

FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES

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1981–1988

VOLUME XIII

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CONFLICT IN THE  
SOUTH ATLANTIC,  
1981–1984



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DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

Washington



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988

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## Volume XIII

# Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

*Editor* Alexander R. Wieland  
*General Editor* Adam M. Howard

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2015

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The records that constitute the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether at-

tachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type).

The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important docu-

ments and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

#### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

#### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2013 and was completed in 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold 5 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 9 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 42 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-

rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the conflict in the South Atlantic.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*General Editor*

**Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.**  
*The Historian*

Bureau of Public Affairs  
December 2015





# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume addresses the administration's response to the crisis and 1982 war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the South Atlantic island territories of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas,<sup>1</sup> South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. It charts the development of the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute which, from the U.S. perspective, was transformed by the Argentine landings on the Falklands/Malvinas and South Georgia in March–April 1982 from a persistent, though peripheral, boundary issue to a formidable diplomatic challenge, with geopolitical implications that threatened to transcend the narrow geography of the South Atlantic. This violent clash between a powerful, if problematic, regional partner and one of the United States's closest allies, prompted a further clash within the U.S. foreign policymaking establishment as administration officials balanced the costs of the conflict for U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere against the risks of undermining the Western Alliance. The volume documents the intense diplomatic efforts, undertaken largely by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict before it escalated further and, when these proved unsuccessful, to manage the outcome of the war and limit its damage to U.S. political and economic interests.

The first part of the volume covers the slowly increasing involvement of the United States in the months leading up to the war. Following a brief series of documents that illustrate both the background of the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute, as well as U.S. attitudes toward the issue on the eve of the Reagan years, Chapter 1 opens with the beginning of a fresh round of talks between Argentina and the United Kingdom regarding the future of the Falklands/Malvinas in February 1981. The inconclusive course of negotiations over the next 14 months forms the backdrop for the rapid emergence and escalation of tensions in the weeks prior to the war, marked by the mounting crisis over the Argentine presence in South Georgia, ominous signs of wider

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<sup>1</sup> Please note that the naming convention in editorial matter for this geographic area reflects Department of State policy at the time of compilation in 2011; it does not reflect the naming convention in 2015, Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Argentine military action, and the Reagan administration's unsuccessful efforts to prevent hostilities.

The volume then turns to the April–June 1982 war itself. Chapter 2 covers the first month of the conflict, which centers around Haig's "shuttle diplomacy" mission between London and Buenos Aires, in which the Secretary of State attempted to broker a negotiated settlement to the dispute, and culminates in the administration's public "tilt" toward the British position on April 30 when a settlement proved elusive. Chapter 3 deals with the final 6 weeks of the war and documents not only the political and military support given by the United States to the British and the implementation of U.S. sanctions against Argentina which followed the April 30 announcement, but also the United States's continued diplomatic efforts to limit the scope of the fighting and its political consequences. Lastly, Chapter 4 looks at the war's aftermath and the U.S. perception of its impact, U.S. postwar relations with the belligerents, and the conflict's damaging effect on U.S.-Latin American relations. This portion of the volume examines the significant influence exerted by the lingering Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty dispute, and the perceived need to accommodate British sensitivities in particular, upon the Reagan administration's attempts to normalize political, economic, and military relations with Argentina between the end of the war and the re-establishment of civilian government in December 1983.

Readers interested in the way in which the Reagan administration's approach to the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the South Atlantic fit into the broader continuum of its bilateral relationship with Argentina, particularly its prewar rapprochement with the ruling Junta, and its wider policy in South America should read *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XVI, South America; Latin America Region*, alongside this compilation. For the administration's policies in Central America and the Caribbean during the first term, researchers should consult *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XIV, Central America, 1981–1984*; *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XVII, Part 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean*, and *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XVII, Part 2, Eastern Caribbean*. Similarly, those seeking the broader context of Anglo-American relations and U.S. strategic relations with the Western Alliance during Reagan's first term should consult *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984* and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977–1983*, respectively.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XIII*

As a crisis volume, this compilation is tightly focused on the events surrounding the April–June 1982 Anglo-Argentine war in the South At-

lantic and the political, economic, diplomatic, and military responses of the U.S. Government to that conflict. For the administration of Ronald Reagan (and, indeed, for the administrations that preceded his), the longstanding sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic was, prior to the spring of 1982, a matter of peripheral interest, an issue toward which the United States had traditionally maintained a neutral stance. However, with the rapid increase of tensions between the two countries beginning in March 1982, followed by the landing of Argentine forces and the expulsion of British authorities from the Falklands/Malvinas, the South Atlantic took hold of the attention of U.S. policymakers at the highest level. The ways in which the Reagan foreign policymaking establishment attempted to meet this challenge, and was often divided by it, are at the heart of this volume. If allowed to escalate, administration officials reasoned, the South Atlantic conflict threatened U.S. relationships with the belligerents, relationships that the United States judged important to geopolitical interests not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in Europe. The conflict also carried explicit Cold War dimensions, providing an opportunity for the Soviet Union or Cuba to exploit the situation and broaden its influence.

In the documentary record, the development of U.S. policy throughout the crisis bears the heaviest, most visible influence of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Following the April 7 decision of the National Security Planning Group to send Haig to London and Buenos Aires, he was given primary responsibility for achieving a negotiated settlement between the two sides. In the weeks that followed, Haig shuttled between the two capitals almost constantly, cabling regularly with the White House on the progress of negotiations. Memoranda of conversation of Haig's meetings with British and Argentine officials, including those with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Argentine President General Leopoldo Galtieri, were kept by the Secretary's party but do not appear to have been given wide distribution. These documents illustrate vividly the extent to which Haig sought to press the two sides to come to terms. Haig's central role in shaping U.S. policy is also clearly displayed in the numerous action memoranda presented for his decision, documents which he frequently annotated extensively with his own observations. In addition, the reader will note the large number of documents printed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense files. From the beginning of the crisis, Secretary Weinberger was a prominent, forceful advocate for the British position. Following the U.S. Government's April 30 announced "tilt" toward the United Kingdom, Weinberger assumed a central role in personally approving a wide range of British requests for military assistance, reflected in the series of decision memoranda printed in this volume.

As compared with the Departments of State and Defense, the role of the National Security Council in the decisionmaking process during the South Atlantic crisis was less pronounced. In contrast with previous administrations, the NSC occupied a less central place in foreign policymaking at the start of the Reagan years, reflective, in part, of the administration's early enthusiasm for a decentralized policymaking process. Moreover, assessment of the impact of the NSC on the development of U.S. policy during the South Atlantic conflict is hampered by the apparent idiosyncrasies of the institution's recordkeeping at the time. William P. Clark, Reagan's Assistant for National Security Affairs in the spring of 1982, was a close confidante of the President, but few of his personal interactions with Reagan during this period, such as Clark's daily national security briefings, made their way into the documentary record. Similarly, NSC Staff members Dennis Blair, Roger Fontaine, and James Rentschler regularly forwarded numerous memoranda to Clark for the latter's action throughout the South Atlantic war; few copies in NSC files, however, bear indication of decisions Clark may have rendered based upon these documents.

Documenting the role of Reagan himself is inhibited by similar constraints. While briefed by his Cabinet officials on their activities, few of Reagan's own views on the situation appear in the documentary record. Unlike some of his predecessors, Reagan rarely wrote on the documents he was given. The President's thoughts or actions regarding the issues presented were usually recorded (if they were recorded at all) in notes written later by someone on the White House staff. Indeed, Reagan's "voice" in U.S. policymaking is displayed most directly in the records of meetings with advisers (where an official record was kept) and in his communications, including both written correspondence and telephone conversations, with Galtieri and Thatcher. Reagan maintained a regular written correspondence with Thatcher throughout the crisis; moreover, he personally intervened with both leaders at several junctures with the intent of convincing them to moderate their actions, beginning with his unsuccessful April 1, 1982, attempt (undertaken at British request) to convince Galtieri to halt Argentine offensive operations on the Falklands/Malvinas before they began. In most cases, these interactions were documented in official memoranda of conversation; in all cases, Reagan was provided with a detailed set of talking points by his advisers beforehand, guidance the President appears to have followed closely.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, especially Mike Dugan, Sherrie Fletcher, Lisa Jones, and Cate Sewell. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan Library materials scanned for the Re-

mote Archives Capture declassification project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency was accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to the Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance. Lastly, the editor wishes to extend special thanks to the families and executors of the Estates of former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of Secretaries Haig and Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Alexander R. Wieland collected, selected, and edited the documentation for this volume under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by Kristin Ahlberg, Assistant to the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, and Stephen Randolph, Historian of the Department of State. Chris Tudda coordinated the final declassification review under Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Mandy A. Chalou, Stephanie Eckroth, Heather McDaniel, and Rita Baker performed the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc., prepared the index.

**Alexander R. Wieland**  
*Historian*



# Contents

About the Series .....	III
Preface .....	IX
Sources .....	XVII
Abbreviations and Terms .....	XXV
Persons .....	XXXV
Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984	
Prelude to the Conflict, May 1979–April 1, 1982 .....	1
Seeking a Negotiated Settlement, April 2–April 30, 1982 .....	75
Managing the Conflict, May 1–June 15, 1982 .....	431
Postwar, June 15, 1982–November 6, 1984 .....	704
Index .....	925





# Sources

## *Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

This volume documents the development of U.S. policy toward the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, centered upon the island territories and adjacent waters of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, during the first administration of President Ronald Reagan. While the volume's main narrative tracks the Reagan administration's handling of the crisis sparked by the outbreak of war in the South Atlantic between Argentina and the United Kingdom in April–June 1982, the volume also seeks to contextualize these actions by documenting U.S. officials' prewar attitudes toward the dispute and the abortive negotiations between the Argentine and British Governments that predated hostilities, as well as the U.S. assessment of the postwar balance between the belligerents, the conflict's impact on wider U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, and attempts to encourage a lasting diplomatic settlement after June 1982. Moreover, the final chapter of the compilation illustrates the significant influence exerted by the lingering sovereignty dispute, and the perceived need to accommodate British sensitivities in particular, upon the Reagan administration's attempts to normalize political, economic, and military relations with Argentina between the end of the 1982 war and the re-establishment of civilian government in December 1983. The purpose of this access guide is twofold: to inform the reader where to locate the most relevant source material related to these issues and to assess the role played by these collections in the construction of this compilation.

As with any subject relating to U.S. foreign policy during the Reagan years, researchers seeking to document the administration's attempts to respond to the crisis and war between Argentina and the United Kingdom the South Atlantic, its prelude and its aftermath, along with the often-thorny interdepartmental debates within the policymaking establishment that accompanied U.S. decisionmaking, would be well-served to begin their work at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. Although the National Security Council did not hold the same dominant position in U.S. foreign policymaking at the start of Reagan's first term that it had held during the 1970s, reflective of the administration's initial enthusiasm for decentralized bureaucracy, the files of the NSC's Executive Secretariat

serve as an important central repository for many of the key policy documents relating to the South Atlantic conflict. Within the Executive Secretariat files, two collections, the Country File and Cable File, were integral for this compilation. Organized geographically by region, the Country File offers substantial documentation not only relating to bilateral relations with Argentina and the United Kingdom, including memoranda, telephone conversations, and reporting cables, but also several folders of material devoted specifically to the course of the war itself. Similarly, the Cable File contains a separate "Falkland File," a voluminous series of telegrams produced during the 1982 Anglo-Argentine war by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. Government agencies, and collected by the White House Situation Room.

Beginning in 1983, the NSC Executive Secretariat was replaced and the NSC Staff was reorganized into geographic directorates. Therefore, researchers interested in documentation relating to the postwar situation in the region; the impact of the British victory on Anglo-American relations, U.S.-Latin American relations, and the transition to civilian rule in Argentina; and the continuation of the sovereignty dispute in the United Nations and Organization of American States, should consult the files of the Latin American Affairs Directorate (which also contains significant additional documentation from the 1982 war) and the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate. Lastly, any documentary record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the South Atlantic conflict, and the role of the National Security Council in shaping it, would be incomplete without research in the office files of several key individuals, most notably the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, William P. Clark, and NSC Staff members Dennis Blair, Roger Fontaine, and James Rentschler.

While the Reagan Library holdings provide a solid foundation for reconstructing the documentary record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Anglo-Argentine dispute, it would be impossible to construct a complete picture of U.S. diplomacy, especially during the April-June 1982 war, without the files of the Department of State and Department of Defense. Both sets of records include vital documentation, including action memoranda and memoranda of conversation with Argentine and British officials, not found elsewhere. As the source notes in this compilation indicate, the Department of State's Central Foreign Policy File and institutional Lot Files are enormously rich resources for illustrating the central role of the Department in general, and of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., in particular, in shaping and executing the administration's attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict following the Argentine landing on the Falklands/Malvinas on April 2, 1982. For documenting Secretary

Haig's diplomatic "shuttle" between Washington, London, and Buenos Aires, three Lot Files—82D370, 83D210, and 89D213—are indispensable. These lots contain not only multiple draft versions of the settlement agreement Haig unsuccessfully sought to broker between the two sides in multiple rounds of intense bilateral discussions, but also verbatim memoranda of conversation of Haig's exchanges with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Argentine President General Leopoldo Galtieri, and other officials of the British and Argentine Governments, documents which do not appear in any other collection. Moreover, these lots provide valuable documentation on diplomatic initiatives undertaken after the administration's public "tilt" toward the British side in late April, most notably records of discussions concerning the Peruvian peace initiative and reports of Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters's meetings with the Argentine Junta in May 1982, copies of which are also not readily available elsewhere.

Like Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger exerted considerable influence on the administration's diplomatic course. An early and consistent supporter of the British position, Secretary Weinberger advocated for the full weight of U.S. political and military resources to be placed behind the Thatcher government. To capture the dimensions of Weinberger's viewpoint, its scope and depth, Department of Defense records are essential. As with Department of State lot files, the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense contain many types of documentation, including memoranda of conversation and reports on the military situation produced by U.S. defense attachés, not generally found in other agencies' files. Also unique to Defense files are many of the documents dealing with U.S. military aid to the British, including most of the relevant signed action memoranda presented to Weinberger.

Numerous other collections also yielded important documentation for this volume. The files of the Central Intelligence Agency provided critical meeting minutes, assessments, and analyses of the political and military situation in the South Atlantic. The files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General David Jones were also useful in rounding out the U.S. military's view of the Anglo-Argentine war.

This documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and, especially, the cooperation of the National Archives and Records Administration. In addition, with the kind permission of the respective Estates of Secretaries Haig and Weinberger and with the assistance of the staff of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, special access was granted Department of State historians to the Secretaries' personal papers, which remain closed to the public. These papers contain a wealth of unique documen-

tation which does not appear in official files, including handwritten notes, meeting minutes, and annotated documents, which contribute significantly to our understanding of the central roles played by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger in shaping the Reagan administration's approach to the South Atlantic conflict. Without these, this volume would have been incomplete.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

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Lot 89D489: Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files

Lot 90D400: Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falklands/Malvinas Files of Luigi Einaudi

Lot 86D157: Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files

Lot 83D210: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983

##### **Executive Secretariat**

Lot 82D370: Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982

Lot 83D288: Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982

Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 1967–1984

Lot 87D327: Executive Secretariat, Secretary Shultz Memoranda of Conversation

Lot 89D213: Executive Secretariat, Files of Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters, 1981–1985

Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983

Lot 12D215: Executive Secretariat, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams

### **National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland**

#### **RG 218, Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

FRC 218–92–0030: Official Files of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones, June 1978–June 1982

## Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

### White House Staff and Office Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security Council

Agency File

Cable File

Falkland File

Country File

Europe and Soviet Union

Latin America/Central

Head of State File

Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

Subject File

VIP Visits File

Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Latin American Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Situation Room, White House

Dennis C. Blair Files

William P. Clark Files

Roger W. Fontaine Files

David Gergen Files

Oliver North Files

Papers of George P. Shultz

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Job 83B01027R: Policy Files (1978–1982)

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#### **RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense**

FRC 330–84–0003: 1982 Official Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense

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# Abbreviations and Terms

**A-3**, U.S. carrier-capable strategic bomber (Skywarrior)  
**A-4**, U.S. carrier-capable attack aircraft (Skyhawk)  
**AAF**, Argentine Air Force  
**AAW**, anti-aircraft warfare  
**ABC**, American Broadcasting Company  
**ACDA**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**Adm**, Admiral  
**AEW**, airborne early warning  
**AF**, airfield  
**AF #1**, Air Force One  
**AFB**, Air Force Base  
**AFCP**, Air Force Command Post  
**AFLC**, Air Force Logistics Command  
**AGI**, auxiliary general intelligence (reconnaissance ship)  
**AIM 9-L**, **AIM 9-M**, U.S. air-to-air missile variants (Sidewinder)  
**ALCON**, all concerned  
**AmCit(s)**, American citizen(s)  
**AMH**, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/BR**, Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/CAR**, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/CEN**, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/ECP**, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/PPC**, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/RPP**, Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/SC**, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARA/USOAS**, U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States  
**ARGNAV**, Argentine Navy  
**ARMA**, Army Attaché  
**Arg.**, Argentine; Argentina  
**ASAP**, as soon as possible  
**ASD**, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
**ASSTSECSTATE**, Assistant Secretary of State  
**ASW**, anti-submarine warfare  
**avail**, available  
**AWACS**, Airborne Warning and Control System  
**AWG-10**, U.S. radar system  
  
**B-52**, U.S. long-range strategic bomber  
**BA**, Buenos Aires

**Backfire**, Soviet long-range strategic bomber  
**BAF**, Brazilian Air Force  
**BAOR**, British Army of the Rhine  
**Bear**, Soviet long-range strategic bomber  
**BGEN**, Brigadier General  
**bldg**, building

**C<sup>3</sup>**, command, control, communications  
**C-130**, U.S. military transport aircraft  
**CBI**, Caribbean Basin Initiative  
**CGT**, *Confederación General del Trabajo* (General Confederation of Labor, Argentine trade union federation)  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINC**, Commander in Chief  
**CINCARGNAV**, Commander in Chief, Argentine Navy  
**CINCLANT**, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command  
**CINCMAC**, Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command  
**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command  
**CINCSAC**, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command  
**CINCUSAFE**, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe  
**CINCUSNAVEUR**, Commander in Chief, United States Navy, Europe  
**CM**, (Nicanor) Costa Méndez  
**CMC**, Commandant of the Marine Corps  
**cmts**, comments  
**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations  
**CNS**, Chief of Naval Staff (UK)  
**COB**, close of business  
**COCOM**, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls  
**COIC**, Combat Operations Intelligence Center (USAFE)  
**COIN**, counterinsurgency  
**COMDR**, **COM**, Commander  
**comm**, communications  
**COMNAVINTCOM**, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command  
**COMNAVSUPSYSCOM**, Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command  
**COMSAT**, communications satellite  
**COMSC**, Commander, Military Sealift Command  
**CONUS**, continental United States  
**CPPG**, Crisis Pre-Planning Group  
**ctry**, country  
**CV**, carrier variant (able to operate from aircraft carriers) (USN)  
**CVBG**, carrier battle group (USN)  
**CVS**, anti-submarine aircraft carrier (USN)  
**CW**, **CWW**, Caspar W. Weinberger

**DAO**, Defense Attaché's Office  
**DAP**, Defense Attaché Program  
**DASD**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
**DASD/IA**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Inter-American Affairs  
**DCA**, Defense Communications Agency  
**DD/FF**, destroyer/fast frigate (USN)  
**DDO (NMCC)**, Deputy Director of Operations (National Military Command Center)  
**DefMin**, Defense Minister  
**DepSec**, Deputy Secretary  
**Dept**, Department

**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DIRLAUTH**, Direct Liaison Authorized  
**dist**, distribution  
**DMA**, Defense Mapping Agency  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DOD/DSAA**, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense  
**DOD/ISA/IA**, Inter-American Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense  
**DOI**, date of information  
**DOS**, Department of State  
**DRB**, Defense Resources Board  
**DSAA**, Defense Security Assistance Agency  
**DSCS**, Defense Satellite Communication System  
**DTG**, date-time-group  
  
**E-2B**, U.S. carrier-capable tactical airborne early warning aircraft  
**E&E**, emergency and evacuation  
**EB**, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**EB/IFD/ODF**, Office of Development Finance, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**EB/OMA**, Office of Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**EC**, European Community  
**ECM**, electronic countermeasures  
**EDT**, Eastern Daylight Time  
**ELINT**, electronic intelligence  
**EmbOff**, Embassy Officer  
**ES**, Executive Secretariat  
**EST**, Eastern Standard Time  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/NE**, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/NE/UKB**, United Kingdom Affairs, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EW**, early warning; electronic warfare  
**Exdis**, exclusive distribution  
**Eximbank**, **Exim**, Export-Import Bank of the United States  
**Exocet**, French anti-ship missile  
  
**F-4**, U.S. interceptor aircraft/fighter bomber  
**F-15**, U.S. tactical fighter aircraft  
**FA**, Falklands Islands  
**FAA**, Federal Aviation Administration  
**FAB**, Fuerza Aerea Brasileira (Brazilian Air Force)  
**FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
**FCO**, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)  
**FICEURLANT**, Field Intelligence Center—Europe and Atlantic (USN)  
**FLTCCINC**, Fleet Commander in Chief  
**FM**, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister  
**FMS**, foreign military sales  
**fo.**, folio  
**FonMin**, **FoMin**, Foreign Minister; Foreign Ministry  
**ForSec**, Foreign Secretary  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany

**FWG**, Falklands Working Group, Department of State

**FY**, fiscal year

**FYDP**, Future Years Defense Program

**G-77**, Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries established at the conclusion of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964

**GA**, (United Nations) General Assembly

**Gannet**, U.K. fighter aircraft

**GDS**, (Argentine Ambassador Lucio) Garcia del Solar

**GMT**, Greenwich Mean Time

**GOA**, Government of Argentina

**GOB**, Government of Brazil

**GOC**, Government of Chile

**GOP**, Government of Portugal

**GPS**, **GS**, George P. Shultz

**GSP**, Generalized System of Preferences

**H**, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.; also, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

**HA**, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State

**HARM**, High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

**Harpoon**, U.S. anti-ship missile

**Harrier**, British fighter aircraft

**Hawk**, U.S. medium-range surface-to-air missile; U.K. jet trainer aircraft

**hdqtrs**, headquarters

**helos**, helicopters

**HF**, high frequency

**H-K**, Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment

**HM**, Her Majesty('s)

**HMG**, Her Majesty's Government (UK)

**HMS**, Her Majesty's Ship (UK)

**ICRC**, International Committee of the Red Cross

**IDB**, Inter-American Development Bank

**IEEPA**, International Emergency Economic Powers Act

**I-Hawk**, Improved Hawk missile

**IMET**, International Military Education and Training

**INF**, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force

**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/IAA**, Office of Analysis of Inter-American Republics, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**INR/IC/CD**, Coordination Division, Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**I.O.**, Indian Ocean

**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IOC**, initial operational capability

**IO/UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**ISP**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

**JB**, James Buckley

**JSOC**, Joint Special Operations Command

**KC-10**, U.S. aerial refueling tanker

**KHz**, kilohertz  
**klm**, kilometer  
**KSG**, K. Scott Gudgeon  
**kts**, knots

**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State; also, Lima time (military time zone equivalent to GMT + 11 hours); local time  
**LADE**, *Lineas Aéreas del Estado*, state-owned airline operated by the Argentine Air Force  
**LANDSAT**, Land Remote-Sensing Satellite  
**LARA**, Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
**LDC**, less-developed country  
**LDP**, p. 81  
**LDX**, long-distance xerography  
**Limdis**, limited distribution  
**L/OES**, Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
**LOU**, Limited Official Use  
**LPD**, Land Platform Dock  
**L/PM**, Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
**LSE**, Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
**LSL**, Landing Ship Logistic  
**LST**, Landing Ship Tank  
**LTG**, Lieutenant General

**M**, Nicanor Costa Méndez  
**MAC**, Military Airlift Command  
**MANPADS**, Man-Portable Air-Defense System  
**Martel**, U.K.-French anti-radiation missile  
**MC**, Office of Munitions Control Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**MCM**, mine countermeasures  
**MDE**, major defense equipment  
**MEGO**, my eyes glaze over  
**Memcon**, memorandum of conversation  
**MEZ**, Maritime Exclusion Zone  
**MFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
**MFm**, Meeting of Foreign Ministers  
**MFO**, Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai  
**MGen**, Major General  
**MILGP**, Military Group  
**MLSF**, mobile logistics support force  
**MOA**, memorandum of agreement  
**MOD**, **MODUK**, Ministry of Defense; Minister of Defense (UK)  
**MOU**, memorandum of understanding  
**MP**, Member of Parliament  
**MPA**, maritime patrol aircraft  
**MRA&L**, manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics  
**MSC**, Military Sealift Command  
**msg**, message

**NAM**, Non-Aligned Movement  
**NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NAVATT**, Naval Attaché  
**NAVMTO**, Naval Matériel Transportation Office

**NAVWPNSTA**, Naval Weapons Station  
**NBC**, National Broadcasting Company  
**NCA**, National Command Authority  
**NDP**, National Disclosure Policy  
**Nestor**, voice encryption device  
**NF**, Noform  
**NFI**, not further identified  
**NFOIO**, Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office  
**Niact**, night action  
**NID**, National Intelligence Daily  
**Nimrod**, U.K. maritime patrol aircraft  
**NLT**, no later than  
**NM**, nautical mile  
**NMCC**, National Military Command Center, Joint Staff, Department of Defense  
**NOAA**, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration  
**Nocontract**, No contractor dissemination  
**Nodis**, no distribution  
**Noform**, no foreign dissemination  
**NOREUR**, Northern Europe(an)  
**Notal**, not received by all addressees  
**NPIC**, National Photographic Interpretation Center  
**NSC**, National Security Council  
**NSPG**, National Security Planning Group

**OAS**, Organization of American States  
**OASD/ISP**, office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy  
**OASGA**, Organization of American States General Assembly  
**OBE**, overtaken by events  
**OES/OPA**, Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State  
**OJCS**, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget  
**OPCON**, operational control  
**ops**, operations  
**Orcon**, originator controlled  
**orig.**, originator  
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OSD(C)**, Comptroller, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OT and E**, operational training and evaluation  
**OVP**, Office of the Vice President

**P**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
**P-3**, U.S. anti-submarine and aerial reconnaissance aircraft  
**PA/OAP**, Office of Plans and Opinion Analysis, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State  
**para**, paratroops  
**PARPRO**, Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program  
**PDC**, Pérez de Cuéllar  
**PEN**, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Power)  
**PermRep**, Permanent Representative  
**PGM**, precision guided munitions  
**Phalanx**, U.S. anti-aircraft/anti-missile gun  
**PM**, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime Minister

**PM/MC**, Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**PM/P**, Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**PM/RSA**, Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**PM/SAS**, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**POL**, petroleum, oil, lubricants; Political Section of an Embassy

**POLAD**, Political Advisor

**Pres.**, President

**RADM**, Rear Admiral

**RAF**, Royal Air Force (UK)

**RB**, Richard Burt

**ref**, reference

**reftel**, reference telegram

**RM**, Royal Marines (UK)

**RN**, Royal Navy (UK)

**RNAS**, Royal Navy Air Station (UK)

**RNLMC**, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps

**RO**, reporting officer

**Roland**, French-German surface-to-air missile

**RR**, Ronald Reagan

**S**, Office of the Secretary of State

**S**, secret

**SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

**SACLANT**, Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic

**SAM**, surface-to-air missile

**SATCOM**, satellite communications

**SC**, (United Nations) Security Council

**SCR**, (United Nations) Security Council Resolution

**Sea King**, U.K. naval helicopter

**SecDef**, Secretary of Defense

**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State

**septel**, separate telegram

**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

**SHF**, super high frequency

**Shrike**, U.S. anti-radiation missile

**Sidewinder**, U.S. short-range air-to-air missile (AIM-9)

**SIG**, Senior Interagency Group

**Sitrep**, situation report

**Skyhawk**, U.S. carrier-capable attack aircraft (A-4)

**SLOC**, sea line of communication

**SOA**, speed of advance

**SOSUS**, sound surveillance system

**SOUTHCOM**, United States Southern Command

**Specat**, special category

**SR-71**, U.S. long-range reconnaissance aircraft

**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**SSG**, Special Situation Group

**SSIXS**, Secure Submarine Information Exchange System

**SSN**, nuclear-powered submarine

**S/S-O**, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State



**SSOD**, (United Nations) Special Session on Disarmament

**SSP**, SACEUR Scheduled Program

**Stadis**, (Department of) State Distribution

**Stinger**, U.S. surface-to-air missile

**STR**, Special Trade Representative

**STRIKFLTANT**, Striking Fleet Atlantic

**SYG**, Secretary-General

**T**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology

**tacair**, tactical aircraft

**TASS**, Soviet official news agency

**telecon**, **telcon**, telephone conversation

**TEZ**, Total Exclusion Zone

**TIAR**, *Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca* (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; also known as the Rio Treaty)

**Todep**, series indicator for telegrams to the Deputy Secretary of State

**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State

**Trident**, U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile

**TU-95**, Soviet long-range strategic bomber (Bear)

**U**, Unclassified

**UHF**, ultra high frequency

**UK**, United Kingdom

**UKUN**, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations

**UN**, United Nations

**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly

**UNITAS**, United International Antisubmarine Warfare (naval exercise)

**UNSC**, United Nations Security Council

**UNSSOD**, United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

**UNSYG**, United Nations Secretary General

**UPI**, United Press International

**US**, United States

**USA**, United States Army

**USAF**, United States Air Force

**USAFE**, United States Air Forces in Europe

**USCINCEUR**, United States Commander in Chief, European Command

**USCINCLANT**, United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command

**USCINCSO**, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command

**USDAO**, United States Defense Attaché's Office

**USDEL**, United States Delegation

**USDOCOSOUTH**, Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe

**USEC**, United States Mission to the European Community

**USG**, United States Government

**USICA**, United States International Communication Agency

**USINT**, United States Interests Section

**USMC**, United States Marine Corps

**USN**, United States Navy

**USNATO**, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**USNMR SHAPE**, United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

**USOAS**, United States Mission to the Organization of American States

**USSOUTHCOM**, United States Southern Command

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USTR**, United States Trade Representative

**USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations

**VADM**, Vice Admiral

**VP**, Vice President

**VSTOL**, **V/STOL**, vertical and/or short take-off and landing (aircraft)

**VTOL**, vertical take-off and landing

**VTXTS**, U.S. Navy training system

**Vulcan**, U.K. strategic bomber

**WH**, White House

**w/in**, within

**w/o**, without

**WPAFB**, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

**WPC**, William P. Clark

**YPF**, *Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales* (Argentine petroleum company)

**Z**, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)



# Persons

- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from December 12, 1981
- Acland, Sir Antony**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Head of the Diplomatic Service from 1982
- Adams, Alvin P., Jr.**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State until December 1982
- Adelman, Kenneth L.**, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1981 until 1983
- Aguirre, Francisco**, Co-owner, *Diario de las Americas*
- Aguirre Lanari, Juan Ramón**, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship from July 2, 1982, until December 10, 1983
- Alberti, Francesco J.**, Deputy Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Alemann, Roberto**, Argentine Minister of Economy from January 1982 until June 1982
- Alfonsín, Raúl**, President of Argentina from December 10, 1983
- Allen, Lew, Jr.**, General, USAF Chief of Staff, USAF until June 30, 1982
- Allen, Richard V.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982
- Allin, Lyndon K.**, "Mort," Staff Member, Office of the Press Secretary, White House
- Anaya, Jorge I.**, Admiral, Commander in Chief, Argentine Navy; Member of the Ruling Junta until June 1982
- Anderson, Robert**, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from May 24, 1982
- Andreotti, Giulio**, Italian Prime Minister, 1972–1973, 1976–1979, and 1989–1992; Italian Foreign Minister, 1983–1989
- Aragones, Emilio**, Cuban Ambassador to Argentina
- Arias Stella, Javier**, Peruvian Foreign Minister until December 1982
- Armstrong, John**, Washington Bureau, American Broadcasting Company
- Atkeson, Edward B.**, Major General, USA; National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency
- Bailey, Norman A.**, Member of the National Security Council Staff, from April 1981 until October 1983
- Baker, James A., III**, White House Chief of Staff
- Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr.**, Secretary of Commerce
- Barnes, Michael D.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-MD)
- Barrow, Robert H.**, General, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps until June 30, 1983
- Begin, Menachim**, Prime Minister of Israel
- Belaúnde Terry, Fernando**, President of Peru
- Benn, Tony**, British Member of Parliament (Labour Party) until June 1983 and from March 1984
- Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.**, Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until March 31, 1983
- Bernstein, Carl**, television correspondent, *Nightline* program, American Broadcasting Company
- Bignone, Reynaldo**, President of Argentina from July 1, 1982, until December 10, 1983

- Binns, Jack R.**, Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from August 1982
- Blackwill, Robert D.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from January 1981 until May 1982; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 1982 until June 1983
- Blair, Dennis C.**, Member of the National Security Council Staff from 1981 until 1983
- Blakemore, David L.**, Director, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from July 1983
- Block, John R.**, Secretary of Agriculture
- Boam, Thomas Anthony**, Major General, British Army, Head of the British Defense Staff in Washington from 1981
- Bolten, Joshua**, Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Bosworth, Stephen W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 1981 until January 1983; Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from January 3, 1983, until April 7, 1984
- Bouchey, Lynn**, Council for Inter-American Security
- Bowdler, William G.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from January 4, 1980, until January 16, 1981
- Braithwaite, Rodric Q.**, British Embassy in Washington
- Bremer, L. Paul, III**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from February 2, 1981, until March 27, 1983
- Briggs, Everett E.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until September 1982; U.S. Ambassador to Panama from September 30, 1982
- Brock, William E., III**, United States Trade Representative
- Brown, James L.**, Major General, USAF, Assistant Director for JCS Support, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Brown, Leslie H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State [[dates?]]
- Buckley, James L.**, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 28, 1981, until August 20, 1982; Counselor of the Department of State from September 9, 1982, until September 26, 1982
- Bullard, Julian**, Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office until 1984
- Bunge, Wenceslao**, Argentine envoy
- Burkhalter, E.A., Jr.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Burt, Richard R.**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from January 23, 1981, until April, 1982; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States
- Camilion, Oscar**, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship from March 29, 1981, until December 11, 1981
- Campbell, John**, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Canosa, Eduardo**, Vice Comodoro, Argentine Air Force, Argentine representative in Falklands/Malvinas
- Caputo, Dante**, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship from December 10, 1983
- Carlucci, Frank C., III**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 4, 1981; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, 1981, until December 31, 1982
- Carrington, 6th Baron of (Peter Alexander Rupert)**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs until April 5, 1982
- Casey, William J.**, Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981

- Castaneda, Jorge**, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs until November 30, 1982
- Cavandoli, Carlos R.**, Comodoro, Under Secretary of State, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
- Chaplin, Maxwell**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1976 until 1980
- Childress, Richard T.**, member, National Security Council Staff from October 1981
- Clarey, S.S.**, Captain, USN; Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations
- Clark, William P., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 18, 1983
- Clarke, Richard A.**, Deputy Director, Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State until September 1983; thereafter, Director, Office of Policy Analysis
- Cochran, Harry C.**, Special Assistant for Warning, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency
- Cohen, Herman J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until April 1984
- Coles, A. John**, Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister
- Colombo, Emilio**, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs until August 4, 1983
- Constable, Elinor G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
- Cormack, James P.**, Captain, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
- Costa Méndez, Nicanor**, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship from December 22, 1981, until June 30, 1982
- Crabbie, Christopher**, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington until 1983
- Dagnino Pastore, José Maria**, Argentine Minister of Economy from June 1982 until September 1982
- Dalton, James E.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of the Joint Staff from July 1, 1981, until June 30, 1983
- Dam, Kenneth W.**, Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982
- Darman, Richard G.**, Deputy Assistant to the President until September 1981; Assistant to the President from September 1981
- Davidoff, Constantino S.**, Argentine businessman
- Davila, Michael A.**, Director of Mission Operations, Mission to the Organization of American States from March 1981 until August 1982
- Deare, Ron**, West Indian and Atlantic Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- Deaver, Michael K.**, White House Deputy Chief of Staff
- DeLauer, Richard D.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering from May 7, 1981, until November 4, 1984
- Dick, Ronald**, Air Commodore, Royal Air Force, Air Attaché, British Embassy in Washington
- Dobbins, James F., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1982
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Draper, William H., III**, Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the United States
- Duarte, José Napoleón**, President of El Salvador
- Eagleburger, Lawrence S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 14, 1981, until January 26, 1982; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982, until May 1, 1984
- Edwards, James B.**, Secretary of Energy from January 23, 1981, until November 5, 1982

**Einaudi, Luigi R.**, Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Groups, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; Director, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**Enders, Thomas O.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from June 23, 1981, until June 27, 1983

**Evans, Rowland**, syndicated newspaper columnist

**Fall, Brian**, Principal Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary from 1981 until 1984

**Fearn, Robin**, South America Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
**Fenn, Nicholas**, News Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira**, President of Brazil

**Figueroa, Gustavo**, Chief of Cabinet, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship

**Finegold, Edmund S.**, Chief, Arms Transfer Division, Bureau of Nuclear Weapons and Control, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**Fischer, Dean E.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from August 7, 1981, until August 19, 1982; Department of State Spokesman from March 28, 1981, until August 19, 1982

**Fontaine, Roger W.**, member, National Security Council Staff from February 1981 until November 1983

**Forrester, Ricardo**, Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship

**Forster, J.R.**, Captain, USN, Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence for Foreign Liaison

**Franco, Ruben O.**, Vice Admiral, Argentine Navy, Naval Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington until June 1982; Member of the Ruling Junta from June 1982 until December 1983

**Fraser, Malcolm**, Australian Prime Minister until March 11, 1983

**Fretwell, M. John E.**, Minister, British Embassy in Washington until December 1981

**Funseth, Robert L.**, Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until November 1982; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

**Galtieri, Leopoldo Fortunato**, Lieutenant General, Commander in Chief, Argentine Army, until December 22, 1981; President of Argentina and Member of the Ruling Junta from December 22, 1981, until June 18, 1982

**Garcia del Solar, Lucio**, Argentine Ambassador to the United States

**Gast, Philip C.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of Operations, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Gates, Robert M.**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency from 1982

**Gergen, David R.**, Assistant to the President and Staff Director, White House until June 1981; Assistant to the President for Communications from June 1981

**Giffard, John**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Gillespie, Charles A.**, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

**Gilly, Pedro M.**, Lieutenant General, Secretary to the Venezuelan National Security and Defense Council

**Gilmore, David**, Under Secretary of State for Defense Affairs, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Goldberg, Sherwood "Woody,"** Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until July 1982

- Gompert, David C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1981 to 1982; Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1982 until 1983
- Gorman, Paul F.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Gosney, Richard**, British Embassy in Buenos Aires
- Graham, Sir John**, British Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1982
- Gregg, Donald**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Gudgeon, K. Scott**, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Haass, Richard N.**, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State until 1982; thereafter, Deputy for Policy Planning, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Haig, Alexander M., Jr.**, General, USA (ret.); Secretary of State from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982
- Hallman, William H.**, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1977 until 1980
- Hastie-Smith, Richard**, Deputy Under Secretary (Policy and Programs), British Ministry of Defense from July 1981
- Hayward, Thomas B.**, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until June 30, 1982
- Hekman, P.M., Jr.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Center, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Helms, Jesse**, Senator (R-North Carolina); Chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Henderson, Sir Nicholas**, "Nicko," British Ambassador to the United States until July 31, 1982
- Herrera Campins, Luis**, President of Venezuela until February 2, 1984
- Hervey, John B.**, Rear Admiral, Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, British Embassy in Washington
- Heseltine, Michael**, British Secretary of State for Defence
- Hidalgo, Edward**, Secretary of the Navy from October 1979 until January 1981
- Hill, M. Charles**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983
- Holmes, H. Allen**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until September 1982
- Hormats, Robert D.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from May 21, 1981, until August 25, 1982
- Howe, Sir Geoffrey**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 11, 1983
- Howe, Jonathan T.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1981 until 1982; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from May 10, 1982, until July 1, 1984
- Howells, W. Dean**, Deputy Director, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from September 1982
- Hunt, Rex Masterman**, British Governor of the Falkland Islands; taken prisoner on April 2, 1982
- Hutchinson, H.F., Jr.**, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency
- Iglesias, Hector Norberto**, Brigadier General, Argentine Army, Secretary General of the Presidency
- Iklé, Fred C.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2, 1981



**Inman, Bobby Ray**, Admiral, USN; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 12, 1981, until June 10, 1982

**Johnson, Philip K.**, Political Officer, Mission to the Organization of American States

**Johnston, Ernest B.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs

**Jones, David C.**, General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 18, 1982

**Jones, George F.**, Director, Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until August 1982

**Kanter, Arnold**, Director, Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**Keane, John F.**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires until September 1984

**Kelly, John H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1983

**Kennedy, Richard T.**, Under Secretary of State for Management from February 28, 1981, until December 15, 1982

**Kilday, Lowell C.**, Director, Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until August 1983

**Kimmitt, Robert M.**, member, National Security Council Staff

**King, John F.**, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires until April 1984

**Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.**, Permanent Representative to the United Nations

**Koch, Noel C.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

**Kozak, Michael T.**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

**Lami Dozo, Basilio**, Brigadier, Commander in Chief, Argentine Air Force, 1981–1982; Member of the Ruling Junta until June 1982

**Lasater, John R.**, Brigadier General, USAF; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe/NATO Policy

**Laxalt, Paul**, Republican Senator from Nevada

**Leach, Sir Henry**, Admiral, Royal Navy, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff until 1982

**Legere, Laurence J.**, Defense Adviser to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Lewin, Sir Terence**, Admiral, Royal Navy, Chief of the Defense Staff until September 30, 1982

**Lilac, Robert H.**, member, National Security Council Staff

**Ling Qing**, Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations; President of the Security Council, 1982

**Listre, Arnoldo**, Acting Argentine Permanent Representative to the United Nations, July 1982; Director General of Foreign Policy, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship from August 1982

**López Portillo, José**, President of Mexico

**Louis, John J., Jr.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from May 7, 1981, until November 7, 1983

**Luce, Richard**, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from September 1981 until April 1982

**Luers, William H.**, Ambassador to Venezuela until June 28, 1982

**Luns, Joseph M.A.H.**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Mallea Gil, Miguel**, General, Argentine Army, Military Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington

**Marsh, John O., Jr.**, Secretary of the Army from February 1981

- McFarlane, Robert C.**, "*Bud*," Counselor of the Department of State from February 28, 1981, until April 4, 1982; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1982 until October 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 17, 1983
- McMahon, John N.**, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency, until June 1982; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from June 1982
- McManaway, Clayton E., Jr.**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from September 1981 until June 1983
- McMullen, R. Bruce**, Deputy Director, Office of Development Finance, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State until August 1983
- McNamar, Robert T.**, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
- McNutt, Louise**, United Nations Adviser, Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- McPherson, Melville P.**, Administrator, Agency for International Development from February 27, 1981
- Meese, Edwin, III**, Counselor to the President
- Menendez, Mario B.**, Brigadier General, Argentine Army, Governor of the Malvinas and Commander of the Argentine garrison from April 3, 1982, until June 15, 1982
- Menges, Constantine C.**, National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mercandetti, Susan**, *Nightline* program, American Broadcasting Company
- Meyer, Edward C.**, "*Shy*," General, USA; Chief of Staff of the United States Army until June 1983
- Michel, James H.**, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1983; thereafter, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Middendorf, J. William, II**, Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States from June 12, 1981
- Miles, Richard M.**, Deputy Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from August 1981 until September 1983
- Miret, Jose**, Major Brigadier General, Argentine Air Force, representative of the Ruling Junta
- Mitterrand, François**, President of France from May 26, 1981
- Monge, Luis Alberto**, President of Costa Rica from May 8, 1982
- Monroe, Frederick F.**, Special Assistant for Science and Technology and for Development, Human Rights and Refugee Affairs, Global Issues Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until September 1984
- Montgomery, Hugh**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from October 19, 1981
- Montgomery, William**, Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1982 until July 1984
- Moore, Jeremy**, Major General, Royal Marines, Commander of British Land Forces in Falklands Campaign
- Morley, Robert B.**, Deputy Director, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until August 1982; Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from August 1982 until August 1983; thereafter, Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Motley, Langhorne A.**, Ambassador to Brazil from September 19, 1981, until July 6, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 12, 1983
- Muldoon, Robert**, New Zealand Prime Minister until July 26, 1984
- Muñiz, Carlos**, Argentine Permanent Representative to the United Nations from August 1982

- Nagler, Gordon R.**, Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Command and Control, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Newell, Gregory J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from June 4, 1982
- Nicolaides, Cristino**, General, Argentine Army, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army; Member of the Ruling Junta from June 1982 until December 1983
- North, Oliver L.**, member, National Security Council Staff from 1982
- Nott, John**, British Defense Secretary until January 6, 1983
- Nutting, Wallace H.**, General, USA; Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command until 1983
- O'Connell, S.K.**, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Ogden, Richard M.**, Director, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from June 1981 until July 1983
- O'Leary, Jeremiah**, Press Secretary to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
- Onslow, Cranley**, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 1982 until 1983
- Ortiz, Francis V.**, Ambassador to Peru from October 1, 1981, until October 27, 1983; Ambassador to Argentina from November 18, 1983
- Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos**, Argentine Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Pakenham, Michael A.**, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington until 1983
- Palliser, Sir Michael**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Head of the Diplomatic Service until 1982; Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Office, from April to July 1982
- Parsons, Sir Anthony**, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1982
- Peña, Ricardo**, Brigadier General, Argentine Air Force, Air Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington
- Pendleton, Miles S., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until December 1982; Member, Falkland Islands Working Group, Department of State from April 1982 until June 1982
- Penfold, John H.**, Deputy Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from August 1981 until July 1983
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier**, Secretary General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982
- Perle, Richard N.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from August 5, 1981
- Perón, Juan**, President of Argentina, 1946–1955 and 1973–1974
- Perry, Robert**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1982 until July 1984
- Piedra, Alberto**, Senior Policy Adviser, Mission to the Organization of American States from April 1982 until July 1984
- Pinochet, Augusto**, President of Chile
- Platt, Nicholas**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from July 1981 until July 1982
- Poindexter, John M.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the President from 1981 until 1983; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Price, Charles H.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from November 11, 1983
- Price, George C.**, Belizean Prime Minister from September 21, 1981
- Proper, Datus C.**, Director, Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from September 1982
- Pym, Francis**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from April 6, 1982, until June 11, 1983

**Quijano, Raúl**, Argentine Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States

**Rabb, Maxwell M.**, Ambassador to Italy from June 20, 1981

**Raphel, Arnold**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from June 1982 until April 1984

**Rashish, Myer**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 29, 1981, until January 20, 1982

**Reagan, Ronald W.**, President of the United States

**Regan, Donald T.**, Secretary of the Treasury from January 22, 1981

**Rentschler, James M.T.**, member, National Security Council Staff from 1982

**Ridley, Nicholas**, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs until September 1981; Financial Secretary to the Treasury from September 14, 1981, until June 11, 1983; thereafter, Transport Secretary

**Richards, Francis**, Assistant Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary

**Robinson, Davis R.**, Legal Adviser of the Department of State from July 30, 1981

**Robinson, William B.**, Director, Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from December 1981

**Roca, Eduardo**, Argentine Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 1982 until June 1982

**Ros, Enrique**, Argentine Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Worship

**Roshco, Bernard**, Director, Office of Plans and Policy Analysis, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

**Rostow, Eugene V.**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from June 30, 1981, until January 12, 1983

**Roussel, Peter**, Staff Member, Office of the Press Secretary, White House

**Rowen, Harry**, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency

**Royo, Aristides**, President of Panama until July 31, 1982

**Ryan, Robert J., Jr.**, Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from August 1981 until March 1984

**Saint-Jean, Alfredo Oscar**, President of Argentina from June 18, 1982, until July 1, 1982

**Sapia-Bosch, Alfonso F.**, member, National Security Council Staff until June 1983

**Scanlan, John D.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1981 until October 1982

**Schmidt, Helmut**, West German Chancellor until October 1, 1982

**Schneider, William, Jr.**, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, until September 9, 1982; thereafter, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology

**Seitz, Raymond G.H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from October 1981 until July 1982; Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from July 1982 until July 1984

**Service, Robert E.**, Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until August 1982; Member, Falkland Islands Working Group, Department of State from April 1982 until June 1982

**Sherman, William C.**, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in the Security Council from July 1981 until January 1984

**Shlaudeman, Harry W.**, Ambassador to Argentina until August 26, 1983; Ambassador at Large and Special Envoy for Central America from March 26, 1984

**Shoemaker, Christopher C.**, Member of the National Security Council Staff until June 1982

**Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of State from July 16, 1982

**Sienkiewicz, Stan**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from July 1981

**Simons, Thomas W., Jr.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from September 1981

**Sinclair, Ian**, Legal Adviser, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Small, William N.**, Admiral, USN; Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 1981 until 1983

**Smith, Carl R.**, Major General, USAF; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from May 1982

**Smith, Keith C.**, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until July 1983

**Smith, N. Shaw**, Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Relations, Department of State from June 1982 until August 1983

**Smith, William D.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Director of Naval Communications, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

**Smith, William F.**, Attorney General from January 23, 1981

**Sorzano, Jose S.**, Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council from 1981 until 1983; Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1983

**Sotera, Alfredo**, General, Argentine Army Intelligence

**Stanford, John H.**, Colonel, USA; Department of Defense representative on Interagency Group

**Stockman, David A.**, Director, Office of Management and Budget from January 21, 1981

**Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until January 26, 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982

**Streator, Edward J., Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in London until August 1984

**Taft, William Howard, IV**, General Counsel of the Department of Defense from April 2, 1981, until May 2, 1984

**Takacs, Esteban Arpad**, Argentine Ambassador to the United States from August 1981

**Thatcher, Margaret H.**, British Prime Minister

**Thomas, Charles H.**, Director, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

**Thomas, David**, Assistant Under Secretary for the Americas, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Thomas, Derek M.D.**, Minister, British Embassy in Washington until 1984

**Thompson, Herbert B.**, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States

**Tobin, Thomas G.**, Brigadier General, USAF; Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Center

**Train, Harry D., II**, Admiral, USN; Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command until September 30, 1982

**Ulloa Elias, Manuel**, Peruvian Prime Minister until January 3, 1983

**Ure, John**, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

**Vessey, John W., Jr.**, General, USA; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 18, 1982

**Videla, Jorge Rafael**, General, President of Argentina until March 29, 1981

**Viola, Roberto Eduardo**, General, President of Argentina from March 29, 1981, until December 10, 1981

**Waldheim, Kurt**, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 31, 1981

**Wall, J. Stephen**, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington until 1983

**Walters, Vernon A.**, "Dick," Ambassador at Large from July 22, 1981

- Watson, Thomas C.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director for Planning and Resources, Office of the Director J-4 (Logistics), Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Weinberger, Caspar W.**, "Cap," Secretary of Defense
- Wenick, Martin A.**, Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from November 1983
- West, Francis J., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April 4, 1981, to April 1, 1983
- Wheeler, Michael O.**, Colonel, Member of the National Security Council Staff from January 1982 until March 1983
- Wheelock, Jaime**, Nicaraguan Minister of Agricultural, Cattle Development and Agrarian Reform
- Whitelaw, William**, British Member of Parliament, Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party
- Whitney, Ray**, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- Whittemore, Clive**, Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister
- Wick, Charles Z.**, Director, International Communication Agency from June 9, 1981
- Williams, Anthony**, British Ambassador to Argentina until April 1982
- Williams, James A.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1981
- Wright, Sir J. Oliver**, British Ambassador to the United States from September 1982
- Young, Janet, Baroness**, Leader of the British House of Lords
- Zakheim, Dov**, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- Zambrano Velasco, Jose Alberto**, Venezuelan Foreign Minister
- Zelnick, Bob**, Deputy Washington Bureau Chief, American Broadcasting Company
- Zinn, Ricardo**, Argentine businessman



# Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

## Prelude to the Conflict, May 1979–April 1, 1982

### 1. Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

A-36

Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979

#### SUBJECT

The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social Review

(U) SUMMARY: This airgram provides a detailed study of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: its history; the foreign policy problem it represents for Argentina and the United Kingdom; travel and logistics; economic, administrative and social factors; American residents and interests on the Malvinas; and aspects of life on the Islands today. It was prepared following the drafting officer's week-long visit to the Islands January 24–31, 1979.

(U) During that trip, American businessmen, American historians and marine architects, American conservationists, American journalists and tourists, and resident American settlers met in Stanley expressed an interest in having on record at the State Department basic information on the Islands, including travel, communications, documentation, and visitors' facilities. Although changes in plane schedules and accommodations will undoubtedly occur, the enclosed information should provide basic orientation for the prospective traveler.

(C) The paper concludes that Argentina will eventually regain political sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falkland Files of Luigi Einaudi, Lot 90D400, Falklands Crisis History. Confidential. Drafted by Yvonne Thayer (POL); cleared by Chaplin; approved by Hallman. Sent for information to London, Montevideo, Santiago, and USCINCSO.



the current talks could postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain's admittedly anachronistic colonial rule. It is less clear whether the Argentines will be successful in populating and rejuvenating the Islands' economy over the long term. As long as the Malvinas do not fall into unfriendly hands or are not exploited for harmful strategic and military ends, US interests are unlikely to be adversely affected by future disposition of the Islands. END SUMMARY.

### THE MALVINAS ISLANDS

#### I. Introduction

(U) The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands constitute one of Argentina's oldest foreign policy problems. The question of sovereignty over the Islands, claimed by Argentina but administered by Great Britain since English marines threw out Argentine settlers in 1833, has become an Argentine staple at the UN and among the Non-Aligned, absorbing for many years a disproportionate amount of Argentine international political capital and energy in world fora.

(U) Argentina wants to re-establish uncontested sovereignty over the Malvinas and far-flung dependencies to the southeast—the South Georgias, Sandwich and Shetland Islands—for a number of reasons: to right its historic grievance against British usurpation; to obtain the strategic and military benefits of a land base and enormous territorial sea claim in the southern Atlantic; to establish possession over the petroleum, fishing, krill, and other maritime resources; and to control access as well as fortify its claim to a corresponding sector of Antarctica.

(C) Argentine claims in Antarctica overlap with those of Great Britain—and, in part, Chile—largely based on overlapping claims to the Malvinas Islands and dependencies. Argentine fear that Chilean rights in the Beagle Channel could spread to future Chilean claims eastward toward the Malvinas and southward in Antarctica helped to feed the southern border controversy with Chile which nearly erupted into war in late 1978.<sup>2</sup>

#### II. The Argentine Claim

(U) Argentina bases her claim to the Malvinas on the Islands' possession and occupation by Spain in the late 1790s. Though the actual discoverer of the Islands remains in dispute, the first documented settlement was established by the French in 1764. The French named the Islands "Iles Malouines", after the French port St. Malo. (The name was later translated by the Spanish to Malvinas.) Two years later the

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation relating to the Carter administration's handling of the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin America Region.

French sold the islands to the Spanish Crown for 25,000 British pounds. In the meantime the British, in 1765, laid claim to the islands, initiating a sovereignty dispute first with France, then with Spain which was only abandoned when Britain's attention was turned to the Revolutionary War launched by the American colonies to the north.

(U) The Spanish remained in actual possession of the Islands for the next 40 years until Argentina, newly independent from Spain, claimed them for itself. A small Argentine delegation established a new capital at the protected harbor of Stanley, only to be dislodged by three boatloads of British seamen in 1833. The British, through the royally chartered Falkland Islands Company, populated the Islands with colonists and sheep, and have administered it ever since.

(U) For many years the Argentines maintained their claim with little more than routine official protests to the British government. Since the mid-1960s however, Argentina has increasingly pressed its claim and persistently raised the issue in world fora. In 1964 the UN, in response to an Argentine appeal, classified the Islands as a non-self-governing territory administered by the UK and called on both parties to initiate talks towards peaceful resolution of their conflicting sovereignty claims.

(U) Confidential bilateral talks began in 1966, showing little progress until 1971. By that time, the Falkland Islands Company, popularly called the FIC, had announced its intention to withdraw its monthly Stanley-Montevideo cargo boat run, thus ending the Islands' only regular link to the mainland. The resultant communications crisis led to the 1971 Joint Statement which established regular Argentine air service to the Islands; norms for telephone, telegraph and postal services; and agreement on travel documents. Subsequent agreements established a Joint Commission to consult on matters of mutual concern regarding the Islands, placed an Argentine official representative to the Joint Commission resident in Stanley, and authorized the Argentine petroleum company YPF and gas company, Gas de Estado, to distribute fuel on the Islands. Today more than a dozen Argentines live in Stanley—the official Joint Commission representative, Argentine Air Force Vice-Commodore Canosa, employees of YPF and Gas de Estado and two Spanish language teachers financed by the Argentine Education Ministry.

(U) In the meantime, bilateral relations with Britain took a sudden turn for the worse when in late 1975 the British government unilaterally dispatched a high-ranking mission to investigate the worrisome economic stagnation of the Islands. Although the Shackleton mission eventually concluded the economic improvement irrevocably required greater ties to the Argentine mainland, the Argentine government strongly opposed the visit and, in an incident overplayed at home

allegedly to distract the Argentine public from more pressing internal problems, recalled its ambassador from London in early 1976. London reciprocated by bringing its ambassador home from Buenos Aires and the two countries have maintained relations at the *chargé* level since then.

(U) In 1977 the two countries resumed bilateral negotiations over the fate of the Islands and by early 1979 Argentina officially suggested diplomatic representation be upgraded to the level of ambassador. Reportedly the two countries will exchange ambassadors before the end of the year.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The current talks promise to be a drawn-out affair. Great Britain has tried to focus the talks on economic cooperation, which Argentina insists on tying to progress on the sovereignty question. Britain has, both publicly and privately, signalled its willingness to withdraw as an anachronistic colonial power from the Islands; but it has also, in response to significant UK parliamentary pressure, promised to take no step without the consent of the Islanders.

(C) The Islanders are opposed to further Argentine presence on the Islands and adamantly opposed to the Islands' transfer. The Islanders maintain a powerful Falkland Islands lobby in Britain and have enlisted conservative MPs in opposing any change in the Islands' colonial status. The Islanders are deeply suspicious of the renewed bilateral talks, grudgingly admitting economic benefits but rejecting any change in political status.

(C) The Islanders are loathe to admit any Argentine foothold in the archipelago. When after the December, 1978 round of talks, the sides announced tentative agreement toward potential cooperation in scientific research in the outer island dependencies, the Islanders emphatically rejected the proposal.<sup>4</sup> (Argentina already has a small

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<sup>3</sup> On November 15, 1979, Argentina and the United Kingdom announced their decision to renew full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Anthony Williams was named the British Ambassador to Argentina and Carlos Ortiz de Rozas was posted to London as Argentine Ambassador to the United Kingdom. (Telegram 9375 from Buenos Aires, November 15, 1979; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D790531–0622)

<sup>4</sup> The talks between Argentina and the United Kingdom took place in Geneva, December 18–20. In telegram 10044 from Buenos Aires, December 26, 1978, the Embassy transmitted a summary and assessment of the meetings. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D780534–0248)

scientific research station on the south Georgian island of Thule,<sup>5</sup> to the periodic consternation of the Islanders and their British Parliament supporters. The December proposal would have, in effect, legitimized the Argentine presence on Thule.) The communique released after the last round of talks in New York in March, 1979 conspicuously omitted any mention of joint scientific cooperation and announced only that the talks were held and another session would be scheduled later in the year.

(C) Argentina is clearly annoyed at British foot dragging on the question. It also feared a Conservative victory in the upcoming British elections.<sup>6</sup> The Conservative Party has traditionally shown far less willingness than the Laborites to discuss the future political disposition of the Islands.

(C) In the meantime, however, Argentina is following a patient, multifront policy designed to build international pressure to force Britain into speeding negotiations on the sovereignty question while, at the same time, steadily seeking to win the Islanders' confidence if not their loyalty. On the international front, Argentina consistently raises the issue in the Non-Aligned, the OAS and the UN and has long conditioned its vote on third world issues to ensure maximum LDC support for its Malvinas position. For the Islands, Argentina provides at great financial sacrifice the twice weekly Air Force LADE flights, subsidized petroleum products and bottled gas, a vastly overbuilt fuel storage complex, two language teachers giving free Spanish lessons, full scholarships to any Islander youth interested in studying in Argentina, and maintenance support for the Stanley airstrip. Air Force Vice Comodoro Canosa told the reporting officer he also intended to offer the Islanders an additional weekly cargo flight to bring in fresh food

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the 1976 Argentine establishment of a weather research station, staffed by 40 scientists, on Southern Thule, an island in the South Sandwich Islands. The United Kingdom formally protested the Argentine presence at the end of 1976 and again in October 1977. In May 1978, the Argentine Foreign Ministry rejected the British protest with a communiqué that "strongly reaffirmed Argentina's sovereignty over the Southern Sandwich Islands." To this, former Prime Minister Lord Home (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) "urged Britain to give Argentina a deadline to withdraw the 40 scientists before Argentina 'try something more ambitious and even more dangerous' in the disputed area," a suggestion a British Foreign Office spokesman reportedly rejected. In telegram 3648 from Buenos Aires, May 11, 1978, the Embassy reported that an official of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires stated "the UK has no real problem with the Argentine base per se and has already taken the legal steps to reaffirm its claims on the Islands," adding "neither country wants trouble over the Thule base and both hope the issue will simply fade away." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D780201-0845)

<sup>6</sup> In the British General Election held May 3, 1979, the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, defeated the incumbent Labour Party government of Prime Minister James Callaghan.

and other desirable supplies from the Argentine mainland. GOA, he said, is also considering offering to build a vocational school on the Islands, which it would construct wholly from Argentine building materials and staff with Argentine teachers. (To date all building materials are shipped in from England at great cost.) With these attractive offers, Argentina hopes to accustom and soften the Islanders to accepting eventual Argentine sovereignty.

(C) Argentine Foreign Ministry officials have made it clear that the Islanders will be free to retain their British citizenship and enjoy advantageous immunities, not to mention considerable economic assistance, under Argentine rule.

(C) COMMENT: The Embassy predicts, based on contacts and information available here, that eventually Argentina will regain political sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely with solid guarantees conserving the Islanders' patrimony and life style and bilateral agreements for joint economic and scientific exploitation of the area. The opposition of the new Conservative government in Britain could delay that outcome, but it is clear that the continued decline and depopulation of the Islands will require some accommodation if the Islands are to remain viable at all.

(C) Another outburst of Argentine impatience and revanchism could, however, upset and maybe destroy the delicate gradualist approach underway today. Such an event would probably stiffen British backs and public opinion from letting go of the Islands and bring about further deterioration in bilateral UK-Argentine relations.

(C) It appears unlikely at this writing that Argentina would attempt an armed occupation of the Islands, which would only bring international sympathy to the stalwart Islanders as an endangered species. The Argentine Foreign Ministry officials currently responsible for the Malvinas negotiations have expressed to an Embassy officer their support for the present gradualist process and their confidence that the Islands will revert to Argentina sooner or later. The recent unnerving near-war with Chile over conflicting Beagle Channel claims may have also helped to temper Argentine officials' impatience in pursuing a Malvinas solution. At the same time, Argentine diplomats will be compelled to demonstrate to the home audience real progress in the ongoing talks, balancing that off against potential British backlash at any sign of a "selling-out" of the Islanders. END COMMENT.

### III. *Economic, Administrative and Social Factors*

(U) The Islands themselves are of little economic importance. The single enterprise on the islands is sheep raising and the entire organization of the Islands is geared to the production of wool. The Malvinas produce about two and one half million kilos of wool each year at a

value of about US \$5 million. (By way of comparison, Argentina produces 155 million kilos of wool per year and exports 90 million kilos.) Other economic endeavors—meat and kelp processing, canning, mink ranching—quickly met with failure, due in good part to the inertia and opposition of the Islanders, who fight any change in their quaint and isolated existence.

(C) The presence of maritime resources and possibly oil in the surrounding sea has sparked renewed interest in the Islands; however, major economic projects have to date been largely kept in abeyance until the political sovereignty question is resolved. A major British food processing firm is tentatively investigating the possibility of commercializing krill which exists in abundance off the South Georgia Islands. Seismic studies prepared by international geophysical research companies suggest oil may be present in the nearby sea, a factor of little interest to the Islanders and one typically downplayed by both the British and Argentine claimants in their discussions over sovereignty of the Islands. Physical and climatic conditions would at any rate make oil exploitation a tremendously costly proposition and near-term exploitation of possible oil reserves does not appear likely.

(U) The limited economic activity and opportunity on the Islands has led to their steady depopulation. Spurred by farm mechanization, economic stagnation, residents' personal dissatisfaction and nagging doubts over the political future of the Islands, the resident population has dropped from 2,400 to about 1,600 in the last ten years. The dismantling several years ago of international satellite tracking and communications installations caused an abrupt fall in the population and outside influence in Stanley. The lack of women, outnumbered by men by almost two to one overall and by an even greater proportion in "the Camp," has also inhibited family growth and permanent settlement on the Islands.

(U) About half of the population of the Islands lives in Stanley, the rest in camp settlements. Camp dwellers, scattered randomly on the two main islands of West and East Falklands and on some of the nearby 200 outer islands of the archipelago, entertain a traditional disdain and dislike for the "city folk" of Stanley and the two societies live effectively cut off from one another.

(U) Responsible both for the economic existence and the increasing stagnation of the Islands is the Falkland Islands Company. The FIC, as it is called, exercises a virtual monopoly over the Islands, owning about half the land, half of the 600,000 sheep and producing nearly half the revenue, at a profit of some US \$1.2 million a year. The company, set up by British royal charter in the mid-1800's, operates the Islands' only inter-island cargo vessel, the main Stanley jetty, the main warehouse and repair service and the largest general store. Its domain

embraces nearly every aspect of the Islanders' daily life. Workers live in the company houses, eat in company kitchens or receive company supplied food, shop at the company store and save at the company "bank."

(C) At the same time, the company encourages no competition and has made no effort to develop the islands beyond wool production. While resident company officials, mostly non-"natives," are among the loudest to condemn Argentine intentions, most are assigned to the Islands only temporarily and evidence little loyalty beyond that to their stockholders.

(U) The Islands are administered by a governor appointed by the British Crown, assisted by an executive council which includes the colonial secretary and the treasurer (also appointed from England) and six island counselors and a legislative council which includes again the colonial secretary and treasurer and five locally elected representatives, apportioned from Stanley and the Camp. Government, for the most part, means carrying out instructions received from London, administering public services, keeping the inter-islands Beaver aircraft flying, and serving as liaison between island interests and the UK. Forty-two Royal British marines comprise the Falklands' token defense force.

(U) The British government is, along with the FIC, the main employer on the Islands. Local revenues come from fairly hefty local taxes, with the British government kicking in mainly salary differentials for British government-hired doctors, teachers, pilots and other necessary skilled personnel. The UK also finances major projects, such as the new airstrip, boarding facilities for the Stanley school, and the first road to be built outside of Stanley, currently under construction.

(U) Given the declining and largely unskilled native population on the Islands, contract workers make up as much as a quarter of the population. These are hired by the British government as well as by the wool companies. Most come to the Islands on two-year renewable contracts with a one-way (to the Islands) trip paid. Contract workers are paid the Islands salaries of some two to four thousand pounds a year (US \$4,000–\$8,000), with the difference from normal British salaries paid directly to their accounts in the UK.

(C) The presence of contract workers and the posted British officials is viewed as a necessary evil, occasioning among many Islanders considerable resentment as well. Native Islanders, for example, are not paid the salary differential automatically granted to British contract workers for the same work. From what the reporting officer saw and heard while visiting the Islands, the "natives" do not mix easily with officials or contract workers, partly due to personality differences and native prejudice against "outsiders." Many of the Islanders (quite correctly) also distrust the UK's commitment to retaining the Falklands



as a colony and are deeply suspicious of the current bilateral talks with Argentina. The Islanders also spoke of the social segregation and “snobbish” behavior of the temporarily-posted officials and contract-workers.

(C) Among the complaints of the Islanders were the failure of Britain to provide more generous and active economic support and to “face down” the Argentines on the question of political sovereignty. Knowledgeable Islanders suspect the winds are changing against continued political attachment to England. Some are coming to grips with that possibility and speak of their determination to remain on the Islands under any flag; others prefer to fight the Argentine presence. One British-born long-time resident married to an Islander asked if the United States might be interested in “taking over” the Islands if the British bowed out. Another hinted ominously that the inhabitants may “offer” the Islands to the Russians, who heavily fish the surrounding waters.

(C) Despite its threats, the formerly vociferous Falkland Islands Committee which fights for keeping the Islands British, has lost a lot of its thunder of late. Finances for the small, albeit effective, Committee delegation in the UK is growing tight, and Islander membership is falling off. A spate of vandalism against Argentine targets or symbols on the Islands in 1975 and 1976 has also ceased and a sense of resignation, with pockets of vocal protest, permeates Stanley.

(C) It can be expected that if the Islands return to Argentine possession, a significant number of British residents will depart the Islands. It is less clear whether Argentina will have any more luck populating the Malvinas with Argentine pioneers than it has had populating its own vast, empty Patagonia.

#### *IV. Americans and US Interests in the Islands*

(U) There are some ten US citizens living in the Malvinas, five in Stanley and another five or six in the Camp. All but one at the time of the reporting officer’s January 1979 visit were Bahai, a universalist religious sect which increases exposure to the faith by encouraging members to “pioneer” in various parts of the world. Pioneers pay their own travel expenses and find their own jobs. They live scattered throughout the community and apparently seek adherents not through active proselytizing, but through attracting others to their simple and serene life style. Members abstain from political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley.

