobile heavy ICBMs. It allows modernization and flight testing within the limit of 154 heavy ICBMs. The issue of heavy ICBM modernization has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

¹¹ Secret; Noform; Grip.

Discussion. Heavy ICBMs have long been identified as the most threatening Soviet systems. A long-standing U.S. goal is to bring about their elimination. The U.S. draft treaty seeks to preclude a follow-on to the SS-18 heavy ICBM (such a missile is now in testing). By banning flight tests the United States seeks to prevent covert modernization; a flight test ban could also decrease Soviet confidence in the reliability of their existing systems. (S)

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs would sanction qualitative improvements in Soviet heavy ICBMs, although other treaty provisions would preclude increases in the numbers of such ICBMs. Some believe that allowing such modernization increases significantly Soviet cheating and breakout potential. Others believe that the United States has never been able successfully to limit (or define) modernization and will be equally unsuccessful in this case, given the nature of the problem. (S/G)

Options. There are three options:

—*Heavy Modernization Option 1*—Maintain the current position. (S/G)

—*Heavy Modernization Option 2*—Allow flight testing of existing SS-18s, but not modernization. (S/G)

—*Heavy Modernization Option 3*—Accept heavy ICBM modernization within the heavy ICBM warhead limit in return for Soviet acceptance of direct throwweight limits. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports *Option 1* (current position).

—Ambassador Lehman supports *Option 2* (allow limited testing of existing SS-18s) and, if the Soviets accept *both* throwweight limits and a 1540 sublimit, *Option 3* (allow heavy ICBM modernization) as well. (S/G)

—The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency support *Option 3*. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹²

Washington, undated

Attachment E—Reduction Period

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty provides for reductions to be completed within seven years of such a treaty coming into effect. The formal Soviet position is five years, although they have said seven years could be discussed. (S)

Discussion. The United States initially favored reductions over a five year period. Following review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States altered its position to seven years. The primary concern was to ensure sufficient time for the strategic modernization program to take effect, since we require modernized forces if we are to accept deep reductions. (S)

The U.S. decision to seek reductions over a seven year period was made in the context of a possible agreement by the end of 1987. Since it now seems unlikely that an agreement can come into effect before the end of 1988, some would argue that the United States could accept a six-year reductions period with little impact. Thus, given apparent Soviet willingness to accept longer than five years, we may have an easy compromise which could eliminate one outstanding issue. (S/G)

Options. The following options exist:

—*Reduction Option 1*—Maintain our position in favor of a seven year reduction period. (S/G)

—*Reduction Option 2*—Suggest a six year reduction period as a compromise. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Lehman support *Option 1* (current position).

—Ambassador Rowny supports *Option 2* (propose six years) if the JCS concur. (S/G)

¹² Secret; Noform; Grip.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹³

Washington, undated

Attachment F—Backfire

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty lists Backfire among the heavy bombers to be constrained. The Soviets assert Backfire is not a strategic bomber. This issue has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

Discussion. The Intelligence Community is unanimous in agreeing that the Backfire is an intermediate-range bomber. They also agree on the approximate range and payload capabilities of the Backfire and that it is best suited for employment for theater strikes. Under certain conditions, the Backfire has a limited technical capability to conduct strikes against targets in the contiguous 48 states. On a one-way, subsonic, all-high-altitude mission, the Backfire could cover all or almost all of the continental U.S. using either Arctic staging or aerial refueling. On a two-way, subsonic, all-high-altitude mission, even using both Arctic staging and aerial refueling, the Backfire could only cover about half of the continental U.S. If relocated to Arctic bases, the Backfire could strike targets in Alaska. The Intelligence Community judges, however, that the Soviets do not intend, and would be unlikely, to use Backfire aircraft as part of an intercontinental strike force against the United States, even after major missile strikes. (S/NF)

Some policy agencies believe that, if it is excluded from START, the Backfire would be the most capable Soviet system with strategic strike potential not limited by arms control constraints, making it an obvious candidate for Soviet circumvention of START limits. (S/G)

Failure to limit Backfire in a START treaty could be a major issue in Senate ratification deliberations. (S/G)

Options. There are three basic options:

—*Backfire Option 1*—Maintain the current position. (S/G)

—*Backfire Option 2*—Be prepared to agree that Backfire bombers (but NOT U.S. systems such as FB-111/F-111) would be dealt with along with SLCMs outside the 1600/6000 aggregates by an exchange of unilateral declarations. Those who favor this option believe that SLCM and Backfire are both end-game issues. By offering to deal with

¹³ Secret; Noform; Grip.

them in a similar manner, the U.S. provides the Soviets an incentive to accept a less restrictive solution on SLCM while still retaining some constraints on Backfire. Others note, however, that setting up a category of theater aircraft to be limited could risk constraints on F-111/FB-111 and thus reverse a long held U.S. policy. (S/G)

—*Backfire Option 3*—Be prepared to deal with Backfire though a Soviet statement recording the total number to be built and a commitment not to give the aircraft an refueling capability or to exercise at refueling. Those who favor this approach note it provides some Backfire constraints and could serve as a model for dealing with SLCMs. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador Rowny support *Option 1* (current position).

—The Department of State supports *Option 3* (accept a Soviet statement recording the total number to be built and a commitment not to give the aircraft a refueling capability or to exercise at refueling).

—Ambassador Lehman believes that, if the Soviets first accept our position on sublimits, the President should consider a package in which we accept a unilateral declaration on Backfire (*Backfire Option 2*) in return for Soviet acceptance of a unilateral declaration on sea-launched cruise missiles (*SLCM Option 2*). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹⁴

Washington, undated

Attachment G—Throwweight

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty states:

“Each party shall . . . limit the aggregate throwweight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs to a level 50 percent below the higher of the levels possessed by the two Parties as of December 31, 1986 . . . by either side. (START Treaty Art. III 2.)”

The Soviets have stated that the practical result of their treaty will be that throwweight (which they reject as a valid measure of strategic capability) will be reduced by 50% and will not increase thereafter.

¹⁴ Secret; Noform; Grip.

They have been unwilling to codify this result, but have expressed willingness to make a unilateral (i.e. nonbinding) statement. (S)

Discussion. Throwweight has long been identified by this Administration as the single most relevant measure of ballistic missile destructive capability. It has, therefore, been U.S. policy to seek a direct limit on ballistic missile throwweight. Such a limit constitutes an important constraint on Soviet ability to cheat or breakout of the agreement; abandoning our position would be a major step which could allow the Soviets to build a strategic force suitable for cheating or rapid breakout. As a result, it could be seen as an unacceptable concession by Congress, particularly if the United States alters its position in other areas, especially mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

On the other hand, we have not yet been able to translate our general desire to constrain throwweight into agreed, verifiable treaty language; our draft throwweight protocol is not near interagency agreement. Thus some would argue we should accept a unilateral Soviet declaration and seek to constrain throwweight indirectly through ballistic missile sublimits and limits on heavy ICBMs. Others argue that throwweight limits are no more or less verifiable than other limits (such as those on numbers of warheads) and that throwweight both can and should be dealt with through direct treaty limits. (S/G)

Options. The following options exist:

—*Throwweight Option 1*—Continue to seek formal treaty limits on ballistic missile throwweight. (S/G)

—*Throwweight Option 2*—Accept a ceiling on Soviet throwweight in a subsidiary document such as an agreed statement, common understanding, or side letter. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support *Option 1* (current position).

—The Department of State supports *Option 2* (accept a Soviet commitment in a subsidiary document). (S/G)

228. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 19, 1987

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on START and Defense and Space

START

Our strategy in Moscow was to focus Soviet attention on the 4800 ballistic missile RV limit, and suggest that 6000, 4800, 1540 and the counting rule comprise an acceptable package. We don't have a formal response to this approach. Our delegation in Geneva continues to emphasize all of our proposed sublimits (including 3300 and 1650). The Soviets probably perceive mixed signals here, and our primary objective is to get Soviet attention fixed on the 4800 as our priority need and try to settle on the above package.

The Support Group has produced a long paper² covering a large number of START issues. Talking points follow on each issue in the paper.

Sublimits

—We have the basis for a good agreement: 6000 total warheads, 1600 launchers and bombers, 1540 heavy ICBM warheads, counting rule.

—The most important element we need to add is the 4800 ballistic missile warhead limit.

—What we have been pushing for since START began in 1982.

—Would ensure equality in this key measure of strategic capability.

—Would give us headway for a substantial bomber and ALCM force, and at the same time maintain equality with the Soviets in missile warheads.

—JCS says this is top priority, we agree with that assessment.

—Should press Soviets hard on the 4800, insist on a response. Their proposal for separate low limits on each component of the triad is out of the question. Need to get them to respond to our approach.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Nitze, Kampelman, and Harrison. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

² See Tab B, Document 227.

—3300 ICBM RV sublimit would be good to have, but is less important to us. Low on the JCS priority list.

Mobile ICBMs

—As we reduce, survivability of our remaining forces becomes even more important.

—For ICBMs, this means mobility.

—We have two programs, and we will need them.

—Soviets have mobile ICBMs, and will want to keep them.

—Problem here is verification.

—Verification is very difficult, but the Soviets are not going to give up their SS-24's and SS-25's. Is this a treaty breaker, or is the real problem our unfamiliarity with verifying mobiles? We should work hard on verification. Get the Soviets to work hard on it too.

—When the time comes to shift our position on mobile ICBMs, we should do so only in return for the verification provisions we need, including a low limit like 500–1000 warheads on mobile ICBMs.

SLCMs

—In the end, we can go back to the idea we suggested at Reykjavik—an exchange of unilateral declarations on SLCM plans.

Heavy ICBM Modernization

—Soviets complain that we permit 1540 heavy ICBM warheads, but they really can't have them under our position because heavy ICBMs can't be tested or modernized.

—In the end, we will have to give ground on modernization and testing, but not the 1540 limit.

—[less than 4 lines not declassified]

Reduction Period

—Seven years is what the Chiefs say they need.

Backfire

—Our intelligence says this aircraft has a theater rather than intercontinental mission.

—We know more about this aircraft now than we did 10 years ago.

—The Soviets are not going to agree to count it as if it were an intercontinental bomber, so we will need to do something else.

—We should, however, get some handle on Backfire. We could get a commitment on the total number, and on the absence of refueling capability and training.

Throwweight

—The Soviets have agreed that one effect of the reductions will be to reduce their throwweight by 50%.

—Now we need to find a way to record this.

—There are several ways to do this, all binding on the Soviets. With a little ingenuity, we can try to capture this important constraint.

Defense and Space

The Defense and Space paper³ produced by the NSC staff has wildly divergent options. OSD is apparently proposing that we hold to our current position in the negotiations and have the President declare our intention to deploy a Phase I SDI system as soon as possible. Hank Cooper apparently recommends that we terminate the radar constraints of the ABM Treaty in order to permit testing and deployment of advanced US satellite sensors; this would also resolve the Krasnoyarsk problem.

The option State has inserted in the paper is more modest:

—Non-withdrawal through 1996 (a two year extension beyond our current proposal, a year has passed since Reykjavik).

—A period of negotiation in the years leading up to 1996 on the situation after the expiration of the non-withdrawal commitment.

—Either side could withdraw from the ABM Treaty after 1996 upon six-month's notice.

The basic objective is to settle on a length of time for the non-withdrawal commitment, and put off all other issues for subsequent negotiations. Such a minimal agreement may permit the START reductions to go forward, without prejudice to either side's positions on interpretation of the ABM Treaty or what may happen after 1996.

—Good beginning in Reykjavik.

—Agreed on the concept of a period of non-withdrawal. Differ on the duration of this period. Soviets have hinted flexibility here. This probably can be resolved.

—Major differences on other questions, such as what happens after this period, and what the ABM Treaty permits and prohibits.

—Probably not necessary to solve all these problems in order to have a START agreement.

—A simple non-withdrawal commitment without a lot of other elaborate provisions may be all we need.

—The Congress would probably be careful in approving funds for SDI testing to avoid jeopardizing the reductions. But they are doing that anyway.

³ See Tab A, Document 227.

—Success in achieving a reductions agreement would be a big plus for the SDI program. The best thing we could do for SDI is to make it part of a strategy that pays off in deep reductions in strategic forces.

—This would broaden support for the program, and bound the threat SDI needs to counter.

Declaration of Decision to Deploy Phase I SDI

—Premature.

—Don't yet know how to meet the criteria we have established.

—Would please only those in Congress who are already enthusiasts, but would further shrink the base of support in Congress for SDI.

—Won't help get START reductions.

—Soviets may be in a position to deploy first.

Terminate ABM Treaty Provisions on Radars and Other Sensors

—[less than 4 lines not declassified]

—Not a good way to resolve Krasnoyarsk. Especially now that the Soviets say they are suspending construction.

229. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 21, 1987, 1044Z

12411. Subject: START: Ifft-Roslyakov Dinner Conversation, November 19, 1987.

1. This is NST/START MEMCON VIII-M-169. Secret—entire text.

2. Meeting date: November 19, 1987

Time: 8:45 p.m.–11:00 p.m.

Place: Restaurant Palais de Justice, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.
Dr. Edward Ifft

USSR
Mr. Yuri Roslyakov

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870960–0341. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

4. Summary: Roslyakov addressed a number of broad NST issues. On INF, he expressed concern about completing the treaty on time and about asymmetries which were developing in the area of verification. He confirmed that the Soviet side no longer requires a separate Defense & Space agreement and gave his personal view that the D&S negotiations are not productive and should be discontinued. It is implicit in the Soviet position that the sides would abide by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but the U.S. would not be required to state this explicitly. On START, Roslyakov said that the Soviet side has decided that it can generally live with the restructuring required by the U.S. sublimits, but only if the U.S. is required to make similar sacrifices in the structuring of its strategic forces. This is the reason for the low SLBM warhead sublimit in the new Soviet proposal. When asked why the Soviet side refused to merge language on sublimits in the JDT, Roslyakov replied that Gorbachev wants to do some things himself at the summit. Also in reference to the summit, Roslyakov said that the sides should consider INF a thing of the past and focus on START and space issues. He said that Gorbachev very much wants to have serious discussions on these two subjects with President Reagan. End summary.

INF

5. Roslyakov apologized for being 45 minutes late, explaining that he had been working on a cable to Moscow containing some new INF proposals. Ifft said that probably he should be the one to apologize, since he feared that he was interfering with very important INF matters this evening. Roslyakov protested that, on the contrary, he was glad for the opportunity to talk and, in any case, the Soviet delegation meeting would still be going on when he returned after dinner, noting that he and others had been up until 2:00 A.M. more than once recently.

6. Roslyakov immediately began talking in a rather agitated manner about the INF negotiations, showing considerable concern about how things would turn out and whether the summit deadline could be met. He made a number of sharply negative remarks about the way in which things were going, but praised the work of Ambassador Kampelman and the atmosphere he had created this week. He noted that Shultz and Shevardnadze would be meeting in Geneva November 23 to attempt once again to wrap up the remaining problems.

7. Noting that Vorontsov would have to defend the INF treaty to the Politburo, Roslyakov remarked that, just as the question in the U.S. used to be, "who lost China?", people in the Soviet Union might one day be asking who was responsible for that INF agreement. For example, the emerging verification provisions provide for something like 129 support facilities in the Soviet Union to be subject to inspection, as opposed to only about 24 in the U.S. and NATO. This meant that, on

the average, about every 2-½ days a Soviet facility would be inspected. When the Soviet leadership becomes aware of this, it could be unpleasant for those who agreed to such an arrangement. Ifft remarked that these inspections should become rather routine events and there should be no need to disturb the leadership on such matters. Roslyakov was skeptical, noting that these are sensitive sites. Ifft pointed out that the U.S. side is also concerned that the agreement be well received at home and, in particular, in the area of verification. The U.S. public and Congress have come to expect a very high standard of verification, perhaps unrealistically so, and this could become a problem. Roslyakov said that he understood the point.

8. Roslyakov did have two positive observations to make. He expressed amazement at the huge volume of sensitive data which the Soviet side had just passed over, noting that even a short time ago any Soviet citizen who had passed over even a single page of such data would have been considered a traitor. Ifft agreed that great progress had been made in this regard. When he remarked that the Soviet data had been slow in arriving, Roslyakov said that the U.S. side must realize the huge Soviet bureaucracy through which the data had to pass. Roslyakov also noted that the work being done in INF would be a big help to START, since much of the detailed language now being worked out could be carried over into START.

Defense and Space

9. Roslyakov gave a negative assessment of the entire D&S negotiation. He said he thought this negotiation should be discontinued and that Obukhov shares this view. Ifft asked whether the Soviet side intended to make a proposal along these lines. Roslyakov replied that a recommendation had been made to Vorontsov but he did not know what decision might be made. Ifft observed that this was a rather ironic situation, since it had been the Soviet side that insisted on a D&S component to NST in the first place.

10. On the substance of D&S, Roslyakov said that the Soviet side had fallen back quite far, and he hoped the U.S. side realized the significance of this. The Soviet side is no longer asking the U.S. to give up the SDI program and has decided that theoretical, theological discussions on this subject are not productive and instead would like to work out a pragmatic solution. Ifft remarked that he had the impression that the Soviet leadership no longer views the U.S. SDI program as the threat it had perceived some time ago. Roslyakov said that was also his impression. Ifft then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Soviet side is no longer seeking a separate D&S agreement. Roslyakov confirmed this. He went on to explain that all the Soviet side seeks now is a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM

treaty, with any problems of interpretation to be resolved as they arise in the SCC. If desired, a list of technical parameters which clearly distinguish between activities which are allowed and not allowed could be worked out by a group of scientists meeting elsewhere.

11. Ifft asked whether Roslyakov would be comfortable with leaving the broad vs. narrow interpretation issue unresolved. Roslyakov granted that this was a problem, but said he did not see how it could be resolved now. Ifft said that the new Soviet position also seems to require that the sides observe the narrow interpretation during the nonwithdrawal period. Roslyakov replied that the Soviet side hopes that the U.S. will continue to abide by the narrow interpretation. Ifft noted that there is an important difference between hoping that something will happen and requiring it as part of an agreement. Roslyakov then elaborated his earlier remark by saying that observance of the narrow interpretation is implicit in the Soviet position. However, the Soviet side does not require that the U.S. administration say this explicitly, recognizing the political difficulties that this would entail. Ifft asked what would happen under this scenario if the U.S. at some point began to conduct its SDI activities in accordance with the broad interpretation. Roslyakov replied that this would create a very difficult situation.

12. Ifft asked, under the approach Roslyakov was suggesting, if there were no separate D&S agreement, how would the sides record the nonwithdrawal commitment? Roslyakov suggested that it could be incorporated into the START treaty. Ifft said that this was not a good idea. Roslyakov then said that some other way could be found—for example, a short separate agreement of some kind. Ifft then asked whether, if there were no D&S agreement, this would mean that the Soviet side would put all of its offense-defense linkage, what was left of it, into START. Roslyakov confirmed that this would be the case. Ifft then pointed out that the current Soviet position has embedded in the START treaty an automatic termination clause linked to the ABM treaty. This was neither a wise nor acceptable approach. He then ventured the purely personal opinion that the Soviet side should be able to live with nothing more than some sort of unilateral statement and did not really need anything on linkage in the START treaty. Roslyakov looked startled and asked if Ifft was a mind reader. In fact, this is exactly the solution that he has been recommending. He noted that Obukhov is also thinking about such a possibility.

START

13. Ifft asked whether the Soviet leadership has definitely decided to go for a START agreement during this administration. Roslyakov said that the answer was definitely affirmative. However, speaking

personally, he was highly skeptical that this would be possible, although, of course, he hoped that it would be. Both sides agree that START is much more important than INF, but it is also much more complicated, and he personally doubted whether the USG could make the tough decisions needed in the short time remaining. In any case, Moscow had decided to seek a summit in Moscow in April. Ifft remarked that this seems too early to have a START agreement completed. Roslyakov shrugged. Ifft observed that there was a dilemma regarding the setting of deadlines. On the one hand, without a deadline it was very difficult to accomplish anything. On the other hand, deadlines can also lead to moving too fast and making mistakes, as Roslyakov seemed to think was now taking place in INF. Ifft remarked that he saw some truth in both sides of this issue and did not know what the correct answer was. Roslyakov agreed that this was the dilemma, and he also could not suggest a solution. In any case, if a deadline had not been set for INF, the negotiations would undoubtedly be far behind where they are today.

14. Roslyakov said that the Soviet side is awaiting U.S. responses to the moves which it had made during the Moscow meetings. Ifft asked whether Roslyakov meant in the area of the new proposals on sublimits and Roslyakov confirmed this. Ifft said that he viewed these new Soviet sublimits as a step toward the U.S. position, but that the Soviet side surely understood that, in their present form, they are unacceptable. In particular, it was difficult to understand the reason for the very low limit on SLBM warheads. For years the Soviet side has argued that all weapons are equally destabilizing and equally threatening. It follows that the Soviet side should not particularly care how the U.S. allocates its ballistic warheads between ICBMs and SLBMs. Roslyakov objected that, on the contrary, the Soviet side is very concerned about sea-based U.S. forces, both SLBMs and SLCMs. Ifft countered that this concern about SLBMs, as opposed to ICBMs, had not been apparent in the Soviet position before the latest proposals and, therefore, Roslyakov's argument was not credible. Roslyakov then explained that neither the political leadership nor the military on the Soviet side wanted sublimits. The U.S. proposals would, to a greater or lesser extent, restructure Soviet strategic forces. The Soviet side had finally decided that it could live with some restructuring, but only if the U.S. makes a similar sacrifice. Thus, it had devised sublimits which hurt the U.S. as much as the U.S. sublimits hurt the Soviet Union. Ifft replied that he had suspected that this was the Soviet motivation. However much the Soviet side might enjoy poking the U.S. in an eye in this way, it would not lead to an agreement. Was the Soviet side, with these clearly unacceptable numbers, trying to force the negotiations back to the 60-percent approach, or are these sublimits just an

opening position? Roslyakov denied that the Soviet side is trying to force the negotiations back to its previous position, but he was also unwilling to show any flexibility on the Soviet numbers, other than saying that the sides must now find some compromise. He singled out the 4800 sublimit as particularly troublesome because the Soviet side simply does not want 1200 ALCMs and sees no reason why it should be forced to build them. Ifft noted that the U.S. side had been disappointed that the Soviet side was not willing to merge the language related to the two sides' sublimits in the JDT. Roslyakov dismissed this by saying that Gorbachev wants to do some things himself at the summit.

Conduct of Negotiations

15. Roslyakov complained strongly about the growing tendency of some on the U.S. side to introduce statements from other discussions—for example, Shultz-Shevardnadze discussions—into the meetings here. Such a practice will make it impossible to carry on frank negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Ifft replied that his strict personal code in U.S.-Soviet negotiations is never to introduce sensitive attributed statements made elsewhere into a discussion. Although this sometimes meant not being able to use attractive arguments, he felt it made for more productive relations in the long run. However, others had different views on this matter. Roslyakov said that he definitely agreed with Ifft's approach, and he strongly recommended that it be applied more broadly.

16. Ifft remarked that he was distressed at the misunderstandings which seem to arise in our negotiations despite the best efforts of the two sides to communicate clearly. For example, in mid-October the U.S. side had gained the impression that the Soviet side had withdrawn certain aspects of its parameter approach in the D&S negotiations. Roslyakov emphatically denied that anything had been withdrawn in the Soviet proposals and stated that it must have been due to a lack of understanding on the U.S. side. Ifft then raised another example closer to home. Today on the fringes of a working group meeting he had asked Colonel Kuklev a number of questions about the Soviet position on its 1540 limit. When the U.S. side returned to its offices, it turned out that people had differing versions of what the answers to the questions had been. Perhaps Roslyakov could clarify the point. Ifft then briefly reviewed his understanding of the Soviet position. The Soviet side proposes a limit of 154 heavy ICBM launchers. It also proposes that a counting rule of 10 warheads per heavy ICBM be adopted. If such a counting rule is adopted, the Soviet side would accept a sublimit of 1540 warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs, having the same legal status as the other warhead sublimits. Furthermore, the counting rule of 10 warheads per heavy ICBM would mean that it

would be forbidden to deploy more than 10 warheads on any heavy ICBM. Roslyakov confirmed each step of Ifft's understanding.

17. Roslyakov then remarked that the Soviet side had exactly the same problem Ifft has described. Frequently when the Soviet delegation returns to its offices after a meeting, it is unable to agree on exactly what had been said by the U.S. negotiators. Roslyakov thought that a major contribution to this situation is poor translations. For example, he has to pay attention to the English translation which is given of his remarks, because mistakes or at least different nuances are sometimes introduced.

Summit

18. Ifft asked what understanding Roslyakov had of the sort of language on START which might be agreed at the summit. Roslyakov said he did not have much to offer on this subject, noting that Vorontsov had said very little on this point. Evidently some sort of framework agreement was being considered. Ifft noted that the U.S. side does not think that a framework is a good idea at this stage. Roslyakov replied that it could take a different form. He then emphasized that Gorbachev very much wants to have serious discussions with President Reagan on START and space. The sides should take the view that INF is a thing of the past at this summit and concentrate on these two topics. This is the reason why Vorontsov had ended the round early—i.e., in order to allow better preparation for the summit discussions. Ifft said that he was sure that the U.S. side also is looking forward to serious discussions at the summit, but he hoped that there would be no surprises of the sort that Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. Although one should not be against all surprises in principle, in a three-day meeting one could not expect to succeed with dramatic new initiatives. In addition, as Roslyakov knew, the Reykjavik experience would make people suspicious of anything that looked like an attempt on the part of Gorbachev to trick the President in some way. Ifft said that he thought the summit could have a positive impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and it was extremely important that it go well. Roslyakov agreed. Ifft asked whether Gorbachev was especially concerned about his personal security. Roslyakov said that Gorbachev was not personally concerned—he is a natural politician who likes personal contact with ordinary people. However, this does make the people around Gorbachev somewhat nervous. People in Moscow have the impression that the U.S. is a rather dangerous and violent place, and this is the reason why the duration of the summit is being kept short.

Perestroika

19. Ifft asked whether Perestroika was alive and well in Moscow. Roslyakov assured Ifft that it was. Ifft asked what Roslyakov would

consider the most significant aspect of the recent 70th anniversary events. Roslyakov did not answer directly but did emphasize his view of what was not significant. In particular, all the attention given in the west to the revision of Soviet history, such as the rehabilitation of Bukharin and Trotsky, misses the point completely. Ordinary people in the Soviet Union do not care in the least about such questions. Ifft noted that a commission has been created to reexamine Party history. Roslyakov said that this did not mean anything and would not lead anywhere. Ifft expressed the view that the question of history is important, at least to intellectuals, in both the West and the Soviet Union. Roslyakov agreed, but emphasized that it would be a mistake to focus on such matters. What is needed is to improve the lot of the average Soviet citizen and not to agitate the entire country about historical questions. Ifft replied that this was probably true, but why could not certain archives be opened and historians be allowed to write objectively about historical periods such as the 20's and 30's and fill in the missing pages? Roslyakov assured Ifft that this will in fact happen. Roslyakov continued with his theme that the situation of the average Soviet citizen must be the focus of Perestroyka. Ifft had recently gone to a conference in Baku where he had been wine and dined and lived as a rich Western tourist. This did not give an accurate impression of life in the Soviet Union. Roslyakov went on to say that, while he personally lives very well in Moscow, he was genuinely concerned about the life of the average Soviet citizen, which is in fact rather miserable.

20. Roslyakov had his usual high praise for Gorbachev. However, in contrast to earlier conversations, he said that there is the danger that Gorbachev could begin to lose his popular support if things do not begin to move forward in ways which improve life in the country. There had been much talk, but now things must begin to happen. In this connection, the Yeltsin affair was somewhat disturbing. Yeltsin had made certain mistakes, but he did not deserve the humiliation which he had been forced to undergo. In this connection, Roslyakov urged Ifft to read the speeches denouncing Yeltsin which had been carried by Pravda, which reminded him almost of what had happened to people in the 20's and 30's or in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. One could not expect people to speak up freely if there was the danger of being humiliated later as a result.

Future Negotiations

21. In response to Ifft's question, Roslyakov said that he certainly hoped to return to the START negotiations in January, although he was concerned that he might be required to engage in further work related to INF in Moscow. He recognized that the Soviet START delegation needs to be augmented. He thought that this would be done in January by transferring a significant number of INF people to START.

He asked whether the U.S. side would also move its INF people into START. Ifft said that he did not expect this to happen, because a significant pool of START experts already exists which can be drawn upon and because a lot of work related to INF ratification will still be needed in the new year in Washington. Roslyakov thanked Ifft for the dinner, conveyed his best wishes to the U.S. START delegation, and said that he would now return to the INF meetings at the Soviet mission, which he was sure would last far into the night.

22. Moscow minimize considered.

Lehman

230. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 20, 1987, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Arms Control Issues for the Summit

PARTICIPANTS

The President

State

Secretary Shultz

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

OSD

Secretary Weinberger

Dr. Fred Ikle

Energy

Secretary Herrington

CIA

Mr. Robert Gates

JCS

General Robert Herres

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

ACDA

Dr. Kenneth Adelman

The White House

Mr. Kenneth Duberstein

Mr. Frank Carlucci

Dr. William Graham

Lt. Gen. Colin Powell

Col. Robert Linhard

Mr. William Tobey

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 170 11/20/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original text.

Minutes

The President began the meeting with a statement from the attached talking points.² He added that he was prepared to consider new options and that the only thing he would rule out is canceling the summit. (S)

Frank Carlucci began discussion of Defense and Space issues by reviewing our current position and available options from the attached talking points.³ He then turned to the Secretary of State. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he thought the central idea the U.S. has used in the Defense and Space negotiations, i.e. identifying some period of time of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is a fundamentally better approach than negotiating over what the ABM Treaty means, although it does leave ambiguity about what activities we can undertake. He continued that we have said that we will live by the ABM Treaty and that we will somehow have to “kick along” the question of what activities we can undertake and leave as the centerpiece a period of non-withdrawal. He added that restrictions on what activities can be undertaken must not abort our ability to effectively test SDI. As for the length of the non-withdrawal period, he expressed a desire to hear carefully and well thought through statements by those who are close to the SDI program on what would be an appropriate period of time for non-withdrawal. (S)

Secretary Weinberger offered what he said was a careful and well thought through answer. He said the real question is, “Do we want to deploy?” He continued that he did not know if we can in 1995, although he thought it would be possible. He said some want to extend the non-withdrawal period [from 1994] to 1996, but that he was not sufficiently sure that we would not be ready in 1995 to favor this. He said we would pace the research by what we tell ourselves about non-withdrawal. To illustrate the point he said if we had done this with the Manhattan Project, he is not sure we would have gotten the atomic bomb before the Germans did. He said that although there is dissimilarity between the two projects, because SDI is to save lives, the point is that we did not limit the number of tests or put any restraints on ourselves. Instead, we went full bore ahead and we were fortunate we did. (S)

Secretary Weinberger continued that SDI is fully as important as—and far more constructive as an alternative to—the [atomic] bomb. He said that we should not lengthen the time under the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, or worry about any “nonsense about cost effectiveness at the margin, in the middle, or at the end.” He said

² Not attached.

³ Not attached.

he hoped we could get a START agreement, but not at the price of “hampering, giving up, delaying, or denying what we need for SDI.” (S)

With respect to the problem of Congressional funding for SDI, *Secretary Weinberger* said he did not think more restrictions would bring more funds from Congress. He continued that we should do nothing that would require additional negotiations before deployment. He endorsed an option that would have the President restructure the SDI program according to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He said that we cannot verify whether or not the Soviets are testing under the broad interpretation, that we cannot photograph satellites from satellites, and that the Soviets will cheat by cloaking tests under the mantle of other activities. (S)

Secretary Weinberger concluded that we cannot predict when SDI will be ready if we cannot work on it, and that we should do everything possible to advance the program. He noted that the public supports the program. (S)

Frank Carlucci noted that *Secretary Weinberger* seemed to be supporting the current U.S. position. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he could agree with all of what *Secretary Weinberger* said, except when he “snarled” at the criterion of cost effectiveness. *Secretary Weinberger* said that subject “always brings out the worst in me.” *Secretary Shultz* said there must be conditions under which we will not deploy, if defenses do not work, if they are not survivable, and if they are not cost effective in the sense that the Soviets could expect to overwhelm them through proliferation of offensive weapons. *Secretary Weinberger* appeared to agree.

Secretary Shultz asked why *Secretary Weinberger* had “snarled” at the criterion. *Secretary Weinberger* said that his opposition was because opponents of SDI use the criterion to argue that we cannot prove SDI is cost effective so we should stop work on it. *Amb. Rowny* agreed. *Secretary Shultz* said that was not the point. *Secretary Weinberger* said we should seek thoroughly reliable defenses and not worry about whether an interceptor might cost \$1 more than a warhead; after all, the targets they would be protecting must be taken into account. *Secretary Shultz* said “let the leaks from the meeting show that” he supported *Secretary Weinberger’s* desire to have cost effective defenses. (S)

The President said that journalists sometimes use the criterion to oppose the program by arguing that it is too expensive. *The President* continued that he does not think anything could be too expensive if it were to save us from nuclear annihilation. (S)

Frank Carlucci then asked Robert Linhard to explain another of the options under consideration, involving removing ABM Treaty restrictions on sensors. (S)

Robert Linhard said that the idea was one we should study. He said it would do something about most of the compliance issues we will have to deal with including the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Gomel radars, and concurrent operation of ABM and air defense components. He said the idea was to modify the ABM Treaty by unilateral action or by negotiation with the Soviets to: (1) resolve the Krasnoyarsk radar issue in a manner helpful to SDI; and, (2) free up our ability to pursue a wide range of SDI activities that are critical to the program. He said that the main drawback of the idea is that it would remove the Krasnoyarsk radar as a reason why we should not be bound by the entire ABM Treaty. (S)

Frank Carlucci added that Linhard's explanation was just that, not advocacy of the idea. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said he was "not going to snarl at Bob [Linhard]." *Robert Linhard* said the Secretary was welcome to snarl at him as that is what colonels are for. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said he was opposed to the idea because it was tantamount to handling the difficult question of how to prosecute a bank robber by repealing the law against robbing banks. He said that it would legitimize a Soviet violation of the treaty but would allow us to engage only one narrow activity that would be permitted under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He said that the U.S. could do nothing under the option that it could not already do under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Frank Carlucci disagreed, saying we could deploy certain systems. *Secretary Weinberger* said we could do virtually all we could otherwise do. *Frank Carlucci* said it was not enough. *Secretary Shultz* asked if in essence the proposal amounted to saying to the Soviets let's agree to do everything except deployment. *Kenneth Adelman* pointed out that interceptors were not included. *Frank Carlucci* agreed that testing interceptors was not part of this proposal. *Secretary Weinberger* said the proposal was the road to discussing permitted and prohibited activities, which would only lead to additional restrictions on the SDI program. (S)

Robert Linhard agreed that was a danger, but said that we have been arguing with the Soviets about what to do about the Krasnoyarsk radar, that this is the year of the ABM Treaty review, and that we must step up to the issue of whether the radar constitutes a material breach of the Treaty. If we decide it does, and we do not act, we could lose our right to take a proportional response to the Soviet violation. (S)

William Graham said he thought we had already called the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty. *Kenneth Adelman* said that we had not. *Secretary Weinberger* joked that we had perhaps called it an immaterial breach. (S)

Frank Carlucci summarized by saying the option had not received unanimous enthusiasm. (S)

Secretary Shultz expressed surprise that *Secretary Weinberger* had not favored the proposal as it would have eased the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. *Secretary Weinberger* said let those who leak know that I did not.

Kenneth Adelman explained the ACDA option saying that there was not sufficient time to negotiate a separate Defense and Space Treaty. He therefore suggested a protocol to the START Treaty with an extension of the non-withdrawal period. (S)

Frank Carlucci asked if that would play into the Soviets' hands on linkage between START and Defense and Space. *Kenneth Adelman* reiterated the ACDA proposal. *Frank Carlucci* asked what we would do if the Soviets halted START reductions to force concessions on SDI. *Kenneth Adelman* said we would tell them before signing the START Treaty that we intend to test SDI under the broad interpretation. *Frank Carlucci* asked how we would handle this issue with Congress. *George Shultz* said that we need to be careful not to limit our offensive forces regardless of what the Soviets do with defenses. (S)

Frank Carlucci asked *Gen. Herres* if the Chiefs saw the non-withdrawal period as advantageous. *Gen. Herres* said yes, because the Soviets can break out of the ABM Treaty rapidly with nuclear ABM interceptors that do not require sophisticated sensors or great accuracy. He added that the Soviets have tested these systems and have open production lines; they only need to produce additional systems. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he wanted to support a point made by *Kenneth Adelman* on the relation between START and Defense and Space. He said that the Soviets could play the game of seeking additional restrictions on the SDI program, but that we too wish to have the right to stop offensive reductions if the Soviets deploy defenses, because theirs are not cost effective. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said he hoped we could reach a START agreement but opposed paying for it with a concession on SDI. He said the ACDA option was like a framework agreement, which we oppose. *Kenneth Adelman* said it would not be a framework, but a minimalist agreement. *Secretary Weinberger* asked how they would differ. *Kenneth Adelman* said the ACDA option would finesse many difficult questions. (S)

Secretary Herrington noted the importance of not doing anything that would undermine the morale of scientists working on the SDI program, who follow the negotiations and the Administration's statements on restrictions on the program very closely. He urged against any decision that would make prospects for deployment dubious. (S)

Frank Carlucci observed that no one was advocating such an option. (S)

Secretary Herrington said that requiring 6 months notice of intention to deploy makes the decision more difficult. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said we must not agree to negotiate when we can withdraw after the non-withdrawal period. *Secretary Shultz* said no one was advocating that. (S)

Kenneth Adelman observed that the ABM Treaty was not really constraining the Soviets with their large but less sophisticated programs, but it is constraining the U.S. *Gen. Herres* agreed that they can break out. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the Soviets have a closed society which makes it easier for them to take steps to deploy defenses; therefore, we should not accept political barriers to deployment. *Frank Carlucci* said no one was advocating such an option. *Secretary Weinberger* said the State Department was. Several said the State Department was not supporting such an option. *Secretary Shultz* asked what he was not supporting; when told, he denied it. *Secretary Weinberger* said to *Secretary Shultz*, "but you might some day." (S)

Dr. Graham said that we should proceed as fast as possible with SDI. He continued that we are world beaters at technological advance, that our central impediment to progress toward effective defenses—funding and legal constraints—is not the same as the Soviets' central impediment—backward technology. Nonetheless, the Soviets have built a lead which we must overcome. Furthermore, it would be incorrect to attempt to secure more support for SDI in Congress by making concessions to the Soviets. (S)

Frank Carlucci noted that *Secretary Shultz* had to leave to meet with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, and that it was best to move on to START.

Amb. Rowny noted that we have been victimized by Soviet semantic infiltration. He explained that we have ignored that fact that although they seem to be more interested in discussing strategic stability, they remain committed to halting SDI. He concluded that we must secure an eventual right to deploy and maintain our rights to test as needed.

Frank Carlucci started to make a point about working with Congress. He was interrupted by *Kenneth Adelman* who made the point that atmospherics are important. He continued that we should not have a kick off of detente like the 1972 summit with clinking champagne glasses. He said that there was even greater danger of this because "you have a glitzy wife," referring to Raisa Gorbacheva. (S)

Secretary Shultz drew an analogy to our relations with China. He said that relations have steadily improved and are now much broader

and stronger, but no one has noticed. He continued that people will notice if they get stronger. He concluded that in our relations with the Soviets we must have neither euphoria nor depression. He then departed. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that verification of a limit on mobile missiles is a problem and that we should stick with our proposal to ban them. (S)

The President said this was a key question to getting an agreement or not. He asked whether it was not equally difficult to determine whether the Soviets were cheating under a ban on mobile missiles or limits on such systems. (S)

Secretary Weinberger answered that there was always a risk the Soviets could cheat under either proposal, but that it was easier to tell under a ban; finding one mobile missile would be an automatic violation. *Kenneth Adelman* added that flight test and production bans associated with the comprehensive ban would decrease the reliability of any covert systems the Soviets might have. *Secretary Weinberger* said we have a good position now. (S)

Frank Carlucci concluded the meeting at 11:53 a.m. by noting that there would be another NSPG before the summit. (S)

231. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 23, 1987, 0932Z

12442. Subject: START at the end of Round VIII.

1. Secret—entire text.

Results of Round VIII

2. The atmosphere here has continued businesslike and a new JDT will be issued on November 23.² Both sides are scraping the bottom of the barrel as far as finding additional places when text can be merged is concerned. A certain weariness is evident and there has been little effort to discuss major substantive issues in recent weeks. Progress

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870962-0305. Secret; Priority; Stadis.

² The Delegation transmitted the Joint Draft Treaty in telegram 12483 from NST Geneva, November 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870963-0649)

from here on will depend upon narrowing of differences on major issues and upon tabling the various protocols. The sudden departure of Ron Lehman is obviously a major discontinuity, presenting both opportunities and dangers. State must do some hard thinking about this.

Summit Document on START

3. We do not have a clear idea here of either the form or the scope of the summit document Washington (and Moscow) have in mind for START. Ron seems to be uneasy with the direction in which he sees things headed. He has the impression that a framework or key elements is likely, but under another name. In the past, he has advocated “guidance to negotiators” as the result of the summit. As you know, I have never fully understood or shared his opposition to an agreed framework, but his objections will be less if the document is focused on what new aspects of START have been agreed, rather than attempting to provide the entire START framework. Such a more narrowly drawn statement would be logical and helpful, but would also conflict with the desire to produce something that can stand on its own and be comprehensible to the public. The Soviets have been silent here recently on this subject, but will probably push for a relatively more comprehensive statement, as well as wanting a reference to Reykjavik. In any case, I note that we briefed the allies after the October Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting to the effect that we do not envision a “Vladivostok-like” or “key provisions” agreement.

4. Whatever the form and scope of the statement, we obviously should try hard for a breakthrough on as many of the remaining issues as possible. Foremost among these would be sublimits and mobiles, which should be settled as a package. If specific numerical levels cannot be agreed, the summit should at least establish exactly which categories of systems should be subject to sublimits, with precise levels to be agreed later. In any case, Roslyakov told me that the sides should regard INF as a thing of the past at the summit and concentrate on START and space issues. He said that Gorbachev wants very much to have serious discussions with the President on these issues.

5. We have tabled the new U.S. position on non-deployed ballistic missiles. The Soviets received it rather glumly. If this position stands, regardless of the number eventually put into the blank, I believe it will go down as one of the gravest mistakes made by the USG in the entire history of SALT/START. If accepted by the Soviets, we will have an impossible verification situation. If the Soviets reject it or counter with even more far-reaching constraints on other non-deployed weapons, we will have a messy negotiating situation (they already have in the JDT placeholder language on non-deployed ALCMs). However, if the

outcome is that we fall back to some sort of numerical constraints on non-deployed mobile ICBMs only, perhaps the situation could still be saved.

Schedule

6. The question of scheduling is on everyone's mind here, largely because of the INF experience. On the one hand, fixing an end date for START (presumably a summit in Moscow) is probably the only way in which a START treaty can be concluded. On the other hand, announcing a date which is unrealistic might not be wise in the long run. In the view of most people here, including myself, any date earlier than next June would be wildly optimistic (Roslyakov told me that Moscow has already decided to seek April as the date for the next summit). Of course, ratification and other important political considerations are also crucial factors. One variation of the "deadline" idea could be to agree now with the Soviets informally on an end date for the START negotiations (for this administration), with or without a completed treaty. This might be a way to allow the sides to nail down the next summit if desired, and plan the path to a treaty efficiently, but make us a bit less vulnerable to the charge that we had set an artificial deadline and were prepared to pay any price in the rush to conclude a treaty. I suspect that the INF experience will make people especially sensitive to such a charge, whether justified or not.

Linkage

7. The interesting Lehman-Obukhov conversation of November 10 (Geneva 11928),³ basically confirmed in Roslyakov's conversation with me on November 19 (Geneva 12411),⁴ shows how far the Soviets have fallen back on offense-defense linkage. It is even possible that they have in a sense fallen back too far. I take it as a given that there will be some sort of nonwithdrawal commitment plus a statement establishing some sort of linkage between the START and ABM treaties. As I said in a previous message, it is conceivable that this could be in the form of a Soviet unilateral statement and we could not push them back any further than that. Alternatively, a milder form of such a linkage could be included in the START Treaty itself. I would think we could live with this if the words were carefully formulated. The current U.S. version of the JDT has no linkage at all and not even a reference to the ABM Treaty. The Soviet version, on the other hand, has language in the preamble referring to the ABM Treaty and repeating the agreed NST mandate of terminating the arms race on Earth and

³ See Document 225.

⁴ See Document 229.

preventing an arms race in space, both of which we should be able to accept. It also contains a provision which would trigger automatic termination of the START Treaty if either side proceeded with “practical development and deployment” of an ABM system beyond that allowed by the ABM Treaty. This we should not accept. However, I think it would be possible for us in the end to accept a provision which established the fact that abrogation of the ABM Treaty by one side could be grounds for withdrawal from the START Treaty by the other side, which is quite different than automatic termination.

8. Two questions about what is apparently the emerging Soviet position on linkage arise:

—(A) Do we want a new treaty along the lines being discussed in the Defense and Space group, or would it be a victory for the U.S. position if this idea simply faded away and the linkage issue were resolved as suggested above? The Soviets no longer require such a treaty and are even suggesting informally that the D&S negotiations should be discontinued altogether.

—(B) Is it in our interest to allow the broad vs. narrow interpretation controversy to remain unsettled? On the one hand it is an attractive idea to be able to kick this can down the road and not have to resolve it now. The Soviets are suggesting that such interpretation issues should be resolved as they arise in the SCC, which does not seem like a good idea. On the other hand, I do not see how the two sides can undertake a legal commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for some agreed period, without knowing which ABM Treaty (broad, narrow or otherwise) they are not withdrawing from. As I have said before, to undertake new commitments with regard to a treaty whose central provisions are manifestly viewed differently by the two sides is a prescription for disaster. However, this problem does look less serious if we are dealing only with the original ABM Treaty, rather than a new agreement which must be ratified.

Lehman

232. Editorial Note

On November 22, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz flew to Geneva to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to discuss preparations for the upcoming Washington Summit, details of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, plans for a 1988

Moscow Summit, and the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Defense and Space Talks. Shultz met with Shevardnadze November 23–24 before flying to Brussels to brief North Atlantic Treaty Organization Foreign Ministers and returning to Washington later that day. The memoranda of conversations between Shultz and Shevardnadze are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 98–102.

In their morning meeting of November 23, Shultz and Shevardnadze appointed Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze to lead a working group to discuss onsite verification sites and procedures for the INF Treaty and report back to the heads of delegations. Memoranda of conversation of the working groups are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1984–1987.

Akhromeyev and Nitze reported back to Shultz and Shevardnadze in November 24 sessions lasting from 4:15–4:55 p.m. and 5:05–5:40 p.m. Shevardnadze began the second session by saying “there was cause to congratulate the leaders, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan, on an important and momentous occasion. It had begun with them at Geneva, and they had carried it on at Reykjavik. Their contribution had been decisive, in Moscow and Washington.” The Soviet foreign minister “was truly pleased and happy that we had reached the final stage; we were witnesses to a momentous occasion.” (Memorandum of Conversation, November 24; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87]) The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 102.

Shultz thanked Shevardnadze for his kind words and expressed agreement. “One of the things the sides had seen in the past two years,” Shultz said, “was how difficult it is to translate what the leaders had agreed into a treaty. But it was now a done thing. Now the sides should move on to a bigger task. There was less time this time, before the Moscow meeting. But perhaps we had acquired practice and a sense of competence that we could confront the problems.” The secretary “valued his relationship with Shevardnadze and their ability to work together. Reykjavik had also been the first place General Akhromeyev had appeared, and when the Secretary had heard he was to be here he had taken it as a good sign.” (Ibid.)

After a discussion of outstanding differences, Shevardnadze reiterated the Soviet position that an agreement on Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty “could be reached in a short period, on the assumption, of course, that the ABM Treaty would be preserved.” Akhromeyev asserted “that the rest was details,” and stated that the working group would continue its discussions and report back prior to the Soviet delegation’s scheduled departure that evening. (Ibid.) No memorandum of conversation for the working group meeting was found; see, however, Document 235.

233. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 25, 1987

SUBJECT

Achieving an Early START Agreement

SUMMARY. Our highest arms control negotiating priority over the next several months will be to work toward signature of the START agreement at a Moscow summit. The Soviets also seem to want to finish START as soon as possible. But finalizing an agreement in the first half of 1988 will be a tall order. If we are to have a reasonable chance of meeting that target, we need:

- to persuade the Soviets in December to drop their START-SDI linkage altogether or settle for much less than they have proposed;
- to resolve several first-order START issues at the Washington summit (e.g., sublimits, SLCMs, mobile ICBMs);
- to supplement NST with regular high-level negotiating sessions throughout the winter and spring; and
- to adopt special internal USG procedures capable of supporting an expedited negotiating process. *END SUMMARY.*

Soviet incentives for early agreement. For a variety of reasons, the Soviets have recently been calling, both publicly and in private, for rapid completion of START.

—One might assume the Soviets are once again trying to generate pressures on us to accept restrictive limits on SDI testing. But by now,

¹ Source: Department of State, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron—November 1987. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Solomon’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

they probably recognize such an effort is futile. Instead, they seem to be coming around to the view that specific, negotiated limits on SDI experimentation are unnecessary for their purposes, and that they can depend on budgetary pressures, the Democratic Congress, and technological obstacles to keep the program within acceptance bounds. Indeed, they may now believe their leverage against SDI would be improved by temporarily setting aside our differences on ABM issues and allowing START to enter into force, and then threatening to terminate START if we depart from the ABM Treaty (as they interpret it). If this analysis is correct, we can expect the Soviets to drop or substantially relax their START-SDI linkage.

—One of the main criticisms of the INF treaty is that it will have little military impact, and indeed can be circumvented through a buildup in strategic forces. By achieving an early START agreement, or simply appearing to be headed toward one, the Soviets may hope to improve chances for INF ratification in the U.S.

—To legitimize the arms control process and make it politically sustainable for succeeding U.S. administrations, the Soviets would like Reagan's signature on an arms control agreement. While INF serves this function, START (because it is more important, because it will contain more controversial provisions) would be infinitely better.

—To support their anti-SDI campaign, the Soviets have, for several years, sought to create the public impression that deep strategic cuts are a major Soviet sacrifice that could only be justified by strict limits on U.S. defenses. However, the Soviets probably see benefits in 50% reductions even in the absence of SDI limits (i.e., curbs on threatening U.S. systems such as D-5, movement toward denuclearization and stigmatization of nuclear deterrence in Western public opinion, creation of an East-West climate more conducive to internal reform efforts, etc.). And given their doctrinal shift away from heavy reliance on nuclear capabilities, as well as their ability to meet military requirements more efficiently with more modern systems, they are unlikely to view START reductions as a major sacrifice.

Is early completion realistic? There are significant obstacles to wrapping up a START agreement by late spring.

—Agreement in START will require early and major Soviet concessions, including on START-SDI linkage. If it is true that Gorbachev's room for maneuver is narrowing because of opposition within the Kremlin, the Soviets may not show the flexibility needed to close a deal soon.

—The INF ratification process will be an impediment to rapid START progress. Not only will the ratification fight absorb the time and energies of the same senior-level officials required to push START ahead, but the dynamics of ratification will make it hard politically to

take controversial decisions necessary to keep START on schedule. (For example, with Senators criticizing INF verification provisions and arguing that those provisions must not be a model for the much harder START verification tasks, we might be reluctant to show the necessary flexibility on START verification for fear of adversely affecting INF ratification prospects.)

—START is simply much more complex than INF. It is not just that START addresses a large number of systems or that there will be no “zero” solution to simplify verification and other provisions. In addition, START requires us to deal with a multitude of technically complicated and bureaucratically contentious issues that we were able to avoid in INF (e.g., warhead counting rules, defining and limiting throw-weight, etc.).

—Given the much higher stakes for U.S. security of a START agreement, the negotiating endgame in START will be much more difficult politically than in INF.

The Soviets presumably recognize that it will be very difficult to finish START by late spring. Nonetheless, they have talked up the possibility of early completion (Vorontsov mentioned April to Max Kampelman). Among their reasons for doing so is the desire to give a boost to INF ratification, to make a record that they are as supportive of START as the U.S., and to pressure us to cut back on some of our negotiating requirements (in order to facilitate an early deal). But they may also genuinely wish to generate momentum in START. They may reason that, even if an agreement cannot be completed and ratified in 1988, it would be desirable to make as much headway as possible—because the farther along the process, the more likely it would be for a successor administration simply to pick up where Reagan left off. In this connection, the Soviets probably have in mind that, if a final agreement proves unreachable in 1988, the two sides could find some suitable format for recording (and thereby hopefully preserving) the progress achieved under the Reagan Administration.

Promoting rapid progress. Our highest arms control priority continues to be a sound START agreement, and we should push hard for signature of a complete treaty text at a Moscow summit during the first half of 1988, as envisaged in the October 30 joint statement. But if we are to have much hope of meeting that target, we will have to do several things.

—We will have to persuade the Soviets at the upcoming summit to drop or substantially relax their START-SDI linkage. Either they will have to abandon their insistence on a Defense and Space agreement altogether or settle for an ABM non-withdrawal commitment (7–10 years) that leaves unresolved the question of permitted ABM activities.

—We will have to resolve several first-order START issues, and we should do so in December if we want to keep on schedule.

- Nailing down sublimits is obviously the most important task. Without them, progress on other issues will be minimal.

- We also have to agree on the treatment of mobile ICBMs, because the sublimits and verification measures are fundamentally affected by how this is resolved.

- Similarly, we cannot duck the seemingly technical issues of ALCM range and armament any longer because the Soviets will be reluctant to go very far as long as they fear we may be creating a major loophole.

- SLCMs may also require early treatment because of their potentially far-reaching implications for the verification regime.

—We should propose periodic meetings of senior-level U.S. and Soviet officials from the two capitals (including you and Shevardnadze occasionally) to help resolve problems encountered by the Geneva NST delegations.

—We will have to strengthen our *internal* procedures for supporting the negotiations in a manner that would help expedite the decision-making process and build Congressional support (e.g., frequent high-level interagency meetings with strong White House guidance and involvement, extensive Congressional consultations and briefings, etc.).

While pushing hard for completing the treaty by late spring, we should not proceed on the assumption that our START efforts will be wasted if we cannot meet that target date. Indeed, if we are unable to finish in 1988 but can nonetheless produce a detailed treaty text with most of the issues resolved, that will be a major accomplishment—one that is likely to survive and be built upon by our successors.

234. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 27, 1987

SUBJECT

Luncheon with General Herres—November 27

As we were leaving the meeting with the JCS,² General Herres asked me whether I would have lunch with him; I agreed. To save time, I showed him a copy of the “Draft Instructions to the Geneva Negotiators”. I explained that it was an effort on my part to get a process of organized thought on this subject, there being so few days left before the Summit. I told him you had not had a chance to see it prior to your meeting with the Chiefs; I did not leave a copy with him.

He approved of the presentation of the sub-limits question saying the Chiefs did not care about an ICBM sub-ceiling but from a negotiating standpoint, it was wise to leave it in with the 4800 number as trading material. He was much interested in the treatment of the counting rule for long-range ALCMs. He thought the right number might be eight but agreed with the idea of an initial position of six per bomber, thus allowing some trading room.

It was his view that if the Soviets wish to cheat, they could do so as easily with non-mobile ICBMs as they could with mobiles. If they could covertly build additional missiles, they could also construct a number of concrete slabs adequate to serve as launching pads, transporter vehicles not easily associateable with a given missile, and cranes capable of erecting such missiles not distinguishable from other mobile cranes.

He suggested that SLCMs just be left out of any agreement. I said I doubted the Soviets would permit that to happen, that we needed a better posture than that.

On the section dealing with the Defense and Space Treaty, he said he favored making a distinction between non-withdrawal and non-deployment. He favored a five-year period of non-withdrawal and an additional five-year period of non-deployment. I explained why I thought it unlikely the Soviets would agree to such a position and why

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 16, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum.

² Not further identified.

I thought it better to push the negotiating problem forward to the period beginning no later than 1989 or 1990.

His position on Filingsdale phased array radar is similar to that of the other Chiefs. He said that no one built big mobile dish radars any more and that he doubted the heavy precision cast parts for such a radar could be obtained except at great expense. He thought it best to have the Soviets agree that they would not resume construction of Krasnyosk and permit us on-site inspection to see that this would not happen.

He said that in sum, he thought that we were inches away from being able to work out a START Treaty. As he saw it, there were only two real issues: one was the problem of verification; the other was the relationship of a START Treaty to the ABM Treaty and SDI testing.

On the latter point, we had an extended discussion on whether kinetic kill vehicles were based upon other physical principles. I noted that they were included in the Soviet list of “devices” and thus were treated by the Soviet side in the same manner as devices based upon “other physical principles.”

235. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 27, 1987

SUBJECT

START

Akhromeyev made the following points on START:²

—He suggested a ballistic missile warhead limit “in the ballpark” of 5100. He later said the difference between 4800 and 5100 was the key remaining issue.

—The Soviets want no other sublimit (except the 1540). When told that in addition to a ballistic missile warhead limit, the U.S. wants an ICBM warhead limit but not an SLBM warhead limit, he burst out laughing.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive November 17–30 (1987). Secret.

² See Document 232.

—He said there will be no START Treaty if we take the position that the Navy cannot be inspected and there can be no limits on SLCMs. He said he personally has given this subject a lot of thought since Reykjavik, and SLCM limits can be verified by inspection of ships.

—The Soviets are prepared to record both 154 heavy ICBM and 1540 heavy ICBM warhead limits in the Treaty. (This is the best solution.)

We can conclude the following:

—The underlying outcome the Soviets are working toward is 5000 ballistic missile warheads with freedom-to-mix except for the 1540 heavy ICBM warhead constraint. This is a big step forward; the ideas you gave Gorbachev in Moscow are beginning to pay off.

—At the end of the day, they may accept 4800 with freedom-to-mix, or 5000 with a 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, but we will have to work hard to achieve either of these.

—The counting rules for attributing the number of warheads to each type of missile and the number of ALCMs to each type of bomber are as important as the ceilings. Akhromeyev agreed that it was important to settle on the counting rules.

—The Soviets will come at us hard on SLCMs, and would be happy to go public that they are prepared to have their ships inspected, that the U.S. is not, and this is one reason there is no START Treaty. If we are not prepared to have our ships inspected, we need to understand and be able to articulate the reasons.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 2, 1987, 1720Z

00592. Subject: Soviet NST policy, the last year of the Reagan administration and the Washington summit.

1. Secret—Entire text.

Summary

2. With the INF Treaty to be signed at next week's summit, the focus of Soviet arms control policy is now on START and the ABM Treaty. Despite the fact that President Reagan has only a year left in

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870988-0097. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

office, the Soviets seem willing, and have incentives, to work to conclude further agreements with the current administration.

3. The Soviets recognize, however, that time is short. In order to have a START accord ready for the 1988 Moscow summit, they probably believe that the Washington meeting must produce agreed instructions to the NST negotiators regarding the basic structure of a treaty (or two treaties). In fact, the success or failure of the Washington meeting in this regard will determine the thrust of the Soviet NST approach for the next year, i.e. whether they work actively for agreement or adopt a more passive stance, waiting for the next administration.

4. We believe Gorbachev in Washington will be ready to accept something approaching our START sublimits structure, solving the main question and moving the focus to other issues—mobile ICBMs, Backfire, SLCM and verification—on which the Soviets also will press to make progress next week. He is likely to maintain some linkage between START reductions and the ABM Treaty. While the Soviets are less obsessed with and unnerved by SDI than in the past, they have made much of it politically. We doubt Gorbachev can back totally off, though he may settle for a “solution” which is largely cosmetic.

End summary

5. This message provides Embassy thoughts on how the Soviets will pursue NST arms control in 1988 and how they will approach this subject at the Washington summit.

Soviet incentives to deal

6. The Reagan administration has slightly over a year remaining in office. While Moscow may hope that a “softer” administration will succeed it, the Soviets regularly state they are ready to work with this administration. The INF treaty—in which the Soviets have essentially accepted the original U.S. proposal—is one proof. We think Gorbachev personally continues to have incentives to achieve further arms control accords with this administration:

—First, Gorbachev’s interest in striking arms control deals with the U.S. is driven by two longer term desires: to show his countrymen he is a leader of international stature working to reduce the outside threat, and to pursue perestroika with a minimal number of foreign distractions.

—Second, arms control “successes” over the short term can strengthen Gorbachev’s immediate domestic position. A successful and productive Moscow summit would give him a solid boost going into next June’s extraordinary Party conference.

7. There are other reasons that argue in Moscow for moving now as opposed to waiting for the next administration:

—The Soviets probably believe President Reagan is in a stronger position than any likely successor (at least at the start of the new president's term) to press for Senate ratification of an agreement.

—Given the "hard-line" image of the President, his conclusion of major arms control deals with the USSR can be seen as "blessing" the process and making it easier for subsequent administrations to do so.

—The Soviets probably expect that one off shoot of a series of major U.S.-Soviet arms control deals could be a relaxation of U.S. and Western concerns about the Soviet threat (perhaps with less public/legislative support for increased defense spending and greater access to Western technology), a desirable off shoot from the Soviet standpoint.

The potential costs of waiting

8. While some of these benefits could be realized as a result of arms control agreements with the next administration, the Soviets surely appreciate the potential costs of waiting. Although Yel'stin's fall shows that Gorbachev is ready to make tactical retreats when necessary, he still strikes us as an impatient man. He wants to get on with his programs and some of the pluses of further accords (i.e. a personal boost for next June's conference) would be irretrievably lost if the Soviets were to wait for President Reagan's successor.

9. Moreover, the Soviets probably understand that the "waiting period" would be considerably more than a year. A new administration would need time to learn the ropes, reinvent some wheels, and build a relationship with the Senate to ensure ratification of any agreement it might conclude. Delay thus does not mean one year, but likely much more.

Time is growing short

10. The Soviets recognize that the time remaining for dealing with the current administration is growing short. And they understand that the farther we move into 1988, the more the American political process will become absorbed with the election campaign and the less time there would be for Senate ratification (indeed, some of our Soviet interlocutors are pessimistic that a START treaty submitted even in late spring would have time to be ratified, and expect that a subsequent administration would not accept the accord as is, but try to "improve" it).

11. The Soviets also understand that coming to agreement on the details of an accord, even if the main provisions are settled, can be a complex and time-consuming process. This has certainly been the case with INF (though the Soviets appear to believe that much of the INF experience, for example the verification regime, can be applied to START, and thus make that negotiation somewhat simpler).

12. The Soviets believe that, if they are to be in a position to sign further accords at the Moscow summit, they must reach agreement with us on the basic outlines of those accords in Washington. This is the objective (whether expressed as key provisions or instructions to delegations) that they have publicly set for Washington. Delegations in Geneva could then focus on secondary issues and verification when they resume in January, most likely with periodic help from ministers, as has been the INF case the last three months.

13. A failure to produce any major progress on START and the ABM Treaty next week could lead the Soviets to conclude there was not enough time to come to agreement with the current administration. In this case, they might adopt a passive approach at the negotiating table, save “concessions” for the next administration, and play harder at the propaganda game while waiting for 1989.

START

14. With the INF Treaty to be signed next week, the Soviets have publicly placed the spotlight on START. (They previously also regarded START as the more crucial question, calling an INF agreement important above and beyond its own terms, i.e. as a prelude to an accord on strategic offensive arms cuts—the “root” problem.) The Soviets continue to note the need to maintain the ABM Treaty, but generally as a condition for a START accord. They do not usually give it equal attention or treatment.

15. We believe the Soviets are serious about reaching agreement on a fifty-percent START reduction (it is doubtful they would have invested so much public capital in the proposal if it was bluff). Gorbachev will be prepared to deal, and Akhromeyev’s presence on the Soviet delegation suggests they will be ready to try to work seriously on details next week.

More moves on sublimits?

16. At the first Washington, the Moscow and the Geneva ministerials, the Soviet START position evolved and acquired elements moving it toward our own in terms of sublimits structure. Gorbachev will likely have more ideas, perhaps including a combination of a sublimit on total ballistic missile warheads and a sublimit on ICBM warheads with some freedom to mix, that will bring the Soviet position even closer to our own structure.

17. We note that institute arms control experts have long suggested the Soviet position on sublimits could evolve toward our own. MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate and USA desk officers have suggested to us in the last month that there is flexibility in the Soviet position on sublimits. And, in his NBC interview, Gorbachev

stated: “we shall be talking about the strategic offensive arms, about levels and sublevels. And here we have some steps that we could take to meet the American position halfway. Some of these steps we’ve already taken.” The implication is that some steps have not yet been taken. The summit is the logical place to do so.

18. The Soviets understand our position on sublimits. Although they complain about the impact such limits would have in forcing them to restructure their strategic forces, their complaints are less than they make them out to be. They are altering the structure of their strategic forces in any event. This is driven by concerns about the existing and potential threats posed to Soviet fixed land-based ICBMs by MX and the Trident D-5. They are already moving toward a force more reliant on SLBMs, bombers/ALCMs and mobile ICBMs. We believe this will make it easier for them to accept something akin to our own sublimits structure. I would predict that they will accept a limit lower than 5100 for ballistic missile warheads, and will probably accept our proposed 4800 if the other elements of the package are satisfactory to them.

Other START questions important

19. As the Soviets have done in Geneva, Gorbachev will undoubtedly reiterate their concerns over our positions on banning mobile ICBMs, including Backfire in the 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit, and developing some limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. He will likely seek to trade further Soviet moves on sublimits not only to try to bring us to agreement on the ABM Treaty, but also for movement on these START questions.

20. We expect the Soviets will press hard to reach agreement on these secondary START issues as well as the sublimits structure. They may believe resolution of these questions in Washington is also essential to provide a chance to finish a START accord in the first half of 1988. The INF experience is instructive. Four months were necessary to close the deal after Gorbachev’s July 22 acceptance of Double Global Zero. If no progress is registered on these secondary issues in Washington, the Soviets may conclude there is not enough time to work out details, verification provisions and precise treaty text for the Moscow summit.

SDI—The concern appears to have lessened

21. As we have followed it in Moscow, the Soviet concern about SDI has decreased notably over the last two years. In contrast to the shrill outcries against the program after its inception, the Soviets now appear more relaxed about it. We believe there are several reasons for the Soviets becoming less obsessed with and unnerved by SDI:

—Congress has limited funding for the program to levels below those requested by the administration;

—The administration has agreed for the foreseeable future to maintain the program within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty; and

—The Soviets appear to have concluded that there are significant technical complexities facing SDI and are less worried about the possibility of a quick breakthrough that would drastically, and with little warning, upset the strategic balance. Leading scientists, such as Space Research Institute Chief Sagdeyev, seem to have accepted (though they may not admit it publicly) the Sakharov view that the Soviets have nothing to fear from SDI since any system which might be deployed before the end of the century would be easily countered.

22. We have the impression here that the Soviets are downplaying the SDI issue. Indeed, their public short-hand formulation since the September ministerial has generally called for a fifty-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms "in conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time," without detailed elaboration or specific attack on SDI.

23. The Soviets have publicly made a concerted effort to avoid SDI *per se*, and make their arguments in terms of preserving the ABM Treaty. Most recently Gorbachev denied that the Soviets were after SDI in his NBC interview. This may be nothing more than a change in words. Moscow knows full well that their proposals for preserving the ABM Treaty would entail restrictions on SDI. But the change in emphasis may also signal (1) acceptance that there will be a vigorous SDI program, and (2) a public approach more conducive to permitting a face-saving solution for both sides on the ABM Treaty issue.

24. Some Soviet officials seem to be downplaying the nature of the U.S.-Soviet disagreement over the ABM Treaty question as well. MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Chief Karpov, appearing at a November 26 press conference, appeared to suggest the main remaining question on the ABM Treaty was the length of the period of non-withdrawal, an issue he called open for discussion. (However, on December 1, one of his staff told Emboff Karpov had not meant to focus on the time issue to the exclusion of all others.)

25. While the Soviets are focusing less public attention on SDI and the ABM Treaty issue, the question is what will be their bottom line in terms of what they demand in the ABM Treaty area. Over the last six months, there have been some suggestions that the Soviets might be willing to drop the linkage and implement START cuts independently. Various Soviet Institute Arms Control experts (including Sagdeyev) and, on one occasion in June, MFA Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh have expressed interest in an idea originally attributed to Andrey Sakharov, i.e. that the sides would agree to and implement fifty-percent START cuts with the proviso that either could withdraw from those cuts if it felt the other had violated the ABM Treaty, but without further definition of what limits the ABM Treaty entailed.

But the linkage remains

26. We do not wholly exclude the “Sakharov” notion (primarily because Sagdeyev has an interesting track record; though supposedly not a participant in the formal arms control process, he foreshadowed the Soviet NST position on a list and setting parameters that would determine whether devices were allowed or prohibited from space). But delinkage in this manner seems unlikely. The Soviets have made such an issue over SDI and preserving the ABM Treaty that it would be nearly impossible for them to drop any formal connection between the two. While we suspect Soviet concern about SDI has lessened over the last few years, we would be very surprised if the military—suspicious as it is of the possibilities of American high tech—did not insist on some measures to provide predictability in the offense-defense relationship.

27. We would also point out that, while the general Soviet line has been to downplay SDI, the Politburo notes of November 12 made clear in an authoritative manner that the linkage remains. In fact, those notes cited the ABM Treaty’s importance for maintaining strategic stability and as a basis for positive progressive movement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship in general.

28. A variant would be to maintain the linkage, reaffirm the ABM Treaty, but leave open the question of its interpretation. We have occasionally tried to sound out some of our Soviet interlocutors about their reaction to such an approach. The reaction is generally one of no interest.

The September variants

29. We thus come back to the two variants that Shevardnadze offered in September: agreement on a list approach setting parameters for determining devices permitted and prohibited from space or to abide by the ABM Treaty as originally signed and ratified for an agreed period of time. We believe these will be the basis of Gorbachev’s ABM Treaty approach in Washington.

30. While the Soviets appeared to be pressing the list notion over the summer, we have the impression that they are now giving more attention to the latter variant, offering the list as a fall back should there be a need to set specific parameters. There appears to be some sense to this. Our Soviet interlocutors understand that the second variant is simpler; working out a list of devices and parameters would be technically complex and time-consuming (time again being an important factor).

31. But it is also possible that Gorbachev may go back to pursue the list approach in his discussions with the President. First, the Soviets have undoubtedly taken note of press reports regarding interest in

various Washington quarters in exploring the idea. And second, if Gorbachev wants to show some flexibility on the ABM Treaty issue, it may be possible by adjusting the levels for parameters on the list. Reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty as agreed in 1972 likely translates, in Soviet eyes, to reaffirmation of the “narrow” interpretation, a reversal the Soviets may calculate the present administration cannot make, while they themselves cannot accept the “broad” interpretation. They could see the list proposal (admittedly a more complex approach) as a means to blur the “narrow” vs. “broad” interpretation question, and come up with a pragmatic solution presenting a compromise that avoided the impression that either side had given up its principled position.

32. On other ABM Treaty issues, we suspect Gorbachev may show some flexibility on the length of the non-withdrawal period (this was the implication at Karpov’s recent press conference). We believe Gorbachev will be more rigid in refusing to commit now to a new regime after expiration of that period, insisting on reversion to the ABM Treaty’s six month withdrawal clause.

In sum

33. The Soviets likely see the Washington summit as key to how the NST talks will play out during 1988. The meeting’s success or failure will have a major impact on the Soviet approach next year, and could determine such a basic question as whether the Soviets adopt an active and business-like attitude or instead play a waiting game for the next administration.

34. We see significant reasons why Gorbachev would want to make the Washington meeting a success, reasons that relate not least of all to his own domestic position. To this end, he may travel to the U.S. next week prepared to take serious steps to find compromises on START and the ABM Treaty that will move the NST negotiations toward further accords in the first half of 1988.

35. Leningrad minimize considered.

Matlock

237. Memorandum From Linton Brooks, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, December 4, 1987.

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on Arms Control Issues for the Summit—Friday, December 4, 1987—2:00 p.m.

Attached is the meeting memorandum² for Friday's NSPG. We believe the focus should be on START and Defense and Space in order to identify moves we wish to make in an attempt to reach agreement by next summer.

The vehicle for arms control discussion is a compartmented paper (GRIP 40) (*Tab D*)³ based on Paul Nitze's version of a summit joint statement. At present, it includes the following *changes in existing U.S. positions* favored by State:

- Dropping the 1650 ICBM sublimit.
- Establishing an ALCM counting rule of 6 per bomber.
- Accepting a SALT II approach on the BACKFIRE bomber by excluding Backfire from START in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or provide for in-flight refueling (not in the initial position).
- Allowing heavy ICBM modernization.
- Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject to an agreed limit and agreed verification.
- Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.
- Accepting reversion to the ABM Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal period.
- Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.
- Accepting a construction moratorium rather than dismantlement of Krasnoyarsk.

Most of these will be controversial; some more so than others. The paper has some agreed points as well, including the outline of a verification approach for START. In addition to the substantive issues, we believe you need to discuss the tactics of how the statement would

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 171. Secret. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 238.

³ See Tab D, Document 238.

be tabled. This is not on the agenda, but is essential and we have alerted agencies to be prepared for it.

We believe the agency positions are reflected in the paper. We suspect Secretary Shultz will assume this has all been decided. We understand Secretary Carlucci may introduce the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1994 and non-deployment through 1996. The DCI may raise the issue of European concerns with a START treaty.

We are aware of no plans by any agency to raise any other arms control issues. If such issues are raised, we recommend discouraging discussion during the meeting; we need to focus on the questions directly related to START and Defense and Space.

The meeting memorandum for the President is at *Tab I*, it includes brief suggested talking points he might use to set the stage. Talking points for your use are at *Tab II*.

Recommendations

That you approve and forward the Presidential Meeting Memorandum (*Tab I*), along with *Tabs A, B, C and D*.⁴

That you use the talking points at *Tab II* in conducting the meeting.⁵

Fritz Ermarth, Steve Steiner, Don Mahley and Bill Heiser concur (all on previous drafts).

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

GENERAL POWELL'S TALKING POINTS

I. INTRODUCTION

—We are here for a final review of some aspects of our arms reductions positions before the summit.

—Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we begin?

[President makes opening remarks.]

⁴ Powell indicated his approval. On *Tabs A, B, and C*, see footnotes 2 and 3 and *Tab C*, Document 238.

⁵ Powell indicated his approval.

⁶ Secret. All brackets are in the original text.

—Thank you sir. We have a compartmented paper you've all been provided to help structure the discussion. Lets first turn to START.

II. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE START POSITIONS

—I want to walk through the approach as I understand it. First we all need to be clear that this is intended as a package. I know it's important to the JCS and others to view it that way; some moves are only acceptable in the context of things like counting rules.

NOTE: THIS POINT IS IMPORTANT TO THE CHIEFS.

—What we've done is set forth a paper that describes how *we* want the joint statement at the end of the summit to come out. Near the end of the meeting we'll talk about how we get there.

—We have general agreement on several points. We all agree to begin with a chapeau that makes it clear the Joint Draft Treaty Text is agreed by both sides. In the chapeau we also would nail down:

—1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (Bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs);

—6000 total "warheads"

—1540 warheads on Soviet heavy ICBMs (a 50% cut from current levels); and

—A 50% cut in total Soviet ballistic missile throwweight

—Then we'd have sections on:

—4800 ballistic missile sublimit and 3300 sublimit on ICBMs

NOTE: ADELMAN SAID ON THE RECORD YESTERDAY THAT 3300 WASN'T ESSENTIAL. SHOULD STAY IN NONETHELESS.

—ALCM counting rules (attribute 6 ALCMs to each ALCM-carrying heavy bomber)

—Ballistic missile warhead counting rules for existing missiles

—A verification package.

NOTE: PACKAGE INCLUDES:

1. Data exchange

2. Baseline inspections

3. On-site observance of elimination

4. Continuous monitoring of portals of productions facilities

5. Short-notice inspections of declared facilities

6. Short-notice inspections of suspect sites

7. No concealment or interference with NTM

8. Cooperative measures to enhance NTM

—None of this is inconsistent with our past position, although we had not previously agreed on ALCM counting rules or decided on numbers of Soviet RVs we could accept.

—Since there is general agreement on this part, I'd like to move on to the issues where we don't have consensus unless someone objects.

—The first such area is mobile ICBMs. We've discussed this before. As I understand it, there are three views:

- Decide that we should alter our position and accept mobile ICBMs in a future treaty. State advocates agreeing to accept mobiles if effective verification is possible.
- OSD and Ed Rowny would not move in this area.
- ACDA would accept only road-mobile, single RV ICBMs.

—George [Shultz] why should the President change now? Why not wait?

—Verification is key here. Judge [Webster] what are the CIA's views?

—Ken [Adelman] why do you think we should only allow road-mobile.

—How do the JCS feel about Ken's idea?

NOTE: JCS/OSD PROBABLY PLAN TO ABANDON MIDGET-MAN WHICH IS ONLY MOBILE ICBM KEN'S PROPOSAL ALLOWS.

—Does OSD still want to hang tough on mobiles? Does anyone?

NOTE: ROWNY WILL WANT TO HANG TOUGH.

—The next area is allowing heavy missile modernization. As I understand it only State advocates this. George, why is this important?

—Are others opposed to doing this at all, or just opposed to doing it now?

NOTE: MOST WILL ACCEPT; ISSUE IS TIMING.

—We can be sure the Soviets will raise SLCMs and Backfire. As I understand it we all agree that we could respond to Soviet concerns by offering an exchange of unilateral declarations of nuclear SLCM forces. Does anyone disagree?

NOTE: THIS IS THE BEST WE CAN DO, BUT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT SATISFY THE SOVIETS.

—With respect to Backfire, if the Soviets accept our position, State would exclude Backfire from the treaty if there was no increase in numbers, it could not be refueled, and was not equipped to carry ALCMs.

—OSD, ACDA and Ed Rowny oppose this. Why?

CALL ON EACH IN TURN

—What do the JCS think?

III. *DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE AND SPACE POSITIONS*

—Let's move to Defense and Space. Here we have agreement on a chapeau paragraph that is consistent with our current position.

—Our Defense and Space Negotiator, Hank Cooper, and Ed Rowny would make no move beyond that paragraph lengthening the non-withdrawal period, unless the Soviets concede to us a clear right to deploy after the period.

—Other agencies believe that we need to make some concessions. These are spelled out in the first two options.

—The first option would extend the non-withdrawal period through 1996, return us to the ABM Treaty after the period, and commit us to negotiate on the distinction between permitted testing and prohibited deployment.

—The second option would entail a non-*deployment* commitment through 1996, with a right to deploy thereafter, and an agreed understanding of what constitutes prohibited deployment, coupled with clear acknowledgement of our right to test under the broad interpretation.

—Finally, a third option weaves together elements of the first two. I think it would be best if we work from Option 3, as it captures the basic points at issue:

—Whether we commit not to *withdraw* from the ABM Treaty, or simply not to *deploy* defenses not permitted by the Treaty.

—Whether we have a clear right to deploy after the period, or whether we would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—And, whether we should negotiate what constitutes prohibited testing versus permitted deployment.

—Option 3 also contains points of agreement among those who favor changing our position—that we should lengthen the period to 1996 and that we should undertake measures to improve predictability.

—As we think about these options, some of which involve major concessions to the Soviets, we need to think about the tactics involved.

—George [Shultz] why do we need to move on SDI now, and are there any requirements that the Soviets would have to meet before we table the option favored by State?

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—Frank [Carlucci] does Defense want to see anything from the Soviets before we would move in Defense & Space?

NOTE: CARLUCCI MAY SUPPORT NON-WITHDRAWAL THROUGH 1994 AND NON-DEPLOYMENT THROUGH 1996 AS A COMPROMISE

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—Other opinions?

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—As we are about to go toe to toe with the Soviets, I think we must be absolutely clear about where we stand. Mr. President, your

key advisors differ over lengthening the non-withdrawal period (absent key Soviet concessions in Defense and Space), what should happen during the period, and perhaps most importantly what happens to the ABM Treaty after the period.

—We will be preparing papers for your decisions on these issues.

IV. SUMMARY

—We have two more areas to cover.

NOTE: IF TIME SHORT, SKIP KRASNOYARSK AND GO TO TACTICS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT.

—Agencies differ on what to do about Krasnoyarsk.

—Two formulations have been suggested:

—Halt construction and agree that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner. This is the choice of OSD, Ed Rowny and Ambassador Cooper.

—Agree that construction will not be resumed, that the transmitter power supply will be removed and that we'll have a right to periodic on-site inspection. State and ACDA favor this.

—We're running short of time; are there any essential points on this to make to the President?

[AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION]

—I'd like to talk about tactics for a moment. I see three basic possibilities for introducing this material:

—Provide it as a paper to Soviet Marshal Ahkromeyev on Monday December 7.

—Have the President introduce it in his initial meeting and explain it in detail.

—Have the President introduce it and suggest that it be discussed by experts.

—What are your thoughts?

[DISCUSSION]

—This has been useful. Thank you for coming.

238. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 4, 1987

I. PURPOSE

In preparation for your meetings next week with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, to review US START and Defense and Space positions and identify what, if any, moves we might make in an attempt to reach agreement by next summer.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meeting next week with General Secretary Gorbachev will deal with all four aspects of the U.S.—Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since there are no policy decisions required in other areas. This NSPG will be your final opportunity to personally review issues with your senior advisors.

The most important arms reductions issues facing us are whether (and if so how) to modify our START and Defense and Space position in order to move closer to an acceptable START Treaty. I propose the NSPG focus on this issue. In preparation for the meeting the Arms Control Support Group has prepared a compartmented paper attached as *Tab D*. This paper is structured around a draft summit joint statement as a vehicle for considering possible specific moves. The paper has been distributed to your senior advisors and I intend to use it as the focus of discussion.

In general, I expect at least some individuals to argue for the following changes in existing U.S. positions:

- Dropping the 1650 ICBM sublimit.
- Establishing a counting rule of 6 air-launched cruise missiles per bomber.
- Accepting a SALT II approach on the BACKFIRE bomber by excluding Backfire from START in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or provide for in-flight refueling. (This would not be part of our going in position but would be available as a response should the Soviets seem serious).
- Allowing heavy ICBM modernization.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 171. Secret. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

—Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject to an agreed limit and agreed verification.

—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.

—Accepting reversion to the ABM Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal period.

—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

—Accepting a construction moratorium rather than dismantlement of Krasnoyarsk.

Many of these will be controversial; some more so than others. In addition to the substantive issues, we will have a brief discussion on tactics.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

Participants at *Tab B*.²

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

White House photographer only.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

The agenda is at *Tab A*.³ I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at *Tab C*. We will then spend 25 minutes reviewing START options, followed by a similar period on Defense and Space. We will conclude with a brief discussion of Krasnoyarsk (time permitting) and summit tactics. No decisions are required at the meeting; decisions will be needed over the weekend.

² Attached but not printed is the participants list.

³ Attached but not printed is the agenda.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Suggested Opening Talking Points for the President

—We’ve waited a long time to get Gorbachev to come here and sign an agreement on INF. Now the time has arrived.

—We need to keep the momentum and use the summit to move forward in other areas.

—This will be our last chance to meet as a group before the summit. I want to use the time to focus on START and Defense and Space.

—As I told you two weeks ago, I don’t accept the notion that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office. I want a START agreement, but *only* if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security.

—At the same time, I want to set the stage for one day deploying effective defenses in a manner that will strengthen strategic stability.

—I’m prepared to consider new ideas. I’m also prepared to stand pat, if that’s best.

—We’ve had some discussion on how to use next week’s meetings to move toward our goals. Today I need your final thoughts on what we should and shouldn’t do to reach the agreements we seek.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁵

Washington, December 4, 1987

GRIP 40D (U)

Purpose. To set forth the U.S. approach to the arms control aspects of a joint statement to be issued following the 7–9 December summit meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. (S/G)

⁴ Secret.

⁵ Secret; Noform; Grip.

Background. A joint statement will be issued at the end of the summit meeting. The Soviets intend that this joint statement serve as “Instructions to Negotiators” on completing a START and Defense and Space Treaty. In contrast, the President has directed U.S. negotiators to pursue separate START and Defense and Space Treaties. At the summit, the United States seeks to further our negotiating position while avoiding a so-called framework agreement (i.e., a politically binding, quasi-legal statement which could impose *de facto* constraints on the United States while *not* providing legally binding, effectively verifiable constraints on the Soviet Union). (S)

Format. The following points are generally agreed, although with some variations in approach:

—*We want the summit to deal with the whole range of issues (human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control).*

—*The United States doesn’t want a framework agreement.*

—To avoid the perception we have created such an agreement, any “Instructions to Negotiators” or any other arms control statement should be part of a single summit joint statement, not a separate stand-alone document.

—Such a joint statement should simply be issued, as in Geneva, not initialled or signed.

—*We don’t want to set up two different “agreed” categories, those mentioned in a summit statement and those not.*

—We must not allow the Soviets to suggest that material previously agreed and omitted from the summit statement is somehow no longer agreed, or that failure to list an area of disagreement implies we have acquiesced in the Soviet position.

—To this end, we should refer to existing joint START documents (especially the START Joint Draft Treaty) to reaffirm their status. In doing so, we should ensure all associated documents (protocols, etc. are referenced).

—Since there is no draft Defense and Space Treaty, we should avoid the implication that Defense and Space is subsumed in START and thereby acquiescing to Soviet linkage. Thus our objective with respect to Defense and Space should be instructions to negotiators to begin work on a draft Defense and Space Treaty.

—In addition, the only details in such a statement should be general endorsement of previous positions (“50 % reductions”) and/or those new details on which agreement is reached *at the summit*.

—*The summit statement should make the negotiators’ job easier, not harder.*

—We should avoid giving ourselves a negotiating deadline, and simply refer to a “goal” for completion of agreements. To set an arbi-

trary deadline for completion of an agreement could lead to hasty decision making and mistakes, and could lead to an unverifiable treaty. The internal pressure on START, Defense and Space, nuclear testing, and, possibly, chemical warfare, will be great enough without our contributing to it.

—We should avoid statements of “general principles” of verification. Verification is a matter of specific details, not sweeping principles and the summit setting is inappropriate for discussion of a complete verification scheme. But we should encourage the Soviets to offer *specific* ideas on verification and seek agreement on key details. In doing so, we should protect all key elements of a START inspection regime.

—Summit statements, while intended by the United States to be read as broad policy documents, will be used in Geneva by the Soviets to claim agreement with specific, detailed positions. Thus the Geneva negotiators should be given the opportunity to review the arms control portion of any statement to ensure language is technically correct.

—*In areas where we don't narrow differences, the summit statement should simply note the subject was reviewed, not list each side's position.*

—Since we want the summit to deal with the whole range of issues, we shouldn't emphasize arms control more than necessary.

—Recording positions in detail risks the dangers noted above. (S/G)

Approach During the Summit. Negotiations will be conducted by an appropriate working group as at previous high level meetings. The positions set forth in the draft U.S. text below, if and when approved by the President, will be considered a single package to (be used as a going in position) which the negotiating group will not exceed without further Presidential guidance. (S/G)

The group drafting the joint statement should work from the draft U.S. text, modified depending on what agreements are or are not reached. They should be guided by the agreed general principles set forth above. Before reaching final agreement, the drafting group should check with: (a) the U.S. head of the U.S./USSR working group on arms control, (b) U.S. negotiators, as appropriate, to ensure technical accuracy of the language, and (c) SACG principals, including senior representatives of those agencies not directly involved in drafting. In all cases the object of such checks will be to ensure that senior agency players are kept informed and have a chance to offer *substantive* (as opposed to linguistic) comments. It is not the intent to seek interagency agreement on the text of the statement. (S/G)

Substance. Based on the foregoing, those arms control areas other than START and Defense and Space need be treated only briefly. A paragraph in the joint statement along the following lines appears appropriate:

“The two leaders also reviewed the progress of negotiations in other areas, including nuclear testing, conventional arms control, and chemical weapons. They agreed to continue their current efforts in these important areas.” (S/G)

There should also be a separate paragraph on nuclear non-proliferation, which is outside the scope of this paper. Additional language on nuclear testing may also be required; this subject is being dealt with separately. (C/G)

In addition, Ambassador Ledogar, U.S. negotiator to the conventional force negotiations, prefers a longer, more explicit formulation. Based on the rationale set forth above, and in view of the multilateral nature of conventional negotiations all agencies agree that discussion in this area should be kept short and that only a brief mention is appropriate for the joint statement. (S/G)

The remainder of this paper discusses the areas of START and Defense and Space, where agencies disagree on the *substance* (and to a lesser degree the form, of what should be included. In many cases, agency proposals represent significant changes in the current U.S. position. (S/G)

START. With respect to START, some would make *the following changes* in existing U.S. positions:

- Accepting “an agreement” on throwweight rather than including throwweight in the START Treaty itself.
- Dropping the 1650 ICBM sublimit.
- Establishing an ALCM counting rule of six per bomber.
- Allowing heavy ICBM modernization.
- Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject to an agreed limit and agreed verification.

In addition, depending on Soviet responses, some would consider:

- Reintroducing the concept of an exchange of declarations on sea-launched cruise missiles.
- Excluding Backfire from START in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or provide for in-flight refueling.

The START portion of the proposed joint statement would read as follows:

“The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of heads of state the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to

instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

"In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text worked out in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule; and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight which will thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of warheads to be attributed to each type of current and future ballistic missile, and the number of long-range cruise missiles to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1s, B-52s, Bear Hs and Blackjacks carrying long-range ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Heavy bombers which do not carry cruise missiles, including Backfire, shall be counted as one warhead as agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to heavy bombers covered by START.⁶

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles, the number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be:

PEACEKEEPER (MX) :10, Minuteman III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:8, Poseidon: 10;

The Soviets will provide numbers of warheads attributed to each Soviet missile; the United States could accept:

SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-17:4, SS-18:10, SS-19:6, SS-X-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-N-6:1 SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10, SS-N-23:10.

These numbers shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection. There shall be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to future weapons systems covered by START."⁷

(d) Building upon the provisions of the INF Treaty, the measures by which the provisions of the START Treaty can be verified will, at a minimum, include:⁸

⁶ [1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

⁷ See footnote 6.

⁸ "The DCI's Representative notes that in many cases, the Intelligence Community would not want to step back from the provisions listed below. Our monitoring confidence for many of the START-related tasks would be higher given a more comprehensive set of verification measures. As an example, such a set could include a more restrictive deployment mode for mobile missiles. The DCI's Representative also notes we have not examined the risks associated with various verification provisions and our monitoring uncertainties. The policy agencies need to address the risks associated with cheating which may result from such provisions." [Footnote is in the original.]

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to conform to the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of (a) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits, (b) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after conforming to the agreed limits, and (c) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations where either side considers covert production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

NOTE: Text thus far is agreed by all agencies. (C/G)

(e) Additional provisions specifically for verification of mobile ICBMs, including restrictions on their deployment areas and provisions for assuring the distinguishability of mobile missiles. With agreement on methods of verifying the number of mobile ICBMs, an agreed number of such land-mobile ICBMs can be permitted within limits provided by the agreement.⁹

NOTE: *Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny* and the *Office of the Secretary of Defense* would not include this provision. *ACDA* would include this provision only if the Soviets agree to the rest of the package, and then would allow only the single-RV, road-mobile SS-25. (S/G)

⁹ "The DCI's Representative notes that under a START agreement which only limits mobile missiles, many of our monitoring confidences will be reduced over those under a ban. [6 lines not declassified]. Confidence Building Measures can increase our confidence about the size of deployed forces and the number produced at declared facilities but will not eliminate the potential for the Soviets to store previously produced equipment or to covertly produce equipment and missiles at other facilities. ACDA notes there are significant verification differences between road- and rail-mobile ICBMs [less than 1 line not declassified]" [Footnote is in the original.]

(f) Based on agreement to all the foregoing, the President noted that the United States is prepared to permit the continued testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs.

NOTE: *Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny*, the *Office of the Secretary of Defense*, and *ACDA* would not include this provision. (S/G)

No provisions are included for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). There are no known methods by which the numbers of nuclear armed long-range SLCMs may be verifiably counted. [7 lines not declassified]

If the Soviets raise the issue of SLCM limits, all agencies agree the United States should reintroduce the concept of an exchange of notifications on planned SLCM deployments outside of and in addition to the 6000 warhead and 1600 delivery system limits provided for in the current Joint Draft START Treaty text. (S/G)

The language above preserves the existing U.S. position that Backfire should be limited by a START Treaty. If the Soviets accept the rest of our package, but object to Backfire, *State* would agree to exclude Backfire from START if, in return, the Soviets give assurances that the number of Backfire bombers will not be increased above the current levels, that such bombers will not be given the capability to carry long range air-launched cruise missiles, that such bombers are not and will not be equipped for in-flight refueling, and their crews are not and will not be trained for in-flight refueling. *ACDA*, *OSD* and *Ambassador Rowny* oppose such a provision. (S/G)

Defense and Space. All agree that the following language should provide the basis for a U.S. position on a joint statement:

"The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text incorporating a commitment on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in a new separate treaty which would enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to first identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement." (S/G)

This language requires *no change* in existing U.S. positions.

Ambassadors Cooper and Rowny oppose moving beyond this to extend the non-withdrawal periods unless the Soviets agree to a clear right to deploy defenses at the end of the period. Ambassador Rowny considers the remainder of this material fundamentally flawed and unsuitable for submission to the NSPG or the President. Other agencies would make concessions beyond the current U.S. position in the context of Soviet agreement to our basic START requirements. Three options for such additions exist. (S/G)

Option 1. Add to the above as follows:

—Extend the non-withdrawal period through October 11, 1996, i.e. the tenth anniversary of Reykjavik.

—After 1996, the sides resume their full rights to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—Agreement on the distinction between testing (which is permitted) and deployment (which is not).

—Confidence building measures enhancing openness and predictability.

NOTE: Option 1 requires the following changes to U.S. positions:

—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.

—Accepting reversion to the ABM Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal period.

—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

Option 1 is favored by *State*. (S/G)

Option 2. Instead of the previous option, add to the basic language the following:

—Commitment not to deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1996, with a right to deploy thereafter.

—An agreed understanding on what constitutes prohibited deployment.

—A clear understanding, entailing a strong U.S. statement that testing permitted by the ABM Treaty, i.e., under the broad interpretation, would be conducted.

—Predictability measures to ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken.

NOTE: Option 2 requires a change to the current U.S. position by extending the period of non-deployment through 1996.

Option 2 is favored by the *Office of the Secretary of Defense*.

Option 3 would merge various suggested options so that the joint draft statement would include the following:

—A 10 year period of [A: *non-withdrawal*] [B: *non-deployment*] through the tenth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (October 11, 1996).

—After that time (October 11, 1996), the sides are free to [A: *exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty*] [B: *deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty*] after having given 6 months notice.

—It would be clearly understood that during the 10 year period, both sides have the right to conduct research, development and testing,

including testing in space, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and that the United States intends to fully exercise those rights.

—With respect to conduct during the 10 year period, the sides will negotiate an agreed understanding as to [A: *the distinction between testing (which is permitted) and deployment (which is not)*] [B: *what constitutes prohibited deployment*]. [C: *Do not negotiate anything in this area, simply agree to disagree.*]

—To enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the 10 year period, the sides meet regularly to exchange briefings on each side's strategic defense programs and to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities.

—[If at any time after the eighth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (i.e. October 11, 1994), should a side wish to deploy strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty, it shall initiate a two year period of discussions to ensure a stable transition. At the end of this two year discussion period, unless agreed otherwise, either side will be free to [A: *exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty*] [B: *deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty*] after having given 6 months notice.]

Krasnoyarsk. Agencies disagree concerning how Krasnoyarsk should be handled. Two formulations have been suggested:

Formulation 1: "To support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed and that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner." (S/G)

This approach is favored by *Ambassadors Rowny and Cooper* and by OSD. (C/G)

Formulation 2: "To support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed. The power supply for the transmitter will be removed. Procedures for periodic on-site inspection will be agreed to assure confidence that construction has ceased and does not resume." (S/G)

This approach is favored by *State* and ACDA. (C/G)

Tactics. Three approaches have been suggested for introducing this material:

—Provide it as a paper to Soviet Marshal Ahkromeyev on Monday December 7. The President would subsequently refer to it briefly in his initial meeting with the General Secretary.

—Have the President introduce it in his initial meeting and explain it in detail.

—Have the President provide the paper to the General Secretary at his initial meeting and suggest that it be discussed by experts. (S/G)

Regardless of which approach is selected, Ambassadors Cooper and Rowny feel strongly we should initially table *only* the main portion of the START material and the chapeau for Defense and Space. The START portions on mobile missiles and the Defense and Space material modifying U.S. positions would be reserved until there is evidence of Soviet seriousness. (S/G)

239. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 4, 1987, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Arms Control Preparations for the Summit (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

State

Secretary George Shultz
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ms. Rozanne Ridgeway

Treasury

Secretary James Baker

Defense

Secretary Frank Carlucci
Mr. Ron Lehman

Energy

Mr William Martin

CIA

Mr. Robert Gates
Dr. Jay Castillo

JCS

Admiral William Crowe
VADM Jonathan Howe

ACDA

Mr. Kenneth Adelman

Vice President's Office

Mr. Craig Fuller

OMB

Mr. James Miller

OSTP

Dr. William Graham

White House

Mr. Howard Baker
Mr. Ken Duberstein
Mr. Marlin Fitzwater
General Colin Powell
Mr. John Negroponte
Colonel Robert Linhard
Captain Linton Brooks

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 171 12/24/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

Minutes

The NSPG meeting, December 4, opened at 2:00 p.m. *General Powell* opened the meeting: We are here for a final review of some aspects of our arms reductions positions before the summit. Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we begin?

The President: Used his Talking Points (attached at *Tab A*),² interrupting them to say: Our people will learn from the summit. In a Wirthlin poll only 50% supported SDI. Once they heard him [Gorbachev] on air, then 70% say we ought to have SDI.

General Powell [Using his talking points at *Tab B*]:³ Thank you sir. We have a compartmented paper you've all been provided to help structure the discussion. Let's first turn to START. I want to walk through the approach as I understand it. First we all need to be clear that this is intended as a package. I know it's important to the JCS and others to view it that way; some moves are only acceptable in the context of things like counting rules. What we've done is set forth a paper that describes how *we* want the joint statement at the end of the summit to come out. Near the end of the meeting we'll talk about tactics to do this. (S)

We have general agreement on several points. If you look at the top of the paper [NOTE: refers to *Tab C*,⁴ distributed to each participant] you will see an agreed *chapeau* that makes it clear the Joint Draft Treaty Text is agreed by both sides. We then agree and will document in the Joint Statement:

- 1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (Bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs);
- 6000 total “warheads” on these SNDVs
- Within the 6000, 1540 warheads on Soviet heavy ICBMs (a 50% cut from current levels); and
- A 50% cut in total Soviet ballistic missile throwweight.

The introduction would reflect agreement (S)

Secretary Shultz: Where is the bomber counting rule?

Ambassador Lehman: In the Joint Draft Text.

Secretary Shultz: It should go here. That rule is very, very important to the Chiefs, and it needed to be added. We really ought to deal with counting rules first in the order that we deal with the Soviets. Ever since Bill Crowe told me he'd kill for that rule, I want to add it every chance I get. (S)

² Attached but not printed. See *Tab C*, Document 238.

³ Attached but not printed. See *Tab II*, Document 237.

⁴ Attached but not printed. See *Tab D*, Document 238.

General Powell: [continuing]: Then we'd have sections on the 4800 ballistic missile sublimit and our current position of 3300 sublimit on ICBMs. We'd have an ALCM counting rules (attribute 6 ALCMs to each ALCM carrying heavy bomber). It wouldn't be a limit on each bomber but a number we'd use to get an aggregate limit. We'd have ballistic missile warhead counting rules for existing missiles. We would agree on a number for each type, for example 8 for the D-5. They could come to a submarine, pick a missile at random and we'd lift the nose cone and show them the number. If it was more than 8 it would be a violation. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We would declare a number, they would do likewise. (C)

General Powell: Would Admiral Crowe explain to the President why this is important? (U)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, but first, I don't see a discussion of ALCM range and ALCM definitions in the presentation of the counting rules. That's important and needs to be added. (S)

The JCS have looked at this and our highest priority is counting rules. Predictability is important. The Soviets want mobiles, Backfire, and SLCM, but before we can deal with those, we need to focus on the counting rules now including the ALCM range and definition as the highest priority. If we see that they will accept our position there, we can then move on mobile, Backfire, and SLCM, and other items; but we need the counting rules first. The military sufficiency of an agreement at 50% is very very close. (S)

Secretary Shultz: This would be a good subject, Mr. President, for you to raise with Gorbachev as an opening, but for any detailed conversation, we ought to shift it to the Working Groups under Ahkromeyev. (C)

Admiral Crowe: This may be a very difficult area for the Soviets to agree. There will be a lot of give and take. (C)

Ken Adelman: But we also have to recognize that it will be more difficult to get counting rules for future systems. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The Chiefs have done a lot of thinking on verification which will help. The Air Force is ready to have the Soviets look at ALCMs to see if they're nuclear or non-nuclear. The Navy is ready to go as Colin Powell described with respect to warhead numbers. These were painful decisions for the services. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force said it wasn't the Soviets he knew were wandering around his bases he was worried about, it was the ones he didn't know about. (S)

General Powell: (Returned to his Talking Points, and ran down through the verification items that were agreed, working his way to the subject of mobiles and verification. After describing the varying positions on mobiles and verification he asked for comments.) (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We have to be very, very careful. If we move now, we are going to undercut our own position because we have insisted that the Soviets describe for us how they would verify mobiles; the Soviets have not given anything on verification. In addition, if we move now, we're just not going to get anything for it. So it's premature. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I'm inclined to agree with Frank, but we could ask creative questions about verification. For example, do you have in mind that we have a limited area? How would we deploy? What are your views on verification? The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Welch, scoffs at the idea of differentiating between rail- and road-mobile missiles. He thinks that there is no significant difference in distinguishing between road- and rail-mobile systems, we've just had more experience with the road-mobile version. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That's exactly right; he believes that you can verify rail as well as you can road. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Therefore, maybe we could put some ideas forward. We never get anything from the Soviets on any of these technical areas; it's always us who have to put the ideas forward. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: We are not opposed to that; the question is what ideas. (U)

Ambassador Lehman: We've asked them for ideas and just get generalities. What we should do is ask them in Geneva for specific Protocols on verification. We should ask them to give us draft Protocols, and then if we can find something acceptable, we would be willing to consider mobiles. (S)

Mr. Adelman: I see rail- and road-mobiles as different. My problem is we currently have a package on how we verify road mobile missiles; we have no package for rail mobiles, and that's one big difference. And secondly, a little cheating goes an awful long way when you're talking about rail-mobiles, because if you're a little wrong with a missile that has 10 RVs, it's a lot different than being a little wrong about a missile that has only one RV. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: You're not claiming that road-mobiles can be verified? (S)

Mr. Adelman: It was good enough for 100 SS-20s, but of course, the rail situation is worse. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We've always offered to discuss verification, but once again, the Soviets never seem to offer technical details; perhaps, we should move forward. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Verification is our problem; the Soviets can read about it in the Congressional Record. (U)

Admiral Crowe: The Joint Chiefs have some suggestions. We're ready to suggest the rail garrison scheme. We could make some very

constructive suggestions here. Of course we don't know if they'd accept. Our own rail scheme is the *best* of the two options in terms of mobility in a fiscally constrained future. If we face fiscal constraints, there's more deterrence per pound per dollar in the MX than there is in the small mobile. (S)

Secretary James Baker: There's no "if" about fiscal constraints; they're here. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: (Quietly) The small missile is dying anyway. (C)

General Powell: Bob [Gates] what about verification? That seems to be the issue. (U)

Mr. Gates: The hardest thing you can ask us to monitor would be a limit on mobiles, but we can offer suggestions on things that could help us quite a bit. For example, it would be interesting to know how they would distinguish the SS-24's that are rail mobile missiles rather than those being produced with silos. In general, there are some good things that could be done, and we need to explore this. (S)

The President: Well, tell me, suppose we had a ban—our position—what if there were no mobile missiles? Could we *know* that there really were not? I just keep thinking what a vast country that is. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: It would be easier to monitor if they were banned, because if we found one, it would be a violation. (U)

Admiral Crowe: Besides that, Mr. President, they just can't roam around out there forever; they need to bring them in sometime for maintenance and for training, and the like. It would be very hard for them to just hold them out in the field for all that time. (S)

General Powell: They also need to train and to test and that we would be able to observe. (S)

I'd like to summarize up to this point. It seems like people are saying that we should remain on our position, but in the Working Group, we should be ready to explore verification options. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: A caveat; I don't want to go off our current position *unless* we get something. (C)

Senator Baker (Chief of Staff): Well, what do you have in mind, Frank? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: I think we ought to get something in the SDI area, and I'll come back to that later. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We're ready to move on mobiles, but *only* if we get the items above the line; that means agreement on counting rules and the like. (S)

General Powell: [Turning to "heavies," read his talking points on the "heavy" issue through the point where he asked for agency views.]

Secretary Carlucci: It's okay by us; we're prepared to make heavy modernization, provided we get the proper trade and don't just give them away. (C)

General Powell: We can be sure the Soviets will raise SLCMs and Backfire. As I understand it we all agree that we could offer an exchange of declarations of nuclear SLCM forces. At our last meeting in Geneva, Ahkromeyev laid down a marker that SLCMs may be a show stopper for the Soviets. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: I think we ought to note that Ahkromeyev said he has some new ideas on how to verify SLCMs. Before we get involved in unilateral declarations of our force structure, why don't we call his bluff and hear him out. I'm alone in this room; I think that SLCM limits can be verified. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I agree; I think we ought to hear what he has to say. (U)

General Powell: With respect to Backfire, if the Soviets accept our position, some would exclude Backfire from the treaty if there was no increase in numbers, it could not be refueled, and was not equipped to carry ALCMs. Opinions? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Mr. President, what we're talking about is moving towards the Soviets in a number of areas. Once again, I want to make sure if we do so, that we don't do so and not get anything for it. We need to get *some* handle on the Backfire issue and some handle on this motion, and I believe that there needs to be a substantive linkage here—some trade for what we want in SDI. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, two points on the issue of Backfire. First, this can really rattle the conservatives. (During an earlier campaign, I wrote some language for you as then a candidate that argued very strongly against SALT II based specifically on the Backfire issue). Ahkromeyev wants SLCMs. Maybe the best thing we could do is to wait and see if we can get something on SLCM and Backfire at the eleventh hour—push them both off and handle it, perhaps, that way. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We agree [to pushing both Backfire and SLCM until the eleventh hour and working something then]. (S)

Senator Baker (Chief of Staff): Isn't there a verification problem here? (U)

Mr. Adelman: The Intelligence Community said Backfire was strategic; now all agree it is not. (S)

Senator Baker: It says that you're not supposed to have a refueling or ALCM-carriage on Backfires. Can we really verify ALCM-carriage? (S)

Colonel Linhard: One point is that we have yet to see an ALCM tested from a Backfire. (S)

Mr. Castillo: Yes, we haven't seen ALCM testing. We believe that we would be able to do so if they are tested. (S)

Dr. Graham: Well, that's one thing, but we can't really verify the refueling. They have the internal piping already, and all they've done is to cover the refueling probes with a plate. They can refuel in radio silence in the middle of the country, just like we do, and we wouldn't detect it. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We don't just refuel in the middle of the country; we do it worldwide. But I do agree that it would be a simple change for them to have refueling capability. (S)

General Powell: (Summarizing by making the following points) I think I hear that we agree that the Chapeau is fine; that Items "A" through "D"—that's the sublimit issue, the ALCM counting rules, ballistic counting rules, and verification package—are okay, and that the additional items—mobiles, SLCM forces, Backfire, and heavy modernization—we have some reservations on until we see whether we see Soviet movement described above. And Secretary Carlucci has laid down a marker on SDI. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: Before we leave START, I want to make sure that we agree that we're not going to give up on the 3300 sublimit on ICBMs without getting something for it. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Yes, yes, we are agreed that we're going to start with the counting rules, and that we won't move beyond our current position on sublimits unless we get some motion on counting rules. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well, let's keep Item A, which is the sublimits item, out of the basic package. (S)

Colonel Linhard: "A" is our current position. (U)

Admiral Crowe: OK. (U)

General Powell: We push for that; we work the counting rule problem; and only *after* we have ascertained whether we successfully have the counting rules, would we come back to revisit the numbers of 4800 and 3300. [All agree on that summary.] (S)

Secretary Shultz: The counting rules affect our attitude toward the 3300 number. (S)

General Powell: Lets move to Defense and Space. Here we have agreement on a chapeau paragraph that is consistent with our current position. Our Defense and Space Negotiator, Hank Cooper, and Ed Rowny would make no move beyond that paragraph lengthening the non-withdrawal period, unless the Soviets concede to us a clear right to deploy after the period. Other agencies believe that we need to make some concessions. These are spelled out in the first two options. The first option would extend the non-withdrawal period through 1996, return us to the ABM Treaty after the period, and commit us to negotiate on the distinction between permitted testing and prohibited deployment. The second option would entail a non-*deployment* commitment

through 1996, with a right to deploy thereafter, and an agreed understanding of what constitutes prohibited deployment, coupled with clear acknowledgement of our right to test under the broad interpretation. There are some things common to both options; rather than talk about them I want to talk about a third option which weaves together elements of the first two. [refers to second page of handout at *Tab C*]. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We ought to start with the idea that we have agreement on some period of time, whatever that period is, as a concept. I mean we agreed that there would be some period of time where something will happen as a concept. The *big* question really is what can you do during that period of time. If you have no one standing with the Soviets, you fall into the hands of the Congress, and that's a trap in which we give the Soviets the 50% reductions, and then we are inhibited from doing what we want to do by the Congress. So it's important to get an understanding. The only thing we're interested in is testing. . . . (S)

Secretary Carlucci: [Interrupts] And the right to deploy. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Right. So what we want is an agreement that tests aren't deployment. A change from our earlier position of an unstructured attempt to kick the can down the road. We need to make it clear exactly what testing means and what deployment means. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree, an unstructured approach is a very, very dangerous problem for us, but the third bullet on the third option protects us. We can support this without any further discussion of what's broad and what's narrow. We need a clean right to deploy after the regime, and I have reservations on any idea of negotiating a definition of testing and deployment. I prefer to just unilaterally tell them what we mean by deployment. We need to work on that. If we got Option 2 in the paper, I'd be ready to give an awful lot in START. (S)

The President: Well, okay, when might we be able to deploy? I can't remember how many times I've stood up and said "When it's ready we will deploy." 1996 sounds like a long time. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: In all candor 10 years isn't very long for a major weapons program. When you were told 1994, that assumed a crash program and that Jim Baker and Jim Miller would get us all the money we needed. That hasn't happened. (S)

Secretary Baker: Well *excuse* me! (U)

Secretary Carlucci: We asked for 5.8 [billion dollars] in FY 1988 and we got 3.9. These are complex developments. You can't predict how it will go. The issue isn't 7 years versus 10. We need the right to test; that's the issue. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I agree. Testing impacts the schedule. (C)

The President: Well, I've got to tell you that I've seen the monkey; therefore, I'm ready to run the circus. I've been to Denver, and it's

amazing what they're doing out there, and we ought to send out a lot of doubting Thomases in Congress out to Denver and get the spirit of the thing. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: It's impressive. We agree, Sir, but 1992 is the earliest we could go into full-scale engineering development, and, quite honestly, it's going to be a while before we actually get to the point where we can make progress. (S)

Senator Baker (Chief of Staff): Well, the President's been clear on this for a long, long time, and our intent is to research, develop, and deploy as soon as we can. All right, if you guys are suggesting 1996, is that consistent with what the President has said in the past? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: The 1996 year would not be constraining on the US program. We would be ready to move to 1996 as our position if we could get together the items involved and, especially, if we are sure we understood what we are getting on testing. (S)

Senator Baker: I don't want to be at variance with what the President has said before; he has said he wants to deploy at the earliest. Once again, are you sure of this? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: 1996 is not unreasonable. We've been working on the D-5 [Trident II missile] for 9 years. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, Sir, that's exactly right. (U)

The President: Well, I thought that we might be able to have something a lot sooner based on what I've seen. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: Well, what Abe [refers SDIO head General Abrahamson] will tell you, given the budgets and everything that we have, Sir, the window for potential deployment, as we told you in the past, begins in 1994, but that was assuming full budget. (S)

Dr. Graham: Mr. President, you've got to remember that the D-5 program was eight to nine years, but the Minuteman program, the Polaris program, and the Manhattan project were all done in four. The real issue is concurrency. Technologically, if we had the full support we asked for, we could begin phased deployment in 1994. It wouldn't be a full-scale deployment, but it would be a real deterrent, and we could do it. We shouldn't fall off just because we don't have Congressional funding now, because it would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If we fall off, it is certain that it will happen. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: But Bill, it has happened; we moved from 5.8 to 3.9 this year. (U)

Dr. Graham: We shouldn't encourage Congress. (U)

Secretary Baker: We don't have to. (U)

Mr. Adelman: I agree with Secretary Carlucci; we do need the right to deploy. We want the broad interpretation, but the Soviets will not

sign on to the broad interpretation, and we ought to recognize that. So you have to ask yourself, Mr. President, what do you do if they just say no. One option would be for us to agree to the narrow interpretation, and there's no one in the room who would accept that. Another option is to agree to disagree. Now I agree that if we simply agree to disagree, there's a danger that we would fall into the hands of the Congress, but I think I'd rather trust the Congress than the Soviets. . . . [At this point, the whole room broke up with a number of side comments suggesting that many rejected this hypothesis.] (S)

Secretary Carlucci: If the Soviets would accept the broad interpretation, I think the Congress would go along. The key issue, though, is that we have to remember that if the Soviets go with killing SDI, then I think all of this is a waste of effort. But I think they are pressing for their own program, and if that's the case, and they are ready for a START deal under those terms, then it would be okay. (S)

The President: Well, we saw Gorbachev on TV the other night, and he admitted they're working on their own program. I think we might be in that condition, and they may be just worried that we're going to get there first, and they need time to make their program match up and get ahead of us perhaps. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Well, under that context, a commitment not to deploy for some time is very useful for us; we ought to understand that too. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Well, let me summarize. I see a shift here in view. The view that we've had in the past is that we deal with predictability by offering a period of non-deployment or non-withdrawal and then we finesse what goes on during the period. Now, what I've said here is that if they agree to simply accept the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—and they have, providing we comply with the ABM Treaty as negotiated and ratified as they have offered—that would take us in a situation where if we go that route and try to test under the broad interpretation, the Soviets would come up on the net and say if you go broad, we stop the START reductions. (S)

What Frank and I are saying is not to give them that hammer. It isn't the number of years, it's what you can do. If you can do the tests you need, you can make the program go. That's the issue. (S)

We should stop talking about broad/narrow ABM definitions. What we want is the tests we need for our program. You do the tests you need for your program. Now deployment becomes crucial. You put something up today, something more tomorrow, something more the next day. Logical question: is this deployment? (S)

They say they want confidence thru the START period. We have confidence building measures, open labs and the like. We could build

a package of ways of distinguishing tests from deployment. It would be something to talk about. I agree with Ken that it is very unlikely that they will agree, but it's more likely than that they would agree to the broad interpretation of the Treaty. In any case, this would be a good package to stand on before the American people. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: It will help institutionalize SDI. That should be a key goal of the rest of your Administration. We could stop fighting with the legislators. (C)

Senator Baker: Would you really list what you can do, or would you simply identify a criterion of what is not deployment? (S)

Secretary Shultz: Well, others know more about the program than I do. What I wanted to say is that the US can do the tests it needs for its program, and the Soviets can do the tests that they need for their program. We would have a right of observation of tests. Now a lot of development is needed on this idea, but it is more in line with our real objectives. (S).

Secretary Carlucci: I agree that we can develop some kind of confidence-building measures in this area. (S)

Dr. Graham: Confidence-building measures are okay, and we need safeguards too, but we can't commit to negotiate what is deployment because it would move us down the road to what is permitted and prohibited. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: George didn't say to negotiate. (U)

Senator Baker: That was my point. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: It would be unilateral, not negotiated. (U)

Secretary Shultz: Well, I really think we need to begin . . . (U)

Senator Baker: [Interrupted] If we could let it evolve over time, we could simply get into this and develop an understanding of what is deployment over time. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Look, my position is that we don't negotiate on this; we declare what we mean by deployment; and we avoid slipping that way into permitted and prohibited. (S)

Dr. Graham: That's absolutely right, Mr. President. We can't afford a structure of agreement that involves what's permitted and what's prohibited. (S)

Secretary Baker: Once again, I thought you told us the last time that we don't know what the technology might be; so how are we going to do that? (S)

General Powell: All right then, how do we engage the Soviets on this? (U)

Dr. Graham: We just tell them we do what we want to do for testing and they do what they want to do, and then we describe what we are

going to do. And if there's an issue with respect to whether that's deployment or not, we'll talk about it. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: That's right, and we've got to make sure we don't give them a veto on testing or what we test. (S)

Senator Baker: They can't stop, they can just look. (S)

Admiral Crowe: It may be easier to distinguish deployment versus testing than permitted and prohibited. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: I asked Ahkromeyev if they were interested in blocking testing for SDI, and his answer was "yes," they were. So we must not accept some of the words of the Soviets until we get that cleared up. [Several participants say "yes, that's their goal."] (S)

General Powell: Well, let me summarize then. For the Chapeau in Defense and Space, everybody is okay. As far as it goes, as I understand this conversation, it's okay to go to 1996 if we need to, based on what happens in the Working Groups. We have to reaffirm our right to deploy; we'll add a six-months' notification, but we have the right to deploy after the period. It's better not to determine what is broad and narrow and what's permitted and prohibited, and we probably have to engage in a discussion on what is testing vice deployment. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: No, I don't agree with that; just make a unilateral statement about what deployment means for us. "Here is our understanding of what we're going to do." (S)

Secretary Shultz: I'm not as hung up on our right to deploy as distinct from the 6 month ABM non-withdrawal. We can give six-months' notice to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and that will allow us to deploy. We shouldn't get all hung up on the idea that this extra withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is significant, because the act of deployment will be significant enough. Someone will have to make the decision to deploy; it will involve a lot of people and dollars, so it won't go unnoticed. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Let me read you Article 15 of the Treaty. It says I have the right to deploy, but only if I can declare that the situation jeopardizes my supreme national interest. That's a real high criterion; there's no reason for us to have that. What we ought to be doing is to get away from that and bring it down; I have no doubt that it's going to be a hard choice. (S)

Senator Baker: Am I correct that we don't need the Congress to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; we don't need consent? [All noted that while that's legally true, Congress will be involved in any case.] (C)

Secretary Carlucci: Look, I'm trying to lower the threshold here. I want to go with the direct right to deploy after the period. I'm prepared to give them six-months' notice. (S)

Senator Baker: The threshold is what we say it is. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: But we should shift what we say it is. (U)

Secretary Shultz: I'm willing to settle for Frank's position. But if the Soviets say "OK, except it has to be non-withdrawal," I bet you'll all buy it. (S)

General Powell: Okay, six-months' notice and the right to deploy. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I want to emphasize once again that what we've done and what we need to do is to reverse the emphasis so that we don't focus so much on a time-frame and time period, but more on understanding that we get what we need in the period, i.e., the ability to test and the like. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I agree; it's important that we reverse. (U)

General Powell: Fine, Bob Linhard and the compartmentalized group will write this all up, and we'll get these decisions reported. We have a lot of consensus. It's been a useful conversation. Please, gentlemen, no press; don't debrief your staffs. We'll get decisions out through the group. (U)

Ambassador Rowny: Mr. President, before you go, Gorbachev wants you to go to Moscow. The pressure is on him. We can draw a lot out of him if we just recognize that. We have a lot of leverage here. It's all lost on the press, but the leverage is really yours. We've had our deadlines; now let him have his deadlines and put his prestige on the line as to whether you are going to be there in '88 or not. So you've got a lot that you can do there. (S)

The President: That will be easy for me; from everything I hear about the Soviet Union, I don't think I want to go there. (C)

The meeting then ended at 3:05 p.m.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

START

Agreed chapeau:

—1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (Bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs)

—6000 total "warheads"

⁵ Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original.

—1540 warheads on Soviet heavy ICBMs (a 50% cut from current levels)

—a 50% cut in total Soviet ballistic missile throwweight

Additional items:

- a. 4800 ballistic missile sublimit and 3300 sublimit on ICBMs
- b. ALCM counting rules (attribute 6 ALCMs to each ALCM carrying heavy bomber)
- c. Ballistic missile warhead counting rules for existing missiles
- d. Verification package:

- 1. Data exchange
- 2. Baseline inspections
- 3. On-site observance of elimination
- 4. Continuous monitoring of portals of productions facilities
- 5. Short-notice inspections of declared facilities
- 6. Short-notice inspections of suspect sites
- 7. No concealment or interference with NTN
- 8. Cooperative measures to enhance NTM

[Added items if Soviets accept the above]

- e. Provisions for verification of a limited mobile ICBM deployment
- f. Allow heavy ICBM modernization
- g. Unilateral declarations of nuclear SLCM forces
- h. Permit BACKFIRE if not refueled, numbers not increased, and not equipped to carry ALCMs

DEFENSE AND SPACE

Agreed chapeau:

—Instruct negotiators to develop Joint Draft Treaty Text

Additional items: take the form of three options

Option 1:

- Non-withdrawal through October 11, 1996
- After 1996, return to ABM Treaty regime
- Negotiate distinction between testing and deployment
- Confidence building package

Option 2:

- Non-deployment through October 11, 1996
- After 1996, free to deploy
- Negotiate understanding on what constitute deployment
- Make it clear that testing is permitted
- Confidence building package

Merge of two options is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, December 3, 1987

DEFENSE AND SPACE “MERGE” OPTION

—A 10 year period of [A: *non-withdrawal*] [B: *non-deployment*] through the tenth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (October 11, 1996).

—After that time (October 11, 1996), the sides are free to [A: *exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty*] [B: *deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty*] after having given 6 months notice.

—It would be clearly understood that during the 10 year period, both sides have the right to conduct research, development and testing, including testing in space, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and that the United States intends to fully exercise those rights.

—With respect to conduct during the 10 year period, the sides will negotiate an agreed understanding as to [A: *the distinction between testing (which is permitted) and deployment (which is not)*] [B: *what constitutes prohibited deployment*]. [C: *Do not negotiate anything in this area, simply agree to disagree.*]

—To enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the 10 year period, the sides meet regularly to exchange briefings on each side’s strategic defense programs and to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities.

—[If at any time after the eighth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (i.e. October 11, 1994), should a side wish to deploy strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty, it shall initiate a two year period of discussions to ensure a stable transition. At the end of this two year discussion period, unless agreed otherwise, either side will be free to [A: *exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty*] [B: *deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty*] after having given 6 months notice.]

⁶ Secret; Sensitive.

240. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 5, 1987

SUBJECT

Events Prior to the Washington Summit

The following events occurred prior to the President's first meeting with Gorbachev² at the Washington Summit:

1) On December 3, 1987 at a meeting³ in the Tank at the Pentagon, chaired by the Secretary of State, the discussion turned from the previously announced agenda, to a review of U.S. positions in START and Defense and Space, with a view to changing them. The Secretary of State averred that the December 3rd meeting was a more appropriate forum for such discussions than the NSPG scheduled for the next day⁴ because fewer people were in attendance. NSPG participants not present included the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the White House Chief of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the White House Science Advisor, and Ambassador Rowny.

The consensus on changes to U.S. arms control positions the Secretary of State believed he had achieved proved illusory and an NSPG meeting was held, despite the Secretary of State's objections.

Although the National Security Advisor was invited to the meeting, he was unaware of the intended change of agenda. NSC staff first learned of the meeting from his debrief.

2) At 5:00 p.m. on December 3, 1987, Allen Holmes, seemingly inadvertently admitted to Bob Linhard that the State Department was working with the Soviets on agreed joint statement language on chemical weapons, despite a clear understanding with the NSC staff that no such discussions would take place, except in the context of arms control working group discussions during the Summit.

3) On the afternoon of December 4, 1987, during or shortly after the NSPG meeting, Dan Howard was called by [a] reporter[s] saying

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Pre-Summit Pearl Harbor File December 6, 1987. Secret. Drafted by Linhard and Tobey. Printed from an uninitialed copy of the memorandum. All brackets are in the original.

² The memorandum of conversation of Reagan and Gorbachev's conversation the morning of December 8 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Document 107.

³ No minutes were found.

⁴ See Document 239.

that “those in a position to know” say that the U.S. intended to make the following concessions on arms control:

—Recognizing that mobile missiles are an integral part of Soviet strategic forces;

—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to October 11, 1996; and,

—Accepting a moratorium on construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

These positions represented the State Department’s recommendations at the NSPG, but not the consensus of those at the meeting. Indeed, the Krasnoyarsk radar issue was not dealt with.

4) At about 2:00 p.m. on December 5, 1987 NSC staff learned that Nitze intended to meet with Soviet scientists Velikhov and Sagdeev at Nitze’s farm in Southern Maryland. NSC staff learned this from Hank Cooper who had also been invited. Velikhov and Sagdeev had been closely involved in discussions with U.S. scientists of a list of parameters limiting SDI experiments.

5) At about 2:00 p.m. on December 5, 1987, NSC staff learned that Nitze had met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmyrtnikh.⁵ In that meeting, Nitze allowed Bessmyrtnikh to read but not to keep papers outlining the U.S. positions on language for a joint statement on START and Defense and Space. Nitze also showed Bessmyrtnikh a paragraph describing a solution to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation whereby there would be a verified moratorium on construction and destruction of power supply to the transmitter. This proposal is incompatible with U.S. policy which is that the radar is a violation and must be dismantled. Nitze also tabled a paragraph on START which the ACSG had agreed to defer until the first working group meeting on December 7, 1987.

⁵ See Document 241.

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 5, 1987, 1:40–2:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
Amb. Nitze
DAS Simons
Mr. Burton
Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

U.S.S.R.
Dep FM Bessmertnykh

SUBJECT

NST Instructions

BESSMERTNYKH said he understood that the Ministers had talked in Geneva about the subject of instructions, and that Nitze had also had a good talk with Akhromeyev about this topic.² The U.S. side was probably well aware of the Soviet view on the structure of the Summit documents.

NITZE replied that he had in mind two documents. One would be the communique; the other would be instructions to the Geneva delegations which might or might not be part of the communique.

BESSMERTNYKH said it fit his preference to have separate documents. He wanted good instructions and, if they were a separate document, there would be a greater incentive to make them look nice for the public. He preferred 3–4 pages of instructions published as a separate document. The sides could reference these instructions in the final Summit document. If the sides failed to come up with good instructions, however (and he hoped this would not be the case), then they could just put a short reference to the negotiations in the communique.

In the instructions, he would prefer to include first the things already settled. Next could be some of the unilateral commitments on which the sides had already agreed. The sides should try to find such commitments for both; for example, the Soviet commitment to a 50% cut in heavies should be balanced by some unilateral U.S. commitment.

SIMONS noted that there was also the Soviet commitment to reduce throwweight by 50%, and BESSMERTNYKH agreed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place in the State Department.

² Nitze and Akhromeyev's November 23–24 conversations are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1984–1987.

NITZE suggested the U.S. could reconfirm its commitment not to have heavies. It could also agree not to increase its throwweight beyond the Soviet level. BESSMERTNYKH said these were perhaps acceptable, but the key was that unilateral commitments should not be made only by the Soviet Union.

BESSMERTNYKH continued that the toughest part was likely to be the chapter on the ABM Treaty. He hoped the U.S. side had given some thought to what could be done in that area.

NITZE said he had given thought to the form the instructions might take. He could show Bessmertnykh a skeleton version³ of that form to get his reaction. He thought the instructions would be worked primarily in the experts group.

BESSMERTNYKH agreed that such a group could be established; he would refer to it as the arms control working group. It would probably deal with the NST instructions. He doubted it would have time to address other issues, such as CW. In this group, the sides should try to minimize attempts to impose unacceptable things on the other. A three-day period was too short for this. The instructions should include some figures and data to show the world they were practical, and also should include some diplomatic language to cover differences between the sides.

NITZE said this was the last meeting of the leaders before the Moscow Summit. He would hope the sides could achieve agreement on formulations to make the negotiating task easier so the sides could meet their timetable for completing a treaty. This would not be an easy task, but it was important to get it done. INF had been somewhat easier, especially after the agreements reached at Reykjavik, but the sides still had had much difficulty finishing the job. They should try this week to achieve progress wherever possible. At this point, Nitze passed over the skeleton instructions (attached), and Bessmertnykh read and returned them.

SIMONS asked if Bessmertnykh had a text to show the U.S. side. BESSMERTNYKH said the Soviet ideas were those that Akhromeyev

³ Attached but not printed is a December 5 draft set of instructions to the U.S. and Soviet START negotiators "to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of heads of state in the first half of 1988." It also instructed the U.S. and Soviet Defense and Space negotiators "to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treat Text for a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms." Finally, it indicated that "to support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed."

had read to Nitze in Geneva. He had only a Russian text of these points, but would try to get an English copy to Nitze on Sunday.⁴

Reflecting on the U.S. text, BESSMERTNYKH said the defense and space part would be the more difficult. He wondered how best to handle it in a general sense, whether the sides should seek a separate treaty or something else. His personal feeling was that it would be difficult to negotiate two treaties by the end of the first half of 1988.

NITZE replied that he felt it would be better if the sides could do that; he would like to try for two. But he was really just trying to indicate the current U.S. thinking on how to structure the instructions. The content of the instructions would be the result of the next several days' negotiations. He hoped the sides could achieve as much content as possible.

BESSMERTNYKH said he thought the general structure the U.S. side had in mind was fine. The Soviet side was thinking of a short introduction, then the START portion starting with what was agreed, such as the 1600 and 6000 ceilings and certain subceilings.

NITZE interjected that the U.S. view was that, before the sides settled on figures for the sublimits, they needed to discuss counting rules. The sides had an agreed bomber weapon counting rule, but no rules for the number of warheads on ballistic missiles with more than one RV and heavy bombers carrying more than one long-range, nuclear ALCM. The sides needed to know what they meant by "long-range". This would influence what was meant by the sublimits. Then the sides could address sublimits and other issues. If agreement was reached, it could be incorporated in the document.

BESSMERTNYKH expressed concern that the working group might get bogged down on the definitional issues and not get to the other problems.

NITZE responded that he did not want to get bogged down either, but the more the sides could get agreed over the next few days, the easier it would be to hit the target for a START treaty. The sides should not be too timid about their goals.

BESSMERTNYKH said the issues addressed must include the ABM Treaty and SLCMs. On the former, the Soviet side had made it easier for the U.S. side; the linkage between areas was simpler and the Soviet side was not mentioning SDI. NITZE retorted that the U.S. was not embarrassed about SDI, and SIMONS added that this was particularly true after Gorbachev's NBC interview.

⁴ December 6.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested the sides have a list of the toughest issues for the working group to address. He and Nitze agreed they could outline such a list in their minds. Maybe the lists would be dissimilar but they would be close in content. Bessmertnykh thought the sides should present each other with draft papers and then tackle the most difficult issues.

NITZE said he thought the sides could settle some of these issues; they were not infinitely difficult.

BESSMERTNYKH said it had been agreed at Reykjavik to handle the problem of limiting SLCMs. He thought the sides could do something about verifying such limits. NITZE replied that the U.S. side continued to study the problem, and thought unilateral declarations continued to offer the best solution.

BESSMERTNYKH responded that there were some things agreed in INF, which had seemed impossible as recently as two weeks ago, that might apply to the SLCM verification problem. NITZE said the U.S. side was prepared to discuss radical steps for verification, but there were limits to what either side would be able to do.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested that scientists be invited to participate in addressing this problem. NITZE noted that he had invited Velikhov and Sagdeyev to lunch on Sunday, and said he would pump them for ideas on this topic.

SIMONS suggested that Nitze preview the topics the U.S. would like to address in the working group. NITZE listed these topics as: (1) those areas already agreed, e.g. 1600, 6000, 1540, 50% throwweight cut, bomber weapon counting rule; (2) clarification of additional counting rules; (3) sublimits; (4) a verification package, for which the sides should build on and augment the verification elements of the INF Treaty, and which would include a data exchange, baseline inspections, on-site observance of elimination, continuous monitoring of portals of production facilities, short-notice inspections of declared facilities, short-notice inspections of suspect sites, no concealment or interference with NTM, and cooperative measures to enhance NTM; (5) possibilities for verifying mobile ICBMs, were they to be allowed; (6) the question of heavy ICBM modernization; (7) SLCMs; and (8) Backfire.

BESSMERTNYKH said the Soviet concept would require also addressing the ABM situation. NITZE replied that, on that, the issues were the same three as at Reykjavik: the length of the time period, what happens after the period, and what happens during the period. It would be useful to agree on these issues or at least get closer.

BESSMERTNYKH asked what the U.S. view was of further negotiations toward the end of the period, at about the 7-year point. NITZE said the U.S. side was sympathetic to the idea of such negotiations, but it should not prejudice the positions on the length of the period.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested that, if the sides finished such negotiations early, the resulting regime could go into effect immediately. If no agreement was reached, the original agreed period would remain in effect. NITZE agreed, adding that the sides would also need a good deal of discussion on the issues of what happened during and after the period.

SIMONS asked if the Soviet concept of the issues to be addressed was similar to the U.S. idea. BESSMERTNYKH said it was, but he was not sure the sides would have time to handle the definitional part. He understood, however, Nitze's logic about the connection to the sublimits question.

NITZE said that some of the counting rules should be relatively easy. The simplest solution for existing ballistic missiles would be for each side to declare the number of RVs it would deploy on each type. Then the other side could inspect to ensure this was correct. Akhromeyev had seemed to be suggesting such an approach for SS-18s in Geneva. Counting ALCMs would be more difficult.

BESSMERTNYKH said there was a certain degree of pessimism in Moscow about perceived U.S. attempts to back away from agreements reached in SALT II. He knew the U.S. was no longer observing SALT II, but it would not help move things along to reopen old issues. SIMONS said it would be helpful if the Soviet side would provide specific examples of its concerns on this point. BESSMERTNYKH said he understood. There was not much time; the Soviet side wanted a treaty with this Administration, not instructions that would be negotiated on for years.

NITZE opined that there was a greater opportunity to move forward in the next three days than in the next three months. BESSMERTNYKH agreed, and said this was why reopening SALT II issues would not help. He and Nitze agreed that the gist of the Summit was the NST instructions.

BESSMERTNYKH repeated that he would try to make available a copy of the Soviet side's draft instructions. SIMONS said it would also be helpful to get the Soviet list of the main issues, as well as specifics on where the Soviet side thought the U.S. side was reopening SALT II issues. BESSMERTNYKH said he would try to get the former, or at least get the Soviet delegation to pass it over on Monday,⁵ and would pass along Simons' request on the latter.

⁵ December 7.

BESSMERTNYKH said he understood the Ministers would be getting together Monday night with experts standing by, and SIMONS confirmed that understanding.⁶

⁶ The memorandum of conversation of Shultz's December 7 meeting with Shevardnadze is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 105.

242. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 6, 1987, 4:05–5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Amb. Nitze

Amb. Cooper

Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Velikhov

Mr. Sagdeyev

Mr. Kokoshin

SUBJECT

Verification, Krasnoyarsk, NST Instructions, Defense and Space

VELIKHOV said the agreed INF verification measures represented an historical step. NITZE agreed, and said he understood the Soviet side had some ideas on how to address the more complicated verification tasks associated with START.

SAGDEYEV said he had been involved in some verification discussions with the National Academy of Sciences CISAC. In these discussions, the idea had arisen of verifying mobile ICBMs by placing a special kind of tag on them. The tag would send periodic electronic signals, perhaps once every few months, for the other side to track. Through these signals, a side could count the mobiles of the other side but could not keep track of their everyday location. Since the force structures of the sides differed, i.e. the Soviet side was the only side with mobiles at present, this approach would probably require some reciprocity for submarines. There could also be permanent monitoring at entry points of bases to count missiles.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place at Nitze's house.

Turning to SLCM verification, VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. really needed long-range, conventional SLCMs. NITZE said it did, because otherwise the U.S. Navy would be outranged by other forces, such as Khadafhi's.

VELIKHOV asked if it was necessary also to have nuclear SLCMs, since a ban would be easier to verify. COOPER said it was.

VELIKHOV suggested three complementary ways to verify SLCM limits. First, the sides could rely on passive methods to measure the existence of nuclear material on ships. SAGDEYEV explained that the Soviet side has a gamma-ray telescope which can detect nuclear devices. A detection device similar to this telescope could be brought on board ships or flown over them in a helicopter to detect nuclear material. The closer the device could be brought to the ship, the easier the detection task.

VELIKHOV said the second way would be to rely on active methods to overcome shielding of nuclear material. Such a method would be to use a small neutron gun to penetrate the shielding material, trigger a reaction in the nuclear material, and create a somewhat larger response. The third method would be to verify production. Inspectors could count the nuclear and conventional SLCMs coming out of the production facilities, and could use a PAL-like device to lock canisters so that a side could not subsequently convert conventional cruise missiles to nuclear ones. The locking devices would have two keys, one of which would be retained by each side. If a side wanted to dispose of a missile in the future, the sides could work out a procedure using the two keys.

SAGDEYEV said the gamma-ray device or neutron gun could be used for challenge inspections. A special international team could be created, with special procedures to avoid counterintelligence problems. If a ship were powered by a nuclear reactor, the team could check it, so it could discriminate between the reactor and other nuclear material. VELIKHOV asserted that the detector should be able to distinguish between a reactor and nuclear warheads.

NITZE asked how much the gamma-ray detector would cost. KOKOSHIN estimated it at \$1 million per device, and SAGDEYEV added that this cost should diminish as more detectors were purchased.

NITZE asked how the sides would know that the production facilities monitored under the third method were the only ones producing missiles. VELIKHOV said monitoring of the production facilities would be supplemented by the challenge inspections Sagdeyev had just described.

NITZE asked if both sides today had gamma-ray detectors like the Soviet side was describing. SAGDEYEV said they did, and added that

he thought U.S. detectors were better than Soviet ones. They were used for several purposes, such as remote sensing of soil by geologists and in astronomy. Such devices were also made by the British, Germans and Dutch.

VELIKHOV suggested that the sides could establish an international working group to develop this approach. NITZE expressed U.S. reservations about international groups, and VELIKHOV said a bilateral effort would be better.

Turning to verification of nuclear testing, VELIKHOV said the Soviet side had developed seismic sensing to the point where they could measure explosions of a few kilograms from 1000 kilometers. By supplementing this capability with OSI of industrial explosions, the sides could solve the problem of verifying a CTB.

COOPER reminded Velikhov that the U.S. has no interest in a CTB as long as there is a requirement for nuclear weapons, and also explained U.S. concerns about seismic monitoring and preference for CORRTX. VELIKHOV responded that Soviet specialists thought it possible to cheat on CORRTX, which COOPER disputed.

NITZE said a problem related to verification was compliance. A key problem here was the Krasnoyarsk radar. The other day he had speculated on a solution to this problem and had misspoken. The Soviet side had proposed a moratorium on construction of this radar, but the U.S. side needed it destroyed.

VELIKHOV claimed that a moratorium for a few years was equivalent to destruction of the radar. NITZE replied that, in that case, it would be better to just go ahead and destroy the radar.

VELIKHOV tried to draw a distinction between a formal violation and a substantive one, arguing that there was no way that the radar, which the Soviet side had declared was intended for space tracking, could be transformed for battle management. NITZE said the radar was clearly an early warning radar, making it both a formal and a substantive violation, and must be totally eliminated.

SAGDEYEV said a possible compromise was for the radar to be retained only as a monument for future generations. Schukhin had suggested it be used only for purely scientific purposes, with U.S. scientists invited to join in the work there. NITZE said scientific work could include early warning. If it were retained as a nonoperational monument—that is, if the Soviet side took out all antenna elements and removed the power source—the U.S. side could take a look at that, but that was not what he proposed.

NITZE continued that there was one other subject he wished to raise. In discussing the joint document that might emerge from the Summit, he had suggested the possibility of both a joint document and

instructions to the negotiators. The latter should be done by each side; what was jointly agreed should be included in the joint statement.

VELIKHOV asked if Nitze thought it possible to complete a START Treaty in the next year, and NITZE said yes. VELIKHOV asked if pushing START would hurt the chances for ratification of INF, and NITZE said he did not think so but was not sure. SAGDEYEV noted that, if the U.S. side was worried about INF ratification in the Supreme Soviet, three members of that body were involved in this discussion. NITZE said he assumed they would vote for ratification. SAGDEYEV said this was an advantage of a one-party system, but VELIKHOV noted that the U.S. was having trouble within one of its parties.

COOPER said he had seen Velikhov on TV the other day and had a question about his remarks. A number of people in the U.S. had been taken with Gorbachev's comments about the USSR's having a program comparable to SDI. Of course, Gorbachev had said the Soviet side had no intention to deploy. But Velikhov had seemed to say that all the Soviet side was doing was basic research.

VELIKHOV replied that Gorbachev had meant that the Soviet side was working on powerful lasers. There were various possible results, but the USSR had no program dedicated to making defensive systems. The Soviet side had not only the ABM limits, but also a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in space. This put a great restriction on Soviet scientists.

COOPER said the U.S. side was aware of the two lasers at Sary Shagan. VELIKHOV claimed these lasers were only for space tracking. They had insufficient power for an ASAT role. Even Weinberger, in his last report, had changed his charge to a claim that the lasers maybe threatened sensitive parts of U.S. satellites. Damaging such parts would be extraordinarily improbable.

COOPER said that, some time ago, the U.S. side had made a suggestion in Geneva for predictability measures. Why could the sides not exchange visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands to see what the other was doing?

VELIKHOV replied that the powerful Soviet laser was not in Sary Shagan. He had been working for two years to allow a U.S. visit to show the U.S. side, but had run into a diplomatic problem. He had worked for three years to secure the U.S. invitation to Krasnoyarsk. NITZE noted that that invitation had been made to the U.S. legislative, not executive, branch.

VELIKHOV asked if the proposal for an exchange of visits was an official one. COOPER said it was; it had been made about 18 months ago, and involved reciprocal visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands. The response from the Soviet side had been that the sides could talk

about such visits if the U.S. first agreed to a ban on research; then the visits could support verification of the ban. Of course, the U.S. was not interested in a ban on research.

VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. side was asking to see everything at Sary Shagan. COOPER said the sides could talk over the details, but what the U.S. side wanted to see were the Soviet ground-based lasers. This was an example of a more general U.S. proposal for a predictability package, including an exchange of programmatic data, mutual observation of experiments, an exchange of briefings, etc.

VELIKHOV said he would talk to Moscow about working out visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands. He thought this was a fair proposal, he would like to²

SAGDEYEV said he understood U.S. negotiators were suggesting agreement on some kinds of tests for SDI. If this agreement were not based on precise quantitative analysis, then it would risk confrontation with the U.S. Congress. It could risk ratification in the Senate. He thought perhaps the formula of linkage should be simplified, to agreement that the sides would stay within the ABM Treaty as stated in 1972.

NITZE replied that language like “as stated in 1972” did not say anything. KOKOSHIN suggested “as signed and ratified in 1972.” SAGDEYEV added that he was looking for a compromise that would be acceptable to the U.S. legislative and executive branches.

NITZE said that the words “as signed and ratified” would add nothing but confusion. Marshall Grechko had made a statement that went well beyond what the Soviet side now claimed was “signed and ratified.” KOKOSHIN claimed the U.S. side was using the Grechko statement out of context and exaggerating it. It had not been made to the Supreme Soviet and was not an official statement.

SAGDEYEV said that, if both sides were interested in a START agreement, they could keep loose language regarding ABM Treaty adherence for now.

STAFFORD asked if what Sagdeyev had in mind was language that would commit the sides to observance of the ABM Treaty while allowing the U.S. side to continue to assert the validity of its interpretation of the Treaty. SAGDEYEV said that only the leaders could decide this, but his personal view was that such an outcome should be acceptable to the Soviet side.

VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. envisioned the deployment of defenses on both sides, and COOPER said yes. VELIKHOV said this

² One line of text is cut off in the version on file.

would be destabilizing, because the side that struck first would be able to defend against a ragged retaliatory response.

COOPER noted that this would not be the case if the retaliatory forces were themselves survivable—and that defenses could help improve their survivability. VELIKHOV agreed, with some enthusiasm, that defenses could improve the survivability of retaliatory forces, but said the U.S. was not pursuing that course. COOPER said this was not correct; the U.S. was interested in defenses for such a purpose.

VELIKHOV said no space-based ABM systems were necessary for such defenses. COOPER replied that there was no reason to preclude space-based defenses from such a role.

VELIKHOV said that such space-based defenses on both sides would be destabilizing, since each side would be vulnerable to a defense-suppression first strike by the other side. COOPER responded that this would not happen under the U.S. approach, because such space-based defenses would not be deployed unless they were survivable.

VELIKHOV said he doubted that this could be done, and observed that nuclear-armed interceptors could be deployed with such systems. COOPER suggested that the Soviet-proposed gamma detectors could be used to verify that there were no such systems.

VELIKHOV said this would help, but he still doubted that such space-based interceptors could be made survivable, and he noted that Edward Teller had emphasized this problem. COOPER replied that this was a major problem that was understood by the U.S. side, but it believed that solutions could be found. If they were found, space-based ABM systems could be very effective.

KOKOSHIN said the Soviet side wished to talk about “strategic stability.” NITZE commented that in the past the Soviet side had used that phrase to mean something different from what the U.S. side meant by it. The Soviet side used it to mean what the U.S. called “dynamic stability,” and they used it interchangeably with “stopping an arms race.”

KOKOSHIN replied that he was using it in the U.S. sense of the phrase. The Soviet side had done a study of the subject and had come to the conclusion that 600 warheads on each side could be enough to preserve stability under appropriate equal constraints. He thought the sides should not be permitted weapons with more than one warhead and should be permitted a mix of single-warhead systems. Included in the mix should be a number of sea-based systems and a number of land mobiles. A number lower than 600 would raise a risk of cheating.

NITZE said that, before going below 50% cuts in strategic arms, the sides would need to deal with other problems, including the con-

ventional imbalance. He also noted that the land mobiles Kokoshin envisaged would create a verification problem. KOKOSHIN responded that he thought that problem could be reduced to manageable proportions through verification means of the type they had suggested be explored.

243. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 7, 1987

SUBJECT

Proposed NSDD on Arms Control Positions for US-USSR Summit

Issue

Whether you should sign the proposed NSDD² at TAB A establishing the United States Government position on Arms Control subjects for the December 8–10, 1987 summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

Background

After extended discussion with your cabinet and other senior US officials, recommendations on arms control positions with the Soviets have become clear. The proposed NSDD reflects both those recommendations and your own views as expressed in the meetings in preparation for the summit.

Discussion

Before summit and other important meetings, an NSDD codifying the discussions, recommendations, and consensus positions of the United States Government is very useful. It documents the origin of the US positions, and also provides clear guidance for the working groups and other meetings with the Soviets that will occur during the summit period.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR096, NSDD 290. Top Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Linhard. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on December 7. Another stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed below as Document 244.

In accordance with NSDD 266,³ the NSC Legal Advisor has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK No
_____ _____ That you sign the proposed NSDD at TAB A.⁴

³ NSDD 266, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special Review Board," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

244. National Security Decision Directive 290¹

Washington, December 7, 1987

*INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ARMS REDUCTIONS DISCUSSIONS
AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT (December 8–10, 1987) (S)*

Introduction. The purpose of this NSDD is to provide guidance on the arms reductions aspects of the December 1987 U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit in Washington. It should be used to guide both the general discussions with the Soviet team on these matters and the development of those portions of any "agreed statement" which may result from the summit which apply to the arms reductions area. (C)

Recording Agreement and Instructions to Negotiators. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it views an agreement on new "instructions to negotiators" on the START and Defense & Space areas as one of its principal goals for this summit. I share this goal, but only as a tool to further efforts to achieve equitable and verifiable treaties in both the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR096, NSDD 290. Top Secret. All brackets are in the original. Powell distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Crowe, Webster, and Adelman under cover of a December 7 memorandum: "The President has approved the instructions for use during the Summit as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290). Due to the sensitivity of this NSDD, no copies of this document should be made. It is further directed that a record of all those to whom this document is given should be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

START and Defense & Space areas. In documenting the results of the summit in general, and any agreed instructions to negotiators in particular, we must avoid conveying the impression that we have made politically binding, quasi-legal agreements short of treaties in these areas which could impose *de facto* constraints on the United States while *not* providing legally binding, effectively verifiable constraints on the Soviet Union. To avoid the perception we have joined in such an agreement, any recording of agreed instructions to negotiators or any other arms control statement should be part of a single summit joint statement, not a separate stand-alone document. (S)

We must also not allow the Soviets to believe that material previously agreed and omitted from the summit statement is somehow no longer agreed, or that failure to list an area of disagreement implies we have acquiesced in the Soviet position. To this end, we should refer to existing joint documents (especially the START Joint Draft Treaty) to reaffirm their status. In doing so, we should ensure all associated documents (protocols, etc.) are appropriately referenced. (C)

Since there is no draft Defense and Space Treaty, we should avoid the implication that Defense and Space is subsumed in START, thereby acquiescing to Soviet linkage. Thus, our objective with respect to Defense and Space should be instructions to negotiators to begin work on a draft Defense and Space Treaty. (C)

START. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the START portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

“The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of Heads of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text worked out in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule; and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet

ballistic missile throwweight which will thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 1500 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1, B-52, BEAR-H and BLACKJACK bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Other heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including BACKFIRE, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing how many ALCMs shall be attributed to future heavy bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs.

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be:

PEACEKEEPER (MX): 10, MINUTEMAN III: 3, MINUTEMAN II: 1, TRIDENT I: 8, TRIDENT II: 8, POSEIDON: 10.

The number of warheads attributable to each type of Soviet ballistic missile shall be:

[TO BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET SIDE]

These numbers shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection. There shall be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to future types of ballistic missiles covered by START.

(d) Building upon the provisions of the INF Treaty, the measures by which the provisions of the START Treaty can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to conform to the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

- (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after conforming to the agreed limits; and

- (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party." (S)

Ballistic Missile Warhead Sublimit and Counting Rule Issue. The Soviet Union has indicated that it may be prepared to consider a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. However, it has further indicated that rather than the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 4800 which we seek, it would prefer to raise that sublimit to 5000 or 5100. Before we can consider accepting such a proposal, it is essential that we have a clear agreement with the Soviet side concerning:

- an acceptable definition to be applied to air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in START (i.e., that only *nuclear*-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 1500 kilometers would be included in the Treaty's limits);

- the counting rules applied to such ALCMs; and

- the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by the START Treaty. (S)

Should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept (1) a definition of ALCMs to be covered by START as only nuclear-armed ALCMs of a range greater than 1500 kilometers, (2) a counting rule for such ALCMs generally along the lines specified in item (b) above, and (3) the counting rule for the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles as specified in item (c) above, I am prepared to consider additional flexibility with respect to the U.S. position on those sublimits as yet not agreed. (TS)

With respect to the ALCM counting rule, if needed, and in the context of reaching agreement on the general approach outlined in (b) above, I am prepared to increase the number of ALCMs attributed to each bomber to 8 in order to reach agreement on this critical point. (TS)

Mobile ICBMs. Should the Soviet side agree to the approach on START counting rules and sublimits outlined above, and given acceptable progress towards the U.S. position in the Defense & Space area, I would be prepared to add to the "agreed statement" the following paragraph covering mobile ICBMs:

"(e) Development of additional provisions which would provide for effective verification of mobile ICBMs, including restrictions on their deployment areas and provisions for assuring the distinguishability of mobile missiles. With agreement on an inspection protocol incorporating such provisions for effectively verifying the number of mobile

ICBMs, an agreed number of such land-mobile ICBMs can be permitted within limits provided by the agreement.” (TS)

Heavy ICBM Modernization. Should the Soviets meet the conditions outlined for the inclusion of the paragraph on mobile missiles indicated above, I would also be prepared to add to the “agreed statement’s” treatment of START the following paragraph covering the issue of the modernization of heavy ICBMs:

“(f) Based on agreement to the foregoing, the President noted that the United States is prepared to permit the continued testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs.” (TS)

Treatment of SLCM. No provisions are included for addressing sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) in the “agreed statement.” When the Soviets raise the issue of SLCM limits, the United States should seek Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. The U.S. side can acknowledge that the concept of an exchange of notifications on planned SLCM deployments outside of and in addition to the 6000 warhead and 1600 delivery system limits provided for in the current Joint Draft START Treaty text was discussed at Reykjavik. However, the U.S. side should not actively pursue this outcome at this time. (TS)

Treatment of BACKFIRE. The U.S. position remains that the BACKFIRE bomber should be included within the main START Treaty limits. I may be prepared to consider alternative positions on the BACKFIRE issue, but only in the context of the resolution of all other major treaty issues (including a resolution of the SLCM issue on terms acceptable to the U.S.) and only in the context of Soviet agreement that the Soviet Union provide appropriate assurances that the number of BACKFIRE bombers will not be increased above the current levels, that such bombers will not be given the capability to carry long-range air-launched cruise missiles, that such bombers are not and will not be equipped for in-flight refueling, and their crews are not and will not be trained for in-flight refueling. No indication of a change in the U.S. position on BACKFIRE should be given to the Soviet Union at this time. (TS)

DEFENSE & SPACE. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the Defense & Space portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

“The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva first to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement.” (S)

Further Elements. Should the Soviet side press for the inclusion of additional “instructions” in the Defense & Space area, the U.S. side should pursue the inclusion of the following language in the agreed statement:

“In pursuing a Joint Draft Treaty Text, the negotiators should build upon the following elements:

(a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty;

(b) after that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 6 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the ABM Treaty;

(c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and

(d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the sides meet regularly:

1. to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side’s strategic defense programs; and,

2. to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities.” (S)

Conduct During the Non-deployment Period. The U.S. proposal would be that both sides have the right to conduct their programs, including testing as needed, during the period. The focus of the commitment would be on non-deployment. The U.S. side should make it clear that, under such an agreement, the United States intends to exercise fully these rights. The United States will be prepared to explain in Geneva what it means by the term “deployment” and how the Soviet Union can be ensured that no “deployment” of defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty occurred. (S)

In the context of the discussions, no attempt will be made to negotiate or commit to negotiate in the future with the Soviet Union:

a. what is meant by the “broad” or “narrow” interpretation of the ABM Treaty;

b. what would be permitted or prohibited during the non-deployment period; or

c. what is meant by “testing” vice “deployment.” (TS)

Length of the Period. The key issue to determining the length of the period of non-deployment is agreement on what will be permitted during that period and on a clear right to deploy defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty thereafter. If the Soviet Union were to agree to the basic U.S. proposal, the U.S. could agree to extend the period of non-deployment through the tenth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (i.e., October 11, 1996). (TS)

COMPLIANCE & KRASNOYARSK. U.S. policy remains that instances of Soviet non-compliance with existing treaties must be corrected, and that the method of correcting the violation caused by the Krasnoyarsk radar is the dismantlement of this illegal radar. In the context of the discussions, the U.S. side should make this policy clear to its Soviet counterparts. To that effect, the U.S. side should pursue Soviet agreement on the inclusion in the “agreed statement” of the following language:

“To support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed and that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner.” (S)

I am not prepared to accept measures short of dismantlement. Inclusion of a Soviet commitment to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar is not, however, a precondition for agreement to the other positions set forth in this NSDD. (TS)

Ronald Reagan

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, undated

Ermarth: The President opened up with his talking points. He read them all. Shultz then picked up with his line, the thrust of which you know I presume: (1) No deployment of defenses prohibited by the ABM Treaty, (2) to be negotiated on how long that applied, then after six months withdrawal, deployment allowed without reference to the ABM Treaty, (3) various stability predictability packages—data observation, consultations on how things are going and decade minus three years. Carlucci then picked up to describe the predictability package.

Brooks: Consultation on things decade minus three years is a new concept that I have never heard before.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tobey Files, Washington Summit. Secret. The memorandum of conversation of the December 8 meeting among Reagan, Gorbachev, and U.S. and Soviet officials, described herein, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 107.

Ermarth: Consultation during the last three years of the nonwithdrawal period on where things are going before the end of the nondeployment period. The Soviets suggested it.

Brooks: Is it Shultz' idea or a Soviet idea?

Ermarth: Shultz' idea. Talking with the Soviets. Regular meetings about strategic stability no later than three years before the end of the nondeployment period. Soviet suggestion. It is a period about a couple of presidential terms away with the results of research discuss what research the Soviets are going to be doing. To discuss strategic stability in the light of new developments—to develop intensive dialogue about strategic stability before the end of the nonwithdrawal period. This was regarded as an amplification of the President's remarks. At another point, Shultz got very close to proposing prohibited and permitted. Carlucci then picked up with his package of predictability measures—confidence-building measures—so aimed specifically at assuring both sides that no offensive weapons were being developed and deployed in the period. Open labs, he made some suggestions, you didn't respond, I said something about the free electron lasers, Lawrence Livermore chemical lasers, labs in space, their mere lab and our shuttle, experiment sensors, Astronauts going up and looking at the hardware that is being tested or developed and he is going to discuss all this with Oppenav this afternoon over at Defense Department with Abrahamson available to talk about it too. I finished the American presentation. Then Gorbo starts. The essence of Gorbo's line is we can't support your pitch—your approach. Basically you are trying to bring the Soviet Union into a collaboration on something like SDI—an SDI affair—and get us to invite the United States to renounce the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty works however. And preserving the ABM Treaty has been understood from day one as to be the essence of our enterprise going back to Reykjavik. Later in the meeting Dobrynin intervened and said "how can you propose to us that we end this summit with a statement that says—that foreshadows the end of the ABM Treaty which is the foundation of all arms control here?" Back to Gorbachev, if you try to draw us into SDI that won't speed up the process of getting to a START agreement, it will slow it down. What you are able to do or want to do during and after the ten year period is your business. We object to SDI. We are not going to do it ourselves. We will respond in a way that doesn't ????????² cost effective. Defeating it and all that, but what you do is your business. We insist however on a ten year period of nonwithdrawal, a guaranteed maintenance of the ABM Treaty. Later he said, well, how about nine. So they are probably willing to play

² Question marks are in the original.

around with the dates. The President intervened and said “Hey lets get going with the 50 percent cut.” And we need SDI in the future as insurance. The gas mask madmen bullshit. Gorbachev said something about his Brokaw interview. Gorbachev clarified that we weren’t citing it accurately. As to START, we are ready to compromise but if we involve SDI the way we are proposing there won’t be any START treaty with you or your successor. Shultz tried to recapture control of the meeting. He tried to recapture control by saying the Working Groups were making progress which apparently is not true but correcting the President as not advocating any kind of linkage to SDI—there is no link. Gorbachev intervened quite forcefully saying “Yeah but there is a link to the ABM Treaty which you are trying to break.” Shultz resumed “What you propose is consistent with our approach and our approach is consistent with the ABM Treaty. What we are proposing is to go into this clarifying what is going on during the period. Knowing what we are doing. You advocate predictability over ten years. That each side know what’s going on under the ABM Treaty. You said that the U.S. could decide what it wants to do but what goes on in the meantime at the end of the period. We would try to get at that with some proposals like Frank Carlucci gave. Give you a sense of confidence, even hope that you would participate. Willing to look at your ideas.” Shevardnadze intervened and basically came back and said “Look why not zero in on the requirements for 50 percent cuts in the strategic forces under a regime in the context of ten years non-use of the withdrawal provision with two to three years to discuss what happens at the end of the ten year period. This approach would impose no burdens on the present phase of the 50 percent cuts with all that talk about SDI which isn’t necessary. We have the added factor of time. If there is a serious prospect for a reciprocal visit in Moscow, we have to understand what it is going to produce and our understanding was that we were going to get a 50 percent START agreement with nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We’ve laid that ground work. If we begin to introduce philosophical excursions the President’s visit won’t be crowned with START. Its very important that we decide at a high level the parameters under the 50 percent reductions. If we leave it to experts, it will go on endlessly. We have to decide at the high level the duration of the nonwithdrawal provision and we have some flexibility regarding what’s permitted and prohibited under ABM. We are prepared to discuss that. The third element we have got to have limits on SLCMs. We have got to decide these things at a high level in order to move ahead. This is where Dobrynin intervened forcefully to say “How can a summit end with a communique that foreshadows the demise of the ABM Treaty under this with no reference to the language we have been using” The President intervened again, “Our people feel strongly about pursuing SDI and meanwhile you guys are violating the ABM

Treaty with Krasnoyarsk.” Shultz tried once again to sort out what we had agreed on and what not. Let us make another effort. We agree that there is a period of time of nonwithdrawal. Lets discuss that. We know that there shall be no deployment during that period that’s prohibited by the treaty which is a concept that we agree. We also agree at the end that either side has the right to do what it wants and we want to nail that down at the beginning. Shultz ended up noting that there were some differences about what we believed is permitted under the ABM Treaty but he referred once again to Krasnoyarsk. Gorbachev said “Yeah we have different interpretations but only after 1983. For eleven years we had a completely consistent interpretation supported by Congressional hearings, DOD reports. We only got different interpretations when you started looking for lawyerly rationalizations on how to get out of the ABM Treaty and we know this is a trick. Why don’t you respect our intelligence? This is no way to proceed. Especially since 1994 you won’t have anything to deploy by then. Lets be patient for ten years and two to three years before the end of the ten years we can discuss strategic stability if you want to deploy something and we want uncork our responsive measures or whatever we have developed by then.” The President intervened forcefully saying, “Look ABM and SDI are another subject. Lets agree on 50 percent—eliminate those. Then people would be even more happy than they were—you could almost feel the happiness at the dinner last night. That we had actually achieved something. Lets get started working on the details.” Gorbachev says, “Yeah but we got to base this on parameters necessary to find a way to a START agreement. SLCMs are very important but we have got to also take care of assurances on the ABM Treaty and a ten year nonwithdrawal period. Here’s one I introduced nine years, if you are interested.” Shultz resumed saying that he thought there had been about enough on this subject—eventually got somewhere. We have agreed on the concept of the period of nonwithdrawal. Rights and activities under that period were not quite agreed there. Exchange with the President involved a considerable amount of electricity when the President said “Come on lets get on with the 50 percent,” and Gorbachev said, “No not until you satisfy us with the ABM Treaty.” Then Gorbachev hit on SLCMs, saying, “Alright you had your turn to avoid SLCMs. Why are you trying to avoid SLCMs? If they are not taken care of there won’t be a treaty. Our position is a 400 limit. What’s yours?” The President said, “Let the Working Group take care of it.” If there is no guidance from the top, the Working Group won’t resolve it. Shultz intervened saying, “The President has said that we are ready to hear your verification ideas.” Gorbachev said, “Fine.” “We are ready,” said Shultz, “to study your ideas to see if they satisfy us on verification. We don’t have a response to the 400 number.” Gorbachev said, “Well you have given us no answer on mobiles, you given

us no answer on SLCMs. All you do is place demands on us and squeeze us for concessions. We've pampered you by letting you do that. We're as concerned about verification as you are. You've many more SLCMs, you have many more submarines to put them on. It is important to decide that they must be limited, to set a limit and then move on to verification." Gorbachev and other Soviets intervened at various times to establish that elimination of nuclear weapons is the objective here. The President said, "No I'm not stopping things. I don't want to come to Moscow unhappy." Gorbachev then said, "Now if you want to come to Moscow without an agreement you tell us. Our assumption has been that we want a document, some forward steps here and move toward an agreement in Moscow. We thought you had the same idea. If you have changed your mind, let's quit playing around here. We can let the guys in Geneva fiddle around and waste the government's time and money but if you believe that it's not necessary for a treaty to be ready for Moscow tell us. We believe we want to move ahead with this administration but if you have changed your mind about proceeding, then say so. Shultz said, "Well you've heard how forcefully the President spoke on behalf of a START agreement."

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 8, 1987, 4–5:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Amb. Nitze
Amb. Kampelman
Amb. Lehman
Amb. Cooper
Amb. Rowny
AS Holmes
Dir. Adelman
Adm. Howe
Mr. Castillo
Dr. Graham
Amb. Hanmer

U.S.S.R.

Marshall Akhromeev
Amb. Karpov
Amb. Obukhov (part-time)
Amb. Masterkov
Gen. Medvedev
Gen. Chervov
Mr. Mikhailov
Mr. Popov
Mr. Shebalin

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. Drafted by Moon. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

DAS Thomas
Col. Linhard
Dr. Timbie
Mr. Stafford (notetaker)
Mrs. Moon (notetaker)
Ms. Sutter (notetaker)

SUBJECT

Instructions to Delegations and Joint Statement

NITZE suggested that the meeting begin by setting out what the sides wanted to achieve in the Arms Control Working Group and how the sides would try to get there. It seemed in Geneva that the sides shared the same general sense of goals—to reach agreement where possible on outstanding issues in the START and Defense and Space areas. Nitze said that the U.S. envisioned recording new areas of agreement in the joint statement resulting from the Summit in order to permit the negotiators in Geneva to move forward. He stated that Bessmertnykh and Amb. Ridgway had exchanged drafts² on the arms control issues. He believed they achieved *ad referendum* agreement on the non-NST language.

NITZE continued that the NST portion of the joint statement would permit each side to instruct its negotiators to build on the work they had already done and complete treaties in each of the two areas. Subsequently, in response to that joint document and to further instructions that each side would give its own delegation, the negotiators would address remaining issues and attempt to produce agreed treaty texts. Nitze suggested that the group attempt to resolve differences in the context of specific language. He proposed to begin with START and handed over proposed language on START for the joint statement (the same language the President had given Gorbachev that day).³

AKHROMEYEV said that he thought that a result of the first and second meetings between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, four matters could be discussed: reductions in strategic offensive arms; compliance with the ABM Treaty, including the interrelationship between the ABM Treaty and reductions of strategic offensive arms; the reduction of forces and arms in Europe; and the elimination of chemical weapons. Akhromeev asked whether Nitze agreed in principle to discussing these matters.

NITZE agreed to the proposed four issues, but also suggested that the sides break the discussions on conventional arms into a subgroup,

² Not found.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, footnote 5, Document 107.

which might even meet the following day. Nitze thought the same could be done with chemical weapons.

AKHROMEYEV agreed. He suggested that positions of principle be outlined first in the main group; then subgroups could deal with the details. He suggested that if there were no objections, he would like to begin with setting forth the Soviet side's view on the main issues, such as the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. Akhromeev then provided the text of the proposal which had been earlier provided to the President in its English translation. He observed that the Soviet side had also prepared some other issues which the Soviet side believed relevant. Akhromeev said that if there was time, these issues could be discussed today or at the next meeting. Akhromeev suggested that the discussion begin with the START issues in the U.S. draft after the Soviet side had a chance to read the document.

After the U.S. document was read aloud in Russian, AKHROMEYEV asked whether that was all (note: the Defense and Space portion was not read). Nitze confirmed that it was and Akhromeev said he had two questions pertaining to two matters which had been omitted. The first concerned the interrelationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty as it had been signed in 1972. The second was that the U.S. document contained nothing on the reduction or limitation of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. Akhromeev emphasized that he was speaking only of two omissions, rather than on the overall content of the U.S. proposal, but the two problems which he had outlined would have to be dealt with in some way.

NITZE responded that the U.S. side took a different approach to the relationship between the ABM Treaty and the START Treaty. The U.S. side thought the sides could agree on a separate Defense and Space Treaty. This would be dealt with in a package in one place.

AKHROMEYEV said that the U.S. was aware of the Soviet side's position, which was fundamental and was the basis on which reductions in strategic offensive arms could be made. He said that the START Treaty should be connected to compliance with the ABM Treaty as it had been signed in 1972, and further, that the START Treaty should explicitly state that compliance would continue for at least ten years. A Treaty on this issue could be worked out separately, but a provision should be included in the START Treaty. Akhromeev recalled that Shultz had said that if either side begins a nationwide deployment after that time, then the other side could be excused from its obligations under a START Treaty and could act as it saw fit. Further, the General Secretary had told the President that in such a case, the other side would have the right to deploy anti-satellite weapons. Akhromeev said that this issue could not be sidestepped in the Treaty on strategic offensive arms.

KAMPELMAN stated that the U.S. side was aware of the Soviet position and was making no effort to avoid confronting it. He thought that there was a logical way to proceed, however. Kampelman said that if the sides could not agree on strategic offensive arms issues then there would be no Treaty in which to reflect a relationship. Kampelman suggested that the sides address themselves to whether the sides could agree on strategic reductions and the questions that remain. He stressed that he understood that the final agreement would be contingent on ABM Treaty issues, but suggested that the sides address the specifics of numbers and how to count those numbers and not let theological questions get in the way. Kampelman emphasized that he was not trying to denigrate the position of the Soviet side, but was merely suggesting that the sides first see what they could do on START and resolve other questions later.

AKHROMEYEV noted that the interrelationship between START and ABM Treaty compliance was acknowledged not only by the Soviets but also by the U.S. side. Working out ideal wording for the joint communique was another matter and might not be possible in three days. But the relationship was not just a matter of wording, but of principles; it should be recognized and recorded in the U.S. document at a minimum, though it would be good if the sides could achieve something more specific. He then said he would like to hear the U.S. side's considerations on sea-launched cruise missiles.

NITZE said that SLCMs had been discussed at great length at Reykjavik where the U.S. said that it did not see how limitations could be verified. Further, the U.S. had not seen anything since then that would permit verification in any acceptable manner. This was why the U.S. side had not included them in the Geneva discussions. However, the U.S. side was interested in the Soviet side's ideas. Nitze suggested that it might be more orderly if the group started with counting rules, sublimits, and verification—points that were already laid out and on which there was not much division between the sides. The U.S. side was not attempting to avoid other issues, but merely to do things in order.

AKHROMEYEV said the group could pursue that objective, but that he could not fail to point out this fundamental difference between the positions of the two sides and that there could not be a joint document which did not address an issue that was so important to the Soviet side. The two questions which had been raised should be reflected in the document being worked out. The Soviet side had studied verification of SLCMs and he had some remarks on the issue before the group proceeded. Akhromeyev stated that verification could first be carried out with NTM. The Soviet Union possessed radiotechnological means which could detect the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships,

and could also determine whether they are in the bow or stern or other parts of the ship. These means could also determine approximate yield. Akhromeev stated that both sides have such systems, and the systems could detect whether or not cruise missiles were on ships. After their discovery, the sides would have the right to inspect sites where their presence had been discovered. Akhromeev observed that the U.S. document contained a program for verification of ICBMs and SLBMs, which could be inspected, to which the Soviet side did not object in principle. If ground-launched cruise missiles could be verified, then why not SLCMs? Akhromeev said that these were just some of the arguments. Akhromeev concluded that the systems to which he referred could be on helicopters, aircraft, or on ships, and asked whether the U.S. side wished to go down the issues enumerated in its draft.

GRAHAM said that with respect to radiological means, the U.S. side's experience was that material could be shielded easily and effectively by light masses. Furthermore, the radiological background of nuclear-propelled ships would make discrimination even more difficult, so in the U.S. view, radiological means would be subject to practical problems: suppressing the signal, and mixing it with the signal generated by the nuclear means of propulsion.

AKHROMEYEV disagreed. He stated that it was possible to discriminate sufficiently between the signals generated by warheads engines. Further, shielding of systems would be prohibited. The U.S. side was proposing a ban on telemetry encryption, so why not also ban shielding? Thus everything would be verifiable. The objective was to assist NTM and not to interfere with it; there should not be a double-standard, with strict verification some systems but not for others. Akhromeev suggested that the sides take a positive approach and resolve a problem of mutual concern. Akhromeev asked whether Nitze had studied the Soviet proposal.

NITZE said that he had only glanced through the Soviet side's proposal. GRAHAM continued that nuclear propulsion systems used the same fissile material as nuclear explosives and caused a higher radiological background. Graham explained that he was not talking about such measures as non-encryption of telemetry as a means of detection but rather as a means of understanding the characteristics of missiles. But as he understood it, the Soviet side was proposing radiological methods as a means of detection—a different situation. Shielding was a way to protect the missiles and which could conceal the missiles. The U.S. side believed that these difficulties were insurmountable.

AKHROMEYEV offered to share more information with the U.S. on how the distinction could be made between propulsion plants and nuclear charges. But with respect to telemetry encryption, this was not

in question—this pertained to relevant data on missile characteristics while shielding concerned relevant data concerning missiles on-board ships. Akhromeev suggested that the U.S. side read the Soviet-proposal, so the sides could discuss individual issues.

NITZE suggested there could perhaps be a separate subgroup the following day on SLCM verification. Mr. Sagdeev might join.

AKHROMEYEV stressed that the problem pertained to strategic offensive arms and that it would not be acceptable to have a separate group. NITZE clarified that he was speaking about a sub-group of the current group.

AKHROMEYEV still thought this suggestion unacceptable and Nitze proposed to move on. Akhromeev observed that the sides should discuss which document should be worked and how many meetings were feasible before Thursday.⁴ There was then a discussion of the schedule, it being tentatively agreed that the group would meet Wednesday, December 9 from 8:00–10:30 A.M. and again later in the day and after the dinner. Akhromeev emphasized that he must obtain permission from General Secretary Gorbachev to adjust his schedule.

AKHROMEYEV turned to sublimits, noting that the Soviet side had laid down its position in Geneva and that, in principle, the difference between the two positions was 300 warheads. Akhromeev restated each side's position: the U.S. spoke of 4800 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and the Soviet side spoke of between 5100 and 5300 warheads. Akhromeev emphasized that the Soviet Union was not going to build heavy bombers for the deployment of more than 900 cruise missiles. There was no need for more than that. Akhromeev stressed that he could say frankly that the Soviet Union's production capacity would not allow the production of more bombers than that and that this was an objective fact, not a whim. Akhromeev proposed that the sides agree on a sublimit of 5100 for ICBMs and SLBMs.

NITZE proposed that the sublimit be 4800 on ballistic missiles and 3300 on ICBMs, but the main point was that the U.S. side thought it would be more orderly to discuss counting rules first because the counting rules would determine to some extent what the sublimits should be. Nitze clarified that the sides should discuss how one defines ALCMs and reentry vehicles before the sides turned to the sublimits.

AKHROMEYEV said that he understood and turned to the Backfire bomber. He stated that the Soviet position was well-known; this was a medium-range bomber with a range of 2300 kilometers. He stated that the Soviet Union remained in compliance with the 1979 statement

⁴ December 10.

of the Soviet leadership⁵ and that nothing had changed regarding that bomber since that time: the bomber continued to be produced as a medium-bomber; it was not capable of mid-air refueling or of carrying cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. He concluded that it was unjustified to subject it to the Treaty on strategic offensive arms and that the sides could not arrive at an acceptable resolution of the problem if the U.S. insisted on counting the Backfire. Akhromeev recalled that the U.S. statement referred to the counting of the U.S. B-1 and B-52 and the Bear H and that the U.S. had proposed to count each with six cruise missiles.

NITZE confirmed that this was the U.S. proposal. Akhromeev stated that the U.S. bombers had the capability to carry significantly more than six each. He wondered why the Soviet side should count each with six.

LEHMAN explained that the question of counting ALCMs had two dimensions. First, one should simplify a difficult verification issue. Second, one should deal with the operational realities of heavy bomber aircraft. As Akhromeev was aware, the theoretical capability of a bomber could be significantly higher than the operational capability. What the U.S. had done was to seek a straightforward approach to counting ALCMs on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. The U.S. thought this a simplification of the task because one simply had to identify the ALCM-carrying bombers in order to attribute the number to be accredited to the side.

AKHROMEYEV thought the sides should not proceed in such a manner. He suggested that the sides select an airfield and land bombers such as the Blackjack and the B-1, old ones and new ones, with mock-ups of cruise missiles aboard. They could be examined to see how many cruise missiles existed and the proper number could be attributed. He thought this manner the best way to verify ALCM deployments.

NITZE stated that in U.S. operational practice, heavy bombers carried considerably fewer than their theoretical capability. So he wondered what the Soviet side proposed to examine.

AKHROMEYEV said that the Soviet side was aware that U.S. bombers were capable of carrying many more than six ALCMs and so he did not see why the Soviet side should attribute six to each. The Soviet side was prepared to demonstrate to the U.S. how many cruise missiles

⁵ Reference is to Brezhnev's June 16, 1979 written statement to Carter asserting that the Soviet Tu-22M "Backfire" airplane was a medium-range bomber, and that the Soviet Union would not increase its range to strike targets in the continental United States. ("Vienna Summit Meeting: United States-Soviet Union Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Related Documents," June 18, 1979, *Public Papers of the President: Carter*, 1979, pp. 1051–1079)

were actually carried by Soviet bombers. CHERVOV recalled that the U.S. had tested not six, but 20 or more ALCMs. AKHROMEYEV suggested that on-site inspection on a designated airfield be employed so that an appropriate number could be determined.

NITZE asked again what would be inspected. AKHROMEYEV stated that the sides would inspect the number of cruise missiles that the bomber was carrying. He stated that bombers also have unique equipment for cruise missiles, such as special containers, and special pods under wings. It was therefore easy for experts to determine how many ALCMs a bomber was equipped to carry.

NITZE stated that the U.S. simply would not agree to a counting rule that counted phantom cruise missiles that we were not going to carry. He stressed that the U.S.-proposed rule was fair and worked well for both sides.

AKHROMEYEV recalled earlier discussions on heavy missiles, which the U.S. side had argued were special weapons which were capable of carrying significantly more reentry vehicles. The Soviet side agreed with the U.S. on this score and had undertaken appropriate limitations. Now the same arguments should apply to U.S. heavy bombers, which carry more ALCMs than Soviet bombers, and should be attributed with the actual number they carried.

LEHMAN explained that the type of heavy bomber of which the U.S. side was speaking existed on both sides. They were similar in design, capability, and size, and therefore it would be difficult to be certain how many ALCMs a bomber would carry at any one time. Lehman thought that the Soviet side's approach complicated a problem for which there existed a simple solution.

AKHROMEYEV suggested that the sides think about it and suggested that the U.S. side do the same. NITZE agreed to think about it, but repeated that the U.S. could not count ALCMs that it was not going to carry.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood the problem, but that in equal degree, the Soviet side could not count each bomber at six when the real number was 12 or more. He observed that this was a new proposal, and asked that it be studied seriously, for any response now would necessarily be off-the-cuff. Akhromeev concluded that if the sides landed bombers on a common airfield, then the Backfire would be landed as well. NITZE suggested that the sides might have an easier time with the proposed counting rule for existing ballistic missiles.

AKHROMEYEV said that he had not yet finished with cruise missiles. He stated that the range for long-range cruise missiles had been previously settled at 600 km and now the U.S. proposed to raise the threshold to 1500 km. He wondered why the U.S. proposed such a number.

LEHMAN said that this had been discussed peripherally in Geneva. The U.S. side had made clear that the overall package must address U.S. concerns about stability. The U.S. had come to the conclusion that the 600 km threshold was not acceptable and that the proper number was 1500.

AKHROMEYEV thought this to be Lehman's opinion but that seven years experience in SALT II had shown—and Rowny had been a witness to this—that the range should be recognized to be 600 km. The Soviet side continued to believe this adequate; he wondered what had changed. If anything, the range of bombers had increased, not decreased.

NITZE rejoined that air defenses had improved. ROWNY said that the 600 km threshold had always been a Soviet formulation—the U.S. had never agreed that the SALT II number was applicable in START. The SALT II Treaty had many problems, which was why it had not been ratified, and this was one problem.

AKHROMEYEV observed that nevertheless the 600 number had been accepted and the Treaty had been signed by the U.S. Delegation, though not ratified. Rowny had objected, but the position was that of the United States Government. NITZE said that the sides had noted a number of differences between the two positions. He said he had hoped to get on to areas of agreement, and suggested the sides discuss counting rules for existing missiles.

AKHROMEYEV thought the sides would come to this but for now, the sides had not finished their discussion of cruise missiles. Here there were many differences and it seemed that the U.S. delegation had toughened its position. The number and range issue had been stipulated in SALT II which was signed but not ratified. It would be unjustified to depart from those agreed figures.

NITZE said that there was a basic problem; the U.S. side did not think that the SALT II provisions were any longer valid.

ADELMAN said that in START the U.S. side was trying to fill in the numbers and was clarifying its position, not hardening it. The U.S. side had never proposed the SALT II number to the Soviet side in START.

AKHROMEYEV agreed that this was the first time that these positions had been offered in the current talks. But the sides had twenty years of experience in strategic weapons talks, and that history remained of some significance. He was not saying that SALT II was U.S. "law," no such Treaty existed at present. But considerable work had been done previously; it should be the basis for discussions of this issue.

AKHROMEYEV turned to ballistic missile counting. He asked for confirmation that the U.S. proposed to attribute to a missile the number of reentry vehicles with which it had been tested.

NITZE said that this was not the case; the sides would declare the number of deployed reentry vehicles which would not be exceeded in the future. This declaration would be subject to inspection.

AKHROMEEV said that the Soviet side would study the matter and offer an opinion later.

KARPOV asked if the Trident II were to be tested with twelve warheads prior to the conclusion of an agreement, would the U.S. suggest that it be counted as 8.

NITZE said that it would be possible to declare that its deployed number would be 8 even though it might have been tested with twelve. KARPOV asked whether the U.S. would test at 12.

ADELMAN replied that this could be done only prior to signature.

AKHROMEEV said this was not logical; he was not saying he disagreed, but he thought that if the sides agreed on such an approach, then missiles should not be tested with greater than their declared number. ADELMAN repeated that this would be possible after entry-into-force.

NITZE explained that the U.S. was trying to get away from capability. For example, some estimated that the SS-18 could carry 14 reentry vehicles, but if the Soviet side presented a declared number of 10, the U.S. was prepared to accept it—and would expect the Soviet Union to accept U.S. assurances that the Trident II would be deployed with no more than 8, which would be subject to inspection.

AKHROMEEV stated that the Soviet Union had never tested the SS-18 with more than 10 reentry vehicles. If the Soviet Union accepted such a solution, then a missile should not be tested with greater than its declared number of warheads.

NITZE replied that the U.S. side did not wish to base limitations on previous tests; it would only limit future tests.

LINHARD announced that the Soviet side's cars had arrived, and that when the sides returned, they could pick up on the discussions on ballistic missile warhead counting.

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1987, 8 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation of Nitze/Akhromeyev Working Group Meeting,
December 9, 1987

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Ron Lehman
Ambassador Henry Cooper
Ambassador Read Hanmer
Ken Adelman
Admiral John Howe
Robert Linhard
Dr. William Graham
Allen Holmes
Jay Castillo
James Timbie
Donald J. McConnell
Michael Stafford
Eleanor Sutter
Dimitri Arensberger (interpreter)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

S.F. Akhromeyev
V.P. Karpov
N.F. Chervov
N.A. Obukhov
V.I. Medvedev
K.F. Mikhailov
L.A. Masterkov
Iu.A. Nazarkin
N.B. Shabalin
F.F. Popov
A. Lu. Obukhov

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION

NITZE opened the meeting by welcoming the Soviet participants to the Arms Control Working Group. AKHROMEYEV commented that he and the Soviet delegation had been subjected to a security examination at the entrance to the State Department. A very thorough examination revealed that the Soviet visitors had no nuclear weapons on their persons. NITZE replied that he hoped the Soviet guests had passed the security examination. AKHROMEYEV said there were no incidents thanks to the discipline of the Soviet delegation. ADELMAN asked jokingly whether the U.S. security officers had a chance to look at the Soviet papers. AKHROMEYEV said no, but this was perhaps because they knew he would not have shown them.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State. Also on this day, Reagan and Gorbachev held two meetings in the Oval Office, the memoranda of conversations for which are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Documents 109–110.

ORDER OF THE DAY FOR WORKING GROUP MEETING

Turning to the business of the day, AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side had considered the U.S. paper turned over the previous evening on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was willing to carry out further discussion based on the U.S. paper, with the appropriate clarifications the Soviet side had inserted. To aid this process, the Soviet side had prepared an English text. Since it would not be feasible to work the specific words of this text in this group, AKHROMEYEV suggested that a drafting subgroup be formed to develop a common text after the issues have been discussed substantively in this body. The Soviet participants in the drafting subgroup would be Ambassador Obukhov and General Medvedev. With regard to the schedule for the day, AKHROMEYEV said he assumed this meeting would continue until lunch. NITZE suggested the group break at 10:30 for 30 minutes, resume at 11:00 and then work to lunch. AKHROMEYEV agreed. Noting the official lunch scheduled at the State Department for 1:00, he assumed this meeting should adjourn by approximately 12:30.

AKHROMEYEV suggested the working group resume for a brief meeting from 1800 to 1900 this evening just before the official dinner at the Soviet Embassy. After dinner the working group could resume to try to reach final agreement. The results of the working group would be reported to our leaders the next morning.

NITZE suggested that when the working group resumes at 11:00 a separate group be convened to discuss conventional weapons and chemical weapons. Charles Thomas is prepared to host such a meeting for the U.S. side in his office. AKHROMEYEV agreed and said the three Soviet participants would be Amb. Nazarkin, General Chervov, and General Mikhailov.

AKHROMEYEV then handed over a revised draft joint text (Tab 1)² which he said reflected the discussions of the previous evening with the U.S. side. AKHROMEYEV suggested the working group consider this text now. NITZE replied that our comments would be preliminary since this was the first time the U.S. side had a chance to look at the text. AKHROMEYEV agreed, adding that in any event this group should discuss the issues in substance and refer working the words of the text to the drafting subgroup.

50% REDUCTION IN THROW WEIGHT

NITZE said his first question was the word "approximately" at the bottom of the first page in the phrase "throw weight for the USSR

² Attached but not printed is a Soviet draft of the revised joint text. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the draft: "USSR, 0800, 12/09."

will be cut by approximately 50%.” NITZE said he thought the sides agreed that the throw weight reduction should be exactly 50%.

AKHROMEYEV said it was agreed that the Soviet side would cut its throw weight by 50%. The word approximately simply reflected the technical reality that the calculations to quantify the throw weight had not yet been done and thus it is difficult to say the reductions will be precisely 50%.

NITZE said his next question was the reference to the Soviet reduction of 50% in throw weight being laid out in a “unilateral statement” of the Soviet side. The U.S. believed the 50% throw weight reduction should be formally recorded. He was not sure a unilateral statement would meet this requirement. AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. was recommending that the reduction be recorded in the treaty itself. NITZE said that a unilateral statement could be in the treaty. In the ABM Treaty there are agreed statements and there are also unilateral statements. The Soviet side appears to want to have this commitment in the form of a unilateral statement.

LEHMAN said the U.S. position is that the aggregate ballistic missile throw weight level resulting from Soviet reductions by 50% would become a ceiling which would be binding on both sides and which would be codified in the treaty. AKHROMEYEV said he understood the U.S. to be suggesting that the 50% reduction of throw weight should apply to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and should be recorded in the treaty. Was this the U.S. position?

LEHMAN said no. The USSR should reduce its throw weight by 50%. The resulting level becomes a ceiling which applies equally to both sides.

AKHROMEYEV said it could, therefore, be possible that one side would have a throw weight level higher than the other side. NITZE replied the actual U.S. level, or Soviet level, could be lower than the ceiling permitted. LEHMAN added that there would, however, be only one ceiling which applies to both sides and which is codified in the treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood the U.S. position now to be that the USSR would reduce its throw weight by approximately 50% and not build above that level later. Both sides would not go above that ceiling. LEHMAN said this was correct. AKHROMEYEV said he had no objections to this position. NITZE added that the sides will need to set the throw weight level resulting from 50% reductions on the Soviet side. The Geneva negotiators can work on the task of spelling out the language. AKHROMEYEV agreed and suggested that this issue now be referred to the drafting group to develop joint statement language. NITZE said that Ambassador Read Hanmer would chair the

drafting group for the U.S. side. They could begin with page one of the joint text now. AKHROMEYEV asked again whether the U.S. side objected to the commitment of the Soviet side on 50% reduction of throw weight being in the form of a unilateral statement. LEHMAN said yes, this should be codified in the treaty. The working group could work out language. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet unilateral statement would have the force of a treaty commitment. NITZE said it is not a unilateral statement any longer if both sides are bound by it. AKHROMEYEV said okay. The drafting group should draft such a provision for inclusion in the treaty to apply to both sides.

SUBLIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

NITZE called attention to subparagraph A³ of the draft text, concerning ballistic missile ceilings. The United States would prefer a ceiling of 4800, rather than 5100. But the main problem concerned the subceiling: The United States would like the phrase “or SLBM warheads” to be deleted, so that there would be freedom to mix.

AKHROMEYEV suggested removing the last one-and-a-half lines of subparagraph A, so that the sentence would read: “that will include a ceiling of (5100)2 (4800)1 in the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total.” NITZE said that both sides would be subject to the subceiling at 3,300; both Soviet and U.S. ICBMs would be limited. Why not keep it for ICBMs and just remove the last phrase?

AKHROMEYEV sought to confirm that the U.S. side did not want a sublimit on SLBMs. NITZE replied that SLBMs would be subject to the 4800 ceiling, but not to a separate subceiling. AKHROMEYEV objected that this was not a matter of substance, but of the rights of the sides. Why should the Soviet side accept a sublimit on ICBMs (1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles)?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side had agreed to translate the reduction to 154 heavy missiles into a limit at 1540 warheads on such missiles to meet U.S. concerns. With respect to the 3300 sublimit, the USSR will not in any event exceed 3300 ICBM warheads. However, the Soviet side was concerned about the principle of equality. If the U.S. side would not accept SLBM sublimits, why should the Soviet

³ Subparagraph A of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the priority tasks on which negotiations should focus: “The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 5100 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM and SLBM warheads.” An unknown hand crossed out the final “and” and wrote “or.”

side accept the sublimits the U.S. side was proposing? NITZE said there was no inequality; the United States would also be subject to the 3300 sublimit. LEHMAN said if the Soviet side does not intend to deploy more than 3300 ICBM warheads then it should have no difficulty in agreeing to the U.S. proposed sublimits. The concept of sublimits within an aggregate limit of ballistic missile warheads follows the approach taken by the U.S. and Soviet sides in the previous SALT I and SALT II negotiations and thus is not a new idea.

ADELMAN asked Akhromeyev for clarification.

AKHROMEYEV said Soviet agreement for an ICBM sublimit without an SLBM sublimit, taking into account the actual structure of the Soviet forces, would be a concession to the U.S. side. In formal legal terms the U.S. may be right in saying these are ceilings applicable to both sides, but practically speaking it would be a Soviet concession given the differing structure of the two sides' forces. NITZE said the limits would require changes in U.S. forces as well. The U.S. would have to make many changes in the way it operates and in its forces as a result of the treaty; neither side would get everything with which it had started. AKHROMEYEV said of course this was true for both sides.

600 KM. RANGE CRITERION FOR ALCMS

NITZE suggested the two sides move on to discuss subparagraph B of the text.⁴ There the problem is with the Soviet language referring to a range of over 600 kilometers as a counting rule for ALCMs.

HOWE said that, as Nitze had noted the previous day, there are a number of reasons why a range criterion of 1500 kilometers is better than the 600-kilometer range discussed in the early 1970s. The Soviet side has expanded its air defense and made many improvements in recent years since SALT II incorporated the 600 kilometer range. From a military point of view, having longer-range ALCMs makes sense. But the 1500 criterion is still well below the range of ALCMs the sides

⁴ Subparagraph B of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the "priority tasks" on which negotiations should focus: "The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 600 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The number of long-range ALCMs that can be carried by the heavy bomber of a given type (for the USSR—'Tupolev-95' ('Bear') and 'Tupolev-160' ('Blackjack'); for the USA—B-1 and B-52) is to be determined through observation of flight testing. Consultations at the level of experts could be conducted for that purpose, to include joint inspections of the sides' heavy bombers with the aim of determining the number of long-range ALCM, for which the bombers of a given type could be equipped for flight at intercontinental ranges. Whenever necessary, demonstration flights could be conducted to this end."

are actually producing. Fifteen hundred kilometers provides a clear line between short range and longer range ALCMs. For military reasons the actual range of strategic ALCMs for both sides will be much greater than 1500 kilometers. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why the Soviet side wants to set the counting rule so low at 600 kilometers.

AKHROMEYEV said if we put the counting rule at 1500 kilometers this would make it a medium range system rather than a strategic system. Yesterday our leaders signed an INF Treaty eliminating medium range (500–5500 km.) nuclear missiles. Moreover, AKHROMEYEV said, ALCMs are strategic systems because they depend on the range of their carrier vehicles, strategic bombers. The U.S. side knows the combat range of the strategic bombers of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Strategic bomber range is above 5000 kilometers, even above 7000 kilometers. If one adds to the 7000 kilometer range of a strategic bomber an additional 600 kilometers for cruise missiles, the total is a range of 7600 kilometers or even more. This is, therefore, a strategic weapon. This is a long held premise felt by both sides in the 1970's, dating from the SALT negotiations. The range for an ALCM was 600 kilometers. AKHROMEYEV said he could not see why this should be changed today. On the contrary, new heavy bombers of both sides have even greater ranges than those of the 1970s. Thus the 600 kilometer range is a valid limit.

HOWE replied that geographic considerations presented the two sides with different situations. The reason why ALCMs are more important to the United States is because Soviet air defenses have been greatly improved over the years and are much better than those of the U.S. They risk making heavy bombers obsolete in terms of coming in close to their targets. The only way they could survive would be to remain farther away—not penetrate so far into Soviet territory. The agreement we are discussing is not just for 1987 but for years to come, and Soviet air defenses are likely to improve even further.

LEHMAN said that, as Admiral Howe noted, the strategic situation is such that 600 kilometers is not a proper dividing line between tactical and strategic ALCMs. The Soviet side said 600 kilometers is good because it derives from SALT II. Admiral Howe had already explained in detail why this was not so. The U.S. side is ready to agree on the aggregate number of ALCMs. But for all the reasons outlined by Admiral Howe we think the counting rule for range should be set at 1500 kilometers.

NITZE said this issue would need further discussion with military people before a final conclusion could be reached. He suggested that the discussion move on.

AKHROMEYEV agreed to leave the question for now and return to it later. For the present, the range would be put in brackets for the drafting group text.

NUMBER OF ALCMS DETERMINED THROUGH FLIGHT TESTING

NITZE suggested that the sides move on to discuss the next paragraph, concerning the attribution of a number of long-range ALCMs to each heavy bomber based on flight texting. LEHMAN said the U.S. had examined this question carefully and discussed it thoroughly with the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. He had concluded that aircraft are fundamentally different from ICBMs or SLBMs. AKHROMEYEV said that is the U.S. conclusion. LEHMAN said aircraft could be loaded with varying amounts of weapons, electronic equipment, supplies, or fuel. The mix could change their capability. Trying to determine the number of ALCMs which a particular bomber carries on a particular day would be impossible. Counting rules based on total theoretical capability would be unrealistic and lead to contention. Therefore, we are looking for a straightforward solution to reflect the operational realities of heavy bombers, a solution which is fair to both sides and simple enough that it would not create compliance questions or problems. The easiest solution, therefore, would be for the treaty to include the number of long range nuclear-armed ALCMs to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber.

AKHROMEYEV said we will not convince each other on the point. Instead we should seek common language in the drafting group to cover the point. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side believes its proposal is correct and valid. The geographic differences which Admiral Howe referred to affecting the U.S./USSR with respect to the combat applications of heavy bombers adversely affects the Soviet Union more than the U.S. The Soviet side bases its bombers only on Soviet territory. If we are to make progress in these talks we must speak bitter truths frankly and without embarrassment. If the terrible circumstance would arrive—God forbid—when these heavy bombers would have to be used, they would have to fly from the USSR to U.S. territory and back. Therefore, the number of missiles they could carry in light of the fuel requirements would be very limited. Older bombers might carry six ALCMs. For new bombers the number might be somewhat greater, but only negligibly so. The U.S., on the other hand, has forward bases in Spain, Guam, and other places around the world from which the distance to the USSR is shorter. Therefore, U.S. bombers can carry many more ALCMs since they require less fuel. AKHROMEYEV added he would not dispute that many, even the majority, of U.S. bombers would still fly from U.S. territory. But there is nonetheless an inequality of the geographic situation, given U.S. forward bases. The Soviet side was concerned about this, just as the U.S. side was worried about Soviet heavy ICBMs.

AKHROMEYEV said on a number of points the Soviet side took steps to meet U.S. concerns. Examples of this were the reduction of

50% in throw weight and counting rules on heavy bombers with respect to SRAMs and bombs. But, in contrast, the Soviet side sees no counterpart U.S. steps to meet Soviet concerns. There can be “no one way traffic” in concessions. The delegations need to work on this issue.

AKHROMEYEV suggested page two of the draft joint text be remanded to the drafting group to try to find general language to cover the differences between the sides.

LEHMAN said that with respect to the discussion on ALCM counting rules, the U.S. distinguishes between the issue of the range criterion (600 kilometers vice 1500 kilometers), where the differing numbers should be bracketed, and the issue of attributing a certain number of ALCMs to each type of heavy bomber. The U.S. side agrees with the Soviet side that there should be an agreed number; we are searching for a rule for doing this. The U.S. side believes a number should be *attributed*. The Soviet side says the number of ALCMs is to be determined through observation of flight testing. This is impractical as the U.S. side has explained. Instead, a number should be attributed.

AKHROMEYEV said the drafting group should find general language to cover differences between the sides. During the negotiations in Geneva the sides could address further the questions of numbers attached to sublimits, the range criterion for ALCMS if we fail to agree here, and also the heavy bomber counting rules with respect to attributing ALCMs or visually observing them. Let the drafting group work on this problem.

NITZE said before remanding the issue to the drafting group he wondered if a general formula along the following lines could be agreed upon: “the negotiators should agree on the number of ALCMs to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber.” LINHARD noted that the sides agreed that there should be an agreed number, but only disagreed on how to arrive at that number. KARPOV asked whether, if we agree to attribute a number of ALCMs to each heavy bomber, this means that it would be a number not to be exceeded on any particular bomber. NITZE said no. A number would be attributed to each bomber for counting purposes but this does not mean that it could not be exceeded in individual cases. KARPOV asked if a bomber actually carries 12 ALCMs could it still be attributed with only 6? NITZE replied the B-1 is capable of carrying 6 ALCMs and the B-52 may carry up to 20 ALCMs. But this heavy load of ALCMs would not be present on every aircraft of that type. The U.S. side preferred not to use carrying capacity as an indication of capability. Thus our solution is to attribute to each bomber a certain number which it would be counted as carrying. This is a realistic approach. LEHMAN added the U.S. side is prepared to set a maximum limit of 20 for the number of ALCMs any one bomber can carry. To respond to Karpov’s question, certain bombers might be

theoretically capable of carrying a maximum of 12 ALCMs although we would attribute it with carrying only 6 for treaty counting purposes since that reflects more realistic operational considerations.

AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. was proposing the number 6 to attribute to every heavy bomber, irrespective of how many it had carried before, was carrying now, or might carry in the future. NITZE said we can discuss the number. It is the principle of attributing a number on which we seek agreement at this point. AKHROMEYEV asked if this would be regardless of how many ALCMs were on board. LEHMAN replied the U.S. is offering a maximum limit of 20 ALCMs actually on board any heavy bomber plus an attributed number of 6 per heavy bomber. AKHROMEYEV said all this could be clarified in the negotiations, but at present he wanted to clarify the essence of the U.S. position, the U.S. wants to attribute in the treaty 6 ALCMs to each heavy bomber regardless of what the actual ALCM load is. NITZE replied this is correct. We want to attribute a number rather than attempt to verify an actual number through demonstration flights as the Soviet Union proposes. The Soviet proposal is impractical since actual numbers could vary from day to day.

AKHROMEYEV said the positions are clear. The sides are unable to agree on specific language. Therefore, the drafting group should seek a general formulation to cover the positions of both sides.

LEHMAN said Akhromeyev was a military man and would recognize that an individual airplane can always carry more in theory than the actual load which is assigned to it in practice. Thus, would Akhromeyev not agree that the attributed number could be lower than actual capacity?

AKHROMEYEV said no. The sides should refer the issue to the drafting group. This issue cannot be agreed here. It is a major issue between the sides, requiring further study. We should seek generalized wording at this stage.

DETERMINING BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBERS THROUGH FLIGHT TESTING

NITZE suggested the sides turn now to subparagraph C⁵ dealing with counting rules for warheads on existing ballistic missiles. The

⁵ Subparagraph C of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the "priority tasks" on which negotiators should focus: "The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be: MX-10, MINUTEMAN III-3, MINUTEMAN II-1, TRIDENT I-1, TRIDENT II-, POSEIDON-. The number of warheads attributable to each type of Soviet ballistic missile shall be: 'SS-17'-4, 'SS-19'-6, 'SS-18'-10, 'SS-24'-10 and 'SS-25'-[unclear]. These numbers shall be determined through flight testing. There be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to future types of ballistic missiles covered by START." An unknown hand added the phrase "in addition" between the words "There shall" and "be agreed" in the final sentence.

U.S. has difficulty with the Soviet language which provides that “these numbers shall be determined through flight testing.” The U.S. side believes we should attribute a number of warheads for each existing missile type in the treaty. This could be verified through on-site inspection. He asked Admiral Howe to elaborate.

HOWE said the United States believes that the treaty should list the number of warheads for existing types of ballistic missiles for both sides. Those numbers would be declared or attributed in the treaty, thus stepping back from using testing as a criterion. We could rely on OSI to inspect. In Geneva the Soviet side had requested on-site inspection on board ships. The U.S. side would be willing to work with the Soviet side on a system where the Soviet inspector could pick a particular U.S. SSBN and say he wished to inspect the missile in tube number 8. The U.S. would remove the missile, take it to a facility and the Soviet inspector could verify that the number of warheads in that missile did not exceed the number permitted. This would demonstrate to the Soviet inspector that the U.S. is not deploying more than the number of RVs permitted on any specific missile. The system would be reciprocal, of course. The same system could apply to ICBMs. The U.S. would remove the missile selected by the Soviet side and there could be on-site inspection of the number of warheads on that particular missile. Such a system would give us both greater confidence in the treaty limits.

AKHROMEYEV said this is excellent “but,” and the “but” is important. If the U.S. says it has tested an MX missile, for example, with 10 or 12 or even 14 warheads, and afterwards the U.S. makes it operational and declares it with 10 warheads, and with strict OSI, while there is peace between the sides no problems would arise. But if, unfortunately there was no confidence between the sides—President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev said yesterday we must proceed step by step in the relationship and there is a need to verify at each step of the way—if tensions were to arise, then the proposal outlined by Admiral Howe would lead to serious consequences. The side which had tested a missile with more warheads than it actually declared and deployed at, could have a breakout capability. That side could rapidly increase the number of warheads on such missiles from 10 to 16. Why did the U.S. side want this added complication? There are many in the U.S. who believe the Soviet side will cheat on any agreement. We should devise a regime which would rule this out. If a side wants to deploy an ICBM with 10 warheads, why test it at 12 or 14? Test it at the number you actually want to deploy it at. Count it at that in the treaty and leave it at that. That would remove the problem.

HOWE replied that Akhromeyev was theoretically correct. But if we foresee an era of growing confidence, built in part through OSI,

the U.S. would not want to be in a position where it could not modernize its missiles and test, if necessary, at numbers greater than those actually deployed. If the U.S. deployed a new missile with a greater number of warheads we would declare it and attribute the new number to it in the treaty. Conversely, if the Soviet side tested a new SS-18 with more warheads than they presently declared, the new number would have to be included in the treaty. There would be consultations about this and OSI to inspect that the regime was not being exceeded. But the U.S. side did not think flight testing should be the rule; rather, the sides should rely on OSI to ensure that declared numbers were being observed. HOWE said we all know that missiles have capability greater than those tested when they are deployed. But if one increases the number of warheads on a single missile, the increased throw weight lends to increased costs. Thus, even in a more hostile world, if a side wanted more than the 6000 aggregate, it would not necessarily be militarily advantageous to put more RVs on a missile.

AKHROMEYEV said the U.S. has not convinced him with its arguments. But if this was of interest to the U.S. side, he proposed a text saying the following: "If a side wants to increase the number of warheads on its missiles it will inform the other side." This would of course increase the number of RVs attributable and increase the total of a side under its aggregate.

LEHMAN said the Soviet side says the SS-18 has 10 RVs, that it always has had and always will have. This had led the U.S. to consider the idea of declaring the number of warheads attributable to each type of missile, coupled with challenge inspections. For example, an inspection might uncover a Minuteman-3 with only two warheads, but never more than three. The sides would declare the numbers of existing types. The Soviet proposal might be useful for new types, but for existing types the sides should be able to agree on a number. The sides would agree to deal with future missile types as a separate question. AKHROMEYEV said he still did not understand why the U.S. needed this system, or why the U.S. needed the right to test with a greater number of warheads than had been declared. The SS-18, for example, had been tested at 10 and was deployed at 10. It was clear that it would not be tested with more than 10. If it had been tested with 10, it could not be made operational with more than 10.

NITZE suggested that the sides postpone their attempt to resolve this issue until after the break.

NITZE then raised another issue with respect to subparagraph C in the Soviet draft text: it included no references to Soviet submarines, and no numbers of warheads to be attributed to submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

AKHROMEYEV acknowledged the omission, and undertook to fill in the Soviet numbers.

SLCM VERIFICATION

NITZE then turned to the issue of SLCMs in subparagraph D,⁶ a difficult issue for the United States.

HOWE said the U.S. had looked long and hard at how to verify SLCMs. Though we had looked at some of the innovative proposals raised by the Soviet side, we were having trouble finding a regime to verify SLCMs in which both sides could have confidence. Five years ago the task might have been easier, but it is a hard problem to overcome given the capability of a side to defeat technical instruments through, for example, shielding. HOWE said he was pessimistic this problem would be solved.

NITZE asked Ambassador Lehman to elaborate further on SLCM verification.

LEHMAN said the U.S. has examined the possibility of determining whether a ship has nuclear warheads on board, whether it can determine the number of nuclear weapons on ships and whether a determination can be made concerning adherence to treaty limits on SLCMs. Our study included methods such as the ones mentioned by the Soviet side. However, on the basis of Soviet statements yesterday, the U.S. will again reexamine the relevant technologies. Nevertheless, LEHMAN said, he must emphasize that the U.S. remains highly dubious that such approaches could be used to verify treaty limitations.

AKHROMEYEV replied that the Soviet view is that SLCMs are a fundamental issue which would determine whether the sides could agree on a START treaty. If the treaty does not limit SLCMs, and if there is no strict verification of the limits on SLCMs, it is pointless to sign a START agreement. One could otherwise easily circumvent the START limits. The Soviet side knew of U.S. plans for several thousand SLCMs (though, admittedly, not all would have nuclear warheads). This would have to be verified. AKHROMEYEV emphasized this is a major, fundamental issue. We must resolve it if we want a START treaty. Otherwise the SLCM question will stay in brackets and there will be no START treaty. The U.S. side should understand this.

AKHROMEYEV added that he failed to understand why it is possible to verify ICBMs with on-site inspection and not to verify SLCMs

⁶ Subparagraph D of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the "priority tasks" on which negotiations should focus: "The reduction of the number of SLCMs shall be conducted in a manner as to allow each side to possess not more than 400 units outside the total of 6000 nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms, with their deployment being limited to an agreed number of submarine (two classes) and surface ship classes (the number of classes is to be agreed upon)."

on ships through OSI. Is the problem one of OSI on ships? A Navy issue? In the future we will have to do this. Otherwise we cannot proceed forward. Why reduce land troops and ICBMs and verify the limits through OSI and leave out a similar regime for SLCMs with OSI for navies? AKHROMEYEV said he knew why, and would like to discuss this issue with Admiral Crowe in the future. The sides would have to search for a means of verification.

For the present, AKHROMEYEV suggested that the sides record the following in the joint statement: "SLCMs must be limited to a certain number, which would be apart from the 6000 aggregate. The sides must limit the number of warships on which SLCMs could be deployed and provide for a strict inspection regime which would assure compliance with the treaty." That is what the Soviet side suggests.

NITZE said there is a deep difference of opinion on SLCMs. What we can put in the joint statement on this subject, therefore, is problematic. NITZE said he had no good ideas. LEHMAN suggested the sides return to this issue later.

HOWE said he knew Admiral Crowe would like to discuss the SLCM concern of the Soviets with Akhromeyev in the future. At present, he wished to raise one point, however: An ICBM base is exclusively dedicated to strategic defense. Ships, however, combine many interchangeable missions, both nuclear and non-nuclear. We don't rule out anything regarding a sensible verification regime. Navies are not off limits for verification. The problem is how to do it.

AKHROMEYEV asked, with an apology, whether this was a matter of Naval military egoism. He noted that last September the U.S. had inspected a Soviet motorized infantry division in Germany. During a 48-hour period the U.S. inspectors went everywhere, took photographs, talked to whom they wished, collected lots of information. The Soviet side inspected the U.S. First Armored Division in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet side had access to anything it had a right to inspect under the Stockholm agreement. If it is possible to do this with respect to U.S. ground forces, which include 155 mm howitzer which is known to be nuclear capable, as well as inspecting, for example, the Abrams tank which is conventional only, then why is it impossible to do similar inspections with respect to navies?

HOWE said there were many reasons why the Stockholm agreement had omitted navies. That was something that might come later. In defense of navies, HOWE noted that in 1972 the U.S. and the USSR signed the agreement on the high seas. Despite opposition, this was a good agreement which had reduced tensions; it was discussed every year. It is something we can build on.

AKHROMEYEV said all honor and praise were due to the U.S. side for that agreement. But he had raised the issue not of inspecting navies in their entirety, but limiting SLCMs to one or two types of submarines and surface ships with respect to long range SLCMS on board which would be subject to verification. Only this would be monitored. He repeated he could not understand why this could not be done. This has been discussed many times between the sides but the U.S. has not convinced him. HOWE said the Soviet proposal to limit the numbers of SLCMs on certain classes of ships and submarines was something the sides could discuss; it might be possible to agree on flexible deployment of forces.

AKHROMEYEV repeated that the sides would have to find some formula to address this issue, because without SLCM there could be no treaty. Without SLCM there could be no joint statement from this summit. It was obvious we would need to discuss this issue further.

ON-SITE INSPECTION OF DECLARED FACILITIES

NITZE said paragraph 6⁷ of the Soviet text also gave rise to question with respect to the right to short notice on-site inspections at locations given during data exchanges where covert activities could be occurring.

LEHMAN said the U.S. side was not sure it had understood the phrase "given during data exchanges." This appears to require a side to declare in advance the sites it intended to inspect, *before* they had been identified as suspect.

KARPOV said this is analogous to the INF Treaty. Inspections in INF are on the basis of declared facilities listed in the MOU on Data. One should apply the same principle to START. This would limit the opportunities of both sides to circumvent an agreement on strategic offensive arms providing for 50% reductions. The Soviets propose that the facilities which were to be subject to inspection be declared.

LEHMAN said it was the U.S. view that the inspection regime for START must be more extensive than that for INF. We need to work out the details in the treaty. LEHMAN recommended dropping the phrase "given during data exchanges" and substitute the phrase "according to agreed procedures."

AKHROMEYEV said okay. CHERVOV then asked what Lehman meant when he said the START verification regime would have to be

⁷ Paragraph 6 of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) reads: "The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations given during data exchanges where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring." An unknown hand circled the phrase "given during data exchanges."

wider than that for INF. LEHMAN said that whereas the INF Treaty contained a regime for liquidation of an entire class of weapons, under a START treaty the sides would need to verify a large number of residual systems and quite a variety of constraints. Therefore, the sides must have access to a wider range of facilities and systems. We need to work out agreed procedures. LEHMAN said the revised language he suggested does not prejudice this, but that in the end the sides would have to work out the specifics.

AKHROMEYEV said the INF Treaty verification regime works in principle for START verification as well. The Soviet phrase “locations given during data exchanges” implies all of a side’s strategic offensive arms—ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, production facilities, training facilities, bases, everything—would be listed in the memorandum. Such a complete data exchange facilitates inspection on the other side’s territory. It will be an exhaustive list, as in the preceding treaty, and there will be no objection to inspect absolutely everything regarding strategic offensive arms. AKHROMEYEV emphasized “absolutely everything,” and to including everything in the memorandum. There still will be general purpose forces not subject to inspection under this nuclear arms control agreement. Maybe in the future this too will come under a conventional treaty and eventually all weapons of all types will be subject to some form of inspection.

LEHMAN said he understood Akhromeyev’s position. He hoped the problem could be resolved in detail.

CHERVOV asked whether the implication of Lehman’s question meant that the U.S. preferred an inspection regime without any limits of any kind; does the U.S. believe there should be some limits?

LEHMAN asked whether Chervov believed there should be some limits to inspection rights. CHERVOV said yes, and that these would be recorded in the memorandum. LEHMAN replied the U.S. also acknowledges the possibility of some limits. The sides would work out agreed procedures. It is not a question to be resolved in generalizations or in principle. It is a question that will be resolved by working with the specifics. LEHMAN said the Soviet language implies that the other side will be limited to suspect site inspection of facilities declared in advance. There was a need to address the problem of suspect sites that might crop up in the future. The heart of the question, therefore, is the suspect site verification regime.

AKHROMEYEV said he could agree to the revised language proposed by Lehman “according to agreed procedures.” AKHROMEYEV suggested the text be sent to the drafting group.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ABM TREATY

NITZE suggested that the question of subparagraph 7⁸ (SLCMs) be put off till later. Apart from that, the U.S. had no difficulty with the remaining Soviet text with respect to START language.

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side also had no further START language problems. That brings the discussion to the section of the paper dealing with the relationship with the ABM Treaty. This is the most difficult problem. AKHROMEYEV suggested that it may be best before dealing with the text to clarify the positions of the two sides.

NITZE agreed, but said this was also a logical point at which to break the meeting. AKHROMEYEV asked how long, noting that he was willing to work straight through without a break. NITZE suggested 30 minutes and AKHROMEYEV agreed. AKHROMEYEV said after the break the sides must discuss how to record an agreement on the ABM Treaty relationship in the joint statement text. The positions of the two sides as now stated are mutually unacceptable. Therefore, it would be difficult to agree on common language. NITZE said this was true and the sides would have a lot of work to do. AKHROMEYEV repeated that when the meeting resumes the discussion should first be in terms of a statement of position by both sides and then a discussion of the text of the joint statement.

At that point the meeting adjourned for a 30 minute break.

NITZE resumed the meeting by saying that he wanted to give the Soviet side language on Defense and Space that the President had passed to the General Secretary. He then passed over the D&S paragraph (Tab 2).⁹ He noted that it provided for an obligation that would be equally binding on the sides.

Nitze said he wished to summarize the U.S. position with respect to Defense and Space issues. The U.S. was seeking a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect the same time as the START Treaty went into effect. During the first period of this new treaty, both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems

⁸ Paragraph 7 of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) reads: "Measures designed to verify SLCMs by national technical means, cooperative measures for on-site inspections; these inspections could be carried out on any ship, at naval bases, storage and production facilities."

⁹ Attached but not printed is an undated paper that reads: "*DEFENSE & SPACE*. The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva first to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement."

currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty after giving 6 months' notice of intent to deploy. During the nondeployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required.

The Soviet side had been saying a lot lately about "strategic stability" and about its desire to ensure predictability. The U.S. side also placed high priority on continuing—indeed on enhancing—stability. It was with this in mind that the U.S. side proposed its predictability package to ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the nondeployment period. Specifically, the U.S. side proposed that the sides meet regularly to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defensive programs, and to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. These activities could begin immediately upon the entry into force of the Defense and Space Treaty.

The U.S. side took especial note that the General Secretary had acknowledged recently on NBC the Soviet activities comparable to the U.S. SDI program. The U.S. side believed agreement on its proposed predictability package would serve to build confidence and reduce suspicions between the sides regarding each other's programs. At this point, Nitze passed over a four-point paper on D&S (Tab 3).¹⁰

AKHROMEYEV said he had some questions. The U.S. side referred to a new treaty. What about the existing ABM Treaty? What relationship would exist between that treaty and the preparation and signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms? During what period would the Treaty of 1972 be observed? In what cases could a party withdraw from that treaty if the treaty reducing strategic offensive arms had been signed? What should the other side do if one side, after the agreed period expired, began deployment of a nationwide ABM defense?

¹⁰ Attached but not printed is an undated draft text, suggesting that when negotiating the Joint Draft Treaty Text, "negotiators build upon the following elements: (a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty; (b) after that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 6 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the ABM Treaty; (c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and (d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the two sides meet regularly: (1) to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defense programs; and, (2) to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities." (No classification marking)

NITZE said that, regarding the first question, the ABM Treaty would continue in effect just as it was now. A side could withdraw from the Treaty according to its terms as it could today, but it could not deploy even if it withdrew. Regarding the third question, the Treaty the U.S. was proposing would say that the sides could not deploy during the nondeployment period. After the period, it would be permissible for either side to deploy defenses after 6 months' notice.

COOPER said the U.S. was interested in deploying defenses as soon as possible. The kind it sought to deploy would be those that were effective. The U.S. side believed the strategic regime could be stable with both offense and defense on both sides. It saw this treaty as a vehicle for getting there. He was speaking of a treaty of unlimited duration, just as Lehman spoke of a treaty of unlimited duration in START. Each treaty would be of benefit to both sides and should stand alone.

AKHROMEYEV asked if it was not agreed that the treaties were interrelated. COOPER replied that it was agreed that they would enter into force at the same time. The U.S. saw its proposal as meeting the General Secretary's concern about a rapid movement to deployment.

CHERVOV asked if the U.S. side made provision for the relationship of the ABM Treaty to reductions in strategic offensive arms. NITZE responded that the U.S. side did take seriously the interrelationship between offense and defense, but this did not mean there was a specific relationship between START and the D&S Treaty.

CHERVOV asked how the relationship could be recorded. NITZE said there would be two treaties of an equally binding nature, entered into concurrently.

KAMPELMAN added that the interrelationship was recognized when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. The assumption was that, after the Treaty was signed, there would be offensive reductions. Now the sides were arriving at those reductions. Much had happened since then; the U.S. objective was to get the reductions completed.

There was a difference of opinion between the sides on what the ABM Treaty meant. The sides had never had to face the question of new technologies until recently. The current effort was to see if they could find a formulation not pregnant with further argument between the sides. The question of what the ABM Treaty meant was only a formula for further argument. The theme the U.S. side was hearing from the General Secretary was predictability and no deployment. That was what the U.S. side was trying to address, some predictability for both sides without either deploying.

The U.S. side did not believe defensive programs should interfere with offensive reductions from either a logical or a military point of

view. The sides were talking about reductions in offensive systems to a level higher than in 1972. To respond to Soviet concerns, the U.S. side was saying that the Defense and Space Treaty could enter into force at the same time as START reductions.

As for the question of what would happen if one side decided to deploy, if that side were in violation of its commitment not to deploy, there would be lots of remedies. If the deployment occurred after the agreed period expired, it should not impact on keeping reductions going. But the sides would be talking to each other during the intervening period of time. The START Treaty would have a provision that, if either side believed its supreme national interests were in jeopardy, it could respond. But, if one considered that the START reductions were not that great compared to 1972 levels, it should not be a matter of tremendous concern.

KARPOV said he thought the discussion was going in the wrong direction. He had the joint statement from the Shevardnadze visit to Washington on October 30.¹¹ It stated clearly that the two sides should determine the agenda of future negotiations and work out instructions to delegations to reach agreement on complying with the ABM Treaty and nonwithdrawal from the Treaty for an agreed period of time. The Ministers had not been talking about a new treaty to supplement the ABM Treaty, but rather an agreement not to withdraw from the existing ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV, reading from the October 30 joint statement, said that during the meeting in the U.S., the General Secretary and the President would determine the agenda. This was the agenda: Preparation of an agreement on reductions of strategic offensive arms and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time.

COOPER replied that, in Geneva, the sides had spoken of the form that the commitment would take. The U.S. side preferred a treaty, while the Soviet side talked about an agreement, but both sides talked about a stand-alone document. He understood that the Soviet side wanted a legally binding commitment that would not be part of the ABM Treaty or the START Treaty. The sides had been talking about what to call it since the Soviet side tabled its draft agreement on July

¹¹ See Document 222.

29.¹² Were the sides talking about a labeling problem here or was there a more fundamental problem?

KARPOV said the problem was that the Ministerial discussion and thorough work by the sides had created a formulation approved by the Ministers. This formulation should now be the guidance for the sides.

COOPER said the U.S. side understood the formulation to call for separate, legally binding documents. KARPOV replied that that was not the problem; the problem was that the accord should be related to compliance with the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time without the right to withdraw.

AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. side was challenging the agreement between Ministers. On the basis of this agreement, the General Secretary had come to Washington. The Soviet side had guidance from the General Secretary on this basis. The agreed task was not to elaborate a new agreement, but to comply with the ABM Treaty.

LINHARD said the U.S. side believed its position was consistent with the Ministerial agreement. Was the issue one treaty or one agreement? KARPOV said this was not the issue; the question was with regard to substance. Would there be a provision on compliance with the ABM Treaty and nonwithdrawal from that Treaty? This provision could be part of the START Treaty, a separate protocol in the START Treaty, or a protocol to the ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet position was that there was an intimate relationship between deliberations on a treaty reducing strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty within a fixed period of time. This relationship could be recorded as the sides

¹² Attached but not printed is a paper titled "Karpov's Revised Defense and Space Language Read During Morning Session of Arms Control Working Group, December 9, 1987," which reads: "*The General Secretary and the President also discussed the situation at the negotiations on questions of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and space. They agreed to instruct their Geneva delegations to work out an agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972 and on nonwithdrawal from that treaty for an agreed period of time. Such an agreement would be recorded in a treaty on strategic offensive arms or in a protocol to that treaty or in a protocol to the ABM Treaty. In any case, the agreement should have the same legal status as the START Treaty itself. The two sides proceed from the premise that the ABM Treaty remains of unlimited duration and will be in force after the agreement on the nonwithdrawal period expires if the sides do not decide otherwise. Upon completion of 50% reductions of strategic offensive arms, 2–3 years before the expiration of the agreed nonwithdrawal period, the two sides will begin negotiations on future commitments in the field of ABM defense having in mind assuring predictability in the development of Soviet-American strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability and reduced risk of nuclear war. If the sides deem it appropriate such an agreement could as well enter into force even prior to the expiration of the agreed period.*" At the bottom of the paper is a note: "Underlining indicates text included in written form given by Masterkov to Linhard at lunch, but not present as read out orally in the morning Working Group."

deemed necessary and appropriate; the Soviet side had suggested three options.

The ABM Treaty should stay in force for a ten-year period as signed in 1972. If, within that period, either side became concerned about how the other side was complying with the Treaty, the sides should settle their concerns within the framework of the SCC. They should exchange information and allow inspection of the facilities causing concern.

Since the view of the goal of deploying a nationwide defense was different between the sides, the Soviet side was stating that, if either side proceeded with deployment of a nationwide defense, then the Treaty on strategic offensive arms would be invalid. If the Treaty had already been signed, ratified and implemented, the Treaty would not be in force anymore and the sides could act as necessary.

The Soviet side had other proposals which it had made earlier and which it wished to confirm now. This included a list of devices with certain characteristics that could be deployed in space. The U.S. position had been specified, and the Soviet side had outlined its position. How could the sides find mutually acceptable language? This could be done, provided the agreement between the Ministers was complied with. A formula should be recorded in the joint text.

KAMPELMAN suggested it might be necessary to refer this issue to the Ministers. But some clarification was needed. The U.S. side was totally within the spirit of the Ministerial statement. That statement did not refer to several things that had been included in the Soviet position. The Soviet side talked about complying with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, but it knew the sides disagreed on that. The U.S. side was trying to avoid disputes.

He had thought the Soviet side had said it was worried about deployment; the Soviet side's own statement had said that. That aspect the sides agreed on. The sides should take the area on which they agreed and build on it.

On the other question, every party had the right, if it felt its supreme national interests were in danger, to act to protect itself. For the U.S. side to acknowledge at this time in the START Treaty that deployment anytime would threaten supreme national interests and nullify reductions would be to testify to a conclusion that the U.S. side did not share with the Soviet side. The U.S. was still doing research. Both sides knew that over time they could change positions as they saw new developments.

AKHROMEYEV replied that he was not suggesting language, but just trying to understand the U.S. position and outline that of the Soviet side. There appeared to be a very serious issue on which the sides were now agreed, that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a certain

period of time. Was it true that the issue was the period of time? The relationship with the treaty on strategic offensive arms should be reflected in the document. The rest of the Soviet position was not agreed to by the U.S., and he understood that. Perhaps the sides could find some joint common language.

LINHARD suggested the sides break the problem down into its parts and go through each. The U.S. side had gone through the Soviet text point-by-point to see how the sides differed. In the first paragraph, the Soviet side was talking about a protocol to the START Treaty. He thought it was agreed that there was an issue of form. This was a minor issue, but it had to be resolved. The U.S. side felt strongly about it.

In the second element was a nonwithdrawal period of 10 years. The U.S. side had talked about a period during which it would not take action to deploy. The third element indicated that the Defense and Space agreement would have the same force as START; the U.S. side wanted this outcome as well.

The third paragraph suggested that the sides could refer any concerns to the SCC; the U.S. side agreed that concerns could be referred to the appropriate body. The Soviet side had mentioned an exchange of data; that was common with U.S. language. The Soviet idea for inspection of sites had some commonality with the U.S. open labs proposal.

The fourth paragraph indicated that a side would be free from START if the other side violated the Defense and Space agreement. The U.S. side had nothing like this.

The fifth paragraph called for a 2–3 year discussion period. The U.S. side had nothing about this, but had talked about something like these discussions before.

The sixth paragraph concerned the list proposal, which the U.S. language did not address. The U.S. language had either side free to deploy after 6 months' notice; he understood the Soviet position to be that the sides would revert to the ABM Treaty. Maybe, by comparing language and finding common areas, the sides could build the basis for a joint statement.

AKHROMEYEV said this was a logical train of thought. This approach could help the sides arrive at mutually acceptable language. LINHARD replied that he was not sure that, without a bit more, the sides could simply take the language of either side and modify it slightly. He was looking for a way to extract elements from the language of both sides.

AKHROMEYEV asked how the sides might proceed in practical terms. LINHARD suggested they use a period of time to continue to explore where they differed. Then they could go to lunch and, before

meeting at 6, they could come up with some thoughts on the matter. They might exchange something, either before or at the 6:00 meeting.

AKHROMEYEV said he had tried to find something proper here, and he would read it aloud. Perhaps the sides could work on it before the meeting at 6. He then read the Soviet-proposed language (Tab 4).¹³

NITZE indicated that he had thought the Soviet position was that, after the expiration of the period, the ABM Treaty would resume full force. The Soviet side was now saying that the ABM Treaty would continue forever unless the sides decided otherwise. Would there be no more right of withdrawal upon 6 months' notice?

KARPOV replied that the Treaty would remain in force as it was now unless the sides agreed otherwise.

COOPER said he thought the Soviet side had included the possibility of a separate agreement. Now he understood that that was not one of the three options being proposed. Did the Soviet side now reject a separate treaty?

KARPOV said that talk about a treaty that could supersede the ABM Treaty was for the next stage. He was saying that, with the entry into force of a START Treaty, one of three options should be implemented. The second stage would be upon completion of 50% reductions; the sides would then discuss what to do after the expiration of the nonwithdrawal period.

LINHARD said he had not heard a reference to 10 years in the language the Soviet side had just read. KARPOV explained that the language took into account the differences of the sides on the length of the period. They could just record that there would be an agreed period, as recorded in the joint statement of October 30.

LINHARD said that, in comparing what had just been read to what the Soviet side had proposed before, it appeared that the Soviet side had deleted the paragraphs on going to the SCC, on being released from START in case of violations of the Defense and Space agreement, and on the list of devices.

KARPOV responded that, if it was understood that the sides could go to the SCC, perhaps they should write it down. The second paragraph had been omitted just to make the text brief. The third paragraph was perhaps advisable if there was a willingness to try the list approach; alternatively, the sides could leave it out for now in the interest of time and consider it later on.

¹³ In telegram 8164 from NST Geneva, July 29, the Department discussed the Soviet draft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870724–0140)(S)

LINHARD said he thought the sides agreed on taking questions that might arise in the future to some forum. He recognized that there was motion in some of the Soviet language, but he was not sure it was a text the sides could draw upon. It was important to find a formulation that focused on the issue of deployment, because that was common to the positions of both sides. The U.S. side would have to look at the Soviet language; he was not sure it would work.

AKHROMEYEV suggested the sides send representatives to the Drafting Group with this text. NITZE proposed that the Group look not only at the Soviet language but also at the first paragraph passed by the U.S. side. AKHROMEYEV agreed.

KAMPELMAN said both sides understood that they differed on what it meant to comply with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. position on that question permitted it theoretically to do all the testing it wanted short of deployment. The U.S. had not acted on that view but had asserted it. Would the Soviet side be satisfied with a statement saying the sides agreed to comply with the ABM Treaty even if it was aware of the significant differences in interpretation?

AKHROMEYEV replied that he had outlined the Soviet position. If the sides were able to arrive at mutually acceptable language here, it would be reported to the leadership. He would also report Kampelman's rather significant statement.

KAMPELMAN asked if Akhromeyev understood why the U.S. side was hesitant about any phrase referring to "agreement" when there was none. AKHROMEYEV responded that he was fully aware of what Kampelman was saying.

KAMPELMAN asked why the Soviet side hesitated to use nondeployment language. AKHROMEYEV replied that he thought this would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. He had had a lot of discussion with Nitze on this. He had referred to Article V,¹⁴ and Nitze had referred to Agreed Statement D. This disagreement should be taken into account by the two sides.

KAMPELMAN objected that both sides agreed that deployment would violate the ABM Treaty. That was why the U.S. side had pro-

¹⁴ Article V of the ABM Treaty states: "(1) Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based; (2) Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers." ("Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," May 26, 1972, *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 316)

posed a nondeployment commitment. Why was the Soviet side reluctant?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side was convinced that Article V prohibited not only deployment but also testing of space-based ABM systems, while Agreed Statement D concerned the area of deployment which each side was entitled to for systems based on other physical principles. Now he was trying to find new language. Before either side accepted new wording, they should report to the leaders. But first, wording should be formulated. It should be mutually acceptable. The sides could do it *ad ref*, and report to leaders.

COOPER asked if it would help to include language acknowledging the continuing existence of the ABM Treaty along with the new treaty the U.S. side was proposing. AKHROMEYEV replied that Karpov had put forward the Soviet position quite clearly.

NITZE proposed that the Drafting Group meet between 5 and 6 to work out something on this subject. The Working Group could assemble at 6 and work from 6 to 7 to see if they could agree on final recommendations for Ministers.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, saying the sides should now instruct the Drafting Group to complete work on the text as a whole, especially on the subject of the ABM Treaty and its relationship with START. After dinner at the Soviet Embassy, the sides could meet again and complete work on the text, so they would be able to report by morning to the leaders. He did not know whether there would be a separate document or a portion for the joint statement.

ROWNY said the sides should make clear to the Drafting Group that they were not agreed on what constituted compliance with the ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV noted that the sides now had a certain common understanding that a text could be worked out, and also a common understanding that there was disagreement on their understanding of the ABM Treaty.

NITZE said the U.S. side thought Article V applied only to components defined in Article II. ROWNY suggested that, instead of going back to Article V, the Soviet side take note that the U.S. position was in the four-point paper that Nitze had given them.

AKHROMEYEV said he would have to report this disagreement to the leaders. Differences of principle should be understood by the Ministers.

KAMPELMAN indicated, for the record, that the sides fully understood that they had a difference of opinion on the Krasnoyarsk radar. NITZE added that there were many issues the sides had only touched on; Krasnoyarsk was an example. AKHROMEYEV agreed that there

were many issues to deal with in Geneva, and noted that the Soviet side thought the Thule and Fylingdales radars were violations.

KARPOV said he had heard that the U.S. side was not going to publish the INF MOU. Was this so? Was this a unilateral decision or something the sides should decide together?

KAMPELMAN replied that this was a good point. He had talked to Obukhov about it yesterday. He thought the sides should operate on the assumption that the MOU would be published, but would get back to the Soviet side on this.

KARPOV said the Soviet side was prepared to publish. NITZE said he thought the question was one of timing, and KAMPELMAN repeated that the U.S. side would get back to the Soviet side on this.

248. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1987, 6–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Amb. Nitze
Amb. Kampelman
Amb. Lehman
Amb. Cooper
Amb. Rowny
Amb. Hanmer
Dir. Adelman
AS Holmes
Mr. Castillo
Adm. Howe
DAS Thomas
DAS Joseph
Col. Linhard
Dr. Graham
Mr. Timbie
Ms. Sutter

U.S.S.R.

Marshall Akhromeyev
Amb. Karpov
Amb. Obukhov
Amb. Masterkov
Amb. Nazarkin
Gen. Medvedev
Gen. Chervov
Mr. Popov
Mr. Shebalin

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State. It followed a plenary meeting, also at the Department of State, led by Shultz and Shevardnadze, on the topics of human rights and regional affairs. That meeting, which Nitze and Akhromeyev and their respective delegations did not attend, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Document 111.

Mr. McConnell
Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

START, Defense and Space

AKHROMEYEV suggested the sides begin by hearing the reports from the Drafting Group, and NITZE agreed.

OBUKHOV said that, as a result of the day's work, the group had, on the whole, reached agreement on the text dealing with strategic offensive arms. Comparing the Russian and English texts, he realized it would be necessary to do some drafting work, but this could be done in a short time. Among the outstanding issues to be considered by the Working Group, and later in the Drafting Group, were questions concerning the number of warheads the sides would deploy on ballistic missiles. Specific figures had been recorded tentatively. There were also two blanks in the text. These dealt with limits on long-range SLCMs. The U.S. side had thus far made no counterproposal on SLCM limits. He suggested that, after this brief meeting, the Drafting Group continue working on the text, and he expected the U.S. side to introduce its proposal on SLCMs.

The Drafting Group had also considered proposals regarding the ABM Treaty. Here, regrettably, no common text was emerging. The Soviet side had not yet studied a Russian text of the U.S. proposal, but it did not appear to contain any changes in the U.S. position. It would perhaps be appropriate to write a shorter joint text on this subject, based on the language of the joint statement of October 30. That language was in the Soviet text proposed earlier. The U.S. proposal did not make any step toward the Soviet proposal.

HANMER reported that he essentially agreed with Obukhov's report on the START section. He summarized the outstanding issues as two: the numbers for Soviet SLBMs were yet to be provided and placeholder language was in the text for SLCMs. Otherwise, the agreed text was very adequate.

NITZE said he had some language to propose on SLCMs, and passed a text (attached)² to the Soviet side.

After studying the text, AKHROMEYEV said he thought the sides had not found a solution to the cruise missile question. He believed

² Attached but not printed is an undated draft text: "The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 SNDV limits. The sides committed themselves to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such a limitation, including the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection."

the sides should reach agreement on the number of SLCMs deployed in excess of 6000 warheads, the types of ships on which SLCMs could be deployed, and where inspections should take place. This was an elementary thing. Without such agreement, there would be no instructions to delegations; the delegations would mark time and would prepare nothing.

NITZE disagreed, saying each side would issue instructions to its delegation and would try to work this problem out. The technology for verification had been previously reviewed by the U.S. side, but it would undertake to review it again.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood Nitze's point, but today Ministers were in Washington. They expected proposals from this group. The delegations would be in Geneva, far from Moscow and Washington. Both sides knew the capabilities of the delegations there. The draft joint statement contained no basis on which the delegations could work. While on other issues there was a certain basis, there was no prospect on SLCMs.

NITZE said this should not be a surprise. At Reykjavik, the U.S. side had said this problem was very difficult; it did not see a way to solve it except, perhaps, through unilateral declarations. The Soviet side had not been able to accept that, but the U.S. side saw no way to make the problem easier.

KARPOV argued that more than a year had passed since Reykjavik. It was time to come up with a solution. The U.S. side said the Soviet side had introduced inadequate verification methods, but the U.S. side had introduced nothing. The U.S. side had no desire to consider this question.

AKHROMEYEV concluded that the U.S.-proposed SLCM language could be included in the text, but added that he considered it to be inadequate. He would report to his Foreign Minister that this was a unilateral U.S. proposal, and that, since the Soviet proposal had not been taken into consideration, there had been no movement.

KAMPELMAN asked how the Soviet side would feel about putting a period after the reference to the aggregates and leaving out the characterization.

AKHROMEYEV asked what would be done about verification measures. In Reykjavik, the sides had already agreed that SLCMs should be limited, and that this should be included in the treaty. The current U.S. proposal did not move the sides ahead by one inch. The Soviet side, after Reykjavik, had introduced a series of proposals for relevant instructions.

NITZE replied that it was just in the last few days that the Soviet verification proposals had been presented. They had not been made

at Reykjavik. What the U.S. side was proposing now was that, even though it had already looked at such verification measures, it would re-examine them since they had been raised by the Soviet side. So the situation was not unchanged.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that, while it was true that there had been a change in verification, the Soviet side had proposed specific terms to limit SLCMs to 400 on certain types of submarines. The U.S. side had not once cited a figure or a limit on where they could be deployed. What was the U.S. view?

NITZE said it was not appropriate to negotiate a figure until the sides had some understanding on a general approach to verification of SLCM limits.

Turning to the ABM question, AKHROMEYEV said there appeared to be no common wording. COOPER agreed, but added that the U.S. side had provided new information. It was not entirely correct that the U.S. side had not changed its position, although there were no major changes. This morning, Kampelman had explained the reason for there being no nonwithdrawal language. This afternoon, the U.S. side had returned to nonwithdrawal language, reverting to its previous Geneva position. It had proposed clarifying language to avoid papering over real differences. The U.S. side had sought to modify its lead-in language, taking into account the text Karpov had provided this morning. The Soviet-proposed language on “interrelationship” had given the U.S. side trouble; he understood the words “defense and space” gave the Soviet side trouble. So he had suggested a compromise using the phrase “offense/defense relationship.” Cooper also wanted to raise another issue: for the last 8 or 9 months, the Soviet side had understood that the sides were working for a separate agreement.

AKHROMEYEV interrupted, saying that the sides were wasting time. They had discussed these issues for two hours earlier. The Soviet side had provided its proposed wording, and the U.S. side had said it would study it. The sides had only 5 more minutes for this meeting. He suggested they leave behind their drafters, so they could deal with the problem of the relationship between the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty as it had been set forth in the October 30 Shultz/Shevardnadze joint statement.

COOPER accused the Soviet side of reversing its position concerning a separate treaty.

KARPOV said that the sides, in their drafting work, had to be fully aware of context. He was talking about ensuring in material terms the visit by President Reagan to Moscow next year. If the U.S. side was ready to work, then the sides should work. If the U.S. side was unprepared, it should say so.

KAMPELMAN objected, saying that what he heard Karpov saying was that the U.S. side should agree with the Soviet position or there would be no visit to Moscow. The U.S. side had a right to its own position. KARPOV countered by urging that the sides discuss real proposals.

AKHROMEYEV said that no one was dictating anything to anyone. But the sides could not proceed as Cooper was doing. The sides had discussed the issues for two hours and Cooper was now, eight hours later, just repeating the same arguments. There was no time for this. He suggested the sides leave their drafters behind and let them work the basic documents. The Working Group could meet again after dinner to review the work of the Drafting Group. He asked most emphatically that the sides not repeat what had already been said. The U.S. side could maintain its position; he respected that. But the sides should not waste time repeating their positions.

NITZE agreed to leave drafters behind and reconvene after dinner, which he estimated would be about 10:30 p.m.

249. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 9, 1987

We have made some progress today on START. A sheet summarizing the differences is attached. The steps forward are:

—Akhromeyev has agreed to put the 50% throw weight cut in the Treaty.

—1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles is agreed.

—Akhromeyev agrees on a ceiling on ballistic missile warheads, and proposes to negotiate on a number between 4800 and 5100. He suggests dropping all other sublimits.

—He agrees to attribute numbers of warheads to ICBMs and SLBMs, and we agree on the numbers for both sides' existing ICBMs and on numbers for U.S. SLBMs. (He hasn't given us Soviet SLBM numbers yet). He wants to base the numbers of warheads, however, on the maximum tested; whereas we want to verify the number by on-site inspection of deployed missiles.

—Soviets agree to ban encryption of telemetry.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret.

We are far apart on SLCMs and on rules attributing numbers of ALCMs to bombers. (He says there will be no START Treaty and no joint statement unless we work something out on SLCMs.) The Soviet paper² this morning would constrain only nuclear-armed ALCMs, but this appears to have been a mistake, and the Soviets have bracketed the term “nuclear-armed,” so there is no progress to report on this issue.

The drafting group has produced general START language to capture the above situation and refer everything else to Geneva. The text that has been agreed is good. We are negotiating language on SLCMs.

On defense and space, Akhromeyev emphasizes the October joint statement, which he says is the basis of Gorbachev’s visit, and which he says we are walking back. Working out some language in this area is the other major objective for tonight.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

START

1. Throw Weight

US: Record commitment in Treaty	USSR: Could be common document
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2. Sublimits

Ballistic Missile Warheads

US: 4800	USSR: 5100
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ICBM and SLBM Warheads

US: 3300 ICBM warheads, no sublimit on SLBM warheads	USSR: 3300 ICBM warheads and 3300 SLBM warheads, or drop both. Assert they will not deploy more than 3300 ICBM RVs.
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² Reference is to footnote 2, Document 247.

³ No classification marking.

3. *Counting Rules*

ALCMs

US: Attribute 6 per bomber
equipped for ALCMS

USSR: Attribute a number
reflecting the maximum
capability for each
bomber type, inspection
(can't resolve here)

ALCMs Covered by START

US: Nuclear-armed; range over
1500 km

USSR: Bracketed "nuclear-armed"
(answer in the morning)
range over 600 km

Soviet SLBM and some ICBM Warhead Numbers

US: Soviets should provide
numbers

USSR: Numbers in the morning

4. *SLCMs*

US: Find mutually acceptable
solution; seek effective
verification

USSR: Limits on numbers and
platforms

250. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9–10, 1987, 11:05 p.m.–12:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Amb. Nitze
Amb. Kampelman
Amb. Lehman
Amb. Cooper
Amb. Rowny
Amb. Hanmer
Dir. Adelman
AS Holmes
Mr. Castillo
Adm. Howe

U.S.S.R.

Marshall Akhromeyev
Amb. Karpov
Amb. Obukhov
Amb. Masterkov
Amb. Nazarkin
Gen. Medvedev
Gen. Chervov
Mr. Popov
Mr. Shebalin

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

DAS Thomas
DAS Joseph
Col. Linhard
Dr. Graham
Mr. Timbie
Ms. Sutter
Mr. McConnell
Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Draft Joint Text on START, Defense and Space

The sides proceeded with a page-by-page review of the draft joint text (attached). AKHROMEYEV asked why the word “nuclear-armed” was bracketed in the paragraph on ALCMs. LINHARD replied that the brackets had been placed there by the Soviet side; the U.S. side would like to remove them. After a side conversation with Karpov, AKHROMEYEV said he understood.

NITZE referred to the two sentences on throwweight and noted that the second sentence left open how the commitment on throwweight would be recorded. In view of the fact that this would be a mutual obligation, it seemed that it should be part of the Treaty, perhaps an agreed statement within the Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said he had no objection in principle. It should be recorded in some common or joint document. The delegations could determine the form in the course of their work.

Referring to the paragraph on sublimits, NITZE noted the phrase “number to be agreed” regarding a ballistic missile warhead sublimit, and said the sides would need to reach agreement on that number. Was the Soviet side not yet ready to agree to a number between 4800 and 5100? AKHROMEYEV replied that they were not.

NITZE continued that the U.S. side would like to see a 3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads. The Soviet side had said it would not be going above 3300 ICBM warheads. How the sides might codify that was an issue that remained.

AKHROMEYEV said this was covered by the phrase “number to be agreed,” but added that this phrase spoke of an aggregate ceiling, not a separate ceiling on any leg. NITZE said this was another matter to discuss further, and AKHROMEYEV said he understood the wording of this paragraph to reserve the right of the U.S. side to raise an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300 in the future. He had no objection to this.

NITZE said the main questions left open in the ALCM paragraph were whether only nuclear-armed ALCMs would be counted, the definition of “long range,” and the number of ALCMs to attribute to each type of heavy bomber. These issues would need work, either in the

Working Group or in Geneva. AKHROMEYEV replied that the last two questions the Working Group would not be able to address; they should be referred to the delegations. He would reply the next morning on the “nuclear-armed” question.

Continuing to the ballistic missile counting rule paragraph, NITZE noted that there were still blanks to fill in for Soviet SLBM warhead numbers; also the SS-N-23 needed to be added to the list. Would it be possible to get the numbers by the next morning?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side would consider this question and provide answers the next morning. Turning to the SLCM paragraph, he proposed inserting at the beginning of the last sentence the following phrase: “The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships, and to seek . . .”

NITZE replied that the U.S. side had difficulty with this language, for reasons he had outlined earlier. HOWE added that the U.S. side simply was not ready at this time to commit itself on types, ceilings, etc. The language it had proposed, pushing toward finding a solution by finding a verification method, was as far as the U.S. side could go at this time.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that the current paragraph was diplomatic language creating the appearance that the sides were deciding something on SLCMs when, as a matter of fact, they were deciding nothing and making no commitments. On other issues, the sides had given working instructions to the delegations. The U.S. side would be able to use this language as the basis for removing the SLCM problem from these talks, leaving the SLCMs deployed on ships while concluding a START Treaty that omitted SLCMs. Certain commitments should be made here. This was the argument Akhromeyev had had with Perle in Reykjavik. The Soviet side had made verification proposals; he did not know why the U.S. side considered them ineffective. Without a solution on SLCMs, there could be no treaty. But the U.S. side was now suggesting a general provision. The sides had not yet agreed on a specific number of missiles or specific types of ships, but it was necessary to stipulate the principle here.

NITZE repeated that the U.S. side could not agree with that approach. One alternative was to keep the language in brackets, so the Soviet position would be known.

AKHROMEYEV agreed to put the language in brackets and report it as not agreed to the leaders. He had no comments on the rest of the START text. It was up to the leaders to decide, but his opinion was that, without a provision on SLCMs like that the Soviet side had proposed, the text would not be acceptable for the Soviet side. He would

report that as well. He thought the Soviet-proposed language on SLCMs was an absolute minimum to indicate a commitment by both sides.

NITZE said he would report these remarks to Secretary Shultz.

AKHROMEYEV summed up the review of the START text by saying there were two brackets, with the rest of the text agreed. He asked how the U.S. side wished to handle conventional arms. CHERVOV noted that he had discussed this in general terms, in the Vienna context, with Holmes and Thomas. The question of how to handle this section here had already been agreed by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh, based on the results of the conversation between the leaders. The sides had agreed on the need to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe. With that goal in mind, the U.S. and Soviet delegations would be instructed to intensify work on a mandate for negotiations by the 23 countries and on a final document. The Soviet side believed the negotiations should cover conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons. Taking account of NATO views, the Soviet side had agreed to formulate the subject matter so as to include dual-capable systems. Thomas had not objected.

Turning to the Defense and Space text,² AKHROMEYEV said he thought the two sides had failed to prepare mutually acceptable language on the ABM Treaty. The language in the draft text represented mutually exclusive obligations. The Soviet side did not see how to arrive at an agreement here. The sides thus had failed to work out a paper for the President and the General Secretary.

NITZE said he thought all the Group could do was refer this to the leaders the next morning.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, adding that he was prepared to work immediately to find solutions, but the content of the draft ruled out the possibility of agreement. He saw nothing to be done here. If the U.S. side disagreed, he was prepared to stay and work. KARPOV said there was one possible radical solution: everything in brackets could be deleted.

NITZE said the U.S. side would prefer to leave the bracketed material in. The sides could see if the Ministers wanted to remove it.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, but stated that unilateral statements were included in the brackets. The General Secretary could not sign a statement incorporating unilateral positions of the U.S. side. So the sides had failed to elaborate a document.

COOPER said the U.S. side would be happy to have the Soviet side make a unilateral statement of its position.

² Attached but not printed is a December 9 draft joint text on Defense and Space.

AKHROMEYEV replied that the sides were talking about joint instructions to delegations. But the draft text was just a conglomeration of unilateral statements. The first half of the document was more or less acceptable, with only two brackets, only one of a principled nature. However, the second part was a failure. When he had flown to Washington, he had thought there was a greater degree of agreement than was reflected in this document. He had heard positions here that were contrary to what he had heard before. Previously, the sides had emphasized areas of agreement, but this document had accented disagreements.

NITZE suggested that what the sides had done was clarify positions. AKHROMEYEV agreed that the positions of the sides were now perfectly clear.

NITZE said that, at Reykjavik, he had suggested that there were three questions for the Ministers: the length of the agreed period, what would happen during the period, and what would happen after. The sides were still not agreed on any of the three.

COOPER added that the sides were also not agreed on what a nonwithdrawal commitment meant. He and Obukhov had worked hard to bridge the positions of the sides, to get language not prejudicial to the positions of either side. There were no new positions here.

AKHROMEYEV voiced concern that now there would be mutual recriminations; this was not what the sides should do. Their work should be positive, but they had failed. He suggested the Group adjourn and report later that morning to Ministers. Then the Ministers, the General Secretary and the President could make the necessary decisions. NITZE agreed.

Attachment

Draft Joint Text³

Washington, December 9, 1987, 9 p.m.

JOINT TEXT

START: The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic

³ No classification marking.

Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling, the number to be agreed, on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range [nuclear-armed] air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:____, SS-13:____, SS-N-6:____, SS-N-8:____, SS-N-17:____, SS-N-18:____, and SS-N-20:____. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

- (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

- (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited

items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

251. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

Mr. Secretary:

Attached are materials for your meeting with Shevardnadze this morning:

1. *The draft START Text.*² It is quite good, and incorporates real advances in throwweight, ballistic missile warhead counting rules, and telemetry encryption. Akhromeyev says he will give us an answer on one bracket in the ALCM counting rule (“nuclear-armed”) in the morning, and give us the Soviet SLBM warhead numbers at the same time. If Akhromeyev removes the bracket, this will represent another major step toward our position.

Unfortunately, after we saw you last night Akhromeyev added a phrase to the SLCM paragraph which we bracketed. It commits the sides to establish ceilings on SLCMs, and confine them to certain classes of ships. In our view, the unbracketed language committing us to seek effective methods of verification of SLCM limits is as far as we can go at this time, and we cannot commit to limits until the verification is in hand. Akhromeyev says there will be no START agreement without SLCM constraints, so he would recommend against the START statement if the bracketed sentence is not included.

The guidance in the NSDD is to seek Soviet views on how SLCM limits could be verified, which we have done. Colin planned to take this subject up with the Chiefs, and you might touch base with him before you see Shevardnadze. Akhromeyev will be seeing Crowe in the morning, and their conversation could be helpful.

Points to make:

—We have studied verification of SLCM limits.

—Have not found anything that would give us confidence.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret.

² Attached but not printed. See Attachment, Document 250.

- Therefore cannot commit to limits on SLCMs.
- We have agreed to take another look at the verification question.
- Let's see what we come up with. If we find something, we can revisit this issue.

2. *The START Issues Sheet*³

3. *The draft Defense and Space Text*.⁴ There are a number of brackets. The Working Group could have dropped the pair of brackets dealing with what happens after the period, and the two bracketed unilateral statements on conduct during the period. They have been left in to give you a basis for discussing these two subjects with Shevardnadze and making clear to him our position, and give you an opportunity to work in Gorbachev's comment about the sides being free to do what they please after the period. (We do not have access to the memcons tonight, so we don't have the language Gorbachev used.) Whenever you wish, you can drop all the brackets except the first. If you want to capture the thought of the "as required" sentence, these words can be added to the first sentence. (The package includes both a clean copy and a markup Bob Linhard has done for Colin.)

The first bracket is the hard one. The Soviets will not want to back away from the October 30 language ("observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period"). The language in the bracket moves away from non-withdrawal toward non-deployment, the direction we want to go. There will be much unhappiness if the qualification in the first bracket were dropped. (Conversely, Karpov suggested dropping *all* the bracketed language, and you may hear that again.)

4. *The Defense and Space Issues Sheet*.