Those Bahais visited in Stanley appeared to be fairly well integrated into the community. The senior Bahai was John Leonard, a gracious



fatherly person who has worked for the FIC in Stanley for 22 years. Other US citizens on the Islands are John and Jeanne Sheridan (she works as the secretary to the British colonial secretary, he is a cabinet maker and artist); Kathryn Watson (a nurse married to a British-contract dentist); Don and Debbie Youngquist (who live in Port Stephens settlement, where he works as an electrician); Greg and Polly Malby (who live on Fox Bay East settlement where he works as a carpenter and electrician and she as a nurse); and Martin Dibble and Robin Grey who work as laborers at the Port Howard settlement. American citizen Margaret Smith, who is not a Bahai, was working on a settlement during the reporting officer's January 1979 visit. The Bahais in Stanley expressed considerable satisfaction at the visit of an American government official and requested assistance with US tax, passport, residency and other documents and information. (It was later arranged with the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires that US citizens on the Islands could transmit their passports for renewal to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires through the British Embassy's Stanley-Buenos Aires weekly air pouch.)

(U) The US at present has no economic or political interests in the Islands. An American shrimp-shelling equipment manufacturer has been approached by a British firm to consider participating in a commercial krill processing project, with no concrete results to date. Potential oil reserves are unknown and high extraction costs preclude near term petroleum exploitation in the Malvinas area. American marine archeologists and conservationists are increasingly visiting the Islands, attracted by the many historical shipwrecks and interesting and unique flora and fauna.

(U) Strategically the Malvinas are important for their geographical location straddling the southern Atlantic. Although a Soviet presence or base on the Malvinas might properly be viewed with alarm by the US for strategic and defense reasons, that possibility appears remote. The US position on the Argentine-British dispute has been strictly neutral and the USG has always abstained on the issue in world fora.

[Omitted here are sections on "Travel and Logistics" and "Life on the Malvinas."]

## VII. *Conclusion*

(C) The steady depopulation and economic stagnation of the Islands coupled with Britain's confidentially acknowledged intention to ease out of its anachronistic colonial rule make it fairly apparent that Argentina will eventually triumph in its long pressed claim to the Malvinas. What of the present British heritage will remain and whether the Argentines will be more successful in populating and making economically viable the archipelago is worthy of doubt. Argentine interest in the Malvinas is primarily strategic and historic and only secondarily

economic. The vast barrenness and distance of the Malvinas, coupled with its present minimal economic output, would require a major costly and sustained effort on the part of succeeding Argentine governments to boost the islands out of their present stagnation. Argentine Vice-Commodore Canosa, who presently represents his government on the Islands, speaks expansively of future Argentine plans to bring roads and houses, businesses and factories, tourists and Argentine pioneers to the Malvinas. In the end, it may well be the sheep and penguins that win out.

Chaplin<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Chaplin initialed "MC" next to this typewritten signature.

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## 2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 7, 1980, 0200Z

120050. Subject: US/UK Consultations: UK Talks on Falkland Islands.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. During the discussion on the Caribbean and Guatemala-Belize (septels)<sup>2</sup> on April 30 between UK FCO Minister Ridley and FCO Latin America Director Harding, and Asst. Secretary Bowdler and DAS

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225–0913. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to London. Drafted by J.D. Blacken (ARA/CEN); cleared in S/S–O and in draft by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John A. Bushnell, W.R. Warne (ARA/CAR), and M. Michaud (EUR/NE); and approved by Bowdler.

<sup>2</sup> The portion of the conversation dealing with the Caribbean was summarized and transmitted by the Department in telegram 117143 to London, Ottawa, Paris, Bonn, USNATO, USINT Havana, Kingston, Paramaribo, and Brussels, May 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800220–0586) A summary of the portion of the conversation that addressed the Guatemala-Belize border dispute was transmitted in telegram 121020 to Belize, May 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800227–0153)

Bushnell, Ridley described his recent talks with the Argentines concerning the Falkland Islands.<sup>3</sup>

3. Ridley said that his recent meeting with the Argentines should be called “talks” rather than negotiations. He met with the Argentine Foreign Minister Cavandoli to test the Argentine position and report back to his government. An anodyne communique had been issued at the conclusion of the talks. The Argentine position is that they want to have a solution which enables them to say that the Islands have been returned to them.

4. For the 1850 British residents on the Islands, the problem is one of their interest which is not to be Argentinian. This is also an emotional political issue in the UK all out of proportion to the number of people involved. However, if nothing is done, the Argentines might harass the British on the Island. Ridley said that both sides would have to be flexible. He commented that perhaps one solution might be for the UK to recognize Argentine sovereignty, then lease the Islands, since no Argentines live on them; however, this raises questions of oil rights, etc.

5. Argentine military leaders told Ridley that Argentina had just two major foreign policy problems left—the Beagle Channel,<sup>4</sup> and Falkland Island disputes—and once they were solved the slate would be wiped clean. Then, the military could turn the country over to a civilian government.

6. Ridley remarked that the Argentines appeared to be “increasingly thick” with the Russians and, to a lesser extent perhaps, with the Cubans. Bowdler noted that they appeared interested in developing cooperation with the Soviets on nuclear energy. The U.S., however, did not believe that they were developing a close relationship with the Cubans. Bushnell pointed out that Cuban support of Argentine terrorists will continue to be an impediment to close relations beyond trade between the Argentine military regime and the Cubans.

**Christopher**

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<sup>3</sup> The talks took place April 28–29 in New York. The British and Argentine delegations were headed by Ridley and Cavandoli, respectively. A formal summary of the talks was presented in the form of two separate but identical letters from the delegations to Waldheim, dated May 5. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations reported on May 13 that the letters were circulated as General Assembly documents on May 12. The English language text of these letters was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1871 from USUN, May 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800242–0884)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 1.

**3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 3, 1981, 2021Z

53712. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With British Foreign Secretary Carrington, February 27, 1981: Falkland Islands.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. At their meeting on the above date and subject, Carrington briefly outlined what he regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands.<sup>2</sup> Argentina will not agree to put its claims before the International Court because they are not valid. Problem for Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not want to become Argentines.<sup>3</sup> The British tactic is to keep the ball in the air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don't like this idea.

3. Participants in addition to principals: US—Stoessel, Rashish, Eagleburger, Streator and Funseth; UK—Henderson, Palliser, Bullard, Fretwell, Walden, Fenn and Pakenham.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810100–0377. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Funseth; cleared by Eagleburger and Bremer; and approved by Goldberg.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> On January 20, as part of an overall assessment of British policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, the Embassy in London wrote of the state of the Falklands/Malvinas negotiations: "The end-of-year push to achieve some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands dispute came to naught. Ridley's efforts to employ a forcing strategy in negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and give public assurances that nothing would be done to change the status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign Office, though discouraged, will probably have another go at moving things off dead center before the current Parliament is dismissed. Ridley may have decided it is simply not worth the trouble." (Telegram 1165 from London, January 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810029–0299)

#### 4. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

London, March 12, 1981, 1235Z

4663. Subject: Britain Searches for Solution to Falkland Island Dispute. Ref: State 53712.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text) Summary: Although last month's talks in New York<sup>3</sup> produced no progress toward a settlement of Britain's dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, they may have served a useful purpose. Island negotiators may finally realize that the current arrangement cannot be maintained indefinitely. The Islanders are considering new proposals as a basis for further discussions with the Argentines. Another round of talks, however, is unlikely before the end of the year. While the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. End summary.

2. Stalemate in New York: On March 10, Ron Deare, Head of the Foreign Office's West Indian and Atlantic Department, reviewed the status of discussions with Argentina on the future of the Falkland Islands. The ministerial level talks in New York at the end of February produced a stalemate. Argentina still insisted on its sovereignty, and the Islanders were determined to remain British. Minister of State Nicholas Ridley had carried a mandate from London to support the Islanders.

3. Reviewing the options: During the runup to the New York talks, Ridley, in an effort to get things off dead center, had proposed several options to the Islanders including a lease-back arrangement which would have conceded Argentina sovereignty over the Islands on the understanding that they would immediately be leased back to the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810117–1025. Confidential. Sent for information to Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 3.

<sup>3</sup> British and Argentine representatives, led by Ridley and Cavandoli respectively, convened in New York February 23–24 for a new round of discussions on the status of the Falklands/Malvinas. During these talks, the first between the two sides since April 1980, the two sides agreed to pursue the "question" of the Islands "in further negotiations at an early date." On March 23, the two sides confirmed the outcome of the talks in separate but identical letters to Waldheim from Beltramno and Whyte, which were circulated as General Assembly documents on April 1. The text of these letters was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1050 from USUN on April 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810160–0579) During a meeting with a USUN official, April 3, a UKUN officer described the February session as "more an opportunity to give Argentines and Falkland Islanders exposure to each other" than "a substantive meeting." (Ibid.)

British for a specified period. The Islanders wanted to make no concessions. They proposed a freezing of the status quo for as long as fifty years, in the hopes that the problem would somehow disappear in the interim. The ensuing discussions predictably made little progress.

4. A poor start: The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British dependency of St. Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British domination or as an insidious plot "to dilute Argentina's racial stock." Not the best way to start negotiations, Deare observed.

5. The bright side: There was, however, a positive aspect. The inclusion of two Islanders on the British side of the table was a useful educational device. They were "shocked" to learn first hand of the depth of the Argentine feeling on the sovereignty issue. They went home in a sober mood. Through them, Deare opined, the Islanders may finally realize that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely.

6. Next steps: The Falklanders are now reassessing their position and in due course will come back to the British with new proposals as a basis for further discussions with the Argentines. Fortunately the upcoming elections are likely to occupy center stage in Buenos Aires over the summer. Nothing therefore is likely to occur much before the end of the year when another effort will be made.

7. The U.S. perspective: Against this background, the best the British are likely to achieve in the near-term is to neutralize the issue in the hopes that, with time, the realities of interdependence will eventually compel the parties themselves to come to terms. From the U.S. standpoint, a settlement would remove another contentious Latin American perennial. But while the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere.

**Streator**

**5. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, March 30, 1981, 1830Z

2289. Subject: (U) Falkland Islands Negotiations: The View From Buenos Aires. Ref: London 4663.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C) Summary: Argentine Government hopes that recent New York talks<sup>3</sup> have convinced Falkland Islanders and HMG that freeze in the status quo is unacceptable. The GOA would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement. End summary.

2. (U) On March 6 the Argentine Foreign Ministry issued a communique in which it referred to recent rumors about the status of negotiations on the Falkland/Malvinas question and declared GOA continues to reject any proposal that does not recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as a first principle. GOA statement also noted that the negotiations have been stepped up since April of 1980.<sup>4</sup>

3. (C) EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as "Kelpers" (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands. An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection.

4. (C) The Islanders will be holding elections in the second half of this year. According to UK Embassy Malvinas Officer Richard Gosney, the incumbent popularly-elected leaders, called Counsellors, are reluctant to make commitments that would limit their successors' options. Nevertheless, the community of 1,800 is closely knit despite being scattered and isolated, and, according to Gosney, there is reason to hope that discussion among the Islanders will proceed so that the new

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810152-0335. Confidential. Sent for information to London.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 4.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 4.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 2.

authorities will be ready to present views to HMG soon after taking office in the latter part of 1981.

5. (C) The Argentines are prepared to wait a while, but their patience is limited, according to Forrester. He acknowledged that Argentina would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement, depending on the formulation. Economic decline of the Islands is of concern to all parties, although he noted that in addition to promising geological structures indicating that the area has petroleum potential, there are substantial fishing resources. These at present are exploited mostly by the Poles and Soviets. Argentina and the UK, according to Forrester, share the hope that the sovereignty issue can finally be resolved so that progress can be made on economic problems.

Shlaudeman

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**6. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, July 30, 1981, 1225Z

5542. Rome for Vatican. Subject: Argentina Urges Acceleration of Negotiations. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 5472 (Notal),<sup>2</sup> (B) memcon of July 8, 1981 with British EmbOff in Buenos Aires (Notal).<sup>3</sup>

1. (C) Summary. On July 22, Foreign Ministry announced that it was urging HMG to accelerate the pace of negotiations over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). The announcement revealed some details of a strong and detailed reiteration of the GOA's position contained in a note handed to the British Ambassador here. The timing and vigorous tone of the statement took the British here somewhat by surprise, but the substance was not new, according to a source at UK Embassy. FonMin Camilion said that the GOA acted now because the Falklanders will hold municipal elections in September and he plans to meet with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810356–0871. Confidential. Sent for information to London, Montevideo, Rome, Santiago, and Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 5472 from Buenos Aires, July 27, addressed Argentine press coverage of the question of Argentina's participation in the Multinational Force and Observers mission (MFO), an entity which was to serve in a peacekeeping capacity following Israeli withdrawal from Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810351–0120)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.



Lord Carrington in New York at the UN General Assembly.<sup>4</sup> We suspect that Camilion's timing may also be related to the Junta's consideration of participation in the Sinai MFO. He may want to divert media attention from that subject or, on the contrary, make a point: Arab support on the Malvinas issue would be jeopardized by Argentine participation in MFO. End summary.

2. (U) Key points of the GOA note are:

(A) No significant progress has occurred since the recommencement of Falkland negotiations in 1977.

(B) Better communications between the Islands and South America have not produced the intended results of "improving mutual understanding" and "contributing to a successful negotiation."

(C) The question of Island sovereignty is a subject for bilateral negotiation between GOA and HMG exclusively; Islander attitudes are not a factor.

(D) There are only two alternatives: effective Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands or a continuation of the status quo, and the latter is not only intolerable to GOA and world community but also means a constant deterioration in the economy of the Islands.

3. (U) The note goes on to state the longstanding GOA position on sovereignty and willingness to respect the interests of the Falklanders. It adds that Argentina will continue to provide services to the Islanders (among other things, air transport, fuel and some foodstuffs) as long as there is "an evident British political will to advance constructively" in the negotiations. The GOA states that it is prepared to have the United Nations guarantee that the interests of the Islanders will be protected. (References to the role of the UN interlace the statement.) Finally, the communique indicates that "Argentina will consider practical arrangements that take into account the interests of those who could benefit from the development of the Islands' resources."

4. (U) In a separate but related development, on July 24 the Argentine Navy stopped six Polish vessels for fishing "within Argentine jurisdictional waters south of the Malvinas" (precise location not cited), escorted them to an area beyond the claimed jurisdictional waters and lodged a protest with the Polish fleet commander.

5. (C) A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs here told EmbOff that GOA statement appears at first reading to contain nothing new. However, he noted that the timing is somewhat odd—the Island elections and meeting in New York with FonSec Carrington

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 7.

are six weeks off—and its tone is more vigorous than in the past. The implied threat to cut back further on services to the Islands (flights were reduced from twice weekly to once weekly some time ago) was cited as an example, but he acknowledged that GOA entities—the state airline and the state oil company—are losing money on these operations, so HMG is not surprised at GOA frustration. British Embassy official was unwilling to speculate on reasons for new, tougher line on the Malvinas. With respect to the six Polish trawlers, he said they had not been able to learn coordinates of vessels' location when they were stopped, and HMG will consider what action to take, if any, once this information is obtained.

6. (C) Comment: FonMin Camilion has wrapped himself tightly in the flag over the Malvinas before (Ref B), no doubt in part to dispel doubts about him among the Argentine military. But the unlikely timing and unusual force of this announcement makes us suspect he has ulterior motives. Camilion is in a difficult spot on the Sinai MFO issue, which is receiving heavy press play, including a strong "La Prensa" editorial on July 28 in support of Argentine participation; Camilion may be trying to divert attention to another issue. On the other hand, he may be trying to remind his readers that Arab support of the Argentine position on the Malvinas should be factored into the Sinai participation equation. In the same vein, we note that last week the Under Secretary for International Economic Relations in the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Figuerero Antequeda, announced out of the blue that Argentina and a large number of unspecified Arab countries will soon be signing a major commercial agreement, but no other details were offered. Argentina has never had significant trade with the Arab world.

**Shlaudeman**

**7. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, October 5, 1981, 1900Z

7196. CINCSO also for POLAD. Subject: Malvinas/Falklands Dispute.

1. (U) Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion was questioned sharply on this subject at his airport press conference on arrival from the U.S. October 4. Camilion said he and Lord Carrington had agreed in New York that once certain events have taken place over the coming weeks (meaning the current round of elections in the Islands), a date would be set for resuming the negotiations, perhaps before the end of the year. Asked if it were true, as press accounts from New York suggested, that he and Lord Carrington had also agreed that the Islands could not continue as a “colony”, the Minister asserted his belief in a general “understanding” that “the status quo of the Mavinas can no longer be maintained and now we must negotiate.”

2. (U) The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that Argentina is committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is between the UK and Argentina. According to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when questioned as to what specific steps the GOA might take to resolve the issue.

3. (C) Comment. HMG’s Ambassador here, Anthony Williams, told me that Lord Carrington made clear to Camilion in New York that the question is not one of respecting the “interests” of the Islanders, but rather of respecting their “desires.” Williams says that the current elections in the Islands seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the Argentines. Williams nevertheless expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in the early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of results. In his view HMG has about exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying “the Malvinas are ours.”

He also notes continuing muttering in the GOA about cutting off Argentine air service and supply to the Islands.

**Shlaudeman**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965. Confidential. Sent for information to London and USCINCSO.

8. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

London, December 10, 1981, 1704Z

24464. Subj: Talks Resume on Falkland Islands. Ref: London 4663.<sup>2</sup>

1. C–Entire text.

2. Summary: Anglo-Argentine talks on the future of the Falkland Islands will be held in Geneva on Dec. 18–19. With no solution in sight, the British objective is simply to keep the process of dialogue going. While the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. End summary.

3. Robin Fearn, Head of the Foreign Office's South America Department, confirmed to EmbOff on December 8 that talks on the future of the Falkland Islands will be held in Geneva on December 18–19. Two representatives of the Falkland Islands will also attend the talks.

4. Fearn noted that circumstances had gotten in the way of an earlier resumption of the talks adjourned in New York at the end of February.

—In March, the government in Buenos Aires changed.<sup>3</sup>

—In July, Argentina, after informal talks with HMG, had circulated a statement at the UN about reconvening talks.

—In October, Legislative Council elections were held in the Falklands, with HMG pledged to consult with the winners.

5. HMG views Argentina as the proposer and HMG as the responder in the upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG's position is straightforward: It seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement "over the heads of the Islanders."

6. HMG is pessimistic about possibilities for any dramatic breakthroughs. The Islanders have rejected the lease back arrangement, and few options seem available. It might help, Fearn speculated, if there were another government in Argentina. It is easy to understand, he said, why those currently in charge in Buenos Aires are not well loved. The Falklanders argue with considerable effect in London that they do not wish to become "1800 more disappeared persons." From the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810588–0688. Confidential. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and Bern.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 4.

<sup>3</sup> On March 29, Lieutenant General Roberto Viola replaced Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla as head of the Argentine Junta and de facto President.

standpoint, while the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>4</sup>

Louis

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<sup>4</sup> On December 14, the scheduled talks were postponed following a request from the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, which cited his need to remain in Buenos Aires during the transition of government following President Viola's ouster by fellow members of the ruling military Junta on December 10. In telegram 24760 from London, December 15, the Embassy reported that "no new date was set for the talks, but the British assume the delay may carry over until the spring as the new Argentine government reassesses its position on the Falklands." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810596–1184) After a brief interval, Viola was succeeded as de facto President of Argentina by Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri on December 22.

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## 9. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, January 27, 1982

### SUBJECT

Status of Falklands Dispute; Beagle Negotiations; Argentine Ties to Nonaligned Movement

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Richard Forrester, Malvinas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
John F. Keane, Political Officer, American Embassy

### *Falklands Dispute*

Forrester does not expect any significant new Argentine initiative regarding the Malvinas dispute in the near future. Activity has been at a standstill in his office since the government crisis here led to postponement of talks scheduled for late last year.<sup>2</sup> Rescheduling them may be put off until Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas is replaced in London.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL-15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. Confidential. Drafted by Keane on January 28; cleared by King.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 8.

I asked Forrester for his views on a recent article in Buenos Aires daily *La Prensa* by gadfly Iglesias Rouco, who alleged that the Galtieri administration may be considering sending an “ultimatum” to Her Majesty’s Government demanding recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and significant movement toward resolution of the drawn-out dispute. Forrester brushed aside the article as Rouco’s fantasy. He acknowledged that there are officials in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry who would like to threaten or use force, but these people are not involved in the issue. He noted, for example, that in the Foreign Ministry the only officials involved are Under Secretary Ros, the Malvinas directorate, the legal division in a supporting role and, of course, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. He said that he did not know the attitude of Costa Mendez or the President, but it appeared to him that the administration is fully engaged in other issues (e.g. the economy and, in foreign affairs, the Beagle dispute). The Malvinas problem is on the back burner.

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion relating to Argentina’s dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel, Argentine participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, and decisionmaking in the Argentine Foreign Ministry.]

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## 10. Editorial Note

On February 24, 1982, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in London, Edward J. Streater, met with British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Richard Luce for a tour d’horizon of Latin American topics in anticipation of the latter’s meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, scheduled to take place in Washington on March 1. During the meeting, which also touched upon El Salvador, Belize, and Cuba, Luce commented on the upcoming negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas, set to begin in New York on February 26. In telegram 4235 from London, February 25, the Embassy transmitted a synopsis of the meeting and on these negotiations: “Luce noted that he would be in New York over the weekend for further discussions with Argentine officials on the future of the Falkland Islands. The Argentines, he said, were if anything more prickly than ever. The new regime in Buenos Aires was sounding more hawkish. It came through in a more aggressive attitude toward Chile over the Beagle Channel, and the Falklands negotiations could easily go the same route, to the disadvantage of all

concerned. Luce wondered if we might quietly pass the word to the Argentines to ‘cool it’ a bit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820101–1058)

No memorandum of conversation or summary of Luce’s March 1 meeting with Enders has been found, although British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington stated in his March 8 message to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. that the Falklands/Malvinas were among the topics discussed by the two officials (see Document 12). The Department transmitted a summary of the portion of the meeting in which British commitments to Belize were discussed in telegram 55897 to Belize, London, and Guatemala, March 3, repeated for information to USSOUTHCOM, March 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820114–0181)

## 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, March 4, 1982, 1855Z

1250. Subject: (U) Malvinas Dispute. Refs: (A) Buenos Aires 1197,<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 1112.<sup>3</sup>

1. (C) Summary: The focus of the Feb. 26–27 UK–GOA talks on the Falkland Islands was on the pace of the negotiations rather than the substantive issues. The Argentine delegation proposed monthly meetings which it hopes will accelerate resolution of the dispute or at least give the appearance of movement to the domestic audience. A combination of carrots and sticks which the GOA revealed on its drawing boards is not new and the GOA breach of confidentiality of the talks was an irritant to HMG. The ball is now in HMG's court, but UK official here is not optimistic, since HMG rejects GOA premise that negotiations are predicated on HMG acceptance of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. End summary.

2. (U) The unilateral GOA FonMin statement of March 1 (reftel A) marks a renewed effort by the Argentines to force the pace of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820117–0752. Confidential. Sent for information to London, Montevideo, Rome, and Santiago.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1197 from Buenos Aires, March 2, conveyed an informal translation of the text of a "tough" statement on the outcome of the February 26–27 talks, which Figueroa issued the evening of March 1. After discussing the Argentine proposal for monthly Anglo-Argentine meetings on the Falklands/Malvinas, the objective of which "will be to genuinely accelerate negotiations underway toward obtaining recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands," the statement continued: "Argentina has for fifteen years negotiated patiently, loyally and in good faith with Great Britain for a solution of the dispute over sovereignty on those islands within the framework of the U.N. resolutions. The new system is a positive step toward an early solution to the issue. In the event this (early solution) does not occur, Argentina retains the right to put an end to that mechanism and to choose freely the procedure which best suits her interests." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820112–0040)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1112 from Buenos Aires, February 26, the Embassy conveyed its comments on Ros's remarks to the press after the February talks and the views of a British Embassy official on U.K. impressions of Argentina's approach to the bilateral talks. In response to Luce's February 24 request (see Document 10) for the United States to "quietly urge restraint on the Argentines," the Embassy advised that the United States should "avoid involvement" in the dispute. "As Department recalls, the Argentine Navy has tried to draw us into the dispute on Argentina's side. In any case, the cost to us here of being perceived as leaning toward the British in this dispute, which arouses Argentine passions, could be high and the Argentines would find ways of indicating their displeasure." In a final comment, the Embassy noted: "Some of our contacts in the GOA have sought to convey a sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations" and "we have also heard references to an Argentine desire to accelerate the pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820105–0567)



Falkland Islands negotiations. GOA statement reveals part of what transpired at the New York talks, in violation of an understanding with HMG to treat the substance of the negotiations confidential. Furthermore, in a press backgrounder, a FonMin source, probably Costa Mendez himself, “revealed” how the GOA is prepared to take Islanders’ interests into account, but also how GOA would bring pressure to bear if no solution develops soon.

3. (U) The GOA is preparing several proposals to be tabled at the next meeting, according to the FonMin source. These include “statutes” that Argentina would implement guaranteeing respect for the economic interests, religious freedom, political structures and a system for compensating those inhabitants of the Islands who might choose to leave once Argentine sovereignty comes into force. On the other hand, according to the source, if the negotiations remain stalemated, the GOA is prepared to carry out a “well-defined plan” of increasing pressure on HMG, including UN denunciations, “international juridical measures” (presumably the World Court), economic pressure on the Islanders, and a step-by-step cooling of bilateral relations, all the way to a complete break. Some of the measures the GOA would consider against the Islanders, according to the press, include suspension of the Islands’ only airplane connections and air postal service to the outside world, and suspension of Argentine fuel shipments. However, the source noted that, contrary to some jingoistic press speculation, the GOA is not contemplating the use of force to seize the Islands.

4. (C) A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs told EmbOff on March 3 that Argentine FonMin statement took HMG by surprise and is likely to annoy HMG because of the breach of confidentiality. We note BA dailies March 4 carry wire service reports that HMG negotiator Richard Luce said the GOA statement is “not positive and it concerns us.” He confirmed that in the New York talks Argentina proposed high-level monthly meetings with pre-determined agendas, but it is by no means certain that HMG will accept, in view of the complexity of the issues to be discussed and impracticality of such frequent meetings. Moreover, the premise implied in the Argentine statement that the objective of the monthly talks would be to determine when the UK will recognize Argentine sovereignty is totally unacceptable to HMG.

5. (C) As to the “concessions” Argentina is prepared to make to win “the hearts and minds of the Islanders” and the threat of sanctions in the event of an impasse, as UK EmbOff put it, there is nothing new in the Argentine proposal. Former Foreign Minister Camilion made the same offers and threats last year, he pointed out (81 Buenos Aires 5542).<sup>4</sup> He was not willing to speculate on whether the GOA means it

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 6.

this time, although he said that there have been too many rumors recently of a hardening GOA position to dismiss them entirely.

6. (C) Comment: The unilateral Argentine communique was released before the GOA negotiator returned to Buenos Aires, indicating that the GOA planned to issue it regardless of the outcome of the talks, which the British entered with instructions to listen only. In any event, the Foreign Ministry has limited influence on GOA decisions regarding the Malvinas, which, like the Beagle, is managed at the Junta level. The unexpected, threatening GOA communique suggests a hardening attitude, which was also reflected in a bellicose speech on March 3, attended by tough-minded Navy CINC Anaya, on the anniversary of the death of Argentina's most famous naval hero. The GOA may also have wanted to assume a popular posture at a time when any distraction from the nation's economic woes is welcome.

**Shlaudeman**

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## **12. Editorial Note**

From March 4 through 11, 1982, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders traveled to Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina. He visited Argentina March 8 through 10. Summaries of his discussions with Argentine officials on Argentina's human rights record and the situation in Central America are in telegrams 1401 and 1409 from Buenos Aires, March 11 and 12, respectively. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820131-0466 and D820133-0169) During a meeting on March 8 between Enders and Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship Nicanor Costa Mendez devoted to a range of bilateral and regional issues, which had followed a private meeting between the two men earlier the same day, the status of the Falklands/Malvinas negotiations was discussed. Telegram 1446 from Buenos Aires, March 12, transmitted a summary of the meeting, including the portion on the Islands: "This portion of the talk was almost exclusively devoted to a briefing by [Argentine] Under Secretary [Enrique] Ros on the history of the issue since 1964. Ros presented a picture of British intransigence. The GOA has long been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies. When Enders observed that HMG's position does not seem to be based on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of the

Islanders must be respected, Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that ‘the United Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto.’ Ros stated that at the recent bilateral talks with the British, the GOA had proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. Ros stated that his government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its utmost to find a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, Ros stated.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137–0228)

The same day, March 8, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington sent a message to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig about Enders’s discussions with the Argentines, which was delivered by the British Embassy to the Department of State under a covering letter from the U.K. Ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson. In the message, which mentioned the “very helpful” meeting between Enders and Richard Luce on March 1 (see Document 10), Carrington stated the United Kingdom’s increasing concern about “the Argentine Government’s attitude, in particular about the threats which recur in the Argentine press (apparently with some measure of government inspiration) to use force if the negotiations do not soon reach a conclusion on Argentine terms.” “You will realize,” Carrington continued, in a passage that Haig highlighted in the margin of his copy, “that it is politically impossible for us to negotiate against such a background, so anything that Tom Enders can do while in Buenos Aires to bring the Argentines to a more reasonable and pacific frame of mind will be much appreciated by us.” At the top of his copy of Carrington’s message, Haig wrote: “Was Tom apprised?” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820044–1953) No evidence of a transmission of Carrington’s message to Enders in Buenos Aires has been found. On March 12, following his return to Washington, Enders sent a draft response to Carrington’s message, under an action memorandum, to Haig for the latter’s approval. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820044–1948 and 1949) For Haig’s response, as transmitted to London, March 13, see Document 13.

**13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 13, 1982, 1437Z

67606. Subject: Message to Foreign Minister.

1. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to Lord Carrington:

Begin text:

Dear Mr. Minister:

During his visit to Buenos Aires,<sup>2</sup> Tom Enders raised the Falkland Islands both in private and in public. He said that there are human and strategic aspects to the dispute and that both must be satisfied. Tom urged the Argentines to continue negotiations. They were non-committal but not negative.

As opportunities present themselves, we will continue to urge a constructive approach with due regard for all interests at stake. End text.

2. FYI: On March 8, British Embassy delivered message from the Foreign Minister requesting that Assistant Secretary Enders, during his talks in Buenos Aires, urge the GOA to be more reasonable regarding the Falkland Islands.<sup>3</sup> Text being pouched.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820135–0667. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted by O'Connell; cleared by Enders, Service, and K. Smith; and approved by Haig.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 12.

<sup>3</sup> Summarized in Document 12.

**14. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, March 18, 1982, 1719Z

6107. Subject: Falklands Dispute: The view From London. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 1197,<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 1250.<sup>3</sup>

1. C–Entire Text.

2. Summary: HMG fears that the Falkland Islands talks may break down if Argentina continues to insist on discussing only the question of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the British believe that at this point the Argentines have little choice but to continue negotiations. End summary.

3. FCO South America Department Head Robin Fearn has told us that the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine delegation was “clearly uninterested” in discussing anything other than the early transfer of sovereignty. Every British effort to widen the discussion failed, ending with the unilateral Argentine communique (Ref A).

4. HMG is anxious to keep the negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled to attempt a military solution. The British remain convinced of the legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach.

5. Should negotiations break down, HMG is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK’s recent successes in decolonization (Zimbabwe and Belize),<sup>4</sup> and the contrast between British democracy and the Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, however, to avoid such a course if at all possible.

6. Comment: Argentine diplomats here keep in close touch with the evolving situation in Gibraltar, a case with some parallels. With

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146–0021. Confidential. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 11.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 11.

<sup>4</sup> Following the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979, Zimbabwe achieved de jure independence from the United Kingdom on April 18, 1980. Belize became independent of British rule on September 21, 1981.

Anglo-Spanish negotiations scheduled to begin after April 20, the Argentines will be examining closely any concessions HMG is willing to make to Spain. Any give on Gibraltar will almost certainly harden the Argentine position even farther, despite the many differences between the two situations. For the moment, however, FCO believes that negotiations will continue, if only for lack of a better option on either side.

Streator

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**15. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, March 23, 1982, 1916Z

1638. Subject: Weekend Episodes in the South Georgia and Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

1. (U) All Buenos Aires morning dailies March 23 bannered the weekend flag-raising incident involving Argentine seamen in the South Georgia Islands on March 19, denounced yesterday in London. British Ambassador Anthony Williams was summoned this morning to the Foreign Ministry for a discussion of the issue, which now appears complicated by the retaliation by British Falkland Islanders. On March 22, learning of the Argentine activity, the Falkland "Kelpers" reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina's state airline in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and hoisted the Union Jack, vowing "an eye for an eye", according to local press reports.

2. (U) The GOA initial reaction Monday evening<sup>2</sup> to the British complaint about the crew of an Argentine Government vessel landing in Leith Harbor in the South Georgia Islands, about 900 miles east of the Falklands, seemed bland. A spokesman explained that an Argentine Navy cargo transport, the "Bahia Buen Suceso", had been routinely chartered to a private firm to work in the Islands, as it had to other private operators in South Atlantic ports. The March 23 press reported that in this instance, the ship was being used to salvage scrap from an abandoned whale processing facility owned by the Christian

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820154-0489. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to London and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> March 22.

Salvendsen firm. The spokesman said when this work was completed March 21, the vessel and its privately-chartered crew left the area.

3. (U) Asked about the Falklanders' attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said the situation could become "grave". LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air Force feeder airline which is the Falklands' main connection to the mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no other reports of damages.

4. (C) During a meeting March 23, the Foreign Minister and Under Secretary Ros at their initiative briefed the Ambassador on the Argentine version of this affair. They said a local entrepreneur had entered into a contract in London to take the scrap from the whale "factory." He then hired a crew of workmen (four they thought) and bought passage for them on the "Bahia Buen Suceso" which deposited them in Leith. Ros emphasized that the ship regularly plies those waters, is unarmed and crewed entirely by civilians.

5. (C) HMG protested because permission was not sought to land the workmen. As indicated in the press, the ship has departed; but, contrary to the impression left by the press accounts, the workmen are still there, according to Ros. He was unable to say how long they might remain, that presumably depending on the time required to finish the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.

Shlaudeman

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**16. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, March 24, 1982, 1949Z

1671. Subject: Falklands/Malvinas Dispute: Argentine Concerns.  
Ref: (A) London 6107;<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 1638.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157–0409. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to London, USUN, Montevideo, and Santiago.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 14.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 15.

1. (C–Entire Text).

2. Summary. The GOA, having failed so far to elicit a response from HMG to the proposal for a permanent negotiating commission, seems increasingly inclined to write off the current round of negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas. The next Argentine move will probably be to take the issue again to the UN's Committee of 24.<sup>4</sup> The GOA might apply pressure by cutting off services now provided to the Islands, but we doubt that an attempt at a "military solution" will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. relations, particularly as matters of importance to US arise in the UN and the NAM where Argentina will continue to seek support for its claim on the Islands. End summary.

3. As reported in Ref B, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and Under Secretary Enrique Ros on March 23 gave me their version of the weekend incident in the South Georgia Islands. They also took the occasion to assert their concern over the direction in which the underlying dispute seems to be headed.

4. Ros said the GOA proposed in the February talks with HMG that the two sides establish a permanent negotiating commission. The British delegation purportedly agreed to recommend the proposal to HMG, but the Argentines have subsequently heard nothing. Ros thought that must mean a rejection of the proposal. Ros added that the GOA would then be obliged again to take the dispute to the UN, to the Committee of 24.

5. Costa Mendez observed that the weekend affair, particularly the insult to the Argentine flag, has aroused nationalist feelings here. The Foreign Ministry tries to calm these emotions, but that is getting increasingly more difficult to do. The Minister next reverted to a theme we have heard from him before: "You (the USG) will sometime have to take an interest in this." When the Malvinas problem comes up President Galtieri allegedly often asks "what do the Americans say?" According to Costa Mendez, he has continued to explain to the President that we are only kept informed, not consulted. But, given our

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<sup>4</sup> The United Nations General Assembly established the Committee of 24, known more formally as the Special Committee on Decolonization, in 1961 in order to monitor the implementation of UNGA Resolution 1514, the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," which affirmed the right of all peoples to self-determination and called for the end of colonialism. It was the Special Committee that in 1964 confirmed that the provisions of the Declaration applied to the Falklands/Malvinas.



security interests, the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine<sup>5</sup> and the like, we will have to become concerned, in the Minister's opinion.

6. I replied that we would most certainly not wish to see the negotiations break down. We do have a strong interest in seeing this dispute between two friends resolved. The way to do that is through negotiations between the two parties. As for the Monroe Doctrine, I recalled reading that Daniel Webster<sup>6</sup> had made clear to the Argentines in 1841 that it did not apply retroactively, and thus did not apply to the Malvinas problem.

7. Comment. The cynical view here, especially among the politicians, is that the GOA has brought this ancient quarrel up to center stage as a means of diverting the attention of the Argentine people away from their economic woes. I am not so sure. The talks with the British seem to have evolved quite naturally into a stalemate, given the time elapsed and the inability of the British to negotiate on sovereignty. In any event, the GOA has now gotten itself into a domestic political position where it will have to do something if the proposal for a permanent commission is not accepted.

8. We are not inclined to take very seriously the rumbling here about a "military solution." It seems more likely that the "other measures" the GOA threatens will at least initially take the form of a renewed plea in the UN and perhaps a reduction in the level of diplomatic relations with HMG. The Argentines also have open the possibility of making life more difficult for the Islanders, particularly by cutting off air service. With respect to the UN, HMG's estimate of its chances there (Ref A) is clearly not shared by the GOA which continues to count on NAM and G-77 support. (We assume that Robin Fearn's remark about Argentina's military government did not indicate an expectation that the problem would be easier to deal with if Argentina had an elected government. The politicians, particularly the Peronists and the left-wing radicals, are even more bellicose than the military when it comes to the Malvinas).

9. We do think that at least some elements in the GOA are quite serious about trying to enlist U.S. support for their Malvinas case in the context of our closer and more cooperative bilateral relationship. We have managed to stay pretty well clear of this dispute since Web-

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<sup>5</sup> First articulated by President James Monroe in his State of the Union address of December 2, 1823, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the policy that regarded any attempts by a European country to expand its colonial holdings in the Western Hemisphere or to interfere in the affairs of any sovereign state in the Americas as an act of aggression to which the United States would respond. At the same time, the Doctrine pledged that the United States would refrain from interfering in the affairs of existing European colonies in the Americas or in the internal affairs of the European countries themselves.

<sup>6</sup> Secretary of State from 1841 until 1843 and again from 1850 until 1852.

ster's time and there is no reason to change course now. But we should recognize that the Malvinas (and the Beagle too) are likely to be a complicating factor in our relationship. Complications may particularly arise in relation to issues in the UN and the NAM where Argentina will continue to look for support from those who frequently do not share our views.

Shlaudeman

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**17. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, March 25, 1982, 1748Z

6687. Subject: HMG Requests U.S. Help in South Georgia Dispute. Ref: London 06653.<sup>2</sup>

1. C–Entire text.

2. Summary: U.K. wants U.S. support soonest with Argentina to achieve Argentine withdrawal from South Georgia of party of Argentines who landed on the Island ostensibly to collect scrap metal and hoisted Argentine flag. End summary.

3. Deputy Under-Secretary John Giffard called in Charge March 25 to inform him that Carrington is sending a message to the Secretary<sup>3</sup> requesting that the U.S. use its influence with Argentina in the current impasse over the Argentines encamped on South Georgia Island. Argentina has conveyed its displeasure over the dispatching of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820159–0368. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6653 from London, March 25, the Embassy reported on the British political atmosphere following the Argentine landing on South Georgia. Streater informed the Department that while the landing was “a pretty small affair, even within the context of the Falklands/Malvinas” dispute, “feeling runs deep in some quarters,” as illustrated by comments made by both political parties critical of the Thatcher government’s decision to withdraw the Royal Navy ship HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic. The FCO, he continued, “is trying to tread as carefully as possible and believes that the Government of Argentina will do so, too.” Noted Streater: “They [the British] fear that too precipitate action might be perceived as an insult to Argentine national honor and provoke an exaggerated response. This in turn could lead to a confrontation that neither side wants, but from which neither could withdraw.” He concluded: “Despite the comic-opera quality of the incident itself, FCO officials believe that the pressure for quick action will be ‘enormous.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820159–0310)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 22.

British ice patrol vessel *Endurance* to South Georgia.<sup>4</sup> HMG also has had reports that the Argentine Navy may be planning to intercept the *Endurance* if it removes Argentine party and provoke a naval confrontation, possibly with a view to bringing the entire Falklands dispute to a head. Should that happen, the British would have to respond, and a situation will have arisen that neither Foreign Ministry wants. HMG consequently plans to hold off taking any action, but considers it essential that the intruders be removed. The *Endurance* is presently waiting about ten miles away from the Argentine party.

4. British also said an Argentine vessel is lying off South Georgia that could be used to evacuate landing party. No landing strip is available on the Island for aircraft.

5. Comment: British concern over this affair has clearly intensified since the earlier briefing reported reftel.

**Streator**

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<sup>4</sup> The *Endurance*, normally stationed at Port Stanley, had been on patrol when the Argentine party landed on South Georgia on March 19.

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## **18. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, March 25, 1982, 2211Z

1718. Subject: HMG Request for U.S. Help in South Georgia Dispute. Ref: London 6687.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S–Entire text).

2. There are clearly some ugly possibilities in this situation. As I understand it, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez asked HMG to hold off when he learned on Tuesday<sup>3</sup> that the *Endurance* had been sent to South Georgia to take off the Argentine working party. Anthony Williams, the British Ambassador here, in turn asked that the GOA find a way

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820160–0043. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 17.

<sup>3</sup> March 23.

ASAP to have the group depart. The FCO in London is pressing for Argentine action. But, according to Williams, Costa Mendez now says that the presence of the *Endurance* in the area has become widely known and the GOA would appear to be succumbing to British pressure if it agreed to evacuate the men. It appears likely that the Argentine Navy will in fact act if the *Endurance* attempts to remove the working party.

3. Williams has explored the perceptible alternatives, including various possibilities for legalizing the entry of the Argentines into South Georgia, but so far he has had no success. He believes a way must be found to freeze the situation until a solution can be found. He has suggested informally to me that the USG call on both sides to stand down. The *Endurance* would then presumably proceed to Stanley for re-fueling, tensions would ease and perhaps a way out could be negotiated without undue damage to either party's claim to sovereignty.

4. I agree with Williams (and please protect him) that any USG intervention must be directed at both sides. An attempt on our part simply to get the Argentines to withdraw the working party, as HMG requests, has little prospect for success. What would be needed in my judgment would be parallel messages from the Secretary to Carrington and Costa Mendez calling for the two countries to take no further action and perhaps offering our good offices. The problem with this is that it gets us into the middle of a dispute with no resolution in sight. I am far from certain, for example, that at this point the Argentines on South Georgia would agree—or that the GOA would let them agree—to a legalization of their entry even if HMG could find a way. Presumably the working party would depart after finishing the scrap job, but that will require four to five months I am told.

5. Under Secretary Ros has asked me to come in tomorrow morning specifically to inform me on the current state of GOA relations with HMG. I shall urge restraint.<sup>4</sup> But on balance, barring suddenly fortuitous developments, I think we also need a high-level message to both sides which at a minimum does the same thing.

**Shlaudeman**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 20.

**19. Article In the National Intelligence Daily Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 26, 1982

*ARGENTINA-UK: Possible Conflict in South Atlantic*

An incident last weekend in the South Georgia Islands—administered by the UK but claimed by Argentina—could develop into a more serious problem between the two countries. A group of Argentine civilians was transported last weekend to South Georgia, where they raised the Argentine flag, and the British ordered a lightly armed patrol boat to evict the group. While diplomats in London and Buenos Aires tried to smooth over the incident, the Argentine Navy issued orders to several warships to prevent any British interference. The UK has agreed to delay action if the Argentines remove the civilians, but Buenos Aires intends to keep them on the island. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

*Comment:* The two countries have been negotiating their conflicting claims for 15 years, but Buenos Aires recently has become impatient for some progress and is threatening to break off the talks. The Argentine Navy is the most aggressive and nationalistic of the services, and some potential exists for precipitate action not fully authorized by the high command. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84B00049R, Subject Files (1981–1982) Box 7, NSPG Meeting re: [*text not declassified*]/Falklands Islands Dispute 5 Apr 82. Top Secret; Codeword. The *National Intelligence Daily* was a serial publication by the CIA. This article was attached to an April 5 covering note from [*name not declassified*] to Inman [*text not declassified*].

## 20. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, March 26, 1982, 2225Z

1752. Subject: Argentine-British Dispute in South Georgia. Ref: Buenos Aires 1718.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Ambassador Williams told me by telephone late this afternoon (March 26) that he had been discussing with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez throughout the day a possible solution to the impasse at South Georgia and that the proposal was not up for consideration in London and here by the Junta. Williams gave me no details, but I assume the deal would involve withdrawal of the *Endurance* from the scene and an Argentine commitment to take off the working party.

3. In a meeting with me this afternoon (postponed from this morning) Under Secretary Ros argued that the basic problem was British “gunboat diplomacy”. He said HMG’s demand that the working party withdraw or be removed by force was unacceptable to the GOA. He also said that if the *Endurance* were to retire, a solution “might be possible.”

4. Ros gave me the following version of the Argentine case: Davidov<sup>3</sup> (the scrap merchant) went out to Stanley last year and explained to the authorities what he intended to do. He then provided the British Embassy with the names of the 40 members of the working party (Ros insists that the correct number of men on the Island is 40) and documented them in accordance with the 1971 British-Argentine treaty governing navigation and air transport in the Falklands.<sup>4</sup> The party admittedly did not check in at Grytviken, but that is only a scientific station in any case. Now the British assert that the 1971 treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams’s understanding until yesterday.)

5. Comment. The British fear, perhaps with reason, that the Argentines intend to establish a permanent presence on South Georgia as they did in 1976 on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands.<sup>5</sup> Ros’s

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 18.

<sup>3</sup> Constantino S. Davidoff.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 1.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 1.

remark to me that it might take year or more to finish the South Georgia scrap job was not reassuring on that score. In any event, it would appear from here that the *Endurance* is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will continue. An agreement on reciprocal withdrawals may be possible but it will not be easy to reach.

Shlaudeman

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**21. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, March 27, 1982, 1515Z

1753. Subj: Confrontation in South Georgia Islands.

1. The crisis atmosphere heightened sharply overnight Mar 26–27 as the armed Argentine Navy transport “Bahia Paraíso” carrying a unit of marines, reportedly turned up at Leith Harbor. Its mission there, where it is said to be in sight of the British icebreaker “Endurance”, is to protect the Argentine work party landed on San Pedro Island Mar 18 that triggered the present UK-GOA face-off. Unconfirmed press accounts attributed to Argentine naval sources also reported the dispatch of two missile corvettes, “Drummond” and “Granville”, to the South Georgias in support of the ArgNav transport.

2. The arrival at Leith of “Bahia Paraíso” was announced last night by FonMin Costa Mendez, who called the situation in the disputed archipelago “serious” and “grave”. He spoke to the press after an emergency meeting of the three service commanders of the ruling Junta, making clear that the GOA is not presently disposed to back off. “The Republic is ready to provide the workers (at Leith) all diplomatic and security protection that may be necessary,” he said. The GOA, he added, has adopted a posture to insure that “measures are not taken against them (una medida que no corresponde) and that they are permitted to continue their work.” Costa Mendez added that a British proposal for overcoming the crisis is under study. He has met six times

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820163–0916. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USUN and London and for information to Santiago and Montevideo.

in the last three days with British Ambassador Williams and reportedly is meeting Williams again this morning.

3. President Galtieri, returning to the National Palace after midnight following the Junta meeting, told waiting reporters that Costa Mendez has briefed the military high command on several international questions, not just the situation in the South Georgias. Among these he said was the current debate in UNSC on Nicaragua's intervention accusations against the US and Argentina and the status of the Papal mediation on the Beagle channel dispute with Chile. He was otherwise uncommunicative, calling the situation at Leith a diplomatic matter.

4. Press reports attributed to GOA military sources said "Bahia Paraíso" has a crew of 200 plus a contingent of marine infantry and two helicopters aboard. Military sources had taken note of reports from London that "Endurance" has orders to extract the workers at Leith by force if necessary. The crisis atmosphere was ratcheted up several notches by additional reports of intense activity at the nation's principal naval base at Puerto Belgrano and the marine station at Mar del Plata. "Clarín" quoted high navy sources as saying the temperature is rising to "extremely critical" levels.

5. Also overnight, the GOA's case for the presence of the Argentine work party at Leith—numbered anywhere from six to more than 40—appeared to get an important boost. "Georgias del Sur", the Argentine company which bought the abandoned whaling facilities at Leith Harbor from its Scottish owner in 1979, made public a letter it had sent to the UK Embassy here on March 9 setting out its work plans for San Pedro Island. The firm is headed by an Argentine-Levantine named Constantin Davidoff. The letter was addressed to Ambassador Williams. The company also asserted last night that its plans to send a work party to the Island were discussed previously in greater detail with the Embassy Political Counselor who it claimed was also provided a list of the workers being sent to Leith.

6. Comment: The point of the dispute in the UK view, as we understand it, is that the work crew was not properly processed under British immigration procedures. While everyone in Buenos Aires had assumed that the South Georgias were part of the administrative regime governing the Falkland Islands, it appears now that the other South Atlantic archipelagoes come under a separate set of rules for immigration purposes.

**Shlaudeman**



**22. Message From British Foreign Secretary Carrington to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

March 28, 1982

Your Charge d’Affaires in London will have reported to you<sup>2</sup> the serious situation which has developed between ourselves and the Argentine Government following the illegal landing at Leith Harbour on the British island of South Georgia last week of a party of Argentines. The Argentines have a long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies and, despite all our efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiation, the Argentines have recently been making it clear that they are prepared to use other means to achieve their aim of a full transfer of sovereignty. The whole question of the Falklands is a very sensitive one for us, our public opinion and our Parliament.

As soon as we discovered the presence of the party, we sought to persuade the Argentine Government through diplomatic channels to remove them. But they have refused to do this. Instead they appear to have consolidated the party’s position by landing further equipment and have issued a statement that the men on South Georgia will be given all necessary protection. I have moreover, just received an uncompromising and negative message from the Argentine Foreign Minister about the problem. It offers no constructive suggestions and seems likely only to aggravate the problem.

The Royal Navy Ice Patrol Ship, HMS *Endurance*, is anchored nearby in Grytveken Harbour. A number of Argentine Navy vessels are heading for the area and we cannot exclude the possibility that, if we attempt to remove the men ourselves, they may retaliate.

It is our firm wish to resolve this problem peacefully. To that end, we have done everything we can to persuade the Argentines to find a way out: we are prepared to examine every avenue with them. But the continued presence of these men is an infringement of British sovereignty and you will understand that we cannot acquiesce in that.

I appreciate that this dispute will seem to others a bilateral matter from the British and Argentine Governments. But despite all my Government’s efforts to find an acceptable solution, we have now reached

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820054–0571. Confidential. Printed from an unsigned copy. Sent to Haig under a March 28 cover letter from Henderson. According to Haig’s memoirs, Henderson personally delivered the message the same day. (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 261) The Department transmitted the text of the message to the Embassy in Buenos Aires in telegram 83326, March 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–1097)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 17.

a stage where the situation will soon become very difficult. I do not, however, believe that it is in anyone's interests to allow this incident to be the cause of what may become armed conflict in the South Atlantic, and I wish to explore every possible avenue which might help us to avoid this.

I should accordingly be grateful if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines, stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. If the Argentines maintain that they will not remove the men themselves and that they will resist any attempt by us to do so, the use of a third country ship might be a compromise they could accept. The problem could also be resolved by the Argentines agreeing that their men should seek the necessary permission from the British authorities at Grytveken in order to regularise their presence.

I should be very grateful for any help you can give us on this. If we do not find a solution soon, I fear the gravest consequences.

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### 23. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, March 29, 1982, 1457Z

1768. Subject: Dispute in South Georgia. Ref: Buenos Aires 1753,<sup>2</sup> 1754.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S–Entire text).

2. British Ambassador Williams called on me this morning (March 29) with the following information:

—Last Friday<sup>4</sup> Foreign Minister Costa Mendez proposed informally as a way out of the impasse that the Argentine ship *Bahia Paraiso* take the Argentine working party on South Georgia around to Grytvi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London and for information to Montevideo, Santiago, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 21.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1754 from Buenos Aires, March 28, the Embassy provided a report on the situation in the South Atlantic as of noon Buenos Aires time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820164–0279)

<sup>4</sup> March 26. See Document 20.

ken where their entry could be legalized. London accepted this idea over the protests of the Islanders, who I gather are self-governing. The military Junta here rejected the Foreign Minister's proposal. The Foreign Minister then handed yesterday to Williams a note<sup>5</sup> which insists on Argentine rights and offers no apparent way out of the impasse.

—Williams is now persuaded that the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the fact that the *Bahia Paraíso* has been unloading equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa Mendez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate them.

—Lord Carrington has sent a message to the Secretary<sup>6</sup> asking us to take the problem up with the Argentines, "stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept." (Williams gave me the text of the message.)

3. I informed Williams that the CNO will be visiting Argentina, arriving Wednesday evening<sup>7</sup> and departing Saturday afternoon.<sup>8</sup> I emphasized that this trip had been planned long in advance.

4. Comment: As I feared, the Argentines refuse to have the presence of the working party regularized. The British, for their part, continue to insist that the men must be removed. If that is not done, their point being that the exercise of immigration controls is an essential element of sovereignty. The GOA may be attempting to force HMG to accept the Argentine proposal for a permanent negotiating commission on the Falklands/Malvinas. If that is the purpose, it is difficult to imagine how the Argentines could have been more mistaken in the method they chose.

5. I am not optimistic about the results of an intervention on our part at this juncture. A general appeal from the Secretary to the two sides to calm down might help momentarily, but to ask both to withdraw their ships (which is what is needed) without some agreement on the working party would presumably not go over very well in London. I should note Williams' comment that the British Navy cur-

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<sup>5</sup> Williams provided a copy of Costa Mendez's note to the Embassy on March 29. In telegram 1790 from Buenos Aires, March 30, the Embassy transmitted an informal translation of the note. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820167–0259)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 22.

<sup>7</sup> March 31.

<sup>8</sup> April 3.

rently has units on maneuvers in the Caribbean that could be deployed fairly rapidly to the South Atlantic.

Shlaudeman

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**24. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Scanlan) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 29, 1982

SUBJECT

Your Demarches to British Ambassador Henderson and Argentine Ambassador Takacs

**I. YOUR OBJECTIVE**

Express our concern over potential confrontation between British and Argentine naval vessels in South Atlantic; urge restraint and concerted effort to defuse situation; offer our good offices in resolving this immediate problem, if so requested by both parties. Talking points attached.

**II. SETTING**

The British and Argentines have been *disputing the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands* (250 miles east of Argentina) since the 1830s. The two countries also dispute sovereignty over the *South Georgia, Sandwich and Shetland Islands*, long administered by the UK. There are 1800 British residents in the Falklands and British installations on some of the other islands. In 1964 the UN classified the islands as a *non-self-governing territory* administered by the UK and there have been *sporadic UK-Argentine talks* since then. There is an agreement on travel documents and the GOA provides regular airline and communications services and fuel supplies. The *talks*, last held in February,<sup>2</sup> have *stalemated* over

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820057–0766. Confidential. Tom Niles (EUR) initialed the memorandum on behalf of Scanlan. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page states that Stoessel saw the memorandum on March 30. Attached but not printed are a copy of telegram 1768 from Buenos Aires (see Document 23), biographical information about Henderson and Takacs, and agendas for the March 29 meetings with the two Ambassadors. For a record of the two meetings, see Document 25.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 11.

*Argentine insistence that its sovereignty be discussed first, and the UK's unwillingness to agree to anything without the consent of the islanders who are vehemently attached to the UK. The Argentines have recently escalated the public rhetoric on the dispute and the UK asked us to counsel them to be more reasonable. The GOA has traditionally sought our support. We have maintained a neutral stance, asserting the issue should be resolved through negotiations. Either side may take the dispute back to the UN.*

### III. CURRENT PROBLEM

On March 19, a civilian-chartered Argentine naval transport landed a party of salvage workers on a South Georgia Island and departed, pursuant to a contract with a British firm for removal of an old whaling station. HMG protested that the party did not seek permission and requested their removal. The Argentine company says it requested and received approval to land the men. Following reports that the Argentines raised their flag on one of the South Georgia Islands, Falkland Islanders March 22 allegedly retaliated against the Argentine airline office in Port Stanley. Details of the situation are in dispute. A British icebreaker, the *Endurance*, is in the area; the Argentine navy is shadowing it and probably will interfere if the *Endurance* attempts to remove the work party.<sup>3</sup> The dispute has become a major nationalistic issue in both countries. The British want us to use our influence to have the GOA withdraw the workers, and Lord Carrington has sent a personal message to the Secretary (attached).<sup>4</sup>

The GOA would resent such a one-sided approach, and a U.S. tilt could endanger our improving relations with Argentina and their support on hemispheric issues. The best course is to advise both sides to avoid precipitous action in order to allow passions to cool so that a compromise can be found without loss of face to either side. While we do not intend to become directly involved in the substance of this bilateral dispute, we could offer our good offices to assist with a solution to the immediate problem, if both sides agree and so request. However, it is not clear at this point how any such "good office" role could usefully extend beyond talking to the two sides. We doubt strongly that the GOA would agree to let a U.S. ship take the men off the island, as suggested by Carrington in his letter to the Secretary.

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<sup>3</sup> At 1604Z, March 29, the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that Argentine press reports, citing "unidentified high level Argentine navy sources," had stated that "five Argentine warships, including two missile-carrying corvettes, two destroyers and a submarine, will join the '*Bahia Paraiso*' at the South Georgia Islands, but this has not been officially confirmed." (Telegram 1770 from Buenos Aires, March 29; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165-0327)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 22.

- CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL NAVAL CONFRONTATION.
- APPRECIATE THE PUBLIC CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES.
- UK AND ARGENTINA BOTH OUR FRIENDS.
- WISH TO SEE AMICABLE RESOLUTION.
- URGE RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES.
- UNDERLYING ISSUES CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY YOUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. DO NOT SEE A USEFUL USG ROLE.
- IF BOTH PARTIES AGREE ON A USEFUL ROLE FOR USG IN HELPING RESOLVE IMMEDIATE<sup>5</sup> PROBLEM, WE ARE PREPARED TO LISTEN AND DO WHAT WE CAN.

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<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined this word.

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## **25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 30, 1982, 0149Z

83963. Subject: Deputy Secretary's Meeting With Argentine and UK Ambassadors. References: (A) London 6930,<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 1770,<sup>3</sup> and previous.

### **1. Confidential–Entire text.**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820166–0400. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Montevideo, Santiago, and USUN. Drafted by O'Connell; cleared by Service, Smith, Bosworth, Bremer, and Stern; and approved by Stoessel.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6930 from London, March 29, the Embassy reported: "According to FCO, the British believe that there has been 'absolutely no movement' on the impasse over South Georgia. The British are maintaining their position that the Argentines must be removed from the Island, and Argentina, complaining about gunboat diplomacy, insists that it is prepared to defend them. Talks are continuing mainly through the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, as the Argentine Ambassador is not in London. FCO officials fear that the two countries may be on a confrontation course, and deny that any likely form of compromise is currently under discussion. Indeed, the Carrington-Haig letter was sent only after the Argentines had made clear the intractability of their position." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0386)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 24.

2. The Deputy Secretary called in separately March 29 the Ambassadors of Argentina and the UK and made the following points regarding the situation at South Georgia Island:<sup>4</sup>

—We are concerned about the situation in the South Georgia Island and the possibility of confrontation.

—We appreciate the public concern over this issue in Argentina and in the UK.

—We would hope for an amicable resolution; both parties are good friends of ours.

—We urge restraint on both sides.

—We realize that the underlying issues need to be solved between the two parties and do not see a useful role we could play with respect to them.

—However, we are concerned about the immediate situation in South Georgia Island and if both sides felt we could play a useful role, we are ready to listen and offer our good offices.

—The situation is of personal interest to the Secretary.

2. Ambassador Takacs said that he had no instructions on the issue but would convey the Deputy Secretary's comments to Buenos Aires immediately. Takacs asked if he could tell his Foreign Minister that the same message was being conveyed to the British. The Deputy Secretary replied that he would be telling the exact same thing to Ambassador Henderson and reiterated that we would like to be helpful if both sides believe we can be.

3. Ambassador Henderson said that the workmen were on the Island illegally, having gone there ostensibly under the scrap removal contract. They had no immigration permission for the Island, not even a white card which is valid for entry into the Falkland Islands proper. The line the Argentines are taking does not suggest they are prepared to do anything. The British do not want them to stay there but they are prepared to make an important concession: if the Argentine ship, the *Bahia Paraiso*, would take the work party around to Grytviken Harbour, they could give them permission to stay. Henderson did not see how the USG could condone the illegal occupation of the Island and did not see why it would be taking sides to ask if the GOA was willing to accept this reasonable compromise. Henderson did not seem to be aware (Buenos Aires 1768)<sup>5</sup> that the GOA had vetoed this possibility.

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<sup>4</sup> No memoranda of conversation of Stoessel's meetings with Takacs or Henderson have been found.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 23.

4. Henderson then noted that CNO, Admiral Hayward would be arriving in Argentina in a few days and asked if he might be able to play a helpful role with the Argentines. The Deputy Secretary said that the CNO would be fully briefed.

5. We asked whether it might be possible for HMG to send an official around to Leith Harbor to regularize the status of the workmen. Henderson said that if we gave assurances that the GOA would agree, he would suggest it to London.

Going back to the points the Deputy Secretary had made earlier, Henderson took mild issue with our counseling them on restraint; the British were “not hotting it up at all.” The Deputy Secretary said we would inform our Embassy in Buenos Aires to see if there were any unexplored possibilities that could be raised with the GOA in an effort to regularize the status of the Argentine workmen.

6. You should report these demarches to Foreign Ministries. Embassy Buenos Aires, unless it perceives reasons to contrary, should ask the GOA if it would be agreeable to having someone travel from Grytviken to Leith Harbor to document workmen, while making clear that there is no HMG agreement at this time.<sup>6</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>6</sup> On the morning of March 30, Shlaudeman met with Costa Mendez to discuss the Stoessel-Takacs meeting and to convey the Department's request. Summarizing the meeting, Shlaudeman reported: “The GOA is not at the moment willing to entertain any face-saving device by which the status of the workmen on South Georgia could be regularized. The Argentine position is that this problem can only be dealt with in the framework of negotiations on the question of sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas. The GOA is not interested in USG good offices unless these were to be extended to treatment of the underlying issues.” (Telegram 1814 from Buenos Aires, March 30; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820168–0344)



**26. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 30, 1982, 1612Z

184543. TDFIRDB–315/06529–82. Dist: 30 Mar 82. Country: Argentina/United Kingdom. Subject: Argentine Army and Navy Assessment of the Current Status and Prospects of the Dispute With the United Kingdom Over Islands in the South Atlantic (DOI: About 28 March 1982). Source: [3 lines not declassified].

1. On or shortly before 28 March 1982, the Argentine Army and Navy prepared a joint assessment for President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) on the current dispute with the United Kingdom over the South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. The assessment included the following points:

A. Argentine public opinion strongly approves of the Argentine Government taking a strong stand against UK “threats” to Argentina.

B. The UK Embassy in Buenos Aires was aware of plans to place Argentine workers on the Island and has therefore urged London to keep this in mind and be moderate in its response.

C. The UK appears unwilling to take any action to remove the workers.

D. Successful handling of this incident could help to fortify the Galtieri government and give it an image of being strong, decisive, and highly nationalistic. This will deflect leftist charges against the government. The “crisis” is already serving to deflect public attention from economic problems and from the planned labor demonstration in Buenos Aires on 30 March.

E. If Argentina gives the appearance of having “lost” in this confrontation with the UK, it will serve to strengthen enormously Chile’s position in the dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel.

2. (Source comment: On 28 March, working-level officers within the Argentine Naval Intelligence Service, who are not necessarily privy to actual operational planning, discounted the possibility of Argentine intervention should the British choose to forcibly remove the Argentine workers from the Island; these naval intelligence officers believed that the Argentine Navy is not ready or able to support any type of armed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL–15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Wnintel. Sent to the National Security Agency, Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of the Treasury, White House Situation Room, National Security Council Staff, CIA Office of Current Operations, and USCINCSO.

conflict in the South Georgias area because of existing limitations on equipment. These naval intelligence officers expected that, if the British should remove the workers, the Argentine Government would certainly speak strongly but would try to cast itself as a peacemaker by avoiding a direct conflict with the UK.)

3. (Field comments:

A. The views attributed to the British Government may not reflect its true position, but these perceptions by the Argentine Army and Navy will help determine the policies it recommends to the President and may help determine the policies he actually adopts.

B. The views of naval intelligence personnel in paragraph 2 should not be read as a definitive statement of Argentine Naval operational plans.)

4. (Ambassador's comment: Former Foreign Minister Oscar ((Camilion)) told me that the Argentine Government has deliberately built up the incident in South Georgia to buy "political space" for Galtieri. This report would suggest that he may be right.)

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

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**27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1982, 1802Z

85529. Subject: Letter From the Secretary to Lord Carrington.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Please convey immediately the following message from the Secretary to Lord Carrington.

3. Begin text:

Dear Peter,

I know that the Falkland Islands was one of the first issues you raised with us as Foreign Secretary.<sup>2</sup> The situation which has developed in the last few days on South Georgia Island is indeed serious, and I want you to know that we will do everything we can to assist in its

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 3.

resolution. I am instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the Argentine Foreign Minister<sup>3</sup> and to urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island.

We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve. I believe that you know Tom Hayward, our Chief of Naval Operations. He arrives in Buenos Aires on March 31 on a long-standing invitation, and will do what he can to be helpful.

Let me know, Peter, if you have any suggestions on how we might help defuse the immediate crisis through the use of our good offices.

I admire your patience in this situation.

Sincerely,

Al.

End text.

4. Instruction to Ambassador Schlaudeman in Buenos Aires sent septel.

**Haig**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 29.

**28. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, March 31, 1982, 2025Z

Dear Ron,

You will know about the disturbing intelligence reports both from your sources and from ours that the Argentine Navy could be preparing to invade the Falkland Islands within the next 48 hours. There are less than 2,000 inhabitants there. We maintain only a small garrison of about 75 Marines at Port Stanley—the capital of the Falklands—and the only Royal Navy vessel which we have in the area at the moment is an ice patrol ship. An Argentine assault would undoubtedly result in loss of life. We could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation: The Falkland Islanders have always made it clear they wish and intend to remain British.

Will you talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities. You can tell him that we will not escalate the dispute or start fighting. Meanwhile, we are pursuing urgent diplomatic initiatives with the Argentine to reach a settlement and I would ask for your support in this effort too.

Warm personal regards,

**Margaret**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent personal from Thatcher via Cabinet Office channels. Telegram 7232 from London, April 1, reported that FCO Assistant Undersecretary for the Americas Ure informed the Embassy that Thatcher, during a late evening meeting on March 31, had decided to send the message to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4)) In telegram 86943 to London, April 1, the Department re-transmitted the text of Thatcher's message. (Ibid.)

**29. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1982, 2208Z

1871. Subject: South Georgia Dispute: Junta's Response to Our Demarche. Refs: (A) Buenos Aires 1814,<sup>2</sup> (B) State 85529,<sup>3</sup> (C) State 85654.<sup>4</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez called me in late this afternoon (March 31). (The instructions referred to in Ref B had not arrived.) The Minister said he had conveyed my demarche of yesterday (Ref A) to the governing Junta. After expressions of high regard for the USG and myself, he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered good offices of the USG, but only on the basis that HMG first recognize the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period of time. The good offices of the USG would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a permanent British fueling station to support operations in the Antarctic.

3. I asked two questions in response. Had prior recognition of Argentine sovereignty been a precondition in the GOA's February proposal for a permanent negotiating commission? Did this reply from the Junta affect in any way the Minister's assurances to me yesterday with respect to the possibility of a confrontation? Costa Mendez said that recognition of sovereignty was not a prior condition in the February

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 25.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 27.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 85654 to Buenos Aires, March 31, the Department instructed Shlaude-man to deliver a message from Haig to Costa Mendez expressing the former's "hope that both governments will be able to move forward toward satisfactory resolution" of the "longstanding issues" between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig continued; "Because these issues are not new, it would appear that arrangements and understandings have been agreed upon in the past for how to deal with problems such as that now posed at Leith Harbour. I urge your government do everything possible to adhere to such arrangements, and to avoid any actions that would make solution even more difficult. I have made the same requests to the British. I am convinced that it is in the interest of both governments to resolve the current impasse as quickly as possible. If our good offices can be of assistance, please let me know." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982))

proposal, but that the objective of the proposed negotiations was clearly stated as being affirmation of Argentine sovereignty. On the second question, he reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any confrontation as most serious.

4. With respect to the Junta's message, I said again that we did not see how we could be useful in resolving the sovereignty issue. I did promise to convey the Junta's message to the Secretary. Costa Mendez closed the meeting by delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting that the GOA had had enough, that HMG had tried to dupe and string along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared "to break relations" without any qualms.

5. Comment: The Junta's response is, of course, absurd. It sounds like Galtieri playing Patton. In any event, the GOA is clearly bent on pressing to the utmost the advantage it thinks it has. Always assuming the British are not going to make any rash move with the *Endurance* and its marines, my inclination would be to let things sit for awhile in the hope that the Argentines will begin to come down out of the clouds. They are likely to have increasing difficulties in maintaining a significant naval presence within reasonably quick reach of South Georgia. For one thing, the Argentine Navy's only oiler is reportedly laid up in Ushuaia. If the press reports of British Navy ship movements toward the South Atlantic are true, the Argentines may simmer down a bit. Our impression from contacts in the Argentine Navy is that no armed action is expected in that quarter for the time being at least.

6. Ref C arrived as I was drafting this cable. In view of the Junta's reply, I recommend against delivery of the Secretary's message. It would only prompt the GOA to put its extreme position into writing, where we surely don't want it. I would prefer not to deliver any high-level message until after the CNO has had a chance to talk to the navy here and to give us his insights.

7. I will leave to the Department the question of whether or not to share any of this with HMG. I have told my British colleague that the GOA has not so far accepted our good offices and did not find acceptable the proposal to send someone to document the workmen at South Georgia. (London had fully informed him on the Stoessel-Henderson conversation.)<sup>5</sup> I do not propose to brief him on the Junta's extraordinary response.

Shlaudeman

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 25.

**30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 1, 1982, 0429Z

086367. Subject: British Demarche on Argentine Threat.

1. S–Entire text.

2. Summary. UK Ambassador Henderson called on the Secretary to report HMG's fear that the Argentine Government is planning to carry out a military invasion of the Falkland Islands within forty eight hours. He asked for immediate US intervention with the Argentines at the Presidential level. The Secretary assured the British that the US would be in touch urgently with the Argentines at the highest level. End summary.

3. British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site. The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us.

4. Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to defuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor.<sup>2</sup> The British believe, however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1888 from Buenos Aires, April 1, Shlaudeman reported that Williams had received from Costa Mendez a verbal answer that morning regarding the proposed visit of a high-level British official to discuss the workers at Leith Harbor. Costa Mendez said the Government of Argentina was "not interested" and that "from the Argentine point of view the Leith Harbor affair is closed." Conveying this reply to Shlaudeman, Williams added that Costa Mendez did indicate that "the GOA would be prepared for immediate discussions on the sovereignty issue." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)) Later that day, Williams provided Shlaudeman with the text of Costa Mendez's written follow-up to his verbal response, an informal translation of which Shlaudeman transmitted to the Department in telegram 1908 from Buenos Aires, April 1. (Ibid.)

the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. Henderson said that the situation is serious and that Mrs. Thatcher is very worried.

5. The Secretary answered that he had been concerned that Carrington thought we had not been supportive enough at the outset of the dispute. The USG had not wanted to take sides as long as the dispute appeared to be only over workers status. Now that that there is plainly a military dimension, we will urgently contact the Argentine Government at the highest level. The Secretary said he recognized that the British have done much for us and in turn Carrington should be told that we will do what we can to assist in this matter.

6. Henderson said Carrington would certainly be reassured to hear that.

7. In addition to the Secretary and the Ambassador, present were Asst. Sec. Enders, DAS Holmes, Robert Service of ARA/SC and Keith Smith of EUR/NE.

**Haig**

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### 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 1, 1982, 0918Z

86790. For Shlaudeman from Enders. Subject: Possible Military Action Off Falklands.

1. S–Entire text.

2. British Ambassador Henderson has just been in to see the Secretary<sup>2</sup> to follow up on personal message from PriMin Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>3</sup> referring to “the disturbing intelligence reports from both your sources and ours that the Argentine Navy could be preparing to invade the Falkland Islands within the next forty-eight hours.” Hender-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to London.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 30.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 28.



son left us a summary of their intelligence analysis<sup>4</sup> which we are sending you separately. Although our analysts have not developed such a full picture, there is enough information to support their fear of possible military action. We would welcome your comments on the British analysis. But clearly it is difficult in this situation to rely only on our own assessment of intentions. The British are most concerned that the Argentines not know about the extent of their intelligence on Argentine military moves. You should therefore take care not to disclose the source or extent of this intelligence.

3. Thatcher's message says that the Brits "would not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation." That, of course, is a statement of political fact.

4. Request you contact Galtieri immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don't want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him that from the US point of view we believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but together we can again achieve that standing in international life which we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new and promising relationship we are building. We would deeply regret that, because we regard it as one of the more promising factors of the current international picture.

5. Tell him that the British tell us they will not escalate the dispute or start fighting. It would be useful if we could assure the British that the Argentines have no intention to make a military landing on disputed Islands or to initiate hostilities.

6. The British have also told us that they are preparing an "urgent, diplomatic initiative," which we understand to be the sending of a high level emissary to Buenos Aires to discuss the South Georgia dispute. We do not want to volunteer, of course, but obviously you should send back to us any reaction for the British that they have to that concept.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 30 and footnote 2 thereto.

7. You should say that the Secretary, acting at the request of the President, has asked you to make this demarche.<sup>6</sup>

8. This message supersedes earlier guidance on message from Secretary to Costa Mendez.<sup>7</sup>

Haig

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<sup>6</sup> Following a telephone conversation with Service, Shlaudeman conveyed this message for Galtieri to Costa Mendez. In telegram 1892 from Buenos Aires, sent at 1802Z on April 1, Shlaudeman reported that he “stressed” to Costa Mendez “the importance we attach to the developing relationship between our two countries and the heavy damage any military action would do to that relationship.” Costa Mendez “made no direct response to my request for assurances re Argentine intentions,” but “did say he realized the seriousness of the message, asked for a non-paper covering it (which I have provided) and said he would get it to the President before my appointment with Galtieri this afternoon.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982) For a report of Shlaudeman’s meeting with Galtieri, see Document 37.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 29.

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## 32. Article In the National Intelligence Daily Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 1, 1982

### *ARGENTINA-UK: Possible Clash*

*Argentina evidently plans an invasion as early as tomorrow of the disputed Falkland Islands, if its increasingly tough diplomatic posture does not yield results. [handling restriction not declassified]*

Buenos Aires has formed an amphibious task force with landing craft, air cover, and communications security. It joins a task force in the area having the country’s only aircraft carrier, as well as several destroyers, escorts, and a submarine. [handling restriction not declassified]

Argentina’s Foreign Minister has stated that it will require British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Island and South Georgia groups and expeditious transfer of them to Buenos

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T00301R: Intelligence Pub Files (1982), Box 2, Folder 1: National Intelligence Daily. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

Aires. He said, however, there would be no confrontation unless the British try to remove the Argentine nationals from South Georgia. [2 lines not declassified] [handling restriction not declassified]

The UK reportedly has formed a task force in Britain and has alerted naval units in the Caribbean and near Gibraltar, but they will not arrive for 10 days to two weeks. Last Thursday,<sup>2</sup> however, one or two British nuclear-powered attack submarines evidently deployed toward the South Atlantic and could be in the Falklands this weekend. [handling restriction not declassified]

*Comment:* The Argentine force could be in position—probably just south of the Falkland Islands—at dawn. The Foreign Minister’s suggestion that Argentina will only respond militarily to direct British action is belied by the amphibious force’s invasion configuration. [handling restriction not declassified]

Britain is aware of a possible invasion and could send reinforcements to the Falklands—a runway capable of handling large transports is available, but refueling would be required. [handling restriction not declassified]

A negotiated settlement is possible, but the Argentines may still be gambling that a third power such as the US will intercede and force some concessions from the UK. London, however, will resist Buenos Aires’s effort to link resolution of the issue of the nationals in South Georgia to discussions of sovereignty. If Argentina does invade, the Thatcher government would have little choice but to respond militarily, or risk a crisis it might not survive. [handling restriction not declassified]

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<sup>2</sup> March 30.

**33. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

TDFIR DB-315/06791-82

Washington, April 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Argentine Government Determination To Take Military Action, If Necessary, in the Current Conflict With the UK Over Islands in the South Atlantic (DOI: 31 March, 1 April 1982)

SOURCE

*[4 lines not declassified]*

1. On the evening of 31 March 1982, Argentine President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) and the other two members of the ruling military Junta were determined that Argentina will take military action, if necessary, to resolve the current conflict with the United Kingdom over conflicting claims of sovereignty over the South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. In meetings late on 31 March, Galtieri and the two other members of the Junta were in firm agreement that Argentina will not back down on this matter.

2. This position was supported by Argentine Foreign Minister Nicenor ((Costa Mendez)). Late on 31 March, Costa Mendez told members of the Junta that the current impasse with the UK is a military problem, not a diplomatic problem; Galtieri forcefully echoed this statement.

3. On the morning of 1 April, there was no change in this position. The Argentine Army and Air Force were ready to provide whatever assistance might be required by the Navy if a decision were made to take military action.

4. On 1 April, the Argentine Navy had information that two Soviet submarines were in the general area of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands/ South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic.

5. (Field comment: The source did not state or imply that a decision has been made to take military action in the current dispute. He did not provide any time at which such a decision might be made or such action might be taken.)

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Falkland Islands [04/01/1982–04/02/1982]. Secret; Wnintel; Nofor; Nocontract. Sent to the Department of State (INR), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DIA), the NMCC at CIA, the National Security Agency, the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, the FBI, and the National Security Council Staff.

**34. Memorandum From Dennis C. Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 1, 1982

SUBJECT

U.K.-Argentine Dispute in Falkland Islands

In briefing the President this morning,<sup>2</sup> the following points are most important:

—Last night Mrs. Thatcher asked you to call General Galtieri to ask him for an assurance that he will not authorize an invasion of the Falkland Islands;<sup>3</sup>

—An amphibious force, probably carrying 500 troops, is on the way to the Falkland Islands, and is estimated to arrive at 6:00 a.m. on Friday;<sup>4</sup>

—Secretary Haig has instructed our ambassador to tell General Galtieri that any military action would wreck the promising U.S.-Argentina relationship;<sup>5</sup>

The question to decide this morning is whether the President should personally call Galtieri to urge restraint.

*Pros*

—Mrs. Thatcher has asked the President to do so;

—The call might cause Galtieri to think twice about the invasion and call it off or delay it;

*Cons*

—The President runs the risk of becoming a mediator in an intractable dispute which has gone on for years;

—We do not yet have the results of the ambassador's call on Galtieri,<sup>6</sup> so it may not be necessary for the President to intervene personally

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/General, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Top Secret. The date is handwritten. Poin-dexter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Most likely a reference to the President's daily national security briefing. On April 1, Reagan met with Bush, Clark, Gregg, and Meese for the briefing in the Oval Office from 9:30 to 10:10 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the briefing has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 28.

<sup>4</sup> April 2.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 31.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 37.

The question for the longer term is the attitude the United States should take if the Argentinians invade tomorrow, and war breaks out between the two countries.

—We clearly should call for an end to hostilities, and support peace conferences, cease-fires, etc.

—The United Kingdom is both in the right, and a more important and closer ally. In the final analysis, we must support the U.K.

—We should consider initiatives like a personal envoy from the President (a la Habib)<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to Ambassador Philip C. Habib. Following his retirement from the Foreign Service, Habib served as a special envoy on behalf of the Carter and Reagan administrations, most notably in Lebanon.

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**35. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands/South Georgia Dispute Between Argentina and the UK

ISSUE

Argentina appears to be planning military action against the Falkland Islands. The British have asked for our urgent assistance to prevent any such action; their intelligence (and ours) *indicates invasion plans for 0400 EST April 2*. Ambassador Shlaudeman has instructions to obtain peaceful assurances from President Galtieri today.<sup>2</sup> *If Galtieri will not give adequate assurances, what do we do next?*<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1407. Secret. Drafted by Service; cleared by Smith, B. Willcox (P), and Bosworth. Bosworth initialed the memorandum on behalf of Enders. Service initialed for Smith and Wilcox.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 31.

<sup>3</sup> In the right-hand margin of this paragraph, a notation in an unknown hand reads: "British holding cabinet meeting at 5:30 (our time) WH stressing about possible call by Pres."

*ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND*

Argentina and the UK dispute sovereignty over the islands. We do not take a position on that issue but recognize UK administration and control. UK/Argentine negotiations over the years have made very little progress on the basic sovereignty issue. The Galtieri Government wants to force the pace and appears to be using the incident on South Georgia Island as the handle.

*Argentine naval forces have been deployed and are capable of taking the Falkland Islands. We doubt they could hold them against a British effort to retake. We cannot be sure that the GOA intends to follow through with its invasion plans. However, they only stopped a similar invasion order against Chilean-held islands at the very last minute in December 1978. In that case the Pope stepped in as mediator. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez has twice assured our Ambassador that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to remove the Argentine working party from South Georgia, but it is not clear whether this also rules out an invasion of the Falklands.*

*The British seek a diplomatic resolution to the current crisis, and we do not expect them to escalate it by forcibly removing the Argentine workers from Leith Harbour. Nevertheless, if Argentina takes military action against British possessions, there will be a British military response. As long as the majority of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands prefer British citizenship, the British will not cede sovereignty to Argentina.*

The GOA has serious internal problems and might see bold action on the Falklands as the best way to rally popular support. On the other hand, the Galtieri government has eagerly sought good relations with the U.S. as the best way of overcoming legitimization problems stemming from the excesses of the 1976–78 period. The GOA may see their support for our policy in Central America as reducing USG opposition to a forceful posture on the disputed islands.

*WHAT NEXT?*

*Scenario A*—Galtieri provides assurances that the GOA will not initiate military action.

This will resolve the immediate problem. While the Argentine ships might remain on station for a face-saving period, the action would return to the diplomatic plane.

*We should:*

—Urge the UK not to increase its own military and naval presence and at the same time ask Argentina to remove its own.

—Encourage UK to proceed with its plans to send a special emissary to Buenos Aires and urge the GOA to accept him.

—Maintain our offer of good offices with respect to the immediate problem at the South Georgias.

*Scenario B*—Galtieri does not give Ambassador Shlaudeman the necessary assurances that Argentina will not use force.

*Given the shortness of our time horizon we should immediately:*

—Ask President to place a direct call to Galtieri.

—Call in the Argentine Ambassador to see you.

In addition to pointing out the grave damage that would be done to US/Argentine relations by Argentine seizure of the disputed islands, we should tell them that in the event of Argentine military action in the Falklands, the U.S. would support politically the UK.

*We could also consider the following:*

1. US support for a UK appeal to the UN Security Council.

However, a UK initiative in the Security Council would probably not get very far. Argentina enjoys the support of most of the Third World for its sovereignty claims, could count on the Soviet Bloc, and probably also China.

2. Tell the GOA that we will reassess our current position of neutrality on its somewhat similar Beagle Channel dispute with Chile.

While the GOA can reasonably hope to gain sovereignty over the Falklands and southern dependencies through patience (the islands are increasingly dependent on the Argentine economy and assistance; many British realize that UK control is an anachronism, even though they are strongly opposed to abandoning British subjects), the same does not apply to areas disputed with Chile. The GOA needs international community support for a negotiated settlement.

#### WHAT IF THE ARGENTINES INVADE THE FALKLANDS?

We may have no good options at that point. Once in possession of the Falklands it is very unlikely the Argentines will leave voluntarily, regardless of what we do or threaten. They may assume that the UK will not attempt to retake the islands, and that international attention will soon shift elsewhere.

*Nevertheless, we will have to:*

—Voice our strongest opposition to this action and state that the United States cannot recognize a solution that has not been agreed upon by the two parties.

—Urge immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces.

—Hold up indefinitely on the certification that would permit renewed U.S. arms sales and assistance to Argentina.

—Support fully UK initiatives at the UN or elsewhere.

*It is more likely at this point, given the pressures on the Thatcher Government, that the UK will order the marine garrison to resist an invasion and will attempt to retake the islands. It could bring in sufficient naval power*



in 3–4 weeks to effectively neutralize Argentina's proximity advantage. There could well be armed conflict, both at sea and on land. U.S. efforts at that point should be directed toward a cease fire and withdrawal of the Argentines. *In that context we could consider sending our own special emissary.*

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### 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 1, 1982, 1600Z

86916. Subject: Presidential Message to Mrs. Thatcher on Falkland Island Dispute.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Embassy should deliver immediately the following message from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher: Quote: Dear Margaret, I have your urgent message of March 31 over Argentina's apparent moves against the Falkland Islands.<sup>2</sup> We share your concern over the disturbing military steps which the Argentines are taking and regret that negotiations have not succeeded in defusing the problem.

Accordingly, we are contacting the Argentine Government at the highest levels<sup>3</sup> to urge them not to take military measures which would make a just solution more difficult to achieve. As you requested, we are also asking for assurances from them that they will show restraint and not initiate hostilities.

I want you to know how we have valued your cooperation on the challenges we both face in many different parts of the world. We will do what we can to assist you here.

Sincerely, Ron. Unquote.<sup>4</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White House.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 28.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 37 and 41.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 7307 from London, April 1, the Embassy reported that Reagan's message was delivered to the Prime Minister's office during the evening of April 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820174–0106)

### 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 1, 1982, 2345Z

1912. Subject: Possible Military Action in Falklands. Ref: State 86790.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. I met this evening with President Galtieri to review the points in reftel. Also present were the Foreign Minister, the President's principal military aide, and our ARMA. Galtieri had been informed of our demarche and had with him a talking paper prepared for his response. I emphasized to him, as I had to the Foreign Minister, that any armed confrontation would do serious damage to the excellent relations we have been developing between our two countries. I asked for the assurances on the use of force as set forth in para five of the reftel. Galtieri did not address that question in his talking paper, but when later I pressed it said bluntly that he was not going to tell us whether or not he intended to use force.

3. The President and the Foreign Minister both made it clear that they believed our demarche was the result of a request from HMG. (Comment: This should be borne in mind in assessing Galtieri's response. He was undoubtedly speaking as much to the British as to us and his intention was clearly to keep from tipping his hand.) With respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine support for our position in Central America—support which I acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in this case.

4. The talking paper, which the President handed to me at the end of the meeting, reviews the Argentine complaints about HMG's lack of response to the Argentine proposals of January and February. It describes the current situation as "intolerable and impossible to maintain" in terms of "our national honor." The paper contains the following sentence: "We have not considered for a moment that at a time when the freedom of the American people is seen to be seriously threatened

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent Niact Immediate to London. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 31.

your government (USG) would be inclined to defend a colonial system represented by fewer than 2,000 persons thousands of kilometers from the metropol. We believe firmly that such situations belong to the history of past centuries and that it is not rationally possible to ask us to be the last example of a colonial aggression."

5. The last point in the paper responds in a way to our request for assurances. The Foreign Minister commented that this point was the key. It states: "We can offer all the tranquility and security required if public and express recognition of our sovereignty is made real, along with the stipulation, also public, that in a period not to exceed the end of the year 1982 the consequences of said recognition will be made concrete." I told the President that we were not talking about US support or lack of support for the British position, that we were not taking sides, and that we were only speaking of the possibility of military action, a possibility which concerns us greatly. I said that such action could bring unforeseen and very grave consequences. The President said that Argentina was prepared to face such consequences.

6. Comment: Galtieri was emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I'm still not certain that he means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious inflation and I'm afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid.

**Shlaudeman**

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**38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982, 0019Z

87649. Subject: Falkland Islands Dispute in the Security Council.

1. (C–Entire Text)

2. US should vote for the resolution which the British have informed us they will introduce in the Security Council calling on all parties to refrain from the use of force in the Falkland Islands dispute and to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820173–1064. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to all UN Security Council capitals and Buenos Aires. Drafted by P.C. Wilcox (IO); cleared by Pendleton, Service, Platt, Holmes, Bosworth, and in S/S–O; and approved by Stoessel.

seek settlement of the matter through peaceful negotiations.<sup>2</sup> US representatives should make a brief statement during the debate in the Council in support of the principles in the UK resolution, emphasizing the need for peaceful, negotiated settlement. The US statement should not comment in any way on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The Secretary has been in touch with Lord Carrington to assure him of our strong support for the UK position. If UK proposes approval by the Council of a statement by the President of the Council instead of a resolution, US should likewise support.

**Haig**

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 808 from USUN, sent at 0104Z, April 2, the Mission informed the Department that a special emergency session of the Security Council would be held the evening of April 1 "at urgent request of the UK." At the session, the Mission continued, "UK seeks a statement by the President of the Security Council which is non-judgmental, balanced and emphasizes restraint by both parties, non-use of force and settlement by peaceful means. UK statement to the Council will point to the imminent danger of armed invasion of the Falklands and the deterrent effect which prompt Council action might have on GOA." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820173–1097)

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### **39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982, 0304Z

87865. Subject: UK-Argentine Confrontation: Secretary Calls In Argentine Ambassador.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Takacs at 7:45 p.m., April 1. They met for 15 minutes, with ARA DAS Bosworth also present. The Secretary told Takacs that the President and he are deeply concerned about the situation in the South Atlantic. Our assessment suggests that the use of force is contemplated on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia as well. We know that the UK will take a counter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

action if this happens. The situation would become a tragedy. Nothing would be more self defeating for Argentina's interest in good relations with the United States. The Secretary described our present relations as those of unprecedented cordiality after many years of languishing. GOA use of force would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days.

3. The Secretary said he had been in touch with Lord Carrington and received the clear impression the British will react. He said he had urged the President to call Galtieri. He was shocked to learn that the Argentine President would not take the call.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, an Argentine official (Gustavo Figueroa) had called to say that Galtieri would be available for a call shortly. The Secretary told Takacs that he had called him in before this subsequent information.

4. The Secretary concluded his opening presentation by saying it would be a supreme irony when we are confronting the threat from Castro for our friends to come to blows. To avoid that, the President is prepared to send Vice President Bush to Buenos Aires immediately if that would be helpful.

5. Takacs asked if our Ambassador in Buenos Aires had told Galtieri this afternoon that the British were prepared to use force. The Secretary did not know but he affirmed that it was his clear judgment after talking to Carrington. He added he knows enough about British politics to be pretty sure how Prime Minister Thatcher will react. Time has about run out. If the information we have is correct, it will be a *casus belli*.

6. The Secretary repeated that we are willing to do all we can, adding, however, that we cannot get into the dispute itself.

7. Takacs wanted the Secretary to know some of the history of this problem from the Argentine side. He said that Galtieri is in much the same situation as Thatcher, that next year will be the 150th anniversary of the start of the dispute, and no (Argentine) Government can exist with the situation remaining as it is. The incident in South Georgia has added fuel to the fire. Takacs added, however, that we must hope we can keep the situation manageable.

8. Takacs said he would inform his government immediately of the conversation.

**Haig**

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<sup>2</sup> In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Reagan had attempted to telephone Galtieri at 6:30 p.m., but had been informed by Galtieri's aide that he was "unavailable" to take Reagan's call. (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 264)

#### 40. Talking Points Prepared for President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

##### SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI

—I am calling you on an extremely serious matter that threatens the peace of this hemisphere.

—I want you to know of my personal concern about your dispute with the United Kingdom regarding the Malvinas and South Georgia Islands.

—I have very disturbing intelligence that Argentina is prepared to invade the Malvinas Islands by early tomorrow morning—0600 to be exact.<sup>2</sup>

—Another concern of mine is this. I know Prime Minister Thatcher very well. Maggie is a very determined woman. When she knows she's right as in the case of Gibraltar and Northern Ireland, she will not give in. The use of force by anyone will be met by force on her part. I am convinced of that. There should be no illusions about it.

—I know this is a matter of longstanding and great sensitivity to all Argentines.

—As you know, both you and the British are close friends of this country. And you know that with our traditional friendship with Great Britain, I am determined as I laid out in my February 24 OAS speech<sup>3</sup> to help build a lasting positive relationship with all the nations of this hemisphere.

—Long before I became President I advocated renewed good relations with the countries of this Hemisphere, especially the major ones—Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. I was and am determined to reverse the course set by my predecessor.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the talking points. The talking points are attached to an April 2 handwritten note by Poindexter, which reads: "President used this with minor mods [modifications] in telephone call last night." In addition, an attached NSC correspondence routing slip indicates that the talking points were sent to McFarlane for action. Both Poindexter and McFarlane initialed the routing slip. No memorandum of conversation of the Reagan-Galtieri telephone call has been found. For the substance of the conversation, see Document 41.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 34.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Reagan's remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Organization of American States made on February 24. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 210–215.

—And as you know better than I there have been a number of bad moments in our relations. I want to end that forever and build a lasting partnership.

—Together we can do so much. Argentines and Americans are working together now more closely than at any time in our history.

—But a conflict in this hemisphere would be a heavy blow to these hopes.

—Furthermore, I must tell you in all candor that if Argentina initiates the use of force against the Malvinas Islands, it will wreck our relationship. The American people and the Congress will see it as an act of Argentine aggression. And as President, so will I.

—I am therefore asking you not to invade the Malvinas Islands or start any conflict with the United Kingdom.

—I am further prepared to act on our longstanding position of seeking peaceful bilateral negotiations in this matter which I understand is of great importance to you and all Argentines.

—I<sup>4</sup> usually do not talk this way, but I must have, now, your absolute assurance that there will be no landing on the Falkland Islands<sup>5</sup> tomorrow morning.<sup>6</sup>

*IF THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO AGREE*

—I am prepared to dispatch Vice President Bush/Amb. Kirkpatrick immediately and insist that you withhold action until you have met with him/her.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This point and the following point are on an attached page which appears to have been added from another draft of the talking points. Both sections are classified Secret.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand crossed out the word “Falkland” which had been typed before this word.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand added “IF:” in large capital letters above the subject heading.

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this point with vertical lines in both the left- and right-hand margins.

#### 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1982, 0437Z

87911. Subject: President's Conversation With Argentine President Galtieri.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. The President telephoned Argentine President Galtieri at 2030 EST to discuss threat of Argentine military action against Falkland Islands.<sup>2</sup> The President stated that USG had solid information that Argentina was planning to take military action to take control of the Islands, and warned that doing so would be a tragedy, and would gravely compromise US-Argentine relations. The President made a personal appeal to Galtieri not to take any military step against the Falkland Island chain and offered the USG's good offices, including his willingness to send Vice President Bush to Buenos Aires.

3. Galtieri replied that he appreciated the President's concern, but the UK had refused to relinquish sovereignty for 149 years and time had run out. He went on to refuse President's offer of good offices and said the US appeal had been simply overtaken by events.

4. When President pressed Galtieri whether GOA intended to use force, Galtieri replied that Argentina feels free to use whatever resources are at its disposal, unless HMG that very night recognized full Argentine sovereignty over all of the Islands and agreed to provisions for turning over control within next few months. When pressed whether Argentine military would take action in the morning, Galtieri stated that GOA had full freedom to use force at the moment it judges opportune.

5. Following the conversation, the President sent a personal message to Prime Minister Thatcher.<sup>3</sup>

**Haig**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Galtieri over a conference line from 8:34 to 9:14 p.m., April 1. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been found. In his personal diary entry for April 2, Reagan recorded his account of the conversation: "Last night I called the Pres. of Argentina—talked for 40 min. trying to persuade him not to invade the Falkland Islands (property of U.K. since 1540 or so). Argentina has been trying to claim them for 149 years. I got nowhere." (Reagan, *Diaries*, vol. I, p. 121) For Haig's account of the conversation, see *Caveat*, pp. 264–265.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 42.



**42. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982, 0245Z

Dear Margaret,

I have just talked at length with General Galtieri about the situation in the Falklands.<sup>2</sup> I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland Islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your government in the effort to resolve this dispute, both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.

Warmest wishes,

**Ron**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive. Sent in telegram WH01641 via Cabinet Office channels. The Department transmitted the text of the message to Buenos Aires and London in telegram 88190, April 2. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 41.

# Seeking a Negotiated Settlement, April 2–April 30, 1982

## 43. Situation Report Prepared by the Department of State Falkland Islands Working Group<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1982

### Situation Report No. 1

#### *Situation in Falkland Islands as of 0600 EST*

1. Argentine press reports invasion of Falkland Islands began at 0400 EST April 2.<sup>2</sup> There is no official confirmation, but UK FCO reports it has lost communications contact with Port Stanley.<sup>3</sup> However, HMG thus far is saying “that no invasion has taken place.”

2. At the urgent request of the British, the Security Council met evening of April 1. UK permrep said that an Argentine force was heading for the Falklands and an invasion could occur as early as the next morning. Both sides presented their versions of the long-disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies of South Shetlands and South Georgia Islands. The President of the Council read a statement previously accepted or acquiesced in by all members which expressed concern and called on the two governments to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from use or threat of force in the region. The US rep supported the President’s statement as did the UK rep.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> At 9:40 a.m. Buenos Aires time, the Argentine Junta released an official statement announcing the commencement of the operation. According to an Embassy translation of the statement, the “combined operation” was launched “with the objective of recovering for the national patrimony the territories of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands.” (Telegram 1917 from Buenos Aires, April 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820175–0906)

<sup>3</sup> Ure informed the Embassy in London at 11:30 local time (GMT + 1 hour) that the U.K. Government had “lost communications contact with Port Stanley because of technical and weather problems, was trying to patch in a link through HMS *Endurance*, and was not sure at that moment whether the Argentines had landed.” Ure added that he planned to telephone Henderson and instruct him to ask Haig to issue a “prompt, public condemnation of Argentine military action if it were confirmed, and to request U.S. help in getting other countries to condemn the aggression and to call for a withdrawal of troops and a cessation of hostilities.” (Telegram 7330 from London, April 2; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3)) For an account of Henderson’s April 2 morning meeting with Haig, see Document 46.

3. The British have notified us they are contemplating using Wide-awake Air Force Base on British-owned Ascension Island to debark limited number of personnel for transfer to navy ship. We believe this is a courtesy notification, but are checking.

4. We are telling the press the US strongly supports the UN Security Council's call for the exercise of the utmost restraint and avoidance of the use of or threat of force.<sup>5</sup>

**Robert E. Service**

*Falkland Islands Working Group*

**Richard W. Erdman**

*Senior Watch Officer*

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<sup>4</sup> For a summary of the Security Council meeting of April 1, including the text of the UNSC President's statement, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1320.

<sup>5</sup> The White House issued a statement at the daily news briefing, which began at 12:40 p.m. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 411.

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#### **44. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 2, 1982, 1330Z

921345/Bravo 005. Subj: Argentina Situation. Adm Hayward sends.

1. (S/NF) Adm Hayward was received by Adm Anaya, CINARG-NAV and naval member ruling Junta, at 0825L this am in ARGNAV Hdqtrs Bldg here in Buenos Aires.

2. (S/NF) Adm Anaya explained situation as follows:

A. At 10 pm local last evening (1 Apr) 70 Argentine Marines (referred to as commandos) landed south of Port Stanley, Malvinas Islands (Falklands).

B. At 4 am this morning the govt radio station on the Island was secured.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; NoFORN. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State, Department of Defense, DIA, and CNO Admin.

C. At 6 am a battalion of Marines landed by amphibious means near Port Stanley (a batt normally is about 350). NavAtt estimates with LST *Cabo San Antonio* and available LVTP-7 amphibious vehicles Arg Marine force ashore could total max of 300.

3. (S/NF) No additional info was provided on action in Malvinas by Adm Anaya. Adm expressed apologies that this action came during my visit. He attempted to link Arg action with their role in countering the perceived threat of “Soviets” in the region, refering to their count of an estimated 60 Soviet fishing trawlers in the vicinity of these Islands.

4. (S/NF) I informed Adm Anaya that remainder of my visit was cancelled and that plans were initiated to leave for Rio de Janeiro this afternoon.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1950 from Buenos Aires, April 3, the Embassy reported that [*text not declassified*] had met with Anaya’s personal aide, Captain Ricardo Nolte, on April 2. Nolte indicated that Anaya was “surprised” by Hayward’s “brusque” reaction to the Malvinas operation when Anaya and Hayward met that morning, which “did not accord at all” with the Argentine Navy’s expectation of how the United States would receive the news of the operation. According to Nolte, “the navy believed that while we would disapprove, our reaction would be more softly stated owing to growing GOA–US coincidence of interests and US pragmatism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0027)

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#### 45. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1982, 1704Z

88344. Inform Consuls. Subject: Falklands Situation Report No. 2.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Situation in Falkland Islands as of 1000 EST.

3. The Argentine Junta announced at 0815 EST that their military occupation of the Falklands is a complete success. The UK Embassy in Washington has confirmed only that Argentina has launched military operations against the Falklands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0038. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Service; approved in S/S–O.

4. The Secretary has approved revised press guidance which reflects the confirmation of hostilities, deplores Argentina's resorting to force, and calls on Argentina to immediately withdraw its forces.

5. There are Argentine press reports that the UK ice patrol vessel *Endurance* has been sunk. The UK Embassy here denies this.

6. The UK Embassy has told us that the Royal Marines on the Falklands are under orders to resist. The Argentines claim the Marines made no resistance. We have no reports as yet of either any fighting or casualties.

7. At Brussels there was a special meeting of the NAC to consider the crisis.<sup>2</sup> The UK asked that the Allies weigh in with the Argentines and supported a statement to be issued by SYG Luns urging resistance and non-use of force. In London, Prime Minister Thatcher held an emergency Cabinet meeting this morning.

8. Embassy Buenos Aires reports that there are ten to twenty American citizens on the Falklands.

9. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires reports that his government is breaking diplomatic relations with Argentina and asking the Swiss to take over its interests.

10. Sitrep 1<sup>3</sup> not disseminated telegraphically.

**Haig**

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<sup>2</sup> A summary of the special meeting of the NAC was sent to the Department in telegram 2272 from the Mission to NATO, April 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820175–0930)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 43.

**46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982, 1916Z

88416. Subject: Secretary Discusses Falkland Island Invasion With Ambassador.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. The Secretary met with UK Ambassador Henderson morning of April 2 to discuss Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands. The Secretary began by describing the latest information from Buenos Aires on the extent of Argentine military activities in the South Atlantic and said that it was the U.S. judgment that the reports of occupation were accurate. Henderson answered that HMG had reached the same conclusion.

3. Henderson said that his government would like the U.S. to take three important steps: recall the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina; raise the issue of Argentine military action in the Organization of American States (OAS); and embargo U.S. defense sales to Argentina. He also said that his government was raising the issue today in the UN Security Council and would like our support.

4. The Secretary replied that the U.S. would carefully consider the three measures and get back to the British promptly. He assured Henderson that the U.S. wanted to be as helpful as possible in the Security Council and that we would instruct the U.S. delegation to get in touch right away with UK Ambassador Parsons.<sup>2</sup> Henderson inquired as to what the Secretary thought the reaction would be in the OAS if the U.S. raised the issue. The Secretary answered that it could

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4)). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, USUN, and the Mission to NATO. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> At 1958Z, April 2, the Department advised USUN of the Haig-Henderson meeting and instructed the Mission to vote for a British resolution calling for “a cessation of hostilities by Argentina, withdrawal of Argentine forces, and a return to negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute,” which British representatives planned to introduce in the Security Council that day. In addition, the Department instructed USUN to make a supporting statement containing the following points: “The US deplores Argentina’s use of force; We call on Argentina to cease hostilities and withdraw its military force immediately; We also urge the parties to resume negotiations in order to settle this dispute peacefully.” (Telegram 88491 to USUN, April 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0398) In telegram 89843 to USUN, April 3, the Department transmitted the final, cleared text of the U.S. statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0647) The statement as read by the Alternate Representative to the UN Security Council on April 3 is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1298.

be viewed as another anti-colonial, Third World issue, but we would look carefully at it.

5. DAS Holmes asked whether HMG considered getting the Vatican involved in trying to resolve the dispute. The Ambassador said that in his opinion the GOA won't listen to the Vatican, if it won't listen to the President of the U.S. The Secretary concluded by stating that it was clear that the GOA was using the Falklands issue at home as a political diversionary move, and the military operation would prove to be a major problem for what we are trying to do in this Hemisphere.

Haig

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**47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Issues Luncheon<sup>2</sup>

*Falkland Islands*

The Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands is a genuine crisis. The conflict involves two powers friendly to the U.S.—one of them a key NATO partner who remembers an American betrayal under very vaguely similar circumstances—Suez, 1956. The problem for the U.S. is to maintain its commitment to the U.K. special relationship; not alienate the Argentines; and find a peaceful way for all concerned out of this mess. Only the U.S. possesses the energy, wit, resources, and motivation to do so.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan held a luncheon meeting with Senator Laxalt at the White House swimming pool from 12:18 to 1:18 p.m., April 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

48. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State and the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 2, 1982, 1725Z

7406. Subject: Information on U.K. Military Activities Related to Falkland Dispute.

1. Confidential–Entire text.

2. The following repeats for your information [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Begin text:

8. (C/NoFORN) Summary: Ministry of Defense radio contact with Port Stanley was lost at 0945 London (GMT plus 1) on 820402 and efforts to reestablish communications are being made through HMS *Endurance*, the Royal Navy ice ship, now on patrol nearby in the South Atlantic. Assuming an Argentine invasion from the amphibious force in the area, the MOD is planning to send a task force of at least 7 ships and probably 2 commandos of Royal Marines (1800 approx strength). Early this date, instructions were given to RN and RM units to reassign all foreign personnel to shore establishments. The MOD Command Center has been on a fully manned basis since early morning (820330) and the Chief of the Defence Staff is holding a 1500 session (820402) to discuss contingency operations.

9A. (C/NoFORN) Details: The following info was all that could be obtained from various sources as MOD offices, both civilian and military, are extremely reluctant to talk.

—(1) (C/NoFORN) The Argentine naval force estimated at 5 ships plus 2 brigades of Marines is believed to have landed near/at Port Stanley around 0930 London time 820402. As of 1300 radio contact had not been reestablished and attempts to reestablish communications through HMS *Endurance* had not been successful.

—(2) (C/NoFORN) The UK response is to organize a task force of at least seven (7) ships which may include the HMS *Invincible*, *Hermes*, *Superb* (a nuclear powered submarine), an LDP, and two Royal fleet auxiliaries. From RM and RN sources an SOA of 16 knots was considered maximum obtainable from the force and it would take at least eighteen (18) days to reach the Falklands from the UK.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820175–0710. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. This telegram repeats portions of a telegram sent from [*text not declassified*] April 2, which was then repeated for information by the DIA to the White House at 1759Z. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/02/1982)



—(3) (C/Nofofn) UK forces in the Falklands area include the HMS *Endurance* with two (2) Lynx helicopters armed with (NFI) anti-tank missiles and 97 Royal Marines (RM's), armed with rifles, general purpose machine guns and (NFI) anti-tank weapons. There are 22 RM's on South Georgia and 75 in or near Port Stanley.

—(4) (C/Nofofn) Two Sea Harrier Squadrons (5 aircraft each) at RNAS Yeovilton have been alerted, 800 Squadron is leaving this date to go aboard HMS *Hermes* for a possible departure 820403, and 801 Squadron is preparing to go aboard HMS *Invincible* with an estimated departure 820406.

—(5) (C/Nofofn) The 3rd Commando Brigade with headquarters at Plymouth is on full alert and 45 Commando in Arbroath Scotland is packing its gear with an order to be prepared to depart in 72 hours. All Easter leaves have been cancelled in 45 Commando.

—(6) (C/Nofofn) Royal Air Force involvement at this point seems to be limited to a small number of C-130 sorties to Ascension Island. They will fly POL and comm gear to the island for transfer to a ship for bulk transport to the Falklands. Although the airport at Port Stanley can handle a C-130 (4100 feet long), RAF staffers feel that the distance of the Falklands from the UK and the lack of a staging point in South America will preclude airlift support to the area.

9B. (C/Nofofn) ORG cmts: Two subsequent attempts since 1300 820402 to obtain further details of UK deployment plans for force dispositions have been unsuccessful. Normally open discussions with close RM contacts have been noticeably guarded and although willing to discuss contingency plans they were not allowed to do so by the Defence Secretariat. It was obvious to RO that staff officers have been on alert for at least 48 to 60 hours and a schedule for full-time operations over the weekend was observed. The above information was passed separately to DIA and the DIA rep in NMCC.

End text.

3. We also note newspaper report in daily "Standard" March 2<sup>2</sup> to the effect that 24-ship U.K. task force which had taken part in NATO exercise "Springtrain" had put to sea again without shore leave. Task force includes two country class guided missile destroyers, 3 other destroyers, thirteen frigates and two submarines including the nuclear submarine *Superb*. Report cites source at Gibraltar as saying only that task force is "no longer in our operational area."

**Streator**

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably April 2.

#### 49. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1982, 1913Z

198782. TDFIR-314/00539-82. Dist: 2 April 1982. Country: Argentina/United Kingdom. Subject: Partial Chronology of the Argentine Military Action Against the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands (DOI: 1, 2 April 82). Source: [3 lines not declassified].

1. On 2 April 1982, a senior Argentine naval officer returned to Buenos Aires from Southern Argentina after having participated in the preparations for and the launching of the Argentine military action against the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. The naval officer said that the time and date of the operation had been set at least seven days in advance; it was launched at 2200 hours local time on 1 April in very high seas. The first unit employed was an eight-man underwater demolition team, followed shortly by a full marine infantry battalion in an amphibious assault; this battalion was augmented by 20 tanks, and two helicopters went in with a total of about 25 army commandos. The purpose of the first part of the operation was to secure the airfield at Port Stanley; this was achieved at 0200 hours local time on 2 April.

2. As soon as the airfield was secured, two C-130 aircraft with air assault troops landed to reinforce the marine battalion. The C-130 aircraft were scheduled to return to Rio Gallegos, in Argentina's southernmost province of Santa Cruz, to ferry members of the 11th Infantry Brigade to Port Stanley.

3. Members of the 9th Infantry Brigade at Comodoro Rivadavia were on alert on the morning of 2 April.

4. Argentine naval personnel involved in the operation believe it went like clockwork.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Cable File, Falkland Islands [04/01/1982-04/02/1982]. Secret; NoFORN; WINTel. Sent to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Security Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Treasury, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the White House Situation Room, the National Security Council Staff, the CIA Office of Current Operations, the Joint Special Operations Command, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT.

**50. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

SUBJECT

How We Should Respond to HMG's Request for Measures Against Argentina

SUMMARY

The Argentine military invasion of the Falkland Islands was successfully completed in the AM of April 2. This morning, British Ambassador Henderson formally presented three requests from his Government: to withdraw the U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires; to take the issue to the OAS; to embargo arms sales to Argentina.<sup>2</sup>

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE

The Argentines apparently calculated that the risk of UK military retaliation and damage to its relations with the U.S. was worth the price, and probably calculated that the US and UK would acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. The Argentines may have calculated that their recent assistance to the U.S. in Central America would ensure our acceptance of the invasion. In analyzing U.S. options, we must take into account Argentine support for U.S. policy in Central America and our longer term relationship with Argentina. At the same time, the British as our oldest and most reliable ally strongly believe that they should be able to count on U.S. support on the Falklands issue. We have already assured the UK that we will give them very strong support on the issue of Argentine use of military force, while remaining neutral on the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands. We are giving them strong support in the UN Security Council debate which began today.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig Jr. 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. Drafted by Smith; cleared by Service, Pendleton, Gudgeon, and Johnson. Service initialed for Enders and Holmes. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 46.

<sup>3</sup> The UN Security Council considered the Falklands/Malvinas issue in both morning and evening sessions, April 2. (Telegram 832 from USUN, April 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0349) On the morning of April 3, the British Embassy requested U.S. assistance to persuade Zaire and Japan to vote for a British

## EVALUATION OF OPTIONS

1. That you recall the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina.

PRO: EUR believes that Ambassador Shlaudeman should be called back to the United States for at least one week in order to comply with a request by our closest ally, and to demonstrate to Argentina that it seriously misjudged U.S. opposition to its military invasion. The British are going to bat for us in many areas of the world. We in effect owe it to them. Having an Ambassador in Buenos Aires over the past week in direct contact with the highest Argentine authorities was not enough to convince them of our serious opposition to the invasion. Recalling the Ambassador might get their attention.

CON: ARA believes that during this period of serious crisis in Buenos Aires and the major strain in U.S./Argentine relations, it would be a serious mistake to withdraw our Ambassador. Recall of our Ambassador would not bring a withdrawal from the Falklands and would result in a further loss of U.S. influence over the Junta. There are actions (e.g., UN) we are taking to help the British. Recall of the Ambassador, even briefly, could seriously jeopardize our common interests with Argentina elsewhere in the hemisphere.

2. Raise this issue in the OAS.

Mechanisms exist to call expeditiously for a Permanent Council session to deal with a situation which endangers the peace of the region. Alternatively, the Permanent Council could consider a resolution calling on the parties to resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The Permanent Council also could consider convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers under either the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

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resolution introduced the previous day; the Department informed the British that "the US will do everything possible to help obtain passage of the UK resolution." (Telegram 89842 to USUN, April 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0646) Later on April 3, the Department instructed USUN to vote against a second draft resolution introduced by Panama should it be brought to a vote. (Telegram 89871 to USUN, April 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0692) The British resolution, which demanded the "immediate cessation of hostilities" and the "immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces" from the Islands and called upon the Argentine and British Governments to "seek a diplomatic solution to their differences," was adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 502, April 3. The Security Council also agreed not to vote on the Panamanian draft resolution. The text of UNSC Resolution 502 (1982) is printed in *American Foreign Policy Current Documents*, 1982, pp. 1298–1299.

<sup>4</sup> The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, was signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held in Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one signatory of the treaty would be considered an attack on all signatories.

We consider the British OAS idea inadvisable and, potentially, seriously prejudicial to their position. In our view:

—The British have no status at the OAS; they are not permanent observers; they would not be permitted to speak.

—The Argentines, if they wish, could seek to turn invocation of OAS mechanisms against the British.

—The Inter-American Juridical Committee in a 1976 statement upheld the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Some OAS members, certainly Argentina, will cite this as a precedent.

—While the OAS is not necessarily a biased forum, Argentina would seem to hold more cards when it comes to votes within that organization; the outcome could be seriously disadvantageous to the British.

—If outright condemnation of the UK could be avoided in the OAS, it could only be on the basis of a peace-making action under OAS auspices which would require significant concessions by the UK.

—The matter is in the UN right now and we strongly support British efforts there.

—Should any attack on Argentine military units occur, the GOA would use this as an additional ground for seeking OAS or Rio Treaty measures against Britain and few OAS members would want to make the British case even if the UK acted in legitimate self-defense consistent with the UN Charter.

Raising the issue on behalf of the British in the OAS would be very costly to U.S. interests in this region. Besides the impact on our bilateral relationship, the OAS itself could be severely damaged. OAS consideration would intensify the latent Latin-Caribbean split within that organization. (We assume a number of the English-speaking Caribbean states, though not enough to change the outcome, would support the British against a united Latin front.)

### 3. Embargo of Arms Sales.

HMG probably does not realize that U.S. arms sales are still prevented under the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.<sup>5</sup> Congress has repealed the restriction but we have not yet gone to the Congress with the required certification. ARA and EUR believe that we should put an indefinite hold on lifting the suspension in light of the Argentine move. But we should not publicly or explicitly link certification with

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the June 1977 amendment to the FY 1978 foreign assistance appropriations bill, named for its sponsors Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), which imposed an embargo on new arms transfers to Argentina in response to its human rights record. The amendment took effect on October 1, 1978.

the Falkland affair, since this could tend to tie our own hands for the indefinite future. You should be aware that Argentine use of USG-furnished defense articles in its invasion may violate the terms of our bilateral agreement under which they were provided, and that a prompt report to Congress under the Arms Export Control Act may be required.<sup>6</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATION

1. Recall of our Ambassador in Buenos Aires for at least one week. (EUR favors, ARA opposes).<sup>7</sup>
2. Raise the Falkland issue at the OAS. (ARA and EUR recommend against).<sup>8</sup>
3. That we put an indefinite hold on lifting the arms sales restriction on Argentina. (ARA and EUR support).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> A notation in an unknown hand reads: "We are looking into this now."

<sup>7</sup> A notation in an unknown hand indicates that this recommendation was disapproved on April 3.

<sup>8</sup> A notation in an unknown hand indicates the decision not to raise the issue at the OAS was taken on April 3.

<sup>9</sup> A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the recommendation was approved on April 3. Following up on this approval, Blackwill sent an April 7 information memorandum to Haig which pointed out that the April 2 memorandum "did not mention that there is \$3.9 million in the pipeline to Argentina under agreements concluded prior to October 1, 1978, the effective date of the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment. These items consist primarily of aircraft and ship spare parts, and were not affected by your decision." Blackwill continued: "The British are particularly concerned about the Argentines acquiring spare parts in this pipeline for C-130's and A-4's, an acquisition which in most cases would not require a Munitions Control license and thus will routinely occur unless you direct otherwise." Attached to this April 7 information memorandum was an April 7 action memorandum from Enders and Holmes to Haig, which spelled out Haig's options regarding action on the Argentine arms pipeline. On the first page of the information memorandum, Haig wrote: "Hold until my return." In the upper right-hand corner of the information memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "Returned to PM 5/19 per APA as OBE." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9, 1982)

**51. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

SUBJECT

U.S. Support for the UK at Ascension

We need your urgent guidance on a British request for support for the movement of up to twelve RAF C-130's through Ascension April 3–7. The request includes a fuel uplift of 630,000 pounds—the fuel to be bought from U.S. stocks on the island.

This request was foreshadowed in a message received early this morning from Carrington.<sup>2</sup> The British plan to ferry troops to Ascension for embarkation aboard ships there en route to the Falkland Islands area.

The issue is whether we support this UK move, particularly by providing our fuel.

We believe we should. L believes we are under an obligation to permit the UK to use these facilities in the event the UK considers additional logistic, administrative or operating facilities necessary at the airfield.<sup>3</sup> DOD has prepared a message authorizing UK access to our fuel.<sup>4</sup> We have held it pending your decision.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0638. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pendleton; cleared by Service, Michel, and Blackwill. Pendleton initialed for Enders, Service, and Michel.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the message from Carrington has not been found. In telegram 7329 from London, April 2, the Embassy reported that the message, which was passed by the British Embassy in Washington, “was intended solely as notification, in keeping with past practice of notifying U.S. authorities when U.K. forces plan to use facilities at Ascension.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, Falklands Crisis—1982 (1))

<sup>3</sup> In an April 5 press conference, Fischer outlined U.S. policy on the British use of U.S. military facilities, including Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island: “Our view on this is that Ascension Island is a British possession. The United Kingdom has the legal right to land military aircraft there after notifying the U.S. Air Force Commander at the airfield. The U.S. Government is obligated under a 1962 agreement governing its use of the airfield, to cooperate in the United Kingdom use of logistic, administrative, or operating facilities; and therefore, such use of the airfield does not, in any way constitute U.S. involvement in the United Kingdom-Argentine dispute.” (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1299) The agreement referenced by Fischer is the Agreement Relating to the Use of the Airfield at Wideawake on Ascension Island by Aircraft of the Royal Air Force, effected by notes exchanged in Washington on August 29, 1962. Wideawake Airfield, which has hosted a continuous USAF presence since 1957, is known officially as RAF Ascension.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

*PROS:* The British will expect this form of tangible support. This is their “en route access,” and to deny it would have enormous consequences for UK cooperation on our own en route access plans.

*CONS:* Our help to the UK would have an obvious impact on those in the hemisphere who support Argentina in its dispute with the UK. It would further alienate us from many Latin American nations once it becomes known, particularly if the UK employs its forces against Argentina.

We believe it would be best to inform the British and our Commander on Ascension orally.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you approve UK access to U.S. fuel on Ascension and that decision be transmitted orally.<sup>5</sup>

ARA sees no alternative but to approve this proposal. However, Tom Enders believes we should instruct Ambassador Shlaudeman to inform the Argentines at an appropriate level and at an appropriate time<sup>6</sup> that we are providing this service to the British under the terms of our agreement.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand initialed approval of this recommendation on behalf of Haig, April 2.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand circled “appropriate time” and drew a line from it to a notation below, which reads: “to be discussed by Enders with the Secretary Sat. [April 3] AM.”

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand initialed approval of this recommendation on behalf of Haig, April 2. In telegram 89865 to Buenos Aires, April 3, the Department transmitted the message to Shlaudeman. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/03/1982–04/06/1982)) Shlaudeman informed the Argentine Government of the U.S. decision the same day. (Telegram 1960 from Buenos Aires, April 3; *ibid.*)



**52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

*Quick Intelligence Assessment on Falkland Affairs (April 2, 1982)**I. Brief History of the Dispute*

The controversy dates to 1833 when the British occupied the island claimed by the Argentines as part of their colonial heritage. The dispute was only a minor irritant in otherwise good bilateral relations until Buenos Aires, anxious to recover the islands, took the dispute to the UN in 1965. The General Assembly declared sovereignty in dispute and established what turned out to be an ineffective mechanism for negotiations. Growing economic potential in Falkland territorial waters heightened tensions during the mid and late 1970s. The latest round of talks, which began in February, failed in mid-March when the British refused to bow to Argentine public demands that negotiations be speeded up. The South Georgia incident began on March 19, escalating into confrontation and the Argentine invasion Friday.

*Did Argentina plan the Escalation?*

Although there is no direct evidence that the Argentines manufactured the original incident at South Georgia on 19 March, they were looking for a chance to put pressure on the British and, at the least, quickly seized upon a tactical opportunity to confront the British militarily. The civilian group that went to South Georgia had complied with all immigration procedures known to Argentine and British authorities in Buenos Aires and whether Argentine officials encouraged the flag raising itself is unknown. Nonetheless, President Galtieri has pursued a generally aggressive foreign policy, and Navy Chief Anaya has been pushing for some action in the absence of diplomatic progress on the Falklands. The Argentines relatively quickly came to see the issue as a military rather than diplomatic problem and the decision to implement long held contingency plans for the invasion was probably made last weekend.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Casey sent [text not declassified] an undated paper entitled “The Falklands Dispute: An Historical Perspective” to Clark under an April 2 covering note. Casey also sent the papers and a memorandum to both Haig and Carlucci, under identical covering notes. The copy sent to Haig is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder; the copy sent to Carlucci is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982.

## II. Events to Date

The Argentines successfully invaded the Falkland Islands this morning; some 200–350 Argentine Marines with armored vehicles evidently went ashore near Port Stanley and airborne units reportedly secured the local airfield. There is also information that three Argentine ships are in the harbor at nearby Port Williams. The Argentines may be debarking as many as 500–1000 well-armed troops from the task force, and the 10–14 naval ships in the area include the country's only aircraft carrier as well as several guided missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, transport and amphibious craft, and at least one submarine. There evidently was sporadic resistance by the small force of Royal Marines and irregulars on the main Falkland Islands, and the ice patrol ship *Endurance* was able to depart South Georgia Island and is now somewhere between South Georgia and the main islands. The Argentines appear to be securing the islands and plan to name the general officer in charge of Army operations as military governor.

## III. UK Options

### A. Diplomatic

The British have broken diplomatic relations with Argentina, but they could continue to make use of the UN Security Council as a means of keeping open a channel of communications and as a forum to put Argentina in the dock as an "aggressor." They probably do not expect the UN debate to resolve the crisis, but they hope it will at least show that Britain had attempted to find a diplomatic solution before resorting to military countermeasures. The British could also ask their European partners to join in a demarche to the Argentines demanding they withdraw their troops and seek a peaceful settlement or even to condemn Argentina openly. London is likely to ask the US to continue to exert pressure on Argentina to "see reason," and to mobilize other Latin American states to intervene with the Argentines. While the British hope that the US will maintain contact with Buenos Aires and perhaps continue to serve as a conduit, they probably prefer public US support for the British position to jolt the Argentines and convince them that the US will not push London to accept a *fait accompli*. London undoubtedly expects US support at the UN as well. London could in principle offer at the UN or in another forum to discuss the ultimate sovereignty of the Falklands, but only after a cooling off period, and only after Argentine withdrawal from the islands.

### B. Economic

British economic options are limited. Trade between Argentina and the UK is not significant for either country. In 1980, the UK exported goods totaling \$402 million to Argentina while imports reached \$265 million—representing 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent of total UK exports

and imports, respectively. Manufactured goods of all kinds accounted for nearly 90 percent of British sales; purchases from Argentina consist mainly of meat and other foodstuffs. UK banks hold about 10 percent of Argentina's total commercial bank debt of \$23 billion, but this provides no practical leverage. London's best hope would be for general US and EC economic restrictions on Argentina—something that would be hard to enforce. The British have never shown much faith in economic sanctions, however, and in any case, the length of time it would take to have any effect would make them politically unacceptable.

### *C. Military*

There have been press reports that one or two nuclear-powered attack submarines were sent to the Falkland Islands last week. The units identified as being detailed to the Falklands were said to be the two taking part in a naval exercise near Gibraltar. Those two submarines, however, were still in place as of 1 April. It is not yet clear whether the press was in error only about the identity of the submarines or, equally likely, it could be that no submarines were deployed ahead of the rest of the forces.

A large British naval group has been participating in an exercise near Gibraltar with US and Portuguese forces. Included in this group of 24–28 ships were four guided missile destroyers, 12 frigates, five naval oilers, two nuclear-powered attack submarines, and other support ships. A substantial portion of this group, if not all, reportedly is underway towards the South Atlantic but probably can not arrive before two weeks. As it is presently configured this force apparently should be capable of attacking the Argentine naval group on arrival. Even if the British were able to force the Argentine fleet away, they do not have the capability to invade the Falklands in light of the substantial forces Argentina evidently is deploying to the islands. The British force could blockade the islands while awaiting the arrival of a second British naval group.

The second British task force of seven ships including two carriers—the *Hermes* and the *Invincible*—is forming in Britain. This force probably can not leave before 8 April and would not arrive in the Falklands for about 18 days after that. The two carriers each have five VSTOL aircraft on board; the *Hermes* carrier has 5 helicopters, the *Invincible* 8 helicopters as well. Two commando units, a brigade headquarters, a *Rapier* battery and 1800 to 1900 troops probably would be on board. This force could be used to invade the islands.

There are a few other British warships in the Caribbean and near Belize. They also could be detailed to join the task force en route.

The British evidently have little option to employ air units. The distance between the British airfield in Ascension Islands to the Falklands is so great that aircraft can not fly from the base and return.

There apparently are no alternate airfields the British could use to land their aircraft.

#### *IV. Argentine Responses—Military, Diplomatic, Implications for Beagle Dispute*

The Argentines probably soon will begin reprovisioning and reinforcing their forces on the islands before any British units arrive. Air Force units in southern Argentina reportedly were being strengthened yesterday; the airbase at Rio Gallegos in the far south would be a particularly good candidate for receiving fighters and has had Mirage aircraft there in the past. It is also possible that combat aircraft could be sent to the airfield at Port Stanley. The field is capable of handling jets and has a fuel storage capacity of 50,000 liters. The Argentines, however, probably will try to increase the fuel storage capacity at the field, to establish command and control communications, and to provide maintenance and logistic support, as well as protection, for aircraft and crews.

While we have no evidence, we believe that Argentine ground force units, particularly those in the south, probably are on a heightened alert status. Reinforcements for the islands likely will come at first from the 9th Infantry Brigade which, with a strength of about 4500, is the largest ground unit in the south. Other units could be alerted and readied for transport to the south, but this probably would take several days to accomplish. Transports and other naval craft could be sent to ports along the South Atlantic to ferry troops and equipment to the islands.

Virtually the entire Argentine fleet is involved in the Falkland operations. Given the age of many of the units—some are almost 40 years old—and their sustained operations at sea, it appears sensible for the Argentines to begin withdrawing some of their more vulnerable naval craft once the reinforcement and reprovisioning of the islands has been accomplished. We also do not believe that the Argentines would fare well in a full-scale naval engagement with the British, particularly in view of the nature of the forces the British are preparing to send to the Falklands. If Argentine ships are attacked, however, they will respond in kind.

The invasion has probably strengthened Galtieri's standing within the military, especially the Navy and among predominantly nationalist political opponents who have long advocated invading the Falklands. We expect this support to continue, even among hardline Peronist labor union leaders who, despite repression of their recent demonstration, will have little choice but to back Galtieri. Like Thatcher, Galtieri probably calculates that he will have to avoid appearing to waver or risk serious domestic and international political costs. The Argentines

see a direct correlation between a tough—and successful—effort on the Falklands and success in their Beagle dispute with Chile. Similarly, they believe a defeat on the Falklands would be an enormous setback in the Chile dispute, thus doubling their stake in the current confrontation.

Diplomatically, Argentina will probably utilize its ties to the Non-Aligned Movement and to developing nations in the United Nations to try to block British efforts in international fora to condemn the invasion. Buenos Aires may anticipate US opposition in the OAS but had calculated earlier that they could defeat the British in a showdown in the UN over the issue.

*V. Potential for Soviet and/or Cuban exploitation*

Cuba, which traditionally has supported Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands, will probably be initially cautious in providing political backing for the Argentine move—Havana will want to be sure to avoid embarrassment in the event Buenos Aires' military adventure fails. Nevertheless, the incident gives Havana the opportunity to renew its criticism of the Thatcher government, which it views with obvious distaste.

The Soviets will seek to exploit the crisis by giving political support to Argentina; but will not become directly involved militarily. The Soviets have been trying to establish close relations with Argentina, in large part because it provides more than 10 percent of Soviet grain imports and helped offset the US grain embargo in 1980–81. In contrast, relations with the UK are already poor. Now that Argentina has already occupied the islands, Moscow could call for a ceasefire and subsequent talks. Moscow will work to avoid UN Security Council condemnation of Argentina, threatening to veto it. It is likely to use the situation to intensify longstanding, but so far unproductive efforts to sell Argentina military equipment. To ingratiate themselves with the Argentines, the Soviets may provide Buenos Aires with surveillance information of British military moves.

**53. Memorandum From James M. Rentschler, Dennis C. Blair, and Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands: What Next?

We believe that it is essential to convene, on an expeditious basis, an SSG whose main objective would be to assess the middle- and longer-term implications of the situation in the South Atlantic and to determine U.S. policy priorities based on the state of play likely to emerge from the current Anglo-Argentine confrontation.

In particular, we need to pose searching questions concerning the desired extent (and duration) of our support for the Brits in these developments; the probable impact which such support might have on larger U.S. strategic interests (NATO commitments); and the degree to which our Hemispheric relationships and policy initiatives (CBI, etc.) will be affected. At a minimum, such a meeting would have a consciousness-raising effect on the national security community and mobilize some assets which have been either deficient or relatively quiescent as current events evolve (defense analysis and logistics, intelligence forecasting, etc.). At a maximum, of course, we would aim for a rational follow-up program to deal with the after-effects of the Falklands issue.

With the above in mind, we have attached an illustrative SSG agenda (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> which identifies the key questions we need to address over the next few days and weeks (possibly months).

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That you review and refine the attached agenda and proceed with convening a Falklands SSG.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, NSC Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret. Sent for action. Blair initialed for Fontaine. Rentschler wrote "Jim" next to his name.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved. No indication of whether a meeting of the SSG was held has been found, although a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), held April 5 to discuss [*text not declassified*] in Central America, briefly touched upon the situation in the Falklands/Malvinas. In the meeting, Haig observed "that the Falkland Islands dispute could complicate the matter as the OAS will be concerned by Argentina's role." (Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Planning Group, April 5; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 0037 04/05/1982 [Central America])

**54. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

## SUBJECT

Argentinian Invasion of Falkland Islands (U)—INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(C) The following points are in addition to the information in today's NID<sup>2</sup> and on the attached memo:<sup>3</sup>

1. I talked to Walt Stoessel to make sure we are in synchronization with what State and the White House are doing. As you probably have learned now, the President got in touch with Argentine President Galtieri yesterday<sup>4</sup> trying to dissuade the Argentinians and consideration was also given to sending the Vice President. But apparently these initiatives were unsuccessful.

2. Tom Hayward who was on a tour to Latin America was told yesterday that there was going to be a landing, and therefore decided to leave Buenos Aires for Brazil.<sup>5</sup> It is obviously the right decision that the CNO should not be visiting Argentina at this time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret. A stamped notation in the bottom right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on April 2. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on April 5.

<sup>2</sup> An article on "Argentine–UK" was in the April 2 *National Intelligence Daily*. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T00301R; Intelligence Pub Files (1982), Box 2, Folder 1: National Intelligence Daily)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an April 2 memorandum from Koch to Iklé, in which Koch offered preliminary thoughts on the Department of Defense role in the U.S. reaction to events in the Falklands/Malvinas. Koch asserted: "We should let State get out front on this issue, because it's not going to end with *both* parties happy with the interlocutor. We at Defense (at least in ISA) have a peculiar interest in not irritating Argentina. In South America, finally, it is the military-to-military relationship that matters—not State to Foreign Ministries." "The argument *for* a strong U.S. response to Argentina," he continued, "is that if we do it correctly (and we consult privately with Argentina about what we're doing and why), then we may strengthen our hand with Congress on Humphrey-Kennedy and benefit Argentina in the end. One argument the other way is that we will get accused of trying to play policeman in the Western Hemisphere. Another is we will likely have no effect (a result of the Carter Administration proving to Argentina they can survive with U.S. disapproval), and the impression of U.S. impotence in its own backyard will be reinforced." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 41.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably a mistaken reference to the April 2 Anaya-Hayward meeting. See Document 44.

3. I am concerned that this Argentinian action will make it more difficult for us to work with the Argentinians on Central American issues and to overcome Congressional opposition to IMET funding for Argentina. Also, there could be a spillover from the undoubtedly strong negative British reaction toward the Argentinians to the pervasive West European hostility toward our Central American policy. The left in Europe will be quick to make connection between Argentina and the governments that we happen to support in Central America. I feel, therefore, that we in DoD and the Services ought to use all our influence to reinforce the Administration's effort to dampen down this conflict.

4. We have to consider further steps, in particular whether to go ahead with General Allen's visit April 12 and your stop in Argentina last week of April.<sup>6</sup>

Fred C. Ikle<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Iklé placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> Iklé signed "Fred" above his typed signature.

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## 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 2, 1982, 2223Z

1946. Subject: The Politics of the Malvinas Adventure.

1. Confidential–Entire text.

2. Summary: This is a preliminary assessment of the politics involved in the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas. President Galtieri hopes to use this adventure to buy political time, solidify his authority and stay in office through 1987. Given those prizes to win, the calculated gamble and the international costs involved must have seemed worth it. Once the popular euphoria wears off, however, the same problems of deep economic recession and the unpopularity of the military government will remain. Still, Galtieri undoubtedly feels himself in a strong

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0629. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Brasilia, London, Montevideo, and Santiago.



position for the moment, strong enough perhaps even to make some concessions on Argentina's other longstanding external dispute, that of the Beagle Channel. End summary.

3. The invasion of the Malvinas is a calculated gamble designed in part to gain Galtieri what is called here "political space" and ultimately to entrench him in power. The latter objective includes extension of his term as CINC of the army beyond his normal retirement date at the end of the year and "re-election" as President for another three years in 1984. During the last six weeks the regime has come under steadily increasing pressure from the political parties, industrialists, labor unions and other organized groups as Roberto Alemann's stabilization program has begun to hurt. The frustrated CGT rally on March 31, the first mass demonstration of consequence since 1976, must have been all too vivid a reminder to the military of what can happen to government authority in the streets of Buenos Aires.<sup>2</sup>

4. As soon as the news of the landings was released, the GOA launched a massive campaign to promote national unity and national rejoicing. The effort has so far included rallies throughout the country, a new song for the occasion, "Malvinas Argentinas", played endlessly on radio and television, flags everywhere, a Galtieri appearance before the masses in the Plaza de Mayo a La Peron, and statements of enthusiastic support elicited from every Argentine personage of any conceivable importance. (The only slightly skeptical voice has been that of former Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion whose fall from office with Viola was a serious setback to hopes for moderation and intelligence in this country's foreign policy). The release of those labor leaders still being held as a result of the events of March 31 so that they too could join in the celebration was further evidence of the effort to open political space.

5. These glittering rewards to be won must have helped persuade Galtieri and his colleague Admiral Anaya (a prime mover in this operation) that the risks were worth taking. British military power was a long way away, and, they could well have calculated, if the British do react militarily, HMG will be hard put to maintain at such a great distance and for so much time the considerable force needed to oust the Argentines and keep them out. The GOA knew from our representations that there would be a high price to pay in terms of relations with the US. But Galtieri seems to think that the Central American connection

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1835 from Buenos Aires, March 31, the Embassy reported that with "a massive display of force" the Argentine Government "frustrated scheduled rallies by the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and crushed a series of related demonstrations" across the country on March 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820170-0509)

and the *fait accompli* in the Malvinas will mitigate that in time. (There is also much talk here at the moment about the Israeli example of how to do these things and get away with them.) Otherwise internationally the GOA appears persuaded that it will have ample support, or at least tolerance, from other Latin Americans, the NAM and the Soviet bloc.

6. How much political space Galtieri has brought himself is open to question. If the Malvinas operation is less than the promised quick success, the President could soon come under fire, although appeals for national unity in a prolonged crisis will not go unheard. In any event, once the euphoria has worn off, the same problems will remain: an unpopular government and a sick economy. In the circumstances, Roberto Alemann's stabilization program may well be a casualty. The Malvinas adventure will cost a lot of money and the temptation to return to populist policies will be strong. Liberalization may be another casualty. The GOA has already shown a tendency toward toughness when challenged in its reactions on March 31. Tolerance in that quarter of further labor demonstrations and political dissidence in general is not likely to be great. We are already hearing from some in the military that further moves toward a political should be postponed.

7. With all that, Galtieri is for the moment riding high. He has some political space and will now be very difficult to move out of the army command at the end of the year. It is also worth noting that Galtieri has positioned himself to make a genuine try to resolve the Beagle dispute, Argentina's other longstanding external problem. Having recovered "national patrimony", at least temporarily, and having assured himself in Argentine history, Galtieri could make some concessions on the Beagle. He could also, of course, prove more difficult than ever after successfully flexing the country's military muscles.

**Shlaudeman**

**56. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Howe)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1982

SUBJECT

Kirkpatrick Dinner/Falklands<sup>2</sup>

(C) 1. Other ranking figures now slated to attend are Stoessel and Middendorf. Mrs. Kirkpatrick intends to go. Bosworth had regretted for other reasons prior to April 1.

SecState will have to make the call on this one, per Bosworth.<sup>3</sup>

(C) 2. State has also considered withdrawing our Ambassador.<sup>4</sup> This is on hold, and cool heads see it as unproductive, and counter-productive. The problem is getting players to focus on the mid-term. We don't want our redeveloping relationship in Argentina to go smash—even if they are the agents of it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Confidential. A copy was sent to Iklé. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on April 2.

<sup>2</sup> On the evening of April 2, Kirkpatrick, along with Stoessel, Enders, Middendorf, Marsh, Meyer, and former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, attended a scheduled dinner, held in Kirkpatrick's honor, at the Argentine Embassy in Washington. The attendance of the U.S. officials was confirmed publicly to United Press International by the Argentine Embassy, April 8. ("Ranking U.S. Official Guests At Argentine Embassy Dinner," *Washington Post*, April 8, p. A22) In an April 8 press interview, Henderson commented on Kirkpatrick's attendance: "I wouldn't have done so. If I had been asked by the Iranian Embassy to go to a banquet the night your hostages were taken, I wouldn't have done so." (John M. Goshko, "U.S. Even-Handedness Is Seen as Best Hope for Damage Control," *Washington Post*, April 9, p. A14) In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Kirkpatrick "persevered in her intention to attend" the dinner and "raised, at the outset, a doubt in the minds of the British as to her impartiality, and no doubt underlay their subsequent consternation about her activities." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 270) Thatcher later wrote of the event: "Unfortunately the attitudes of Mrs Kirkpatrick and some other members of the US Administration were at this point of considerable importance." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 180)

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand drew two parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 50.