5. *The October 30 Joint Announcement*⁵

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

Washington, undated

Defense and Space

1. Form of Agreement

US: Separate treaty.

USSR: In START Treaty or protocol to START or ABM Treaty.

2. Nature of Commitment

US: Not to withdraw to deploy for a specified period of time.

USSR: Not to withdraw for a specified period of time.

3. After the Period

US: Free to deploy on 6-months' notice.

USSR: ABM Treaty continues in effect (6-months' notice to withdraw).

4. During the Period

US: Right to pursue research, development and testing as required.

USSR: Compliance with the ABM Treaty as it was signed and ratified in 1972. Can be accompanied by a list of devices (and characteristics); tests in space of devices below agreed parameters permitted.

5. Form of Commitment

US: Limited to nonwithdrawal to deploy

USSR: Blanket commitment

6. Offense/Defense

US: Failure to implement START reductions grounds for termination of D&S Treaty and ABM Treaty.

USSR: Practical steps to create nationwide defense or other evident breach frees other side from START reductions.

⁶ No classification marking.

7. *Predictability and Confidence in Non-Deployment*

US: Exchange of data and briefings, observation of tests and visits to research facilities.

USSR:

8. *Further Negotiations*

US:

USSR: After completion of 50% START reductions, 2–3 years before 10-year period expires, negotiations begin on future commitments.

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 10, 1987, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz at Soviet Embassy—8:00 A.M., December 10, 1987

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

The subject then turned to the NST talks. Shevardnadze said he had given over the statement except for the guidelines and instructions to the negotiators. Everything seemed to be in order. The NST discussions reached a deadlock at 12:30 a.m. There are differences of opinion in the basic text. There isn't time now to change; the statement will affect progress. Shultz said we were not finished but we were in pretty [good] shape. On the strategic offensive arms, there was a problem. The language Akhromeyev had was tabled last night on SLCMs. He will be meeting with Admiral Crowe this morning. When they would emerge, he didn't know. But in a general way, we see it as follows: the unbracketed language says we will be addressing SLCMs on-site to 6000 and we are committed to consider verification, which we con-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Washington Summit Day Three, December 10, 1987 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the Soviet Embassy. All blank underscores are in the original. Another memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 112.

sider to be more difficult than you do, but we are ready to work at it. This language goes further than we have gone before and represents some advantages. I suggest we wait to hear what the two military men report after their meeting. Shevardnadze said very well; let us wait. We are not trying to set a specific number. This is one thing we cannot settle at this time.

Shultz said no, the unbracketed contains the word “limited.” This is broad and includes numbers and other things as well, such as range. Shevardnadze said that SLCMs are a fundamental problem; the Secretary General has emphasized this. Shultz said he had two suggestions to make on the paragraph concerning the ABM Treaty. These would remove not all, but most of the brackets. Both sides agree that it is desirable to have discussion of stability as we get near end of ____; he said he would look at the memorandum of conversation with General Secretary. General Secretary said should the American side ultimately decide to deploy, that would be alright. At the end of the period, US could decide what to do. Soviets could accept that. Shultz said he had taken a look at stability and the General Secretary’s thought and committed them into a clause that could be inserted at the end of the bracketed section at end of first long sentence. He would read it and give to Shevardnadze, which he did.

After reading it, Karpov asked about the bracketed section on the end of the first sentence. Shultz said no, we can solve some problems, but not all. Shevardnadze said at Shultz’s suggestion, it does not appear to raise a problem but their side must study. Shultz said we are dealing with another issue where there is a difference of opinion, but we are trying to narrow it. The two suggestions were the insert in the first sentence after the word “testing” and before the words “as required.” The bracketed phrase at the end of sentence would remain. No suggestion for it. Shultz noted that with these changes, one could drop all the rest of bracketed language. Shevardnadze said if you accept the language, we will have only one bracketed. Shultz said yes, I will express my preliminary opinion. I don’t think the military will _____. Shevardnadze said I have to talk to higher authorities.

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 10, 1987, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Marshall Akhromeyev
Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Lehman
Colonel Linhard
(Later joined by Secretary Shultz
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Powell)

Akhromeyev began by saying he would like to present a brief report. Mr. Karpov and Akhromeyev have been asked by Gorbachev to meet with the U.S. Working Group to present the Soviet ideas with respect to the text² that was produced by the Working Group and clarified by a conversation between Shultz and Shevardnadze³ in the presence of Karpov and Nitze. He proposed to first present their suggestions and then to discuss them. After discussion it would be up to the U.S. side what to do with the General Secretary's wishes which Akhromeyev was conveying to us.

Akhromeyev had no comments on page 1. He wished to address the suggestions on pages 2 and 3 together. There were brackets around "nuclear-armed" in paragraph (B) on ALCMs. He suggested we remove the brackets. At the same time he proposed to remove the brackets in paragraph (D) on page 3 concerning SLCMs. He summarized the proposal as: he was prepared to remove the brackets on page 2 if the U.S. was prepared to remove the brackets on page 3.

On page 4 he had no comments. On page 5, paragraph 9 concerned the ABM Treaty. He suggested reducing the text to "Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement which would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time." He

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. Drafted by Timbie. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

² See Attachment, Document 250.

³ See Document 252.

proposed a second change later in the paragraph which he withdrew when it became clear it was redundant with the words “after which” in the U.S. text.

He concluded that these are the suggestions of Gorbachev. In the START text there were two brackets. His suggestion was to remove both brackets, from “nuclear-armed” in the ALCM section and from the words “to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships, and” in the SLCM section. In paragraph 9 the words “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty” and “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty” would be deleted.

Linhard said he would like to ask a question about the START material. He would like to understand as precisely as possible the concern on SLCMs. The bracketed language reads “to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships.” As we talked yesterday, your most fundamental concern was captured in the phrase “to establish ceilings on such missiles.” Is that correct?

Akhromeyev responded “Not really.” There were two concerns. Linhard was right that we want to establish ceilings on the number of SLCMs on submarines and surface ships. We propose 400, you do not agree, and we have to find a number that you agree with. The second concern is verification. If there were no constraints on the classes of submarines and surface ships carrying SLCMs, they could be spread all over very broadly. This would affect all ships, all the Navies, and would not be good. If only certain classes carried SLCMs, there would be no basis to verify all ships. Narrowing down the scope of deployment would narrow down the basis of verification.

Nitze said that as you explain your concern, you say your concern about types of submarines and ships is part of verification. Would it not therefore be adequate if we put into the text the first words now in brackets, and go on to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

Akhromeyev said let us consider paragraph 9, and come back later to this question. Linhard asked for a 5-minute break.

After the break, Nitze said let us begin with paragraph 9. We would be prepared to drop the language in the second bracket if you will drop your brackets around the language “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” Let me go on to the other points. On SLCMs we propose to remove the brackets from the words “to establish ceilings on such missiles” and strike the balance of the bracketed words. He expected the Soviets would drop the bracket on “nuclear-armed.” Finally, Nitze

said this package was acceptable if we had a reference to 4800 in paragraph (A) on the ballistic missile warhead sublimit.

Akhromeyev objected that para. (A) has already been agreed upon. He was prepared to report to the General Secretary this U.S. idea but first wished to consult with his colleague.

After the break Akhromeyev said he took note of our suggestion with respect to paragraph (D) which speaks of certain types of submarines and surface ships. He also takes note of the proposal to strike the brackets in paragraph (B) on ALCMs. And of course he agrees to strike the second bracketed portion of paragraph 9. In paragraph (A) the sides established a sublimit within the 6000 warhead total, and we could set a sublimit of 5000 or 4900. In paragraph 9 what we suggest is to delete both the phrase beginning "while conducting their research . . ." as well as the phrase beginning "in order to deploy . . ."

Nitze responded we cannot agree to that. We have gone as far as we can go. We agreed to drop the second bracket in paragraph 9 in return for retaining the language in the first bracket. How should we report to our leaders?

Linhard said the first bracket contained language you have seen before at Reykjavik and since. The only way we can accept "observe the ABM Treaty" is with the following phrase: "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

Akhromeyev said he too cannot agree. He could not agree to "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." So if this is the end, there are two trade-offs. There is the warhead proposal for para. (A) and the paragraph 9 proposal. You can report to Shultz or the President. It is up to them to decide what to do next.

Linhard said he wished to confirm that we understand the situation. The phrase "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty" was bracketed by the Soviet side. He also sought confirmation that the SLCM language proposed by Amb. Nitze was acceptable.

Akhromeyev replied that we came here with certain deadlines and instructions. As this conversation continues, his instructions change. He had assumed a certain responsibility. He would need to obtain either approval from higher authority or reproach for lack of discipline.

Kampelman said it was the same on our side.

Akhromeyev said we could report back. We could set in subpara. (A) a sublimit of 5000 or 4900 warheads, in exchange for deleting the phrase in paragraph 9 "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." But

then we would also report that we could delete brackets in paragraph (B) and delete proposed language that specifies certain classes of submarines and surface ships on which SLCMs can be deployed.

Linhard said there was one problem. There was no way the U.S. would agree to some level other than 4800 in return for sacrificing a point of principle. You have said in the past that diplomatic matters are slow, but we shouldn't waste time. You came in with brackets and we tried to resolve the problem with our suggestions.

Akhromeyev said he had given the general view of the General Secretary. If he decides to give further instructions to Shevardnadze, that was up to him.

Kampelman drew attention to the heading of the portion of the Joint Statement we are dealing with, which read "START." He asked what the heading of the Soviet text was. Karpov responded their language also says strategic arms reductions. Kampelman said that what we have called paragraph 9 does not really concern START. We should change the heading to "Nuclear and Space Talks." Akhromeyev agreed that instead of START we could label this section talks on nuclear and space arms.

Nitze proposed to address the issues again. Let us drop the 4900 or 5000 and concentrate on paragraph 9. He saw no reason why we couldn't agree that you remove brackets around "nuclear-armed" and we agree to the first part of the SLCM language. This will simplify the issue for the Ministers. The issues to concentrate on are the brackets in paragraph 9.

Akhromeyev said to forget that we discussed paragraph (A). He said he had experience with dealing with Ambassador Nitze and noted he had put forth this proposition only in the context of deleting both phrases in paragraph 9. We have not made a proposal. We have forgotten that. As for the brackets on page 3, we together agree that in paragraph (D) we meet your request for removing the phrase on certain types of submarines and ships, leaving "to establish ceilings on such missiles." On paragraph 9, you delete what was in brackets. There is only one unresolved issue in the entire text, the phrase "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

Nitze said you have misunderstood me. We would remove language in the second brackets only if you agree to include "while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

Akhromeyev said he suggested something only to simplify matters for our leadership. The Ministers, President and General Secretary can decide.

Linhard said he can understand why you have made this proposal. We have also made a proposal. Last night, “nuclear-armed” was not bracketed at all. You were also prepared to accept “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” We are prepared to remove the language in the second brackets, but there is no way we can say, “observe the ABM Treaty” without the phrase “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” The leaders understand this.

Akhromeyev said he understood, that this was a repetition of Reykjavik. The significance of this phrase is understood by them and by us. Only the President and the General Secretary can decide. We can refer the proposal as formulated by the Soviet side at the beginning of this meeting, this conversation can be forgotten. Or mutually remove everything else and retain only this phrase in brackets and let the leaders decide.

Nitze said we should retain both brackets in paragraph 9. We should consider as agreed everything except paragraph 9. There we have two brackets, yours and ours.

Akhromeyev said he had no objections. We can remove everything else. Nothing in (A), the formulations we have discussed for (B) and (D), two brackets in 9. It is up to the leaders to decide.

Nitze said he assumes you will give us the numbers missing for SLBM warheads. Akhromeyev replied that if there is agreement on paragraph 9, they will give the numbers immediately. If there is no agreement, there will be no text, and they would make the numbers available in Geneva at a future date.

Linhard summarized the situation as follows: the title would be changed from “START” to “Nuclear and Space Talks,” no change to paragraph (A), the brackets removed from paragraph (B), “to establish ceilings on such missiles” would be retained in paragraph (D), assuming we have agreement on numbers of SLBM warheads, and two brackets are at issue in paragraph 9. (At this point, Linhard left to get the Ministers.)

Kampelman asked Akhromeyev if there is a way to get our START people in Geneva to focus on verification. There was much to do on that subject. Akhromeyev said we would need to rethink what is included in the brackets. He was referring to testing within the framework of the ABM Treaty. Without this there would be no headway in Geneva, trifles only. 4-½ years have passed since SDI was announced. Now this problem has turned out to be the principal and paramount problem. If we do not resolve the problem of testing ABM components in space, this exposes a threat to USSR security. No more and no less. He was not telling us this for us to convince him it won’t come to pass. He

simply wanted to express the importance of testing. He had talked with Crowe, not on this but on the need for US and Soviet professional military people to meet and talk. Kampelman asked how did he respond. Akhromeyev said Crowe outlined his position and he outlined his. But returning to testing, a wall has emerged between the US and the USSR. This wall must be taken down. How, he personally does not know. Absolutely nothing has been done on this in Geneva.

(At this point, Shevardnadze, Shultz, Carlucci and Powell joined the meeting.)

Shultz began: Mr. Foreign Minister, as I understand the situation, subject to all things being agreed, language on strategic arms has been worked out. We are not agreed on defense and space language. You have bracketed “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” You have also bracketed “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty.” I must say we are astounded. Because the first language has been there for a very long time, and until this morning had been agreed. For us it is essential, because we believe in it, and if we were to take a START Treaty to the Senate with terms that ended the SDI program, there is not the slightest chance it would be ratified. This is necessary language. Until this morning it wasn’t bracketed by you.

Shevardnadze said he understood about your concerns regarding retaining the second part. If you want to retain the second part, it is necessary to add “as it was signed and ratified.” If this is not satisfactory, then we should delete the language in both brackets. (He read the text with both bracketed portions deleted.) We are laying the groundwork, establishing fundamental principles. There is much work to be done in Geneva. Although I had another view when I was working with you, when I worked with specialists and experts we found we could not agree. We should confine ourselves to “observe the ABM Treaty.” This would simplify the problem. Otherwise there can be no instructions. If we insert “as it was signed and ratified,” then we would also be able to retain the second part of paragraph 9.

Shultz said he had a different suggestion. We were willing to drop “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty” on the understanding you are willing to drop your other brackets. So it would read “commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.”

Shevardnadze said he agreed. We can restore it, but we can add the elementary requirement that the Treaty is as it was signed and ratified. This does not mean we cannot continue to argue. We are familiar with your approach.

Shultz replied that as you know, there is an internal debate about the ABM Treaty. This is a confusing debate. It is part substance and part Senate prerogatives. We are fairly well along in resolving this question. Such language would involve the Senate. We are prepared to accept “as it was signed” but it would be better to just refer to the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze said this was just elementary.

Shultz said we were in the middle of a political controversy. We don’t want to inject this agreement into it. Shevardnadze replied why do you think that we do not have debates. I often must debate with Marshall Akhromeyev. Shultz noted that Marshall Akhromeyev shouldn’t want to inject himself into the politics of the Senate. Akhromeyev said all he thinks about is the security of the USSR.

Carlucci said that this is going to play on our internal debate, that you are making a mistake. But I will make a proposal. We will put that language in, if you settle for a 4900 sublimit.

Akhromeyev said Mr. Nitze and he had agreed they would forget that subject. That would be a long conversation.

Carlucci said we accept your “as it was signed and ratified” language after “the ABM Treaty,” in return for 4900. Akhromeyev explained to Shevardnadze that what has just been said calls for further clarification. He had outlined Gorbachev’s suggestions. He had gone on to assume responsibility to see what could be done, and did not know whether he would be punished or approved. In paragraph (A) he had suggested a sublimit of 4900 to 5000, and in paragraph 9 all bracketed words would be deleted. This approach was not agreed and he asked that it be forgotten. Now Carlucci was repeating it. If paragraph 9 would be adopted as it is: “commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time,” then he would be ready to give his head to be cut off and propose that this be accepted.

Shultz said we will take the Akhromeyev language precisely as you read it off.

Akhromeyev asked “and add 4900?” Shultz replied “and add 4900.” Shevardnadze said he will report this to his leader. Shultz said exactly as read out.

Carlucci continued that yesterday the General Secretary said: “If the U.S. wanted to reduce strategic arms, it would have to accept a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of that period, the U.S. could decide what it would do. The Soviet side could accept that, although it was definitely against SDI.” Now we have this in paragraph 9, “each side will be free to decide its course

of action.” We want to make sure you understand, that means either side has the right to deploy. Otherwise, the phrase is meaningless. Akhromeyev replied that the Secretary of State had said that if we put 4900 in paragraph (A), the language in paragraph 9 was acceptable word for word as he had read it.

Carlucci said all he wanted to do was ensure we understood what that language means. The Marshall was not in the room when Gorbachev used the phrase: “the U.S. could decide what it would do.”⁴ He went on to talk about what their response would be to US deployment, so he was talking about the right to deploy. Now we have this language in the Joint Statement, “each side will be free to decide its course of action.” We understand that to mean the right to deploy.

Shevardnadze said that is exactly what the General Secretary had said. The context was in the two or three years from the end of the period there would be discussions. The sides could agree to adhere to the Treaty, because it was of unlimited duration. If there was no agreement, either side could take any course of action. Akhromeyev said the next phrase of the text responds to the concerns you have raised.

(At this point the Ministers departed to report to the leaders.)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 112.

254. Editorial Note

On December 10, 1987, President Ronald Reagan hosted Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in a noon meeting in the White House Oval Office followed by a working luncheon in the Family Dining Room that lasted until 2:10 p.m. “After initial pleasantries,” President Reagan “opened by saying that he’d had a chance to review the joint statement,” and “understood that working delegations were now focused on the START and Defense and Space portions of the statement, and suggested that we get a report.” Gorbachev replied that “meetings were now in progress between Marshal Akhromeyev and Mr. Nitze,” and that while they were working “he and the President could have some further decisions of regional issues.” The President agreed. (Memorandum of Conversation, December 10, 1987; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of

Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87]) The memoranda of their conversations are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 114–115.

255. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

Washington, December 11, 1987, 0617Z

384489. Subject: Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement.

1. Transmitted below is the joint statement issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 10, 1987 at the conclusion of the General Secretary's visit to the United States (December 7–10). Posts should draw on it fully in briefing host governments and public audiences. Additional points for briefing the media and host governments will be transmitted septels.

2. Begin text of joint statement.

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on December 7–10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward T. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D871015–0592. Unclassified; Immediate. Also sent Immediate to Moscow, Leningrad, and Kabul. Sent Priority to Baghdad, Malabo, Port Au Prince, and Beirut. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Parris and Burton and in S/S-O and S/S; approved in S/S.

Attending on the Soviet side were member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik they took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive coop-

eration in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. Arms Control

The two leaders signed the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START Treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(A) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(B) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed

to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(C) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX):10, Minuteman III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:8, Poseidon:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

(D) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(E) Building upon the provisions of the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(III) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

256. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

START

With the basic structure of a START Treaty now set, we face four major problems, all related to verification:

- How to verify the number of mobile ICBMs;
- How to verify the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs;
- How to distinguish nuclear-armed ALCMs from conventional ALCMs;
- What to propose in the START Inspection Protocol.

On one of these we are close to having a position to propose to the Soviets—the interagency verification group is working hard on a START Inspection Protocol with the objective of tabling it early in the next round, drawing upon the INF inspection protocol, the concepts agreed to in the Joint Statement, and the special requirements of START. On mobile ICBM's work has been done in the Support Group to develop further the ideas that were once considered for counting SS-20's, but we do not have a scheme which is judged to give us effective verification; this effort will continue on a priority basis. Verification of SLCMs and ALCMs will be taken up in January.

In addition to the verification issues, there is another tier of problems, including the number of mobile ICBM warheads to be permitted, the range threshold for ALCMs, the ALCM counting rule, throw weight definition, and non-deployed missiles. Two more issues—Backfire and heavy ICBM modernization—are not resolved with the Soviets but the summit NSDD² provides adequate guidance. Finally, the Delegation will continue to push for a 3300 ICBM RV sublimit.

Overall, we find ourselves in a position where the basic questions of the structure of the agreement, the key numbers, most of the counting rules, and the verification approach, which have been the center of attention since Reykjavik, are now agreed. Many of the problems which now come to the fore have received relatively little attention, and it will take a major effort to develop our positions. There is much homework to be done.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the paper. Timbie sent the paper to Shultz under cover of a December 31 note: "Some thoughts for the New Year on START." A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the note. (Ibid.)

² See Document 244.

US Strategic Force under START

The principal criticism of START is that it would result in a more vulnerable US strategic force. Kissinger, Scowcroft, Woolsey, and others hold up the specter of a US force consisting of a handful of submarines, a few bombers, and some vulnerable fixed ICBMs. The structure of the agreement we are working out by no means requires this result. The best counter to these charges would be to put forward the sort of force we would intend to deploy under the START agreement. Such an exercise raises tricky questions, but is well worth doing.

The small numbers of submarines that critics cite come from attributing 12 warheads to each Trident II missile and 24 missiles to each Trident submarine. The agreement at the summit to attribute 8 warheads to each Trident II missile increases the number of submarines by 50% [*less than 7 lines not declassified*] (Note that the Soviets quote 4 for their latest SLBM, a sensible number in a reductions environment.) The point is we can have any number of submarines we want, and we should decide at least roughly what that number is and how we want to achieve it, and make sure the agreement preserves our option to move in that direction.

As for ICBMs, the M-X is now in favor as an inexpensive way to deploy large numbers of warheads. The small ICBM is on the chopping block, but with tight limits on RVs it would make a lot of sense. A plausible number of ICBM RVs under START would be 1400. The force in the late 1990's could consist of 50 M-X, 100 MM-III, and 600 small ICBMs (some fixed, some mobile). Many other combinations are possible; the small, single RV ICBM would make a major contribution by keeping the number of aim-points high, giving a portion of the ICBM force survivability through mobility, and replacing the Minuteman II which will be 30 years old in the late 1990's.

Our bomber force could consist of 100 B-1's and 150 stealth bombers, with 850 stealth ALCMs deployed on the B-1's.

Such a force would be far more survivable and effective than the ones postulated by Kissinger, Scowcroft, and the critics, and would fit well within the 6000, 4900, and 1600 limits of START. There is a natural resistance, especially in JCS, to thinking now about how we would allocate the reductions between the services, but some thinking along lines can help us in deciding what options to preserve and in countering the main thrust of our critics.

Chapter 4, December 1987–January 1989

257. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 4, 1988, noon

PARTICIPANTS

Col. Robert Linhard, NSC
Amb. Paul H. Nitze

Linhard began by stressing the importance of thinking through a time-phased strategy for the continuing NST negotiations, so that we control the agenda and what issues remain for the final summit session.

I said I thought we had so many issues to resolve that we must begin with all of them concurrently; we could later decide those on which we wished to place greatest pressure at that particular time. Our first task was to plot our tactics for the late February ministerial in Moscow.

Linhard said he viewed the task of our Geneva negotiators as setting up and clarifying issues for each subsequent ministerial meeting.

We then discussed the various START issues. I said most of them involved verification; this was obviously true of land-mobile ICBMs and of SLCMs; but there were also issues connected with the verification of the other START systems. Linhard said the Verification Working Group was busy drafting a Verification Protocol for tabling at an early session; but there were serious problems with their work. Someone would have to work with the U.S. contractors to take account of their concerns.

I said it was important for us to have a clear idea of what systems we would actually wish to deploy and have the resources and Congressional backing to support. We would need to compare the strategic stability of realistically foreseeable deployments under the assumption that a START agreement along the lines we seek is achieved; it could then be compared with what we could anticipate in the event of no agreement. It was important to know whether a multiplicity of silos per missile would be adequate or whether we need a Midgetman type of mobile system.

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, All of Jan–Feb. 19, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place at the Metropolitan Club.

Linhard said Carlucci was determined to kill the Midgetman; would the Garrison Rail Mobile be adequate? I said I thought not; it would be an invitation to a surprise attack and could convert the improbability of such an attack into a probability.

I said it was important that the State Department be exposed to, and understand, Pentagon thinking on these issues. He said the Air Force and the Navy views were irreconcilably opposed. I asked whether it was not OSD's task to resolve such service conflicts. He said it was. He said he would see whether some of us at State could be briefed on the latest drafts of this year's JCS Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and on the comparable strategic forces paper.

Linhard said there were additional START points on which work needed to be done; (a) the ALCM counting rule, (b) the ballistic missile counting rules (conservatives were already questioning the Soviet declaration of four RVs for the SSN X23), (c) a throw-weight protocol (I said we might not be able to get more than a short unilateral declaration out of the Soviets), and (d) a resolution of the Backfire issue. Linhard urged us to work out the assignment of specific organizations and personnel to work each of these issues.

This got us into a discussion of the work to be done in Geneva and that to be done in Washington. Linhard noted that most of the substantive movement had come at levels higher than the Geneva negotiators, although some had been initiated by Gen. Chervov's exploratory discussions with Mike.² I suggested we might have a problem now that Obukhov had replaced Vorontsov. I asked Linhard what he would think about a proposal that Mike stay on in Geneva and relieve Max as head of the Geneva delegation; he was senior to both Hank Cooper and Read Hanmer and I doubted whether Max would wish to deal with Obukhov. He noted that we were counting on Mike to support INF ratification. I suggested that John Woodworth might be able to carry much of the load.

We then turned to Defense and Space. We quickly agreed on the main outstanding issues of the Defense/Space Treaty text to be submitted; he said he bracketed language would be sent to the President for resolution.

I said I would like to visit some of the laboratories and contractors to gain some first-hand knowledge as to where the SDI program now stood. He said he would like to join me in doing so. We will coordinate on a possible time schedule.³

² Reference is to Maynard "Mike" Glitman.

³ No record of a joint visit was found.

258. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 8, 1988

SUBJECT

Instructions for Upcoming NST Round

Bob Linhard is on travel but is aware of this action.

The next round in the Nuclear and Space talks (NST) begins on January 14. Attached (*Tab II*)² are interagency developed draft START, Defense and Space, and overall instructions. Both START and Defense and Space instructions have brackets.

Normal practice is to submit NST instructions to the President for his approval, documenting that approval in an NSDD. We believe that the issues raised are *not* deserving of the President's time; they are either (a) minor issues of nuance or (b) issues where it is only necessary to reaffirm existing U.S. policy. Thus, we propose that you resolve the issues and forward a clean copy of the instructions to the President for approval as attachments to the NSDD. We have included in your cover memorandum a summary of the action taken so that the President is aware that some of these issues are contentious.

Our recommended action on each issue follows. We have annotated *Tab II* to indicate our recommendations.

START Issue 1—Sublimits. On the familiar issue of sublimits of 3300 ICBM warheads and 1650 ICBM warheads on heavy/highly MIRVd ICBMs, *OSD, JCS, the START Negotiator, and Ambassador Rowny* would retain both sublimits. All but OSD see these as bargaining chips to be given up eventually; OSD continues to believe that the 1650 sublimit (which would constrain the ten RV SS-X-24) is important. *State and ACDA* would drop the 1650 sublimit now in the interest of moving negotiations forward. They would retain the 3300 sublimit with the intent of swapping it for Soviet sublimits of ALCMs and SLBMs (the Soviets will certainly accept such a swap; thus the *de facto* State/ACDA position is to drop both sublimits).

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 096, NSDD 295. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads "Signed." Attached but not printed is a January 14 memorandum for Powell to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns forwarding NSDD-295 (see Document 260.).

² Attached but not printed.

NSC staff sees no advantage in giving up the 3300 ICBM sublimit. It is of modest value, may actually be negotiable, and, at a minimum, could serve as a useful bargaining chip to be given up during one of the ministerial meetings. In contrast, the 1650 sublimit has *de facto* been replaced by the summit agreement of a 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBMs. We recommend authorizing the delegation to acknowledge that fact, but leaving when to do so to the tactical discretion of the negotiator.³

START Issue 2—Mobile ICBMs. All agencies agree that we should discuss mobile ICBM verification with the Soviets, seeking Soviet ideas. *OSD* and *Ambassador Rowny* would stop there, deferring any decision to allow mobile ICBMs until progress has been made in other areas. Other agencies would tell the Soviets that, if verification procedures can be improved, we would “consider permitting” (*JCS* and the *START Negotiator*), “permit” (*State*) or “permit road mobile only” (*ACDA*). These positions, and the accompanying rationale, are familiar and are unchanged since the last NSPG (or indeed in the last year).

NSC staff recommends the *OSD* position; *not* informing the Soviets for now that we will permit mobile ICBMs. We believe this is consistent with NSDD-290⁴ and the President’s guidance during the summit, which made acceptance of mobile ICBMs contingent on progress in other areas.⁵

START Issue 3—Throwweight. *OSD* and *ACDA* would insert a sentence directing the delegation to make it clear that we expect the 50 percent throwweight constraint to be a genuine constraint recorded in the treaty, with throwweight measured in accordance with a throwweight protocol. These agencies fear the Soviets will misinterpret the summit Joint Statement as a softening of our position. Other agencies, especially *State*, oppose the suggested insertion as unnecessary. As you recall, in the past *State* has favored a side agreement with only a limited definition of throwweight.

NSC staff recommends accepting the *ACDA/OSD* insertion. A constraint on throwweight has been a consistent goal of this Administration; we do not yet know that the Soviets will reject including it in a treaty. Pressing them may be useful. More importantly, a decision to exclude this sentence could be misperceived as a softening of our position in an eagerness to gain treaty agreement.⁶

³ Powell initialed his approval.

⁴ See Document 244.

⁵ Powell initialed his approval.

⁶ Powell initialed his approval, and wrote: “But we won’t belabor all Winter + Spring.”

START Issue 4—ALCM Range Definition. All agencies accept ACDA propose using the INF definition of cruise missile range for START. Under this definition range is “the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion.” ACDA opposed this definition in START and continues to oppose it, on the grounds that “standard design mode” is not an agreed term and that we can only be certain of capturing ALCMs if they have been flight tested to greater than 1500 km range. Such flight testing is, however, not essential for ALCM deployment. ACDA thus favors placeholder language while we try to develop a better definition.

NSC staff recommends accepting the INF definition. Whatever the merits of the as-yet-to-be-developed ACDA alternative, it is simply too hard to have different definitions, especially when we already face an uphill fight on negotiating an ALCM range cutoff.⁷

START Issue 5—RV Counting Rules. OSD (supported by ACDA) would impose a new condition on RV counting rules. Presently our approach to RV counting rules allows the sides to agree on a number of warheads to be attributed to a given missile. OSD and ACDA would limit this number to no less than two-thirds of the maximum number of RVs a missile is capable of carrying. This proposed constraint, which results from concern with our agreement to accept four RVs on the SS–N–23, would have no effect on U.S. systems. The OSD/ACDA intent is to minimize the breakout potential by placing some bound on the ability of a side to understate its capability. The practical effect would be to preclude deployment of the SS–N–23 with the smaller of its two designed RVs. All other agencies oppose the OSD addition.

NSC staff recommends rejecting the OSD proposal. It requires additional technical analysis to determine how it would be verified and the impact of such verification on future U.S. systems. Since OSD claims it is not intended to walk back the SS–N–23 decision, its primary effect would be on future systems. It thus can be reconsidered when we draft the so-called “default rules” for attributing warheads to future systems. We have included a statement to this effect in the cover memorandum promulgating the NST instructions.⁸

START Issue 6—Verification Language. There is disagreement on the wording of an instruction to incorporate the verification language from the summit statement into the Joint Draft Text. OSD and JCS would do so “as appropriate;” State and ACDA would use the phrase “in an appropriate manner.” This is a silly issue; while there are some nuances, the practical result of either phrase will be the same.

⁷ Powell initialed his approval.

⁸ Powell initialed his approval.

Per our discussion, *NSC staff* recommends dropping both phrases.⁹

START Issue 7—Inspection Quotas. *State* and *ACDA* would aggregate the inspection quotas for various types of inspections, including suspect site inspections, to more closely parallel the INF agreement. *All other agencies* oppose this as premature. *NSC staff* agrees and recommends the provision be deleted for now.¹⁰

START Issue 8—Transit Notification. Our current draft treaty requires an after the fact notification of the movement of ballistic missiles between sites. *All agencies except JCS* favor adding a requirement to provide the route and the location at two-day intervals. Such a requirement (but with four-day intervals) is in the INF Treaty. The intent is to enhance our ability to use NTM to verify declared movements. *JCS* objections are based on the administrative burden of such reporting.

NSC staff recommend overriding the *JCS* (the Joint Staff expects this and won't yell) and including the requirement, recognizing that we will probably have to accept four-day intervals in *START* as we did in INF at some point during the negotiating process (which will reduce the "administrative burden").¹¹

Additional agency arguments on all *START* issues are at *Tab III*.

Defense and Space Issue 1—Status of the ABM Treaty. *OSD* would delete the paragraph at the bottom of p. 4 and the top of p. 5 of the D&S Instructions. *OSD* believes the paragraph is inconsistent with U.S. policy because it implies that we would revert to the ABM Treaty after the non-withdrawal period. *All other agencies* would include the paragraph as a necessary clarification of our policy.

NSC Staff recommend retaining the paragraph but modifying "After the specified period . . ." to read "Through the specified period. . . ." This would maintain our current position, giving us a right to deploy after the non-withdrawal period, while avoiding the implication that the end of the non-withdrawal period would also end the ABM Treaty.¹²

Defense and Space Issue 2—Characterizing Our Commitment to Deploy. This issue, at the top of p. 5, concerns the strength of our commitment to deploy if we prove that defenses can meet our criteria. *State* would say we "may" deploy, believing this to be consistent with our policy that no deployment decisions have been made. *OSD* would say we

⁹ Powell initialed his approval.

¹⁰ Powell initialed his approval.

¹¹ Powell initialed his approval.

¹² Powell initialed his approval.

“intend” to deploy, believing this to be consistent with our policy that once our criteria are met we will proceed to deployment.

NSC Staff recommend accepting the OSD formulation. The President has repeatedly said that when we are ready (and our criteria are met) we intend to deploy defenses. We have also told this to the Soviets in Geneva.¹³

Recommendation

That you accept our suggested resolution of the issues above, and sign the memorandum at *Tab I*¹⁴ forwarding the NSDD to the President to document his approval of the instructions.¹⁵

Fritz Ermarth, Don Mahley, Steve Steiner, Bill Heiser, Judyt Mandel, Nicholas Rostow (who has coordinated the NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse), and Brenda Regon concur.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency (Castillo) to Linton Brooks of the National Security Council Staff¹⁶

Washington, January 6, 1988

SUBJECT

START Instructions: Round IX [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. The latest draft of the subject instructions has been reviewed by the Intelligence Community. A number of Intelligence Community positions need to be stated to accurately reflect the views of the OCI's Representative. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The following specific views are noted:

—Mobile ICBMs: [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] that mobile missiles are extremely difficult to monitor, and, if they are not banned outright, any acceptable verification regime would require severe restrictions on basing and activities as well as require very substantial OSI.

—Throw-weight: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] any throw-weight option selected will provide treaty accountable throw-weight. This may

¹³ Powell indicated his approval.

¹⁴ Printed as Document 260.

¹⁵ Powell indicated his approval.

¹⁶ Secret; Noform.

or may not be the same as the missiles maximum TW potential. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor throw-weight [1 line not declassified] and report these results through normal channels.

—ALCMs: [4 lines not declassified] Furthermore, no verification regime can effectively monitor whether a particular weapon has a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead. Moreover, in a breakout scenario, an ALCM non-nuclear warhead could easily be replaced with a nuclear warhead in a very short period of time. [3 lines not declassified]

—RV Counting: [less than 1 line not declassified] any warhead counting rules are for the purpose of treaty accountability, and may not be related to the actual number of reentry vehicles carried on deployed missiles and may not be equal to their maximum carrying capability. [3 lines not declassified]

Joseph B. Castillo, Jr.

259. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 12, 1988

SUBJECT

Guidance for the Upcoming Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round

Issue

To approve instructions for the ninth round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on January 14.

Discussion

Draft instructions for the upcoming round have been prepared by the appropriate interagency bodies. Normal practice is to document your approval of all instructions in an NSDD. A draft NSDD² is at *Tab*

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 096, NSDD 295. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President has seen 1/13/88."

² Printed as Document 260.

A; it includes as attachments individual instructions for START and Defense and Space and overall NST instructions.

In preparing the instructions, several issues arose, none of which I consider to require action by you, since none involves new policy. I resolved them as follows:

—Maintained our formal position to ban mobile ICBMs, based on the desire you expressed during the summit that we make more progress in other areas before formally accepting mobile ICBMs. (State and ACDA opposed)

—Authorized dropping our past demand for a sublimit of 1650 warheads on heavy or highly MIRVd ICBMs, replacing it with the 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBM warheads you agreed to during the summit. (OSD, JCS and Ambassador Rowny opposed)

—Accepted wording making it clear that we desire a meaningful constraint on ballistic missile throwweight in the START treaty itself. (State and JCS opposed)

—Accepted the INF approach to defining cruise missile range. (ACDA opposed).

—Deferred for further study an OSD/ACDA proposal for additional constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads a side could declare a missile possesses as well as an ACDA/State proposal to combine quotas for various types of inspections.

—Added new notification requirements for movements of treaty limited items. (JCS opposed)

—Characterized the status of the ABM Treaty after the period of non-withdrawal in such a way as to protect our right to deploy defenses after the period, without implying a date certain for ending the Treaty.

In addition, I resolved minor wording issues.

In accordance with NSDD 266, Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you sign the attached NSDD approving
the negotiating instructions for NST Round IX.³

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

260. National Security Decision Directive 295¹

Washington, January 14, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (C)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the ninth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which begins on January 14, 1988, in Geneva. They include the agreements reached during my December 1987 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

**Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the
Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva²**

Washington, undated

Subject: (S) Overall instructions for Round IX of the US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST). Ref: State 134761.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The following is overall guidance for the US NST Delegation for Round IX, which begins on January 14, 1988. Guidance from previous rounds remains in effect except as modified below. Specific guidance for the START and Defense and Space Negotiating Groups is provided by SEPTEL.

3. Principal objectives for Round IX include:

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 096, NSDD 295. Powell distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of a January 14 memorandum, in which he noted: "Consideration of the proposal to modify RV counting rules to limit the number of declared warheads on a ballistic missile to no less than two-thirds of the maximum number of reentry vehicles the missile is capable of carrying is deferred. The proposal will be reconsidered once procedures have been developed for on-site inspection to verify the number of ballistic missile warheads to be attributed to a given system." (Ibid.)

² Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8948 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880597-0273)

³ In telegram 134761 to NST Geneva, May 5, 1987, the Department transmitted overall instructions for Round IX. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870618-0406)

—To build on the progress achieved during the December 7–10, 1987 summit by concluding by the earliest possible date:

A START Treaty, which implements US principles for effectively verifiable and stabilizing 50 percent reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms:

A Defense and Space Treaty—with the same legal status as the START Treaty—consistent with US negotiating principles and agreements reached at the summit.

—To continue to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space, noting that agreement to equitably reduce and limit strategic offensive arms in a verifiable manner would benefit both sides.

—To continue to resist Soviet attempts to produce a key provisions or framework agreement for either START or DST.

4. In elaborating on US proposals and concluding treaty texts, the delegation should ensure that provisions for effective verification of the obligations assumed are agreed concurrently with other treaty provisions.

5. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting that Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements is an obstacle to achieving arms reductions.

6. If the Soviets raise non-NST issues, the delegation should respond that the issues should be addressed in the FORA designated to discuss them. In the event that the Soviets raise the issue of the ABM Treaty review, the delegation should respond that the US position has not changed. The delegation should repeat that the review may commence anytime before October 1988 and that a date will be established through diplomatic channels.

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁴

Washington, undated

Subject: START: Instructions for Round IX

1. Secret—Entire text.

⁴ Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8947 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D880597-0272)

2. Previous START guidance remains in effect except as modified below. The overall objectives of the U.S. START Negotiating Group remains unchanged: to achieve a START Treaty providing for deep, stabilizing, equitable reductions and effective verification measures. The current U.S. position builds on the U.S. positions tabled after the Reykjavik summit and in the May 1987 U.S. Draft START Treaty.

3. The U.S. language in the November 23, 1987, version of the JDT is accepted and supercedes the U.S. Draft Treaty tabled on May 8, 1987, as the authoritative U.S. position. Negotiating Group should table changes to JDT contained in SEPTTEL at earliest appropriate time. In Round IX, subject to the instructions included below, the U.S. START Negotiating Group should incorporate in the JDT the START elements of the December 10, 1987, joint statement issued at the Washington summit (text in para 5). The Group should make clear that the U.S. is ready to accelerate the resolution of JDT issues on that basis, toward a completed START Treaty package at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature during the next summit meeting in the first half of 1988. While Washington hopes such a package might be ready in time for signature during the next summit meeting in the first half of 1988, the U.S. will not negotiate against an arbitrary deadline.

4. In addition to the START elements of the Washington summit joint statement, the Negotiating Group should draw on the following instructions. The Group should, as appropriate, incorporate these instructions into the JDT.

SUBLIMITS

—The U.S. continues to believe that a sublimit on ICBM warheads of preferably 3000, but certainly not more than 3300, should be included to ensure strategic stability.

—Further, the U.S. accepts the Soviet proposal for a sublimit of 1540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ballistic missiles; the U.S. is willing therefore to drop its proposed sublimit of 1650. The delegation may delay informing the Soviets of U.S. willingness to drop the 1650 sublimit until tactically appropriate.

Mobile ICBMs

—The U.S. continues to propose that mobile ICBMs be banned. The U.S. continues to have very significant concerns regarding verification of mobile ICBMs and their effect on strategic stability. Since the USSR apparently believes that numerical limits on mobile ICBMs can be verified, the Soviet side should table their inspection protocol containing the specific provisions of the mobile ICBM verification regime it envisages. (FYI. If the Soviet side agrees to the U.S. approach on

START counting rules and sublimits as provided in NSDD 290,⁵ and given acceptable progress toward the U.S. position in the Defense and Space area, and if agreement is reached on an inspection protocol incorporating provisions for effective verification of numerical limits on mobile ICBMs, Washington would consider permitting a limited number of warheads and missiles within the 1600 delivery vehicle/6000 warhead central limits. End FYI.)

Throwweight

—The Negotiating Group should seek early Soviet agreement in the JDT to reduce its aggregate ballistic missile throwweight to a level 50 percent below the existing level and for each side not to increase its aggregate throwweight above that level;

The Negotiating Group should make clear that throwweight for both existing and future systems must be calculated in a manner that accurately reflects each missile's potential destructive capability, and that whatever method or methods are used, the resultant throwweight will represent treaty accountable.

Negotiating Group may inform the Soviet side that the U.S. will be providing language that accomplishes these objectives.

SLCMS

—In any discussion of the sides' commitments on SLCMs contained in the Washington summit joint statement, the Negotiating Group should stress the continuing and very basic U.S. concerns about the verifiability of SLCM limits. The Group should indicate that, on the basis of information received so far, the U.S. remains highly dubious that the verification methods discussed during the Washington summit could provide an effective means to verify limits on deployed long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. The U.S. will continue to examine these verification measures and respond at a future date. Pending resolution of verification issues and further guidance, the Negotiating Group should neither table or accept language on SLCMs in the JDT nor discuss specific SLCM limitations except to reiterate that the limits proposed by the Soviet side in the November 23 JDT are unacceptable.

ALCMS

—The U.S. believes that long-range ALCMs, for the purposes of a START Treaty, should be defined as ALCMs capable of a range in excess of 1500 kilometers and that only nuclear-armed, long-range ALCMs will be limited by a START Treaty. With respect to those current and future types of heavy bombers declared to be ALCM heavy

⁵ See Document 260.

bombers, the U.S. believes the number to be attributed to them should be six per bomber. Negotiating Group should state that while six would be the number of ALCMs attributed to ALCM heavy bombers for the purposes of counting against the 6000 warhead limit, each side would be free to actually deploy ALCMs up to the bomber's maximum capability. Other types of heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including Backfire, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik.

—The U.S. believes that the method for determining the range capability of an air-launched cruise missile shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. (FYI. This definition would capture any and all ranges demonstrated in flight testing. End FYI.)

RV Counting

—The group should make clear that U.S. acceptance of Soviet warhead numbers on existing ballistic missiles, as contained in the Washington summit joint statement, is contingent on mutual agreement on procedures, which must at a minimum include on-site inspection to ensure that a side has not deployed more warheads on the deployed ballistic missile being inspected than the side declared in the MOU, and that the joint statement recognizes that there will be an agreement on rules for counting warhead numbers on future types of ballistic missiles. Furthermore, a side may claim a reduced number of RVs for an existing type of ballistic missile only as provided under agreed provisions or limitations. In addition, in discussing this issue, negotiating group should recall that the SS-18 follow-on now being tested would be prohibited by the treaty.

Forum

—The Group should table the following new language for Article XII of the JDT:

"To promote the objectives of the treaty and compliance with its provisions, the parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The parties agree that, if either party so requests, they shall meet using the joint compliance and inspection commission to:

(A) Resolve concerns relating to compliance with the obligations assumed and

(B) Agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this treaty.

The parties also agree that they shall use the nuclear risk reduction centers, which provide for continuous communication between the parties, to:

(A) Exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs (blank) of Article VIII and Paragraphs (blank) of Article X of this treaty;

(B) Exchange schedules for conversion, dismantlement or destruction as required by Paragraph (blank) of Article VIII of this treaty; and

(C) Provide and receive notifications as required by the Protocol on Inspections.”

—In addition, the Group should make the appropriate tracking fixes to Articles VIII and X of the JDT.

—The Group should confirm to the Soviet side that it is the U.S. intent to establish separate commissions for INF and for START, as is clear from the proposed START forum name that is different from the INF forum name.

Verification

—The Group must stress the importance of Agreement to Effective Verification Measures. U.S. agreement to a START Treaty will not be possible without such measures. The Group should continue to stress that the sides must begin to agree now on verification provisions in parallel with agreement on substantive limitations in the JDT, as noted in the joint statement. The group should work to incorporate into the JDT the verification concepts from the joint statement.

Negotiating Group should make it clear to the Soviets that the Treaty cannot be signed until all verification measures are agreed and finalized.

—The Group should stress that, while INF verification concepts can in many cases be applied to START and make important contributions there, START verification problems are much more complicated and difficult than those addressed in the INF Treaty, and that START verification measures will thus have to be much more comprehensive than those for INF.

—The Group should make clear that OSI will be applied to both the reduction and post-reduction phases.

—The Group should emphasize that the U.S. continues to believe that it is necessary to establish a requirement in a START Treaty to ban encryption of telemetry, to make on-board engineering measurements during the flight of every ballistic missile subject to the treaty and to broadcast all such measurements during flight.

—The Group should incorporate the following changes into the JDT:

- Amend Article IX to permit OSI at ballistic missile test ranges;
- Add to Article XI a specific provision for “close-out inspection” of mobile ICBM facilities and facilities (excepting silos) for other ballistic missiles when all such missiles are permanently removed from those facilities and those facilities cease all activities;
- Add to the transit notification in Article X a requirement to provide a description of the entire transit route, including the location and time at that location at least once every two days during the period of transit.

MOU

—The Group will make clear that signature of the MOU does not imply certification by one side of data tabled by the other side. The U.S. believes that the MOU must make explicit that each side attests to the timeliness and accuracy of the data which it tables. The Negotiating Group should make it clear to the Soviets that a treaty cannot be signed until all the MOU data has been provided.

5. There follows the text of the START-related portions of the Washington summit joint statement of December 10, 1987. The Group should, as appropriate, incorporate these positions into the JDT.

Begin text:

“The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throwweight of the Soviet Union’s ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded

by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(A) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(B) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(C) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX): 10, Minuteman III: 3, Minuteman II: 1, Trident I: 8, Trident II: 8, Poseidon: 10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17: 4, SS-19: 6, SS-18: 10, SS-24: 10, SS-25: 1, SS-11: 1, SS-13: 1, SS-N-6: 1, SS-N-8: 1, SS-N-17: 1, SS-N-18: 7, SS-N-20: 10 and SS-N-23: 4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

(D) The sides will find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(E) Building upon the provisions of the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(III) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party."

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁶

Washington, undated

Ref: A. Draft D&S Treaty,⁷ B. SCC Instructions,⁸ C. Cd Instructions⁹

1. Secret—entire text.

⁶ Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8939 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880602-0060)

⁷ In telegram 18670 to NST Geneva, January 22, the Department transmitted the text of a draft Defense and Space Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File,

⁸ In telegram 105910 to Geneva, April 9, 1985, the Department transmitted instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850218-0117)

⁹ In telegram 96088 to Geneva, March 29, 1985, the Department transmitted instructions for coordination between delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and Defense and Space Talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880614-0373)

2. The following is guidance for the U.S. Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round IX, beginning on January 14, 1988. Except as modified below, guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for previous rounds remains in effect.

Principal Objectives

3. The principal U.S. objectives in the Defense and Space area remain the preservation of the option to deploy and to facilitate deployment of advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible—if we choose to do so—preferably in a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses. In this connection, we wish to maintain all rights to conduct research, development and testing—including testing in space—as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, in order to determine the feasibility of such defenses. The Negotiating Group should continue to emphasize the U.S. objectives and oppose conflicting soviet objectives.

Objectives for Round IX:

4. The overall U.S. objective for Round IX is:

—To implement the instructions issued jointly by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement of December 10, 1987, which stated:

“Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

“The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.”

—(FYI to Negotiating Group: the joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement does not constitute a complete statement of the positions held by the two sides on these issues. In order to record areas of agreement

at the summit, neither side insisted on the inclusion of explicit language setting forth certain aspects of its position which the other side could not accept. Both sides did this while retaining the right to maintain their positions on issues of principle. End FYI.)

5. Specific U.S. objectives for Round IX include:

—To reach agreement on a separate, new Defense and Space Treaty consistent with the December 10, 1987, joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement. Such a treaty could enter into force at the same time as a treaty on strategic offensive arms. The Negotiating Group should emphasize that the U.S. approach to such a treaty responds to Soviet concerns regarding predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship to reduce the risk of war, and ensure strategic stability over the long term.

—To table a U.S. D&S Treaty and to develop a joint draft D&S text, while opposing any Soviet attempts to produce a key provision or framework agreement on START and DST issues.

—While maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposal and agenda, to respond to Soviet Defense and Space proposals by continuing to question, criticize and probe them as part of the development of a joint text, pointing out the ways in which the U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns and showing how the U.S. proposals lead to increased stability and security for both parties.

General Approach

6. The Negotiating Group should emphasize that the U.S.-proposed treaty text (REF A) reflects the agreement between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev embodied in their December 10 joint summit statement, building upon the following central provisions:

—Agreement that the sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. This would be reflected in a general commitment by the sides that, during the specified period, neither side would exercise its rights under the new treaty or Article XV of the ABM treaty on the grounds that the ABM Treaty's restrictions on the deployment of systems for strategic defense or on acquiring or improving certain capabilities for strategic defense are, in and of themselves, extraordinary events jeopardizing its supreme interests.

—However, in exercising its national sovereignty, each side would maintain the right to withdraw from this treaty and the ABM Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of either treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side shall also have the right to suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the

new treaty and the ABM Treaty in the event the other side commits a material breach of either treaty. In addition, each side would have the right to suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the new treaty and the ABM Treaty if the other side fails to reduce its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the START Treaty.

—Intensive discussions of strategic stability would begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period.

—Through the specified period and until either side chooses a different course of action, the sides would continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

—At the end of the specified period, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The Negotiating Group should clarify that the U.S. side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses and intends to exercise its freedom to choose to deploy advanced strategic defense if the U.S. research, development and testing program proves that such defenses meet our criteria. In so doing, the U.S. side seeks a cooperative transition, the planning for which could begin now.

—If, after the specified period, either side exercises its right to deploy strategic ballistic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty, then that side would be required to give six months' written notice to the other side of its intention to deploy. In that event, the notice requirement provided in this Article of the defense and space agreement would supersede the notice provision of Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Following the six month notification period, all remaining ABM Treaty restrictions would be terminated unless the sides agreed otherwise.

7. In elaborating further on the U.S. position with regard to provisions of the U.S. draft treaty, the Negotiating Group should be guided by the Joint Summit Statement.

—The Negotiating Group should advocate the U.S.-proposed predictability package as a means to enhance predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of war. The Negotiating Group should indicate, however, U.S. disappointment that to date the Soviet side has shown no interest in these proposals, which would provide predictability for each side regarding the course of the strategic ballistic missile defense programs of the other side. Previous proposals for the predictability package, i.e. exchange of programmatic data, open laboratories initiative, and observation of strategic defense tests, remain on the table.

9. The Negotiating Group should continue to emphasize, as the U.S. side has done since the beginning of these negotiations in March

1985, the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting that violations undermine the arms control process and make achievement of new agreements very difficult. No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters. This becomes particularly important in the context of a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, in light of Soviet noncompliance with that treaty. U.S. policy remains that Soviet noncompliance with existing treaties must be corrected, and in particular that the method of correcting the violation caused by the Krasnoyarsk radar is the dismantlement of this illegal radar. In the context of the negotiations, the U.S. side should make this policy clear to its Soviet counterparts, and note that in order to support efforts to negotiate new agreements, construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, should not be resumed and that the radar should be dismantled in a verifiable manner.

Coordination with Other Negotiations

10. The NST and Defense and Space Negotiating Group relations with the SCC and CD are defined in references B and C.

261. Summary of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

Washington, January 14, 1988, 7:30–9:30 a.m.

Attendees:

At the Table: Shultz, Nitze, Rowny, Holmes, Carlucci, Taft, Ikle, Powell, all six Chiefs (Vice Chiefs for Army and Air Force)

Around the Room: Brooks, Joseph, Burns, Howe, Director of the Joint Staff, EAs to Carlucci and Crowe

Discussion:

Shultz opened by saying these meetings were valuable, suggesting they be held frequently (later he suggested 2–3 week intervals) and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz/Carlucci/JCS Meeting, January 14, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the JCS Meeting Room.

saying it helped the President to reduce the options he had to deal with at NSPGs.

Crowe said the JCS were working frantically, especially on counting rules. They were also working, as agreed at the summit, on SLCMs, but had no insights. He doubts we can make it by May.

Carlucci said Admiral Crowe should go to the NATO summit.² He said the hard issues in arms control were (1) SLCM, (2) mobile ICBM verification, (3) Soviet attempts to kill SDI and (4) counting rules (Crowe interjected “especially ALCM”).

Crowe spoke at some length about the JCS problem with the draft D&S treaty. His objection was that the draft does not make it clear the U.S. has the right to test SDI under the broad interpretation. Crowe believes—based on the correspondence between Levin and Powell, as well as the JCS meeting with Nunn—that we can not allow ABM Treaty interpretation to be ambiguous. We must have a clear right to test under the broad interpretation or we can’t sign a START treaty. Carlucci agreed stating that Congress had linked START and Defense and Space. Shultz asked if we were shifting our position that START should be dealt with separately. Carlucci and Crowe both said we had no choice; Congress has linked them for us. After substantial discussion there appeared to be consensus that we must have not only *words* we can accept but a common interpretation that we, the Soviets, and the Congress will accept. (Note: During this Crowe’s objections to being asked to approve the Defense and Space treaty were repeated and strong.)

Carlucci said he wanted to put long lead money in the budget for a 1990 test that would violate the narrow interpretation. Shultz said we should do what we need to do but should not schedule a test just to challenge the narrow interpretation. Carlucci repeated his enthusiasm for the work Rand has been doing and said that there was ongoing work in DOD on alternate D&S approaches. Bob Joseph implied the work would be done by the end of the month.

After continued discussion there appeared to be consensus that we should lay out a seven-year program (Carlucci said this is possible), go to the Soviets in Geneva, tell them this is what “as required” means, and say that they have to tolerate that program if we are to make progress.

The discussion then turned to START. There was general agreement with Shultz’ statement that the 3300 sublimit was useful, but second order. All agreed we should preserve it for now and that we might get Soviet acceptance.

² Reference is to the NATO Summit in Brussels, March 2–3.

Shultz then asked about SLCM. CNO went through a standard Navy pitch about the importance of conventional SLCM and the large number of platforms it would be carried on. All agreed that our position for now should be to (1) do our homework (i.e., see if there is any new approach we can devise), but (2) in Geneva hang tough and ask them to explain their verification approach. Shultz noted he would be pushing the Chiefs for results of their efforts on SCLM.

Carlucci indicated that he was probably going to accept an Air Force recommendation to kill Midgetman. Shultz asked for a private audience to reclama. (Subsequently Shultz and Nitze met with Carlucci;³ Nitze said they made little progress.) All the JCS explained why Midgetman was bad. Herres asserted that there were verification problems with fixed ICBMs. Cold-launch silos can be reloaded as easily as mobile ICBM launchers. Thus if the Soviets want to cheat, they don't need mobile ICBMs. Herres further asserted that the Soviet ASAT can be set up on a bare concrete pad in four hours, and if the Soviets wanted to, they can do the same thing with offensive ballistic missiles. Carlucci said that if Congress funds rail garrison Peacekeeper, allowing mobile ICBMs is probably in the U.S. interest.

Shultz said we need to use the deadline of the summit to get the treaty we want and force the bureaucracy to do the necessary work. Shultz does not believe that we will cave in to the pressure of a deadline; we have not done so in the past. Crowe said the JCS were "working frantically". A discussion on compliance ensued; all agreed compliance was a major problem, none had any suggestions for enforcement mechanisms. The most commonly mentioned suggestion was a "compliance supplemental" that would increase the Defense budget in some unspecified fashion if the Soviets cheat.

Shultz summarized by saying there was a lot of work which should be done now, not in the next two months. He said we need to sign something in Moscow and suggested Nuclear Testing Treaties were the best candidates. He then argued for some formal mechanism of recording the progress we have been making if we do not get a treaty. He recognized the objections to Vladivostok-type agreements, but we had "gone two-thirds of the way to the top, and we shouldn't have to start over from the bottom."

Everyone told everyone else how profitable the meeting was; Shultz suggested doing it again in two to three weeks.

³ No minutes were found.

262. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 25, 1988

SUBJECT

PFIAB's Interest in Intelligence-Related Aspects of the START Treaty

As I promised in our meeting on January 14,² I am providing you a description of the intelligence issues related to a possible START treaty that Board members believe need close examination. PFIAB, of course, stands ready to examine any of these in greater detail to assist the President in pursuing strategic arms reductions with the Soviets.

The Board's concerns involve two central questions.

1. How do the Soviets expect the implementation of the START treaty to affect their strategic posture?

Will they, for example, seek to capitalize on their already existing asymmetrical advantages in deployed active and passive defenses, especially leadership and civil defense, air defense, and ABM systems? Do they expect that their work on unconventional weapons, such as Chemical-Biological Warfare or directed energy weapons, will pay greater military dividends under the lower levels of offensive arms envisaged by START? Most importantly, from the *Soviet* perspective, how do they see the treaty advancing their military goals?

2. How will we know the Soviets are adhering to the treaty?

The Board's concerns about the Intelligence Community's ability to meet monitoring requirements with the requisite degree of confidence include:

- warhead monitoring, in peacetime and in time of crisis or war;
- monitoring mobile missiles, should they be permitted under the treaty;
- monitoring cruise missiles, both testing and deployments;
- detecting clandestine missile production, deployment and storage;
- determining what confidence the likely on-site inspections can give us, especially for Soviet wartime force levels.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40026-40050. Top Secret. Sent to Powell under cover of a January 25 handwritten note in which Armstrong wrote: "Dear Colin, I'll call you early next week to get your thoughts re where we go from here. Best—Anne P.S. Just heard that Shultz had to cancel our meeting (on Embassy Security)—so my report to you will be delayed!" (Ibid.)

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

In addition, the Board is concerned that current plans for manpower and other resources for the Intelligence Community will fall far short of what is needed for these key monitoring issues.

The Board also believes many lessons are still to be learned from our experience with the on-site inspection regime under the INF treaty. Such lessons are likely to highlight U.S. limitations (especially in personnel) in conducting on-site inspections as well as making explicit what can and cannot be confidently verified.

263. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, January 26, 1988, 1637Z

669. Subject: START: The first two weeks of Round IX.

1. Secret—entire text.

2. The first two weeks of Round IX of START have produced few surprises. The atmosphere has been good and both sides have taken as their first priority making changes to the JDT which flow from the summit joint statement. The Soviet team appears stronger than before with 11 advisers (up from 5 in Round VIII), of whom 5 are declared military. Roslyakov returns after a stint in INF. He should be a constructive addition although he has not participated in any working groups thus far. Both Obukhov and his new deputy, General Lebedev, will probably devote the majority of their time to START. Lebedev works for Chervov and has INF and SCC experience. He has accompanied Masterkov to several 2-on-2 meetings and has made a good impression on his U.S. interlocutors thus far.

3. Both sides are searching for the best procedures to use to cope with the mammoth task before us. The three working groups have all slipped smoothly into their usual mode of operations. This is a civilized and meticulous procedure, but cannot possibly result in a treaty in four months. Obukhov has proposed a second track, consisting of a smaller, higher level group which would deal with “major issues,” while the working groups continue to hammer out the detailed treaty language. While Read and Dean are somewhat suspicious of this idea, we have in fact been having a larger number of 1-on-1 and 2-on-2

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880619-0382. Secret; Priority; Stadis.

discussions. Obukhov also liked the INF “steering group” and thinks we should use the idea in START. One other Soviet idea is special “experts’ groups” (with experts from capitals as in INF) to deal with specific major issues. Naturally, their prime example is SLCM verification, but they have also noted mobiles and heavy bomber armament as candidates. At my suggestion, we have agreed to have an ad hoc meeting or two on SLCM verification to see how it goes. We do not see a need for additional experts on our side at this time.

4. Thus far, the U.S. side has tabled far more proposals in the working groups, while the Soviets have been more active in proposing new ideas regarding procedures. The one major new Soviet proposal—for a sublimit of 1100 warheads on heavy bombers—is a major step backward. It was almost certainly a hasty addition to counter the fact that we did not drop our 3000–3300 and 1650 sublimits as they had hoped. We plan to begin the process of dropping the 1650 in a 1-on-1 meeting January 27. We will try to get rid of the 1100 and improve chances of getting the ICBM warhead sublimit at the same time, but without painting ourselves into a corner.

5. I believe we have a reasonable chance of getting a sublimit on ICBM warheads. However, the new features of our ALCM position—the 1500 km and 6 ALCMs per heavy bomber—have run into strong opposition as expected. It is interesting that Lebedev informally mentioned a range of 1000 km—a figure I have believed for some time would be a reasonable outcome both sides could accept.

6. There is the impression in some circles (not including State, of course) that the Soviets benefitted from the frantic finish in INF and enjoyed it so much that they will try to repeat it in START. Neither of these is true. Obukhov told me that the INF endgame was a one-time event that could not be repeated (Geneva 594).² I believe both sides want a treaty, but one that is negotiated in as orderly a fashion as possible. As I see it, to accomplish this, we must be both lucky and good on three fronts:

A. We must rapidly fill in the remaining gaps in the U.S. position. This means tabling the remaining protocols and getting the Soviets to do the same. It also means making up our minds on the long-standing gaps in the treaty itself (non-deployed missiles, ASBMs, ICCMs, submarine tunnels, etc.). Deadlines need to be established and enforced for these decisions. At this end, I am pushing for the delegation to become more active in recommending solutions to Washington.

² In telegram 594 from NST Geneva, January 22, the Delegation reported on a January 20 lunch meeting between Obukhov, Roslyakov, and Ifft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880614-0565)

B. Each of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings will need to make a major advance in one or more major issues. Agreement in advance with the Soviets on the focus for each meeting would be highly desirable.

C. The delegations here will have to develop a more efficient procedure for reaching agreement on language. I suppose this will eventually have to involve one or two people from each side simply hammering it out—ad referendum of course. Read made a pitch to Masterkov January 26 for a more rapid and real time resolution of language differences in the working groups which should help move things in this direction.

7. The statements of both Obukhov and Roslyakov at the end of last round that the Soviets no longer seek a separate D&S agreement have been borne out. This is supported by the joint statement which, of course, finessed the tough D&S details, the protocol tabled by the Soviets January 15, the fact that their D&S working group has almost withered away (one member and three advisors), and the fact that, in my first encounter with Obukhov and Roslyakov this round, they showed no interest in discussing D&S matters, in sharp contrast to their usual approach.

Hanmer

264. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 27, 1988

SUBJECT

Heading Off Criticism of START

SUMMARY. Several well-known members of the strategic “establishment,” including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Bill Hyland, and Jim Woolsey, have begun to criticize the emerging START agreement on the grounds that 50 percent reductions will concentrate U.S. retaliatory weapons on a precariously small number of platforms and therefore will increase Soviet incentives to strike first in a crisis. They

¹ Source: Department of State, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron—January 1988. Secret. Drafted by Einhorn.

are correct that the number of U.S. strategic launch platforms (especially submarines) will shrink. But the critics exaggerate our potential vulnerability problem, and they misleadingly attribute it to START rather than to our own procurement decisions (e.g., 24-missile TRIDENT submarine, ICBM basing difficulties), which could be remedied, at least in part, under a START treaty. Moreover, the critics ignore the contribution of deep cuts in Soviet forces to our survivability goals.

Public criticism of START, especially from respected centrists, could increase the obstacles to finalizing a START treaty this year, and could even have an adverse effect on INF ratification. These problems would be compounded if we have no coherent and widely supported plan to enhance ICBM survivability. In the next few months, therefore, we should:

- make a major effort publicly to refute the arguments of the critics regarding START's impact on stability;

- undercut criticism by ensuring that our START positions are consistent with our survivability goals (e.g., permit mobile and MPS basing for ICBMs); and

- consider near-term and longer-term force structuring steps that could help maintain the survivability of our deterrent under START constraints (e.g., explore various means of distributing allotted warheads over a larger number of SSBN platforms; develop a politically sustainable ICBM basing plan; etc.). *END SUMMARY.*

ICBM Vulnerability. Henry Kissinger, in his December 21 *Newsweek* article,² warns that signing START at a late spring summit would be a "fateful step." Kissinger attaches substantial importance to the vulnerability of U.S. silo-based ICBMs, arguing that START reductions would adversely affect stability by shifting the ratio of Soviet silo-busting SS-18 warheads to U.S. ICBM silos from the current 3 to 1 to at least 4 to 1.

Kissinger is not necessarily correct that this ratio would shift adversely. He gets his result by specifying that we would deploy only silo-based MIRVs: MX and Minuteman IIIs. But even if we assumed (as Kissinger does) that we would deploy no mobile or MPS ICBMs, we could shift the ratio favorably simply by including a substantial number of single-warhead ICBMs (either Minuteman II or fixed-silo Midgetman) in our treaty-constrained mix of forces.

In a more fundamental sense, however, the vulnerability of U.S. silo-based ICBMs (as well as the related ratio of Soviet silo-busting warheads to U.S. silos) is becoming less and less meaningful as a

² Henry Kissinger, "The Dangers Ahead," *Newsweek*, December 21, 1987, p. 34.

measure of Soviet first-strike incentives. This is because silo-based ICBMs are declining as a share of overall U.S. retaliatory capabilities. When SALT II was signed, about [amount not declassified] of our strategic weapons were deployed in silos. Now the figure is about [amount not declassified]. The principal reason for this decline has been the sharp growth in relatively survivable, non-ICBM capabilities—an increase of well over 3000 U.S. sea-based and bomber-delivered weapons since 1979. Mobile ICBMs would further reduce the share deployed in vulnerable silos. Indeed, under a START agreement permitting mobiles, the number could fall below [amount not declassified], depending on our mix of forces.

Moreover, silo-based ICBMs are not just declining *in numbers* compared to other U.S. strategic forces—they are also declining in terms of their relative contribution to our deterrent strategy. In the late 1970s, only silo-based ICBMs gave us the capability to threaten fortified Soviet military and leadership targets with flexible and accurate retaliatory strikes. (This, incidentally, was at the heart of the “window of vulnerability” concerns, not the vulnerability of silos *per se*. It was feared that, if our ICBMs were wiped out in a Soviet first strike, we would have no militarily effective response, only the option of destroying industrial and civilian targets, a threat which the Soviets might not consider credible.) However, within the next few years, we will have deployed a large number of relatively survivable systems (e.g., D-5, ALCMs, SLCMs, and perhaps eventually mobile ICBMs) that, taken together, will be capable of performing a full range of U.S. deterrent missions. Fixed ICBMs, such as the 50 MX now being deployed in Minuteman silos, will still make an important—and in some respects unique—contribution to our strategy. But with their relative decline both in numbers and strategic value, we need no longer fear that their vulnerability would present the Soviets with a compelling incentive to strike first.

SSBN Vulnerability. Under START, we would probably deploy no more than 18 TRIDENT ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), with only 12 of them patrolling at sea on a day-to-day basis. According to critics, this would present a dangerously small number of targets to Soviet ASW forces.

It is true that our SSBN force will shrink. But this is primarily the result not of arms control constraints but of our own force procurement choices. We decided years ago that, in order to realize substantial economies of scale in the acquisition and operation of SSBNs, we would move from 41 POSEIDON and POLARIS boats, each with 16 SLBM launch-tubes, to an all-TRIDENT force of about 20–24 boats, each with 24 tubes. (Currently we have 36 SSBNs; 28 POSEIDONs and 8 TRIDENTs.) Thus, even in the absence of arms control, we would deploy

only a few more submarines than the number we are likely to deploy under START.

So, with or without START, we will need to cope with a decreasing number of SSBNs. Fortunately, the problem is not as urgent or irreparable as some of the critics suggest.

—Soviet ASW does not currently pose a threat to U.S. SSBNs. And while the Navy and intelligence community cannot (by definition) rule out unexpected ASW developments, they do not see anything on the technological horizon that would make our submarines vulnerable at sea. The Soviets lack the means both to detect U.S. boats and to destroy them once detected. Major technological breakthroughs would be required to alter this situation.

—The idea of only 12 TRIDENTs on patrol is somewhat misleading because, with sufficient warning (e.g., in a deep crisis), the Navy would put about 90% of the SSBN force out to sea (i.e., all boats not in overhaul).

—If we became concerned about having “too many eggs in too few baskets,” we would have various options for distributing our SLBM warheads over a larger number of submarines. Although most options would have long lead-times, the absence of an imminent ASW threat would give us considerable time to deal with the problem.

- As originally recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, we should consider the desirability (especially the cost) of a new, smaller class of SSBNs with fewer launch tubes (e.g., 8–12) as a complement to TRIDENT.

- We could explore a modified D–5 missile with fewer than 8 warheads (e.g., 4) but extended range (to enhance survivability). Because TRIDENTs loaded with 4-warhead missiles would contain only 96 (vice 192) warheads, we could deploy more boats under the START ceiling (e.g., 14 with the original D–5 and 8 with the variant).

- We could render several launch tubes per TRIDENT verifiably inoperable (e.g., by filling them with concrete in the presence of Soviet observers), thereby enabling us to deploy more subs under the START ceiling. This could be implemented quickly, and perhaps serve as an interim step.

Improvements in U.S. Deterrent Capabilities. While focusing on the vulnerability of fixed ICBMs and the potential threat to U.S. SSBNs, the critics have tended to ignore recent developments that have strengthened the ability of our forces to survive a Soviet attack and retaliate effectively.

—Survivability is improved by the B–1’s ability to escape from base more quickly, by the greater quietness of TRIDENT, by basing SLCMs on diverse naval platforms and, if current programs proceed to deployment, by mobile basing of ICBMs.

—Penetrativity of Soviet defenses is enhanced by the deployment of ALCMs, SLCMs, and B-1 and by development of the Stealth bomber and advanced cruise missiles.

—In addition to the qualitative measures mentioned above, deterrence is strengthened by the recent numerical growth in U.S. non-ICBM forces, much of it in bomber weapons including ALCMs. Moreover, START, with its highly permissive treatment of bomber capabilities, will reinforce this development. (Given START counting rules, we could deploy well over 5000 bomber weapons which, added to 4900 missile warheads, could mean well over 10,000 total strategic weapons. While this is a far cry from the nominal ceiling of 6000 and the canonical 50% cuts, it enhances stability. Indeed, START's contribution to stability may lie less in its reductions than in its reshaping of Soviet and U.S. force structures toward more survivable, retaliatory systems. We may not wish to advertise the 10,000 figure publicly, but it and related stability implications of the counting rules could help in discussions with critics.)

Benefits of START Reductions. The critics tend to minimize the significance of the START-mandated reductions in Soviet forces. For example, Kissinger states that, because the Soviets will retain more than enough silo-busting warheads to destroy all remaining U.S. fixed ICBMs (and may even increase the ratio of warheads to silos), "the much advertised halving of Soviet missiles is therefore irrelevant. The number of U.S. targets will shrink faster than the number of Soviet warheads or heavy missiles."

But reductions in Soviet forces should not be considered "irrelevant" just because they are not sufficient to restore the survivability of U.S. fixed ICBMs. Under that criterion, no remotely plausible agreement, even one providing for 90% cuts, would be adequate. A more sensible test, especially with U.S. fixed ICBMs declining in relative numbers and strategic value, is how START reductions will affect overall U.S. retaliatory capabilities.

According to that test, 50% cuts in Soviet missile forces will be highly significant because they will make it easier for us to ensure the continued survivability of that (increasingly large) portion of U.S. retaliatory weapons that is *not* deployed in fixed silos. In particular, START's ceilings, especially on heavy ICBMs, will severely curtail Soviet ability to defeat MPS or to barrage mobile ICBM deployment areas, bomber fly-out zones, and ocean areas in which SSBNs are suspected. By reducing and predictably bounding these (and possible future) threats to our forces, START would enable us to make weapon acquisition decisions and design deployment arrangements (e.g. mobile or MPS basing for ICBMs) with confidence in our ability to ensure survivability.

The Risks Ahead. Criticism of START by centrists with credibility on arms control matters could adversely affect public and Congressional reactions to the treaty when it is eventually completed. But such criticism, if it continues to build, could also do damage over the next few months. In particular, it could hinder our efforts to complete a treaty by the time of the Moscow summit or even this year. The White House, concerned about how the treaty would be received, might become reluctant to push hard for closure. And the Soviets, sensing obstacles in the U.S. to finishing and ratifying the treaty, might begin shying away from the tough decisions needed to wrap up negotiations. START criticism could also spill over onto INF ratification, as INF opponents gained new ammunition to attack the Administration's overall approach to arms control.

These problems would be compounded if we are seen, once again, to be floundering around on ICBM basing. (Even with the relative decline of ICBMs in numbers and deterrent value, we cannot afford—politically if not strategically—to have only vulnerably-based ICBMs.) Indeed, if the Midgetman program is deleted from the budget and we have nothing convincing to take its place, START ratification could be jeopardized.

Heading Off START Criticism. Given these near-term risks, we should not put off dealing with the criticism until the treaty is concluded. We should take steps now to try to prevent the attacks from gaining momentum.

—We should make a substantial public effort (e.g., in op-ed pieces, speeches, specialized journal articles) to rebut the critics and demonstrate START's stabilizing impact.

—We should ensure that our START positions are consistent with our stability/survivability goals. In particular, we should agree, without further delay, to permit mobile ICBMs and MPS basing (which appears precluded by our current proposal). We should also consider proposing additional START measures that could promote survivability (e.g., bans on depressed trajectory SLBMs, water penetrating warheads, etc.).

—We should encourage serious internal USG consideration of near-term and long-term force structuring steps aimed at enhancing survivability under START constraints (e.g., explore options mentioned above for distributing SLBM warheads over a larger number of SSBNs). Although decisions on some such steps might not be taken for some time (and indeed may not prove necessary), public indications that we were pursuing them internally could help deal with criticism.

—In cooperation with key Congressional players, we should develop an ICBM basing plan that enhances survivability through such approaches as rail/off-road mobility, MPS, and/or fixed single-war-

head deployments. It is not enough to say we are studying this problem. By the time START is submitted for ratification, we must not only have devised a plan, we must also have secured the necessary political support for it.

265. Letter From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 5, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

In recent weeks your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has focused its attention on the intelligence issues related to the INF treaty and START negotiations. [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] Board believes the total ban on the intermediate and shorter range missiles and the prohibition on testing such weapons make Soviet cheating more difficult and less likely over time.

In the case of a possible START treaty, however, the Board has serious misgivings. Our concerns center on the Government's ability to monitor the agreement as well as its effort to assess the strategic impact of such an accord. We believe that the negotiating process may be ahead of our resolving key intelligence uncertainties. If these uncertainties are not lessened markedly, they could permit the Soviets to attain strategically decisive advantages in a post-START world.

There appear to be greater incentives for the Soviets to cheat under a possible START agreement and many more opportunities for them to do so. We are struck, for example, by the problem of accounting for warheads given the "counting rules" outlined in the US/Soviet Joint Summit Statement. Several Soviet missile systems will be counted as carrying fewer warheads than they actually can. In time of crisis or war, the Soviets could, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] unconstrained by whatever peacetime on-site inspections might have previously occurred, deploy these missiles armed to their full capacity. Combined

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START PFIAB STUDY NSDD, FEBRUARY 29, 1988. Top Secret. Powell sent the letter to Shultz, Carlucci, Webster, and Crowe, copying Burns, under cover of a February 11 memorandum: "Attached is a copy of a recent PFIAB letter to the President regarding the proposed START Treaty. The letter raises a number of intelligence concerns and a couple non-intelligence, national security, concerns." (Ibid.)

with counting rules that underestimate the Air-Launched Cruise Missile capacity of Soviet strategic aircraft, the United States could face nearly half again as many Soviet warheads as permitted under the treaty. These additional warheads could be deployed in times of crisis with little or no prior testing. Such deployments might well provide the Soviets a militarily and politically significant advantage in a world of deep reductions.

[*less than 3 lines not declassified*]. We are troubled that if mobile missiles are permitted by the START treaty the Soviets could covertly produce them and achieve strategic surprise by deploying missiles beyond the treaty limits in time of crisis or war.

[*1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified*]

On-site inspections [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will not tell us confidently of Soviet warhead deployments when we most need to know, nor can they solve issues of clandestine production and deployment. Although the details of the suspect site inspections agreed to in principle in the US/Soviet Joint Summit Statement need to be carefully worked out, there are limits to the compliance gains that can be hoped for from any inspection regime. Notifying the Soviets that a particular installation is a suspect site [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] also places sensitive U.S. installations at risk by opening them to reciprocal Soviet inspections. In either case, there will be an understandable reluctance on the part of the United States to demand inspections of Soviet suspect sites. We have reservations whether [*less than 1 line not declassified*] inspectors can confidently be expected to pierce in a timely way a determined Soviet effort to conceal illegal missile production and storage.

Beyond these monitoring issues, there remain [*less than 1 line not declassified*] questions about the Soviet strategic posture. They lie outside START but could impact directly on the strategic balance. [*less than 7 lines not declassified*].

Similarly, we worry that Soviet military capabilities that seem less central to the strategic balance today, such as Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare and Air Defense, may weigh much heavier if nuclear weapons are sharply reduced. Finally, we believe that these specific concerns should be addressed in light of a general assessment of where Soviet strategy is heading. The key question is: from the Soviet perspective, regardless of what other objectives they might have, how does the START treaty advance their military goals?

In our opinion, these [*less than 1 line not declassified*] uncertainties require immediate and focused review.

The issues raised above fall within the Board's charter to provide you our best advice on matters of intelligence. By your careful appoint-

ments, however, the Board comprises a unique repository of experience in national security affairs. It includes a former Secretary of State, a former Secretary of Defense, and two former National Security Advisors among other former Cabinet members. We hesitate to step beyond our formal mandate. But if the issue warrants, we believe it our obligation to make known to you other concerns which may fall outside the letter of the Board's governing executive order.

One such concern arises directly from the possible cheating or breakout scenarios mentioned above. We believe detailed analysis by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs is required to determine what the net effect on the strategic balance might be under these scenarios. For different aspects of a START accord, at what level of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] uncertainty need we assume the Soviets may have gained a militarily significant advantage? At what level of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] uncertainty do the unknowns become dangerously destabilizing in times of crisis?

A second area of concern is the disposition of the remaining U.S. strategic forces under a START regime of 50 percent reductions. Have the appropriate studies been undertaken to determine what force modernization or restructuring will be required to enhance the survivability and deterrent effect of the remaining forces? Will such forces meet the objectives and criteria set out in National Security Decision Directive 13,² "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy"? And have these requirements been put up against the budget constraints faced by the Department of Defense for the foreseeable future as well as the enormous political difficulties facing any attempt to restructure or modernize U.S. strategic forces?

Mr. President, we have not raised these concerns to frustrate efforts to reach an agreement. We do so to ensure that whatever shortcomings exist with the proposed treaty be fully understood so that they can be addressed, thereby increasing the soundness of a START accord.

As always, your Board stands ready to assist you in any manner you deem appropriate to address the issues raised in this letter.

Sincerely,

Anne L. Armstrong
Chairman

² Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

266. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 17, 1988, 1149Z

1579. Subject: Official informal.

Max/Don—The following is the draft MEMCON of Max's lunch with Obukhov. The MEMCON is based on my notes from Max's briefing. Begin text.

1. This is NST-IX-M-004. Secret—entire text.

2. Meeting Date: February 5, 1988

Time: 1315–1515 hours

Place: Pearl du Lac Restaurant, Geneva, Switzerland

3. Participants:

U.S.

USSR

Ambassador Kampelman

Ambassador Obukhov

4. Begin summary: The discussion focused primarily on START issues. Each major issue was covered with Amb. Obukhov repeating familiar Soviet positions. Obukhov indicated that the Soviets would provide a "new paper" in the near future which would cover at least verification issues. While he indicated that the Soviets would be willing to compromise on some issues, he did not provide any new Soviet proposals. Amb. Kampelman explained the U.S. positions on the key START issues. Obukhov also asked questions regarding progress in INF ratification which Kampelman answered by explaining the U.S. process. Obukhov claimed that the lack of progress on defense and space issues was caused by the U.S. approach. Kampelman responded that the way to make progress was to work on a joint draft text. End summary.

5. Begin subject summary: INF ratification; Defense and Space; START: heavy ICBMs, sublimits, mobile ICBMs, ALCMs; START Treaty structure; possible verification paper; Moscow ministerial; SLCM issue; closing remarks. End subject summary.

INF Ratification

6. During a warm and friendly luncheon conversation Obukhov probed on the progress of the INF Treaty ratification process. He asked questions regarding Mr. Pearl's testimony and the length of time the Senate will take to provide its advice and consent. In response Kampelman explained the U.S. ratification process noting that the Senate will

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880134-0997. Secret; Immediate.

question members of both current and past administrations along with other individuals who have expertise on the issues.

Defense and Space

7. Obukhov claimed that “nothing was coming out of the space group.” He opined that no advantages could be gained from U.S. claims that the Soviets had agreed to the U.S. approach on key issues during the summit when in fact the Soviet side had not agreed. He said that the approach was “offensive” to the Soviet side. Kampelman emphasized that working on a joint draft text would be the best way to clarify and resolve D&S issues. While Obukhov would not commit to work on a JDT text, he did not totally rule out the possibility. Kampelman emphasized that working on a JDT would be the best way to clarify and resolve D&S issues. He also stressed that the United States would continue to have an SDI program.

START

8. Turning to START issues, discussion of which was the major focus of the conversation, Kampelman noted that the sides must do more than argue about procedures—experienced people must “work the issues.” He said all the work can not be done in a “steering committee.”

Working groups must discuss the issues and resolve problems. Obukhov agreed but said all work must be ad referendum to the “steering committee.”

—Heavy ICBMs—

9. Obukhov said the Soviets would not agree to zero heavy missiles or U.S. attempts to achieve a zero heavy ICBM outcome indirectly. Kampelman noted that the U.S. could not be sanguine as the Soviets developed new generations of heavy ICBMs.

—Sublimits—

10. Obukhov stated that the new 1100 ALCM sublimit was important to the Soviet side and presented his rationale for the number. Kampelman explained why the U.S. side opposed the sublimit. He then explained the U.S. requirement for the 3000 ICBM warhead sublimit, noting that Marshal Akhromeyev had indicated that the Soviet Union did not plan to deploy more than 3000 ICBM warheads. Kampelman asked why the Soviets would not agree to the sublimit. Obukhov acknowledged the U.S. 3000 ICBM warhead sublimit position, and then stated that the Soviets must have the 1100 ALCM sublimit since the United States would have a large advantage without it in light of the heavy bomber counting rule.

—*Mobile ICBMs*—

11. Obukhov said he could not understand why the U.S. side maintained its position to ban mobile ICBMs since the United States had mobile ICBM development programs. He said the Soviets would provide a scheme to verify mobiles which he hoped could be agreed upon quickly. Kampelman indicated that the Soviet statement on verification must be presented and evaluated before judgments could be made. He noted that the United States would have mobiles if the Soviet Union had them, but it would be better to ban them.

—*ALCMs*—

12. Obukhov indicated a Soviet willingness to compromise on the ALCM range issue, but said the Soviet side could not accept the U.S. range figure. He then ridiculed the U.S. ALCM discounting proposal but did not provide a Soviet proposal.

START Treaty Structure

13. Kampelman made a strong case for removing brackets in the JDT as a way to make progress and create momentum. Obukhov noted that the START Treaty lacks the “innerlogic” that the INF Treaty possessed. He indicated that the Soviets were considering a proposal to restructure the START Treaty. Kampelman stressed that any restructuring proposals must be presented at an early date or the U.S. side would not take them seriously. He suggested that Obukhov speak with Amb. Hanmer on the issue as soon as possible.

Possible Verification Paper

14. Obukhov mentioned that the Soviets had a “new paper.” In response to Kampelman’s questions Obukhov noted that it would certainly cover verification, but would not provide any other details regarding its contents. Kampelman noted that the Soviets should not present the paper just before the ministerial if they wanted a serious U.S. response. Obukhov said the Soviets would provide it as soon as possible.

Moscow Ministerial

15. Obukhov stated that it would be a mistake to let the ministers make all the important decisions. He said the sides should make the minister’s lives easier by settling questions in Geneva. For example, he claimed that he was authorized to settle the ICBM sublimits issue. However, he gave no indication regarding how the Soviets would settle the issue. He hoped the ministers would settle the zero heavy ICBMs problem and the ALCM range and other sublimits issues. Kampelman said that the ministers would take a total inventory of the situation.

He expected that experts groups would work on the issues as had been done during past ministerials.

SLCM Issue

16. Kampelman remarked that it was his personal opinion that there was no solution to the SLCM issue. He thought that unilateral declarations would be the only way to handle the SLCM problem. In response Obukhov claimed that the U.S. side owed the Soviet side a SLCM number.

Closing Remarks

18. Kampelman said that he would probably not be returning to Geneva before the ministerial and hoped to see Obukhov in Moscow during the meeting. End text.

Cooper/Hanmer

267. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 8, 1988, 1409Z

1189. Subject: START: Looking toward the Moscow meeting.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The major question on our minds here is how the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting can move START forward. Things have been discouraging here so far this round. On major substantive questions, there has been no progress. We have had trouble even dropping the 1650 out of our position. Read essentially told the Soviets we could do so and that we “assume” that they would also drop their 1100 sublimit. Perhaps this was too subtle for them, but they have not provided an official response and so the 1650 remains.

3. On JDT language issues we have had no success resolving elementary issues, even in cases where a clear INF precedent exists. There have been a number of hints from the Soviet side that they are expecting major new instructions (perhaps including one or more protocols) which will presumably incorporate material from both the Washington

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880108-0607. Secret; Priority; Stadis.

summit and the INF Treaty. I would not exclude the possibility that they may even table major changes in the Treaty itself. Thus, the dismal Soviet performance here so far should be turned around soon, and we could be faced with a deluge of new Soviet language. The situation is similar to that which existed last July before the Soviets tabled their draft treaty. Things looked bleak, and people were convinced the Soviets were not trying; and then on July 31 they tabled their new treaty which incorporated many of our ideas and things immediately picked up. I expect a similar situation here soon, but valuable time has gone by with little to show for it.

4. There follows some brief comments on major issues, roughly in the order in which they might usefully be dealt with in Moscow.

Sublimits

5. It is most unfortunate that, just as after Reykjavik, the sides have wasted considerable time because they left a summit meeting with different understandings of which sublimits were or were not still in play. This urgently needs to be straightened out. The 1650 should be considered gone, and this should be made clear in Moscow if we have not done so in Geneva beforehand. Although the Soviets have been touting the importance of their new 1100 sublimit, it was clearly a tactical maneuver and need not be taken seriously. However, it is probably intended as a counter, not only to the remaining sublimits, but also what the Soviets consider U.S. backtracking on the ALCM issue. Thus it may not be easy to get rid of it until both the sublimit and ALCM issues are fully resolved. A major decision which you may have already made is how hard to fight for the ICBM warhead sublimit. This issue is important but, unlike some other issues, it does not have ramifications (e.g. verification issues) throughout the treaty. I see no risk in failing to resolve this issue at this time although it would certainly be desirable to do so.

6. The 154/1540 sublimits have unexpectedly erupted into a major problem here, with the Soviets insisting that these limits apply only to Soviet systems. At first, the U.S. delegation was inclined to agree, but people here have now become spooked by looking at some of the SALT II ratification testimony which strongly criticized any asymmetry in heavy ICBM rights. This is purely a political issue, and should be easily resolved at the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. My only comment would be that our position for years has not given us equal rights to heavy ICBMs. The appearance of equal rights in Article III will not fool anyone if those rights are taken away in Article V. The straightforward solution would seem to be to recognize that the 154/1540 limits apply only to Soviet systems and that the U.S. does not need or seek heavy ICBMs or SLBMs. Since the Soviets have made such a big production

of this, we might even get something for it. They have also stressed heavily that they cannot accept the special production and testing restraints on heavies in Article V. I assume that we have some flexibility here and will implement it soon. A compromise could well adopt the principle that the Soviet can maintain their 154 heavies (i.e., carry on some minimal level of flight testing and perhaps production), but cannot develop new generations of heavies.

ALCMs

7. The new aspects of our ALCM position have run into strong opposition as expected. The only promising note has been General Lebedev's informal suggestion that a compromise on ALCM range could be reached at 1000 km. I do not know whether or not this is enough to protect future U.S. programs. I do personally think that we would be better advised to fight hard for a generous ALCM range rather than attempting to distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed ALCMs, which would be a verification nightmare. Although the Soviets agreed to the term "nuclear-armed" at the summit, the question is far from settled because they are saying here that all ALCMs over 600 km must be considered nuclear-armed. This, of course, parallels their performance on nuclear-armed SLCMs after Reykjavik. There may, however, be one way out of this dilemma. This would involve counting all ALCMs on heavy bombers over an agreed range limit as nuclear-armed, but allowing conventionally-armed ALCMs over the range limit to run free on non-heavy bombers, provided that they had appropriate FRODs and could not be confused with ALCMs on heavy bombers.

8. The heavy discounting represented by the six ALCM per heavy-bomber rule is a nonstarter and is threatening the heavy-bomber counting rule agreed to at Reykjavik. I understand that the JCS continues to believe that an "equipped for" counting rule for each type of heavy-bomber is perfectly reasonable, at least as far as externally carried ALCMs are concerned. I suppose that merely increasing the number six (e.g., to eight) has some appeal as a next step, but I do not think it will solve the problem. The problem basically is that for the numbers to approximate real U.S. ALCM loadings, they must overcount realistic Soviet ALCM loadings. Thus it is hard to see a single number which could work. The obvious answer is that the accountable number should bear some relation to the real number for each specific heavy-bomber type. This is what we told the Soviets here that the goal should be before the number six appeared.

Mobiles and SLCMs

9. The Soviets have proposed separate experts' groups to deal with SLCM and mobile verification problems. While we have been cautious

in not rushing to charter open-ended and independent new groups, we have told the Soviets we are ready to meet with whomever they designate to discuss these issues. The ball is clearly in their court.

10. We have given the impression here that we will only “listen” in these discussions, which has caused some righteous indignation on their side. In fact, while we do not have proposals to make in these areas, we do have ideas and intelligent questions and are not trying to run away from solutions. The Secretary probably should make this clear to the Soviets. On SLCMs, my impression is that the Soviets are in some disarray because their exotic techniques involving gamma rays and neutrons do not have the capabilities they suggested. They may not in fact have any good ideas on SLCM verification and may be trying to entice us into helping them out of their box. On mobiles they have laid out a reasonable scheme which can serve as a solid starting point from which to deal with this issue. The major problem now is for us to decide what we think needs to be added to it. The recent Carlucci statements² must have removed what few clothes the emperor was still wearing on this issue, and we need to resolve this issue, which has many ramifications throughout the Treaty.

Non-Deployed Missiles

11. My views on non-deployed missiles are well known. A new aspect of this problem which I think people should be considering is the problems now being encountered regarding non-deployed missiles in the INF Treaty. The charges of Soviet cheating and the public airing of conflicts between CIA and DIA estimates over the number of Soviet non-deployed SS-20s should vividly illustrate the political and technical problems which will be raised if we persist in seeking a numerical global limit on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. These domestic problems are in addition to the negotiating difficulties which lie ahead as the Soviets wait to hit us with non-deployed ALCMs and SLCMs once this issue is really joined.

Soviet Agenda

12. On February 5,³ Obukhov told Ambassador Kampelman that he thought priority topics for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting should be sublimits, ALCM range, modernization constraints on heavy ICBMs, and mobiles. His list has quite a lot in common with what I have

² During a February 1 appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Carlucci maintained that the MX nuclear missile should be pulled out of missile silos and instead deployed on railroad cars to protect it from a Soviet attack. (R. Jeffrey Smith, “Carlucci, in Shift, Favors Basing MX on Rail Cars, *Washington Post*, February 2, 1988, p. A4)

³ See Document 266.

outlined above. I believe he is also signaling that the Soviets will have some flexibility in these areas at the Moscow meeting.

13. P.S. The Soviets have just called for a joint plenary at 4:00 P.M. today (February 8), presumably to table the new guidance they have been waiting for. This may make some of the above obsolete, but we will send this cable anyway to assure its timely arrival. We may send a supplement if the Soviet presentation should warrant it.

Hanmer

268. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 9, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

US Options for Arms Control at the Summit

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Donald Gregg (The Vice
President's Office)

State
Secretary George Shultz
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Defense
Secretary Frank Carlucci
Mr. Peter Sullivan

Energy
Secretary John Herrington

OMB
Mr. Joseph Wright

ACDA
Mr. David Emery

CIA
Mr. William Webster
Mr. Lawrence Gershwin

JCS
Admiral William Crowe
Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

White House
Chief of Staff
Kenneth Duberstein
Colin L. Powell
John Negroponte

NSC
Robert E. Linhard
Linton Brooks
William Tobey

OSTP
William Graham

Special Advisors to the Mr. President
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, 02/09/88. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room.

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:05 p.m.

General Powell: Mr. President, the purpose of today's meeting is to review and identify US options for arms control outcomes at the Summit. Would you like to make a few remarks?

The President: We have important issues to discuss today. If the Soviets and we have a Moscow summit, it could be the most important meeting of all. We now have a range of arms control options, but depending on how we use our time, our options will narrow. I need your honest assessments of what we can and should achieve in Moscow. I would like to use the remaining months of this Administration to the best advantage. I meant what I said in the State of the Union²—we should all have our work shoes on. At the same time, I know how much must be accomplished before we can conclude another arms agreement with the Soviets. I *will not* rush to an agreement for agreements' sake; so we should use this meeting to identify the option that should be protected and the work that is required to protect them. If we are to achieve our objectives, all the departments and agencies will have to work hard and work together.

General Powell: Thank you, Mr. President. Today, I would like to review a number of areas as we think about what we have to do with respect to the upcoming summit. Let me take a moment to review where we stand in our internal preparations for completing a START agreement.

To complete a START treaty, we need to do two things: first, we have to finish determining our initial position, and second, we have to reconcile that position with conflicting Soviet positions. I have no idea if the Soviets are prepared for serious negotiations. The tactics in Geneva suggest that they may not be. But for their own reasons, the Soviets might be anxious to complete work on a START treaty this year with this Administration. That's why it is of some significant concern that we have so much remaining to do to complete the details of our own initial START positions. For example, our START Treaty calls for three Protocols—the Conversion and Elimination Protocol, the Inspection Protocol, and the Throw-Weight Protocol. I see serious problems with our progress on all three of these documents.

We tabled a Conversion and Elimination Protocol in Geneva in October,³ supposedly after a thorough interagency review. After it was

² Reference is to "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1988*, volume I, pp. 84–90.

³ In telegram 315873 to NST Geneva, October 9, 1987, the Department transmitted the text of the protocol. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870832-0378)

tabled, we began to get comments from agencies. As a result, a revision to our Conversion and Elimination Protocol was submitted yesterday to the President for the President's approval with literally a dozen of changes, many of them substantive.⁴ Even as this revision is being considered, many additional changes are still coming in from agencies.

On the Inspection Protocol, we have not yet reached agreement on many sensitive issues, to include verifying compliance with RV-carrying rules, verifying compliance with ALCM-carrying rules, the conduct of close-out inspections, rules for suspect-site inspections, tagging Treaty-limited items and procedures for perimeter/portal monitoring. Instead, the current draft has placeholders in all these areas and has, essentially, a shallow listing on basic notification inspection procedures similar to INF. Even with a large number of issues we have had to defer, some have formally objected to the tabling of this version of the critical Protocol.

Finally, on the Throw-Weight Protocol, while limiting Soviet ballistic missiles, throw-weight has been a policy objective of this Administration since 1981. We are far from interagency agreement on how to define and measure throw-weight. The current draft Protocol lists three different options for computing throw-weight. It reflects significant disagreement on rules for flight tests; and there is no agreement on verification and monitoring ability of the Protocol provisions.

Finally, in addition to the Protocols, we have a number of problems with our draft Treaty itself. Many of these involve policy decisions. Among the outstanding issues are how we would limit and verify mobile ICBMs if we offer our position on mobile ICBMs; how we would count and verify ALCMs; how we would ultimately resolve the issue of SLCMs; and how we would limit non-deployed missiles. To deal with all these problems, we have established an ambitious formal START interagency Work Program, and it will complete our initial position, but even if we follow it, it's not going to be done until mid-April.

If a sound agreement is to be reached, we really need to get on with it now. We need to think about the alternatives to signing a treaty because of the difficulties we face. We could consider recording a Joint Statement or perhaps in a framework agreement as we consider the summit. We should note that every one of the agencies at this table has told us that our START Work Program is too ambitious focused at mid-April. So we do really need to think about alternatives, and I would like to have your views on this subject. Secretary Shultz, would you like to start us off?

⁴ Not found.

Secretary Shultz: Mr. President, it's my impression we can get there if we give it the right priority and effort. We will need to work on many of the details, and we will need to make judgments in a number of areas. For example, we will need to make a judgment on the balance of the intrusiveness of inspections we require and the impact of the intrusiveness of our own security. These issues will be no easier eight months or two years from now. The real question is how important is this to us. I think it is important because the Soviets are a lot better than we are at producing and deploying ballistic missiles that are targeted at the United States, and that's just the cruel truth. And it has to do less with our technology and our ability to build missiles than it does with our politics.

Congress blocks our ability to deploy such missiles. A clear example is what's happening to ICBM program. So it benefits us to have placed equitable and stabilizing limits on forces, especially ballistic missiles. This is an issue of our national security.

I understand that we also have a problem, and many of us are uneasy at the idea that we are working against a deadline of a summit, but I'm not negative on that. I think that negotiating against the summit is what we need to do, because deadlines cause tough decisions to be taken. I wouldn't be the negotiator for Jimmy Carter, because he would want agreement for agreement's sake. But I have no fear that we will go bananas and grab a bad deal off the table under your leadership. I remember when Frank Carlucci and I walked away from Gorbachev in Moscow, when they refused to give us a summit date; I called back and asked him whether he wanted us to do anything different, and he said no, just press on. So from my point of view, with Ronald Reagan as President, the fact that we are working with a deadline is an advantage, not a problem. As to how intractable the details are, I can't judge—although I have a feeling I'll get into them fairly quickly now. [Laughter]

I think we're far less along in our work towards the START Treaty than we could have been, and partially it's because of INF; INF took up just too much time. My position is that we should all pledge to make an all-out effort. It would be wrong if we were not to do so; it could lead to a very grave mistake. On the other hand, Mr. President, I think I'd be very concerned if we moved towards a framework, especially if we moved in that direction too soon. Framework's not a good idea; Congress would want us to observe a framework; we'd have no verification; we'd have no leverage on Soviet behavior; we really should press for a treaty. And with respect to verification, I know there are a lot of concerns, especially about cuts in the intelligence assets in the out-year budgets. We need to really watch this; it's going to be a harder verification problem in START; we need to step up to the issue of funding for intelligence assets to accomplish this.

The President: [Interrupts] From my past experiences as a labor negotiator, maybe we need to do this: we need to go for the gold. You need to put down what the ideal agreement would be. After you've done that, you can decide among ourselves what our bottom lines should be—what we can and what can't give up beyond; also where there's no bargaining—those items on which we can't bargain. And we should set up the things that are not essential. Now, once you have that, then you can see the negotiating pattern of what you absolutely *must* get, what you could try for but you'd still have a good agreement if you didn't get, but the bottom line is you've got to go for the gold.

Secretary Carlucci: I don't disagree we should go for the gold; we should work as hard as we can. Our question, though, that has been asked today, Mr. President, is how realistic is that really. In all candor, it'll be very, very difficult to get from where we are today to a START Treaty by the summit. I've been up three times now on the INF Treaty to the Hill with Bill (Crowe), and we've been questioned very toughly on each trip. We have to be certain that the verification to the START Treaty is very, very good. Therefore, I think we should condition public mindset that negotiations will continue beyond the summit. We should take the line that if we get an agreement by the summit, that's fine; if it takes by October, that's fine; if not, whatever we do, it will be a benchmark for the future, and we'll just keep negotiating.

I agree completely with Secretary Shultz that we should *not* go for a framework; a framework would be an absolute disaster. So, therefore, we ought to tell the public that we're going to continue to negotiate towards a good START agreement, and if we get it by the summit, that's okay.

Admiral Crowe: I'd associate with Secretary Carlucci. The JCS are down in the trenches, and they're worried. The INF Treaty provided some good lessons, but START is becoming 50–100 times more difficult. There are at least three areas I think are tough—by the way, you mentioned getting to bottom lines; you know, it's awfully hard to get a real bottom line in Washington. We get a bottom line often acceptable to the negotiators but not acceptable to the military.

With respect to the three areas, the first is the bombers and ALCMs. The Soviets are trying to erode our position in both these areas. We need to make sure that we maintain a good ALCM counting rule, that we protect the ALCM-range definitions that we need, and we protect the ability for us to deploy conventional ALCMs. The Soviets are going to press us on all three. These three are bottom lines. Second, we have verification. For START, we must be able to do better than monitor simply what's in being, but we must also be able to monitor what's in production. We also have to exchange data early, not at the end, because we won't be able to make the decisions we need to make in the process

unless we get the information early. We need the information to make decisions.

Secretary Carlucci: [Interrupts] I must say, Mr. President, we've devoted an immense amount of time lately on the Hill discussing one site, Magna, Utah. We are going to have some real problems with the Defense contractors at handling a whole bunch of sites.

General Powell: [Interrupts] Mr. President, in the INF Treaty, we had 135 sites in the Soviet Union to look at. We are going to have to give you a magnitude about 1800 Soviet sites in the START Treaty.

Admiral Crowe: [Continues] Yes, Mr. President, that one plant caused us an awful lot of problems on the Hill. So we have to get out in front and notify and coordinate with the contractors and with the Congress *before* we sign a treaty. We were hit pretty hard on the Hill, Mr. President, for not talking to them *before* we signed. Therefore, all the above—these three areas—all pose questions about whether the time frame that we are working against is realistic. I agree that we ought go forward as Secretary Shultz suggests as hard as possible, but we ought to do it with our eyes open.

The President: There are things that we simply can't retreat on. One of them is verification.

Admiral Crowe: But we're still developing our approach to verification. Mr. President, we've gone a long way; the Chiefs have gone a long way, with respect to intrusive verification techniques, and we are prepared to go even further. We are considering in order to verify, we're going to have to get on Soviet boats with their troops, and they're going to have to be able to [do] the same for us. It's not only tough intellectually to be fair, it's tough emotionally.

Secretary Carlucci: Others suggested that we need to select the plants that we are going to monitor in advance, and, in fact, on the Hill, they suggested that we should, in advance of signing a treaty, have selected and completed the security upgrades at those plants before we sign.

General Powell: Judge Webster, do you have anything you want to add?

Judge Webster: The monitoring problem is ours; certainly, there is a greater number of places that we have to monitor than in INF, as Colin Powell said moving from 150 sites to over 1800. And in INF, we had no types of missiles that we had [to] monitor after the elimination, and in a START Treaty, we are going to have to monitor some 15–20 different types of systems. We're going to come to loggerheads very quickly with the JCS, and the issue will be the amount of the infrastructure that we want to destroy to make the thing monitorable against the amount of infrastructure they need to maintain to do their mission. The Congress knows about all the cuts that we're taking in our overhead assets in the outyears; we need to work on that.

Mr. President, I'm also worried that we may spook Congress on the INF Treaty if it looks like on the Hill that we're rushing the START Treaty. You must know that we face major monitoring problems in a tough economic environment. However, for all those reasons, I support what Frank Carlucci said—the prospects of getting to where you want to be soon are simply not so good.

Senator Baker (Chief of Staff): I'm a little troubled by the feel of this meeting. It's almost as if we've all decided that we can't do it. If this attitude sets in, we simply won't be able to do it. Now, we are vulnerable in some respects in that we set a date and some of you, if we don't get a START Treaty at that date, will fail. But I don't think we should worry about that. We should go forward with an honest effort to get a START Treaty, and we ought to pursue that START Treaty. In fact, I would argue that if we don't get a START Treaty, we may not have been right chasing an INF Treaty.

I remember, Mr. President, discussions we had in Miami while we waited for an energetic Pope to finish innumerable photo ops, and you, Frank Carlucci, and I sat in the room, and I watched Frank Carlucci walk you through a long list of detailed decisions, and you made them one after the other to allow us to get down on an INF Treaty. I always felt that that was one of the most important meetings I had the honor to attend during my tenure here. Unless we decide to press on seriously forward, let Colin Powell drive this action, and get the President involved in making decisions where he needs to make them, it's going to drift away from us, and that would be the wrong legacy for you, Mr. President.

Acting Director Emery, ACDA: I wanted to say exactly what Senator Baker said, but he said it first. The interagency process has its drawbacks; it's slow and it's ponderous. To meet your goals and the expectations of the public, we need to identify key issues and cut through the system and get decisions as we need them. We may finish if we do this; we need to give it a good try.

The President: We must not ignore certain things. First of all, the situation is not the same as in INF. In this case, the Soviets want a START Treaty too. In INF we were the demandeurs. They had the SS-20's; we had to force them out of them. But in this case, it's very evident that they, too, want a START agreement. They feel they need START. In that context, I can't be too pessimistic. One thing of interest is that they have an innate eye to protect the homeland at all cost, and it may be that they recognized after Chernobyl that facing the nuclear forces they face, they can't do this. So I think we must press.

General Powell: I think we have, therefore, Mr. President, a decision, and the decision is that we'll go for the gold, and we will drive towards that end. We will need high-level involvement now. We can't stand

situations where we don't get agency inputs when required. A lot of this will fall on the OSD, JCS, and the DCI. We're going to throw it into overdrive. Let's hear from agencies once on issues.

Mr. President, with respect to Defense and Space, basically our current position is that we should pursue a separate treaty on the Defense and Space area and that we should pursue a treaty that best protects SDI. Unless the Cabinet has any reason to relook at this issue, I'd like to press on to another subject.

[No Cabinet Discussion]

[Omitted here are discussions relating to nuclear testing, scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues I.]

269. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz's Delegation¹

Washington, February 15, 1988, 1904Z

46736 ToSec 030035. Subject: START.

1. Secret—entire text.

2. The Arms Control Support Group has over the last three weeks produced a little paper on START which is designed to serve as a basis for decisions on our START position for your meeting in Moscow. A copy² will be waiting for you on your return. In the meantime, this note describes the overall plan and the key issues for decision. These START issues could well be discussed at your morning meetings with Colin and Frank, and a family lunch with Colin, Frank, and Bill Crowe is being set up for Wednesday.³

3. There is general agreement that at the February 21–23 meeting we should discuss and hopefully resolve the ALCM counting rule, mobile ICBMs, sublimits, and a few lesser issues. As outlined below, there are a number of differences within the U.S. government that will need to be resolved with Colin and Frank. You will note that the OSD representatives have been taking unhelpful positions. We don't know

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N880001-0529. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in S-S/O; approved by Timbie. Shultz was on vacation in Florida.

² Not found.

³ February 17.

whether Frank or Ron Lehman (who has been in Europe) share these views.

4. Sublimits

—Our idea here is to try to build on Akhromeyev's statement that under START they would not have more than 3300 ICBM warheads, and try to record this somehow.

—If that does not work, we should be prepared to drop it in the context of a package in which we get a good ALCM counting rule and the Soviets drop their 1100 ALCM sublimit.

—In the past the Soviets have linked a 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit to a 3300 SLBM sublimit, and now they have introduced an 1100 ALCM sublimit, so getting Soviet agreement here is still a long shot.

—ACDA supports our approach; JCS considers the 3300 low priority and say we shouldn't pay anything for it. OSD, however, is dug in on a 3000 sublimit.

5. Mobile ICBMs

—Except for OSD (and Rowny), everyone believes that if we are to get anything for our mobile ICBM card we had better play it now. OSD would hold to a ban on mobile ICBMs until a verification package is agreed.

—Our idea is to be prepared to permit mobile ICBMs (again in the context of a good ALCM counting rule), give the Soviets our list of verification measures for mobile ICBMs, and work out a limit on the number of mobile ICBM warheads. ACDA and (I believe) JCS agree.

—[less than 4 lines not declassified] We have opposed this constraint to avoid killing either the Rail MX (the Air Force preference) or the Midgetman (with a lot of Congressional support). The practical effect would be to discourage small, mobile, single-RV ICBMs which are widely viewed as good for stability, and START shouldn't discourage them.

—On the number, with Carlucci on record favoring 100 Rail MX we assume 1000 mobile warheads is a good number for the U.S. on the assumption the Soviets will want more than 1000, we would propose initially a lower number (700), and negotiate upward. The initial number needs to be a defensible position, and acceptable if our assumption is wrong and the Soviets agree to it. 700 would allow 500 Rail MX warheads and 200 Midgetman (or MM-III) warheads. ACDA and Read agree with this approach.

—OSD would include mobile ICBM warheads in the 1540 heavy ICBM warhead sublimit. This would force a hard choice on the Soviets, and would be very hard to get since we propose no comparable hard choices for ourselves.

6. Modernization of Heavy ICBMs

—We were prepared at the Washington summit to permit modernization and testing of heavy ICBMs in the context of agreement on counting rules and other issues, and we should be in the same position in Moscow.

7. ALCM Counting Rule

—This is important to the U.S.; our draft talking points lead with this issue.

—At the Washington summit we proposed to attribute 6 ALCMs to each ALCM bomber, and had authority to go to 8. The Soviets propose the maximum number a bomber is equipped to carry. (For B-52's this could be 20.)

—OSD would stay at 6.

—We, ACDA, and Read all favor trying 8.

—In order to solve this problem if 8 doesn't work, and it probably won't, we propose authority to offer to attribute to an aircraft either the number of external stations for ALCMs or 6, whichever is larger. For aircraft which carry ALCMs externally, the number of ALCM stations is monitorable and that number would be attributed to each aircraft (e.g., 12 for B-52's). For aircraft which carry ALCMs internally, the number cannot be readily monitored so an arbitrary number like 6 (or 8) would be attributed.

—This approach would accurately count ALCMs on B-52's and give us considerable flexibility in the future to deploy ALCMs internally on the B-L.

—JCS, for reasons I do not fathom, supports the Soviet position—the number of ALCMs for which an aircraft is equipped.

8. ALCM Range and Armament

—The U.S. position would subject to START constraints nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range over 1500 km. The Soviet range is 600 km. They agreed to "nuclear-armed" in Washington, but in Geneva they say all ALCMs over 600 km must be considered nuclear-armed because there is no way to distinguish nuclear from conventional.

—OSD and JCS want to hold to our current position.

—The U.S. objective is to preserve an option for conventional ALCMs. The JCS apparently want to preserve the option for conventional ALCMs of all ranges outside START, although we have no program beyond 1000 km. We, ACDA, and Read all believe that a range of 1500 km. would give adequate flexibility for future conventional ALCMs outside START. Since there is no reliable way to verify the distinction between nuclear and conventional ALCMs, we suggest proposing to the Soviets that the U.S. is prepared to agree to consider all

ALCMs over 1500 km to be nuclear-armed if they can agree that only ALCMs with a range over 1500 km are subject to START. (ACDA and Read agree with this approach, and propose 1000 km as the threshold.)

—This position has the following advantages:

—Avoids having to verify the distinction between nuclear and conventional ALCMs. The DCI strongly support us on this point;

—Allows conventional ALCMs on any aircraft up to 1500 km; and,

—Allows conventional ALCMs over 1500 km on ALCM bombers (e.g., B-52's).

—We have not, however, persuaded JCS.

9. Final Points

—As you see, the OSD staffers are proposing that we not change our positions on anything. Whether Ron Lehman (who has been out of the country) or Frank Carlucci feel this way is not known.

—JCS have been quiet except on the ALCM issues.

—The NSC staff, ACDA, and Read generally support the approach we advocate.

—The support group paper tends to combine these issues into a package. This is to some extent necessary, since we want a balanced outcome to the meeting, and U.S. moves on mobile ICBMs and heavy ICBM modernization make more sense in the context of getting what we want on ALCMs. However, we should have enough flexibility to allow resolution of some of the issues even if the package is not exactly the one anticipated in Washington.

Whitehead

270. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, February 17, 1988, 7:30–9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN

General Robert T. Herres, USAF

General Carl Vuono, USA

Admiral A. Carl Trost, USN

General Larry D. Welch, USAF

General Alfred M. Gray, USMC

Secretary of Defense Carlucci

Ambassador Ronald Lehman

General Gordon Fornell, USAF

Secretary of State Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Allen Holmes

General William Burns, USA

General Colin Powell, USA

Colonel Robert Linhard, USAF

Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN

Minutes

Admiral Crowe: Welcome, Secretary Shultz. I don't think we made the right impression at the NSPG,² although we tried. There are a host of issues that stand between us and a START Treaty. They're very difficult issues; and we're going to have a very difficult time reaching answers. I just reviewed the message³ from our START negotiator. I certainly don't appreciate the tone of his language. I have very serious reservations about our ability to do all the necessary work in the time available. We want a good Treaty, not a fast Treaty. It could affect 150–100 years of our future, not a just a few years.

Secretary Shultz: I totally agree. We certainly don't want a half-ass Treaty. However, you told me that the Soviets can produce and field

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Meetings (START), February 17, 1988: Original Minutes. Secret. All brackets, except those indicating an omission of material, are in the original.

² See Document 268.

³ Not found.

ballistic missiles a lot easier than we can and, therefore, START would be important to us if we could get it.

Admiral Crowe: I agree with that.

Secretary Shultz: The meeting in Moscow is going to be a little different than previous ones. Nuclear arms control is not going to be dominant. Human rights will come up high on the agenda. There has been a retrogression there lately, and we need to put human rights on the front burner a bit.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, with respect to START, I've got industry already banging at my door concerned about the implications of START verification.

Admiral Crowe: Secretary Shultz, you asked about our deliberations and I'm here to tell you that our deliberations have not produced clear, unequivocal answers. Prior to the last summit, we placed solutions of the counting rule issues high on our list of priorities, and I guess we ought to start first by discussing ALCMs.

Secretary Carlucci: Before you start into that, can you show Secretary Shultz the chart of all the things that need to be done before a Treaty that you showed me yesterday?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, it's an imposing list. We'll get that arranged.

Secretary Shultz: I thought at the end of the last summit, we had all the counting rules down but the ALCMs. Now, I assume you guys have done some rethinking.

Admiral Crowe: No, the Soviets have back-tracked to some extent. We thought we had all but the ALCMs and SLCMs okay. The SLCMs still need to be deferred in Moscow during this next trip.

Secretary Shultz: You say that the Soviet verification ideas don't hold up; so I guess we have to wait until we see more on their verification.

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we need more detail. Based on what we have seen so far, we can't make a judgment.

Admiral Trost: That's only *part* of the problem. Their idea and their SLCM approach allows them to keep all their SLCMs but effectively cuts ours.

General Welch: That's true; they're also walking back on the Reykjavik aircraft-counting rules.

Ambassador Rowny: I wouldn't count so much on this. I was just in Geneva. I think all we are seeing is tactical movement on their part.

General Welch: What about the 1100 counting rule? Do you think that's tactical?

Ambassador Kampelman: I wouldn't be too concerned over this. It is normal maneuvering.

Secretary Carlucci: Now, they're adding new elements. When they add them, they want us to give a concession so that they will withdraw those elements they've added.

Admiral Crowe: I see us having two main problems. First, we have to protect conventional ALCMs. Secretary Carlucci will remember that he was part of the deal that we would do so when we decided to constrain conventional-armed GLCMs.

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. That was our view.

Admiral Crowe: I just received this message as I mentioned before from Read Hanmer. [He then read the portions of Hanmer's message on ALCM-counting rules.] It looks like Hanmer supports the position that would take the rule near to actual aircraft loading. I would observe, Mr. Secretary, that I think we sense agreement on the need to protect conventional ALCMs. However, with respect to range, I think we need to discuss this a bit. We could go below our current position—1500 km—but we're not sure that we should be the ones who should initiate that movement on the range issue.

General Welch: The range issue is tied to the conventional armament issue. If the conventional issue were separated out and decided in our favor, then the 1500 km range becomes much less critical. We could come off 1500, and compromise at maybe 1000.

General Herres: We would rather protect the conventional ALCM, capability in that way (i.e., by trading a nuclear range floor for it) than almost by any other way. A thousand kilometers is fine if we can get our ability to deploy conventional ALCM-unconstrained protected better.

Secretary Shultz: How would you handle the verification on nuclear versus conventional?

General Welch: Very simple, but it may seem too simple or simplistic. Our rule would be if they know a system exists, they can inspect it. We will paint all our conventional systems blue. They can check. They can come on any SAC base, and they can check that all the blue missiles are free of neutrons. The ALCMs are always on bases. It's not like SLCMs. So our idea is that we'll paint them all blue. If it's blue, it's conventional. They come up and they can check that all the blue systems are free of neutrons.

General Herres: We could also add some features that preclude conventional carriage in certain types of aircraft.

General Powell: But how long would it take to convert one of these blue missiles from a conventional into a nuclear missile?

General Welch: Yeah, that's a problem, but we could also work on the carriers. We really don't see any need for reloads for ALCMs. You know, bombers may have a second-strike capability, but that's 36–40 hours into the war. So we're not really too interested in protecting reloads for ALCMs. We could limit the number of carriers, etc.

Ambassador Lehman: Well, you know, on SLCMs, we made the case that we'd only consider long-range nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets seem to be prepared to accept that. However, the Soviets say they can't tell the conventional and nuclear SLCMs apart. So that's the reason why not, they want a 400 limit on long-range nuclear SLCMs, but a larger limit on overall SLCMs. So we have to be real careful on this, because we could wind up with an overall limit on both SLCMs and ALCMs.

General Welch: We could require that all conventional ALCMs *only* are stored on non-nuclear bases. We're prepared to do that. Yes, these things could be converted overtime, but the verification in this area—that's their problem. We'd have the capability for long-range conventional cruise missiles and they don't.

Admiral Crowe: So if we can get the nuclear-only definition, then 1000 km would probably be okay. I'm not sure that we should race to that position. Are we being practical, Max?

Ambassador Kampelman: This isn't a major problem. I think we can get 1000. I want to make sure I understand that you can't live with anything below 1000.

Admiral Crowe: That's right. We can't live with anything below 1000.

General Herres: That would be a real problem with the Germans.

General Gray: That's the reason why we don't want to offer 1000 immediately as going-in position.

Secretary Shultz: We have a problem dealing with bottom lines. Akhromeyev said to us in the last meeting that there'd be no START Treaty if there weren't limits on SLCMs. We said that there would be no way to verify nuclear-armed SLCMs and, therefore, we were prepared for unilateral statements and that's about it. The Soviets then proposed a faulty regime for verification. At some point, we need to tell them that this is a deal breaker. It is, isn't it?

Admiral Trost: Yes, it certainly is.

Secretary Shultz: Maybe now is the time to put a marker down of [our] own—that we are going to be firm on SLCMs.

Admiral Crowe: I'm a little worried. A number of times on INF, we had to put down bottom lines, and we did that by sheer persistence—no UK-French involvement and the like. But that takes time, and we don't have time.

Secretary Shultz: On INF we had five principles—equality, zero outcome, no UK-French, a global view, and no impact on conventional. What are the principles in START? I hear SLCMs is one of our bottom lines. We've already got warheads; we've got the heavies that we wanted; I think that we're ready to deal on mobiles, but, of course, I'm a little uneasy about that. And we need some other bottom lines—maybe SLCM is one of them.

Admiral Crowe: Well, you can't tell them that their verification scheme for SLCM stinks until you know that's true, and it's not clear to me, based on what we know, that we're in that position. It would be better to say that I'm uncomfortable with it than to say that it won't work.

Admiral Trost: We do know it won't work. They mentioned two types of devices. They said that we know all about this, and a lot of that is just nonsense.

General Powell: The Intelligence Community has looked at it and dismissed the capability being suggested by Gorbachev. In addition, Velikhov said that Gorbachev went beyond his briefing in this area.

Ambassador Kampelman: Yeah, others told us that some Soviets felt he was badly served by his staff in this area.

Admiral Crowe: Well, here are the charts⁴ we asked for.

[At this point, they put up two charts and Mike Wheeler came in and stood there as the charts went up. One chart had a list on one side—things that had to do with aircraft that were not up for decision in February, and the other chart was unreadable—a lot of details that we had not done yet.]

We also have some range charts to show you, and Carl Troust can explain them. This explains why we say their SLCM position captures ours, and not theirs.

[At that point, two charts⁵ went up that shows range comparisons for systems for ALCMs and SLCMs.]

Admiral Trost: As you can see, for example, the SS-N-21 is captured by the 600 km range as is the TLAM-N, but they keep 2700 missiles on their side that are all under 600 km.

Admiral Crowe: You can see why we can't live with 600 km.

Secretary Shultz: But then why do we want go to 1000 km?

Admiral Crowe: No, no, the 1000 km limit is for air-launched cruise missiles, not for sea-launched cruise missiles. We don't want a range limit on SLCM.

Ambassador Nitze: What is the German problem on 1000?

General Herres: We want something that's long enough to get beyond the two Germanies. If we have 600 km, then we're limited to 400 miles without penetration, and that would be bad.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not found.

Admiral Trost: Also, if we have no-nuclear SLCMs, we would cut one of the backup systems that the Germans feel we need to assist us deter in a post-INF world.

Admiral Crowe: Once the conventional issue is clear, the range issue is easier. The bottom line, then, is on ALCMs is that we need to protect conventional coverage. On SLCMs, we can't verify any limits.

On ALCM counting rules, the current rule is six. Some people were talking about going to eight. We're not adverse to moving to "as equipped."

General Welch: It's not clear to us that the ALCM discounting rule is better than a straight "as equipped" rule. The discounting rule allows us to load up non-penetrating bombers, but they're all going to be gone soon. Whatever we can't carry any longer because of the discounting for ALCMs, we can carry in the penetrating bombers. We have tankers for penetration; that's what we intend to do. You know, it's almost as if the Soviets were arguing our position, and we arguing theirs. The Soviets are the ones with the stand-off aircraft. When we started, we thought they had eight on a BLACKJACK; we now find out they really have 16; and on some of their other bombers, they can carry up to 22. They don't have any tankers. They don't have any penetrating capability to speak of. So with the existing situation, we're providing incentives for them to build BLACKJACKs and BEARS equipped to carry large numbers of ALCMs.

Secretary Carlucci: If this is the case, why are they fighting us on this?

General Welch: I don't know. It's the same situation with mobiles. I mean they're fighting for the position we ought to be fighting for. Our *real* problem right now and the real difficulty in moving to a position that we really need is that we have to fall off and accept the Soviet position, and nobody wants to do that.

Secretary Shultz: Well, that's good. That gives us some room.

General Welch: Well, the rule has to be not only *as equipped* and *verified* but *as modified* as of some day after the Treaty goes into force, because we need to reconfigure our bomber force. It won't be expensive, and it won't be too hard, but we need to be able to make changes.

Ambassador Lehman: If you want to do this, I guess it'll be easy with the Soviets. However, when the Soviets say "as equipped," what they mean is different from what you're talking about. They'll want our bombers to be limited "as equipped" now. They'll tell us "look, you told the world that this bomber could carry 20 or 25, or whatever. We're going to have a big fight on verification details, plus the fact we're talking about a major shift from an air unconstrained environment to a situation that would seem like we're worried about and trying to limit Soviet ALCMs. We can eliminate the bomber hard points, I guess, and everything. We are also going to need SRAM-II, aren't we?

General Welch: We could probably keep the ALCM-B and defer the ACM, but I want the ACM, and we certainly need SRAM-II. However, both ACM and SRAM-II are predicated on long supported programs.

Ambassador Lehman: There's also a theoretical argument that says if we do this, the ratio of slow flying to fast flying weapons will change and there are a lot of people on the Hill who watch these kinds of ratios.

General Herres: If we were trading ALCMs for penetrating bombs. However, this isn't true, because I can replace ALCMs with penetrating bombs.

Admiral Crowe: That's not true. I'll have the ability of loading them up anyway with the penetrators.

Secretary Carlucci: But 6000 isn't really 6000.

General Welch: That's always been the case. [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]. The discounting rule does not earn us any weapons on B-52's because when I put an internal carriage ALCM on a B-52, I lose a SRAM—assumption being that B-52H is a penetrator. I only get a benefit if it's a pure stand-off system, like the B-52G. Now during transitory periods, we are going to have to give up some weapons as we cycle aircraft through various roles, but we never drop below 4500 weapons at any time. I can't see how we gain by going to any discounting rules.

Secretary Shultz: So, should I shift gear in this area?

Secretary Carlucci: I think we ought to get something for it.

Secretary Shultz: What about your view on why we should switch position with them on mobiles?

General Welch: [*less than 3 lines not declassified*]. However, in this environment, they're coming out of the silos that we can't attack to go for mobility for survivability. We ought to be out of the silos already. We need the mobility now—they will need it in the future. I can't understand why our position is the way it is.