(C) 3. The over-riding complication is the President's closeness to Mrs. Thatcher. The President called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.<sup>5</sup>

**Noel C. Koch<sup>6</sup>**

*Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary  
International Security Affairs*

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<sup>5</sup> See Documents 40 and 41.

<sup>6</sup> Koch signed "Noel" above his typed signature.

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**57. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 3, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Dispute

The Falklands crisis presents us with difficult issues.<sup>2</sup> We will continue to be dependent upon our close ties with the U.K. as we work a wide range of global issues. If Moscow, the Allies, and the Third World believe we have failed to support the British against an overt use of force, our position as a global power will have been adversely affected. At the same time, we also have much at stake in our relations with Argentina. Our steps in the weeks ahead will have to be carefully nuanced to take into account these conflicting interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, NSC Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & Staff Memos, 1982. Secret. Attached to the memorandum is an April 5 handwritten note from Poindexter that reads: "President was verbally briefed on the contents." An attached NSC correspondence profile also indicates that Reagan was verbally briefed.

<sup>2</sup> In his April 2 Evening Report to Reagan, which briefly summarized the day's events, Haig concluded on the Argentine landings: "We must proceed cautiously and objectively on this question—not endorsing Argentine force while not unnecessarily jeopardizing our relations with Argentina." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (03/25/82–04/21/82))

On the Falklands dispute, the British have no reason to complain about our support to date: your personal intervention with Galtieri;<sup>3</sup> our strong public statements; and our support for the British in New York.<sup>4</sup> London has asked for three other immediate actions from us.<sup>5</sup>

—Withdraw our Ambassador from Buenos Aires. I will tell them we consider it unwise to cut off our most effective and possibly influential channel of communication.

—Consider taking the issue to the OAS. We believe this would severely damage U.K. (and our) interests since their case would elicit little support in that body (which is already on record in support of the Argentine claim).

—Stop arms shipments to Argentina. U.K. is unaware we have not yet made the required certification of Argentina's human rights record to allow shipments. We will continue our hold on the certification and so inform the U.K.

At the same time we must bear in mind our important interest in retaining as much as we can of the new relationship you have forged with the government in Buenos Aires. They have been a key supporter of our broader regional goals, especially in Central America. Also, Argentina is already heavily dependent on Soviet grain purchases; we must avoid giving the USSR new opportunities such as the establishment of an arms supply relationship.

Our calculated policy of balance will become increasingly difficult to sustain if the British are forced to take military action. It will therefore be important for us to use our influence in both capitals to seek a non-military solution before the British fleet arrives in about two weeks. But if diplomatic maneuvers fail, and if the U.K. requires greater support from us, we should be prepared to consider ways to be responsive while bearing in mind our interests in Argentina.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 41.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 46 and 50.

58. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 3, 1982, 1324Z

7429. Military Addressees Handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: British Military Steps in the Falkland Dispute.

1. Entire text—Confidential.

2. Summary: Mrs. Thatcher is under considerable public pressure to take decisive steps in the Falkland dispute. But a military solution may be beyond her reach.<sup>2</sup> The question for her government is how much to put at risk militarily for reasons of politics and prestige. End summary.

3. The military difficulties for Britain of sustaining operations in the South Atlantic are awesome. If they want to go beyond gesture, Mrs. Thatcher's government must reckon that the task would be not only to dislodge the Argentines and restore the status quo, but to defend the Falklands for an indefinite time in the face of continued Argentine hostility. This certainly could not be done without a large and protracted diversion of military assets to the South Atlantic—where no other U.K. security interests are at stake. Conceivably, it could not be done at all.

4. Nevertheless, Mrs. Thatcher is under considerable pressure to act decisively. The popular press are running headlines like "Shame" (the *Daily Express*) and "It's War" (the *Sun*). The April 3 *Times* editorializes in favor of military steps against the Argentine Navy if Argentine troops are not withdrawn. The opposition is pointing out that the government ignored warning signs and failed to dispatch ships—as was done in the past—when tensions with Argentina increased. More-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0587. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to NATO Collective, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, Moscow, USUN, the Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE, CINCUSAFE, USLOSACLANT, and USSOUTHCOM.

<sup>2</sup> Summarizing the special session of Parliament held to discuss the Argentine landing, April 3, the Department reported as part of the Falkland Islands Situation Report Number 5: "Mrs. Thatcher declined to say whether the British fleet would be ordered to engage the Argentines. She said the aircraft carrier *Invincible* would sail April 5 to lead the task force. Press speculation goes as high as 35–40 ships. In debate, the Parliament was virtually unanimous in its call for military action, although speakers acknowledged that a diplomatic solution should be attempted." On Argentine troop strength, the report continued: "The Argentine military reportedly expect to have a 5 to 7,000 man highly trained force in place, with adequate air cover and fortification by the time the British task force could arrive." (Telegram 89892 to all Diplomatic and Consular Posts, the Department of Defense, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT, April 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0717)

over, all this is playing against the background of long standing accusations that the government has gutted the Royal Navy surface fleet to support its pretensions as a nuclear power.

5. In response, Mrs. Thatcher announced in the Commons this morning, April 3, that she will dispatch a fleet on April 5 to the South Atlantic, headed by the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible*. (We suspect elements of the British contingent in NATO exercise Springtrain off Gibraltar may already be on their way.) This will provide perhaps two weeks of breathing space for cooler heads to prevail domestically, and for international pressure to build for a political solution the British can accept. It also relieves the immediate political pressure on Mrs. Thatcher to take action. But it postpones rather than resolves Mrs. Thatcher's dilemma, and increases the political ante for her government—which could be faced with the ultimate and unpalatable choice of either fighting or backing down.

6. When the dust has cleared, whatever the outcome, the present Falkland dispute will have a major impact on the British defense debate. The issue of Royal Navy cutbacks, of Britain's ability to afford a future Trident fleet, and of Britain's military role in the world will all come under intense scrutiny. It is too early to predict the course or outcome of that debate; but we doubt that Mrs. Thatcher will emerge at the end without some changes in both personnel and policy.

**Streator**

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## **59. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 4, 1982, 2308Z

89907. Inform Consuls, Paris pass Eagleburger or Price. Subject: Falkland Islands Situation Report No. 6.

1. C—Entire Text.

2. Military situation: Argentina has taken over South Georgia Island, admitting three Argentines killed. HMG says its forces shot down a helicopter and damaged an Argentine frigate. The status and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0935. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USSOUTHCOM, the Department of Defense, and CINCLANT. Drafted by Service; approved in S/S–O.

location of British ice patrol vessel *Endurance*, which was at South Georgia, is unclear at this time. (South Georgia, along with the Falklands and the South Sandwich Islands, constitute the territory disputed by UK/Argentina.) The British have begun to fly men and materiel into Ascension Island for embarkation on ships.<sup>2</sup>

3. Diplomatic moves: The GOA issued a statement rejecting the UN Security Council approval of the UK-sponsored resolution,<sup>3</sup> saying it violates Argentina's rights and goes against quote contemporary history end quote. The OAS meeting April 5 to hear GOA Foreign Minister Costa Mendez will be a protocolary session. There will be no debate, and we do not now expect more than a statement of the GOA position. However the GOA has said it is considering eventual invocation of the Rio Treaty on hemispheric defense. GOA President Galtieri said late April 3 that his government is ready to talk with the UK over the situation, but will not accept military pressure.

4. Other actions: The GOA has suspended all payments and transfers to the UK (HMG had earlier frozen Argentine assets in the UK), and has also announced a temporary suspension on the purchase of foreign exchange of all kinds except for the payment of import bills and foreign debts two days before they fall due. Embassy Buenos Aires is checking whether this latter step constitutes comprehensive exchange controls.<sup>4</sup>

5. Protection of US citizens: We are asking GOA authorities to inform US promptly after contacts are made with AmCits on the Falklands. We have no reports as yet.<sup>5</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 60.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2003 from Buenos Aires, April 3, the Embassy reported that Argentine bankers "do not characterize temporary suspension of sale to public of foreign exchange bills as comprehensive exchange controls." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820179–0963)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 90947 to all diplomatic posts and the Department of Defense, the Department estimated that there were 35 U.S. citizens then resident in the Falklands/Malvinas. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820180–0067) On April 7, the Argentine Army informed the Embassy that all U.S. citizens in the Falklands/Malvinas were in "good health." (Telegram 2075 from Buenos Aires, April 7; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820184–0455)



**60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 4, 1982, 2309Z

089910. Military Addressee Treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: UK Transit of Ascension.

1. S–Entire text.

2. The UK Embassy provided Department afternoon of April 4 with the following message received by the Embassy an hour earlier. It outlines plans for and likely UK requirements on Ascension Island.

Begin text: (A) Ships: Royal fleet auxiliary *Fort Austin* is arriving at 0800Z 6 April with stores and passengers for transfer to HMS *Endurance*.

(B) Air: 13 Hercules flights are planned for 3–6 April transporting 3 helicopters, support personnel and equipment, coms equipment and a Royal Marine blow-pipe detachment.

A chartered Belfast will arrive night of 5–6 April with two Lynx helicopters.

Hangar space is needed for all five helicopters, 15 tons of stores and ammunition and accommodation for some 146 all ranks between 4–6 April until departure in *Fort Austin*.

(C) Operational support: The island is expected to be the forward operating base for 3rd Commando Brigade with 3 para under command—accommodation required for 25 personnel and 4,000 sq meters of storage. A satellite coms terminal operated by seven men is required to operate there from 6 April. End text.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0932. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the Department of Defense. Drafted by Pendleton; cleared by Service; approved in S/S–O.

**61. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 5, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands

During a private conversation at dinner last night, UK Ambassador Henderson made the following points to me:

—In his contacts with London, he has the sense of a real government crisis. He thought Carrington and Nott might resign. (His prediction was accurate!)<sup>2</sup>

—The British are determined to get the Argentines out. They will fight and sink the Argentine Navy if they can find it and will invade the Islands if necessary.

—It is good that there will be a period of over two weeks before a confrontation; however, the mood of the British will get tougher during this time, not weaker.

—Henderson feels the U.S. is the only possible mediator. He ruled out the UN and the OAS.

—The British would be willing to discuss sovereignty, as they always have been, but cannot accept an Argentine presence of any kind.

—Henderson thought he probably would be instructed to get in touch with us soon if we did not do so first. He thought the British would welcome quiet talks about what might be possible. He warned, however, that—given the present mood in Britain—it would be unwise for the U.S. to come in with any “precooked” schemes for settlement.

**Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0667. Confidential; Nodis. Copies were sent to Bremer, Holmes, Enders, and Platt. A stamped notation on the first page indicates that Haig saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary on April 5. In telegram 7529 from London, April 5, 1843Z, the Embassy transmitted an assessment of Carrington’s replacement, Francis Pym. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820179–0631) Nott tendered his resignation as Defense Secretary to Thatcher, but she did not accept it. For a description of the internal politics of these events, see *Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, Vol. II, pp. 17–18.

<sup>3</sup> Stoessel initialed “WJS” above his typed signature.

**62. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Scanlan) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 5, 1982

SUBJECT

Proximate Visits of High-Level USG Officials to Argentina

ISSUE

Air Force Chief of Staff Allen, is scheduled to attend an inter-American meeting of Air Force Chiefs in Buenos Aires, April 8–9. STR Brock is to head a delegation to a US/Argentine Mixed Economic Commission meeting in Buenos Aires April 13–15. Frank Carlucci will be in Argentina April 27–28 as part of a South American trip. Agriculture Secretary Block is also making a southern swing and will be in Buenos Aires May 1–3. Given recent events and current uncertainties, should we cancel any of these visits?

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS:

In ARA's view, we should go ahead with the Allen, Brock, and Block visits, but be prepared to cancel the Carlucci visit if there is no progress toward peaceful solution by April 12. The Allen meeting is inter-American in nature and affects our relations with all hemispheric countries. Even during the lowest point of our relations with Chile, Allen attended a similar meeting there. The Mixed Economic Commission has already been postponed twice. The Argentines will be holding similar meetings with the Chinese and Russians this month. The Block visit is in support of our agricultural exports and would have relatively low political visibility. More generally, if we are to have a good offices role in finding a peaceful resolution of the Falkland Islands dispute, we should not now be taking actions that will increase the GOA's perception of a tilt toward the UK.

EUR believes neither Allen nor Carlucci should plan to visit Argentina at this time. We strongly supported the UN resolution calling for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0653. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Service and Pendleton; cleared by Bosworth and M. Austin (PM/RSA). Service initialed for Enders. Pendleton initialed for Scanlan. Service also initialed for Bosworth and Austin. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 12. He wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "JB[Buckley]—Per our telecon. LSE." Below this notation, a second notation in an unknown hand reads: "OBE. See marginal notes."

Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands, and to allow top military/defense officials to proceed as if business were usual would leave a decidedly wrong impression of our reaction to the Argentine invasion—an invasion we have repeatedly deplored. We recognize that the issue of a good offices role is an important factor but believe that we can accommodate the Argentines by permitting Messrs. Block and Brock to proceed. The Brock visit to attend the Mixed Economic Commission meeting may have to be cancelled if you decide to support the UK requests for assistance on economic sanctions being addressed separately.

*Recommendations:*

1. That we inform DOD that General Allen should attend the April 8–9 meeting of hemispheric Air Force Chiefs. (ARA favors, EUR opposes).<sup>2</sup>

Alternatively, that the USAF send a lower-ranking official in place of Allen. (PM favors).<sup>3</sup>

2. That we proceed with the Mixed Economic Commission meeting April 13–15, with USTR Brock heading the delegation. (ARA supports, EUR links this to your decision on UK requests for economic sanctions being addressed separately).<sup>4</sup>

3. That we be prepared to cancel the Carlucci visit but hold up a final decision until April 12. (ARA, PM and EUR support).<sup>5</sup>

4. That we tell USDA Block to continue with his travel plans, including the visit to Argentina May 1–3. (ARA and EUR support).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation, adding the handwritten notation: “can help solve problem!” In the right-hand margin next to this recommendation, Eagleburger wrote: “Done.”

<sup>3</sup> Haig neither approved nor disapproved the option. In the left-hand margin, Eagleburger drew an arrow pointing to it.

<sup>4</sup> Haig initialed his approval of this recommendation, adding a handwritten notation: “But with [illegible] that we reassess on April 10.” In the left-hand margin next to this recommendation, Eagleburger drew an arrow pointing to it. In the right-hand margin, he wrote: “Done.”

<sup>5</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation. In the left-hand margin next to it, a notation in an unknown hand reads: “Pending, probable that will not attend.” Eagleburger also drew an arrow pointing to this recommendation and in the right-hand margin highlighted the recommendation with two parallel lines, a check mark, and a question mark.

<sup>6</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation. In the left-hand margin, a notation in an unknown hand reads: “OBE’d by Block. Cancellation of visit.” Eagleburger also drew an arrow pointing to this recommendation and in the right-hand margin highlighted the recommendation with two parallel lines, a check mark, and a question mark.

**63. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982, 0018Z

190325. TDFIRDB–315/07048–82. Dist: 5 Apr 82. Country: Argentina/United Kingdom. Subject: Background on the Argentine Decision To Seize the Falkland Islands; Argentine Misperception of Reaction to the Seizure (DOI: March–5 April 1982). Source: [2½ lines not declassified].

1. The decision to seize the Falkland Islands was made by the Argentine Government “several weeks” before the actual seizure on 2 April 1982. However, the arrival of the party of Argentine civilians on the South Georgia Islands on 18 March was not a deliberate provocation. The specific reason for the decision to seize the Islands was the Argentine Government’s perception of the need to counter serious internal economic and political problems.

2. When the decision was made to seize the Islands, the certainty that the British would not intervene militarily was shared by President Leopoldo (Galtieri)) and by Brigadier Basilio ((Lami Dozo)), Commander in Chief of the Air Force and a member of the governing Junta. (Field Comment: The source has no information on the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.) The Argentine planning for the seizure was based on the premise that the British would react to the seizure as gentlemen react to a duel: when the first blood was drawn (the Argentine seizure), the winner (Argentina) would be declared, and the loser (the UK) would gracefully retire from the field.

3. The Argentine Government, and specifically President Galtieri, are very concerned over the implications of the failure of developments to take place as anticipated: the British have reacted strongly; other countries, especially the United States, have publicly expressed their opposition to the Argentine action; and the Argentine left has vocally been attacking the “imperialist English”. The Argentine Government is very concerned that these sentiments could evolve into a resurgence of extreme nationalism, a generalized public antipathy toward other countries, and a deterioration in the currently good relations between the United States and Argentina. Argentine Government officials are also concerned over the possibility that the final result could be the fall of the Galtieri government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/06/1982. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Wnintel. Sent to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the White House Situation Room, the National Security Council Staff, and the CIA Office of Current Operations.

4. Galtieri and the Argentine Government are assuming that the United States will offer to intercede between Argentina and the United Kingdom because U.S. interests will make such intercession necessary. However, Argentine Government officials do not know whether such intercession will take place before or after British military action against Argentina; they strongly hope U.S. intercession takes place before British military action occurs.

5. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: On 5 April, a series of Argentine officials, using a variety of official channels, have told U.S. Embassy officials of “Argentine Government concern” that the U.S. response to the seizure of the Falklands could lead to a deterioration in relations and even “spontaneous” demonstrations against the U.S. presence in Argentina. The comments in the current report may be another in this series, which appears to be an orchestrated campaign to make the U.S. Government aware of the Argentine displeasure at U.S. actions; it also appears likely that this campaign is designed to encourage the U.S. Government to urge caution on the United Kingdom. A review of the various approaches made by the Argentine Government officials is contained in Embassy Buenos Aires telegram 1982.)<sup>2</sup>

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1982 from Buenos Aires, April 5, the Embassy transmitted a situation report as of 3 p.m. local time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820179–0794)

**64. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982

**SUBJECT**

US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

*Issue*

What should be the US role in preventing a UK-Argentine clash?

*Facts*

Secretary Haig believes and I concur that an armed conflict between the UK and Argentina would be seriously damaging to US interests. Accordingly, we have a major stake in doing what we can to avert such conflict and contribute to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. (S)

*Discussion*

Al Haig believes that our best hope for a constructive role which also keeps the Soviets out of the picture lies in an OAS peacekeeping initiative. His memo (Tab A) sets forth an “honest broker” scenario whereby we quietly sound out both the British and the Argentines with an eye toward assessing the chances of a successful OAS role. (S)

I think Al's recommendation is useful. He recognizes the risks of such an undertaking, which at this point seem significant (given likely British reservations about the OAS, together with the inflexible domestic politics driving Argentina's present course, I would rate our chances of success less than 50–50.) Nevertheless, the initiative is certainly worth trying. (S)

Though Al's proposal is only a first step, an unstated premise of this approach is that the United States may well play a major role in resolving the dispute. It will not be easy and the chances of alienating both countries are possible. Nevertheless, no one else can or will play this role, and without substantial US involvement, the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of the dispute diminishes substantially. You should thus be aware that we could be poised on the brink of a major commitment and that a decision to go forward ought to be taken deliberately—fully aware of possible costs and consequences. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/03/1982–04/06/1982). Secret. Prepared by Rentschler, Fontaine, and Blair. Rentschler and Fontaine sent the memorandum to Clark under an April 6 covering note recommending that Clark sign it. (Ibid.)

## RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Al Haig's recommendation (Tab A) subject to careful monitoring as we process with the problem.<sup>2</sup>

### Tab A

#### **Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, April 5, 1982

#### SUBJECT

US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

You have made clear publicly that the US is willing to serve as an honest broker between the UK and Argentina.<sup>4</sup> With the British fleet on its way south, we have at most two weeks before possible conflict, although a UK submarine may reach the area by April 12.

A military clash between these two friends of ours would be a major setback to our national interests. It would engage British forces far from the European theater. An unsuccessful endeavor by the British to retake the Islands could bring down the Government, resulting in a government in London that would be much less supportive of US interests than that of Mrs. Thatcher. We remain dependent upon close ties with the UK as we pursue our global objectives. Moreover, a clash would divert world attention from the real threats to peace and jeopardize our belief that disputes should be settled without recourse to force whether they be in the Middle East or the South Atlantic. At the same time, a clash could result in closer Argentine-Soviet ties and further undermine the new relationship we have forged with the government in Buenos Aires.

Superficially, a UN role might appear to be attractive. However, while we are satisfied with the UN vote on the UK resolution on the

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<sup>2</sup> Reagan neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

<sup>3</sup> Secret; Nodis.

<sup>4</sup> During a question-and-answer session with reporters in the Oval Office, April 5, Reagan was asked: "Have you accepted the role as honest broker in the Falkland Islands dispute, sir?" Reagan responded: "If we can be of help in doing that, yes, anything that would bring a peaceful solution to what seems to be an unnecessary disagreement." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 431)



Falklands,<sup>5</sup> we see little chance that the issue can be resolved in a UN context. This is particularly true because of the Soviet veto.

We believe the best hope for preventing further fighting and for keeping the Soviets out lies in an OAS peacemaking role. This would be consonant with the collective approach to security we have tried to encourage in Central America. Inevitably there would be both dangers and opportunities in invoking the Rio Treaty.<sup>6</sup> If the Treaty is invoked, and we block the process, the OAS would be damaged at the same time we are trying to reinforce it. This would detract from our ability to turn to it in the Central America context. Conversely, if it can be used successfully, we will have strengthened the Pact and made it a good example of ways in which a regional security treaty can benefit all nations.

Such an OAS initiative could include a separation of forces, as well as withdrawal of Argentine forces now on the Falklands and OAS administration of the Islands while a permanent solution is negotiated. In order to make such an OAS role acceptable to the British, we would have to put Americans on the Islands as part of an OAS mission. If this proposal prospers, it may be desirable for you to name a distinguished American to play a lead role under OAS auspices in achieving a negotiated settlement.<sup>7</sup>

At this point we should keep our role as unstructured as possible. We need to determine the interest of both sides before making a more specific proposal. It is clear that the UK will scrutinize carefully an initiative that involves an organization of which it is not a member.

*Recommendation:*

Following up on your expressed willingness to see the US be an honest broker, that you authorize us to sound out the British and Argentine governments quietly. While we would wish to keep our options open, we would intend to explore initially an OAS peacemaking role in which we would play a leading part.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 50.

<sup>7</sup> Reagan highlighted this sentence by drawing two parallel lines in the right-hand margin.

<sup>8</sup> Reagan signed his approval of the recommendation. In contrast to this memorandum, an April 5 CIA memorandum for the record covering subjects discussed by Haig and Inman at their April 5 breakfast meeting, records the following about their discussion of the Falklands/Malvinas: "There was general discussion and both sides agreed that the U.S. must support the British." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R, Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec 85))

65. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (West) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

I-20929/82

Washington, April 6, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Crisis (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S/NF) In order to provide you some background information, I have prepared the following summary of support we routinely provide to Argentina and the United Kingdom on intelligence, communications, and logistics support. I have also included what the two countries are likely to ask for as the Falkland Islands crisis develops.

(S/NF) *United Kingdom.* US support for UK and the Royal Navy is routinely provided in the broad areas of communications, intelligence, meteorology and logistics. Some of these functions are provided under nation to nation agreement, while others are agreed upon in MOD/DOD or USN/RN documents. The Navy staff has indicated that there have been several requests related to the current Falkland crisis which have been forwarded to US officials, including meteorological support for the South Atlantic and SOSUS data.

Specific areas of support:

*Communication support* for naval units is routinely available on request by the RN. (Tab A) Coverage of some areas of the world may only be possible with US transmitters. Conversely, US units receive such support on occasion from UK sites. It has been a standard procedure for the providing nation to allow transmission of US or UK eyes only traffic on national systems.

*Intelligence reporting* is shared between the US and the UK, under bilateral agreement and also under the aegis of NATO. Cooperation extends to compartmental, sensitive source programs, including SIG-INT, COMINT, overhead and SOSUS. Both real time and analytical intelligence is exchanged.

*Meteorological data* is provided by the US to many foreign governments and services, including the UK. The RN has already requested support for the South Atlantic from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and such data is being provided.

*Logistic support* for units of the armed forces is available to the US and UK in each other's facilities under a variety of agreements. Such

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982. Secret; Noform. Sent through Iklé.

support may come in the form of fuel, provisions or maintenance/repair efforts. There has apparently been no request from the UK for any extraordinary requirements in this broad area.

(S/NF) *Argentina*. US support for Argentinian military forces, particularly Navy, is fairly limited but includes an exchange of intelligence on Soviet bloc shipping information, routine fuel agreement for access to USN sources, and exchange of safety of flight information. In addition, Argentina is a major participant in the annual American naval exercise UNITAS (this year's exercise is scheduled for June–November).<sup>2</sup> By a five-year-old agreement, Defense Mapping Agency is providing mainland mapping services to Argentina and a new agreement with DMA has extended service for aerial charts of Northern Argentina. No requests, however, relating to the current crisis are expected by DMA.

As you know, we are currently precluded by law from selling the Argentinians any new equipment. This has resulted in the following backlog of FMS items:

- Army (\$124,000)—electronic equipment, uniform spares, and radar components

- Navy (\$2,700,000)—ship and aircraft spares, ammunition primers, signal flares, repair exchange cases

- Air Force (\$385,000)—C-130 spares, publications, safety of flight items.

(S) *Conclusion*. On balance, we provide more routine military support to the UK than to Argentina. Throughout this crisis, we should continue providing this type of support. While no special requests are expected from Argentina, the UK will probably continue to request support in the areas of communications, intelligence, and meteorology.

**Francis J. West, Jr**

The UK has requested about one million gallons of JP-5 aviation fuel to be delivered to them at Ascension Island in the mid-South Atlantic.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a series of annual exercises involving the United States and military units from other countries in the Americas. The first UNITAS exercise was held in 1959; UNITAS XXIII was scheduled for 1982.

**Tab A**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US/UK

(C/NF) A review of Memoranda of Understanding indicates that the following agreements are operative:

a. (C/NF) The Navy Memorandum of Understanding of 18 October 1979 concerning Secure Submarine Information Exchange System (SSIXS) broadcast. This MOU provides for two two-minute time slots per hour to be allocated to RN SSIXS broadcast. This circuit is not crypto covered for the RN portion.

b. (C/NF) A US to UK agreement providing for SHF satellite transmissions using Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) satellites provides for:

(1) (C/NF) First order (dedicated) requirements which have been met by DCA for over 10 years.

(2) (C/NF) Second order (on call) requirements are provided, as available. On call channels have been requested for the Atlantic DSCS satellite. (This requirement was filled by DCA last Friday.) Since some RN ships have SHF terminals installed, ship-shore-ship connectivity can be achieved via SHF.

c. (C/NF) Additionally, the UK currently leases from COMSAT one 25 KHz channel of the Atlantic GAPFILLER satellite. Additional UHF channels are not available without reallocation of US requirements.

(C/NF) No other MOUs regarding Navy communications services between the US and the UK are known to exist. Notwithstanding these MOUs, the Royal Navy could request specific HF coverage from US Naval Communication Stations located in Puerto Rico and Balboa as they have frequently done for exercises. This coverage is normally requested through CNO.

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<sup>3</sup> Confidential; Noform.

**66. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 6, 1982, 1742Z

07568. Subj: Falklands Dispute: A Few Suggestions.

1. S—Entire text.

2. With the fleet underway, the chances are high that the British will use it once they reach the South Atlantic—if a face-saving diplomatic initiative is not launched.

3. Britain is in a bellicose mood, and more high-strung and unpredictable than we have known it. The Prime Minister is under pressure to get results. With Carrington out of action, and the Foreign Office reeling, the diplomatic track may wobble without a steadying U.S. hand.

4. It is in our interest, of course, to keep the Argentines and the British from coming to blows. Optimally, we will succeed in a way that maintains our credibility and decent relations with both sides. But realistically, if we intercede, we may break some crockery with both sides. Here are some problems we see with the British:

5. So far our performance has been highly rated. But memories of Suez are just below the surface, especially in the Conservative Party. We cannot be sure HMG will do our bidding if we simply tell them to stop. They already fear being presented with an ultimatum by us, tying their hands militarily when diplomatic options fail. But they are anxious to have our help, knowing that probably only we have the weight to achieve a diplomatic solution. Indeed, their pugnaciousness aims in part to get us to act.

6. HMG now is focusing on the need for help from friends—including the United States—to bring maximum pressure to bear on Argentina. Almost certainly, they will be asking us to do things we will not want to do. The best tactics for dealing with these requests, it seems to us, will be:

—To say we must remain credible as mediators; and not say that we attach equal importance to both sides (an approach that will infuriate the British).

—To press the British to state clearly their diplomatic and military objectives and to set out a total package of requests (thereby forcing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3)). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

them to think through their strategy in a way they have not done yet; giving us a list of requests from which we can choose; and thus discouraging them from coming to us daily for more).

7. Above all, we recommend the U.S. put forward soon a dramatic proposal for talks that can at least buy time. We have no rabbit to suggest. But it seems to us that proposing, perhaps, some sort of condominium over the islands (on the New Hebrides model),<sup>2</sup> which accommodates the claims of both to sovereignty and a presence, might be a way to start. Presentation will be important. The Falklands are a searing political issue in Britain. And with the Prime Minister's future at stake, and bureaucracy shaken, we suggest it will be best to jump traditional channels and go right to the top with a proposal Mrs. Thatcher herself can judge politically.

**Streator**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the condominium under which France and the United Kingdom shared sovereignty over the Pacific island group known as the New Hebrides from 1906 until 1980. In July 1980, the New Hebrides became the independent state of Vanuatu.

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**67. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Blackwill) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Military Analysis of UK Options in the Falkland Crisis

This memorandum briefly reviews military options open to the United Kingdom, examines their chances of success, and describes their costs. It concludes that the UK naval force could inflict high casualties

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1413. Secret. Drafted by D. Sokolosky (PM/P) and Commander M. Austin (PM/RSA); cleared by Clarke and Commander T. Miller (PM/P). Sokolosky initialed for Austin; Clarke initialed for Miller. Copies were sent to Holmes and Enders. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Blackwill wrote: "Mr. Secretary—This is quick and dirty. We will continue working the problem. Bob." A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

on the Argentinian Navy and possibly retake some territory, but recovering the main territory of the Falklands would be extremely difficult.

Although British thinking seems to be focusing on Marine assaults, our analysis suggests that the UK's most viable military option would be to use its fleet to reduce significantly the flow of maritime commerce to Argentina. The objective of this interdiction campaign would be to so damage Argentina's economy that they would agree to an outcome acceptable to the UK.

### *The Options*

In ascending order of difficulty, the British options are:

- *Initial Submarine Attacks.* The initial arriving units will be nuclear hunter/killer submarines, the first of which should be on station in a week. They could attempt to intimidate the Argentinians with a dramatic early success by sinking the most significant military target found and by attriting the Argentinian resupply effort for the Falklands. Argentina's anti-submarine warfare capability is considered by our Navy to be one of the best in Latin America, but it is unlikely to be sufficient to locate and destroy the UK subs.

- *Retake South Georgia.* Our Navy believes the UK's best option would be a combined amphibious/vertical envelopment assault on South Georgia, following bombardment with naval guns and Harriers. This could succeed in retaking the island. Because it is 900 miles further from Argentina than the Falklands, has a poor airfield, and no economic value, the Argentinians may only lightly defend it. Retaking the island would give the Thatcher government a "victory" that included recovered territory, but which does not deal with the central problem. If the Argentinian Navy attempted to block the assault, it would severely tax any possible air cover and thus increase its vulnerability to the RN Task Force.

- *Air/Naval Battle.* The CJCS believe that this is the option that the UK would prefer, i.e., to engage the Argentinian Navy in a large-scale sea battle, inflict heavy casualties, and gain control of the waters in the area. It requires the Argentinians to take the bait and it does not, in itself, succeed in regaining lost territory. It might, however, give the Thatcher government a "victory" which could favorably influence the outcome of the crisis. Our Navy believes that the Royal Navy would suffer some losses, but would win a decisive victory if the Argentinians joined battle. The RN's ASW capability should be able to control Argentina's three operational submarines, although we cannot rule out the possibility of some RN losses. If the battle occurred within 200–300 miles of Argentina, the Argentinian Air Force (AAF) could contribute significantly. The range of the AAF Mirages and A-4s can also be

extended by aerial refueling with Argentina's two KC-130s, although the limited tanker assets would be unable to sustain a high sortie generation rate. Even if they achieve control of the air, the AAF's ability to inflict losses on the RN would be limited because the AAF has not practiced anti-ship missions extensively. The RN's contribution to the air battle is limited to 15 Sea Harriers and SAMs. If the Mirages and Harriers were to engage in air combat, however, the AAF would have the advantage.

- *Blockade the Falklands.* The RN Task Force is of sufficient size to throw a blockade around the Falklands, but the Argentines may be able to resupply their forces by air. The UK would have to destroy the airfield to prevent that resupply. The only capabilities to destroy the runway would be the Harriers and they could be engaged by anti-aircraft defenses around the field. It is unclear what scale of fighter operations the Argentines could sustain on the Falklands over time, but in the next few weeks they are unlikely to have more than a token presence of Air Force assets. (Thus far only 4 light propeller "spotter" aircraft have been deployed.) If the Argentines attempted to run the blockade, the RN Task Force would dominate what would turn into a sea battle. The major problem for the RN would be sustaining a large naval presence over time because the logistical problem would be immense. The RN Task Force's refueling capacity is severely limited. Unless reinforced by more tankers, the Task Force's time on station will be constrained and the cost of establishing a fuel supply train will be high. Moreover, the Argentine forces will by then be stocked for a long siege.

- *Retaking the Falklands.* The RN Task Force has limited amphibious assets (4 LSLs and 1 LPD) and is even using a luxury liner to transport Royal Marines. Although they will have upwards of 4,000 Marines, they have little capability to land them. Only the LPD has amphibious landing capability. While all five of the amphibious ships could support assault helicopters, we believe they may have sailed without a full helicopter force. C-130s are transporting helicopters to Ascension Island, probably for on-loading en route.

The combination of naval bombardment and Harrier/helicopter attacks could sufficiently soften a moderately defended area to permit amphibious/helicopter landing of Marines. By the time the RN Task Force could begin an assault, however, the Argentines could have 7000 troops in place on the islands. If they use their two KC-130 tankers, they might also be able to keep a few of their MIRAGE fighters over the island to bomb the assault force and engage the Harriers. Once the British assault force has been inserted, it will face severe supply problems and a numerically superior force with well established defensive positions. Without larger amphibious forces or airborne capability, the



option of retaking the Falklands seems remote. The RAF does not have aircraft capable of conducting paratroop operations with range sufficient to reach the Falklands from Ascension Island, the nearest UK territory.

- *Attacks on Argentina.* Air or sea attacks on Argentina itself would be the most difficult because the attacking force would lay itself open to the entire Argentinian Air Force of over 40 Mirages and 60 Skyhawk A-4s. Given the size of the guns on the RN ships, coastal shelling would have only a limited effect. Mining is an attractive option, but we are unsure how many mines are on-board UK ships. The most attractive option for the UK, however, is one that is basically similar and relatively easy to conduct. It is to keep its fleet beyond AAF range and interdict as much as possible of Argentina's commercial shipping, thereby damaging the Argentinian economy. We do not know how long it would take to have appreciable effect. This course would seek to make Argentina pay so high a price that they would agree to an acceptable solution to the crisis.

#### *Constraints*

Finally, a number of other factors make HMG military options difficult:

- There are 1,800 British civilians on the Falklands who are concentrated in the areas where fighting would likely take place.
- The British cannot reconfigure their forces easily. The mix of aircraft and loadout of ships will be difficult to alter significantly, even with the use of Ascension. At present the British have built a balanced force structure to handle both the air and submarine threat.
- The onset of winter near the end of May will make sea operations very dangerous due to formation of pack ice, reduced visibility and a high wind and sea state.
- There will be no readily available facilities to handle repairs, battle damage, and casualties.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A similar list of possible British military options was also prepared in the Department of Defense and forwarded, under a covering note, by West to Weinberger and Carlucci, through Iklé, on April 8. In contrast to the PM study, this paper also considered the prospect of the British using South Georgia, after an operation had first been mounted to recapture it from Argentine forces, as a staging point for retaking the Falklands/Malvinas. The paper concluded that while using South Georgia shortened British supply lines, the lack of air superiority and the time needed to develop South Georgia as a support base would negatively affect British operations. The Defense paper also differed in its assessment of a combined airborne/amphibious operation to retake the Islands, highlighting the "high risk of failure" of such an operation since the Argentines "will have approximately 7000 troops on the Islands and air superiority." A stamped notation on West's covering note indicates that Weinberger saw the paper on April 12. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0004, UK (March–April) 1982)

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs<sup>3</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *Forces Available to United Kingdom and Argentina<sup>4</sup>*

##### *British* (En Route to the Area)

- 2 VTOL Carriers
  - 15 Sea Harriers
  - ASW Helicopters
  - Troop Helicopters
- 5 Amphibious ships
- 2 Guided Missile Destroyers
- 3 Destroyers (with missile capability)
- 13 Frigates (most have some missile capability)
- 2 Mobile Logistics Support Ships

Approx. 4 Nuclear hunter/killer submarines

Approximately 2,500 marines

Note: Additional forces are being staged and may be sent to the area.

##### *Argentinian*

- 1 Carrier
  - 18 Fixed wing aircraft (A-4Q, Super Etendard and S-2 Trackers)
  - 4 Helicopters
- 1 Guided Missile Cruiser
- 2 Guided Missile Destroyers
- 7 Destroyers
- 2 Guided Missile Corvettes
- 2 Amphibious ships

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<sup>3</sup> Secret.

<sup>4</sup> Under an April 7 information memorandum, Cohen sent Haig a briefing paper summarizing the Argentine/British military balance, which was prepared in INR. Outlining the paper's principal conclusions, Cohen wrote: "Both sides have well-trained forces. Neither side has a clear overall advantage, and either side could win a major encounter, depending on the circumstances." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis–1982)

2 Logistical Support ships

10,000 Marines

*Air Force*

1 Bomber Squadron (9 Canberras)

7 Fighter/attack squadrons (68 A-4P Skyhawks, 26 Dagger,  
32 MS-760A)

2 Interceptor Squadrons (40 Mirage IIIEA)

2 COIN squadrons (45 IA-58A Pucara)

1 COIN helo squadron with 14 Hughes 500 M, and 6 UH-1H  
7 C-130s

2 KC-130s

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**68. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 6, 1982

Begins:

I am seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands. Argentina has made clear that it will defy the Security Council Resolution adopted on 3 April, calling for its immediate withdrawal.<sup>2</sup> This is unacceptable: all our efforts must be devoted to bringing Argentina to respect the will of the Security Council and to act according to this resolution. In this context we should use all available means of pressure on them. Economic and financial measures would have a particularly powerful impact.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. Confidential. Thomas sent the message to Stoessel under an April 6 covering note that stated that in Henderson's absence, Thomas would deliver Thatcher's message to McFarlane at the White House that afternoon. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Galtieri announced on April 4 that Argentina rejected Resolution 502: "Argentina will maintain its freedom of action to protect the nation's interests and honor, which will not be negotiated. Argentina is not willing to renounce its historical rights over the islands and withdraw from what is hers the armed forces who are and represent the people of our nation." ("Argentina Rejects Resolution," *New York Times*, April 4, p. A18)

I am deeply grateful for your own energetic intervention with the Argentine President<sup>3</sup> and the help which you gave us in the Security Council.<sup>4</sup> What you did was widely noted and applauded here. The United States is a substantial trading and financial partner with Argentina. If you can support us with economic measures, this will be vital to their success. We must not forget that we are dealing with an unprovoked aggression in flagrant breach of international law and of all the principles which your country and mine have done so much to defend.

I seek your personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina. I am already approaching our Community partners on this, since we are bound to consult together on many economic matters. But I very much hope that you will join us too. Coordinated action by the Community, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would bring home to Argentina the consequences of their illegal actions.

The Argentine economy has suffered serious difficulties over the years and is now in a fragile and vulnerable condition. The Argentines depend critically on maintaining their export earnings and in raising finance both to pay for their imports and to cover their external deficit. Measures to limit their access to markets and to credit will hit them hard. We in Britain are already taking action. But such action will be far more effective if our close friends and trading partners will support us as fully as possible. About 40 per cent of Argentina's exports go to these countries, including the countries of the Community. Argentina seeks to raise funds at the leading world financial centres. They cannot afford to be cut off from trade and finance on this scale.

A Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Argentina would bring universal economic action. But the experience over Iran in 1980 shows that the Soviet Union would be bound to veto this:<sup>5</sup> and time is short. I must therefore turn to you, together with our other friends, to ask you to take national action in solidarity with us in introducing economic measures.

The measures I propose are these:

(a) A complete ban on the supply of arms and other military material to Argentina. We have already done this. I urge that you will also ban arms supplies, maintain this ban in force and encourage others to do likewise.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 41.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the January 1980 veto by the Soviet Union of a United Nations Security Council resolution that sought to impose economic sanctions on Iran in the aftermath of its taking of U.S. hostages from the Embassy in Tehran.

(b) An embargo on all or some imports of goods from Argentina. We are announcing a complete embargo with effect from midnight tonight 6 April. I urge you to take supporting action and to be ready to announce it and introduce it as soon as possible.

(c) The ending of export credit guarantees for new commitments to Argentina, and discouragement of further international lending to Argentina. We have ourselves ceased to enter into new guarantee commitments and frozen all Argentine financial assets in London, and we expect British financial institutions to be very reluctant to undertake new commitments towards Argentina in present circumstances. The aggressive actions by the Argentine authorities and the uncertainty of their outcome, against a background of considerable domestic economic difficulty, have already undermined confidence in that country's creditworthiness. The further actions we have taken will directly create financial difficulty for Argentina. Prudence alone should deter the international banking community and other governments from undertaking further credits and loans to Argentina. I ask you to provide no incentive and no encouragement.

I know that these measures will affect your own economic interests. But if they are taken rapidly, with the widest possible solidarity among our partners, they should bring the Argentine Government to their senses. They would show Argentina that force does not pay and lead us towards withdrawal of their forces and the peaceful solution which we want if at all possible. The quicker these measures can be agreed, announced and put into effect, the stronger their impact on Argentina and the better the prospect that they can as quickly be reversed.

I look forward to your earliest possible response.

Ends.

**69. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Scanlan), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Requests re Economic Sanctions/Logistics

*ISSUES FOR DECISION*

We need guidance from you on further requests we have received from the UK. These go beyond requests for political support and involve logistics/intelligence assistance not required by formal agreement,<sup>2</sup> as well as support for economic sanctions against Argentina.<sup>3</sup> We would like to discuss these with you at today's 10:30 meeting. You are scheduled to see Ambassador Henderson this afternoon.

Last week you approved the UK purchase of U.S.-owned fuel on Ascension because it is required by our base agreement.<sup>4</sup> You also decided to put an indefinite hold on lifting the arms sales restriction on Argentina.<sup>5</sup>

*ECONOMIC SANCTIONS*

On April 6 the UK requested that the U.S. curtail export credits and guarantees to Argentina. It is seeking Allied and Commonwealth support for such a move. Currently, Eximbank exposure in Argentina totals \$1.2 billion, with another \$130 million in preliminary commitments outstanding.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pendleton and John S. Monier (EB); cleared by Service, Constable, and M. Austin (PM/SAS). Pendleton initialed for Scanlan; Service initialed for Enders; Hormats did not initial the memorandum. Pendleton also initialed for Monier and Austin. A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. Hormats sent the memorandum to Haig under an April 6 note, indicating: "I support a variant of the EUR Option (Option 2). I would suspend consideration of new Exim loans for Argentina and tell the British we are doing this. I would also consider invoking the Chafee amendment, but I would not tell the British we are doing this because we may decide not to invoke it, and having informed them that we were considering it and subsequently failing to invoke it would look like a weakening of our original position." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 65.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 68.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 51.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 50.

Eximbank is likely to be cautious in further lending to Argentina. Eximbank exposure there increased \$442 million in the past year when U.S. firms won a large share of the giant Yacyreta hydropower project. In addition, Eximbank staff reports that applications for new loans to Argentina have been declining because of the weak economy there.

The so-called “Chafee Amendment” in Eximbank’s statute explicitly prohibits denial of loans for other than commercial or financial reasons except “. . . in cases where the President determines that such action would clearly and importantly advance United States policy in such areas as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection and human rights . . .”<sup>6</sup> The Chafee Amendment has only been invoked once—against Chile as a result of the Letelier-Moffitt case.<sup>7</sup> That determination has since been retracted.

Eximbank Chairman Draper might be prevailed upon to stall consideration and approval of credits to Argentina for a short time, but he would have no legal basis for such action and could be subject to legal and political pressure from U.S. exporters to resume lending. The decision on when to resume lending would be entirely in Eximbank’s hands.

*Options:*

1. The U.S. can invoke the Chafee Amendment and halt Eximbank lending to Argentina. Such action will require a Presidential determination and, in light of its rare use, be seen as a major action.

2. You can offer to consider the UK request and to ask Eximbank to postpone consideration on Argentina loans while State considers Chafee Amendment action and continues its mediation efforts (EUR supports).

3. You can deny the request on the grounds that any action to cut off credits would compromise the U.S. ability to act as a mediator. (ARA supports).

4. You can offer to consider the request without promising any specific actions.

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<sup>6</sup> Passed as Public Law 95–630 in 1978, the Chafee Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was named for the measure’s sponsor, Senator John Chafee (R-Rhode Island).

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the 1976 assassination of expatriate former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier and his U.S. assistant Ronni Moffitt in Washington. For documentation on U.S. Government action taken against Chile in response, including invocation of the Chafee Amendment, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin America Region and *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

## LOGISTICS/INTELLIGENCE-SHARING REQUESTS

The UK has made one specific request (radio loan), and there are indications of two more requests in the works. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*] sharing and overflight rights).<sup>8</sup>

—*Loan of Manpack Satcom Radios*: The UK MOD has requested the loan of five Manpack Satcom radios from JSOC in order to establish a radio net to back up the UK manpack system being used in the operation. Last year we loaned such radios to the UK special forces to monitor an evacuation from the Gambia.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] *Assistance*: Embassy London contacts at the MOD have made clear they expect to ask us for [*less than 1 line not declassified*] assistance (INR is working on a separate memo on the technical aspects of this).<sup>9</sup>

—*Overflight Rights*: These same contacts have indicated that we will be asked for overflight rights.

We will be under considerable pressure from the British to respond favorably. The difficulties inherent in negative decisions are well known to you. EUR believes a lack of support from the U.S. in the period ahead could threaten the life of the Thatcher Government. We should therefore proceed with logistics/intelligence support of the type requested while insisting on the greatest possible secrecy.

ARA believes we must refuse UK requests for economic sanctions against Argentina, and logistics or intelligence-sharing requests that are not clearly required by existing agreements. Our role is political, and we seek to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The UK requests, if accepted, would escalate our involvement on the side of the UK beyond the point where we could serve a mediating role. Such support would become public and would place increased strains on our relations with most other Latin American countries.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> A point paper prepared for Burkhalter at 0250L, April 7 (1550Z April 6), indicates an additional British request to DIA: [2 lines not declassified]. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982)

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

<sup>10</sup> Below this paragraph, McManaway wrote: "Discussed at meeting 10:30 4/6—Secretary gave oral guidance to ARA, EB, EUR, Eagleburger, Stoessel." No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. For a summary of the meeting, see the attachment to Document 70.



**70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982

Mr. President:

Several days ago when the Falklands matter arose, I tasked my staff to answer a number of questions. Their answers are attached.

The most recent development was the request this afternoon from Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>2</sup> that we:

1. Ban all military assistance to Argentina;
2. Impose restrictions on all imports from Argentina;
3. Discontinue export credit guarantees for Argentina.

These rather extreme proposals which we cannot agree to, make clear the near hysterical pitch to which the UK has propelled the political debate in London.

You may wish to scan the highlighted portions of the attached in preparation for Wednesday morning's NSPG.<sup>3</sup>

**Bill**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/06/1982). Secret. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy Thatcher's April 6 message to Reagan (see Document 68).

<sup>3</sup> A list of topics relating to the situation in the Falklands/Malvinas, which was prepared in advance of the April 7 NSPG meeting, is attached but not printed.

## Attachment

### **Memorandum From James M. Rentschler, Dennis C. Blair, and Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1982

#### SUBJECT

Falklands Follow-Up

*SUMMARY:* Provides in-house answers to the questions we raised concerning middle- and longer-term implications of the Falklands crisis; supplements these with a summary of the meeting Secretary Haig chaired on the same general subject this morning;<sup>5</sup> and recommends that you use the information we have provided as a discussion basis during the time you will spend with the President and Haig in the Caribbean.<sup>6</sup> *END SUMMARY*

You asked for staff thinking on the package of questions we raised vis-à-vis the Falklands crisis and our belief that an SSG would be a useful forum in which to address the middle- and longer-term (as opposed to the immediate and operational) implications of the crisis in the Southern Atlantic.

At Tab A you will find a summary of in-house responses to those questions. We have carried these as far as we can, with the information and background to which we now have access, but there remain issues which clearly require much broader inter-agency consideration, particularly those involving the extent to which we should or must support the UK in the event of hostilities. *This is a major policy decision with far-reaching potential, and it may need determination relatively soon (a matter of days).*

Meanwhile, in addition to the material appended we summarize as follows the main points of consensus emerging from the meeting Secretary Haig chaired this morning in which we participated along with Walt Stoessel, Larry Eagleburger, Tom Enders, Bill Middendorf, and a number of others:

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<sup>4</sup> Secret. Rentschler signed "Jim" above his name in the "From" line and also signed for Blair and Fontaine. The memorandum was extensively underlined by an unknown hand with a highlighter pen.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 10, Document 69.

<sup>6</sup> Reagan and Haig were scheduled to travel to Jamaica and Barbados for meetings with Caribbean leaders April 7–11.

—We do not have the luxury of either side-stepping this crisis or attempting to wait it out;

—To the extent that third-party activity may be effective in averting hostilities, the U.S. must be the one to initiate it (no other likely candidates are in view); moreover, we will have more flexibility moving early (i.e. now) rather than later;

—The Thatcher government is at great risk and could well fall over this crisis; it will be important for us to avoid a Suez- or Skybolt-type situation where we are perceived to have thwarted the one lever (military threat against Argentina) capable of turning the crisis around in Britain's favor;

—The above consideration, in turn, requires a basic policy determination concerning the extent of support we will be willing to provide the British, particularly in the context of hostilities involving British naval units (we have already agreed to be responsive to the first series of specific items of military assistance which the Brits have requested);<sup>7</sup>

—Three elements in particular would serve U.S. interests in the crisis: withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands, turn-around of the British fleet, and establishment of some negotiating/arbitration mechanism or formula agreeable to both the Brits and the Argentines;

—The most promising avenue at present may be a U.S.-sponsored OAS initiative which would result in an MFO-type authority in the islands, possibly composed of U.S. and Canadian elements, plus elements from two Latin American countries (trying for this would be contingent on earlier bilateral soundings with both the Brits and the Argentines, which the Secretary is beginning this afternoon);

—The bottom-line issue—ultimate sovereignty over the islands—will have to be addressed at a far later stage in the process and should be allowed to remain murky at present (as one participant put it, “we have to resolve the Sinai before we resolve Jerusalem”);

—State will develop a specific game-plan incorporating the above essentials, including a press line and an early start on some U.S. diplomatic movement which does not leave the President looking exposed and impotent while he is in Barbados.

Since the President, you, and the Secretary will be travelling together to the Caribbean tomorrow, you may wish, in the course of that trip, to use this memo as the basis for a discussion on where and how we proceed from here on out.

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 69.

**Tab A**

**Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>8</sup>**

Washington, undated

*PRELIMINARY NSC STAFF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS/ISSUES  
WHICH WE NEED TO ADDRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF  
MIDDLE- AND LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF UK-  
ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS*

**I. INTELLIGENCE AREA**

Q. [1½ lines not declassified]

A. [3½ lines not declassified]

Q. What is the situation of the small number of American citizens known to be residing in the islands?

A. Under control. Embassy Buenos Aires is keeping a careful watching brief on their whereabouts and safety, and is impressing upon the Argentine authorities our interest in this matter.

Q. What are U.K. deployment plans, assets and capabilities?

A. U.K. force now underway has capability of sinking Argentine surface ships, blockading of Falklands, and hit-and-run attacks on Argentinian mainland; successful amphibious operation to retake the Falklands is difficult, but probably within U.K. capability;

—Primary shortcoming of present U.K. force is lack of fixed-wing aircraft. Argentina has one old aircraft carrier with fixed-wing aircraft, and can operate from shore bases on Falklands and mainland;

—U.K. plans unknown, but statements of leaders and thoroughness of preparations suggest intentions at least to retake Falklands by force if necessary. This aspect should *not* be underestimated.

Q. What are Argentine capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions?

A. Argentine Navy would be unable to prevent U.K. sea blockade of Falklands.

—By time of British arrival, Argentine force on Falklands will be well garrisoned, provisioned, and an airlift could bring essential supplies for period of weeks even if U.K. sea blockade were in place;

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<sup>8</sup> Secret. The paper was underlined extensively by an unknown hand with a highlighter pen.

—Argentine Navy and air force would not be able to lift a British sea blockade of either Falklands or mainland ports (negligible capability against British nuclear submarines).

—Argentine intentions are to dig in on the Falklands, raising the cost of a British attempt to recapture the islands.

Q. What are realistic U.K. options, with best estimate of future actions, both military and political?

A. British options are limited, given the domestic political considerations driving the crisis in both the U.K. and Argentina, and given the logistical constraints on a purely military British response;

—The British hope for a peaceful settlement but are quite prepared to use force;

—Political options have already been embarked on to bring pressure on Argentina, (severance of diplomatic relations, freezing of Argentine assets) but in and of themselves such measures will not be enough to change the situation in the U.K.'s favor;

—Unless third-party activity (i.e. U.S. initiative) proves effective, the prospect is for armed conflict via naval engagements in the very near future; realistically, that is the only option the present British government has absent face-saving intervention.

## II. POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC AREA

Q. What is the recommended U.S. role in private and public diplomacy?

A. This is a major policy decision, to a significant degree already considered by the President's stated willingness to offer U.S. good offices;<sup>9</sup>

—In the *short-term* we should, following bilateral soundings with both parties, attempt an initiative under OAS auspices which seeks replacement of the Argentine military presence with an MFO-type authority (U.S., Canada, plus two Latin America elements from two Latin American countries), in concert with the turn-around of British naval units and agreement by both sides to some impartial negotiating mechanism;

—In the *longer-term* we must at some point address the fundamental issue, which is the question of ultimate sovereignty over the islands;

Q. What should be the extent of U.S. support for the British?

A. This is a major policy decision, to a certain extent conditioned by our formal alliance relationship with the U.K., our positive feelings about the present U.K. government, our need to avoid a Suez-type

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 4, Document 64.

perception of U.S. unhelpfulness, our recognition of the support Mrs. Thatcher's government has given us on many issues; and the fact that we are already favorably responding to a first series of British requests for specific items of military and logistical assistance.

—The NSC's West Europe office recommends a strong pro-British tilt, even at the risk of damaging some relationships in the hemisphere (which we judge to be less serious than our larger strategic interests in the NATO/transatlantic context).

Q. What is our assessment of U.S. public opinion and Congressional opinion re extent of U.S. role?

A. Public interest currently low to moderate, and bemused by the whole affair;

—If military conflict breaks out, U.S. opinion would probably be on side of U.K.

Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications for other key U.S. policy areas (UK/NATO credibility and capability? Impact on US/UK bilateral relations? Effects on U.S. regional interests, e.g., Middle East?)

A. In the *short-term*, serious degradation of U.K. commitments/capability in NATO Europe and other regions of the world;

—In the *longer-term*, assuming British success in thwarting Argentina, psychological enhancement of Western capabilities (nothing succeeds like success), with possible favorable implications for regional areas, including Middle East;

—In the *longer-term*, assuming further British humiliation or outright failure (particularly in a military context), serious damage to the image of Western strength, accompanied by a likely deterioration in the US/UK bilateral relationship (particularly if a Labour government assumes power in the wake of a Tory debacle).

Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications of the crisis for U.S. Hemispheric policy?

A. *Middle-term implications*. The destruction of a currently promising U.S.-Argentine relationship which has yet to be achieved in the history of our two countries.

—*Longer-term implications*. The straining and perhaps collapse of the OAS and its security aspects embedded in the Rio Treaty.

### III. MILITARY/LOGISTICAL AREA

Q. What will be likely U.K. support requests?

A. These are likely to reflect (and keep pace with) the extent of U.K. military involvement; the more committed the British become militarily, the greater the number and frequency of requests for specific assistance (we have already received a number of requests in both the political and military areas);

—The initial focus will be on communications assistance, resupply, and overflight facilitation;

—A later phase, assuming expanded military action, would entail an intensification of requests in the above area and the U.K. pressing for a generally higher profile of U.S. assistance across the board.

Q. What will be the impact on other U.S. assets and commitments in event of support to British?

A. In the *short-term*, no significant impairment of our assets militarily;

—In the *longer-term*, and assuming sustained military operations, drawdowns on available assets transferred from other areas could have a range of adverse consequences from moderate to serious, particularly in some technical areas (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*, communications gear).

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#### 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1982, 0409Z

92488. Subject: Discussions With the UK on Falkland Crisis.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: The Secretary discussed with UK Ambassador the present political climate in Britain, a possible US role in trying to resolve the UK-Argentine dispute over the Falklands, and elements of a formula which both sides might consider in order to ease the threat of a military clash.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary assured the Ambassador of continued US support for Britain, but stressed the need for the US to talk immediately with the Argentines about a possible agreement before US influence in Buenos Aires declines further. End summary.

3. UK Ambassador Nicholas Henderson met with the Secretary early afternoon of April 6 to discuss his government's dispute with Argentina over the military occupation of the Falklands. Henderson appeared deeply troubled by the crisis, and particularly over the resig-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Western Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4)). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

nation of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington.<sup>3</sup> He stressed to the Secretary that Carrington had resigned because of the erroneous views among the British public that he misread Argentine intentions and was responsible for the Argentine military success. The Secretary expressed his sympathy for Carrington, and said that the US firmly supports the Thatcher government. He assured Henderson there would not be a “Suez” situation, where the US pressured the British to back down from taking military action.

4. Henderson repeatedly said it was important for the US to understand that domestic support for military action by the UK had not been stronger since 1939, that the government and the country were determined not to back down, and that they would not mind sinking the Argentine fleet—something which could be done relatively easily. He emphasized that only the US, because of its great influence in Argentina, could bring Buenos Aires to its senses and secure that country’s military withdrawal from the Falklands. Henderson added, however, that the US should not appear impartial about aggression; to do so would threaten the survival of Mrs. Thatcher’s government.

5. The Secretary replied that we recognize the present mood in Britain and will continue to take a strong public stand against the Argentine invasion. He agreed the US has had good relations with Argentina, and maintains influence with the Galtieri government. Nevertheless, US influence in Buenos Aires is declining, and with every day that passes it will be more difficult to secure Argentinian agreement to some formula for ending the crisis. The Secretary said that while we are confident of British naval superiority, a military clash would be politically disastrous for everyone. Therefore, we must accelerate diplomatic efforts over the next seven days in an attempt to achieve an agreement before the British fleet arrives near Ascension Island, which is close to the regional area covered by the Rio Treaty. Henderson said the fleet would not stop at Ascension and Article One of the Rio Treaty should prevent Argentina from invoking mutual assistance measures in the pact.<sup>4</sup> He claimed that although his government was not anxious to use the OAS, HMG did not believe the organization would give strong support to Buenos Aires. In fact, many OAS members would like to see the Argentine fleet “clobbered.” Assistant Secretary Enders remarked that the US believes most Latin Americans strongly support Argentina and would do so in the OAS.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.

<sup>4</sup> In Article 1 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, the Contracting Parties condemn war and pledge not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any way inconsistent with the provisions of the UN Charter.



When pressed by the Secretary about HMG views on the elements of a possible agreement, Henderson would only reply that the Argentine military must withdraw from the Falklands, even if it meant the fall of the Galtieri government. Anything less would topple Mrs. Thatcher. The Secretary asked if the British fleet might be temporarily slowed if the Argentines agreed to a phased military withdrawal from the Falklands, and if there was an understanding that the task force would not return home until the US or some group of impartial nations assured the complete military evacuation. He added that it would assume no prior agreement on sovereignty, that the customs and way of life of the British Islanders be guaranteed, and that a UK-Argentine condominium-type administration could be arranged. Henderson reacted to the Secretary's suggestions. He noted that the British had poor experiences with condominium arrangements, that after what has happened, in the past weeks, a joint administration would not work, and in any case he could not imagine the Argentines accepting the formula. The Secretary and Enders said that while the mood in Buenos Aires had been euphoric after the invasion, the people and government had been sobered by the dispatch of the British fleet, and they might possibly accept the kind of arrangement outlined. Henderson reacted negatively to the suggestion of an interim force from the US, Canada and two Latin American countries. He seemed to prefer the idea of having only the US maintain a presence on the Falklands to insure that any agreement is carried out.

7. The Secretary said that if Henderson had no objection, he would discuss the possible formula with the Argentine Ambassador, who at that moment was waiting in the outer office to see the Secretary.<sup>5</sup> Henderson agreed, and said that he would be in touch with the Secretary. Besides the Secretary and Mr. Enders, present at the meeting were Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe John Scanlan and Keith C. Smith, EUR/NE.

8. Pending instructions, Embassy should not discuss details of a possible UK-Argentine agreement with HMG.

**Haig**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 72.

**72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1982, 0437Z

92491. Subject: Falklands Dispute: Secretary's Meeting With Argentine Ambassador.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Esteban Takacs April 6 at 2:30 p.m.<sup>2</sup> He had just met with the British Ambassador (septel).<sup>3</sup> Argentine Foreign Minister is returning from New York for a meeting with the Secretary at 6:30 p.m. April 6.<sup>4</sup>

3. The Secretary laid out the problem as we see it. The way events are going, Argentina and the UK are heading for a major conflict. The Thatcher government is under tremendous pressure and, with a new Foreign Minister, the Ministry of Defense is in the driver's seat. Emotions are very high in London and there are many who look forward to sinking the entire Argentine Navy.

4. The Secretary told Takacs that he had called these meetings as follow-up to the President's offer of our good offices. It is vital to Western interests that we find a way to avoid further conflict between Argentina and the UK. We are willing to devote all our energies to such an effort, but it is important that we move quickly. The closer the British fleet gets to Argentina, the more difficult it will be for the Thatcher government to pull it back; and there may be a similar psychological impact on the Argentine Government. The Secretary suggested that Galtieri's survival might also be at stake.

5. The Secretary noted that, apart from our position on the UN vote, we wanted to be able to mediate neutrally and impartially in order to perform the good offices role. He then asked Takacs for any suggestions he had at this time regarding a possible peaceful solution. Takacs said he was speaking personally and asked that his thoughts be treated accordingly. In Takacs' view, the first requirement is for the two parties to "send signals that they want to negotiate." Second, there is need for an intermediary. In the first instance at least, Takacs would like to see this done by the United States. He does not think an international organization or a group of countries would work as well. Repeat-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/07/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 71.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 73.

ing previous GOA statements, Takacs described sovereignty as the one issue that the GOA could not yield on, but he later agreed with a suggestion of the Secretary that there might be some way to defer the question.

6. The Secretary suggested it might be desirable to set up a quadripartite group with Canada, the U.S. and two Latin American countries as members and that a satisfactory solution might involve some form of joint administration of the Islands under OAS or other auspices. Implicit in this context was the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary did not see how the sovereignty issue could be resolved now; that would take time. Asked for his opinion, Takacs described the Secretary's ideas as "at the extreme of what the Galtieri government might be able to accept."

7. Others present at the meeting were Assistant Secretary Enders and ARA/SC Service.

**Haig**

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**73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1982, 0520Z

92492. Subject: Secretary's April 6 Meeting With Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez (Falklands Dispute).

1. S–Entire text.

2. Summary: At one hour meeting April 6<sup>2</sup> the Secretary set forth to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez the seriousness of the current situation, our preliminary ideas on how it might be resolved in a peaceful manner, and the need for urgent action. Costa Mendez said he would call his President tonight and be back in touch as soon

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/06/1982–04/10/1982). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to London and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

as possible.<sup>3</sup> Depending on the Argentine response, the Secretary would consider flying tomorrow to London and from there to Buenos Aires.

3. The Secretary began the conversation by delineating the collision course that the Argentine and the UK are now on. Further conflict would be disastrous for both countries: In the case of the Argentines it could well mean the destruction of much of its fleet. The further the British fleet moves toward the South Atlantic, the harder it will be to find a peaceful solution. The US is prepared to do everything possible to find a formula that would permit both countries to save face. It is in all our interests that we succeed.

4. Costa Mendez welcomed our offer of help but noted that this crisis has come about because there was almost no attention given previously to the depth of Argentine feeling on the matter. He repeated the standard GOA line on guarantees for the Islanders.

5. The Secretary said he wanted to get more specific. There are two critical conditions that must be addressed if conflict is to be avoided: The British fleet must stop moving south; the only way that will happen in our view is if the GOA agrees to an alternative administrative arrangement on the Falkland Islands (i.e., withdrawal of its military forces). The Secretary said that a way must be found to delay final resolution of the sovereignty issue. There is no possibility that the British Government would recognize Argentine sovereignty at this time.

6. Costa Mendez made clear that it would be very difficult for the GOA to back down from its recent success in establishing *de facto* sovereignty and control. He went back over the history of negotiations with the UK, claiming that the British have on several occasions been on the verge of acceding to the Argentine claim. It is, in Costa Mendez's view, a much more important issue to the Argentine people than to the British. He mused about the incredible situation that has now arisen. Nevertheless, he agreed that he would do everything possible to find and convince his government of the need for a formula that finesses the sovereignty issue at the present time.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 93478 to Buenos Aires, April 8, the Department confirmed that Costa Mendez telephoned Haig on the night of April 6 to inform him that Argentina accepted the U.S. offer of assistance and that he would be welcome to come to Buenos Aires following his visit to London. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/08/1982 (1)) On April 7, Costa Mendez dispatched to Haig a dossier of briefing documents with an accompanying covering letter stating his belief that they "may assist you in your task." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982) The same day, Henderson also sent to Haig "background material" for him to read during his flight to London. (Ibid.)

7. The Secretary then summarized the possible elements of a solution: Agree to remove Argentine forces and halt the fleet; set up an impartial, third party, administration for the Islanders; and, finally, resolve the sovereignty issue through a negotiating process. Regarding the impartial administrative role, the Secretary suggested that it might be best to have other countries involved, perhaps the Canadians, ourselves, and two Latin American countries. Costa Mendez did suggest as his own personal idea (he emphasized he had not discussed it with Galtieri) that it might be more practical to think in terms of a joint Anglo-Argentine administrative structure, perhaps with a third party to help resolve any problems that might arise.

8. In summarizing, the Secretary said he needed to know from the GOA if we can keep the sovereignty issue out for now, yet find a formula that will represent a sufficiently great change from the previous status so that the GOA can explain the partial backdown to its own people. The Secretary suggested that if the GOA can agree to defer the sovereignty issue in this fashion, he would be willing to go to London immediately and, depending on the response from Prime Minister Thatcher, from there to Buenos Aires. Costa Mendez said he would talk to President Galtieri tonight and get back as soon as possible.

9. Others present at the meeting were Argentine Ambassadors S Takacs and Figueroa, Assistant Secretary Enders, and ARA/SC Service.

10. This message for your info only.

**Haig**

## 74. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 6, 1982

SUBJECT

FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri and your offer of our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked personally with the UK<sup>2</sup> and Argentine<sup>3</sup> Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone following receipt of a letter from him.<sup>4</sup> Tonight I met with the visiting Argentine Foreign Minister.<sup>5</sup> My objective in these discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few.

We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both sides and while each is having second thoughts. Furthermore, we should act before we are placed in an untenable position of having to compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 6, 1982 Falklands. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper-right hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote: "End of day report by AMH—day occupied w/diplomatic contesting." At the bottom of the same page, Goldberg added: "The basic strategy was as AMH envisioned it from 4/5/82 & was what he was telling Bill Clark all day on 4/6/82—This memo was necessary for historical record & because Clark, despite 3 times of AMH explanation, did not appear to comprehend what the issue & strategy were."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 71.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 72.

<sup>4</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Haig's April 6 telephone conversation with Pym has been found. In an April 6 letter to Haig, Pym wrote that it "has never been more important that our two countries should work hand in hand," adding that as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary he would continue to address the "Argentine aggression in the Falkland Islands" on "the lines which Peter Carrington was following." Pym continued: "We are quite determined to secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces and the restoration of the British Administration to the Islands by whatever means are necessary. The role of the United States will be critical on this as on so many issues that concern us deeply. Both what the United States Administration says and what it does will have a profound influence on the Argentine Government and on others." To this end, he expressed his "hope that the US Administration will continue to condemn this aggression, and to bring whatever pressure it can to bear upon the Argentine Government to withdraw its forces." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis—1982)

<sup>5</sup> Goldberg underlined this sentence. For Haig's April 6 meeting with Costa Mendez, see Document 73.

British requests for assistance. In this connection you have just received a letter from Thatcher asking us to take a range of economic measures on their behalf.<sup>6</sup>

Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or Thursday.<sup>7</sup> The principal objective of this mission would be to test our understanding of each side's minimum requirements for a solution to the immediate problem of a prospective armed conflict in this hemisphere between two friends. If we are correct that the greatest concerns of the British are withdrawal of Argentine forces and respect for the rights of its subjects, and that the Argentines must have at least a change from UK administration of the Islands with the clear prospect of ultimate sovereignty, we will have a base on which we may be able to build at least a temporary settlement. Only a beginning, but an essential step to avert hostilities and lay the groundwork for a lasting solution.