Secretary Carlucci: [*1 line not declassified*]

General Welch: Sure, yeah, later we'll be able to, but right now, mobility is more important to us. It will be the worst of all situations if they have mobility and we don't.

Secretary Shultz: Our problem is that the Congress want mobiles, but the Executive has been dragging its feet due to verification.

General Welch: Verification is an issue, of course.

Admiral Crowe: Some in the Congress feel strongly about mobiles, but they feel strongly about MIDGETMAN, not M-X on rail.

Secretary Carlucci: No, they're divided on this.

General Gray: Our verification, won't it get better overtime on mobiles once we understand them a little bit better?

General Welch: Yes, that's true, verification may get better, but there are political problems too. I'm not sure we should get into that now, but I know that if there's no START, I would want a lot of mobiles. If there is START, I want to limit mobiles, simply to ease verification.

Ambassador Rowny: Well, if we're going to go for the gold, why don't we ban mobile? The GRIP paper⁶ I just read shows it getting harder and harder. We ought to get tough with them and just ban mobiles.

General Welch: I wouldn't ban mobiles.

Ambassador Rowny: But that's our position.

Secretary Shultz: He knows that, Ed, but he's suggesting another position.

General Welch: I remember how we got here. We got here based on taking a position meant to be a negotiating tactic, and somehow it evolved into a very hard, fast rule.

Admiral Crowe: Yeah, we never agreed to this as a permanent part of the US position, but simply as a negotiating tactic.

Secretary Shultz: Bud (McFarlane) told us when he originally put it in that it would only be tactical, and we never intended it to be more than that.

General Powell: It would be really tough to take it out now, though.

Ambassador Lehman: The GRIP paper says we need to go into a lot of detail, but, boy, if we follow the GRIP paper, we're just moving in the Soviets' direction. We need more detail and more study before we do something like this. For example, if we move on heavy ICBMs, we just move in the Soviets' position. If we drop 3000, we're just moving to the Soviets' position. If we go to ALCM "as equipped," we're just moving to the Soviets' position. On on-site verification, they've already begun to take themselves down that slope. We don't have to chase that. And, on armament, they've already agreed in principle. We don't have to chase that. The real question we need is: don't we need a draft treaty with all the details now, not this kind of approach?

Secretary Carlucci: Yeah, that's what we need on the Hill; that's what they're interested in.

Admiral Crowe: That's where our people are too. We really need a draft treaty.

Secretary Shultz: Well, what you're telling me then is that the material in GRIP paper doesn't represent the Ministerial agenda. We need to get together and use this and let our experts meet, but this isn't Ministerial stuff.

⁶ Not found.

General Welch: On mobiles, the Soviets have offered us a verification regime that's not that bad. We ought to press them on their ideas on mobiles.

Secretary Shultz: Well, we've had a general discussion here. Colin and I will now need to go and focus on what we want from Moscow. We need to get some bottom lines. In the past we focused on issues; so what we have to ask ourselves is what should we press on now so that we can pass it on to the expert group who can work in more detail.

General Powell: Well, there's no give on ALCMs—on conventional ALCMs. There's some flexibility on ALCM range, and I've got to admit, I hear a real sea change in the position that says we should let ALCMs run free, to one in which we have to capture them.

General Welch: Even with all that said, I have no interest in 1100 sublimit on ALCMs. And what we need is to have actual carriage, but as of *some day* after the Treaty goes into effect.

Admiral Crowe: I'm not sure we should be doing this at Moscow.

General Powell: No, not at the Ministerial level, but we have to move it into the Experts' Group.

Admiral Crowe: No, no, we ought to move all this stuff to Geneva.

Ambassador Kampelman: We have to use the Ministerial level. The Soviets are not going to make motion on *any* of these issues in Geneva. So we have to make use of the Ministerial meetings.

Secretary Carlucci: We have identified a series of things on which we could move. They seem to be at the Ministerial level general broad ideas, but for a return, we want details on verification. Therefore, we've got to disconnect. We can't work very detailed verification material as a Ministerial, and we need to negotiate the details.

Admiral Crowe: Okay, what we need to do is to get them to agree to do verification up front. We need to start exchanging information on verification *right now*. In INF, we put this into the end game, and we got hurt by it. The Soviets may not like it, but we need to exchange information *now*.

Ambassador Rowny: They're not going to do that. It's not to their advantage—it's not their style. They're not going to let us do this in this way. Beyond that, with respect to mobiles, they're going to keep a covert force, and we're not going to be able to ratify any of this mobility stuff.

General Herres: They could make a covert force, but don't need mobiles.

Ambassador Lehman: We've put a lot stuff down already. We've got an Inspection Protocol, a Conversation and Elimination Protocol, and MOU. Now, not all the detail is there, but a lot of it is. The Soviets have begun working on detail in Geneva. What we need now is the

key; we need to tell them we need some tangible progress in detailed information evidenced in Geneva.

Secretary Carlucci: Again, what I'm telling you is that we're talking about making accommodations at the Ministerials at one level of on broad principles, on things like counting rules and, in return, we're looking for agreement on detail that's well below the Ministerial level on verification.

Secretary Shultz: Well, I can take the position that the Treaty process is replete with details, and much of this has to be worked in the trenches. We could seek a commitment to energize each other's side on details. Here, I think what we need to do is have classes of detail and verification to be addressed. You know, we made a lot of mileage on lists of things of problems at Ministerials, both in Moscow and Washington. So we need to build such a listing of the categories of information that we want detail on, and we need to be ready to grapple at the Expert level.

Admiral Crowe: We can give you the categories, but an extensive exchange early of information is very important.

Secretary Shultz: But what kinds of things do you have in mind?

General Gray: Oh, you know, scientific and technical data.

Admiral Trost: Well, for example, we need to know where they manufacture cruise missiles. How can we exchange information; how can we decide if we don't even know where that is? And we're ready to exchange data too.

Secretary Carlucci: We ought to need to know what facilities of ours need to be monitored. And we can't wait until the end, because I'm getting beat up by a whole bunch of Congressmen who think that plants in their District are going to get monitored.

General Herres: We need to understand their maintenance and logistics infrastructure and their concept of operations.

Admiral Crowe: And we need to do likewise.

Secretary Shultz: Can we? Are we prepared to give them this kind of information?

Admiral Crowe: Oh, yeah, most of it is in *Aviation Week* anyway.

Secretary Shultz: Well, Bob Linhard and Allen Holmes can do this, I'm sure.

Admiral Crowe: We need to work on all this, especially make sure we identify all our plants.

Secretary Carlucci: Yeah, again, there's a lot of concern up in Congress.

Ambassador Rowney: You guys are kidding yourselves. The Soviets are never going to give you this.

Ambassador Lehman: Many on the Hill will say right now that we ought to slow down on START, mainly because of verification. We're

going to get hurt if we don't have detailed information on verification before we close on START. This will allow us to put the burden on the Soviets.

Secretary Carlucci: So that's the bottom line then. We have to have our verification regime first before we can work the larger issues. Now let's turn to Defense and Space, George. What about Defense and Space? You know, the GRIP paper is okay. It has the right words, but it doesn't say how we're going to do it. We can't leave it vague on how we [are] going to link or not link, because Nunn and Levin will kill us. I guess I take it you're going to ignore this in Moscow. I've asked Ron to look into this—on how to make this concrete. Ron, have you got anything you want to say?

Ambassador Lehman: We can get them to give in to a separate Treaty, and we want to reduce the linkages to START in any case. Now, there's a lot of ways we could that. We could do a Joint Statement; we could do Joint Side Letter statements; and we could do separate treaties. And we're going to study all this.

Secretary Carlucci: Even with a separate Treaty, Congress is going to link it up anyway.

General Gray: What we need is a *big fat quid* giving us a green light.

Secretary Shultz: Are we concerned that when we get a START Treaty and we make those reductions, that they will deploy the defenses that they are ahead of us in? Isn't it really in our interest really to have the same linkage in a START environment to ensure that we don't have our residual offensive capability undercut?

Secretary Carlucci: Oh, well, that's certainly true, but that would play into decisions on permitted and prohibited. Now no one of us is suggesting we do away with the ABM Treaty. We are prepared to live with it for some time. It's just a matter of what's the time.

Secretary Shultz: You know, back in the Washington Summit, we made a lot of headway. We now see that there's a length of time to be negotiated, and we've got what we want with respect to what will happen at the end. We're totally unconstrained with respect to that. And we added "as required," which marginally helps us remove some of the concerns about testing. I've heard some talk lately about freeing sensors, but I'm not sure where that's going. What we need to do is plow away restrictions on testing in space. And we should be looking for a quid. We moved the ball a lot in Washington. We ought to be able to move it again.

Secretary Carlucci: It would really help us to remove sensors. That would be an amendment to the Treaty, and it would really help. Of

course, we let them out of the K-radar,⁷ but I think that's okay. For example, our next two tests are sensor tests.

Secretary Shultz: But we also want to test weapons.

Secretary Carlucci: Yeah, that's true, but eventually. But we don't want to put the two of them together—sensors and weapons—at an early time.

However, now that I think of it, I don't think that we're ready to propose that we let sensors run free. Ron, are we?

Ambassador Lehman: No.

Secretary Shultz: Oh, then I got no new talking points.

General Powell: Well, what about this programmatic approach that Frank was going to take on SDI?

Secretary Shultz: Well, that's internal though.

Secretary Carlucci: What we need to do is tell them what I told Shevardnadze over lunch. Tell them if they want a START agreement, they'd better figure a way for us to go forward on SDI.

Secretary Shultz: Well, we've got a lot of points in my talking point book. Don't I, Bob (Linhard)?

Colonel Linhard: To some extent you do.

Secretary Carlucci: Bob, isn't that our position though—that if they want to go in START, they must let us go forward?

Colonel Linhard: Yes.

Ambassador Kampelman: I'm not sure that I'd risk SDI too early now. There's no need to press the linkage.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, I'm looking at what's in the budget on SDI.

Secretary Shultz: Well, is there anything more we need to talk about?

Admiral Crowe: We owe you categories of information. We'll get them to you.

Secretary Shultz: Okay. It seems like we are agreed that we need to focus on early information exchange on verification, and that we ought to make a major push on this area vice any of the broader issues. Of course, the Working Groups will get into detail over there.

Admiral Crowe: I feel like I'm hanging you out on mobiles.

Secretary Shultz: Well, you're hanging me out on mobiles and ALCMs.

Admiral Crowe: Well, we could let you run a little bit on mobiles—collect some information; you know, exchange some ideas. We would still kind of only prefer rail mobile anyway.

⁷ Reference is to the Krasnoyarsk Radar.

General Welch: But we need to have them corralled. For example, we need to have them corraled at some time; you know, all the systems corraled at some times.

Secretary Carlucci: But we don't want the M-X confined to a garrison.

General Welch: Well, what we mean by that is "normally" it would be in corral or the garrison, but there's no restrictions on the ability to take it out. You know, we watched the bombers for years. Bombers sit on bases, and we have the right to disperse them, and it's kind of like that. So "normally" they would be in garrison, but they have the right to go out. If a large percentage of their forces are on the roads or at rail "normally," we'll have a hell of a time trying to understand their concept.

Ambassador Nitze: Can we tolerate a percentage limit on how many are outside?

Secretary Carlucci: No, no, can't do that. And we've got to be really careful because if we handle this thing incorrectly, it'll make the case against my cut in MIDGETMAN.

General Welch: Now, I think what we really want to do is just "normally" in garrison.

Ambassador Nitze: I don't know what "normally" means in Treaty terms. Is anyone here who can explain that to me?

Secretary Carlucci: Look, we can't make MIDGETMAN look better than M-X rail garrison.

General Welch: I must be able to put my trains on the rails any time. It only happened in 40 years for the bomber force, but I can't give up that happening.

Ambassador Nitze: Well, how about would you send them out with notification?

General Welch: Okay, but it's got to be damn short notification.

Secretary Shultz: How about the idea that we have some common time in corrals for both so there would be some restrictions on when they had to be there.

Ambassador Lehman: You can see that there's a lot of work we've got to work out. The only thing we should be ready to say is that we're prepared to limit mobiles, but only if there's very good verification and if they're tightly constrained.

Secretary Shultz: Well, it sounds like it's the same posture on SLCMs, but I'm more dubious here.

Admiral Crowe: Well, Trost says that we've had more information on their idea of SLCM verification. We're all very cynical on anything there.

Secretary Carlucci: The Agency says that their idea of verification in SLCM doesn't work.

General Powell: That's right.

Admiral Crowe: I think Ron Lehman has the right idea. We can give them some examples of verification. What we are interested in is an agreement in principle, but not detail.

Ambassador Lehman: We need to show we got something for anything we do in verification. We need to protect ourselves on the Hill.

Secretary Shultz: You know, we make a lot of headway at these Ministerial meetings. Gorbachev is a decider, and it's a productive situation with that chain from Gorbachev to Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev. We have to use this potential. We need to be focused on what we want to get out of this. Shevardnadze will be here in March again—just a month—and I'll be in Moscow in April, Carlucci is going to meet with Yazov in March, and I understand maybe a meeting with Akhromeyev to follow.

Admiral Howe: Congress is already starting ratification hearings on the START Treaty now.

Secretary Shultz: Look, Washington is losing taste for arms control because it's too damn hard. But they also have no taste for spending more money for defense, and no taste for spending money on ICBMs for us. So we have a chance for getting something we need. This reminds me of a long chat I had with Nixon. His idea was to get an INF Treaty out of the way and get a START Treaty and have it negotiated and in-place by September or October, and then make it an issue in the campaign. In that way the guy who gets elected will be for it and have the ratification in the bag.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, I'm not sure we really want to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. We need them to save us from ourselves. Maybe we ought to get them to get and invade or go invade somewhere else.

Secretary Shultz: I just gave a talk a while back, and I'm sure you all are going to read it. In the talk, in relations with the Soviets, there are always some negative things, for example, the Black Sea incident.⁸ Many wanted to use this minor incident of the Black Sea as a cause

⁸ Reference is to an incident of February 12, in which two U.S. Navy vessels conducting an innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters off the Crimean Peninsula were bumped by Soviet coastal patrol boats. In telegram 45505 to Ankara, February 13, the Department reported that Armacost had called in Dubinin following the incident to issue a formal demarche, which Dubinin rejected, terming the presence of U.S. ships in the Black Sea a "provocation." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880128-0222)

for us breaking off conversation. That's stupid. I think that Eastern Europe is very volatile. We could see the Soviets go in and wack it.

Admiral Crowe: Well, I observed Billington's comment the other day⁹ that maybe it's four or five months for Gorbachev total tenure from now on.

Secretary Shultz: I have come to the conclusion that no Soviet expert knows how the Soviet Union works. You're better off just going for watching your interest and not trying to play their system.

The end of the meeting—9:15 a.m.

⁹ Not further identified.

271. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, February 19, 1988

SUBJECT

PFIAB Letter to President Regarding START Treaty (U)

1. (TS) You asked² for my comments on Anne Armstrong's recent PFIAB letter to the President³ regarding the proposed START Treaty. The PFIAB assessment provides a sobering preview of the hard, expansive ratification challenge that a START treaty will face. It reinforces my judgment that we cannot afford to cut corners in trying to accelerate work toward a START agreement. Getting the details right is critical. No matter how good the framework of limits and restrictions, unless that framework is supported by an acceptable network of definitions, counting rules, inspection procedures, and so forth, we will not be able to answer to our satisfaction the sorts of fundamental questions that the PFIAB raises. Nor will we be able to answer the critics. You will

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40051-40073. Top Secret.

² Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs memorandum, 11 February 1988, subject as above. [Footnote is in the original text]

³ See Document 262.

recall that one of the most elusive compliance debates on SALT involved the details of the definition of a new type of light ICBM, and how the Soviets exploited that definition in deploying the SS-25. At this point in START, we still lack, within the US Government, an agreed approach to distinguishing existing from future types of ballistic missiles. That is the sort of detail of which there are dozens that must be nailed down satisfactorily as we proceed.

2. (TS) Turning to the general themes that Anne Armstrong raises, clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not yet in a position to pass judgment on the effective verifiability or the certified military sufficiency of a completed START agreement for the simple reason that so many details remain to be worked out. Thus far the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the framework for approaching START reductions is sound. I am concerned with the resource issues that Anne Armstrong raises. In their 12 May 1987 memorandum to your predecessor,⁴ on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that “the American public should be prepared for the fact that a sound INF agreement will not save money. The cost of effective verification, particularly if residual LRINF and/or SRINF are maintained, and of compensatory security measures will be quite considerable. It is strongly recommended that the political leadership begin conveying this message early and clearly.” The potential costs of INF verification pale in comparison with what is under consideration for START.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have devoted hundreds of hours of discussion and study to START over the past several years. This Administration has made considerable progress toward a sound START agreement. With deliberative, well-conceived answers to the remaining hard questions, that progress can be carried forward. Above all else, we must not cut corners.

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁴ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1984–1988.

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 10:45 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings, February 21 Morning

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (Notetaker)	Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister (Notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)	P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Shevardnadze said he did not think the two ministers needed to spend a long time on the agenda. They would speak at the plenary on the sequence and on the composition of working groups on various problems, as was their tradition.

Shevardnadze said he wished to raise another issue. It would be good if their colleagues would try to prepare a document on the results of their discussions. Perhaps this would not be necessary, but they should see; it had been useful in the past.

The Secretary suggested they see if they had something to say.

Shevardnadze said they should see how things developed. Perhaps they should try to formulate something in one of the working groups.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Turning to START, the Secretary said it was important to recognize that we had accomplished a great deal over the previous year. We had worked very hard at the Washington Summit, and the statement agreed there records progress that two or three years before people would have thought it impossible to achieve. The credit belonged to the two leaders. They had put their backs to it, and achieved a great deal.

Our leader were on record that they wanted to complete a START Treaty in the first half of this year, the Secretary continued. We wanted

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House. Shultz departed Washington on February 19 and met with Koivisto in Helsinki from February 20 to 21 before arriving in Moscow on February 21. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 121.

it to be well and carefully done, but it was doable. The job was to get at it.

The INF Treaty had been well received because it was carefully drafted and included sound verification provisions. He remembered that when he had taken it and distributed it to the U.S.'s partners in NATO, they had been astonished at how thorough the verification provisions were. START would have to meet the same rigorous standards, and would be more difficult than INF. But it was still doable.

The Secretary said it was useful to recall what had already been agreed in START:

- 6000 warheads;
- 1600 strategic missiles and bombers;
- 4900 ballistic missile warheads;
- 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBM's;
- a throwweight ceiling 50 percent below the current Soviet level;
- a bomber weapon counting rule dealing with bombs and short-range missiles; and
- a long list of verification ideas that built upon and went beyond what is in the INF Treaty, including data exchange, various kinds of inspection, and measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means.

That was a very impressive list of accomplishments, the Secretary said. The U.S. side wanted to take advantage of it and bring this to fruition. And our view was that while there were still large items to decide, the most likely difficulty was with verification.

The U.S. view, the Secretary said, was that we need to get back into verification, to get going on it as if we were at the end of the negotiation. Our task is to transform the concepts agreed at the Washington Summit into detailed verification procedures. We had seen in negotiating the INF Treaty that when we resolved one issue another appeared in its place. This was a pick and shovel task; it would only yield to hard work.

The U.S. Delegation in Geneva, the Secretary continued, had recently tabled a draft Inspection Protocol and a revised Protocol on Conversion of Elimination. He asked that Shevardnadze's people work from these documents to produce agreed texts of these important documents. If they found it necessary, they might want to draft their own text. The essential point was that we promptly negotiate these two key documents. We should propose to ourselves to maximize progress on joint drafting of the Protocols before we two ministers met again. They should set the objective of having Shevardnadze's trip to Washington be the focus for getting them into as good shape as we could.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had seen in discussions with the Senate that these issues come to the fore; they take up a high

proportion of the total time. Arms control agreements had to pass severe tests—in the negotiating process, in ratification, and while they were in force. Verification and compliance were essential if START were to measure up to these tests.

We had seen in INF that there were many different numbers involved, the Secretary continued. START would be even more difficult. When they had talked in Washington, they had agreed that the START verification approach would include data exchanges, including declarations by each side of the number and location of weapons systems and associated facilities. We wanted to begin the process, and were prepared to be forthcoming *now*, the Secretary emphasized. We had learned from the INF experience that this important subject should not be left to the last minute. The U.S. side was prepared to table a draft Memorandum of Understanding in Geneva the next week.

This draft MOU would provide for the kinds of data that were contained in the INF MOU, but expanded and adapted to the much more demanding task of START.

The U.S. side was prepared to begin exchanging the data in Geneva that would be contained in the START MOU before the two ministers met the next month.

The Secretary said he was emphasizing this because it was important to get ahead of the curve if the two sides were to complete the task. So that was one part of what he was proposed that day—getting started right away on the data that were necessary for a START Treaty, as was agreed in Washington. He had said it was needed to avoid a last-minute rush, but far more was needed in the case of the START Treaty.

As the Soviet and U.S. sides jointly thought through the problem of how to verify a START Treaty, the Secretary went on, where they did not have the advantages of a zero outcome, and where they had to verify with confidence the size of the remaining forces on both sides, the U.S. side believed that both would need to know much more than they now did about how each acquired, deployed and maintained strategic forces.

If they were successfully to verify, they needed to understand that better than they did now. That was true across the board, but it was especially true with regard to mobile missiles. The U.S. side agreed that they had things to be said for them, but they also presented verification problems.

The overall problem had two aspects. One was to have a better understanding of the magnitude of the on-site inspection tasks the sides would have to contemplate understanding. They were going to put this in place for INF, but that would be small in comparison to START, and the two sides needed to begin doing the things they would need to do.

The U.S. side thought that meant they would need to know more about each other's production plans and procedures, about each other's maintenance requirements and practices, and how each side replaced items which were used, wore out, or became obsolete, in order to make it possible to establish nodes at which periodic or random checks or perhaps permanent monitoring that might assure adequate confidence that ceilings would not be exceeded.

The U.S. side recognized that this would be very sensitive and difficult, the Secretary said. Our own military was swallowing and perspiring, asking what it was getting into. He had told them that if we wanted the Treaty that was the implication: the Soviet Union needed to know more and vice versa. If this was not possible, the military should blow the whistle. And it had not. *General Powell* said the military was having a bad time. *Shevardnadze* commented that U.S. military people must be very emotional.

The Secretary concluded that he had wished to call attention to these proposals on data exchange. He suggested that the two ministers instruct the delegations to shape up the three documents by the time the ministers met in March.

Shevardnadze said he would respond after lunch. (The meeting concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

273. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 2:40–5:40 p.m.

The Secretary's Second Meeting with Shevardnadze

SUBJECT

Defense & Space; SLCM's; ALCM's; Backfire; mobile missiles; Nuclear Testing; CW; summit timing

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
National Security Advisor Powell
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Medvedev
Shevardnadze Counselor Tarasenko
MFA Notetaker
MFA Interpreter

Defense and Space

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by indicating he would like to endorse the Secretary's remarks before lunch on the significance of the INF Treaty. Moscow remained convinced, however, that INF was only the first step.

As to the Secretary's comments on the establishment of the On Site Inspection Agency, Shevardnadze could tell him that the Soviet side was in the final stages of setting up a similar agency and would soon be in a position to provide details. The entity would be composed of experts from both the defense and foreign ministries.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary in his remarks had referred a number of times to the Washington Summit Joint Statement. That was appropriate. In Washington it had been possible to agree on the

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Guest-house of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 122.

main lines of a future treaty. A lot of work had been done before that in Geneva and by the two ministers; some work had been done since in Geneva. The Soviet side wanted to work in a businesslike fashion, and had given its delegation the instructions they needed to meet the task of completing a treaty on fifty percent reductions in strategic arms in the context of preserving the ABM Treaty, as had been agreed in Washington.

Shevardnadze noted that the two sides often accused the other's delegations in Geneva of passivity. But, to a degree, such charges suggested that the ministers themselves were not doing enough. In that context, the Soviet side had welcomed certain recent positive moves by the U.S. delegation, and had made some of its own: Nonetheless, if a treaty were to be achieved, the momentum thus far was inadequate. So Shevardnadze endorsed the Secretary's call for accelerated work in all areas.

Verification, Shevardnadze acknowledged, was the most difficult, sensitive and important set of issues. Moscow was prepared to examine every aspect of the question in a very positive way.

Parallel to that, however, one had to identify clearly the main obstacles to concluding a treaty. What were the fundamental political decisions which would be needed? That was where the Secretary and Shevardnadze should engage.

If the Secretary agreed with that proposition, the key became to clarify the future of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze said that, in reading reports from Geneva, he had the impression it was becoming central. If there were no such understanding, there would be no START treaty.

The fundamental approach, Shevardnadze recalled, had been worked out in Washington. The question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge had been discussed. The General Secretary had raised the possibility of a compromise in the Soviet position. But there had been agreement that, for a given period, neither side would withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Recent U.S. proposals in Geneva were disturbing in this regard. Indeed, the title of the U.S. draft treaty suggested an attempt to move away from the agreement reached in Washington. Shevardnadze did not intend to analyze the U.S. proposal, but he did want to stress that it was inconsistent with the Washington Joint Statement. The matter should be reviewed in Washington. The ABM Treaty should be preserved as signed in 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate and Supreme Soviet, as had been agreed at the summit. Yet the thrust of the U.S. draft treaty was not to preserve the Treaty, but to return to the "old" U.S. approach of seeking Soviet agreement that *any* work short of deployment of actual ABM systems was consistent with the Treaty.

The Soviet side disagreed with this approach, which was simply inconsistent with preserving the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze suggested that it would be useful to have a more detailed discussion of the matter with Gorbachev the next day. The Foreign Minister hoped that the Secretary would be able to give a definitive answer as to whether the U.S. was prepared to continue to work on the basis of the Washington understandings. If so, Shevardnadze was convinced that mutually acceptable formulations could be found.

Another problem which deserved attention, Shevardnadze continued, was violations of the ABM Treaty—an “old story.” The Soviet side was sure that the U.S. was concerned that no violations of the Treaty take place (NOTE: Shevardnadze gave the impression of speaking in the context of the non-withdrawal period). But there were ways of dealing with such contingencies—either through existing bodies or others. Defense Ministers, for example, could take up alleged violations in detail. Shevardnadze did not want to reopen old discussions (NOTE: Here, the implication seemed to be discussions of “permitted/prohibited activities”). But thought should be given to using existing mechanisms, including meetings of Defense Ministers, as well as considering how new ones might make a contribution.

Concluding his presentation, Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had focused in his opening remarks on START verification. Shevardnadze had started with the ABM Treaty to emphasize the need for clarity here if there were to be a START Treaty.

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze’s agreement that the two sides should work hard on verification even as they addressed other issues. He suggested that delegations in Geneva be instructed to complete work on the data exchange MOU and two protocols by the time of the ministers’ March meeting. Giving them a deadline would impart a sense of urgency to their work. The Secretary said he had the impression Shevardnadze agreed to this approach.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he had not specifically addressed the question of focusing on verification in START because it seemed quite agreeable to him. MEDVEDEV interjected that the Soviet side would soon be making proposals based on those already tabled by the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said that this was good. As for the ABM Treaty, it would be good to have an agreement on the issues involved there in parallel with START. We believed that such an agreement should be separate from a START treaty, but both should be pressed. The fact that there would be an agreed period for START reductions and for non-withdrawal suggested there was a relationship. We did not like the idea of attaching the two, but we had no problem with a treaty which

contained important substance. As for what to call it, the Secretary was certain that some sort of satisfactory descriptive title could be found.

Violations, the Secretary agreed, were something the Defense Ministers might take up. We would have to see what came of their first discussion. The Soviet side knew how strongly the U.S. felt about these issues.

THE SECRETARY said that it should be possible to reach agreement. We were already in the “ballpark.” We had worked out what would happen when the non-withdrawal period was over, i.e., the ABM Treaty would remain in force, but each side could give six months notice of its intention to withdraw. We had put the General Secretary’s words on this point in the Washington Joint Statement; now we should put them in a treaty.

The Secretary said he was aware that there since had been an argument in Geneva over whether during the non-withdrawal period the sides would be able to exercise the “supreme national interest” provision of the ABM Treaty. This was standard language used in all treaties. It was not an expression on our part of any intention to withdraw. The Secretary could not help but believe that, in the end, the Soviet side could accept such a standard formulation.

The most difficult issue, the Secretary continued, was what activities would take place during the non-withdrawal period. Various formulations had been tried in Washington before the language of the Joint Statement had been agreed. The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze in his remarks had used the formula, “as ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet.” This suggested an acknowledgement that there was a difference in the two sides’ understanding on this point even in 1972, which, however, was not a major issue because of unclarity with respect to the meaning of the “other physical principles” language of the Treaty. We had subsequently come to the conclusion that the Soviet view at the time was the correct one. But it probably would not be useful to get into a legalistic analysis of the problem. As a general proposition, the President believed that the U.S. should be free to test and determine if strategic defense was feasible. We realized that the General Secretary had a different view. To some extent, they had agreed to disagree on this point as long as there was an agreed period of non-withdrawal which would provide a sense of predictability.

In that regard, the U.S. felt there had been some progress in Geneva. We had proposed a package of confidence building measures. The Soviet side had not agreed to discuss these, but Shevardnadze in his comments on verification seemed to have picked up some of our ideas. Perhaps our proposals for such things as annual exchanges of information, access to tests, and laboratory visits—coupled with an agreed non-withdrawal period—could help provide predictability during that period.

As for other issues, the Secretary believed that everything would fall into place if it were possible to deal with the question of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side was familiar with the President's views on this matter. We agreed on the importance of the ABM area, and on the need to have it treated in some way, although not as part of a START treaty.

POWELL endorsed the Secretary's comments, and pointed out that the difficult issue was activities necessary to conduct ongoing national programs on both sides during the non-withdrawal period. Other elements of an agreement, he agreed, were already in place. He noted that the two sides seemed to be close together on the length of the non-withdrawal period and what happened thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the latter point was clear. Negotiations would begin three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period. The Washington Joint Statement had dealt with the issue.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, as a general proposition, it would be well to stick with the language of the Joint Statement in approaching this issue in Geneva. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach. Noting that it would be difficult to come to an understanding of the Joint Statement's language, the SECRETARY proposed that the Geneva negotiators be instructed to work on this basis, but acknowledged that, ultimately, the task would devolve to himself and Shevardnadze.

SHEVARDNADZE cautioned against reopening in such a context a discussion of what was and was not permitted by the ABM Treaty. This would rekindle an old argument. Rather, the negotiators should focus on a verification regime which would provide predictability.

The Foreign Minister proposed that it be recorded that delegations should work on the basis of the understandings reflected in the Washington Joint Statement.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze's suggestion for putting those understandings in the context of verification might be something that could be built on. POWELL endorsed this idea, noting that it went to the confidence building problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it would be well if the delegations worked on this basis.

SLCM's

Shevardnadze introduced what he referred to as another "fundamental" problem—SLCM's. Moscow knew the U.S. arguments regarding verification. The Soviets agreed it would not be easy. Gorbachev in Washington had alluded to existing devices which could be used to facilitate verification. The Joint Statement had contained important provisions on national technical means (NTM) and on site inspection

(OSI). If these means were used, and the necessary political decisions were made, it would be possible to resolve all other matters.

Shevardnadze was sure the issue would come up with Gorbachev the following morning, because it had been the subject of several meetings of the Soviet leadership. If it were not resolved, it would be impossible to resolve the general question of strategic arms limitations. So Shevardnadze hoped that the Secretary had brought some new ideas.

He emphasized that what was needed was a political decision. As with the concept of 50% strategic arms reductions, once such a decision was made, the methodology would follow. The same was true with cruise missiles. Once there was agreement on ceilings, verification methods could be found. If there were differences, they could be resolved. So SLCM's should be addressed in this framework. Ceilings were necessary, moreover, on both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the START treaty was about strategic *nuclear* weapons. It had nothing to do with conventional weapons. There was no way that the U.S. would agree to limitations on our conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched. He felt the need to make this clear as a matter of principle.

As for verification, as the U.S. viewed it, the generic problem was a difficult one. That was why we had proposed, and Shevardnadze had now agreed, that we should start work now on the issues involved.

But there were different orders of difficulty as between systems. Mobile missiles were more difficult to verify than other missiles. SLCM's were the most difficult of all. We had given the matter much thought. While we were not convinced we would be able to verify a mobile missile limit, we had been able to identify at least conceptually an approach to the problem.

With SLCM's we were still at sea. We had no objection to limiting SLCM's if the Soviet side were willing to accept a declaration that they would be limited to a specific level. We did not like that approach, but we were willing to take it. The Soviets could be sure that Congress would make us live up to any agreements we made. We would prefer something more verifiable, but the problem appeared intractable.

We had considered the possibility of using NTM to determine the presence of nuclear SLCM's aboard ships, but we had concluded it would not work. We had the impression that the Soviet side had of late reached a similar conclusion. It was too difficult to distinguish between nuclear power plants and missiles. There were ways of shielding.

As for OSI, it had serious drawbacks, especially as regarded submarines. There was great reluctance on the part of the U.S. Navy, and

the Secretary sensed similar reluctance on the Soviet side, to having people from the other side roaming around their subs.

So this was a problem. We could not be as confident as we could be even as regarded mobile missiles, which was also open to question. We were prepared to treat the problem of SLCM's. We were prepared to treat the problem of a limit. We were prepared to live up to any commitments. But verification had us baffled.

POWELL, in response to the Secretary's invitation to comment, reinforced the Secretary's affirmation that conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched, were not on the table.

SHEVARDNADZE challenged the U.S. side to read the Washington Joint Statement on that point, and proceeded to read the Statement's language on SLCM's. When he reached the words "nuclear armed" he hesitated, said he was sorry, and mumbled that he hadn't noticed that before.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that the U.S. was prepared to agree to a limit on nuclear armed SLCM's, and was willing to work to find a satisfactory means of verifying such a limit. We had not yet found such means. We had no special insights. Powell and the Secretary had met with the U.S. Navy² the week before in Washington. The Navy had reaffirmed its lack of confidence on this point. They had not said it could not be done. But they could not imagine how to do the job.

The Secretary said that there was agreement between the two sides on the importance of SLCM's and on setting a limit. We were willing to set a number. But how to verify the number was a big problem.

SHEVARDNADZE volunteered to summarize what had been said. The two sides seemed to be ready in Geneva to begin a discussion of SLCM limits, including specific numbers. The Soviet side had already proposed a number; the U.S. should follow suit. Specific types of submarines and surface ships on which SLCM's would be deployed should be identified. Again, Moscow had already made proposals. Expert groups should be established to deal with verification, including by means of NTM and OSI. They could report any progress to ministers at their March meeting.

In short, on the one hand what was needed were political decisions on SLCM numbers and types of vessels; and, parallel to this, a serious discussion of verification. Why could the U.S. not provide a number? The two sides needed to proceed on two tracks.

THE SECRETARY observed that ceilings were one thing, types of ships were another. We were not prepared to go down that track,

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

because of our neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. We were thus leary of defining which types of warships carried nuclear weapons.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that nothing was impossible. That was the Soviet approach to arms control and other types of questions. Moscow had proposed that two types of submarines and one type of surface ship be designated. But the issue could be revisited. What was needed was a decision in principle.

THE SECRETARY said that, as a matter of principle, the U.S. was not prepared to say that we would designate specific types of warships which carry nuclear-armed SLCM's. We were willing to work on verification, but we wanted the Soviet side to have no question as to our doubts on the matter.

KARPOV said that Moscow had only felt that designating ships was the simplest approach to the problem. THE SECRETARY said he was only pointing out the problems with it.

SHEVARDNADZE urged the Secretary to give the matter further thought. This was a problem for both sides. Summarizing, he said that the discussion had produced three areas which required decisions in principle. If these could not be made during the present visit, perhaps they could be revisited in March. It was good that the U.S. was prepared to agree on a ceiling. Perhaps the working groups could discuss this. Shevardnadze proposed saying that, in principle, the two sides agreed that there should be a ceiling.

After consulting with Powell, THE SECRETARY agreed.

ALCM's

SHEVARDNADZE said that there also appeared to be some confusion with respect to ALCM's. He was not sure who was to blame for this. He was sure it was not the Soviet negotiators.

The question was counting—an important question. The delegations should find a way to resolve it. What was at stake was the U.S. insistence on using a very low number for counting weapons on a single bomber. The Soviet side knew that U.S. bombers were equipped to carry much larger numbers of ALCM's. Taking this into account, the actual number of ALCM's on heavy bombers would be well in excess of the number to be counted on bombers within the 6,000 START warhead limit. The correct number was the maximum number of cruise missiles for which a bomber was equipped. This was a proven method.

There was, however, another aspect to the problem—the range question. In the past, both sides had accepted a range of 600 km as the criterion for considering cruise missiles as strategic weapons. Coupled with the U.S. rejection of an 1,100 sublimit on heavy bomber cruise missiles, the higher range figure claimed by the U.S. would give it a

significant unilateral advantage. This was a retreat from agreements already reached, and would not work.

THE SECRETARY said that we were prepared to discuss some of the issues Shevardnadze had raised in the working group. As with SLCM's, the discussion needed to be confined to nuclear cruise missiles. Conventional cruise missiles were not on the table. This was a central point.

We were ready to discuss the range question. On the counting rule, we still have some questions. Our own approach was not a casual one. There were means of determining the capabilities of aircraft. One could go on from there. There appeared to be means of dealing with this problem.

The 1,100 bomber weapons sublimit was a real problem. It seemed to us an unnecessary constraint. If it had been introduced because of Soviet concern over our proposed counting rule, the solution was to deal with the counting rule itself. Perhaps the experts could work on that.

POWELL pointed out that there was no need for the 1,100 sublimit, since, for every bomber weapon we selected, we would have to eliminate one ballistic missile warhead. But this could be addressed in the working group.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the 1,100 limit appeared to have arisen out of concern over the ALCM counting rule. If it were possible to agree on the counting rule, perhaps that would take care of the need for a sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said, "that's right." It was one thing when an aircraft could carry only six weapons, and another when it could carry twenty. There had to be clarity on this question. The methods were well known. "The geometry is the same geometry." As for distinguishing nuclear cruise missiles from others, Shevardnadze believed the problem could be solved. That, too, could be taken up by experts.

Backfire/Mobiles

Moving on to a new issue, Shevardnadze said it was time for the American side to drop its insistence on counting the Backfire as a heavy bomber. There were probably excessive demands in the positions of both sides at Geneva, but it was a waste of time to continue to discuss Backfire. There was not time for such discussions, and more important things to discuss. There was no reason to include the Backfire in a treaty.

As for mobile missiles, it appeared that the two sides were approaching a meeting of the minds. If agreement could be reached on a verification scheme, the U.S. proposal for a ban on mobiles could be removed from the table.

THE SECRETARY said that the Backfire *was* in fact a problem. Perhaps the working groups could solve it.

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary wanted first to make a few “philosophical comments.” Both sides were attracted to the concept of mobile missiles for survivability reasons. But the very reason for the survivability of mobiles made it difficult to verify their presence.

When considering how to verify a specific number of mobile missiles, we had come up with certain answers: by limiting the number; by corralling the missiles in ways which compromised to a degree the factor which made them survivable; by getting a better understanding of the other side’s operational practices. We, for example, would probably confine mobile missiles to corrals, where we could verify them. One could imagine different doctrines, some of which could be messy. So one needed a clear idea of what was possible, recognizing that there would be a trade-off between those factors which provided for survivability and those which enhanced confidence in verification.

Another question was the problem of non-deployed systems. These could be easily hidden in the case of mobile missiles. This raised questions of monitoring production, keeping track of stocks, etc. Dealing with such problems would require a high degree of intrusiveness. The U.S. assumed that Moscow was ready to allow this.

Thus, the U.S. still believed that a ban on mobiles would be best. But we recognized the investment that the Soviet side had in mobiles. We therefore wanted to expose Shevardnadze to the kinds of considerations we felt had to be addressed in verifying mobile systems. Our own approach had not yet entirely crystalized, but we had concluded that the problems involved were of a lesser magnitude than with SLCM’s.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his views. The Foreign Minister had found many interesting and constructive suggestions in what the Secretary had had to say that morning and after lunch. Shevardnadze was certain that Gorbachev would find them equally so, and, rather than try to address them in detail now, he would leave it to the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze could say that he felt the two sides’ discussion of the mobile missile issue inspired more optimism than in the past. Once the Soviet side had had a chance to consult with Gorbachev, it would have some suggestions to make. The General Secretary would have more tomorrow. Moscow had followed closely recent U.S. statements on mobiles, including that of Defense Secretary Carlucci.³ He had had some interesting ideas.

³ See footnote 2, Document 267.

THE SECRETARY said he had another question to raise—sublimits. This was an issue which should be gotten out of the way. There were several numbers which could be dispensed with. The two ministers seemed to agree that the 1,100 ALCM proposal could be dropped if the counting rule question could be dealt with. The U.S. had recently dropped its proposal for a 1,600 limit on highly fractioned missile warheads. (SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow had noticed that.) The last item on the table was therefore the U.S. proposal for a sublimit on land-based ICBM's. We had proposed 3,000. Akhromeyev in Washington had said that the Soviet Union had no plans to have more than 3,300 ICBM's. We were prepared to agree to a sublimit of 3,300 and put the sublimit question behind us.

SHEVARDNADZE said that that was an interesting suggestion. He asked permission to sleep on it. He first needed to brief Gorbachev on this and other questions.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

274. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 22, 1988, 11:05 a.m.–2:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev February 22

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC
Colin Powell, President's National Security Advisor	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President on Arms Control	Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, First Deputy Minister of Defense
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 23. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 125.

Jack F. Matlock, U.S.
Ambassador to Moscow
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant
Secretary of State (EUR)
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State
(EUR) (notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador
to Washington
Mr. Chernyayev, Special Assistant
to the General Secretary
(notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Gorbachev said he thought the Soviet side could agree on the importance of verification in the preparation of the START Treaty. He also believed the problem was more complex than for INF. The Soviet side was ready for cooperation, for intensive, even new forms of verification compared to the INF Treaty, as had been said in Washington. The sides were now doing reductions for real. Verification was needed to assure the U.S. side and the Soviet side that there would not be one-sided advantages in reductions. The U.S. side should take the same approach. Otherwise there would be no movement.

The Secretary said that he agreed, and that to come to grips with this, both sides needed more information on the other's forces. He and Shevardnadze had agreed the day before to instruct the Geneva negotiators to produce drafts of the two protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding in time for Shevardnadze to come to Washington, on March 22 or thereabouts. He had talked to Admiral Crowe and the other chiefs. They were doing a lot of agonizing. But they were ready. Shevardnadze had said Akhromeyev and his colleagues were in the same position. This was an important and serious matter.

Gorbachev said that since verification seemed the most difficult issue, perhaps it should receive priority attention now. Perhaps there should be a special group of experts—say scientists and military people—to single the thing out, not just as part of the general work.

Shevardnadze said he and the Secretary had particularly discussed ways to intensify this work, especially on SLCM's, but this could be expanded to other matters.

Gorbachev said the work should encompass production, inventories, deployment areas on land, at sea, under water. Of course the two sides would need reciprocal information on each other. Without it verification efforts could not be successful.

The Secretary said he agreed. The two sides would see to it that the Geneva delegations were equipped with experts who could work competently and effectively, so that by the time of the Washington meeting there could be results. It was a good thing to set deadlines for them.

Gorbachev said it was a matter of fundamental (*printsipialno*) importance that in this process of seeking solutions to all problems of strategic

arms, including ABM, the sides proceed from the provisions of the Washington statement. He said this because the draft document proposed by the U.S. at Geneva reflected the U.S. approach to strategic stability. President Reagan had taken that approach in Washington too. He (Gorbachev) had made clear from the outset that this was not the way to a solution. Together they had managed to find acceptable language on the subject. But if that were changed there would be no solutions. As was said here, one had to build a bridge across rather than alongside a river.

The Secretary said he agreed that the Washington statement should be the Bible, so to speak, of what we were doing.

He continued that he wished to make some comments in the space and defense area. The U.S. side believed that it was essential, if we were to reach a strategic arms agreement, that there also be a treaty or agreement dealing with this. It was important that it be separate, but in any case it had to be there. The U.S. side believed that the essence of that agreement was contained in the Washington joint statement. It proposed basically to take the language there as the fundamental basis for the agreement or treaty. The sides did not need lawyers to change it. Central to the concept was the idea that there should be an agreed length of time not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They had talked enough about that—they had not agreed, but they had talked a lot—and enough for them to agree that that period would exceed the length of time involved for reductions of strategic arms.

Gorbachev said the Washington statement had had two aspects and not just one. The first concerned interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it was understood in 1972. The second concerned the non-withdrawal period the Secretary had mentioned.

The Secretary said there had been a third element. The statement had used the Soviet side's language on what each side could do, with six months' notice, at the end of the agreed period. So there were three elements.

Gorbachev said that actually there had been a fourth element. In the U.S. side's comments on the Washington statement, it was saying that either side could withdraw at any time when it judged there was a threat to its supreme national interest. This negated the rest of the agreement. It provided for unilateral withdrawal, and then there would be no agreement. Complete clarity was needed on this, for both the U.S. side and the Soviet side. He did not think the U.S. side would want a situation where the Soviet side could decide to withdraw that way.

The Secretary said that, with due respect, he thought the Soviet side was creating an unnecessary issue here. That language was practically standard in all our agreements. It was in the present ABM Treaty. It was in no way related to anything else but a supreme national interest.

The U.S. side would be glad to make a statement along those lines. It was a standard provision.

Gorbachev said he thought the exchange would be useful for continued work on this question.

The Secretary continued that the question of the 1972 Treaty and what “understood” meant was a matter of some controversy. Both sides knew that. There was more work to be done on that subject. Here Shevardnadze had made a suggestion that the U.S. side welcomed, and would go home thinking about. This was to look at the verification aspects of our discussion, and see if in there there was not some way to resolve this issue. He had a feeling that if the sides worked on that they might perhaps find an answer. But he knew more work needed to be done.

The Secretary said he would like to go back to the strategic arms treaty, and make some more comments. Looking at the verification issues, they were all difficult, but those concerning mobiles were a special and more difficult problem, and those concerning SLCM’s even more so. There had been special discussion of each issue in the meeting the day before. The U.S. side had had the position on mobiles that they should be banned, basically because anything agreed to would be so difficult to verify. But both sides had been working on the verification issue. Part of the discussion had been conceptual, part of it explicit. The sides were not home free. But he was somewhat more confident than in times past.

Turning to SLCM’s, the Secretary continued that Akhromeyev had spoken strongly on it in Washington. The U.S. side had examined the suggestion the Soviet side had made. It was still at a loss to see how it could be confident about verification. But the U.S. side was prepared to keep working. It also agreed that there were certain things that could be done: at a minimum this was an area that had to be treated; there should be a limit to nuclear-armed SLCM’s; the U.S. side would be willing at the right time to set a number we would be prepared to live with; we would like to have it verifiable. The U.S. side did not see how that could be accomplished. But it did see that a limit was necessary, and was prepared to step up to the issue.

Gorbachev said that many things on strategic offensive arms had been worked on. In Washington the sides had been able to note progress on some aspects, and to take some important steps. With regard to certain concerns that the U.S. side had expressed, the Soviet side had given some more thought, and was in a position to take some additional steps.

The U.S. side had raised the issue of sublimits, *Gorbachev* went on. The sides had agreed on a sublimit of 4900 warheads on ICBM’s and SLBM’s. This was a basis. Continuing on sublimits, he believed

the Soviet side could speak of an additional sublimit of 3300 on ICBM warheads and another of 1100 on heavy bomber warheads. Then the U.S. side had raised the issue of the heavy bomber warhead sublimit. The Soviet side understood the U.S. side needed it to be bigger than 1100, say 1300. If the sides agreed on 4900, then they might agree to add or subtract 200, if that was a problem for the U.S., say to 1300 on heavy bomber warheads and 5100 for ICBM/SLBM warheads. This was assuming that was a problem for the U.S.

Gorbachev continued that the Soviet side also thought there was agreement concerning Soviet heavy ICBM's—on 154 launchers and 1540 warheads. There could also be a ban on development, production and deployment of new heavy ICBM's and SLBM's. This could be agreed, but the sides would need criteria. The Soviet side was also ready to reach agreement on the limits of acceptable modernization of existing heavy missiles.

In connection with that, Gorbachev continued, the Soviet side thought the sides could write into the treaty a ban on heavy SLBM's and a ban on heavy mobile ICBM's, and a provision for non-conversion of non-heavy launchers into heavy launchers. The Soviet side was ready to specify all that.

The Secretary had raised mobiles, Gorbachev continued. He understood there had been movement on that. To remove ambiguity, the Soviet side was ready to specify the number of mobile launchers and to specify limits on deployed and non-deployed ICBM's.

With regard to verification, Gorbachev said, the Soviet side believed that the problem with respect to mobile missiles could be solved. He did not wish to go into the details. Soviet experts agreed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found.

The Secretary had spoken about SLCM's, Gorbachev went on. The Soviet side did believe, as it had said in Washington, that this was a fundamental problem. If no solution were found it would devalue all the efforts of the two sides on START and ABM. It would make them pointless. He would use the fashionable word "compensation." SLCM's could be the start of a new arms race. He understood that the U.S. position was to agree there should be a specific limit on SLCM's, but to doubt that it could be verified. But if the U.S. agreed to the concept of comprehensive verification, including national technical means, inspections, and limits on types of ships and submarines on which they were deployed, then the task of assuring effective verification could be accomplished. If two elements were combined—verification with the obligation of both sides to abide by and not violate the agreement, and access to production facilities, ships and submarines—then the problem could be resolved. If there were no such access this could be more difficult. Systems could be configured—with lead packaging,

shielding—to make it more difficult. But that would not be good for an agreement. It would be deception.

To sum up, Gorbachev said, he saw good possibilities of moving forward, and doing so faster. Solutions were possible.

The Secretary said he welcomed Gorbachev's comments that he saw things moving forward. He was uncertain about all the subtleties and complications. But he could see important strides in what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on two questions Gorbachev had raised.

Returning to SLCM's, the Secretary said that on-site inspection, at least in certain cases, and identification of types of ships and submarines both give us problems. We would have to think hard on this issue. We were prepared to set a number and live with it, but we were not at all confident about verification. However, we would keep working.

Gorbachev said "now you are afraid of verification." Once the Soviet side has accepted a U.S. proposal, the U.S. side took it back. It was becoming almost a routine.

The Secretary said he did not know how Gorbachev's navy was, but to ours the idea of people tramping around inside nuclear submarines was not attractive. We would keep working on the issue. *Gorbachev* said the Soviet navy was positively enthusiastic about the idea. *Akhromeyev* said the Soviet side's missile people, the ICBM people, had resisted the idea of U.S. inspectors on their bases till the very end. But the Soviet Union had a government. The U.S. side also had people in power, but they did not seem to be able to break the resistance of the navy people. *Gorbachev* commented that there was after all a government (*vlast'*) in both the Soviet Union and the United States. *Akhromeyev* said the Soviet side had broken their land-based people, but the U.S. side could not break its sea-based people. Perhaps that was because the Secretary was a Marine. *Gorbachev* said he thought that was an old bias. *The Secretary* offered to turn the floor over to General Powell.

With reference to the proposal for an 1100 sublimit, the Secretary continued, the U.S. side had no desire to change the 4900 sublimit. It recognized that 4900 plus 1100 equalled 6000. This was an automatic regulator. If either side wanted more than 1100 warheads on heavy bombers and ALCM's it would have to cut ICBM's. There was an automatic tradeoff there that both sides recognized. But in discussing this with Shevardnadze the day before, it had come through to him that this was not the problem. It had seemed to him that the Soviet concern reflecting uneasiness with the rule for counting ALCM's.

Gorbachev said that was another point that had not been discussed, but what the Secretary said was true. It seemed to him that there was

added clarity on that question. *The Secretary* replied that the way the matter had been left was that there was more work to do on that counting rule. As that progressed and the Soviet side got more comfortable with it, the 1100 number would probably fade away. What he had gotten was that the counting rule problem had generated the new number. The U.S. side recognized that it would have work to do on it.

Gorbachev said that as far as ALCM's were concerned there were two important elements. The first was the need for clarity on the long-agreed principle that long-range strategic cruise missiles were those with a range of over 600 km. The second was that we should agree to a specific number of cruise missiles for each type of aircraft, and, as the Secretary had said, that this should be within the 6000 warheads limit. He thought it was possible to reach an understanding on this. He did not see insurmountable obstacles to it.

The Secretary said that he agreed.

Gorbachev continued that nevertheless there were also new problems emerging. To deal with them the sides should add more experts, and make them work harder. *The Secretary* replied that the experience of the other treaty had shown that when one problem was solved, five more emerged. There needed to be an effort to put on more expert manpower and get them working intensively.

Gorbachev said he wished to repeat: it was his view, he was convinced, that if the sides began to work intensively right now, they could prepare good documents, good results, for the President's visit. *The Secretary* said we were determined to do that, and the President was as determined as *Gorbachev*. When Shevardnadze came to Washington the Secretary would keep him up all night. *Gorbachev* said he would give Shevardnadze a big suitcase.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

275. Editorial Note

Following the meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary of State George Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Osobnyak Guest House from 3:30–4:10 p.m. on February 22, 1988. Shevardnadze opened the meeting by stating there was only forty-five minutes to hear from the working groups on arms control, bilateral issues, regional issues, and human rights. After the working groups delivered brisk accounts of their reports, Shevardnadze thanked them for their efforts,

noted “he had made some important proposals on many fundamental problems in the nuclear and space area,” and acknowledged there had been “a useful discussion of the ABM Treaty, of SLCM’s, ALCM’s, mobile missiles, and sublimits and verification.” Shultz expressed gratitude for Shevardnadze’s hospitality, and encouraged U.S. and Soviet delegations to make progress in advance of Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington in March and the planned Moscow Summit at the end of May. (Memcon, Shultz and Shevardnadze February 22, 1988, 3:30–4:10 [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev.]) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 126.

At the close of their 3:30–4:10 meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze joined Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne Ridgway and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh to finish the preparation of a joint statement released later that day. The statement read in part that Shultz and Shevardnadze “affirmed the commitment made in the Washington summit joint statement to make an intensive effort to complete a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents ‘at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988.’ The ministers reviewed the entire complex of issues associated with treaty, with a particular focus on finding mutually acceptable solutions to differences which still remain. Emphasizing the importance of verification, they directed their negotiators to develop, by the time of the March foreign minister’s meeting, a joint draft protocol on inspection; a joint draft protocol on conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms; and a joint draft memorandum of understanding, which will be integral to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.” (Department of State, *Bulletin*, May 1988, p. 42) On February 23, Shultz flew from Moscow to Brussels to brief NATO before returning to Washington that day.

276. Memorandum From Linton Brooks, William Heiser, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, February 24, 1988

SUBJECT

START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

Our draft START Treaty calls for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and three protocols: Conversion or Elimination, Inspections, and Throwweight. If we are to have any chance of signing an acceptable START Treaty in Moscow this summer, we need to table the MOU and the remaining protocols as soon as possible. Attached (*Tab III*)² is the interagency submitted draft MOU. The draft includes no actual data, simply the structure. Even this is contentious, both internally and, we expect, with the Soviets.

After this document was received and initially forwarded, and after the Secretary of State promised that we would table it this week, the JCS formally objected to tabling the MOU. The JCS are concerned with “uncertainties of how the data provided in the MOU will interrelate with requirements specified in the Joint Draft Text and Inspection Protocol.” They fear the MOU could commit the U.S. to “an intrusive inspection regime and capture of facilities and equipment not intended for inclusion as treaty limited items.” They suggest a study of the interrelationships of various documents be conducted by the START IG and tabling the MOU be held in abeyance. Detailed JCS views are at *Tab IV*.³

The specific JCS concern is with baseline inspections. The U.S. draft treaty (tabled last May) states that all facilities listed in the MOU will be subject to baseline inspection. In fact, as we developed the MOU we realized that we needed to include facilities such as bomber production facilities where there is no need for baseline inspection. Thus the JCS are correct that there is an internal inconsistency which must be resolved. We do *not* believe, however, that the problem is so severe that we need delay the MOU; we adjust our text all the time and can do so now. We have put appropriate words into the approval memorandum to make it clear that tabling the MOU is not tantamount to accepting a series of major new obligations.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START Treaty—MOU—February 24, 1988. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed is the draft MOU.

³ Not attached.

In addition to the basic JCS concern, there are two issues:

—*Issue 1—Definition of “ballistic missile submarine port facility”*. The draft definition says such a facility “may include the assembly, maintenance and storage of SLBMs and their components.” ACDA would delete these words because they complicate the definition. All other agencies favor their retention; the Joint Staff notes that Navy facilities are integrated and this definition is thus essential.

NSC Staff agrees that the definition is more accurate with the indicated phrase and recommends it be retained.⁴

—*Issue 2—Inclusion of “mobile ICBM front-end handling facility”*. The draft MOU defines such a facility as “a facility that is used to prepare and maintain mobile ICBM front ends” and calls for an exchange of data on such facilities (but *not* facilities for fixed ICBM or SLBM front ends). DOE and the JCS would delete this definition and not call for exchanging data on such facilities. They fear the term would capture all warhead facilities along with facilities for such non-treaty limited items as guidance sections or post boost vehicles. The DCI was the prime exponent of such a definition and can now accept its deletion.

NSC Staff agrees that the definition is more trouble than it is worth and recommends it be deleted.⁵

JCS comments at *Tab IV* include a proposal for deleting “total engine inlet capture area” from the list of aircraft characteristics to be exchanged. This suggestion was submitted after the MOU arrived and has not received interagency review. In addition, nineteen changes submitted by the DCI after our receipt of the MOU are at *Tab V*.⁶ Consistent with past practice, we propose *not* to deal with these issues but to remand them to the IG for action, while *not* delaying approval of the MOU. Most appear minor; they are being worked separately. The draft approval memorandum reflects this approach.

Since the issues to be resolved are so trivial and the MOU so complex, we recommend you approve the content of the MOU for the President. With regard to the JCS objections, we believe the President should be aware of his military advisors’ concerns. In our view, the JCS unease on this issues is symptomatic of their more general concern that, in an area as complex as START, tabling one portion of our position while other portions are under development could trap us into obligations we do not intend to assume. We suggest you mention these concerns to the President at your next convenient morning meeting with him. Alternatively, we have prepared the short memorandum at *Tab II*⁷ if you wish a more formal notification.

⁴ Powell initialed his approval.

⁵ Powell initialed his approval.

⁶ Not attached.

⁷ Printed as Document 277.

Approval of this MOU only sets up the categories. We will push the interagency process to begin producing actual data so that we can meet the obligation Secretary Shultz assumed in Moscow to begin an actual data exchange before the Washington ministerial. We have given this appropriate emphasis in the suggested approval memorandum.

Recommendation

That you authorize Paul Stevens to sign the memorandum at *Tab I*⁸ approving the START Memorandum of Understanding with the modifications indicated above.⁹

That you either inform the President verbally of the JCS concerns and your action regarding them or sign the memorandum at *Tab II* informing him.¹⁰

Don Mahley, Steve Steiner, Will Tobey, Judy Mandel, Fritz Ermarth and Barry Kelly concur.¹¹

⁸ Attached but not printed is a February 26 memorandum from Stevens to Levitsky.

⁹ Powell indicated his approval.

¹⁰ Powell indicated his approval.

¹¹ An unknown hand bracketed these names and wrote: "All concurred on previous draft."

277. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 26, 1988

SUBJECT

START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

Our draft START Treaty calls for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) listing facilities subject to the treaty and three protocols: Conversion or Elimination, Inspections, and Throwweight. In Moscow Secretary Shultz and his Soviet counterpart agreed that both sides would

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START Treaty—MOU—February 24, 1988. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Brooks. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation indicates the President saw the memorandum on February 29. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

expedite work on the protocols and the MOU. We agreed to table our outline of the MOU within a week.

Based on an interagency submitted draft, I have approved the outline MOU for tabling. The draft includes no actual data, simply the structure. I resolved two minor wording issues in approving it.

The draft MOU is 87 pages long and is simply a list of definitions and categories of facilities for which information will be exchanged. I do not believe you need to review it. You should, however, be aware that after we returned from Moscow the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised a last-minute objection to tabling the MOU. The JCS are concerned with “uncertainties of how the data provided in the MOU will interrelate with requirements specified in the Joint Draft Text and Inspection Protocol.” They fear the MOU could commit the U.S. to “an intrusive inspection regime and capture of facilities and equipment not intended for inclusion as treaty limited items.” They suggest further study before tabling the MOU.

The JCS unease is symptomatic of their more general concern that, in an area as complex as START, tabling one portion of our position while other portions are under development could trap us into obligations we do not intend to assume. While I am sympathetic with the JCS, I do not believe the MOU seriously prejudices our future options. The specific JCS concern is a recognized inconsistency between the treaty text tabled last year and the current MOU. We will take steps to resolve this inconsistency. I have, therefore, authorized tabling the MOU² despite the JCS concerns. I wanted to make certain you were aware of the Chiefs’ unease.

² In telegram 2275 from NST Geneva, March 2, the Delegation reported: “On March 2 the U.S. tabled its 130 page draft Memorandum of Understanding for the START Treaty. This follows the tabling of the U.S. Draft Protocol on Conversion or Elimination in October 1987 and the U.S. Draft Protocol regarding Inspection and Monitoring in early February this year. The Soviet side has not tabled its own version of any these documents and refuses to agree to special working groups on these documents until it does so.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880687–0559) (LOU)

278. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, March 2, 1988

SUBJECT

The PFIAB Letter on START (U)

(S) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's (PFIAB) letter² is an excellent compendium of many of the very difficult issues we must resolve as we are completing our draft START agreement.

(S) The PFIAB's concern about the limitations in our monitoring capabilities is widely shared, including by the Senate. No one would quarrel with its judgment that there will be greater incentive and probably opportunity for the Soviets to cheat under a START agreement than under the INF Treaty. It is not surprising that we are hearing admonitions from Senators on both sides of the aisle that we *not* move hastily on START.

(S) The PFIAB is correct in stating that we need to consider carefully the implications of the counting rules outlined in the December U.S./Soviet Joint Summit Statement. These rules count several Soviet systems as carrying fewer warheads than they are actually capable of carrying. The Board is concerned that the Soviet Union—undetected by NTM and unconstrained by whatever on-site inspection scheme might have previously applied—could easily and rapidly “upload” these systems in time of crises or war. This would give them about 50 percent more than the permitted warheads and a potentially significant military and political advantage.

(S) The Board's concern about the RV breakout is borne out by the latest NIE and the assessment of Larry Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Forces. In his January memorandum to SACG principals,³ Dr. Gershwin noted that “by exploiting the RV counting rule for ballistic missiles, the Soviets could field 7,800 warheads and by additionally exploiting an ALCM counting rule of six per aircraft they could deploy 8,800 warheads under a limit of 6,000 accountable warheads.” He also said that “It is also important to note that although highly intrusive inspection regimes, such as on-demand or short-notice inspections of deployed weapons (even pulling the shrouds and counting RVs) would reduce the chances of the Soviets

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40051-40073. Secret.

² See Document 265.

³ Not found.

actually deploying prohibited warheads in peacetime, *such measures could not prevent the Soviets from doing so in a crisis or war*. The potential for such an increase over the number of permitted warheads is, in my view, a significant issue.” (Emphasis in original.)

(S) The PFIAB’s concern about the implications of permitting mobile ICBMs is also well founded. The latest NIE supports the Board’s view that we cannot confidently monitor a numerical limit on mobiles on the basis of NTM alone. The PFIAB also states that on-site inspection “cannot overcome these uncertainties,” and notes that “there are limits to the compliance gains that can be hoped for from any inspection regime,” as well as security and counterintelligence interests that require protection. The Intelligence Community has concluded that we need unlimited suspect site inspection to have a chance of detecting covert mobiles. But even such a regime will not be able to eliminate the risk of undetected Soviet cheating.

(S) The START work program requires us to develop suspect site inspection schemes and come to grips with mobiles over the next several weeks. I fully agree with the Board that the details must be carefully worked out and the risks carefully weighed before we table our SSI proposal and resolve the mobile issue.

(S) I also agree with the PFIAB’s suggestion that, as part of the USG’s risk assessment of our completed START agreement, we must consider the threat posed by Soviet strategic air and ballistic missile defenses and ASW capabilities against reduced U.S. strategic forces, including the possible technological advances in these capabilities.

(S) At the conclusion of its letter, the PFIAB raises a number of what might be called “big picture” questions that bear, in one way or another, on whether our draft START Treaty will meet the President’s criteria of deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively verifiable reductions. The Board suggests that the Joint Chiefs and I prepare a detailed analysis of the net effect on the strategic balance under the possible breakout and cheating scenarios mentioned above. In this connection, the Board asks for an evaluation of the post-START U.S. deterrent forces. To predetermine the exact post-START U.S. force prior to the completion of a START agreement would be counter-productive as it might be interpreted as the “official” or “desired” force structure. An analysis of generic U.S. force capabilities allowed under the treaty could be accomplished without prejudicing our post-START force structure decisions.

(S) Our START Work Program does not expressly call for this kind of comprehensive analysis, but I think all would agree that it should be done *before* the completion of our draft Treaty. Right now the Program calls for resolving issues and tabling the relevant Treaty text sequentially so that as much progress can be made in the negotiations

as possible. The “big picture” questions raised by the PFIAB will come into focus when we resolve the suspect site and mobiles issues in the latter stages of the Work Program. I believe it is imperative that we have the necessary analyses completed *before* we table the critical final portions of our Treaty text.

Carlucci

279. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Embassy in Moscow¹

Brussels, March 3, 1988, 1017Z

Secto 05094. Subject: President’s Message on START.

1. You are requested to deliver the following message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

2. The President and I have had an opportunity to review the progress we have made and are making in the START negotiations, and to assess the work that lies ahead of us if we are to complete our work by the time of the Moscow summit. The President told me that the recent Washington Post story² reflects his view that, as you no doubt agree, what we want is a good treaty, not a fast treaty.

3. In the course of our conversation, the President asked that I request that you pass to General Secretary Gorbachev the following message from him:

Begin text of President’s message: I know you have been following the American press as it reports my thinking on the START negotiations. I want to be sure you understand fully that I hope we will be able to complete a treaty that serves both our interests by the time we meet in Moscow. Both of us understand, I am sure, and I have sought to convey publicly that we have a lot of work to do in a very short period of time. You should know that I have told our negotiators that we should press forward with great energy, not to get a fast treaty, but to get a good one. Assuming we can resolve the very real and

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Priority for information to the Department of State. Shultz was in Brussels for the March 2–3 NATO Summit.

² Reference is to Gary Lee and Don Oberdorfer, “Modest Progress Reported in Shultz’s Talks in Moscow; Spring Summit Seen Still on Schedule,” *Washington Post*, February 23, 1988, p. A1.

tough problems involved, including those of verification, we intend to “go for it”. That is what I have told our team. End text of President’s message.

4. As you see, this is the position the U.S. side took in Moscow and is taking in Geneva. I hope that, in the effort to make the necessary progress, we will hear soon from the Soviet side that you accept our proposal that we exchange now the information about our strategic forces that is necessary if we are to make real progress.

5. With warm regards. End message to Shevardnadze.

Shultz

280. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 10, 1988

SUBJECT

Message from Gorbachev

Ambassador Dubinin came by Thursday² to deliver a letter from Shevardnadze, which incorporated Gorbachev’s response to the message you sent him from Brussels on START.³

I have attached the text of Gorbachev’s message, which seconds your view that our primary objective should be to get a good START agreement. He expresses confidence that this can be accomplished by the time of your visit to Moscow, and indicates that the Soviet bureaucracy has recently been told, in effect, to “go for the gold.” This may explain the movement we have seen over the past week in Geneva.

I took the opportunity to ask Dubinin if he thought Shevardnadze would be bringing dates for the Moscow summit. He said he had no reason to believe there had been any change from what Shevardnadze had said publicly at the close of my February visit to Moscow—that he expected to set dates during his trip here this month.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers. Memorandum for the President (02/09/1988–03/10/1988). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Ridgway.

² March 10.

³ See Document 279.

Attachment

Message From Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev to President Reagan⁴

Moscow, undated

Text of Gorbachev Message⁵

The Soviet leadership have carefully examined your considerations concerning the conclusion of the START Treaty. We in Moscow share the hope that despite all the difficulties that are, as both of us are well aware, involved in its preparation, this new, important agreement will be concluded in the course of your visit to the U.S.S.R. We agree with you that above all we need a good agreement, that is, one that meets the interests of both sides and fully takes into account their security concerns, as well as the broader objectives of enhancing international stability. We are confident that, given the necessary political will on both sides, this task can be accomplished by the forthcoming Soviet—U.S. summit meeting.

Recently we held a special meeting in Moscow with our diplomatic and military representatives, at which they were given appropriate instructions.

We are convinced, Mr. President, that our two countries now have a realistic possibility to have your visit to Moscow marked by taking another major joint step toward reducing the risks of nuclear war.

⁴ Secret.

⁵ Conveyed in a letter from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary Shultz, dated March 10, 1988, and delivered by Ambassador Dubinin to the Secretary on that date. [Footnote is in the original.]

281. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 9:25–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze, March 22 Morning: Human Rights, START

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary
of State
Colin Powell, National
Security Advisor to the
President
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant
Secretary of State (EUR)
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy
Secretary of State (EUR)
(notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnek (interpreter)

USSR

Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Aleksander A. Bessmertnykh,
Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate
Head, Soviet MFA
Teymuraz A. Stepanov, Assistant
to Shevardnadze
Sergei P. Tarasenko, General
Secretariat Head, MFA
(notetaker)
Unidentified Embassy notetaker
Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

The Secretary suggested, if Shevardnadze agreed, that they turn to strategic arms. *Shevardnadze* joked that they should turn to them, not use them. *The Secretary* said Shevardnadze could lead off if he wished. *Shevardnadze* said he never refused a legitimate privilege.

Shevardnadze said he had already mentioned that little time was left before the President's visit to Moscow. At the present meeting they had to hammer out the principles needed to resolve problems related to the treaty on 50% reductions. The main questions were clear.

Shevardnadze continued that he would like to say the Soviet leaders considered the President's visit an important event, and believed it could become a major landmark in international politics. They had every right to see it in this way, provided the appropriate documents were ready. The ministers had received clear instructions from their leaders in Washington. They were addressed first of all to the foreign

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 133.

ministers and their coworkers. He could not say these instructions had been acted upon in a sufficiently intensive way. Some complaints were due the negotiators, but the ministers were also responsible.

The day before,² Shevardnadze said, he had mentioned the important question of the ABM Treaty, and he would return to it later.

He wished first to single out a few difficult problems on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty. They required collective efforts, especially at the foreign ministers' level.

The first problem, Shevardnadze said, had to do with long-range SLCM's. In Washington Mikhail Gorbachev had stressed that without resolution of that question there could be no START agreement, since without resolution a channel would be left open for building strategic offensive weapons, and nullifying the agreement to reduce them.

What should we decide?, Shevardnadze asked. Perhaps at this meeting they would have to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable figure. The Soviets had made a proposal, and had received no answer. He could reaffirm that such a ceiling on long-range SLCM's could be set at 400. This was not a new figure. Why had the Soviets proposed it? Because they thought the figure should not be too high, in order not to negate the START agreement.

The Secretary, his colleagues, the President had mentioned that verification would be difficult, Shevardnadze went on. This was true. The problem existed. But the Soviets believed it was not hopeless. A solution could be outlined.

Concerning verification of mobile ICBM's the Soviet side had submitted proposals, Shevardnadze continued. He was ready to continue the discussion, to provide more specifics. He expected the Secretary to act in the same way on a question of interest to the Soviets, on SLCM's. If the U.S. believe they were not verifiable, the Soviets were ready for joint measures to ensure that they would be verified.

What was the concept?, Shevardnadze asked. Previous proposals had focussed on national technical means, including remote monitoring. They had also proposed inspections of submarines and surface ships and at basing facilities; he wished to stress the latter. In addition, however, they could ask their experts to study the verification of long-range SLCM's by permanent inspections in specially designated arming facilities, where the systems were armed, after which they were loaded on submarines and surface ships of agreed types.

They had used this method in other areas, Shevardnadze went on, but they would have to designate a limited number of facilities, whose

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 132.

location would be designated in the memorandum of understanding. In the U.S. draft there had been no mention of baseline data for SLCM's. This was not normal. Under the Soviet concept, arming them in any other location than those designated would be prohibited.

The Soviets also proposed suspect site challenge inspections, on a yearly quota. There would also be a ban on loading SLCM's on submarines and surface ships anywhere except in basing areas, for instance on the open sea. They recognized this would be a difficult limitation, but there was no other way.

If some vessels were already equipped with such systems when the agreement went into force, there would have to be demonstrations to the other side for counting purposes. The procedures for such demonstrations would have to be agreed between the two sides.

The Soviets also proposed conducting a special remote monitoring experiment in April. There would be Soviet equipment on helicopters and airplanes. The U.S. would designate ships. U.S. experts would then observe with the Soviet equipment. This could happen in the Mediterranean or in some other area. The U.S. could also test its own equipment with Soviet participation.

The Soviet side recognized that remote monitoring was not a panacea, did not provide a complete guarantee. But together with other measures it could help provide a solution.

That was what he had to say on long-range SLCM's, Shevardnadze concluded. If this key question were not resolved, one could hardly hope that a START agreement for 50% reductions could be concluded.

The Secretary said he thought Shevardnadze had identified perhaps the most difficult issue. Not that there were not other difficult issues, but this was the most difficult. We had thought a lot about it; we had examined it. We had not found a satisfying answer. We would take Shevardnadze's ideas, and see if they added anything. Or, because they clearly added something, we would see if they added enough. We would also look at the Soviet proposal for an early experiment, and see what it yielded for us.

We were prepared to deal with these issues, the Secretary went on. But we had not yet seen possibilities comparable to those in other areas. We were not prepared to put down a flat "no." But in the end it might not be possible to verify here. If verification proved impossible, we would be prepared to make unilateral statements, and live with them. But it would be more satisfactory to achieve agreed verification.

General Powell said we had spent a great deal of time examining these issues. Yazov and Carlucci had discussed them too. We would follow up Shevardnadze's suggestions. *The Secretary* said Carlucci had reported he found his conversations with Yazov constructive. They

had also talked about the prospect of our top military people meeting later this year. *Shevardnadze* noted he and the Secretary had been asking for that for a long time. It would be good if such a meeting took place. But it would be even better to agree on SLCM verification.

Shevardnadze said the question of principle was whether the sides agreed that inspections were possible. We would be having it for INF missiles. We should be applying this to ballistic missiles. *The Secretary* said the U.S. was in principle for inspection. *Shevardnadze* said if that were so, the sides were on the same wave length. The specifics could be resolved.

The Secretary said he wished to recapitulate what had been agreed: 1600 delivery vehicles, 6000 warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles, a bomber counting rule, various items on verification, 50% reductions in throwweight. In Moscow they had agreed to focus on verification and task their negotiators to develop three documents. This had worked out. It had been a good approach.

Shevardnadze said he would like to deal with the most difficult issues. If they were not resolved they would not be doing the protocols. Perhaps they should tell their experts to work especially intensively on SLCM's.

Turning to ALCM's, Shevardnadze said they should have clarity on this fundamental issue. The Soviets were proposing to count on the basis of the actual maximum number for which each bomber was equipped. This of course was on a basis of over 600 km. range. The actual maximum number for the B-52 was 28. Soviet experts believed that, and it was based on what was published in the U.S. The number for the B-1B was 22. If that were accepted the Soviets would drop their insistence on a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons. This had been discussed, and he thought the Secretary understood the basic Soviet concerns. He thought that issue could be resolved.

The third issue was verification. The Soviets suggested there be inspection of heavy bomber bases. Inspectors should look at the bombers and their equipment, and there should be demonstrations of their functioning.

Karpov reminded Shevardnadze of the 600-km. range figure. *Shevardnadze* said he wished to stress once again that he was talking about a 600-km. range threshold.

Shevardnadze continued that he had some suggestions to make on mobiles. At Moscow the two sides had worked on this issue, and the Secretary said that the U.S. side was more confident progress could be made than in the past. To remove grounds for U.S. concern the Soviets had mentioned their readiness to agree to a separate sublimit

for mobile ICBM launchers. He could now provide a figure of 800 launchers.

The Secretary asked how many warheads Shevardnadze had in mind. Or was he just talking about launchers? *Shevardnadze* replied that the actual number would not be as high as 800; but there should be a limit on the total. *The Secretary* said he understood the Soviets had one system with a single warhead, and another with multiple warheads. The unit of count would be critical. The sort of mixture was important. *Shevardnadze* replied that the Soviets would decide on the number of warheads. That could be resolved. What he was proposing now was 800 missiles for mobiles under the 1600 ceiling.

Shevardnadze continued that verification would not be simple, and the Soviets understood that. Previous proposals had included national technical means, continuous inspection of production, and notification of changes in the number and location of launchers. The Soviets were ready for an expanded system, particularly for ground-mobile ICBM launchers. For baseline purposes they could agree to open the roofs of the buildings for a period of time, to assist NTM. This was already agreed for INF. There would be one such opening a year for each base. The geographic coordinates of the bases of ground-mobile launchers would be given in the MOU.

Verification of rail-mobile launchers was the hardest of all, Shevardnadze went on. The Soviets suggested that during the baseline data inspection they be corralled at bases for counting. He would say that if this could be expanded to include SLCM's all the problems would be solved. They also proposed suspect site inspection of rail cars to make sure that numbers were not greater than at the time of the baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBM's should be strictly limited, Shevardnadze continued. There should be no more than an agreed number per base, and these should be those intended for replacement. Moreover, they should be at such a distance from the base that rapid reload would not be possible. This was of fundamental importance.

Shevardnadze said he understood the need to digest all this. Serious experts should examine these ideas. The major Soviet experts had worked on them. What was emerging was a uniform system of inspection procedures.

The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze had some comments to make on sublimits.

Shevardnadze said he saw two alternatives:

—First, concerning reentry vehicles for ICBM's and SLBM's, the text could record a sublimit of 3300 with regard to both, and also a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons.

—Second, the possibility was open, within the 4900 warhead limit which the Secretary had said the U.S. would prefer to stick to, for each side to mix freely between ICBM and SLBM warheads. Each side would decide for itself.

That was what he had to say on sublimits. He had also mentioned the sublimit of 1100 ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons. But, as he had said, if the ALCM counting problem would be resolved that could be dropped.

The Secretary asked if they should continue on strategic arms. They had five minutes before the ceremony, and the Senators were waiting. *Shevardnadze* said in that case it was time to call a break. He had more on the protocols and the MOU. *The Secretary* agreed they should take a break and continue after lunch.

282. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 1:40–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECTS

START, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Weapons/Vienna CSCE, Naval Limitations Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

THE SECRETARY

Gen. Powell

Ambassador Ridgway

EUR/SOV Director Parris

(Notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

FOREIGN MINISTER

SHEVARDNADZE

Ambassador Bessmertnykh

Ambassador Karpov

Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko

(Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 134.

START

THE SECRETARY suggested that he respond to Shevardnadze's morning remarks on strategic arms. The Foreign Minister had listed the areas where agreement had already been reached. It was a good list.

When the ministers had met in Moscow, they had agreed to emphasize verification. They had set their delegations the task drafting the inspection protocol, the conversion/elimination protocol, and the data MOU by the present meeting. Both sides had tabled drafts. There were joint texts to work from. There were many brackets in these texts. Some reflected larger treaty issues—mobile missiles, cruise missiles, non-deployed systems. But many of the brackets seemed susceptible to removal without much difficulty.

Brackets

For example, the two sides had agreed to build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty. The language we had proposed in Geneva did that, while providing additional measures necessary because strategic systems continue to exist. The Soviet side had bracketed most of those initiatives, arguing that to change or move beyond the INF provisions might call the INF agreement into question. To the contrary, if the two sides did not go well beyond the INF verification measures, we would not be able to establish an effective strategic offensive arms verification regime. So those brackets ought to drop out.

A second issue was that there were non-substantive technical and linguistic problems in the treaty and protocols which were cluttering up the documents and wasting the delegations' time. The Secretary proposed that delegations be directed to clear these up. In the inspection protocol, for example, the Soviet side consistently bracketed the term "monitoring" and its variations, which the U.S. had applied throughout the protocol to differentiate perimeter/portal monitoring (PPM) activities from "inspections." This problem accounted for at least half the brackets in the protocol.

KARPOV asked if it were really only a matter of words.

THE SECRETARY repeated that we used "monitoring" only to differentiate between PPM activities and other forms of verification. Maybe some other terminology could be found. We meant no substantive difference.

KARPOV asked why, in that case, the same terminology could not be used as had been agreed upon for challenge and base line inspections. THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. was simply trying to differentiate between different types of activities by using different words. We were not trying to make a substantive point. In that case, KARPOV suggested, why not say that these were a "unique" kind of inspection.

There were precedents for such situations in the INF Treaty; they should be used. THE SECRETARY said that this was a hang-up which did not reflect substance. We should try to resolve it.

With respect to the protocol on conversion or elimination, the Secretary continued, the U.S. view was that removal from accountability derives from substantially unambiguous actions as to a side's intent to proceed with elimination. Consequently, we could not agree to procedures such as the Soviet proposal that silos be considered no longer to contain an accountable missile when the silo door had been opened. Our position was that removal from accountability could only occur when a silo door had been removed, and its headworks destroyed. The Soviet proposal would allow change of accountability by means simply of notification of intent and opening of the silo doors. Since this was a commonly occurring event, and was easily reversible, we had to insist on more concrete steps.

The Secretary noted that he had tried to give Shevardnadze examples of steps which did not depend on resolution of the big issues, but which could remove many brackets.

KARPOV pointed out that it was best to eliminate silos with the doors closed, since explosives were more effective under those conditions. Why not take advantage of technical knowledge as we proceeded in these matters? THE SECRETARY said that, in that case, the doors should be removed after the explosion. KARPOV said that could be discussed.

The Secretary proposed that working groups be instructed to make an effort to eliminate as many such brackets as possible. This would result in real progress on the protocols and MOU.

ALCM's

Moving on to ALCM's, the Secretary first stressed that the two sides were dealing only with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, as had been agreed in Washington. In this context, we considered the 1,100 sublimit proposed by Moscow unnecessary, since for every ALCM-equipped bomber a side chose, it would have to give up a ballistic missile. This was a high price to pay. We had thus welcomed the Soviet side's indication in Moscow that, if there were agreement on a counting rule and verification regime, there would be no need for the 1,100 sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was the experts' job to come up with an ALCM counting rule, and the sooner the better.

THE SECRETARY said he wanted to address that subject. The Soviet side had complained in Moscow that the number the U.S. proposed to assign to each bomber was too low. We had given the matter further thought, and were prepared to consider a higher number. The

numbers that Shevardnadze had proposed that morning were not in the ballpark. But we were prepared to consider a package along the following lines:

- An agreed number per bomber;
- No 1,100 sublimit;
- Attribution of 10 ALCM's to each heavy bomber equipped to carry ALCM's;

We understood the Soviet point on the need to distinguish between ALCM heavy bombers and systems not constrained by the Treaty, the Secretary continued. There were basically three situations which had to be considered: nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bombers; non-ALCM bombers carrying other nuclear weapons; and conventionally equipped bombers. We were prepared to talk about means of distinguishing between the three systems. What we could end up with would be something like the bomber counting rule which had been agreed in Reykjavik.

The number we had chosen, 10, accurately reflected the loadings our bombers would normally carry. The protocol would provide a regime for verifying their basic capacity. Just as there would be no limit on the number of conventionally equipped bombers in each side's inventory, there would be no limit on ALCM inventories. Rather, the number would be based on the capabilities of the aircraft equipped to carry them.

This, the Secretary concluded, was our proposal on ALCM's. If there were agreement on a counting rule and verification scheme, the issue could be disposed of.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how the right solution could be found. KARPOV pointed out that B-52's normally carried 12 ALCM's. Why was the U.S. proposing they be counted as carrying only 10? SHEVARDNADZE asked if agreed verification procedures would help.

THE SECRETARY said that was exactly what needed to be explored. Each side needed to be able to verify that 10 was the number that the aircraft was equipped to carry. This could be given to the working groups.

KARPOV asked what would happen if it were determined that the aircraft could carry more than 10 ALCM's.

THE SECRETARY said that one would have to look at how they were configured, and, if necessary, configure them in such a way that 10 was the right number.

KARPOV pointed out that the Soviet "Bear" bomber could carry no more than 6 ALCM's. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. should have stayed with its original ALCM counting figure. KARPOV said at least that would have been right for Soviet bombers. SHEVARDNADZE

said that the counting rule should be based on the load for which a bomber was equipped.

POWELL said that what was needed was an understanding on what the expected load would be. We had set the number 10. KARPOV asked if that was the average or planned capability. Powell said it was “planned.” But the working group could discuss this.

THE SECRETARY said that he assumed the Soviet side designed its aircraft for different configurations, depending on their missions. Verification regimes would have to be developed to determine how the relevant bombers were configured. We would be configured to carry 10 ALCM’s. There would be a regime to verify that.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be referred to experts. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SLCM’s

On SLCM’s, the Secretary said that he had listened carefully to the ideas Shevardnadze had presented. It was clear that Moscow had given the matter a lot of thought. We would look at what had been proposed, but were unable to say more at this time.

Mobile ICBM’s

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary had noted in Moscow that the very features which made them attractive from a survivability standpoint made them a problem from the standpoint of verifiability. We had some ideas, which the Secretary was prepared to share on a preliminary basis. Some seemed to coincide with ideas the Soviet side had put forward.

What we had in mind was to build on the basic START verification arrangements—data exchanges, short notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, the U.S. would add specific provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBM’s, taking into account their unique characteristics. For example, mobile ICBM’s and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. They would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI. Missiles and launchers could depart this area only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time. As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited conditions. Their return would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided.

The problem of monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBM’s was another difficult challenge, which would require further measures. Shevardnadze had suggested this morning that all such missiles would

be confined to storage areas removed from operational bases. This would amount to a kind of “zero option,” except in the designated areas. This was something we could think about.

If adequate verification methods could be found, the Secretary said, the U.S. was ready to consider modification of its insistence on a mobile missile ban. In this case, there would obviously have to be a sublimit. Shevardnadze that morning had spoken of 800 launchers, but there would have to be a warhead figure as well. We felt that number should be small. 800 times any figure looked on the high side.

After consultation with Bessmertnykh, SHEVARDNADZE said that most of the missiles involved would carry only a single warhead. THE SECRETARY said that warheads would have to be limited along with launchers. SHEVARDNADZE added that it would all have to be verifiable.

Sublimits

Moving on to sublimits, THE SECRETARY said he had thought that the only additional sublimit issue had to do with ground-based ICBM's. We recalled Akhromeyev's statement that the Soviet Union did not intend to field more than 3,000 ICBM's, 3,300 at the outside. So we had the impression that figure was acceptable to Moscow.

The U.S. had always been unwilling to equate ICBM's with SLBM's because of command and control considerations and the different “on station” ratios of the two types of systems. That morning, Shevardnadze had linked the two. We could not agree to that. If the Soviet side would accept the 3,300/3,000 ICBM figure, and the 1,100 ALCM bomber number fell away, we could close out the sublimit issue.

The Secretary put down a marker on suspect-site inspections under a START treaty. The basic concept had been agreed at the Washington summit. It seemed to us that the main task for such inspections should be to give confidence that the other side was not covertly producing, storing or deploying ballistic missiles or launchers beyond what was permitted by the treaty. We were not yet ready to put forward detailed ideas on this, but perhaps the ministers could address the subject during their April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had already addressed the question of a sublimit for ICBM's and SLBM's. It should be 3,300.

THE SECRETARY said that the problem was that it applied to both types of systems. ICBM's could not be equated with SLBM's.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in that case there should be simple freedom to mix within the 4,900 ballistic missile sublimit.

THE SECRETARY said that that would be the practical effect of the 3,300 limit, since, as Akhromeyev had said, the Soviet Union had

no plans to exceed that figure. ICBM's warranted special consideration, in our view, because of their unique characteristics. There were strong views on this point in the U.S. Senate, he added.

KARPOV noted that the Secretary's quoting Akhromeyev did not remove from the agenda the need for an SLCM sublimit. The alternative was *no* new sublimit. The U.S. proposal for an ICBM sublimit was unfair in that 80% of the Soviet arsenal was deployed on such systems.

BESSMERTNYKH wondered, if the U.S. were to ask an "Akhromeyev" of its own how many SLCM's the U.S. intended to build, how he would respond.

THE SECRETARY quipped that "ours" wouldn't answer.

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet Union each had about 6,400 warheads on, respectively, SLBM's and ICBM's. The Soviet proposal would cut both by half.

THE SECRETARY said that was just a coincidence of numbers. The 3,300 ICBM sublimit was equitable in that it applied to both sides. SLBM's were qualitatively different because of the factors the Secretary had mentioned.

KARPOV pointed out that American SLBM's had a far higher "on station" ratio than their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. had 6,400 SLBM warheads; the Soviet Union only 2,400. But the Soviet side had more ICBM warheads. There were real structural differences, but the two sides were in relatively the same position with respect to the number of warheads on American SLBM's and Soviet ICBM's.

THE SECRETARY observed that both sides would be limited by the 4,900 sublimit. Both would be limited by the desire to have more than one ballistic missile leg. There were historically different structures. But that did not change the fact that there were qualitative differences between ICBM's and SLBM's. The Secretary had thought this issue was resolved in Moscow. He was surprised it had resurfaced.

KARPOV said there had been no change in the Soviet position. SHEVARNADZE said that experts should work on the problem.

Defense and Space

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he had some material on defense and space. He and Shevardnadze had gotten into the subject a bit the night before. The Secretary had asked Kampelman to look into the problem. Perhaps the ministers could see what, if anything, he had been able to accomplish.

KARPOV said that when he and Kampelman had spoken at lunch, Kampelman had said that the working group was dealing with the problem. But, Karpov said, the working groups could reach no conclusions. Kampelman had made some personal suggestions, which, since

they were personal, Karpov did not feel comfortable commenting on. But, so far, the working groups had made no progress.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Kampelman and Obukhov be invited to join the group, and they were sent for.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to emphasize the fundamental importance of this question. He had set forth Moscow's views the day before, but could repeat them if necessary.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened the day before, but was not in a position to respond in detail. He suggested that the ministers hear from the experts.

When Kampelman and Obukhov arrived, the Secretary asked if he could state the problem. The two sides, he said, agreed on the language of the Washington Summit Statement. That language, assuming the duration of the non-withdrawal period were agreed and the issue of the supreme national interest clause resolved, left ambiguity as to what actions were to be conducted during the non-withdrawal period. The two sides had different views on this point. The Soviet side said, in effect, "Let it ride." We felt the need for greater clarity. Otherwise, any strategic withdrawal schedule which might be agreed to would be made hostage to potential disagreements over how research on strategic defense was to be conducted. So there was a need to clarify this ambiguity.

The Secretary had thought that Shevardnadze's comments in Moscow on the need for work on the verification aspects of the Washington statement could be useful in this regard. The Soviet side had put forward some predictability ideas, and we had welcomed them. We had some ideas of our own on how to reduce or eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington statement. The Secretary asked Kampelman to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE asked to speak first. He agreed with the Secretary that the Washington Summit Statement language was good. Indeed, it could not be improved upon. The only addition he had ever mentioned had to do with the need to give the document a legally binding character. Moscow had since given the matter much thought, and could now agree with the U.S. that this should take the form of a separate agreement.

As for the non-withdrawal period, this should be regarded by both sides as a period to ensure stability and predictability during the process of reducing strategic arms. This would comprise both the reduction period itself and a period during which negotiations would take place on future arrangements. For Moscow, the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty during this period should be unconditional. As to the period of non-withdrawal, the U.S. in Moscow had

said it should be longer than the reduction period itself. The Soviet side agreed. It was now ready to accept the U.S. proposal for a seven year reduction period. That would mean that the total duration of the non-withdrawal period would be nine or ten years.

It was true, Shevardnadze continued, that confidence that both sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed during this period could be enhanced by verification measures. The Soviet side had thus proposed an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous sites. They attached much importance to this proposal. It would involve notification of permitted activities, as well as on-site inspections of facilities as necessary to satisfy concerns. A special protocol could be drawn up to this effect. Full use would also be made of the SCC, which should deal not only with past compliance questions, but seek to prevent the emergence of new concerns. Taken as a whole, such measures would significantly enhance confidence that the ABM Treaty was being observed.

What was not needed, Shevardnadze said, was new language. The General Secretary and President, with the help of those in the room, had succeeded in hammering out a formula. Now totally new elements were being added. This was totally inadmissible if one were serious about reducing strategic arms.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with the way Shevardnadze had formulated the problem, particularly with respect to verification. At the same time, the Secretary believed it was possible to add verification provisions which would further reduce ambiguity. We wanted to discuss this problem. We would like to see less contention in the SCC, with its associated fall-out on a possible strategic arms reduction schedule.

The Secretary said we also had to insist that our standard supreme national interest language be included in an agreement. It was in all our agreements. We were prepared to say that this right would not be exercised on the grounds that development of strategic defense systems in themselves were a matter of supreme national interest.

The Secretary noted that he had raised these two issues with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, and had thought that discussion had cleared the air. The first, verification, was very important, and we realized we owed the Soviet side some ideas. In that context, he would ask Ambassador Kampelman to speak.

KAMPELMAN said that, based on his discussion with Karpov, it was the Soviet view that any attempt to agree on language beyond that of the Washington Summit Statement would complicate matters for two reasons. First, it would be time consuming, and might not be done in a reasonable time. Second, the issues themselves created new problems which could not be resolved in the near future. If that perception were accurate, the Secretary was correct when he suggested that

any words on which agreement might be reached would be interpreted differently by each side.

Over lunch, Karpov had told Kampelman that Moscow would like the words of the Washington statement to mean that the U.S. would restrict SDI. Whether he actually said that or not was not the point. That was clearly the objective. If the U.S. intended to proceed with its SDI program—and it did—it would be misleading to sign an agreement which would certainly lead to tension at a later date. We did not need a formula which would guarantee future arguments. We wanted one which would minimize them.

Kampelman said he had taken the liberty of trying out on Karpov some ideas, which he had shared with U.S. scientists, for dealing with the problem. Karpov had resisted the ideas, on grounds that they would be troublesome to work out, and take time. Kampelman would be glad to summarize them.

The first was that, since the Soviet Union was concerned by U.S. defensive programs—and vice versa—perhaps there could be an exchange of information on what each side was planning. Moscow might find that some of our plans were not so troublesome as it thought.

The second idea was to try to separate weapons out of our planning. It was possible, Kampelman pointed out, to distinguish between weapons and sensors. The two sides might agree that during the non-withdrawal period neither side would deploy or test space-based weapons. This, too, could give some confidence.

Kampelman noted that there might be other approaches he had not thought of. The point of the exercise, he stressed, would be to avoid arguments which would break out as soon as a piece of paper were signed. The idea would be to see if mutually acceptable arrangements could be worked out, without trying to resolve all the possible questions. That would take too long. Rather than argue over what had been signed in 1972, we should try to address what was in each side's interest today.

SHEVARDNADZE said that these ideas would have to be discussed. KARPOV suggested that he and Kampelman be excused to do so. THE SECRETARY said he hoped it would advance things to have heard some of our ideas. SHEVARDNADZE said it was the first time he had heard of the notion of singling out sensors. Kampelman said it might prove to be a terrible idea, but it could be explored.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to remind the Secretary of one thing. When the Soviet side had agreed in Washington to the 4,900 sublimit, it had said that the formula on observance of the ABM Treaty was the final word, which could not be appealed. Now the U.S. was seeking new language.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. stood by the words of the Washington Statement. We were simply acknowledging that, in the area of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period, there was room for differences of interpretation. We wanted to clarify that. With this exception, the Washington language served both sides well. And even in the area of permitted activities, it provided a good start.

KAMPELMAN said he looked upon what the U.S. was trying to do in Geneva as carrying out the Washington Statement's charge. It was in no way an attempt to backtrack on what was signed. KARPOV said that much could be said on this point, but that the ministers' time should not be taken up with it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was a question that needed to be resolved before he left. If it were not, the two sides would have to recognize that there would be no strategic arms agreement.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. might be able to make additional proposals along the lines of those Kampelman had outlined. He hoped the Soviet side would be receptive. But it would be unwise to proceed with an agreement with built-in ambiguities on observance of the ABM Treaty. The ambiguity had to be removed.

POWELL reminded Shevardnadze that the issue had emerged within a week after the Washington summit. Congress had been promised the ambiguity would be cleared up. THE SECRETARY reiterated that we were prepared to share ideas on how this might be done.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that Kampelman and Karpov should get to work—and quickly.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 8:45–10:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Amb Nitze
 Amb Kampelman
 Col Linhard
 Amb Rowny
 Amb Hamner
 Amb Cooper
 Amb Lehman
 Gen Burns
 ADM Howe
 Mr. Harrison
 Mr. Graham
 Mr. Joseph
 Mr. Foley
 Mr. Castillo
 Mr. Timbie
 Ms. Moon
 Mr. Stafford
 Mr. McConnell
 Mr. Farr
 Mr. Korobovsky

Soviet Side

Amb Obukhov
 Amb Masterkov
 Amb Kuznetsov
 Gen Chervov
 Gen Lebedev
 Mr. Khromov
 Mr. Koltunov
 Mr. Khripunov
 Mr. Korchikov

Nitze began by outlining the US position on mobile ICBMs. He said that in Moscow the two sides had a good discussion of the conflicting considerations regarding mobile ICBMs. On the one hand, the features that contributed to survivability made verification very difficult; on the other hand, it made no sense to design a verification scheme that unduly compromised the survivability of these missiles. Nevertheless, the US side had said that, if the verification problem could be resolved, we would be prepared to reconsider our position on banning mobile ICBMs, and that, if permitted, mobile ICBMs would need to be tightly constrained.

Nitze said that the US had reviewed the ideas tabled by the Soviet side in Geneva on mobile ICBM verification. We now had some ideas of our own for a mobile ICBM verification package and were prepared to sketch out in a preliminary way the approach we had in mind. Our approach would build on the basic START verification arrangements—

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room.

data exchange, short-notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, we would add provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBMs such as the following:

Mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. In these areas, they would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI.

Missiles and launchers could depart these areas only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time.

As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited circumstances. The return of the missiles and launchers would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided at an appropriate time.

Nitze said that monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBMs was another difficult challenge that would require further measures. If the two sides could agree on specific measures that would provide for effective verification, then we could consider allowing a strictly limited number of mobile ICBMs.

Obukhov replied that the ideas presented by Ambassador Nitze would be studied by the Soviet side, particularly within the context of the goals of the START Treaty and of permitting the survivability of mobile ICBM launchers. He added that the Soviet side would have additional ideas to explore on this issue later in this session, but that he would prefer to allow the US side to say what it had to say on this and other issues first, given the little time available.

Nitze then proceeded to the subject of sublimits. He said the two sides had come a long way on warhead sublimits and it was time to finish the job. The US had dropped its 1650 sublimit, and understood the Soviet side was prepared to drop its 1100 sublimit in the context of agreement on how to count ALCMs. This would leave us with one last pending sublimit, that for ICBM warheads.

On this subject, *Nitze* continued, we had given much thought to the concerns Marshal Akhromeyev expressed in our meetings in Geneva and Washington. But the Soviet side should also realize the importance of this issue to the US, especially as we contemplate the treaty ratification process. The important thing to the US is that we be assured that the Soviet Union would not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads if there were a START agreement. Akhromeyev had told us in Washington that, in fact, the Soviet Union would not exceed such a level.

If we could record this fact, the problem would be resolved. Obviously, the most straightforward way would be to include this as a sublimit, but we were prepared to consider other ways to establish that neither side would deploy more than 3300 ICBM RVs.

Nitze concluded by adding that, as the US side had frequently said, we did not believe that sublimits on SLBMs would be appropriate.

Obukhov replied that the question of sublimits was indeed ripe for solution, with due regard for understandings reached last December in Washington. Taking into account the ideas presented by both sides after the Washington summit, the Soviets now proposed the following:

For ALCMs, that the missiles on each type of heavy bomber be counted in accordance with the maximum number it is equipped to carry with a range capability of more than 600 kilometers. Specifically, this meant setting limits for each type of heavy bomber as follows—for B-52s, 28; for B-1s, 22.

If this solution were adopted, *Obukhov* said, the Soviet side would not insist on the 1100 limit on ALCMs and other types of heavy bomber armaments.

On the question of sublimits for ICBM and SLBM warheads, the Soviet side proposed a sublimit of 3300 on warheads of ICBMs or SLBMs, combined with 1100 ALCMs and other heavy bomber armaments.

An alternative approach would be that each side would retain the right to determine for itself the correlation or ratio of warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs.

Thus, *Obukhov* concluded, the Soviet side was proposing several options, convinced that each would ensure a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue.

Nitze said that, with respect to ALCMs on heavy bombers, *Obukhov* had provided numbers for the US bombers, but not for Soviet bombers. Could he provide them now?

Obukhov replied that, at this stage, he did not have those figures, but the Soviet side would be willing to consider any US suggestions on the matter. Clearly, figures for both sides would be specified in any Treaty.

Nitze reminded *Obukhov* that the US side had suggested that each ALCM carrying heavy bomber be counted as having ten ALCMs against the 6000 warhead ceiling.

Obukhov responded that the coefficient suggested by the US side had been discussed yesterday, and that it seemed there were still differences between the two sides. While the Soviet side favored counting those long-range ALCMs for which heavy bombers were really equipped, the US proposal was based on different principles.

The Soviets had in mind a counting rule for each heavy bomber that reflected the maximum extent possible it could be equipped with long range ALCMs. Speaking candidly, he had to say the Soviet approach was more accurate, precise and fair. It would take into

account all long-range ALCMs a side might deploy on heavy bombers. As Nitze knew, the Soviet side had also proposed a verification package which would make it possible to reliably verify the limits they had proposed.

Nitze said that the two sides had been discussing this issue since 1968, or at least the Spring of 1969. The original US view was that bombers and defenses against bombers should not be included in the negotiations. The US had finally agreed to the Soviet desire to limit bombers, but air defenses had never been limited, and remained uncontrolled.

This, in turn, raised the problem of trying to weigh the value of bombers against that of missiles. It was an understatement of relative value to say the MX and the heavy bomber should count one to one. *Nitze* believed the US proposal was imminently fair.

He did not, however, believe the sides could resolve this problem today, and he suggested they move on to the subject of SLCMs.

Admiral Howe added that he was disappointed in the Soviet reaction to the US proposal for counting ALCMs. It appeared to him that the discussion had retrogressed, in particular with regard to the Soviet return to the 3300 sublimit on ICBM and SLBM warheads.

Obukhov responded that it would be erroneous to consider the discussion a retrogressive step. The Soviet side had some time ago proposed a limit of 1100 on heavy bomber armaments, and the US side had expressed its doubts. The Soviets were now doing their best to find a solution to this and other problems, and they expected the American side carefully to study the proposals and give a positive reply.

With respect to air defenses and limits on heavy bombers and their armaments, it was true that the US side had raised these issues long ago, but attempts now to include air defenses in these talks could hardly be considered helpful. Also, it was not justifiable to subdivide strategic arms into types some of which allegedly may be less destabilizing than others. The US is concerned about mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side also has a serious concern with US heavy bombers, in particular given the fact that US forward bases and forward-based systems encircle the Soviet Union.

Obukhov continued that the only correct way out was to try and find objective criteria for counting the respective armaments of each side. For long-range ALCMs, he believed the criterion should be, to the extent possible, the real equipment of heavy bombers for such missiles. Otherwise, we would inevitably face the possibility of more imbalances emerging, in this case in favor of the US. Such a development would work to neither side's advantage; it would undermine the viability of the Treaty.

Nitze repeated that the two sides had discussed these views for many years. He believed they were thoroughly understood on both sides, but that both sides would continue to work toward a more stable situation.

Obukhov said the START Treaty could reduce the risk of conflict only if its limits were fair and equal for both sides, and the military-strategic balance were maintained, subject to strict verification which could provide confidence that obligations were observed. The Soviet side had presented far-reaching proposals, such as test flights for inspectors, with inspectors operating both on the ground and in the planes.

Nitze said he believed the sides had made great progress in reducing the risk of war, and that they would make more progress. He suggested they go on to the next subject.

Obukhov agreed that this was just the right moment to proceed to SLCMs.

Nitze said the US had given careful study to the SLCM verification ideas the Soviet side had provided in Washington, and we did not see how they could work as a reliable means of verification.

Obukhov asked whether *Nitze* was referring to proposals from yesterday's meeting.

Nitze said he was referring to ideas expressed during the Washington summit, and expounded by Sagdeev, Velhikov and others.

Obukhov asked whether this was the "remote verification" idea.

Nitze replied that it was. The Soviet idea, as originally expressed, was that you could use a neutron gun to detect nuclear warheads from 400 feet.

Even if, *Nitze* continued, the detectors could overcome shielding and the background created by nuclear propulsion units, which we did not believe was possible, we could not see how they could discriminate between nuclear SLCMs and the other nuclear weapons aboard a ship. It appeared, therefore, that the technique proposed by the Soviets would not allow a side reliably to detect and count nuclear SLCMs.

Nitze said that, in addition to studying the Soviet verification ideas, the US had continued to investigate other possibilities for verifying SLCM limits. To date, we had been unable to devise a scheme in which we could have confidence. But the US was prepared to continue to seek a satisfactory means of verification; the experts meetings in Geneva should contribute to this effort. As that work went forward, however, we should keep in mind the possibility that an adequate verification scheme could prove unattainable. In that event, we could not agree to formal limits; constraints that could not be verified would not contribute to stability and could not be supported before our Senate.

If a verifiable scheme did not prove attainable, it could not include limits on conventional SLCMs. The US was not about to put itself at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis all the other countries that are free to deploy conventional SLCMs without limitation. We also could not accept the concept of designating certain ships as carriers of nuclear SLCMs. As before, the first task for nuclear SLCMs was to determine if effective verification was possible.

Nitze concluded by noting that the Soviet side had presented another concept yesterday. He requested that it be repeated again today to ensure that the US side fully understood it.

Obukhov said that the Soviet side had a more optimistic view on verifying long-range SLCMs. They believed that with the cooperation of both sides verification was possible, but that in any case verification could not be an obstacle to agreeing on limits for this dangerous type of strategic offensive weapon.

Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of the verification issue, the Soviets had sent an additional group to Geneva to work with the US delegation on the matter. He noted with satisfaction the willingness of the American side to seek more vigorously a system of verification on long-range SLCMs.

Specifically, Foreign Ministers had agreed to set and observe ceilings on long-range nuclear armed SLCMs. This had been an important step, without which the whole problem of the buildup of strategic offensive arms would remain open. The time had come, said *Obukhov*, to agree on a figure. The US side had not responded to the Soviet proposal, but he wished to confirm that the limit on nuclear-armed long range SLCMs could be set at 400.

As to verification, if the American side believed SLCM limits could not be verified, the Soviet side was ready to take joint action to ensure they were made verifiable. Their earlier proposals had envisaged NTM, remote verification, and inspections on submarines and surface ships at the points where such ships were based.

In addition, he proposed that the experts study the possibility of verification of SLCM limits by continuous inspection at specified points where SLCMs were equipped with warheads, and at which they were loaded on ships of agreed types. A certain number of such points would be specified in the MOU; equipping of ships at other points would be prohibited. Compliance with these obligations would be verified by suspect site inspections under an annual quota.

There would also be a ban on loading nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships in the open sea, beyond the points at which they were based. If at the time of entry into force either side had submarines or surface ships already equipped with long-range nuclear

SLCMs, that side would display each ship for the purpose of counting. Display procedures would be subject to agreement.

Nitze asked whether by “remote verification” *Obukhov* meant “inspection from a distance.”

Obukhov replied that he did mean inspection from a distance. Further, he wished to propose a joint experiment in this regard, perhaps in April, employing Soviet equipment on ships or helicopters. The US would designate those ships which would be and would not be equipped with nuclear-armed SLCMs. US specialists could monitor Soviet instruments. The experiment could be conducted in the Mediterranean Sea or elsewhere as agreed. The US could also test its own equipment, with Soviet participation.

Obukhov concluded that he would like a positive reaction from the US side on these supplementary considerations. The joint experiment in particular, he said, would be helpful in removing US concerns.

Nitze said the US side would study the Soviet proposal carefully. In the meantime, Admiral Howe or Dr. Graham might care to comment.

Howe said that even if we could devise a scheme to distinguish whether a ship had nuclear weapons or not, many questions would need resolution before the sides could have confidence in their ability to verify nuclear SLCM limits. The US concern involved the possibility that weapons could be shielded or moved, or that other relatively simple measures could be employed in order to defeat verification. For example, a side could undergo an inspection one day and switch its conventional SLCMs to nuclear SLCMs the next. He asked *Obukhov* what he envisioned such an experiment as he had proposed would demonstrate. Would he expect it to demonstrate, for example, the capability to distinguish a nuclear SLCM from other nuclear weapons on board a ship?

Obukhov said that General *Chervov* would answer *Howe*’s question.

Chervov replied that the two sides could discuss shielding and other measures to impede verification, but this would be a discussion of ways to circumvent Treaty obligations. He had also noted that the US had proposed nothing on SLCM verification, and had expressed only a negative attitude.

Concerning the proposed joint experiment, *Chervov* said that agreement had been reached in Berne, when *Howe* and Mr. *Lehman* had been present, to carry out this experiment. There, the US had expressed a more positive attitude. He did not know why the US now was expressing doubts.

Obukhov said that an experiment was just that—an experiment. The two sides should simply do it and see what it resolved and what

additional measures were required. It was impossible to predict what it would yield; indeed, if we knew in advance what the results would be, no experiment would be required. He was proposing a purely scientific test.

Also, inspection from a distance was just one element of the Soviet proposal. It also included inspection on warships, verification of production along the perimeter of production plants, as well as NTM.

Obukhov then noted that time was running short. He wanted to address two other questions of concern today, prior to departing for the White House lunch.

Graham said that the US attitude regarding the proposal for a joint experiment was not negative, but was shaped by the laws of nature. The problem was the use of the technique and the signal to background problem. In this case, the background derived from other nuclear material in the reactor, other nuclear weapons, and natural radiation.

Graham also noted that Obukhov said an experiment was to test something impossible to predict. The US had studied this problem for many years and believed it could predict the result with accuracy. He was convinced this was not a useful verification measure because it could be rendered ineffective so easily. As a purely scientific test, he saw nothing this experiment could add to Soviet or to US understanding.

Obukhov responded that a negative attitude expressed in advance was hardly productive. Any scientific prediction could only be tested in practice. Since the most popular philosophy in the US was pragmatism, the two sides should be pragmatic.

Nitze then proposed that the two sides break at 10:50 am, and reconvene at 2:30.

Obukhov said that the two sides must report to their leaders after lunch, and that there would be no time for another meeting. Having covered SLCMs, he would like the the US reaction to the Soviet proposal on heavy missiles, and, if there was then time, he would cover Soviet ideas on mobile ICBMs.

Lehman said that he first wanted to point out that, with regard to the proposed joint experiment on SLCM verification, there was no difference between what the US side said in Berne and what the US side was saying here today. The US was addressing SLCM verification internally, here, and in Geneva. As for the experiment, even if it had a technically positive result, it would not help resolve the problem of verification. He believed the two sides should focus on the real issues of verification and not a side show. That would be the real pragmatic approach.

Obukhov said he did not want to pursue this philosophic discussion, and he would simply ask the US to study the Soviet proposal.

He then turned to the subject of mobile ICBM launchers. He said he believed the US was taking a more confident look at resolving the problem than before. In order to remove US concerns, the Soviet side expressed its willingness to set a separate sublimit of 800 mobile ICBM launchers.

In order to verify this provision, the Soviet side had already proposed, for example, NTM, continuous inspection of production facilities, and notifications of changes in the number and locations of launchers. He said they could also accept other measures. For road-mobile ICBM launchers, in order to determine the declared number on missile bases, the Soviet side could agree to open the roofs of fixed structures of such launchers, perhaps once a year for each base. The MOU could give coordinates for these bases.

Rail-mobile ICBM launchers, Obukhov continued, could be concentrated at missile bases during baseline inspections for counting. Other rail cars could then be subject to suspect-site inspection to verify that there were no missile launchers in excess of the numbers verified during baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBMs could be limited at each missile base. Storage sites could be a specified distance away in order to preclude the possibility of rapid reload. These measures in their totality present an expanded basis for resolving the issue.

Now, said Obukhov, the Soviet side would like to hear the US response to its proposal on heavy ICBMs.

Nitze responded by saying that the US had proposed a package for the future treatment of heavy ICBMs: a ban on new types, a ban on modernization, and a ban on flight testing. This package implied the gradual phase-out of existing heavy ICBMs as they aged and would preclude the deployment of new heavy ICBMs by either side in the future. In other words, this package would achieve a balanced result for the sides.

In Moscow, Nitze continued, the Soviet side had proposed to accept one element of the package—the ban on new types—while rejecting the other two elements. This would result in a decidedly unbalanced outcome; the Soviet side would be able to retain a heavy ICBM force indefinitely, while the US would have no corresponding right. We could not take a treaty with such an unequal provision to the Senate; we must have equal rights.

Obukhov responded that the Soviet proposals were serious and a major step forward. At the Washington summit, the leaders had reached a clear understanding on heavy ICBMs: the number was to be reduced to 154. The US proposal did not correspond to the Washington agreement, and seemed to suggest a zero solution.

He said the time had now come to agree on the reports to ministers. He suggested the reports be presented in parallel, and that they outline those expanded areas of understanding where progress had been made and areas where more work remained.

Nitze said he agreed with *Obukhov's* proposal regarding the reports to ministers. He wanted to point out, however, that the US side was not proposing something different from the 154 limit on heavies. The US was talking about follow-ons and new types. It was not a zero proposal.

Nitze asked, with regard to the proposal of a limit of 800 on mobile ICBM launchers, whether it would not be better to limit reentry vehicles.

Linhard asked whether the Soviets had any ideas on reentry vehicle limits on mobile ICBMs.

Obukhov said that Soviet ideas on heavies had been presented, and he requested the US side to analyze them. The Soviets had no intention of exceeding the aggregate levels with mobiles or with heavy bombers and their armaments.

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 9–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

Amb. Max M. Kampelman

Amb. Henry F. Cooper

SOVIET

Amb. Viktor Karpov

In a two hour discussion with Ambassador Karpov, Ambassadors Kampelman and Cooper probed the Soviet proposal for a D&S Agreement consisting of principal provisions quoting the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS) (responding to Soviet concerns) and a protocol on predictability measures to clarify the meaning of the WSJS (responding to U.S. concerns). While Karpov refused to work on bracketed language for a joint draft text and no agreement was reached on how to proceed, several issues were discussed and clarified, including:

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret.

—U.S. side corrected Karpov's statements that the U.S. side in Geneva was insisting on explicit references to "transition" in the JDT;

—Karpov agreed the "agreement" and "protocol" could be worked in parallel, but argued that the agreement should be completed first; the U.S. side agreed to study the Soviet approach and try to work with it, but insisted that the agreement and protocol would have to be worked and finalized as a package;

—The U.S. side insisted that the agreement would have to deal with withdrawal and termination rights;

—The dispute over the duration of the agreement is central to the issue of what happens after the specified period—the Soviet position would have the agreement expire at the end of the period, thereby nullifying each parties' right after the period "to decide its own course of action" (which means the right to deploy as negotiated at the Summit); the president insisted on (and obtained) this right in exchange for the nonwithdrawal period that Gorbachev wanted at the Summit;

—Karpov made clear the Soviet desire to set up a process of perpetually challenging U.S. testing activities through the activities of a "strengthened" SCC, a position rejected by the U.S. side;

—The Soviet verification measures approach is intended to support such challenging approach in contrast to the U.S. predictability measures approach;

—Karpov noted U.S. interest in a provision clarifying the WSJS language by stating that the parties would agree not to argue about the activities of sensors in space;

—Cooper noted that Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov's concerns regarding having a hundred objects in space turn into a defacto territorial defense was perhaps a common concern and a possible basis for reaching an agreement of mutual interest.

ACTIVITIES IN GENEVA

Early in the discussion, Karpov said he wanted to avoid a repetition of the arguments in Geneva which were based on incompatible positions: the Soviets sought to implement the WSJS language but the U.S. side sought to replace the WSJS language, alleging to improve that language. He said that to escape such a repetition, the sides should not speak of transition and stick to the essence of the WSJS. Cooper disputed Karpov's inference and noted that the U.S. proposed merged text did not mention transition; he said this was not because the U.S. side had dropped its view that a cooperative transition was desirable but because of Soviet stated concerns regarding the January 22 U.S. Treaty. At the same time, the U.S. proposal included a provision on withdrawal rights, which had to be dealt with, and predictability measures in keeping with suggestions from the Moscow Ministerial that pursuing this approach might settle the outstanding issues on "activities during the period." Regarding the references to "transition" in the January 22 U.S. Treaty, Cooper noted that it had included this language to counter balance Soviet language in previous proposals—for example, their references to the "ABM problem" as the subject of the 3 years of intense discussions.

Karpov showed no inclination to accept Cooper's accounting of the U.S. position, insisted that the Geneva approach was futile, and several times during the meeting urged that the agreement be worked out now, in Washington. The U.S. side refused to engage in this approach. At the end of the meeting, Cooper gave Karpov a copy of the March 17 U.S. Merged Text with the WSJS language highlighted, and urged Karpov to review it more carefully.

SOVIET PROPOSED AGREEMENT

Kampelman described his understanding of the Soviet proposal that called for an agreement and a protocol to the agreement. The agreement would surround the words of the December 10 WSJS with a title, a short preamble, and ending provisions. The Soviets proposed to meet U.S. concerns in an attached protocol which would seek to reduce ambiguities associated with the WSJS language and reduce tensions between the sides through confidence-building/verification measures.

Kampelman indicated that Secretary Shultz had said we should see what could be done with the Soviet proposal. The Secretary had emphasized that, while we would not pull back from the Washington Summit language, we could not accept an agreement framework where the protocol gets separated from the body of the agreement.

Karpov agreed the protocol could be negotiated in parallel with the body of the agreement, but argued that the body was easy to finish and should be done first. He argued that we should complete it at this meeting by quoting the WSJS and accepting the Soviet position on all unsettled issues, e.g., the duration of the agreement would be the specified period, and the sides would return to the ABM Treaty after the specified period. He refused to accept the idea of working bracketed text.

Kampelman suggested that Karpov outline his view of the suggested protocol; last night,² Karpov had mentioned the Soviet list proposal and Kampelman had said this was not a workable approach. Karpov said that had only been a suggestion and added that Kampelman last evening had mentioned something on sensors—perhaps some approach could build on Kampelman's idea. Karpov noted that the various confidence building measures to be included in the protocol should be directed toward enhancing the verifiability of the ABM Treaty—augmenting NTM. To complement NTM verification procedures with respect to questionable activities, he suggested greater exchange of information “on demand” and enhanced systems of verifi-

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

cation including on-site inspection. He was cool to U.S. arguments to enhance predictability and objected to exchanging planning data because he said it would create a situation where a side would either have to object to or give tacit approval to planned tests. He stated that other specific cooperative measures, including something like the U.S. proposal for mutual observation of tests, might be worked out.

In the discussion, the U.S. side indicated its willingness to consider the Soviet proposed agreement/protocol approach, but insisted that both the agreement and its protocol would have to be negotiated in parallel together. Also, the body of the agreement would have to include a provision dealing with “supreme interests” withdrawal rights and there would be brackets dealing with unresolved issues such as the duration of the agreement, the specified period, and when the agreement would enter into force. Karpov took note of the U.S. position but refused to indicate any flexibility regarding his insistence that everything be agreed in the agreement (no brackets).

DURATION OF AGREEMENT/RIGHTS AFTER THE PERIOD

Perhaps the most contentious part of the discussion was associated with Karpov’s insistence that the duration of the agreement be equal to the specified period, after which the parties would return to the ABM Treaty with their currently existing Article XV withdrawal rights that could be exercised only in the event of extraordinary events. He insisted that this was the meaning of the WSJS and refused to acknowledge that the U.S. position of an unlimited duration was consistent with the WSJS. He argued that the U.S. position of an unlimited duration was the essence of the dispute: the Soviets wished to preserve the ABM Treaty and the U.S. wish to replace the ABM Treaty. He was oblivious to the U.S. proposal that, thru the specified period and until a side exercised its freedom to decide its course of action, the sides would observe the ABM Treaty.

He was equally oblivious to the point that, if the D&S agreement expired at the end of the specified period, there would be no legal manifestation of the WSJS agreement that after the specified period, unless the sides agreed otherwise, “each side will be free to decide its course of action.”

The U.S. side emphasized that at the Summit, it had been agreed that these words meant the right to deploy—as reaffirmed on the final morning by an exchange between Secretary Carlucci and Shevardnadze in Marshal Akhromeyev’s presence. That meant the right to deploy without further negotiation and without making arguments about extraordinary events; this was part of what the U.S. side got for meeting the Soviet sides’ demand for a period of nonwithdrawal. The U.S. side would not agree that this right could exist for only a nanosecond at

the end of the specified period. Karpov did not dispute that the U.S. side got the freedom to decide its course of action after the period in exchange for meeting the Soviet demand for a nonwithdrawal period, but still insisted that the D&S agreement should terminate at the end of the period at which time the sides should return to the ABM Treaty regime, including Article XV.

LINKAGE AND ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD

During this discussion on rights of the parties after the period, Cooper emphasized that the Defense and Space agreement would have to stand on its own merits—there would have to be something in it for both sides. This was contrary to the Soviet argument that it was necessary only to provide the condition for fifty-percent reductions. This meant that in exchange for the nonwithdrawal period, which the Soviet side wanted, the U.S. side would get something in return, including the freedom to decide its course of action after the period as described above. In addition there would have to be clarity on withdrawal rights and on the activities during the period. Kampelman emphasized the need for an agreement that met both sides concerns and that the Soviet side appeared to be insisting that only its views be accommodated—especially regarding the activities during the specified period.

Karpov reiterated the standard Soviet line on needing a nonwithdrawal commitment for fifty percent reduction and went on to argue that the way to deal with any ambiguities was for the sides “to exercise restraint” and discuss problems in the SCC. During the exchange, Karpov made clear what he had in mind was setting up a process of perpetually challenging U.S. testing activities as being inconsistent with a Soviet restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty—not necessarily the U.S. “narrow interpretation.” At one point he acknowledged that the Delta 181 experiment³ was legal under the terms of the ABM Treaty, but that the Soviets were concerned about the trend of such experiments. The U.S. side insisted that the U.S. side could not accept an agreement under the conditions Karpov described.

SPACE SENSORS GO FREE

During the discussion on “activities”—and after an extended exchange on U.S. suggestions that the sides should avoid arguments over sensors in space, Karpov indicated his understanding that the U.S. side wished to see the WSJS ambiguities clarified by a provision in the protocol stating that the parties would agree not to argue about sensors during the term of the agreement.

³ Reference is to a February 1988 test by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

In the exchange, Cooper noted that, with modernization on both sides, there would be increasing difficulty distinguishing between space-based sensors without ABM capability and those with ABM capability; and furthermore, that neither side should wish restraints on warning and attack assessment satellites. He referred to the fact that the ABM Treaty imposed restraints on basing ground-based radars inside a country's perimeter did not have any analog for space-based sensors. Therefore it was in both sides's interest to simply agree that space-based sensors would be free from dispute regarding ABM Treaty restrictions.

Karpov noted that there had never been any restraints on space-based warning systems—which had existed when the ABM Treaty was signed and asked if he was now proposing any restraints or bans. Cooper said no, to the contrary he was suggesting simply that the sides clarify that there would be no dispute on space-based sensors—that space-based sensors go free—because of the difficulties of distinguishing between ABM-related and other space-based sensors.

VORONTSOV'S CONCERNS

Cooper pointed out that it had been reported to him that Vorontsov, in his discussions with the press, had raised two issues. First, he had said components but not systems could be tested in space, then he took this back. This issue related to the "broad-narrow" interpretation issue of Article V which the sides disagreed on. The second was an Article I issue regarding providing a base for a territorial defense—and Cooper thought there was a basis for agreement here. Vorontsov had said there was a concern that 100 objects in space for testing might turn into a defacto territorial defense overnight. Cooper said he thought that maybe there was basis for agreement in dealing with this concern and requested that Karpov think about it.

285. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 11:45 a.m.–2:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George Shultz

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci

Chief of Staff Howard Baker

Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein

Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Counselor Max Kampelman

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway

Robert E. Linhard, NSC

Thomas Simons (State, Notetaker)

Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

USSR

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh

Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin

Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin

General Nikolay Chervov

Ambassador Victor Karpov

Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov

Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Georgiy Mamedov

Foreign Ministry Official Teymuraz Stepanov

Foreign Ministry Official Sergey Tarasenko

Pavel R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The Soviets arrived at 1135 in the Oval Office. Following initial pleasantries and a multiwave photo-op, *the President* opened the meet-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and the Roosevelt Room. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 138.

ing by saying that he wished to raise a few personal thoughts before convening the larger plenary session.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

PLENARY MEETING IN CABINET ROOM

When the plenary session convened in the Cabinet Room at 1200, *the President* noted that the discussion had already begun and invited Secretary Shultz to start this round. (U)

Secretary Shultz said that the now regular pattern of small meetings with principals, including Colin Powell and Roz Ridgway on the US side, had been applied during this ministerial. He noted that working groups on all the arms control issues and on regional conflicts had met, that ambassadors had met on bilateral matters, and that working-group talks on human rights would be underway during the day. He said that all areas of concern were in play and that reports would be heard about them. But, first, he asked whether the Soviet visitor would like to comment on the overall ministerial. (S)

Shevardnadze began by conveying to the President the personal regards of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev who, he said, warmly remembered their visit to Washington and their talks with the President and with the American people. They believed that this was a truly historic occasion. In the dynamic of US-Soviet relations, especially regarding security issues, *Shevardnadze* continued, the first constructive phase of the relationship starting with Geneva in 1985 could now be said to be over, and we were moving into a new phase. There was no need, he said, to elaborate on the importance of the INF agreement signed in Washington. The General Secretary had recently received the President's message conveyed through Secretary Shultz saying that the US side was willing to move forward on security issues, especially to accomplish a 50% reduction of strategic forces within the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty and the parameters of the Joint Statement agreed to in Washington. (S)

Shevardnadze observed that he had had 23 meetings with Secretary Shultz, and could report that the dialogue was constructive and businesslike. Good experience had been gained in using a unique mechanism involving summits—an unprecedented fourth summit now impending—and the continuing dialogue of foreign ministers and experts. Now the state of US-Soviet relations was focused particularly on the task of completing a 50% START agreement. The President and the General Secretary had instructed the ministers and, in turn, the Geneva delegations to accelerate their work. The latter had prepared very substantial documents—on inspection, elimination and conversion, and an MOU on data exchange—which provided a basis for progress. Informed by the INF experience, these were important for-

ward steps, in Shevardnadze's view. Despite many areas of disagreement and little time to resolve them, Shevardnadze said there was a good basis for a joint effort to reach a 50% START agreement by the Moscow Summit. The Soviet leadership believed, he said, that, while difficult, this goal could be achieved. (S)

Shevardnadze observed that this ministerial would lay a good basis for the Moscow summit if there was agreement on the basic question of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The General Secretary had said and the President had agreed that there would be no 50% reductions agreement if there were no agreement on the ABM Treaty, according to Shevardnadze, and it was important to be guided by this in preparing for the summit. Additional requirements existed to amplify on certain aspects of verification so as to assure against circumvention. Shevardnadze said that he had shared new suggestions with the Secretary. Another very complex issue, he continued, concerned SLCM. As discussed since Reykjavik, without a solution to the SLCM problem no START agreement could be hoped for, but a basis for proceeding had been achieved. First, it had been agreed that there would be a limit on SLCMs. The Soviets had proposed a ceiling which, whether accepted now or not, provided a basis for discussion. Both sides agreed that the verification problem, secondly, was very difficult, but susceptible to solution through hard work by the experts. The Soviet side had presented to Secretary Shultz a comprehensive concept for SLCM verification. It had not yet heard a response, but understood that this might take time to study. Shevardnadze said this concept deserved serious study, and expressed the conviction of the Soviet side the SLCM limits could be verified. Another issue, he said, concerned ALCM counting rules. Both sides had proposed counting rules, and now the effort to reach agreement must be intensified. (S)

Shevardnadze said it was realistic to work for documents on nuclear testing for signature in Moscow. There were two aspects that needed to proceed in parallel, the preparation of protocols and the preparation of joint verification experiments. If willingness to accelerate both processes existed, a basis for agreement existed. The Soviet side had accepted the US technical approach and the US side did not object to the Soviet seismic approach. Moving to chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said that, since a completed convention banning chemical weapons was not realistic by the time of the Moscow summit, then a statement on accelerating the effort to complete a convention should be sought, a worthwhile draft of which had been submitted by the Soviet side. (S)

Regarding conventional arms, specifically in Europe, *Shevardnadze* said there was every reason to accelerate work on defining the mandate and substance of talks. Good progress was being made and acceptable

language was attainable. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze recalled, had said the Soviet side was ready to put all its cards on the table, all its forces data. It was ready to begin negotiating on all asymmetries regarding conventional arms. Even before negotiations, it was ready to publish jointly all data about weapons pertinent to the goal of limiting conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, data covering Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The Soviet side was ready to publish data by region, including central, southern, and northern Europe. (S)

This in broad outline, *Shevardnadze* said, was the state of his dialogue with the Secretary. As to regional matters, he said he could not yet report conclusions. Agreed language regarding Afghanistan had not yet been reached, but he was hopeful it could be reached based on the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces. There had been discussion of Iran-Iraq and the Middle East, but no agreement yet; there would be discussion of Central America and Kampuchea, and some on southern Africa. (S)

This was the agenda, the mosaic of the ministerial, *Shevardnadze* said, and the ministers would work in a businesslike manner to build a good basis for the Moscow summit. After this ministerial in Washington, Shevardnadze proposed another ministerial in Moscow, suggesting a date somewhere in mid-May, to assure that the Moscow Summit was as productive as possible, something the Soviet Union and its people keenly desired. (S)

LUNCH DISCUSSION

Repairing for lunch in the Roosevelt Room at 1315, the party sat down at 1325 for a discussion that ranged over many topics.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Secretary Shultz turned to arms control topics noting the importance of coming to grips with chemical weapons. The US side, he said, wanted to see results in the effort to get a ban on chemical weapons. Toward this objective he said that maybe a suitable statement for issuance at the Moscow summit could be constructed. He then asked Ambassador Nitze for a run-down on arms control. (S)

Ambassador Nitze reported that one large working group on arms control had subdivided into several separate groups on nuclear testing, conventional arms, START, Defense and Space. Verification problems generally, ALCMs, mobile ICBMs and their verification, heavy ICBMs, and SLCMs had been addressed. The two protocols on elimination and inspection and the MOU on data tabled in Geneva had been examined and some progress made on eliminating differences. Nitze observed that it would be important and feasible to exchange data called for by the MOU even before completing the full outline of the START agreement because the first informed the second action. The US side moved

from 6 to 10 as an ALCM counting rule in response to Soviet concerns, but the Soviet side still had problems with the US position. (S)

Shevardnadze charged that the US was understating the ALCM carrying capability of its very good bombers. *Nitze* responded that the counting rule of 10 was fair for the force as a whole. He went on to say that mobile ICBM verification had seen hard work and some progress. On heavy ICBM, the sides' positions were clear and disagreed. There remained problems on sublimits, but progress was being made. The main problem remain SLCMs, where the Soviet side, *Nitze* reported, had made substantive proposals which the US side was examining. (S)

Shevardnadze agreed that the MOU on data was important; categories needed to be defined; it would provide the basis for speeding up exchange of data. But, he said, it remained unacceptable that SLCMs were not included. *Nitze* said that the sides should start exchanging data as soon as possible. He then broached Defense and Space. (S)

Shevardnadze interjected by proposing to the President that the language of the December Joint Statement simply be used as the text of a document to be signed in Moscow. Not only had the two top leaders already accepted it, others present had worked on it, including Shultz, Carlucci, Baker, and Powell. If the Washington language on the ABM Treaty was still in effect, then things could move boldly ahead. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded that this matter was actively being discussed; the Washington language was valid. But, he said, it contained areas of ambiguity which even the Soviets could see. This had to be cleared up. (S)

Shevardnadze said that efforts were being made to go beyond the Washington language; these might lead in a negative direction which would be unfortunate. (S)

The luncheon broke up at 1435. Departing, *Shevardnadze* asked the President to consider the proposal of spending more time and doing more travel in the USSR than currently planned. (C)

286. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 2:30–8:10 p.m.

SUBJECTS

Ministerial Dates, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Other Regional Issues, Working Group Reports, Joint Statement

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
THE SECRETARY	FOREIGN MINISTER
Gen. Powell	SHEVARDNADZE
Under Secretary Armacost	Amb. Bessmertnykh
Amb. Ridgway	Amb. Adamishin
EUR/SOV Director Parris	Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
(Notetaker)	Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	Soviet MFA Notetaker
	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Working Group Reports

The Ministers then decided that, as the joint statement was still being prepared, they should hear from working groups. Nitze and Obukhov were summoned, and Obukhov briefly summarized the results of the Nuclear and Space group's discussions.

The thrust of OBUKHOV's opening remarks was that the U.S. had insisted on language which had nothing to do with the Washington Summit statement, which ministers had agreed in Moscow should be the basis for a new agreement on observance of the ABM Treaty. SHEVARDNADZE asked if that meant that nothing had been achieved in this area. OBUKHOV said that the issue had been discussed both in the working group and by Kampelman and Karpov. Obukhov was not informed on the outcome of their discussions.

NITZE challenged Obukhov's presentation of the subject, noting that the real problem was that the Washington Summit Statement language was never intended to be a self-standing agreement. A formal agreement would require greater specificity as to the meaning on "non-withdrawal." It would also have to deal with issues like the supreme

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 139.

national interest clause, and what should happen at the end of the non-withdrawal period. So a number of questions remained on which work had to be done.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there were also verification questions to be addressed. There seemed to have been some headway, but more was needed. We had some ideas on how to reduce ambiguity. NITZE said that our proposal on space sensors was one such idea.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Nitze what he meant by “sensors.” Nitze briefly explained the concept.

OBUKHOV noted that the Soviet side had just received the U.S. proposal. It would require expert analysis and assessment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the key was to determine what would take place during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side thought that should be compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the two sides could agree on this, it would make open the field to progress across the board.

THE SECRETARY noted that that was the virtue of trying to work from a joint draft text. As had proven the case in other areas, such a device forced negotiators to identify for ministers where the problems lay. This could be done for the April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said this could be considered. But the important thing was not the text itself, but knowing where the differences lay. The bottom line was that the present visit had added nothing to what had been achieved during the Washington summit. If anything, the situation was less clear. So, work should continue.

THE SECRETARY agreed, but on the basis of a joint text. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet delegation didn’t consider that a useful idea. OBUKHOV explained that the U.S. text would “drown” the principles which had been agreed to in Washington. Perhaps the U.S. could provide a revised text, which dropped the additional points. NITZE noted that the U.S. text contained all of the elements of the Washington Statement, as well as other elements we considered necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE said he disagreed with something Nitze had said earlier—that the Washington statement was only “communique language.” Rather, it should be seen as the basis for everything. THE SECRETARY pointed out that Nitze had said the Washington Statement language was incorporated into the U.S. text, adding that it did not provide adequate clarity. We had provided some ideas on how to achieve that.

“OK,” SHEVARDNADZE said, “let’s work on a joint document.” But that was not the solution. It could not be recorded that progress had been made. NITZE noted that agreement to work a joint draft text *was* progress. THE SECRETARY said that, whether it was progress or

not, it should be done. He agreed with Shevardnadze that, on the whole, little had been achieved. SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides had gotten nowhere, and asked Obukhov to continue his report.

When Obukhov had finished, Shevardnadze asked him where, in the Soviet working group's view, there had been progress during the visit. OBUKHOV said that there had been some movement on ALCM's, in that the U.S. had revised upward its proposals for a counting rule. This did not solve the problem, since, in the Soviet view, the only realistic rule was the maximum number for which bombers could be configured, but the U.S. move suggested that this issue could ultimately be resolved. While there had been no definitive progress on the SLCM question, the U.S. had agreed to intensify experts discussions on verification questions, and this, too, was a step forward.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if there had been a discussion of the detailed proposals the Soviet side had made on SLCM verification. OBUKHOV said that the Soviet side had made a thorough presentation, that the U.S. had asked a number of questions, and that Nitze had raised no objections. From this, Obukhov assumed that the Soviet ideas would be studied. NITZE interjected that he had said the proposals would be studied. He had made no commitments.

THE SECRETARY asked if any brackets had been eliminated in the texts prepared to date. NITZE said Hamner felt it would be possible to remove some brackets. SHEVARDNADZE said that, as best he could tell, there had been no serious movement on NST. If the other groups had done no better, it was not clear there would be anything for the ministers to review in April.

Nitze and Obukhov were then dismissed, and Holmes and Palenykh summoned to report on the nuclear testing group's discussion.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Joint Statement/Final Assessments

At this point, the ministers received copies of the draft joint statements for their review.

After reading the texts, THE SECRETARY expressed regret that the Soviet side had not, as Shevardnadze had earlier indicated, been willing to include a reference to "strong actions" which would be undertaken in the event the UN Secretary General's early April consultations with Iran and Iraq produced no results. SHEVARDNADZE said that such language was not needed, as nothing was said about Afghanistan. THE SECRETARY said, "OK."

The ministers authorized release of the statements.

Reflecting on the results of his visit, SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that if progress continued at this rate there would be no serious docu-

ments to sign at the Moscow summit. It was of course possible to meet and talk without signing documents. But it was discouraging that the two ministers and their delegations could meet for two days without accomplishing anything substantive. The statement was a good one, but it contained no specifics.

Shevardnadze suggested that this pointed to the need for particularly thorough preparations before the ministers' next meeting. He would be in favor of removing as many brackets and disagreements as possible.

What then, should be said to the press? Was a press conference really necessary? How would the ministers assess their work?

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that the visit had not been very productive. He had been asking himself why this should be. In the past, the ministers had dealt more successfully with some very difficult problems. That had not happened this time.

The problems which remained were the hard ones. But the Secretary felt that, with the right spirit on both sides, the ABM issue could be resolved. The ALCM discounting rule also seemed to be resolvable, even if, thus far, it had not proved possible to identify conceptually common ground. The SLCM issue remained tough, but we would look at Soviet suggestions. We thought that a declaration was a realistic way out of the problem; we were not optimistic about being able to verify a limit.

The U.S. desire to limit strategic arms was strong, the Secretary affirmed. The President shared this view. He wanted to get the job done. And the prospect was tantalizing when we looked at how much had been accomplished since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki. The difference was like night and day. The two START protocols and MOU which the ministers had commissioned in Moscow had been produced, albeit with lots of brackets. Many of these had to do with technical issues which should yield to further efforts. Others required resolution of broader questions.

The Secretary said he was as discouraged as anything by the failure to accomplish anything in the regional area. He felt that the overall effort we had been making in this area had been soured. Even at the most difficult moments in their relationship, e.g. during the Daniloff affair,² he had not felt such a sourness, even though the discussions were tough.

² Refence is to Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. journalist who was arrested by the KGB in Moscow on September 2, 1986, and held on charges of espionage. Documentation pertaining to U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading to his eventual release is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

The Secretary said that he had gained the impression from his experience going back to the Nixon administration that there were rhythms to the relationship. One of the accomplishments of the past few years had been to attenuate the swings of the pendulum, while keeping the trend line moving in a generally positive direction. Perhaps the relationship was entering a downward cycle; the Secretary hoped we could pull out of it.

POWELL said that, while both sides obviously would have liked to accomplish more, they knew that they would be dealing with the most difficult questions—particularly on arms control. Powell agreed that we could work on ALCM's; SLCM's would be harder, even with the new Soviet ideas.

For his part, Powell had been most disappointed over the failure to make progress on the question of the ABM Treaty. We had felt after the Secretary's Moscow visit that there would be movement in this area. Since then, the Soviet side had not engaged. Powell emphasized that steps *must* be taken to eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington Summit Statement. This was an essential political imperative for the U.S. After the Washington summit, our negotiators had been instructed to use the Statement as the *basis* for a treaty, not as the text of a treaty itself. This ambiguity had to be resolved before we could take a possible treaty to the Senate. That was why we had put forward our proposals on sensors and verification procedures. Soviet acceptance of these would create a common understanding of what had been intended in Washington.

THE SECRETARY stressed that the approach Powell had described was intended to get away from the debate over the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It sought to put out information on the nature of each side's programs. This would provide greater predictability and certainty, something which the Soviet side had sought, as well as a clearer idea of what would happen during the non-withdrawal period.

RIDGWAY said that she had been reminded by some of her colleagues that in "off cycle" periods, bilateral progress could provide useful buoyancy. The report of the bilateral working group had identified a number of areas where constructive progress was being made.

THE SECRETARY observed that, seen in the long term, there were clearly stages in the development of our relationship, each with its own dynamics. The Geneva summit had had a certain air. Reykjavik was a different sort of meeting—highly charged, but, as summits went, the most productive ever. The Washington summit was a magnificent event, crowned by the signing of the INF Treaty. We hoped that there would be an even more important treaty to sign in Moscow.

But one could ask: "What about a 1989 summit?" If we concluded a START agreement for Moscow, what could be done for an encore?

This was by way of saying that, for the relationship to become more normal, the time had to come when our leaders could meet, and, while it would be a major event, it need not be marked by gigantic achievements. This was a mark of maturity in the relationship. As people thought about the management of the relationship over the next five to ten years, that needed to be kept in mind.

So, the Secretary concluded, he felt a little disappointed with their meetings. But the way one accomplished things in this area was to keep plugging away. Our people would be working in Geneva. It would be even more important that people in capitals do their homework. The work in Geneva reflected what was being done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not think that the meetings had been useless—particularly when he read the joint statement. What disturbed him was that he had expected to be able to identify some concept for the Moscow summit, even if only in general terms. If he were asked what that concept might be at this point, he could not answer. This did not imply that the ministers should set grandiose tasks for themselves, but they needed a clear idea of where the process was leading. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be possible to have a meeting which did not produce major results. There was plenty of precedent for that in visits by other world leaders. But U.S.-Soviet relations were special.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed completely. He thought that something could be accomplished in the time remaining. So did the President.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers should try to move positions closer together during their April meeting. They should try to identify more clearly a concept for the summit.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to return to all the problems the ministers had discussed. ABM was central. Unless some decisions were taken, there could be no expectation of progress in other areas. SLCM's were another important area which the Soviet side hoped the U.S. would be ready to address urgently. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize that if there were not understanding on the ABM Treaty, there would be no agreement on 50% strategic reductions. The same went for SLCM's.

The U.S. and Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued, had a unique chance to close off the main channels of the arms race. He did not know how Moscow's relations with the next administration would be. Perhaps they would be better. But the Soviet leadership felt that there was a unique chance to negotiate an agreement now. It should not be missed. Guided by this principle, the two sides should act more vigorously in Geneva, Washington and Moscow.

By way of a second general observation, Shevardnadze said he had known the Secretary now for some time. The Secretary knew the Foreign Minister did not hide his feelings. Shevardnadze had been deeply disappointed by the results of their discussion of Afghanistan. He did not know how to continue the discussion. The U.S. had simply decided it didn't want to help solve the problem. A major chance had existed to do something together, to resolve "the most acute problem of our time." Moscow would resolve the problem. But it would have been well to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could work together to solve such problems. This was Shevardnadze's most acute disappointment as he left Washington.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to overdramatize this. But he had believed the two sides could do better. There was every reason to expect success.

So, Shevardnadze summed up, he had been very frank. No purpose would be served by going over the issue once more. But success would have helped in the resolution of other problems, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East. The two sides had to cooperate if these issues were to be resolved. Moscow knew the mentality of the Arab world. Resolution of the Afghanistan conflict on a negotiated basis would have been a good stimulus in the Middle East.

But the meeting had been useful, despite the disappointments. There was a clearer idea of our differences. That was progress. And the atmosphere, as always, had been hospitable and constructive. Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary convey his thanks to the President for the time he had made available.

THE SECRETARY asked to respond on a few points.

On the ABM question, he urged that Soviet negotiators in Geneva be instructed to engage on a joint draft text. They should try to eliminate the inconsequential problems, e.g. the supreme national interests clause issue. We were surprised at the adverse reaction to our proposal that the ABM Treaty should remain in effect at the end of the non-withdrawal period unless a side exercised the six-month notice of withdrawal option, and hoped the Soviet side would look again at that. We urged the Soviet side to look closely at our sensors and verification proposals as a means of giving clarity to the Washington Summit Statement. Our objective was to put the issue on an operation basis, avoiding the question of broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

On Afghanistan, the Secretary expressed his own disappointment, for reasons paralleling those Shevardnadze had expressed. The Secretary felt the two sides had come close to an understanding. He hoped Shevardnadze had a better appreciation of the difficulties we had. Our moratorium proposal was an attempt to find solutions consistent with

the Soviet need to maintain a certain posture, and with what, in practical terms, Moscow would want to do. It would give us the necessary sense of balance and even contribute to a solution to Afghanistan's internal problems.

If asked, the Secretary would say that there had been a thorough discussion of Afghanistan and that, from our standpoint, there were some positive results. We would welcome acceptance of Cordovez's mediation efforts. We would describe where the talks had ended up. We would not put it in a cataclysmic way, but would express our disappointment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked by the press whether the U.S. and Soviet Union would sign as guarantors in Geneva, he would say, "no." Was that correct?

THE SECRETARY said he would say the U.S. was prepared to act as a guarantor, and that the arrangements which had been agreed to were close to what we needed to do so. But he would indicate that an essential element—balance—was missing. He would say we had tried to resolve this and were not successful. We remained glad to be a guarantor if the issue could be resolved.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked what the U.S. would do, he would say the press should ask the Secretary.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of plans for press conferences that evening.³

³ The joint statement of March 23 noted Shultz and Shevardnadze had "reaffirmed the strong commitment made in the Washington summit joint statement to make an intensive effort to complete a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of the two leaders." (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1988, pp. 42–43.)

287. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 25, 1988

SUBJECT

December 10 Statement and ABM

My views on “ambiguity” and our ABM problem are not widely accepted, but I do want to share them with you. I recognize the importance of clarity in an agreement, but I also have experienced benefit from ambiguity on occasion where clarity is unachievable or not in my interest. We have such a potential here.

We will, I believe, not be able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviets as to the meaning of the December Summit Joint Statement language on “observation of the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” This is not the time that either we or the Soviets will retreat from our established position on the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the President has taken a consistent position that we should avoid a “permitted-prohibited” agreement.

Were this ambiguous statement to be a provision of our START Treaty, thereby providing the Soviets with the opportunity to withdraw from their 50 percent commitments when we conduct SDI activities which they consider inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, then I would certainly be opposed to such a provision. We could, however, insist that the December 10 provision be limited to the separate agreement, and kept out of the START agreement. As a fallback, we could agree to a START provision which would free the parties from pursuing their START obligations in the event the other party deploys a space-based ABM system, an obvious violation of the ABM Treaty.

With respect to sensors, however, you will recall, from my earlier report to you,² that from my first meeting with Karpov during this ministerial, we pushed the concept that both parties would be free to work with sensors in space, i.e., either test or deploy. Karpov reaffirmed at the end of our talks yesterday that he would give this idea very serious consideration. He raised no objection to it during our exchanges. Were we able to achieve this goal we would be providing “legitimacy” to the principal SDI testing objective in the foreseeable future. This

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, All of March, 1988. Secret.

² Not found.

would be an important plus, even if ambiguity remains with respect to the rest of the provision.

The Soviets have suggested that our concerns about ambiguity be considered as part of a predictability package and incorporated as a protocol to the agreement, with the agreement limited to the December 10 words alone. (Karpov promised to cable me the text of such an agreement as they see it.) The Soviets have agreed in principle to the idea of a legally binding protocol which would be an integral part of the agreement.

We may be able to add to the protocol a few other clarifying details in the confidence building area, but I don't know how significant they will be. Karpov is reviewing some of these ideas and has already indicated opposition to others. An important issue that would have to be resolved is whether we are required "to decide (our) own course of action" (the right to deploy) at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, or whether our freedom to deploy remains a right given to us by the December 10 statement as reflected in the agreement to be executed. The Soviet position is that the new agreement ends with the termination of the nonwithdrawal period. Our own position is that the new agreement be of unlimited duration. Karpov was concerned that our preference for unlimited duration was a backdoor effort to have them agree now that the ABM Treaty will go out of existence at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. Both Hank and I assured him that we are not now making any such decision; and that, from our point of view, we are assuming the ABM Treaty would continue in force at the end of the period.

There is one final question. My own inclination is to favor an additional understanding between us that we would begin to resolve the issues we didn't settle now in a new negotiation that begins sometime in 1989. I favor that for two reasons. First, I believe that where we and the Soviets have a serious problem we should continue talking in order to see if we can resolve that problem. Secondly, I believe that establishing such a firm negotiation to take place in a year or so permits us to argue with the Congress that they ought not to legislate any further SDI restrictions since we should not have our feet cut out from under us.

In summary, I am prepared to accept ambiguity as to what can be done (other than deployment) during the nonwithdrawal period, as long as the ambiguity does not extend to the text of the START Treaty and as long as we get an agreement permitting us freedom in space-based sensors.

288. Note From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman)¹

Washington, March 28, 1988

Max:

I agree that as long as the President wishes there not to be an agreement on “prohibited-permitted”, there must be some degree of ambiguity with respect to the Defense and Space issue. Our objective should be to narrow that ambiguity to the degree mutually acceptable. To agree that sensors run free would go far; to establish a test range, a dividing line between testing and deployment, and a confirmation that neither side will “deploy” would go still further. Predictability measures such as exchanges of information regarding the sides’ testing programs could also be helpful as could continuing negotiations on rules governing permitted testing. All these measures are covered in the treaty language under consideration by the Support Group.

I therefore don’t see your views as “not being widely accepted”; though they are inconsistent with the current instructions to the Defense and Space negotiating group, they are the basis on which we are working possible changes to those instructions.

As we proceed with implementation of the directive in last week’s Joint Statement “to expedite preparation of a joint draft text . . . allowing consideration of any unresolved issues at the next meeting of the Secretary and the Foreign Minister in Moscow,” we should work to get as many of these measures as possible included in instructions to the negotiating group.

Paul²

¹ Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, All of March, 1988. Secret.

² Nitze initialed the note PHN beside his typed signature.

289. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Director of Central Intelligence Webster, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

PFIAB Letter Regarding START Treaty (U)

Reference NSC/ICS 40066 dated February 11, 1988.² After receiving your comments on the PFIAB letter to the President regarding the START Treaty I met with the Board to discuss their concerns.³ I shared your comments⁴ on their letter to the President and asked for their thoughts regarding a possible PFIAB assessment of two START related issues: (1) intelligence support to a strategic assessment of START Treaty; and (2) our monitoring capabilities for a START Treaty. (S)

The PFIAB response, a copy of which is attached (Tab A), amplifies on their earlier correspondence. The Board still suggests that the two major issues regarding a START Treaty that need to be studied are: (1) the strategic impact of a START Treaty; and (2) our ability to monitor and verify a START Treaty. The Board's letter includes a draft tasking memorandum with statements of work for the studies of these issues that the Board suggests should be part of our efforts to achieve a Treaty. (S)

Certainly comprehensive reviews of these critical issues should be part of our efforts to achieve a START Treaty. However I am concerned about the resource, and associated schedule, impacts that the suggested studies would have on our existing START work program if we initiated them right now. The work program is producing very good results and, even if our current goal of a Treaty by the May Summit is unobtainable, maintaining the existing work schedule will allow the President to address, and resolve, the greatest number of issues with the Soviets at the Summit. My sense is that the right time to initiate these studies is right after the Summit or earlier if we decide to readjust our START Treaty support activities before then. The studies suggested by the PFIAB would certainly benefit from having as much of our existing

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40179–40200. Top Secret.

² See footnote 1, Document 265.

³ No minutes were found.

⁴ Carlucci and Webster's comments were not found. For Crowe's comments, see Document 271.

START work program complete as possible before they were initiated. However, there is the potential risk, associated with delaying the studies, that they might result in our having to back out of a position which we had already tabled with the Soviets.

I would like to have your comments on the PFIAB's latest letter. In addition, I would like your thoughts regarding the substance of the attached draft tasking memorandum (Tab B),⁵ which is a slightly modified version of the one suggested by the PFIAB, and when, and if, such an effort should be initiated. (S)

Attachment

Letter From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)⁶

Washington, April 8, 1988

Dear Colin:

Since sending our February 5 letter⁷ to the President regarding our concerns about the proposed START Treaty, PFIAB has continued to work on these matters. In addition to our discussions with you and other principal administration officials, we now have had the opportunity to study the agencies' responses to our letter. [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] and the Joint Draft Treaty text and US-proposed Protocols.

This letter identifies in general fashion some of the issues we believe require further study. The issues raised serve only as examples and in no way pretend to be exhaustive. If you agree that these issues require additional work, the letter makes a recommendation that a program of study be incorporated into the START Work Program before the final provisions of our Treaty language are tabled in Geneva.

While the Board recognizes the enormous burden now carried by those involved in support of START, it also believes these studies are critical to the successful completion of a sound accord.

I. Monitoring the Treaty

When we sent our letter to the President we had not yet had the benefit of reading NIE 4/11-88 on US monitoring capabilities against

⁵ Attached but not printed is the draft tasking memorandum.

⁶ Top Secret.

⁷ See Document 265.

Soviet strategic forces. Little discrepancy appears between PFIAB's general assessment of our monitoring capabilities and the analysis of the Estimate. Nor do any of the agencies' responses to our letter differ markedly with the Estimate. [5 lines not declassified]

In large measure, therefore, our ability to detect whether the nation's supreme interests are at risk will depend on the cooperative measures now being negotiated with the Soviets. The Board cannot overstate the importance of accurately understanding how and to what degree these measures will improve our ability to monitor and verify Soviet compliance with the Treaty.⁸

Missile Tagging

In a recent visit to the Sandia National Laboratory, Dr. John Foster and I saw demonstration models of two concepts under consideration: missile tagging and portal-perimeter monitoring of Soviet missile production and assembly plants.

Tagging (in combination with short-notice on-site inspections and prior notice of eliminations under Article VIII) could, in theory, frustrate a militarily significant number of covert missiles from being produced and covertly deployed. Its future effectiveness will hinge, however, on our ability to negotiate a highly reliable procedure for ensuring that only tagged missiles are launched from Soviet test ranges or operational sites, preventing the Soviets from testing the reliability of a covert production line. This assumes, of course, that tagging technology and procedures can provide a unique, tamperproof identifier on the missile itself, a proposition not yet tested by a thorough, intentionally adversarial analysis.

Portal-Perimeter Monitoring

Portal-perimeter monitoring (PPM) of Soviet solid- and liquid-fuel first stage production facilities and liquid-fuel final assembly facilities as proposed in the US Protocol would no doubt add to our knowledge of Soviet missile production operations. Its ability to contribute to monitoring treaty compliance, however, depends directly on many details still to be negotiated with the Soviet Union.

The proposed PPM sites are designed to inspect all items entering and exiting the facility that are of the size and weight capable of containing a missile first stage. The effectiveness of such inspections is directly contingent on the accuracy of the data determining the size and weight thresholds which are to trigger U.S. inspections. If the United States should actually weigh a Soviet missile stage to set these

⁸ [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

thresholds, we must have high confidence that the Soviet sample is authentic and has not, for instance, had its weight artificially increased. We must also have high confidence in our understanding of the engineering of Soviet first stages. [4 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

On-Site Inspections

On-site inspections (OSI) continue to be debated by the various agencies, both for their monitoring utility and for the counter-intelligence impacts of reciprocal Soviet inspections. Because, [less than 1 line not declassified], so much of our confidence in detecting and deterring Soviet cheating must rest on suspect-site inspections, we are troubled by the difference of views among the agencies on their effectiveness.⁹

Assuming the Soviets are unlikely to openly cheat at declared facilities, initial inspections validating the declared numbers of accountable items after a data exchange and later inspections during the Treaty's duration will do little to lessen current uncertainties about Soviet numbers of nondeployed missiles. Our chances of uncovering discrepancies with Soviet declared numbers will depend heavily on suspect-site inspections. Given the limits we are likely to agree to because of counterintelligence concerns and the scope of the problems SSI is meant to address, we are concerned that the effectiveness of SSI for monitoring purposes may fall short of expectations.

OSI and Enigmatic Soviet Facilities

In recent weeks the Board has been gaining a better appreciation of the enormous challenge of piercing Soviet concealment and deception practices. [3 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

We should not be optimistic that technical collection systems will appreciably winnow down these candidate suspect sites. [6 lines not declassified]

The Soviet Union's enormous size, [less than 2 lines not declassified] add to our questions about the monitoring effectiveness of SSI. We are not prepared to conclude, as the Intelligence Community has done, that SSI, "would raise measurably (but not make perfect) our confidence that the Soviets were not cheating, were not stockpiling weaponry for break out and were adhering to the letter and spirit of the treaty." Nor have we yet seen persuasive evidence that SSI "would increase significantly the risks to the Soviets of engaging in illegal activities [for] under such an inspection regime, the Soviets could never be certain that illegal activities would go undetected."

⁹ [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

It is our firm belief that with so much of our monitoring confidence relying on OSI, we need to have a realistic understanding of its utility and its limits.

Other Monitoring Issues

PFIAB has additional monitoring concerns. None of the agencies disputed the point made in our letter regarding the large uncertainties in times of crisis about actual Soviet RV counts. Nor did any of them dispute our concerns about mobile missiles. Some believe additional investments in our NTM can ameliorate some of these uncertainties. However, there must be much further study of how these investments, in combination with cooperative measures, will improve our ability to detect a determined Soviet strategy of cheating.

II. Verification

Whatever the monitoring uncertainties, the verification uncertainties are even greater. As the NIE notes, any group of US inspectors will encounter unavoidable frustrations and delays. The Estimate then goes on to state, “the Soviets would make every effort to thwart any inspection that threatened to uncover cheating on some provision of an agreement . . . Nonetheless, [2 lines not declassified] (The reconciliation of this statement with the monitoring confidence the NIE finds in SSI is urgently needed.)

Assuming that the U.S. has indeed selected a suspect site that houses a Soviet violation, we must nonetheless accept, as most analysts do, that it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will ever permit U.S. inspectors to find a substantive Soviet treaty violation. If the violation is removed before U.S. inspectors arrive, the Soviet reputation for treaty compliance will be enhanced when no violation is found. [less than 4 lines not declassified]

Violations detected by our NTM still must be handled within the framework of a monitoring regime which has recourse to SSI. Because NTM-detected violations will almost certainly contain a degree of ambiguity, the U.S. will confront the almost irresistible demand to resolve the ambiguity by conducting an inspection to “see it with our own eyes.” We can expect this pressure especially before we make any formal U.S. finding of Soviet treaty non-compliance. What may have proven a substantive violation if we could rely on NTM alone could then be effectively converted to a “procedural” violation should the resulting inspection be delayed or frustrated.

Because the most likely results from an SSI regime are findings of procedural violations, the ability of short-notice SSI to deter Soviet cheating may be less than expected. Indeed, multiple suspect-site inspections which fail to uncover Soviet cheating will have the effect of enhancing the Soviet reputation for compliance.

PFIAB's point is not that cooperative measures have no monitoring value; rather, its concern is that the limitations associated with these measures be fully appreciated. Nor do we want to be understood as saying that no verification difficulties exist when relying on National Technical Means. The perennial problem of revealing NTM-derived evidence to substantiate U.S. claims of Soviet noncompliance will also affect the verification of a START Treaty as it has others.

To state the obvious, verification is a technically and politically difficult task. It is made all-the-more difficult by the fact that the burden of proof will always rest with those proposing a U.S. finding of Soviet non-compliance. Therefore, the key verification question will be: can the Intelligence Community produce evidence of Soviet noncompliance weighty and timely enough to trigger an adequate offsetting U.S. response? Will we be able to detect Soviet cheating before the Soviets have achieved a significant military advantage? Given the possible incentives for the Soviets to circumvent a START Treaty's strictures and past Soviet examples of doing so (even when the gains seemed to be marginal), it is worrisome that we will be depending on a monitoring regime whose key element is of unknown reliability.

III. Assessing the Strategic Impact of START

PFIAB was gratified that Secretary of Defense Carlucci and the Department of State shared our belief that a systematic net assessment of the START treaty be conducted. PFIAB, however, was surprised to learn that the JCS at this stage cannot preliminarily describe the certified military sufficiency of the treaty or its implications for changes in U.S. force structure. Given how much of the START Treaty framework already has been agreed upon, and making assumptions about the outcomes of the biggest unknowns in the Treaty, the task does not seem unreasonable. It presumably should be done in some fashion to support the negotiations. Although final assessments will always have to be made, it would not seem prudent to delay judgments about the strategic and force structure impacts of an agreement until the end of the negotiating process.

Although we understand, as Secretary Carlucci puts it, the continuing task of "resolving issues and tabling the relevant treaty text sequentially so that as much progress can be made in the negotiations as possible," we believe a constantly updated version of the treaty's impacts should inform the negotiations.

Inevitably a comprehensive agreement such as the proposed START Treaty will necessitate tradeoffs. For example, it is evident that in some critical instances, such as cruise- and mobile- missiles, judgments about the difficulties of monitoring these systems might not outweigh the strategic advantages for the U.S. by their deployment.

The program of study outlined in this letter's attachment should make clearer the costs and benefits of those tradeoffs.

Conclusion

We recognize that no strategic arms reduction treaty will be without uncertainty and risk, just as today, without a treaty, we live with large uncertainty and risk.

Before entering the Treaty, however, PFIAB believes we need a confident understanding of the type and level of cheating which would give the Soviets decisive strategic advantages. The treaty's verification regime must provide us high confidence that we can detect such cheating by US monitoring means. The evidence derived from such monitoring must be capable of eliciting from us an appropriate and timely response to ensure Soviet compliance with the Treaty or to safeguard our interests threatened by Soviet cheating. Finally, we believe we need a net assessment of the strategic impact of the treaty in peacetime, crisis, and war that takes into account military systems limited by the treaty and military systems not limited by it.

Should you agree that the types of issues raised in this letter need the comprehensive study we have suggested, we submit the attached Draft Study Program¹⁰ as a possible point of departure.

Sincerely,

Anne L. Armstrong¹¹
Chairman

¹⁰ Attached but not printed.

¹¹ Armstrong signed the letter "Anne" above her typed signature.

290. Memorandum of Conversation for the Record¹

Washington, April 11, 1988, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

April 21 Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Shultz
Admiral Crowe
Admiral Howe
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Holmes

Admiral Crowe: The NST process was moving much too fast. He had decreed that the Chiefs would meet every morning at 8:00 a.m. on the subject in order to make progress as rapidly as possible.

Secretary Shultz: He was going to see Shevardnadze on Thursday, April 14th.² In addition to signing the Afghanistan document,³ he had an hour scheduled with Shevardnadze on NST. They would discuss the schedule for ministerial meetings, including the ministerial in April, probably one in early May and then the Summit. Pressure has emerged regarding START. The President wishes us to push for an agreement, but he wants a good agreement; he would reject anything that was not. He suggested we should look at what the situation would be if there were no agreement and we could write our own ticket.

Admiral Crowe: Setting a deadline is wrong. He had a long list of unresolved problems; we were not really making progress on them. This was not really a matter of resources. To achieve a consensus an evolutionary process. Two years ago no one thought on-site inspection

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Breakfast, April 15, 1988. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum, which is stamped "Draft," was drafted on April 12. The meeting took place in Shultz's office.

² On April 14, Shultz and Shevardnadze met at the Residence of the Soviet Minister to the United Nations in Geneva from 4:30–6:05 p.m., following the signing that morning of accords of Afghanistan. Discussions in the afternoon meeting focused on planning the agenda for Shultz's planned visit to Moscow, and the need to make progress on SLCMs, ALCM counting, and mobile ICBMs in advance of the Moscow Summit scheduled for the end of May. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shev (Geneva—4/14/88.) (S) The memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 142.

³ For Shultz's statement on the signing of the April 14 Geneva Accords as well as text of the agreements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1988, pp. 55–61.

was possible, but thinking has evolved; the Chiefs moved gradually and now accept it.

But not only must we solve the list of crucial problems; we must also restudy some of the things we have already tabled. Also there are 1200 brackets in the Joint Draft Text which have been negotiated in Geneva. Some are technical and some need substantial movement on both sides.

Shultz: We need something that is clear on defense and space. We support three theses: 1) the sensors go free; 2) that there be a test range in space; and maybe 3) as a part of the predictability measures each side would lay out its test program for the other.

Crowe: The Chiefs had a three-four hour meeting on defense and space recently.⁴ It turned out that the Soviets cannot use the same ranges as we. Their launch areas are further north. We have come up with a sphere idea. This is made necessary because we have black satellites in the area where our test range might be. We might have to announce what is there. Bob Herres is the one who knows most about these problems. The test range idea is a good example of something that needs further study.

Nitze: When do you think you would be in shape to approve of a position on a test range in space which we could use at the Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Crowe: I asked them to have something ready 10 days from last Friday.⁵

The NSC has been making decisions without digging into the facts. We sent instructions to Geneva based upon such NSC decisions and our delegation in Geneva has come back and asked a number of questions similar to the ones that the Chiefs have asked.

Mobiles are our most overlooked problem. Congress has not told us what they will give us. Many of them say that if you negotiate a limit on my mobiles, I will not vote for your treaty. Each has his favorite type of mobile. As a result, we do not know what the Congress will vote for.

Shultz: Congress has lost its taste for financing fixed ICBMs.

Crowe: As a result of not knowing what would be acceptable to the Congress, we are trying for a deal which allows the Soviets and us to have both road mobiles and garrison rail mobiles and either MIRVed or single missiles.

⁴ No minutes were found.

⁵ April 8.

Shultz: If they came in with a proposal limiting mobiles to X number of single RV missiles, they would have a winner. Many take the position that verification of mobiles is bound to have some uncertainties but that uncertainty would have greater importance if MIRVed missiles are permitted.

Crowe: I think verification of mobiles has made progress. It is not necessarily a treaty stopper. But Congress is not strapped by deadlines and will proceed at its own pace.

The Chiefs are coming up with a regime permitting rail and road mobiles with single or MIRVed RVs. The number of RVs on mobile missiles which the Chiefs like is around 1000. We could, of course, de-MIRV some of our MIRVed missiles.

Shultz: Why not do it?

Crowe: We might be forced to deploy a train with a single warhead.

Shultz: We should look at the implications of no agreement versus an agreement. In the START area, we now live in an unconstrained field. What would happen if we continue in that way? The best we will have is a few rail mobile MXs.

Crowe: We need a meeting with the Congress regarding this issue and come to a consensus. The Congress wants 500 midgetmen; Carlucci wants 500 rail mobile MXs. Both together would be 1000 re-entry vehicles. Something around 1500 might be the right number. The Soviets are building all types and are working on MIRVed SS-25s. In the absence of an agreement, we see a modest rise in numbers of Soviets RVs with an increase in the number of those that are mobile.

Shultz: If you can't work all the problems by May, we probably cannot do so by the middle of October either.

Crowe: We should think now about how to solve all these problems. The JCS are for START but the process will be complex, and the result of a protracted process.

Shultz: If we do not make it, we want to be in a posture that we have good positions but could not get Soviet agreement on them. On SDI we can have good positions; there we can be alright. But on SLCMs we are not in such a good position.

Crowe: Here is a partial list⁶ of what needs to be done. The problem is how are we going to cast this? If we come to a framework agreement, we must do it with specificity.

Shultz: Can we draw something from all of this that has some public impact. Perhaps some limit on numbers. We have a tougher SDI position than they. SLCMs are different.

⁶ Not found.

Crowe: We are not ready to put up with excessive intrusiveness. With respect to the suggestion that the Navy give up nuclears except for SLBMs, it would take at least a year to work out a change in the philosophy we have had for a number of years.

Shultz: The Soviets want to interfere with the Navy.

Crowe: Let's not let them. The TLAM (tomahawk land to air missile) gives us a real reason to keep nuclears at sea. Because of the INF elimination, they are needed at sea to support NATO. This is at the forefront of the Chiefs' consideration not to give up nuclear SLCMs and bring us down to their level. They do not know where our SLCMs are or on what ship. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* We have kept them out of the 6,000 figure. The military rationale for nuclear armed SLCMs is a sound one.

Shultz: We have said we would declare a ceiling on the number of our nuclear armed SLCMs.

Crowe: We would like to see them go free. We are looking for a figure around 1500 but don't see a solution. The Defense Science Board says it would take more than a year to work things out. It would be a network system and elaborate, if solveable at all. The Navy has not done what is necessary to see what intrusiveness they can put up with. The Soviet scheme for verification at a distance is merely to indicate whether they need on-site inspection of a ship or not. The test is to see how much intrusiveness we can tolerate. We do not see a scheme we can live with at this juncture.

Kampelman: There is a difference between declaring a ceiling which would be permanent, and a declaration which one can change from time to time.

Crowe: We made a commitment to the Congress not to jeopardize conventional cruise missiles. Ahkromeyev wants to throttle them as well. The Soviets believe they are at a disadvantage in this field.

Shultz: Let us discuss the ALCM counting rule.

Crowe: The Chiefs have now moved. The Air Force is prepared to let all present long-range nuclear missiles count as being nuclear. In the future all conventional ones will be structurally different and distinguishable from other missiles. The present ones are not interchangeable from one to another. The Air Force is willing to count the conventional ones as if they are nuclear because we now have so few conventional ones. It would take several years to get distinguishable ALCMs deployed. Aircraft with presently designed long-range ALCMs would be based at given fields. New conventional ALCMs would be distinguishable from them.

So far I have talked only about distinguishability. Another question is the number that would be attributed to each heavy bomber carrying

ALCMs. We said 10. We have said there would be various types of bombers, those carrying nuclear ALCMs, those in transition, and those carrying only conventionals. When we deploy the new ALCMs, both the planes and the conventional ALCMs will be different and distinguishable from nuclear ALCMs and their planes.

We can thus avoid inspection of the nuclear ALCMs altogether. One only counts the planes capable of carrying them. We will need some inspection on the conventional planes. There is a big disagreement between us and the Soviets concerning what different types of planes can carry and on how to count them, particularly on the ALCMs plus one for bombers carrying both ALCMs and gravity bombs and SRAMs.

Nitze: I have recently reviewed the record of the Reykjavik all-night session.⁷ It shows that I asked Ahkromeyev some questions that bear on the counting rule. I asked him what a bomber carrying only SRAMs and gravity bombs would count; he answered, one. And, what such a bomber also carrying one long-range ALCM would count; he answered, two.

I had assumed that certain of the long range bombers we plan to have in the future would be dedicated to stand-off bombing with long-range cruise missiles while others would be assigned to the role of penetrating the defenses. I had further assumed that the stand-off bomber would not need SRAMs and gravity bombs. Furthermore, I do not understand the sentence in your memorandum⁸ wherein you say that to accept the ALCMs plus one counting rule would cost us 1400 weapons. If we had 80 ALCM carriers they would count at 11 which equal 880. This would leave us room for 220 bombers not carrying ALCMs. Each one of those could carry a large number of SRAMs and gravity bombs.

Shultz interrupted to say he had a note saying that he should change the Thursday meeting of the Chiefs to Friday.⁹ Crowe agreed.

Crowe: By that time I will try to get something on why we can't get something done by May.

Shultz: Do we want to say it is too complicated and leave it there? It would be a bad public relations problem. Gorbachev is delighted with reporting that I had said the U.S. Navy won't permit inspection on its ships.

Crowe: Maybe the Navy will change its mind.

⁷ See Document 159.

⁸ Not further identified.

⁹ April 15.

Shultz: Let's not leave this meeting with impression we can't get there.

Crowe: Inspection protocol; no department agrees with what was tabled. Tagging is wrong. If not May 29, it won't be the end of the world.

Shultz: True.

291. Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Webster to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, April 13, 1988

Dear Lieutenant General Powell:

In a recent discussion² regarding the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the elements of a potential START treaty, Secretary Shultz urged me to provide any ideas which would increase our monitoring confidence levels. The enclosed paper is a discussion of National Technical Means, cooperative measures, and treaty language proposals which, if implemented, would provide the highest confidence levels for START monitoring. Most of these ideas have been proposed and debated at the working level. [*portion marking not declassified*]

I believe that it would helpful for senior policy officials to have their review, a consolidated summary of proposed START monitoring enhancements. I fully recognize that you must make the trade-offs between enhanced monitorability and the impact of these proposals on U.S. policies and programs. I would value any comments you might have on the attached paper. My representatives in the arms control policy process will continue to assist in these difficult deliberations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40201–40225. Confidential. Copied to Shultz, Weinberger, and Crowe. In a handwritten note of April 17, Powell wrote: "PSS, Put in system ASAP. Copy Back to me, pls. CP" (Ibid.)

² No minutes were found.

³ Webster signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, April 13, 1988

What would it take to monitor the
provisions of START with high confidence?

Introduction

This paper describes requirements for monitoring the fundamental components of a START agreement with high confidence.⁵ It examines monitoring measures solely in terms of monitoring criteria, and does not attempt to assess the tradeoffs that clearly must be weighed between monitoring confidence and such factors as cost, disadvantageous counting of US forces, the impact on US operational readiness, or the counter-intelligence threat. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The far greater monitoring problems of a START agreement, compared to the INF Treaty, arise from the fact that START would require the Intelligence Community to:

- Determine the *number* of Soviet weapon systems rather than to detect the *presence* of banned systems.
- Determine both the potential and actual loadings of Soviet weapon platforms.
- Determine the number of nondeployed missiles and their operational status, if such missiles are limited. [*portion marking not declassified*]

This paper explores measures that could improve our ability to monitor

- The number of mobile ICBMs.
- The number of RVs deployed on MIRVed ballistic missiles.
- Ballistic missile modernization. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We discuss four types of measures, all of which should be pursued in combination:

- Improvements to US national technical means (NTM) beyond the current baseline.
- Counting rules, definitions, and restrictions that could be included in the START treaty.
- Passive* cooperative measures, which involve reciprocal agreed-upon actions by which one side facilitates monitoring by the other.

⁴ Top Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]

⁵ [*Less than 2 lines not declassified*]

Such measures could include exchanges of data, assured access to flight-test data, or restrictions on the operational practices of each sides' strategic forces.

—*Active cooperative measures, which would supplement NTM collection through the physical presence of personnel or technical sensing equipment or both on the territory of the other party. For example, inspectors or sensors could be stationed at production facilities to acquire information on the number of weapons produced. [4½ lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]*

[24 paragraphs (84 lines) not declassified]

Illegal Production

To prevent *production of extra mobile missiles at declared missile production and final assembly facilities*, perimeter-portal monitoring of such facilities would be necessary.

To contend with possible *production at undeclared facilities*, unique tamperproof *tags should be placed on mobile missiles produced at declared facilities*, and the tag of each mobile missile that is flight-tested should be checked to prevent the undetected flight-testing of missiles produced at an *undeclared facility*. Such a measure would undermine Soviet confidence in covertly produced missiles. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Illegal Use of Nondeployed Missiles

START would allow both sides a substantial number of nondeployed mobile ICBMs in addition to those deployed, and there is a consequent risk that the Soviets could circumvent the treaty by maintaining some of these “nondeployed” missiles in an operational status, or by planning to augment their forces in a crisis. Even with stringent cooperative measures, it would be difficult to detect such cheating on a militarily significant scale.

—A treaty provision that required *all mobile ICBMs to be counted against START limits on deployed systems, regardless of whether the missiles were “deployed” or “nondeployed,”* would eliminate the opportunity to circumvent treaty limits with allowed nondeployed missiles. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Stockpiling Illegal Missiles Before a Treaty Goes Into Effect

The Soviets' SS-24 and SS-25 missile systems have been in production a relatively short time and large numbers have not yet been produced. Consequently, if the Soviets declared a total more than tens of missiles below Intelligence Community estimates, their number would not be credible.

—Therefore, an early exchange of data, followed by frequent updates, would provide much higher confidence that there were not a militarily significant number of unaccounted missiles at the time the treaty entered into effect. (This would eliminate the problem encoun-

tered in connection with the INF Treaty with SS-20 production numbers.)⁶

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Fallback Measures

[1 paragraph (less than 8 lines) not declassified]

Determining the number of RVs on MIRVed ballistic missiles

[7 lines not declassified]

Once the maximum potential for a given type of deployed missile is established, it would not be necessary to inspect individual deployed missiles of that type, since *all* deployed missiles of that type would be counted as carrying the maximum number. [portion marking not declassified]

If the accountable figure is established by *any criteria less than the maximum potential*, it would be necessary to inspect individual deployed missiles to ensure they are not deployed with more than the permitted number.

—Since inspection of *every* deployed missile does not appear to be a practical option, confidence in monitoring through inspection will depend on the frequency, randomness, and short notice permitted for “sampling” inspections.

[3 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified]

If the accountable figure for each type of missile is defined in the treaty as its maximum capacity, the breakout problem would be minimized.

Defining Maximum Capacity

Maximum capability could be defined as being the number of warheads of a given size that could fit in the payload area of a postboost vehicle (PBV).

Cooperative measures would be required to monitor such a provision with high confidence, including:

—On-site inspection to measure the payload area of PBVs. A sufficient number of test missiles, operational missiles, or both would have to be inspected on short notice for us to be confident we were measuring

⁶ [Less than 6 lines not declassified]

an actual PBV. We could not estimate the size of the payload area accurately enough with NTM to achieve high confidence.

—Prohibition on unusual PBV designs to prevent the Soviets from claiming the payload area was less than it really was.

—On-site inspection to measure the smallest RV that had been tested. Our uncertainty would be minimized if we were permitted to measure each RV that was flight-tested. Alternatively, if we were allowed to measure a few of the smallest RVs flight-tested on each type of missile, we could rely on NTM and short notice inspections of operational missiles to ensure that smaller ones were not tested or deployed. It would be important to prohibit deliberate distortion of the radar signatures of RVs if we had to rely on NTM to estimate RV shapes. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Such a counting rule would count some US and Soviet missile systems as carrying more RVs than the number each side intended to deploy. We assess, however, that such a rule would overcount US systems to about the same degree as Soviet ones and thus would appear to be equitable. A rule that overcounted some US and Soviet systems, however, could have some disadvantages:

—The 6,000 RV limit in START probably would have to be increased to 7,000 or so to compensate for some systems being counted with more RVs than was envisioned at the 1987 Washington Summit.

—The United States may be concerned that the Soviets would tend to deploy systems closer to the maximum RV loadings than would the United States. [*portion marking not declassified*]

An alternative, indirect approach (described below) for defining the potential RV loading of a MIRVed ballistic missile would be a rule based on potential throw weight; for example, dividing a portion of the potential throw weight by the weight of the lightest RV. [*portion marking not declassified*]

ICBM Modernization

A limit that attempted to literally prevent *all* modernization would have to prohibit changes in many different technical parameters, including things like specific impulse, and lengths and diameters of each missile stage—in addition to launch weight and throw weight.

[12 paragraphs (37 lines) not declassified.]

292. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, April 14, 1988, 1202Z

4167. Subject: START: Is it a treaty out there or is it a mirage?

1. There was considerable disappointment here at the lack of progress at the Washington Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. As a result, progress here in terms of treaty text has largely been confined to technical language fixes in the MOU and inspection protocol. These are important and require much effort, but do not generally involve the major substantive issues on which the Secretary would be engaged. The Soviets have not shown any particular reactions to the Washington meeting and are working along the same lines as we are. They have recently fallen off a number of previous positions in the JDT. Some of these are fairly important and long-held, such as "equal security" in the preamble. They have also within the past few days inserted the 7-year reductions period and the sublimit of 800 mobile ICBM launchers into the JDT.

Experts Group

2. The discussions in the Experts Group continue to be easily the most interesting of all the START FORA. The intelligence community is paying close attention to these, and I hope the policy agencies are as well. The Soviets have clearly accepted our challenge to address seriously the verification issues and to design a total verification package for mobile ICBMs and SLCMs (and, although we did not ask for it, for ALCMs as well). They are attempting to respond seriously to all our questions, some of which are quite intrusive. How long this discussion can be kept productive with essentially no input from our side is a serious question. When our guidance on those questions is prepared, it is important that it clearly address the extensive proposals the Soviets have made here, adding and subtracting as appropriate, and not appear to have ignored what has been happening in the Experts Group. Some of their ideas are beginning to be inserted into the JDT, but most can only be understood by a careful reading of our reports. You will soon receive an important cable which attempts to summarize all this information.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880749-0777. Secret; Immediate.

ALCM Counting

3. No one here understands the formulation we used in Washington—"distinguish between ALCM heavy bombers and systems not constrained by the treaty." There are several crucial distinctions required by the U.S. position. Some involve distinctions between items which count and items which do not count, while others involve distinctions among items all of which count, but in different ways: ALCM heavy bombers/non-ALCM heavy bombers, nuclear-armed ALCMs/conventionally-armed ALCMs, heavy bombers/non-heavy bombers and heavy bombers which, count/heavy bombers which do not count (because they carry no nuclear weapons).

4. I believe the Soviets will accept our basic approach of a negotiated ALCM counting rule, as opposed to "equipped for." However, they are not likely to accept a single number for all heavy bombers. The logical compromise, to which we should move promptly, is to negotiate an appropriate number of ALCMs for each separate type of ALCM heavy bomber. We could perhaps still achieve some discounting of U.S. ALCMs in this way, as well as keeping verification simple. Lebedev told me April 12 that the Soviets do not object in principle to the concept of attributing a number of ALCMs to heavy bombers, but only to the number we propose. Roslyakov confirmed this to me April 13 and also indicated some flexibility on ALCM range. I see no softening of their position on conventionally-armed ALCMs, however.

SLCMs

5. There is a ray of hope here. The new Soviet idea, being discussed in the Experts Group, of some sort of OSI at "arming" and "loading" points on land is not too different from an idea being discussed informally in State. I have tried to encourage them to consider their new idea as an alternative to their remote sensing and OSI on ships proposals, rather than merely a supplement. An accurate count of nuclear SLCMs could obviate the need to limit them to certain classes of ships and submarines or conduct intrusive inspecting on ships, both of which would negatively impact on our naval operations. Avoiding the specific association of nuclear SLCMs with certain classes of ships and submarines would also help us maintain our NCND policy. Since NCND is emerging as a major factor in our thinking, I suggest we tell them so—there is no indication here they are aware of its importance to us, although it has begun to appear in the press. In addition, we need to give them a clear answer on their remote sensing technique and the proposal for a demonstration. Being cute about this will be counterproductive and send misleading signals.

6. If the USG is convinced that the declaratory approach is the answer to the SLCM problem, I think we should put it on the table

and begin trying to sell it. I think it would be risky to save it for the endgame, where it could fail catastrophically. In fact, it might be logical to try the declaratory approach now and, if it fails, turn as a fallback to the idea of some sort of verification on land of the production and/or arming process. Another important reason for doing this is that even thoughtful Soviets who are looking for a solution to the SLCM problem believe that we intend to declare which vessels carry nuclear SLCMs. This is a reasonable conclusion for them to draw, given the very sparse discussion thus far of the declaratory approach, plus our heavy emphasis on data exchange.

Mobile ICBMs

7. We have gotten in the Experts Group both a wealth of information on the characteristics of Soviet mobile ICBMs and intelligent ideas on verification. One point which is emerging is that the regime they are describing is not intended to be generic, but is carefully tailored to their own two systems. In fact, they noted the other day that they had described the verification regime for the SS-24 rail-mobile and asked me what verification regime we have in mind for the rail-mobile Peacekeeper.

8. This system-specific approach is different than the traditional one, but does make some sense and could actually be more effective than a generic scheme which tries to apply identical requirements to diverse systems. The point is illustrated by considering the SS-25 vs. the mobile Midgetman. It would be stupid not to use the verification possibilities offered by the alleged 1-to-1 association between SS-25 tels and their garages just because Midgetman will not have such garages. It would be equally silly to think that the only way to use the garages to help in verification is to force similar structures to be built for Midgetman. I hope we will take those factors into account in designing the U.S. verification regime for mobiles. Specifically, we should use the unique features of Soviet systems and also design a package specific to our own mobile ICBMs, in addition to the general constraints which would apply to all mobile ICBMs.

Non-Deployed Systems

9. I hope the rumors are true that we are moving toward having numerical limits on only non-deployed ICBMs of types deployed in a mobile mode. The simplifications in the treaty which would follow would be substantial.

10. The other shoe has finally dropped on non-deployed ALCMs and SLCMs. Although it is not yet in the treaty text, Lebedev made clear in the Experts Group that the Soviet proposal is for a numerical limit on non-deployed ALCMs at each base, expressed as a percentage of the number of deployed ALCMs at that base. The proposal for non-

deployed SLCMs is less specific, but also expressed as a percentage of deployed missiles.

11. A minor issue which is becoming annoying here concerns non-deployed heavy bombers. Why don't we simply allow each side a small number (10–20?) of "non-deployed" heavy bombers to be located at test facilities, educational establishments, etc.? Both sides would understand, and neither would care, that these could not be distinguished, as far as capability is concerned, from "deployed" models. I should think the Air Force would be delighted at the prospect.

12. Thus a sensible grand compromise on all the issues related to non-deployed systems is possible:

—The U.S. drops its numerical limit on non-deployed SLBMs and non-deployed ICBMs associated with fixed launchers (the geographical and the other collateral constraints would remain). The U.S. accepts a small allowance for non-deployed heavy bombers.

—The Soviets drop their constraints on non-deployed SLCMs and non-deployed heavy bomber armament.

13. The Soviet idea of an overall limit on ICBMs and SLBMs which does not distinguish between deployed and non-deployed missiles remains in play here at an informal level and Obukhov wants Kryuchkov and me to continue exploring it (see Geneva 3187).² Hanmer and Sackett continue to see merit in the idea and you may get some sort of message from the delegation on the subject soon. I explained the idea in some detail in my last message (Geneva 2711).³ If we are unable to make the simplifying compromise suggested above, then I believe this Obukhov/Kryuchkov idea should be considered.

Phasing of Resolutions

14. The Soviets have now proposed that reductions be carried out in two phases of 3½ years each. Unfortunately, they apparently have only an intermediate ceiling in SNDVs and this is obtained by equal percentage reductions from existing levels. I think we can get them to add intermediate ceilings on ballistic missile warheads, heavy ICBMs, etc., but only if Washington provides us a U.S. schedule of reduction counter the Soviet proposal. I would not be [garble] to that the agreed intermediate levels will all be equal nor do I think we need to insist

² In telegram 3187 from NST Geneva, March 21, the Delegation transmitted a memorandum of conversation for Ifft's March 17 meeting with Kryuchkov. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880241-0674)

³ In telegram 2711 from NST Geneva, March 9, Ifft reported on the progress of the START negotiations at the halfway point between the Washington and Moscow Summits. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880205-0058)

on this. Sensible reductions which drop more or less in a straight line over seven years, with a few intermediate points, should be sufficient.

Suspect Site Inspections

15. This is a tough political issue, but the Soviets are showing interest in getting it resolved. Informally, they say they hope we can avoid a game of chicken on this problem as occurred in INF. It would be good if we could reach agreement in principle on the May, since the Soviets seem ready to deal.

Armand Hammer Comments

16. Roslyakov told me he and Obukhov had dinner April 10 with Armand Hammer, who was on one of his Washington–Moscow shuttles. Hammer said that he had spoken with the President, who seemed very calm and in command. He contrasted this attitude with Gorbachev, whom he described as a “raging bull.” The President told Hammer that he did not want to rock the boat and upset the right while INF ratification is pending. However once INF ratification is completed, a big push would be made on START.

Follow Up to High Level Meetings

17. There has often been confusion here between ourselves and the Soviets, as well as some internal confusion, after a Shultz–Shevardnadze meeting. This has three aspects:

- Are new proposals or ideas floated at the high level also supposed to be tabled in Geneva?
- Are responses to such proposals and ideas supposed to be made by the other side in Geneva?
- Are U.S. talking points used by the experts also available for our use in Geneva?

I would think that, in general, the answer to all three questions should be “yes,” but there may well be things which one or both sides wish to keep in a special channel. In any case, two procedures would be most helpful:

- Before ending a high-level discussion, get a clear understanding with the Soviets what follow-up each side will make in Geneva and what will be kept away from Geneva.
- Promptly after the meeting, send us (back channel if necessary) an update of our instructions which reflects what has occurred (not just a MEMCON), so that we know how best to take account of the new situation and support the direction in which Washington is moving.

Schedule

18. Now that it is obvious that there will not be a treaty in May, the question which is assuming greater importance here than ALCMs,

SLCMs and mobiles combined is the schedule issue. Probably the only point on which agreement would be found among all four delegations (START and D&S, U.S. and Soviet) is that there should be a civilized recess after the summit. Appeals to humanitarian considerations are generally ineffective, although it should be noted that people came here in January having arranged their lives under the assumption that the negotiations would end one way or the other in late May.

19. The usual objection to a recess is that it would slow down the negotiations. Most people here believe the opposite is the case. If major breakthroughs are not made at the summit, our efforts here this summer will be rather fruitless. If such breakthroughs are made, and if they have the usual delphic character, a period in which both sides sort out in capitals what these breakthroughs mean and how to reflect them in treaty language would expedite progress. In addition, experience shows that new guidance is best prepared when the entire U.S. delegation is in Washington, takes the lead in drafting, and then can coordinate on the spot with the interagency apparatus. For all these reasons, most people here believe we should recess at or just after the summit and reconvene after the 4th of July weekend for the final push.

Hammer

293. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, April 15, 1988, 7:30–9:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Secretary Shultz and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN
General Robert T. Herres, USAF
General Carl Vuono, USA
Admiral A. Carl Troust, USN
General Alfred M. Gray, USMC
General Monroe Hatch, USAF
Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Breakfast, April 15, 1988 (2). Secret. Brackets are in the original.

General Gordon Fornell, USAF
Admiral Thomas Fox, USN
Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN
Colonel Michael Wheeler, USAF
Mr. Robert Joseph

Secretary of State Shultz
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Ambassador Allen Holmes
General William Burns

Judge William Webster
General Colin Powell, USA
Colonel Robert Linhard, USAF

(The main principals—Shultz, Powell, Crowe, Carlucci, Webster—had a private meeting from 7:30–8:00 a.m. The regular meeting started at 8:00 a.m. in the CJCS Dining Room.)

Minutes

Admiral Crowe: After the session we had on Monday,² Mr. Secretary, we've been working very hard on the tasking you had given us, and we are ready to address the questions that you had asked us to address.

—Before we can agree “in principle” on any of the areas that are of concern to us, we need to make sure that we agree internally on detail. This is essential.

—The idea of a “test range in space” is a primary example. We need a lot more work before we can move forward on something like that.

—There's no way we can reach a START Treaty by May, that is, a Treaty that is verifiable and ratifiable.

Secretary Shultz: So it is your military judgment that there is no chance for a START agreement during that timeframe?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, that's a corporate position of the Chiefs. It's a matter of not being able to do the military assessments needed and have confidence in them within that time.

Secretary Shultz: I want to underscore, then, you're telling me that's your military judgment, and it's a matter of reality.

—This leads, of course, to a political concern that we not be portrayed as the country that is not prepared to move to a stabilizing arms control agreement. We must stay on the high ground on this issue.

² April 11. See Document 290.

—I told Shevardnadze that we were prepared to work as hard as possible, but there was just a very, very hard set of issues and, for example, that we can't see any way of getting a ratifiable SLCM solution by May.

Secretary Carlucci: Once again, George, the Chiefs are saying there's simply not time for them to make the military judgments that have to be made to support such a Treaty.

General Powell: After April, it will be clear to all concerned that we're in this situation. I think many will sigh a very deep sigh of relief with respect to that situation.

Secretary Shultz: I'm not sure of that. I think we may have a battle in Europe.

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we need to consider this problem and think about how we limit public affairs damage. However, people are working this problem (i.e., of a START Treaty) very hard, and the people who are working this problem are overextended and almost dead.

What we need to do, perhaps, is to refocus on a few critical issues first. We should focus our best talents on them and resolve them so that we can move forward on a sound basis.

Secretary Shultz: Yes, that's important. We need to build as a constructive a base for the next Administration as we can.

Admiral Troust: You understand, Mr. Secretary, we really are not stonewalling this. It's just a matter of being too hard.

[At this point, the Chairman physically poled each of the Service Chiefs, one at a time, and had them verify that that was a unified Chiefs position, and they all did.]

[Admiral Crowe then had his staff pass out a paper³ that summarized the GRIP papers⁴ so that they could be used as a basis of discussion.]

Admiral Crowe: Here's a paper that in varying levels of detail is simply a listing of the issues raised in the GRIP papers. What we'd like to do is to walk through them issue by issue.

—From our point of view, it's okay to drop the 3300, but we should, at least, resolve that issue.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, OSD disagrees.

³ The undated JCS paper listing issues raised in the GRIP paper is in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Breakfast, April 15, 1988 (2).

⁴ Not found.

General Hatch: (Vice Chief of the Air Force) We should be able to trade it (dropping 3300) for the Soviets dropping their 1100 sublimit on bomber weapons.

Secretary Shultz: We shouldn't trade anything to get them to drop the 1100. That 1100 number simply must go.

Secretary Carlucci: The problem with dropping the 3300 is we're going to generate a problem on the Hill. Ron Lehman knows all about this, and I wish he were here to explain it.

Secretary Shultz: You know I have authority to move on this area. I've had it for a very long time. My authority is vested in the mind of the gentleman sitting next to me, and General Powell can confirm this.

General Powell: Yes, that's exactly right.

Secretary Carlucci: But what would we trade it for?

General Powell: Whatever we can get.

Ambassador Rowny: I'm very opposed to this. There are two things that we need to be able to say to establish the fact that after 50% reductions, we'll still establish a stable regime: the first is restriction on heavies; the second is the tightest limitations on ICBMs.

Akhromeyev said that he intended not to go beyond 3300. We should press for this. We can get it. Don't throw in on this now.

Secretary Shultz: I agree, Ed. That's, of course, where we are.

Admiral Crowe: We don't oppose lifting the ban on modernization on heavy ICBMs. But that needs to be symmetrical.

Secretary Shultz: Of course, this means that we let them go and obtain for us a right that we know we aren't going to exercise.

Admiral Crowe: That's right. But another consideration is we must protect modernization in other areas.

Secretary Carlucci: But you're saying we want to let them modernize. I thought we had most of this agreed but that we needed some constraints on modernization.

Ambassador Rowny: I don't agree. Why let them modernize? This doesn't add to stability. It's destabilizing. I think we ought to hang tough on this.

Admiral Crowe: Well, we're not there at all on mobiles.

Secretary Shultz: I thought you had told me early in the week that this area was okay.

Admiral Crowe: No, my staff says that we are rapidly regressing in this area. And I don't think we can discuss *any* number until we get the verification worked out.

Secretary Shultz: Shevardnadze talked to me about this over in Geneva.⁵

—He reminded me that he gave us some number (i.e., 800 launchers) for mobiles at the last meeting.

—I explained to him that the number they gave us was on launchers and didn't mean anything. The number was so high it could be completely contained in any agreement. Shevardnadze said that we will get a number based on warheads in Moscow.

Secretary Carlucci: We can't do very much here unless we have Congressional agreement. And until we do, we can't really fall off our ban of mobiles.

Secretary Shultz: We've worked ourselves into a totally inconsistent posture.

—The problem is that we really don't want MIRVed mobile ICBMs for verification reasons. If we miss a few MIRVed launchers, we miss an awful lot of warheads. Also, we all think that single RVs are better not only for verification, but also form a much better basis for stability.

—I recognize the cost arguments.

—However, our problem is that the *only* mobile ICBM we can conceive carries 10 RVs.

General Hatch: The rail garrison concepts that we have are fairly well developed. Their verification scheme is fairly well developed, and it looks fairly good for verification.

General Herres: Any of these garrison concepts that we've got look good for verification, and we ought to apply them to the road mobiles too.

Admiral Crowe: I think the Soviets are ready to come to us on this.

Secretary Shultz: I agree, they are ready to work. The problem is that we're in disarray, both on our programs and budgets.

General Herres: Many in Congress claim they favor the 1-RV mobile missile, but those who do that have no concern whatsoever with the operational realities of such a system.

Secretary Carlucci: When we talk about concepts of verification and stability, we're letting arms control concerns drive national security. The President said we would never do that.

General Hatch: We're working concepts for both rail and road mobile ICBMs, and I felt we were making progress. We will be able to solve this, but we need more time.

⁵ Shultz met with Shevardnadze in Geneva on April 14. The memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relation*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 142.

Admiral Crowe: The issue is certainly complicated.

—We can work it out.

—We need time to let the solution evolve and we get comfortable with it.

—We can't continually simply send disagreements over to Colin Powell and ask him to pick one of the options.

—Don't go for this in April, and don't go for an exploration of this area in April. Finally, you can't put a number down for the US-preferred sublimit on mobile ICBM RVs until we understand the verification.

Secretary Carlucci: I suggest that maybe Shultz, Crowe, and myself go up and sit down with the Congressional leaders and talk about the relationship between the mobile ICBMs we have available, the Defense program, and arms control.

Admiral Crowe: I think that's a very good idea.

Secretary Taft: Don't go up and just talk to the leadership; talk to the followership too.

Admiral Crowe: The Congress really doesn't know a lot about the impact on START of their maneuverings on this mobile issue.

Secretary Carlucci: The problem is that some really do, and they are using it for the wrong purposes.

Admiral Crowe: Once again, what we need is to be consistent, and we need to make sure we have all the details worked out.

Let's move to ALCMs. The Chiefs have been consistent on one other point. We cannot move to 1,000 km range on ALCMs, or below 1500, until we have the distinguishability, the counting rule, and the verification worked out.

General Hatch: I think we made a lot progress here, but we're just not quite there.

Admiral Crowe: I understand we have problems on the distinguishability paper.⁶

Admiral Fox: Yes, Sir, there are three options in the paper now.

General Powell: If we get the other conditions though, you don't have a problem with 1,000 range cutoff?

Admiral Crowe: That's exactly right. It's just a matter of order. We have to have the other pieces first.

—The other elements basically of the ALCM package are okay for us. I don't know about for others.

—We must protect the conventional options, especially in light of all the debate on the Hill about futures.

⁶ Not found.

—General Herres, I didn't talk to you since yesterday. I'm glad you've survived alive. How did it go?

General Herres: It went okay overall, but not with Quayle, and we're not going to be able to make much progress with Danny. They may wind up asking for some confirmation from the Soviets in writing. (General Herres did not mention that some in the Senate would call for a Senate Select Intelligence Committee Hearings on this general subject.)

Secretary Shultz: I did raise this issue after listening to the Senators with Shevardnadze.

—The Senators basically told me don't raise this with the Soviets until the Senate had a chance to work all this out; however, in discussing it with my Cabinet colleagues, they encouraged me to go ahead and contact the Soviets. I guess I know who I work for. I raised this and went through the Talking Points that we had cleared. Obukov was there. He looked scared as a ghost when he found himself being quoted by the US Government. Shevardnadze and the rest of them, I would say, were totally mystified. They said "where is the problem—we thought we agreed that for any missile in the range, it would be covered if it carried a weapon. Therefore, we don't understand the problem."

—I explained the issue to them. I answered that there are some people who think there is ambiguity here and probably do not like that answer and, therefore, they are forcing us to get confirmation that we share this understanding. Shevardnadze said he didn't see any problem at all, but he will check it out and get back to us. At the same time, I can understand why he would do that. I would probably do the same if I received, out of the blue, this type of a request from the Soviet Union. They're not sure that they're not being tricked.

Admiral Crowe: It is comforting for us to think that they think we're as smart as that.

General Powell: This is a big issue for Senator Byrd.

Secretary Shultz: We'll get a Memcon on all this. I don't think we should try for a letter. If we signal that we need a letter, we surrender some negotiating leverage, and we may wind up paying for it.

—I understand that we have no issue on most of the ALCM things.

—We do need a way of distinguishing between ALCMs that are covered, or bombers that are covered, and those that are not.

—I understand the ALCM-counting rule: an ALCM-Heavy Bomber counts 10, even if it carries some gravity bombs or SRAM.

—I think that this is almost unnecessary statement. Once we identify an aircraft as a 10-counter, it's going to count 10 if it's totally empty. So why should we be arguing about whether there's a gravity bomb or SRAM involved.

General Herres: The tricky part is going to be convincing them that the bombers that are not ALCM carriers, and not START counters, are such.

Admiral Crowe: We still need to make sure the detail on distinguishing is done right, and it's my understanding that there's an interagency controversy about the counting rule.

—I propose we move on to SLCM.

Admiral Troust: I recognize that there was agreement somewhat at Reykjavik and an agreement in December that we would find a solution to Soviet concerns about SLCMs, but we (the Chiefs) sure don't like this.

—The Soviets are really showing us that they fear the deterrent value of TLAM-N. There are essentially 200 platforms that could carry SLCMs; half of them surface and half of them submarines.

—We recognize the significant problem that Soviet SLCM poses against us too.

—But we must consider requirements and signals in a post-INF environment. Therefore, our position ought to be we avoid *any* constraint we can because we can't verify this stuff.

—We talked about declaratory policies and things like that. They can certainly check all this out with the Congressional Record. I would love to withdraw from this entire area, but I guess we can't.

Admiral Crowe: We also have a problem with the SLCM experiment. I think all agree we shouldn't do this.

Secretary Shultz: I think also we are all agreed.

Secretary Carlucci: Yeah, I guess I agree too, but we need to figure how to handle the public relations aspects of our rejection.

Secretary Shultz: Yes, it's his PR problem because anything that has to do with SLCM has immense appeal for the Nordic countries and the Canadians.

Secretary Carlucci: I understand that there's a draft⁷ out of the language that could be used for a declaratory statement.

Colonel Linhard: That's true. An LDX came out late last night from the Department of State, and it will be looked at over the days. After the conversation between the SecState and CJCS on Monday, we understood that the Secretary expressed an interest in seeing if we could agree on what a declaratory statement might look like, so I asked Timbie to go ahead and circulate such a statement to the Support Group. And we have *just* received the draft. There's been no conversation; and I don't think it's appropriate, since none of principals here, or the

⁷ Not found.

staff, has had a chance to look at it, to comment on that, except for the fact that it's going to be staffed over the weekend. The idea was to see if we could understand what a declaratory would look like *before* the Secretary and General Powell left for Moscow.

Admiral Crowe: Okay, I think that we can find a declaratory approach that is acceptable. If asked for a number, I think the number ought to probably be about 1500; but I will not be sure how sound this number is until we get a good chance to look at it.

Secretary Shultz: There has to be some place to go in START. They proposed a number of 400 SLCMs. How does all this work?

Admiral Troust: Of course, we ought to watch this closely. They will want platform limitations, and they will want to exclude a lot of other of their missiles that are at sea.

Secretary Shultz: I think we might want to come back to this subject and start avoiding hanging ourselves out too far on simply saying that SLCM limits are not verifiable. As we talked about last time, what we need to say is that they are not verifiable under conditions of acceptable intrusiveness.

Ambassador Rowny: Let me make sure I understand this. Is 1500 the bottom line?

Admiral Troust: I don't know how to answer that—1500 is basically the summation of the stated requirements for the CINCs, plus 15%.

Ambassador Rowny: I understand, but what I'm asking you is Secretary Shultz identified a 400 number, you identified a 1500 number—obviously, the 1500 number could be considered a starting point. Could you accept 1000? Because if you really wanted 1500, you ought to go higher.

Admiral Troust: I could accept, probably, 1000, but you have understand our program now is more like 800. And we think we need more, but I'm not sure exactly how much more. The 1500 is the compilation of the CINCs plus 15%.

Ambassador Kampelman: What about the Soviet idea of verification by checking on choke points on land?

Admiral Troust: We can't do that because of the geographic diversity of the SLCM program.

Secretary Shultz: What we need to do is we need to try to position ourselves as the Soviets have done.

—The Soviets have positioned themselves so they'll have a complete package on the table, and then they will be in a position to challenge us for not being ready.

—For example, their SLCM regime looks *very* powerful to a layman.

—What I'm trying to do now is to consider how to shift from thinking about trying to get an agreement to thinking about how to

get the USG into a position that protects the President from any charge that they're ready and we're not. Let's face it, folks, we don't have positions on everything.

—I'm concerned that it's going to be hard for us to come out of this looking good.

—We need to do a lot more on each of these areas, and each is a big problem. As you look at the remainder of issues on the page here, I'm not sure we need to discuss them. Our problem is we don't have things we are in favor of; we've got things that we are afraid of. This is not a good posture. The public here and in Europe love the INF Treaty, and they love the idea of arms control.

—We need to get ourselves into the posture of having a "forward thrust on a sound basis."

Admiral Crowe: Well, you know, Mr. Secretary, the Commandant, General Gray, says his problem is that it's hard to explain our position to the good ole boys down at the 7-11.

Admiral Troust: Maybe we can play on the basic mistrust all good Americans have of the Soviets. We ought make the point that we're not going to get an agreement because they're not ready to give the store just to get an agreement.

Secretary Shultz: Well, I agree we could do that. We did that on SDI. Our problem is we're not in that posture now, and we have to move around a lot of furniture to get there.

Admiral Crowe: You got to remember the country's different inside and outside the Beltway.

General Gray: There's a difference between a zero-zero treaty and what we're doing in START.

—After START, both sides will still have enough nuclear weapons to end mankind or alter it significantly, and we have to take extreme care in this.

—By the way, with respect to the Soviet SLCM position, although it's all on the table, it's all unacceptable.

Secretary Shultz: I'm not arguing the case of the Soviet position. I'm worried about the case from a public diplomacy point of view. The Soviets do care about public affairs, and they're making points on this.

General Gray: I think we can sell our position too.

Secretary Shultz: I agree, once we find a position to sell.

—Can we point to any increment of progress in START since the December Summit?

Admiral Troust: Well, we have wide areas of agreement, but we need to resolve a lot of details.

Secretary Carlucci: We've reversed the process on INF. The verification and data issues are up front. This is not a write-off—I mean we're doing something here.

Secretary Shultz: Well, I agree that we've had *some* progress. There's some push on verification, and we've made some progress there.

Admiral Crowe: We have made progress, and we understand the issues a hell of a lot better.

Secretary Shultz: Okay, in April, can we focus on getting the ALCM-counting rule, on dropping the 1100 sublimit, and on keeping or doing what we have to do on the 3300? In other words, try to get these numbers in place so that the focus for the April Ministerial in START is to complete the circle on numbers.

Admiral Crowe: After that, we really need to focus on mobiles and ALCMs by the Summit. We need to get back to them by the Summit, but we have to apply a distinct focus on those two subjects.

General Powell: Okay, then I understand that we can press on the counting rule, the 1100, and the 3300.

General Herres: You can do everything on the list except the distinguishing because I don't think that's going to be ready.

Admiral Crowe: That's right. We support all on the list but the distinguishing between one type of ALCM and another.

General Powell: This should be enough for a major step forward. (At this point Gordy Fornell called me down the table and said there's new there, is there. And I answered him back to let it drop, and he signalled in an appropriate manner.)

Secretary Shultz: Let's turn to Defense and Space, if we could.

Admiral Crowe: The sensors in space idea, in principle, is okay. I'd like a little more detail, but we think that's alright. I can't see how any one can object to that. It makes sense. On the test range in space idea, however, the debate is absolutely vigorous. The DCI has *very* strong views. Director Webster, maybe you'd like to make some points.

Judge Webster: This does present problems for us, but I'm not prepared to make any comments on this at this point.

Secretary Shultz: Well, let me see if I understand this. This idea of the test range was proposed by Abrahamson, and what we'd have is an agreed area in space.

—If you are going to test, you would identify in that broader, big area where the test activity is going to be. At the end of the test, you may pick another area wherein the broader area you're going to test the next time. Isn't this about right?

Ambassador Rowny: No, I believe that the test range in space idea should just be thought as predictability. All we should do is to tell

them where we want to test, and that's about it. We shouldn't negotiate where those areas are, and I share Crowe's view that this is all complex right now.

General Gray: My problem right now with all our proposals in the predictability area is our predictability basically reduces to "why don't you come on and observe what we're doing," and their ideas focus on verification.

Secretary Shultz: All I want is some kind of proposal here. Is there something here?

General Herres: This is a real problem. Even at the concept stage, the issue is too complex, and we could get into trouble. We need to be very careful. We're going to be bound by what we're permitted to do. I think we're much closer on letting space-based sensors off the hook. The test range, however, has a different set of problems. It could be implemented in many ways (e.g., limits on numbers, limits on inclinations of orbits, etc.). But we need more time to study this.

—The problem in the test range area is if we propose the concept, then there is no solution, and we find ourselves in a box canyon with the Indians with the opening.

Ambassador Kampelman: Why is there an asterisk then on the chart that shows we shouldn't raise sensors in space?

General Herres: I don't think there's any problem concentrating on sensors. We ought to make sure we work the language as precisely as we can before we go.

General Powell: Okay, I understand the test range is out for this meeting; sensors are okay.

Admiral Crowe: I know most of this is not very comforting, but that's the reality of it.

General Powell: I would like to call the attention to all the Cabinet principals that there will be a memo out this morning on Canadian SSNs. We'll get your vote, and then we're going to move on the action. So please give some focus to this.

The meeting broke up at about 9:20 a.m.

294. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 15, 1988, 11–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Preparations for the Moscow Ministerial

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

The Vice President's Office
Craig Fuller

State
Secretary George P. Shultz
Assistant Secretary Rozanne

Ridgway
Max Kampelman
Paul Nitze
Edward Rowny

Treasury
Secretary James Baker

Defense
Secretary Frank Carlucci
Robert G. Joseph

Justice
Attorney General Edwin Meese

Energy
William F. Martin

CIA
Director William Webster
Robert Gates

JCS
Admiral William Crowe
VADM Jonathan Howe
ACDA
Director MG William Burns

OSTP
Director William Graham

White House
Howard Baker
Kenneth Duberstein
Colin Powell
Marlin Fitzwater
John Negroponte

NSC
Nelson C. Ledsky
Robert Linhard

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Then *Secretary Shultz* turned to START and Defense and Space. He noted that the going here was getting very difficult. There were many outstanding issues, and all of them hard. Our problem now was to figure out what to focus on in this environment. It looked like we could focus on the ALCM-counting rule, and on mobiles. There also was the hope to be able to negotiate something to help on SDI deployment, but our discussion this morning was quite discouraging. The Secretary

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records: NSPG 184. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The full minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 143.

concluded his summary by emphasizing that we need to work on this some more, and turned the meeting over to Colin Powell.

General Powell stressed that, with respect to START, we had three general parts of the problem which we have to worry about. The first part involved those things that we have agreed from the Washington Summit. This included the 6000 limit on overall weapons, the 1600 limit on SNDVs, and the 4900 limit on ICBMs and SLBMs. These issues were basically resolved; we have to work out the details associated with them. The second part involved issues on which the U.S. Government had a view, but where we need to gain Soviet agreement. Examples of these were 3300 limit on ICBMs, agreement on asymmetry on handling the modernization of heavy ICBMs, an ALCM-counting rule that counts ALCM heavy bombers as 10, basic information on the range bans for ALCMs, and the like. These we needed to negotiate with the Soviets and gain their agreement.

The problems in the third basket were the most difficult. These were ones on which we did not have U.S. internal agreement. One category of these was mobiles. Mobiles were especially difficult for two reasons. First, the Congress had not been clear on our own position and on what is likely to be given Congressional funding. Therefore, it was exceptionally hard to make military judgments supporting arms control in the absence of information about your own program. This is an extremely difficult issue to resolve in Washington.

Another issue, continued *General Powell*, associated with mobiles was verification. The verification regime was extremely hard to develop because we were breaking complex new ground. We're struggling here, but working. The second major cluster of problems was on verification itself. The issue of detailed verification was very, very tricky. For example, we still had to resolve the fundamentals with respect to suspect-site inspections, perimeter-portal monitoring, tagging, and limits on non-deployed missiles. The third cluster had to do with SLCMs. *General Powell* said he was not encouraged that we could solve this problem, especially the verification on SLCMs, anytime soon or before the Summit.

Secretary Shultz informed the President that he had told Shevardnadze it's not going to be possible, in his opinion, to resolve the verification questions satisfactorily before the Summit. There was just too much verification work to be done. Therefore, unless there was a breakthrough in the interim, Secretary Shultz said, that SLCMs were not going to be ready, and also that we would not have closure by the Summit on mobiles. There was a possibility that we would be able to handle the ALCM issue and the heavy ICBM issue, and in addition, we may have to address some secondary issues like BACKFIRE and the like.

General Powell remarked that he would be curious as to whether Secretary Carlucci or the Chairman agreed with all this before moving forward and to talk about Defense and Space. Both *Secretary Carlucci* and *Admiral Crowe* responded that they were in complete agreement with Secretary Shultz's statements. *Judge Webster* also said he had nothing to add.

General Powell next mentioned that the Defense and Space situation was largely the way the Secretary of State had outlined it. We told the Soviets at the last meeting that we needed to reduce ambiguity in this area. To do so, we suggested letting sensors "run free," and we may be close to being able to do something in this area. We're certainly close to being able to articulate our position without hesitation in this area.

General Powell added that the other idea that we've had was loosely called "test range in space." We were examining this now. He then explained to the President that it was like a column of air that's identified as a test range, and each side confines its systems to that column in such a manner as to show that it is not a threat to anyone. Unfortunately, we needed more study of how to explain this, how to define it precisely, and what the implications were. He then turned to Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe to ask them if this were correct. *Secretary Carlucci* responded that this was exactly right. *Admiral Crowe* addressed his remarks to the President and reiterated that this was a potentially good idea. We were studying it, but there were implications for *all* of our space programs. Therefore, it could not move further without making sure we've taken an absolutely careful look.

General Powell then turned to the topic of the upcoming Summit, and said we would be able to demonstrate that we've made progress between the Washington Summit and the Moscow Summit. We also needed to position ourselves so that after the Summit there would be a legacy for future actions. And, finally, when we're done, if nothing else, that there would be left a firm foundation for the President's successor so that he could pick up the baton and run with it without missing a beat. We also had to work on the public dimension so that it would be clear to all concerned that we were not holding back, but that we were trying to get a good foundation. As the President has said in the past, it's important that we do it right, not necessarily that we do it fast. Everyone was working very, very hard. As Admiral Crowe had said often, it was not a matter of applying resources; we just needed time for the resources to produce and gather our position together.

The President summed up the meeting by saying that the discussion confirmed that we were on the right track. He concluded by saying that we need to keep pressure on Moscow for improved performance

on human rights and constructive moves on regional conflicts. The meeting then shifted to a discussion of Persian Gulf issues.

295. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 18, 1988, 1253Z

9725. Subject: Soviets lowering sights from goal of signing treaty at Moscow summit.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

Summary

2. With the Moscow summit approaching and significant unresolved issues remaining at the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviets have begun to back away publically from the goal of having a START treaty (accompanied by an accord on the ABM Treaty) ready to sign when the President travels to the USSR. Soviet leaders are clearly lowering their sights and no longer repeating the earlier hope that a agreement will be ready by the summit.

3. Soviet MFA and institute arms control experts are paralleling this shift in private, evincing little belief that a treaty can be finished in time. They note, however, that NST work can continue after the summit and that the meeting could give the talks a useful impetus. Their comments—plus relatively upbeat Soviet public treatment of the prospects for eventually achieving an accord—suggest the Soviets will be prepared to carry on in Geneva through the summer and into the fall.

4. Motives for the shift in the Soviet public stance likely include: the recognition that simply too much work remains to be done to conclude a treaty by the end of May, a desire not to fuel a Soviet domestic expectation that will not be fulfilled, and a desire not to appear overeager for an agreement.

End summary

Soviet Public Statements—Lowering Their Sights

5. The Washington Summit Joint Statement set down the objective of concluding a START treaty (presumably to be accompanied by an

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880330-0236. Confidential; Priority. Also sent Priority to Moscow Political Collective and Leningrad.

accord on Defense and Space) by the Moscow summit. This objective was espoused by senior Soviet leaders—including Gorbachev—in the aftermath of the December meeting and the first months of 1988. One of the most recent examples was the notes of the March 31 Politburo meeting which, in the discussion of the March ministerial, said in part:

“The firm intention of the Soviet side to continue intensive work toward the earliest working out of a set of documents on strategic offensive arms and ABM, so that they could as far as possible be ready for signing during the course of the Soviet-American summit from 29 May to 2 June, was confirmed.

6. Subsequent Soviet leadership statements on the subject have shown a marked lowering of the public goal. For example, in his April 11 dinner speech for visiting Czech President Husak, Gromyko noted that the question of a fifty percent strategic offensive arms reduction (conditioned on ABM Treaty observance) was in the center of world attention, and added:

“It would be hoped that the visit of the USA president to the Soviet Union planned for the end of May-beginning of June will be marked by progress in this direction.”

7. When addressing the Soviet-American joint commercial commission on April 13, Gorbachev stated that the Soviets “were convinced that this goal (a fifty percent strategic arms cut) was achievable in the very near future” if the sides were governed by the principled approach agreed upon at earlier summits. Gorbachev avoided, however, defining a time line for conclusion of a treaty, and did not relate this goal to the upcoming summit.

Soviet Arms Control Experts—A Parallel Shift

8. This public lowering of sights for the summit has been paralleled by Soviet arms control experts in private. MFA arms control experts—while making a pro forma endorsement of the possibility to conclude a treaty by the summit—evinced little faith in the possibility to do so.

But keep working after the summit

9. In recent discussions, MFA USA desk officers Palazhchenko and Berdennikov and Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Officer Kortunov looked to continuing work in Geneva after the Moscow summit, saying that the Soviets would be ready to continue intense efforts toward conclusion of a START treaty and an accord on the ABM Treaty. Kortunov commented that past summits had given the negotiations valuable impulses and instructions, and that this could also be the case with the Moscow meeting.

10. In a recent discussion with Emboff, USA and Canada Institute Political-Military Section Head Vasil'yev stated plainly that he did not

believe a treaty was doable by the summit. But he also saw the possibility that the President and General Secretary would give the negotiators new instructions that would be the basis for continued work in the summer.

11. The Soviet experts with whom we have been speaking seem to see the question as one of when more than “if.” Palazhchenko felt the question of a treaty was merely one of pace, i.e. how quickly it would be finished. Similarly, Vasil’yev professed himself to be very optimistic that progress could be made at the Moscow summit and that a START agreement would eventually be concluded.

12. What we hear from these experts—combined with the relatively upbeat public treatment of the NST talks and prospects for progress—suggests that the Soviets do not see the Moscow summit as any kind of deadline. No one is saying publicly that, if the summit does not produce an agreement, the Soviets should write off this administration and wait for the next. Quite the contrary, the Soviets appear to be planning to continue work after the summit.

13. This seems to be a sensible policy from Gorbachev’s point of view. If he wants an agreement (and we believe he does, albeit on certain terms), a summer-fall hiatus in the negotiations would appear to do him little good. And the Soviets have noticed (and some have pointed out) the possibility suggested by the President of one more summit post-Moscow to conclude a START treaty.

Motives for Lowering their Sights

14. There are likely several motives that have led the Soviets to lower their sights for NST at the Moscow summit:

—First, they likely realize that too much work remains on the table to have a treaty (or two treaties) wrapped up in six weeks time.

—Second, Gorbachev probably does not want to raise domestic expectations for a treaty in a way that would make the summit (which comes on the eve of an extraordinary Party Conference that is very important to him) appear to be a failure, particularly as compared to Washington.

—Third, the Soviets likely do not want to put themselves in a position of appearing overeager, especially as they have interpreted some of Washington’s recent commentary on NST as trying to dampen down U.S. expectations.

15. Leningrad minimize considered.

Matlock

296. Editorial Note

On April 20, 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz traveled to Helsinki, where he met with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto. The next morning, he flew to Moscow, where he met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze from 9:50 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. to discuss President Ronald Reagan's upcoming visit to Moscow to meet with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Shevardnadze stated that "the Secretary's visit assumed acute importance in the context of seizing the opportunity provided by the upcoming summit to conclude an agreement on reducing strategic arsenal by fifty percent, and to resolve certain other problems." "If the ministers reached the conclusion that no START agreement would be possible by the summit," Shevardnadze went on to say, "they would have to explain why." Shultz responded by thanking Shevardnadze for his comments, and calling on bilateral working groups to discuss outstanding disagreements over strategic arms and defense and space for the duration of the ministerial. (Memorandum of Conversation, April 21; Department of State, Executive Secretary, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze)(declass) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 144. Following a break for lunch, Shultz and Shevardnadze and delegations met again from 3:30–5:15 p.m. to discuss the Middle East. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 145.

297. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 21, 1988, 7:40–10:30 p.m.

SUBJECTS

START/ABM; Other Arms Control; Direct Flights; Krasnoyarsk, Central America

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
THE SECRETARY	SHEVARDNADZE
Gen. Powell	DepFonMin Bessmertnykh
Amb. Ridgway	Amb. Karpov
Amb. Matlock	Amb. Dubinin
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)	Mr. Kuznetsov (Notetaker)
Mr. Hopkins (Interpreter)	Mr. (?) (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting that the ministers first take up arms control, followed by regional issues, if time permitted.

Invited to lead off, THE SECRETARY noted that he had been provided with extensive talking points² on START and D/S issues. Much of the same ground would be gone over in working groups. But, as he saw it, there were several tasks at hand: to get as much agreed as possible while the Secretary was in Moscow; to assess what could be done by others in the weeks ahead; to see if there were a role for a final ministerial before the summit; to see if there were further steps which might yield an agreement on strategic arms by the summit; and, if this proved impossible, to find a work program which would take advantage of work done to date to achieve an agreement as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that what he had just said reflected his personal outlook. But he could say he also spoke for the President as well. The President had campaigned on a platform that said arms control required radical reductions in strategic arms. That was his theme song, along with the stress he put on improving the quality of the peace by enhancing the contribution of defense. Having come as far as we had, the President wanted to finish the job. But, like the General Secretary,

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House. The full memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 146.

² Not found.

he wanted to do the job in a good, solid way—a way that people were comfortable with. Nonetheless, it was true that the remaining issues were difficult. So what was to be done?

The Secretary noted that he had some proposals on ALCM's which he felt represented a good way to deal with the subject. It was not clear that the Soviet side would buy the concept on which our approach was based. Another problem area was verification. Some subjects were well along, and could be pushed further. Others, like suspect sites, were relatively undeveloped, even though both sides agreed on their importance. We would soon be in a position to share some ideas, but were not there yet.

The President, the Secretary continued, was interested in reaching an agreement by the time of the summit. He wanted to complete the Treaty if that were possible. If it were not, we should nail down what we can and find a way to maintain the momentum. That was the Secretary's basic outlook. He and Shevardnadze might have a discussion of the problem at their level, leaving experts to work on the details.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva the week before he had shared his doubts that it would be possible to come up with a satisfactory, verifiable solution to the problem of SLCM's by the time of the summit. The Secretary did think there was merit in the idea of unilateral declarations, followed up continued work. The Secretary saw better prospects for the ALCM counting rule. Sublimit issues were also resolvable, in his opinion. And progress had been made on verification since the ministers had agreed to concentrate efforts in that area. There were other areas in START where much had also been achieved.

On D/S, it appeared the two sides' delegations were arguing about what should be included in the text, and what in the protocol, of any new agreement. There seemed to be a consensus that the agreement would involve the two types of documents. The Secretary felt it would make most sense to try to resolve substantive issues and then to decide where to put them.

With respect to the substance of D/S, the Secretary reaffirmed the U.S. view that the "supreme national interest" clause had to be an element of any agreement. The Washington Statement meant that there would be a non-withdrawal period, during the last three years of which there would be discussions on strategic stability. At the end of the period, each side would be able to do as it chose (and, the Secretary predicted, neither could foresee at this point what that might be). In the meantime, the ABM Treaty would remain in force, and the right of each side to do what it chose would remain in force. The Secretary felt that the length of the non-withdrawal period could be worked out. The real issue was what would happen during that period. We had made proposals regarding sensors, and were glad to detect what

appeared to be interest on the Soviet side. We might be in a position to share some additional ideas along these lines.

The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that he had not been reading talking points, but giving the Minister a personal assessment of how things stacked up. Progress was possible with hard work. The Secretary's concern was that people would decide it wasn't possible to "get there from here" by the time of the summit and would stop working. He did not want that to happen. The summit should be a means of making things happen. But there was also a need to manage expectations. Both sides wanted the summit to be a success. The Secretary believed that, in fact, it would be, in view of the remarkable progress the two leaders had achieved. That was what needed to be recorded. But the secret of the success of the past several years had been that the substance which lay behind the documents which had been issued. This, the Secretary reiterated, was not the presentation he had been given talking points for; but it gave Shevardnadze some general frame of reference.

The Secretary thought that the Vienna meeting provided some prospects for a summit outcome. It might also be possible to focus people's attention on CW use. Human rights and regional issues were underlying sources of tension, and, if people came to be convinced that things were different, it would have an important impact on perceptions of the relationship. We wanted to leave as a legacy the notion that it was possible to have more constructive U.S.–Soviet relations. We were thus prepared to work hard to pull together the threads of the work which had been done so that the summit would be a positive contribution.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had no quarrel with the philosophy the Secretary had articulated. As for the Soviet Union's approach, he believed there was no need to remind the Secretary of statements by Gorbachev and other Soviet spokesmen. Moscow was prepared for a far-reaching approach, and the conclusion of the INF Treaty showed that such an approach was no fantasy. Moscow agreed that there was no alternative to an agreement which guaranteed workable reductions and contributed to strategic stability.

Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that the two sides had to press on, but was concerned that no "milestones" were emerging. He did not think the ministers should limit themselves to only general discussions. They should seek to address the main points at issue. What were these? They had mainly to do with attitudes toward the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side had provided some ideas with respect to both substance and modalities—i.e., nothing should be changed in the Washington Summit Statement, other than the possible addition of some "legal aspects." As to predictability and related considerations,

these could be part of a joint protocol. The Washington Statement, however, was the two sides' "common heritage"—a breakthrough which provided the basis for work in other areas.

THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. had no problem with the Washington statement as such. But we clearly had different views as to what the statement meant, and needed to clear that up. It was not possible to wind up with a formal agreement which embodied different views. If there were no difference as to the meaning of the Washington statement, the U.S. could simply sign the Soviet draft agreement. But we knew that not to be the case, and therefore needed to keep pushing.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that there were differences. The Secretary had mentioned the "supreme national interest" issue. The Soviet side had not exhausted its possibilities for resolving the problem. If solutions were found to other issues, the two sides could work on this one. The U.S. had also talked about sensors, and the Secretary had suggested the Soviet side "welcomed" the ideas the U.S. had presented. In fact, the Soviets were not enthusiastic. Sensors were good things by themselves, but not if they contributed to the development of a space-based ABM system. So expert discussion was necessary to clarify what the U.S. had in mind.

THE SECRETARY said these were fair enough points, which could be discussed. The distinction between testing and deployment was an area which we needed to try to identify. There was no question that deployment was banned by the ABM Treaty. As for sensors, they already played a role outside of the ABM context. Both sides used them.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that the sensors idea was an interesting. He said he had had a fine chat about it with Soviet scientists. He suggested, however, that the ministers leave it to their experts to clarify the concept, particularly with respect to the performance characteristics of the sensors in question. Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side at an earlier stage had proposed a discussion of devices which would and would not be banned. The U.S. had rejected the proposal; perhaps if it had accepted it, there would now be no argument. But this was something for the experts to look at.

Returning to the basic Soviet proposal on the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze urged that the U.S. accept a "work program" involving no changes to the language of the Washington Statement, with all other questions, e.g. on verification, sensors, to be covered by a separate document. Perhaps experts could work overnight on fleshing out the concept, and report the next morning to ministers.

Moving on to SLCM's, Shevardnadze said the Soviet side had formulated what it believed to be a sound package for resolving the problem. Moscow had proposed a ceiling for nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's. To elaborate on that proposal, there would be,

respectively, 400 and 600 in the two categories. Shevardnadze was able to go further and state that within this 1,000 ceiling, there could be freedom to mix. But so far there had been no numbers from the U.S. side.

Moscow had also set forth a proposal for verifying a SLCM limit. The Soviets were not comfortable with ambiguity in this area. If there were no agreement on SLCM's, there could be no agreement on 50% reductions of strategic weapons, since a major path would be left open for an arms race. Soviet proposals for verification were comprehensive, involving remote detection, on site inspection of production facilities, etc. The Secretary had said that the U.S. Navy was not enthusiastic about the Soviet proposals, but had provided no arguments. So there was a lack of clarity here. Shevardnadze had expected that the Secretary would be able to clarify things somewhat, but this had not happened.

On ALCM's as well, the Soviet position had been made clear. Shevardnadze was nonetheless prepared to elaborate further on the verification regime previously proposed. In the interest of clarity, the Soviet side proposed inspections even in advance of conclusion of a START agreement to determine the number of ALCM's each type of bomber could carry. Shevardnadze noted that he had alluded to this possibility the week before in Geneva. Did it not satisfy the U.S.? It appeared Powell was not satisfied. Why was that? Why should on-site inspections be permitted for ballistic missiles, but not for bombers. If agreement could be reached on a counting regime, Shevardnadze said, it would be possible to reconsider the Soviet insistence on a sublimit for heavy bombers. Shevardnadze suggested that working groups consider the problem overnight and report to ministers the next morning. He noted jocularly that Karpov had gone pale.

On the question of mobile ICBM's, too, the Soviet side was in favor of being candid and honest. It appeared there was agreement in principle that there should be no ban on mobiles. The Soviet side had set out a verification regime for mobile missiles. Shevardnadze had asked his specialists to assume the role of U.S. spokesmen, in order to highlight the flaws in the Soviet approach. They had not convinced him. The Soviet proposal was an effective means of preventing any circumvention of the treaty. The Soviet side had made major concessions in agreeing to limit deployment areas for mobile missiles.

Shevardnadze recalled that the Soviet side had previously proposed a limit of 800 launchers for mobile ICBM's. The U.S. had called for a separate warhead number. He was now prepared to give that number—1,600. That would be the top limit. But Shevardnadze could see on the faces of his American interlocutors that they were not impressed. If the U.S. provided a figure of its own there could be a discussion. But so far, there had been only unilateral moves from the Soviet side.

So, Shevardnadze summarized, if one took a realistic view it was clear it would be difficult to finish work on all the remaining issues. That morning he had reflected a certain optimism. Then he had assumed the Secretary would not come to Moscow with empty hands. He had expected some new ideas from the American side.

Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that, if the two sides failed to produce an agreement by the time of the summit, work should continue. But there must be movement on both sides, not just one. Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet side did not want to take a START agreement off the summit agenda. Both sides clearly wanted one and were anxious to achieve one. But if they failed, what then? There had been some limited movement since the Washington meeting. Perhaps the experts had developed something in their discussions. In short, the Soviet side was in favor of intensifying efforts to resolve the complex issues which remained on the table.

But a key question in any future joint work should be whether one side was seeking a unilateral advantage in the negotiations. That seemed to be the U.S. approach on the ALCM and SLCM questions. At Reykjavik, the Soviet side had appreciated that the U.S. felt most threatened by land based ICBM's, and had offered to reduce those weapons by 50%. None [on] the Soviet side sought reciprocal treatment with respect to SLCM's and heavy bombers. That might seem an elementary approach, but it was an important one.

THE SECRETARY said that he would deal with Shevardnadze's remarks issue by issue. On ALCM's, the issue was one of distinguishing between nuclear ALCM carrying bombers and other bombers. We would be elaborating on this concept in more detail in the working group. But in essence, the number we had chosen—10—represented the load our Air Force planned to carry on most missions. What we were proposing was a rule not unlike the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. A cruise missile fit somewhere between a ballistic missile and a gravity bomb in terms of its strategic potency. We thus proposed to count—or discount—cruise missile carrying bombers by giving them the value of 10. That would be close to the reality, and we felt it was a fair approach to the problem.

On SLCM's, the Secretary said he was not certain he had followed some of Shevardnadze's comments. He hoped he had not heard the Minister seek to count SLCM's in the 6,000 warhead sublimit. We had always assumed it was agreed that they would be outside that ceiling. Had the Secretary misunderstood Shevardnadze? Shevardnadze had also cited a number for both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's. It was fundamental, the Secretary emphasized, that we were talking *only* about nuclear armed cruise missiles. Conventionally armed systems were not covered. The Secretary had wanted to flag these two points.

He also wanted to repeat what he had said in Geneva the week before. The U.S. was not opposed to a limit on SLCM's. We had examined the proposals made by the Soviet side on verification of a limit, but did not feel confident it was possible to verify a number. Moreover, the Soviet suggestions would be extremely intrusive with respect to the operations of naval units. Our Navy had approached the whole issue of SLCM's with a great sense of commitment, but, at least for the moment, we had not found the answer.

As for mobile ICBM's, we saw the advantages inherent in mobile systems in terms of survivability, and had worked hard to find a means of dealing with the problem. We were prepared to talk about accountability of mobiles by such means as: confining them to restricted areas; periodic OSI and enhanced NTM; limitations on departures from restricted areas for day-to-day operations. Some means of providing for dispersal could be permitted, and specific approaches would vary with the type of permitted mobile system.

Non-deployed mobile missiles were more of a problem. We were glad to have the 1,600 warhead figure, although it sounded high at first blush.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had not mentioned the ICBM sub-limit, which the U.S. had at one point thought was settled. We still believed the 3,300 figure we had proposed was a good one.

On suspect site inspections, the Secretary noted that the President and Gorbachev had agreed in Washington on "the right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring." How to implement that commitment was a problem. The U.S. was close to being in a position to make concrete proposals in this area. One might, for example, think in terms of an annual quota and certain types of locations. Our focus was ballistic missiles, as we saw no need for suspect site inspections of heavy bombers or ALCM's. One set of facilities and sites which the U.S. would consider making subject to such a regime would be those associated with ballistic missiles, but which were not listed in the Data MOU and therefore would not otherwise be subject to inspection. Another set of facilities and sites that could be subject to suspect site inspections might be those which are identified by some agreed objective criteria observable by NTM. As for the Data MOU itself, we expected by the time of the next ministerial to have put some numbers on the table.

The Secretary concluded by observing that work was proceeding in all these areas. At the same time, they were very difficult. But both sides had made proposals, and there could be more on the table in a week or two. He asked Powell if he had anything to add.

POWELL observed that we continued to raise conventional SLCM's to emphasize that such systems were not constrained by a START agreement. As for ALCM's, he emphasized that our figure of 10 was already a concession to Soviet concerns, and that it corresponded to what the Air Force in fact intended to use on its bombers. The Reykjavik bomber rule had been based on the same philosophical approach. We thus had difficulty understanding the basis of the Soviet objection, and had hoped this might be an area of progress at the present meeting. Powell emphasized that he felt the need of a better understanding of the Soviet position.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted first to clarify the Soviet position on LCM's. It had been agreed in Reykjavik that SLCM's would not count against the 6,000 limit.

As to Powell's query, the basis of Soviet objections to the U.S. ALCM counting rule was elementary—U.S. bombers were capable of carrying many, many more ALCM's than the U.S. sought to credit them with. American B-52's and B-1b's carried, respectively, 28 and 22 ALCM's. The Soviets could not settle for less.

POWELL protested that there were no plans to equip those types of bombers to carry the numbers of ALCM's Shevardnadze had cited. To use those figures would be to overcount U.S. capabilities. KAPROV noted that U.S. aircraft were already being equipped to carry 12 ALCM's. SHEVARDNADZE asked Powell why the U.S. opposed on-site inspection of bombers and SLCM's.

POWELL indicated that the U.S. had no objections to inspections of bombers which did not carry nuclear ALCM's. THE SECRETARY noted that there were three categories of heavy bombers which needed to be distinguished. If there were agreement on a discounting rule for nuclear ALCM equipped heavy bombers, there would be no need to inspect them. For the remainder—bombers carrying no ALCM's and bombers equipped with non-nuclear ALCM's, we could see the case for on-site inspections.

The underlying rationale for the U.S. position, the Secretary explained, was that ballistic missiles were the most potent weapon in each side's arsenal. They were fast, accurate, hard to defend against and non-retrievable. Anything that flies, on the other hand, is slower, can be recalled, and has difficulty penetrating air defenses. This had been recognized at Reykjavik in the bomber counting rule. Cruise missiles were not as potent as ballistic missiles, but we were nonetheless willing to count them as the equivalent of 10 gravity bomb-equipped bombers. As the Air Force didn't care to put all its eggs in one basket, they would not use maximum loads on nuclear ALCM equipped bombers. All of these considerations pointed to the need for a discounting rule.

The Secretary emphasized that, as total numbers of nuclear forces were reduced under a START agreement, neither side could expect to impose its traditional strategic force structure on the other. That was why measures were needed to enable the two sides to compare the various “apples, oranges and pears” involved. We had earlier said that 6 was a good number for purposes of discounting nuclear ALCM equipped bombers. The Soviet side had said that was too low a figure, so we had raised it to 10—i.e., ten times the value of a bomber with gravity bombs. We had also bought into the idea of OSI for heavy bombers not equipped with nuclear ALCM’s. Thus, the U.S. proposal was a comprehensive one in this, as in other areas. And we might soon be in a position to share additional ideas in some of these areas.

As for SLCM’s, the Secretary repeated that our digestive process was underway, but would not be complete in the next few months. That was why he had commended once again to Shevardnadze the concept of unilateral statements.

SHEVARDNADZE asked again what was wrong with the Soviet proposal to determine the capacities of specific types of bombers by on-site inspection.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the U.S. was not opposed to inspecting those types of bombers about which questions might arise—i.e., bombers which had been declared not to be equipped with nuclear ALCM’s. For those which had been designated as nuclear ALCM carriers, national technical means would be sufficient to ensure compliance if there were agreement on a discounting rule. If the U.S. were to equip such aircraft with conventional weapons or non-nuclear cruise missiles, that would be our problem. So we were for OSI of bombers where there was something to inspect.

KARPOV asked a series of questions relating to the technical capabilities of the B-52H equipped with rotary ALCM dispensers, and how they would be counted under the U.S. proposal. THE SECRETARY and POWELL explained that, should that type of bomber be designated as a nuclear ALCM-carrier, it would count as 10 warheads, regardless of its actual load. KARPOV asked why it was fair in that case to count Soviet bombers which could carry less than 10 ALCM’s as carrying 10.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the issue was really whether one wanted to count every weapon or agree on a discounting rule. If the basic U.S. approach were accepted, one could agree on a specific number and means of ensuring it was the right one. If one did not accept the concept that cruise missiles should be discounted, the task was far more difficult. But, the Secretary recalled, a similar approach had been accepted by both sides for gravity bombs at Reykjavik.

In response to Karpov’s attempts to question the validity of discounting cruise missiles relative to ballistic missiles, the SECRETARY

emphasized the vulnerability of cruise missiles en route to their targets. He noted that the two sides had agreed to assign to each MX or SS-18 missile 10 warheads. We were saying that this was equivalent to a single bomber with 10 ALCM's. Seen in those terms, our approach was a generous one.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought the discussion had made some things clearer. The experts could pursue the matter further, it appeared that, on the question of inspecting bombers, at least, there was no disagreement. THE SECRETARY said that this was true if agreement were reached on a discounting rule for nuclear armed ALCM's. In the future, he added, nuclear and conventionally armed ALCM's might well have functionally related external differences. At this point, of course, they did not. SHEVARDNADZE suggested moving on to a new issue.

Returning to the question of mobile ICBM's, THE SECRETARY repeated that the U.S. was not opposed in principle to such systems. He felt that headway was being made on verification, especially with regard to deployed mobile missiles. We were still studying the problem of non-deployed mobiles. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet proposal dealt with that problem. THE SECRETARY acknowledged that Soviet proposals had given us greater confidence that deployed mobile missiles could be verified; we were less certain about non-deployed systems.

Moving on to ICBM sublimits, the Secretary reaffirmed the U.S. understanding that the Soviet side would drop its insistence on a ALCM/heavy bomber sublimit if agreement could be reached on a discounting rule. SHEVARDNADZE said that the sublimit demand would be removed *if* the U.S. accepted the Soviet approach to counting heavy bombers equipped with ALCM's.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. still believed a ceiling of 3,300 on ground based ICBM's was desirable, for reasons we had explained often in the past. Particularly in light of Marshal Akhromeyev's statement in Washington that the Soviet side did not intend to exceed this limit, we had thought the issue was resolved. The Secretary therefore had wanted to reaffirm the U.S. position.

He also wanted to underscore the importance of dealing with suspect sites—an issue both sides were struggling with. We hoped to be able to present some specific ideas in a week or two, either at the Geneva NST talks or when the ministers next met.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the Soviets had accepted the concept of a 3,300 sublimit for either ICBM's or SLBM's within a 4,900 ballistic sublimit. It was his understanding that the U.S. did not accept this approach.

THE SECRETARY confirmed this. SHEVARDNADZE asked if the same went for the Soviet alternative proposal that there should be freedom to mix between SLBM's and ICBM's within the 4,900 sublimit. THE SECRETARY said that the 3,300 sublimit for ICBM's was desirable because of the unique characteristics of those weapons. SHEVARDNADZE asked if the U.S. could accept any sublimit on SLBM's. THE SECRETARY said, "No." SHEVARDNADZE said it sounded like a job for experts. THE SECRETARY said the experts said the reverse. It was up to the ministers to work out the conceptual differences; experts could go to work on details.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested a brief look at verification. He noted that the reason the Soviet side had sought to focus on all the remaining substantive issues was that there was a relationship between data exchange and the resolution of questions such as SLCM's and ALCM's. Data exchange could hardly take place until these issues had been settled. The Secretary had said the U.S. was ready to begin providing data. The Soviets had their own data filed away in a safe place, but until the SLCM and ALCM issues had been resolved, they could not provide it.

THE SECRETARY suggested that perhaps some headway had been made on ALCM's. On SLCM's, the U.S. was prepared to adopt a declaratory policy; that, at least, would provide a number. "All right, SHEVARDNADZE responded, "Let's wait."³

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

³ The following morning, Shultz met Gorbachev in a plenary session from 11:00 a.m. to 2:05 p.m. The two delegations mainly discussed topics not related to START. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 147. Following this meeting, Shultz traveled to Kiev and Tblisi before flying to Brussels on April 25 to brief NATO foreign ministers, and returning to Washington.

298. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, May 9, 1988, 7:30–9:00 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Secretary Shultz and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN

General Robert T. Herres, USAF

General Carl Vuono, USA

Admiral A. Carl Trost, USN

General Alfred M. Gray, USMC

General Monroe Hatch, USAF

Secretary of Defense Carlucci

Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft

Ambassador Ronald Lehman

General Gordon Fomell, USAF

Admiral Thomas Fox, USN

Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN

Secretary of State Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Allen Holmes

General William Burns

Judge William Webster

General Colin Powell, USA

Colonel Robert Linhard, USAF

Minutes

The meeting started with an informal discussion on the Middle East at the table. About 7:45 a.m., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs opened the main discussion.

Admiral Crowe: The Soviets have kicked up a lot of dust, but so far there's no positive movement. The Chiefs are very concerned about specifics right now in the Nuclear and Space area. Details are the substance. There's a lot of work, and it is not getting any easier. We've put down a number of placeholders, but we need to be hard-nosed and demand that the Soviets move in our direction.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Breakfast on Arms Control, May 9, 1988 (4). Secret. Drafted on May 17. All brackets and blank underscores are in the original text.

Secretary Shultz: I think we need to think about how to handle the Ministerial, the Summit, and the post-Summit period. At the Ministerial, it is always a good idea to remind ourselves to discuss all four parts of our agenda.

[Secretary Shultz then went into a discussion of regional, human rights, bilateral, etc.—on which I did not take notes.]

—At the Ministerial, with respect to arms control, we are staffed up to have a good discussion. I guess we'll have the JVE and the PNET documents ready for review at the Ministerial.

—I will have something to say on CW.

—We should continue to push to get the nonaligned nations issue and Soviet movement on human rights in the CDE far enough along to allow conventional arms negotiations to move forward.

—With respect to NST, we need to hear the Soviet views and try to push things along. No one thinks we can get treaties in either of these areas by the Summit, except perhaps Hank Cooper. Our problem, then, is where will we be by the Summit? And how should we proceed in the post-Summit period?

—In fact, we should ask ourselves how possible and desirable a START treaty would be at all after the Summit. All of you seem to be telling me that START is too difficult anyway. All the critical things—essential numbers—we can accommodate. Our question then is: Is it desirable to put all our elements down?

—With respect to ALCMs, we just put down a number of 10. The Soviets seem to have interpreted Shevardnadze's remarks to me as a counter to that proposal.

Admiral Crowe: We have great difficulty with the idea of 28 and 20 as a count.

Secretary Shultz: Well, I'm not sure that was his only comment. We have to ask ourselves does what he said to us mean that he agrees now to the concept of discounting and all we do is argue about the number to be applied for each type of bomber. If that's the way it is, we may have something to work with.

General Herres: Our distinguishability package was a very comprehensive proposal. Their idea of 28 and 20 is not a reaction to that at all. The distinguishability package was a lot of movement, and, once again, I don't see their 28–20 as a reaction at all.

[It became obvious that the Chiefs didn't seem to know about the additional Soviet position.]

General Welch: I agree with Herres. I thought we had a comprehensive package on distinguishability. If they want 28 ALCMs for B-52 discounts, then we aren't going to have an agreement; I don't believe that's in our interest at all.

General Herres: Our distinguishability package was a full package.

General Welch: It's not clear that in presenting this to the Soviets we put *all* our distinguishability package down on the table.

General Powell: Well, I still think that we did argue with them, and we explained it to them, but they can't accept discounting.

Ambassador Nitze: I agree; they don't accept discounting.

General Powell: They can't accept the idea that we're going to attribute 10 weapons to a B-52 when we know that it could carry [amount not declassified]

General Welch: Besides everything else, we need the right to reconfigure our aircraft. If there's *no* discounting, we need the right to reconfigure them from a forestructure designed for SALT limits to a forestructure designed for START limits. And what we do with our B-52 is reconfigure them so they only carry 10, thus getting them in line with START, not SALT.

Admiral Crowe: Do you think that there's anything in this?

Ambassador Nitze: It could really help if we could move to an "as equipped" situation.

[(At this point, Linhard jumped up from the back, and explained that he thought they were missing the point here; that we had talked the Soviets into _____ margins; that now their position has changed, and it's *not* necessarily 28–20 and maximum carriage, but rather they object to the idea of all types of ALCM-carrying bombers being counted as 10. Rather, they would like to count individual types, and as we understand what they're suggesting, they're hinting that they would be prepared to have the type count be more in line with operational carriage rather than maximum carriage.)]

Secretary Shultz: Well, I don't know where all this will carry us. We need to absolutely understand what the position is, and there is a big distinction between an operational load and a maximum carriage—maximum load.

Ambassador Nitze: Yes, we should press them on what they mean by operational load.

General Welch: We can't accept a number above 10 for our bombers. If we do, we're not going to have any operational bombers.

Ambassador Nitze: Well, we need to explore all this.

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we do need to explore this. We need to know where they are.

General Powell: Shevardnadze knows all about discounting now. Karpov always knew. What they're afraid of is what we count as 10 in peace time would be in a crisis; we'll load the second 10 on B-52H's and they'll face 20, not 10.

Ambassador Nitze: We need to keep far away from an "as equipped" rule, and we should move to discounting by type.

General Herres: A type number near operational load may be the average; an operational load would be great. Let's avoid "as equipped."

Ambassador Nitze: Don't say an average. Let's just say it's a number near the operational load, and that it's a fair number.

Ambassador Kampelman: I think we could negotiate a number for each type. We don't have to call it discounting because it's really a number near the operational load. We could separate the number by type and certainly it's not "as equipped."

General Herres: Let's call it a counting rule then; let's not call it a discounting rule.

Ambassador Kampelman: That's great; call it a counting rule.

General Herres: I agree.

Ambassador Nitze: Yes, we need to negotiate. When we do, we ought call it a number that's fair for both sides. Then we'll come in much less than 10 for their forces.

Admiral Crowe: Don't they have the same concern as we do with respect to verification and the like? I don't poke a finger in their eye, but I'm not sure that they wouldn't want some numbers less than 10.

General Welch: We only have one type, and it's at 10. Maybe I could go to eight if you had to negotiate it.

Ambassador Nitze: Well, our problem might be defining type.

General Herres: And we've also got to remember that our bombers carry more than theirs.

Ambassador Nitze: But I can distinguish between G's and H's and B-52's and B-1's. I'm sure they can too.

Admiral Crowe: All our proposals assume that they can. That's part of our distinguishability package.

General Herres: Are they likely to offer new ideas in Geneva?

Ambassador Kampelman: It takes a while for them to offer new ideas in Geneva. Oh, but wait, you're talking about this week. Yes, they might, because they'll study it in Moscow

Secretary Shultz: Well, in Geneva, the real question is when we get there, are we really talking about trying to move things along, or will we just kind of tidy things up for the Summit. Tidying it up in one way could just be getting things into describable terms. Now, a lot of this depends upon their attitude, not ours. I don't know who we're going to see in Geneva. If their delegation is in a certain configuration, then it will simply be tidying up. But if Akhromeyev is in their delegation, they will be signaling that they're prepared to move further forward.

Admiral Crowe: Well, we always want to make progress. We're just not sure they're ready. We're all for moving forward.

Secretary Shultz: One way to find out is to press to see if they are.

General Herres: We also need the rest of our proposals. We've got to protect the ranges here until we know what the situation is with respect to conventional assets.

Secretary Shultz: But that's our posture.

General Herres: Yes, but I just want to reinforce that there should be no treatment of range if there's no conventional understanding.

Ambassador Kampelman: We all understand that.

Admiral Crowe: Yes, let me say it once more—no range now.

General Powell: What is our average number now for bombers?

General Welch: Well, for ALCMs it would be close to [amount not declassified], but we shouldn't forget that at Reykjavik we would let non-ALCM-carrying bombers with 18 or so weapons count as 1. So we've got to assume that the Soviets are less concerned about the numbers than we thought.

Ambassador Nitze: And besides that, we face unlimited air defenses.

General Welch: Yes, that's right. We need 10 because we face air defenses. If we have count more than 10, we would need to do something about the air defenses differently. If they want less than 10, that might be understandable. For example, their aircraft now carry 12–16; ours carry [amount not declassified]; we're carrying 10. We've never counted 28; we've never loaded to 28. Since ours carry [amount not declassified] and we want 10 and theirs carry 12–16, it would be fair for them to ask for 8. That would be even-handed. Of course, we should not agree to that, but it may seem just.

Admiral Crowe: I'd be interested to see if they still agree to the basic principle agreed at Reykjavik.

General Powell: We did walk through most of this with them, and they gagged on the 90 B–52H's, which would carry [amount not declassified], not 10.

Secretary Shultz: Well, it was different at Reykjavik too, because then we were talking about 6000 plus weapons, and we were trying to put some parity on weapons, but now we are at 4900 with parity on ballistic missile warheads, and it kind of reinforces the argument that we need certain discounting. Right now, we've got to work within the 1100.

General Welch: But we can't forget the asymmetry and air defenses, and we would have to add numbers on our side just to offset the advantage to the defenses.

Ambassador Nitze: But they could respond that we could deploy defenses if we wish, and we have better technology than they do. You know, they watch things like that.

General Welch: It's not better. They have AWACS-2 and very good fighters, and they have an advantage in their legislative process.

Ambassador Kampelman: If we can work via types, okay. The key is let's make sure we understand this. You're telling me if we can work by types, it's okay; the key is that you want to protect the 10-loading for us and also want to protect conventional carriers. Right?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, that's right. But in our end-game to the conventional issue may be less troublesome than it is now.

Secretary Shultz: Well, I thought it was true that you are unwilling to have OSI at ALCM heavy bomber bases.

General Welch: No, no, that's not true. We said that our counting rule made it unnecessary. We don't oppose on-site inspection.

General Herres: Yes, our basing mode in the distinguishability package solves this.

Secretary Shultz: But you thought you wanted to avoid on-site inspection on bombers like Stealth.

Admiral Crowe: What we meant was that when we get down to the end-game, we may have less problem with conventional bomber carriage.

General Welch: By our rule, we would accept OSI at non-ALCM bomber bases.