Neither the British nor the Argentines want the OAS or the UN involved. Consequently, we are thinking of the formation of a neutral force to administer the Islands while the sovereignty issue is settled. This might include ourselves (the British will not accept less), the Canadians and two Latin countries. This will be a high risk mission but one I believe we must take if we are not to suffer a major setback to our policies in this hemisphere.

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 68.

<sup>7</sup> April 8. Goldberg underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "I propose."

## 75. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

NSPG MEETING  
8:30 a.m., April 7, 1982

### *U.K. POLITICAL SITUATION*

- Brits in warlike mood—high strung, unpredictable.
- Thatcher could fall if no diplomatic solution or military rout.
- Could also fall if U.S. seen as turning our back.
- Labor opposition no friend of ours on security issues—challenging Thatcher on Falklands.
- Thatcher turning to MOD for advice. Nott safe for now. I have been in contact with Francis Pym—new Foreign Secretary.<sup>2</sup>

### *POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA*

- Galtieri under pressure because of economy and other reasons.
- Falklands recovery popular. Regime stakes its future on no return to status quo.
- Second thoughts now—but nationalism and war spirit will mount as Brits move closer.
- Galtieri a gambler—but probably will make major concessions.

### *MILITARY CAPABILITIES*

- U.K. Navy could hurt Argentines and possibly retake some territory.
- But recovery of main island difficult.
- U.K. best option to block maritime commerce to Argentina.
- U.K. options in ascending order of difficulty:
  1. Initial submarine attack.
  2. Retake South Georgia.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 7, 1982 Falklands. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by McManaway. A slightly different, undated version of the talking points, drafted by Enders, Service, and Pendleton is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Another set of talking points summarizing the diplomatic and political situation in Argentina and in the United Kingdom, which were prepared by the CIA for the meeting and distributed to the Department of Defense where they were seen by Weinberger on April 7, are in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 74.



3. Air/Naval blockade Falklands.
4. Retake Falklands.
5. Attacks on Argentina mainland.
- U.K. probably wants big sea battle to give Thatcher a “victory.”
- But Argentines can pull major ships to port.<sup>3</sup>
- Other factors: U.K. civilians on Falklands, approach of winter.

#### *YESTERDAY’S CONTACTS*

- Argentines looking for way out.
- I told them I would not engage if they insist us recognizing their sovereignty.<sup>4</sup>
- Costa Mendez invited me to Buenos Aires.<sup>5</sup>
- Argentina may consider withdrawal of military from Islands—but wants to leave administrative personnel on Islands.<sup>6</sup>
- Argentines need to show all not in vain—we need to leave them their pride or they will self-destruct.
- British tougher. Pym and Henderson emphasize war fever and impossible to negotiate while Argentina occupies Islands.
- Less insistent on need to restore status quo ante.<sup>7</sup>
- British have momentum—not sure how far to go.
- I put them on guard by suggesting I go to London first.
- U.K. and Argentina see role for us in the Islands but not for others. We would rather spread the burden around.

#### *PROPOSAL TO U.K. AND ARGENTINA*

1. All military on islands withdrawn within short, agreed period.
2. No additional military force introduced within 200 miles of Islands.
3. Consortium (U.S., Canada, two Latin American countries) introduce small military and police force into Islands. This force in place by time withdrawal completed.
4. Consortium assumes responsibility for local administration on interim basis. British and Argentine administrators of the Islands attached to consortium.

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<sup>3</sup> At the end of this point, Haig wrote: “And they are doing so!”

<sup>4</sup> Haig underlined “us recognizing their sovereignty” and wrote “I” in the right-hand margin next to this point. For Haig’s April 6 conversation with Costa Mendez, see Document 73.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 73.

<sup>6</sup> Haig underlined “administrative personnel.”

<sup>7</sup> Haig underlined “less insistent.”

5. Argentina and Britain to negotiate ultimate disposition of Islands within framework of respect for sovereign rights and for the right of the inhabitants of the Islands to self-determination. Consortium to help with negotiations and application of settlement.

#### NEXT STEPS

- U.K. has initiative. Must stop their fleet. We should ask them to show first card.
- Question for Brits: If Argentines evacuate and there is an interim administration involving us, plus agreed negotiating scenario, will you hold up your fleet?
- Argentina more negotiable if there is a little running room in Britain.
- Need President's authority to say, when talk gets tough in London, that we can't support a military solution if a reasonable political solution is available.
- If this goes at all, may take two bites with each party.
- If we fail, our interests suffer. But no loss of prestige for having tried for peaceful solution.
- We must move quickly while there is uncertainty on both sides and each is having second thoughts. As the U.K. fleet proceeds, war fever on both sides mounts.

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## 76. Editorial Note

On the morning of April 7, 1982, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) met in the White House Situation Room from 8:34 to 9:15 a.m. to discuss the situation in the South Atlantic. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. President Ronald W. Reagan, who chaired the meeting, wrote briefly of the meeting in his personal diary: "8:10 A.M. meeting on So. Atlantic problem then off to Barbados." (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 122) National Security Council (NSC) Staff Member James M. Rentschler also wrote of the meeting in his own personal diary: "I reported in earlier than usual [the morning of April 7]—and found myself assigned as notetaker in a hurriedly-convened NSPG." (Rentschler, "Falklands Diary," fo. 151) The meeting was chaired by Reagan and attended by Vice President George H.W. Bush, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William P. Clark, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinber-

ger, Permanent Representative to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Bobby Ray Inman.

In his memoirs, based upon his personal diary and published after his death in 2007, Rentschler provided a detailed—and colorful—account of the April 7 NSPG and its immediate aftermath:

*"Sit Room, White House, April 7, 1982.* The National Security Planning Group this morning—NSPG being an invention of my new boss, Judge Bill Clark, to finesse the large numbers of people, not to mention their press leaks, which forever crowd a formal statutory convening of the full NSC. We've got the nation's core group of top decisionmakers here, chaired by RAWHIDE [Reagan] himself—a *very* relaxed RAWHIDE, sportily attired in blazer and open-neck blue shirt (he'll move directly from here to the Caribbean, start of an Easter vacation in Barbados, home of his longtime Hollywood pal Claudette Colbert). My government-issue ball-point flies low over the steno pad, filling page after page from the mouths of crisis-managers:

*"Judge Clark:* The subject is U.S. posture concerning the Falklands. The main issues, should the U.S. decide to intervene, are *why, when, and how*. Bobby, let's have CIA's latest information.

*"Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, Deputy DCI:* We see signs of increasing Argentine nervousness. The UK has declared this 200-mile maritime exclusion zone around the Falklands, and Argentine naval vessels appear to have backed off from the outer limits. Meanwhile, the Brit load-out continues, they are dead serious and mobilizing everything they can get into the water.

*"Clark:* Does this square with the info your people have, Cap?

*"Sec. of Defense Cap Weinberger:* Absolutely. And we have a few more details on the purely military aspects of the British deployment. They plan to get their subs in first, do as much damage as possible, and then proceed with a landing. Argentina is putting more troop strength ashore, but on balance our people believe the Brits have the edge.

[The following exchange between Bush and Weinberger refers to an April 6, 1982, ABC-TV report that a U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance plane overflew the Falklands/Malvinas "before and after the Argentine invasion to gather intelligence that was shared with Britain." On April 7, the Department of Defense issued a statement which described the report as "completely untrue." (John M. Goshko, "Reagan Sending Haig to Britain, Argentina," *Washington Post*, April 8, 1982, p. A22.)]

*"Vice Pres. George Bush:* How accurate is the ABC report on the SR-71? The one where the U.S. is allegedly providing Britain with detailed pictures of Argentine troop emplacements and ship positions we get from our spy aircraft?

*“Weinberger:* Totally untrue. A typical piece of Soviet disinformation. What’s true is that the Soviets have repositioned their own satellites and may be supplying Argentina with info on Brit fleet movements.

*“Inman:* In fact, a key question mark for us at this juncture remains the Sovs. Are they getting ready to roil the waters here? We don’t know for sure. This bears the closest possible watching.

*“RR [Reagan]:* Soviet collusion with Argentina on a totally illegal invasion? If it came to that, I’d think we could sink the whole island with a couple of B-52s! (Gen. Davy Jones, JCS Chairman and Weinberger launch into a long droning rundown on airfields in the South Atlantic, technical MEGO stuff about runway lengths, cargo-load capacity, refueling radii, etc. while RR eyes the door with a how-soon-can-I-get *outta* here look).

*“SecState Haig:* The two sides of the crisis shape up like this: *first*, we have the UK in a very warlike mood. Mrs. Thatcher recognizes that if this thing goes sour, her government could fall—Peter Carrington’s principled resignation as Foreign Secretary showed the way. At the same time, she is super-sensitive about the 1956 Suez débâcle—she’s not going to let England be humiliated this time around. *Second*, we have an increasingly nervous Argentina, maybe looking for a way out. The Foreign Minister down there, Costa Mendez, definitely wants your help, Mr. President. I think we’ve got a window of 72 hours here, the time it will take the fleet to steam down the Atlantic. My suggestion would be for a small team and me to go to London first, test the waters with Mrs. Thatcher, then proceed on to Buenos Aires, see if we can talk a bit of sense into the junta, get them to walk this kitty back. The Brits’ main fear at this point is that we will make them turn their fleet around, with nothing to show for it. The 50th Parallel is the trigger.

*“U.S. Amb. to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick:* I am quite concerned about the Soviet disinformation campaign. Not only the SR-71 falsehood but also the business, equally false, about Uganda using its rotational seat on the Security Council to support British war preparations. Mr. President, I have no doubt whatsoever that this crisis is the gravest foreign policy issue to face you since you became President. Argentina is an all-important partner in hemisphere solidarity. We must settle this. We simply cannot let the UK call the shots.

*“Inman:* I couldn’t disagree more strongly with Jeane. For hemisphere solidarity we don’t depend on Argentina—we don’t owe Argentina a thing!

*“Kirkpatrick:* The question is not Argentina—it’s the entire hemisphere, the viability of the Rio Treaty. The point is, we have to settle this.

*“RR:* I’d offer this assessment: I would feel better about Latin America if we retain the friendship of both parties in this crisis, but it is more important to us now that the UK not fail.

*“Haig: All of this confirms what I’ve been feeling: we have a window of opportunity now. We will have to apply leverage in both capitals. It’ll be a bruising exercise but we need to do it if war is to be averted. Argentina is friendly, and we don’t want to alienate its leadership, whose continuing cooperation against Castro and the Sandinistas in Central America is essential. The really key point is to secure, simultaneously, withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands, and getting the fleet to hold. I’ll go to London first, meet with Mrs. Thatcher. The UK is an ally, but we need to know their bottom line. We need to sober both sides up.*

*“Clark: What we need now first and foremost is clear communication with all parties.”*

Switching narrative style, Rentschler continued: *“Starting, maybe, with the Sit Room participants themselves? Monitoring it all, I nearly missed the morning’s most important message, as did most of the principals, including RAWHIDE himself during the oddly festive exit bustle, his ruddy face wreathed in smiling merriment, his spirits visibly high, while bag-toting aides hustled him toward the South Lawn where the noise from whup-a-whup rotary blades of his Marine One chopper loudly whooshed. He couldn’t wait for that Caribbean idyll to begin! Al Haig, ruddy-faced himself and radiant with fresh confidence, barely had time to murmur sotto-voce in the Presidential ear: ‘Don’t worry Mr. President, we’ll pull this thing off. I’ll take Dick Walters with me—he’ll talk to those junta generals in Spanish military slang and scare the hell out of ‘em.’ But the main message, eloquent and compelling, was behind me in the Sit Room, behind everyone else. It came from CIA’s Deputy Director, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. I saw him standing there, slim bespectacled figure, his country boy’s impassioned voice directed toward the backs of his fellow principals now bumping each other in their eager rush from the Sit Room:*

*“‘I want to reiterate, as emphatically as I can, my opposition to Jeane Kirkpatrick’s point of view, it’s the most wrongheaded thing I have ever heard! I’m here to say we have no alternative but to back our British allies to the hilt. I’m not evoking just the historic ties of bloodlines, language, law, alliance, culture, and tradition, central as these are. I want you to remember the overwhelming importance of our shared interest in the strategic stakes, the depth and breadth of our intelligence cooperation, the whole gamut of global Cold War concerns we have riding on close interaction with the UK. And I want you to remember the problems we have with Argentina on the nuclear non-proliferation front. If we let the Argentines get away with aggression now using purely conventional stuff, who is to say that in ten or fifteen years down the road they won’t be tempted to try it again with nukes?’ (Rentschler, *A Reason to Get Up*, pages 632–637)*

Secretary of Defense Weinberger also took his own handwritten notes of the April 7 NSPG meeting. In Weinberger's fragmented account, Inman began: "Argentina's getting nervous. [Argentina's] air-lifting troops—fleet." The notes continue:

"CWW [Weinberger]: Military sit[uation]—UK

"Al [Haig]: UK very firm & warlike. Argentine Pres., when RR [Reagan] called, couldn't call [him] back. Al told them we wouldn't get involved[.] [I]f Argentina's got[,] they would never compromise sovereignty. Have they called back & asked Al to come to Buenos Aires. Ready to withdraw forces—cannot [withdraw] admin. [Argentines] Can't take return to prior order. Al suggests he go to London first—& go fast—Argentina's soft & the stronger the UK gets its war fever up.

"RR: When could British fleet get in? & we [volunteer?] to air lift detachment for peacekeeping.

"RR: Could people [illegible] vote on it & choose their own government?

"Haig: [Joint] admin.—with neutral overseers. Is [illegible] an arrangement—UK [?] from Argentines. *Or* UN Trusteeship or O.A.S.

"RR: Must be a solution [illegible] all them.

"Haig: But UK wants to make a show.

"Jeane K[irkpatrick]: Soviets are pumping out disinformation. Latin Americans are lining up behind Argentina. Vital error—whole hemisphere involved. We can't let UK [. . .]

"Inman: Support British.

"CW: Mrs. T [Thatcher] will fall.

"RR: Settle it in a way that doesn't let UK fall. That's [illegible] Argentines to as them whether this Argentine Gov't *fall*.

"Al: We can settle it—but will have to bruise[?] both capitals. Simultaneous action—withdrawal of troops—while UK fleet holds. So Al should go to London first—even tho[ugh] the UK doesn't want us to.

"J.K. [Kirkpatrick]: *Can be settled*. But should be before fleet crosses 50th Parallel & brings Rio Treaty in.

"RR: Oil rights could be bargaining chip. [Illegible]

"RR: Will send Haig—will go to London & Buenos Aires.

"RR: UK will have to understand threat its" [Weinberger's notes appear to fail to record the remainder of Reagan's statement.]

Weinberger's handwritten notes are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, White House and Cabinet Notes Set A, 1981 (1).

The White House issued a statement after the meeting announcing that the President was sending Secretary Haig to London and Buenos

Aires “in the interest of assisting both parties in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in the South Atlantic.” (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, Book I, pages 440–441)

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**77. Telegram From the Defense Attaché’s Office in the United Kingdom to the Defense Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 8, 1982, 1354Z

N03820. Subj: IR 6.836 0066 82/UK/AR/FA/Senior Royal Navy Views on Current Falkland Island Issue (U).

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

1. (U) Ctry: United Kingdom (UK), Falkland Islands (FA), Argentina (AR).

2. (U) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

3. (U) Title: Senior Royal Navy views on current Falkland Island issue.

4. (U) Date of info: 820407.

5. (U) Orig: See FM line.

6. (U) Req Ref: U–UCR–42080/Continues.

7. (U) Source: Chief of Naval Staff.

8. (U) Summary: Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, amplifies to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the implications of Defence Secretary Nott announcement in Parliament on 820407 regarding Falkland Islands exclusion zone.<sup>2</sup>

9A. (C/Noform) Details:

1. (U) During early evening 820407 orig was called at home by the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] requesting I visit town residence of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at 2230 local 820407 to discuss an announcement to be made in House of Commons that evening. Orig went to the Admiral’s flat at Admiralty Arch near Trafalgar Square at the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Confidential; Immediate; Noform. Sent for information to USCINCEUR Vaihingen, USAFE COIC Ramstein, FICEURLANT, TFC Boerfink, [*text not declassified*], Department of State, COMNAVINTCOM, CNO, [*text not declassified*], USCINCSO, [*text not declassified*], NFOIO, CMC, CINCUSNAVEUR, [*text not declassified*], [*text not declassified*], and [*text not declassified*]. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Weinberger saw the telegram on April 8.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 78 and footnote 2 thereto.



appointed time and was escorted into the living room where [name not declassified] and orig sat down over a scotch and had a friendly chat.

2. (C/Noform) After a few pleasantries, [name not declassified] went directly to the point indicating that Defence Secretary Nott would be summing up the discussions in the House of Commons within a few minutes and would be announcing the Falkland exclusion zone declaration. [name not declassified] then went on to quote directly the words of the declaration, summarized in [less than 1 line not declassified] added that he was not sure if Nott would indicate that Article 51 of the UN charter<sup>3</sup> was certainly applicable to the declaration; however, he said it was and would most certainly be evoked.

3. (C/Noform) [name not declassified] in this one-on-one discussion made it clear the British Government was taking deliberate and direct military moves they felt were a totally appropriate response in continuing the discussion—by now in no way a social chat, [name not declassified] did his part in sending the signal to the US that the British intend to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the rights of the crown. [name not declassified] chose his words carefully, speaking as he does in direct terms, conveying a seriousness to the situation he obviously considered necessary to express.

4. (C/Noform) [name not declassified] returning to the exclusion zone declaration spoke the obvious in stressing the probability of sinking Argentine ships which could result from the declaration. He stressed there would be no hesitancy on the British part to enforce the exclusion zone.

5. (C/Noform) [name not declassified] shifted to the American role, acknowledging Secretary of State Haig's impending arrival in London. Carefully selecting his words, he evoked the long-term ties between the US/UK. Emphasizing what some in the UK sense as fence-stratling by the US. (He described the sense as having one foot firmly planted on one side and on the other the foot a little off the ground.) [name not declassified] as too gracious to even suggest he shared this opinion, but the point was made.

9B. (C/Noform) Orig comments: Admiral [name not declassified] looked rested—although the hours he has been keeping have clearly kept him on the run. His message was totally clear but issued in a

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<sup>3</sup> Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."



quiet, direct tone. Certainly, the assembled force under full combat orders are mounted up, ready to go into a hostile situation, and confident of success, this notwithstanding they were forced to move out more quickly than might be desired.

(1) (C/NOFORN) Implied in [*name not declassified*] message and picked up again between the lines in recent days within the Ministry of Defence is a feeling that America perhaps does not think the British will initiate direct military action. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] point in having this one-on-one was to relay the serious intentions the UK has to use force if diplomacy doesn't work. The UK appears willing to accept long-term economic difficulties associated with a hostile confrontation, especially if it drags out over weeks.

(2) (C/NOFORN) [*name not declassified*] certainly expressed the hope that diplomacy would work.

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

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#### 78. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

London, April 7, 1982

Begins:

Dear Al,

I wanted you to know that John Nott, in his winding up speech in today's debate on the Falklands in the House of Commons, will announce the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands from 0400 on Monday 12 April.

I am asking Nicko Henderson to pass you the text of this announcement with this message,<sup>2</sup> and I look forward to explaining the background to you when we meet tomorrow.

Yours ever,

Francis<sup>3</sup>

Ends.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis—1982. Confidential. Henderson sent the message to Haig under an April 7 covering note. A notation on the covering note, in an unknown hand, states that the message was received in S at 4:30 p.m., April 7.

<sup>2</sup> The text of Nott's statement to the House of Commons is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**79. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 9, 1982, 1740Z

7889. For Goldberg from Streator. USDel Secretary. Subject: Memcon: Secretary's Meeting With Foreign Secretary Pym April 8: Falkland Island Crisis.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Secretary met at 5 p.m. April 8 at the Commonwealth and Foreign Office with Foreign Secretary Francis Pym to discuss the Falkland Island crisis. Also present were Brian Fall, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, and U.S. Charge Streator.

3. After the Secretary had congratulated Pym on his appointment and Pym had welcomed the Secretary, the latter said it goes without saying that he was in London as a friend; there is no other conception, he said, in the President's mind. Starting his trip in London was a way to demonstrate that. He then would travel to Buenos Aires to demonstrate the consequences to the Argentines of failure to resolve the problem. He assured Pym that there would be no repeat of Suez.

4. Continuing, the Secretary said we've looked at some possibilities for dealing with the Falklands problem but he thought it best to reserve discussion of them for the Prime Minister. Clearly, he said, withdrawal of security forces is the core problem; we needed to see how that can be achieved. At present, there is a window of opportunity; the situation will become more complex as time passes. The degree of Argentine macho already is unprecedented; it might become greater if Galtieri falls.

5. Pym said the Falklands had been under discussion for 15 years. Recently, both sides had met in New York.<sup>2</sup> The British had known nothing until early last week that even suggested the event that occurred last Friday.<sup>3</sup> It had shocked the nation; the fundamental question was whether we should have had forces there. The emergency debate last Saturday<sup>4</sup> had led to an expression of national unanimity and strong criticism that the problem had arisen in the first place. After the weekend the decision was taken to move militarily. He said no

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped notation indicates the telegram was received in the Department at 4:36 p.m. Haig arrived in London April 8.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 2.

<sup>3</sup> April 2.

<sup>4</sup> April 3. See footnote 2, Document 58.

mistake had been made, but the signs had not been read right and Carrington had done the honorable thing and left.<sup>5</sup> He had been strongly criticized by the parliamentary party. The immediate reaction was one of anger and the fleet was dispatched without knowing what it would do. Pym expressed gratitude for the U.S. position at the UN and said they were approaching the Commonwealth countries to put pressure on the Argentines. The hope was to use the window before the arrival of the fleet to put maximum pressure on the Argentines to force them to withdraw. British objectives were well defined in the UN resolution.<sup>6</sup> British sovereignty existed in the Islands, the Argentines have annexed them and they must be withdrawn. After that, the issues of what to do next and what the Islanders want can be addressed.

6. Pym said the government's "recovery program" was going well, as reflected in this week's debate in Parliament in which the opposition had not done well. "We don't look wobbly," he said. Authority has been returned. Among backbenchers there is less emotion. The feeling in the country is that we cannot let the Argentines get away with it. Throughout Central America and elsewhere the unravelling would be significant if Argentina were to succeed. All would prefer to achieve withdrawal without shots and for that reason maximum pressure must be applied to the Argentines. What the U.S. does there is decisive. Whether it can be done in the time available is the question. In any case, Britain is more stable and will be proceeding more calmly in the days ahead.

7. The Secretary said he believed that the window was not as long as the two weeks before the fleet's arrival. While not departing from the premise of withdrawal—and indeed that was the essence of any temporary solution—the issue was how to accomplish withdrawal without doing violence to the U.K. principles and the work on the longer term issues. Withdrawal was most important. Extensive analysis suggested that the government in Buenos Aires now is in the softest position they will be in. There is some dissent in the military structure.

8. The Secretary noted that the U.S. was caught more by surprise than the British; our people, he said, had not picked up the indicators, except for the submarine reconnaissance. He was not certain whether it was an intelligence failure or a consequence of varying sensitivities. Within hours, though, he had all the material Ambassador Henderson had, integrated it into our material and notified the President. The Secretary said he had sent strong messages that the Argentine Foreign Minister had fended off and that Galtieri had deferred in receiving the

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

President's call.<sup>7</sup> The Foreign Minister had said it was too late to meet U.S. demands. At that point, they were extremely rigid and totally confident that they would get away with it. On their side were distance, time, surprise, and they had been preparing for months. They could not have done it without bloodshed without having worked for months. The reactions in the U.K. shocked the Argentines, as had those at the United Nations; they are now more divided and their internal problems are mounting. The real difficulty is that after the fleet reaches the fiftieth parallel the Argentines will go to the OAS. While most Latin Americans are outraged by Argentina's action, on the other hand they will be driven to Third World demeanor. The Secretary said he had told Henderson that the OAS meant trouble when Henderson had said the British hoped to have support in that body. In some respects, the Secretary wished the British had not announced a blockade, for that affronts Argentine machismo, but on the other hand it keeps the pressure on.

9. It is necessary, the Secretary said, to work for a solution that avoids confirming Argentina's cowardice; it must be face-saving. While the U.K. is impelled by logic and principle, Argentina moves by macho.

The Secretary said he thought the window was 72 hours. He believed genuinely, he said, that if we don't seize the window, the chances of avoiding bloodshed are dim. Meanwhile, the greater the U.K. investment in the situation the more difficult it will be to deal with in political terms. Pym said he feared that the situation might turn out to be prolonged: more complicated and involving more investment. The Secretary said our desire was to keep the U.K. Government viable. It has always supported US during fifteen months in office.

10. The Secretary said he sought a convergence of view on the criticality of timing. The problem will become more difficult thereafter because of the OAS and the Soviets. The vote in the UN shook Argentina; they thought the Soviets would veto. The Argentine Foreign Minister said that two options were now open: the OAS where they expect success; and the Soviet option. The Soviet option entails analyzing the implications of pursuing the military alternative. The Secretary thought the Argentines would put the fleet in harbor and that the U.K. would face a land-based air problem. Moreover, the Argentines would put the Falklands in a cocoon. The Soviets might offer to fill the gap created by lost fleet assets. Moreover, if possibilities for a political solution are allowed to pass, the U.S. and U.K. press will start to turn.

11. The Secretary continued that the noise out of Buenos Aires is reasonable; for example, they said they were studying the UN resolu-

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 39.

tion. It will be important to use the 72 hours available in a reasonable way. The Secretary noted that the U.S. had avoided “high profile tilts”; but in reality nothing has been done except to tilt toward Britain. He said we are not sending military equipment, we are working on the problem of existing contracts, and doing anything else we can to help. Pym noted that American influence in Argentina is very great. The Secretary said that Argentine self-confidence had been enhanced by collaboration with us in Central America. We cannot let the Argentines believe that this gives them a special dispensation. The issue may be more time-sensitive than the British believe. While it may seem better to let pressure build, he said, it also seemed to him that the U.K. was at a break-point. Perhaps it will become more difficult for Britain as opposition increases and it may be necessary to go to war to protect the principle. He hoped to leave Britain with a sense of what might be possible. He told the Argentines he would not go to Argentina if he were faced with *a priori* demands on sovereignty and the Argentines said, “come ahead.”

12. Pym said that the Prime Minister feels very strongly about withdrawal because it presents a formidable political problem. It was very damaging to have Carrington leave. The rebuilding began in the debate yesterday. Thatcher was splendid throughout and it was a good day. He said the Secretary could expect her to take a strong line; but Pym noted that he had been saying all along that a peaceful solution is needed.

13. The Secretary pointed out that he was prepared to remain for discussions the following day if that would be useful.

14. The core area of the problem, the Secretary said, involves sovereignty and self-determination. He hoped to deal with those issues with the Prime Minister.

15. Pym raised the meeting of the Air Chiefs of Staff in Buenos Aires on April 13. He noted General Allen was to attend.<sup>8</sup> Haig said it was the U.S. view that the meeting should go ahead because it was to address Hemispheric problems. If the U.S. were not there, chances of mischievous discussion of the Falklands issue are great. The other options were to cancel or downgrade the meeting. However if the meeting went ahead it was best to use the highest level with an authoritative voice.

16. Pym suggested the possibility of postponement and the Secretary said he would be very comfortable with that.

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<sup>8</sup> Haig approved Allen's attendance on April 5. See Document 62.

17. Pym said he felt that public opinion in the U.K. could get the wrong impression if the meeting were held. The Secretary concluded that he was prepared to postpone.

18. Returning to the Falklands issue, the Secretary said that if he got an agreement in principle with time certain for the Argentines to withdraw it was clear they must have something in return, but not a return to the status quo ante. He said he conceived the possibility of moving in an impartial authority, perhaps comprising representatives of the U.S. and Canada as two who are acceptable to the parties, together possibly with British and Argentine representatives, to guarantee the rights and interests of the population. Such a mechanism might be involved in dealing with the longer term problem. In that connection, he saw value in avoiding language on sovereignty and self-determination early in the debate and achieving a perception that over time would be negotiated in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. This could be enough to elicit a commitment to withdraw coming first from Argentina. Meanwhile the British would hold the fleet in readiness and be seen doing that. The Secretary saw a need to work out language that meets British needs for definition of principles.

19. Pym said the plan seemed to have possibilities. However, he said the Secretary would need to persevere with the Prime Minister. For his part, Pym liked the reference to UN principles. If the Prime Minister didn't agree at first, the Secretary should persevere.

20. The Secretary said he thought it would be necessary to deal first with the issue of withdrawal and its conditions, then with the issue of administration and finally with the issue of negotiations and the basis on which they would begin. He saw a need to balance the requirements of self-determination and sovereignty.

21. In conclusion, Pym thanked the Secretary for the information received from the U.S. intelligence and services.

**Streator**

**80. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 13, 1982, 0929Z

Secto 5078. For S/S–Bremer only. Secretary's Meeting With Prime Minister Thatcher April 8: Falkland Islands Crisis. Ref: London 7892.<sup>2</sup>

Following is cleared memcon of Secretary's April 8 meeting which replaces draft contained in London 7892.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. The Secretary began by meeting at 6:00 p.m. April 8 at No. 10 Downing Street with Prime Minister Thatcher to discuss the Falkland Islands crisis. Also present were Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Private Secretary John Coles and U.S. Charge Edward Streator.

3. The Prime Minister welcomed the Secretary and thanked him for the April 7 message she had received.<sup>3</sup>

4. She said the U.K. had been having good talks with Argentina and was extremely surprised by the actions of that government. No one had anticipated them. After the Secretary said that the U.S., too, was surprised, the Prime Minister said Carrington had been in Israel and thus out of touch. The only hope of stopping the Argentines was through President Reagan's good offices. She was most grateful for his action. The mood in Britain was very deeply felt, she said, because our sovereign territory was involved and we were unable to defend it. The discussion in Parliament was the most difficult she had seen in 25 years. A majority felt Britain had been humiliated and had betrayed the people of the Falklands. The debate left no doubt about the depth of feeling in the country. As she informed President Reagan,<sup>4</sup> she had dispatched submarines, put the fleet on alert and announced it would sail. The debate yesterday had been sombre, but the government had full support. Moreover, hope had been expressed that the situation could be resolved by diplomatic means. There is total determination among the British to use military strength if needed. John Nott's speech<sup>5</sup> had been good and Britain had not put a foot wrong in international law.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7892 from London, April 10, the Embassy transmitted to Buenos Aires an earlier, uncleared version of the April 8 memorandum of conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0387)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 68.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 78.

5. The Prime Minister continued that she had been heartened by the support from elsewhere. Mitterand had telephoned and agreed to get support from Togo and Zaire. The King of Jordan had supported Britain in the UN as well. Schmidt had called to express his support, and had said that unprovoked aggression if not turned back could lead to problems everywhere there are border disputes. Unless we stop the Argentines from succeeding, we are all vulnerable. Muldoon of New Zealand and Fraser of Australia also had expressed support and Fraser had cut off Argentine trade.

6. The Prime Minister recalled the lengthy negotiations with Argentina that had been held on the basis that no negotiations could take place unless it was with the agreement of the Islanders and no scheme would be put forward that was unacceptable to the Islanders.

7. The Prime Minister made clear her view that it was impossible to be neutral in the face of unprovoked aggression. In reviewing the bidding, she said the fleet was en route, an exclusion zone has been established, yet Britain hopes for a diplomatic solution. However, there could be no negotiations unless Argentina leaves the Islands. Unprovoked aggression does not change legal status. She said Britain sought to restore British administration to the Falklands and cannot negotiate under duress and without the participation of the Islanders. She noted that concern had been stirred by statements from Washington about not taking sides. These were off the cuff and not carefully conceived remarks. At the same time, she expressed appreciation for U.S. cooperation in intelligence matters and in the use of Ascension Island.

8. The Secretary said that he was certain the Prime Minister knew where the President stood. We are not impartial. Certainly we were not impartial on the UN resolution and the President was not impartial in his telephone call to Galtieri.<sup>6</sup> He said he did not need to elaborate President Reagan's feelings towards the Prime Minister. The special friendship of the Prime Minister over fifteen months was deeply appreciated; there is no issue on which the Prime Minister had not backed the U.S.

9. The Secretary said that we face a critical common problem: "We must do all we can to strengthen you and your government."

10. Having analyzed the situation very carefully, the Secretary said he thought there had been an intelligence failure. The only information available was about submarine reconnaissance by the Argentines. When Henderson had provided sensitive intelligence, the Secretary had concluded that there had been a failure of concentration rather than management. The Secretary also said that delays had been manip-

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 41.



ulated in Buenos Aires. For example, the Argentines had stonewalled on the issue of sovereignty. Moreover, the President had been kept waiting when he telephoned to speak to Galtieri. When the President was able to get in touch with the President of Argentina, Galtieri used the same talking points earlier used by the GOA with our Ambassador to Argentina.<sup>7</sup> In the Secretary's view the GOA operation had been planned for months.

11. The Secretary said we were watching the Argentine situation closely. The Argentines had been arrogantly confident that the U.K. would not be able to challenge the invasion and thus they were not deterred. The Secretary also observed that the Soviets were beginning to position themselves for mischief. At the same time, he said that the incumbent President of Argentina is in some jeopardy and would be followed by someone more intransigent if a change of government occurred in Argentina as a result of this crisis. The Argentine Foreign Minister had told the Secretary that everything was negotiable.<sup>8</sup> The Secretary had responded that he would not go to Buenos Aires if he were going to be told the same things as previously. The Argentine Foreign Minister had made it clear he wanted the Secretary to come. The Secretary said we would not accept a change in status quo by force. The Secretary continued, we have a window now, we believe. When the British fleet reaches the 50th parallel it will become an emotional issue in both U.K. and Argentina<sup>9</sup> and progress thereafter will be difficult. Similarly, the OAS, with its Third World problems, will not be objective when it meets and ultimately will form an anti-colonialist consensus. The Secretary recalled that the Argentine Foreign Minister had said he had two options: the OAS and the Soviet Union, and would use them. While he didn't want to overdramatize, the Argentines would be strengthened in their macho by the OAS. Even in the U.K. he said, the situation will become more difficult with heavy expenditures of resources.

12. The Secretary said he viewed the next 72 hours as very important in Argentina. While we need to demand withdrawal and achieve it, we need to do it by Monday (4/12/82). London was chosen to visit first because the British are our closest friends and allies and we wished to start discussions with them; it was pointless to go to Buenos Aires

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 37.

<sup>8</sup> For a summary of Haig's April 6 meeting with Costa Mendez, see Document 73.

<sup>9</sup> On April 8, Shlaudeman reported that "feelings are running high" in the Argentine Navy and that the Embassy was "getting ultra-tough sounds" from it, "including statements that the Secretary should not come here because all he will be doing is carrying the campaign of pressure and disinformation." (Telegram 2103 from Buenos Aires, April 8; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/06/1982–04/10/1982))

first and listen to macho rhetoric without a fundamental feel for Britain's limits. And the Secretary said he wanted to be able to say how strong U.S. views are. He hoped to be able to force a withdrawal. He added, "We agree with what you are doing, although we want to avoid a war."

13. The Prime Minister said that the current effort was "more important than us." "We are rolling back the tide of socialism," she said. Moreover our success will be important to France, Latin America and the Caribbean. She recalled that Britain had had experience with appeasement and notions of "peace with honor." It comes to a point, she said, where one cannot compromise. She opined that the Soviets were afraid of the U.S. getting involved as it is. In her view, the Soviets are stretched and it would surprise her if they got involved.

14. The Secretary said that he did not fear a major U.S. involvement, but if the British carried out a military action he could envisage Soviet military involvement. He foresaw that the British could succeed in military terms in a limited way. However, the Argentines would go into port and land-based air would become a problem. The Prime Minister said that her government was correct and law-abiding and needed to give timely notice on the exclusion zone. She recalled that the whole Argentine effort was minutely planned down to getting the names of all the British marines. She recalled that the Argentines knew the names of the five missing marines. Doubtless the 20 Argentines on the island were involved. It was amazing there had been no intelligence on their activities. The Argentine commander on the Island had said the U.K. will do nothing. We had tried to negotiate in a civilized way. Clearly, there was a difference of view between the politicians and the military in Argentina. However, we were looking at constructive proposals in our negotiations in New York which were friendly. Pym suggested that the Argentines had been carried away in a macho way. Galtieri had taken care of his predecessor, but apparently he was less tough than the navy chiefs.

15. The Secretary asked what pressures Britain could bring to bear, noting that Europe knows that the reputation of the West is at stake. The U.S. had stopped military exports. The Prime Minister responded that the Argentines can feed themselves; however, they have no credit worthiness left. It will be difficult for them to borrow more on the Euro dollar market. They miscalculated in her view and she said she wanted to solve the problem by democratic means. To date Britain was getting a lot of help because most realized that the West is on trial.

16. In response to the Prime Minister's questions about Galtieri, the Secretary said he is reputed to be a religious man and something of a drinker. He had a reputation as well for being a "tough guy" and a poker player. That is why there may be a window now. He will up

the ante if forced and he will continue the struggle even if he won't survive. His fleet can be damaged severely and the Islands put in a cocoon. But landing on the big Island would be very costly and it will put the population in jeopardy. In the final analysis once engagement starts it will become an increasingly difficult burden to protect principle. People will begin to ask questions like why they are making such a sacrifice for a thousand sheep herders. U.S. opinion now supports the principled position Britain has taken but we cannot be sure it will last too long if the issue is not settled.

17. The Prime Minister said there is no border in the Falklands; the situation is more like Malaysia than Vietnam.

18. The Secretary said he wanted to find some approach that protected principle and achieved a success before there is a backlash. The Thatcher government had to be strengthened and if so, we will all come out better. The Prime Minister emphasized that this could happen after withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Islands. She noted that the Islands are short of water, cold, and that there is nothing but sheep to eat. The Secretary said the hope was to work for withdrawal in such a way that Galtieri is not toppled and replaced by someone more rigid. He emphasized withdrawal of military and security related forces; to get that step he thought the Argentines need to be convinced that they are not losing face in the process. At the same time, there must be a victory for principle. The Prime Minister thought these approaches contradictory.

19. The Secretary outlined a three-step approach involving withdrawal of forces, restoration of administration and negotiations on next steps. The topic of sovereignty would arise. The Prime Minister emphasized that the U.K. is the sovereign, the people were free before and clearly gave allegiance to the crown under law. The Secretary saw the need to avoid a priori judgements; it was necessary to go back to negotiations. The Prime Minister said this was very dangerous ground with public opinion. British administration must be restored: we cannot agree that a dictator can change that by force. Britain negotiated politely. The Argentines to the British are neo-imperialists. Forces must be withdrawn and pressure must be applied to that end. After withdrawal we could take up where we left off. The Secretary said that if Britain went that route, force will be required and there will be war. The Prime Minister replied that it will be a great tragedy if force is required. Britain is worried about its people there.

20. The Secretary said that if in the future freedom of choice can be assured and if the forces are withdrawn as a first step and if change in local authority is brought about immediately some progress might be possible. The Prime Minister said she would not negotiate under duress. She was unable even to have access to the Falklanders now.

She was pledged to the House of Commons, as are Foreign Secretary Pym and Minister of Defence John Nott. The Secretary said he was not suggesting negotiating under duress. He had in mind the return of the British presence. In addition he envisaged a U.S. and Canadian presence. The Prime Minister said she was pledged to restore British administration and to effective restoration of sovereignty. She believed the Secretary's proposal violated these principles. The Secretary said he saw withdrawal of the Argentine forces and the subsequent application of a temporary arrangement. Thatcher insisted the people have a right to stay on the Islands. The Secretary replied that was what he was seeking to achieve in conformity with the UN Charter. The Prime Minister said rights under the UN Charter were removed by force. She indicated the Secretary was suggesting the Argentines get by force what they failed to get before. The Secretary said his intention was to achieve withdrawal of the force, restoration of an administration that could guarantee the freedom of the people while negotiations go on. The Prime Minister said the people had everything they wanted before. She sought withdrawal and restoration of British administration—which merged with sovereignty. Then there could be negotiations. As a guardian of the Islanders' rights, she cannot put up something these people turned down, she said. Pym said preserving the right of self-determination was involved. The Secretary said one must find a way on the issue of administration. If we insist on withdrawal and go back to the status quo ante the consequences will be conflict. The Prime Minister said that this approach would mean the Venezuelans can go into Guyana, the Soviets into Berlin and the Argentines into Chile. Is that the message we want to give the world, she asked. The Secretary said principles would be preserved; but the only way to get the problem turned around in the short term is to achieve an interim arrangement on authority in the Island.

21. Pym asked if the Secretary envisaged a return to U.K. administration and the Prime Minister said that issue could not be put in jeopardy. She added that she needed to demonstrate that she was not operating under duress at the interim stage. The Secretary recalled that the process previously underway included proposals for leasing that would have been a direct concession of sovereignty. The Prime Minister recalled that leasing had never been proposed to the Argentines. The Secretary said that it had been widely discussed and all were aware of it. The Secretary asked what happened if we don't find a solution and conflict develops. The Prime Minister said it had developed and was initiated by the Argentines. The first principle of America, she said, is the right to use force to recover your own home. Once British administration is restored of course Britain will negotiate. The Argentines flouted every canon of law. Our friends agree. She did not want

a shot to be fired. But she could not tolerate their getting by force what they failed to get otherwise.

22. The meeting adjourned for dinner.<sup>10</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>10</sup> For a record of the April 8 dinner meeting between Haig and Thatcher, see Document 81.

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### **81. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 0425Z

Secto 5038. Subject: Secretary's Working Dinner With Prime Minister Thatcher, April 8.

1. Summary. During an extended working dinner discussion April 8 in Number Ten, the Secretary and senior members of his party explored with Prime Minister Thatcher the possibilities of a peaceful settlement between the UK and Argentina of the South Atlantic crisis. The PM, strongly seconded by Defense Minister Nott and less so by Foreign Secretary Pym, asserted UK determination to achieve the status quo ante. The Secretary suggested a possible course which might ensure essentials of British position (withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland, restoration of British administration) while leaving Argentina a face-saving way out via interim arrangement involving internationally recognized presence. PM indicated little willingness or give in UK position but expressed deep appreciation for U.S. initiative and interest in further views Secretary might develop during discussions with Argentine leadership in Buenos Aires. Accompanying the Secretary on the U.S. side were: Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs Thomas Enders; Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters; Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Gompert; NSC Senior Staff Member James Rentschler; Embassy London Charge

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/11/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram was sent after Haig left London for Buenos Aires, where he arrived on April 9.

d’Affaires Edward Streator. Joining Mrs. Thatcher were: Foreign Secretary Francis Pym; Defense Minister John Nott; Chief of Military Staff Terri Lewins; Director of Foreign Office Sir Antony Acland; Private Secretary to Prime Minister Clive Whittemore. End summary.

2. In an extensive dinner discussion April 8 which centered on the crisis in the South Atlantic, Prime Minister Thatcher asserted that the basis of British action was compliance with UNSC Resolution 502.<sup>2</sup> This meant that Argentina must withdraw its forces and that British administration of the Falkland Islands must be restored. British sovereignty continues by international law.

3. Secretary Haig stated that the U.S. saw the situation pretty much the same way as the British. Where the two of us might differ, he suggested, was in our view that it may be desirable to change somewhat the approach to the problem, but not the basic principle. The Secretary went on to emphasize that he was in London to help the British, that we desired above all the maintenance of the present British Government in power, and that we were fully sensitive to the depth of British feeling which surrounds the Falklands issue. Nevertheless, he added, the UK and the U.S. now faced a common danger: it would be very bad if we put ourselves in a position where our publics perceived us to have failed to grasp a possible political opportunity to avert armed conflict. The Secretary noted that we agree a political settlement must involve the withdrawal of Argentine forces, the return of British administration, and a mechanism for the resumption of negotiations on the future of the Islands; nevertheless, it was unlikely that either side could get the totality of what it wants, and what we would like to assist in finding is some vehicle which would enable the British to preserve the essentials of its position while leaving a way out for the Argentines, who now probably recognize the enormity of the risk they have taken.

4. In reply the Prime Minister forcefully observed that she, the Foreign Secretary, and the Defense Minister were all pledged before the House of Commons to restore British administration in the Falklands. Sovereignty was not the issue, because British sovereignty was a fact—it continues no matter what the Argentines did.

5. The Secretary suggested that a useful approach to a diplomatic solution might be to fence off the questions of sovereignty and self-determination, to leave them aside for the time being. Meanwhile, one could proceed with a possible scenario where the basic premise is withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary added that he could then go on to Buenos Aires and speak to the leadership there in the context of Britain’s basic requirements, but for this to happen he would

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

have to have a bit of air, something which would enable the Argentines to act without risking the survival of their regime.

6. The Prime Minister interjected to say that at this same table Neville Chamberlain had sat in 1938. She begged us, she said, to remember that fact and not urge Britain to acquiesce in a course which would simply reward aggression, which would give Argentina something by force which it could not have gained by peaceful means, and which would send a signal around the world with devastating consequences. Britain, she added, could not be considered on the same level as Argentina. The latter was the aggressor. She had not sent a fleet into the South Atlantic to strike a bargain with an aggressor.

7. Defense Minister Nott said he for one was not convinced that the British military position was weaker than Argentina's. He expressed confidence in the fleet's ability to sustain operations over a protracted period of time and, in conjunction with economic measures, to inflict considerable hardship on the Argentines. It was they, not Britain, which had to initiate moves toward a diplomatic solution.

8. Foreign Secretary Pym, less assertive than either the PM or Nott throughout the discussions, felt that it was relevant to find out how the Falklanders themselves felt about the prospect of war—a suggestion which the PM heatedly challenged, noting that aggressors classically tried to intimidate the people against whom they were aggressing by saying that things far worse than the aggression itself could happen.

9. Both sides then discussed at length the possible ingredients of a diplomatic solution. The Secretary reiterated what he felt might be a promising approach, which involved an interim arrangement whereby an internationally recognized "umbrella", perhaps composed of U.S. and Canadian elements, plus two Latins, could prevent war, oversee the withdrawal of Argentine forces, and ensure conditions of self-determination.

10. The Prime Minister questioned the notion of an international presence as too "woolly"—the House of Commons would never accept it, she said, because she was pledged to the restoration of British administration, which meant the courts, public services, etc. No vague international presence could substitute for that essential authority. She added that her fear was that what we were really talking about was negotiations under conditions of duress, which would be a terrible insult to Britain. It was her view, she concluded, that Argentina would never accept in any event the self-determination of the Falklanders, all of whom wanted to remain British.

11. The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. had no intention of forcing the UK to negotiate under duress. Nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. stood by the UK, we were allied, we had already shown we were not treating the UK and Argentina as



equals through our vote on UNSC 502. We were here to help, and while we felt that the suggestion we put forward was worth reflecting on—withdrawal of Argentine forces, the temporary introduction of an internationally recognized authority to supervise and verify it, and a resumption of negotiations—all we could do now was continue on to Buenos Aires and probe the Argentines. We would be sure to carry with us the message of British unity and resolve and convey to them the strength of feeling which exists over the Falklands dispute. The Secretary went on to say that in all frankness he felt the British should be fully aware of the many factors at play in the present crisis, including the substantial interests we have in the hemisphere and the potential for Soviet exploitation of the crisis.

12. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary and his party and said that only true friends could discuss such an issue with the candor and feeling which had characterized this dinner exchange, she laughingly concluded by noting that “we’re nice to other people”.

Haig

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**82. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 9, 1982, 0131Z

Secto 5010. Dept pass Bridgetown Flash. For the President from the Secretary. Subject: Memo to the President: Discussions in London.<sup>2</sup>

1. (Top Secret–Entire text).

2. I spent five hours with Prime Minister Thatcher, the first hour with her and the Foreign Secretary, Pym, alone, followed by a working

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115]. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> In a telegram to McFarlane, which was also seen by Clark, sent April 9, Rentschler wrote of Haig’s report: “You should know that his views accurately summarize the mood and mind-set of HMG at this critical point in the South Atlantic caper and delineate our rather limited room for maneuver on the Buenos Aires leg (whither we are now bound.) I believe the substance of that report should be shared with Roger Fontaine and Dennis Blair, since it will undoubtedly condition our next immediate steps. However the present situation turns out, it will clearly be a ‘close-run thing’—in fact Mrs. Thatcher herself may have recognized when she pointedly showed us portraits in Number 10 not only of Nelson but also Wellington.” (Telegram Secto 5017 to the White House, April 9; *ibid.*)



dinner which included the Defense Minister, Nott, and senior officials.<sup>3</sup> Before meeting with her, I spent an hour alone with Pym.<sup>4</sup>

3. The Prime Minister has the bit in her teeth, owing to the politics of a unified nation and an angry Parliament, as well as her own convictions about the principles at stake. She is clearly prepared to use force, though she admits a preference for a diplomatic solution. She is rigid in her insistence on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any solution involve some retribution.

4. Her Defense Secretary is squarely behind her, though less ideological than she. He is confident of military success, based not on a strategy of landing on the Islands but rather by a blockade which, he believes, will eventually make the Argentine presence untenable. Thus, the prospect of imminent hostilities appears less acute—if the Argentines keep their distance—though this does not fundamentally diminish the gravity and urgency of the crisis.

5. Her Foreign Secretary does not share her position, and went surprisingly far in showing this in her presence. Whether this means he will have a restraining influence or instead that there will be a problem within the government is impossible to say.

6. The British tried to avoid the question of the long-term consequences of using force, though they are concerned and, I believe, our discussions sobered them further. They agree with our assessment that the next 72 hours, before the fleet arrives, is crucial.

7. The Prime Minister is convinced she will fall if she concedes on any of three basic points, to which she is committed to Parliament:

A. Immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces;

B. Restoration of British administration on the Islands;

C. Preservation of their position that the Islanders must be able to exercise self-determination.

8. We focussed on three elements of a solution, which I argued would meet her needs:

A. Withdrawal of Argentine forces;

B. An interim arrangement involving an international presence (e.g., US, Canada, and two Latin American countries) to provide an umbrella for the restoration of British administration;

C. Swift resumption of negotiations.

9. The main problems were with point B. She wants nothing that would impinge on British authority; she wants the British Governor

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 80 and 81.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 79.

back;<sup>5</sup> and she bridled at the thought of any Argentine non-military presence even under an international umbrella. She does not insist that British sovereignty be accepted—she is finessing this by saying that British sovereignty is simply a fact that has not been affected by aggression—but she rules out anything that would be inconsistent with self-determination.

10. All in all, we got no give in the basic British position, and only the glimmering of some possibilities, and that only after much effort by me with considerable help not appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym. It is clear that they had not thought much about diplomatic possibilities. They will now, but whether they become more imaginative or instead recoil will depend on the political situation and what I hear in Argentina.

11. I will arrive in Buenos Aires late Friday.<sup>6</sup> I will convey a picture of total British resolve, and see what I can draw from the Argentines along lines we discussed in London, without giving any hint that the British are prepared for any give-and-take.

12. If the Argentines give me something to work with, I plan to return to London over the weekend. It may then be necessary for me to ask you to apply unusual pressure on Thatcher. If the Argentines offer very little, I would plan to return to confer with you. In this case, it may be necessary to apply even greater pressure on the British if we are to head off hostilities. I cannot presently offer much optimism, even if I get enough in Buenos Aires to justify a return to London. This is clearly a very steep uphill struggle, but essential, given the enormous stakes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Immediately after the invasion on April 2, Argentina appointed Brigadier General Mario Benjamin Menéndez as Governor of the Islands. The British Governor and the British Marines were captured and taken to the British Embassy in Montevideo.

<sup>6</sup> April 9. At 0228Z, April 9, Haig sent a message to Costa Mendez requesting that the meetings begin the morning of Saturday, April 10, “in view of the lateness of the hour of my arrival in Argentina.” (Telegram Secto 5013 to Buenos Aires, April 9; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/09/1982 (1))

<sup>7</sup> From his aircraft en route to Buenos Aires, Haig sent a follow-up telegram to Reagan. In it, he expanded on his assessment of Thatcher’s outlook on the crisis, noting that “it is virtually as important to us” that Thatcher achieve “success” in this situation “for the principle at stake is central to your vision of international order, in addition to being in our strategic interest.” Haig also observed: “The key question is whether I can bring back enough from the Argentines to convince her [Thatcher] that she has within reach a successful, peaceful solution. Obviously, if Galtieri accepts a political defeat it’s the end of him. Just as Mrs. Thatcher must be able to show that Galtieri got nothing from his use of force, he must be able to show that he got something. Whether this rules out a diplomatic solution, or whether there is a narrow band in which some ambiguity will permit both parties a way out of their respective corners, I do not know.” (Unnumbered telegram from Haig to Reagan, April 9; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/09/1982 (2))

13. Throughout what was a difficult discussion, there was no trace of anything but gratitude for the role we are playing and for your personal concern and commitment to the Prime Minister. She said, in conclusion, that the candor of the discussion reflected the strength of our relationship.

14. As you know I have excluded travelling US press from the plane. All I have said to the local press is that we want to be helpful and support UN Security Council Resolution 502, which calls for withdrawal and a diplomatic solution. For the benefit of Thatcher—and the Argentines—I also said I was impressed with the resolve of the British Government. We must be absolutely disciplined with the press during this critical stage, avoiding at all cost any suggestion that we are encouraged. There is, in fact, little basis for encouragement in any event.

Haig

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**83. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1982

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the situation in the South Atlantic.]

2. *Falklands*: Bill Middendorf succeeded in persuading the OAS to adjourn until Monday<sup>2</sup> without substantive debate on an OAS good offices resolution proposed chiefly by Colombia.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, I met separately with the French and German Ambassadors to discuss the Falklands situation. Each Ambassador indicated his nation's solidarity with the UK, support for the Secretary's efforts to defuse the crisis, and concern about the implications of a military clash.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the situation in the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (03/25/1982–04/21/1982). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> April 12.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 113.

#### 84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig's Aircraft<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 9, 1982, 0643Z

Tosec 50043. Subject: Action Memorandum: UK Request for Additional Support on Ascension Island. To the Secretary from EUR—H. Allen Holmes, Acting, ARA—Everett Briggs, Acting, PM—Richard Burt.

1. Issue for Decision: Whether to accede to a UK request for additional support on Ascension Island.

2. Essential Factors: As foreshadowed in earlier memoranda to you, the UK now has now requested additional US support at Ascension Island. This memorandum provides a legal analysis of the options and recommends a positive response, if your reading of the situation on the ground so permits.

The UK is formally requesting (A) that the US arrange for Wideawake to operate on a 24-hour basis for the time being to allow for maintenance operations and (B) that additional air controllers be provided by the US. The UK has also indicated that it plans to locate various communication facilities on the Island and a met facility and that it "shall require" facilities for three commando brigades. Text of UK request received by Department evening of April 8 is at para 3.

On April 2 you decided the US should agree to sell fuel to the UK at Ascension.<sup>2</sup> As you are aware, the 1962 exchange of notes between the US and the UK on the use of Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island by UK military aircraft obligates the US to permit the UK to land at Wideawake and to use the facilities in the event that the UK considers additional logistic, administrative or operating facilities to be necessary at the airfield. You determined that the provision of fuel was legitimately encompassed by the obligation to let the UK use the facilities on Ascension. The new request, however, appears to the Legal Adviser's office to have elements that go beyond our legal obligation to permit the UK to use the facility. The 1962 agreement does not obligate us to provide additional services and clearly does not constitute

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0758. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to USDel Secretary. Drafted by E. Cummings (L/PM); cleared by R. Haas, Pendleton, and J. Earle (L/ARA); approved in S/S–O. A stamped notation at the top right-hand corner of the telegram indicates that Haig saw it. An additional notation in an unknown hand reads: "Sec. acted upon in Secto 24—hold off on grey areas." Reference is presumably to telegram Secto 5024; see footnote 4 below.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 51.

an obligation on the part of the US to assign military personnel to support the UK operations in a direct manner in potential combat operations, nor would it appear to obligate us to provide additional air controllers.

However, the agreement also contemplates that the US and UK will coordinate their actions to avoid interference in US operations when the UK uses the facilities. Consequently, though not technically required under the agreement, the UK request to operate the airfield on a 24 hour basis and to provide additional air controllers is justifiable on the basis of the increased operational strain on US operations and the limited nature of the air traffic activities. The other British requests are clearly within the scope of the agreement, and the UK has the right to establish the facilities they have proposed.

Recommendation:

That you inform the British that we can agree to their overall request, based on the increased activity at Ascension Island. We are well aware that your response to this recommendation will depend on your reading of the state of play following your April 8 London talks.<sup>3</sup>

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_<sup>4</sup>

3. Text of UK message of April 8 re Ascension. (UK Embassy informed us request being made concurrently and in much greater detail through military channels to DOD). Begin text:

We wish to use airfield for two Nimrod aircraft in order to conduct maritime reconnaissance operations on a 24-hour basis for an indefinite period (since their missions will be coordinated with our submarine forces 24 hour cover is essential). We should therefore be grateful if the US would arrange for the airfield to operate on a 24-hour basis for the time being. We realise that this will involve the provision of

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 79, 81, and 82.

<sup>4</sup> At 1435Z, April 9, Haig replied to Eagleburger: "Proceed with only those elements of UK request which clearly fall within range of our treaty commitment. Concerning grey areas, such as assignment of additional air controllers, you should address the issue indicating that we will view the request sympathetically but in an upbeat manner without committing ourselves to approval at this time. We first need to make an assessment in wake of result of Buenos Aires stop this weekend—and possible return to London. I am concerned that approval at this point would quickly become known to Argentines, with unhelpful impact on upcoming talks with Argentines. We recognize that the practical effect of this guidance is that 24 hour operation of Wide-Awake will not likely be possible for time-being unless it can be attained without using additional air controllers. If British convey sense of great urgency, you should get back to me. But my thinking now is that it would be a great mistake to agree to the request for air controllers while I am in Buenos Aires." (Telegram Secto 5024 from Haig, April 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0762)

additional air controllers as foreshadowed in earlier message.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile air transport force operations will continue on the present scale. We also plan to locate various communications facilities on the Island and a met facility. In addition we shall require facilities for three commando brigades as earlier mentioned.

A senior officer has now been appointed as Commander of the British Forces Support Unit and has been instructed to liaise as required with the Commander of the US Forces Ascension Island on all matters of detail. End text.

4. The message referred to above “as earlier mentioned” is with your staff as an attachment to a bullet paper entitled “Your Meeting with UK Ambassador Henderson, 4/6/82”.<sup>6</sup>

5. Please assure that Assistant Secretary Enders sees this message as it goes to the Secretary.

6. Cleared by: PM:RHaas, FWG:MSPendleton, L/ARA: JEarle. Drafted by: L/PM:ECummings.

**Eagleburger**

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to an April 6 message from Wall to Pendleton which stated that the British Embassy had been asked by HMG “to let you know that later expansion of forces could require reception and staging facilities for 3500 men: a logistic base would require 200 men for the reception, storage and onward movement of combat supplies.” In addition, regarding “other longer term requirements,” Wall specified that one “particular requirement will be for additional air controllers to allow for 24-hour operations.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982)

<sup>6</sup> A copy of the undated bullet paper is *ibid.* For a summary of that meeting, see Document 71.

85. Telegram From President Reagan to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

Bridgetown, April 9, 1982, 1640Z

10. Ref Secto 5010.<sup>2</sup> Subject: Your Discussions in London.

1. (TS) The report of your discussions in London makes clear how difficult it will be to foster a compromise that gives Maggie enough to carry on and at the same time meets the test of “equity” with our Latin neighbors. As you expected there isn’t much room for maneuver in the British position. How much this “going-in” position can be influenced is unclear although London headlines give little basis for optimism. Point B looks to be the crux<sup>3</sup> and I’d be interested in your further thinking on how a multinational presence might be made more appealing in London. It’s my guess from the diffident British stance that any compromise on Thatcher’s part will take time. If that’s true the closure of the British submarines is all the more worrisome. In this regard, whether we can expect Galtieri to have the wisdom and strength to keep his distance is obviously a central near-term issue.

2. (TS) On a separate subject, I was struck by reporting from Tel Aviv that Begin is moving Soviet tanks to the northern border.<sup>4</sup> Recognizing you have your hands full, I’d appreciate your views on whether another intervention from us would be useful or not.

3. (TS) Here, we had useful sessions in Jamaica and Barbados.<sup>5</sup> What struck me most was that while they are interested in the contents of the CBI, through it we have achieved the larger purpose of a breakthrough in U.S. credibility in this part of the world. Their confidence that finally we care is a fragile but terribly important achievement for which you should be very proud.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115]. Top Secret. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan was in Barbados for meetings with the Prime Ministers of Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. He had arrived in Barbados on April 8, following a brief official visit to Jamaica. A notation in Poindexter’s handwriting in the top right-hand corner of the telegram reads: “Judge—JP,” indicating that Poindexter forwarded the telegram to Clark. A stamped notation indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 82.

<sup>3</sup> See paragraph 8B of of Document 82.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on U.S. responses to the mounting crisis in Lebanon, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XVIII, Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982.

<sup>5</sup> For documentation relating to Reagan’s discussions in Jamaica and Barbados, as well as other documentation related to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XVII, Part 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean, and *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XVII, Part 2, Eastern Caribbean.

4. (TS) On the press line you propose with respect to the Falklands, I agree. We are saying nothing from here to color expectations.

5. (TS) As you proceed to Buenos Aires, I'm very conscious of the enormity of the task. I'd appreciate a call on the secure line when you have a chance to discuss where things might lead in the days ahead.

Warm regards.

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**86. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Defense Communications Agency, Department of Defense (Layman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 9, 1982

SUBJECT

US Communications Satellite Support to UK Naval Forces (S)

1. (S) In view of the current situation between the UK and Argentina, you should be aware that the US is providing communications satellite support to the British fleet enroute to the Falkland Island.<sup>2</sup> This communications satellite support provides two-way communications between the fleet and its shore establishment. Approximately half of the UK fleet has satellite capability.

2. (C) This support is provided because a memorandum of understanding exists between the US and the UK to provide limited worldwide Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) support to the UK. This agreement was initiated on 1 Jan 78 and concludes on 1 Jan 83.<sup>3</sup> The MOU differentiates between first and second order satellite

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Subject File, 1982 United Kingdom (2) #29–42. Secret. Stamped notations on the first page of the memorandum indicate that Weinberger and Carlucci saw it on April 9.

<sup>2</sup> According to an April 9 memorandum for the record produced by Nagler, the decision to provide communications support was taken by Carlucci in consultation with Eagleburger. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (March–April) 1982) Nagler informed Hervey of Carlucci's decision, its terms, and its conditions in a memorandum, April 9. In addition, Nagler indicated that the United States had approved a Royal Navy request for cryptographic equipment for a maximum period of 7 months. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word "concludes." Commenting on this sentence, Weinberger wrote at the bottom of the page: "1) OK; 2) We should start action Monday to renew MOU now."



accesses. A first order requirement is for full-time continuous service with satellite capacity reserved for the UK for the entire year. A second order requirement is considered to be of a short duration and temporary nature to cover R&D, contingencies, and special operations. Satellite capacity is not reserved for second order requirements but the US will attempt to accommodate the UK, subject to US overriding national requirements. In practice, the US has in the past accommodated UK second order requirements.

3. (S) The DCA Area Control Center in Europe, which is controlling all UK accesses on the DSCS Atlantic satellite, reports that the UK has 21 channels authorized and 21 channels operational as of 1200 hours 8 Apr 82. The channels include broadcast circuits to ships, dedicated ship/shore and shore/ship circuits and two channels from mobile ground terminals. The UK is using approximately 11% of the total Atlantic satellite power. Although no second order circuits have been requested as yet, the UK is authorized an additional 27 channels.

**Lawrence Layman**  
*Rear Admiral, USN*  
*Acting Director*

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## 87. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

SNIE 21/91–82

Washington, April 9, 1982

### THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS

[Omitted here are the Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]

#### KEY JUDGMENTS

A peaceful resolution of the Falkland Islands crisis will depend on a willingness to make concessions that are not yet evident in either

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/09/1982–04/15/1982). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The estimate was issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The estimate was prepared with the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [text not declassified], and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, also participated in the preparation of the estimate.

London or Buenos Aires. The negotiating flexibility of both the UK and Argentina will diminish as the British task force nears the Falklands. Even now there is little or no flexibility on the key imperatives of either party: sovereignty now or in the finite future for Argentina, or the removal of all Argentine military forces and the restoration of British control for London.

Only a negotiated settlement achieved before hostilities, or following an extremely limited military engagement, however, is likely to leave US interests relatively unscathed. In the event of extensive armed conflict, the United States will be increasingly pressured to “choose” between Britain and Argentina, and by extension between Latin America and the US-European alliance. A clear-cut British victory would avoid the negative consequences for UK-US relations that could result from such an invidious comparison.

We believe that the British task force could undertake the following categories of military operations after arriving in the vicinity of the Falklands. In order of increasing cost to the British, they are:

- Enforce a naval exclusion zone.
- Engage in a high seas naval confrontation.
- Prevent air resupply of the Islands.
- Assault the Falklands in an attempt to retake them.

A British defeat would not only result in the fall of the Thatcher government but would also deal a severe political blow to Britain’s standing as a major European power and key NATO member. It would have a demoralizing effect within the Alliance and would dampen the prospect of British cooperation with the United States in such areas as strategic nuclear planning and the Persian Gulf.

Argentina’s defeat would result in the fall of the Galtieri regime and probably usher in a period of weaker, less stable governments. An Argentine loss would diminish Buenos Aires’ current willingness to cooperate with US policy initiatives in Central America. On the other hand, even an Argentine victory would evoke mixed reactions in Latin America, especially because this outcome would seem to justify reliance on force to resolve territorial disputes.

A standoff after limited combat would create more promising circumstances for negotiations than now exist. Growing awareness of military vulnerabilities might generate more concerns about the debilitating consequences of full-scale conflict, and thus allow exploitation of diplomatic options.

The opening for negotiations could be relatively brief, because both governments might come under strong pressure to reengage in order to avoid an attrition of capabilities—the British concerned about sustaining the distant military effort, and the Argentines susceptible to

growing economic difficulties and isolation. If full-scale but inconclusive hostilities ensue, the respective allies and hoped-for supporters of each side would be increasingly entreated to take stronger actions.

The Soviets are unlikely to become directly involved militarily in the dispute, although they probably will secretly provide Argentina with information on UK military deployments.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section of the estimate and an Annex illustrating the Balance of Forces.]

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## 88. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 9, 1982, 3:15 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Derek Thomas, Minister, Embassy of Great Britain  
J. W. Middendorf, Ambassador, USOAS

Minister Thomas called me with some questions of a technical nature about the Rio Treaty<sup>2</sup> and took the opportunity to discuss the Haig visit to Prime Minister Thatcher. Derek advised me that the position of Her Majesty's Government had hardened perceptibly in the past two to three days prior to the Haig visit, largely as a result of an aroused domestic public opinion which was being incited by television coverage of the issue, e.g. "Who is this tin horn dictator pushing us around?" As a result, the Thatcher Government's conditions for a resolution of the issue now consist of the following three points:

1. Argentine withdrawal of military forces from the Falkland Islands.
2. Observance of the principle of self-determination of the Islanders.
3. A return to the status-quo ante with British administration until negotiations resolve the issue.

I pointed out that these conditions might seem too harsh in the limited time framework available and could, if not tempered with face-saving measures, involve the downfall of the Galtieri Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. Secret. Drafted by Davila and approved by Middendorf. Davila initialed for Middendorf. Copies were sent to Bosworth and Kirkpatrick.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 50.

I queried Thomas as to how much this reflected UK posturing for domestic opinion and how much was for intimidating the Argentines to be able to get a better deal. After a pause, he said that he could not answer that question but reiterated the grave seriousness with which HMG views the situation and that it would not refrain from use of armed force, if necessary.<sup>3</sup>

Expressing my dismay to Thomas, I pointed out that the basic elements for a solution were already in hand, and that a decision between a Hong-Kong (lease-back) or condominium (joint administration) arrangement was the only real remaining stumbling block which was not a significant obstacle as the two sides are very close to an agreement. I stressed that a failure to achieve a peaceful solution could spell the end of the Inter-American system, damage British commercial interests throughout Latin America and involve the British in a lengthy no-win situation in the Falkland Islands in which HMG could conceivably reoccupy the Falklands by force but would require them to maintain lengthy sea lanes of communication. Furthermore, it would not contribute to a stable, lasting solution to the problem; instead, it could engender protracted Argentine resistance along Vietnam lines that could prove costly to Britain.

He said that HM ships are prepared to sink any Argentine warship that would be “foolish enough” to enter the 200 mile zone after midnight Sunday.<sup>4</sup> I countered that this left little time for negotiation. He, in turn, said that if the GOA commenced withdrawal by that time, obviously, the British Navy would not take physical action. I pointed out that any early hostilities would cause the Rio Treaty to be invoked and would make any diplomatic initiatives almost impossible after that.

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<sup>3</sup> Later, he told me it was unfortunate that the Secretary did not go to Argentina first because Margaret Thatcher was not able to respond to an offer but had to lay her own offer out on the table first (implying to me that it was, therefore, tougher than it might otherwise have been—I hope that I am right on this). [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> April 11. See Document 78.

**89. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 9, 1982, 5:30 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Galtieri, Argentina  
Ambassador Vernon Walters

At 5:30 pm on April 9, 1982 under instructions from Secretary Haig, I met with President Leopold Galtieri alone at the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires.

I explained that I came at Secretary Haig's request to convey privately some thoughts to consider before our general discussion later in the evening.<sup>2</sup> We understood that President Galtieri had unified his people in a way none of his predecessors could. His mandate in the Malvinas affair is clearly broad and sound. If we can resolve the matter without war, Galtieri will go down in Argentine history as the man who reconquered the Malvinas Islands without firing a shot. He will be perceived as a leader of the free world and a man of peace. If his government accepts a proposal that is recognized as reasonable and fair his place in history is secure even if the British reject it. A war between Argentina and England will serve only the Soviets and their allies.

If President Galtieri insists upon having an Argentine governor of the Malvinas during an interim negotiating period, the effort to avoid war will surely fail. There is clearly an honorable and demonstrably important role for his representative on the islands during negotiations. If he would not insist upon having his own governor, we would insist that the negotiations conclude by December 31, 1982 and in a manner to suit his domestic needs.

Both sides must make concessions if peace is to continue. History, however, seems to favor the Argentines. The matter has been pending for 130 years and has now come to a head. An interim arrangement can hardly be seen as anything other than progress for Argentina. Most of the islanders appear to want to leave if Argentina gains control. Those who remain can be accommodated.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to Haig's anticipated arrival in Buenos Aires from London the evening of April 9. Although no memorandum of conversation of their meeting has been found, Costa Méndez met Haig upon his arrival at the airport. (Edward Schumacher, "Haig, in Buenos Aires, Says U.S. Ties With Argentina Form Basis for Talks," *New York Times*, April 10, p. 6)

The British must have a face-saving solution. Mrs. Thatcher is determined that Argentina not be perceived as achieving through arms what it failed to achieve through negotiations. Insistence upon an Argentine governor will surely send the British into combat. Our assessment is that they might lose some ships but their nuclear submarines and surface combatants could seriously damage the Argentine Navy and seal off the sea and air access to the Malvinas. The 9000 Argentine troops would find life quite difficult. The Argentine choice today is to accept a half loaf now and wait to gain the rest in a year or to face a war. We are working on a draft we hope he will find acceptable.

President Galtieri replied, "Walters, the one thing you cannot ask me to do is to haul down the Argentine flag. If I do that, I will be kicked out of this building. You must work out something that does not leave me empty-handed." He did not mention the Argentine governor.

President Galtieri abruptly changed the conversation to ask if I had, indeed, gone to Cuba to see Fidel Castro as the papers reported.<sup>3</sup> I answered affirmatively and said I carried a tough message warning him to cease and desist from the activities we found unacceptable. Galtieri asked about Castro's reaction. I replied that he was not happy but, surprisingly, did not bluster about. He was quite calm, almost intimidated. Galtieri then asked about Castro's appearance, behavior, and attitudes. I answered briefly.

He thanked me for my visit, asked me not to hesitate to call him, if I felt it necessary, and sent his regards to Secretary Haig.

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<sup>3</sup> For documentation relating to Walters's trip to Cuba, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, Part 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean.

**90. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 10, 1982

**PARTICIPANTS**

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
President Galtieri, Argentina  
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders  
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez, Argentina  
Under Secretary Enrique Ros, Argentina  
Brig Gen Iglesias, Secretary General of Presidency, Argen.  
Maj General Mertil, Chief of Planning, Argentina  
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters

President Galtieri welcomed Secretary Haig by saying that he would call the Secretary “General” because there is a brotherhood between military men and a commonality of ethical values that made blunt talk easier between them. He would talk first of all about yesterday, and then about tomorrow.

Since 1833 when the British took the Malvinas Islands by force, the Argentines have never ceased to claim sovereignty and to demand their return. The United Nations in 1965 recommended negotiations between the two powers in order to accomplish the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. The United Kingdom accepted under the framework of decolonization. The Argentines tried for the next 17 years, by every possible means, to convince the British government to arrive at a solution. The British have never conducted any substantial discussions concerning the transfer of sovereignty of the territorial integration of the Malvinas into Argentina. No one can accuse the Argentines of a lack of patience or prudence throughout this period. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Argentines have not used diplomatic legerdemain and evasion. The Argentine claims are and have always been clear. We are patient, but patience, like water, can run out. We now face a crisis initiated perhaps by Argentina but aggravated by the over-reaction of the United Kingdom government. The British reaction to the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas is out of all proportion to the Argentine action. The Argentine government is willing to find an honorable solution that will save Mrs. Thatcher’s government. Argentina does not desire to undermine the prestige of the United Kingdom. But we cannot sacrifice our honor either. The Argentine people and nation owe a great

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa Rosada. For Haig’s later account of this meeting, see Haig, *Caveat*, pp. 276–279.

deal to the United Kingdom. The British community in Argentina is prosperous and well integrated into Argentine life. British families are always welcome in Argentina. The only grave difference we have had with the British is the matter that is under discussion today. No member of the Argentine government has spoken offensive or insulting words towards Mrs. Thatcher or the Cabinet Ministers of Great Britain—General Galtieri repeated twice for emphasis—“until today.”

Galtieri continued that before you (Secretary Haig) and your friends came to power in the United States, the Argentine government struggled against subversion. We continue the struggle. In El Salvador, Argentina worked to save the political situation. Argentina is loved in Central America. On the Malvinas matter, Peru and Bolivia support us, along with others. We and the United States ride the same train, but we will not ride in the caboose. I will talk to you about something quite frankly that the Argentine government does not like, and that is the furnishing of intelligence to Great Britain and the use of Ascension Islands for supply for the British. That is what I have to say about events up to yesterday. But today I do want to thank you for your presence here and the interest the United States has shown in helping us to find a solution to this problem. Today, the Argentine government is perfectly disposed to finding a decorous, acceptable way out for Great Britain. But you will understand that the Argentine government must look good too. We have an internal situation that you will have already felt. The United States has in Argentina today a government as friendly to you as any ever to govern here. We understand that we need Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative government in Great Britain; but not at the expense of Argentine national interests. The measures taken by Mrs. Thatcher are creating a delicate domestic situation for us. Her statements lack balance. We want to help her to achieve a balanced position. Remember that Peron did not win his election in 1946, the United States lost Argentina. The Argentine people tend to react instinctively and emotionally. I must lead them to a solution which will not recreate an Argentina of the 1940s. Our crisis today can easily result in the destabilization of South America and thereby weaken the defense of the West. I cannot fail to express to you that directly or indirectly I have received offers of aircraft, pilots, and armaments from countries “not part of the West.” When Margaret Thatcher declared a zone of exclusion, in reality a zone of war, she created an environment wherein if Monday an Argentine ship were torpedoed, the Argentine people would believe and hold the United Kingdom responsible, even if the Soviets or some other nation did it. Conversely, if a United Kingdom ship were sunk the British would certainly blame the Argentines. Our present equilibrium is difficult to maintain and a conflict could spread to other parts of the world. The consequences



can go far beyond a local problem between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The result is uncertain. The Argentine people took the decision on the second of April to recover our legitimate heritage. Our fleet and five thousand Marines acted. If the British want to send an expedition, we will receive this anachronistic colonial expedition with the appropriate honors. In 1806 and 1807 the Argentine people with very little means acted against the British forces. (Here Galtieri referred to an episode during which the British attempted to conquer colonial Argentina. Lord Beresford was captured by the Argentines and interned at the religious shrine at Lujan.)

General Galtieri said that his remarks are the prologue to our conversation. He repeated that the Argentines have the best disposition possible toward Margaret Thatcher, but find it difficult to assist her in light of her strident posture.

Secretary Haig replied to President Galtieri that he was pleased and welcomed the President's perceptive analysis. He felt that he knew the President well because he had heard so much about him from General Walters and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The Secretary agreed that there is a universal brotherhood among military men, despite national differences. We have a commonality of approach, an ethical understanding that permits free interchange. He found this true at NATO where often the political officials got caught up on technical difficulties. The brotherhood of professional military men, however, were able to elevate themselves beyond contemporary political pressures and with detachment to get to the heart of matters of vital interest to the people. Secretary Haig continued that he had watched over the years with special concern the valiant struggle of the Argentine people against the dark forces of Marxism and radicalism. "Too often in my own country people forget the basic stake that we have is a fundamental struggle that is going on in the world against the threat of Russian and Marxist imperialists. We are grateful for the direction in which Argentina is moving. In recent months we have seen not empty rhetoric, but real cooperation; we have seen your contribution to the solidarity of the hemisphere, and your understanding of the threat presented by the Soviets. We feel that many of the Soviet recent actions were taken in the light of what they perceive to be US weakness. They are aggressive and more dangerous. Following our failure in VietNam, we witnessed the Soviets or their proxies move against Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. They concluded that, despite our vast resources, our self-paralysis made these fruits ripe for plucking. Throughout this period the Argentine professional military conducted a successful struggle despite the unjustified criticism from other parts of the world. Today the same vital struggle continues in Central America. I know the President understands the character of

this struggle and understands the essential character of the partnership which we have forged in recent months. We cannot allow this to be broken up by a “thousand Scottish shepherds.” The Secretary told President Galtieri that the reports that the US has furnished intelligence and satellite information to the UK are untrue. We denied the British request. As a matter of principle we feel that allies should not spy on each other. Our satellite, moreover, was not in a position to collect data from this area. Had it been, we would not have furnished it to the British. He gave President Galtieri his personal guarantee. The story was planted by the leftists in England to use against Mrs. Thatcher. They contended that she had advance knowledge and had taken no action. The story had the additional advantage of putting the US in an unfavorable light. President Galtieri thanked him for these assurances.

Secretary Haig said the first indication we had of the present crisis was from the UK. General Galtieri laughed and said the Argentines were good professionals and were able to cover up the operation. Secretary Haig agreed that the conduct of the cover for the operation was masterful. General Galtieri said that the Argentines had issued strong orders that no one was to be shot. Consequently, although four Argentines were killed, two more seriously injured, and some six others wounded, there were no British casualties. The Argentines made a special effort to avoid physical damage to the island. The only shots fired were by the British.

The Secretary repeated “that the stakes are profound in our global struggle. Even while we follow the Malvinas crisis hour by hour, and as I speak to you, the struggle continues in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico. Mexico is a serious problem. The Communist penetration into the whole of Mexico is far more extensive than any other nation is willing to admit.” The Secretary recalled that when he was at the UN, the Mexicans kidnapped a Nicaraguan volunteer with the Salvadoran rebel forces from the naive Salvadoran police. Castaneda, the Mexican Foreign Minister, invited this student to speak at the UN and also invited Jaime Wheelock up from Nicaragua to meet the press. The Secretary warned Castaneda that he had in his pocket a five page confession by this Nicaraguan in which he clearly implicated Mexico. This confession made reference to five camps in southern Mexico run by Mexican, Soviet, and Cuban personnel. The evidence also implicated the Mexican PRI party. The Secretary promised Castaneda that if he made any public statement about the Nicaraguan the Secretary would read this confession to the press. Castaneda said, “Please don’t do that, please don’t do that.” Castaneda told the press that the version he received came from the Nicaraguans. He could not verify it himself. Mexico is a real problem.

In the face of all these difficulties it is vital that we maintain an understanding and cooperation. General Galtieri said he fully agreed

with what the Secretary had said. He then told the Secretary of his news that at midnight last night a Cuban plane arrived from Havana carrying Ambassador Aragones, a former Cuban ambassador to Mexico, bringing an urgent letter for President Galtieri from Fidel Castro. He knew that the plane had arrived, but had not yet received the letter. Returning to the Malvinas issue, President Galtieri said that while they do not know what Chileans might do, neither do the Chileans know what Peru will do. The Argentines know what both the Peruvian and Bolivian armed forces think. The implications here are ominous. The Argentine President said that he remembered well that a small incident at Sarajevo had led to an uncontrollable conflagration.<sup>2</sup>

With respect to Cuba, the Secretary then told President Galtieri in confidence that we had completed planning and if the Cubans move into Nicaragua we will take military action. Next Monday or Tuesday<sup>3</sup> we could have indications of just such Cuban actions. We have a large concentration of naval vessels in the Caribbean this month. We may be provided with the opportunity we have been seeking. The Secretary stressed that he told President Galtieri this because of his and President Reagan's great respect for him and his government. He pointed out that this adds to the tragedy of this situation. President Galtieri must know that, if Great Britain continues on her present course, we would be the losers and the USSR and Cuba the principal beneficiaries. He could tell General Galtieri right now what the message from El Supremo (Castro) was. "Later you will undoubtedly get a message from the Soviets."

Margaret Thatcher is unquestionably the most vigorous leader of western Europe and has been extremely supportive to us on Polish and Afghanistan matters. To undermine this cooperation would also be a tragedy. She has in a sense boxed herself into a corner with imprudent rhetoric. When the Secretary was in London he met with her for five hours of discussion.<sup>4</sup> At one point she said to the Secretary that she felt he was silent and disapproving. The Secretary replied that he was because Mrs. Thatcher is wrong to issue an ultimatum. An ultimatum makes the problem insoluble. The US government could not support it. He also told this to the British Foreign Minister earlier.<sup>5</sup> We need greater flexibility. We desire to work out an interim solution that will provide two important and friendly leaders with a success. If the Secretary had a proposal that he could return to London with

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, an event which helped precipitate the First World War.

<sup>3</sup> April 12 or 13.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 80–82.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 79.

which the United States considers just and fair it would be almost impossible for Margaret Thatcher to refuse. She could not. The problem for us now is how to structure such a proposal. The Secretary had no illusions that this would be easy. He told this to the Argentine Foreign Minister earlier that morning.<sup>6</sup>

We have naval intelligence suggesting that the British submarines plan to attack ships in the exclusion zone starting at 4:00 Monday morning. Galtieri said that that was a problem that Margaret Thatcher would have to worry about. The Secretary said that we could not condone an ultimative situation. We must move forward with urgency. If the UK fleet starts striking in Argentine waters the situation could become uncontrollable. History would condemn us for refusing to make sacrifices on a question of minor importance with major consequences. The Secretary said that we believe that we do have basis for a solution. If he did not look very vigorous it was because he spent all his time on the long flight the previous day trying to devise an approach which would be acceptable to Argentina and to the UK, one that would not require unacceptable concessions by either party. There is a precarious balance but he personally believes that we can maintain it. The ultimate sovereignty would reside with Argentina, a Hong Kong type solution would weaken the British claim and would not stop the internal agitation. We must avoid any apparent return to the status quo and go to a new level of intense negotiations leading to the imperatives for a solution for the Argentine government. The action the second of April was seen, in London, as excessive and he would be less than frank if he did not say that it would be very difficult to sell any such package to Margaret Thatcher in London. But if he were to obtain such a package it would not be easy for her to cast it aside.

President Galtieri said that in this pleasant conversation he would say something once and he would not repeat it again. As far as the Argentines are concerned there will be no question about Argentine sovereignty. Everything else Argentina is disposed to negotiate. He asked the Foreign Minister to say something about this. The FM then recalled that the UN Resolution 502 has three points. One is the cessation of hostilities. Two is the withdrawal of forces. And three is negotiation. The UK is proposing the cessation of hostilities, but there are no hostilities now. The hostilities have ceased; but Margaret Thatcher has launched her fleet. Argentina had fulfilled the requirement for cessation. Argentina was disposed to withdraw their forces if the British

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<sup>6</sup> No memoranda of conversation of Haig's exchanges with Costa Mendez on the morning of April 10 have been found. For Haig's memoir account of his automobile ride with Costa Mendez to the Casa Rosada, see Haig, *Caveat*, p. 276.

withdrew their fleet. But Argentina would not withdraw its authorities. Anything else could be negotiated.

Secretary Haig said perhaps he should now speak in specific terms. The first thing to be done is to break the ultimative character of Margaret Thatcher's proposals. We must find an integrated comprehensive program based on the UN resolution which includes simultaneous withdrawal, creation of a zone excluding UK forces, an interim administration, perhaps with an international entity of some sort to break the umbilical line of control from London to the islands, recognition of autonomy or local government or local institutions that will permit avoiding, from the Argentine point of view, appearing to return to the status quo ante. Mrs. Thatcher's interests seem to be primarily in the local population and in maintaining a line of authority to the island. General Galtieri said that this would be very difficult. Secretary Haig agreed.

President Galtieri asked whether the entity of which the Secretary is speaking would be the UN or the US. Haig said he would offer a model of several different countries friendly and acceptable to both parties. For example, the US, Canada, perhaps Brazil and Peru or any countries that Argentina would feel comfortable with pending a final solution. He believed that would guarantee the situation for the thousand such shepherds who could go to New Zealand or anywhere else they wanted, if they were not happy. The FM said that the Argentines were disposed to compensate the shepherds. They offered them money to buy land in Argentina, 29 years loans, if they wanted a boat or plane to leave the Argentines would provide that. If they wanted to stay all their rights would be taken care of and they would have a more sophisticated or privileged status in the islands. In 1968 he was in London working with the FM. At the time he saw a draft agreement with the UK in which the UK agreed to the principle of transfer of sovereignty over the islands to Argentina. The agreement died because of a revolt in the British Parliament.

Secretary Haig said that the problem was one of contemporary politics—politics in London, politics in Buenos Aires. We must have success for we share a great deal in common. President Galtieri said that in London and other capitals of Europe including Paris, Bonn and Spain, they had shuddered when a few Argentine soldiers had gone to Central America to defend freedom and the culture of the West. No one had, however, shuddered when the British sent a fleet to defend islands that were not theirs. Is there a real difference?

Secretary Haig said we must remember one simple fact: if the Argentines persist Margaret Thatcher will fall. He must be frank. In the US the support for Great Britain is widespread. In the liberal world and in others the sentiment is overwhelmingly in favor of Great Britain and would remain so if it came to a confrontation.

Secretary Haig said that President Reagan is under attack even now for being evenhanded. Herblock<sup>7</sup> had drawn a nasty cartoon. It is a political question, the left wing will seize it, it manages the press. We have ascertained that some 90% of the senior people in the press are supportive of the Democratic Party. General Galtieri said that with regard to the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the Argentine fleet, and armed forces there are two points. He said there is one problem he could not see how to resolve. It is the question of the government of the islands. He was really regretful but the government must be Argentine with whatever entity the UN, the British, the US, or the Canadians might set up until normalization. The Argentines are prepared to offer the British facilities of every sort to join in developing the resources of the seabed, resources of fishing, for refueling British naval ships or aircraft; but Argentina is not disposed to step back from what it considers to be its rights.

Secretary Haig said he recognizes that this is the most difficult element, it is going to be extremely tough to resolve. He then asked President Galtieri how long he estimated it would take to remove the Argentine armed forces from the island. General Galtieri said four or five days. Admiral Moya interjected to say that he did not think this would be possible in so short a time and would probably require two weeks. Secretary Haig said that he agreed with that estimate. Secretary Haig then went on to say that we would have to use the UN Resolution 502 as a basis. The FM said he would like to see the wording. Secretary Haig said that between now and this evening he thought that the Americans and the Argentines might get together and work to see if they could prepare a draft. General Galtieri said that they might meet again at 6:00.<sup>8</sup> The FM agreed. General Galtieri said that the Argentines did not want to fail. Secretary Haig said that in one form or another it would appear as an Argentine victory because the Argentines would eventually get the sovereignty of the islands; but we do not want the British to appear to lose. Secretary Haig said that it is important to consider this in the long term. Often one finds a military man who can rise above contemporary politics as Sadat<sup>9</sup> had, although he did not want to draw an exact parallel. Galtieri laughed and said, yes, Sadat had come to a bad end. Secretary Haig said that it was important that this case not be approached from the perspective of grantor and grantee. General Galtieri said Argentina had been asking about this matter for a long time. Nothing had happened. It was then agreed between the

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<sup>7</sup> Nom de plume of *Washington Post* political cartoonist Herbert Block.

<sup>8</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found, but see Document 92. For Haig's later recollection of this session, see Haig, *Caveat*, pp. 281–282.

<sup>9</sup> Anwar al-Sadat, Egyptian President from 1970 until his assassination in 1981.

Secretary and the Argentine President that their staffs and the FM would get together to work on a draft.

**Vernon A. Walters**  
*Ambassador at Large*

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**91. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 0645Z

Secto 5041. Subj: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher From Secretary of State Haig.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. You should deliver the following message to Prime Minister Thatcher ASAP:<sup>2</sup>

3. Begin text:

Dear Madame Prime Minister,

I have had lengthy and intensive discussions here, and I now expect to arrive in London about 0630 a.m. Monday, April 12.

I will be prepared to talk to you whenever you wish about a draft proposal and some additional ideas that have come out of our 12 hours of meetings here.

In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to consider this draft proposal.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Haig's message was delivered to 10 Downing Street at 1055Z, April 11. (Telegram 7899 from London, April 11; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File (04/11/1982) (2))



Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been made. With warm regards, Al Haig.<sup>3</sup>

End text.

Haig

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7902 from London, April 11, the Embassy transmitted Thatcher's response to Haig's message. She stated: "I look forward to seeing you in London again tomorrow and shall be glad to hold further discussions. I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders. But if there is any doubt in your mind as to their intentions, you may wish to consider sending them a further immediate message." (Ibid.)

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## 92. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the White House<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 1124Z

Secto 5047. Please pass to President from the Secretary. Dept also pass Secretary's aircraft. Subject: Memorandum for the President.

1. (S)–Entire text.
2. I have concluded nearly twelve hours of gruelling and emotion-filled talks with President Galtieri and his Foreign Minister,<sup>2</sup> amidst a public mood approaching frenzy.
3. The proposals I introduced here were accepted in large part, except with regard to the pivotal question of interim governing arrangements (which we knew would be a problem) and Argentine insistence on an early date certain for completion of negotiations on a final settlement. These two issues will have to be resolved in order to trigger Argentine withdrawal and thus avert war.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of State. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 91.



4. We made some progress on these issues, though very probably not enough to secure British agreement. The Argentines began by demanding that they, in effect, administer the island in the interim period, and that the British agree a priori that the outcome of the ensuing negotiations would provide for a transfer of sovereignty. In the end, we came up with a formula that would involve interim U.S.-UK-Argentine tripartite supervision of local administration, and we have blurred the question of whether the negotiations would result in Argentine sovereignty. We have specified December 31, 1982, as the date for completion of negotiations. The thought of negotiating under this deadline may cause Mrs. Thatcher as much of a problem as will the formula for interim administration. Nevertheless, what we have is definitely worth taking to London.

5. The day was filled with ups and downs. At one point late in the day the Argentines returned to their demand for sovereignty, and I was faced with what looked like the end of the road. But the situation broke between midnight and 1:30 a.m., when Galtieri, face-to-face with the prospect of war, levelled with me. He said he could not withdraw both his military and administrative presence and last a week. If the British attacked, he explained, he would have to accept the offer of full support made by the Cuban Ambassador, who just returned after more than a year's absence. The Cubans implied they were speaking for the Russians, and even insinuated that the Soviets had offered to sink the British carrier (with Prince Andrew aboard) with the British and the world believing an Argentine submarine had done it. I doubt that such an offer was actually made by the Soviets, but we cannot discount it altogether.

6. Galtieri said that he could not abandon Argentina's destiny with us, and even with the British, except in the most extreme circumstances. He and the others here are clearly shaken and approaching panic as war grows near. At the end of the day, he took me aside and said that only soldiers could appreciate how critical it is to avoid conflict. (I did not correct him). He is trying desperately to ease the pressure of impending hostilities and thus provide a better climate for negotiations. (I suspect the British prefer the present climate).

7. I am not optimistic that Mrs. Thatcher will think she can accept the current proposals. As my last message said, it is not in our interest that she inflict herself with a political defeat.<sup>3</sup> But there is a basis for the process to continue. I plan to leave for London at 10:00 a.m. I told Galtieri I would do my best to gain British agreement and then return here. I have also informed Mrs. Thatcher that I will be returning with

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 82.

some proposals, and urged her to avoid military engagement until I complete my talks there.<sup>4</sup> Obviously, any hostilities would obliterate what has been accomplished so far.

8. The time for a possible personal intervention by you with Mrs. Thatcher has not arrived. We must first see how she reacts to the proposed interim solution and the date certain for a final settlement, as well as my appeal for British military restraint. I will not hesitate to ask when I feel time is right for you to approach her.

9. I will tell the press only that my discussions here were open and meaningful, and that I am returning to London with some ideas for further discussion. While we can now build pressure on the British by conveying a sense of movement on the part of the Argentines, I do not want to characterize the current proposals or describe them as U.S. proposals, since that would put the blame for war on Mrs. Thatcher if she cannot accept them. Even as we press for diplomatic success, we must not shift the onus to our closest ally if war occurs.<sup>5</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 91.

<sup>5</sup> In his memoirs, Haig recounted a meeting with Costa Mendez at the Buenos Aires airport, held before the Secretary's departure for London: "At the airport, Costa Mendez, showing the fatigue of our long session of the night before, awaited me. We had parted at one o'clock, and it was only a little after eight. Costa Mendez handed me a paper. It contained some personal thoughts of his own, he said. He hoped that I would read them on the plane. Aloft, I scanned the paper Costa Mendez had given me. It constituted a retreat from everything we had accomplished at the Casa Rosada the night before. The Argentinians were demanding either de facto authority over the islands through administrative arrangements that would give them immediate control of its government, or a British promise that sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina no later than December 31, 1982, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. This was a formula for war." (Haig, *Caveat*, pp. 282–283) A copy of Costa Mendez's paper has not been found.

**93. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for Additional Fuel

AmEmbassy London alerted us to the UK need for additional fuel at Ascension Island.<sup>2</sup> We have told London in the attached message that we are investigating the feasibility of providing additional fuel.<sup>3</sup> The British have indicated a need for two and one-half million gallons of JP-5 not later than April 24.

Our investigation with DOD (MRA&L) late Friday, April 9 indicated that we may be able to get a tanker load of fuel to Ascension by April 25. DOD will provide refined information on Monday morning, April 12.

The tanker that just left Ascension pumped off all of the JP-5 cargo fuel that he carried (1.3 million gallons).

From the London message it appears that 100,000 gallons of JP-5 have already been provided to the RAF. Most of the 1.3 million gallons just delivered should be available for RAF use without seriously impairing US flight operations at Wideawake.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Austin and cleared by Miles and Pendleton. Miles initialed for Burt. A stamped notation at the top the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 12. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page, Eagleburger wrote: “(1) Bremer should see; 2) RB [Richard Burt]—go ahead and tell Brits. LSE.”

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram 7891 from London, April 9, which reported a request from the Royal Air Force to the Assistant Air Attaché for the United States to authorize a USAF tanker, then offloading 1.3 million gallons of JP-5 fuel at Ascension, to “fill the storage tanks at Ascension to full capacity (two and one-half million gallons) for RAF use.” “Additionally,” the Embassy reported, “the British have an urgent need for another tanker with a similar quantity of JP 5 to arrive at Ascension no later than 24 April 82.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a draft of telegram Tosec 50118/97144 to London, April 10, which instructed the Embassy to inform HMG “that the tanker presently offloading at Ascension has no additional cargo fuel available for delivery.” “We will investigate and advise,” the telegram continued, “of the feasibility of providing an additional load of fuel within the time period desired. Should we not be able to meet this requirement, we have no objection to HMG delivering additional fuel by means of its own tankers.” The telegram, as sent on April 10 at 2036Z, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/10/1982 (3).

*Recommendation:*

Subject to any caution that Mr. Robinson (L) may have provided to you on Saturday, April 10 concerning further assistance to the UK,<sup>4</sup> I recommend telling the British that we have no objection to their drawing upon the JP-5 in storage at Wideawake. This would be subject to any limitation the base commander might have regarding protection of his own operational requirements. You could also advise the British that we are investigating our capability for immediate resupply and will advise them as quickly as possible. As stated in our earlier message to London, we have no objection to the British resupplying the JP-5 fuel supply from their own sources.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this portion of the sentence, Eagleburger drew a vertical line and wrote “rethink.” In an April 10 briefing memorandum to Eagleburger, which analyzed U.S. obligations to provide services and facilities to the British on Ascension Island, Robinson indicated that L had concluded “that the United States is obliged upon specified advance notice to permit and facilitate the landing of British military aircraft within the existing capacity of U.S. resources on the island. We conclude that the United States is not obliged to augment its own personnel or other resources in order to meet British needs. If the British needs exceed the existing U.S. capacity, the United States is obliged to permit the United Kingdom to introduce its own personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment for that purpose, in accordance with appropriate arrangements to be agreed by military authorities of the two governments. However, such administrative arrangements, which could not be unreasonably resisted by the USG, could provide alternatively for the provision of services by the USG on a reimbursable basis.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830074-0771)

<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this entire paragraph, Eagleburger drew a vertical line and wrote: “RB—You do with D. Thomas.”

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**94. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Buenos Aires<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1982, 2110Z

Tosec 50149/097203. For the Secretary from Eagleburger. Subject: The Falklands Dispute: The Soviet and Cuban Angle.

1. S—Entire text.

2. I have been contemplating, rather unproductively, the Soviet/Cuban aspect of the Falklands dispute for several days. Your most

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Lot 84D204, Chron—April 1982. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Eagleburger and cleared by Bremer and in S/S-O.

recent report to the President<sup>2</sup> has rekindled my concerns. The following are some suggestions for your consideration; I have discussed them with no one.

3. That the Soviets and Cubans have decided to play on the Argentine side should not surprise us. It was probably inevitable under any circumstances, but USG involvement and/or evident British intent to move toward confrontation would have removed any doubts in Moscow and therefore Havana. It is another example of Moscow's inability to restrain itself (partly because we have given the Soviets so little reason for constraint).

4. Thus, in the abstract, there is probably reason to warn Moscow that hanky panky in our hemisphere won't be tolerated. But the "abstract" becomes less compelling when we contemplate the "or else" side of the equation. We have had enough of US warnings of dire consequences; we should not lightly engage in that game again.

5. On the other hand, there is a potential for real trouble should your efforts to get London and Buenos Aires to show some maturity fail. I can conceive of a scenario (though I think it unlikely) of escalation between the UK and Argentina leading to a threat of Soviet military involvement—particularly if the British are not able to pull off a quick military victory. The longer the stalemate the more the Soviets may be tempted to try to tip the balance.

6. Thus, I believe we need to do something with the Soviets (I'll discuss timing below) although we need to be careful about the tone and content of any "threats." I would suggest that Walter (or I, if Walter has left) could call in Dobrynin and do the following:

—Outline in very repeat very general terms the objectives of your involvement. While we should not repeat not give him any detail about what you have heard, we should emphasize your desire to be "helpful" in finding a peaceful solution.

—Talk a bit about our concerns, in a global context, should fighting begin and outside powers become involved. The point here would be to emphasize (without being explicit) that Monroe Doctrine-like concepts come into play for us at some point.

—Remind him that we are at a "threshold" (Reagan-Brezhnev at the SSOD, experts talks on Afghanistan, etc.) in our relations; that Poland has already set back the process; that the circuits can't bear any more overloads. In other words, without getting very specific, remind Dobrynin that bad as things are, they can get better or worse, and that little we can think of would make things worse faster than getting involved in the South Atlantic.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 92.

7. There are obvious drawbacks in doing anything, particularly if it gives the Soviets a chance to tell us they are ready to help us solve the problem. On the other hand, should we reach a stage where Soviet mischief-making leads to a potential confrontation we will be in better public shape if we can argue we warned the Soviets.

8. As to the Cubans, I believe we should, at least for now, do nothing. We can keep this under review, but it would be unwise to be talking to them for a host of reasons you well understand.

9. I do not believe there is any reason for haste re the Soviets; these are thoughts for you to consider. If you see any merit in the idea let me know and we will send for your approval fleshed out talking points. My bottom line is that I believe we should talk to Dobrynin soon, but it could certainly wait for your return if you come directly back from your London stop.<sup>3</sup> If you return to B.A., then I believe we should call him in by Tuesday or Wednesday.<sup>4</sup>

**Stoessel**

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<sup>3</sup> On April 12, Stoessel, then serving as Acting Secretary, raised with Dobrynin the Soviet media's allegations "that the U.S. was not serious about its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Falkland Islands problem." "The U.S.," Stoessel informed Dobrynin, "was doing everything possible to find a peaceful solution. Unfounded allegations regarding U.S. motives were unhelpful, to say the least." Dobrynin "responded that the Soviet Union definitely favored a peaceful solution and had been much more critical of the UK than of the US," a position justified by the 1963 UNGA resolution listing the Falklands/Malvinas as a territory to be decolonized. "But this resolution did not provide grounds for military actions," Dobrynin continued, and "admitted that there might be an anti-U.S. bias in the Soviet media on this issue and undertook to convey the Acting Secretary's demarche to Moscow." The Department transmitted a summary of the Stoessel-Dobrynin meeting in telegram Tosec 50182/97917 to Haig in Buenos Aires, April 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820191-0965)

<sup>4</sup> April 13 or 14. On April 13, Gompert responded to Eagleburger and Bremer: "Please give further thought to the ideas offered in reftel, in view of recent developments. Assuming we have returned to Washington by this evening (Tuesday), the Secretary would like to have upon his return (or [garble] Wednesday) your recommendation on whether and how he should raise this matter with Dobrynin, including talking points." (Telegram Secto 5079 from London, April 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

**95. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 8:15 p.m.

*TALKING POINTS—THATCHER*

*Argentine Mood*

—As we agreed, I was brutally frank with Galtieri about your resolve and the solidarity of the British people. I told him you were ready for war—militarily and psychologically—and that this would be the result unless he altered his course.

—Galtieri is being swept along by forces over which he has at best limited control. He has whipped up the public into a state of frenzy. He is not committed to fight—though the navy is itching for battle.

—He will have no choice but to see this through unless he can show his people that the original decision was not a mistake. And if his forces are attacked, he will have no choice at all.

—My sense is that your strategy of pressure is working—*so far*. But there is no doubt in my mind that it will not produce a withdrawal from the Falklands. Thus, if there is no settlement, and assuming hostilities do not occur, what it comes down to is whether the Argentine presence on the Island will become untenable over time.

—It will not. The Argentines are a fatalistic people. Your fleet will be in the South Atlantic indefinitely, even if we are lucky enough to avoid hostilities.

*State of Play*

—After twelve hours of back and forth—and ups and downs—we came up with a package which the Argentines *may* be able to accept. I say “may” because as I left they reintroduced unacceptable demands involving Argentine interim rule and assured sovereignty. We have no choice but to ignore this posturing.

—The package I have brought here is not a US proposal. But I must tell you in candor, I would have to say it’s reasonable.

—If the choice is between this package and war, the view of the United States is clear.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, which was presumably prepared in advance of Haig’s April 12–13 discussions with Thatcher in London (see Document 98).

*Thatcher's Starting Point*

—I understand and support your basic position:

—withdrawal

—restoration of British administration

—preservation of the right of self-determination for the Falklanders.

—My whole effort in Argentina was aimed at bringing them as far as possible on these fundamental points.

—They began by demanding, as the price for withdrawal, Argentine rule in the interim and a commitment to Argentine sovereignty in a fixed, short period.

—We brought them a long way. If they were to confirm their acceptance of the package we developed there, your three basic needs would be met.

*The Package*

—The basic concept is to trigger withdrawal by giving the Argentines some sort of interim official presence on the Islands and a commitment on negotiations, without saying how the negotiations turn out.

—We would accomplish this by an agreement containing the following elements.

—*First*, the sides would agree to withdraw from the island and an agreed surrounding area. Knowing you do not relish the thought of keeping your fleet at the bottom of the world, we got the Argentines to agree to two weeks.

—*Second*, the vacated zone would become demilitarized until a final settlement. The Argentines would like a commitment from you to keep your fleet out of the South Atlantic altogether, but in the end will be satisfied if you simply announce unilaterally your plans to return the fleet as the crisis is defused.

—*Third*, compliance with these provisions would be entrusted to a commission made up of American, British, and Argentine representatives. Such a mechanism is needed anyway, and there is a logic to the composition. The alternative is the OAS or an *ad hoc* group of friendly countries.

—*Fourth*, the sanctions will be lifted. This would not have to include restoring of diplomatic ties.

—*Fifth*, traditional local administration would be restored, including the Executive and Legislative Councils. In keeping with the idea that the Commission is to ensure compliance with the agreement, your administration would submit its decisions and regulations to ensure that British actions on the Island were consistent with the agreement. I believe you told me last time that you could accept a mechanism to



ensure your compliance. The fig leaf for Galtieri is his representative on the Commission.

—*Sixth*, the commission will recommend ways of facilitating communication, trade, and transportation between Argentina and the Islands. You would have a veto, though frankly I'm not sure that greater communication isn't wise.

—*Seventh*, negotiations on a final settlement will be pursued consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. This covers the right of self-determination.

—Rightly or wrongly, the Argentines claim that the negotiations would drag on forever. They therefore insisted that the parties undertake to complete them by December 31, 1982.

—I took to heart what you said when I was last here about your position, and I believe what I've outlined is responsive.

#### *Principles and Politics*

—I recall that you also stressed that we could not reward aggression. This is as important to us as it is to you.

—Let's face it, if there is to be a peaceful outcome, Galtieri will, by definition, try to sell it as a victory. If we try to deny that, I'm convinced we'll have war.

—But consider the larger equation. Argentina seizes the Falklands by force. Then, confronted with the British fleet and British resolve, he is compelled to withdraw, without much to show for it.

—This will be a success for British will, British principles, British might, and American diplomacy. We want such a success as much as you.

#### *The Consequences of Failure*

—I am sure you have considered the consequences of failure to arrive at a peaceful outcome.

—Argentina has isolated itself by using force. If Britain does so now, the fact that you feel it's justified won't stop world opinion from turning against you. I'm sure you're ready for that, but it won't help you in proving your point that aggression doesn't pay.

—The Soviets were cautious at first, but no longer. The Cuban Ambassador to Argentina returned while I was there, after over a year's absence. He offered Galtieri full support and implied strongly that the Soviets were also ready to help.

—The Soviets see a chance to replace the French and others as Argentina's arms supplier and thus establish a beachhead in the Southern Cone. The junta will not decline, if there is no settlement. Anti-communist feelings will be subordinated to the imperative of survival.

—Soviet access to Argentina could have profound strategic consequences.

—A conflict would tear the OAS apart, virtually eliminating it as a bulwork against communist subversion.

—It could trigger trouble in Belize, the Beagle Channel, and between Guyana and Venezuela.

—And of course, the Argentines will not leave the Falklands alone.

—The problem will not simply be the destruction of American policy in the Western Hemisphere. Western interests are at stake in the broadest sense.

—Finally, having brought the Argentines this far, how will we be able to explain to our own people why war was chosen over peace.

#### *How to Proceed*

—If you believe what I have outlined provides a basis for discussion, I suggest that I follow up with Francis and John and then get back to you.

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## 96. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

April 12, 1982, 0219Z

Secto 5064. Subject: Memorandum for the President. For the President from the Secretary.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Let me share with you my thoughts on the Falklands crisis as I head into London.

3. Our immediate goal is unchanged: To find a way to permit Galtieri to withdraw with honor. The key issues are as we foresaw them: the character of interim rule and the tension between Argentine demand for sovereignty and British insistence on self-determination in negotiations on a final settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (6)). Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of State. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the first page of the telegram, indicating that he saw it. Haig was then en route from Buenos Aires to London.

4. I am convinced that Mrs. Thatcher wants a peaceful solution and is willing to give Galtieri a fig leaf, provided she does not have to violate in any fundamental way her pledge to Parliament: withdrawal, restoration of British administration, and protection of the right of self-determination. Her strategy remains one of pressure and threat; by and large, it's working. My hope is that it may now be clear to her that while her strategy is having the right effect—in rattling the Argentines—it will not produce withdrawal. Only diplomacy, in combination with threat, will succeed. If she has come this far in her own thinking, the question becomes how much can she concede before endangering her government.

5. Galtieri's problem is that he has so excited the Argentine people that he has left himself little room for maneuver. He must show something for the invasion—which many Argentines, despite their excitement, think was a blunder—or else he will be swept aside in ignominy. But if he is humiliated militarily, the result will be the same. Although he is dealing with a more volatile domestic situation than Mrs. Thatcher, he can more easily be bought off with optics than can she, given the difference in the two societies and political systems. It will be hard for Mrs. Thatcher to sell to Parliament an agreement that does not measure up to her commitment.

6. We will soon learn whether Mrs. Thatcher is ready to deal. If she is, I believe what I am taking to London provides a basis for a solution. But progress must come swiftly. We cannot count on Mrs. Thatcher to hold her fire as our diplomacy proceeds. And any hostilities—even an incident—would change the picture radically.

7. In all likelihood, you will know from my next report whether war can be averted.

**Haig**

## 97. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

April 12, 1982, 0400Z

Secto 5066. For Judge Clark from the Secretary. Please pass to White House. Subject: Statements on Islands Crisis.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Bill: How distressing is to find on the eve of our arrival in London that the language provided the President for his radio speech from Barbados<sup>2</sup> repeated a public line on the present crisis we know to be anathema to Mrs. Thatcher. The two-friends parallel used to describe our relations with Argentina and Great Britain will generate a strong reaction from the Prime Minister, you can be sure. It harks back to the even-handed posture which, you may recall, caused a furor early last week when used by DOD. Indeed, the statement will be read with even less favor in London as it calls only for negotiations—and does not mention withdrawals, which is the other half of the Security Council resolution. To reopen this old sore now will not help our prospects in London. Please, please ensure that any further statements do not deviate from our standing guidance.

3. Furthermore I am appalled by the fact of Jeane's appearance on Face the Nation Sunday morning<sup>3</sup> where she was interviewed at great length on the current crisis. I cannot over emphasize the sensitivity of the current phase of the mission and thus the importance of minimizing commentary over for the crucial days to come. Interviews such as Jeane's run unacceptable risks of misstatement of errors of fact which could have profound effects on the outcome. That Jeane maneuvered through this mine field almost blind folded, without major incident is much to her credit—but misses the point.

Warm regards, Al.

**Haig**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Haig was then en route from Buenos Aires to London.

<sup>2</sup> In his April 10 radio address, broadcast from Bridgetown, Reagan stated: "Two of our friends, the United Kingdom and Argentina, confront each other in a complex disagreement which goes back many generations. Because they're both our friends, I've offered our help in an effort to bring the two countries together. Secretary Haig has completed a visit to London and is now in Buenos Aires. We'll do all we can to help bring a peaceful resolution of this matter." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 450–451)

<sup>3</sup> April 11.

## 98. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

London, April 12–13, 1982

### SUBJECT

Meetings at 10 Downing Street

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *British Side*

PM Thatcher

ForSec Pym

DefMin Nott

PM's Personal Secretary

#### *U.S. Side*

Secretary Haig

Amb Walters

Amb Enders

David Gompert

**THATCHER:** We heard on the radio that they will withdraw if they can keep their flag. The EC came through for us.<sup>2</sup> The meeting “turned up trumps.” We are pleased.

**HAIG:** The approach I took in BA was true to our discussion here. I was brutally frank with them. I said the UK was ready for war and that the nation was united. I said this was inevitable if Galtieri did not alter course.

He was not bellicose but he has whipped up the people almost out of hand, though many of them are more pacific than jingoistic. The air force is fearful, the army is moderate, and the navy wants a fight.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum appears to be an incomplete record, although no other records of Haig's meetings with Thatcher on April 12–13 have been found. According to Thatcher's memoirs, she met with Haig on three occasions on April 12 and once again on the morning of April 13. For her account of these meetings, see Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, pp. 194–199. Rentschler's accounts of these meetings are in “Falklands Diary,” fo. 159–163. Haig's memoirs provide a more abbreviated account of his visit to London and discuss only one face-to-face meeting between himself and Thatcher. (Haig, *Caveat*, pp. 283–285)

<sup>2</sup> On April 10, in response to the Argentine landings, Ambassadors from the ten European Community member states approved a ban on all imports from Argentina. The previous day, they approved a measure prohibiting arms sales and deliveries from EC members to the Argentines. (Leonard Downie Jr., “Common Market Sets Ban on Argentina's Imports,” *Washington Post*, April 11, p. A1) For the text of the April 10 Joint Statement on the embargo issued by the EC member governments, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1300.

I spent all day bringing the thing around then got a counter-draft<sup>3</sup> that destroyed everything. It called for sovereignty, Argentine administration, and buying the land from the islanders. I told them I would go to Washington and that there will be war. The Foreign Minister, who is intelligent and moderate, got us back on track. He got back to the junta; Galtieri had been drinking. This is what we are dealing with; the drinking is not unusual.

Galtieri said that the Cuban Ambassador returned to BA after a year's absence and offered them everything, also indicating that it reflected Soviet willingness to provide support. Galtieri said that he did not want to break Argentina's Western involvement. He said the Soviets are willing to sink British vessels. Galtieri said he couldn't turn to the Soviets. But if he is forced to haul down the Argentine flag, he will be gone in a week.

Your pressure has worked. There is an undercurrent of fear down there. The basic problem is that the threat of force alone is not enough to bring about withdrawal. Your fleet could be down there a long time. I think what they will try to do is run the blockade with Eastern European and Soviet ships.

We have worked up proposals that they may be willing to accept. Don't let up on the toughness of your demeanor.

*THATCHER:* We are deeply peace-loving, deeply democratic, and therefore deeply determined.

*HAIG:* Every effort we made in BA was to support your aims: (1) withdrawal of the Argentines; (2) restoration of British administration; (3) preservation of self-determination. It was ideal for me to stop here first. The Argentines were totally intransigent. They wanted Argentine rule or a commitment on sovereignty within a fixed, short-period. We brought them a long way. If they could confirm our final ideas, your needs would be met. The basic concept we have developed necessarily provides for some Argentine presence and a commitment on negotiations. (At this point, the Secretary described the approach verbatim from his talking points.)<sup>4</sup>

*THATCHER:* Did they accept?

*HAIG:* Yes, but they pulled back. Your local administration would be overseen to be sure that what it does is in accordance with the agreement.

*THATCHER:* Why do they want communication? There's already a lot of communication.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 92.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 95.

*HAIG*: You should know that these people are resentful about the exclusive character of the administration.

*THATCHER*: I don't understand; do you realize that they are changing the school curriculum already?

*HAIG*: They want more visits from the mainland. They say that the process is almost impossible from their standpoint.

*THATCHER*: Do they want to people the islands with Argentines?

*HAIG*: No.

*ENDERS*: They can't purchase or rent property for purposes of expanding business and trade.

*HAIG*: They say the 1971 agreement<sup>5</sup> produced no results. They said the 1980 proposal<sup>6</sup> was rejected by your back-benchers, not by the islanders. The only way they'll go along is with a date certain.

*THATCHER*: A date certain is inconsistent with self-determination.

*PYM*: Not necessarily.

*HAIG*: There would be no preconceived outcome. We drove them off that.

*ENDERS*: They say sovereignty is not negotiable.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 1.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 2.

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## 99. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

London, April 12, 1982, 1554Z

Secto 5071. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Falkland Crisis.

1. (Secret–Entire text).

2. Deliver, in person if possible, the following message from the Secretary to President Galtieri without delay, and make sure that it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State.

also reaches the Foreign Minister, either at the Presidential Palace or simultaneously at the Foreign Ministry.

3. Begin quote: I have introduced ideas here<sup>2</sup> along the lines discussed at the Presidential Palace Saturday night.<sup>3</sup> I have confirmed that these ideas were discussed with and recorded on your side by Ros and Iglesias. The talks have been exceedingly difficult, but some progress has been made. I hope to leave here this evening for Buenos Aires, arriving around mid-afternoon tomorrow. Time is of the essence. The British will not withhold the use of force in the exclusion zone unless and until there is an agreement. I hope to bring to Buenos Aires a US proposal that holds the prospect of agreement, thus averting war. I urge you to hold off on any decisions until I have a chance to present the proposal. I am convinced that any substantial deviation by your government from the ideas discussed on Saturday night will doom this mission.<sup>4</sup> End quote.

Haig

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 98. For the draft agreement that Haig negotiated with the British, April 12, see Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> April 10. See Document 92.

<sup>4</sup> In his memoirs, Haig wrote that “in the midst of the talks” with the British, April 12, “we were informed that the *New York Times*, in its editions of that day, had carried an article describing the ‘personal thoughts’ that Costa Mendez had handed to me at the airport in Buenos Aires as the official policy of the Argentinian government.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 283) On Costa Mendez’s “airport paper,” see footnote 5, Document 92. The referenced newspaper article is Edward Schumacher, “Argentine Officials Say Prospects of Falkland Settlement Are Dim,” *New York Times*, April 12, p. A1. Learning of the article, Haig recalled: “At about 2:30 in the afternoon, I placed a telephone call from No. 10 Downing Street to the Argentinian foreign minister in Buenos Aires and asked for an explanation. Costa Mendez suggested that we talk later, after he had time to discuss the matter with the Casa Rosada.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 283) No memorandum of conversation of this afternoon telephone call has been found. In telegram 2161 from Buenos Aires to London, April 12, Shlaudeman noted that Costa Mendez, in response to Haig’s message contained in telegram Secto 5071, had asked Haig to “await a message from him before departing London” and to “not discard the paper that he gave you on Sunday morning.” Costa Mendez “said it was important to recall that he had not participated in the final drafting session at the palace and that he felt some of the principles embodied in the paper he gave you should be incorporated in the proposal.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (2))



**100. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1982, 1931Z

196242. TDFIRDB-315/07558-82. Dist: 12 April 1982. Subject: Argentine Government Views of the Current Dispute with the United Kingdom (DOI: 12 April 1982). Source: [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. The following are the views of the Argentine Government [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

A. The Argentine Government is gravely concerned about the possibility of war with the United Kingdom and the international political implications of such a war.

B. The latest intelligence indicates that the British fleet is proceeding toward the Falkland Islands; once it arrives, the British fleet is expected to attempt to assault and hold a position, possibly in the South Georgia or Sandwich Islands.

C. The Argentine fleet has been instructed to avoid provoking the British. However, if an Argentine ship is sunk by the British or if a military engagement results in “significant” Argentine casualties, the Argentine Government will discontinue the current talks and will fight the British, regardless of the odds, with the assistance of those countries that prove themselves to be friends of Argentina.

D. The sole winner in a conflict between Argentina and the U.K. would be the Soviet Union; it would gain a toe-hold in the Southern Zone, and with a termination of the current Argentine role in Central America—it would gain a relatively free hand to consolidate its position in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

E. The Argentine armed forces do not want a close relationship with the Soviet Union. However, in the event of an all-out war with the British, Argentina would be forced to accept help from any nation willing to provide help, including the Soviet Union. The Argentine armed forces have not requested Soviet aid, but the Soviet Union has volunteered to provide assistance to Argentina; such offers of Soviet assistance are not unusual because the Soviet Union usually tries to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Sent to the National Security Agency, Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of the Treasury, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, NPIC, White House Situation Room, National Security Council Staff, CIA Office of Current Operations, JSOC, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT.

turn international disputes to its own advantage. (Field comment: It was not specified whether Argentina has accepted the Soviet offers of assistance.)

F. Many Argentines believe the U.S. Government is helping the British in the current dispute. If this perception should become widespread, there is the possibility of a backlash of Argentine public opinion against the U.S. Government.

G. If the U.S. Government should publicly show any pro-British “tilt” in the current dispute, the Argentine Government will consider the U.S. Government as part of the enemy camp.

2. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) comment: This is an updated restatement of the positions that the Argentine Government has been filtering into the U.S. Embassy, through a variety of channels, since the current dispute began.)

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**101. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez<sup>1</sup>**

April 13, 1982, 12:19–1:09 a.m.

CM: Mr. Secretary, hello. How are you? I’m glad to get through finally. (We are almost positive Costa Mendez got thru first)

H: I’ve been trying for one hour.

CM: I was expecting your call.

H: I’m in London, Mr. Minister; I got your message after I hung up from talking with you—the message through Ambassador Shlaude-man.<sup>2</sup> It concerns me a great deal in light of our discussion and then to get that message, I feel more clearly that if I go down there, it is under almost an ultimatum—a set of demands—which I really do not feel is in the spirit of what I went down in the first place on. You remember, we had a discussion of sovereignty in Washington.<sup>3</sup> I started

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel in London; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires. A typewritten notation at the top of the transcript reads: “Poor connection—sometimes the Foreign Minister faded out.” A notation by Haig reads: “OK.”

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 99.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 73.

this process with the assurance from your side that I wouldn't be faced with this or I wouldn't have begun it. It is not in the spirit of 502 or our earlier discussions.

CM: Let us put it this way. As we told you, we are ready to comply with 502. You remember, you told me 502 didn't require . . . 502 doesn't speak at all on returning to total sovereignty.

H: Nor do we recommend that.

CM: We would comply with 502 and provide for some way of complying and keeping the troops and navy from the place where it is now.

H: That was my understanding, and I still understand that. I gather from your earlier phone call—someone else was on the line speaking at the same time. . . but I got the impression you said don't come unless you accept sovereignty on the one hand or unilateral Argentinian government on the island.

CM: You have the paper<sup>4</sup>. . .

H: With the 5 points? From the phone call I understood it was either 1 or 2.

CM: That is correct; either 1 or 2.

H: That constitutes an ultimatum.

CM: We are ready to discuss it provided we are satisfied with the wording and the dropping of point 1 which I told you on the phone.

H: Point 1 depends on what that wording is and, as you know, the first one the President said he could not live with. We had several models; we then discussed another model, and we all got the distinct impression that was satisfactory or at least a basis for solution, and we still believe that is so. If I thought that was your feeling, then I think this trip to Buenos Aires is worth doing. If it is not, then, you see, we could not just go down with a situation in which a total change occurred. We are ready to support a very substantial change but not a total change in which rule of force has been a decisive factor.

CM: Let us avoid discussing force because that leads to a long discussion of the reason for that decision. Let's take things as they stand today. Our point—where we have control of the island—and then we can discuss self-determination and by the end of the year when all other points are decided on and we are assured self-determination will be granted by the end of the year, and then we can have a different way of governing the island. In order to comply with the solution, we will retreat from the islands by the end of April.

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<sup>4</sup> At the end of this line, Goldberg wrote: "(Paper given to AMH at airport in B.A. on 4/11/82)." See footnote 5, Document 92.

Then, an interim government could be discussed along the lines you mentioned.

H: I think that is very, very different from the conditions under which we started this talk—at least on which the U.S. entered the process.

CM: It is the only thing that would constitute the same situation as before the 2d of April. Even public opinion in Argentina is this.

H: I think we have understood from the beginning—that is why substantial change was discussed in your place and here today. It is just patently impossible for us to go along a route where a priori it is decided this is concluded as a consequence of the actions of the earlier part of this month.

CM: If Britain doesn't give us any assurance concerning transfer but, on the contrary, insists on discussion, what is our decision then? Where are we?

H: The only thing Britain has been firm on is self-determination. Everything else is very, very easy. I thought I made it clear down there. How you will show that would be very clear in my view after another 9 months.

CM: I am absolutely sure if this discussion were held . . . Britain has retreated every year from what they said the year before. In 1968, when the document was drafted, they retreated. What are the assurances we could have?

H: I think it should be explored today on the basis of information we have acquired here today. It does not constitute a total process on which conditions of 1 or 2 are clear without reservation, and I do not believe it could be. I believe there is substantial movement in that direction, the outcome of which settlement will be settled along responsible lines.

CM: An Argentine island will be governed by an Argentine governor—if that is not done, the public reaction will be in a very negative way. We cannot tell them there were two governors and a committee and then we will discuss self-determination—after all the risks we have taken.

H: The alternatives are just . . .

CM: This is not an easy task for the Argentine Government. I think the mood of public opinion has been good; even European public opinion; even the papers are changing face and have a different position.

H: I don't know that that is necessarily true. I think what you are telling me. . . what I am faced with tonight or first thing in the morning, making sure we get some sleep, is that you are telling me it is of no value to come down because I cannot meet the conditions you insist

are necessary from your side. That means I will have to call the press in and make this clear, and I think from that point on—it isn't anything I want to do lightly—I will have to talk to the President about it because it will set a number of things in train.

CM: Mr. Secretary, I think you have witnessed the best good will possible. We have analyzed it with openmindedness. We must have either point 1 or point 2.

H: It has to be point 1 or 2?

CM: It has to be either point 1 or 2.

H: I think you have answered my question. I am sorry it has turned out this way.

CM: I don't hear a word, Mr. Secretary.

H: I think you have answered my question. I am in the position that the only alternative is to suspend this effort. We would stand by to be helpful if there is some interest in what I call negotiating solutions, but I don't see any. You answered in a way I hoped you wouldn't. No progress is not good enough. I hardly consider that a diplomatic solution.

CM: It all depends on the wording and drafting and the way you present it. It could be a problem of cosmetics.

H: I must say I thought we had a very sound basis going which was doable.

CM: Our position is either 1 or the other.

H: This forces me to tell my President we are given an ultimatum.

CM: I don't think this is an ultimatum if you bear in mind all the collateral offers we are making in order to give to the people on the Island. We mustn't forget the ultimate aim of this exercise. England has always fought. England at one time will be compelled to relinquish something. The whole idea in the UN came when Britain presented a list of places to be decolonized. Britain's list included the Falkland Islands. When we saw in the list the name of the Falkland Islands, then our presentation was made to the UN. This was created by Britain herself. We don't see why they would retreat now when they were the first to include it in the list of countries or colonies to be decolonized. I'm sorry to hear from you this is an ultimatum. On the contrary, we are ready to consider every aspect of lives and properties of the Island and of ourselves.

H: The simple problem, however, is we have been talking about these things. We exchanged some ideas. I don't know if it serves any purpose if those ideas have to be predetermined along a single course of action. I don't know how I can justify this effort. I have given five days of my time to be helpful.

CM: We are grateful, and I am sure the President is very grateful to you, too.

H: You understand I would have to tell the press why I am terminating or suspending this.

CM: I would have to tell the press something, too. We may come back to the Security Council, too.

H: I have a message today laying out a demand on your side in order for this process to continue.

CM: I handed this paper to you the morning you left.

H: I remember your saying it is your personal thinking—if you go strong on one, you wouldn't go strong on the other. This is what we have been working on today. You said to me today you knew the afternoon before. I said I am going home. You said don't do this, and we went upstairs.

CM: We produced an alternative.

H: That alternative I thought represented a basis for constructive discussion. Then, I got your paper just before I got on the plane. You said you understand there has to be progress in one area and we don't need so much in the other area. Then you handed me the paper and said these are my personal views and you understand 1 and 2 are two key areas I talked to you about. I didn't think for a moment you meant it had to be a total and complete situation of one or the other. I took it on good faith until I read it in the newspaper today.<sup>5</sup>

CM: I have not seen in the paper any reference to our position.

H: I will have to send it to you. It wasn't a list of 5 points, but it referred to the Island or sovereignty. I am in the position where I think we would be very badly criticized. It is an article by Mr. Shoemaker of the *New York Times*.

CM: I will take care of that.

H: You talked about limited local autonomy as all that could be provided. That is why I sent that message today.<sup>6</sup>

CM: I am surprised by this because I haven't seen it in the paper.

H: It was in the *New York Times*, but that was what got me concerned today. With the British Government, we went through what we did in your place. We had 12 straight hours—no easy process. I remain concerned because I don't feel it is in the spirit of what we talked about in Washington and I had the Ambassador doublecheck to be sure we were all clear on it.<sup>7</sup> Men of good will would sit down and try to

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 99.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 99.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 73.

establish a new situation in line with your hopes and wishes but would not present a situation which could not be justified by international law.

CM: The best token of our good will is we had accepted 70% along with you.

H: I must be misreading it. I didn't know you had. I got the distinct impression today that that draft had no standing at all.

CM: My understanding was the draft brought by you—7 of the 9 points—were discussed in an attitude of good will. Those two points—either one or the other—are essential. This is what the President said.

H: I didn't get that from the President. The only thing I got when I met with him alone was the importance of the flying of the flag.

CM: What is the real difference that has not been reached yet.

H: I think it is significant that you now insist on unilateral solution on the Island and on an interim solution in which the US engages to keep peace and being sure our relationships, which have taken a new and positive turn, will go sour, which will ultimately happen. That is a tragedy for both of us.

CM: It is a real tragedy for both countries.

H: Is there any sense in my coming down there and discussing this matter further?

CM: I'm afraid you have to ask yourself. You know our position. We are willing to receive you; we are happy with you; we are optimistic about the possibility of discussion. You know our position.

H: Then, you are giving an ultimatum.

CM: You are a very old negotiator and one of the best in the world.

H: You are saying 'come, if I am ready to give what you insist you must have.' That means there is no chance in coming, and that is clearly what I will have to say to the public in my own country.

CM: We have made an offer. We haven't received the best answer to our position.

H: I think you say take it or leave it—that is shorthand for an ultimatum.

CM: I feel it is too early to negotiate.

H: I am not dealing with that. I finished 12 hours with them.

CM: To put it in other words, if you don't think there is room for continuing negotiations, I can't force you to continue.

H: You are saying total sovereignty in 9 months or total control of the Island.

CM: If there is a clear statement for timing, it couldn't be the best offer.

H: This will be interpreted as insistence on your way totally—after you have applied force. I think that is an unfortunate position to be

in. We could realize every objective you are seeking with some clever drafting and clever negotiating, and some give and take. I can't see how it could ever be realized by insistence that it be black and white.

CM: You know our position.

H: I must admit I did not leave your country knowing it.

CM: Our position has been very clearly stated.

H: I made it clear in your country that would be grounds for not coming in the first place, with a clear indication that would not be the case. You have departed from the assurances which I had going into the negotiations. I must say it was the feeling of my colleague and myself.

CM: I don't think it compares with my notes.

H: I don't understand. We have ourselves in a very difficult position.

CM: Which is the urgency to end the exercise tomorrow morning.

H: I think it is a tragedy if you tell me no negotiating can be done; then, you see, I am in an untenable position to try to be of help, and that is all I am trying to do. I am very happy to come down there under circumstances similar to the conditions I started on Friday.<sup>8</sup> We are willing as rational men to craft some language that constitutes a political solution.

CM: Why don't you wire me your definite ideas, and I will then tell you. . .

H: I just don't think that is a good way to do it. I think it is a very dangerous way to do it.

CM: Don't send it in writing. Send it any other way. If you make all the points on 1 or 2, we are open to negotiation.

H: I had every intention to go to Buenos Aires tonight until I talked to you. I don't think that is the way to do it. I dread returning, recognizing it will end in failure if there is nothing to negotiate. I don't consider myself a negotiator but a transmitter of ideas. There is the very, very serious prospect of war with grave consequences to us both.

CM: To everybody.

H: I leave there and after 12 hours today, I am more convinced than ever about that. I think it is terrible to kick it away by taking stiff decisions. I don't have the right to tell you how to lay out your positions, but it is too brittle.

CM: What is your suggestion?

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<sup>8</sup> April 9.



H: I would like your suggestion. The results will be felt within hours if I do not continue on with this process. I cannot continue if it has to be one way or the other.

CM: The problem is that I have no way of reaching you in London. We have no Embassy there.

H: Do you think I should come down tomorrow? Is it worth it at all?

CM: Do you want me to send a man to London?

H: I can't stay here. I have a problem in the Middle East.

CM: Do you want me to come to Washington?

H: I think it would be a mistake. You think about this overnight. I will call you in the morning. Because I think, right now, the only alternative for me is to break this off, hold it in suspense, unless I can have some assurance these are negotiable items and not demands.

CM: I will think over tonight with the President.

H: Talk to him. Tell him I think we are close to a workable solution if we are not faced with this kind of alternative.

CM: There is always the counter-problem of how to make them palatable. I offered; you are pressed by time and in foreign countries. I don't see any real definite reason to continue the negotiations now. There is a very stern, negative position on the other side.

H: My basic feeling is total realization of paragraph 1 or 2 in the terms you presented to us deprives us of any facilitating role in this crisis.

CM: Let's see if we can turn those into . . . (inaudible) . . . and resume negotiations early. I can send a man to London or Washington or come to Washington myself.

H: You sleep on it. It is very late here. We have been at it all day. I don't think it is a good idea to make a decision under these circumstances. I hope you can talk to the President tonight and tell him the way 1 and 2 are worded, if there has to be total realization of 1 or the other, I don't think it can be done. I will call you in the morning.

CM: I will be expecting your call.

H: Fine; very good.

CM: I will try to do my homework now. Good-bye.

**102. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 13, 1982, 1:15–1:18 a.m.

H: Francis, I have been on the phone with this lad for about an hour.<sup>2</sup> He quibbles right and left. On the one hand, he says we cannot break this off; he would send somebody to London or he will come to Washington. On the other, he doesn't change his ultimatum at all.

P: It is a very difficult decision for you, Al—a very big one.

H: I told him it is so important and the stakes are so high I hoped he would sleep on it and talk to his President.

P: I respect that very much.

H: I think I should see the Prime Minister in the morning—at 10:00 or 11:00. We should know exactly where we are coming to. I may have to get President Reagan in on it.

P: It is very, very difficult; the stakes are very high. I will see you in the morning.

H: I will call the Prime Minister now.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 101.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 103.

**103. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 13, 1982, 1:20–1:24 a.m.

H: Madame Prime Minister, I am terribly sorry to bother you at this hour.

T: It's perfectly all right.

H: I just finished about an hour of open conversation with this Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup> He is clearly dissembling and quibbling. On the one hand, he says he has to have sovereignty or control of the Island, and on the other, he says go on with the negotiations—these are principles and we can craft words. I think he is under a firm mandate from his President. I told him I thought I should sleep on it, and he should and that he should talk to his President. I don't think we should do anything without the two of us getting together. One of the things which worries me is it will appear that your position today has caused this problem. I think it would build problems for you here and everywhere else. I would intend to tell the press tonight that I have been on the phone with Buenos Aires; a complication has developed at that end and the picture still is unclear. We hope to have it clarified tomorrow and we will have more for them tomorrow. I think if we don't put that twist on it, it will turn negatively here.

T: I watched television news and they reported it very glumly indeed.

H: I think that is justified. I think they are giving an ultimatum. I told them we couldn't accept it. I think the two of us should meet in the morning before I talk with him again. He now says this paper is official which was unofficial.<sup>3</sup>

T: Did he send you a paper or give you one before.

H: He handed to me as I got on the plane and said these were his own thoughts. Now they have become rigid alternatives.

T: What time would you like to come?

H: 9:00 or 9:30?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1981, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 101.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 92.

T: 9:00 am is perfectly all right.<sup>4</sup> What a sad thing!

H: I fear with the Peronista mood they have created a problem and it is running away with them.

T: We will just hope for the best. I will call Francis.

H: I'll see you in the morning; I called Francis before I called you.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Haig's meeting with Thatcher on the morning of April 13 has been found. In her memoirs, Thatcher wrote that the U.S. and U.K. teams met "first thing" that day. "By this stage it was becoming obvious that the proposals the Americans had presented to us the previous day had no measure of Argentine approval. In fact, the status of all these proposals was doubtful. The more closely I questioned Al Haig on this point, the more uncertain it became. Since these proposals had not been agreed by the Argentinians, even if we accepted them, they might therefore not form the basis of a settlement." Thatcher continued: "This fact was made painfully clear at the meeting that morning when Mr Haig handed us a document embodying five points which he described as essential to the Argentine position. As he himself said, the practical effect of the Argentine tactics was to buy time. I always thought that this was their main purpose in negotiating. I was becoming impatient with all this. I said this was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy. Galtieri wanted to be able to claim victory by force of arms. The question now was whether he could be diverted from his course by economic sanctions or, as I suspected all along, only by military force. Mr Haig replied that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if a conflict developed the United States would side with Britain. But did he wish to bring negotiations to an end today? He could say publicly that he was suspending his own efforts, making it clear that this was due to Argentine intransigence. But if he did so other less helpful people might try to intervene. I was keenly aware of that and I also felt that public opinion here required us not to give up on negotiations yet." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 198)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 102.

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#### 104. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in London<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 13, 1982, 1215Z

Tosec 50196/98442. Subject: Areas of Possible Argentine Retaliation/U.S. Vulnerabilities.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. In response to your request,<sup>2</sup> following is our quick and dirty assessment of Argentina's potential for retaliation against U.S. interests

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/13/1982. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

and our major areas of vulnerability. There are several areas in which the Argentines could take retaliatory action, although in some cases, at as much cost to themselves as to the U.S.

### 3. Political Military

—Accepting military supply relationship which USSR has long sought to establish. Argentine Air Force is ready to make a major purchase of combat aircraft this year, and with US and Western European sources blocked it could well turn to USSR. (French willingness to adhere over time to the current boycott,<sup>3</sup> of course, would be a factor.) Depending upon the closeness of military ties, Soviet Navy could enjoy use of Argentine ports and, for the first time, friendly waters in the South Atlantic. This relationship would constitute a setback to U.S. strategic interests, could eventually cause major damage to US interests.

—Reducing or terminating military-to-military cooperation with the US, by withdrawing from 1982 UNITAS exercise,<sup>4</sup> expelling our MILGP and DAP, canceling high-level military visits. (Most visible, immediate action Argentina could take militarily but would have little real impact.)

—Making clear that it is no longer interested in cooperation on security of South Atlantic SLOCs. (Damage to important US objective, but one which may not have been obtainable in any event.)

—Being even less supportive of US positions, and more supportive of Soviet/Cuban positions, in UN, the NAM, and other international fora. (However, Argentina already rarely cooperative.)

—Reaching a national decision to use its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to develop a nuclear weapon, both in defiance of US policy and to increase Argentine leverage in any future Falklands or Beagle crisis. This could only take place over medium-term (3 to 5 years) and is already probably under way, but perception Argentina moving in that direction would be seriously destabilizing in South America.

—Ceasing its cooperation with US in Central America.

### 4. Economic

#### (A) Trade:

—US exports total \$2 billion representing 20 percent of Argentine imports. Major US exports are organic chemicals, construction and heavy duty earthmoving equipment. Argentina could embargo all or part of US imports. However, exports to Argentina represent less than one percent of US exports. Individual US exporters may be hurt in the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 98.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 65.

short term. An embargo would cause considerable disruption to the Argentine economy.

—US imports only 8 percent of Argentina's exports, or slightly more than \$700 million, and consist mostly of sugar, prepared meat products, petroleum products, leather and leather manufactures. Argentina could embargo all or part of exports to the US. Some initial disruption of orderly conduct of trade would occur but no major items are of strategic importance and some are contentious such as sugar and hides.

(B) Investment:

—US direct investment in Argentina totals \$2.5 billion, less than one percent of total US overseas investment. Petroleum and chemicals make up the largest group totaling \$400 million and \$415 million respectively. Nationalization could be consistent with the nationalistic fervor and should rank as a possible action.

(C) Finance:

—Argentina owes US concerns some \$17 billion. However the loss on an Argentine default or payments moratorium, once undisbursed credits and US holdings of Argentine assets are netted out, would only be about \$7.6 billion. This would be a painful but wholly sustainable loss to the US banking industry. Argentina must roll-over some \$11 billion in short-term debt this year and needs to borrow an estimated \$7 billion in balance of payments support. Should the GOA declare a moratorium, finding this level of financing would prove an impossibility. Moreover, the USG could freeze Argentine assets (\$5.7 billion).