Secretary Shultz: But once again, I thought you didn't want OSI at an ATB base.

General Welch: Yes, that's true. We see no reason for OSI for a system that's never tested with ALCMs. So it's true that we object to OSI for the B-2. The B-2 is not programmed to test with ALCMs; it's not planned to test with ALCMs; there are no ALCMs.

Ambassador Rowny: The Soviets want 20 ALCMs counted for the B-1 and 2.

General Welch: We can accept OSI on the B-1 to show that there's no ALCM that can be carried.

Admiral Crowe: Let's turn to mobiles.

Secretary Shultz: Right now we've got 2 numbers I think we need—one on mobiles and one on SLCMs. We can pin those down; we can pin down the four corners.

Admiral Crowe: I defer to Herres on the recent discussions on mobiles, but I think we should agree on verification first.

General Herres: We need a comprehensive verification package, not a partial package. This can be done. We're making progress. There are big disagreements on the deployment areas, and strong views are held there. We all agree, but we need numbers if we're going to fall off our ban. The number we think is right is a range of 500–700 RVs. That's

lower than the Soviet number, but we don't think we should consider *any* number until the verification is agreed.

Secretary Carlucci: If we lay down a number, it may cause Congress to block what we're trying to do and, by the way, we're not sure what verification regime we need because our basing mode may change. The Soviets have mobile missiles; we don't. Our basing modes can change; we shouldn't do anything right now.

Secretary Shultz: But that's where we are now. They have mobiles, and we don't.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, it's hard to say if START will get us mobiles or not.

General Powell: But they have mobiles.

Secretary Carlucci: START would sanctify their mobiles.

General Herres: Perimeter-Portal is *really* tough. It's a lot of big money. No one really knows the cost right now. It could be 2–3 million per site; that seems low. And it's all coming out of the Defense budget.

Secretary Shultz: But that's the only budget that counts.

Secretary Carlucci: But we can't do it all out of that budget.

Secretary Shultz: I thought we were ready to lift the ban on mobiles, and that you wanted to go talk to Congress first.

Secretary Carlucci: Before we lift the ban, the President ought to meet with Congress and talk to the leadership. The House, for example, funded both programs—Midgetman and M–X—equally, and that puts both at risk. I'm *very* uncomfortable with that. The House is playing politics on this issue; the Senate is fine. We need some commitment out of the leadership to relieve the situation.

Judge Webster: The Congress will want to monitor this, and the Congress will want to track it. And we need enough things in the sky to do both. If we're going to fall off mobiles, I really think we should only keep *one* category of mobiles.

Secretary Carlucci: That's fine, but which one?

Admiral Crowe: Well, we'll be blasted in Congress if we scrapped either of the two.

General Powell: We left the President last week with the thought that we didn't want to move until we had a feel for Congress. For the Ministerial, we want to talk verification. And it looks like we don't want to talk any number until we agree on verification.

General Herres: Our position is zero until we fall off the ban.

Secretary Carlucci: That's always been our position. Why fall off now? Why not get something for when we fall off?

Secretary Shultz: Well, I could stay under those conditions, and if you ask me, I'd say we have a chance of meeting them in about 1992.

Secretary Carlucci: But this is the most fundamental aspect of our strategic forces.

Secretary Shultz: But they have more and more mobile forces day-by-day, and we have none. I thought the JCS thought that some constraints would be useful.

Admiral Crowe: Well, the fact that we don't have any is exactly the reason why we need to involve the Congressional leadership.

Secretary Carlucci: I don't think there are 10 people up there on the Hill who have thought about this issue.

General Herres: You know, if the number we negotiate with the Soviets is large enough, there'll be a natural constraint on the SS-24's, and we'd also like to keep the limit within the 1540 to force the Soviets to face a tradeoff of heavies for mobiles.

Admiral Crowe: (Looking at Secretary Shultz) Do you think that's acceptable? (Shultz laughed)

Ambassador Kampelman: Look, we need to ask. You can't know until you ask. You can't ask if you don't have a number in mind. The conditions you put on us just paralyzes us. What you need to do is set forth the objective and let the negotiators choose the devices. Let's agree on the objective. We need some flexibility on how we get there. We know how important the verification is, but numbers are important too.

General Herres: The conditions are there because things tend to hang together.

Admiral Crowe: And the Congress makes it a hell of a lot worse.

Ambassador Kampelman: Well, I've been talking to Jim Woolsey.

Secretary Carlucci: Sharing (?) He's the one who's driving the problem.

Ambassador Kampelman: He says he's not. He wants to talk to Herres. He has some good ideas.

Secretary Carlucci: He might make Midgetman cheaper. And then he wants to let it go to the next Administration.

General Welch: No matter what the number is, it seems like verification is the same. Let's get on with verification. Even Woolsey says now he'd let me rebase the first 50 M-X on rail.

Admiral Crowe: What progress could we make on number if we're agreed on verification?

Secretary Shultz: Well, I'm waiting for General Welch to say that he wants a number of 1000.

General Welch: In the best of all worlds, I'd say I want a 1000; and in the real world, I'd probably get less, maybe 500; 500–700 works. It doesn't hit the 500 baseline, which is 50 M-X. If I got everything I wanted, I'd want 1000.

Ambassador Lehman: The range of 500–700 allows us to avoid a firm position on numbers. Therefore, we don't have to fall off the ban as hard.

General Welch: And the RDA, which restricted to deployment area, allows us to do what we want to do and allows the Soviets to do what they want to do too.

Secretary Carlucci: Bob Linhard can tell us more about verification. Where do we stand on that?

Colonel Linhard: A large number of elements have been agreed on with respect to verification: we agreed on principles for suspect site, but we need much more work at the major and captain level to get down the details. However, we have reached a point where I could explain to my mother how verification works.

[General Laughter]

Colonel Linhard: I was going to explain it at the 711, but General Gray would kick me.

Admiral Crowe: Let's talk about SLCM.

Secretary Shultz: They laid down a verification regime for SLCM and some numbers. We said that the verification regime was no good, and that we advocated unilateral declarations for both sides.

Admiral Crowe: I agree. It has to be on both sides.

Secretary Shultz: We now have language for that declaration, but no number.

Admiral Trost: We have a number—1500 nuclear SLCM.

Secretary Shultz: Yes, but 1500 is about double the number you really are contemplating.

Admiral Trost: No, no, it's what we need. That's the needed number.

Secretary Shultz: So you're telling me 1500 is a hard requirement.

Admiral Trost: Yeah, we need to maintain some flexibility here. General Galvin needs some SLCMs—1500 is a good number.

Admiral Crowe: Is there any real Soviet interest in declaration?

Secretary Shultz: No, I don't think so, but we have to recognize that the Soviet objective, I think, is to get a handle on US Navy capability. They're having a good time with this now. They're playing with neither-confirmed-nor-deny and they're playing with us in other countries. They're stalling and we have a problem. If there were a prospect for an overall agreement, there might be a chance that they would agree to a declaration. What we need to do is make our position clear. I'm not talking about it from a PR point of view, but we need to have something we're for so that we can have those who support us fall in line and help.

Admiral Trost and Admiral Crowe: (Together) We agree.

Secretary Shultz: 1500 is very, very high, and that number may be a problem.

Admiral Trost: Well, you know, there's a 1600 number for SNDVs and 2700 SLCM on their side. Are we to make that clear? It also protects about 40–50 of their equivalent SLCMs to our TOMAHAWK. But all their 2700 are aimed at NATO forces.

General Herres: We should point out that it's not in their interest to pursue a range exclusion. They would see no reason for making it a zero range.

Admiral Crowe: But with no range exclusion at zero range, 1500 is going to be too small for the Soviets.

Admiral Trost: We need to strike deeper into the Soviet Union than they do beyond the shore. Therefore, any shorter range is just no good.

General Herres: Yes, they have many coastal targets they can shoot at that are significant; we don't.

Secretary Shultz: I know that SLCMs are in some manner a part of START, but in some manner they shouldn't be. We shouldn't look at them as a part of START, but we should understand if there's an assault on SLCM, there's assault on US Navy capability. We need to put our mind to protect the capability of the United States Navy. All the proposals the Soviets made have dimensions that attack our Alliances and our nuclear neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. Akhromeyev as much as said to me we are going to hear a lot more on US Navy capability as we move on, and they're trying to use this to beat up on us to offset the ICBM asymmetries.

Admiral Crowe: I agree.

Secretary Shultz: I think we need a much broader, much deeper approach.

Admiral Trost: This is the first attempt to capture a non-strategic system in START. Once again, I believe it's a clear attempt to curb NATO's maritime power, and, by the way, they're covering the globe with proposals. The only area that they don't have proposal on is the South Atlantic.

Secretary Shultz: That's exactly my point. We are close to being dead in the water right now. We need to do a better job on positioning ourselves with other countries.

Admiral Crowe: The idea of doing away with a range exclusion would help us with the Soviets and with Scandinavia. You ought to go down to zero range, a declared approach, and some number, and that would look pretty good.

Secretary Shultz: We have to be really careful about how we take off on that. Our problem is that we don't have proposals; we just object to their proposals. What I would love to be able to do is to say, yes,

we're in favor of SLCM restrictions, but we are in favor of SLCM restrictions down at zero range and a limit of 1500, or a declared number of 1500. But you are reluctant.

Admiral Crowe and Admiral Trost: (Together) No, no, we're not reluctant. (CJCS Chairman asked Admiral Howe for his view.)

Admiral Howe: We can defend such a declaratory posture, and it's defensible from the Soviets' point of view too. There's no reason why we can't go ahead and do this.

Admiral Crowe: Yes, this would allow us to cast the SLCM issue differently—make it a Navy-to-Navy issue.

General Herres: (To Secretary Shultz) Is this a treaty stopper?

Secretary Shultz: Well, it certainly is an end-game issue. We need to be for something and the Soviets would probably not buy this unless they wanted to close on a treaty.

General Herres: Should we go further now, or should we wait until end-game?

Admiral Trost: I thought at first that we ought to wait until end-game, but I think we ought to push now—push it not as part of START, but push now—give them something that they can table.

Secretary Shultz: Can you give me something that we can table?

Admiral Crowe: We agree, and we'll work on it today.

Secretary Shultz: Okay, but won't zero range hurt our position on ALCM?

General Welch: Well, I think we're going to have to differentiate. I'm all for a 0–1500 for SLCM, but we absolutely have to be ready to explain why it doesn't apply to ALCMs.

Secretary Shultz: (To Welch) Can you give me some points on that?

General Welch: Yes.

General Herres: We do have to keep them separate, but you've got to remember that we already are talking about ALCM carriers, not ALCMs, and in SLCM we're talking about SLCMs.

Admiral Crowe: As Linhard would say, this is going to be hard to explain to our moms.

General Powell: Well, it seems like a *bold* idea.

Ambassador Lehman: It will be difficult to explain to our moms. Therefore, we ought to stick with declaratory and tell them that we want to declare zero.

Admiral Crowe: It's absolutely essential that we have no ceilings—that we're only talking about declaring a number.

Ambassador Rowny: We should tell them no number until they agree to pull out the language in the their treaty on SLCMs and they show their interest.

Admiral Trost: I agree to this type of proposition, and I think I'd agree to a declaratory approach.

Admiral Crowe: Let's turn to Defense and Space.

General Herres: It's difficult to deal with the issues right now, because we're putting in jeopardy some of our space programs. We need to be very careful. For example, the limit on a number of space platforms brings around the question of how do we deal with challenges to our classified launchers, etc. And this all begins with the sensor problem. It's very, very tough to deal with futures with respect to sensors. We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that what we're trying to do is let our warning systems, etc.—our early warning systems—run free. However, if we can get the sensors, like ALPARS, nailed, then we can go look at test range. But we must do sensors first.

Secretary Shultz: Okay, so sensors are alright, but you're not ready on the test range.

General Herres: That's right.

Admiral Crowe: We gave you quite a bit of material on sensors—a lot of Q's and A's.²

General Herres: We do have a problem on sensor launchers too, but this may be a little bit easier.

Secretary Carlucci: Have we ever discussed the idea that early warning in space is like large-phased radars on the periphery?

Ambassador Kampelman: Didn't you discuss that with Yazov?³

Secretary Carlucci: No, I started to, but he raised Krasnoyarsk. I think it's a good concept, and they already have eight or nine on the periphery.

Secretary Shultz: Here we are—we have a President who's in favor of SDI, probably more strongly in favor than any of his successors are going to be, and a program hog-tied by the Congress. Carlucci worked out with Nunn an operational approach to the broad/narrow interpretation, and it's applied to Congress. Then we looked around and said maybe we should try this with the Soviets. So far, we've cycled through a few ideas, but we found nothing to our liking. Don't we have anything to put forward?

Secretary Carlucci: As I said, we can work the sensors.

General Herres: That's right. That's the first block; it's a good starting point; and then we can work further.

² Not found.

³ Carlucci and Yazov met in Bern, Switzerland, March 19–20. Memoranda of conversations are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

Secretary Carlucci: And I'll even help with the Senate.
The meeting ended at about 9:00 a.m.

299. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 9, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Arms Control Positions (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State:

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese

Defense:

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Mr. Ron Lehman

Energy:

Mr. William Martin

CIA:

Judge William Webster

Mr. Richard Kerr

JCS:

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

ACDA:

Mr. George Murphy

Vice President's Office:

Mr. Craig Fuller

OMB:

Mr. Joseph Wright

OSTP:

Dr. William Graham

White House:

Mr. Howard Baker

Mr. Ken Duberstein

Mr. Marlin Fitzwater

General Colin Powell

Mr. John Negroponte

NSC Staff:

Colonel Robert Linhard

Captain Linton Brooks

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. *The President* opened the meeting as follows:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 188, 05/09/1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

Tomorrow night George and Colin will be leaving for their final Foreign Ministers' meeting before the summit.² They'll deal with our whole agenda, just as I will in Moscow. Today, however, I want to focus on arms reduction, especially on START and Defense and Space. (S)

You and your people have done a huge amount of work coming to grips with these very difficult issues. I appreciate it and hope you will pass my appreciation on to your staffs. Because of Soviet stonewalling and the inherent difficulty of the issues, we weren't able to have START and Defense and Space treaties ready for signature. However, as I've been saying lately, I want a good treaty, not a quick treaty. Nothing less than a verifiable agreement which enhances our security will do. (S)

I want us to keep working toward this goal after the summit. We have an obligation to finish development of a complete, coherent position to bring about deep reductions while setting the stage for one day deploying effective defenses. As we move forward, I depend on each of the people in this room to tell me if we're moving too fast, or too slow, or in the wrong direction. (S)

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued (not verbatim): (U)

General Powell: Thank you sir. While, as the President said, our focus is on arms reductions issues, we need to consider the overall context of the meeting. Secretary Shultz, could you review that context? (U)

Secretary Shultz: We will follow the same four part agenda you will follow in Moscow. Since the technical discussions will be on arms control only, I will only be taking an arms control team with me. I will talk human rights personally. I will also discuss regional and bilateral matters. On regional matters, there won't be much on Afghanistan. The most interesting topic will be recent discussions on South Africa. It's a good idea to talk about these. I won't plan to raise the Middle East, but he may. Previously he told us "no" on the second UN resolution until Soviet troops are away from the Afghan-Iran border and, perhaps, out of Afghanistan. I will draw him out on this. We will also be working bilateral issues. We will have the right people there to do this discussion. (S)

That brings us to arms control. On INF we don't know yet whether or not we will need more discussion. There will be some discussion

² On May 10, Shultz and Powell traveled to Geneva to meet Shevardnadze.

of CW along the lines we discussed last NSPG.³ We hope to finish the JVE [Joint Verification Experiment] and PNET [Verification Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty] in time for the summit. There is no issue of principle here, we just have to do it. They want something on conventional and so do we. There has been no Soviet movement in Vienna; they are probably waiting for the neutral and nonaligned nations to table something. Since the NNA are Western in their ideas on human rights that may be alright. It will give us something to point to. (S)

In NST [Nuclear and Space Talks] we will take the usual suspects. We don't know who they will bring. We have some indication they are interested in Defense and Space movement. There was some movement over the weekend. In Geneva we asked the Soviets this morning about ALCMs. We put the question to them and they gave a negative response. (S)

As we look to the summit and beyond, it is not useful to point fingers at who is stonewalling. If we were given a blank sheet of paper and told that they would sign any treaty we would write, we are not ready to fill in the paper. It is better to say we are looking for a good agreement, and engaged in a fundamentally good faith effort. No one is stonewalling, there is resolve on both sides. Finally, we will talk summit schedule and how to record the results of our progress thus far. (S)

General Powell: We don't want to say we "failed" to get a START agreement. We're working on START; the issue is how to record progress. We agree on most of the procedural aspects for the summit. The one issue is whether to have a separate, signed statement documenting our progress in START or simply a joint summit statement. That question is under review. I think we can move right into the START issues. (S)

The first issue has to do with SLCM [sea-launched cruise missiles]. The Soviet verification approach is unacceptable. The best outcome is a declaratory approach. If the Soviets accept, the question is are we ready on numbers. Secretary Carlucci? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: It is unlikely that they will accept a declaratory approach. SLCMs is a big issue for them; they are clearly in an all out offensive to capture SLCMs. Their approach could threaten NCND [neither confirm nor deny]. George is correct, they are targeting our Naval capability. SLCM is not a strategic weapon, it is not inside the

³ Reference is to a May 5 National Security Planning Group meeting to discuss chemical weapons and other arms control matters not related to START. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 187, 05/05/1988)

6,000 limit. We think this is an endgame issue. The JCS favor 1,500 if we must give a number; that's more than we plan to purchase now. (S)

Admiral Crowe: It's based on our procurement plans with a hedge. (C)

Secretary Shultz: Yes a hedge of one-half [general laughter]. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The number is a meaningful number. Setting the range at zero so that there is no range exclusion puts a new light on the optics of this. It would capture all sorts of Soviet missiles and could put a positive spin on this. We are working on the issue. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: The risk is the Soviets will apply the same approach to ALCMs. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That's a real risk which we must deflect. (C)

Secretary Shultz: I agree in general. The Soviets are really after our Naval capability. They want to offset the conventional symmetries that exists. But there will come a time when we will need to say what we are *for*. If we are for something we need to put down a marker. As I understand what we are for is an unilateral declaration, a number of 1,500 SLCMs and zero range. It would be good to get that down. Now all we say is we are against the Soviet proposals. (S)

Admiral Crowe: There is some merit in getting out of START into the Naval side. We might be better just talking about Naval nuclear weapons. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: But I still worry about the numbers. (C)

General Powell: We will see what the JCS can have for us by tomorrow.⁴ (U)

Secretary Shultz: In the past we said the Soviet verification scheme wouldn't work and is disruptive but we will keep looking. We will keep saying that. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The Defense Science Board report says it will take a year to sort out verification. (S)

Dr. Graham: It is a dangerous point to touch on. There is nothing there. We shouldn't give a glimmer of hope. For 15 or 20 years we have studied SLCM verification without finding a solution. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I like that if we can live with it. (U)

Dr. Graham: It's the truth. (U)

Secretary Shultz: I think that's dangerous. We can't only say we need to depend on verification. We need not to disrupt Naval operations as well. (S)

⁴ Not further identified.

General Powell: Lets turn to mobile ICBMs. The first order of business is to get verification down. Interagency work on a verification regime has been completed. It's clear we can't table treaty language in this area by the ministerial, although we should be able to do so by the summit. The issue is are we willing to go beyond talking verification. If so, are we willing to offer a number and will that number be within or without the heavy ICBM limit? (S)

Secretary Shultz: I would have expressed it a little differently. I have said we agree that mobiles are desirable, they are more survivable and hence more stable. The trouble is that they are hard to verify. That is why we propose the ban. We need verification clarified. My sense is that we are reasonably confident that deployed mobiles can be verified. The issue is suspect site inspections. We may have something to say on that. If we have a sense that a satisfactory solution is near, we will need a number. They tabled 1,600. That's too high. We have not wanted to put down a number until we are close on verification. I understand that we are. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree it's close but suspect site is still not settled. There is some tension between verification and survivability. Our approach is being put together to stress verification not survivability. There is an additional problem with Congress. We may not get *any* mobiles. We could endorse mobiles, and the Soviets will have them but we still don't know what Congress will do. Our recommendation to you, sir, is that before we make a move on mobiles you convene a meeting of the Congressional leadership. (S)

General Powell: Admiral Crowe? (U)

Admiral Crowe: I have nothing to add. (U)

Judge Webster: This is our toughest area. That is why we need the overhead assets that we briefed you on earlier.⁵ There are lots of tough requirements but mobiles are either number one or very close. This is the area that is of most concern with Congress. We have our lowest monitoring confidence level with mobiles. We will try and constrain production and movement. We are not ready to tell you we can verify mobiles if we sign the treaty today and we allowed large numbers. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have a dilemma. Increasingly in Congress and the general public there is a belief that the only ICBM to have is a survivable ICBM. As the weapons get more accurate, fixed silo-based ICBMs are not survivable. Maybe if we don't have mobile ICBMs we won't have any new ICBMs. That is why Admiral Crowe wisely wants no sublimit on SLBMs. We may need all 4,900 ballistic missile warheads on submarines. But there are good reasons to have a Triad. So we

⁵ Not further identified.

should keep ICBMs. But the basing mode is difficult; it is unstable if we have a vulnerable basing mode. We have to work hard to find the answer in our own interest, not just to accommodate the Soviets. The Soviets are miles ahead on mobiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well some of the verification regime will help. (S)

Judge Webster: But that makes problems for the JCS. (U)

Admiral Crowe: We are going to accept some scheme, but we are not going to nail all the mobiles down. (S)

General Powell: In summary, there is progress on the verification scheme, but not everyone agrees that we are ready to lay down a number. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: If we indicate verification comes first, we would be willing to lay down a range of numbers. I would be willing to go with a range 500 to 700. State has another number. (S)

The President: The Midgetman that Congress loves. It is my understanding that the military just doesn't want it. Is that correct? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes that is correct. It is not cost effective. It would be \$39 billion for Midgetman against \$17 billion for MX. (S)

The President: Then why not holler and fight? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: I have hollered. The Senate has suggested the program to put only 45 million in Midgetman and the rest in MX. But the House is playing politics. Aspin says he has to have a big Midgetman number to deal with the Senate in conference. But MX will be funded. We just can't afford Midgetman. (S)

The President: What's their argument against MX? (C)

Secretary Carlucci: They say it is not survivable in a bolt out of the blue. I think this is all political. The basic motivation comes straight from the Democratic caucus. I told Aspin he was holding up a START agreement and he said he didn't care; START is a problem for the next Administration. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Let me play the Devil's advocate. As I understand it, if cost wasn't an issue the military would rather have a hundred single RV missiles than ten multi-warhead missiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That is true in part. People are also a resource and we need more people with a larger number of missiles. (S)

The President: But there is no military problem; you would want them? (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes. (U)

Secretary Shultz: So there are some arguments on this side. So it is a cost argument. If money and people were available we would want to go to single RV missile. There is also a verification argument. If we miss a MX, we miss ten warheads. Two or three years ago that is why

we were interested in banning Soviet MIRVed mobiles. Personally I don't dismiss Midgetman as politics. The problem is cost. That is why I have always said we ought to cut the number of warheads on our MIRVed system. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Then it's the same problem. If you cut warheads you still need to buy more missiles. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Why not down load MX? (S)

Admiral Crowe: We could do that. (U)

Secretary Shultz: We say we worry about Soviet heavys because of the breakout question. They could breakout and have more warheads. If we down load MX we will have the same breakout potential. (S)

The Vice President: Isn't there a survivability issue? MX can't deploy as quickly. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes. Midgetman advocates say that it is more survivable to a bolt out of the blue. The difference is something like six hours. (S)

The Vice President: Isn't that a convincing argument? (U)

Admiral Crowe: Some. It is like the big carrier-little carrier debate. The military would always prefer more but they don't believe they are ever going to get it. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: If you take State's idea of 1,000 warheads, it will really break the bank. It will cost you \$80 billion for Midgetman. (S)

The President: How do we get back to the horse cavalry? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: This whole thing will lead to a stalemate on the Hill and no U.S. mobile. (S)

General Powell: Do we need to say anything more on heavy ICBMs? (C)

Ambassador Rowny: I favor a ban on flight testing of heavy ICBMs. That way we will force Soviet heavy ICBMs to atrophy. Even if we cut those ICBMs in half there will still be an unilateral advantage if we allow flight testing. We must not allow that. We won't build any, so including a U.S. right to build is ephemeral. They can put 20 to 30 warheads on heavys. If we go to Congress we will get—correctly—significant problems on questions of equality. (S)

General Powell: Other comments? [Silence] In Defense and Space, we are close to having a complete U.S. position. We are agreed that in Geneva we should:

—Affirm the basic positions in our draft treaty, including: our right to deploy after the specified period; that we will not accept a rolling non-withdrawal period; and, that we believe START reductions should not be held hostage to D&S.

—Maintain our proposal that neither side object to space-based sensors and elicit a Soviet response.

—And, that we should not now formally table our ideas for stipulating that testing of weapons in space does not constitute deployment. (S)

The question is how far to go in changing our Defense and Space position. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We did get something on Sunday.⁶ It shows the Soviets are anxious to move. There may be opportunity here. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, the opportunity for a swap may be present. (C)

Secretary Shultz: It is just motion. We don't know if there is a swap there. If we could get something we want in SDI it would be a great help. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Remember it's not just SDI that our "sensors run free" proposal is needed for. We also need it for BSTS, our next generation early warning system. (S)

Secretary Shultz: As I understand it we will have a complete proposal on sensors running free. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we have to be able to distinguish between sensors and weapons. That is not agreed within the United States Government. We can't allow the Soviets to see Black programs. So there is movement here, but we have to be very, very careful. (S)

General Powell: Let's turn to the ABM Treaty review. We are agreed that we should press the Soviets to correct their ABM Treaty violations and advise them that the U.S. will not sign START or Defense and Space Treaties until they agree to correct their violations in a verifiable manner. (S)

At issue is how to treat the ABM Treaty Review. According to the terms of the ABM Treaty the review must begin by October 3.

—Our first option is to tell the Soviets that we will not settle on timing and forum for the review if their violations persist.

—The second option is to tell them that the review will begin by October, but that major uncorrected violations could raise serious questions as to the future of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Secretary Shultz, would you like to comment? (U)

Secretary Shultz: As I understand the facts about the K-radar, its position and orientation make it a clear violation. The outer shell is built, but there is nothing inside; the guts are not there. And they have stopped construction. Also my understanding from Admiral Crowe is that the military judgment is that ending the ABM Treaty is not in our interest because the Soviets are more ready to breakout than we are.

⁶ May 1.

Also, ending the ABM Treaty would be hard to sustain politically, both in this country and abroad. So we don't want to abrogate the treaty or get on any track pointing to abrogation. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. We shouldn't get on a track toward abrogating the treaty. That's why I don't understand the State position. If we have an SCC [Standing Consultative Commission] meeting we will be forced to take some action. We should have no SCC meeting until we have a commitment on what they are going to do. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have a commitment. An understanding that they will destroy the radar once we complete a treaty. If we agree we are not going to abrogate, we ought to be on a careful track. If we refuse to review the treaty, we violate it. If we review it we have a tactical problem, but it will have been reviewed. We shouldn't abrogate the treaty, we should work things out. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We agree we don't want to abrogate, although we don't want to keep it forever. But remember they may yet try to go to Thule and Fylingdales. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Mr. President this certainly is esoteric. (U)

General Powell: Meanwhile it gets closer and closer to 3 October. (U)

Secretary Shultz: This is a time bomb. (U)

General Powell: What do we need from the Soviets to schedule a review? What do we accept—blowing up the radar? Or do we schedule the review and explain the failure to destroy the radar will be a material breach. (S)

The President: What about other radars which are violations? (S)

General Powell: The radars at Gomel. (S)

Secretary Shultz: It's a technical violation they can't correct. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Can't both parties agree to delay the review? (S)

General Powell: But they keep pressing for it. (U)

Admiral Crowe: But can't we delay? (U)

Ambassador Rowny: They don't want a delay. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: We are the ones doing the delay. (U)

Secretary Shultz: We won't conclude a Defense and Space or START Treaty unless the K-radar is dealt with satisfactorily. (S)

General Powell: And satisfactory means it has to be destroyed. (S)

Secretary Shultz: They said they would do that, although I don't like to say so in so big a room. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: Even most liberals know the K-radar is a violation and if not corrected there can't be a new treaty. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have a commitment tied to a new treaty, but not tied to the review. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: We need more discussion. It is premature to do anything on this. Why not try to define the discussions we have had during the last three years as the ABM Treaty review. There has been more discussion on that treaty in the last three years than ever before. I suggest we need more discussion and we need to look at this. (S)

General Powell: I believe we have now covered all the issues. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: Well there is one more issue, which is how we record our progress. It is mentioned in the GRIP paper.⁷ Should we have a separate START paper? (S)

General Powell: Yes that's right. There are two options. The first option is a signed report, the second option is an unsigned joint summit statement like we did in Washington. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: A signed report starts you down the road to a framework agreement a la Vladivostok. Congress will lock you in. We much prefer a joint statement. Also a separate report takes away from the Joint Draft Text. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I don't agree with Frank. There is no difference in the report. It is not any more binding. You and Gorbachev should take credit for your accomplishments. A report could be structured to give the history of what we have done and take credit for the history to come. We need something to sign. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We do that in a Joint Statement, but we avoid the risk of a separate signed document. (S)

Attorney General Meese: It is less a legal question than a perception question. The perception with Congress. We can get all we want with a Joint Statement. (S)

Secretary Shultz: But there are somethings *we* want. We want to pin those down. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: There are somethings we don't want, too. (C)

The President: But isn't it a fact that the nay sayers will claim that if we don't have a START Treaty to sign we failed. We ought to defuse that. And a report can do that. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We don't want to create the idea that the game is over. We want to continue to work in Geneva. If we sign a statement, it will slow down the effort in Geneva. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I disagree. (U)

The President: I had in mind a positive statement that would shut off the editorializing. (S)

⁷ Not found.

Secretary Carlucci: If we link Defense and Space we will have a problem. (S)

General Powell: The statement is just on START. (S)

Secretary Shultz: [To Secretary Carlucci] You know what we want. You read it. You have not given me any views. This is the first I have heard that you have a problem with it. (C)

Attorney General Meese: Is there anything in it we might want to back out of later? (S)

General Powell: It is not yet complete. We need to work out the details. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The most important part is not there yet. There are still big blanks. (S)

General Powell: It's no more legal than a joint unsigned statement. The issue is perception. (S)

Attorney General Meese: The danger is that it will be used by Congress. We should avoid putting anything we might want to back away from. (S)

General Powell: But it's no more legally binding? (S)

Attorney General Meese: Legally no, but perceptually yes. (S)

General Powell: I think we should end on this note; this issue is obviously not decided yet. (C)

Thereupon the meeting ended at 3:05 pm.

300. Editorial Note

On May 11, 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the Ambassador's Office of the U.S. Mission in Geneva from 2:55 to 5:30 p.m., in advance of the Moscow Summit scheduled for the end of the month. "Realistically," Shevardnadze acknowledged, "it would not be possible to reach a START agreement by the summit. Even if the ministers agreed on all the basic issues that day, it would be physically impossible to put them all on paper in time. But he would welcome, as the crown of the summit, an impressive document that summarized the results of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and the work prior to Moscow. What the document was called was not important. What was important was to record the results achieved." (Memorandum of Conversation, May 11, 2:55–5:30 p.m.; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 149.

Shultz and Shevardnadze met again that evening, from 8:20 to 9:50 p.m., at the Soviet Mission. After agreeing to adjourn the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks from May 24 to July 12, they discussed ongoing efforts to craft a summit joint statement, and whether to include a separate statement on START. "The most difficult area," Shultz noted, "was START and Defense and Space. Working groups were already at work and had dealt with three items already, according to the reports the Secretary had heard. The Secretary would be glad to hear any comments Shevardnadze might have, but he was inclined to await a full report from the experts when they had concluded their discussions rather than work in parallel." (Memorandum of Conversation, May 11, 8:20–9:50 p.m.; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 150.

301. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 2:40–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Working Group Reports

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
THE SECRETARY	SHEVARDNADZE
Gen. Powell	Dep. FM Bessmertnykh
Amb. Ridgway	Amb. Karpov
Amb. Kampelman	Gen. Chervov
Amb. Nitze	Amb. Obukhov
Amb. Matlock	Mr. Stepanov
Amb. Glitman	Mr. Tarasenko
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)	Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interp.)	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting it be used to take stock. THE SECRETARY agreed. SHEVARDNADZE asked Amb. Nitze to lead off with a report of his working group's discussion² of NST issues.

NITZE indicated that the two sides had begun by addressing nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made a proposal responding to the proposal the U.S. had made in Moscow on distinguishing nuclear-armed ALCM's covered by START from conventional air-to-surface cruise missiles. As a result, there had been some convergence on this question, and the U.S. had given the Soviet side a paper³ documenting what it believed to be areas of commonality in ALCM limitations.

In particular, Nitze could report that: all currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be considered nuclear armed; future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission, and followed a meeting from 9:10–11:30 a.m. at the U.S. Mission, the memorandum of conversation for which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–88, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 151. The full memorandum of conversation of this meeting is printed in *ibid.*, Document 152. From Geneva, Shultz flew to Brussels before returning to Washington.

² No minutes were found.

³ Not found.

missiles; and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from other bombers. While a number of questions remained to be resolved, including the nature of the differences that would distinguish conventional from nuclear systems, agreement on the basic point that conventional missiles were not subject to START constraints was a significant step forward.

Nitze said that the two sides had also discussed approaches to attributing numbers of ALCM's to heavy bombers. The U.S. proposed to attribute ten warheads to each bomber equipped for ALCM's. The Soviet Union proposed to attribute a number that reflected the number of ALCM's that could be carried for one operational mission.

There had also been extensive exchanges on mobile ICBM verification, suspect site inspection, and sea-launched nuclear armed cruise missiles. While these discussions had been useful in clarifying each side's concerns, Nitze could not report convergence of views on these subjects at the present meeting.

In response to the data the U.S. had provided in Moscow on its strategic forces, Nitze continued, the Soviet side in Geneva had provided certain data of its own. The U.S. had welcomed the start of exchange of data, and looked forward to further exchanges of more detailed information on a reciprocal basis.

On defense and space, Nitze said that the working group had discussed an agreement which would build on the Washington Joint Statement. The U.S. had put forward its ideas for reflecting in the agreement the standard right to respond in the event supreme national interests were jeopardized, and the concept that the two sides' leaders had agreed upon in Washington that, after the expiration of the non-withdrawal period, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The U.S. ideas had taken into account and responded to the proposal made by the Soviet side the previous Sunday.⁴ We hoped that the Soviet side would carefully examine the U.S. counterproposal to resolve the issues standing in the way of working out a joint draft treaty text by the time of the summit. While there had been a useful exchange of views, Nitze could not report progress on the subject at that time.

Nitze said that the U.S. team had elaborated further its idea that neither side object to the other side's space-based sensors. The Soviet response was to distinguish between sensors which were ABM-capable and those which were not. The U.S. proposal was to agree not to object to any space-based sensors.

⁴ May 8.

The U.S. had also emphasized the need to correct Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the particular importance of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar prior to the ABM Treaty Review, which is required to begin by October of the current year.

Asked by SHEVARDNADZE to respond, Obukhov read a statement of his own, key points of which included:

- A reiteration of the Soviet position on dealing with the ABM Treaty in a separate agreement, and of the Soviet offer to discuss the threshold between activities permitted and not permitted by the ABM Treaty;

- Acknowledgement that there had been some convergence of views on mobile missiles;

- Confirmation that SLCM's remained an area of dispute, despite Soviet urging in the working group that the U.S. respond seriously to previous verification proposals and provide a number. Obukhov said that the U.S. proposal for a unilateral declaration offered no basis for an agreement.

- ICBM and SLCM sublimits had been discussed, with the U.S. still insisting upon excluding SLCM's;

- The view that the two sides seemed to be thinking along similar lines with respect to suspect sites, with the U.S. to provide additional data, including the criteria for identifying suspect sites;

- A statement that the Soviet side would study the U.S. proposal for an agreement on mutual notification of test launches;

- Agreement that agreement had been reached in the areas Nitze had indicated on ALCM counting.

THE SECRETARY commented that three things emerged from the two presentations. Building on work done at the Washington summit, further work since then had clearly produced further progress. The most significant advances had come in the area of verification. It was no mean achievement to have pulled together a joint draft text for the verification protocols and MOU, and to have gotten well into an exchange of data. So there was a need to work on how to express this at the summit.

The Secretary recalled that the two leaders had also emphasized in Washington the importance of completing a START agreement. Ultimately, that goal would be achieved. But it was now apparent that it would not be by the time of the summit. In their previous meetings, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had always said that they would keep trying to conclude a treaty by the time of the Moscow visit. They both understood that, once one admitted that the goal could not be reached, there would be a slackening of efforts. But at some point they had to start briefing in such way that the public would focus not on the

absence of a treaty, but on the progress already made and both sides' determination to keep working on the problems that remained.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the working group report underscored the progress which had been made in some important areas since the Washington summit. The Foreign Minister's view was that delegations in Geneva should now direct their efforts to seeking more progress between then and the summit in key areas. They should also begin intensive work to prepare documents for the Moscow summit. Such documents could give some sense of how much had been done both before and after the Washington summit. Shevardnadze agreed there had been progress; a good foundation had been built for future work.

The two sides' representatives should now work hard to prepare the necessary documents, Shevardnadze repeated. It would also be a good idea to have a good document on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The fundamental issues had already been discussed. There was agreement that the basis for an agreement should be the Washington statement; everything else should be in the protocol. The object should be to have the agreement itself in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the period of non-withdrawal at the summit itself.

As for mobile ICBM's, Shevardnadze sensed some progress had been made. Now was the time to complete things, especially if the U.S. came forward with a number on launchers and warheads. Given the progress already achieved on verifying mobiles, it should be possible to develop some concrete language on the issue in Moscow. Any document should also reflect the progress made on ALCM's. On verification, Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that much had been achieved.

Shevardnadze said he remained concerned over the "passive" situation with respect to SLCM's. There had been no movement at all on this issue; it would be well if there were some before Moscow. Everything at this point depended on the U.S. The Soviets had put forward their ideas and were ready for a serious discussion.

That then, Shevardnadze concluded, was the task to be set before the negotiators—to work toward these objectives by the summit. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary that the time had come to admit there would be no START agreement by then. But the progress which had been achieved could be noted. It would be possible to state that there should be a Treaty.

Responding to some of the areas Shevardnadze had singled out, THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. thought the Washington Statement's language on the ABM Treaty was fine. Unfortunately the two sides differed over what it meant. So that language could not simply stand alone. That was what lay behind our desire to discuss the issue. The Secretary did not believe that the question of where to put what

as between the agreement itself and a protocol was as important as reaching agreement on the substance of the matter. But the key was to agree on the main points of what we were discussing. The Secretary felt that some progress had been made. Since the last ministerial, there had been movement on developing a joint draft text. That was a good sign, but there was still work to do.

As for mobile ICBM's, there was progress being made. We did have a number in mind. We were ready to share it when we were comfortable with verification. The Secretary could tell Shevardnadze our number was substantially lower than that the Soviet side had put forward. But we felt that if verification could be dealt with satisfactorily, mobiles could be a positive element in the strategic structure. So we were prepared to continue to work on the issues between Geneva and the summit. This could lead to a discussion of numbers.

The Secretary noted that there seemed to be some convergence of views on ALCM's. On SLCM's, we had already advised the Soviet side of our view that the verification schemes which had been advanced were, on the one hand, not sufficiently reliable, and, on the other, very intrusive. They gave insufficient confidence but would impose serious operational difficulties on our Navy. These considerations had led us to propose that the issue be dealt with by means of unilateral declarations. We had not been able to put a number to the verification concept proposed by Moscow. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union could accept our concept, we could provide a number.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand one thing. The Soviet side had made SLCM verification proposals which covered the main elements. Why could not a discussion begin on that basis, maybe even after the summit, with the objective of identifying positive and negative elements in the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze seemed to be suggesting something between a unilateral declaration and a verifiable number, i.e., a situation where there would be a number established and there would be things which gave comfort on verification, even though there was agreement that the verification regime was not totally satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the declaratory approach was not consistent with dealing with the problem. Moscow saw SLCM's as a component part of all other strategic offensive arms. They should therefore be treated the same as other such weapons. A unilateral declaration was not sufficient. That was why there was a need for discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that we were working on this within the USG. As we had something new to say on the subject, we would want to talk about it. But the question did arise as to whether the standard of verification both sides had thus far demanded could realistically be applied to SLCM's.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that unless the discussion began, there would never be an answer. He asked what the ministers should take up next.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Glitman report on the work he and Chervov had done.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

302. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 20, 1988, 2:12–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN
General Robert T. Herres, USAF
General Carl Vuono, USA
Admiral A. Carl Trost, USN
General Alfred M. Gray, USMC
General Monroe Hatch, USAF
General Welch, USAF

Secretary of State Shultz

Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft

Chief of Staff Howard Baker
Mr. Kenneth Duberstein
Mr. Marlin Fitzwater

General Colin Powell,
Ambassador John Negroponte

Colonel Robert Linhard, NSC
Captain Linton Brooks, NSC
Colonel Don Snider, NSC

The meeting started at 2:12 p.m. with opening remarks by the President.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS-PRES MEETING, May 20, 1988. Secret. Drafted on June 2. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. All brackets are in the original text.

The President: As you know, you have a unique responsibility to assess the ability of the United States to perform the military tasks required to execute our strategy and ensure our security. This is particularly true in your evaluation of the Arms Reduction proposals that we plan to put forward. I would like to know what you think we can successfully negotiate at the Summit.

General Powell: Secretary Carlucci, would you like to say a few words.

Secretary Carlucci: I think we should go directly to the Chiefs; Admiral Crowe.

Admiral Crowe: I've just returned from my wife's home in Oklahoma. The American people are mighty proud of you, Mr. President, and of what you're doing. Arms control is highly popular right now, and is being well received by the American public.

From the JCS standpoint, we are happy that you are seeking treaties of substance that make a difference. You want agreements that provide for verifiability and for stability. We can support treaties of that sort.

—The INF Treaty is a good Treaty. We told you in December of last year that it was militarily sufficient and would enhance U.S. and Allied security. There has been nothing to change our minds since then.

—With respect to a START agreement, however, this situation is a bit more difficult. The current proposals are certainly sound and in the right direction. I want to emphasize strongly, however, that among all your advisors the Joint Chiefs must pay the most attention to details. The detail is fundamental; specifics are substance. We're very interested in making sure we get the counting rules, definitions, and procedures down correctly.

—We were charged early in the Administration to ensure that any proposal that we made provided relative to the forces of the Soviet Union that the U.S. could possess sufficient force to execute our national security with reasonable assurance of success. [Note: the reference is to the initial tasking in NSSD 1-82.]² The Chiefs have spent hundreds of hours working on this tasking. We are now meeting every day on arms control.

—To work through the START labyrinth takes a lot of time, and right now going beyond our current positions—if you ask us to examine additional positions, I would have to say that the Chiefs don't have a lot of ability to do more.

² NSSD 1-82, "U.S. National Security Strategy," February 5, 1982, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

I would like to ask the individual Chiefs to provide their views on where they stand in areas that they're interested in. The first item is SLCM. Admiral Trost.

Admiral Trost: Mr. President, let me talk to you about SLCM. SLCM came up as a part of START, even though it's a tactical system. Initially, we called it tactical, and we said it was inappropriate to include it in START at all. However, at Reykjavik, you told the Soviets that we would participate in finding ways to limit long-range nuclear SLCM, and now we are unable to divorce it from START.

—The Chiefs subsequently set forth what we could *not* accept with respect to SLCM:

1. Limits on conventional capability;
2. Some range threshold above which all SLCMs would be considered nuclear;
3. Anything that imposes problems with our policy of not confirming or denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons; and
4. Intrusive verification that would compromise our operational security or our ability to conduct our mission.

—The Soviets have proposed platform limits, suggested that we should identify a range above which all SLCMs are considered nuclear, and sought limits on the types of ships which can carry SLCM.

—The Soviets have a large number of shorter range nuclear-tipped, sea-launched cruise missiles that are of concern to us.

—The Interagency Group agrees that there are no verification procedures currently on the books that would help us in verifying nuclear-armed SLCMs. [At this point, Admiral Trost gave the President some pictures of U.S. SLCMs. They included a picture of a Tomahawk land-attack missile/nuclear (TLAM-N), Tomahawk land-attack missile/conventional (TLAM-C), a Tomahawk land-attack missile that drops bomb-lets and an antiship version of the Tomahawk.]

—We have planned to put sea-launched cruise missiles on a number of our submarines, including the 637 and the 688 class and the new SSN-21's. On surface ships we have them in armored box launchers or vertical launch tubes. [Here a second picture was shown the President.]

—The real issues are what we plan to do with them and why the Soviets are worried about them. We plan to put them on about 100 subs and about 90 surface ships. The Soviets are worried because this spread of capability is better than having all nuclear capability bottled up in our 15-carrier battle groups.

—The Soviets, on their part, have lesser needs for sea-launched cruise missiles, but they are building both supersonic and subsonic variants. All the Soviets' proposals hurt with respect to the points that I made earlier. They certainly hurt our operational flexibility.

—The bottom line is SLCM are too valuable to trade away, especially if our conventional capability could be capped.

—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

—We considered these conventional SLCMs in planning for the Libya raid,³ although they weren't used. And we plan future growth for this capability, perhaps to a 2000-mile range system with greater accuracy.

—Finally, we told our Allies, and the Congress that if the INF Treaty is agreed, that would be acceptable because we would have both dual-capable air and cruise missiles to back up the INF targets sets that are uncovered by removing Pershing II and GLCM and to compensate for Soviet cheating.

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, the Soviet interest in SLCM may be a piece of a larger pattern of Soviet activity. The Soviets may be after the United States' Navy, and, because of its capability, may seek to involve it in conventional arms talks. They would love to cut into our naval superiority. The next two issues, which I think we should turn to General Welch for, are ALCMs and mobile ICBMs.

General Welch: Mr. President, we in the JCS agree that mobile ICBMs could help stability if both sides have them and a verifiable mode limiting them to a specific number. However, these things are very difficult to verify. We need to get a complete set of rules before we drop the current unit ban on mobiles.

—The planned U.S. deployment mode would simplify verification. The approach we have in mind for both our road- and rail-mobile ICBMs would keep systems restricted to garrison during peacetime except for exercise and operational dispersals.

—If the Soviets agreed to a similar mode, then we would be prepared to propose a number of between 500–700 mobile reentry vehicles and to fall off our current position banning mobile ICBMs. But the Soviets must agree to deployment modes lending themselves to verification.

—With respect to air-launched cruise missiles, counting rules and verification procedures need to be worked out. The United States has offered such procedures.

—As for counting rules, the U.S. approach is simple and practical. Our approach is an indirect approach, attributing to each bomber a number of ALCMs. We would then count ALCMs by multiplying that number times the number of bombers for that type. The Soviets want a more complex, direct counting rule that would count both ALCMs

³ Reference is to the U.S. air strikes on targets in Libya on April 15, 1986.

and bombs. They would limit all ALCMs, both deployed and non-deployed. We don't know how to verify such limits and they would not add to stability.

—To help the process, we have agreed that existing ALCMs with both conventional and nuclear capability would all be considered nuclear, and, in the future, that any conventional ALCM that we say is conventional would be distinguishable. The Soviets want to capture *all* future ALCMs under the nuclear rules. We can't accept that, but we are ready to distinguish nuclear ALCMs and conventional ALCMs.

—In sum, Mr. President, we have a good solution if the Soviets are willing.

Admiral Crowe: Verification, Mr. President, is very pervasive. It plays in all the issues. In every case, we need very complicated and detailed rules. Maybe I can ask General Gray to add a little bit more on this.

General Gray: If we had perfect knowledge of our future requirements and how our future strategic forces will be structured, then we could simply devise rules for verification that would fit these requirements in the most cost effective way. Unfortunately, Mr. President, our knowledge is *not* perfect, and we face dollar constraints in the future and Congressional pressures that are beyond our control. To deal with this, we must protect our flexibility. We must try to design verification which meets our needs, while still maintaining flexibility, and, in the process, we must: (1) carefully protect our future force structure options; and (2) watch the cost of verification itself in terms of manpower, resources, and dollars.

Admiral Crowe: The bottom line with respect to verification is we've just got to get it right. This has been a very painful process, and we all recognize its complexity. Now, let's turn to Defense and Space and hear from General Herres.

General Herres: I'd like to review what we want and what they want in the Defense and Space area. The Soviets want to have us commit to nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty and they want that recorded in a START agreement. We want more protection for U.S. rights, once we give that commitment not to withdraw. We want that protection recorded in a separate treaty.

—We need assurance, first of all, that our surveillance and warning satellites that are *not* components or potential components of an ABM system should run free. Otherwise needed modernization could be a treaty violation. This should be easy; it is in the Soviet interest as well.

—Today, both sides have early warning satellites. They are totally passive. In the future, they may become more active; therefore, we need agreement on how to distinguish between a sensor and a weapon

as active sensors illuminate the objects about which they are trying to gather information.

—There is currently no interagency agreement on a suitable definition of a sensor. I don't think we are that far apart, but we need to work it out. We need this definition because the treaty will be in effect for a long time, the issue is *very* important, and it could spill over very quickly as a precedent in other areas. Finally, we need it because it would be key to compliance and verification.

—Having worked sensors, we then need to know what testing we can do before deployment. Now we have ground test ranges. We must be able to define permissible SDI testing in space.

—Our initial idea was to define a test range in space. What we mean by that is to try to agree on a set of procedures so each side would be able to show the other that they were not deploying weapons when they were testing.

—The problem here is, again, boundary definitions. It's very hard to make sure we get what we want while still protecting U.S. systems. This is a difficult problem, but I believe it's not insurmountable.

—The implications of both of these items—sensors and test range in space—is that we must protect a number of sensitive U.S. space programs, not just SDI. All agree on this point, but as Admiral Crowe said, the substance is in the detail. We must go slowly. We must not let the Soviets force a choice between compliance and compromise of covert, sensitive U.S. programs.

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, with respect to Defense and Space, and, in fact, in other areas, we found that the answers that we need must evolve over time. Key players in the Administration need time to think about and adjust their thinking and be comfortable with the answers that we want. We'll get there, but it's a tough job.

—Finally, we should talk about the conventional and CW areas. For this, let's turn to General Vuono.

General Vuono: With respect to conventional arms control issues, Mr. President, our intent in all arms control has always been to increase our security and reduce the chances of war. We can apply the same concept to what we pursue in the conventional area.

—There are two things we have to keep in mind: (1) we need to be careful not to involve dual-capable systems, and thus undercut our residual nuclear capability; and (2) we need to remember *always* that this is an Alliance-to-Alliance problem, not a bilateral US-Soviet problem. We worry about anything the Soviets do which would result in further elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe.

—With respect to the chemical weapons area, we continue to favor a complete ban on chemical weapons. Now it's very difficult for us to

verify such a ban, and that remains our toughest problem. We also have to remember that this is a multilateral problem and, again, not a bilateral problem. We need to find some way to cover ourselves during the transition to the complete implementation of the ban. We need a security stockpile or some method to ensure that we can maintain our security as we work towards the ban.

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, these are the JCS views on the arms control issues they are most concerned about. We are proud of the progress that we've made in INF and START. We know, Mr. President, that you want to try to document that progress at the Summit. We caution against using any such document for taking any new steps. We'll give a memo to General Powell that captures *all* of the Chiefs' feelings. We hope it will help.

—This is a frustratingly slow process. We're frustrated too. The Soviets are patient negotiators. We must work patiently like they do. I think that now they may be testing us to see how far we will go.

—However, Mr. President, I can assure you that the Joint Chiefs support the basic goals you have set forth. We are committed to achieve them. We can't predict the outcome, but we're willing to try as hard as we can. Are there any questions?

[No questions]

—In that case, we'll move on to regional issues.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to START.]

—The only remaining item is the status of military-to-military talks and exchanges. These were a spinoff from the last Summit. They are being executed under the principle of reciprocity. The charter was really laid down in Secretary Carlucci and Minister Yazov's meeting in Bern, Switzerland. I have invited General Akhromeyev to come to the United States. He has agreed in principle, but there is no date yet. I hope it will be in July. We will proceed carefully and analyze what is achieved in these talks after the Ackremeyov visit. We see the possibility of future exchanges from war colleges, exchanges by high-level commanders and commanders in various regions of the world, and perhaps exchanges of sports teams.

—That's all we have; we're open to questions.

The President: Does anyone have anything to ask?

Secretary Carlucci: Mr. President, with respect to the last point, I will meet my counterpart, General Yazov, on the margins of the Summit.

The President: Admiral Crowe, I'll look forward to seeing what you send to General Powell.

Secretary Shultz: The military-to-military talks that Frank Carlucci mentioned offer unique opportunities. The Soviets have responded with enthusiasm. What we need to do—Frank and I agree—is to sit

down and see what we want so we can operate one coordinated strategy with both military-to-military contacts and diplomatic plans supporting each other. We ought to decide what we want now and then figure out how to manage the meetings and plan for the meetings to achieve it. In short, we need to plan. This will not be difficult to do.

Admiral Trost: We'll get a signal from the Soviets early in June as we go to the INCSEA talks [periodic discussions under the Incidents at Sea Agreement]. This time they've offered the INCSEA delegation to meet with the Soviet Chief of Naval Operations; this is a real new step. There will also be a visit to Leningrad.

Secretary Carlucci: I agree that we ought to get together on a plan, but we do have objectives: (1) to better understand Soviet doctrine and what they mean when they say they are shifting from offense to defense, and (2) to reduce dangerous military incidents involving the forces of both sides. We are making very slow progress.

Admiral Crowe: I have another objective. I want to get my counterpart, Akhromeyev, to get to *know* our country and know about the U.S. military. I think it's very important for him to have a good sense of knowing who he's dealing with, and as he learns he may change and modify his views.

The President: Tell him if there is no meeting of the minds, we're going to start recruiting Afghanistan freedom fighters.

Admiral Crowe: We're not that mad at the Soviets yet.

The President: But you know, what you said is true, they are very unknowledgeable about us. This touches on a great frustration of mine. How can I get Gorbachev into a helicopter to fly from here almost anywhere to see workers' houses with their cars and lawns and pools? How can I convince him that it's for real and not a Potemkin village?

I believe that Gorbachev is inclined to believe his country's propaganda about us and has no real picture about our country. You know, he did go to Italy with his wife and get a car and drive around as a tourist. I wish I could encourage him to do the same here.

Admiral Crowe: In Italy, I'm sure when he did that he discovered how well a country can run without a government.

General Powell: Have you any more questions, Mr. President?

The President: No, I think that's all.

Admiral Crowe: We wish you success at the Summit, sir.

The meeting ended at 3:00 p.m.

303. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 20, 1988

I. PURPOSE

To conduct a final review of U.S. arms reduction positions on START, Defense and Space, and Soviet ABM Treaty compliance in preparation for the impending Moscow summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Your Moscow meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will deal with all four aspects of the U.S.–Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since you had the opportunity to review other areas last week.

I believe the meeting should focus on START, Defense and Space, Soviet ABM Treaty Compliance, and the impending ABM Treaty Review. These are the areas which I believe will occupy the most attention in Moscow; in other areas we will simply be reviewing existing positions during the summit.

In START there are three significant issues to discuss:

—How much detail to provide the Soviets on our declaratory approach to limiting sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). All agree that our approach ultimately should be based on reciprocal declarations covering nuclear-armed SLCM of all ranges and that we could state our intent not to acquire more than 1500 such nuclear-armed SLCMs. At issue is the tactical question of whether to provide the Soviets with details now, or wait until closer to end-game. This issue is largely moot since the Soviets show little interest in our declaratory approach.

—How to induce the Soviets to accept our position on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). We seek to attribute 10 ALCM to each ALCM-carrying bomber. This is less than the maximum load but approximates the actual operational load. Thus far the Soviets have insisted on attributing unrealistically high (20+) numbers of ALCMs to our bombers. Recently, however, they have shown interest in an approach close to ours, but where their bombers would be attributed a smaller number than ours, reflecting their actual lesser capability. Most of your advisors

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 190, 05/32/1988. Secret. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

favor pursuing this approach in Moscow. Agreement on such a counting rule could open the way for reaching agreement on other disputed elements of our ALCM position.

—How to proceed with regard to mobile ICBMs. This is the most complex START issue. Our proposed mobile ICBM verification scheme has been completed. There are a number of issues requiring resolution; we are working to have details completed before the summit so that they can be presented in Moscow. Assuming that we do, your advisors disagree on whether to propose specific numerical limits for mobile ICBMs and if so what numbers to use. Secretary Carlucci, supported by the JCS, would not discuss numbers until the Soviets accept our verification scheme. He also recommends advance consultations with Congress to ensure their support for our own mobile ICBM programs. Secretary Shultz and ACDA Director Burns would discuss specific numbers once our verification scheme is tabled, without waiting for a Soviet reaction. All agree that a range of 500–700 mobile ICBM warheads is an appropriate limit, although Secretary Carlucci, supported by Ambassador Rowny, would require the Soviets to eliminate one heavy ICBM warhead for each mobile ICBM warhead they deploy.

In Defense and Space, the issue is how to deal with Soviet suggestions for some form of abbreviated agreement based on the deliberately ambiguous language of the Washington summit statement. I expect the Soviets may push for some form of signed document in this area in Moscow. We are working to complete our own draft, but have not resolved all issues. All agree we should counter with a joint summit statement (as at the Washington summit) and should reject Soviet attempts to include Defense and Space in the separate report we will complete on START. Additional details are at *Tab D*.²

The final issue is how to deal with the 5-year ABM Treaty review in the context of Soviet ABM Treaty violations (e.g. Krasnoyarsk and Gornyi). Under the ABM Treaty, we are required to conduct a review before October 3, 1988, at which point, if Soviet violations are not corrected, some might favor declaring that there has been a material breach of the ABM Treaty by the Soviets and taking appropriate (and as yet undetermined) U.S. actions in response. Others believe that we should simply conduct the ABM Treaty review at the summit, making it clear to the Soviets that we will conclude no further agreements on strategic arms until Soviet ABM violations are corrected. We have been deferring a decision on the ABM Treaty review for some time; I have included in your opening talking points the suggestion that it is time to reach a decision. At a minimum, we must decide now if we want

² Not attached.

to conduct the review at the summit so that the necessary preparations can be completed expeditiously. Additional details are at *Tab E*.³

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

Participants at *Tab B*.⁴

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

White House photographer only.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

The agenda is at *Tab A*.⁵ I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at *Tab C*.⁶ We will then review, in turn, START issues, Defense and Space issues and ABM Treaty compliance. No decisions are required at the meeting; decisions are needed prior to the summit.

³ Not attached.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Not attached.

⁶ Not attached.

304. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 23, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

US Options for Arms Control at the Summit

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. Gregg Fuller (Office of the Vice President)

State

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Ambassador Edward Rowny

White House

Chief of Staff

Kenneth Duberstein

Colin L. Powell

John Negroponte

Marlin Fitzwater

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 190, 05/32/1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

Defense

Secretary Frank Carlucci
Ambassador Ronald Lehman

Treasury

Secretary James Baker, III

OSTP

William Graham

CIA

Judge William Webster
Mr. Jay Castillo

NSC

Robert E. Linhard

Energy

Secretary John Herrington

JCS

Admiral William Crowe
Admiral Jonathan Howe

OMB

Director James Miller

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:02 p.m. The President opened the meeting as follows:

—This is our last chance to meet as a group before my final meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

—Last week we discussed areas other than arms reduction.² Today, I want to focus on START, Defense and Space, and the ABM Treaty.

—I need your advice in two areas.

—First, what should we try to accomplish in Moscow to further our START and Defense and Space goals?

—Second, what are we going to do about what George Shultz referred to at our last meeting as a “time bomb?”³ I mean, of course, the ABM Treaty Review.

—We’ve been putting off decisions in this area, but we can’t do so forever. I need your advice on how to proceed.

—Looking to the future, even though we weren’t able to have START and Defense and Space treaties ready for signature at this meeting, we musn’t stop our efforts.

—I want to leave as a legacy as complete and coherent an arms reduction position as I can.

General Powell: We’ve discussed a number of the issues in the last two NSPGs. Today, we’ll focus only on those arms control issues where additional discussion is needed.

—Among them the ABM Treaty Review is extremely important. As the President has said, it is a time bomb.

² On May 17, Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Planning Group to discuss regional affairs and human rights in advance of the upcoming Moscow Summit. The minutes of that meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–88, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 154.

³ See Document 299.

—First, procedural points. We agreed that there would only be a START/Defense and Space Working Group at the Summit—no other arms control Working Groups.

—Well, let's start in on cruise missiles as our first substantive issue. Up to now, we've been insisting on a discounting rule in which we would attribute 10 ALCMs to every ALCM heavy bomber under the START counting rules. The Soviets want our bombers to count with a higher number. Lately, they have been hinting that they may accept operationally realistic loads (i.e., smaller numbers), *if* we would accept a different number for each type of bomber associated with ALCM carriage. For example, right now, most agencies would agree that if the Soviets would accept 10 or less for the US B-52 bomber, we could accept six or more for the BEAR-H bomber and eight or more for the BLACKJACK. I think that's the way, Mr. President, this issue plays out. Perhaps Secretary of Defense Carlucci would like to start the discussion.

Secretary Carlucci: The basic problem that we have is we have no loading information at all on the BLACKJACK bomber. We prefer all be counted as 10, but we are not opposed to the other figures.

We prefer to count 10 across the board for all ALCM-carrying bombers. We're just not certain that eight is the right number for the BLACKJACK.

The President: If we count six and eight, wouldn't that give them somewhat of an advantage? I mean, couldn't they load a hell of lot more on their bombers than those numbers?

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, we're doing the same thing.

The President: You mean we can, in fact, carry 20 on our B-52H?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we can.

Secretary Carlucci: Mr. President, we need discounting to avoid bumping into the 6000 limit.

Secretary Shultz: I don't have any expertise on how to load a bomber, but I understand that by counting six for BEAR-H and eight for the BLACKJACK, we use parallel procedures like our counting 10 for the B-52H. In other words, Mr. President, I think they're fair numbers.

Secretary Carlucci: I think that would be okay if you want to go that way.

The President: Well, we should recognize that we do this kind of thing better than they do. It's an area of natural superiority, isn't it?

Admiral Crowe: Yes, it is, and they know it is. So I'm not sure that they're going to give us this. But certainly, the numbers we've just talked about have an element of fairness.

Secretary Carlucci: Ron Lehman thinks that we need more flexibility for the B-52 so that we can change the number when we go to the B-1.

General Powell: General Burns, Ambassador Nitze, do you have any comments? (Neither offered any.)

Ambassador Rowny: I think what we ought do, Mr. President, if they say that they want six and eight for their bombers and will give us 10 for ours, we ought grab it and run.

Secretary Carlucci: That's okay by me.

Admiral Crowe: That's okay by me too.

General Powell: Okay, let's now move to mobile ICBMs. The decisions on mobile ICBMs verification are pending. If they're ready for the Summit, and I believe they will be, the issue will be what number to use with them. Some feel that we should not propose any number associated with mobile ICBMs until the Soviets accept our complete verification package. Therefore, only after accepting such package should we talk about either a range of numbers like 500–700 or a single-point number like 700 or a number that's imbedded in the 1540 heavy warhead limit. Others feel we should put down the numbers at the Summit so that we can have a complete and coherent position.

Secretary Shultz: I guess I'm taking the negotiator's point of view, kind of in between. We have not laid down our verification regime which we should get down as quickly as we can and then have a back and forth on verification. If it looks agreeable to the Soviets, then we ought let the negotiator use his judgment when he puts a number down. We need to emerge from the Summit with a clear statement of what we're for. We should not give them a number until the thrust is clear that the regime we propose will make it. But we can't wait until we've got it all marked down before we begin to talk numbers.

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. Let's lay down our verification regime first before going any further, and certainly before putting down numbers. From our point of view, Mr. President, we don't know if we're going to have mobile ICBM's because of the Congress. The worst of all worlds would be to agree to let them have mobiles and then not get a US mobile program ourselves. Therefore, it's very important that we get the verification first.

Secretary Shultz: You know, I took it from the remarks made by General Welch last Friday⁴ that the issue is whether they will accept the basing mode scheme we have in mind, and the material that Bill circulated⁵ (Bill Webster, the DCI) shows high marks for being able to verify deployed systems.

⁴ See Document 302.

⁵ Not further identified.

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, that's true, but the problem is in non-deployed systems.

Admiral Crowe: I think a lot of our verification is generally in good shape except for the area of suspect-site inspection.

General Powell: I think the whole package will be there shortly. OSD, as I understand it, wants to complete the entire package and get Soviet acceptance, not just have a feel that the Soviets think the package is pretty good. State, on the other hand, wants to have the package presented, and if there's any receptivity on the Soviets' part, put down the number so that we have a complete numerical picture.

Secretary Shultz: I hope, Frank, that you don't mean by complete that they must sign up to all the language we put down.

Secretary Carlucci: No, all we want them to do is to agree on the type regime—just to agree with us on the fundamental points.

Secretary Shultz: We agree. Let's just stop the discussion there.

The President: Will someone tell me why we wouldn't be better off with no mobiles? It seems like their mobiles are bigger than ours and they have a bigger program.

Secretary Shultz: If we have no mobiles, then we're only going to have fixed silos. Fixed silos can be taken out by accurate weapons. They're an invitation to a first strike.

Secretary Carlucci: You know, Mr. President, we don't advocate launch on warning, but they do have two types of mobiles ready to deploy and we have none. They've out done us. It would be no good to endorse mobiles if we had none for ourselves.

Secretary Shultz: We must be able to deploy what we want to deploy under a treaty or no arms control makes sense.

Admiral Crowe: We do have mobiles now, Mr. President, at sea, and if fixed ICBM silos become very vulnerable, it would be more of a problem for them than for us because they have a higher percentage of their forces in ICBMs.

Secretary Shultz: I agree. They're going to mobiles no matter what we do.

Judge Webster: I agree. They are going to mobiles.

General Powell: Except perhaps the SS-24 plant explosion, will settle them down a little bit. (General laughter.) Whatever the number, should it be within the 1540 or not?

Secretary Carlucci: This has always been our position. We have always taken the position that they should be forced to trade off between mobiles and heavies.

Secretary Shultz: No, no, no, that's not right. We had a number of 1650 at one time and we dropped it. You know, we want to get 50%

reduction from heavies; we shouldn't come out with that as an alternative to mobiles.

Secretary Carlucci: I agree, so let's put the number in as a subset for the 1540.

Secretary Shultz: No, no, no, 1540 should be heavy only.

Secretary Carlucci: From the beginning, we said we wanted to force the Soviets to trade heavies for mobiles.

General Powell: I can see that this is not as much of a subordinate issue as I thought. Chiefs, do you have anything you would like to add?

Admiral Crowe: No.

General Powell: The Chiefs are open-minded about this. If we get it in the 1540 number, that's okay, but if not, that's okay too.

The President: Tell me again, the 1540 number is 1540 warheads, right?

Secretary Shultz: That's right—1540 warheads on heavy missiles.

Secretary Baker: Treasury agrees with the Joint Chiefs.

Ambassador Rowny: We need to get the heavies. If we get a flight-test ban for future heavy flight tests, that's okay; if not, let's put the mobiles under the 1540. That would force them to get rid of heavies that way.

General Burns: The whole mobile issue can be looked at as a litmus test to whether the Soviets really want a START treaty soon. If we get a lot of interest in our mobile verification scheme, and serious interest, then we're probably on course; if not, that'll give us a good indicator that the Soviets are not serious about trying to get a treaty soon. 1540 is a good number to play with; maybe we ought see what the traffic will bear.

The President: In Moscow, then, the key will be how the Soviets react to our verification scheme. We'll need to make some decisions in Moscow once we see their reaction.

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, we could pick a number or a range of numbers.

General Powell: Mr. President, you summarized correctly. As for range, I guess the numbers would be 500–700. Let's turn to Defense and Space.

—We still need to complete our position on Defense and Space—both on sensors and on testing in space.

—On testing in space, State basically takes the position that this idea ought to be negotiated with the Soviets, whereas OSD thinks it should be a unilateral declaration.

—Secretary Carlucci, would you like to start on this subject?

[After some confusion about what the testing issue was about, the Secretary focused on sensors.]

Secretary Carlucci: We favor a unilateral declaration on sensors vice negotiations about them.

Secretary Shultz: You know, this discussion highlights the fact that we can't get straight internally what we want. How can we *possibly* negotiate with the Soviets when we can't even articulate to each other what our position is in a meeting like this?

Secretary Carlucci: We know what we want. We want sensors to run free. We have language to that effect.

General Powell: But we need to pin down both the sensors, Frank, and testing in space.

Admiral Crowe: The idea of sensors has a lot of appeal, but we must be careful about capturing unintended effects. We don't want the Soviets crawling all over our space vehicles. Right now, we don't have any definition of sensors; we need to work on that. And we certainly can have no discussion of testing in space until we've gotten the sensors nailed down.

The President: You're very concerned about sensors—about the distinction between sensors and weapons. You don't have any idea of putting nuclear weapons in space, do you?

Admiral Crowe: No, I'm just talking about regular weapons, like kinetic-kill vehicles. But we still have a problem with sensors, because some sensors can turn into weapons if you get the power up high enough.

Dr. Graham: You know, Mr. President, one way to look at it is you can say let's not look at anything on the ground, you can look at anything you want in space, and what you should look for is to make sure that whatever is up there isn't shooting down ballistic missiles.

Ambassador Rowny: I tried to solve this, and I recommend to you Option C.⁶

Judge Webster: Option C may capture some of my intelligence assets.

Ambassador Rowny: Oh no, it only refers to things in the ABM Treaty terms—it makes no definitions, just explanations, but in a backhanded way it lets you know what it means.

Secretary Shultz: Once again, this conversation confirms my overall view—we work hard to try to understand what we want, but we have not yet found something we're ready to put down on paper and sign. The only thing we can do right now is listen and keep our options open and look for the right opening. We're not in a position to state *anything*.

General Powell: We may still to be able to solve the sensors issues prior to the meeting, but probably not the testing issue.

⁶ An options paper was not found.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, I think we're in a defensive crouch. We also have to deal with the Soviets and with Congress.

Secretary Shultz: Yes, Mr. President, it's kind of hard, because we're trying to talk the Soviets into giving us what the Congress will not give us and they know it. At the same time, as we work on that problem, among ourselves we can't agree on how to put down an explanation of what the hell we want.

General Powell: The Soviets may come at us again with a short D&S treaty, tracking the Washington Joint Statement, but still maintaining all the ambiguity.

Secretary Shultz: You know, we could tell them, as we did before, that the Washington Joint Statement is okay, but at the same time, not only do we agree on the language, but we also agree that we don't agree on what the language means. Therefore, it does not settle anything. We probably want to settle the issue on supreme national interest and on duration.

General Powell: You probably won't be able to solve the supreme national interest issue until all the other elements, including duration, are solved.

Secretary Carlucci: It's not clear to me that you want to solve duration until everything else is solved.

General Powell: Let's turn to the issue of the ABM Treaty Review. The issue here is should we do it on the margins of the Summit?

Secretary Shultz: As you know, Mr. President, this Review must start by 3 October. The Soviets say we ought to get going and get it out of the way. The Review has one major problem, the K-Radar. Other than that, we've been reviewing the Treaty for the past three years. So the question is where do we want to be at the end of the Review? I would think that we want to be at the following position.

—The K-Radar is a violation, and it should be destroyed. But they stopped construction on it and they said that if we sign a D&S treaty, they will take it down.

—I also believe that getting out of the ABM Treaty this year is not in our interest. That's what we've been told by the Joint Chiefs.

—So where we want to be at the end of the year is basically where we are right now. There's certainly no material breach call; that would end the ABM Treaty. One way to do this at the Summit is to simply say that we've been discussing the ABM Treaty for three years, so we'll have a short meeting on the margins and clear the books.

—If we don't do it at the Summit, we need to put a review process in motion, I've got to tell you, it's not likely that they're going to destroy the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Secretary Carlucci: I'm here to tell you, George, that if you come out of the Review with the K-Radar not down, and you don't declare

a material breach, you'll never see a START treaty. There can be *no* review until the K-Radar is down, or if we do have such a review, you've got to call a material breach. And calling a material breach is not the end of the treaty.

General Powell: Helms will put great pressure on us on the Hill to conduct the Review.

Secretary Carlucci: I would prefer to kick it down the street a bit.

Ambassador Rowny: I think what we ought to do is let him hear from the President. You know, he may tear the thing down once he hears our strongest card; once we have you, Mr. President, talk to him face to face to tell him that it's got to come down.

The President: Well, the K-Radar isn't the only issue. I have questions on other radars, don't I?

[Several principals said "Gomel."]

Secretary Shultz: How can you claim a material breach and still retain the ABM Treaty? And by the way, when we call material breach for that, they'll call a tit-for-tat at Fylingdales.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, but we can take compensatory measures.

General Powell: There'll be a lot of pressure on the Hill to do a hell of a lot more than just take compensatory measures.

Secretary Shultz: There isn't going to be any change in the current situation by the time we get to September or October. Why do you want to talk to yourself in that environment? All that's going to happen is that we are going to be perceived as walking away from the ABM Treaty then.

Admiral Crowe: Tell me, what's the difference between destroying and simply keeping the K-Radar in a condition where it won't work?

General Powell: Our position is that the K-Radar has to come down. We need to have it come down because it is a violation, and in order to put us back into compliance with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Dr. Graham: Mr. President, it would take them a lot of time to rebuild the radar, but less time for them to re-equip it.

Secretary Shultz: Yes, time is essential—and an essential consideration when we picked this item in negotiating the Treaty. The feeling was that time would give warning.

Ambassador Nitze: At the time we negotiated the Treaty, we expected it would take five to 10 years to build this kind of radar. You can equip one in a much shorter time. So you'd lose the breakout protection that's involved in the radar. On the other hand, if we don't conduct a review before the 3rd of October, we ourselves will be in violation of the Treaty.

Secretary Carlucci: Well, that's just a technical violation.

Secretary Shultz: Do we want to handle this at the Summit? The question is do we want to handle this at the Summit; and, if not, then what do we do?

Secretary Carlucci: The point, George, is that you're prepared to come out of the Review without taking the K-Radar down and with no declaration of material breach, and I simply am not there.

Secretary Shultz: I disagree. What would you do?

Secretary Carlucci: I'd take compensatory measures.

Secretary Shultz: What do you mean—more money on SDI?

Secretary Carlucci: Well, that's one way to go.

Secretary Shultz: Fat chance.

Judge Webster: Couldn't we do something with confidence-building?

Secretary Shultz: Yes, we've tried that in the Predictability Protocol, trying to work something on confidence-building that might provide an out, but let's not kid ourselves. The Soviets know they have a violation on their hands. It's just a matter of how to handle it.

Admiral Howe: Well, the way I see this, the question is do we do this Review at the Summit, early thereafter in, perhaps, late-June, or later in September or October. But before you can decide the timing, you've got to ask yourselves if the K-Radar is still there, what do we do about material breach—how do we handle the K-Radar. You have to answer that question first.

Secretary Shultz: You know, we all agreed that there would be no START treaty until the K-Radar is down. That's something we should point to.

Admiral Crowe: You know, it's strange that the K-Radar and START are linked. How about another option? Couldn't both sides just decide to change the dates of the Review—maybe slip it for a year by mutual consent?

Ambassador Rowny: I say let the President take his run at Gorbachev and see if they take it down, and then decide what we do after that.

Secretary Shultz: I guess we could try for a one-year delay.

Secretary Carlucci: No you can't. You would leave the President completely politically vulnerable. We've already got dozens of letters from Jesse Helms on why we aren't conducting the Review.

Admiral Crowe: So what.

Secretary Shultz: We all agree that it's a violation. What we're struggling with is how to handle it.

General Powell: Mr. President, we owe you a recommendation. But this, at least, has given you a good feel for the debate on this issue.

—I'd like to turn to one final issue, and that's Nuclear Testing.

—Right now, we have two documents that we're going after—the JVE (Joint Verification Experiment) agreement and the PNET (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty).

—The JVE, Mr. President, is 167 pages long and 37 annexes in all. So far it's under control, but I need each of the Cabinet members to pay very close attention to the input, because if they don't, we're never going to finish this treaty in time for you to sign it.

—For example, I've had at least one agency, recently, that's given me two absolutely conflicting inputs. You have to know that I'm going to be absolutely vicious in getting this treaty complete. So please review the inputs that we get on testing from your agencies, and make sure they represent your views.

—On PNET, we have two problems. One is that the articles are just starting to come back to Washington for review. So we need your cooperation in reviewing them; and secondly, the Soviets have suggested that rather than use CORRTX on any shot above 50 kilotons, we use CORRTX on all shots. But we know that CORRTX is not useful on lower range. We're going to have to sort this one out.

—Finally, in INF, we're driving ahead. Right now, the current minor flap is on Article VI, paragraph 2, where some of our friends want a letter on this subject.

—If there are no other questions, that will conclude the meeting.
The meeting ended at about 2:50 p.m.

305. Editorial Note

On May 27, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 307, "Review of United States Arms Reduction Positions in Preparation for the Moscow Summit." The NSDD set the following U.S. goals for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks for the May 29–June 2 summit: "We will continue to advocate a legally binding sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program"; "We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMs based upon the decision reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National Security Council staff on May 24, 1988. Based on Soviet receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical limits on mobile ICBMs and, if so, what limits to propose"; "If warranted by Soviet movement in other areas, I am prepared to agree to allow testing and moderniza-

tion of silo-based heavy ICBMs subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missiles (but *not* on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United States having an equal right to heavy ICBMs." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 250) The guidance of May 24 was not found.

"Building upon the Reykjavik formula for heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or SRAMs," the NSDD went on to say, "we will seek to resolve additional issues concerning air-breathing weapons in a single, integrated package as follows:—While continuing to prefer a counting rule of 10 ALCMs per bomber, if the Soviets accept our approach to counting rules, we can accept an outcome which meets the following criteria:" (1) "For the U.S., a counting rule of *no more than* 10 ALCMs per B-52;—For existing Soviet bombers, a counting rule of *no less than* 6 ALCMs per BEAR-H and *no less than* 8 ALCMs per Blackjack"; (2) "Provisions for agreeing on counting rules for future bomber types"; (3) "No sublimit on ALCMs or bomber weapons;—No restrictions on conventionally-armed cruise missiles; (4) "1000 km range cut-off for counting nuclear-armed ALCM (acceptable only if the Soviets agree to the remaining elements of our proposal);" (5) "Acceptance of the U.S. position on bomber and bomber weapon distinguishability and verification;" (6) "No constraints on ALCM inventory;" and (7) "Acceptance of the limited right to convert ALCM bombers to non-ALCM bombers and non-ALCM bombers to conventional bombers set forth in the U.S. draft of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol." (Ibid.)

On sea-launched cruise missiles, the NSDD stated that "if the Soviets appear interested in moving from their current position to a declaratory approach, we will base such an approach on reciprocal non-binding declarations of acquisition plans for all nuclear-armed SLCMs regardless of their range. If such a scheme were agreed to, the United States would declare it has no plans to acquire more than 1500 nuclear-armed SLCMs." The NSDD also stated that "We will continue the expanded data exchange begun in Geneva," and ordered the priorities: "—*First priority.* Resolving issues relating to the joint summit statement/separate START statement as required.—*Second priority.* Seeking Soviet agreement to the ALCM position set forth above.—*Third priority.* Setting forth additional details of the U.S. approach to mobile ICBM verification.—*Fourth priority.* Continuing the expanded data exchange." (Ibid.)

In a section on Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Non-compliance and the ABM Treaty Review, the NSDD stated that U.S. officials would reaffirm their "long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty," and "make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in

START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement or destruction of the radar." (Ibid.)

President Reagan arrived in Moscow on May 29 and delivered remarks alongside Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the opening ceremony of the summit. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, volume I, pp. 673–674) In a one-on-one meeting that afternoon in St. Catherine's Hall of the Kremlin, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed previous meetings, human rights, and religion. (Memorandum of Conversation, May 29; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 156.

In an evening meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Secretary of State George Shultz "observed that both sides had hoped there would be a START agreement to sign by the summit. But they also agreed that they wanted a good treaty, not a fast one. Concluding an agreement would take a lot of long, hard work; but it could be done. But more important than the progress which had been made on a START treaty was the fact that the summit had focused attention on the changes which had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Geneva summit." In response, "Shevardnadze noted that, even though it had not proved possible to complete a START agreement, much basic work had been done as a result of the Reykjavik, Geneva, and Washington summits. There was a good foundation to build on. There was greater experience than in the past on such issues as verification, and implementation of the INF agreement would provide 'unique' additional opportunities." Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed that "there were two main areas of START where progress was possible: how to count nuclear ALCM's and mobile ICBM verification." (Memorandum of Conversation, May 29; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 157.

306. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 29, 1988, 9:25–11:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

START

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

AMB Nitze

AMB Kampelman

AMB Hanmer

AMB Cooper

AMB Rowny

AS Lehman

ADM Howe

COL Linhard

Mr. Castillo

Dr. Timbie

Dr. Graham

LTC Richardson

Mr. Mozur (Interpreter)

Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

USSR

MSU Akhromeyev

AMB Obukhov

AMB Kuznetsov

AMB Masterkov

AMB Karpov

AMB Dubinin

GEN Chervov

GEN Starodubov

GEN Lebedev

CPT Beketov

Mr. Khromov

Mr. Batrushev (Int)

NITZE said he would like to begin by addressing START. The instructions to the U.S. side from the President were to see what could be done during the next few days to add to the important elements of the START Treaty that were already agreed. In this spirit, the U.S. side proposed to focus the START discussions especially on ALCMs, building on the progress the sides had achieved at their last meeting, and mobile ICBMs. The sides should also review the other key outstanding START issues and, of course, the U.S. side would be prepared to concentrate on any issue on which the Soviet side felt progress could be made. The U.S. side would also like to continue the data exchange on strategic forces that was begun in Moscow in April. Finally, at some point, the sides would need to turn to the question of the joint statement.

The sides had made some progress on ALCMs in Geneva; they should continue their efforts on that subject in this meeting. On the distinguishability problem, they agreed on three points:

1. All currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be considered to be nuclear-armed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place at the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

2. Future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

3. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers.

The sides should try at this meeting to expand this list. There appeared to be two additional points on which they already agreed:

—Any long-range air-to-surface cruise missile which has been tested and deployed with a nuclear variant—all existing such missiles—may be carried only by a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

—Nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will not be located at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

With regard to other points, the Soviet side had proposed that the means of distinguishing between conventionally armed and nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and between heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles and other heavy bombers, be functionally related, externally observable differences. The U.S. side would be interested in Soviet ideas as to what such differences could be.

The U.S. side had made some additional proposals to aid in distinguishing between bomber types:

—The sides would base at separate locations their heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, their heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and their former heavy bombers.

—Visits of each such class of heavy bomber to airbases of the other classes would be subject to notification.

—The sides would be permitted to conduct on-site inspections of bases for heavy bombers of a type from which nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles had been tested, but which were not so equipped, to confirm that they were not so equipped.

The U.S. side would be interested in the Soviet reaction to these proposals. By way of explanation, the U.S. side did not see how the sides could make functionally related observable differences. To overcome this difficulty, the U.S. side was proposing OSI, as he had just described.

If the sides could agree on these provisions, they would have a good foundation for handling ALCM distinguishability.

The sides should also see if they could reach closure on the ALCM counting rules. The U.S. proposal would attribute an agreed number of warheads to a heavy bomber as follows:

—Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would count as 10.

—Heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, i.e. those equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, would count as 1.

—Those bombers defined in the U.S. draft Treaty as “former heavy bombers” would not count, although conversion would be limited.

The number of ALCMs counted in START would be determined by the number of aircraft equipped to carry nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, multiplied by 10. There would be no limit on the total inventory of ALCMs.

As the U.S. side understood the Soviet approach, the Soviet side differed with it on three points:

—For each type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, the Soviet side would count the number of such missiles for which bombers of that type were equipped.

—The Soviet side would count each heavy bomber equipped for conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles as 1 delivery vehicle and the complement of conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles carried by that bomber as 1 warhead. In other words, the Soviet side would count heavy bombers equipped for conventionally-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles the same way the sides had agreed to count heavy bombers equipped for nuclear bombs and SRAMs.

—The Soviet side would limit the total number of nuclear-armed ALCMs to the number for which heavy bombers would be equipped for one operational mission plus an agreed percentage of non-deployed ALCMs.

On the first point, the U.S. side had made clear its rationale for attributing an agreed number to bombers equipped for ALCMs and basing the count on the number of such bombers. This made sense for both operational and verification reasons. The U.S. side had also made clear its views on the fairness of the number it proposed—10. It believed this number fairly represented the combat potential of the bombers of both sides.

The Soviet side had objected to this number, arguing that it was too low for U.S. bombers and too high for Soviet bombers. The U.S. side didn’t think the number was too low for its bombers; it would attribute to a B-52 equipped for ALCMs the same number of warheads as the largest ICBMs on both sides. Bombers and ballistic missiles differed in speed and in the defenses they faced. Given these differences, the U.S. proposal to count heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs at 10, in the context of the U.S. package proposal, represented a substantial effort to accommodate Soviet concerns.

The Soviet side said that ten was too high a number for its bombers. If so, what did it think the right number would be? The U.S. side could

not address this problem while the Soviet side continued to refuse to say what number it would propose for its bombers.

With regard to the second difference, the U.S. side saw no justification for counting a bomber that carried no nuclear weapons, either as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit or as 1 warhead against the 6000 limit. The sides had already agreed that the bombers and the conventionally armed ALCMs would be distinguishable and that there would be agreed procedures for conversion. There could be no rationale for counting such clearly conventionally armed systems as nuclear delivery vehicles or as nuclear warheads. The U.S. side would note, however, that it had proposed to limit the number of converted, former heavy bombers that a side could possess.

With respect to the third difference, the U.S. side continued to believe that limits on ALCM inventories were inappropriate and would create unnecessary verification difficulties. By counting heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and by attributing an agreed number to each bomber, the sides would sufficiently limit the capability of each side's ALCM force.

The sides should see if they could close on numbers of warheads to attribute to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

If the sides could resolve the distinguishability provisions and reach closure on the counting rules, they could discuss the range threshold issue. As the U.S. side had said before, 600 KM was too low and it preferred that the threshold be 1500 KM, but once the rest of the ALCM package was agreed, the U.S. side could consider a range threshold somewhat lower than 1500 KM.

In this context, the Soviet-proposed sublimit on heavy bomber weapons would be dropped, as the Soviet side had said.

Finally, the sides should try to resolve their differences on bomber conversion. Both sides agreed that a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers could be converted using agreed procedures and thus be removed from the 1600 and 6000 limits. Both sides would permit conversion to reconnaissance, jamming, and tanker aircraft. But the sides should also agree to allow some conversion to bombers capable of carrying only conventional armaments. Nitze wanted to emphasize that these bombers would be converted according to agreed procedures and would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed heavy bombers.

In sum, the U.S. side envisaged the following compromise package for ALCMs:

- A set of agreed distinguishability rules; no restrictions on future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

- Counting rules attributing a number of warheads per heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise

missiles, 1 warhead per heavy bomber equipped for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, and zero for bombers equipped only for conventional arms.

—No constraints on the ALCM inventory.

—No sublimit on heavy bomber weapons.

—Agreement that ALCM bombers could be converted to non-ALCM bombers and that a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers could be converted to reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, tankers, or bombers capable of carrying only conventional armaments.

—A range threshold somewhat lower than 1500 KM.

As Nitze had said two weeks previously in Geneva, resolution of the ALCM question would be a significant step toward completion of a START Treaty, and would be a positive and concrete result of this Summit.

Nitze said the U.S. side had a paper (Tab 1)² summarizing the points he had just made, which it wanted to pass to the Soviet side. This paper was in English; the U.S. side would provide a Russian version the next morning.

Turning to the question of mobile ICBMs, Nitze stated that the US position was to ban mobile ICBMs. The U.S. side had said that, if the sides could agree on specific measures that would provide for effective verification of limits on mobile ICBMs, it could consider allowing a strictly limited number of such systems. And the U.S. side had sketched out the approach it had in mind for a mobile ICBM verification package. It was now prepared to address how it would verify the declared mobile ICBMs, launchers and infrastructure.

Conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs and deployment of liquid-fueled mobile ICBMs would be prohibited. For road-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to small “Restricted Deployment Areas,” or RDAs, specified in the MOU. The U.S. side had in mind that an RDA would be approximately 25 square kilometers in size. Each RDA would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each RDA, the number of structures unique to mobile ICBM launchers would be limited to no more than the number of missiles on launchers specified for that RDA in the MOU. These structures would be described in the MOU.

—A limited number of times per year, each side would be required, at the request of the other, to carry out measures at the RDAs to enhance observation by NTM.

² Attached but not printed, at Tab 1, is a May 29 paper entitled “ALCM WORKSHEET.”

—Missiles would be allowed to depart RDAs for routine movements, e.g., movements for training, maintenance and testing. Such movements would be subject to prior notification and would involve no more than an agreed percentage of the total mobile force at any one time.

—Dispersal of mobile ICBMs and launchers from the RDAs would be permitted. Such dispersals would be of two types:

- Exercise dispersals, which would be limited in duration and frequency.
- Operational dispersals, which would be for national security purposes; there would be no constraints on duration and frequency of operational dispersals, but, in practice, they should occur only rarely.

—Notification of a dispersal would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal began and notification of return would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal ended. All dispersals would be assumed to be exercise dispersals, unless the dispersing party notified otherwise.

—When a force was one day from the mandated end of an exercise dispersal, the dispersing side would have the option of returning it to its base or notifying that an operational dispersal was in progress. Upon such notification, the dispersing side would be required to state the reason for the operational dispersal.

—Upon return of a dispersed force to RDAs, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road-mobile ICBM force for enhanced NTM measures and/or on-site inspection.

- NTM enhancement measures would involve either moving launchers halfway out of their structures or opening the roofs of the structures, at the discretion of the inspected side.
- Post-dispersal OSI would be additional to those inspections conducted under the quota for short-notice OSI.

—Non-deployed ICBMs of types that had been deployed in road-mobile launchers, and road-mobile launchers that did not contain ICBMs, would be restricted to facilities listed in the MOU or in transit between permitted facilities.

—The non-deployed ICBMs would be limited in number and, except for an agreed number of missiles, would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any RDA and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBM launchers were stored.

—A side could possess no more than an agreed percentage of its road-mobile launchers that would be considered as operational spares not containing deployed ICBMs; such launchers would be located at least an agreed distance from any RDA and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBMs were stored.

—Dedicated mobile resupply vehicles for road-mobile ICBMs would be prohibited.

—There would be a limit on the number of road-mobile training launchers; these training launchers could not be capable of launching ICBMs and would have to be distinguishable from commercial road-mobile vehicles and from road-mobile ICBM launchers by NTM.

For rail-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to a limited number of small rail garrisons, specified in the MOU. Each rail garrison would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each garrison, the number of unique shelters for trains would be limited to no more than the number of trains specified for that garrison in the MOU. No shelter would be capable of holding more cars than the number on a standard train.

—Each garrison would have no more than a specified number of rail entrance/exits.

—Missiles would be allowed to depart rail garrisons for routine movements and dispersals, subject to notification requirements and limitations comparable to those for departure of road-mobile ICBMs from RDAs.

—Trains with missiles and their launchers would be maintained in one standard configuration, as specified in the MOU, while in the garrison.

—Trains with missiles and their launchers would be allowed to vary from their standard configuration during notified transit to declared maintenance and testing facilities, and during routine movement for training, provided that such variations were reported upon completion of the movement.

—There would be no restriction on the configuration of trains during dispersals.

—Non-deployed rail-mobile missiles and launchers, resupply vehicles and training launchers would be limited in a manner similar to that for the comparable road-mobile items.

In addition to these provisions, the sides would have the right to implement perimeter portal monitoring, at a minimum, at all facilities producing solid rocket motor stages as large as the smallest accountable stage of a treaty-limited mobile ICBM. All accountable stages of mobile ICBMs, and their launchers, would be tagged.

The sides also had to address the possibility of a covert infrastructure. One element for dealing with that would be suspect-site inspection. Two weeks previously in Geneva, the U.S. side had laid out its thinking on suspect-site inspection. It had also expressed its readiness to work with the Soviet side on appropriate procedures to both protect legitimate security interests and assure strengthened confidence in compliance with the agreement. As the Soviet side knew, the Washington Summit Joint Statement included language stating the agreement of the sides on “the right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.” The sides should see if they could agree in this meeting on additional guidelines for SSI that could apply to mobile ICBMs as well as other ballistic missiles, so that further details could be added to the language agreed in Washington.

This was Nitze’s review of the U.S. proposals for a mobile ICBM verification regime. The U.S. side proposed to try to reach agreement

in this meeting on the general provisions Nitze had just outlined; the details would then be negotiated in Geneva.

In sum, the sides should see if they could close on the key elements of mobile ICBM verification. They could then consider the numerical limit for such systems should such systems be permitted. As it had said in Geneva, the U.S. side believed that number should be much lower than the Soviet-proposed number of 1600 mobile ICBM warheads.

While Nitze had the floor, he wanted to address the question of the ICBM warhead sublimit. The positions of the two sides on an ICBM warhead sublimit had been thoroughly discussed; the sides did not need to repeat all the arguments. Instead, they should seek a practical solution that addressed the concerns of both sides. To the U.S. side, the path to such a solution still seemed to lie in Akhromeyev's statement that the Soviet Union would not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads if there was a START agreement. The U.S. side had said it was willing to consider various ways to record this statement, but the Soviet side had not followed up on the U.S. suggestion. It would be helpful to ascertain the exact nature of the Soviet problem with the U.S. suggestion.

This concluded Nitze's presentation. He now wanted to pass to the Soviet side a non-paper that described the points he had made on mobile ICBM verification (Tab 2).³

AKHROMEYEV replied that the Soviet side now had enough homework to do for that night. It would do its best to study the U.S. documents and provide answers the next day. He could say immediately, however, that some issues would remain unresolved. The next day, the sides would have an opportunity to address those issues. They must work hard to reach agreement on mobile ICBM verification, and he was sure that their work would be useful. These thoughts applied equally to the ALCM problem, but there the sides were confronted with difficult problems. He was not sure they could reach agreement on all ALCM questions during this meeting.

After addressing these issues, the Soviet side would present its position on SLCMs and SLCM verification, and its ideas on how to push forward the interconnection between the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. He would try to compress his views to 1-½ hours, leaving another 1-½ hours in the next session to a discussion of views.

NITZE said he would look forward to the next day's discussion.

The meeting adjourned at 11:10 pm.

³ Attached but not printed, at Tab 2, is an undated paper entitled "Mobile ICBM Verification Points."

307. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

First Plenary Meeting (U)

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
Secretary George P. Shultz
Secretary Frank C. Carlucci
Senator Howard Baker
General Colin Powell
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)
Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC (Notetaker)

USSR

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman Andrei Gromyko
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov
Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev
Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
Mr. Chernyayev
Ambassador Yuri Dubinin
Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)
Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Moving on to arms control, *the President* noted that experts were already at work, but volunteered to summarize the state of play. The two sides' discussions on arms reductions had come a long way since the Geneva Summit. Progress had been registered across the whole spectrum of arms reduction problems, from intercontinental strategic forces to conventional forces, nuclear testing and chemical weapons. At each of the two leaders' meetings, they had been able to add another piece to the foundation. They should do the same in Moscow. (S)

The INF Treaty reduced arsenals for the first time in the nuclear age, and set a tough new standard for verification. The two sides were

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988, Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall at the Kremlin. The full memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 158.

well along the way to a START agreement. The President wanted to move ahead and complete START and Defense and Space (D&S) treaties that year. But we had to begin with a clean slate. Before we could enter into new agreements on strategic arms, we needed an understanding on how our concerns about Soviet activities that we considered to be violations of the ABM Treaty would be resolved. This was a very important issue, as Congress raised questions on issues which were perceived as challenges. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had the same problem with the Supreme Soviet. He felt that Congress would have difficulty fighting against peaceful proposals; it could not afford to be perceived as militaristic. But it was up to the Administration to put the issue squarely to them. (S)

The President observed that it was not as easy as that. Congress was good at pointing fingers at the Administration when it lacked a good answer for issues which arose. The INF Treaty had been a success, but we had shed a lot of blood to get it. In any case, the President hoped that, at the end of his visit, he would be able to report that ways had been found to resolve the major questions blocking new agreements. The President was prepared, if Gorbachev agreed, to review what we viewed as the main obstacles. (S)

Starting with strategic arms, *the President* noted that the two sides' negotiators in Geneva were working on a draft treaty to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 percent. There were several outstanding issues he and Gorbachev ought to address. First, they should agree to sublimits on ICBMs—the most destabilizing weapons systems—so as to strengthen stability and reduce incentives for a first strike. Second, they should work out a formula for attributing numbers to the nuclear-armed cruise missiles on heavy bombers, taking into account the differences in terms of stability between these slow-flying systems and ballistic missiles. The President noted that the US still preferred to ban mobile missiles, but was prepared to see if it were possible to pin down verification provisions for mobile ICBMs which would make it possible to determine whether limits were feasible.

Finally, because START dealt exclusively with nuclear forces, the President proposed the two sides work out procedures for removing from START constraints older heavy bombers that were converted to conventional missions, in other words, to work out means to exclude conventional bombers. The President asked if Gorbachev wished to comment. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had a few remarks. His impression was that everything was settled with respect to medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles. It was important that the exchange of instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty would be an element in

the Moscow Summit. The importance was political: this was the first disarmament treaty in post-war history. (S)

The *General Secretary* expressed his thanks to the US team for its contribution to the INF Treaty; he hoped that reciprocal thanks would be forthcoming, as neither side could have done it alone. It was true, he acknowledged, that the US had been the first by a few hours to ratify the Treaty. It was also well that the final Senate vote had been so high—93 to 5. Neither side had expected such an impressive figure earlier. True, the Soviet side had done better—with 100 percent of the votes in favor. (S)

As for strategic offensive arms, the Soviet side had already agreed to work on the question of sublimits by linking them to resolution of the mobile missile issue. Moscow was aware that the US had concerns on this point; but so did the Soviet Union. The Soviet side, for example, wanted to apply sublimits to submarines. But if a solution could be found to the problem of mobile missiles—both with respect to a number and to verification provisions—it would also be possible to think about setting ICBM sublimits. The working group could work on the issue. (S)

As for SLCMs, *General Secretary Gorbachev* wanted to set the record straight. It had been agreed in Reykjavik that SLCMs should be constrained. If they were not, and the two sides started down the path of 50-percent reductions, it would open the gate for a whole new arms race. There must be clarity on this point. Did Gorbachev correctly understand that the US was now prepared to agree to a limit on SLCMs? (S)

Secretary Shultz said that the President had been talking about ALCMs. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had misunderstood. There was a saying in Russian: “He who has a hurt, keeps talking about it.” So here was another for the President’s collections of proverbs. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he thought ALCMs could be discussed in a positive light. The Soviet side understood that the US felt it needed this system. It hoped for reciprocal US understanding of Soviet concerns about ALCMs and SLCMs. There seemed to be agreement that ceilings were necessary; it would be well if the two sides could agree on numbers. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said his experts told him that it might be possible to find a solution to the ALCM problem on the basis of a compromise. If so, it would improve chances for an agreement on 50-percent reductions. Gorbachev could assure the President that the Soviet side wanted to sign a treaty while the Reagan Administration was still in power. Gorbachev had said yesterday that he had once said to Secretary Shultz that the two sides had arrived at a relationship

which made it possible for them to discuss things calmly. Gorbachev was sorry that the Administration's term of office was nearing an end. It was too bad it could not be extended, like Roosevelt's. But the President should know that Moscow was ready to work on a START agreement right up to the end. (S)

The President said he had some points to make on Defense and Space. The objective of SDI, he explained, was to make the US and its allies more secure, not to threaten the Soviet Union. The Soviet side knew the merits of defending itself, as it devoted far more resources to strategic defense than did the US. As the two leaders had discussed in Reykjavik, the US was willing in the context of a START agreement to agree to a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, after which, unless it were otherwise agreed, each side would be free to choose its own course of action. (S)

The President said he could not agree to a nonwithdrawal provision until the Soviet Union had corrected its violations of the ABM Treaty. In Washington, he reminded Gorbachev, the General Secretary had made clear that he opposed the United States investigating advanced strategic defenses. Nonetheless, he had accepted that, at the end of a nonwithdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise, each side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses if it so chose. This needed to be made clear in the agreement. (S)

The US also needed, *the President* continued, the right to take necessary steps if its supreme interests were jeopardized by unexpected extraordinary events. This was standard in treaties. It needed as well to protect the right to research, develop and test advanced strategic defenses during the nonwithdrawal period, and could not accept restrictions beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. We had thus proposed an agreement not to object to each others' space-based sensors. Both sides used space to collect information for a variety of purposes. It was impossible to distinguish among these purposes. Why not agree not to make this the subject of unnecessary disputes? The two sides' negotiators, the President concluded, had put together a joint draft D&S agreement text. He proposed they be instructed to press ahead. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that that task could be facilitated if the US could accept a single formula in the treaty—that, if one side violated the ABM Treaty, the other would be free of its obligations under the treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. Such an approach would make it unnecessary to discuss what was or was not permitted under the ABM Treaty. But Secretaries Shultz and Carlucci argued against this. (S)

Secretary Shultz reminded the General Secretary that the US viewed the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of the Treaty. The essence of the

problem, however, was that the two sides did not agree on what was permitted by the Treaty with respect to research, development and testing. If that were agreed, the US would not have so many hang-ups. We had always felt that the Soviet Union agreed that during the period of strategic arms reductions, it would be a good thing to know what would be happening with respect to nonwithdrawal. But there was no such agreement. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he could give the President some free advice—even though Henry Kissinger would have charged him millions for the favor. The President, he stated amiably, was being deceived. He had initially been deceived by former Defense Secretary Weinberger; perhaps Carlucci was now doing the same thing. Some might think that it was possible to put something in space which could give the US an advantage (even though, Gorbachev pointed out, this would be contrary to one of the principles, which had been agreed to at the Geneva Summit). But during the proposed nonwithdrawal period—nine or eight and a half years—SDI was not a workable concept. If the President would tell his military people to confine their experiments to earth, nothing would happen. There was no need during this period for research in space. Attempts to conduct such research, on the other hand, would produce suspicion and mistrust. It would lead to a cooling of relations. That was why Gorbachev felt Carlucci, with Shultz's help, was moving the President in the wrong direction. He wanted to state this in their presence so they could defend themselves. (S)

The President said that, before they did that, he had some things to say of his own. He had come into office believing in the instability of a world whose security was based primarily on nuclear missiles. The average person could envision and was psychologically prepared to deal with the threat of conventional weapons. But when cities could be destroyed at the push of a button, it was another thing. Shortly after entering office, therefore, he had called in America's senior military leaders and asked if it would be possible to devise a system to render missiles obsolete. They had come back after consulting with our scientific community and said that, with a lot of time and resources, it could be done. The President had said, "Do it." So SDI from its inception has been a defensive weapon. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that the systems being developed in connection with SDI could be used for other than defensive purposes. (S)

The President replied that Gorbachev was overlooking the President's frequently stated belief that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The President believed nuclear weapons must be eliminated. When he had been informed that SDI was possible,

the President had announced, if a workable system were devised, the US would make deployment of such a system available to all countries, and would not deploy until nuclear weapons had been eliminated. (S)

But if nuclear weapons were eliminated, there would still be a need to ensure that no madman could obtain the knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapon and blackmail the world. The situation, *the President* explained, was akin to that after World War I. Poison gas had been banned, but people had kept their gas masks. The President said he really meant this. There had been breakthroughs, and US scientists were very optimistic SDI could work. But the purpose of the exercise was to eliminate the arsenals which could bring about such destruction in minutes. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl had shown what damage could be done with a release of radioactivity which was miniscule compared to that of even the smallest nuclear warheads. No one could be a victor in a nuclear war. (S)

The President reiterated that if SDI were proved workable, it could not be put into effect until nuclear weapons were eliminated. It was not an offensive weapon in any way. It was, therefore, non-negotiable, as far as the President was concerned. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev asked why SDI would be necessary if all missiles were destroyed. (S)

The President repeated that it was like a gas mask. It was impossible to unlearn the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. One had to be sure that a madman like Hitler was not at some point able to build a bomb and name his terms to the world. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said one could not be too careful where nuclear weapons were concerned. He reaffirmed that the Soviet side believed SDI was not just a defensive system, but also would provide a means of attacking targets on Earth. The question also arose as to why, if one party wanted to build such weapons, the other should make it easy for him. It was one thing for SDI to defend against a certain number of missiles; it was another for it to stop that number times X. But if both sides devoted all their national wealth to such a competition, the discussions the two sides were having were meaningless. Stability would also suffer. The capital which had been accrued in negotiations to date would be undermined; mistrust would arise; Moscow would have to consider a response. (S)

The President reminded Gorbachev that he had offered in Geneva to share development of SDI with the Soviet Union. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had to express doubt as to that offer. He pointed out that the US had refused to work out a system of on-site inspection of SLCMs aboard US warships. How could one believe that America would open its laboratories. This simply was not serious. The two sides were talking about matters of life and death. (S)

Secretary Carlucci noted that there was a difference between verifying an operational system and exchanging data and mutual observation opportunities relating to research and development. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said Carlucci had not convinced him. He reiterated that the two sides should proceed on the basis of the Washington Summit statement language on the ABM Treaty. In that connection, he noted that the US had raised the question of sensors. Perhaps the experts could talk more about that. But Gorbachev urged the President to think about what he had said. The President was listening only to scientists like Teller,² not to scientists, including those in Europe and the Soviet Union, who had very different views. So the experts could work, but Gorbachev hoped the President would weigh what he had said. (S)

On the Krasnoyarsk radar, *General Secretary Gorbachev* added, several things needed to be kept in mind. First, construction had been stopped. Second, US “scientists” (sic) had visited the site and found nothing. Finally, the Soviet side had expressed its willingness totally to dismantle the radar if an agreement were reached. Gorbachev reminded the President that there were also US “forward” radars which should not be forgotten. But experts could discuss all of this, “including the US sensor idea,” in Geneva. (S)

Moving to verification, *General Secretary Gorbachev* stated that the problem here was resistance on the part of the US leadership and US Navy. The President had earlier been a strong advocate of verification. Now the Soviet side had to talk the US into it. Was the earlier position a bluff? It was the same for chemical weapons. Now it seemed that factories and ships could not be included. What was to be inspected? The White House and Kremlin? The two leaders had now visited both sites themselves. They had to move forward on verification. (S)

The President said he thought both sides understood the importance of excluding certain things which bore no relationship to weapons. For example, on mobile missiles, we were talking about how to count them, not how they were manufactured. The key was to be able to determine if agreed ceilings had been exceeded. That went for the Soviet side as well. That was the problem verification had to deal with, rather than exposing techniques one side or the other was using to manufacture weapons. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he agreed, but stressed that the two sides should be talking verification in comprehensive terms. Privately owned facilities should not be excluded. Ownership was irrelevant;

² Nuclear physicist Edward Teller.

the question was what could be produced. Moscow would be very stringent on verification issues. (S)

Secretary Shultz clarified that the question of excluding private manufacturing facilities had arisen in the CW negotiations. For its part, the US was not drawing distinctions on the basis of private versus government ownership. *Secretary Carlucci* noted that neither had we made this an issue in negotiating the INF Treaty. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev suggested that the US may have removed its demand with respect to CW. In that case, the only obstacle to conclusion of a CW convention was the US binary program. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that the President had some points on CW. There had been some progress on that issue. There was a good statement to be included in a Summit concluding document. The Secretary recalled what a strong impression photographs of the effects of CW use against Kurdish civilians in the Iran-Iraq War had made at the time of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's March visit to Washington. This had redoubled our determination to come to grips with this issue. This was why it was essential that all states with CW manufacturing capability sign on to a convention. (S)

The President said that the language in the agreed joint statement would help bring about further progress. Nonetheless, much work remained to be done on a chemical weapons ban, especially in the areas of verification and ensuring the participation of all states. And no solutions were yet in sight for these problems. The situation was similar to that with respect to strategic defense. Given the conflicts in the world, any CW ban had to be comprehensive. Both sides ought to work toward that goal. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had consulted his notes, which indicated that as yet there was no agreement on the question of inspecting private and multinational plants. Was there a change in the US position? Was it true that the US was not excluding such facilities? (S)

Secretary Carlucci confirmed that the US was not excluding private facilities. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev welcomed this clarification. This was what he had wanted to be clear on. (S)

General Powell pointed out that the disagreement was over the size of the "net." No one was talking about declaring "open season." Categories needed to be carefully defined. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev asked how that squared with the President's concern that prohibited activities could be taking place without the knowledge of parties to a convention. General Powell's clarification had raised questions about the workability of a CW verification scheme. If there were a convention, anyone with a manufacturing capability

should adhere. This, in turn, implied comprehensive verification provisions. But this was an issue for further discussion at another time. (S)

For the moment, *General Secretary Gorbachev* continued, he wanted to address the US proposal for an agreement on launches of missiles within national territories. *Secretary Shultz* noted that the US proposal had related to ballistic missile launches. *General Secretary Gorbachev* said that the Soviet side agreed to the proposal. It had an additional suggestion to make, but authorization should be given to finalize the US proposal for signature during the President's visit. *Secretary Shultz* said we could do that. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev continued that the Soviet side would also like to propose that experts reach agreement—or at least begin discussions—on launches of ALCMs and SLCMs, as well as of mass take-offs of 100 or more heavy bombers, of exercises of strategic forces, and of ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. Agreement on such steps would increase predictability and reduce the threat of miscalculation. So perhaps experts could study this even as they elaborated an ICBM test launch notification agreement. (S)

Secretary Carlucci asked if *Gorbachev* was proposing to ban depressed trajectory missile test launches, or simply to notify in advance that they would take place. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he was talking about notification. As for depressed trajectory tests, he was not proposing a ban, but that could be discussed. The US had proposed this at one point. It could be discussed. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that there were two things to consider. One was an agreement on ballistic missile test launch notification, regardless of trajectory. That could be signed in Moscow. (*General Secretary Gorbachev* interjected that he was talking about launches *within* national territories.) *Secretary Shultz* said that the second issue was a proposed discussion of notification of other activities. This was something we could certainly agree to study. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said this might be reflected in instructions to delegations in a joint statement. *The President* said that a test launch agreement would be a concrete example of the progress being made by our START delegations. (S)

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 9:15 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense and Space, START

PARTICIPANTS*U.S.*

AMB Nitze
 AMB Kampelman
 AMB Hanmer
 AMB Cooper
 AMB Rowny
 AS Lehman
 ADM Howe
 COL Linhard
 Mr. Castillo
 Dr. Timbie
 Dr. Graham
 Mr. Richardson
 Mr. Korobovsky (Interpreter)
 Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

USSR

MSU Akhromeyev
 AMB Obukhov
 AMB Kuznetsov
 AMB Masterkov
 AMB Karpov
 GEN Chervov
 GEN Lebedev
 GEN Starodubov
 CPT Beketov
 Mr. Khromov
 Mr. Batrushev (Int)

AKHROMEYEV stated that the Soviet side had worked on the documents provided the previous night by the U.S. side. It had singled out agreed elements. On ALCMs, it had focussed on distinguishability and counting rules. Reading from a paper that he subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 1),² Akhromeyev said that the following was agreed:

1. All currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be considered to be nuclear-armed.

2. Future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles. (In this connection, the Soviet side was proceeding from the fact that nuclear and non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would have externally observable and functionally related differences.)

3. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. (In this connection, the Soviet side was proceeding from the fact

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

² Attached but not printed is an undated paper, marked “Official Translation” and titled “Working Paper of the Soviet Side on ALCMs.”

that heavy bombers with long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs would have externally observable and functionally related differences from other heavy bombers.)

4. Any long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles which have been tested and deployed in a nuclear variant, including all existing such missiles, may be carried only by a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

5. Nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will not be located at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

The following were proposed additional elements:

6. The sides will base at separate locations their heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles and their heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles. Visits of heavy bombers of each such category to airbases of the other categories will be subject to notification. The former heavy bombers converted into tanker aircraft, jamming aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft may be based at bases for heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear- and non-nuclear armed ALCMs.

7. All heavy bomber bases and all heavy bombers with their armaments are subject to inspection.

With regard to counting rules, the following were apparently agreed elements:

1. Heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, i.e., those equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, will count as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and 1 warhead against the 6000 limit.

2. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will count as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and an agreed number of warheads against the 6000 limit. (*Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev*: The Soviet side was prepared not to count nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs against the 6000 limit in connection with agreement on counting rules for nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers, based on the maximum number of ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a specific type was equipped. In this connection, heavy bombers with non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would be counted against the 1600 limit.)

The following were proposed additional elements:

3. The number of warheads that will be attributed to each type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs will be the maximum number of ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of that type is equipped.

4. The number of ALCMs counted in START will be the sum of the numbers determined by multiplying the number of heavy bombers

of each type equipped to carry nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles by the number of warheads attributed to that type. (*Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev*: There will be no limit on the total inventory of nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs in the event agreement is reached on paragraph 3.)

5. The sides may convert, through agreed procedures, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles to heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs.

6. The sides may convert a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers, using agreed procedures, into reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, or tanker aircraft. These aircraft will not count against the 1600 or 6000 limits.

7. Each nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 KM, installed on a heavy bomber, will count as one warhead against the 6000 limit. An increase above 600 KM in the range criterion for such missiles would render inoperative the agreement on counting nuclear munitions on heavy bombers equipped with nuclear bombs and short-range (under 600 km) ALCMs as one warhead against the 6000 limit. This would result in a setback of much that had been accomplished at the negotiations.

Having finished his paper, Akhromeyev added that he wanted to clarify that the Soviet side felt sure that the number of warheads for which each heavy bomber was equipped should be the basis for the ALCM count. According to available information, U.S. heavy bombers were equipped with more than 10 cruise missiles. For example, on May 16–17 of this year, the U.S. House of Representatives had looked at the U.S. approach to limits on strategic arms, and the Congressmen and experts had indicated that B–52s were being equipped with 12 ALCMs, B–1Bs (99 assets in all) were being equipped with 24 ALCMs, and future B–2s would be equipped with 12 ALCMs. Therefore, according to Akhromeyev's count, all U.S. heavy bombers would be carrying 5688 ALCMs. The Soviet side would abide by the obligation not to exceed the 1100 limit while equipping its heavy bombers with long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and it would show those bombers, including the command systems, to the U.S. side. But it could not agree to allowing the U.S. to equip its heavy bombers with many more long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

He suggested the sides agree to a compromise. The Soviet side was prepared not to count long-range cruise missiles in a non-nuclear variant against the 6000 limit, if the U.S. side would agree to the counting rule of attributing warheads to heavy bombers according to the maximum number of ALCMs for which each type of heavy bomber was equipped. Heavy bombers carrying non-nuclear ALCMs should

be counted against the 1600 limit. The Soviet side would not envisage limits for the total number of long-range ALCMs that were deployed, i.e. 1100, given agreement on the counting rule for nuclear-armed, long-range ALCMs, which would be limited by the number of cruise missiles for which heavy bombers were equipped.

Turning to mobile ICBMs, Akhromeyev said the two sides had much common ground in their proposals. Reading from another paper, which he subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 2),³ he stated that the Soviet side proceeded from the following:

- Conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs would be prohibited.

- For road-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

- The missiles and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas specified in the MOU, of an agreed size. The Soviet side had in mind that a restricted area would be approximately 100 square kilometers. Each restricted area would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

- Within each restricted area, the number of structures unique to mobile ICBM launchers would be limited to no more than the number of missiles on launchers specified for that restricted area in the MOU. These structures would be described in the MOU.

- Each side would be required, at the request of the other, to carry out measures at the restricted areas to enhance observation by NTM. The number of such enhancement measures would be subject to agreement.

- Missiles and launchers would be allowed to depart restricted areas for routine movement, for example, for training, maintenance and testing. Such movements would be subject to prior notification and would involve no more than an agreed percentage of the total mobile force at any one time.

- Dispersal of mobile ICBMs and launchers from the restricted areas would be permitted. Such dispersals would be of two types:

- Exercise dispersal, which would be limited in duration and frequency.

- Operational dispersal, which would be for national security purposes; there would be no constraints on duration and frequency of operational dispersal.

- Notification of a dispersal would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal began and notification of return would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the disper-

³ Attached but not printed is an undated paper, marked "Official Translation" and titled "Mobile ICBM Verification Provisions."

sal ended. All dispersals would be assumed to be exercise dispersals, unless the dispersing party notified otherwise.

—One day before the planned end of an exercise dispersal, the dispersing side would have the option of returning forces to base or notifying that an operational dispersal was in progress. Upon such notification, the dispersing side would be required to state the reason for the operational dispersal.

—Upon return of a dispersed force to restricted areas, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road-mobile ICBM force for enhanced NTM measures and/or on-site inspection:

- (a) NTM enhancement measures would involve either moving launchers halfway out of their structures or opening the roofs of the structures, at the discretion of the inspected side;
- (b) Post-dispersal OSI would be in addition to those inspections conducted under the quota for short-notice OSI. (It would be wise to examine the problem of proliferation of these non-quota inspections so as to be prepared for dispersal of other strategic offensive arms.)

—Non-deployed ICBMs of types that had been deployed in road-mobile launchers, and road-mobile launchers that did not contain ICBMs, would be restricted to facilities listed in the MOU or in transit between permitted facilities.

—The non-deployed ICBMs would be limited in number; except for an agreed number of missiles, they would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any restricted area and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBM launchers were stored.

—The non-deployed road-mobile ICBM launchers would be limited in number; except for an agreed number of launchers, they would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any restricted area and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBMs would be stored.

—A limited (agreed) number of dedicated mobile resupply vehicles for road-mobile ICBMs would be permitted for the purpose of repair.

—There would be a limit on the number of road-mobile training launchers; these training launchers would not be capable of launching ICBMs and would be distinguishable from commercial road-mobile vehicles and from road-mobile ICBM launchers by NTM.

—For rail-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to a limited number of rail garrisons, specified in the MOU. Each rail garrison would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each garrison, the number of unique shelters for trains would be limited to no more than the number of trains specified for

that garrison in the MOU. No shelter would be capable of holding more cars than the number on a standard train.

—Each garrison would have no more than a specified number of rail entrances/exits.

—Missiles and launchers would be allowed to depart rail garrisons, subject to notification requirements and limitations comparable to those for departure of road-mobile ICBMs from restricted areas.

—While in the garrison, trains with missiles and their launchers would be maintained in one standard configuration, as specified in the MOU, except for changes for the purpose of routine maintenance and repair.

—During notified transit to declared maintenance and training facilities, and during routine movement for training, trains with missiles and their launchers would be allowed to vary from their standard configuration, provided that such variations were reported upon completion of the movement.

—There would be no restrictions on the configuration of trains during dispersals.

—Non-deployed rail-mobile missiles and launchers, resupply vehicles and training launchers would be limited in a manner similar to that for the comparable road-mobile items.

—(Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev: The sides would have the right to implement continuous perimeter portal monitoring at all facilities producing mobile ICBM launchers and missiles for them.)

This concluded the Soviet mobile ICBMs paper. Akhromeyev added that the Soviet side had done its utmost to follow the U.S. proposal as closely as possible. There was much common ground, so he thought the sides should now address the number of warheads to be allowed on mobile ICBMs.

NITZE said the U.S. side had a few technical questions on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs.

LINHARD said there had been one point he did not understand in Akhromeyev's presentation on mobiles. In discussing enhanced NTM measures after a dispersal, the Soviet side had suggested either having missiles halfway out of shelters or having roofs opened. Which side would choose between these options?

AKHROMEYEV replied that the choice would be made by the inspected side.

LINHARD noted that the U.S. side had proposed banning both conversion of SLBMs to mobile ICBMs and use of liquid-fueled mobiles. Was the Soviet dropping of reference to liquid-fueled mobiles intentional?

AKHROMEYEV responded that the Soviet proposal would ban conversion of SLBMs to mobile ICBMs. The type of fuel for a mobile ICBM was of no importance whatsoever. What difference did it make if a missile was liquid-fueled or solid-fueled? Why should the sides ostracize liquid-fueled ICBMs?

NITZE said he had a question regarding the ALCM issue. The Soviet side had used the phrase “functionally related, externally observable difference.” Would the Soviet side consider the difference between a B-52H and a B-52G to satisfy that criterion?

AKHROMEYEV replied that he did not think he could answer that question right away; the Soviet side should have a look at the aircraft.

In the long run, the sides would have to arrive at the same approach for each element of the triad. It would not be feasible if U.S. officials could visit each Soviet ICBM base to verify all missiles there, while Soviet officials could not verify U.S. heavy bombers and SLBM assets. The sides could not be guided by the opinion of Secretary Carlucci, and Akhromeyev would tell him that. Carlucci had said in an interview with *Der Spiegel* on May 2 that strict verification in the USSR was wonderful, whereas the same verification regarding the U.S. and its allies would require consideration of national security. This attitude denied the USSR the right to account for its national interests. The sides could not complete the negotiations if the U.S. side remained on this stance. The sides should inspect the heavy bombers of both sides the way they were going to inspect ballistic missiles.

NITZE responded that the experience of the sides in trying to negotiate arms control agreements had indicated that each type of weapon system required a unique kind of verification regime.

AKHROMEYEV said he agreed, but the approach should be the same. All assets should be subject to verification with the same degree of detail and the same scope of inspection. Of course, specific methods would differ with the type of weaponry.

NITZE replied that the sides needed to take account of the points important to both sides. He did not think they could adopt the philosophy that everything was the same. They did have to take account of the fact that weapons systems differed.

AKHROMEYEV again agreed, saying that there were specific features for each type of system, but this specificity argument should not be developed to the point where it killed any chance for verification at all. The sides had had very detailed discussions in INF about verifying IRMs and SRMs, both ground-based missiles. In these talks, verification should include SLBM assets and aviation assets.

NITZE asked if it was the Soviet intent to omit reference to the U.S. suggestions on tagging and PPM.

AKHROMEYEV responded that the Soviet side did not believe tagging could take the sides far, because the tags would not be identifiable by NTM. The Soviet side had a proposal for PPM, which it had inadvertently omitted; this proposal would be provided at the next meeting.

NITZE suggested that Akhromeyev proceed with the Soviet position on linkage.

Reading from a paper subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 3),⁴ AKHROMEYEV stated the following:

1. The basic issue which had to be decided was the approach to the strategic offensive arms-ABM problem from the point of view of taking into account the objective interrelationship between strategic reductions and ABM limitations. For the USSR this was of fundamental importance. A 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms was possible only if the ABM Treaty was preserved as it was signed in 1972 and if there was non-withdrawal from it during an agreed period of time.

Proceeding from this formula, the Soviet side had included in the text of the START agreement a provision on the interrelationship between compliance with the ABM Treaty and compliance with the START Treaty. The U.S. side was attempting to resolve the questions of reducing strategic offensive arms and the questions connected with the ABM Treaty independently of each other.

At the negotiations, the U.S. side had proposed (on May 18, 1988) to exclude the Soviet formulation on the interrelationship from the draft Treaty on strategic offensive arms, removing in return its provision on the termination of the agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty and of the ABM Treaty itself in case of violation of the agreement on strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was against the artificial separation of organically interrelated problems. In 1972, the USSR and U.S. had indicated this interrelationship in the ABM Treaty.

In creating an ABM defense of the territory of a country, including a space echelon, a side would acquire the ability to deliver a first nuclear strike in the hope of doing so with impunity. Creation of an ABM defense of the territory of the country would invariably require not a reduction of strategic offensive arms, but rather their improvement and even an increase of their number. Negotiations on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms would become pointless. The deployment by both sides of an ABM defense of the territory of

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated paper, "On the Interconnection Between Strategic Offensive Arms and ABM."

the country, including space systems, would not add to stability. On the contrary, the threat of war would increase.

2. With regard to the ABM Treaty, the basis for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on compliance with the Treaty was the Washington formula codified at the Summit on December 10, and the agreement of the sides to implement this formula as a separate agreement with an attached protocol. The Soviet side proposed to have an agreed text of the agreement in strict conformity with the formulation in the Washington agreement and had proposed a corresponding draft at the negotiations of the delegations. Questions of verification, predictability of the development of the strategic situation and other necessary provisions should be included in the protocol to the agreement.

(Included in paper but not read by Akhromyev: The U.S. side proposes to include provisions in it or to indicate understandings which change the meaning of this formula: about the right of withdrawing from the agreement and the ABM Treaty during the period of non-withdrawal; about the deployment of a large-scale ABM system immediately after the non-withdrawal period; about conducting any tests which are necessary, including tests in space, during the non-withdrawal period. These proposals do not correspond to the Washington agreement.)

The Soviet side was in favor of an obligation on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty within an agreed period of time. Taking into consideration the position of the U.S. side, it had proposed compromise solutions of issues on which the sides had a difference and it had proposed a set of measures to prevent and resolve situations which would be considered by a party to be a threat to its supreme national interests:

1. Exchange of data related to work in the ABM area, meetings of experts, mutual visits to test ranges where final work (testing) was conducted in this area.

2. Exchange of information for the purpose of preventing and eliminating ambiguities from the point of view of complying with the obligations which the sides had adopted.

3. Verification of compliance with the obligations undertaken (including inspections at facilities about which the sides had a concern).

4. Immediate consultations to examine and resolve situations which, in the opinion of one of the sides, threatened its supreme interests. During the consultations the sides would use all available means to resolve situations on a mutually acceptable basis.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that after the end of the non-withdrawal period, the right of the sides to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would be restored and each of the sides, unless otherwise

agreed, could determine its own course of action in accordance with the procedures provided for in the ABM Treaty. In order that such a possibility, provided for in the agreement on compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, be legally binding after the end of the non-withdrawal period (i.e., the end of the period during which the agreement was in force), the Soviet side proposed that the sides make corresponding statements on such a right together with the signing of the agreement.

The question of testing during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty had been unequivocally resolved by the Washington formula on compliance with the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

The Soviet side agreed to continue discussing the question of testing “data sensors” in space, in order to determine the boundaries of permitted and prohibited activity under the ABM Treaty.

With regard to SLCMs, one of the main obstacles to completing work on the treaty on strategic offensive arms was the fact that the question of SLCMs had not been resolved. A solution had to be found and it could be found, since there was a basis for this—the Washington understanding of December 10, 1987, which indicated the obligations of the sides to set limits on the number of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs and to search for mutually acceptable and effective measures to verify the implementation of these limits. Both sides had stated their desire to implement this obligation, including at the May meeting between FM Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz in Geneva.

The U.S. side was aware of the specific proposals of the Soviet side both on the SLCM limits and on their verification. The Soviet side proposed having not more than 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs and not more than 600 non-nuclear-armed SLCMs. If such a solution was unacceptable to the U.S. side, the Soviet side was prepared for another version—to have an overall limit of 1,000 for nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs. Within this limit, each side would determine the ratio between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs.

The Soviet side had also proposed a set of verification measures:

- Use of NTM, including remote monitoring at the discretion of the sides. The Soviet side had proposed to conduct a joint experiment of such verification;

- Inspection of surface ships and submarines of each side at their basing stations;

- Verification of production and arming of SLCMs (inspection on a permanent basis at SLCM production plants and at specially designated arming areas);

- Prohibition of loading of missiles onto submarines and surface ships outside of basing stations and on the high seas;

- Locating SLCMs on specific types of submarines and surface ships.

These proposals were in accordance with the Washington Summit understanding. They did not impinge on the security interests of either party and they formed a basis for reaching a mutually acceptable understanding.

The proposed solution of resolving the SLCM issue on the basis of unilateral declarations about SLCM production programs without any verification could not lead to an understanding.

At this point, Akhromeyev read the PPM proposal that he had omitted from his mobile ICBM presentation.

NITZE passed to the Soviet side the Russian-language versions of the U.S. papers on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs.

AKHROMEYEV thanked Nitze, and noted that it had taken the Soviet side all of the previous night to translate the English versions of the U.S. papers and prepare a response.

Turning to the U.S. position on Defense and Space, NITZE stated that the U.S. side wanted to see what could be accomplished over the next few days to add to the elements that were already agreed. The central elements were, of course, referred to in the Washington Summit Joint Statement, which both sides had agreed to “build on” in formulating an agreement. Since the Washington Summit, the sides had achieved some progress in building on the Joint Statement:

—They had agreed to include in a protocol, which would be an integral part of the agreement, predictability measures.

—The JDT of this protocol included the agreement on regular and reciprocal exchanges of information and visits, meetings of experts, and observation of tests.

—They had agreed to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of the information provided for in the protocol, and normal diplomatic channels to confirm plans and resolve disagreements.

—And they had agreed that the Defense and Space agreement would be a separate agreement.

In implementing the instructions to further build on this progress, the U.S. side proposed to focus the discussions on the form of the agreement, supreme interest rights, rights after the nonwithdrawal period, and the U.S. proposal that neither side object to the other's space-based sensors. The U.S. side also wanted to concentrate on any other issue that the Soviet side felt was ripe for resolution.

On the form of the agreement, the sides had agreed at the Washington Summit that the Defense and Space agreement would have the legal status of a treaty. At that time, the Soviet position had been that the agreement should be a protocol to the START Treaty, so there had been a reason for using the neutral word “agreement” in the Joint Statement.

Since then, the sides had agreed to work toward a separate Defense and Space agreement; given the agreement that it would have the legal

status of a treaty, the sides should call the separate agreement a treaty. This would clear up a number of brackets in the JDT, and would represent tangible progress from this Summit.

Another issue that seemed ripe for resolution was that associated with the standard right a sovereign nation had to protect its supreme interests. The U.S. side had made clear its views on the necessity of recognizing this right accorded both sides by international law, as the sides had done in all other arms control agreements between the two nations. And the U.S. side had explained why this meant it could not agree to the Soviet proposal for an “unconditional” nonwithdrawal commitment. Soviet negotiators had acknowledged that supreme interest rights were maintained in any agreement; the question then was just one of recording this point.

The Soviet proposal for consultations if there were concerns regarding threats to supreme interests did not go far enough; an agreed commitment to consultations was helpful, but the sides must recognize the right of each side to take appropriate action to protect its interests, should such consultations take place and fail to resolve the associated concerns.

The Soviet side had objected to the lengthy provision on withdrawal rights included in the US working paper, so the U.S. side had responded to that concern with a compromise proposal at the last Ministerial meeting and in Geneva. This compromise had incorporated the following elements:

- A standard supreme interests provision in the treaty.

- An agreed statement providing that international law rights were to be retained.

- An agreed statement clarifying that, notwithstanding the supreme interests provision, the sides would not exercise their rights under it on the grounds that the ABM Treaty restrictions on deployment and acquiring capability were, in and of themselves, extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme interests.

- Acceptance of Article I without the currently bracketed language.

- Elimination of the US-proposed provision relating to termination rights if there was a failure to reduce strategic offensive arms according to the START Treaty, in return for elimination of a Soviet-proposed provision in the START JDT that was its mirror image.

The U.S. side continued to believe that this compromise proposal offered the best solution, in a manner responsive to the concerns of both sides, to the disputes regarding Article I of the Defense and Space agreement.

The U.S. side had also proposed at the last Ministerial meeting a compromise package for resolving the issue of the rights of the sides

after the nonwithdrawal period. This package was based on the Soviet proposal for a joint statement clarifying that the rights of the sides after the nonwithdrawal period to decide their course of action unless agreed otherwise, as embodied in the Washington Summit Joint Statement, would remain in force after the nonwithdrawal period.

The U.S. side had stated that, for this proposal to be of interest, such a statement would have to have the legal status of a treaty, as agreed in the Washington Summit Joint Statement. Furthermore, it would have to include a clarification that, if a side decided to deploy, it must provide 6 months' notification, after which all ABM Treaty provisions would be considered terminated, unless the parties agreed otherwise. This notification provision would, in this event, supersede Article XV of the ABM Treaty.

U.S. negotiators in Geneva had provided a working paper suggesting how such a document might look as a protocol. As the U.S. side had said at the last meeting, if the Soviet side would accept the US formulation of Article III, either in a treaty of unlimited duration or a free-standing document with the same legal status, the U.S. side could then accept the Soviet formulation of Article II. If the sides could resolve this issue and that of supreme interest rights, they would have cleared up the major disputes that had prevented the completion of a conformed JDT; this would represent a significant and concrete result in the Defense and Space area from the Summit.

On activities during the period, the sides had to reach some understanding on what constituted "research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." They were making progress in working on the protocol, and that would help. The U.S. side had noted in the past Soviet statements of concern that, by having a large number of test objects in space at one time, a side might actually have deployed a *de facto* system with some ABM capability. The U.S. side agreed that this should not occur and would be receptive to Soviet suggestions as to how the sides might utilize the predictability measures protocol to address this concern.

The U.S. side had also proposed that the sides agree not to object to each other's space-based sensors. It believed the rationale was compelling: these satellite sensor systems were vitally important to both sides and to stability, and it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between the capabilities of various space-based sensor systems.

Trying to limit satellite sensors with some ABM capability while allowing the rest would pose an unsolvable verification problem, a headache both sides should want to avoid. The provision the U.S. side had in mind would state that neither Party would object, on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing or deployment by the other Party of any space-based sensor, and that, accordingly, each Party could develop, test and deploy space-based sensors without restriction.

In the last meeting, the Soviet side had suggested that sensor testing in space be limited to those sensors that did not have the capability in technical terms for performing ABM missions. But this would create exactly the problem the U.S. side thought both sides would want to avoid—that of distinguishing which space-based sensors would have the capability to perform ABM missions, when in fact almost any space-based sensor could be of some use to an ABM system. To repeat, this would create an unsolvable verification problem and headaches that neither side wanted. Therefore, the sides should agree not to have disputes about space-based sensors, whatever their purpose. The U.S. side hoped the Soviet side would reconsider the U.S. proposal and join in putting this looming problem behind.

Turning to SLCMs, Nitze said the U.S. position could be summarized as follows:

—The Soviet-proposed SLCM verification regime would not allow a side reliably to detect and count nuclear SLCMs, and would cause unacceptable interference with operations, and exposure of sensitive facilities to intrusive inspection.

AKHROMEYEV interrupted to ask why a comparable regime was acceptable for ground-based ballistic missiles.

NITZE said the sides could come back to this question.

AKHROMEYEV argued that the sides should scrutinize in great detail the verification questions and the linkage of verification to different types of weapons. They could not speak openly with the mass media, but in these confidential talks they could get into details. He and Nitze had been present together at the last meeting of Gorbachev with Shultz. The two had talked in a very straightforward way. Shultz had said that U.S. sailors did not want verification. Akhromeyev had asked if that meant the U.S. did not want U.S. officials to interfere with Soviet operations, and the answer was no. The U.S. attitude was that the USSR could have no secrets from the U.S., that the U.S. was entitled to verify everything on Soviet territory, but the Soviet Union did not get a reciprocal right. This could not be accepted. Verification measures should be equally applicable to any type of strategic weapon. Otherwise, no matter how ardently the sides sought agreement, they would not succeed.

LEHMAN, referring to the Carlucci interview with *Der Spiegel*, said Carlucci had made precisely the point that one could not place demands on the USSR and not understand that the same demands would be made on the U.S. He had been making the point that the verification provisions would apply equally to the U.S. and USSR. But this was with full recognition that verification requirements and difficulties with regard to specific systems could be quite different. The measures the

U.S. side had proposed for verification of ICBMs were the same for both sides. The measures it had proposed for SLBMs were the same for both sides. Similarly for heavy bombers. Carlucci had not been speaking to the Soviet people but rather to audiences in the West, to those saying that there should be tighter constraints on Soviet ICBMs than on U.S. ICBMs. That was the approach he had been criticizing.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that he had read Carlucci's comments, and he did not think the sides should waste time discussing them. Carlucci had said that verification measures applied to the USSR were a wonderful thing, but those applied to the U.S. should not undercut national security.

Lehman was right in saying that verification measures for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers were equal for both sides. But ICBMs of both sides would be verified thoroughly, while verification of the heavy bombers of both sides would not be that profound. There would be no verification at all of the SLCMs of either side. The problem was that the Soviet share of ICBMs in the mix of strategic arms was much larger than that for the U.S. The share of heavy bombers and SLCMs was larger for the U.S. That was the injustice. All strategic assets should be subject to the same degree and scope of verification. The Soviet side could not agree to anything else.

LEHMAN suggested that the Carlucci statement might have lost its irony in translation. But the intent was clear: For each type of system, the U.S. side had in mind that provisions that applied to the USSR would apply to the U.S. as well. The sides could discuss further the Soviet argument that differences in force structures might result in different levels of verification burdens, but he did not think this was at all self-evident, given the extensive verification proposals made by the U.S. side.

HOWE added that what was important was that there be the same level of effectiveness or result from each verification scheme, not necessarily the same measures, since the sides were looking at different systems with different problems. But the end result should be the same degree of confidence that the verification measures were effective. He noted that Akhromeyev had not mentioned SLBMs; the procedures almost agreed in that area were quite extensive and posed an equal burden on both sides. SLCMs, on the other hand, presented unique problems that perplexed the U.S. side in its attempt to find an effective verification scheme.

AKHROMEYEV rejoined that it was easier for him and Howe to talk as professionals. The Soviet side could not agree to determining the number of cruise missiles carried by heavy bombers as some number, e.g. 10, unless it was sure that that was the number for which the heavy bombers were actually equipped. It needed to scrutinize the

heavy bombers themselves to make sure how many missiles they could carry, and to look at the aircraft control systems to make sure how many cruise missiles could be launched and guided by the heavy bombers. Unless the sides were well aware of these technical characteristics on both sides, it would be hard to agree.

This approach could also be applied to the SLCMs of both sides. Submarines should be inspected to see how many cruise missiles they could carry. Then the sides could agree on specific numbers for the missiles.

Everything was provided for in the case of ICBMs; there were no secrets. But it was a secret when the sides tried to deal with heavy bombers and submarines for cruise missiles. That was where the Soviet side saw injustice. President Reagan said to trust, but verify. The Soviet side agreed.

Akhromeyev asked how the sides should proceed at the next session.

NITZE suggested the sides pick up their current discussion. At some time, they would need to discuss their report to the Ministers.

AKHROMEYEV agreed. The sides could continue their discussion, but they might instruct some of their officials to get down to language, because some agreement on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs was taking shape. By 6:00 pm, these officials should be ready with something. In the meantime, the larger group could continue its discussions.

NITZE agreed, adding that the U.S. side had more questions on the Soviet ALCM and mobile ICBM positions. In addition, he wanted to deal with compliance.

AKHROMEYEV said that, at the next meeting, the Soviet side would pass over the NST portion of its draft Joint Statement.

NITZE replied that the U.S. side would also have a draft; the sides could establish a subgroup to work on these drafts. There was indeed greater convergence now between the positions of the sides.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, and said the subgroup could address that.

The meeting adjourned at 12:05 pm, with the next session scheduled for 3:00 pm.

309. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 3–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS*US*

AMB Nitze
 AMB Rowny
 AMB Cooper
 AMB Hanmer
 AMB Lehman
 VADM Howe
 Dr. Graham
 Col Linhard
 LtCol Richardson (Note taker)
 Korobovsky (Interpreter)

USSR

Marshall Akhromeyev
 Col Gen Chervov
 AMB Karpov
 AMB Masterkov
 AMB Obukhov
 Batrushev (Interpreter)

1. AKHROMEYEV began by suggesting that the group organize its work for the afternoon session in the following way: Karpov would explain the Soviet view of the linkage between the ABM Treaty and reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms; following this, the Soviet side would pass over its version of language to be inserted in the joint statement on the START and ABM Treaty areas. Then he, Akhromeyev, and Karpov would be absent for approximately 45 minutes, after which the group would resume work until 6:00 pm, if the US side had no objection.

2. KARPOV said that he wanted to discuss the core issue of the work before the group. The Soviet side had been very attentive to Nitze's previous remarks on Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) and linkage, but Karpov believed that channeling energies to the minor details would result in deviation from the final goal. Karpov said that the gist, the fundamental basis is the Dec. 10, 1987 WSJS language, whose main idea is to insure compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and to insure an agreed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This is the core of the understanding reached by the leaders. Karpov acknowledged both sides had accomplished useful work in Geneva; the Soviet side had agreed to elaborate a separate agreement on compliance and non-withdrawal for an agreed period, and a protocol on predictability and verification. The Soviet side recognized the necessity for a separate protocol based on the text agreed in Washington, and holds that any other view which envisages replacement of

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. Drafted on June 13. The meeting took place at the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

the ABM Treaty is in violation of the agreement expressed in the WSJS, and an obstacle to reductions in SOA. Karpov wanted to remind the US side that the Soviets had taken US concerns into account in the form of a draft protocol on predictability and verification, which now offer a good possibility for agreement based on the USJS. The Soviet side believes that, if each side accepts such an agreement without deviation, it would be possible to complete at least a joint draft agreement (JDA) even in Moscow. This would be a notable advance. In any case, Karpov said, preservation of the ABM Treaty as an instrument of stability is the basis for 50% reductions in SOA. The main task before the group is to reach accord on the agreed period: it must be at least more “durable” than the period of SOA reductions, and it requires precise and complete compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, including verification, predictability, and consultation measures guaranteeing the treaty will not be violated. If both sides act on this basis, other questions will be quickly resolvable and this will cease to be a problem in Geneva.

3. NITZE said that the US side wholly agrees with the nature of the Dec 10 WSJS. The US wishes to include every word of the WSJS pertinent language in its version of the draft treaty. But Karpov had emphasized only certain parts of the WSJS. From the beginning, Nitze said, there have been three sets of problems with matters relating to the ABM Treaty. One question is the length of the agreed period. The US doubts the sides are far apart on the length, and believe this can be specified after the other issues are concluded. A second question is what happens after expiration of the agreed period. This, the WSJS says, is that each side is “free to decide its own course of action.” These were GS Gorbachev’s words referred to by Shultz and Shevardnadze on the final morning of the Washington summit. In the context of President Reagan’s exchange with Gorbachev, the clear meaning was that each side, without further discussion, would deploy after expiration of the period. Gorbachev said he didn’t like this but would accept it in exchange for a commitment to comply for a specified period. Carlucci had confirmed with Shevardnadze on the final morning of the summit, in the presence of both Nitze and Akhromeyev, that this meant a right to deploy. So the pertinent issue is how to include this agreement in the appropriate legal context of the treaty or agreement. That is the purpose of the notification provision which supercedes Article XV. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the US draft Article III constitute the legal package of the WSJS pertaining to what happens after the period. Finally, on the third question, Nitze said, Karpov had emphasized only the phrase pertaining to what happens during the specified period. He emphasized the words “comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;” he did not refer to the succeeding phrase, “conduct

research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” The US side recognizes there have been questions as to what was and was not covered by the language.

4. AKHROMEYEV interrupted to say that there is always a question, indeed a constant disagreement, between the sides on this matter. That is to say, the Soviet understanding is different from that of the US.

5. NITZE said this is why Secretary Shultz said he wants to narrow differences on this matter. US proposals on predictability, in which the Soviet side has joined in developing, contribute much toward resolving these differences. The US believes its proposals on sensors would resolve potential misunderstandings as to the relationship of a given sensor to an ABM system. Certain sensors now deployed or contemplated by both sides give precise, timely information on ballistic missile launches. They may be capable of giving ballistic missile tracking information as well. The US proposal is that we not object to Soviet satellite sensors and the Soviet side will not object to ours. One further issue, Nitze said, with respect to the discussion of the ABM treaty, is that it is important to clarify the matter of extraordinary events affecting the national security of a side. This is a provision recognized by international law and part of every treaty previously agreed between the two countries. The US envisions that such a provision is not to be invoked lightly without a compelling declared reason. But the US side believes it must be protected during the period, if such extraordinary circumstances do arise. As to the contention by the Soviet side that exercise of the right to deploy after the non-withdrawal period requires invocation of the supreme interest clause of the ABM treaty, this is counter to Gorbachev’s stated intent in the WSJS agreement.

6. AKHROMEYEV said that since this was the second time Nitze had raised ABM and START linkage during these meetings, and since Karpov had not satisfied US concerns, the Soviet side would weigh US remarks carefully and answer each point tomorrow. Akhromeyev then announced it was time for him and Karpov to recess for approximately 45 minutes to attend a meeting with Shevardnadze. [The Soviet side handed over its draft version of joint statement language on START/D&S matters]²

7. After return of Akhromeyev and Karpov, NITZE began a review of US positions on SLCMs. He said that despite an intensive effort over many years, the US had not yet been able to devise an acceptable, reliable means of giving confidence on SLCMs. The Geneva experts’ meetings should continue to address this problem, but at this point, the only solution the US side can envision is a non-binding declaration

² Not found.

of plans for nuclear-armed SLCMs. If the issue can be resolved on the basis of a declaratory approach, the US and Soviet sides would make a statement about the number of nuclear armed SLCMs it plans for, with the right to change plans as necessary. The Soviet side, Nitze said, has responded negatively to a declaratory approach, but has not been clear about its objections. If the Soviet side could be more specific about its objections, perhaps those objections could be addressed.

8. AKHROMEYEV said that he had already set forth Soviet views on SLCMs, including some new ones. The Soviet side requests the US to consider these views and not rule them out point blank. Further, the US stand on declaratory statements for SLCMs contradicts the US position on other issues. The Soviet side is sure that the problem is not that SLCMs cannot be verified, but that the US does not want to subject its “assets” to verification. This is “unimaginable.” If the sides agree to two or three classes of submarines and one or two classes of surface ships on which to deploy SLCMs, this will amount to approximately 100 “units” to be verified, in contrast to the case in INF where the Soviets will have close to 200 installations subject to verification. This illustrates that the problem is manageable. The problem is an obvious lack of desire on the part of the US side, and no one can convince the Soviet side that this is not the case. Even US leaders say that the US Navy is reluctant to subject its assets to verification. It is up to the US administration to deal with the US Navy; the Soviet side cannot control this. The US is familiar with General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement that only if SLCMs are constrained with verification can there be an agreement on reduction of SOAs. If there is no agreement to control SLCMs, the Soviet side would wait for the Americans to change its mind. On ABM Treaty linkage, Akhromeyev said he had nothing further to add.

9. NITZE replied that from the outset, it was agreed that SLCMs represented a different case; this is why they were not included under the 6000 weapon limit. Akhromeyev would recall that at Reykjavik, Nitze had said he could not envisage an acceptable verification regime for SLCMs, that the best imaginable scheme would be unilateral declarations. At that time, the US had agreed to seek mutually acceptable limitations on SLCMs. Now, Nitze said, he could assure Akhromeyev that the US had sought such limitations but had not succeeded. He then asked Amb Rowny to elaborate.

10. ROWNY said he wanted to emphasize it was not a matter of reluctance, but rather inability to find a solution, which has led the US to its conclusions on SLCMs. Although Rowny had spent a career in the Army, he said, he was familiar with naval operational concepts. Modern navies rely to a large degree on conventional sea-launched cruise missiles. Flexibility is the hallmark of modern navies of all

nations; limiting SLCMs to certain types of ships violates this principle. The US has worked long and hard to solve the problem of SLCM verification, but we have found no answer. The US has been promised a solution by the Soviet side, but it is clear that Soviet ideas do not offer a workable approach. Whereas certain systems lend themselves to verification, naval vessels do not. In an absence of a workable solution, or a better answer from the Soviet side, declarations appear to be the only feasible approach. This would give some degree of predictability. To repeat, Rowny said, the US position reflects not reluctance, but an inability to find an acceptable verification regime.

11. HOWE then stated he endorsed everything Nitze and Rowny had said, which illustrates that the problem of SLCMs is not simply the case of the US Navy being “out of control”, but is rather a joint, unified position of the US Government.

12. AKHROMEYEV interrupted to say that he had not used the words “out of control” in his presentation.

13. HOWE acknowledged this and thanked Akhromeyev for the correction. He continued that the USN has difficult problems with verification of the SLCM system, which has both nuclear and conventional applications, in contrast to SLBMs, which of course pose a much more significant strategic potential. On SLBMs, the US Navy has demonstrated its full cooperativeness in being willing to demonstrate to the Soviets the number of deployed missiles and warheads. He continued that, despite the fact that US coasts are more exposed, the US side does not consider SLCMs to be in the same category of threat as fast-flying ICBMs or SLBMs. On the matter of Akhromeyev’s comparison of INF base verification with SLCM verification, Howe wanted to point out that these are very different cases. Verification of the eventual total absence of INF systems from facilities on land is fundamentally different from distinguishing and counting SLCMs on operational, multi-purpose platforms. While the Soviet side may have elected to deploy its SLCMs on a small number of platforms, the US has already chosen to spread them over a large number of vessels; this proliferation which is inherent in the problem. As a final point, Howe said, US compliance with a declaratory approach would be assured by the combination of a free press in our open society and the scrutiny of the US Congress. For these reasons, the US bears, and is willing to accept, the greater risk from adopting declaratory statements.

14. AKHROMEYEV said he had a couple of comments on the general US approach. He suggested that the US side recall that the Dec. 10 WSJS, the leaders instructed the negotiators to set mutually agreed SLCM limitations and to seek mutually acceptable and effective verification measures. This means the sides should continue the search. Akhromeyev said that he wished to speak frankly on the US SLCM

position, and to a certain extent, on the US ALCM position. It was not his intent to offend, and he had not used the language Howe had cited, but simply wished to give the Soviet assessment, on which the Soviet side is firmly convinced. Looking at the problem as a whole, the US side want to “maximally reduce” Soviet ballistic missiles while deploying cruise missiles *en masse*, by the thousands. In this manner, the US will have used legal instruments to achieve military superiority over the USSR. The US wished to have a verbally determined number of cruise missiles, but an actual number greatly in excess of this, and to remove SLCMs from the verification framework entirely. The US side cannot convince the Soviets that this is not the US aim. In the two years since Reykjavik the US has offered no specific proposals on SLCMs. Soviet proposals on SLCM verification have not been seriously analyzed by the US, but rather, ruled out. The Soviet side simply wants the US side to understand and recognize the concerns of the Soviet MOD and General Staff, which the Soviet military is obligated to report to its government. Such a situation would be dangerous for the security interests of the USSR. It is clear that unless the US changes its position, this is an impediment to progress. On this current discussion, Akhromeyev said it was not his intention to launch another dispute, since each knows the other’s position. Rather, it is necessary to prepare the ground to move on. His aim in elaborating at length was to dwell on General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement that without SLCM resolution, there can be no solution to START. He then asked Nitze if the US had any further issues to raise.

15. NITZE said that the US takes the Soviet position seriously, but that we differ on the US motivation. He, Nitze, had personally dealt with these issues over many years; it is clear that the US concern over ballistic missiles, especially large MIRVs, is fundamental. Karpov will confirm this, that the US has longed viewed a strategic distinction between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The US acknowledges the different Soviet view, but our motivation is to reduce not just Soviet ICBMs, but all ballistic missiles. We believe cruise missiles are more suited to retaliation than to executing a first strike, and are inherently more stabilizing. On the question of long range ALCMs, the US side has tried to be fair to both sides. The count suggested by the US for heavy bombers is fair, and equal to the number of warheads on the most powerful ICBM of either side. It may be possible to discuss other numbers to be attributed if the Soviets do not believe that US and Soviet numbers should be the same. In the meantime the US side will review the Soviet SLCM proposals, and see if further progress can be achieved.

16. NITZE then turned to the issue of compliance with existing agreements. Nitze emphasized the importance of the compliance prob-

lem, and said he wished to make it clear that the US cannot conclude further agreements in the strategic area unless and until the Soviet record on non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, especially the problems of Krasnoyarsk and Gomel, are rectified. The sort of response provided by General Detinov at the last meeting on Krasnoyarsk is insufficient. Everyone who has studied this problem in the West concludes that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty; both Houses of Congress have called for its dismantlement. Nitze said he wished to note again the upcoming ABM Treaty review, that this compliance problem should not be allowed to fester, but should be resolved by effectively verifiable dismantlement of the ABM radar. Stopping construction of the radar is a step in the right direction, but is not enough. The only solution which will dispel the mistrust caused by Krasnoyarsk is to dismantle the radar, including the structure. Similarly, the violation involving radar facilities at Gomel must be corrected by verifiable dismantling. Finally, Nitze said he wished to discuss another topic—modernization of Soviet heavy ICBMs. Nitze noted that the START Treaty's provisions must result in an equal outcome over the long term. The current Soviet proposal would not do that, but would preserve a unilateral Soviet right to retain a heavy ICBM force indefinitely. The US proposal, banning flight testing, modernization, and new types, would achieve a balanced result. The Soviet side would gradually phase out existing heavy ICBMs as they aged, and both sides would be precluded from deploying new heavy ICBMs in the future. The US side cannot agree to any proposal on heavy ICBMs which does not create a balanced outcome over time. Nitze asked if Akhromeyev had any comments.

17. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side would reply on compliance and linkage to reduction of SOA at the next meeting. As to Soviet heavy ICBMs, the US presentation illustrates the point he was making earlier. The US aim, it is clear, is to liquidate Soviet ICBMs, while the US itself deploys many cruise missiles. Akhromeyev said he meant no offense, but this is his assessment. At Reykjavik, the sides agreed to cut heavy ICBMs by 50%; later, with due regard for US concerns, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a prohibition of new types of heavy ICBMs. The Soviet Union does not intend to forego necessary modernization and thereby disarm. The US proposal is unacceptable; the Soviet position is legitimate, and the Soviet side will stand by it. For now, Akhromeyev said, the meeting time is running short. Some of the group, he suggested, should be detailed to work on the joint statement, with the objective of reporting common ground by the following morning. At that time, the respective heads of the Arms Control groups could hear reports from the CST, Nuclear Testing, and CW groups. Following these reports, Akhromeyev said he could

respond to the US presentations on linkage and compliance. The Soviet side would also expect to hear US reaction to Soviet proposals on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs. It should therefore be possible to complete the tasks in time to report to ministers at 2:15 pm on the next day.

18. NITZE then proposed the group reconvene the next day, 31 May, at 9:00 am. Akhromeyev agreed.

310. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 31, 1988, 9:15 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense and Space, START

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

AMB Nitze
AMB Kampelman
AMB Hanmer
AMB Cooper
AMB Rowny
AS Lehman
ADM Howe
GOL Linhard
Mr. Castillo
Dr. Timbie
Dr. Graham
LTC Richardson
Mr. Joseph
Mr. Mozur (Interpreter)
Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

USSR

MSU Akhromeyev
AMB Obukhov
AMB Kuznetsov
AMB Masterkov
AMB Karpov
AMB Dubinin
GEN Chervov
GEN Starodubov
GEN Lebedev
CPT Beketov
Mr. Khromov
Mr. Batrushev (Int)

AKHROMEYEV stated that there was an objective interconnection between reductions in strategic offensive arms and limits on ABM systems. This was a question of principle. Fifty percent cuts in strategic offensive arms would be possible only if there were limits on development of ABM systems.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

The joint Soviet-American statement of December 10 contained the following formulation: "the sides will comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." Shultz had called this formulation the bible, but practice indicated that the sides interpreted the bible in their own ways. They had a different understanding regarding activities during the nonwithdrawal period and after.

The Soviet side understood the Washington formula the way it was drafted. During the specified period, all RD&T should comply with the ABM Treaty, in particular Article V, which stated that the sides should not develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components that were sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

This applied even if the systems were based on other physical principles. Deployment of fixed, ground-based ABM systems based on OPP and their components would be allowed in allowed areas, but only after discussion and agreement with the other side as called for in Agreed Statement D. The December 10 formula did not allow other interpretations.

As agreed in Washington, three years prior to the termination of the nonwithdrawal period, the sides should start intensive discussions of strategic stability. These would be carried out in a qualitatively different situation, when 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms were nearing completion. Such a situation, compared to today, would be much closer to the conditions of 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed. The sides would be involved in a joint quest for strategic stability. They should concentrate their efforts here.

Only in the case that the sides could not agree otherwise, only after the nonwithdrawal period, could the sides have the right to determine their own courses of action. After completion of the period, the right of the sides to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would be restored. Each side would be entitled to determine whether to remain in the ABM Treaty or not. Withdrawal from the Treaty should be carried out in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article XV. There was no need for provisions replacing Article XV. Agreement on non-withdrawal would not cancel the ABM Treaty or replace its provisions.

The U.S. side had raised the point of defending supreme interests. It insisted on including in the agreement a provision stipulating the right to withdraw if supreme interests were threatened. But the agreement being worked out was unique in nature, an agreement on non-withdrawal from another legal instrument. The attitude of the sides toward situations that might develop during the period of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and that might be viewed as threatening supreme interests should not imply withdrawal from the Treaty but rather a desire to avoid such situations.

The Soviet proposals were aimed at this. For example, the Soviet side agreed to cut strategic offensive arms by 50% within a period of 7 years. The sides would be doing that during the period of nonwithdrawal. If, in 4 years, the U.S. were to announce that, in connection with some circumstances, it planned to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, even though such circumstances had nothing to do with the USSR, the Soviet Union would face a situation where it was intensively cutting strategic offensive arms while the U.S. was deploying a territorial ABM system. This would seriously damage Soviet interests. The obligation not to withdraw must guarantee that a side would not face a situation such as this.

With regard to sensors, the U.S. side suggested that there be no limits on the testing and development of sensors of any type in outer space. The rationale was that sensors were useful and that it was difficult to distinguish between ABM and early warning sensors. The Soviet side could not agree.

It was difficult to oppose the use of sensors. Many had operated in space for quite some time. If there were no early warning sensors, the sides could not sit there and calmly discuss such things, because security would be impossible. But the situation was different with sensors used with functions similar to ABM radars, because under Article II, ABM radars were part of an ABM system and Article V prohibited deployment of such systems in space.

In March, at the Defense Ministers' meeting,² Carlucci had provided Yazov a simple scheme depicting placement of sensors in space. Akhromeyev had looked through the scheme and discussed it with Soviet experts. He had concluded that, because the scheme provided for placing into orbit not one sensor that might function as an ABM radar but rather an interconnected system of such sensors including command and control, each sensor of this kind would be capable not only of detecting the existence of a warhead in space but also of determining its position at any one time.

Moreover, those sensors would be capable of transmitting information to the command and control of strike systems. The sensors could control attack systems of different types, so they could be targeted against the warheads to ensure their destruction. This would mean that a large-scale territorial ABM system was being deployed.

Of course, the Soviet side was against this, because to complete the ABM system, it would take only the addition of strike systems to these components. The sides should let their experts scrutinize this problem.

² See footnote 3, Document 298.

With regard to compliance, the U.S. side had mentioned Krasnoyarsk. That was a spacetrack radar, but even if it was an early warning radar, it would not be a violation since it was not yet deployed. Construction of the radar had been frozen.

The Soviet side expected, since the U.S. side mentioned Krasnoyarsk, that it would address the radar in Greenland that was deployed and that was a violation of the ABM Treaty, since it was not an early warning radar but was an ABM radar. It had been an early warning radar, but after modernization it had been converted to an ABM radar.

Agreed Statement F stipulated that phased array radars with a potential greater than 3 million watt-meters squared could be deployed only in agreed areas (testing grounds or on the periphery pointing out), for spacetrack, or for NTM. One could not categorize the deployment of the Thule radar with potential greater than 3 million into any of the allowed modes of deployment. Therefore, the deployment was not allowed and was a direct violation. This was the Soviet way of handling both concerns, Krasnoyarsk and Thule.

NITZE responded that the U.S. side would study Akhromeyev's statement carefully and provide detailed replies. He had some preliminary comments. Akhromeyev had misstated the sense of Agreed Statement D. That statement indicated that, in the event systems or components capable of substituting for ABM components were created in the future, they would not be deployed without prior consultations and agreement. The word "create" clearly implied testing and development as part of the act of creation. There was no reference to ground-based systems in Agreed Statement D. The requirement for consultations and amendment under Article XIV was a precondition to deployment.

With regard to rights after the nonwithdrawal period, each side could choose its own course of action, as proposed in Washington by the General Secretary and agreed in the presence of both Akhromeyev and Nitze. It was clearly considered by both sides that 50% reductions would increase stability, not decrease it. It was not the U.S. view that 50% reductions would create extraordinary conditions increasing the threat to either side. The U.S. side did not envisage that reductions would entitle it to say that conditions had been created threatening its national security; its written position was specifically to the contrary.

Regarding Krasnoyarsk and Thule, Nitze's recollection was that the ABM Treaty, in Article II, Paragraph 2, said that the ABM systems and components listed in Paragraph 1 included those that were operational as well as those under construction. There was no distinction in the applicability of the provisions between the two categories.

Agreed Statement F did not distinguish whether or not early warning radars would be phased array radars with power aperture greater

than 3×10^6 . Both a dish radar and a phased array radar could be an early warning radar. Certainly not all Soviet radars were dish radars.

The Thule radar was in existence at the time of signing of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, it was exempted from the locational restrictions in the Treaty. The Treaty did permit modernization of those systems already in existence.

AKHROMEYEV said the sides had not understood each other on two points. The first was whether 50% reductions could upset strategic stability. The Soviet side was working on 50% cuts. What he had meant was that, if the reductions started and, after 3–4 years, the USSR had reduced a considerable portion of its assets, and the U.S. then announced that it was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty due to a situation not connected with the USSR, this would damage strategic stability and the interests of the USSR. That was why the Soviet side was against either side using the right of withdrawal during the agreed period of time.

The second misunderstanding was on Thule. The Soviet side did not object to repair and maintenance of a radar; that was allowed by the ABM Treaty. But the U.S. modernization at Thule gave that radar new qualities. An early warning radar had been turned into an ABM radar. This was a violation of the Treaty.

NITZE replied that, concerning the second point, he believed it correct that the USSR had transformed many early warning stations from non-phased array to phased array warning stations. The question had arisen whether those early warning stations provided information to the USSR's central information network. Therefore, these stations might have ABM capability; this was hard to determine. But the U.S. side had not raised this question. Certainly Thule fell in the same category.

AKHROMEYEV said he was not sure if this had been raised in Geneva, but Thule had acquired new qualities. If there was any doubt, the sides might pick out any early warning station in the USSR and compare its capabilities to those of Thule. Any early warning station in the USSR had only early warning qualities and nothing more. Thule had originally been an early warning station, but after modernization it had acquired ABM capabilities.

KAMPELMAN noted that the sides would not resolve this problem in this session, but they should realize that they were involved in a very important process. As part of that process, the U.S. side wanted the Soviet side to consider the following.

In 1972, when the sides signed the ABM Treaty, it was agreed that there would be further reductions in strategic offensive arms. The reductions the sides were now discussing would not take them below

the level they were at in 1972. Indeed, the levels would still be higher. Had the sides performed what they had undertaken to perform in 1972, there could be theoretical arguments along the lines Akhromeyev had taken. The sides might disagree, but the logic could be understood. But he did not see Akhromeyev's logic in this case, since the sides would, after the 50% cuts, still be in a posture above the 1972 levels.

It would seem better to go through the reductions, then continue the discussion in the defense area, and not make the reductions agreed on in 1972 dependent on this area the sides disagreed on. Unless the sides proceeded in this way, they would continue each time they met to argue without resolution the question of what the ABM Treaty meant. This question must be resolved someday, but Kampelman did not see the sides finding that resolution in a timely fashion.

AKHROMEYEV responded that there were two issues to discuss: the Thule radar and the point Kampelman had just raised. On the latter, it would take much time to make the U.S. side understand the Soviet position.

KAMPELMAN replied that the U.S. side understood the Soviet position; it just did not agree. And he thought the Soviet side understood the U.S. position.

AKHROMEYEV noted that there was the December 10 statement in which the leaders recognized the existence of linkage. Kampelman might have his point of view, but he could not avoid recognition of linkage being officially acknowledged by the U.S. side. It was impossible not to recognize linkage, because the General Secretary and the President had agreed to seek a resolution of the problem.

KAMPELMAN retorted that, certainly in the English language, there was a difference between linkage and interrelationship. The U.S. side recognized an interrelationship; there was no denying that. But linkage, where one area does not move unless the other moves, was where the sides had differences. He suggested the sides move to the more immediate crisis they faced in the strategic area.

AKHROMEYEV replied that interrelationship was the proper word. There was an objective, existing reality that had to be recognized. But he agreed to move on.

NITZE suggested the sides move to the papers worked by Hanmer and Obukhov. He understood that Obukhov wanted to restrict the papers to agreed elements and leave out the other points. The U.S. side believed the section on those points yet to be resolved was also important to transmit to Ministers. They should know the magnitude of the work yet to be done on ALCMs.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood the ALCM problem to be reflected in paragraph 3 of the Soviet document. This paragraph was

detailed enough; it included all points discussed between the sides. But there were too many brackets.

OBUKHOV added that the problem was that, at this point, the U.S. side had its paper and the Soviet side had its own.

AKHROMEYEV continued that, when reporting to Ministers, the sides would need a joint document. There might be points disagreed, but the sides should have a joint paper.

NITZE noted that, in the past, the sides had done their own reports. It was not necessary to have one paper.

AKHROMEYEV replied that, if the sides could not agree, they would have to have different papers, but one paper would be better.

The rest of the meeting was spent working text of the papers on ALCMs and mobile ICBM verification. Final versions of these papers are attached.³

³ Attached but not printed are two June 1 papers: "Elements of Common Ground on ALCMS" and "Elements of Common Ground on Mobile ICBM Verification."

311. Editorial Note

From 2:20–3:25 p.m. on May 31, 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze heard reports from the Working Groups on arms control and regional issues. Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze "led off with a report on the arms control working group, stating that the two sides had long, extensive, and productive discussions on the issues. On ALCM's, the two sides had reached a large measure of agreement and had produced a paper which recorded the areas of agreement. Similarly, there was a large measure of agreement on mobile ICBM's, and a paper on these areas of agreement was prepared." Nitze then outlined the remaining issues: "SLCM's were discussed at length, but no progress was made. There was also discussion about the relationship between the ABM Treaty and offensive arms reductions. There had been some progress in the clarification of views, but no substantive progress had been achieved." Nitze also "noted that the U.S. side had stressed its concerns over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and had demanded the dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar facility prior to the ABM Treaty review scheduled for October

this year.” Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeyev, Nitze’s counterpart on the arms control working group, “agreed that good work had been done. Work had practically concluded on the issue of notification of Ballistic Missile Launchers. The two sides continued to work toward solutions on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and the future. On mobile ICBM’s, Akhromeyev agreed that headway had been made on verification, creating a basis for more specific agreement on numbers. Looking ahead, Akhromeyev said that the two sides would try to do something on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and a Strategic Arms Treaty as a basis for the main document.” In response, Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed “that if the entire report was not incorporated in the Joint Statement, the heads of the working group could initial their agreed reports as the basis for future work.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 161.

On the evening of May 31, President Ronald Reagan hosted the Soviet delegation at Spaso House. In a memorandum for the record, drafted June 9, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Colin Powell summarized his dinner conversation with Akhromeyev: “I began the conversation by asking Marshal Akhromeyev for a better insight into Soviet thinking on the issue of ALCM’s and SLCM’s. With respect to ALCM’s, Marshal Akhromeyev said the simple problem was that the Soviets could not accept the position that our nuclear ALCM-carrying bombers would only be counted, under START rules, as carrying half as many warheads than they are actually equipped to carry. He said that they could not accept the discounting concept with respect to ALCM’s. He reaffirmed the long-standing Soviet view that a START agreement which did not constrain SLCM’s is unacceptable since SLCM’s are an easy way to circumvent START limits.” (Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, USSR 1988 Memos. Letters (05/24/1988–06/15/1988))

“From that basic restatement of Soviet positions,” Powell went on to recall, “he then launched into a long dissertation on why the Soviets had such concerns over nuclear cruise missiles. He said that the Soviets see themselves boxed in in both the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the Mediterranean and in the northern seas by a powerful US Navy with the ability to deliver sea-launched cruise missiles. As if this wasn’t bad enough, they had to be concerned with over-the-pole threats from US nuclear bombers. To illustrate his point he said that every morning when he went to the office, the first thing he was briefed on was the location of US Navy ships, P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft, and aircraft carriers. He singled out the US Navy as being a particularly difficult

threat to deal with as well as the bureaucratic impediment in coming to a solution on the SLCM problem. The fact that the Navy does not want to find a solution to the SLCM verification problem is evidence for the Soviet argument that such a system must be constrained." Powell "pointed out to him that the difficulties we've had with their verification ideas and thought that he was overstating the strategic threat that the Soviets faced from nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles." Akhromeyev "disagreed and repeated his position that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles simply had to be constrained for the reasons he had already given." Powell and Akhromeyev then discussed "Soviet claims of a new doctrine of defense sufficiency," and Akhromeyev's upcoming trip to the United States at the invitation of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe. (Ibid.)

The following morning, in a 10:05–11:20 a.m. meeting at St. Catherine's Hall in the Kremlin, Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev discussed arms control, bilateral affairs, regional affairs, and human rights. Shultz, having read aloud the portions of the draft joint summit statement about a potential Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, stated that "there had been no progress in Moscow on the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles. On defense and space, the discussions this week helped establish a better understanding of how we should go about clarifying the meaning of the statement at the Washington Summit. The talks did not, however, identify anything special to report to Ministers at this time." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) (declass) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 162.

On June 1, the United States and Soviet Union issued a joint statement to mark the conclusion of the Moscow Summit. A section of it, "Nuclear and Space Talks," reads in part: "The joint draft treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 on the aggregate of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The draft treaty also records the sides' agreement that a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50% below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded. During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing

types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the joint statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new types of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.” (All brackets are in the original text) The joint statement went on to discuss data exchanges, and note discussions on ALCM counting and SLCMs, and note that Reagan and Gorbachev had instructed their delegations to return to Geneva on July 12. (“Joint Statement, Moscow, June 1, 1988,” Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1988, pp. 26–27)

312. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 10, 1988

SUBJECT

WHETHER TO GO FOR A START TREATY

Our stated position—a correct one—following the Summit is that we will continue our efforts to make progress on START and see how far we can get; we would like to conclude a START Treaty in this Administration; but we will not be rushed to decision by the calendar.

It will come as no surprise to you that many in and out of Government have concluded that “the air is out of the soufflé” and there is virtually no chance of concluding a START Treaty this year. Some welcome this outcome as avoiding a “rush to decision” on difficult START issues.

I am concerned we not drift into a situation where drift alone makes a Treaty impossible. We should make a conscious decision now whether to press for a Treaty or concentrate instead on consolidating the maximum amount of agreement to pass on to the next Administration.

A START Treaty this year is, in my opinion, not achievable unless the Soviets agree at the final end game to put aside the two most difficult issues—SLCMs and SDI. This is quite possible, but even with this Soviet acquiescence, it is highly uncertain whether Washington can organize itself to make the extraordinary effort necessary to arrive at decisions on the range of other remaining difficult START issues, such as suspect site inspections, mobile ICBM verification, ALCMs, bombers, and a throw-weight protocol.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, June 1988 Meeting w/ President. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

The list of obstacles is daunting, but the Soviets may still want to conclude a START agreement with the Reagan administration. If we were within sight of agreement on all other START issues, they just might settle for a declaration on SLCMs and a ban on *deployment* of SDI for a certain number of years. But even if the Soviets do not agree, we would have a package and could use it to our advantage when the issue of “blame” for no agreement is raised. I fully expect the Soviets to come in with their initiatives in a public way on July 12. (I expect to be in Geneva that first week.)

Whatever slim chance there may be now for a Treaty in 1988, the odds will decrease quickly with time. We should decide now, therefore, whether or not to go for it. We should also recognize that if we are to have a shot at it, a maximum effort from the top will be required. That will mean, among other things, forcing decisions out of a reluctant inter-agency bureaucracy. This will require the personal commitment and direction of the President with those who would prefer to go slow, such as JCS. The JCS should understand that in a Dukakis Presidency, there is unlikely to be a $\frac{2}{3}$ Senate ratification vote. We would then be left with no Soviet 50% reductions and unilateral US reductions by virtue of budget cuts.

I recommend that in your next private meeting with the President, you discuss START prospects frankly. Whatever his decision, we can then execute it politically and organize ourselves accordingly.

313. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

Washington, June 27, 1988

SUBJECT

JCS Military Evaluation of U.S. Strategy Under a START Regime (U)

As we've discussed, outlines of the strategic forces which will be allowed under a START Treaty are now clear. While there are a number of important issues outstanding, both within the United States Government and with the Soviets, the bulk of these involve verification, not fundamental treaty limits. (U)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Mtg on START, August 11, 1988. Secret. Copied to Shultz, Webster, and Crowe.

While we have spent long hours on specific details of the START treaty, we have spent much less time in recent months on the broader question of our overall strategic posture once such a treaty is implemented. While this topic was examined thoroughly when our START approach was initially devised, I believe we should do it again for several reasons:

—First, we will be completing our START position over the summer. Stepping back to examine the impact of the treaty is logical and appropriate.

—Second, it is clear that a treaty cannot be completed this year without extraordinary efforts. Before making those efforts, with the attendant risks of being misinterpreted in a political year, we should have a better understanding of the value of such a treaty.

—Both supporters and opponents of our position are beginning to assert that we do not understand the strategic result of our proposals. While I believe this charge to be unfounded, where national security is involved we have an obligation to make absolutely certain we understand where we are going and what the results of our approach will be.

—Finally, such a review would be useful in responding to the issues raised by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (S)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are uniquely qualified to conduct the type of review we need. While the formal JCS evaluation of military sufficiency must await completion of negotiations, I believe the President and his senior advisors would benefit from the Chiefs' current assessment of the benefits to the United States of a START treaty. I therefore request that the JCS prepare a 30–45 minute briefing on whether, and if so to what degree, START will improve the overall U.S. strategic posture. (S)

To be most useful, I suggest the briefing:

- Assume our current START position prevails in a final treaty;
- Not focus on verification details, but consider the effect of Soviet non-compliance at appropriate levels;
- Assume the continuation of the strategic modernization program; and
- Provide the JCS professional military judgement of the benefits to the United States of a post-START world compared with a world without START. (S)

I do not believe that deployment of advanced strategic defenses need be considered in this specific briefing. (S)

—I suggest a briefing; rather than a formal study, because I hope the briefing will serve as a vehicle to stimulate discussion among the President's senior advisors. I would appreciate it if the briefing could be available for presentation to the President by the end of July. (C)

Colin L. Powell²

² Powell initialed the memorandum above his typed signature.

314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State's Delegation¹

Washington, July 8, 1988, 2007Z

219954/ToSec 140195. Subject: Info Memo: Discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev (S/S: 8821018)

I attended a dinner at Admiral Crowe's residence July 6 in honor of Marshal Akhromeyev.

On the margins of that dinner, Akhromeyev and I had a private conversation. He described his talks with the Chiefs as being forthright, firm and, he thought, useful. He, and more importantly his generals and admirals, now understand the worries of the American generals and admirals better than they had before. I asked for an example. He said Admiral Trost had made a very good presentation on cruise missiles. Trost had described the U.S. Navy's concerns about the growing Soviet nuclear threat to U.S. ships. Trost had charts and maps supporting these statements; he demonstrated that, as a result of the Soviet threat, the U.S. Navy had felt compelled to distribute its nuclear attack forces on a wider range of ships. This had driven the Navy to SLCMs. Akhromeyev's people had earlier not fully perceived the extent to which the U.S. Navy thought the survival of its forces was threatened.

Akhromeyev said that NST negotiations had now gotten to a point where the direct national security interests of both sides were involved; from this point on it would be difficult to make progress. I said I thought the first step in a successful process of this kind was for each side to understand fully the needs and concerns of the other. It seemed to me that progress had been made in this direction. But then one had to look at how further substantive progress could be made. For example, we might identify five major issues in START; maybe it would not be possible to solve all five initially, but if we could solve one of those five, we might then go beyond to a series of lesser issues, so that one by one all issues might ultimately be resolved.

Akhromeyev said that we would have made enormous progress if we could achieve a solution to, say, three of the five major issues. I asked if we could make progress on one issue, didn't he think we would have better hopes at progress on a second and then a third. He said yes. I asked him whether he still thought we could reach agreement on all major issues by the end of this administration. He said he thought

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N880005-0334. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Nitze; cleared by Levitsky, and in S/S-0; approved by Nitze. From July 6–July 20, Shultz traveled to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Japan, and the Marshall Islands.

it possible, but not likely; both sides would have to make major concessions.

Later, when I reported my conversation to Admiral Crowe, his comment was, “what kind of pot are you smoking, Paul?”

315. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 11, 1988, 1737Z

7836. Subject: NST: Kampelman-Obukhov Conversation June 11.

1. This is NST-X-M-001. Secret—entire text.

2. Meeting Date: July 11, 1988

Time: 1300–1500 hours

Place: Restaurant les Continents, Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

USSR

Ambassador Kampelman

Ambassador Obukhov

4. Begin summary: Obukhov was cordial and constructive in one-on-one conversation with Kampelman July 11. He asked for joint plenary to open NST Round X July 12, with indications he may have substantive comments to raise, but declined to be specific about possible new substantive moves. Citing past precedent, Obukhov suggested personally (and not on behalf of his government) a logical break-point of the negotiations would be shortly after U.S. elections in November, “assuming we don’t have a treaty by then,” but quickly added we should still try for that. He assumed issue would be discussed at September ministerial. Obukhov professed disappointment at Kampelman’s statement that Soviet SLCM position made a START treaty in 1988 unlikely. On ABM Treaty review, Obukhov said Shevardnadze wanted NST talks to resume July 12 as announced by leaders. Moscow, he said, was discussing proposed dates. He did not demur at Kampelman’s suggestion the Defense/Space Talks break and not be in session for the period of the ABM Treaty review. End summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880590-0360. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to the Mission to NATO, USNMR SHAPE, and Moscow.

5. Begin subject summary. NST talks/U.S. political calendar; request for joint plenary July 12; passing on START to the next administration; Defense and Space; ABM Treaty review; one-sided Soviet concessions. End subject summary.

NST Talks/U.S. Political Calendar

6. Kampelman invited Obukhov for customary one-on-one discussion July 11 as prelude to opening of Round X of NST negotiations July 12. Obukhov was relaxed and cordial. Much of conversation dwelt on how the NST negotiations fit into the U.S. political calendar and transition between administrations.

7. Obukhov asked whether the U.S. has views on how long the round should go, given the U.S. elections this fall. Kampelman replied this was an issue on which the U.S. had not yet taken a position. We believed we should make as much progress as we can now, and face that question later. He was certain that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would want to discuss this question when they meet in September.

8. Obukhov said he believed that in the past, the nuclear arms negotiations had recessed just after the U.S. elections in November, resuming early in the new year after the new administration took office. Obukhov quickly added that such a scenario “assumes we won’t have a treaty before then,” but of course both sides should work toward that goal.

9. In listing START issues, Kampelman said a START treaty in 1988 was unlikely if the Soviets continued to insist on including SLCMs in the agreement along the lines of their current position. Obukhov expressed disappointment at Kampelman’s view that if the Soviets deferred the SLCM issue for future negotiations it would expedite movement toward a START treaty.

Passing on START to the Next Administration

10. Obukhov asked what would be the likely reaction of Bush and Dukakis to the START agreement now under negotiation. Kampelman replied that he could not speak for either candidate, but he would guess both would want to build on what had been agreed by the Reagan administration. This argued for making as much progress and developing the maximum amount of agreed language as possible before the negotiations adjourn, should a formal treaty not be ready for the President’s signature.

11. Obukhov agreed and asked if Amb. Hanmer would be prepared to work on this basis in START. Kampelman replied affirmatively, noting for example the importance of developing detailed, agreed verification provisions, which was still a “manageable” task. They also

noted the importance of striving for agreed language on mobiles, ALCMs, and suspect sites. Obukhov emphasized the importance of closing on agreed language where possible.

Request for Joint Plenary July 12

12. In response to Kampelman's inquiry as to how the Soviets preferred to open the round, Obukhov replied the Soviet side would like a joint plenary meeting this time rather than a less formal luncheon meeting of the senior negotiators. Kampelman asked if that indicated the Soviet side wanted to table something new. Obukhov evaded a direct answer, saying only that a joint plenary was a more appropriate way for the formal opening, but he did indicate he was at work formulating substantive language.

Defense and Space

13. Obukhov asked Kampelman's views on turning the language of the December 10 joint statement on Defense and Space into treaty language.

14. Kampelman replied that the language was very good for its non-treaty purpose, but there would be no prospect of getting ambiguous language which the Soviets interpret one way and we another through the Senate. Kampelman added he hoped progress could be made this round on the predictability measures. He suggested Ambassador Cooper was prepared to arrive at a practical solution.

ABM Treaty Review

15. Obukhov said Shevardnadze told Matlock on Friday July 8 that the Soviets wanted the NST negotiations (including Defense and Space) to resume on July 12, as agreed. As for the date of the ABM Treaty review, the Soviet side was still considering the question and would reply shortly.

16. Kampelman suggested that the Defense and Space negotiations break during few days of the ABM Treaty review, whenever it occurs. Obukhov did not object to this suggestion.

17. Obukhov asked why the U.S. did not want to conduct the treaty review in the SCC, as was done in the past. Kampelman replied the SCC had not been able to resolve the serious Soviet violations. The U.S. wanted a special, high-level review to underline the depth of our concern about Krasnoyarsk.

One-Sided Soviet Concessions

18. In closing, Obukhov complained that an objective review of concessions in the START as well as the INF negotiations showed that nearly all of the major moves had been on the Soviet side. This had been noted in Moscow and could not continue if a START agreement were to be reached.

19. Kampelman replied that it was unproductive to tote up the moves made by one side or another. What was important was the final agreement and whether it met the security interests of both sides and enhanced stability.

20. The formal opening of Round X will begin at 1100 a.m., tomorrow, July 12, at the U.S. Mission.

Kampelman

316. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 15, 1988

SUBJECT

Guidance for the Nuclear and Space Talks

Issue

To document your approval of instructions for the tenth round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resumed in Geneva on July 12.

Discussion

Draft instructions for the NST Round X were prepared by the appropriate interagency bodies. Because there were no issues raised warranting Presidential decision, I have authorized their dispatch in your name, after resolving a number of issues. Normal practice is to document your formal approval of all instructions in an NSDD. A draft NSDD is at *Tab A*;² it includes as attachments individual instructions for START and Defense and Space and overall NST instructions.

The overall instructions reaffirm our current general objectives and our unwillingness to conclude a new treaty until the Soviet illegal radar at Karsnoyarsk is dismantled.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round X]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. Copied to Bush and Duberstein. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "The President has seen 7/17/88."

² Printed as Document 317.

The START instructions are quite long and include instructions to translate the work done during the Moscow summit (especially on ALCMs and mobile ICBM verification) into treaty text. They also record the results of an extensive review of our existing position and provide a number of minor corrections and modifications to our current draft treaty text.

In preparing the START instructions, one significant issue arose. Just prior to the Moscow summit we prepared a mobile ICBM verification scheme for discussion with the Soviets in the event you alter the U.S. position and allow mobile ICBMs under START. Our approach was to confine mobile ICBMs to small peacetime locations except for (1) limited numbers in pre-notified transit or (2) large scale dispersal. During dispersals (which we envision to be rare) there would be no restrictions on mobile ICBM location.

Allowing dispersals was strongly opposed by all agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that it increased verification problems significantly. We included dispersals, despite this opposition, because the JCS were convinced that such a provision was essential both for survivability and for continued Congressional support of the U.S. mobile ICBM program. ACDA Director Burns, supported by the Director of Central Intelligence, believes the decision should be reconsidered. His rationale is at *Tab B*. While I appreciate his concerns, nothing has changed since the pre-summit decision. The Soviets appear to have accepted the broad outlines of our approach and I elected not to alter it at this time.

In addition to the mobile ICBM issue, a number of other issues arose during preparation of the START instructions, none of which involved new policy. My resolution of the issues is at *Tab C*.

The primary Defense and Space issue was how hard to press our proposal to allow space-based sensors to run free from ABM Treaty constraints. We have discussed this proposal with the Soviets several times, including at the Moscow Summit.

The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency believed we are ready to table draft treaty language on the proposal. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense and Space Negotiator believed we should not table treaty language until the Soviets accept the idea in principle, but that we should be prepared to answer Soviet questions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence opposed even reiterating points we made to the Soviets at Moscow or authorizing the U.S. Negotiating Group to answer Soviet questions. While there is no present urgency to table treaty language, we should be prepared to answer Soviet questions. Therefore, I accepted the advice of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense and Space Negotiator.

In accordance with NSDD 266, Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you sign the attached NSDD approving the negotiating instructions for NST Round X. ³

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Burns) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)⁴

Washington, July 1, 1988

SUBJECT

Further Steps on Mobile Verification

Even with the “elements on mobile ICBM verification,” as agreed at the summit, we are a long way from resolving the details and remaining differences for verifying mobile ICBMs. The differences reflected at the summit, in my view, underline the need to add a key constraint to our position.

In particular, the Soviets appear to question our position that operational dispersals would, in practice, occur only rarely. This heightens an already deep concern that the Soviet's conduct of operational and exercise dispersals—with no constraints whatsoever on dispersal area—would give them a relatively easy opportunity to exercise and integrate the operations of covert forces should they decide to do so. We would have little basis for objecting to legal dispersals and no basis for distinguishing legal from illegal systems, since the former could be anywhere.

Therefore, as we flesh out our position further, I recommend that we reconsider adding a key constraint. We should, in my view, introduce some boundary beyond which systems could not legally go in dispersing—as we have in INF. For road-mobiles, this would mean superimposing a dispersal zone on the Restricted Deployment Area

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁴ Secret.

(RDA) we have proposed. For rail-mobiles, this would look again at some concept for defining how far trains could go.

This constraint would be important to a mobile verification regime whether or not we get tagging. If an effective tagging scheme can be devised (which is still uncertain) and sold to the Soviets (who so far have rejected the idea), it will at most help deter mixing illegal and legal systems at declared facilities (e.g., missiles in garrisons or RDAs). Nothing in our current position is designed to help deter mixing or coordinating illegal and legal systems during exercises or other dispersals.

An outer boundary for dispersals, or dispersal zone, would provide such a deterrent by providing a basis—indeed, the only basis—for distinguishing between legal and illegal systems by NTM. Since we would define the outer boundary by a number that would not adversely affect our expected operations and survivability, I see little, if any, disadvantage to this approach.

An added advantage of an outer boundary is that, for verification purposes, we would not need to impose any restrictions on movement within the dispersal zone. Thus, this scheme would permit much greater survivability on a day-to-day basis and satisfy the concern that our systems might, in effect, be stuck in small areas and very vulnerable. Moreover, regular movements within the larger dispersal area would not raise the alarms that could easily be triggered by the very infrequent dispersals envisioned under our current approach.

Therefore, I believe consideration should be given to introducing this constraint in the upcoming round. Without such a constraint, we would have less confidence for strategic mobile ICBMs than we were willing to accept for the 100-100 INF approach, and that would not be acceptable.

I am sending similar memoranda to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵

William F. Burns

⁵ Not found.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

RESOLUTION OF START ISSUES

I resolved minor START issues as follows:

- Agreed to consider the Joint Draft Text as an authoritative U.S. position, consistent with past practice. (OSD and JCS opposed)

- Included instructions in START on the need to dismantle Krasnoyarsk before concluding a START treaty. (State and ACDA preferred to cover this only in overall instructions)

- Authorized the START delegation to explore an ALCM counting rule attributing 10 ALCM per B52, 8 per Soviet BEAR H and 6 per Soviet Blackjack. (OSD opposed)

- Authorized discussing a Soviet proposal on functional differences for bomber distinguishability. (OSD and ACDA opposed)

- Authorized tabling treaty text on mobile ICBM verification (OSD and the DCI opposed)

- Declined to limit the technical data we will exchange, pending additional review. (JCS opposed)

- Declined to allow the Negotiator to discuss allowing heavy ICBM testing and modernization without further Washington approval. (State opposed)

- Declined an OSD request to reconsider our position on perimeter portal monitoring and a JCS request to reconsider restrictions on movement of ballistic missiles before inspections.

- Accepted a proposal to allow provide separate limits on different types of non-deployed ICBM at a single launcher deployment area. (State opposed)

- Declined to authorize language on treaty duration pending a policy review. (ACDA and the Negotiator opposed)

⁶ Secret. In a July 8 memorandum to Powell, Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard wrote: "Normal practice is to submit NST instructions to the President for his approval, documenting that approval in an NSDD. We believe that the issues raised are *not* deserving of the President's time; they are either (a) minor issues of nuance or (b) issues where it is only necessary to reaffirm existing U.S. policy. Thus, we propose that you resolve the issues and authorize the issuance of the instructions." Powell approved all of the recommendations offered by Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard in the memorandum. (National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round XI])

—Agreed that, consistent with INF, the entire area inside a site boundary should be subject to inspection. (JCS opposed)

—Disapproved a proposal to make the number of exits to sites subject to perimeter portal monitoring the subject of agreement after ratification; retained current treaty provisions. (State opposed)

—Authorized tabling some new definitions despite a JCS belief that they required further study. (JCS opposed)

—Reaffirmed our existing position that launchers for rail-mobile ICBMs must be tagged. (State, ACDA and JCS opposed)

In addition, I resolved several minor wording or clarity issues.

317. National Security Decision Directive 310¹

Washington, July 18, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TENTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (C)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the tenth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which begins on July 12, 1988, in Geneva. They include the agreements reached during my June 1988 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. (S)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round X]. Secret. Negroponte distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of a July 18 memorandum that reads in part: "Agency proposals to limit the scope of technical data exchanged, to specify treaty duration and to define space launch vehicles were deleted from the instructions without prejudice and will be reconsidered as part of the START work program." (Ibid.)

Attachment

Draft Telegram²

Washington, undated

Subject: Overall instructions for Round X of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (U)

Ref: (A) Round X START Instructions³

(B) Round X DST Instructions⁴

1. Secret—entire text.

2. The following is overall guidance for the U.S. NST delegation for Round X, which begins on July 12, 1988. Guidance from previous rounds remains in effect except as modified below. Specific guidance for the START and the Defense and Space Negotiating Groups is provided in refels.

3. Principal objectives for Round X include:

—To build on the progress achieved during the May 29–June 1, 1988 summit in Moscow.

—To conclude by the earliest possible date the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms consistent with U.S. principles that we seek only effectively verifiable and stabilizing reductions.

—To prepare the joint draft text of a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington summit joint statement dated December 10, 1987 and to continue work on its associated protocol.

—To continue to resist Soviet attempts to produce a key provisions or framework agreement for either START or DST.

—To continue to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space.

—To reaffirm our longstanding concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty.

² Secret. The Department transmitted the overall instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 22382, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880591-0430)

³ Attached but not printed. The Department transmitted Round X START Instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 222516, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880088-1905)

⁴ Attached but not printed. The Department transmitted Round X DST Instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 222515, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A)

—To make it clear that we will not conclude any strategic ARMS agreements, either in START or Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement of the radar.

318. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 5, 1988

SUBJECT

Weekend Reading

Next Friday, August 12, I anticipate holding an NSPG² to review two START issues. The first, verification of limits on mobile ICBMs, will provide an opportunity for some of your advisors to share their reservations with the position we established just prior to the Moscow summit. I am working to see if a consensus can be forged on this issue and will provide you information on it subsequently.

The second issue, non-deployed missiles, is one we have not discussed with you in some time. Our current START position places significant constraints on all types of non-deployed ballistic missiles. Reducing these constraints could reduce the cost to us of our verification regime as well as decreasing the intrusiveness of Soviet inspectors in the United States. We have therefore been reexamining our position to see if our objectives can be met with a less elaborate verification approach.

The attached paper, prepared by the Arms Control Support Group, has served as a vehicle for our reexamination. While agencies disagree on what should be done, all but the Office of the Secretary of Defense agree with the basic analysis. While Secretary Carlucci has not personally addressed the issue, his staff (which favors retaining all our current constraints and adding new ones) disagrees with the Intelligence Com-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, C Files, 8850150–8850174. Secret. Copied to Bush and Duberstein. Prepared by Brooks. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Brooks and Linhard sent the memorandum to Powell for signature under cover of an August 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) (S)

² See Document 320.

munity assessment and believes the threat from non-deployed missiles to be more severe than indicated.

I recommend you include the attached paper in your weekend reading. I will provide additional details before the NSPG.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group³

Washington, August 5, 1988

GRIP 58G (U)

Purpose. To review the U.S. position on limits on nondeployed missiles and on the associated verification regime. (S/G)

Background. “Nondeployed” missiles (NDM) are those not in silos, on mobile launchers or loaded in submarines, and thus not counted in the basic START limits. Some nondeployed missiles are necessary to allow for routine maintenance, for spares, and for periodic reliability testing. Nondeployed missiles beyond those necessary for such legitimate purposes could add to military capability because of their potential for breakout and refire. Because of this potential, the United States seeks a direct numerical limit on nondeployed missiles in START. (S)

Ideally we would like to keep the number of nondeployed missiles small to minimize the potential risks. To keep acquisition costs down, however, U.S. practice is to produce all the missiles of any given type we need at one time and store the excess missiles until they are required for testing or maintenance. This practice means that we tend to have a large number of nondeployed missiles on hand ourselves and thus would have to allow the Soviets a similar large number. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] The large number of nondeployed missiles required for U.S. forces may, therefore, limit the impact of NDM limits in START. (S/G)

Many of our most complex treaty provisions—tagging, perimeter/portal monitoring, suspect site inspections—exist primarily to help enforce restrictions on nondeployed missiles. Because of the financial costs and the operational impact on U.S. forces, it is appropriate to consider whether U.S. goals could be achieved by constraining some lesser subset of nondeployed missiles. (S/G)

³ Secret; Grip.

In broad terms there are three types of threat posed by a large number of nondeployed missiles (or a small number of highly MIRVd missiles):

—*Breakout Via Soft Launchers.* The Soviets might, in time of great tension, attempt to rapidly erect their nondeployed missiles on soft launchers, drastically increasing the threat facing the United States in a relatively brief period of time. The Soviets could thus gain the substantial coercive leverage inherent in a situation in which they suddenly had a substantially larger strategic force than the United States. [2 lines not declassified] although we have seen no evidence that such launchers or the large support structure implied by such a scenario exist or that Soviet missiles are capable of being rapidly erected and fired from such soft launchers.

—*Breakout Via Covert Mobile Missile Launchers.* The Soviets might gain coercive leverage from bringing into full operational readiness mobile ICBMs and launchers which were covertly maintained in a reduced state of readiness or in storage. Such missiles and launchers could consist of those produced before the treaty enters into force but not declared, and/or those covertly produced after the treaty enters into force.

—*Reload and Refire.* The Soviets could use a large force of nondeployed missiles to reload and refire existing launchers. There is clear evidence of a Soviet reload and refire capability. For this option to be effective the Soviets would need launchers; refire missiles; and handling equipment, transportation equipment and trained personnel, all of which survive the initial exchange. If the Soviets believed that they had all of these, their correlation of forces calculations in a crisis might embolden them to take risks they would otherwise not take, thereby weakening deterrence. (S/G)

Soviet Plans—General. The Intelligence Community judges that the Soviets would attempt to reload and refire some silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs and to restore as much as possible after nuclear strikes, the combat effectiveness of their ICBM and submarine forces. It is judged also that the Soviets probably would be able to reload only a small portion of their silos in the final phases of general nuclear war. Further the Soviets currently have only a limited capability to carry out SLBM reload and refire operations in a post strike nuclear environment. The range of views within the Intelligence Community extends from those who believe that the Soviets would be able to reload and refire from a significant number of surviving silo-based launchers to those who believe that Soviet capabilities in this regard are negligible. All agencies except OSD agree that the Soviets currently do not have the capability or intent to engage in any of the following refire-related activities: large-scale reload, maintain reserves of older retired missile systems, and soft launch of silo-based ICBMs. All agencies agree also that it would be much easier to reload and refire mobile ICBMs [1 line not declassified] (S/G)

Soviet Plans—Fixed Site Refire. The feasibility of fixed-site refire operations depends on the availability and survival of missile reserves, transportation assets, support equipment, largely intact silos, and personnel; on the maintenance of an operable logistic support infrastructure, especially relevant portions of the railway system; on a well-planned set of operational procedures; and on the timing and staging of the reload. Successful implementation would be heavily influenced by damage sustained before the reload operations. Effective execution of U.S. SIOP plans would laydown weapons on all Soviet silos making survival of a large number of silos unlikely. Support facilities at fixed operational complexes are not hardened and storage apparently is limited, moreover, rear depots that hold reserve missiles and propellant are neither hardened nor well-suited for rapid evacuation of missile airframes. In addition to the difficulties associated with recovery from the effects of nuclear strikes, restoration of unit combat effectiveness and reloading launchers with missiles, nuclear effects and potential damage could cause significant uncertainties for the Soviets about the operational effectiveness of their withheld weapons (although these factors might not dissuade the Soviets from dispersing missiles and support equipment and attempting reload operations). (S/G)

Soviet Plans—Soft Launch. In theory, probably any Soviet ICBM could be launched without a silo by using special equipment to support the missile before liftoff. [8 lines not declassified] The number of personnel, the new and unique equipment, and the training needed for a large soft launch program would be substantial and it is unlikely that such preparations would escape U.S. attention. (The dual-based SS-24 is considered a mobile missile in the context of this paper.) (S/G)

Soviet Plans—SLBM Refire. We judge that Soviet capability to reload SSBNs is limited. Soviet submarine tenders carry reload missiles and would disperse to relocation sites where they could limit reloading. Any SLBM reload operation beyond the initial capacity of a submarine tender, however, would face the difficulties of having to pre-position reloading equipment, deliver missiles and their warheads, and conduct the reload operation either under the threat of direct attack or under collateral nuclear effects. Moreover, if Soviet SSBN force generation had been disrupted by hostilities, all available missile-loading capabilities would most likely be devoted first to arming those boats that dispersed without a full complement of SLBMs. (S/G)

Problems with our Current Position. Our current position places a numerical limit (as yet undefined) on all nondeployed missiles. While this goes the farthest to constrain Soviet capability, it has certain problems. Some, though not all, of the problems we are facing in developing details of our START inspection protocol are unique to SLBMs. Allowing on-site inspection of flight testing, for example, is made significantly

more difficult because of our unwillingness to have Soviet observers on U.S. submarines for at sea launches. Similarly, some provisions for tag reading, for tagging, and for on-site inspection are made more complicated by the unique nature of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and by our unwillingness to allow the Soviets access to our submarines. While there are operational difficulties with applying our tagging regime to ICBMs, the ICBM problems and the SLBM problems differ, forcing us to overcome two separate sets of problems in designing a verification regime. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] (S/G)

In addition, the magnitude of our requirements for Perimeter Portal Monitoring could be reduced by altering our current position. Our current position involves PPM at the following Soviet facilities:

- facilities producing the accountable stage of solid propellant ballistic missiles [*less than 1 line not declassified*];
- facilities producing the accountable stage of liquid propellant ballistic missiles [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; and
- final assembly facilities for liquid propellant ballistic missiles [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

If mobile ICBMs are allowed, the U.S. would expand PPM to include, at a minimum, facilities producing solid rocket motor stages as large as the smallest accountable stage of a treaty-limited mobile ICBM; some agencies would extend PPM to facilities producing second and third stages of ballistic missiles. A PPM program of this scope is costly. (S/G)

As a result of the foregoing, it is appropriate to consider whether U.S. objectives can be met by a regime which limits only some nondeployed missiles. For purposes of this paper, non-deployed missiles will be considered in four classes: mobile ICBMs, solid propellant fixed ICBMs, liquid propellant fixed ICBMs, and SLBMs. (S/G)

Discussion—Mobile ICBMs. Nondeployed missiles capable of being launched by mobile ICBM launchers are obviously the highest priority for constraint. Our decision to ban mobile ICBMs is based on verification and stability concerns, with the stability concerns related to both the problem of reloads and refires and the problem of covert launchers. Since mobile ICBM launchers are expected to survive an initial exchange, and since handling equipment for mobile ICBMs is portable (and thus also survivable), a large number of reload missiles gives the Soviets all three required elements for an effective restrike capability. In addition, since mobile launchers could be produced with relative ease, either covertly or (if unconstrained) legally, a large number of nondeployed missiles provides significant breakout potential. Constraints on nondeployed missiles capable of being fired by mobile ICBM launchers are thus essential. (S/G)

Discussion—Solid Fixed ICBMs. The reload problem is less significant for fixed ICBMs, although such reloads appear to figure in Soviet

war plans and training. Even if a substantial number of reload missiles and their handling equipment survive, most silos are not expected to if our strategic deterrent functions as expected. By constraining rapid reload (to the extent this is possible via START), we might provide sufficient time for those silos not destroyed in the initial ballistic missile exchange to be destroyed by penetrating aircraft. Thus the reload threat from silo-based ICBMs is considerably less, assuming existing targeting practices are retained in the future. Theoretically, the Soviets could choose to create and develop the large infrastructure necessary to soft-launch solid silo-based ICBMs, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (S/G)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are developing solid ICBMs capable of launching from both mobile launchers and silos (Peacekeeper and SS-24). Thus, as a practical matter, if non-deployed missile constraints are to limit the mobile ICBM reload and refire threat, fixed, solid propellant ICBMs must be limited as well. There are only a relative handful of Soviet solid propellant ICBMs which do *not* have a mobile variant (60 aging SS-13s); if mobile ICBMs are allowed, the significance of constraints on this small category is limited. Even if the United States were to retain—and be successful in obtaining—its current proposal to ban mobile ICBMs, however, some believe nondeployed missile constraints on solid, fixed ICBMs, would be appropriate either because of the potential for soft launch or because they doubt that targeting and reload constraints can preclude significant reloading of silos. (S/G)

Discussion—Liquid Propellant ICBMs. Currently liquid fueled ICBMs are deployed only in silo launchers. Since our primary defense against reload of silos is silo destruction, there is less incentive to constrain liquid fueled ICBM reloads. Further, the Intelligence Community believes that liquid fuel ICBMs are inherently less suited than solid fueled ICBMs for breakout through rapid proliferation of soft launchers. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] Liquid ICBM systems are hypergolic and therefore are not transportable in a fueled state. Soft site launch of such missiles would require the creation of highly trained units and large stocks of specialty equipment. Finally, the Soviets currently have no mobile launchers capable of launching liquid fuel ICBMs; if mobile ICBMs are allowed, the U.S. position is to ban mobile liquid ICBMs. These factors argue that it is less important to constrain nondeployed liquid fueled ICBMs. On the other hand, lessening the constraints on such missiles could allow the Soviets to maintain sanctioned reloads for the SS-18 or to develop other liquid-fuel ICBM circumvention options. Reduction in the SS-18 threat has long been a primary goal of U.S. arms reduction policy. Further, even if liquid fueled ICBMs are less suited for use on soft launchers (which is not certain), such use is

clearly possible. Thus while a case exists for constraints on liquid fueled nondeployed ICBMs, the incentives for such limitations are less than for solid ICBMs. (S/G)

Discussion—SLBMs. The need for constraints on nondeployed SLBMs is no more compelling (and may be less compelling) than that associated with liquid missiles or soft launches of solid fueled ICBMs. While SLBM launchers will survive an initial exchange, and substantial nondeployed missiles might survive, handling equipment necessary for reloading SLBMs currently exists only in a limited number of port facilities, all of them targetable. Thus even if a substantial number of Soviet SLBM reloads existed, they might be militarily unusable. The existence of mobile (and thus potentially survivable) Soviet submarine tenders does not change this situation. Any limit on nondeployed missiles currently being considered will be high enough to allow load-out of all existing tenders. Reloading of those tenders, like direct reloading of submarines, depends on survivability of handling equipment ashore. (S/G)

Current SLBMs, because of their generally lesser range, are less suitable for launch against the United States from soft launchers. (Range deficiencies could, of course, easily be remedied by downloading RVs or by future designs, and SLBMs could be soft launched against theater targets, freeing ICBMs for intercontinental missions.) [2 lines not declassified] If a Soviet military establishment, dominated by a land oriented view of warfare, elects to take the risk inherent in a breakout scenario, it is more likely to select a weapon system it is comfortable with and relies upon normally. These factors all suggest the case for constraints on nondeployed SLBMs is less powerful than the case for constraints on other nondeployed ballistic missiles. (S/G)

Current Position. Our current position on the table in Geneva is to seek constraints on *all* nondeployed ballistic missiles, accepting the burden of the verification regime associated therewith. This position has been reviewed by the Arms Control Support Group. All agencies agree that the following should apply to *all* non-deployed missiles:

- a data exchange on the numbers of such missiles;
- restrictions on the locations where such missiles can be stored;
- baseline inspections of the storage locations; and
- short-notice OSI of the storage locations.

In addition, agencies agree that all non-deployed missiles should be the object of suspect site inspections once the U.S. suspect site inspection regime has been determined. (S/G)

In addition to these “baseline constraints”, agencies considered the following:

- Baseline Constraints Only.

- Declared Numerical Limits.
- Perimeter Portal Monitoring.
- Tagging.

All agencies agree that the entire panoply of proposed constraints should apply to nondeployed solid ICBMs of a type deployed in a mobile mode (assuming (a) the United States alters its position and allows mobile ICBMs, and (b) an effective tagging system can be demonstrated). Based on the current U.S. position, if mobile ICBMs are allowed, the U.S. would require PPM, at a minimum, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. (Note that the conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs and the deployment of liquid propellant mobile ICBMs will be banned.) (S/G)

Issues. Beyond the positions indicated above, agencies disagree on what constraints to apply to other types of missiles. Agency views are as follows:

—*Option 1—No additional constraints beyond baseline.* This option is favored by *State* and the JCS and would involve PPM at the five Soviet facilities noted above.

—*Option 2—Constraints on all nondeployed missiles (current position).* This option would involve numerical limits, tagging and PPM. In addition to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] noted above, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] final assembly facilities for liquid propellant ballistic missiles would be involved. No facilities producing the accountable stage of solid propellant ballistic missiles which are not mobile ICBMs would be involved since no such facilities exist.

This position is favored by *OSD*, *ACDA* and *Ambassador Rowny*. *DOE* would favor applying constraints to the accountable stage of solid propellant ballistic missiles which are not mobile ICBMs if such facilities were to exist in the future; otherwise *DOE* favors Option 1.

Additional Possible Modifications to the U.S. Position. If we were to alter our position on nondeployed missile constraints, and depending on the residual constraints applied, we could consider additional modifications to our position. Some of these should be considered regardless of our ultimate position on non-deployed missiles. Possibilities include:

—For every launcher destroyed in reducing to the new limits, require the destruction of one missile associated with that type of launcher. Absent a limit on nondeployed missiles, there is no legal requirement for the Soviets to destroy any missiles rather than just placing them in nondeployed status. (Requires review for impact on U.S. options for a mobile Minuteman alternative to the small ICBM.)

—Ban soft launchers. This issue is already being considered in the interagency process. Because it is difficult to verify, it would provide only a modest constraint on the soft launcher breakout threat.

—Cap the number of ballistic missile submarine tenders. If constraints on nondeployed SLBMs are relaxed, the Soviets could store a large number of reload missiles on survivable tenders. They would thus circumvent a U.S. strategy which depended on our ability to target fixed reload facilities as a means of limiting SLBM reload and refire.

—Establish separate sublimits on the number of non-deployed ballistic missiles of most concern. Such sublimits could involve limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles for mobile ICBMs, limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles of a certain throwweight or limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles of a type first deployed after a given date.

—Ban reloads for heavy ICBMs. (S/G)

319. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, August 11, 1988, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Military Implications of a START Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

State:

Secretary George Shultz

Defense:

Secretary Frank Carlucci

The Joint Chiefs:

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN)

The Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Robert T. Herres, USAF)

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (General Carl E. Vuono, USA)

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (General Larry D. Welch, USAF)

Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN)

Commandant, Marine Corps (General Alfred M. Gray, USMC)

White House:

Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell

M.B. Oglesby

Marlin Fitzwater

NSC Staff:

Colonel Robert Linhard

William Cockell

Captain Linton Brooks

Marybel Batjer

Joint Staff (briefers)

Major Michael Kemp, USAF

Major Richard Rock, USAF

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Mtg on START, August 11, 1988. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. All brackets are in the original text.

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. *The President* opened the meeting as follows:

I was particularly pleased to learn that you had undertaken an examination² of the military implications of our START proposals. We've spent a lot of time on the details of arms reduction, but it is even more important to step back from time to time and look at the big picture and remember what we are trying to accomplish. You have a unique responsibility to assess the ability of the United States to perform the military tasks required to execute our strategy and ensure our security. That is why it is especially valuable that you have undertaken this assessment. I'm looking forward to hearing your thoughts. Colin, why don't you set the stage. (S)

General Powell: Thank you, Mr. President. As you indicated, today we will hear the results of a JCS assessment of the strategic implications of START. There are several reasons why we decided it was timely to have this review. First, we will be completing our START position over the summer. Stepping back to examine the impact of the treaty is logical and appropriate. Second, both supporters and opponents of our position are beginning to assert that we do not understand the strategic result of our proposals. While this charge is unfounded, we thought it was useful to deal with it. Finally, this review will be useful in my discussions with the PFIAB [President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]. (S)

Mr. Secretary [Carlucci], do you want to set the stage? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: No; it's a good briefing. They even said they would be willing to talk to the PFIAB. (C)

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, before I begin, let me introduce Major Kemp and Major Rock who helped prepare the briefing. They are on the Joint Staff. This briefing is longer and more technical than I'd like. That's because nuclear war is a difficult subject. (S)

NOTE: FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PRESENTATION ADMIRAL CROWE USED A PREPARED SCRIPT. BRIEFING BOARDS, WHICH WERE DISPLAYED AT THE POINTS INDICATED, ARE ATTACHED AS TAB A.³

Title Chart

Mr. President, the NSC has concluded that it is appropriate once again to step back and examine our overall strategic posture after a START Treaty is concluded. (TS)

² See Document 313.

³ Attached but not printed are a set of briefing boards dated August 11 and entitled "START: ARE WE BETTER OFF WITH A START AGREEMENT?"

Certainly current events reinforce this conclusion. For whatever the reasons, both supporters and opponents of arms reductions are directing considerable public attention to START and in the process several criticisms have surfaced. It is important at this juncture that we understand the strategic results of our work, be able to respond to our critics, and reassert the value of such a treaty. (TS)

Let me now lay out the Chiefs' approach to the question of whether we are better off with a START Treaty. (TS)

A few observers have asserted that we simply don't know where we are going with the strategic arms reduction process. Much of this concern is created because we have failed to identify publicly a post-START force structure. (TS)

There are a number of sound reasons not to do this—the negotiations are still in a dynamic state and the ultimate force requirements will derive from the outcome of that process as well as the evolving threat, the verification regime, Congressional actions, and fiscal realities at the time. To identify a force mix based on an incomplete START agreement further presents the risk of preempting the negotiators by revealing our bottom lines to the Soviets. So much for that argument . . . (TS)

Other critics, including Dr. Kissinger, have attempted to make the case that we have not adequately assessed the military balance in the post-START world. This is simply not true. (TS)

Chart #1

Strategic Balance Without START (U)

This placard addresses the strategic weapons balance without START. As the left hand columns show, today's situation is characterized most prominently by asymmetries. The United States still has a superiority in total numbers. The large advantage we hold in bomber-delivered weapons gives us over 2500 more warheads than the Soviets. The Kremlin, however, has concentrated heavily on ballistic missiles, overcoming the advantage we used to enjoy in this category. The Soviet edge is currently over 1600 reentry vehicles and continues to grow. Unfortunately, this trend pushes the overall balance toward a less stable condition. (TS)

Without a START agreement, our best estimates indicate that by 1998, both sides would possess about 1300 weapons. The Soviet advantage in *ballistic missile* warheads, however, more than doubles (to 3548). This is true despite our strategic modernization program which includes some Poseidon submarine retirements. Introduction of the B-2 provides an offset so that total weapons remain roughly equal. *But from the U.S. perspective, the significantly larger number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads is the crucial issue.* (TS)

The Kremlin could, with a determined effort, increase its total inventory even more by 1998, but all things considered, it is our judgment that we will see instead a gradual and steady growth pattern. This has been the historical approach of the Russians when expanding their strategic inventory. (TS)

Force Structure (U)

Before proceeding to examine *START constraints*, it is necessary to say an additional word about force structure. As I previously mentioned, we have not settled this question as yet. That does not mean, however, that we have not examined any force structure; to the contrary, we have constructed a number of hypothetical orders of battle which could fit within START limits and then compared them in a number of ways. Having done that, we have reached several conclusions. For instance:

—That there are a number of such force structures which, using the weaponry that we currently own and are seeking in our modernization programs, will be militarily sufficient.

—That once an agreement is reached, we can then refine these force structures in light of the circumstances at the time and choose a recommended alternative.

—That while the mix of ICBMs and SLBMs will vary somewhat with each force structure, there is little variation in total numbers.

—That the choice between alternatives will be dictated not by numbers, but qualitative considerations such as survivability, accuracy, responsiveness, and the like.

—That, to provide structural flexibility, we will require the right to de-MIRV or download our missiles. For instance, it may be necessary to reduce our current Minuteman III missiles from 3 to 2 or even single warheads and/or lower the number of reentry vehicles which SLBMs can carry. Our current START position permits us to do this. It would allow us thereby to increase weapon survivability by reducing the value of a delivery system as a target to the Soviets or changing the number of aimpoints if we deem it wise to do so. (TS)

To do the illustrative analysis which follows, it was necessary to use one of those representative force structures. The one chosen achieves our objectives for survivability and effectiveness, as well as a balance among the legs of the Triad—and considers fiscal realities. (TS)

Chart #2

Strategic Balance With Treaty (U)

As we address the impact of START on the strategic balance, we must recognize the heart of the proposed treaty is its limitation on both

Intercontinental and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warheads. These are the most destabilizing weapons in the inventory and both sides will be limited to 4900. Most important, the Soviet advantage of 1600 that exists today, and which unconstrained would more than double in the next ten years, will disappear. (TS)

At the same time, inclusion of the Reykjavik bomber counting rule in START allows both sides to depend more heavily upon bomber-delivered weapons (i.e., gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles) which do not lend themselves well to sudden pre-emptive or surprise attack. Because we already rely heavily on bombers, we achieve a total weapon count that is larger than the Soviets (i.e., approximately 9500 to 7000). Overall the Soviets would cut about 3000 strategic weapons from today's order of battle. You will, of course, recall from the preceding chart that without START we projected the Soviets would have a total of about 13,000 warheads by 1998. (TS)

I am not sure I can explain why the Soviets have conceded us the Reykjavik bomber counting rule. But I can show you that the overall advantage which we would enjoy as a result of that rule is very important to us. This is true because of the *inherent asymmetry* between the target bases of our two countries. Let me elaborate. . . (TS)

Target Base Asymmetry (U)

The relationship between the U.S. and Soviet target bases is fundamental to addressing the strategic balance. We have for years compiled a list of important military and economic installations in the Soviet Union from which we choose SIOP targets. This target base is continually revised as circumstances change. At the same time, we put ourselves in the Kremlin's shoes and build a "theoretical" Soviet target base for attacking the United States. This permits us to game hypothetical nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and USSR, and to draw relevant conclusions. (TS)

Russia is a nation whose land mass is over two times the size of ours. It has: a greater population; five million men under arms; a much larger security infrastructure; and a more dispersed military industrial base. It produces, for example, submarines, rocket engines, aircraft and tanks at two to four times the rate of the United States. The end result of all this is a pronounced target base asymmetry between the two superpowers which severely complicates the balance calculations. (TS)

It is imperative that we attempt to understand this asymmetry and account for it in our advice to you. (TS)

Chart #3

This graph displays the difference in targets with and without START. The red cross-hatched U.S. bars represent targets in the Soviet

Union that we plan to hit with strategic weapons. For the Soviet Union, the blue cross-hatched bars represent the number of targets in the United States which the Kremlin would strike. As the bars demonstrate, the START Treaty will not have an appreciable effect on the basic asymmetry, or on the number of targets that need to be hit by both sides. (TS)

Our best estimate of the difference is in the neighborhood of 4,000 aimpoints, this figure may seem large and some expert judgments might argue for a smaller number. The fact, however, that the asymmetry exists and is substantial cannot be disputed. (TS)

As you have seen, today we depend upon our advantage in bomber delivery capability to deal with this problem. A START agreement will rectify the latter imbalance and, with the bomber counting rule that you negotiated at Reykjavik, we can continue to safely accommodate the target base asymmetry, although our success here is somewhat attenuated by the elaborate *Soviet* air defense network. The Kremlin can, of course, also exploit this feature of a START Treaty, but it would take them a good many years to effectively match the U.S. in bombers. We, of course, have always wanted the USSR to shift the emphasis in its force structure from ballistic missiles to bomber delivered weapons which are less destabilizing. The bottom line is that we must have the Reykjavik bomber counting rule to assure military sufficiency in the face of a disproportionately large Soviet military establishment and industrial infrastructure. (TS)

Chart #4

Weapon-to-Target Ratios (U)

With that background, we can now look at the relationship between weapons and targets. On this chart we have overlaid weapons on the targets displayed on the last graph. This measure compares static weapon-to-target ratios. *Our projections for this relationship show that by 1998, the impressive Soviet advantage expands to an awesome proportion without a treaty, but is markedly constrained by a START agreement.* (TS)

It should be noted that if one takes into account Soviet concerns with the nuclear weapons of China, UK, and France, it would drive down the Soviet ratio accordingly. (TS)

In all candor, a direct comparison of the number of weapons and targets does not tell you much about military consequences because the calculations for a real world attack are much more complicated than a one-on-one relationship. Nevertheless, given the Russian mentality, such a substantial reduction in order-of-battle will undoubtedly have an impact on their confidence, and limit their options. (TS)

Weapon Quality and Modernization (U)

Before examining some real world comparisons, let me comment on modernization and its importance to the strategic balance. As just

mentioned, in building the SIOP a good many targets will call for more than one weapon in order to obtain the desired damage levels. The reason of course, is that several factors such as weapon reliability, yield, and accuracy as well as target hardness determine the level of damage that can be inflicted by a specific weapon. In turn, improved weapon quality (e.g., better accuracy) increases single weapon effectiveness and can reduce the number of warheads needed for a specific task. (TS)

Chart #5

This explains why the Chiefs put so much emphasis on the strategic modernization programs which your Administration initiated and is in the process of implementing. The new systems in each leg of the triad will considerably increase the efficiency of our order-of-battle. These improvements can be measured in damage expectance ratios. This placard shows the degree of improvements which three of our most modern systems represent. For example, one Peacekeeper warhead can do the work of two Minuteman II RVs. This is primarily due to better accuracy. Such upgrades are essential, if we are to keep the threshold of deterrence high in the face of treaty reductions. (TS)

Target Coverage (U)

To get a better idea of where we will stand under START, let us look at a real world laydown of our 1988 treaty constrained force against the Soviets. We will examine the results from three perspectives: target coverage, impact on reserve forces and the aggregated damage expectancy levels. (TS)

Chart #6

The blocks on this graph represent the proportionate numbers of targets in each labeled category. On the right hand axis are notations to demonstrate in a rough fashion the relative number of targets which can be covered by various levels of *weapons*. Today, we plan warheads on about 95 percent of the SIOP list. Without START we could attack the entire list of aimpoints by 1998. (TS)

Not surprisingly, with treaty limitations we would not be able to strike all the targets we could under an unconstrained regime. You do give up something when you cut large numbers of weapons. As suggested by the graph, our sample laydown does cover those aimpoints in the "critical" and "essential" categories as well as a number of those in the "significant" group. (TS)

In interpreting this picture, it should be kept in mind that our damage criteria are very *conservative* and do not take into account fire, wind or radiation damage. Moreover, once we have concluded a START agreement, the entire targeting policy of the United States should be

reviewed in the light of the new circumstances. This would, of course, include a rigorous scrub of the target base geared to the new order of battle. We have already commenced this process and are confident that such a review will improve this picture somewhat. (TS)

Chart #7

Reserve Weapons (U)

At the same time we look at other factors as well. A START Treaty would cut heavily into the Soviet strategic reserve, i.e., the residual weapons available to them after committing their initial and primary strike against our territory. We are convinced that an integral part of the Kremlin's strategy is to hold back a large weapon reserve. This accounts in part for their current excessive numbers and is consistent with their historical warfighting philosophy. The comparison, displayed here, shows the dramatic effect START has on this aspect of Soviet capabilities. In my judgment such a reduction will be especially painful for the Kremlin. (TS)

Chart #8

Damage Expectancy (U)

Another way of looking at our 1998 hypothetical force is to calculate its aggregate damage expectancy and to compare it with today's SIOP. This graph makes such a comparison. (TS)

Damage expectancy predicts the qualitative results obtained from the number of weapon systems committed against a certain class of targets. This measure of merit has historically been our primary instrument for judging trends in our effectiveness. (TS)

The bar on the left depicts our current damage expectancy of [amount not declassified] percent. The bar on the right shows that in 1998, with a START agreement, we achieve an aggregated damage expectancy of [amount not declassified] percent. The significant point of this comparison is that the trend is one of improvement, even with the limitations of a START Treaty. I again emphasize, however, that the favorable figures you see here would not occur without modernization and the essential counting rule we desire in START. (TS)

Uncertainties (U)

Mr. President, we have shown you a number of analytical views of the strategic impact of a START agreement, but you should be aware that it is not possible to reduce all considerations to graphs. (TS)

I have mentioned that we don't know a good way to bring all the effects of our weapons into our calculations. We don't put into our equations the attrition that conventional hostilities might exact on strategic systems. For example, the Soviets are persuaded that in the con-

ventional phase before a nuclear exchange our attack submarines will sink a number of their own ballistic missile boats. (TS)

We, of course, have a great many warheads outside of those considered today, for instance, our theater nuclear weapons. Their impact on a general nuclear exchange is extremely difficult to estimate. But undoubtedly these systems would play a major role in the outcome. (TS)

In a word, this business is not an exact science and our intelligence cannot tell us all we need to know. Fortunately, most of these uncertainties would weigh in our favor if we could quantify them. (TS)

As a consequence, final assessments must, of necessity, be a mixture of mathematical analysis, military experience, and a knowledge of our enemy. This means that human judgment still plays a significant role in the reasoning process. The Chiefs work hard to make those judgments informed ones. (TS)

Chart #9

Verification

All in all, the foregoing calculations support the adoption of a START Treaty. They do not, however speak to verification or the possibility of Soviet cheating. That subject has likewise been receiving a great deal of scrutiny during the current debate. (TS)

The JCS have, in fact, spent considerable time reviewing not only each negotiating position, but also the ramifications of potential Soviet cheating and breakout, and their possible effect on our strategic balance. We will continue to do so. (TS)

We believe the verification provisions emerging in the treaty combined with the programmed improvements to our national intelligence systems will provide a reasonable assurance that we will detect cheating early enough to offset its impact before the Kremlin could gain a militarily significant advantage. That type of compromise strikes the best balance between reality and risk. If we negotiate a regime that is dependable and practical, the Soviet potential gain from cheating is far outweighed by the potential losses. (TS)

There is, of course, a lot of detail work that has yet to be completed. Unlike much of the treaty, verification does not lend itself to general principles—the devil is in the details. Moreover, we will be breaking new ground as we attempt to work out a satisfactory scheme for tracking mobile missiles. The verification provisions of START will be many orders of magnitude more complicated than those in INF. Also the costs in both people and resources will probably be *a great deal higher than expected*. We have yet to come fully to grips with this aspect of the treaty. In essence, negotiating the verification arrangements will be complex, difficult, and above all protracted. (TS)

Should the Soviets decide to cheat or breakout of the treaty, the United States has the ability to respond in a number of ways:

- ReMIRVing our ballistic missiles;
- Protecting our current production lines;
- Reopening lines of production for systems that are currently deployed (ALCMs, etc.);
- Increasing the alert rates for our strategic forces;
- Taking advantage of our theater nuclear weapons, such as dual-capable aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. (TS)

Our response will only be constrained by our national will to act. Our potential growth in the face of Soviet noncompliance could more than offset the military gains they may have hoped to achieve and the Kremlin knows this. The Russian leaders respect our industrial capacity and remember the huge bursts of industrial and military energy the United States has put forth in past national crises. (TS)

Chart #10

Conclusions (U)

In terms of national security strategy, the Chiefs are convinced, that on balance the United States will be *better* off with a START agreement if it includes the counting rules the U.S. has proposed and a proper verification regime. Similarly, this judgment assumes continued modernization. (TS)

While the asymmetrical target base gives the Soviets a built-in advantage, treaty limits will present them with a host of difficult decisions and greatly reduce the more important advantages they enjoy today. The character of the reductions will make for a more equal nuclear balance and a more stable world. To recap the main conclusions:

1) Total weapon inventories would be significantly reduced and future strategic weapon growth would be capped.

2) The continued widening of the already large gap in ballistic missile weapons will be arrested and restored to parity by START.

3) The disproportionate weapon-to-target ratio that would exist in ten years is brought down to more reasonable levels.

4) The United States will exceed the total number of weapons the USSR has. This is extremely important from a “deterrence” stand point since deterrence rests mainly on each nation’s general perceptions rather than complex calculations. For the Soviets to redress this balance would require dramatic change in their strategic policies. Even that possibility would lead to a more stable balance than exists today.

5) While we would not be able to strike all the current SIOP targets, those in the “critical” and “essential” categories would be adequately covered as well as a number of those designated “significant”. In our

judgment, this would be sufficient when viewed in company with the other measures we have discussed.

6) We still possess the strategic capability to support a strong deterrent policy or,

7) In the event of nuclear war, to achieve high enough damage levels in the USSR to render further Soviet actions ineffectual.

8) All of this equates to military sufficiency. (TS)

General Powell: Comments? (U)

Secretary Shultz: This is a very powerful statement. It is exceptionally worthwhile to have gone back to square one and reviewed our position. We have come out where we were before; START is to our advantage. When the President first proposed what is now become START, some people saw that it was to our advantage and claimed that he was therefore not serious. Yet we got the numbers. We've got a lot of work to do to screw everything down, and we've got a SLCM problem, and an ABM problem, but we have the basic numbers. What you are telling me is that it is a hell of a deal. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Colin, may I ask the Chiefs to comment? (U)

General Gray: Colin, we face difficulties because we are a democracy. We have to negotiate flexibly because we don't know what kind of support we will get in the future. They don't. We have to take our Allies and Congress into account. When Akhromeyev was here he said he could speak for the Warsaw Pact. That is obviously quite different. (S)

General Welch: Colin, when you see this you have to question why the Soviets have agreed to it. One possible reason is that they will still have the numbers to cover the U.S. targets. But this is still a better deal for us. (S)

Admiral Trost: Colin, this briefing points up how important strategic modernization program is. Without that program we can't do the job. We can't allow euphoria for a possible arms control treaty to kill the strategic modernization program. (S)

The President: Colin, this strengthens what I have always taken for granted. Our approach reduces the danger of nuclear war. Some of our so-called friends are saying we gave away the store. Your briefing says its quite the reverse. I see why the Soviets are willing to accept it; we know how their economy is. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Also their enormous conventional advantages allow them to accept strategic arms reductions. (C)

The President: That is why, with respect to things like battle field weapons, I have always said that we can't do anything to reduce tactical nuclear weapons until we have addressed the conventional balance. That is what we have to do next. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Of course Secretary Carlucci and I hear the Soviets say that there is rough parity in the balance now. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: They say all their stuff is just junk, until you actually see it! (C)

Secretary Shultz: I remember that Gorbachev told us that there were a lot of nuclear weapons sitting around ready to be detonated by conventional capability. He was referring to Chernobyl. He said France was particularly vulnerable. If we hit the nuclear power plants, it would put France out of commission. (S)

The President: [Interrupting] They have the most don't they? (U)

Secretary Shultz: [Continuing] Colin, if you hit a nuclear power plant, it's the same thing as a nuclear weapon in Gorbachev's view. Do you agree? (S)

Admiral Crowe: Maybe. (U)

General Gray: We have all types of safety mechanisms that the Soviets don't have. (C)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, but they are talking about bypassing safety mechanisms with a bomb. (C)

Admiral Trost: Yes, he's talking about a plant operating at power. That's a real problem. If it is a light water plant you will have substantial amounts of radioactive steam. And if you have melted down, there will be a substantial release of radioactivity to the environment. (U)

Secretary Shultz: How about if it is shut down? (U)

Admiral Trost: Even then the exposure is bad. (U)

Secretary Shultz: I used to build these . . . (U)

Admiral Crowe: [Interrupting] And he [Admiral Trost] used to operate them. (U)

Secretary Shultz: [Continuing] We have cement walls and everything but we are still vulnerable to conventional attack. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: Mr. President, I would like to make another point. You said they could not sustain the economic competition. That is true, but they are willing to devote a very high percentage of their resources to that competition. In my talks with the Defense Minister [Yazov] he said we [i.e., the Soviets] made an enormous mistake in not going into computers some years back. I think they are showing us all this fancy equipment to suggest that we should make a deal now because they are going to catch up. When in reality they can't cut it from the standpoint of technology. That's why they are going after SLCM. (S)

The President: You know that at the first Geneva meeting, the two of us were sitting alone in front of the fire. I pointed out that we were two men alone in the room who had the power to create world war

or to create world peace. I told him there was no way we would allow military superiority on his part. His choice was either arms reductions or an arms race, a race he could not win. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: But they still have not done any reductions. (C)

Admiral Crowe: They don't know how. (U)

The President: But they have accepted zero INF and a 50 percent START agreement. I received a letter sometime back with two verses from Revelations about a third angel who brought down the star Wormwood and where the star hit the earth at a place from which a third of the water of the earth sprang, the water was poisoned. The letter pointed out that in Russian wormwood was "Chernobyl". And I had some of the NSC staff look it up and they were right; it was a Ukrainian word, but of course Chernobyl was in the Ukraine. (C)

General Powell: I think that concludes the briefing. (U)

Admiral Crowe: When Akhromeyev was here he used the word "thank God" so much that I was beginning to wonder. But the translation said it was just a Soviet phrase that didn't mean anything from a religious standpoint. (U)

The President: Yes, I am told that it is a figure of speech. Its God with a small "g". (U)

Admiral Crowe: Akhromeyev had another expression. After our discussion on doctrine he said "I feel like I have just been to confession." (C)

The President: That reminds me of my most recent Soviet story, one I heard from my Secret Service Agent during the summit. It seems there is a joke in Moscow that Gorbachev and I, along with the head of the KGB and the head of the Secret Service, were driving in a car seeing the sights. We stopped by a waterfall, and got out to look at it. Gorbachev turned to my Secret Service Agent and said, "Jump into the waterfall." The Secret Service Agent said, "I've got a wife and three kids", and refused to jump. Gorbachev then turned to the KGB Agent and said, "Jump into the waterfall." He did so. When the Secret Service Agent pulled him out and asked him why he had jumped he said, "I've got a wife and three kids." (U)

Thereupon the meeting ended at 2:45 p.m. (U)

320. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 12, 1988, 1–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

START: Mobile ICBM Verification and Nondeployed Missile Limits (U)

PARTICIPANTS

<i>The President</i>	<i>Office of the Vice President</i>
<i>State</i>	Don Gregg
John Whitehead	<i>White House</i>
Max Kampelman	LTG Colin L. Powell
<i>Defense</i>	M.B. Oglesby
Secretary Frank Carlucci	Marlin Fitzwater
Ronald Lehman, II	<i>NSC Staff</i>
<i>Energy</i>	Colonel Robert Linhard
Secretary John Herrington	William Heiser
<i>JCS</i>	Captain Linton Brooks
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.	<i>OMB</i>
VADM Jonathan Howe	James Miller
<i>Director of Central Intelligence</i>	<i>Special Advisor</i>
Judge William Webster	Ambassador Edward Rowny
[name not declassified]	<i>START Negotiator</i>
ACDA	Ambassador Read Hanmer
George Murphy	

Minutes

The meeting opened at 1:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. *The President* opened the meeting as follows:

Yesterday I heard an excellent assessment by the Joint Chiefs of the military value of START.² I remain convinced that a good START treaty is attainable and that we should strive for it. As I've said before, even though we almost certainly can't have START and Defense and Space treaties ready for signature this year, we must not stop our efforts. I want to leave as a legacy as complete and coherent an arms reduction position as I can. (S)

Shortly before my Moscow meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev we reviewed the subject of verification of road-mobile ICBMs and established the position we presented in Moscow. I understand there

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 196 08/12/88. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original text.

² See Document 319.

are some reservations with that position. I want to clear them up so that we can move forward with discussions of this subject in Geneva. We also need to continue to review our position to make certain our verification regime makes sense and, where possible, to simplify it. Verification remains absolutely central to us, but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be subject to critical scrutiny. I'm looking forward to today's discussion. So, over to you, Colin. (S)

General Powell then reviewed the mobile ICBM verification issue making the following points:

On May 25, prior to the Moscow summit, the President made a set of decisions on the U.S. approach to mobile missile verification.³ On the basis of these decisions, we presented the main points of the approach to the Soviets in Moscow; and they agreed on a package of "common elements" at the summit. Subsequent to the summit, both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of ACDA have expressed some concerns about our current position. Pending the opportunity to meet and discuss these concerns, we have held up tabling any treaty language in Geneva on this area. In the interim, the Soviets have tabled in Geneva their version of treaty text formalizing the "common elements" as agreed at the summit. (S)

Our purpose today is to see how best to proceed:

- a. in resolving any remaining internal USG concerns so that we can table our treaty text on this area; and,
- b. in responding to the treaty text that the Soviet Union has now tabled on this subject in Geneva. (S)

The U.S. approach to road-mobile ICBM verification includes the following main elements.

1. All deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small (i.e., 25 k²) Restricted Areas.
2. There would be a limit on the percentage (e.g. 20–30%) of such systems that could be outside these areas for training, testing and maintenance.
3. There would be notification requirements associated with all such movements.
4. There could be exercise dispersals of the entire force, without geographic restriction, but these would be limited in frequency and duration.
5. There could also be operational dispersals (intended to ensure survivability in a crisis). These dispersals would not be limited in

³ Apparent reference to Document 305, dated May 27.

number or in duration; but both sides acknowledge that they would be rare. (S)

The Soviet approach as tabled in Geneva differs in certain key ways.

1. They agree that all deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small Restricted Areas, with each area having no more than 10 deployed missiles. The Soviets would likely deploy 9 or 10 missiles per Restricted Area. Given our current planned basing mode for Midgetman, we would likely have no more than 1 or 2.

2. They would add the concept of a larger Deployment Area which would contain some number of Restricted Areas, a Maintenance Base, and some surrounding area. The Soviets would likely have 5 smaller Restricted Areas per larger Deployment Area. If we were to accept such an approach, we would want quite a few more small areas.

3. There would be a *50% limit* on the number of such systems that could be outside the smaller Restricted Areas for training, testing and maintenance at any one time.

4. There would be notification requirements associated with all such movements except for up to 3 launchers per small Restricted Area as long as they stayed within the larger Deployment Area.

5. There could be exercise dispersals of up to 50% of the entire force. It is not clear if these would be confined to within the Deployment Area or whether they would be limited in frequency and duration.

6. There could also be operational dispersals of the entire force. It is not clear if these would be confined in any way and the Soviets have yet to acknowledge that such operational dispersals would be rare. (S)

Three options have been offered for consideration.

—*Option 1.* Table the US position as approved in May.

This option is strongly favored by the JCS.

—*Option 2.* Accept the Soviet approach. No one favors this approach.

—*Option 3.* Table a slight modification of the US position, taking the Soviet approach into account. All agencies except the JCS favor this option. (S)

Under *Option 3*, we would make *only* two modifications to the US position:

1. we would accept the idea of a larger Deployment Area surrounding the small Restricted Areas, as proposed by the Soviet Union; and,

2. we would confine exercise dispersals geographically to the larger Deployment Areas. (S)

All other elements of the US position would remain as previously approved. (S)

Secretary Carlucci, would you like to start us off on this topic?

Secretary Carlucci: We favor Option 3. We believe that Option 3 would provide the best mix of survivability and verification. With this modification more people can be on board. We would be permitted to run our dispersal exercises although we would be confined to the larger Deployment Area. That should be OK because of the size of the area. If we needed to deploy for real, any operational deployment can go anywhere it wishes. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Before I start Colin, under this idea could we do maintenance anywhere? (S)

General Powell: No. [For the Record, this is the wrong answer. The right answer is we could do maintenance anywhere if notification is provided.] (S)

Admiral Crowe: The main problem we have with Option 3 is that because we are constrained in exercise deployments we will be unable to train in the same manner as we would fight. One of the main principles of our military has always been that we need to train in the same way as we plan to fight. In addition, this idea is kind of a late entry. We only saw it in the last few days. We need to vet it with the Strategic Air Command. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: We in the Department of State agree with the Department of Defense. We think that Option 3, which adds a slight provision to our current position, will certainly help with verification. We aren't changing anything. It's just a slight modification. (S)

Admiral Crowe: From our point of view its quite a bit of a change. You are limiting my operational flexibility. Once again, we need to be able to train as we fight. You know an exercise is really a larger training, it is the use of a lot of force. We need to be able to exercise as we would in operational circumstances, therefore this solution would limit our capability. (S)

General Powell: What you are saying is that an exercise is a full flushing of the force just as we would under operational conditions. If that is the case, the real question is with a larger Deployment Area around the Restricted Deployment Areas, doesn't this give you enough room to exercise the mobile force in the way you plan to use or operate the force? (S)

Judge Webster: As I understand it, we are talking about 8 to 50 thousand kilometers as the area. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, that's about the area that we were talking, too. (S)

General Powell: Is there enough land under this to do what we need? (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: I would note that we are not restricted to just one of these areas. We can have more if we need it. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We need to vet this idea with the Strategic Air Command. We may need an area that is as large or perhaps even larger than that cited because we are going to need to check our communications, command and control capabilities. (S)

Judge Webster: The current U.S. approach presents serious monitoring problems. It allows some percentage of the force to be outside the Restricted Deployment Area (RDA) at all times and allows forcewide dispersals of unlimited duration to unrestricted areas. (S)

It imposes the very difficult monitoring requirement to ascertain what percentage of the force is out of garrison at any point in time and whether this exceeds the allowed percentage. Moreover, it would not be possible to determine whether missiles detected outside RDAs were part of the legal force or an illegal force. Under these conditions an undeclared force could train more easily with the legal force. (S)

Finally, the size of the RDA is too small for the Soviets to conduct normal peacetime operations, or to meet survivability requirements, and thus may force the Soviets to adopt new operating procedures. Under these circumstances our confidence in assessments of the force could drop while we reestablished our understanding of revised Soviet operating procedures. (S)

We believe that a larger circumscribed deployment area for each division-sized unit of about 8,000–10,000 square kilometers, within which *all* road-mobile missiles would have to operate, would be adequate to ensure the survivability of U.S. and Soviet road mobile missile units, while giving us the benefit of being able to brand any missiles found *outside* the area as illegal. The Soviets have conducted almost all of their operational dispersals within about 50 kilometers of their garrisons (about 7,850 square kilometers). Moreover, the Soviets could not successfully attack U.S. road-mobile forces in an area of this size. [Judge Webster handed out the diagram at *Tab A*.]⁴ (S)

Admiral Crowe: I want to ask you one thing, Judge. You are worried about requirements for verification, aren't you? You are not really talking about requirements that we need for targeting, are you? (S)

Judge Webster: That's right. I am only worried about verification, not targeting. An enlarged area is probably better for us because if we find anything outside of the area we will know it is illegal. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That really doesn't tell you whether its illegal or not just because it is outside of the area. It could just be an inadvertent movement. But what we really need to know is the overall number of systems so that we know if we have a military set. It's not important

⁴ Attached but not printed is a diagram of the deployment area.

that we just catch one item outside the area. And if they are going to cheat, it seems to me it would be a hell of a lot easier to cheat if you give them an legitimate area that is 10,000 square kilometers large.

George Murphy: From our point of view, Mr. President, we should balance survivability and verification. ACDA agrees with the position taken by the DCI. If we find something outside of these deployment areas, it should be a violation. The deployment areas should be big enough to permit the JCS to do their exercises as they need—survivability comes first. (S)

I would also like to note that our original position was that we ban mobiles. You know we are going to have a hell of a time getting mobiles through the Congress. In effect we are negotiating with the Soviets but we have a blueprint while they have missiles. Therefore I think we should keep that in mind as we think about committing to mobile missiles. (S)

In summary though I'm here to support the ACDA position which would be Option 3. And I'm concerned because just like we found with GLCMs, in a crisis we are going to have a hell of a time getting these mobile missiles out of their deployment bases. Some strategist will not want to release them from their bases because of the escalatory signal that such an action would make. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That's not a problem from the point of the strategist, its a problem from the point of view that we are going to find some politician who is going to want to do that. (S)

Secretary Whitehead: Admiral, I certainly understand that the smaller circle could limit our ability to do training exercises. I would assume that your counterpart in the Soviet Union would agree with this and that he also would like to have the ability to exercise dispersal forces. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, I think so. (U)

Secretary Whitehead: If you both have similar interests then, isn't it likely you will agree on an area the size of which would be acceptable to both sides? (S)

Admiral Crowe: But they have more political leeway in their ability to agree with something like this. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: And they have the mobiles already and we don't. (S)

General Powell: Mr. President, this is typical of the type of problem we face in the arms control area right now. It brings into conflict the needs of the DCI to verify provisions of the treaty and the operational requirements of the JCS to operate our forces. Admiral Crowe wants operational flexibility, the flexibility to flush his force during an exercise just like he would if it were for real. (S)

In May you made a decision, Mr. President, and you leaned in favor of the JCS, in favor of operational flexibility. Let's have the Strategic

Air Command look over Option 3. Let's see if there is a way that we may have an area large enough to meet both the requirements involved. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The crux of the issue is certainly size, the size of the area. (S)

Judge Webster: I can right now take 8,000 to 10,000 square kilometers; and I can go higher if you wish. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Congress places a special emphasis on flexibility as we look at our weapons. You know Mr. President, as we just briefed you, that we too want flexibility. (S)

Judge Webster: From our point of view, Admiral, we need to know what you can live with. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Once again, we like flexibility. This is a treaty of indefinite duration. We may exercise in one area and operate in another, you know, we would not go back to the same spot. We need an area large enough to test our ability to distribute our forces, to test at distances between our missiles and our command and control. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I lean on the side of verification vice operational flexibility. Operational flexibility like that which we are discussing is only marginal anyway. We very well may not get the Midgetman at all, therefore we ought to constrain the Soviets. Option 3 will give us this opportunity. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We have not discussed rail-mobile at all at this time. Is that correct? (S)

General Powell: That's right. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: There is just not enough money for road mobile. Maybe if Jim Miller would open up the purse, we could really look at this subject. (S)

Secretary Whitehead: Well, if you want to check your links between missiles and C³, is there any reason why you can't move your C³ elements out as far as you want? And then run what you call a CPX? (S)

Admiral Crowe: We can certainly do that. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. We can do that. (U)

Ambassador Rowny: I would just like to add that I think its very unlikely that we are ever going to have a road mobile. We ought to do what will restrict the Soviets the most. Let's make sure we are able to verify a treaty. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well, Mr. President, that's really my problem. It's hard for me to give you advice when I don't know what kind of weapons or what numbers Congress is going to allow us to have. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: That's why we argue, Mr. President, that we need to look at the whole regime for all of the verification before we agree to tabling anything on mobile ICBMs. (S)

George Murphy: Again, Mr. President, I am very hesitant about this area because we have got blueprints and they have got missiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I would note one last thing. Remember we thought we were not going to have any limits on operational dispersals. And in fact we thought that we could use exercise dispersals to get out of the system first in case we really needed to go into operational dispersals. We could make the dispersal under the guise of an exercise with some period of time prior to an actual operational dispersal. Option 3 will certainly inhibit us from doing something like that. (S)

General Powell: Well, gentlemen, as I understand where we are I think, Mr. President, we should see if we can get a version of Option 3 that would be satisfactory to the JCS and then check it with the Strategic Air Command. (S)

The President: How come it doesn't feel like I made a decision here? I remember when I first came on, I wanted to bring back the horse cavalry. (U)

General Powell then reviewed the nondeployed missile issue making the following points:

Nondeployed missiles are those that are not in silos, on mobile launchers or loaded in submarines. Therefore, they are not included in the 1600/6000 limits of START. (S)

Some number of nondeployed missiles are necessary to allow for routine maintenance, to serve as spares, and for periodic reliability testing over the life of the missile system. However, if additional launchers or other means of launching these missiles are available, they could also be used to rapidly increase the size of one's missile force in excess of START limits. This is called the threat of breakout. (S)

Even without additional launchers, in wartime, nondeployed missiles could be used to reload and refire existing, treaty limited launchers. This is commonly referred to as the refire threat. (S)

Ideally, we would like to keep the number of nondeployed missiles small to minimize these threats. However, to minimize acquisition costs, we tend to produce all of the missiles of any given type we need at one time, and to store the excess missiles until they are required for testing or maintenance. Unless we alter our practice, this means that we tend to have a large number of nondeployed missiles on hand at any one time; and we would have to allow the Soviets a similarly large number. (S)

The threats that we wish to handle are from the use of nondeployed missiles for breakout and refire. The Arms Control Support Group work in this area recognizes that these threats may vary based on the type of ballistic missile concerned. The ACSG has divided ballistic missiles into:

- solid ICBMs deployed as mobile missiles;
- solid ICBMs launched only from fixed silos;
- liquid ICBMs; and
- SLBMs. (S)

The ACSG then considered each type of ballistic missile in terms of the threat involved. (S)

For nondeployed missiles to be used in a breakout scenario, additional launchers must also be available. If we consider silo-based ICBMs or SLBMs, and if silos or submarine tubes are required for their launch, then the breakout threat is relatively low since we should be able to monitor the number of silos and SLBM-capable submarines with high confidence. Mobile ICBMs are much more of a problem since the monitoring of the number of mobile launchers will be so much harder. Finally, if you credit the Soviets with the capability to launch their nondeployed ICBM and SLBM missiles from soft launchers, then each and every nondeployed missile could pose a breakout threat. (S)

For nondeployed missiles to be used as refire missiles, the missiles, some appropriate launchers, handling equipment and trained personnel must all survive the initial nuclear exchange. Should any of these four elements fail to survive, then the refire threat is removed. For this reason, some feel that the refire threat posed by nondeployed silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs is significantly less than threat posed by nondeployed mobile ICBMs. (S)

All agencies except JCS agree that we should demand certain constraints be applied to *all* non-deployed ballistic missiles including:

- a data exchange on the numbers of nondeployed missiles;
- restrictions on where such missiles can be stored;
- baseline inspections of declared storage locations; and
- short-notice OSI of declared storage locations. (S)

Given the threat that nondeployed mobile ICBMs pose both for breakout and refire, all agencies agree on additional constraints on these missiles to include:

- a ban on the conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs;
- a ban on liquid propellant mobile ICBMs;
- numerical limits on such missiles and their launchers;
- perimeter-portal monitoring, *at a minimum*, of the five Soviet facilities capable of producing solid motors as large as the smallest accountable stage of such missiles [FYI: OSD would also add all second and third stage production facilities]; and
- tagging of such missiles and their launchers. (S)

Given the threats posed by other types of nondeployed missiles in terms of breakout or refire, and the costs associated with additional constraints, the issue we face is should we apply additional restraints on nondeployed missiles other than those already agreed. (S)

Option I would:

a. apply the full set of constraints listed above to nondeployed missiles capable of using mobile launchers (i.e., numerical limits, PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) [i.e., all SS-24, SS-25, PEACEKEEPER and MIDGETMAN missiles if any are deployed in mobile modes];

b. apply perimeter-portal monitoring only at the five Soviet facilities cited (i.e., facilities capable of producing the smallest accountable mobile ICBM stage); and,

c. apply only the baseline constraints (i.e., data exchange on numbers, locational constraints, baseline and short-notice OSI) to all other nondeployed missiles [i.e., silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs]. (S)

This option is supported by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the START negotiator. The JCS are reviewing the need for even the baseline constraints for non-mobile systems because of concerns that we may set an adverse precedent for ALCMs. (S)

Option II would:

a. apply the full set of constraints listed above to nondeployed mobile ICBMs (i.e., numerical limits, PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) [i.e., all SS-24, SS-25, PEACEKEEPER and MIDGETMAN missiles if any are deployed in mobile modes];

b. apply an additional numerical limit of 100 to the number of nondeployed heavy ICBMs plus modern high-throwweight ICBMs (i.e. those deployed after 1985 with throwweights above 1,500 kilograms, and tag all such missiles [i.e., the SS-18 and the PEACEKEEPER if not deployed in mobile mode];

c. apply only the baseline constraints (i.e., data exchange on numbers, locational constraints, baseline and short-notice OSI) to all other nondeployed missiles [i.e., older, smaller, silo-based ICBMs and all SLBMs]; and,

d. add additional sites to the basic perimeter-portal monitoring list (i.e., production facilities for all stages of mobile ICBMs and production facilities). (S)

This option is supported by the Secretary of Defense. (U)

Option III would:

a. apply the full set of constraints available (i.e., numerical limits, PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) to *all* nondeployed missiles (i.e., mobile ICBMs, silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs); and,

b. add additional sites to the basic perimeter-portal monitoring list (i.e., liquid rocket assembly facilities). (S)

This option is supported by ACDA and Ambassador Rowney. (U)

The issue for discussion, then, is whether we should apply numerical limits, perimeter-portal monitoring, and tags to nondeployed missiles other than ICBMs that can be launched from a mobile launcher. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman, would you like to kick off the conversation on this subject? (U)

Ambassador Kampelman: The State Department recognizes that an excess number of missiles above those that are committed and deployed is a problem. The issue though is what is practical. What, as a practical matter, can be done? The danger of excess missiles seems to be simply less for all types except for mobiles. For all the other types of missiles, other than mobiles, the extra expense for verification on silo-based systems and SSBNs may be too much. It's not clear that what we get in return for what we have to pay is worth it for that excess. For that reason, State Department thinks we ought to limit these concerns to mobile missiles. And we will work with the JCS on how to approach this. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I think we should have a limit on missiles that are nondeployed. If we don't, you know we could go through this whole treaty and destroy all the deployed systems which tend to be tied to launchers and not cut up one single missile. They could just declare them to be nondeployed. (S)

Another scenario that we need to consider, and this is not a war-fighting scenario, also drives the issue. Someday we may want to deploy SDI. The Soviets may say fine. If you deploy SDI, we will put all our spare SS-18s into silos. We need some kind of a constraint on their doing something like that because silos could be constructed. So I offer a compromise, the compromise that is captured in the OSD option. Let's try to capture the SS-18 in a follow-on in some undeployed limit. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, if we try to capture nondeployeds, we are going to pick up an awful lot of missiles. No one has yet said how many, but the number is sizable. If you look just at the US, the number is likely to be about 2000 nondeployed missiles. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: That number certainly needs to be scrubbed. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well, in operational terms we have got a normal requirement for about 800 nondeployed ballistic missiles. The SDIO says that they need 528 for their purposes. And the Ballistic Missile Office for their testing says they need another 480. These are big numbers. The Soviets are going to object to the size of our number of nondeployed missiles. If we have a number that high, then the limitations on nondeployed missiles are basically meaningless. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Our option just tries to capture mobile missiles and the PEACEKEEPER on our side. It doesn't try to capture the

Minuteman III and all the others. Therefore the number that would be required wouldn't be as high. (S)

Admiral Crowe: This is a very, very dicey subject, Mr. President. We must ensure that we don't emasculate our ability to do testing or to store the missiles we require. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I'm not trying to beat up on the SDIO, but I want to go check those numbers. All we are proposing is, in addition to the first option, which is the least comprehensive option, a cap on heavy nondeployed missiles. That should help us politically, too. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The JCS feel that the real threat is mobile missiles. Max Kampelman is right. We ought to go ahead and focus on these. (S)

The SS-18 issue that Secretary Carlucci raises is a big change. If they were to build additional SS-18 silos, they would violate the basic START Treaty. I doubt any of us really think they could re-load silos in the middle of the environment you are facing in a real war. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I am very concerned about the SS-18 threat. (S)

Admiral Crowe: If you are really worried about breakout with the SS-18, the real threat is that they would put more warheads on the SS-18s than the number permitted under START. (What the Admiral is referring to here is that the START Treaty caps the SS-18 at ten warheads, however, we know it was optimized at 14 warheads and could hold perhaps as many as 20 to 24 warheads.) (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I certainly want to capture the warheads, too. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I am concerned on some of these limits because I want to avoid a spill over in capturing ALCMs. That's why we are even a little concerned with this baseline idea. That we would tell each other how many nondeployed missiles we have and put additional constraints on them. We don't want to count our nondeployed ALCMs. We don't want them to count in any way. (S)

Judge Webster: The Intelligence Community agrees basically with Admiral Crowe. We agree that we should support Option 1. (S)

Although evidence indicates the Soviets intend to use some nondeployed missiles for refire, we judge that the Soviets do not have the capability, nor do we see an intent, to engage in 1) *large scale* reload of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 2) reload of older missiles, or 3) soft launch of strategic missiles. Therefore, our principal concern should rest with constraining nondeployed mobile missiles which represent the most significant refire threat. (S)

Our insistence until now on tagging *all* ICBM and SLBM nondeployed missiles was based largely on the policy requirement for us to monitor strict limits on these missiles. If large numbers of legal nondeployed missiles are permitted, I see little value in pursuing limits

on other than *mobile* missiles. The large number of *legal* non-deployed missiles that the Defense Department is planning for US forces (800–1250, nearly as many as the number of deployed missiles) makes such limits of little consequence. (S)

However, I support the full panoply of constraints on nondeployed missiles of the types tested in a mobile mode, and their launchers. A large number of extra mobile missiles can constitute an effective refire or force augmentation capability. I believe that tagging and portal perimeter monitoring of solid rocket motor and mobile missile final assembly facilities is vital to a strong verification program. Production facilities for liquid fueled missiles need not be portal monitored, in our opinion. Such nondeployed missiles constitute a much less significant threat. (S)

George Murphy: ACDA supports Option 3. We are more worried about the Soviets than about maintaining our own capabilities. They really can cheat. We can't cheat. (S)

We are also worried about the Congress. If we get this treaty through, we need to be able to tell the Congress how many deployed and nondeployed missiles exist. We absolutely need to know. And we need to keep the numbers down. If you don't, you are going to repeat SALT II, where launchers only were constrained not the missiles. For all those reasons, we support Option 3. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: The problem with the compromise proposed by DOD is the number is too low. We are going to need 130 spare nondeployed missiles for MX PEACEKEEPER alone. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Well, I am open to readjusting the number. However, I will also say that if Option 2, the one we propose, loses, then I would prefer we go to Option 3 and restrict everything. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The only way we can do that is if we are set to handle a number of 2000 nondeployed missiles with a basic limit on all other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of 1600. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I can't see how we can get this treaty ratified unless we have a cap on non-mobile, nondeployed missiles. It will be difficult enough just to limit the mobiles. (S)

Ambassador Hanmer: Mr. President, my concern is that if we limit everything, as Option 3 does, it's going to constrain us and hurt us more than it will the Soviets. If we just look at the situation that Secretary Carlucci raised, we have a situation where even if we constrain them, we are not constraining Soviet capability. They have live production lines and will keep their production lines warm. We do not. So it's not going to be a real constraint on them. It will be a real constraint on us. (S)

General Powell: Mr. President, we should also consider what was said earlier, too. If we go to Option 2 or Option 3, the overall cost to

the United States is going to go up. So we have got to make sure that the costs and the threat and the benefits are all in balance. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Why don't we go back and look at some number, some option between Option 2 and Option 3. I think we can compromise on this. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Look at the dollars that are involved in all this stuff. We have to look at the payoff on investment and watch our appetites for verification to make sure it's keyed to our needs directly. (S)

General Powell: Well, Mr. President, that concludes our conversation. We will wrap this up into an appropriate decision document and forward it to you for your views. (S)

The meeting ended at 2:05 p.m.