5. U.S. responses. While we cannot prevent Argentina from taking the actions enumerated above, we are not without the means to take measures of our own. On the military side, these could include:

- Military and other assistance to the British;
- Announcement that we will not proceed with certification permitting resumption of military assistance and training;
- Termination of pipeline of FMS equipment ordered prior to the cut-off of sales in 1978;<sup>5</sup>
- Support of international sanctions in UN Security Council and with European Community;
- Seeking halt of West German and Canadian nuclear cooperation with Argentina.

**Eagleburger**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 50.

**105. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez<sup>1</sup>**

April 13, 1982, 12:30–12:34 p.m.

H: Hello.

CM: Good morning. How are you?

H: I feel better rested.

CM: We have been working the whole night. I have a formula. What would you like me to do?

H: Can you give me an idea what it contains. I have been waiting until I spoke with you before I speak to the press.

CM: We will yield point 1 and 2 and add “both parties affirm absolute sovereignty on the Island, but the British will relinquish their claim in the UN.” The interim period would be by government along the lines we discussed.

H: The interim period would be along the lines we discussed?

CM: Provided Britain says she will decolonize the Islands as announced in the UN.

H: Along the lines of the 64 declaration?<sup>2</sup>

CM: If she could view them specifically as the Malvinas.

H: That offers some possibilities. What about in the context of self-determination—would that then come in?

CM: The General Assembly has ruled out self-determination in the case of the Malvinas. We can imagine some sort of minority status for the Islands in the meantime.

H: Let me consider this. Perhaps it would be helpful if you could give our Ambassador a more detailed indication of what you are thinking of. And I will hold in place. My intent was to go back to Washington. Perhaps that is the better thing to do and have him send it there.

CM: So you are flying to Washington?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel in London; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> In 1964 the report of the UN Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24) confirmed that the provisions of the Declaration applied to the Falklands Islands and invited the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations to determine sovereignty. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1964, pp. 431–432) For the text of the Declaration (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on December 14, 1960), see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1960, pp. 49–50.

H: I don't want to just sit here in London as the advocate of one government. I want to avoid that appearance. Our only effort here is to find a solution.

CM: We will call your Ambassador.

H: I will probably leave here today and make an announcement that there are certain difficulties; we are not ending this effort and are hopeful of going to Buenos Aires shortly. Is that all right?

CM: Perfectly. But don't attribute the difficulty to one side.

H: I am trying to be even-handed and as frank as I can. I don't want to prejudice this.

CM: We will be in touch immediately with your Ambassador. In Washington, you will have all our options.

H: I think we can operate that way somewhat better.

CM: Thank you for calling. I won't make a statement until you make your statement. Good-bye.

H: Good-bye.

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**106. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 13, 1982, 12:40 p.m.

P: Hello, Al.

H: Hello, Francis. I just got a call from Costa Mendez.<sup>2</sup> He would like to offer another compromise to the last point, in which they would, in effect, accept the formula in paragraph 5 and want some language that parallels the '64 Declaration of the United Nations on decolonization. I think in that conjunction they are willing to accept autonomy for the Islands which gives them a local government—self-determination, in essence.

P: That is a move from their position this morning.

H: Clearly. It is a difficult problem for you here. You have a historical precedent. But we don't want to reject it out of hand.

P: Do they want to add to paragraph 5?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 105.



H: To paragraph 7.

P: We will just have to see. Would they drop that list?

H: They would drop everything and buy paragraph 5. I think they know what we are talking about. A number of changes we made might make them uncomfortable, but I think all that is manageable if we can get decolonization.

P: And the wishes of the people. That is crucial. I will have to find out about the '64 resolution.

H: In the meantime, I am going to get this proposal in specific terms through the Ambassador. I think we should stay put until we look at it. I told him I would return to Washington. Staying here makes it look like I am an agent. You start looking; we will start our looking.

P: We ought to have another talking maybe. And obviously you don't want to stay too long. You presumably would do your thinking quickly.

H: The most important thing, very frankly, is that your position over the years has been eroded by other governments and you cannot now take a position which goes back and across that history. I think the Prime Minister would be vulnerable to criticism.

P: I'm sure—and not only for that reason.

H: At least we can keep the dialogue going through a structured framework.

P: All right.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In his memoirs, Haig wrote that he spoke to Thatcher following this conversation with Pym, observing that her "wariness and reservations were as great as Pym's; but she, too, believed that there was a basis for continuing the process." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 285) No memorandum of conversation of this exchange has been found.

**107. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 13, 1982, 2:15 p.m.

H: Francis, we have been doing some thinking on this thing and have some ideas.<sup>2</sup> Let me tell you how I would propose to proceed from here. Would it be possible for you and some of your colleagues to meet here in the hotel rather than at No. 10?

P: It is not a good idea to go back there.

H: I will share some of those ideas with you. Then I would go to the airport and make a statement there (read proposed statement to Pym).<sup>3</sup> I will do it formally at the airport. I think it is important you and I have a heart-to-heart as we look at these new ideas and then I can stay in very close touch as you consider them over the next 24 hours. I assume I would wait at least a day in Washington before going on. It is clear they are terrified. They don't want things to break off. I won't attribute the ideas to anyone and I won't indicate where the difficulties came from.

P: What you plan to say sounds fine, but I think we should agree after the meeting. I think it would be lower profile if I came to you.

H: There is great sensitivity somehow that we are becoming an agent.

P: I can say I am coming to see you off at your hotel. Come as soon as possible?

H: Leave your place in 15 minutes.

P: Say be there in a half-hour?

H: Yes.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> Haig wrote in his memoirs that prior to this conversation with Pym, Costa Mendez telephoned him at 2 p.m. Haig recalled: "I was able to tell him that I had spoken to the highest figures in the British government, and that I saw grounds for a breakthrough. Costa Mendez agreed that I should return to Buenos Aires." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 285) No memorandum of conversation of this exchange has been found, although it is possible that he was mistakenly recalling the conversation in Document 105.

<sup>3</sup> At 5:30 p.m. Haig delivered the following statement to assembled reporters upon his departure from London's Heathrow Airport: "As you know, yesterday I had planned to go on to Buenos Aires in continuation of our effort to help in this crisis, but difficulties developed to change those plans. We have now received some new ideas, and while the parties are considering those ideas it will provide an opportunity for me to return to Washington to report to President Reagan prior to proceeding on to Buenos Aires shortly." (Telegram 7977 from London, April 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820193–0063) He also made a statement and spoke with reporters on his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on April 13. For the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

**108. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for Additional JP-5 Fuel at Ascension

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

How to respond to British request for fuel support at Ascension.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

The British are estimating their fuel (JP-5) consumption rate at 660,000 to 800,000 gallons per week to support air operations at Ascension. Based on our computations, we agree with HMG that we can spare 900,000 gallons of fuel (just over one week's supply) that are currently in storage on the island. Even with access to this fuel, however, the UK would run out on approximately April 19–20 unless they either adjusted their consumption rate or received additional supplies.

DOD, working with Defense Fuel Supply Center and the Military Sealift Command, states that they can get a tanker to Ascension by April 23 or 24. To accomplish this they have pulled a tanker out of a Caribbean exercise and are sending it directly to Ascension without consolidating its load or taking on additional cargo fuel. It will carry approximately 2.4 million gallons of JP-5. There are no other tankers in the area that could provide JP-5 before then.

Aviation fuel resupply is critically needed by the UK to ensure a steady flow of logistical support via cargo aircraft to Ascension where support is to be staged for delivery to the UK forces off the Falklands. The five logistical support ships and possibly some of the amphibious ships with the task force would shuttle supplies between Ascension and the Falklands. HMG also plans to use Nimrods (which consume JP-5) based at Ascension for communications support and in an anti-submarine role to prevent Argentine interdiction of their supply line. (Nimrods could cover all but the last 600 miles of the route.)

Alternative sources of the required fuel are hard to pinpoint. The MSC ships are the only tankers that carry JP-5, a special military fuel,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Austin; cleared by Haass. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 13.

other than Navy oilers. The closest US Navy oilers are supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. They could not arrive in time.

The only other possibility would be to fly cargo fuel to Ascension or attempt to use commercial tankers. The relatively small quantities that could be delivered and limited storage and handling facilities at Wideawake Airfield make the former approach unrealistic. In the latter case, the time required to find a ship, load and sail it to Ascension would exceed the MSC delivery date.

In short, time and distance factors preclude a more favorable response on our part. I spoke with Dave Jones this morning. He is aware of the situation and has directed his staff to make whatever adjustments as necessary to get the tanker underway. He said he would get back to me later today.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you advise HMG:<sup>2</sup>

- That we are making every effort to get the tanker to Ascension as soon as possible, perhaps by April 24 or 25 with approximately 2.4 million gallons of JP-5. You may want to explain that there are no other tankers in the area that could provide JP-5 before then.

- We realize that this will create a shortfall of several hundred thousand gallons of fuel before the resupply of JP-5 arrives. Hopefully HMG can adjust its operations to compensate. We have pulled our tanker away from a major exercise and sailed it directly to Ascension without consolidating the load. This is simply the best we can do.

- We are investigating additional resupply capability and will advise as soon as possible when the next load of fuel can be delivered. We realize that a second load will be required in about two weeks.

- RADM Watson, our JCS Deputy Director for Planning and Resources, has asked that Air Commodore Dick contact him to work out the details of further JP-5 resupply at Ascension. His number is 695-2934.

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<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to the following three bulleted points, Burt wrote: "Larry: I informed D. Thomas of this today. Rick." Under this annotation, Eagleburger wrote: "Good." In an April 16 memorandum to Eagleburger, Burt reported that the Ascension base commander had been authorized to "draw on his war reserve stock to meet the UK requirements" until the MSC tanker arrived on April 24 or 25. "This means that the RAF will be able to operate without any reduction in tempo." (Memorandum from Burt to Eagleburger, April 16; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982)

**109. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Dispute: Calling in Dobrynin

You asked for our recommendation on whether and how you should raise the Falklands with Dobrynin,<sup>2</sup> and for talking points if you decide to do so.

On balance, we believe that you should. There is a danger that the Soviets will take such a demarche as an invitation to meddle even further, and the “threat” we have available to warn them off is not very impressive. Nevertheless, we think the danger can be easily deflected, and a warning could help. More importantly, even if it does not, *it will be extremely important to be able to cite a diplomatic warning to the Soviets in the event that the crisis drags on and they and/or the Cubans become increasingly involved.*

At the same time, the questions of “whether” and “how” are related, because *only a “threat” to relations overall has a chance of being plausible and effective.* Moreover, in every meeting with the Soviets you should reiterate our main message that we are working for peaceful solutions while they are the troublemakers, and the Falklands fits the case. Hence, you should cast your remarks broadly, as a warning against involvement which would break the back of an already overburdened geopolitical agenda and our hopes for future progress embodied in the President’s invitation to Brezhnev to meet at the SSOD. (In our judgment, this is also the proper glancing way to reaffirm that invitation in diplomatic channels.)

Accordingly, the attached talking points<sup>3</sup> are intended to help you sound both angry and statesmanlike. They begin with a *statement of our objectives in the Falklands dispute which you may wish to supplement; proceed to complain strongly about increasingly malicious Soviet media treat-*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Scanlan and Bosworth. Sent through Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 94.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

*ment; and then set the problem within the overall relationship. A contingency point in case Dobrynin seeks a role for the USSR in the crisis is added.*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Below this paragraph, Bremer wrote on April 14 a notation that reads: "The Secretary has asked Mr. Eagleburger to do this." See Document 135.

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**110. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

British Request for FMS Data on Argentina

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

How to respond to the British request that we provide them with data on our FMS sales to Argentina.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

DOD/DSAA received a phone call yesterday from the British Embassy asking that we provide them with data on the types and quantity of equipment we have sold to Argentina through FMS. The Embassy was specifically interested in sales of Electronic Warfare equipment. DSAA has instructed the Embassy to make the request through the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State. DSAA has compiled the information (all unclassified) and sent it to PM for transmittal to the British Embassy.

I do not see any reason not to provide this information to the British, who probably could obtain it through other channels in any case. However, I believe you should be aware of the request and approve it.

ARA points out that we would be crossing another, potentially significant threshold of support for the UK in providing this data. Unlike the support we have previously provided, it flows neither from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ogden on April 12; cleared by Brown, Bosworth, and M. Konner (EUR). A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that Eagleburger saw the memorandum on April 14.

the Ascension agreement nor from the commingling of US-UK intelligence services. We should assume that the GOA would learn of our action, and it would be impossible for us to portray our decision as other than a clear statement of US support for UK military action. That would obviously prejudice any continuing “good offices” role by us.

EUR supports the PM position and sees no problem with supplying the UK with the requested information.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you agree to provide the British with data on our Foreign Military Sales to Argentina.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Eagleburger initialed his approval of the recommendation.

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**111. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982, 2243Z

Tosec 50206/99019. For the Secretary from PM Director Burt. Subject: Reactivated UK Request For Emergency Stinger Delivery.

1. Top Secret–Entire text.

2. The British have reactivated their April 11 request for Stinger.<sup>2</sup> We now need to decide when and how to respond. The British are pressing for an immediate and favorable reply.

3. As you know, the British Embassy approached the Department and DOD on Sunday<sup>3</sup> with a request for six Stinger missile launchers

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams, Lot 12D215, No Folder. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Kanter; cleared by Burt, Bremer, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger. Haig was then en route from London to Washington.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tosec 50172/97528, April 12, the Department reported to Haig in London that the British Embassy approached the Departments of State and Defense to request 12 Stinger missile launchers “equipped for para-delivery” on an emergency basis, adding that “although cleared for NATO sale,” Stinger “has not been transferred to any NATO nation yet.” The following day, the British informed Jones that their request had been put “on ice.” The Department reported to Haig that “no reason was given” for the British reversal. “For now, we have told DOD to go ahead with preparations to ship in event British renew request but to do nothing else without our specific authorization.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> April 11.

and 12 missiles “equipped for para-delivery” on an emergency basis. In response to that request, JCS ordered the Army to appropriately package the Stingers and ready them for shipment. At that time, the British asked that the Stingers be shipped to Mildenhall by noon, April 14.

4. On April 12, Davy Jones was informed by his UK counterpart that the Stinger request was being “put on ice.” Today (April 13), the British reactivated the request with both the Department and DOD, making clear that they would appreciate a prompt reply. DOD believes that it could come close to meeting its April 14 delivery date to Mildenhall if a favorable decision were made immediately.

5. There are risks in going ahead with the Stinger delivery. The JCS is concerned that if the shipment is discovered, it would directly link the US with any British attempt to retake the Falklands and would provoke a serious reaction from Argentina (and perhaps others in Latin America). Nevertheless, Larry and I believe that we simply have no alternative but to respond favorably to the reactivated British request. This is apparently Cap’s<sup>4</sup> view as well.

6. You, however, are much closer to the situation and are the best judge of how we should respond to the British request, particularly how the timing of our response will affect the delicate diplomatic state of play. You also will want to consider whether White House involvement is necessary at this stage.

7. In order to preserve the option of responding in a timely way to the British request, we will need your guidance soon. Larry will meet you at Andrews AFB when you land to discuss this matter with you.<sup>5</sup>

**Eagleburger**

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<sup>4</sup> Caspar Weinberger.

<sup>5</sup> On April 15, Eagleburger informed Henderson that a final answer on U.S. delivery of Stingers was not possible because of the “press leaks concerning US–UK cooperation” (see Document 115). Six hours later, Thomas called on Burt to “renew urgently the UK request for six Stinger launchers and twelve missiles” to be delivered to Ascension by April 19. According to Thomas, the timing of the shipment was “crucial because the missiles would be transferred to the first UK naval contingent which would head south from Ascension on April 19” and “would be carried by initial British landing party.” Eagleburger forwarded this request to Haig in Buenos Aires in telegram Tosec 60031/101880, April 16. (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert) A further 24-hour hold was placed on the request on April 18. (Telegram Tosec 60111/104145, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0667) In telegram Tosec 60123/104180, April 19, the Department transmitted the text of an action memorandum to Haig from Burt which requested the Secretary’s approval of a parachute drop at sea of the requested missiles. On a copy of this telegram, Goldberg wrote: “1440 hrs. 4/19/82 from B.A. AMH approved—told Eagleburger” and “approval of this by AMH w/o further [hesitation?] no doubt because he was just ‘disgusted’ w/the Argent.—” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 19, 1982 Falklands)



**112. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982

*REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT**The Basic Negotiating Problem*

- British have for years totally frustrated Argentine efforts to expand their role in the Falklands or to negotiate a shift of sovereignty. Now Argentines want one or the other: guarantee of sovereignty by the end of the year or de facto control now.

- For the British, the key is to ensure the Islanders can determine their own future: a matter of both principle and politics.

- This negotiation is a clash between these interests. British insistence on self-determination excludes guarantee of Argentine sovereignty. And British fear that greater de facto Argentine role will allow mainlanders to swamp the Islanders.

*Politics in the Two Countries*

- Galtieri has whipped up public emotions and now is their hostage. Peronist movement getting stronger. Navy Chief wants war, for glory (win or lose), and is a threat to Galtieri. Nevertheless, Argentines getting nervous and know that war would be ruinous.

- Thatcher was jolted by criticism for allowing the crisis to occur, and has therefore had to limit her own flexibility by her pledge to Parliament and commitment to military action. Brits are basically united, but their perseverance is suspect.

- Neither leader—or nation—wants war. But neither can back down militarily or accept a defeat through negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 1982. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. In the upper right hand corner of the first page, a note in an unknown hand reads: “6:30 pm, 4/13/82.” Rentschler forwarded the paper to Clark under an April 14 covering note, stating that Clark might find it useful for his 9:30 a.m. briefing for Reagan. Rentschler added: “A longer-range problem, should this mission fail, will be the stance we adopt with our principal ally, particularly as regards the President’s trip to London in June. At this point, however, the focus is much more immediate, and with luck we won’t have to address the other problem.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/09/1982–04/15/1982) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Clark met with Bush and Reagan for a national security briefing from 9:30 to 9:45 a.m., April 14. Reagan then met with Haig, Carlucci, Baker, Meese, and Clark in the Oval Office from 9:45 to 10:05 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of either meeting has been found.

### *Status of the Negotiations*

- Thatcher has conceded change from the status quo ante. She has agreed to: (1) place local British administration under tripartite commission; (2) an Argentine flag; (3) provisions for expanded Argentine interaction with the Islanders; (4) December 31, 1982, deadline. (Text at Tab A)

- Argentine demand for either de facto control or guarantee of sovereignty sets up cross-play between Articles 5/6 and Article 8.

- Argentines' demands *may* be wavering—hard to tell given erratic behavior of GOA. They've floated the idea of *decolonization*—meaning that they might not insist on Argentine sovereignty if they can at least exclude British sovereignty. This would fit with a more subtle strategy of weakening the British link and expanding their de facto role as a way to secure eventual control. (Tab B)

### *Our Strategy*

- Work with decolonization concept but not the word, while protecting self-determination. At the same time, loosen up provisions for expanded Argentine interim role.

- Convince Brits of the need to let events take a natural historical course—i.e., give Argentines a chance to work out a relationship with the Islanders.

- Convince the Argentines that we will use our decisive vote on the commission to help expand their role.

### *Prospects*

- Keep the process going. The British would rather have us play this role than join in sanctions. Their suspicions about us are gone.

- Keep the threat of break-off hanging over the Argentines. They cannot afford to be blamed and further isolated.

### *Timing*

- Optimal time for agreement is toward the end of next week. Before then, Thatcher won't stop her fleet; Galtieri won't sign unless the fleet is stopped. After then, the proximity of forces increases sharply the possibility of hostilities.

- Need to crack the main issues this weekend. Must leave for Buenos Aires on Thursday night.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> April 15.

**Tab A****Draft Agreement<sup>3</sup>**

Undated

Draft Agreed Memorandum as agreed at London 4/12/82, 8 p.m.

1. On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 502, and noting relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, Argentina and the United Kingdom have agreed on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

2. All military and security forces other than local police shall be withdrawn within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks from the date of this agreement, from three areas defined by circles of 150 nautical miles' radius from the following coordinate points:

- |                        |                          |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| (a) Lat. 51° 40' South |                          |
| Long. 59° 30' West     | (Falklands)              |
| (b) Lat. 54° 20' South |                          |
| Long. 36° 40' West     | (South Georgia)          |
| (c) Lat. 57° 40' South |                          |
| Long 26° 30' West      | (South Sandwich Islands) |

3. After the date of this agreement and pending a definitive settlement, no military or security force shall be introduced into the areas defined in paragraph 2 above. On completion of the withdrawal specified in paragraph 2, all forces that have been deployed in connection with the current controversy shall be redeployed to normal duties.

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United States agrees to appoint, a representative to constitute a Special Commission which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the obligations in the preceding paragraphs. Each Commissioner may be supported by a staff of not more than (ten) persons.

5. On an interim basis, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the Special Commission, except in the event that the Special Commission (unanimously) deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue, including the Executive and Legislative Councils, which would be enlarged to include representatives of the Argentine population whose period of residence on the islands is equal to that required

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<sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

of others entitled to representation, such representatives to be in proportion to that population subject to there being at least one such representative on each Council. The Special Commission shall fly the flag of each of its constituent members at the Commission's headquarters.

6. The Special Commission shall make specific recommendations to the two governments or to the Executive and Legislative Councils to facilitate and promote travel, transportation, communications and trade between the mainland and the islands.

7. Within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks from the date of this agreement, steps shall be taken to terminate the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy; including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. Likewise, the United Kingdom shall request third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them by that date.

8. December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period, and during this period the conditions of the definitive status of the islands shall be negotiated consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.

## **Tab B**

### **Proposed Revised Text of Paragraph 8 of Draft Agreement<sup>4</sup>**

Undated

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period and, during this period, the signatories shall negotiate the conditions of the decolonization and definitive status of the islands, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), and the 1964 Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 105.

**113. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands: Next Steps In The OAS

*ISSUES (CONTINGENCY) FOR DECISION*

Argentina is keeping open its option to call for an Organ of Consultation, or Meeting of Foreign Ministers, under the Rio Treaty. The timing could be tight, depending on the status of the Secretary's discussions. On a contingency basis we should decide on:

—Whether to seek actively to block an Argentine call for a Rio Treaty meeting.

—How to vote on such an Argentine request.

—Our strategy if such a meeting is convened.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

As of Tuesday morning,<sup>2</sup> Argentina is holding off on calling for a Rio Treaty meeting. The Argentine Mission has informed USOAS that they are under instructions from the Foreign Ministry not to exercise that option today.

Any of the twenty-one Rio Treaty signatories can call for an Organ of Consultation, or Meeting of Foreign Ministers, under the Rio Treaty. The request is addressed to the President of the OAS Permanent Council and debated there by the 30 OAS members. However, since the subject of debate is convening an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, only the twenty-one signatories can vote. The decision is taken by simple majority—which means we would need 11 votes to block. The twenty-one signatories are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1014. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson and Holmes. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> April 13. On that day, after several days of debate, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 359 (492/82), sponsored by Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, which expressed the OAS's "profound concern" over the Anglo-Argentine dispute, expressed its "fervent hope that a rapid, peaceful solution can be found to the disagreement between the two nations within the context of the rules of international law," and offered its "friendly cooperation in the peace efforts already under way." For the complete text of the resolution, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, pp. 1300–1301.

Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The OAS Argentine Mission told us Saturday<sup>3</sup> that should they call for an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, they visualized basing their request on the moderately worded Article 6 of the Treaty—“any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America”—rather than the much more troublesome Article 3—“an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States.” The Argentines stated they would not be requesting assistance of the signatories. Subsequently, the Argentine Mission has stated to us that should they seek OAS action it would be under the Rio Treaty, not the OAS Charter (as we had requested) in which the non-Treaty signatory English-speaking Caribbeans could have participated.<sup>4</sup>

In the TOSEC of late Saturday (copy attached)<sup>5</sup> we recommended Option C, that we seek to turn Permanent Council debate on the Argentine request toward a Meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Charter rather than the Treaty. We had hoped the Argentines might agree; they do not. More importantly, we had hoped for a useful persuasive contribution from statesman-like participation in the preliminary debate by non-Treaty signatory Caribbeans. Unfortunately, since that time in the closed Permanent Council session of Monday on the Colombian resolution, the Caribbeans have done their worst to aggravate the Latins, coming close to fingering the Argentines as aggressors. With this poisoning of the wells, chances are much dimmer for a Charter invocation outcome and we now face an uphill struggle with serious consequences for the inter-American system over the longer haul and for our continuing acceptability as a mediator of the present dispute. This action memorandum deals with actions required to implement Option C and the costs. We then request guidance on how to proceed if we find ourselves in a Rio Treaty situation and we present the following options:

#### *THE OPTION TO BLOCK THE ARGENTINES*

(Option C of the attached cable)

With the Caribbeans out of the equation, to implement Option C, get 11 votes against Argentina, and hold off a Rio Treaty invocation, we would need to engage in hard lobbying in key capitals.

<sup>3</sup> April 10.

<sup>4</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Haig wrote: “6 v 3. OAS Charter vs. Rio Treaty.”

<sup>5</sup> Not attached. Reference is to telegram Tosec 50131/97180, April 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0925)

Our arguments could include:

—The OAS Charter which contemplates in Article 59 “problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States” provides us with the necessary flexibility to deal with the Falkland dispute, rather than the Rio Treaty, which could involve us in undesirable suggestions that binding sanctions (which require a two-thirds majority) be invoked against the British.

—Charter consideration provides us with more of the sort of conciliation mechanisms appropriate to the present situation, rather than the collective security, confrontational in this case, mechanisms of the Treaty.

—Charter consideration is fairer; it permits participation by all hemispheric states on a problem which clearly concerns the entire region.

—Rio Treaty invocation, or at least adoption of collective security measures under the Treaty, is troublesome since (a) Argentina’s armed takeover, whatever their claim to the islands, violates international law; (b) the binding legal duty to withdraw forces imposed by UNSC resolution 502 cannot be avoided by recourse to OAS or Rio Treaty mechanisms; (c) we and the other hemispheric states are obliged to respect the SC decision in conformity with our obligations under the UN and OAS Charters and the Rio Treaty; and (d) under international law the UK no doubt believes it is entitled to exercise a right to self defense.

(The Latins are likely to find these last arguments too harsh. However, in his recent memorandum of law (copy attached)<sup>6</sup> the Legal Adviser has concluded that under international law and in the light of UN action the UK has a right of self defense to use proportionate force to retake the islands and that we would have strong legal objection to the adoption of any Rio Treaty collective security measures that impaired that right.)

The demerits of these arguments are:

—Not many Latins will agree with bringing in the Caribbeans. (Some may point out that Caribbean exclusion is precisely why the US may favor using the Treaty sometime in the future to deal with Nicaragua or Cuba.)

—An Article 6 Treaty invocation with no Argentine calls for assistance and no subsequent hostilities or British military moves could still permit flexibility for conciliatory measures.

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed. The April 10 memorandum of law is in the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1019.

—In arguing UN primacy in the OAS and advancing the British right to self defense, we irrevocably take sides, damaging both our future ability to use the Rio Treaty and our present acceptability as a mediator to the Argentines.

In trying to get the 11 blocking votes (bearing in mind the GOA's intent to use the moderate Article 6 rationale):

—At the moment we count as with us Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and possibly Brazil and possibly Colombia—a shaky 5.

—For invoking the Treaty, we see at least Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela—16.

—Minds which might be changed by a hard push—not because they agree with us but because of our leverage—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras (to give us 8 votes).<sup>7</sup>

—Even more difficult but perhaps open minded—Ecuador and Chile (it probably would not be in Chile's interest to spite the Argentines—although they are deeply bothered by the Argentine action)—to give us the probably remote possibility of 10 votes.<sup>8</sup>

—As an 11th vote in this very shaky equation, Haiti. But the Haitians know how to cut deals and their asking price could be high.

In the view of ARA and USOAS, this game, with no promise of assured success, is no longer worth the candle. Indeed it appears that events have overtaken this option. Time is very short and the fall-out from a full court press will be heavy. At a minimum the Argentines will think that we have slammed a door on them. This conclusion leads to considering what courses of action are open to us in the event Argentina calls for an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty.

#### *VOTING OPTIONS ON THE ARGENTINE REQUEST*

While we should explain fully in the debate on the request our view that the OAS Charter is a more appropriate conciliatory mechanism, we have these choices in the voting which follows:

—*Yes*, for invocation, which will displease the British and the English-speaking Caribbeans;

—*No*, against invocation, which will displease the Argentines and most Latins;

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<sup>7</sup> Following this point, Middendorf wrote: "Hond. & El Salv. Made impassioned speeches tonight in support of Argentina."

<sup>8</sup> Following this point, Middendorf wrote: "These 2 will be mighty tough."



—*Abstain*, which probably will irritate both sides, but to a lesser degree, while preserving our ability to mediate.

#### OPTIONS ONCE IN A RIO TREATY MEETING

There are two options:

—We can advance views that Argentina has violated international law by its takeover and that Argentina further is obligated to heed immediately UNSC resolution 502, and withdraw its forces;

—We can lobby intensively for use of the Treaty mechanism in a conciliatory, peace-making effort.

In our view, the first tactic cripples our ability to mediate. In advancing the UN primacy concept, it also pokes a hole in our recent argument in a somewhat similar, though different, situation, at the UN that Nicaragua should have taken its case to the OAS, not the UNSC. The second option will find favor with a number of the signatories; most will want to avoid imposing sanctions; most will want to work for a useful conciliatory OAS role. During the course of a Rio Treaty meeting should the British take off the gloves and commence to sink Argentine shipping, we will be in a different situation. Working for conciliation and avoiding imposition of sanctions will be harder. We may then be faced with a decision on going along with sanctions or, along with Mexico, asserting UN primacy and our legal reasons to not comply with Rio Treaty sanctions.

#### *Recommendations:*

1. That with respect to an Argentine request to convoke the Rio Treaty, we not lobby among the OAS Permanent Representatives in Washington and in the capitals for a Charter action since events have overtaken us, but that we do explain our views in order to prepare the way for the push toward conciliation we would make in an MFM convened under the Treaty.<sup>9</sup>

2. That on a vote on invoking the Rio Treaty, we *abstain*, explaining our view that the Charter would be the more appropriate mechanism.<sup>10</sup>

3. That once in an Organ of Consultation, convened under the Rio Treaty, we work with other Permanent Representatives to achieve an outcome in which a conciliatory mechanism would be offered to both sides, if agreeable to them, but no collective security measures would be considered.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation.

<sup>10</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation.

<sup>11</sup> Haig underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “a” to the end and initialed his approval of the recommendation. A handwritten notation in an unknown hand after this recommendation reads: “Approved per Secto 6008.” Telegram Secto 6008, April 15, is in the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0566.

**114. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

Possible Reversible Pressure Points on Argentina

In considering political/military and economic measures we might take to exercise leverage on Argentina to moderate its position, we must recognize that the most effective measures are also the most drastic, the most likely to do permanent damage to our long-term relations with Argentina and Latin America, the least likely to have broad Congressional support, and the most likely to affect interests not presently involved in the Falkland Islands problem. The more moderate steps will annoy but not seriously affect Argentina and may well increase its nationalistic resistance to foreign pressure. Our leverage is therefore extremely limited.<sup>2</sup>

*POLITICAL/MILITARY*

OPTION 1—Suspend deliveries under the pre-1978 FMS pipeline. This would affect primarily spare parts that are useful but not immediately essential to the GOA. In the long run, it could force cannibalization or abandonment of US equipment such as the A-4s, but even if the Western European cutoff holds, Argentina could turn to the Soviet Union for new combat aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

OPTION 2—Inform Argentina we will not make the certification necessary for new military sales or resumption of IMET training. This would have little practical significance as long as any other country remained willing to supply them.

OPTION 3—Deny new requests for Munitions List licenses to export arms and ammunition to commercial gunshops and other private end-users. Sales to private users were not halted by the Kennedy-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Nodis. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by Carolyn Allen (ARA/ECP) and George F. Jones (ARA/ECP); cleared by Haass and Ryan and in draft by Glen R. Rase (EB/OMA) and Alberti. Jones initialed for Haass; Allen initialed for Rase and Alberti. At the top of the memorandum, Haig wrote: "Tom [Enders]: Structure *sensitive* game plan in event of worst case scenario, drawing from this. AMH."

<sup>2</sup> Haig underlined this sentence.

<sup>3</sup> Haig underlined the phrases "as the A-4s" and "for new combat aircraft" in this sentence.

Humphrey amendment. Again, this would be little more than an inconvenience for the GOA.<sup>4</sup>

OPTION 4—Cancel pending high-level US visits, such as Deputy Secretary Carlucci and General Allen, and withdraw the invitation for Argentina to participate in UNITAS (as Carter Administration did for Chile) and other joint exercises and planning talks. Other than as a clear signal of US displeasure, this would have little impact on Argentina. However, it might well add to Argentina's support among other Latins, including Chile.

OPTION 5—Announce that we are supplying fuel to UK at Ascension and/or to UK ships in the South Atlantic from US tankers. This would be most effective step we could take to maintain military pressure on GOA, but it would be a clear taking of sides and would probably prevent any future Argentine acceptance of US good offices or mediation.

OPTION 6—Seek further UN Security Council action. The voting situation in the UN is favorable to the US and UK, but the Latin states will accuse us of violating a position for which we argued forcefully in the Nicaragua debate, namely that OAS should be the forum of first instance on Western Hemisphere matters.

## ECONOMIC

### TRADE

—Our exports to Argentina in 1982 are estimated to reach \$2.2 billion, representing 28 percent of Argentine imports. Imports are estimated at \$1.4 billion, representing 14 percent of Argentine exports. Nearly 25 percent of Argentina's exports to the US enter duty free under GSP. Sugar comprises over \$200 million of Argentina exports to the US.

OPTION 1—Embargo imports from and/or exports to Argentina. US authority to restrict *all* exports and imports is very limited. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) confers broad power on the President to regulate economic relations with foreign countries in times of declared national emergency. Once invoked, the IEEPA would permit a ban on exports and imports as well as freezing of Argentine assets. Use of the IEEPA, however, would require the President to find that the Falkland situation constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. Moreover, invocation of IEEPA is a matter of great concern to foreign investors and could disrupt US

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<sup>4</sup> Haig underlined the phrases "to private users" and "for the GOA" in this sentence.

financial markets. This authority has been used only in the case of Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and Kampuchea.

OPTION 2—Restrict some or most exports. There is legal authority under the Export Administration Act to restrict most exports to Argentina. The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, has the authority to impose these restrictions. All exports to Iran except food and medicine were restricted under this authority. This authority is used in most cases, however, to restrict export of security items.

OPTION 3—Graduate some or all of products exported to the US now receiving benefit of GSP. While the nominal cost is difficult to calculate, Argentina has indicated concern over prospective graduation of products currently on the list and has expressed interest in having the present 1985 expiry date of GSP extended.

OPTION 4—Argentina has expressed its concern over the provisions in the CBI concerning sugar. As an enticement, we could offer a duty free quota equivalent to their current export level of sugar. However, such an action could undermine our sugar support program, and severely detract from the unique CBI package.

#### *MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS*

—Argentina is a major borrower from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank. Proposed projects in the IDB pipeline amount to \$194 million, and \$505 million in the World Bank. An \$84 million loan at the IDB for Agricultural Vocational Education Training is the only loan likely to be submitted for approval in the near future.

OPTION 1—Seek to delay presentation to the Board of Executive Directors of any loans likely to come forward in the near future. This can only be accomplished by behind the scenes pressures on the Banks. This tactic has been successful in several cases but may be difficult in this case if Argentina wins significant Latin American support.

OPTION 2—Permit loans to be submitted for approval and vote against them. In the case of the IDB loan mentioned above, a portion of the loan (\$26 million) can be vetoed by the US. The Congress is very sensitive to political actions in the Banks by the USG. It also undermines the independence of the Banks in addressing development problems and alienates both borrowers and donors of the Banks.

#### *FINANCIAL*

—Argentina's exposure to US banks totals \$17 billion. Of this, \$11 billion must be rolled over this year, a large part of which is held by US concerns. Argentina will need additional borrowings of \$7.6 billion for balance of payments support this year. Eximbank exposure in

Argentina totals \$1.2 billion, with another \$130 million in preliminary commitments outstanding.

OPTION 1—US financial leverage on Argentina is quite limited. We could jawbone banks on lending to Argentina, but this would be antithetical to the Administration's free market approach to international financial matters (we have not even approached banks on the Polish situation). On the assumption that anything said to the banking community will be repeated to the GOA, we can respond to banking queries by arguing that while current political/economic circumstances are not such that new lending is indicated once the Falkland Islands issue is resolved, the long term Argentine outlook is good.

OPTION 2—The next level of leverage would be to freeze Argentine assets. This would require invocation of the IEEPA (see TRADE). Such a move would cripple the Argentine economy, especially given the British freeze. Invoking the IEEPA to freeze Argentine assets puts us clearly in the UK camp and eliminates any potential role for the US as mediator. It might also redound to our own detriment, however, by forcing the Argentines into a default/moratorium/freeze and by shaking international confidence (already damaged by the Iranian freeze) in the US as a secure repository for investments. We have no real financial carrots to offer Argentina.

OPTION 3—There are no Eximbank direct credits for Argentina in the pipeline. There are several small \$1½ to \$5 million insurance cases now pending in the Bank. These could be indefinitely delayed by the Bank without fanfare since the economic situation is now cause for pause. Should any applications for loans be received, the Chafee Amendment in Eximbank's statute prohibits denial of loans for other than commercial or financial reasons unless the President determines that such action would clearly and importantly advance US policy in such areas as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection and human rights. Such determination has only been made for Chile.

# 115. Memorandum for the Files by the President's Assistant for Communications (Gergen)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 14, 1982

SUBJECT

*ABC Story on U.S.—British Cooperation*

This is a recap of my activities on Tuesday, April 13 regarding ABC's story on the U.S. providing help to the British with regard to the dispute on the Falklands.<sup>2</sup>

At approximately 5:00 p.m. Tuesday, Jerry O'Leary came into my office looking very concerned and said, "I've got a hot one that we have to do something about."<sup>3</sup> He then explained that Carl Bernstein had called him to say they had a story from their sources (which included U.S. government sources plus a British source) that the U.S. was providing ELINT information and AWACS data to the British and had American sailors on the British ships.<sup>4</sup> These were the only three aspects of the story that were discussed with me. Jerry was very concerned because he thought publication of the story would damage our diplomatic efforts in Argentina and might lead to an attack on the U.S. embassy there. He thought it imperative that the story be denied and that we make every effort to keep it off the air.

I agreed with him on both points and said that if he could definitely confirm that it wasn't true and that he had proper guidance from NSC, he should deny it. He said he was satisfied that he could vouch for its untruthfulness. Since he had taken the first call from Bernstein, I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, David Gergen Files, [Correspondence and Memos 1982] Falklands. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In his personal diary entry for April 14, Reagan wrote of this episode: "We really have a tough problem and it hasn't been made any easier by the press. In what I think is a most irresponsible act—engineered by Bernstein of the Post, they have charged that we are lending aid to Britain's Navy in the Falklands dispute. This of course has set the Argentinians on fire. The charge is false. We are providing Eng. with a communications channel via satellite but that is part of a regular routine that existed before the dispute. To have cancelled it would have been taken as supporting the Argentine." (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 123)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an April 14 memorandum from O'Leary to Gergen, detailing O'Leary's activities relating to the *ABC Nightline* story.

<sup>4</sup> The following day, April 15, an article citing unnamed "Administration officials" appeared in the *New York Times* asserting the United States was providing the British with a "wide range of intelligence." "Those officials," the article continued, "said that the sharing of intelligence with Britain, including that from aerial surveillance, electronic intercepts, covert agents and diplomats, was based on cooperation dating back to World War II. 'It's become routine,' said an informed official." ("U.S. Providing British a Wide Range of Intelligence," *New York Times*, April 15, p. A11)

suggested that he call Bernstein back with the denial and in the meantime, I would talk with the managerial side of the house to see if we could dissuade them from using it. I tried to call the deputy bureau chief here in Washington (Bob Zellnick) since the bureau chief is with our traveling team in Europe; Zellnick was on his way to Europe, so I asked for the next person in charge and was given to John Armstrong (whom I have never met before). I explained to Armstrong the seriousness of the story, said that I was informed that it was wrong and that we would view its publication—in view of our denial—as detrimental to our national interests. As a double pre-caution, I then called Bernstein briefly to re-inforce O’Leary’s denial: I told him that I didn’t know all the facts but that I had it on good authority the story was untrue and our denial was a good one.

About an hour later, I was informed—I think by Mort Allin—that ABC was planning to run the story, that the matter was serious, and we needed to huddle on it. At that point, I recommended we meet with Judge Clark, John Poindexter, etc., to see if we couldn’t come up with a stronger denial from the White House that might knock it off the air. Specifically, I thought that a denial straight from Clark might keep it from running.

As Judge Clark was unavailable, Mort, Jerry and I gathered in Poindexter’s office where we had a rather lengthy exchange before we saw Clark. While in Clark’s office, there was a tentative decision that the Judge would make a statement in time for the 7:00 p.m. news, and I called ABC to alert them that something might be coming from us—so they would be sure to be ready. It was at that point they told us (Poindexter and I were on the line) what the actual contents of the story were. It turned out that the story they were running had nothing to do with any of the three points we had denied but were four additional points that I had never heard about before in any of our conversations.<sup>5</sup>

After we all stewed for a while, it was agreed after 7:00 p.m. by the group that we would not issue any additional statement but would instead have a no comment on the story they had run. We were also greatly perturbed that the story quoted a Pentagon spokesman to the effect that the story was correct and said other administration officials were confirming it. This, of course, made the White House denial sound very hollow and undercut us badly. (To me it was the second time in the day we had been undercut by the agencies: first, when someone

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<sup>5</sup> The April 13 ABC *World News Tonight* story at 7 p.m. reported that the United States was providing the United Kingdom with a communications link to its submarines, intelligence on Argentine military activity, weather forecasting, and supplies on Ascension Island.



leaked out all the information to ABC and then when those outside the building confirmed it.)

With the show over, I was in a position where I owed ABC a call on two counts: (1) to tell them that we in fact were not going to have a statement but were not commenting the story; and (2) to tell them that we would not place a spokesman on Nightline (Nightline had been calling others during the day about this and still did not have a firm answer from the White House).

At approximately 7:30 p.m., I called ABC and spoke with Bernstein and Susan Mercandetti of the Nightline staff to make both of the above points. Bernstein informed me at that point that they had been getting very mixed signals from the administration during the day and they suspected that our denials in the afternoon were lies since others in the administration were confirming their story. I explained to him that our denials earlier in the day were with regard to the ELINT, AWACS and American soldiers; I also explained that I really didn't know much about the points that he did report but that our official posture was one of "no comment" (as we had agreed with NSC).

Other than some later conversations with Mort and Jerry, that was the end of my contact with the matter until about 10:30 p.m. when I had a call from our White House duty officer (Pete Roussel) who said that UPI had it from ABC that the White House had confirmed their earlier story. Pete and I were both indignant because that had not been the thrust of our conversation, and I agreed to call them yet once again. I then spoke in a joint call with Bernstein and Ted Koppel of Nightline to say: I want to make only this point. Earlier in the day we denied a story that we understood you were going to run; you then did not run it. Instead you ran something else; our posture on that story, I want to emphasize, is one of no comment, and I want to be sure you understand that. They said that they did but that they had had calls after their evening news from administration sources who confirmed their story (and they had even had one apology). I said I had no way of knowing what others in the administration might have told them, but I wanted to be sure they understood our position was one of no comment. That ended the conversation and my involvement in the matter except for a subsequent conversation with Roussel to close the loop so that he could continue to no comment the substance of the story.

I cannot vouch for what others may have told ABC, but I do know these two things:

—We would never have been in this mess unless someone/ones had not first spilled a lot of sensitive information to the network. This is not information that anyone in the White House (outside NSC) had; it came, I presume, from an outside agency.

—Secondly, our whole effort to deny a story from the White House (or to no comment it) will never be credible when those outside the



White House (e.g., a “Pentagon spokesman”) tell reporters that the story is true.

Our problem is those who are causing damage, not those who are trying to contain it.

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**116. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1982, 11 a.m.

In a telephone discussion with Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and Secretary Haig at 11:00 am, April 14, 1982, the following essential points emerged:

1. There will be no submission of Argentine proposals for paragraph 8 until there has been a submission by the UK.<sup>2</sup> The basic Argentine thinking would be contained in a memo from the Foreign Minister to the US Secretary of State which involves a concept of decolonization and the creation of a status of international minority provision for compensation of island inhabitants’ property rights, etc. and establishment of arrangements for joint ventures for the exportation of island resources; minerals, fish, oil. However, there would be no formal submission of this unless there is some indication of British flexibility. If you have some statement from London or if the US is authorized by London to make a statement which would indicate clearer flexibility than the Argentines interpreted to have emerged from Mrs. Thatcher’s statement to the Parliament today, we will be willing to submit our comments.

2. The second issue raised by the Foreign Minister involves the consensus of US news reporting over the last 24 hours which suggested US support for British forces.<sup>3</sup> Costa Mendez stated that Argentina must have a firm statement that the US is not helping in any way. Secretary Haig emphasized that such a statement would be impossible in light of ongoing agreements of many years standing and especially

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. The summary was dictated by Haig, April 14.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the agreement, as concluded with the British on April 12, see Tab A, Document 112. For an alternative draft of paragraph 8 of the agreement, see Tab B, Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 115.

US obligations on Ascension Island. Secretary Haig stated that he would seek to affirm that there has been no modification to *status quo ante* and if such were the case, would do all within his power to reverse such policies.

3. Argentine Foreign Minister Costa stated it would be essential to have some guarantee on a limit for the movement of the fleet and that they were already under great pressure from OAS members to invoke the Rio Treaty in this regard. Secretary Haig emphasized that this latter point would be provided for and encompassed in our proposals and there would be no way to place such limits on movement of the fleet until an agreement was arrived at.<sup>4</sup> He underlined again that this all highlights the urgency of immediate resumption of discussions. The Foreign Minister then stated that none of these concerns should be considered as personally against President Reagan or the Secretary of State; rather, were the outcome of public perception which needs to be dealt with in Argentina. He then expressed the deep personal gratitude of President Galtieri to President Reagan and Secretary Haig as well as his own. Secretary Haig informed the Minister he would give him an early report to include an assessment of the Rio Treaty situation.

*Footnote:* It is clear that the Argentines will not accept a visit from the Secretary until some action has been taken on points one and two above.<sup>5</sup>

Dictated by Secretary Haig April 14, 1982.

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<sup>4</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this sentence a note in an unknown hand reads: "AMH keeping pressure of fleet on Argentina."

<sup>5</sup> Following this sentence, Goldberg wrote: "AMH phoned FM again at 2:05 on 4/14/82—see transcript." For the transcript of this conversation, see Document 117.

**117. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez<sup>1</sup>**

April 14, 1982, 2:05 p.m.

H: (reads his proposed press statement)<sup>2</sup>

H: We have turned down a number of requests.

M: I understand that.

H: You know, this statement from my point of view is going to subject me to investigation here but I want you to know that will be a problem and you must not be concerned about press speculation. These people are malicious and wrong.

M: Yes.

H: I do have definitely some new ideas from London. They involve the process of normalization between the island and the mainland; such as a date certain for completion of concessions; some proposals for the fleet and its movement in the context of the agreement. I have also been told we will receive some suggestions from them to broaden paragraph 8 and they will be here tomorrow morning.

M: You will hear tomorrow morning from them?

H: Yes.<sup>3</sup> On paragraph 8.<sup>4</sup> Based on this, Mr. Minister, I think that we do have some additional basis for continuing our talks.

M: You think that you have enough basis to continue our talks?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. Haig was in Washington; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote the date and the following: "H=Haig; M=Costa Mendez."

<sup>2</sup> At 3:45 p.m., April 14, Haig read a statement to the media, noting that while the positions held by Argentina and the United Kingdom "are deeply felt, and in many cases mutually contradictory," the leaders of both countries "have assured me, and in turn the President, again today, that they are prepared to go on working with us to reach a peaceful solution." "As a result of my conversations in London, plus telephone conversations today," he continued, "I have developed new ideas which I have described to the Argentine Government. Based on these new ideas, the Argentines have invited me to return to Buenos Aires. I propose to do so tomorrow." Emphasizing the U.S. role as mediator since the beginning of the crisis, Haig pointed out that "the United States has therefore, not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation based on existing bilateral agreements." The Department transmitted the text of the statement in telegram 100466 to Buenos Aires and London, April 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840626–0175)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 123.

<sup>4</sup> See Tab B, Document 112.

H: Yes and I talked personally with Mrs. Thatcher on the phone.<sup>5</sup> I read her the statement as I have just read it to you and there will be nothing said in London that would contradict any of those statements.

M: That is very important to us. When will you issue that statement?

H: 3:45.

M: Okay. Nevertheless, I think that it is important for me to send you now the draft we have—the draft agreement we intend to propose so that you can study it before and call me as soon as you receive it. I have already sent it to you an hour ago, a sort of aide memoire<sup>6</sup> with a very short history of what were the real beginnings of this problem and you will receive it. I think I can send you too a new idea.

H: I think this means both sides have contributed new ideas and I will have some of my own.

M: You are perfectly welcome.

H: I think this trip is all worthwhile doing. I think it is important we keep the negotiations going.

M: I will give you the Spanish version and I will ask him to send it as soon as possible.

H: I should announce this this afternoon that I am going. If I don't, we will have this continual press speculation. There is the danger of wrong things being said publicly by people who really don't know the facts. I think once the process starts, people tend to be more responsible. I would like to say I will leave tomorrow and that would mean we could start Friday morning.<sup>7</sup>

M: I am ready for that. That suits me perfectly well. I would only want to stress two or three points. First, I would need a firm denial that we already talked about those of the American Government vis-a-vis the British Government giving assistance.

H: I do not think it is a good idea. I would make this statement here in 45 minutes.

H: It must be impossible at your end with public opinion. I would propose to go ahead. I will await your message and send you some intelligence thinking here. I continue to believe that we are getting very close to a workable outcome.

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<sup>5</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this telephone exchange between Haig and Thatcher has been found.

<sup>6</sup> The text of the aide-mémoire was delivered to Shlaudeman by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on the evening of April 14. Shlaudeman transmitted an informational translation to the Department in telegram 2246 from Buenos Aires, April 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982))

<sup>7</sup> April 16.

M: Very good news.

H: I see ground through which we can get a breakthrough. I do believe it will take scaling down of requirements at both ends but in a very balanced way.

M: Let me tell you two points. We have a very strong pressure from public opinion and inside government to work for the Rio Treaty meeting.

H: I promise you some thoughts on that. First, our position is that the Rio Pact is going to be a very difficult legal question as to whether it is applicable. So we would be opposed to invoking it at this time. Secondly, if we were faced with a two-thirds majority, the great difficulty would be it would entail our having to apply sanctions and we have refused, as you know, to join the efforts to have us apply sanctions against you. You understand that.

M: Yes.

H: We have refused approaching by the Ten to do so and we are going to continue to maintain that position.<sup>8</sup> If we get into an OAS debate while these talks are still going on, it would serve no purpose other than to complicate our position of sketching a position.

M: There are two points missing. I understand and it is fine you are coming here and in the next 48 hours the fleet will not go on advancing toward \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>9</sup> Is that correct?

H: I cannot get them to change their fleet movements until we have an agreement.

M: I see.

H: But in the agreement are specifics to take care of that situation.

M: The second point is this. Our idea was that their attitude concerning the blockade; will they continue strict blockading or will they have a flexible blockade. Our information is there are many submarines in the zone, far more than what I think the British could have sent.

H: They could have as many as four or five from our estimates. I think it is important nobody test that blockade until we have talked.

M: Anything can happen in that area because as we told you, we are afraid that there are all nationalities of marines in that area. It is important that they be very careful in that area. If you could get this to the British, it would be worthwhile.

H: I will do so.

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<sup>8</sup> See footnote 2, Document 98.

<sup>9</sup> Goldberg added "Ascension Isl." by hand where the transcriptionist left a blank underscore.

M: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for calling and for your statement and for your good will. I hope in a couple of hours you will be receiving our general ideas which I think you will find in some aspects even far more generous than what they are expecting.

H: I am pleased to hear that. I am grateful to you for what I know must be an unprecedented human effort.

M: . . . if we have this visit from you to announce we will suspend our Rio Treaty call and we will be expecting you tomorrow night to begin talks on Friday.<sup>10</sup> Anyhow, if you receive my papers before you leave Washington, I would appreciate your comments.

H: (agrees to look for papers)<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Goldberg underlined the phrases “visit from you to announce we will” and “Rio Treaty call” in this sentence.

<sup>11</sup> Goldberg underlined “look for.” In the space below this sentence, Goldberg wrote: “Recall—AMH concerned about the FM’s health—reflected in fact that AMH did not want to go to Argentina on 4/15/82 *too late* as it would add fatigue to Costa Mendez—so AMH said, ‘You have to look at the schedule from their perspective as well as our *own*.’”

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# **118. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1982

## SUBJECT

Political Implications of Argentine Military Activity in the Antarctic

*The British Embassy asked us April 8 (Tab 1)<sup>2</sup> to seek assurances from Argentina that it would take no action against British scientific stations*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0970. Secret. Drafted by Jones and G. McCulloch (ARA/RPP); cleared by M. McLeod (L/OES), Alberti, J.P.A. Bernhardt (OES/OPA), D. Jones (FWG), Monroe, and McNutt. Jones initialed for all clearing officials; McCulloch did not initial. Haig initialed the upper right-hand corner of the first page and underneath this wrote “agree.”

<sup>2</sup> At Tab 1, but not printed, is telegram Tosec 50082/96333, April 10, in which the Department transmitted the text of the British Embassy request to Haig in London. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0973)

*in Antarctica*. A legal analysis sent you on April 10 (Tab 2)<sup>3</sup> concluded that *any military activity* not in self-defense, south of 60 degrees south latitude, including exercises, *would violate the Antarctic Treaty*.

A recent CIA study argued that, “Perhaps more than any other country, Argentina is likely to abrogate the Treaty if its primacy in its claim area is threatened. For example, if another country began a significant unilateral exploration or exploitation effort in the Argentina claim, Argentina might well react with military force even though the Treaty forbids it. *All but one of Argentina’s eight permanent stations are run by the military,*” and *it has an all-weather airstrip capable of handling C-130’s*. (Tab 3)<sup>4</sup> All of the Argentine territorial claim lies within the British territorial claim, and all the British research stations are within the Argentine claim. In addition, the Argentine and British claims overlap with that of Chile and contain research stations operated by Poland, the USSR and the U.S. Brazil has proclaimed a “zone of interest” within the Argentine claimed area.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

[2 lines not declassified] *We believe that Argentina is most unlikely to initiate hostilities as long as the U.K. does not. In the event of military or naval conflict in the Falklands area, further Argentine action against British interests in Argentina is likely. Likewise, the chance of some action in the Antarctic would increase. Even in those circumstances, we would not rate the chances as higher than one in ten, unless Argentina suffered major naval losses and casualties that drove it to seek any available opportunity for striking back.*

The factors restraining Argentine action are:

—An attack in the Antarctic would be strongly opposed by the 24 other parties to the Antarctic Treaty. We would expect it to be as disturbing to the USSR as to the others;

—*Seizure of the British stations would give Argentina no military advantage and under Article IV of the Treaty would neither advance nor consolidate its Antarctic claim, which already encompasses most of the British claim. The British claim does not stem from or depend upon its title to the Falklands, and the other Treaty parties would strongly resist any effort to change the present status of territorial claims;*

—*An attack on unarmed scientists would be far more widely condemned in the international community than was the attack on the Falklands;*

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<sup>3</sup> At Tab 2, not printed, is telegram Tosec 50097/96817, April 10, in which the Department transmitted to Haig in Buenos Aires the text of an information memorandum analyzing the implications of Argentine action against U.K. research stations in the context of the Antarctic Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0974)

<sup>4</sup> At Tab 3, not printed, is an excerpt from a June 1981 CIA study of the Argentine position on Antarctica. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0975)

—By undermining, if not destroying, the Treaty, Argentina would sacrifice a regime it helped negotiate, in which it has participated for 21 years, and which is working out rules for fish and mineral resource exploitation more beneficial to Treaty participants than any likely alternative regime. In particular, Argentina has an interest in continuing to exclude the Antarctic Treaty area from the draft Law of the Sea convention.

However unlikely it may be, an Argentine attack in the Antarctic would be highly detrimental to U.S. interest in preservation of the Treaty regime. *Should any such action become more likely, we will certainly wish to express our concern in the strongest terms in Buenos Aires.*

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**119. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1982

SUBJECT

US Military Assistance to the UK During Falkland Island Crisis

This memorandum provides an update on the military assistance we have been providing the British. A full report on intelligence cooperation is the subject of a separate memo.<sup>2</sup>

*Communications Support.* UK access to the US Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) has increased [less than 1 line not declassified]. We also have loaned the British five man-portable SATCOM radios to facilitate UK utilization of the DSCS link. The British also have requested a second channel on the USN Fleet Broadcast System [2 lines not declassified].

*Ascension Island Logistics Support.* A tanker carrying a partial load (approximately 2.4 million gallons) of JP-5 fuel is scheduled to arrive at Ascension April 24–25. The British probably will have to reduce somewhat the tempo of their air resupply and Nimrod operations until the tanker arrives. The 2.4 million gallons should meet British needs for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter. Haig initialed the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified and not found.



about three weeks. *DoD is working* with their UK counterparts *on follow-on fuel supply*.

We have not responded to the British request for additional US personnel to permit around-the-clock operation of the air control facilities at Ascension.

*Military Equipment.* You are current on the status of the British request for Stinger.<sup>3</sup> We also have received a request for night observation devices.

*Weather and Related Information.* We are *providing* the British with *weather information, oceanographic data etc.* Some of this information is obtained by weather satellites. Much of the data is being supplied in the context of an ongoing mutual exchange of weather information.

*Order of Battle and Related Information.* We have responded to British requests for intelligence about *Argentine military capabilities* and our estimate of their probable *operational effectiveness*. We also have provided them with our assessment of the UK-Argentine military balance in the area.

*Reconnaissance Information.* We are supplying the British [*1 line not declassified*]. Intelligence obtained from aircraft operations (PARPRO information) is not being provided.

*Miscellaneous.* In response to a British inquiry, we informed them that there were no US submarines operating in the Falkland area. We also are providing normal merchant ship data to the UK.

You also should know that the JCS believes that, if the US wanted to, we could provide some of the same kinds of information (e.g., weather, merchant shipping) to the Argentines in an effort to demonstrate US even-handedness. In many cases, however, even this information would not be of the same quality or detail that we are supplying the British. We note, moreover, that such an offer to the Argentines could easily open the door to their requests for additional information which we would not provide.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 111.

## 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 14, 1982, 2209Z

100276. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Message for President Galtieri.

1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Please deliver the following message from me to President Galtieri<sup>2</sup> as quickly as you can.
3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept President Reagan's and my deep personal appreciation for the patience and statesmanship which you have shown over the last 24 hours in the face of some extremely unhelpful press and public speculation about our discussions. We know these press stories have been a great burden to you and your government.

I will be proceeding to Buenos Aires tomorrow with some new ideas which I am convinced we can use to bridge the significant gap which still exists between the parties, provided both governments show additional flexibility and statesmanship. These thoughts involve creating de facto conditions on the Islands which, in the context of the objectives of the negotiations, will ensure that Argentina's essential needs are met.

Hopefully all the parties involved in this delicate situation will be able to avoid feeding or overreacting to mischievous press stories in the days ahead. We must at all costs not lose sight of the many common objectives we have and the common danger we face that the situation, if not handled properly, could be used by common enemies to strike at us both. We must not let the situation be turned into a North/South problem at the instigation of the East.

I look forward to seeing you again Friday morning.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End text.

**Haig**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File (04/14/1982) (5). Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 100334 to London, April 14, the Department transmitted a similar message addressed to Pym from Haig. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4))

<sup>3</sup> April 16.

**121. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room and the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1982, 0114Z

198827. TDFIR–314/00604–82. Dist: 14 April 1982. Country: Argentina/United Kingdom/USSR. Subject: Argentine Plans To Deploy Part of Its Fleet; Argentine Hopes for U.S. Intelligence Support To Prevent Contact With the British Fleet; Argentine Willingness To Accept Soviet Intelligence Support If the United States Does Not Provide It (DOI: 12, 13 April 1982) Source: [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified].

1. On 12 and 13 April 1982, two Argentine Air Force generals said that the Argentine Navy and Air Force are currently avoiding any operations that might bring them into contact with elements of the British fleet or that might cause Argentine units to enter the British-announced zone of exclusion around the Falkland Islands. The Air Force generals said that this policy must be changed soon because the Argentine Government wants to put some of its fleet to sea to detect the locations of British ships. However, they said, the Argentine Government does not have accurate information of the general disposition of the British fleet and will thus be sending its units out “blind”; they added that a confrontation with the British is likely under this circumstance.

2. The Air Force generals said that the Argentine Government, using its Embassy in Washington, has already requested U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] on the disposition of the British fleet as an aid to avoiding conflict. They reiterated the necessity for this intelligence support; they said that if the United States does not provide this assistance, the Argentine Government will accept a standing offer from the Soviet Union to provide such [less than 1 line not declassified]. The two generals added that they are well aware that the U.S. Government has provided [less than 1 line not declassified] on Argentine forces to the British Government, and the U.S. Government must provide similar support to the Argentine Government if it wants to remain neutral in the current dispute.

3. [less than 1 line not declassified] comments.

A. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

B. Unsubstantiated reports have been filtered into the Embassy by Argentine Government officials, claiming that the Soviet Union has offered or has provided [less than 1 line not declassified] intelligence to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/15/1982 (1). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

the Argentine Government on the disposition of the British fleet. Those claims have not been confirmed. However, evidence has been received that the Soviet Union has provided other information to the Argentine Government on the aircraft carrier “Invincible”; [1½ lines not declassified].

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

## 122. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Caracas, April 15, 1982

### PARTICIPANTS

US  
Secretary Haig  
Ambassador Walters  
Ambassador Enders  
Ambassador Luers

Venezuela  
Foreign Minister Zambrano  
Interpreter

After an initial exchange of amenities re photographers which Secretary Haig described as one of the hazards of democracy, FM Zambrano thanked the Secretary for stopping in Caracas.

Secretary Haig then said he believed it would be helpful for him to give FM Zambrano a picture of the situation relating to the Falkland Islands. The Secretary had spoken to President Reagan last night, who had asked him to convey his highest esteem and regards to President Herrera Campins. The President recalled with great pleasure his discussions in Washington with President Herrera Campins. President Reagan had also expressed the hope that Secretary Haig could meet with FM Zambrano during his stop in Caracas. Secretary Haig said that with this difficult situation in the South Atlantic we would welcome their advice as we continue our efforts to find a peaceful solution.

First, the US has supported the UN Resolution 502 which has two primary operative paragraphs, withdrawal and a political solution; but the resolution did not imply a return to the status quo ante. Therefore, we are making an effort to maintain a balanced position recognizing that the situation was not balanced at the outset. We have longstanding,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Marqueta Airport, where the airplane transporting Haig and his party to Buenos Aires stopped for refueling.

highly intimate relations with Great Britain and when we say balanced position we mean that we do not go beyond our traditional relationship. The Secretary said he was trying to walk a narrow path. Basic problems reside in three areas.

First, the manner in which the forces would be withdrawn. This will be manageable. It was clear during the visit in Britain that the UK insists that all Argentine forces must be withdrawn before they would recall or even stop the fleet. Clearly Argentina expects greater simultaneity. This we think we can achieve.

The second range of problems involves the immediate situation we will have in the islands following withdrawal. Here the British position is hard. They are insisting, as a matter of principle, on the return to the status quo ante on the grounds that the application of force to change the status quo ante cannot be accepted. In Buenos Aires, not only as a matter of principle, but we believe in order to survive politically, they are insisting on the retention of the Governor of the islands and the maintenance of the Argentine flag. Here we have developed some possible solutions but the flexibility that the Argentines can demonstrate in this area is intimately dependent on the third range of problems.

The ultimate disposition of the islands. Here we have great differences. On one hand the UK insists that sovereignty is not in question. The UK focus is not on sovereignty but on self-determination and the will of the inhabitants. Argentina conversely insists that historically the islands have been Argentine and, secondly, they are confident that the rules and regulations that have governed the islands make it impossible for self-determination to manifest itself except in the direction of continued allegiance to the United Kingdom. There is much truth in that argument. What we are trying to do is solve the three problems.

The first is easiest but tension-laden.

The second is easier for the UK than for the Argentines.

The third is an area of more concern to Great Britain and will lead to ultimate realization of an outcome that may already be evolving in a legal sense.

We have just now received the first serious proposals from the Argentines. The Secretary does not believe that these proposals can be accepted in London. We are awaiting London's ideas this morning. They will focus on sovereignty but will not use the word. Nevertheless, the process must lead to the ultimate solution.

It is our great concern as we try to solve this problem that it not become a North-South issue nor an East-West issue. There is great danger that both may happen if we do not get a solution. It has been a very frustrating process. Some progress has been made on important questions, but there is still a long way to go.

FM Zambrano said he was very grateful that the Secretary had chosen to pass through Caracas on a refueling stop on his trip but the Venezuelans very much hope to receive him on another occasion, not as a refueling stop, but on a visit to their country.

President Herrera Campins had charged FM Zambrano expressly to ask Secretary Haig to convey to President Reagan the happy memories he retains from his visit to Washington and the friendship he shares with the President of the United States. The Venezuelan President asked the Minister of the Presidency also to accompany the Foreign Minister to his meeting with the Secretary, but at the last minute he had not felt well and was unable to come. President Herrera Campins is very conscious of the importance of the Secretary's mission and expressed his wishes for a happy outcome.

For the Venezuelans the matter has some special aspects the FM would like to transmit to the Secretary, so he could understand their approach to this matter. Venezuela has a territorial claim, analogous to that of Argentina's, resulting from the British occupation in the last century of a vast expanse of territory belonging to Venezuela. The US presence in the last century has been of special assistance in leading Venezuela to seek a judicial solution through the International Court of Justice. The Court's award had many shortcomings into which he would not go. On the eve of Guyana's independence the Venezuelans recognized the situation and signed a treaty in Geneva in which judicial means would be applied to a political situation. This was the fundamental difference between the Venezuelan claims and the Argentine claim. Argentina is now in the phase in which Venezuela found itself prior to the 1899 award. Venezuela's claim was advanced under the treaty and they were convinced that if good faith was shown under the Geneva agreement with the UK and Guyana they would achieve a fair solution; but it will not be as clear to public opinion as it is to government officials who are familiar with the details. Public opinion could be easily aroused to demand that Venezuela follow the Argentine example. Yesterday's evening paper had even demanded this in an 8 column headline. He mentioned this to describe how Venezuela public opinion is very sensitive. The Venezuelan government will have to be very careful to avoid negative results. Another element of an emotional nature is the fact that at the turn of the century the UK, Italy, and Germany blockaded Venezuelan ports in order to collect debts in arrears. The Argentine FM Luis Drago formulated the Drago doctrine that force should not be used to collect unpaid debts and to deny the right to blockade for this purpose. This contributes to an emotional public opinion and would require a certain caution.

On the other hand the Venezuelans noted with some concern that the small islands of the Caribbean, which have sentimental ties to Great

Britain, support the British despite Venezuela's strenuous efforts to incorporate them into the hemisphere. This attitude is working against Venezuelan efforts to develop a good relationship with those countries. For all of these reasons the Venezuelans attach special value to the immense work the Secretary of State was doing.

It is important to prevent a disastrous confrontation which would complicate the North-South and East-West tensions. For this reason when he received the Secretary's kind invitation yesterday and the final paragraph referred to the importance of not invoking the Treaty of Rio so as to give you time to work on this matter he accepted the wise suggestion. A resolution by the OAS could be meaningless and would lead to criticism. We should not jeopardize the unity of the hemisphere. A different solution could blow the organization apart and lead to resentments we should seek to avoid. Nevertheless, he felt that we should not let too much time go by before a meeting of the organization. It is important for the system that it should function so that if circumstances demand it we will have a body that can act.

Secretary Haig said that what Mr. Zambrano said is very important. Yesterday in a talk with Argentine FM Costa Mendez<sup>2</sup> the Secretary suggested to him that we must delay calling on the OAS or invoking the Rio Treaty while we are deliberating, certainly for the next 72 hours, now that we are involved in serious negotiations. As the FM knew the US has not joined the European 10 on economic sanctions<sup>3</sup> and this had created some resentment in Great Britain. We have resisted such pressure but if the Treaty of Rio is invoked we will be faced with exactly the opposite situation. We will have a split between the English-speaking peoples and the Spanish-speaking peoples. In the event of a clash, US public opinion will inevitably push US policy towards Britain. This was a matter of great urgency and he is pleased that Costa Mendez understands this. He believes that Argentina will not act until the completion of our next round of talks and we hope our friends would "cool it" for now. Whether we have to change that attitude depends on success or failure. He would be very prudent and try and handle this in a sensible way but there were many contradictions in this situation.

FM Zambrano said that it could involve all of us. Secretary Haig said that we are very sensitive to this and that is why we feel obliged to keep the Venezuelans fully informed as our talks proceed. In that way they will be better able to manage the internal pressures. Frankly right now he had no good news to offer.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 117.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 98.

FM Zambrano said that really the solution lay in the three orders of problems. In the UN Panama had presented an appeal to repeal Resolution 502. The UK fleet is continuing to sail south. The Argentine wish for the fleet to stop is difficult but conceivable. In the second order of problems we must find a formula to control the UK and the Argentine pressure, to maintain both flags. It will be difficult but it should be possible. There is a very limited space to negotiate these problems. Evidently national pride and the survival of the governments of both countries is at stake. Yesterday in Caracas an Argentine Christian Democrat Jose Antonio Allende told how the issue has rallied political support for Galtieri so that, if he is unable to secure a favorable result for Argentina, Galtieri's government will fall. In the UK the situation is similar. If the British fleet returns with no results, people will not understand and the British government will fall.