321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State's Delegation¹

Washington, August 27, 1988, 1905Z

281983 ToSec 160286. Subject. Information Memo: Our START legacy: Consolidating gains in the coming months (S/S 8825460)

1. (S—entire text.)

2. Summary: There is now virtually no chance of concluding START in 1988. Moreover, there is a risk that, unless we take steps this year to maintain the negotiating momentum and shore up START's sagging political support, our successors will have difficulty bringing the process to closure and may even decide to alter the basic framework we have created. Therefore, we should capitalize on Soviet interest in preventing START from bogging down or unraveling by pressing in coming months to resolve some key remaining issues (e.g., ALCM counting). We could also smooth the way ahead by adopting more realistic U.S. positions on a few politically sensitive matters (e.g., suspect site inspections). Outside the negotiations, we could help promote a stronger political base for START through such steps as issuing an administration "final report" on START that would explain and defend what we have done and commissioning a study to identify U.S. force

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D880759-002. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Einhorn; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Solomon.

structuring options that would maintain survivability under START. End summary.

Prospects for 1988.

The interagency machinery is moving slowly but steadily to fill in gaps in the U.S. negotiating position on START. But no one believes START can be completed this year. With cautionary signals coming from the Hill and uncertainties remaining especially on ICBM modernization, the Chiefs have insisted on a very deliberate negotiating pace, and the White House has showed no inclination to accelerate the process in order to complete an agreement in 1988.

The Soviets have played a constructive role since NST resumption in early July, with modest moves in our direction on telemetry, ALCMs, throwweight, and other issues. However, they are not behaving as if they have any expectation of finishing this year. Their goal seems to be to make as much progress as possible in 1988 on the assumption that, the closer the agreement is to completion (and therefore the more the final product will bear Ronald Reagan's imprimatur), the less tempted the next administration will be to reopen major aspects of it.

Passing on a Promising Foundation.

This administration's main objective in START should be to leave its successor with a sound basis for bringing to a successful and reasonably early conclusion a treaty very much along the lines we have pursued. While we obviously want to achieve as much common ground with the Soviets as possible, our highest priority should be to turn over a joint draft text (JDT) and a set of U.S. negotiating positions that are technically solid and capable of obtaining wide political support. However, in some respects, the START foundation that exists today is not quite as promising as the one we might hope to pass on in January.

—On a number of politically sensitive issues, we initially staked out ambitious tasks (e.g., wide-ranging suspect site inspections) but later found that we had promised more than we really want to deliver. Having raised unrealistic expectations, we are now reluctant to pull back. Unless we come to grips with these issues internally, we will simply pass them on to our successors, who may be less well equipped politically to take the steps necessary to resolve them.

—Key opinion leaders, including Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and Brent Scowcroft, have publicly criticized the START limits on the grounds that they would make U.S. strategic forces more vulnerable to a Soviet strike. Although these criticisms may reflect dissatisfaction less with START itself than with certain strategic plans (e.g., ICBM basing), they have created the impression among influential segments of the public that START is strategically flawed. Indeed, this impression

probably contributed to the reluctance of congressional leaders to push START in 1988. Allowing it to go unchallenged would increase the difficulties of finalizing and ratifying the treaty.

—We successfully contained criticism of INF's verification regime by arguing that a total ban (including on flight testing) simplified the problem and minimized risks. In doing so, we ensured that START would be held to a much higher standard. But the regime that is taking shape might not fully measure up. Faced with trade-offs between, on the one hand, facilitating verification and, on the other hand, either preserving U.S. force structuring options or minimizing the risks of Soviet inspections, we have mostly opted for the latter (e.g., agreeing to count certain missiles with fewer than the maximum number of warheads tested, minimizing OSI for heavy bombers). Usually (though not always) these choices were justified. But they are sure to create ratification difficulties.

Negotiating Priorities.

In light of these considerations, we should use the following guidelines in deciding whether and how to tackle certain START issues in our remaining time.

—We should bite the bullet on a few politically sensitive issues where our current positions must sooner or later be changed. In particular, we should adopt a more modest approach to suspect site inspections. We should also finally agree to permit mobile ICBMs and negotiate a ceiling on mobile ICBM warheads.

—We should press the Soviets for solutions to some other key remaining issues. While progress on SLCMs and the ABM-START link seems unlikely, we should try to reach agreement on ALCM counting rules and range, the ICBM warhead sublimit, heavy ICBM modernization, and some other manageable issues.

—We need to ensure that our positions promote, and are perceived to promote, survivability. For example, we should seek to flesh out the agreed treaty elements on mobile ICBM verification in a way that blunts criticism of the restricted areas approach (e.g., permit a substantial percentage of the force to be outside restricted areas on a day-to-day basis).

—We can afford to retain blanks in our negotiating position on certain issues that, if decided now, would likely be decided in a way that would add to future problems. For example, early decisions on counting rules for future missile types and "downloading" (i.e., whether and how much to permit lowering the number of warheads deployed on and attributable to ballistic missiles) would probably side with the JCS desire for maximum flexibility, which would raise concerns about Soviet "breakout" opportunities. Later, when our force

plans are clearer and we need not protect so many theoretical options, these might be handled in a less troublesome way.

Efforts Outside the Negotiations.

We can help promote a more promising foundation for START not only through our negotiating posture but also—and perhaps more importantly—by what we say and do outside the negotiations.

—So far, we have done very little publicly (other than an op-ed piece by Paul Nitze² and a letter to the editor by Allen Holmes³) to counter arguments that START makes our forces more vulnerable. We have a strong case on this, and should look for opportunities during the next several months to help shape the public debate—speeches, op-ed pieces, articles in specialized journals, etc. An unclassified version of the JCS study recently briefed to the President could be very helpful.

—Continued domestic paralysis on means of enhancing ICBM survivability could be a serious obstacle to ratifying START. Although the election campaign rules out any possibility of forging a workable consensus on ICBM modernization at this stage, we should consider whether there are actions we could take that would increase the prospects for such a consensus under our successors. One device might be to ask several former Secretaries of Defense (Weinberger, Brown, Rumsfeld, Schlesinger) to study how to maintain the survivability of our strategic forces (not just ICBMs) under the emerging START regime. Such a study might identify options for the new administration rather than try to recommend a single approach. It could be conducted after the election to reduce partisanship and perhaps be coordinated informally with the transition staff. The main argument against this idea is that it might be seen by the incoming administration as prejudicing its own options. The main argument for it is that it could help build a consensus for modernization programs, especially survivable ICBM basing, as well as for START.

—To explain what this administration has accomplished in START and to increase the likelihood of continuity, we should consider issuing a “final report” on START at the end of our tenure. It could be signed by the President and sent either to the Congress or the President-Elect, or both. It would be a public report but a classified version could also be prepared. It could outline the status of the negotiations, provide rationales for some of the elements already agreed as well as U.S. positions taken on remaining issues, and discuss the implications of

² Paul H. Nitze, “The Case for Cutting Strategic Arms,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 1988, p. A19.

³ H. Allen Holmes, “Sound Approach for Mobile ICBMs,” *Washington Post*, July 5, 1988, p. A18.

the START regime for stability and U.S. security interests. It would thus give us an opportunity to explain and build support for some controversial trade-offs affecting verification (e.g., scaled-back suspect site inspections) and, in so doing, could strengthen the case for eventual ratification. At the same time, we would have to guard against the possibility that some might try to use the report to complicate the task of the next administration.

Suspending the START Negotiations.

A few issues arise as to how and when we suspend the negotiations.

—A date for suspending the Geneva talks could be announced at the end of Shevardnadze's September visit.

If substantial progress on START issues is made in Washington, the delegations might need to stay in session until just before the election in order to crank the new material into the JDT. If there is less for them to do, they might break somewhat earlier.

—Various means have been suggested for codifying and giving status to what will have been agreed to at the time of suspending the talks. But there does not seem to be any need for a joint high-level, highly-visible blessing of agreed elements. It would suffice for the negotiators to exchange an up-to-date JDT with its accompanying documents, brackets and all. This would, of course, be classified, but the unilateral "final report" discussed above would enable us to give the public an account of where the negotiations left off in whatever detail we considered appropriate.

Whitehead

322. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, September 8, 1988, 1653Z

9953. Subject: Official-Informal No. 17—Defense and Space at the September Shultz-Shevardnadze

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D880798-0138. Secret; Niact. Sent to Moscow.

As preparations are made for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting later this month, several considerations affecting the D&S talks are worth bearing in mind.

1. In NST as a whole since 1985, the Soviets have agreed to much of our agenda. INF was a major victory, and the Soviets have come a long way in START. While progress in D&S has been slow, our priority has been offensive reductions.

2. True, a D&S treaty on our terms could be valuable. Congressional support for SDI would go up, and we would have uncontested freedom to develop and test whatever promising SDI technologies appeared on the horizon.

3. A D&S treaty that fell short of this, however, could be controversial. An ambiguous accord would fail in the Senate if we and the Soviets disagreed on meanings. A compromise treaty might alienate conservatives—or even diehard SDI opponents—and stumble in the Senate.

4. Fortunately, such dilemmas are not here and now. At present the Soviets seem in no mood to conclude even a compromise treaty. They appear to be waiting for another president less committed to SDI than Ronald Reagan. In the meantime, the Soviets continue to demand that we agree to sharp constraints on SDI as the price for a START treaty. But some Soviet comments outside Geneva suggest eventual flexibility. Karpov and others have downplayed the threat of SDI (and implicitly the urgency of a D&S pact to corral SDI), and Vorontsov has hinted that some testing in space could be possible.

5. It remains important for us to be ready if and when the Soviets do decide to negotiate on a more realistic basis. While this may or may not happen soon, we do not at present have a complete position on one of the most essential issues for the United States in a D&S treaty—What development and testing activities could be undertaken during and after the nonwithdrawal period, until a side elects to deploy. With this exception, the rest of our position is on the table and the Soviets understand it.

6. If not now, then later—perhaps in the START endgame—the Soviets will seek to exploit our interest in offensive reductions by squeezing us on D&S. If we are ready at that time we can deal. If not, our choices would be less attractive, and pressures on us greater. In any event, not until the Soviets come off the idea that we will pay a D&S price for START will a realistic D&S agreement be possible. The Senate would not ratify a D&S treaty that did not stand on its own.

7. From this perspective, we should take in stride the current limited prospects for D&S, while persisting in efforts to complete a technically sound position on testing. At this point it seems clear that D&S is not

worth much of the Secretary's valuable time with Shevardnadze. He would do better to concentrate on Krasnoyarsk, which may be ripe for solution and is fundamental to getting START and D&S treaties anyway.

8. The Secretary should, however, lay down a few markers on D&S (the Experts Group would follow up):

- Your negotiators in Geneva have yet to make good on high-level Soviet pledges to work out a joint draft text of the treaty/agreement. Thus, it makes no sense for us again to restate this pledge in the joint statement for our meeting.

- Not until the Soviet Union is ready to agree to a balance of benefits in a D&S treaty will progress come on the main issues. We will not pay in D&S for a START Treaty. A D&S treaty must be worthwhile on its own.

- We hope progress can be made on the more modest predictability CBMS. But it is inhibited by Soviet insistence on binding verification measures. We think these would be ineffective for technical reasons, and would jeopardize the security of essential programs.

- When the Soviet approach in D&S becomes more realistic, our negotiators in Geneva will be ready for more productive negotiations.

9. Shevardnadze should not leave Washington thinking the rocky road in D&S causes sleepless nights on the Potomac. The D&S talks today resemble the INF and START in 1982–83—when there were gaping differences on basic concepts and the Soviets were out of touch with reality. We were patient and determined then, and should remain so today.

Cooper

323. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 12, 1988

SUBJECT

Verifying Road-Mobile ICBMs in START

Issue

Whether to modify the U.S. guidance on verification provisions for road-mobile ICBMs in START.

Background

On May 25, prior to the Moscow summit, you issued guidance on the U.S. approach to mobile missile verification.² On the basis of this guidance, we presented the main points of the approach to the Soviets in Moscow, and they agreed on a package of “common elements” at the summit.

Subsequent to the summit, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of ACDA expressed concern about our position. Pending the opportunity to meet and discuss their concerns, we held up tabling treaty language on this area in Geneva. In the interim, the Soviets have tabled in Geneva their version of treaty text formalizing the “common elements” as agreed at the summit.

Discussion

The *current U.S. guidance* on road-mobile ICBM verification provisions includes the following main elements.

1. All deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small (i.e., 25 km²) Restricted Deployment Areas (RDAs). These RDAs would include the shelters in which such missiles are stored on a day-to-day basis, and it is here that the deployed road-mobile ICBMs would stay unless they are being used for training or flight testing, or undergoing maintenance.

2. There would be a limit on the percentage (e.g. 20–30%) of deployed road-mobile ICBMs that could be outside these Restricted Deployment Areas for training, testing and maintenance at any one

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, ACSV, Sept 13, 1988 (4). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Linhard. Copied to Bush and Duberstein. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

² Apparent reference to Document 305, dated May 27.

time. There would be notification requirements associated with *all* movements away from the RDAs.

4. There could be *exercise dispersals* of the entire force, without geographic restriction, but these would be limited in frequency and duration. There could also be *operational dispersals* (intended to ensure survivability in a crisis). Operational dispersals would not be limited in number or in duration, but both sides acknowledge that they would be rare.

The *Soviet approach* as tabled in Geneva differs in certain ways.

1. While they agree that all deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small Restricted Deployment Areas (RDAs), they would add the concept of a larger Deployment Area (DA) which would contain some number of RDAs, a Maintenance Base, and some surrounding area.

2. The Soviets also agree that there should be a limit on the number of mobile ICBMs that could be outside the smaller Restricted Deployment Areas at any one time, but they would make this a much higher limit (50%) than we would prefer. They also agree to notification requirements associated with all such movements, except they would exempt up to 3 launchers per small RDA as long as they stayed within the larger Deployment Area.

3. While agreeing on the idea of exercise dispersals, the Soviets would limit exercise dispersals to no more than 50% of the entire force. We want the right to use our entire force in an exercise dispersal.

Based on the concerns expressed by Judge Webster and ACDA Director Burns, and considering the proposals tabled by the Soviets, two slight modifications to your current guidance have been suggested:

1. that we accept the idea of a larger Deployment Area surrounding the small Restricted Deployment Areas, as proposed by the Soviet Union; and,

2. that we confine *exercise dispersals* geographically to the larger Deployment Areas.

All agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff support these modifications. Supporters argue that the larger Deployment Area concept marginally improves overall verification and provides additional protection for U.S. future road-mobile basing options.

The JCS oppose the modifications arguing that the restriction on exercise dispersals blocks our ability to train with our forces in the same manner as we would have to use them in combat and could restrict U.S. options in designing and operating future road-mobile systems. The formal views of the JCS on this subject are at *Tab B*.³

³ Not attached.

I think that, overall, the modifications proposed are an improvement to the U.S. position. I recommend that you authorize these modifications. In implementing the modifications, we can make the Deployment Areas large enough to meet most of the legitimate concern expressed by the JCS.

To implement this recommendation, if you approve, I would issue the memorandum to agencies at *Tab A*⁴ which lays this out in greater detail.

Recommendation

OK	No	
_____	_____	That you approve modifying the U.S. guidance on verifying road-mobile ICBMs as set forth above. ⁵

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

324. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1988, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze—Second Small Group Meeting: Arms Control Issues

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary
of State

USSR

Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign
Affairs

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershow and Evans; cleared by Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 173. Memoranda of conversation covering the rest of Shevardnadze's September 22–23 visit to Washington are printed in *ibid.*, Documents 170–172 and 174–177.

Colin Powell, National
Security Advisor to the
President
Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor
on Arms Control Matters
Rozanne L. Ridgway,
Assistant Secretary of
State (EUR)
Jack Matlock, U.S.
Ambassador to the
USSR
Alexander R. Vershbow,
Director, Office of
Soviet Union Affairs
(notetaker)
John M. Evans, Deputy
Director, Office of
Soviet Union Affairs
(notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

Aleksander A. Bessmertnykh,
Deputy Foreign Minister
Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate
Head, Soviet MFA
Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet
Ambassador to the U.S.
Yevgeniy Gusarov, MFA
(notetaker)
Pavel Palazhchenko, USA &
Canada Department,
Soviet MFA (interpreter)

DEFENSE AND SPACE/ABM TREATY

The Secretary suggested that they begin with strategic arms and invited Shevardnadze to open the discussion. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said there was reason for some satisfaction about the results achieved to date. We not only had completed the INF Treaty but also other useful agreements. Moreover, despite our great differences in START, positive assets were increasing gradually. It would be desirable to make the process more dynamic, but he understood the objective reasons why this was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that the President and Gorbachev had both said many times that it was necessary to use to the maximum the existing opportunities, to make good use of the experience we had gained. The question was what we needed to do to conclude our interaction with real progress. He wanted to begin with the most difficult problems where the prospects were not very bright. He had in mind the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty. Time had shown that the road we mapped together in searching for an agreement on the ABM Treaty was the only possible basis for agreement. This was what the joint statements of the Washington and Moscow Summits made clear. In the future we needed to stick to the same course: the provisions and the language agreed upon in Washington. One of the most important fundamental issues was the relationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and START. He wanted to reemphasize the Soviet Union's fundamental approach.

Regarding the specific problems that had emerged, *Shevardnadze* said he wanted to begin with the problem of sensors. The Soviets had considered very carefully this question and all aspects of the U.S.

proposal. They had concluded that unlimited permission of sensors in space would seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. It would not be consistent with our objectives. At the same time the Soviets could agree to discuss the problem in hopes of finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviets proposed that this question be considered in the context of Soviets suggestions that had been made earlier with respect to reaching an agreement on a list of devices that would be permitted in space. At the outset the sides would have to agree that the launching of space based sensors would be conducted under conditions of verification with inspections. On this basis the Soviets would be prepared to continue the dialogue in the working group and in the negotiations in Geneva.

The next question, *Shevardnadze* continued, concerned the sides' mutual concerns with respect to the ABM treaty. Our two leaders had discussed this question thoroughly. It was very important not to permit our differences to result in an undermining of everything we had achieved through mutual efforts. The U.S., *Shevardnadze* said, was aware of the most recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. was also aware of the Soviet side's other suggestions regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets were very sincere in trying to set aside everything that stands in the way of solving this problem. Soviet proposals called for creating on the basis of that radar a center for international cooperation for peaceful space research.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to tell the Secretary frankly that the Soviets had not wanted to make a public statement and would have preferred to address this issue at the working level in private confidential discussions. They had made it public, however, because of certain propagandistic steps by the U.S. with respect to Krasnoyarsk by the Administration (an "uproar of accusations" against the Soviet Union alleging violations and, indeed, statements that Krasnoyarsk was almost a material breach of the Treaty). Because of these statements the Soviet side had to react publicly. *Shevardnadze* explained that the space center would be included in the system of a world space organization and that it would be possible for many countries to participate in its research efforts. The Soviets were ready for experts from the U.S. and the USSR to lead the way in the process of practically implementing this decision. This would imply visits to Krasnoyarsk and joint work to look at the equipment there.

Shevardnadze added that another Soviet proposal was still on the table. If the sides were able to agree on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Soviets would dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. This, however, would be a pity because the radar provided a good basis for joint use for peaceful purposes. But he repeated that

the old proposal was still in effect. It would be helpful if the U.S. side were to consider Soviet proposals and respond in kind. He had in mind Soviet concerns about the U.S. radar in Greenland as well as the rocket probe launch facility at Shemya Island. He urged that the U.S. let Soviet experts visit these facilities. While he was no expert, Shevardnadze said Soviet specialists were certain that these were clear violations of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had permitted members of the U.S. Congress and scientists to visit Krasnoyarsk, so it was quite logical to expect the U.S. side to respond similarly with visits to its facilities.

Secretary Shultz replied by saying he was sorry the Soviet delegation had responded negatively to the U.S. sensors proposal. He noted Shevardnadze's expression of readiness to continue the discussion on this proposal, however, and said the U.S. intended to pursue it further. In the U.S. view, it was impossible to distinguish between the functions of sensors of different kinds. It would lend itself to serious disputes if we tried to differentiate. This was why we thought our proposal would be helpful and fit the situation well. As we had looked at the situation in the defense and space talks it seemed to us that the length of the non-withdrawal period, based on discussions between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, should fall into place without difficulty. The U.S. also felt that the question of what happens after the period of non-withdrawal had been settled at the Washington Summit by Gorbachev's statement (he had said that, at the end of the period, each side would be free to decide its course, while in the meantime the ABM Treaty would remain in effect). In Geneva, however, disagreement had broken out on this question.

The most difficult question, *the Secretary* continued, continued to be what would occur during the non-withdrawal period. The sensors proposal was an attempt to address that along with our proposed confidence-building measures. Much good work had been done with respect to the predictability protocol, and we should instruct our negotiators to get that portion of our work completed. Many things already had been agreed, such as data exchange and observation of tests. We did not think mandatory on-site inspection would work, however—we had sensitive facilities and so did the Soviets. But there was a lot of good material in the Protocol and we should get it done to pass along to the next group.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was a very troublesome issue. There was a wide bipartisan consensus that the radar, because of its location and orientation, was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had said this issue had the potential to be a major disruptive force, and he believed the Minister was right. *Shevardnadze* interjected that he had not said that. *The Secretary* rejoined that, in that case, he would say it! We had to consider what we would do in the absence

of any agreement on this issue. We had studied the General Secretary's letter² and would like to raise some questions about his proposal.

The problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was that it is one of the critical items identified in the ABM Treaty as representing a long lead-time item for a territorial ABM defense. The ban on LPARs except on the periphery was a sort of insurance policy against ABM breakout. The existence of the radar was the problem. It might be used for other purposes, but it could easily be reconverted to an LPAR. Thus, knowing the origins of the LPAR limits, we had to ask what Gorbachev had in mind:

—Was he proposing to dismantle the radar and establish a space science center in its place? If so, we might “dig into that one.” We didn't see the location as ideal for such research, but if that was the proposal we could look at it.

—Another variation was that Gorbachev meant the radar would be completed, with additional parts added for space research purposes. For reasons he had already explained, the Secretary said, that would not do the job.

We needed to know whether the plan was to dismantle the radar and put something else useful there, or whether it was something else. The Secretary added that the U.S. had no problem with salvaging equipment from Krasnoyarsk and recovering it for other uses.

There was also a major problem, *Secretary Shultz* continued, with Soviet activities at Gomel. The movement of radars from a test range to another site was, in itself, a violation. We did visit the site, and the Soviets had explained their plans; now those plans were being carried out. Ambassador Karpov had spoken about a “radical solution” to Gomel during the ABM Treaty review, and we would like to know what was meant by this.

With respect to Thule and Fylingdales, *the Secretary* said, these radars had been grandfathered under the ABM Treaty. We did not regard them as in any way parallel to Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze asked whether the radar in Greenland was a phased-array type. *The Secretary* said he could not give a description. *General Powell* intervened to say that this question was irrelevant. The point was that the radar was at a site in existence at the time the ABM Treaty

² Reference is to Gorbachev's letter to Reagan of September 13, in which the Soviet leader pledged to dismantle the radar at Krasnoyarsk while reiterating his position that U.S. radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor violated the ABM Treaty. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750)). The letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Tab A, Document 167.

was signed; the Treaty allowed such radars to remain and modernization was permitted under the Treaty.

Shevardnadze asked whether, if it was an LPAR and was outside national territory, it was not a violation. *The Secretary* replied that it was not a violation as long as the Treaty grandfathered such radars. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed that modernization was permitted, but using the site for an ABM radar was a violation, in the Soviet view. *Karpov* added that, after signing the ABM Treaty, the sides were barred from building outside their national territory phased-array radars with a potential greater than 3 million.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. let the Soviet side visit Thule. If there were no violation, the Soviets would take the issue off the agenda. *The Secretary* replied that "what you see is not as important as what we say." The radar was there before the Treaty was signed and could be modernized. If the Soviets visited, they would see that it was being modernized. The same thing occurred with the U.S. visit to Krasnoyarsk; the Congressmen took photos; the visit confirmed what we already knew; that an LPAR was being built at that location.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to imagine the Soviet side had violated the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Then, after the two countries had agreed in Washington and Moscow that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a specified period of time, the Soviets put forward a proposal: if that issue was settled, the Soviets would dismantle the radar. This seemed to solve the problem. And now, the Soviets were offering a further step: to transfer the radar to the use of Soviet, U.S., Indian, Japanese and other scientists. If these scientists found elements that confirmed the radar was a violation, those elements would be removed and the building used for scientific purposes. *Shevardnadze* added that the Soviets could present this case to any audience and it would agree the U.S. position was indefensible. Why destroy the radar if it could be used for science?

The Secretary replied that there was a reason why not: Under the ABM Treaty regime, there were provisions aimed at making it difficult to break out of the Treaty. The chief one was the prohibition on battle management radars inside national boundaries and pointed inwards. Since it took a long time to build such radars, we could see them coming. That was the theory underlying the Treaty and that was why we regard Krasnoyarsk as a serious problem. It was not just a technical violation without real meaning; it had a lot of meaning.

Shevardnadze asked what would be so bad about making the radar into a laboratory for the use of world science or a world space organization, a place for peaceful research, for tracking space objects, to be used collectively not only by Soviet scientists? If there were certain elements of the radar that are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, these could be

removed. If not inconsistent, then all other devices and instruments could be used for peaceful purposes. This was a very noble idea and a reasonable solution, taking care of both the political problem and the interests of scientists. Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to please think again about the proposal, as it opened up an interesting prospect. As for the Greenland and UK radars, the Soviets believed they could seriously and earnestly say that these were violations of the ABM Treaty. If LPARs were there, they were violations. If no LPARs were there, then let the Soviets visit to confirm that there were no grounds for complaint.

Karpov said that when the Secretary spoke of modernization, one had to note that there were five radars at Thule and Fylingdales when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not one of them was a phased-array radar. Now LPARs with a potential much greater than 3 million were being built. These could have been built legally in Connecticut or Washington, but they should not have been built at Thule or Fylingdales.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had *not* conditioned his proposal on the U.S. doing the same thing to its disputed radars as Gorbachev had proposed to do with Krasnoyarsk. *Secretary Shultz* replied that he had noticed this. We contend that no matter what exists at Thule and Fylingdales, these were permitted, modernized radars. When it came to using Krasnoyarsk as a site for scientific research, however, there was a question as to what existed there. If it was an LPAR, then it was a problem. If there was a significant proportion of what is needed for an LPAR, it was also a problem. If the LPAR was gone, that would be a different story. This was why he had asked whether the Gorbachev proposal entailed dismantlement or substantial alteration of the radar. Whatever the Soviets might say about Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary added, they were far away from U.S. national borders.

Shevardnadze said he had been told that, when scientists met at Krasnoyarsk, they would be able to decide what kind of equipment could be preserved and what should be taken away. If there were elements that represented a violation of the ABM Treaty, then the Soviets would remove them. He reiterated that keeping the radar functioning would be useful for world science. Many countries' scientists would jointly determine its use as a laboratory. With some emotion, Shevardnadze stressed that he thought this was a good idea. If there were elements of concern, the Soviets would be ready to dismantle them and convert the installation. The aim, he said, was to remove this problem from contention as well as to make the radar available to help implement the plans our countries had for space exploration. This was a mission that could only be accomplished by big countries like the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. Shevardnadze noted that there was a

big building at Krasnoyarsk, with much costly equipment—all of this could be used. But the Soviets had made a political decision; they were ready to do something useful for world science and were surprised the U.S. had reacted so negatively.

The Secretary said his reaction was not negative, but one of questioning what will be at Krasnoyarsk under the Soviet proposal. If the LPAR were there, in whole or in part, then the problem would not be solved. If something else was implied, then we could work it out. The Working Group should delve further into this idea. But if the idea was to use an LPAR for scientific purposes, this would be a problem.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to confirm the Soviet aim: to preserve at Krasnoyarsk *only* that equipment needed for scientific purposes. *Karpov* added that he had told General Burns that various options existed for converting the radar. They had discussed dismantling the transmitter antenna and replacing it with a parabolic antenna. This was a radical solution, one which would remove any concern about the radar's use for early warning of ballistic missile launch.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group continue this discussion. He could not say he was very optimistic, but he accepted that it was a good faith effort to resolve the problem. He asked again for the Soviets to explain what would be a "radical solution" at Gomel.

Karpov replied: To eliminate what exists there—to eliminate the base for the antenna. *Shevardnadze* broke in to say that "Gomel is not a problem; let me assure you of this. Let us not fan that issue into a big problem; it's a matter that can be taken off the agenda quickly." As for Krasnoyarsk, *Shevardnadze* continued, he wanted to ask the U.S. again to take a very careful look at the Soviet proposal—to think of what the U.S. would want to see done so that it was sure Krasnoyarsk was only a research center. Let us allow our experts to work on the problem. Do not dismiss the Soviet proposal out of hand: that would shape public opinion in a way that the U.S. would find difficult to cope with, he warned, since the U.S. would have trouble explaining what was wrong with the Soviet proposal for a genuine scientific research center at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. didn't trust the Soviets, then it could come and see the radar for itself. Let the experts come and decide, *Shevardnadze* concluded.

The Secretary said that the Soviet proposal would be a great idea if it meant there would be no LPAR at Krasnoyarsk, in whole or in part. There might be ways to change the physical characteristics of the radar such that it would be dismantled in terms of its ability to operate as an LPAR.

Ambassador Ridgway, referring to *Shevardnadze's* comment that the Gomel issue should not be allowed to become a major problem, commented that our concerns had been exacerbated by the fact that

construction work was continuing at Gomel. This made management of the issue more difficult.

Shevardnadze asked what U.S. experts had found at Gomel. If there was a violation, then why would the Soviets have invited experts? The fact was that they did not find anything. But he repeated that Gomel was not a big problem, since there was not a big structure involved. Krasnoyarsk was much larger. Gomel was a simple matter that could be solved. *Karpov* noted that at Gomel there was simply a rotating tower on which a mirror antenna had been placed.

Shevardnadze invited U.S. experts to visit Gomel again, and quipped that he was considering visiting Gomel himself. Regarding Krasnoyarsk, he again urged the U.S. to look carefully at the Soviet proposal. It was a serious one presented in good faith. When Krasnoyarsk becomes a facility for space cooperation, perhaps the U.S. could do the same thing at Thule.

Secretary Shultz said that his understanding of the Gomel problem was that, while the sides were allowed to have ABM radars at test ranges for experimental purposes, they were barred from moving them to other locations. So simply moving the radar was a violation. Beyond this, one must ask why the negotiators had made this a violation. The answer was that they did not want lesser radars to proliferate, since a large number of such radars could add up to a significant capability. Therefore, when the radar was moved, it was a technical violation. Now that we were seeing the parts reconstructed, it exacerbated the situation. *Karpov* said the Soviets were not building at Gomel.

General Powell noted that, in the fall of 1987, we seriously considered whether the Gomel matter constituted a violation. We judged that, on technical grounds, there was no doubt, although we reported to Congress that this was a minor problem. Inspectors subsequently visited Gomel. But the problem had since become more serious with the renewal of assembly activity there. In December we would need to report again to Congress on the status of the issue, and this activity would turn a small problem into a big one.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides decide on the following course: At Gomel, where there was nothing that constituted a violation, the U.S. should come and visit once again and have its experts take another look. The Soviets had a vital interest in removing all irritants in this area. The inspectors could go for 10 days or two weeks, if they wished. In our joint statement, we could note the readiness of the Soviet side to allow this to happen.

The Secretary replied that it was not a secret what was happening at Gomel. When our people visited, they were openly shown the plans, and now we were seeing those plans carried out. It was not as though we were mystified about what was going on. It was the fact that the

radar was there that posed the problem. We had no problem verifying what the Soviets had been telling us.

General Powell explained that it was the simple presence of those components that was the issue. The simplest solution would be to remove them to a test range or destroy them. The question was not the purpose of the radar, but its location. And if the work continued, this meant more of a problem for our December compliance report.

The Secretary said that what the Soviets called a van was, in fact, a radar. *Shevardnadze* said it really was a van. The Soviets may have done something they shouldn't have, taking it from one place to another. But if they had wanted to violate the Treaty, then why would they have invited U.S. experts to come inspect the facility? Did the Secretary think the Soviets were naïve or trying openly to provoke the U.S.?

The Secretary said he did not think Gomel was a big enough deal to warrant all this trouble. *Shevardnadze* said: "I have an interest in resolving the issue." He said he would ask Karpov and the highest authorities to go there to see the site. Removing one van was not going to be a problem. *General Powell* said it was more than just one van that was involved. Other components that had been moved to Gomel also had to be eliminated. We now knew what's there based on our experts' visit. He added that, before we had included Gomel in our compliance report, we had raised this issue with the Soviets privately in an effort to resolve it.

Karpov said he wanted to point out that there was no radar at Gomel of a kind deployed at test ranges, but only a rotating tower on which mirror antennas and other devices had been placed. This was not the same kind of antenna as was located at test ranges.

The Secretary said he would like to tell the Soviets again precisely what we considered a violation. *Powell* argued that this was surely a problem we could solve. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed. The Soviets recognized the concerns of the U.S. side and wanted to find a solution. He confirmed the Soviets' readiness to receive U.S. experts again at Gomel, after which, he joked, they could all go together to Greenland. *Secretary Shultz* said this should wait until the summer. *Shevardnadze* said he was ready to go even in winter. *The Secretary* said they would need to ask Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides think of language on Krasnoyarsk, to see what might be possible here. The Soviets were not sure what the U.S. wanted, what conditions had to be satisfied. He had confirmed the Soviet Government's readiness to ensure that it becomes a scientific facility. If this approach was acceptable, we could say this in the joint statement.

The Secretary said the U.S. was looking for something that fixed the radar so that, from a physical and operational viewpoint, it was not a phased-array radar in whole or in part. This was the essence of the problem. If, in the process, something useful was created, this was fine—a creative idea. But if what was being proposed was to have scientists use the LPAR, Gorbachev's proposal would not solve the problem.

The Secretary recalled the Soviets' Moscow offer that, in connection with a satisfactory arrangement on the ABM Treaty, they would dismantle the radar. Of course, we hadn't been able to work this out. On the other hand, if we could resolve the problem by accompanying dismantlement with a statement that expressed satisfaction with the ABM Treaty as it stands, leaving aside what we were negotiating in NST, we could do that too. If this idea was of interest, then there were several solutions to explore. But the essence of the question was that we cannot wind up with something that had the physical characteristics of an LPAR in whole or in part.

Shevardnadze said: "We agree on this." Let us give the task to the experts to find a way to do this. Of course, an inventory would need to be taken of the equipment and structure to see what elements were incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What was not incompatible could stay in place and be used for science. On the basis of the Secretary's proposal, *Shevardnadze* concluded, work could be done.

START

SLCMs

Shevardnadze said he would like to open the discussion of START with one of the most difficult questions: SLCMs. He knew the Secretary didn't like to discuss the issue, but it could not be avoided. He reminded the Secretary that in the Washington Summit joint statement the sides pledged to reach agreement on quantitative limits on nuclear-armed, long-range SLCMs, and to look for mutually acceptable verification measures to enforce those limits. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation had been trying to avoid any specific discussion of SLCMs and was attempting to remove the subject from the agenda. But he wanted to say that a treaty on strategic offensive arms would not be possible if such a channel for circumvention was not closed. Therefore, the working group should look seriously at the SLCM question.

Shevardnadze said that, in Geneva, the negotiators had on the table a major package of Soviet proposals for SLCM verification. The Soviets had suggested use of NTM, remote verification, inspections, checks at production and arming facilities. He proposed that detailed discussions now begin on these proposals, one-by-one or all together. If any one

proposal was unacceptable, the Soviets were prepared to discuss U.S. concerns. But a process of specific discussion had to begin.

Shevardnadze said that while the Soviets wanted to understand U.S. objections to their verification proposals, it was also important to decide what would be the numerical limits. Sooner or later, this must be done. If possible, an agreed limit could be reflected in the joint statement from this ministerial. The Soviets proposed an upper limit of 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs and 600 non-nuclear SLCMs. What did the U.S. have to say? Would the questions be shelved for good or was the U.S. side ready to discuss the question of numerical limits?

Secretary Shultz replied that the U.S. did not have any doubt that SLCMs were important and we were prepared to discuss the subject. Our feeling was that it was very difficult to verify satisfactorily whatever limits might be agreed. The Soviet side has been very energetic and creative. We had examined every proposal and discussed each one with the Soviet side, and we had tried to devise things we might ourselves propose. But we had found the process very frustrating.

The Secretary explained that our problems with SLCMs could be divided into two categories: approaches we did not believe would do the job; and approaches that might do the job but would be so intrusive as to reconfigure our navy and constrain the way our navy operates. This would not be verification, but a change in naval operations. At this point, the Secretary explained, the navy had told him that it did not see a way to solve the SLCM verification problem. We had proposed, as a way of recognizing the verification problem, that the sides make unilateral declarations. We admitted that this approach could not be verified. Rather, each country would declare the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs it intended to deploy; if it became necessary to change the number, a side could do so. If this approach were acceptable to the Soviets, we would name a number.

The Secretary added, in this regard, that we could not accept limits on conventional SLCMs as the Soviets had proposed. We had a fundamental principle that START deals only with nuclear arms. We had made a distinction in our ALCM proposal. As for the Soviet-proposed figure for nuclear-armed SLCMs, our unilaterally-declared figure—if we were to agree on a declaratory approach—would be much higher than 400.

Shevardnadze rejoined that SLCMs were a part of the overall agreement. He thought the question would have to be resolved; it went back to Reykjavik, where it was decided that SLCMs had to be settled. Discussing *whether* there was to be a solution was pointless. The Soviets could agree, however, that limiting SLCMs was difficult. The Soviets had been looking at various ideas and they knew the U.S. had been looking at some ideas as well. They continued to believe their devices

for verifying SLCMs, while not taking care of the whole problem, could serve as a subsidiary element in a verification scheme. In any case, while we might not be able to solve the problem at this meeting, we should agree to proceed step-by-step, starting with agreement on a *number* even if we do not have agreement on the verification arrangements. We should proceed with joint experiments on verification, but in the meantime agree on a numerical limit as a first step.

The Secretary said he would like to try to rearrange Shevardnadze's proposal. Recognizing that the SLCM problem had been on the agenda since Reykjavik and that it involved an important class of weapons, the way to proceed should be to start with unilateral declarations. If this were acceptable, then the U.S. could go back and review its thinking and provide a number, while continuing to work on verification. The Secretary added that we recognized that the declaratory approach was not fully satisfactory to either side. Some in the U.S. would criticize the lack of measures to verify Soviet compliance, whereas U.S. compliance would be ensured by the fact that Congress would be looking down our throats. Thus we were not offering the declaratory approach as an ideal solution. Nonetheless, we believed that problems like this "yield to the weight of continued insistence." We would say to our Navy: You've got to resolve this problem; get a fresh batch of Admirals and keep looking; tell us how many new ideas you have looked at in the last month (since they do think of things after a while).

Recapitulating, *the Secretary* said he was not advocating the declaratory approach, since he accepted it was unsatisfactory. But the Minister was asking for a way to get started. Having heard the CNO and CJCS hold forth on the subject of SLCMs, we were not likely ever to have anything that represented a satisfactory verification regime. Our approach was a way of starting to surround the problem and keep the pressure on it. Shevardnadze had said we should start with the number; in our view, the number had to be fit into something.

Shevardnadze replied that it appeared that it would be very difficult to move forward on SLCMs, as well as on other questions. This was because the U.S. did not seem to have decided the basic questions of verification. Why had we been able to agree on INF? Because we moved boldly on verification with on-site inspection, challenge inspection, suspect-site verification and the like. On SLCMs we were in a kind of impasse because, the U.S. claimed, its naval people did not want to be verified by another country. This applied to the U.S. air force as well. For this reason, Shevardnadze explained, he did not really emphasize SLCM verification: he knew the U.S. was not disposed to allow inspections of its navy, and therefore he thought we could achieve small progress by giving the delegations the boost provided by an agreed number.

General Powell commented that the Secretary's proposal was a bold one. We were ready to provide the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs we would have. Verification would be brought to you by the U.S. Congress. Just as the Soviets knew our inventory now, so they would be able to get all the information they might need from our Congress. This would not require any of the intrusive on-site inspection that was such a problem for our navy. The Soviet side, for its part, would have the option to build its own required number of SLCMs.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the U.S. was more vulnerable to Soviet SLCMs than vice versa, with so many major cities on our coasts. He urged that Shevardnadze look seriously at the declaratory approach; this was not an inconsequential matter.

Shevardnadze said that if the U.S. could agree to record a numerical limit for SLCMs, this could be reflected in the joint statement. Why have separate unilateral statements when we could record a mutual number (300, 400, 500) in the joint statement?

The Secretary said we had no problem with an equal upper level. But we had to start with the concept that it was in the form of a declaration—a voluntary piece of information, with both sides saying they will have no more than "X" SLCMs. *Shevardnadze* asked whether this meant no more than a certain level. *The Secretary* replied that each side would have the right to change its number if circumstances warranted (although he had no doubt that the U.S. would pick a "safe" number at the outset).

Shevardnadze replied that this was not acceptable. *The Secretary* said he had gone back to the declaratory approach because *Shevardnadze* had argued that we should at least get started on addressing SLCMs. Even if our idea was not satisfactory—or perhaps because it was not satisfactory—it would, once adopted, put pressure on our people to exercise more creativity. *Shevardnadze* said, all right, let us have our experts give it another try.

HEAVY BOMBERS/ALCMS

Shevardnadze said the sides should try to find a compromise on heavy bombers and their armaments, as well as on mobile ICBMs and verification. These were items where the delegations could, in short order, draft language for inclusion in the draft Treaty. On ALCMs, he would not run through those provisions already recorded at the Summits. The Soviet position was that:

—All heavy bombers regardless of armament should be counted in the 1600 ceiling.

—For each type of heavy bomber, the maximum number of accountable ALCMs should be determined.

—Short-range missiles and gravity bombs count as one in the 6000 warhead limit.

—Non-nuclear ALCMs are not counted.

—There will be separate basing for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear warheads and those not so equipped.

—Verification of baseline data will be by both NTM and on-site inspection.

Karpov interjected that these were the main elements, without all the details.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to say a few words about the range criterion and the counting of ALCMs on various types of bombers. The Soviets believed the U.S. should modify its position. Soviet arguments against revision of the agreed 600-km range criterion were well known. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation in Geneva, in insisting on revising this threshold, had not even supplied arguments in support of this change.

Shevardnadze also wanted to call attention to the U.S. delegation's negative approach to the question of counting ALCMs on various types of heavy bombers. Whereas it stated in the summit joint statement that agreement should be reached on counting rules for each type of heavy bomber—i.e. a different number for each type—the U.S. continued to propose the artificial number 10 for all heavy bombers. This would put the USSR in an unequal position. The Soviet proposal for a 600-km range cut-off and for counting the maximum number of ALCMs on each type of heavy bomber has been set forth in detail in Geneva.

Finally, *Shevardnadze* said, he wanted to raise the question of inspections. This was also of fundamental importance. The Soviets believed there should be inspections of heavy bomber bases. After entry-into-force of the Treaty, but before implementation began, the Soviets proposed that all types of heavy bombers should be shown to the other side (those equipped for ALCMs, those equipped for short-range missiles and gravity bombs, and those not equipped with nuclear missiles). Such a demonstration would help both sides to distinguish (based on functionally-related observable differences) those types of heavy bomber from one another, and to help demonstrate that ALCM carriers cannot carry a greater number of ALCMs than agreed.

The Secretary replied that this might be a promising area. There had been some activity on the U.S. side and it would seem some progress could be made. We too would like to see this issue resolved, along with verification and mobiles. Rather than commenting on all aspects of *Shevardnadze's* presentation, he wanted to focus on the question of how to account for the number of ALCMs.

The Secretary recalled that the sides were now agreed on attributing numbers to bombers. The U.S. proposal, he said, was to attribute 10 to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs; these would be distinguishable from non-ALCM-equipped bombers. This number would

mean that a B-52 equipped for ALCMs would count just as much as an SS-18, despite the big differences between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. We believed that, in this light, the Soviets should understand why a number like 10 is appropriate.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva, the Soviet side had suggested the possibility of attributing different numbers to different bomber types because their capacities were demonstrably different. The U.S. side was prepared to consider a proposal attributing different numbers to different types so long as the maximum number was no more than 10. Some would count as 10, some at a lower number.

Shevardnadze asked whether some would count at a number greater than 10. *The Secretary* said the Soviet side had also raised the question of equipping heavy bombers with huge numbers of ALCMs—multiples of 10. We had no plans to do this. We had put forward in Geneva a ban on conversion of aircraft other than heavy bombers into heavy bombers. This, the Secretary said, should help resolve any concern the Soviet side might have about the possibility of converting large aircraft to carry large numbers of ALCMs. We were prepared to find other forms of assurance.

Summing up, *the Secretary* outlined the following package:

- Attribute 10 ALCMs to existing heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs
- Attribute 10 ALCMs to future bomber types unless the sides agree otherwise
- No 1100 sublimit on ALCMs and bomber weapons
- No limits on ALCM inventories
- No conversion to heavy bombers of aircraft constructed for other purposes.

Under this approach, we would be ready to:

- Consider a proposal to attribute a number smaller than 10 to specific types of existing heavy bombers
- Consider a range cut-off somewhat lower than 1500 km (a figure which he knew bothered *Shevardnadze*; *Shevardnadze* replied: "Yes it does").
- Work with the USSR on ways to meet concerns about very large numbers of ALCMs on future bombers.

This was an effort to come to grips with proposals the Soviet side had made, *the Secretary* concluded. They reflected quite a lot of give, and we hoped we could get somewhere on this basis.

Shevardnadze said he had one question. What was the U.S. attitude on inspections to check heavy bomber types? The U.S. had proposed a figure of 10, but there were other numbers possible, such as 22 or 28. The Soviets understood a compromise was needed, but they would need to have a look at the heavy bombers.

The Secretary replied that, if the Soviets agreed to the U.S. approach, the sides would assume that each distinguishable type of heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs would count as 10. The only verification needed would be to confirm the bomber type. The actual weapons load might be more or less than 10. But we were prepared to work so that there could be no extravagant number of ALCMs on a heavy bomber. We had no thought of deploying numbers like 60 or 70 which the Soviet delegation had cited. The Secretary added that we were not opposed to on-site inspection—we were doing a lot of it under the INF Treaty. But this was not something either side necessarily relished. Therefore, if there were ways to resolve issues without OSI, this would be better.

Shevardnadze said the problems of verification were really not so terrible as far as bombers were concerned. After all, Secretary of Defense Carlucci had been in the cockpit of the most modern Soviet plane. *The Secretary* said he had flown on a B-1 and it had scared the daylights out of him. *Shevardnadze* suggested that the experts look into the new U.S. proposals.

MOBILE ICBMs

Shevardnadze said he thought it was quite possible to take a decision on mobile ICBMs. What was needed was to reach complete agreement on verification. He said the Soviets were prepared to agree to a figure of 100 square kilometers for the restricted area for road-mobiles. This could be recorded in the data MOU. The U.S. side, he noted, had also said it was interested in reaching agreement on tagging mobile ICBMs. In the spirit of this proposal, the Soviets believed agreement should be reached on a system of registration: for all missiles built after entry-into-force, the mobile launchers and associated missiles would be registered. The same registration would also apply to SLBMs, ALCMs and SLCMs.

Shevardnadze said another area where a mutually acceptable position could be found would be to establish sublimits of 800 mobile ICBM launchers and 1600 warheads on such launchers. If the U.S. was not ready to accept these numbers, the Soviets would like to hear a figure that would be acceptable.

The Secretary recalled that mobile ICBM verification was another area in which the two sides had made real progress in Moscow. Agreement had been reached on a large number of elements of common ground. Last week, Ambassador Hanmer had described in Geneva some new proposals which took into account Soviet ideas. In light of the discussions in Moscow and Geneva, the Secretary said, we had also developed some language reflecting further thoughts on mobile ICBM verification and suspect-site inspections. Once we had agreed on verification, we would be prepared to reconsider our proposal to

ban mobile ICBMs and to table a number for mobile ICBM warheads. The Secretary added that we thought this number would need to be much lower than the Soviet-proposed 1600.

The Secretary concluded that we had a lot of material for the working group to work on, and it would perhaps be possible to get far enough on mobiles and ALCMs to wrap these up during these talks. If so, it would be very welcome. *Shevardnadze* suggested that the ministers perhaps give stricter instructions: that the working groups should make substantial progress on mobiles and ALCMs. What the Secretary had said gave him hope. Let us see what the working groups can do in terms of agreements that can be reported to ministers the following afternoon.

ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT

Secretary Shultz said it would be good to wrap up the question of an ICBM warhead sublimit. He recalled Marshal Akhromeyev's statement that the USSR did not intend to deploy more than 3300 ICBM warheads. Our problem was with heavy missiles, the most destructive and destabilizing ones in the Soviet arsenal. The U.S. proposals would ban new types, modernization and flight-testing of heavy ICBMs. The problem was that the Soviet Union possessed such heavy missiles, but the U.S. did not. One way to solve this problem was to gradually phase them out. If the Soviet side objected to banning flight-testing, the outcome would be one-sided. We would prefer to phase them out, and the technological trends favor that. We were willing, the Secretary said, to consider other outcomes, but not to grant the Soviet Union a permanent monopoly. And we would rather not have heavies ourselves, although that would be one option for us if we needed it.

Shevardnadze said he did not think the Soviet side was prepared to discuss banning modernization. The right approach was to concentrate on sublimits. There were two options here, and the figures were already known to both sides. Within the total of 4900 warheads on ballistic missiles, the sublimit on ICBMs would be 3300, but there would also be a sublimit on SLBMs. If that was not acceptable, the Soviet side would be ready to accept another solution: each side would be free to determine the composition of its warhead mix. This was not new, but the Soviet side had looked at the possibilities. *Shevardnadze* added that he would like to reach agreement on this soon, even before leaving Washington.

Secretary Shultz observed that ICBMs and SLBMs were very different, and noted that we had been around the circle many times on this question; he did not propose to go around it again.

Shevardnadze said the two sides should also finish up their work on exchange of data. The exchange of baseline data was very important, and should apply to all strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty: ICBMs, heavy bombers, SLBMs, and SLCMs. He suggested that the pace of work on exchange of data be accelerated because of its importance.

The Secretary noted that both sides had already submitted some data. He said he basically agreed with the Foreign Minister that we should proceed with an exchange of data.

SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

Shevardnadze suggested that the working groups be instructed to accelerate their work on this. There was also another issue on which the Foreign Minister recalled he had written a letter, namely that of an agreement on limiting the numbers of warheads on existing missiles. He said it would be possible to exchange letters on this at the present meeting, thus producing a substantive result.

Secretary Shultz recalled Ambassador Dubinin's having brought the proposal to his attention on September 19th. He said the U.S. side had studied it carefully and aggressively, and agreed that breaking elements out of the START agreement would be possible, but we had a number of questions and some additional points to make on the subject. On-site-inspection was a very big undertaking in START, and there was a lot of language that went with the concept. We would have to see how it came out in the working group. *Shevardnadze* agreed with this approach.

The Secretary added that the problem of the Krasnoyarsk radar intersected with our willingness to do anything in the area of strategic arms. We would have to see that resolved. *Shevardnadze* agreed that the discussion should continue in the working group. But he thought something should be possible, since there were already thousands of warheads and their numbers should not be increased. *Shevardnadze* said he had understood that questions would be raised about his proposal. Still, he thought it would be good if we could conclude something. *The Secretary* told *Shevardnadze* we had found the suggestion constructive and were studying it in that spirit.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, October 5, 1988, 0143Z

325164. Subject: Official—informal.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is the draft of the final memorandum of conversation for the Ministerial Experts meeting during the morning of September 23, 1988.

3. Begin text:

Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Amb Nitze
Amb Kampelman
Amb Hanmer
Amb Cooper
Amb Rowny
Adm Howe
Gen Burns
DAS Harrison
DAS Joseph
Col Linhard
Mr. Castillo
Dr. Timbie
Dr. Graham
Mr. Teye
Mr. Ramee
Mr. Walpole
Mr. Afanasenko (interpreter)
Mr. Starr (notetaker)

USSR

Amb Obukhov
Amb Masterkov
Amb Kuznetsov
Gen Kuklev
Gen Lebedev
Mr. Roslyakov
Mr. Khromov
Mr. Groshev (int)

SUBJECT

Defense and Space, START

Ambassador Nitze opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Obukhov if he had any points with which to begin the discussion.

Obukhov responded that the sides should agree on the work objectives for today. It would be just a few hours until the ministers called upon the experts to report on the work underway to finalize the text

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 2, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Starr; cleared by Collins and in S/S-O; approved by Stafford.

of a statement. Apparently, the results of our work in this group will be reflected in the final document. Therefore, we need to agree upon provisions on the basis of yesterday's discussions.² We should reserve time to prepare our report to the ministers. What is your view?

Nitze responded that he agreed with Obukhov's points. He suggested that the sides might begin with the Soviet reaction to the points that the U.S. had made about ALCMs and mobiles to see if there was any common ground to report to the ministers. The next issue that the U.S. wanted to raise was that there ought to be some discussion of Mr. Shevardnadze's letter³ regarding limitations on ballistic missile RVs. The U.S. has some questions to ask about the language of that proposal. The sides should also consider whether there would be any language inserted on the basis of recommendations made by Roz and Bessmertnykh.

Obukhov said that this was a reasonable approach, but added that the sides should not take too much time discussing these details. Bearing this in mind, his comments would be brief and specific. Regarding the proposal made by the U.S. on the protocol of the future agreement on compliance and nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty, the Soviet point of view is that the issues raised by the U.S. side required additional consideration. Such consideration might be provided at the negotiations in Geneva. If we have time, as a matter of principle, we will express the additional considerations of Ambassador Kuznetsov.

Regarding the discussion about ALCMs and heavy bombers, both sides have introduced proposals which have been sufficiently detailed by both sides. Today, the Soviet side will express its point of view on what was derived from yesterday's discussions in order to include it in the final document by way of expressing common ground. At the same time, we intend to do the same with regard to mobiles. The Soviet side is aware of the exchange of points of view regarding the separate agreement on non-increase of the number of warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles. The Soviet side will answer any question today or in the future. These aspects could also be recorded in a final document.

These are the Soviet remarks in general terms. We should put these remarks in the final draft. The U.S. questions on the Krasnoyarsk radar station will be specifically examined by Karpov and Kampelman.

Here are the approximate ideas that the Soviet side is ready to suggest. (Obukhov handed over to Amb. Hanmer copies of a Soviet draft of the final joint statement.)

² No minutes of the experts' discussions on September 22, 1988 were found.

³ Shevardnadze's letter was not found.

Nitze handed to Obukhov the U.S. draft final joint statement.⁴

Obukhov observed that the U.S. suggestion was far more laconic, briefer.

(The sides took a short break to read the statements of the other side)

Obukhov noted to Nitze, by way of clarification, that when the Soviet side speaks of a mutual understanding of deployed areas for mobiles, the Soviet side proceeds from the understanding that exercises would not be limited in area.

Nitze asked if the Soviet side was suggesting that exercises be permitted outside of deployment areas.

Obukhov said that the Soviet proposal does not provide for a limitation of the area in which one can exercise.

Nitze responded that the U.S. does provide for such a limitation.

Obukhov said yes, the sides have different views on that point. He thought, though, that the sides could record agreement in other areas, such as the use of the deployment area concept. This was his first point. His second, in anticipation of U.S. proposals, might record the following: that the ministers directed the negotiations in Geneva to continue to work on a final agreement of documents on all problems of nuclear and space weapons, including possible agreement on the issue of the non-increase of warheads on ballistic missiles of existing types. These are the Soviet proposals.

Nitze suggested that the U.S. experts needed to discuss these points among themselves. The Soviet proposal went more to the heart of the matter than the U.S. draft. Nitze asked if the sides should break at this point to discuss the drafts. Nitze said that he would prefer to put this issue aside for now, go on to discuss long range ALCMs and mobiles, spend a few minutes on some questions that he had on Shevardnadze's letter, then go back to consideration of the statements.

Obukhov told Nitze that the Soviet side's reaction to the U.S. proposals on the verification of mobiles and on the issue of limitations on ALCMs and heavy bombers are contained in the document that he had just passed over. If the sides start to analyze the U.S.-Soviet proposals again, we will cover the same trails. We decided to select for this

⁴ Neither draft was found. In their joint statement of September 23, Shultz and Shevardnadze "noted the active and serious effort underway to resolve outstanding issues in the Geneva nuclear and space talks. They received updated joint draft texts of a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and its associated documents. They welcomed the further elaboration since the Moscow summit of these drafts. The sides discussed a range of issues including air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and the problem of verification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Some further progress was achieved in the first two areas." (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1988, p. 29.)

document only that which can be recorded now. All the rest is subject to further discussion or analysis.

Hanmer noted that at the Moscow summit, the sides took the approach that the material that added to common ground, but not all of the specifics, would go in the public document. He proposed to put the specifics in the Soviet text aside into a separate paper.

Obukhov said that the Soviet side could go along with this. He suggested that it would be appropriate to have a ten minute break to examine the document.

Nitze agreed on taking a ten minute break.

* * *

Nitze opened after the break suggesting that Kuznetsov and Cooper should go off to discuss the Defense and Space portion of the two draft joint statements, and that Hanmer and Masterkov should go off to discuss the START text. If he and Obukhov tried to reach agreement on both START and Defense and Space, then it would take too long.

Obukhov agreed, and the four ambassadors left the room.

Nitze said that he would ask some questions about the Soviet proposal on ballistic missile RV limits. We have begun to examine the proposal on ballistic missile RVs contained in Minister Shevardnadze's letter to Secretary Shultz. As we understand it, the proposal contains the following basic elements:

—The sides would reaffirm their intention to continue their efforts for early completion of a START treaty.

—The sides would agree not to deploy or flight test more RVs on each type of existing ICBM and SLBM than the number declared for that type in the Washington summit joint statement.

—During flight testing of each type of existing ICBM and SLBM, the number of procedures for releasing or dispensing RVs would not exceed the number of RVs declared for that type in the Washington summit joint statement.

—Verification would be carried out by national technical means and on-site inspection.

—Agreement on these provisions would take the form of an exchange of letters between the ministers.

—The agreement would enter into force on the date of the return letter from Secretary Shultz and would remain in effect until replaced by a START treaty.

—Each side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement upon six months' written notice.

Nitze continued that the U.S. would like to clarify some aspects of such a possible agreement before we decide on our response. First, there would have to be a clear understanding that any such agreement

will not affect existing patterns of cooperation with our allies; we will not enter into such an agreement on any other basis.

Obukhov said that Nitze had correctly described the Soviet proposal. Regarding the issue of cooperation with the allies, the Soviet side had a question. How could this point affect compliance with this agreement? What additional rights did the U.S. request for itself?

Nitze responded that the U.S. was asking for no additional rights. He noted that it was traditional that agreements not affect patterns of cooperation, as in the case of INF.

Obukhov had one more question. Do you imply that the obligations assumed by the U.S. under this agreement could be strictly complied with by the U.S., but not by its allies?

Nitze answered that the U.S. would not test more warheads on missiles than would be permitted under this agreement, but that such an agreement would not affect existing patterns of cooperation. Nitze then continued with his points on the proposal.

Second, we should be clear on the purpose of and procedures for the on-site inspections incorporated into the verification regime for any such agreement. We believe that the purpose of the on-site inspections would be to help verify that deployed ICBMs and SLBMs carried no more than the permitted number of RVs.

Obukhov asked if his understanding was correct that the U.S. could positively view the Soviet proposal if it provided details on the inspection procedures for the RV limitations.

Nitze said that this question raised his next point. The procedures for such inspections should follow the approach that we have proposed in the START JDT. The details of these procedures would have to be agreed prior to completion of this agreement. Third, the prohibition on launching missiles with more reentry vehicles than the declared number should be applied to all launches, not just flight tests. National technical means of verification would be used for this prohibition.

Obukhov asked if this implied that the ban would apply to launches from test ranges and elsewhere.

Nitze said that this was exactly what he was asking, that it was not clear from Shevardnadze's letter. To facilitate the use of national technical means, any such agreement could only be reached if we had agreement on a requirement to broadcast telemetry during all launches and flights of these missiles and a ban on denial of full access to the data thus broadcast, including through the use of encryption. Nitze asked Obukhov if this seemed possible to him.

Obukhov asked if Nitze had provided any provision to pass over telemetry on all launches. This provision seemed to be missing in Nitze's text.

Nitze stated that he was just asking a question.

Obukhov concluded then that Nitze's question did not contain an obligation to transmit telemetry.

Nitze said no, that he was saying that an agreement could only be reached with agreement to broadcast telemetry and to guarantee access to this telemetry.

Rowny added that the answer to Obukhov's question was "yes", that the ban would apply to all flight tests and to all other launches.

Obukhov said that this question would require study. The Soviet side would propose to provide a clarification in the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

Nitze said that he had some additional points to make. Fourth, if there were to be an agreement, it could not be open-ended; despite statements indicating otherwise, an open-ended agreement could create the impression that the sides were no longer seeking a START treaty with the same degree of urgency. Instead, any such agreement should be of a specified duration, unless superseded earlier by a START treaty.

Obukhov asked what specific ideas the U.S. had about time limitations.

Nitze said that he was not suggesting a particular time, but maybe something like three years would be appropriate.

Obukhov said "good".

Nitze continued his presentation: fifth, the proposal deals only with existing ballistic missiles; to ensure that nothing happened during the duration of any such agreement to undermine the agreement's effects, we should discuss a provision for future ballistic missiles as well.

Obukhov acknowledged that he understood.

Nitze said sixth, the question of the form of the agreement also requires further study. We have to be sure that the form of the agreement is consistent with the applicable laws of the United States.

Obukhov asked Nitze to speak more specifically about this point.

Nitze said that any agreement worked out by the Executive Branch could not enter into force without positive action by the Congress.

Obukhov said that he understood that point, but wanted to know how this fact might affect the format of the agreement.

Nitze responded that one option was to record this agreement in the form of a treaty, which would require approval by two-thirds of the Senate. A second option would be an executive agreement that could be approved by a joint resolution of Congress.

Obukhov summarized that either the treaty option or an exchange of letters would require approval by both chambers of Congress. Was

Ambassador Nitze implying that a provision related to the form of the agreement be included in the text?

Nitze answered no, that he had just pointed out that the issue required consideration, not that it should be included in the text. Nitze continued with his presentation, saying finally, there is the question of the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel radars. As the Soviet side knows, the President has stated that the U.S. will enter into no new strategic agreements until the violations at Krasnoyarsk and Gomel are resolved.

Obukhov said that on this question, the Soviet side can provide an answer. General Burns and Ambassador Karpov are discussing this now.

Nitze concluded that these were the U.S. questions.

Obukhov said that he would provide the only reasonable answer now. The questions posed by the American side required study and well thought out answers that would be provided in Geneva.

Nitze responded “good” and asked if anyone else (on the U.S. side) had any comments.

Rowny, after a couple minutes of private conversation among members of the Soviet delegation, said that, without repeating all six points, the first and the last point should be given special attention, that is, that cooperation with the allies would be preserved in any agreement reached and that any agreement would need the approval of our Congress.

Obukhov asked the U.S. to clarify one point with respect to cooperation with the allies. He asked if it were possible, in line with the U.S. approach, that if the Trident II were shipped to Great Britain for deployment in submarines, that the British could have not 8 but 14 warheads on that missile.

Nitze responded yes it was possible, but that he did not think it was possible that Great Britain would conduct such testing in the next two to three years.

Obukhov suggested that the sides break to see about progress in the next room.

* * *

(The meeting adjourned while the sides separately discussed the progress made in the subgroup meetings on the draft joint statements.)

* * *

Obukhov asked the U.S. side what were the results of its discussion?

Nitze responded that the U.S. [has] a minor point to deal with first, in the last sentence of the first paragraph. In English the phrase “new progress” is confusing. It would be better to say “further progress.”

Obukhov said that he agreed to this change.

Hanmer said that he had a couple of points regarding the paper on ALCMs. Both sides spoke of package approval with respect to the issue of ALCMs and heavy bombers. While Hanmer did not have a substantive difference with respect to the particular points in the current draft joint paper describing the status of ALCMs, to ascribe the points of agreement on ALCMs as common ground without resolving the other issues is not appropriate at this time. His second point was that the U.S. would be prepared to ban conversion (of existing types of aircraft that are not heavy bombers into heavy bombers) if the Soviet side could accept the U.S. point on attribution. But the sides are not yet agreed on the “maximum equipped” issue. Given the overall dispute about how the number should be assigned or attributed, this issue could not be described as common ground. But this does not mean that the sides cannot record further progress.

Obukhov asked if the U.S. side proposed just to have the issue in mind without putting it on paper.

Hanmer said yes, it would be a non-paper. With regard to common ground on mobile missiles, since the sides have different meanings regarding deployment areas, again he would not have the ministers issue this as a point of common ground at this time.

Obukhov said well in these two non-papers, we have reflected certain positive outcomes in our discussions. We will take these papers to Geneva and take note of them in our work, treating them as non-papers. The language here reflects what has been done. Then we may consider our work completed. We must report back about the work that we have done. Obukhov proposed to make the report quite brief by saying that the outcome of the work was summarized in the text (of the joint statement) to be provided. In addition, both sides have expressed certain considerations on certain issues which will be examined in the negotiations in Geneva.

Nitze said that in the past, the sides have reported to ministers differently; the sides have reported separately. Nitze proposed that Obukhov give his report and that Nitze would give his.

Obukhov said that he was proposing a different approach. If they take a different approach than what he had suggested, then it will be the task of the sides to make complete reports on all of our previous work and to enumerate the quite numerous points of diversion. Obukhov said that his idea was to limit the reports to refer to these papers, noting that each side had made proposals that would be subjected to analysis to see if they increased the common ground. If this approach reflects the U.S. views, Obukhov said that he could agree to such a report made by Ambassador Nitze. If the U.S. goes into greater detail, then the Soviet side may respond with greater detail of their own.

Nitze said that he envisioned summarizing ALCMs, mobiles and the other subjects discussed and that he would conclude that there was no basic change in either side's position.

Obukhov said that Nitze favored a more detailed report.

Nitze said yes, slightly.

Obukhov concluded that they should make separate reports.

Nitze responded yes.

Nitze and Obukhov agreed to adjourn the meeting at 12:00.

End text.

Whitehead

326. Memorandum from Linton Brooks, Barry Kelly, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Geneva, November 16, 1988, 1547Z

SUBJECT

DCI START Monitoring Assessment

The DCI has sent you (*Tab B*)² his START monitoring judgement. We have extracted the "Key Judgments" section (*Tab A*) and recommend you read only that.

The report includes both a monitoring analysis and an identification of the monitoring implications of past decisions on verification in which the DCI's position did not prevail (although not so indicated). It also describes Soviet potential for *legally* augmenting their forces under START in a way that gives some of us some concern. Points we would especially call to your attention include:

—The most difficult monitoring problems involve mobile ICBMs, deployed RV counts and the number of ALCM bombers. The report

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT (1989 to end of RWR Administration 1/20/1989 8940001-89400149). Top Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Powell initialed in the upper-right hand margin of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is an undated paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, "Monitoring A START Treaty: An Interim Assessment," along with Webster's covering memorandum to Powell of November 23. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

states that the decision to allow non-nuclear ALCMs [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]

—[*less than 3 lines not declassified*]

—SS-24s present particular problems [*less than 9 lines not declassified*]

—[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (less than 21 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

The DCI caveats his paper to note that he does “not assess the tradeoffs that clearly must be weighed between monitoring confidence and such factors as cost, disadvantageous countering of US forces, the impact on US operational readiness, or the counterintelligence threat.” (One exception is his support for the recent SSI decision where those tradeoffs affected the Intelligence Community directly.)

We see no required action. The DCI’s cover note is a routine transmittal and does not call for a reply. The PFIAB has been given a copy of the paper and will be providing you its assessment shortly. We anticipate that they will comment on the differences between the JCS briefing on START and the monitoring report, differences Mrs. Armstrong has previously raised with you. (The JCS START briefing assumed no Soviet breakout and showed a significant U.S. advantage in warheads. While the monitoring report doesn’t list U.S. values it gives a much larger Soviet value by assuming a combination of legal and illegal measures. If the Soviets did this, the U.S. advantage the JCS project would be much smaller.)

Recommendation

That you read the Executive Summary at *Tab A* but that we take no formal action on this paper.³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated

[Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT (1989 to end of RWR Administration 1/20/89 8940001-8940019. Top Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Four pages not declassified.]

³ Powell initialed his approval.

327. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

12688

Washington, December 14, 1988

SUBJECT

NST: Plenary summary report

REF

A: NST-X-026² B: NST-X-027³ C: NST-X-028⁴ D: NST-X-029⁵

1. This is NST-X-025. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Date: November 15, 1988

Time: 1000–1230 hours

Place: Soviet Mission, Geneva

3. Begin summary: Ambassador Kampelman read a statement (Ref A) which reviewed the achievements of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and outlined possible future progress in the talks and U.S.-Soviet relations generally. He noted two particularly important obstacles to completion of the START and Defense and Space (D&S) treaties: the continued Soviet failure to correct its Krasnoyarsk radar violation of the ABM treaty, and continued Soviet linkage, holding a START agreement hostage to completion of an agreement in D&S. Separate statements by Ambassadors Hanmer and Cooper (Refs B & C) reviewed the status of the START and D&S talks, respectively. Ambassador Obukhov delivered the Soviet statement (Ref D) covering both D&S and START issues. He also reiterated Soviet proposals regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. End summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881013-0266. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE, and Moscow.

² In telegram 12636 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Kampelman's final Round X statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881009-0597)

³ In telegram 12641 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Cooper's final Round X statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881009-0661)

⁴ In telegram 12602 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Hanmer's joint plenary statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A)

⁵ In telegram 12763 from NST Geneva, November 17, the Delegation transmitted the text of the official translation of Obukhov's final Round X joint plenary statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881018-0058)

Kampelman's Statement

4. Kampelman recalled that the U.S. side had begun the NST in March of 1985 with hopes tempered by realism. He reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to continue to pursue strategic arms control agreements. Describing the purpose of the negotiations as ensuring greater security and stability for both sides, he outlined the guiding principles for the talks which had resulted in the INF treaty and which continued to guide the current negotiations. Kampelman noted that START had accomplished a major portion of its tasks, and could be completed consistent with the guiding principles. He reviewed the basic agreed points in START, emphasizing the measures for effective verification. In summarizing the D&S negotiations, Kampelman noted that disagreements outnumbered agreements. The sides had reached somewhat greater understanding of each other's positions, but the differences that remained were serious. He added that the U.S. side will continue to pursue mutually acceptable solutions that would enhance deterrence.

5. Regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar violation, Kampelman said the Soviet side had not dealt with U.S. concerns that the prohibited radar capability must be eliminated and that there must be no "lead-time advantage" after the corrective actions were completed. Failure to resolve the violation would prevent completion of START or D&S agreements. On the linkage issue, Kampelman observed that the Soviet side continued to hold START hostage to agreement in D&S, but a START agreement should be concluded on its own merits. He emphasized that the sides' interests in the arms control area transcended leadership changes. President-elect Bush's administration would be committed to continuing efforts to reach agreement. Kampelman noted that the U.S. side had proposed a specific tentative opening date for round XI, and hoped that it would be accepted. He then called upon Hanmer and Cooper to review developments in their respective negotiations.

Hanmer's statement

6. In a prepared statement, Hanmer reviewed the status of the START negotiations, noting that the sides had made substantial progress toward an agreement. Hanmer also cited unresolved issues:

—Heavy bombers and ALCMs: i.e., range and attribution, whether to exclude former heavy bombers from accountability in the 1600/6000 central limits, and the scope of OSI for verifying heavy bomber constraints;

—Mobile ICBMs: i.e., the need to resolve remaining outstanding issues before the U.S. could reconsider its proposed ban, including provisions for suspect site inspection;

—SLCMs: The unacceptability of Soviet proposals, the sides' inability to develop a mutually acceptable verification regime, and the preferred US-proposed declaratory approach;

—Sublimits: The requirement for an ICBM warhead sublimit, and the counterproductive Soviet proposal for a reciprocal SLBM warhead sublimit; and,

—Throw-weight limits: The US-proposed throw-weight protocol provides for an effective and workable approach for determining accountable throw-weight for existing and future types of ballistic missiles.

Hanmer enjoined the Soviet side to give serious consideration to U.S. proposals during the recess.

Cooper's Statement

7. Cooper noted that the Soviet side had hindered progress toward facilitation of a jointly managed transition to greater reliance on effective strategic defenses, and toward finding ways to enhance predictability and strategic stability within the context of the ABM treaty. Soviet positions were inconsistent with extensive Soviet programs in the strategic defense field; when these positions became more consistent with both U.S. and Soviet interest, a D&S Treaty could be readily completed. Cooper described the U.S. position as comprehensive, and noted that there had been progress on some issues, although the Soviet side had backed away from the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS), and limited progress on others, including by its refusal to complete a joint draft text of the separate agreement.

8. Cooper noted that agreement on a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty was contingent upon three conditions' being met:

—First, there must be recognition, in an agreement with the same legal status as the ABM Treaty, of each side's right to choose its course of action at the end of the nonwithdrawal period;

—Second, supreme interest and other standard rights must be included;

—Third, there must be mutual, unambiguous agreement on the the meaning of the WSJS language "research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

9. Cooper said the U.S. side had offered compromise proposals on all these issues, including a three-part initiative on activities during the nonwithdrawal period that included predictability measures, a proposal on space-based sensors, and, as a response to expressed Soviet concerns, an initiative on testing in space. The underlying reality was that both sides were pursuing advanced defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, Soviet D&S positions should reflect this. When the

sides met again, the U.S. side would be ready to cooperate in the search for mutually acceptable resolutions of the outstanding issues.

Obukhov's Statement

10. In his statement, Obukhov said he hoped that progress would continue in the NST, and reviewed familiar Soviet positions in the D&S area, stressing that fifty-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms could only take place under conditions of strict observance of the ABM treaty. After quoting the WSJS language, Obukhov claimed that the Soviet side had been willing to work on that basis, and had introduced a draft agreement to that end. Other issues of interest to the U.S. side could be discussed and subsequently resolved in the protocol to the agreement. The Soviet side had also proposed a joint statement to be issued at the signing of a D&S agreement to make possible realization of the right of the sides, following the expiration of the agreement, to decide their course of action in the event of failure to agree on an alternative. He charged that the U.S. side had sought to use the WSJS to assert the possibility of moving to a more defense-reliant regime. The Soviet side had pointed out the drawbacks of this approach.

11. Obukhov said confidence-building, predictability and verification measures in the protocol were intended to assure that obligations under the ABM treaty and the D&S agreement were being complied with. The U.S. side, however, had made proposals for data exchange, space test notification measures, and sensors that were in conflict with accords reached at the highest levels and would undermine the ABM treaty. Obukhov expressed Soviet willingness to continue to discuss the U.S. sensors proposal in light of the earlier Soviet proposal that the sides agree on a "list of devices" they would allow to be introduced into space; this would include agreement that the launch of such sensors into space would be verified using on-site inspection.

12. Turning to the question of the Krasnoyarsk Radar, Obukhov claimed that the Soviet side had presented concrete views on how to turn the radar into an international space research facility during a recent meeting of U.S. and Soviet experts. The Soviet side at that meeting had explained the mission the radar would perform and proposed additional measures to satisfy U.S. concerns and guarantee the impossibility of the radar being used for early warning or ABM purposes. The Soviet side would not rule out structural changes in the overall radar design called for by the scientific missions of the Space Research Center. So far, the U.S. side had not responded adequately, or made an effort to address Soviet concerns about violations of the ABM treaty related to the U.S. large phased-array radar in Greenland and construction of a similar radar in Britain.

13. Addressing START, Obukhov noted that progress had been achieved, evidenced by the fact that the sides now had a JDT of a START agreement. He pointed out progress made in agreeing on legal formulations for the Moscow elements of common ground on heavy bombers and ALCMS and on mobile ICBM launchers—progress that had given the sides a good head START for the future. Obukhov also said that serious work needed to be done to remove the remaining brackets.

14. Obukhov also listed basic unresolved problems, including the issue of space arms and their relationship to the implementation of fifty-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and the limitation of long-range SLCMs. A stable accord on strategic offensive arms could not be concluded without limitations on SLCMs. Obukhov added that the issue of heavy ICBMs still remained on hold, although it had already been resolved at the Reykjavik and Washington Summit meetings. The Soviet side believed that it was possible to settle the issue of heavy ICBMs on the basis of agreements reached at the highest levels and earlier soviet proposals. Some key elements on mobile ICBM launchers and ALCMs/heavy bombers remained unresolved. Work on provisions on mobile ICBM launchers had been held up, in the Soviet view, by the ambiguity in the U.S. position regarding such systems. The Moscow elements of common ground offered a solution. Concerning ALCM counting, the Soviet side proposed that heavy bombers be counted as carrying the maximum number for which they were equipped. Also, all heavy bombers, regardless of how they were armed, should count in the 1600 aggregate limit. It was also important to preserve the earlier understanding of 600 km as the division between longer- and shorter-range ALCMs, particularly regarding the agreed rule that all short-range air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs carried on a heavy bomber would count as one unit in the 6000 limit. The Soviet side had made a package proposal that would provide the necessary grounds for resolving this problem.

15. On verification, the U.S. approach, Obukhov said, was less than fully comprehensive, that is, not applicable to all types of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. side also would not accept verification of strategic offensive arms that were outside the confines of U.S. territory. The U.S. side had presented a truncated version of verification measures for heavy bombers and ALCMs. Long-range SLCMs would be left completely outside of verification under the U.S. approach. The system of continuous monitoring of production facilities under the U.S. approach was seriously curtailed and there were other shortcomings in the U.S. proposal.

16. Obukhov said that another important issue is that of “non-circumvention.” The Soviet side had proposed a non-circumvention

obligation in Article XIII of the JDT, but the U.S. side continued to shy away from its substantive discussion.

17. Obukhov noted that, in response to the U.S. throw-weight proposal, the Soviet side had made a proposal that was aimed at a mutually acceptable solution. He again raised the idea of a separate accord for limiting the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and said that such an accord could become part of the future treaty.

Closing Remarks

18. Kampelman thanked Obukhov for his hospitality and for his clear statement of the Soviet side's position in his formal statement, which Kampelman promised the U.S. side would review with care. Kampelman said he wanted to close with a warm personal greeting to Obukhov, to Ambassadors Kuznetsov and Masterkov, to Generals Detinov and Kurlanov, and to all of the Soviet delegation's associates and colleagues in Moscow. Kampelman said he had both enjoyed and been enriched by their relationship and many exchanges. He offered his best personal wishes to the Soviet side and to their families. Obukhov concluded by offering his best wishes to the U.S. delegation, wishing all its members and officials a happy return home, and hoping they might do much productive work during the working recess.

19. List of Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Amb Kampelman	Amb Obukhov
Amb Cooper	Amb Kuznetsov
Amb Hanmer	Amb Masterkov
Mr. Barry	Mr. Artem'yev
Mr. Carpenter	Gen Lt Detinov
Mr. Courtney	Mr. Kardashev
Mr. Daniel	Mr. Kelin
BGen Daniel	Mr. Kryuchkov
Mr. Davison	Mr. Kulebyakin
Col Dellermann	Gen Maj Kurlanov
Dr. Dyster	Gen Maj Lebedev
LTC Evans	Mr. Lyzenko
Mr. Foley	Col Novosadov
LCDR Frye	Mr. Mizin
Mr. Furniss	Mr. Pakhomov
Maj Godby	Capt Perlovskiy
Mr. Herlihy	Col Romanov
Mr. Ifft	Mr. Roslyakov
BGen Johnson	Mr. Sokov
Capt Johnson	Mr. Yakushina
Mr. Levinson	Mr. Yeroshkin

Mr. Maddalena
LTC Madding
Mr. McDowell
Col Miller
Dr. O'Fallon
Mr. Orban
LTC Siemon
Mr. Wattawa
Mr. Arensbürger (Int)

Col Yoznyuk
Mr. Zaytsev
Mr. Berezhkov (Int)

Hanmer/Courtney

328. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 21, 1988

SUBJECT

Transition

I am told that that portion of the White House staff which in the past has dealt with arms control has been told that none of them will have a job in the new Administration. As a result not much on that subject seems to be going on below the Scowcroft² level.

I am concerned that a situation will result in which it will be impossible to avoid giving Gorbachev a free run for some months to work on our allies in NATO and others with little organized U.S. response. In the meantime, divisions between the Washington agencies are likely to become more firmly locked into opposing views.

To mitigate this risk, I suggest you may wish to mention something along the following lines to Secretary-Designate Baker:³

1. It is important that the new Administration not delay too long in straightening out certain policy issues.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memos—Transition. Secret; Sensitive.

² On November 23, President-Elect Bush announced his intention to select Brent Scowcroft as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

³ On November 9, President-Elect Bush announced his intention to nominate James Baker as Secretary of State.

2. It is normal, and perhaps necessary, that the Secretary of State-Designate take a certain degree of responsibility and initiative in getting the process moving.

3. As to process, he might suggest creation of a new top administration arms control policy group, analogous to the current NSPG, chaired by the President and including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of ACDA and the Director of the CIA. This group could be supported, as in this administration, by a senior group chaired by Scowcroft and including other members competent to analyze problems, to draft proposals, and to task specific groups for specific purposes.

4. One question which the top policy group should be able promptly to decide is whether it is necessary to review that language in the START Joint Draft Text which has already been agreed by the two sides. If not, it would be possible to concentrate immediately on developing recommendations to the President with respect to the more important portions of the Joint Draft Text which are not agreed between the sides. Resolution of these issues would facilitate allocation of time and staff to the most urgent and useful work.

5. Another task would be to establish appropriate groups to develop recommendations on certain issues involving important strategic questions and budgetary allocations which should logically be decided by the new Administration before decisions regarding the U.S. negotiating positions are arrived at. These groups could include not only Administration personnel, but also those outside the Executive Branch, including Members of Congress.

The most important of the issues to be addressed is resolution of what type of mobile (or movable) U.S. ICBM system or systems should be proposed to the Congress for authorization and funding. Ideally, we should resolve this question before determining our position on ICBMs for the next round of START. At a minimum, if that proves impossible, we should ensure that our START position does not foreclose any of our modernization options; i.e., by banning mobiles or movables. It appears that the garrison road-mobile mode of deployment supported by the Joint Chiefs and the Air Force staff would require launch from under attack if only tactical warning were available, and that such a deployment mode would be unacceptable to much of the Congress.

A related issue is whether the B-2 bomber will be worth the up-to-two hundred billion dollars it is estimated it will cost. There is merit in a redundant triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers to complicate Soviet attacks, leave no doubt in Soviet minds as to our ability to retaliate, and hedge against problems in any one system. *[less than 5 lines not declassified]* A high level special group could promptly address the issue of bomber modernization and its cost.

Finally, another special group could usefully re-examine the scope, timing, cost and relative strategic importance from an overall policy standpoint of various aspects of the SDI program.

The Krasnoyarsk radar and SLCM verification issues are important, but it is less likely that they will need to be resolved until the final stages of the negotiations.

If you believe these ideas have merit, you may wish to pass them on to the Secretary-Designate.

329. Notes Prepared by Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

Arms Control Views

overall: cut to 6,000 counted warheads in our interest = compare with unconstrained.

1 Land-based leg of triad

a. must be survivable to have a future

b. means move asap to less MIRV and to mobility even within constrained spaces

2. Nuclear weapons on ships

a. except for SLBM's

b. better off w/o any since

—Sov can hit us more easily than we them with cruise missiles

—threat to sub force

—this better conserves ability to maintain conventional cruise missile

3. Verification is out of hand

a. Extensive on-site is

—so expensive that it will be hard to sustain

—very intrusive into our own activities

b. Nevertheless, is a real opening

4. Aversion to nuclear weapons (and plants) is growing = should be very active re alternative = good to get TTBT & NPET done—Paris is difficult

5 Chem + Biol wont be put back in the bottle but

6. Conditions Σ^2 key to conventional reductions + vice versa.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Files, Memos Meetings/Secty.—Designate Baker. No classification marking.

330. Memorandum from Barry Kelly and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 17, 1989

SUBJECT

PFIAB Letter Regarding START Treaty

At Tab I is a letter from Anne Armstrong in response to your request for the PFIAB's comments on the START Monitoring Study recently completed by the Intelligence Community (Tab II).² In addition, the letter provides the PFIAB's comments on the JCS briefing to the President³ regarding the strategic impact of the START Treaty and the differences between the briefing and the Intelligence Community Study.

Rather than addressing the monitoring study itself, the letter focuses on the differences between the study and the assumptions used in the JCS briefing as a means of highlighting the PFIAB's control concerns with the potential strategic impact of the treaty. The PFIAB comments are highly critical and go as far as to question whether the proposed treaty supports the U.S. objectives for START.

This is a substantive and political arms control issue. At this point, there is little, if any benefit for the current Administration to try and address the PFIAB issues. The rationale for our current START position is very well documented. We suggest that you should share this with General Scowcroft in anticipation of the new Administration's initial review of arms control.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share PFIAB letter with General Scowcroft.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT (1989 to end of RWR Administration 1/20/1989 8940001-89400149). Top Secret [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Sent for action. Prepared by Kimberling. An unknown hand wrote at the bottom of a routing slip of January 17, "Passed from Gen. Powell. Gates has seen. Recommends you read." On February 13, Scowcroft wrote on same routing slip, "An excellent paper. Important input to the strategic review." (Ibid.)

² See Document 326.

³ See Document 319.

⁴ Powell indicated his approval.

Attachment**Memorandum for the Chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Board (Armstrong) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)⁵**

Washington, January 11, 1989

SUBJECT

START Monitoring and Arms Control Choices

PFIAB recently received a full copy of the study you requested from DCI Webster on monitoring a START agreement, which was undertaken by the NIO for Strategic Programs and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. In conjunction with the briefing by General Herres which you generously helped to arrange, the Board has sharpened its understanding of the START Treaty and the strategic issues surrounding it. This memo responds to your request for our comments on the study.

During its September meeting the Board was surprised by the large discrepancies which appeared between the briefings we received from General Herres and the one received from the NIO for Strategic Programs, Larry Gershwin. Larry's briefing essentially previewed for us his later report. At that time, of course, General Herres could not take full advantage of the NIO's comprehensive study. We understand that the JCS has now received a briefing based upon it.

In simple terms, the Board became concerned when the JCS assumed under START that the aggregate number of Soviet warheads in the late-1990s would be some 7000, *[less than 2 lines not declassified]* A good portion of the discrepancy lies in the fact that the JCS projected the "legal" Soviet forces under the Treaty's terms, while the NIO described his assessment of actual Soviet wartime potential.

Specifically:

- The JCS assumed, in its US/Soviet comparison, that the Soviets would not, during crisis or wartime, upload at least some of their SS-18 heavy missiles to their full capacity of 14 warheads, nor upload the SS-N-23 and SS-N-20 follow-on. The NIO did.
 - *[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]*
- We were told that the JCS discount the likelihood of Moscow deploying its nondeployed mobile-missiles in times of crisis; the NIO takes special note of the Soviet capacity to do so, especially the rail-mobile SS-24. These differences in how nondeployed mobile-missiles

⁵ Top Secret. All asterisks are in the original.

are assessed mark one of the greatest discrepancies between the two briefings.⁶

- The JCS comparison of US/Soviet bomber warheads presumes that under a final treaty the B1 will not be counted as an ALCM carrier, a “leap” others find unrealistic.

The Board expressed its concerns about Soviet breakout potential under the treaty in its February 5, 1988 letter to the President.⁷ But the Board’s concern was heightened significantly [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that with *no peacetime cheating* the Soviets could, “within weeks or months,” break out of the treaty and more than *double* the 6000 weapons the treaty nominally permits. The Board does not discount the operational difficulties for the Soviets to surge during crisis by uploading ballistic missiles to their full capacity and matching nondeployed mobile missiles with launchers. It is wartime potential, however, not the peacetime, nominal forces by which the treaty should be judged, and will certainly be judged during a ratification debate.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

The principal purpose of the treaty, as we understand it, is strategic stability, especially crisis stability. Concern that growth in Soviet ballistic warheads relative to U.S. targets is pushing the strategic balance into a less stable condition has motivated the President’s arms control efforts from the beginning. As General Herres emphasized, the heart of the treaty is the ballistic missile warhead limit.

[1 paragraph (less than 12 lines) not declassified]

One might argue that the pronounced target base asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union eliminate Soviet incentives to prepare for crisis breakout because, even under treaty limits, they have U.S. targets sufficiently covered. But to make such a claim is to undercut the principal rationale for the treaty: limiting ballistic missile warheads. The argument says, on the one hand, that the Soviet’s *legal* modernization leads to such destabilizing warhead-to-target ratios that Soviet ballistic missile warheads must be constrained by a START treaty; but on the other hand, equally advantageous warhead-to-target ratios which the Soviets can gain by *cheating* may be dismissed. It cannot be both ways.

Another commonly stated purpose of the treaty is to enhance predictability in U.S. and Soviet force structures. The START treaty’s central limits on warheads, launchers, ICBMs, and heavy ICBMs, it is argued, will channel U.S. and Soviet force improvements into more

⁶ An unknown hand placed a short horizontal line in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.

⁷ See Document 265.

predictable patterns. It will also ease U.S. decisions about how to [6 lines not declassified]

[4 paragraphs (less than 35 lines) not declassified]

PFIAB raised a number of other monitoring issues in its April letter to you,⁸ some of which we have not addressed in depth here because of the criticality of the Soviet breakout issue. Many of these issues were examined in [less than 1 line not declassified] gives more detail to them. We think the study provides a more realistic assessment of the utility and limits of different cooperative measures. The study provides yet another reminder of the daunting problems of monitoring mobile missiles.

PFIAB recognizes that the United States faces uncertainties with or without a treaty. But as we wrote to you in April, "Before entering the treaty . . . PFIAB believes we need a confident understanding of the type and level of cheating that would give the Soviets decisive strategic advantages. The treaty's verification regime must provide us high confidence that we can detect such cheating by US monitoring means. The evidence derived from such monitoring must be capable of eliciting from us an appropriate and timely response to ensure Soviet compliance with the treaty or to safeguard our interests threatened by Soviet cheating. Finally, we believe we need a net assessment of the strategic impact of the treaty in peacetime, crisis, and war that takes into account military systems limited by the treaty and military systems not limited by it."

We continue to believe this standard is appropriate. [less than 1 line not declassified] is a very good beginning of the START Study Program we suggested in April. In our judgment it raises concerns that give compelling reasons for completing the review.

⁸ See attachment, Document 289.

Appendix

A. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 3, 1982, 9:45 a.m.

Declassified
A/GIS/IPS
Department of State
EO 13526
Date:

5/3/82
945
START
at Hq.

Weinberger/Carlucci/Side
Rostow/S. / Rosen
Haymond/Gorman
Kutepatrik

[State absent when President arrives]

Pres: tells stories ... #120 tickets - 12,000 pennies

Judge Clark: units of account & intent to be discussed today - hold on verification - 90% agreement ... do we limit TW directly or indirectly - Bud McF will review charts

Bud McFarlane: criteria = ① carry out strategy ② deep cuts ③ equality ④ easily understanding ⑤ satisfy allies, ⑥ allow for stability — all agree
① substantial difference from SALT II
② 5000 warheads ③ focus on ICBM ④ treat bombers differently ... ultimately 250 on each side ⑤ limit TW, but how? — STATE & JCS ... 2000 W/H → substantial cut in TW (2-3M kg)
— easily understandable, deep reductions — cons w/ W/H = breakout (even w/ only modest TW advantage) ...
pennies ... accuracy or yield advantage — cons w/ TW = understandability ... verifiability ... Soviets alone called to reduce to 2M (w/d increase) ... Soviets may also wish to limit bomber P/L

Adm Suran: cannot give certainty w/o on-site inspection, but can give high confidence — (review factors that allow high confidence) — moderate to high w/ mobile ICBMs, high w/ fixed, for W/Hs ... (review other measures)

high = <10%
moderate = 25-50% } confidence

¹ Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, NSC00049 05/03/1982 [START]. Top Secret. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 13.

(2)

Judge Clark: Roundtable discussion

000/2500

850/250

Haig: (praise Rud's summary) ... must focus on both military and political aspects ... all agree on 5000 W/Hs (= $\frac{1}{3}$ reduction from current levels) — ~~no~~ ^{no} more than half could be 1000 W/Hs — require Soviets to do 60% reduction in their best systems) — 3 major problems w/ Tw: ① Tw above current levels ... 1.3 to 2 ... paper equivalence but real disparity ② 65% cut for Soviets in Tw ... not credible ③ hard to verify Tw ... 14 leg uncertainty equivalent to 180 SS-18s — ceiling of 850 missiles is most significant guard against breakout — go beyond satellites for verification, but wait on decision until after fix position

Weinberger: vital disagreement (passes out chart) — if we just limit warheads, we'd play into hands of Kennedy & Hadfield — not the relevant measure, since yield is the real measure, and one gets at yield through Tw — it can be easily understood — not relevant that Soviets wouldn't like proposal ... (analogy to) what Soviets are doing at MF now — verification uncertainties affect every proposal — *speech should be specific

(2)

Hayward: Should I discuss certification and position?
 (...do both...) — T/W important, but JCS think
 we should get at it indirectly... combination of
 (2500 ICBM) w/4s & 850 missiles gets our big cat
 — if you take T/W as principal indicator, you'll
 end up less ... we'll end up w/ imbalance in T/W,
 no matter what our position is

Postow: important difference in principle remains — recommend
 in speeches you talk about # of warheads and
 their destructive capacity, % going into detail
 on how we measure that — we essentially agree
 w/SSD position ... (refer to Chart) (slight confusion as
 people shuffle paper) ... most fundamental objection
 to State/JCS position is that it would be
 profoundly destabilizing (fewer aims would
 encourage larger warheads) ... press in direction
 of smaller warheads, which would decrease
 attractiveness of 1st strike — Committee on the Present
 Danger's experience was that people had strong
 views on reaching agreement, but did not
 understand details ... that's not the function
 of the American people — cites (—?) that
 Soviets prepared to negotiate on T/W — my
 former memo was that unless we restore ... —
 START & INF are not the centerpiece of our
 foreign policy — Soviets will have no motivation
 to enter into agreement, unless we convince it

④

course carries substantial risk — we haven't solved the MX problem, established a strong nil presence SIDA, etc. — we're all recommending the same goal of equal deterrence

(Jean Kirkpatrick leaves)

Gen Rosny: are the goals understandable & can we negotiate? my preference is that we set goals and then phase — are goals plausible? ... set goals, then do the "possible" first — will they come down? ... we're giving up SIBMs later on ... they fear D-5 ... we give up something in long run, ask them to give up something in the short run

Judge Clark: evidence is in for your later decision — move to START insert for May 9th

Weinberger: 3 quick points — U.S. cut vs. add to get to parity — Soviets did negotiate in INF where only they cut

Judge Clark: insert ... comments?

⑤

Roots: add consultation w/ Cong'l leaders (...to allies)

Deinberger: add onsite verification

Haig: disagree ... not before we agree on what to verify

Roots: save verification for later speech

Howard: Chiefs don't have issue that ^{onsite} ^{more worried select} ^{choice where only onsite} ^{would work} should be in or out of speech ...

Baker: are we checking on prior statements by Pres Reagan re: verification, etc.

Sumner: sooner or later you'll have to decide what degree of confidence you want

Haig: you're faced w/ sharply divergent views -
campaign statement for long-term goal
excellent (don't pose threat to one another) -
add to that now that we'll proceed over
time to that goal - taking 2500 warheads
away will drive them to smaller missiles
= put equal T/W forth at a later
stage - capture essence of both positions
but in a more realistic way - Soviets
won't negotiate T/W

(6)

Weinberger: on phased approach, comment that comes to mind is that in long run all will be dead - Soviets will negotiate
Tw

Judge Clark: (cites Geld article of yesterday ... rendition of 16 Apr mtg. et al.)
compulsion to give argument to press a mystery to me

Postow: another mtg.?

Clark: yes, on interim measures, after Pres. decides

Pres: if W/Hs, do you not automatically achieve ↓ Tw? (Haig: almost same)
Weinberger: no — Postow: no ... Haig: requires they do all, we do nothing — Wein: INF... never get them to table)

B. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 21, 1982, 9:43 a.m.

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A/GIS/IPS
Department of State
EO 13526
Date:

[illegible]

Pres. What's good, if anything, in SALT II?

Find: Counting Rules

Has preclude threshold then could do — we're not abiding by SAIT II
 force — political element

Heise: Strategic planning not constrained

Weinberger: Disrupt /ALOM - I don't think the Soviets could
do more than they've done now - if we say we'll
abide by SALT II, I don't think we'll get on with
START

Heise: I was assuming that what the Pres. said earlier
— we'll not be constrained in planning

Bottom: for the moment, it's in our interest to abide —
no advantage to change policy — SFRC

Reinberger: I'm not advocating public announcement - ^{we need to be} close inter-

Heise: But when we advance basins moved for MX, we must be prepared!

thing: problem & moment is a political problem - getting on w/ START will resolve issue - if we raise issue now, it will complicate MX

Deinberg: ensure our budget planning

Grinnell: Answer question ODELTA III testing - have to take out THREE
- 1/27 (2) ODELTA 2 and 102114 and 102115 on a 1.4.1.1

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 21.

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②

② BACKLOG production less than it could be ③ ES-12 MIRVs
④ future verification — exemption of telemetry
Kagan: are they going ahead w/ new sub programs
S. Dean:

Kane: I think we're agreed OK to a in public formulation

② resist any attempt to revise SSCI as a
matter of policy, no constraints... when

Poston: don't violate until deploy...

McFarlane: we have words that capture this — 15-20 years

Rowley: whether we say, distance ourselves from SSCI
— help negotiate

COE

McFarlane: 2nd issue

Weinberger: would hope paper not intended for
dissemination — "some believe..."

Murphy: does this paper assume we're satisfied w/
telemetry we're getting now

23

McFarlane: is not intended to — next issue mobiles
— propose we reserve judgment in our
position, although Rowley wishes to build
in from start

Rowley: everyone's agreed we want to keep open options
in the — issue is true mobile — if we don't
want time to decide is now

25

McFarlane: you have paper to consider — now on
— do we want to ban because first,
etc. — number of ~~issues~~ — to 10, w/
now approval. for report within 1 or 2 weeks

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Deininger: I thought original paper did include
banning of trans

Pres: MXs?

Weinberger: less than heavy

Pres: Trans - trading clips?

Stle: brother worse about trans

Pres: heavier than MX?

(Cous): 18°

Pres: 18 heavier than 10°

(Cous): yes

Postow: common

Pres: if we go for heavier lot, don't we have
negotiating problems

Stle: it's like SS-20 / zero-option

Hayward: get at 18s indirectly

15

McFarlane: final issue - phasing - single or
two agreements

Weinberger: Phase II as important as Phase I

I worried procedurally - would agree
for single treaty; one process, because
of strong importance we attach to it as
only way to achieve equality at lower levels
- if treaty w/ Phase II, don't get then back

Haig: thought this was where you decided
last time, Mr. Pres - if we can get
objectives in I, ~~we~~ we can reach
I read decision where that was
& bricked on Hill rather bricked that now -

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— easy matter — have, for instance, 3 years
review tied to good faith in Phase I
must keep credit.

Weinberger: some ~~more~~ interest to understand

Haig: must be clear or clear

Weinberger: I'm worried — Sign ALONG ...

Haig: if achieve everything in Phase I, then
I don't sign, and get tangled out of
court.

Hayward: if you get Phase I, substantial
cut off

Rosen: announcement of whether or not we
seek agreement in Phase I should
be kept open, from negotiating
point of view (discuss Soviet tactics)

Fris: when we talked about it, I didn't
think we meant 2 separate treaties
— when we achieve 1st, then see what's
needed in phase I, where we stand
(asks question) — am I being long Scout

Haig: you said it better than anybody

McFarlane: will you sign

Reese: can't you reserve question until then

Haig: it's already been asked: Congress,
allies — don't want to reverse
decision already made, via the executive

Weinberger: Don't touch it because we've
tried to clarify it already

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(5)

Rostow: explain as in INF, discuss on how
Sovets plan it - don't create impression
we're out to get one treaty quickly

Haig: great danger that it looks
like you walking on what you
said: Phase I underlined

Bureaucracy's confused, will engage
Pres: couldn't part of negotiations be this

Haig: yes - ~~call~~ call it interim, or whatever

Meese: Phase I - reserve decision

McFarlane: precedent - conclude,

Bush: do we then go to Senate, ask ready I?

Dele: do like test bans

DeMabuzer: procedural matter - don't tie hands
Oby saying that once Phase I done,
go to Senate

Pres: until completed on Phase I, don't know
What TV problem is in Phase II

Haig: want to be careful of what has
been bureaucratic hassle - don't
undercut Phase I unit of measure

Pres: continuing negotiations

Rostow: don't fix on 2 agreements

Meese: think we're agreed

McFarlane: yes

Baker: on fact, prepare written guidance

Pre consensus items
McFarlane

63

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C. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, August 9, 1982, 3:10 p.m.

NSC
START
19/82

1510

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Date:

Bud McF - introductory remarks IVP joins ... Baker, Deaver, Danner still out -
 Poindexter not present ... missiles above 850, nondeployed - 4 groups of
 constraints - (1) development of capabilities, (2) missiles & equipment
 at sites, (3) activities to develop reconstitution - recommend adoption, any
 agency comment?
 (nobody comments)

group B, procedural constraints on non-deployed missiles
 of disassembling/destroying missiles that are taken out
 of inventory ... comment on caveat for SS-9/Titan
 for space launch I Pres comments: But warheads could
 be destroyed I - some spares, but stored at designated
 sites - propose adopting measures "1 & 3" of B if
 no objection

(nobody comments)

As for "2", there's still a question on ability to verify (i.e.,
 for old missiles intended to serve as space launch
 vehicles) ... agency remarks

- Shultz - difference of opinion within State - question for Bud:
 verify if tested ... test to sustain confidence in system
- Bud - time you must test to sustain confidence ... Gen Versey?
- Gen Versey - based on tests, Soviets can have graph of
 degradation over time
- Pres - what about int'l group responsible for dismantling
 or destroying - how do you destroy? shoot it off?
- Bud McF - Soviets have dismantled SS-7s, #8s
- Shultz - can we verify if destruction's where we can see it
- McMahen - we've not observe dismantling of a large
 number of missiles

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 32.

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- Shultz - the reason I raise the issue is that verification is at the heart of agency disagreement ... and of whether or not you want an agreement
- McFarlane - if you ^{could} even find one instance of cheating, the knowledge that this may happen has some deterrent value
- Weinberger - analogy to laws against bank robbery - we've always offered on-site verification - we should go in with our set of conditions, even if we can't verify on-site or don't get in negotiations
- Shultz - inclined to go along w/ this ... but what disturbs me is that if we get an agreement & find they've cheated after several yrs, we're left w/ a serious imbalance
- Weinberger - high moral ground, and we should keep it
- Shultz - approach on grounds we can't trust them ... assume that if we can't verify, they'll cheat - evaluate the importance to ourselves on this grounds that it will be done ... how essential is it to our purpose?
- President - I reworded ... discussion ensues on what the generic issue involves ... covert I
- McMahon - web of verification / network of constraints - Soviets will worry about getting caught
- Shultz - but what will they have done over the 5 years
- Fres - alternative is we'd have to do it also
- Gen Vessers - we don't want to do certain things ... can't go to Congress because

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③

- Weinberger - we should go in w/ what we want to get ^{- like laws -} importance to us a valid issue, but not here
- Pres - [discusses zero option]
- Grey - we should have opportunity to raise in SCC ... basis for challenge
- McF - agreed to adopt #2?
[no comments]
- McF - find one ... designated locations for storage
.. verification against the issue - comments
- Pres - our attitude has to be that of preacher in church who let the only one-armed man pass the basket
- McF - last group of constraints ... question again is verification
- Shultz - same arguments apply - I'm not convinced it's a good thing to go with ... logic troublesome
- Weinberger - reconstitution favors Soviets now ... again, argues for on-site inspection ... hollow & shallow w/ it
- Shultz - makes it hollow & shallow ... means if we don't get this, we don't have much
- Pres - is it easier to verify if we close down production facilities?
- McMahon - put inspectors at chokepoints
- Shultz - why don't we aspire to have a reconstitution capability?
expensive ...

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(4)

- Pres - 30% & 50% worry me ... how do we explain to nuclear protestors?
- Gen Vessy - (explains function of space launchers)
- Pres - I see ... % warheads
- Weinberger - anything we can do to get onsite inspection
- McF - even w/ spares, below SALT II
- Gray - (makes point of SCC again)
- Meese - isn't key issue whether to have onsite verification (discussion, briefly)
- Nelman - our problem over the years has been calling violations - treaties may have provisions (e.g., re: yellow rain) but we've been poor in calling
- Pres - challenge immediately, and if we find even one, we're back in an arms race and we'll outbuild you
- McF - (summarize ... include in instruction ... ~~the~~ Middle East

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty.]

D. Notes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 22, 1985

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Date:

START 114 ORIGINAL

USPO
0.1 + 2.1
1

- Pres sent a proposal by Sovs 3 weeks ago
 - 2 purposes ① sound general
 - ② self surviving nations
- lumped in many systems not strategic
- Paper this weekend gave 5-6 approaches
 - 3 for discussion today
- 2 issues
 - ① substance - what should say?
 - ② if yes, when how present - when, how, where?
 - in VN
 - in See met with Shew
 - round or year 19
- Turned to chart
 - col 2 - Current US position
- Example A
 - 1800 figure is figure Sov Union posed previously
 - 4500 - Sovs have 8900 R's now - at 50%
 - 3000 - 50% of 6K figure suggested in offer
 - 15000 - ALCE
 - 6000 - 4500 + 1500 ALCE
- Example B
 - do 50% across board
 - 1250 is 50% of what Sovs
 - 280 is 50% of SALT Acet bombs

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, NSPG 10/22-NST. Secret. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 114.

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2

- 4500 is 50% now
- 3000 either 50% of 6K or 60% of 6K
- 1500 - needed to get 6K if 4500
- Tuffened up by a - 50% cut in TWT
 - 50% cut in size of new RVs
- BAN ALL Ballistic, land based missiles
(SS-24 and SS-25, ^{NOT MISS} ~~SS-25~~?)
- This number - can we get views?

Sec State

- need to make counter and things in A or B mod are sensible
- Launchers from Sawdust - fewer warheads on launchers
1800 figure better

[3 lines not declassified]

- MRVed mobiles ban - not just mobile missiles
 - MRVed not all mobiles if choice
- Make a proposal - either OK
- RCM - There are defense and space by 50%,
that def,

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3

- EXAMPLE A - would say reductions are linked to defense - reductions tied to adhere to ABM Treaty - work talks on research; test
- EXAMPLE B - no commit to ABM
 - ϕ - ϕ : not a proposal but a play if no ballistic missiles, no need for SDI - not a proposal

SecSTATE - set it up so reductions tied to SDI

- an insurance policy, if Congress cuts SDI undercuts support for reductions
- clarifying what research is be permitted from negotiator asked what mean by that - must explain
- research means also that manner of testing needed to answer four questions
- we are already exploring coop trans

Pres

- we start from position that they have more than we - they are more modern
- would we stop MX

Cap - we would be banned from MX JS Midget
ATB under their proposals

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4

- most import decision of four term
- got paper on Sunday, revisions today
- no decision today, no change at UNGA, if move, do it just prior to Geneva
- why not just repackaging current position
- both A+B are insufficient - too many hard targets
- 1995 date assumption that Congress will permit us to mod.
 - Sov can tell what they do
 - We can't guarantee
- spend more time on developing proposal both A+B are insufficient

REM - what is sufficient

Cap

- total weapons / targets
- Chiefs can show
- Actions in D+S invite all arguments said would not make
 - clarification will not help as
- I felt that phase D-S - we will abandon SDI - never suggest abandon SDI
- all research is permitted
- any oral reaffirmation bad
- stay out of D+S in countries
- if 50% act in middle in TWI - still Sov ahead

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- INF - SS-20s has 3 warheads
 - if 1 off, ~~that~~ hit US
 - any fences etc can still move
Asia - Europe
- not can't do something, but not now
2-3 days before think to respond
- repackaging what we have on table now

SecState - a lot more uncertainty on our
Congress, then what they can deploy
-- get theirs down now

Pres - need to replace dele missiles

[1 line not declassified]

Sep -

[less than 1 line not declassified]

Pres - in an agreement, Congress will have
to commit to cold hard facts of
numbers

- if we are serious about arms, inability to
compromise etc - need to sound like
their proposals to appear to meet
- I don't think there's any way to restrict
SSI - keeping your gas mask
- SSI only meet them on is being
willing to share with world - more
willing to get rid of off

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- if able to modernize, A or B offer potential to legit arms reduction
- no way we can match great expense of Sov - can't hit all

Crowe - fundamental asym is in target base

- they have fewer targets to hit
- look at what it does via our street
- easier for them to have suffering
- worked on (B) over night - 1995 - all modernization - buy all MRLs only -
- simplifies targeting and verif

Pies - agree to ban all mobiles

Sap - may make targeting may increase verification - may never know

Pies - need heavy verification

- what does 1580 mean

Powry - mistake

RCM - Sovs want 1800
take 280 from 1800 1520
1250 is 38% of today

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- a range

Crowe - on mobile missiles
we have not advantage if no
mobile missiles

- on (B) reasonable deter
about 1600 weapons short
500 RV shot Economic short-out of missiles
- 16% off on time against
- NO RESERVE
- if 175K a problem for II-5
could make jump to hunt

Ken - avoid

Cap - that's why we need more time
to study

Crowe - modest trying can be done
but hurts presentation

Ken - try to use 4 pts of Sovs
- 50%, 3600 (60%), -6000 K, ben
on modernization
- turn these mobile MRV and RV weight

- agree with mod of #'s as Shultz
- agree with US trying
- in public diplomacy - if margin small
put up #'s

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- any tie to SSI before reductions bad
- reductions good before SSI came along
- we should clarify research, our job, no negotiate
- can see how wait till before Geneva but shows seriousness to have Shew - neg - table
 - L ideas to Shew
 - concept at Geneva
 - details in the prior to summit

TIMING

- Shultz - if do something, should say to at UN - that told to put something forward
- good idea to give Shew an idea of plan
 - table this in detail before end of round - don't hold back
 - if leaks out - fine

- Cap - 2 problems
- 1) if you refer to in UN, lose all else but of press on proposal
 - 2) not quite worked out - tough for Nov 1

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- Better time after Nov 1 - a few days before Summit
- consider arguments too soon
- elements could be put together
 - not today
 - not really before 1 Nov
 - 2/3 weeks to chew it up

Pres - what is advantage of talking in advance
advantage is what say

Shultz - If we want agreed to, also to have
it set out in detail by negotiators
- you can get broad

Pres - Another idea, Sols have presented
- in UNCA - the Soviets have Sols
provided #1's

Ken - given #1's
Shultz - all in domain

Pres - What if simply say, that after
numerous proposals they have
made specific, we will shortly
present to negotiators
some of the aspects acceptable

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Meese - from their proposals, seeds of negotiation

- details handled by negotiators not you
- ask the negotiators to stay an extra week - shows move

Cap - if ready, Pres statement OK

- not acceptable, basis for negotiation
- still need to study

Pres - don't put in idea of not acceptable

- got to remember that Gorb. must take back something to show he's "Big shot McCain"
- if we simply indicate an area here, General, he will have to come to us in meeting but he can see elements and pocket
- let's not go in and again drive him to reject
- give him something he can claim win
- give him (not concede) must be in US interest - but must play game
- need to compromise

Meese - need to talk up verification issue

you need raise
no problem for us
a plus for us

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Cap - yes

Ken - don't think you should worry about Sovs
like this - close to 1982 - not need to study
- not wise to overpromise at UN
make not all arms control
- largely an SSI summit - Soviet question
overseas

Pes - arms control a sideline issue if remove hostility
- they have gone public, if can use their
numbers - give an est to Govt
- if we fall into trap of arms control
summit - weeklies solves
- PFIAB make report - we are planning for
any contingency that could happen - Soviet
Union is planning a war - a surrender of
the ultimatum
- SSI changes rules, need to recalculate
whole war scenario

CIA - reductions not militarily significant
- to say more - Soviets not very far apart
∴ only reason not do it is US insistence
on SSI
- the latter the proposal make the better
- same is an SSI - more we talk
about ABB

Pas - ans must be if we get it, we then, must say
we will share it with world

Casey - need to think when on table
= Sors want to use ABM to undercut
SDI

Ken - agree, need counter-counter focused
on offense-offense

Cep - also in many things - TWI - 50% still
leaves them up on us
- goal is parity
- pt. is it is a defensive weapon, share
it with world
↳ cut ground out of

RCM - 2/3 lines by UN

E. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

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Sunday
0200 PN = ③, JT, Max, Poole, Giffing, Lumbert.
PN - They look at this or generate papers for press
③ - produce the paper & then we see what to do w/ it.
PN - It divided into the parts.
Akers wanted to change order. I agreed.
Good disc on START on #5. Akers didn't really
understand sub-limits.
③ - 50% w/ the proportion w/ 8's proposal
L - he talked grants & I know w/ 6/100 & RV's
at 6000
PN - O.C. we got it all done. Then it stopped
when we cancelled & it came to
putting it on paper.
JT - Romy didn't agree w/ anything.
JT - R. didn't agree.
PN - Then Adelman didn't agree too
& Karpov at same time was w/ 6/100
Akersongar
- Then long delay & when Akers went back it
I turn off & we resumed. Akers said how
does this differ from yr Sept 18 prop?
It wasn't different at all

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 160.

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at that pt, alers sd it differed from G proposal today
They wd reduce by 50% of every cat - but we
wdn't. They wanted 50% of our SDRs.
G sd it was equal ceilings in all cats. And
we cdnt go to unequal in cats where they had
more - (bombers)

① - Karpov can't neg. of sd.

PN - Alers is 1st class person to nego w. Heads
of Gen'l Staffs.

L - In 5 areas we went thru.

- down shell waste on Jap

②. Def's place: no closure. After 10 yrs
we cd deploy? No they sd - then we
nego

next - That's also a Karpov interjection ~~about~~
straight.

PN - here are papers we submitted

① - But These don't capture G. proposal! These
are our original positions!

PN - I was opposed by our own deleg.

②. P didn't tell our deleg just to change our
start position - I he sd he'd like this
50% idea & what do we do w it?

- Jimie says they didn't agree, so you
didn't get anywhere straight.

RP - we go back at 3 a.m.

③ - P doesn't want to stand on just what we
proposed before - he wants to know what 50% means.

RP - ~~Problem~~ Problem is that w 50% cats across board
Sovs entitled to more than we are, when
we start to move on their side.

④ - They have put something new on table
we shld just be bound by our old
position

RP - Alers was agreeable. Then they convinced
o Karpov all over Alers for how he
departed from G. proposal. (50% w/out
apps & equal outcome)

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- ① - So mil. reasonable & For Min. blocked him.
 - This paper is our current position.
- PN + Areas of disagreement are:
 - under what conditions, cd adv. defenses be deployed
 - what restrictions during that period.
- ② - but of SD let us have 10 yrs in which we both agree not to withdraw from ABM.
 ③ What reduces b/m to 50%
 Nobody said over what period of time (5 yrs mentioned orally)
- DR SA if does get decision pt. located in a US election yr. so 4 or 6.
- RP - JES thinks 5 yrs too short. need it for mostly for roundtable price.
- ④ - So 10 yrs. was g. idea. He requested thereby. He SA we want to bring about zero. By 2000. Less than 15 yrs. So ~~that~~ P sees 2 yrs of negos. -- then y start eliminating b/m's. That's where closure exists.
- L - That's where PN was going.
- ⑤ - Why make a pt that we will deploy? Stress the 10 yrs
- RP - At a diff later SDI disintegrates or not. If we say at end we have nt to deploy, Congr cant oppose.
- ⑥ - g. said ~~we~~ we looking for 10 yrs during which we agree not to withdraw from ABM.
 - testing & risk red in hand? (yes)
- L - This looks like our old proposal because we ended by talking about a public paper.
 - Also was asked twice, wd we have nt to deploy at end pt & he SA yes.
- RP - we cd characterize differences & agree to discuss them later -- & meet what P wants. Forces Ssgs to decide if they want to do that far. Wd then be center of Wash. Ill.

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- L - we can't close base on Inf.
we can pocket 6000 #.
we have made it we can't accept unag. limits.
at end tomorrow we can get P's instructions done.
- Q - Sun. disc will be less precise, but potentially bolder
because P not hanging in Romy nor of
D Karpov.
But P needs boundaries & wants to stick to.
- L - If we can get next tonight -- try to capture
Lang before you see it at 0900
- Then P & G can agree to this document
- Q - on Inf, can we get to pt where we agree on
all but this? (yes)
- RP - They will freeze at our level & theirs -- ours is zero.
- L - we at risk politically in start bec they make
prop today & we just rejected ours.
- JT - We cd agree on 50% but they talk
about how to deal w asymmetry.
- Q - your task is to make use of 50% on heavy
bms.
- RP - That's what they offered, how w that come
50 in other categories.
- JT - There are ways of symmetrizing.
- Q - You apply the 50% rule
Then say that equality is their long story
position
You have to get to loose from just rejecting
our old position & cut loose the
guys who don't want that (Romy)
- L - Also concerned about 6000 level -- as he
won't deploy X allms. So we have
that spec.
- Q - you can't have strict equality as there are

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- asymmetry in force structure. J. wants zero
w/o changing force structure.
- RP - He sd a few hundred weapons - don't make a diff
Of we get eq principle, then arithmetic can be worked.
- ② - Is that we were on WH as unit of acct? (yes)
- Use workbooks in up table.
- PN - They will come back tomorrow & say no deal
- ③ - A shame to lose that.
- PN - They are prepared to do it. Many people there to see how
to exploit it. A seminar chance it
- ④ note, head of
⑤ (PN's side) will blow up.
- ⑥ - We need to get a structure from you.
- PN - I don't know how to do that in space.
- ⑦ - You need to id what's involved in way J can
work w. Our prop is no wtd in 7 yrs.
- Max. And they want 10. Because of what Albany has^{to} be done
in Geneva. At 2 day to them.
- L - We ch id the critical P's & hand off to negot.
(The PN's above)
- ⑧ - P all cranking up on SE. Maybe need lang for him
That says, 2 sides no longer int. in reciprocal
summits. 2 sides will meet at Geneva &
do hilled summit. If J doesn't want
a summit until everything is settled, fine
... he won't have so for that.
- RP - They see it as public doc. How it will play.
- ⑨ - So we agreed on 50/50 principle. They have changed
to J. proposal & we trying to see how to use it in way we
care about.
- L - We need to show we off just ready to on position.
- RP - We ch say lets see if we can agree on 6000 wh.
- ⑩ - apply principle of 50% and of equality
+ get 80% structured on down P.
We want in 75% to nail down that they agreed not
to wtd for 10 yrs is the key.

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- We got to get deployment similar worked in
but also get in idea that rules in off weapons
are result of SDI continuing
- PN - That means agree on what ~~SDI~~ ABM prohibits
(Max: and we'll do that at Geneva)
- They'll never agree to not to deploy.
- L - do it via lang on restrictions that apply during
the p.d.
- PP - we can do that
- RP - It will be a public doc. If we end up
status diff, our plans must be
shown.
- Q - We don't want to tell the world we can't
to agree on difference.
- RP - only in NATO is that
- L - Lang cont. the position
- Q: (to PN) - you meet to sign the boss. That's why where
anybody can veto. You 4 are in control.
There's no rule of unanimity on our side
- PLA

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F. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

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START 161 ORIGINAL

10/12

Sunday Reykjavik

0710 Q = PN

Darin good! (shake hands) When we came fr.
PN: Last cont. on SECM took it home.

I sd it could be done if each side made
unilateral declarations of how many they want have.
Not negotiable. I said, because of conventional SECM.
I sd if that was you would see it, I was prepared
to agree on it. They were full of talk about
trust, etc.

on space-def I didn't let them to buy
Lukhardt's 3 sentences.

"Come close to one sent in INF that don't
the pt of non agmt."

Q: give me all the points as you came close so
I can prepare the P.

PN: on testing they wanted first sentence on nego a CPB.
I sd no -- shd be last sentence.

on Defense & space our 3 tests were

- how to synchronize investigation of SD/
in goal of eliminating all WMs?
- under what conditions could both consider
transition to strategy defense?

- until then, what understood about
ABM & advanced defense?

Q: on testing, we have more forthcoming long in
on press release (CHG info)

PN: Right and ... agreed. But don't want to say anything
- ASAT -- I still agree to excellent efforts
for an ASAT ban.

Q: terrific night's work.

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 161.

G. Notes of a Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986

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START 165 ORIGINALS

15:50
on CH
notebook
G & F
binder & paper
as I thought to
X's to find
family

W) Worn or close, may suggest
a pt of substance.
Mr. P. down in after - on prop
has 50. Such many. after 10 yr
put the holes in rings and
fine further must accept. solutions
aspects in this field, there is, & the
ABM. On prop allows us to
see take acct of all possible things
10 years. You see 10: we don't agree.
We put something of that again
- to sum up. 10 yr put in two sides, see
WPA. Adh. Study. Can conduct
lab. research. After 10, 15, 20, 30,
we complete clinical strategy upon. see

9 - If both chem. much upon, what a concern
If one side wants to build def
syst. just in case?
any country starts up as of after 10 yrs
again to upon? & have a diff picture.
I have a pt after 10 yrs. 1 yr + & come to
behold each try the best 2 muscles
in the world & we have the best
down party in celebration.

9 - Mr. P we close to must accept formula
Part think we have with diagnosis, we don't

P - & not in blood in 10 yrs. All be
So old & now very new. D. P
say hi. You'll say Ron? &
we'll destroy the 2.

9 - I may not be very after these 10

P - I'll count on it.

9 - Now I can go straight to 100% going
passer the danger period.

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 165.

I'm just entering it. Beyond that, I'll have trouble of being gone. Then all these mty. is P who doesn't like circumstances, he wants to be a winner. We must both be winners.

- P - I can't live + 100 money, you'll shoot one of these m. at me.
- 50% -- we both get it. You told yr people 10-15% got it. I told my people I would receive 50%. So I have to go home show I have 50%. Our people will cheer we got rid of the missiles.

G. Well, what is my job as a + in lab. Constitution basis + off going to form with fresh 50%. So I have not removed 50% on yr side.

- I am conv. opp of it where is a woman + loan in our mty. If that case, then after agmt + ratify, the loan wld take steps to undermine the agmt. So that can't be basis. Has to be eq. footing. Otherwise you can say agmt in terms of US + I can't say its in line of USSR.

So does shd be drawing parity if in line of both sides.

- P - What's wrong w goes by this + then say R, dear d of. pointed by ABR -- we received that for our mty in the summer. Then that's -- we then cd discuss it under a B.M. prov.

TS returns