Ambassador Enders said that Argentina would not accept recourse to the International Court of Justice. The British wanted it but this is unacceptable to Argentina.

FM Zambrano said that Venezuela has similar concerns but they would have many reservations about a recourse to the ICJ. It was a political body and Venezuela had a bad experience with its decisions this century. This experience has destroyed their confidence in it.

Secretary Haig said that in the light of recent history the Argentines have a strong legal case and that is also true in the light of earlier history. We will have to work with great ingenuity.

[Omitted here is discussion of Central America.]

FM Zambrano asked if the Secretary wanted to say anything to the press as only he could speak for the US.

Secretary Haig said he thought it better for the FM to say that they had a thorough discussion of the situation in the South Atlantic and other matters of mutual concern such as Central America. He could say that you found the talks most beneficial.

FM Zambrano said that it was a great pleasure to have had these discussions with the Secretary and if he wished to stop in Caracas on his way back he would be most welcome.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary replied that if that was the route perhaps he would, but it would be better to go to London.

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<sup>4</sup> During a brief stopover en route from Buenos Aires to Washington on April 19, Haig again met with Zambrano at the Caracas airport. The conversation during which Haig discussed the outcome of his talks with the Argentines, is summarized in telegram 3111 from Caracas, April 20. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/20/1982) Haig made a brief statement and had an exchange with reporters; see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 84.



**123. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 15, 1982, 1901Z

8241. For the Secretary. Subj: Message From the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Secretary Haig: Falkland Islands.

1. S–Entire text.

2. Begin text:

Thank you for your friendly message<sup>2</sup> which I have just received. As I have said to you, and indeed to the British Parliament and people, we in London are most grateful for the efforts which you are making to resolve the Falkland Islands crisis. We realise that the determination and stamina required are very great. We send you our warmest wishes for your crucial meetings in the coming days in Buenos Aires.

Since your most recent visit and our subsequent talks by telephone, we have been thinking further about the position reached in your efforts to promote a settlement and about the draft memorandum which we have been discussing.<sup>3</sup>

There is one matter which greatly concerns the Prime Minister and myself and our other colleagues. Recent experience has proved that Argentina is willing to resort to aggression. Having been the victim of one sudden attack, then assuming that your present efforts are successful and Argentine troops are withdrawn, we could not risk the same thing again. We therefore need to ensure that the Islands are protected from further aggression in the future. This is a general requirement, but one particular aspect of it is that Argentina might use the airfield at Port Stanley, only 350 miles from the mainland, to introduce large numbers of troops quickly and conveniently, without our being in a position to prevent this.

We in London believe that the best way of minimising these risks would be a concrete arrangement involving the United States, which would provide an effective deterrent to Argentine use of force. The methods of achieving this can be discussed further. But I must emphasise that an arrangement of this kind is of the utmost importance to the British Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/15/1982 (3). Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 120.

<sup>3</sup> See Tab A, Document 112.

Before your departure from London on 13 April, you gave me a revised text of paragraph 8 of the draft memorandum.<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, this text as it stands presents considerable difficulties for us. The word ‘decolonisation’ would in any case be unacceptable to Parliament, given the importance to this country of the wishes of the Islanders which, as you know, remain paramount for us. I enclose a formula for paragraph 8 on lines which we could accept. For us, the important element is to provide a sounding of the opinion of our people on the Islands. If the Argentinians seem reasonably inclined to a solution on the lines envisaged, but argue for more explicit account to be taken of the idea of decolonisation, I hope that you will impress on them the significance of the reference to UNGA Resolution 1514.<sup>5</sup> If, however, you felt it essential in order to reach full agreement, we would be prepared to consider adding to the text after ‘these groups of Islands’ the phrase ‘within the framework of the provisions of the UN Charter relating to non-self-governing territories.’

New formulation for paragraph 8 of the draft memorandum: December 31, 1982 will conclude the interim period. During this period, the signatories shall negotiate with a view to determining the future definitive status of each of the three groups of Islands consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2625 (XXV)<sup>6</sup> and, so far as Islands with a settled population are concerned, in accordance with the wishes and interests of that population, which shall be ascertained by a sounding of their opinion to be supervised by the special commission. If it is not possible to complete the processes envisaged in this paragraph by December 31, 1982, the interim period may be extended for (three) months by agreement between the parties.

End text.

**Louis**

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<sup>4</sup> See Tab B, Document 112.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 16.

<sup>6</sup> Titled the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted October 24, 1970, stipulated that states had the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state or in any manner inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations.

**124. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1982, 1943Z

Tosec 60014/101388. For the Secretary from Jerry Bremer. Subject: Message From John Nott.

1. Entire text–Top Secret.
2. Following is the text of a letter from Minister Nott to you delivered by the British Ambassador this afternoon.

3. Begin text:

Dear Al,

Our intelligence suggests that one or more Argentinian submarines may be operating inside the maritime exclusion zone, which clearly contravenes our notice to mariners which established the zone. I felt that you should know this immediately as you will appreciate the very real dangers.

Yours ever, John Nott. End text.

**Eagleburger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams, Lot 12D215. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Bremer and cleared in S/S–O. Haig was then en route to Buenos Aires.

## 125. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

ALA 82–10059

Washington, April 1982

### Falkland Islands Dispute: Economic Impact (U)

#### *Summary*

The sanctions against Buenos Aires stemming from the Falkland crisis probably will have minimal impact on the Argentine economy in the next 30 to 60 days. The limitations on imports by the United Kingdom and the European Community from Argentina will require some time to take effect. Although there have been a few loan cancellations, Buenos Aires still is far from financial disaster. And, even though some serious technical problems are arising in covering obligations to British banks, there appears to be enough interest on the part of both debtors and creditors to arrange mechanisms to service Argentina's external debts.

Beyond the next few months, the duration of the conflict and the intensity of British measures will be important factors in determining how much disruption occurs to Argentina's economy and foreign financing. At the limit, Buenos Aires has reserves adequate to meet its debt obligations and basic import requirements over the next three to five months, so long as the British do not choose to blockade Argentine merchant shipping. Such a lengthening of the crisis would, however, add to existing Argentine economic problems and substantially raise the risk of a generalized debt rescheduling in 1982. Moreover, the political fallout of growing inflationary pressures and shortages would seriously constrain the Galtieri administration's options for stabilization policies.

In the event of a major armed conflict that seriously impaired Argentina's ability and willingness to service its external debt, many US and European banks that have lent heavily to Argentina would suffer serious profit declines or even net losses, but the international banking system as a whole could probably manage with little lasting damage. The real danger to the international financial system is a combination of adverse events. A simultaneous loss of payments from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 83B00225R: Production Case Files (1982), Box 1, ALA 82–10059 Falkland Islands Dispute: Economic Impact. Confidential; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Information available as of April 15 was used in the preparation of the memorandum, which was prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and the Office of Global Issues in cooperation with the Department of the Treasury.

Argentina, Poland, and a few other large East European or LDC borrowers would be very difficult to manage without official intervention.

[1 line not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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**126. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces (Atkeson) to the Chairman, National Intelligence Council (Rowen), the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe, and General Palmer of the Senior Review Panel<sup>1</sup>**

DDI #3104–82

Washington, April 15, 1982

SUBJECT

What's Next in the Falklands?—Some Thoughts on the Tactical Problem

1. Everyone hopes, and many expect that the Falklands crisis will be resolved before the issue comes to blows. However, it is worthwhile at this juncture examining the matter from a military point of view to see how events may transpire if the current political efforts fall short of the mark. [5½ lines not declassified] three categories of military operations which the British task force might undertake upon arrival in the vicinity of the Falklands:

- Engage in a high seas naval confrontation;
- Blockade the islands;
- Assault the Falklands in an attempt to retake them.

2. All three of these categories have serious drawbacks from the British point of view:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Rowen forwarded the memorandum to Casey under a covering note on April 19. Atkeson prepared a follow-up memorandum, which examined the Argentine defensive position, for Casey and Inman, April 21. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982), Box 7, Folder 179: NSPG Meeting Re: Falkland Islands) Attached but not printed is a map of the Falklands/Malvinas, which labels the beaches referenced in the memorandum.

—The high seas confrontation (which would be attractive from a military standpoint) depends upon Argentine cooperation. The clear superiority of the British force in the open ocean is likely to deter the Argentines from venturing far beyond their land-based air coverage;

—A blockade of the islands could entail protracted deployment of the naval task force at great distance from support bases. Eventually it would have to be reduced or removed, probably before the Argentines would be obliged to remove their forces. Moreover, the indigenous British population may well suffer even more acutely from a prolonged blockade and occupation by an embattled, hostile military force;

—Assault is likely to cause casualties among the civilian population and between the combatants. This could vastly complicate the achievement of a political settlement in the short run, and contribute to an historical enmity between Argentina and the UK in the longer term.

3. These drawbacks notwithstanding, the British task force will have to assume one posture or another upon arrival in the contested area, assuming no political solution is forthcoming in the meanwhile. Barring Argentine acceptance of battle at sea, it comes down to blockade or assault. Blockade has an additional, near fatal drawback; it passes the initiative to the Argentinians. The Argentines can challenge the blockade or wait it out as they choose. In either case the strategic advantage is theirs, while the British are obliged to react as they can to whatever their adversaries do. Considering the shorter distances that the Argentines have to deal with and the likelihood that many small craft under air cover from the mainland could ferry supplies to the islands, it seems quite possible that they could keep their small garrison adequately provisioned for a longer time than the British could their rather larger commitment. Moreover, the extended deployment of British capital ships to areas in range of hostile land-based air would be a high risk posture for any length of time. The British must launch an assault—the earlier the better.

*Where?*

4. There is an advantage of seizing South Georgia first. Practically unopposed, the landing could be accomplished without much difficulty. The island would provide a rudimentary base and give the troops a chance to stretch their legs—perhaps to refresh their small unit tactics in the South Atlantic climate. Having loaded their troops onto commercial ships, the British probably need to sort themselves out before attempting a serious amphibious assault. South Georgia offers a convenient way station for staging. Three or four days may be sufficient for this purpose.

5. The main assault must be made on the Falklands themselves to settle the issue, if a military solution is in the cards. More than half of

the population lives on the eastern island, principally around Port Stanley. In World War II the eastern island would have been the immediate target, primarily to seize the airfield and the deep water anchorage at Port William. In this case, however, these objectives may be postponed until the latter phases of the operation. The British aircraft are helicopters and V/STOL, neither of which require an airstrip. The assault fleet includes five tank landing ships and an assault landing dock which, together with the helicopters, should be able to maintain an adequate ship-to-shore lift to keep the assault force (approximately 4,500 troops) supplied. Ultimately, of course, the British would have to have both the airfield and the port.

6. Good landing beaches exist on both the eastern and western islands (See Map). The best are reported to lie near Port Stanley and Salvador on East Falkland. Landings in these areas would rapidly bring the action to a point of decision. Unfortunately, decisive military action would very likely also be the most expensive in terms of both military and civilian casualties. The beaches on East Falkland are probably well defended, and may require extensive bombardment to subdue the defenses and to clear mines and other impediments.

7. Other beaches exist on the southern coast of East Falkland in Choiseal Sound and the Bay of Harbors. The assault force could put ashore in these areas and then move northeastward toward Port Stanley. Some difficulty would have to be anticipated in crossing the island, inasmuch as there is only one known gravel road suitable for vehicular movement and the principal terrain feature, the Wickham Heights, stretches across the island, almost from coast to coast, posing a natural line of defense against approach from the south. An advance along the east coast against Port Stanley would be an exceedingly risky maneuver without first seizing Mt. Kent, a 458 meter promontory to the west. A battle for the heights, even if only modestly defended, could prove to be an especially costly venture for the British.

8. A far more attractive option would seem to be a landing on one or more of the beaches on the southern side of West Falkland. Those in the neighborhood of Fox Bay West would place the assault force astride three roads leading inland, offering multiple axes of advance to the north and west. The sparsity of the population on the western island would hold civilian casualties to a minimum, while the capture of the island would afford the UK both political and military prizes.

9. From the political point of view, the effort would demonstrate the Government's determination and the Armed Forces' capability for protecting British interests. From a military point of view it would offer a strong vantage point from which the Argentinian supply line to the continent could be subjected to ready interdiction and from which a follow-on assault could be mounted against the eastern island,

if necessary. Adequate beaches exist on the eastern side of Falkland Sound for such an attack. This maneuver would outflank the Wickham Heights to the north if the battle had to be joined on the main island.

*How?*

10. We should recognize certain strengths the British have which they can exercise in a West Falkland scenario. First, their destroyers, frigates and Harrier aircraft provide them plentiful strike capability for subduing shore defenses and preparing the landing areas. Second, their assault helicopters (capable of carrying 20 men each) provide them an inland landing ability simultaneous with a surface ship-to-shore movement. Third, the carriers can be held out of areas of vulnerability most of the time. The Harrier V/STOL aircraft can be based ashore as soon as a secure enclave is in hand, and the carriers could be quickly withdrawn from the area, out of range of Argentinian land-based air. Fourth, the seizure of West Falkland would oblige the Argentinians to operate their aircraft at extended ranges from the mainland, except for those few which might attempt to continue to use the Port Stanley strip. The British could mount periodic attacks on the strip to insure its neutralization. Of course, the flexibility of the V/STOL aircraft would make the British relatively less vulnerable to corresponding attacks on their landing areas.

11. The British assault would not be without risk. The Argentine land forces are well trained and well led. The British must bring superior fire power to bear at the critical points quickly. April marks the autumn in the Falklands, and the beginning of the storm season. Cloud cover exceeding seven-tenths of the sky exists for an average of 22 days per month in April, gradually increasing in May and June. Cloud ceilings, limiting ground-air coordination, hang below 3,000 ft. about 40% of the time, and below 1,000 ft. up to 25% of the time. Aerial photo reconnaissance of Argentine defenses could be spotty and unreliable. Sea states suitable for landings of heavy equipment, such as tanks, may be interrupted for a number of days. Some of the beach areas are known to have submerged rocks which would be hazardous to landing craft. The British would probably have to employ underwater demolition teams to remove some of the obstructions.

12. Once ashore, the British force should be able to sustain itself with periodic resupply by helicopter and surface ship-to-shore lift. Casualties, detainees and prisoners could be evacuated by similar means, perhaps to the South Georgia base.

13. A potentially great advantage of an operation against the western island is that the British might be able to suspend operations once the island was secure and before much blood was spilt. The drama of a victory in the west might prove sufficient to cause Buenos Aires to



reconsider its actions and to allow London to moderate its position regarding the ultimate sovereignty of the islands. Grounds for settlement might well be achieved without a full-fledged battle in the populated sectors.

14. In sum, a West Falkland military scenario, coupled with appropriate political action, may offer the contestants the following:

*For the UK*

- Quick military “victory”;
- Preservation of its reputation as protector of its interests and responsibilities;
- Avoidance of heavy losses;
- Some basis for later friendship with Argentina.

*For Argentina*

- An image as a gutsy minor power not afraid of playing in the big leagues;
- Achievement of at least a prospect of sovereignty over the Falklands;
- Avoidance of decisive military defeat;
- Avoidance of heavy casualties.

**Edward B. Atkeson**

**127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1982

SUBJECT

Proposed Phone Call from President Galtieri of Argentina

*Issue*

President Galtieri of Argentina has asked to talk to you by phone today.

*Facts*

President Galtieri's office phoned the White House this morning to arrange a phone call between you and President Galtieri. We have set a mutually agreed upon time of 5:00 p.m. today.

*Discussion*

President Galtieri has made known that the call is not "urgent" but he wishes to continue the dialogue begun with you last week shortly before Argentine forces occupied the Falkland Islands.<sup>2</sup>

The best guess is President Galtieri is looking for reassurance from you that the U.S. remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the dispute and an evenhanded approach to the problem.

He may, however, raise some new points to be considered in the negotiations. More likely, Galtieri may seek your personal assurance that the United States is not providing intelligence and other forms of military assistance to the British during the crisis as was reported in the American press two days ago.<sup>3</sup>

It is important that Galtieri hear from you your personal concern regarding the crisis and your commitment to bringing about a peaceful resolution of the dispute. It would also be a good idea to phone Prime

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). No classification marking. Sent for action. Drafted by Fontaine. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Clark under an April 15 cover memorandum, in which he recommended that Clark sign it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 41.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 115.

Minister Thatcher in order to brief her on your talk with President Galtieri.<sup>4</sup>

Attached are talking points for your use in talking today with President Galtieri (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

*Recommendation*

That you talk to President Galtieri and then contact Mrs. Thatcher at the earliest convenient moment.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In an April 15 memorandum to Clark, Blair recommended that Reagan contact Thatcher after the Galtieri conversation “[i]n order to maintain our even handed approach” to the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. Instead of a telephone call, Blair noted, and “[b]ecause of the time difference, it makes most sense for him [Reagan] to send a message to London on the Cabinet line.” “In the message,” he continued, “the President will relay the essence of his conversation with Galtieri, and offer to talk with Mrs. Thatcher directly tomorrow morning if she thinks it necessary.” On the memorandum, Clark approved Blair’s recommendation that Blair contact the British Embassy to inform them of the plan to send Thatcher a message following the Galtieri conversation. (Reagan Library, NSC Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) For Reagan’s message to Thatcher, see Document 129.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand approved the recommendation.

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**128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1982

SUBJECT

MEMCON FOR SECRETARY HAIG ON PRESIDENT’S PHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT GALTIERI

For your information in your meetings with President Galtieri, attached is a verbatim transcript of the President’s phone conversation with President Galtieri tonight.<sup>2</sup> As you can see, it ran about 30 minutes.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The texts of the memorandum and the three referenced tabs were transmitted by the White House to Haig in Buenos Aires in telegram WH2019, April 16. (Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands Crisis 1982)

<sup>2</sup> According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Galtieri on a conference line from the White House Residence between 5:06 and 5:38 p.m., April 15. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

Galtieri did not raise much that was new nor did he bring up specific negotiating points. He did underline his obvious concern about the approaching British fleet. Galtieri also suggested unnamed nations might be exacerbating the conflict, and that U.S. media disclosures were unhelpful. The Argentine President ended with a rousing Argentine version of Western Hemisphere history and implied that the Argentines and North Americans share a common heritage of struggle against (British) colonialism.

President Reagan reiterated our search for a peaceful solution resolution of the dispute and called on the parties to be flexible and restrained in the coming days and weeks. The President also expressed his personal support for your mission.

I might add we read Galtieri as a worried man, but one not yet ready to retreat from previously established positions.

Word of the call leaked and as a consequence we prepared a short press release<sup>3</sup> which deals only with generalities. Then, so as to relieve any concerns on Maggie's part we notified Prime Minister Thatcher of the call through a cabinet line message.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Attached at Tab B but not printed. For the text of the press release, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 476.

<sup>4</sup> Attached at Tab C. See Document 129.

**Tab A**

**Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between  
President Reagan and Argentine President Galtieri<sup>5</sup>**

Undated

President: This is Ronald Reagan.

Galtieri: Good afternoon, Mr. President. This is President Galtieri of Argentina speaking to you. It's a pleasure to greet you, Mr. President. I wonder if you hear me well. I can hear you very well.

President: Yes, I can hear just fine, and I know that you wish to continue our conversations. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you. I'm at your disposal.

Galtieri: Mr. President, I'm very glad to be able to speak to you once again as a follow-up to our first conversation that we had which, perhaps, was not very fruitful on the night of April 1<sup>6</sup> at a time from our standpoint the essence of the issue was resolved and we were not in a position to accede immediately to your request. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

President: Yes, just fine.

Galtieri: Mr. President, I think it is highly important for Argentina, for us to have assistance, the assistance of your government, in this very difficult situation, that we are experiencing in our relationship with Great Britain which, among other things, is affecting the solidity of the Western World. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

President: I can hear you, yes, very well.

Galtieri: Mr. President, it is the profound wish, my personal wish, and that of the government, and the people of Argentina, to see to it that this situation does not continue to deteriorate. And it is furthermore our wish that with the assistance of the United States, that both countries seek an acceptable solution within the framework of UN Resolution 502 taking into account the whole background of this problem that goes back 150 years both from the standpoint of the bilateral relationship as well as all that has been debated, all that has been, the way the problem has been dealt with, the whole record of the UN in its debates of the problem of the past 16 years with reference to the issue of decolonization around the world. Did you read me, Mr. President?

President: Yes, I have all of that.

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<sup>5</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 41.

President: Was that all the President wanted to say BEFORE, or do you want a response from me now or does he have more?

Galtieri: Mr. President, going on for one more paragraph, if you would allow me, I also wish to have you realize that with the advance of the British fleet toward the South Atlantic region we feel that there is an increasingly dangerous situation, not only between our two countries, between the two countries involved in the South Atlantic, but it also our concern that this issue not deteriorate to a point where other nations might become involved and that this might not become tangled up and exacerbated by outside interests. We wish to continue the good relationships that have been established between our two governments, your administration and my administration, over recent times, relationships which have become so close, Mr. President, and for this reason we wish to continue this relationship with reference to all aspects of the international scene and within this context it is my fear that if the British continue their hostilities in the direction of the South Atlantic region the situation may slip out of our grasp; may slip out of our control and become an extremely delicate issue for the world at large. Did you understand me, Mr. President?

President: Yes, let me just say I'm committed to a peaceful resolution of this dispute. This is important to us because as I've said both countries involved, yours and Great Britain, are friends of ours so our good offices will continue to be extended to you both. Now, Secretary Haig will be arriving in Buenos Aires in a few hours to continue our efforts, and he is my personal representative and I have full faith and confidence in him. Now, Mr. President, I am committed wholeheartedly to a peaceful resolution of this dispute. I agree that a war in this hemisphere between two Western nations, both friendly to the United States, is unthinkable. It would be a tragedy and disaster for the Western world, and a bitter legacy for future generations of Argentines, Britons, and Americans. The only one who could profit from such a war would be the Soviet Union and its slave state allies, and it would be a common misfortune for all the rest of us. So I hope that we can work out a solution to this. Over.

Galtieri: Thank you, Mr. President, I share your views. But with the passing of every hour and with the continuation of the blockade by Great Britain along our coasts and as the British fleet continues to advance toward the South Atlantic, I fear that whether we wish to see this or not, this may bring about some serious misfortune that we will not be in a position to pinpoint or to keep under control immediately and will have the consequence of aggravating the present situation. And this is why I think that we must be very careful in regard to this because it is obvious that there are attempts also on the part of the

American press<sup>7</sup> and the world press as we noticed in some of the coverage yesterday, in particular to bring about some split in the very good relationships that have been established between our two countries in recent times; between our governments, our two governments, our two nations, and between our two administrations. For this reason I fear that as time passes we may be faced with certain events that would be very difficult to bring under control. It goes without saying, Mr. President, that I am thankful to you for dispatching Secretary Haig once again to Buenos Aires and, of course, I will again be in touch with him tomorrow and we will have lengthy conversations tomorrow to focus on this problem which is of grave concern to us. Over.

President: Mr. President, as I said, I sincerely hope that we all can reach an agreement soon. And I share your fears about some inadvertent act creating the trouble that you will be unable to retreat from. I know that you and the British Prime Minister are leaders of courage, principle and determination and we're going to need all of that in these days ahead. We're also going to need, though, flexibility and restraint from both you and the British. And, if we have that we can get through this together. I know we have a ways to go but there must be a just and peaceful solution to this very serious matter and one that, as I said the other night when I spoke to you, that takes into consideration the interests of those people living on the islands. And, Secretary Haig will be with you soon and I will be relaying what we have just said to my own staff here, and again you have my assurance about him and that he is my personal representative. It's a most sensitive situation and I want to assure you that I know others have used propaganda to try and indicate that there is some division between us. We are doing nothing to undermine our role as an honest broker in these talks. Peace, Mr. President, is our common cause. To preserve peace between our two good friends, you and Britain. That is my personal goal. And that is our single objective. We've been careful to maintain good relations with both you and the British, because if we didn't we couldn't continue to offer our help in this. At the same time, failure to live up to existing obligations, going beyond them, would jeopardize our ability to play an honest role. The role both Argentina and the United Kingdom want. So, I want you to know that we are maintaining this neutral attitude. I hope we can continue to, if fighting breaks out this will be much more difficult. I have undergone some criticism myself simply because we're trying to remain neutral. But I intend to do that as we continue to negotiate this and I just hope and pray that there will be no hostile act from either side while we continue to work this out.

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 115.

Galtieri: I thank you very much, Mr. President, I'm sure that you are aware that the purpose of this call was to continue the dialogue that we had initiated on the first of April for a direct communication between two presidents and to continue the cordial and friendly relationships in the understanding that has been developed between both countries in our search on behalf of the Western world for solutions to our problems in order to avoid any divisions or splits between us. I only wish to add, Mr. President, the following consideration. The people of the United States in 1776 (sic)<sup>8</sup> and the Northern Hemisphere began their struggle against colonialism and achieved their independence. We, in the Southern Hemisphere, began this struggle in the last century, perhaps somewhat later than you did, and we achieved independence for our people and now on the 2nd of April 1982, we have tried to make this independence complete. Perhaps achieving complete independence, as I said, later than you did, Mr. President. I hope that you can appreciate our sentiments in this regard, Mr. President. Over.

President: I understand your concern and assure you again that we are going to stay in this with the sincere hope that we can help bring about a peaceful solution and maintain the friendship that we have with the nations of the Western world and I appreciate your calling me and look forward to hearing from Secretary Haig after you have had a chance to discuss matters with him and so I will say thank you again and good night.

Galtieri: Talk to you again, Mr. President, thank you very much.

Galtieri: Good night to you, Mr. President. We'll talk again, some time.

President: Good night.

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<sup>8</sup> As in the original. An erroneous reference to the beginning of the American Revolution in 1776.



**129. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1982, 2353Z

Dear Margaret:

At his request, I have just talked with General Galtieri concerning the Falklands Island crisis.<sup>2</sup> I wanted to relay to you a summary of that conversation. In view of the late hour in London, I have sent you this message, but we can talk on the telephone tomorrow morning if you think it necessary.

General Galtieri reaffirmed to me his desire to avoid conflict with your country, and his fears that conflict would cause deterioration in recently improving relations with the United States. He said that the advance of your fleet and the blockade of the islands were making his situation difficult. I told him that I shared his desire to avoid conflict, and urged him to be forthcoming and flexible in his negotiations with Secretary Haig, who had my full faith and confidence. Without making specific suggestions for further steps to me, General Galtieri promised to deal honestly and seriously with Secretary Haig.

I would like to add that we greatly appreciate the hospitality you have shown to Al during his two visits. We are also grateful for the receptivity you have shown to our efforts to find a common ground between your country, one of our closest allies, and Argentina, with whom we would like to be able to cooperate in advancing specific interests in this hemisphere.

Warm regards,

**Ron**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret; Flash. Sent via Cabinet Office channels in telegram WH2011.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 128.

### 130. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

April 16, 1982, 0330Z

Secto 6020. Subject: Falkland Islands Crisis.

1. The situation has become distinctly more ominous. I base this assesment on several recent developments:

A. Today's Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. This may be a response to British rhetoric and yesterday's tragic revelations about US intelligence and logistical support for the UK. More than anything, it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor.

B. I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic demand all along: Control of the Falklands, *de facto*, if not *de jure*.

2. An optimist might argue that these signs reflect posturing for what both sides know is the final round. This may be especially true of Buenos Aires with me enroute there to extract concessions. A pessimist would take these developments on face value, based on the premise that rational statesmanship gives way to more powerful impulses—not easily controlled by the leaders themselves—as war grows more imminent.

3. As I see it, the truth is probably somewhere in between. I should have a much clearer fix on the Argentine state-of-mind by late tomorrow. But we should begin to prepare ourselves for the worst.

4. In this regard, I may need very soon to seek your decisions on two critical questions.

A. Whether and how far to push Mrs. Thatcher to come forth with a significant concession?

B. Whether and how to break off this mission if its futility becomes clear?

5. On the first question, I am beginning to think that our only hope is that the British will come to realize that they cannot, in any event, resist the course of history and that they are now paying the price for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/16/1982 (1). Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State. Sent from the Secretary's aircraft.

previous UK vacillation on the question of sovereignty. It is still too soon to say whether they will be able to make a major move by accepting local conditions that permit evolutionary change on the Islands. This, of course, would risk an ultimate change in the Islands' status as a result of a more open and natural process of self-determination than the British have thus far been willing to permit. Whether you should, or could, push Mrs. Thatcher to this bitter conclusion—with all that it would mean to her, our relationship, and our own principles—will require very careful thought.

6. On the second question, we must think—and think quickly—about whether there is value in continuing this process and our role even though it will lead nowhere.

It may well be that the Argentines make significant concessions and adopt a position that is fair and reasonable when seen in the historical context of this crisis. In that case, we should certainly go on to London and be prepared to place heavy pressure on the British, recognizing the costs but assessing the alternative—war—as worse. The burden of flexibility, and the onus for failure to achieve a peaceful outcome, will then be squarely on the British. If the Argentines are intransigent, we will have to consider having me return to Washington. We may find that we are not in a position to make a basic decision on our role until after a full round in both Buenos Aires and London. But we must be ready to decide as early as this time tomorrow.

7. At this point, the odds of avoiding war still appear very long. We could reach a flash-point at any time.

**Haig**

**131. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 16, 1982, 10–10:40 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Ambassador Vernon C. Walters

Argentine President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri

Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez

Admiral Moya, Chief of Military Household of The Presidency

President Galtieri welcomed Secretary Haig. The Secretary said that he brought President Galtieri a message from President Reagan of our President's hope for a peaceful solution.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary knew that the two Presidents had a good and useful conversation.<sup>3</sup> Their problems were different, but he had found a moderate feeling in both capitals (Washington and Buenos Aires).

The Secretary said he knew that Argentina was ready for war if it came. This is equally true of the United Kingdom. For that reason, the situation could very soon become critical. It is important that we work out a solution. Our President is very concerned about the consequences of this conflict for the future. It could affect the entire strategy of the Free World. We had prepared a document.<sup>4</sup> It is well thought out and was based on the ideas we developed after our second visit to London. We found the atmosphere there better than on our first visit. He would tell President Galtieri what our proposal would do.

- 1) It would keep the Argentine flag flying in the Islands.
- 2) It would expand the Argentine role in the interim period.
- 3) It would guarantee a conclusion of negotiations by the end of the year.
- 4) It would guide the process by the principles of decolonization for the normalization of relations between the Islands and the Mainland.
- 5) It would immediately lift economic sanctions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa Rosada. The original handwritten version of the memorandum by Walters is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 128.

<sup>4</sup> See Tab A, Document 112.

6) It would guarantee American help throughout the whole process. In London, we insisted on negotiations that would lead to final sovereignty over the Islands for Buenos Aires.

What he was saying to the President is that neither side would get everything it wanted if we wish to arrive at a successful solution.

As time went on, the military position of the UK would improve; this might not be so, but that was the perception in London. If we let time go by, something could happen in a matter of hours. He was confident that both governments realized that a conflict would be disastrous for both and emotions would be more aroused. We must not permit time to catch up with us. We must make extremely serious efforts to resolve this situation or we will find an unenviable series of developments.

What we must do is provide for Argentina's immediate and perceived benefits for the sacrifices they have made. These can be visible, but far more important is a final solution for this problem that finally realizes their hopes. There will be a turning away from the status of a non-selfgoverning territory. If we do this, Argentina will have achieved not all it wants but enough to justify its agreement. He must say that we had extracted much of this from London, and we would have to extract more. If he had not thought he could, he would not have bothered to go.

Secretary Haig then said that if President Galtieri thought it useful, he could, at some point, present to the Argentine leadership our feeling of the gravity of the situation and the American proposals on the whole matter. President Galtieri asked if the Secretary was referring to the Junta, and the Secretary confirmed that that was the case; but only if the President thought it useful. President Galtieri did not reply directly to the Secretary's question as to whether he should see the other members of the Junta.

President Galtieri then said he wished to assure the Secretary that he had full confidence in the U.S. Government, in President Reagan, and in the Secretary himself. But speaking with the frankness that is possible between members of a family, he would tell the Secretary that he is not pleased with the fact that a number of people in the American Embassy were asking for visas to go to Uruguay. After all, it is not the summer season for people to go to the beaches in Uruguay, and this evidence of evacuation by Embassy people caused a bad impression and gave people the feeling that the U.S. might be preparing for a break in diplomatic relations.

Secretary Haig said this was absolutely not the case, and it would stop but, in the same confidence, he would tell the President that we had some intelligence reports [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that, in case a conflict broke out, some Argentine Services might take steps

against certain Americans.<sup>5</sup> President Galtieri said that this is nonsense, and he hoped we would not compare the Argentines to the Iranians. Secretary Haig said he feared someone had panicked.

President Galtieri said that there was a British Community here of over 20,000 people who, with the other members of their families, must total some 100,000 people, and they did not feel themselves in any danger.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez then said that he had a friend in the British Community, a leader thereof, who had told him that he was a wartime comrade of Foreign Secretary Pym in Tobruk and Italy and was flying to London to tell him that the British attitude was crazy.

Secretary Haig said he would stop any further such requests for visas.

President Galtieri said that such reports could spread to the press and create in the Argentine people a psychosis that the U.S. was preparing for a diplomatic break with Argentina.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez said that it could jeopardize the image of U.S. neutrality and the Secretary's mission if a perception arose that the U.S. was not neutral.

President Galtieri said that these requests could lead to an awkward situation internally in Argentina. President Galtieri said that we must try to avoid giving newsmen the opportunity to present Argentina in an unfavorable light.

Secretary Haig said that some of the stories that came out while he was flying to the U.S. had not been helpful either.

President Galtieri said that it was essential to tranquilize the press.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez said that the statement made today by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger was not very encouraging.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> On April 14, INR prepared an intelligence estimate on the threat to U.S. officials and citizens in Argentina stemming from the "combination" of "the extraordinary deep nationalistic fervor whipped up over the Falklands issue, the latent anti-Americanism that is seldom far from the surface in Argentina, and the perception of a U.S. 'tilt' toward the UK. In the context of an Argentine military defeat or any outcome that is perceived domestically as humiliating, these three factors would probably lead many Argentines in and out of government to view the US as responsible. US citizens could then become scapegoats exposed to a dramatically heightened security risk. They might well be subject to random harassment and violence simply for being US citizens, and US officials all the more so." Although the estimate concluded that it was "unlikely that Argentine intelligence and security units would be ordered to harm US citizens," individual officials "might indulge in unauthorized actions" and official services "might become less scrupulous in responding to the security needs of US citizens." (Telegram 100726 to Buenos Aires, April 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840730–0700)

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

Secretary Haig said that he spoke without authorization. The Argentines know what our President had said. The UK had been furious at our evenhandedness. So had Mrs. Thatcher. The Secretary went on that he must be frank. If open conflict began, U.S. public opinion would push us towards the UK. This was lamentable, and we must avoid it.

President Galtieri said that Secretary Haig must seek a peaceful solution for all of the reasons he had expressed; otherwise, we run the risk of splitting the Americas in two—those north of the Rio Grande and those south of it; some more and some less—but such a split would alter substantially the strategic panorama of the world.

Secretary Haig said that was why we must get to work with the Foreign Minister immediately.

President Galtieri said that he would be in his office and available all day to help them find a solution and overcome any problem that might arise.

Secretary Haig said he wished to assure President Galtieri that no one in the U.S., especially the President, felt they had encountered intransigence in Argentina. On the contrary, they had found good will and serious efforts.

President Galtieri said that the Argentines would give all guarantees covering the way of life and freedom of each individual who chose to remain on the Islands. The Argentines were also prepared to take into account present and future strategic needs of Great Britain as well as her economic interests.

Secretary Haig said he wished to tell them that, despite any other information they might be getting from other sources, he was convinced that economic matters had very little to do with the British position. What bothered them was the question of honor after a long period of humiliation. This was really the driving force behind their attitude.

President Galtieri then wished the Secretary and Foreign Minister Costa Mendez well in their work.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> No memoranda of conversation of Haig's discussions with Costa Mendez during the morning and afternoon, April 16, have been found. For Haig's brief summary of the course of the talks, which he sent to Reagan that evening, see Document 137.

**132. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 16, 1982, 1343Z

WH2039. Please deliver to Ambassador Shlaudeman for Secretary Haig. The following message was received this morning from Mrs. Thatcher.

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 15 April about your conversation with General Galtieri.<sup>2</sup>

I am sure that neither you nor Al Haig, following his most helpful visits here, are in any doubt that it is the strong wish of the British Government, Parliament and people to avoid conflict. We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government.

I regret that we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me—and I must state this frankly to you as a friend and ally—that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain who broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland Islands. That is the essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. When it has been taken, discussions about the future of the Islands can profitably take place. Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced.<sup>3</sup> The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered.

May I ask you to convey my strong feelings on this point urgently to Al Haig in Buenos Aires.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. Sent via privacy channels. On another copy of the telegram, Goldberg wrote that Haig received the telegram at 2 p.m., April 16. It was delivered to him during a meeting with Costa Mendez at the Foreign Ministry. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falkland Crisis—1982)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 129.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “by” and ending with “occupation,” placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to the sentence, and added the following annotation: “Mr. Secretary: You might recall the PM’s own words. 2 Arg [*entries?*] hardly represents ‘occupation.’”



We remain ready at any time to continue discussions with yourself and Al Haig. Our earnest aim is to avoid conflict. But it is essential that America, our closest friend and ally, should share with us a common perception of the fundamental issues of democracy and freedom which are at stake, as I am sure you do.

Warmest good wishes

Margaret

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**133. Action Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 16, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Dispute: Separating the Disputants

Larry:

*The lousy situation in the South Atlantic and the disastrous consequences that an actual outbreak of hostilities between the United Kingdom and Argentina would have on the Inter-American system and the interests of the United States in this hemisphere (Rio Treaty pressure to take sides, etc.), prompts this anxious memo.*

Those of us in the Latin American trenches, who in the last week at the OAS have been struggling to keep the delicately balanced Inter-American System from coming apart at the seams, have been thinking hard about any straws which might be helpful to Al in his efforts to extricate the British, the Argentines, and us from this dismal entanglement. As you know, before he left on his first trip, Al asked for any suggestions but I also am aware that his thinking must be far in front of whatever contributions we might make. *If the following thought is of any help whatsoever, I can help do up a cable to the Secretary but if it already is on our drawing boards or discarded please tell me and I'll stand down.*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1183. Secret; Nodis. Sent through Bosworth. Drafted by Johnson and Middendorf. On the first page of the memorandum, Middendorf wrote: "Larry—This is the memo I spoke to [you] about this morning. Bill." Above this note, Bosworth wrote: "Larry, I am also cutting USOAS into the broader contingency paper which we will have for you by COB. Steve."

*My concept is tied to a possibility of a negotiating deadlock, a flashpoint rapidly approaching in the South Atlantic but a remaining wish by both sides to avoid overt hostilities. Under such circumstances both sides might welcome a face saving way to separate their most immediate problem—hostilities—from the range of knotty problems concerning the islands themselves. There are really two issues here: one is immediate disengagement, and the second is negotiation over territory. It seems to me that as long as both sides appear to want to solve both issues at once, an impasse is more likely. Getting them to avert war, for now, is critical to pave the way for later agreements on the other issue.*

As the Great Nightfall approaches there must be growing doubts on both sides. *Both sides might now be persuaded to accept a temporary, at least, disengagement of forces, with face saving provisions, and options left open to re-escalate, if necessary. For us such an arrangement, if workable, would buy time.*

*The bare bones of such a formula could involve:*

*1. Disengagement:*

(a) The British agree for a set period of time to stay well out of the high risk area, perhaps pulling back to port facilities at Ascension or, say, Rio de Janeiro (the Brazilians would be helpful if both sides asked);

(b) The Argentines agree for a set period of time to phased troop withdrawals (perhaps an initial increment of 2,000 as the British fleet pulls back) and further 2,000 increments weekly based upon positive pre-agreed benchmarks in ongoing talks between the two sides.

The British, of course, would have to back off their declaration of a quarantine zone and the Argentines would have to back off their statements about keeping the Falklands fully fortified. Both, therefore, would have to be steered toward making statements that:

(a) pronounce their strong commitment to a peaceful solution;

(b) explain, therefore, this cooling off period to allow for negotiations toward a peaceful settlement; but

(c) make clear that they are not foreclosing their military options.

*2. Talks:*

I recommend we try to get both sides engaged in exhaustive talks at a neutral site such as *Bretton Woods* or another site that would be symbolic of peacemaking but would not increase our exposure, (or even *Camp David*, but only for the final signing of the definitive peaceful settlement) where their best negotiators and lawyers can compare briefs to their hearts' content. From such a meeting I foresee tedium, dwindling media attention (and thus less need to strike public poses) and perhaps even progress toward agreement on the thorny issues of sovereignty and administration.

### 3. *Their military options:*

While talks proceed, the British fleet would, if say at Rio, be in the neighborhood and able to get to the scene if the talks fail. At the same time the Argentines, though troop units had been phased down, would be able to reinsert their forces well before the British could return to the scene. Both sides should perceive that this costs little in terms of logistics.

Maybe this sort of framework for keeping both sides engaged and not fighting is workable. It is, in effect, a Howler Baboon solution (see attachment).<sup>2</sup> At least it is a last gasp possibility if all else fails. Let me know what you think.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The attachment is a quotation taken from the book *African Genesis: A Personal Investigation Into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man* by author Robert Ardrey.

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## 134. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1982

### SUBJECT

Exports to Argentina

Derek Thomas called Bob Blackwill this afternoon to say that the Embassy had heard there was a Bolivian cargo aircraft in Miami scheduled to fly on Tuesday, April 20th to Rio Gallegos, Argentina carrying communications gear. The British think they smell something fishy.

We have checked quietly and discovered that:

1. There is indeed a Bolivian plane in Miami, scheduled for a Tuesday flight to Rio Gallegos, due West of the Falklands.
2. It needs U.S. authorization to take off, which is issued by the CAB.
3. The cargo is “telephonic equipment.”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared by Blackwill.

4. We have issued no export licenses for any kind of military communications equipment to either country, but if it is civilian equipment, no licenses are required.<sup>2</sup>

5. The CAB (and FAA) who deal with the take-off clearances are mildly interested because of the destination, but have no plans to do anything at least until Monday.<sup>3</sup>

If we want to stop the plane or alternatively insure that it goes we should so inform the CAB. We will continue to check the facts in order to avoid another LANDSAT screwup. But if the information above does not change, I see no basis for stopping the Bolivian flight.

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<sup>2</sup> Burt drew an asterisk at the end of this sentence and wrote at the end of the memorandum: "Here we go again!"

<sup>3</sup> April 19.

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### 135. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Buenos Aires<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1982, 2048Z

Tosec 60058/102928. Subject: Eagleburger-Dobrynin Meeting on Falkland Islands, SSOD.

1. (Secret)—Entire text.

2. Acting Secretary Eagleburger called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin April 16 to present him with following non-paper on Falkland Islands issue:

3. Begin text:

—The disinformation campaign being waged by the Soviet Union regarding the role of the United States in the Falkland Islands crisis has been carefully noted by the United States Government and will not be soon forgotten. Soviet media commentary leaves no doubt that there is a deliberate effort underway to distort U.S. efforts to avert armed conflict. For example, *Pravda* on April 12 asserted that the U.S. effort to play the role of "honest broker" masked the fact that the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and Moscow. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

was siding with Britain and was engaged in secret military and political cooperation. TASS on April 13 claimed that the U.S. was planning to set up a “South Atlantic Treaty Organization” and to establish a military base in the Falklands. Radio Moscow broadcasts in Spanish have been even more tendentious, flatly accusing the U.S. of siding with the British and seeking a “foothold” in the South Atlantic.<sup>2</sup>

—The Falkland Islands issue is between Great Britain and Argentina. It is not an East-West issue, and it would serve no one’s interest to make it an East-West issue. U.S. actions are aimed solely at preventing bloodshed; we are seeking to prevent further military action by either side, and to lay the groundwork for a process which addresses the critical issues of self-determination.

—As Secretary Haig has made clear to you and to Foreign Minister Gromyko, both in New York and Geneva, Poland and other regional issues have placed a very heavy burden on U.S.-Soviet relations. We have discussed these problem areas at great length, together with arms control, and we are prepared to continue this dialogue. But we must underscore that involvement by the Soviet Union or its friends in the South Atlantic crisis would hopelessly complicate and perhaps irreparably damage our hopes for moving forward in relations with you. There must be no misunderstanding on this point. End text.

4. After reading the non-paper Dobrynin claimed that the U.S. press was also talking about a U.S. tilt toward the U.K. Soviet press accounts were not official government statements and were merely quoting other news sources. In any event, relations between the U.S. and its allies were not the USSR’s business. The USSR viewed this issue in the context of colonialism. Soviet involvement in the Falkland Islands issue should not be overstated: the nearest Soviet ships were hundreds of miles away.

5. The Acting Secretary responded that Dobrynin was entirely correct in noting that US-UK relations were none of the USSR’s business. Neither, in our view, was the Falkland Islands issue. For some twenty years Dobrynin had been arguing in Washington that Soviet media were entirely unofficial; the Acting Secretary saw no point in debating the point further. On Soviet involvement, the Soviet side should note that our non-paper said Soviet involvement would rpt would complicate our relations.

6. At the close of the meeting, Dobrynin gratuitously asked who would lead the US SSOD delegation. The Acting Secretary said that

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<sup>2</sup> A more complete translation of the referenced April 12 *Pravda* article, as well as the texts of the April 13 TASS article and April 14 Spanish-language broadcast by Radio Moscow, is attached to a typewritten version of Eagleburger’s non-paper for Dobrynin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820078–0820)

while, as Dobrynin knew, the President would address the SSOD, we had not yet determined who would head our delegation when the President was not in New York. Dobrynin supposed that permanent representatives would lead delegations but said he certainly hoped Gromyko would head the Soviet SSOD delegation.

Eagleburger

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**136. Memorandum From Dennis C. Blair and Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 16, 1982

SUBJECT

Suspension of the Haig Mission on the Falklands

*Issue.* Should the President suspend Secretary Haig's shuttle diplomacy after the current consultations in Buenos Aires?

*Judgments:*

—That the Argentines will offer no major concessions today to justify Haig going on to London;

—That Presidential pressure on Mrs. Thatcher for a major concession would both be unsuccessful, and would seriously damage U.S.-U.K. relations;

—That Haig therefore stands little chance of negotiating an agreement before the British fleet arrives (approximately 20 April).

*Discussion:*

—Suspension of what increasingly appears to be a futile mission prevents undermining of American diplomacy, and preserves the personal reputations of the Secretary and the President;

—Suspension may well *decrease* chances of conflict by removing illusions (particularly Argentina's) that U.S. can "deliver" the other side;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. A second notation in an unknown hand reads: "President has seen."

—Suspension will force UK and Argentina to face squarely the consequences of possible military defeat or stalemate, now that both gunboat diplomacy and third-party mediation have run their course.

*However:*

—Suspension of the mission will spark criticism that the U.S. “Failed to go the extra mile” for peace;

—Suspension removes restraint on Argentines who have said they publicly will not challenge U.K. military while Haig mediation efforts continue;

—The U.S. will be under greater pressure to take sides, either damaging relations with its closest ally, Great Britain, or ending cooperation with Argentina, and damaging relations with other Latin America countries which support Argentina.

*How to Disengage the Haig Mission*

—Without announcing the end of the mission, President today calls Haig back to Washington from B.A. for consultations;

—After consultations tomorrow with Haig, President announces (probably on TV) that Haig will remain in Washington until the two sides show more flexibility and a forthcoming approach;

—Haig explains in more detail that we have exercised our good offices, we have narrowed and identified the differences between the sides, but have failed to bridge them, after two visits to each capital, further visits are not warranted, but he is prepared to resume visits if conditions warrant it

*And Then*

—We must decide what public, diplomatic and military policies to adopt if conflict breaks out when the British fleet arrives.

**137. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 16, 1982, 2345Z

Secto 6024. Department pass to White House. For S/Klosson and S/S–Bremer. Subject: Message to the President From the Secretary of State.

1. Secret Entire text.
2. Mr. President:

As of 1900 hours local, we have completed first round with very little give here. Argentines now reviewing situation with President Galtieri and probably with Junta. Meanwhile, we remain in holding pattern at the Foreign Ministry. Nothing that has transpired thus far in this initial round changes the assessment I provided you from the aircraft enroute here yesterday.<sup>2</sup> We are not at point where break is inevitable. But events could unfold rapidly, even this evening. Warm regards, Al.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 130.



### 138. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 16, 1982, 10–10:30 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
 Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman  
 Ambassador Thomas Enders  
 Ambassador Vernon Walters  
 Argentinian Foreign Minister Costa Mendez  
 Under Secretary Enrique Ros

The conversation was conducted entirely in English.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez opened by saying that he had good news concerning the British marines and scientific personnel captured on South Georgia; they were safe. One American family and one other citizen from the Falklands would be arriving in Buenos Aires tomorrow. There is some confusion with the Swiss over the names.

The Foreign Minister then said he had met with President Galtieri and the Junta on the three points left in suspense. Paragraph 6 is okay. Regarding paragraph 10, the Argentine position is that always known to Ambassador Shlaudeman. He then showed the Americans the proposed Argentine version of this paragraph which demands an affirmation of Argentine sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary, after reading it, said that it was certain to be rejected in London. He asked whether the Foreign Minister had any flexibility on that paragraph. Costa Mendez replied that he had none; but that if it was accepted, then the Argentine position on paragraphs 6 and 8 would be easier.

The Secretary then said, "This means war." Ambassador Enders added that this is tantamount to a declaration of war.

Costa Mendez replied that this was simply the position Argentina had always maintained and that the UN Resolution affirmed.

Ambassador Enders said that there was quite frankly no mention of Argentine sovereignty in those resolutions. Costa Mendez replied that he honestly felt that the wording included the territorial integrity of Argentina.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Haig's suite at the Sheraton Hotel. The original handwritten version of the memorandum is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 141.

Ambassador Enders then asked whether the authorities of this country knew that their inflexibility meant war.

Costa Mendez replied that if the Secretary wanted to see the President and/or if President Reagan wanted to talk to the President, they could. He then asked whether the Secretary wanted to talk to the Junta.

The Secretary replied that he did. He had earned and deserved the opportunity to speak to them and tell them the consequences of their decision.

Costa Mendez replied that the Secretary had made superhuman efforts and deserved anything he wanted.

The Secretary said he would not want to go home without having had the opportunity to tell the Junta that their position probably means war as a consequence. He would not be hesitant to tell them.

Costa Mendez, visibly shocked, said that he felt he had been clear and honest and had been consistent in what he was saying all along.

The Secretary said that this would be a disaster for Argentina, and we would have to take a position in the case of an armed conflict.

Costa Mendez said it was not a consequence of any intransigence on the part of the Argentines.

The Secretary said he had made a real effort to bridge the gap between the two positions. He had told the Foreign Minister that neither side could obtain everything it wanted. He thought that everyone had seemed to accept that.

Costa Mendez then said that the Argentines had done their best.

The Secretary said he was willing to meet with the Junta; but it might be better to sleep on it and meet tomorrow.<sup>3</sup> Costa Mendez said he agreed that would be best and would give everyone time to reflect.

Secretary Haig said that he was sure the British would shoot when they received the message.

Costa Mendez said his advice was to wait until after the Secretary met with the Junta to send his message.

Ambassador Enders asked whether they had any doubt that this meant war with the British.

Costa Mendez said that the Argentines had not been in touch with the British; but he would rely on our word for it. He was surprised that the United Kingdom would go to the edge of war for such a small problem as these few rocky islands.

Ambassador Shlaudeman said that they would. Ambassador Enders said they would fight for the same reason as the Argentines would fight—for honor.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 142.

Costa Mendez replied that the Argentines had put up with this problem for 149 years.

Secretary Haig said that there was the same imperative on both sides. The judgment of history would be serious.

Costa Mendez said that they should sleep on the matter and thanked the Secretary for the efforts he had made.

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### **139. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 17, 1982, 0519Z

Secto 6027. Department please pass to White House. Subj: Memorandum From the Secretary to the President.

1. The Argentine Foreign Minister has just come back to me after seeing the Junta.<sup>2</sup> The language he delivered is unacceptable.<sup>3</sup> In essence, it calls for: 1) shared control in the interim period, with provisions that would permit Argentina to saturate the Islands and push out the Falklanders; (2) conditions for negotiations on a final settlement that amount to a prior agreement that the result will be the affirmation of Argentine sovereignty. What little flexibility there is in their position on interim control must be seen in the context of their rigid position that negotiations must lead to an affirmation of their sovereignty.

2. It has become increasingly clear that we are not dealing with people in a position to negotiate in good faith. I have spent hours negotiating with the Foreign Minister, as well as time with Galtieri himself, only to find that what is agreed ad referendum is then toughened substantially each time the Junta gets in the act.

3. I told the Foreign Minister that the latest Argentine proposal would assure war with the United Kingdom, and that I wanted to be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 138.

<sup>3</sup> Haig also informed Pym of the outcome of the meeting with Costa Mendez and of his forthcoming meeting with the entire Junta. In his brief message, Haig described the new Argentine response delivered by Costa Mendez as “very discouraging.” (Telegram Secto 6026 to London, April 17; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/17/1982 (1))

sure that Galtieri and the Junta were in no doubt about this. The Foreign Minister agreed and undertook to arrange a meeting. I have just been told that Galtieri will see me at 10:00 a.m. Frankly, I doubt that my message will register. Even if he and his colleagues can be convinced that the British are deadly serious, I doubt they can be brought really to grasp the tragic consequences for Argentina.

4. If, as I anticipate, I make no headway in the morning, I should depart immediately for Washington. It would be fruitless and unfair to Mrs. Thatcher for me to carry these proposals to London, thereby shifting the spotlight and onus onto her. I plan to make a brief, calm, yet clear departure statement that will leave no doubt that we are at an impasse because of Argentine inflexibility. I will be non-provocative, in hopes of preserving some chance for resuming this process and avoiding a sharp anti-American reaction here. I would propose to say that you have instructed me to return to Washington, and I ask that you cable such an instruction to me without delay. You should know that our Ambassador will now begin taking steps to assure the safety of our people here. In addition, Bill Clark should continue refining the plans that I discussed with him earlier in this crisis.<sup>4</sup>

5. It is of course possible that the Argentines will come to their senses by tomorrow and offer us something more forthcoming. In that unlikely event, we will need to make finer judgments about how to proceed, such as by going on to London or working the problem further here. However, it is important in any event that I have in hand before my meeting with Galtieri your instruction to return home. If the instruction does not fit the circumstances, I will be in touch immediately.

6. Assuming I leave, I will send, on departure, the text of the Argentine proposals to London. I will make clear that the US neither is advocating these proposals nor expects the UK to make the next move. I am quite sure the substance of the Argentine proposals will be made public by the British, and probably here as well. We will need to be prepared to refute any suggestion that we are associated with these proposals.

7. We will find that pressures will mount quickly to provide substantial US support to the UK, and clearly our thinking must now run in this direction. But it is important that I have a chance to return and discuss this with you before anything is done or said along these lines.

8. The need for discipline with the press has never been greater. Until I make my departure statement we should maintain total silence.

**Haig**

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

**140. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1982, 0806Z

WH2077. State Department: Eyes Only for Assistant [*Acting*] Secretary Eagleburger.

Begin text

To: U.S. delegation Secretary in Buenos Aires

From: The President

Subject: Memorandum for the Secretary of State From the President.

Begin text

1. I have reviewed your report of negotiations with President Galtieri and other officials of the Argentine Government.<sup>2</sup> From this distance, it appears that the President lacks the strength to carry the Junta even though he must surely know that failing to act with courage now merely forestalls his ultimate decline. I agree with your assessment that the terms offered provide no basis for compromise—especially the assertion of preconditions on negotiations for the final outcome.

2. It is conceivable as you say that enlightenment may occur overnight and, as a consequence, you should go ahead with tomorrow's meeting.<sup>3</sup> Failing such a change, you are directed to return to Washington to await a change in attitude.

3. At your meeting you should make clear to President Galtieri and his government the following points: (1) From the outset the United States believed it worthwhile to make a serious effort to bring the parties together in the interest of finding a peaceful solution, notwithstanding the considerable political vulnerabilities and criticism it would engender. (2) It did so because of our concern for the preservation of peace and our confidence that that concern was shared by both Argentina and Great Britain. (3) In that spirit it has come as a great disappointment now to receive a position of such retrogression as to call into question the value of continued efforts on our part. (4) Negotiations require a measure of good will and serious intent on both sides. (5) The United States remains willing to lend its assistance to the parties in seeking a solution. (6) The position of the Argentine Government

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information to the Department of State. Reagan initialed the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 139.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 142.

at this time is not, however, one which holds promise of continued progress. (7) Therefore, you have been instructed to discontinue your mission and return to Washington.

4. You may modify these points as may be necessary to underscore that by its shortsightedness the Junta has brought this upon itself.

5. I can understand your personal frustration and disappointment. You undertook an extremely difficult task and have carried the burden to its fullest potential at great personal sacrifice. For that you have my deep personal thanks, Al. I look forward to hearing of your sessions in some detail upon your return.

Warm personal regards.

Ronald Reagan

End text

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#### 141. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 17, 1982, 1345Z

Secto 6029. 1. Please deliver ASAP the following message from Secretary Haig to Foreign Minister Pym.

2. Dear Francis:

Further to my message of early this morning<sup>2</sup> —and as I go into my 10:00 a.m. meeting with the Junta—I want you to have the three key paragraphs we received last night from Costa Mendez following his meeting at Casa Rosada.<sup>3</sup> As I told you in my message, we are deeply disappointed. The Argentine paragraphs are totally unacceptable. I will be in touch with you again following my meeting. Al. End of message.

3. Begin Argentine paragraphs:

Interim Administration:

Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations to be hereafter implemented on the Islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the special interim authority, except in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/17/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Flash to the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 139.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 138.

event that the special interim authority deems such decisions, laws and regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue through the executive and legislative councils, which shall be enlarged to include an equal number of representatives appointed by the Argentine Government among local residents. The local police shall be subject to the general supervision of the special interim authority. The flags of each of the constituent members of the special interim authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

Links between mainland and Islands:

Full freedom of travel, transportation, movement of persons, residence, ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between the mainland and the Islands shall be recognized to the inhabitants of the Islands and to the Argentine nationals coming from the mainland on an equal basis.

The special interim authority shall make specific provisions on these matters in order to implement these freedoms, including arrangements for compensation of Islanders who do not wish to remain.

Negotiations:

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non-governing territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on conditions for their definitive status, on the basis of the implementation of the principle of Argentine territorial integrity and taking fully into consideration the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX)<sup>4</sup> and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

**Haig**

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<sup>4</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 2065, adopted December 16, 1965, invited the Argentine and U.K. Governments to proceed with negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the decolonization of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.

## 142. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 17, 1982, 10 a.m.–1:10 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Ambassador Vernon C. Walters

Argentine President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri  
Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya  
Lt. General Basilio Lami Dozo

President Galtieri welcomed the Secretary and was happy to give him the opportunity to meet with the other members of the military junta.

Secretary Haig said that he had frank and open discussions, but one drawback was that we were perceived in some quarters in Argentina as being the agents of Great Britain. Nothing could be further from the truth. He, himself, as well as President Reagan considered themselves as agents for the interests of the entire Free World and, in that light, had been working to strengthen relations between Argentina and the United States to increase the political and military security of all.

At the same time, the U.S. must advocate the respect for international law. The Secretary well understood the years of frustration for the Argentines in the light of the insensitivity of the British. We felt that we could achieve fundamental changes in two ways:

1. We must find a way to change the internal arrangements on the Islands but not in such a way as to cause a breakdown in relations between the US and the UK and, consequently, Western Europe. All of the Soviet efforts and policies were directed at splitting Europe away from the U.S. This we had to avoid at all costs. We could not, as a government, accept that the use of force, no matter how justified, could bring about changes. President Reagan himself could not survive such an acceptance. The Secretary had been in communication with other European governments, France, West Germany, Italy, and had found no support for the use of force, whereas there was widespread support for evolutionary change.<sup>2</sup> We had also been in contact with Latin Ameri-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa Rosada.

<sup>2</sup> The French and West German Ambassadors expressed this viewpoint to Eagleburger in separate meetings with the Acting Secretary on April 8. (Telegram 97143 to all NATO capitals, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Montevideo, and USUN, April 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820190–0347)



can governments. He had, for instance, stopped in Caracas on his way down and they, too, understand the difficulty of this acceptance in legal terms.<sup>3</sup> He would tell them exactly what it was we were trying to structure, to initiate change in the islands to increase Argentine presence and participation in the governing process of the islands. The US would join so that the UK could say that the rule of law had not been ignored. We had a great debate in London that had lasted some 11 hours. We had insisted for the Special Ad Interim Authority that decisions be taken by a majority of the three and not by unanimity which would effectively give them a veto over change. It would enable the US to influence every decision taken with a view of opening the islands to change.

2. With respect to the negotiations, he had last night received proposed wordings that would inevitably lead to war. That was the unanimous view of all of his colleagues. We had tried in our discussions with the Foreign Minister to create language that would be more benign and less ultimative in nature but which would lead as surely as the language the Argentines desired to the changes they had in mind. This would permit us to build stronger relations between our countries that could preside over change.

Where are we now? We are at a point that would lead straight to armed conflict. The tragedy is that such a conflict would inevitably push the US toward support of Great Britain exactly as was the case in the early part of World War II. We have had the situation carefully analyzed by our military experts. Frankly, we could not see anything but disaster for all concerned if this were to come to armed conflict. It would be a total disaster, and there would be no winner except the USSR. They would win. Our analysis is that, at the first shot fired, Argentine ports would be mined, the Argentine forces on the islands would be isolated, the first British objective would be the destruction of the airfield, and surface and air resupply for the Argentine forces would be increasingly difficult. Since both nations are limited in what they could do to one another, the only winner under such circumstances would be the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said that last night he had sent a message to the President saying he could not support in London the Argentine proposal, and he had asked the President to instruct him to return to Washington—not to terminate but to suspend his efforts.<sup>4</sup> He must say that he felt that this was tragic. He felt that we should now sit down with military participation rather than dealing through third

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 122.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 139.

parties. The Foreign Minister and he had constructive discussions. He felt that, in terms of human communications, problems arose of misunderstandings in transmittal of messages. The whole matter is too important to allow such misunderstandings to preclude successful negotiations and lead us to a tragic outcome. It would be tragic for Argentina, tragic for Western unity, and for our main struggle against Soviet imperialism. To let this happen would be foolish, and history would condemn us all for it.

General Lami Dozo said that he would like to ask the Secretary for clarification. He had stated that the Argentine text for paragraphs 6 and 10<sup>5</sup> would be a step toward war.

The Secretary stated that what we were trying to express was that we could not prejudge the outcome.

Admiral Anaya said he was concerned because we were all working under extreme tensions. The UN Resolution should be complied with. Argentine forces were in a high state of readiness. The British fleet was continuing to advance, and it would be very difficult to find a solution when emotions were so high. For that reason, we must find a way to avoid a clash between the Argentine and UK forces. He spoke as a naval officer. He had ordered his submarines not to enter the exclusion area in order to avoid a spark that would make war inevitable. He felt, and he did not know whether the other Commanders-in-Chief agreed with him, that the situation had to be defused by the withdrawal of the forces and their talk under the auspices of the US to try and find a situation that would be acceptable to both countries. Admiral Anaya feared that if a submarine that belonged to another country, the Soviet Union for example, sinks an Argentine or a British ship, it would give the Soviets a great opportunity to set off a conflict. He is not a submariner himself but when a submarine has contact with another submarine which was not of his own nationality, he would use his weapons and we would never know whether it was Argentine, British or of another nationality. We must defuse such a situation. This is extremely urgent in the light of the continued forward motion of the British fleet. There are British and other submarines in the area that could unleash a conflict at any time. If both forces do not withdraw in compliance with Resolution 502, we may be overtaken by events. The problem could become expensive if we did not deal with it.

Secretary Haig said that he shared the Admiral's concern. That is why we attempted to work out a formula that is very different from the British approach. We tried to draft it in such a way that it would not be unacceptable to the British.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 141.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez noted that the two parties agreed on four paragraphs.

Admiral Anaya then said he did not wish to violate military secrecy but asked whether we know whether there were Soviet submarines in the area around the islands. Secretary Haig replied that there were no Soviet submarines in the area. There were some around the Azores but not in the area.

Admiral Anaya said that he had another concern. He was not a diplomat, but he could see another danger and that was that the Soviets might sink one or more ships of the British fleet to demonstrate their vulnerability, and it would be blamed on the Argentines. This humiliation of the British would be very useful from the Soviet point of view to prove that a small country with determination could defeat the third largest navy in the world. He is convinced that the US understood that this would divert us from our main struggle against Marxist subversion. The Argentines believe in the Western values and way of life. There is a deep-rooted feeling in the Argentine armed forces and especially in the Navy. He wants to emphasize that the first thing we must do is to avoid a military confrontation first. Then, we could move on to seek a political solution. He could see no way to achieve a global solution while the forces were facing one another.

The Secretary said that he agreed completely with Admiral Anaya's analysis. The matter was one of great urgency.

General Lami Dozo said that with the exception of the Foreign Minister, all of those present were military men, and we were obliged to take part in what was essentially a political situation.

Secretary Haig commented humorously, "Unfortunately for us."

General Lami Dozo then went on to say that in his capacity he felt that various peoples had historic imperatives, and one of the historic imperatives for the Argentine people was the question of the Malvinas. He believed that in the Secretary's analysis, he had perhaps not given enough importance to the matter of North-South relations on the American continent. He believed—even more, he was convinced—that the last bulwark of the West and of the Christian world would be here on the American continent, not in Europe. In any solution, we must take all of this into account. We respect the British, and we are convinced anti-Marxists, and nothing will make us abandon this position. Any solution must give the same value to the feelings of American unity which is gravely affected by Marxist infiltration in several of the American countries. Recently, there concluded in Buenos Aires the regular meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the American Air Forces.<sup>6</sup> Bilaterally,

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<sup>6</sup> The April 8–9 meeting was attended on behalf of the United States by Allen. See Document 62 and footnote 2 thereto.

he had spoken with each one, and all felt (with the exception of the Nicaraguan who was also present) that the Americas should form a single bloc against Communist aggression. This should be a vital criterion in arriving at any solution. As the Navy Commander-in-Chief had said, it was very difficult to negotiate under the threat of force, and this was correct. He would like to round out his views on this matter by saying that there must be an indication of what the final solution would be; otherwise, it would be very difficult to reach agreement.

Secretary Haig said that he wished to reply to the Admiral's important suggestion that the first need was to defuse the situation. We tried to do this in London. There the British are most agitated. It was the most agitated conversation he had had with Mrs. Thatcher. There is no way the UK would accept a freeze or stop. It would be easier to start to talk about the political aspects to which General Lami Dozo had referred. We must find a political solution acceptable to both sides which suggests but does not decide the final outcome.

There should be a certain ambiguity regarding the negotiations, but all understood that the outcome would mean the return of the islands to Argentina. The real problem, as the Secretary saw it, is a certain understandable Argentine skepticism.

What we are trying to do is to make sufficient changes on the islands to change their character that would cover the principle of decolonization and their removal from the list of non-self-governing territories.

The islands are only 400 miles from Argentina and 7000 from the UK. Margaret Thatcher is fighting to survive and would fight on the principle of international law. That was our dilemma.

Secretary Haig said that we must sit down and recognize that it is impossible for everyone to get everything he wants. The text offered by the Argentines last night would be impossible for President Reagan or he, himself, to defend.

President Galtieri said he had not wanted to intervene until now because he wanted the Secretary to hear what the Commanders-in-Chief had to say. Now, the Secretary had talked to him and to the other Commanders-in-Chief. Secretary Haig inspired great confidence and gratitude for the extraordinary efforts he was making. Two principal problems rendered this matter difficult to solve. One was the lack of confidence by the Argentine people in Britain. He, himself, had stated and the CINCs opined that the matter of Argentine sovereignty was never up for discussion. The main problems were paragraphs 6 and 10 and a way to make it palatable for Margaret Thatcher but also for Argentine opinion. If at the end of 1982, that is after 8 or 9 months, there were no indications of progress toward a transfer of sovereignty . . .

The Special Ad Interim Authority should provide judicial and administrative functions for 8 or 9 months—then proceed to gentle and evolutionary changes until, on December 31, he could foresee a ceremony with the lowering and raising of flags with an honor guard of British Marines and San Martin Grenadiers, with the British Band playing the Argentine National Anthem and the Argentine Band playing “God Save the Queen.” Unfortunately, he had not seen any draft that would lead to this. He repeated that there were two key points.

The first was Argentine lack of confidence after 150 years of frustration. Argentina, too, had a vocal public opinion to whom he would have to give some answer. He believed that General Haig had the full confidence of the Argentine people.

Admiral Anaya said that there were very strong feelings in Argentina. He had a son who was an Army helicopter pilot. (These things happened even in the best of naval families.) His son had asked his father to use his influence to get him to the Malvinas, and that was where his son was now serving. As far as the Argentines were concerned, the Malvinas were the same as the Alcazar of Toledo during the Spanish Civil War.<sup>7</sup> This was his family’s point of view, and his son was ready to die for the Malvinas. It would be desirable for both forces to withdraw and then talk about finding some way to make the US proposal more palatable. What is impossible for the Argentines is withdrawal to take place under the threat of force. If that were done, Argentine feelings would be uncontrollable. If they could trust that Great Britain really intended to turn over sovereignty of the islands, that would make the US proposed wording more acceptable and would make possible a joint withdrawal. The Argentines simply could not trust a country that had refused for 150 years to do this.

Secretary Haig said that he was impressed by the Admiral’s concern. He had been concerned the night before when he had received the “bad news.” He still feels that a solution is achievable if we sit down immediately and find wording that would be acceptable to both sides with a clear understanding that both sides realized that they would have to agree to something that is less than what they wanted. There is Argentine skepticism concerning UK intentions—that something should be acceptable to Great Britain and, whatever wording was achieved, that both governments could explain to their peoples. If not, then there could be a clash in a matter of hours. Otherwise, he shared the Admiral’s views.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the July–September 1936 siege of the castle-fortress (Alcázar) of Toledo, held by Spanish Nationalist troops, by forces loyal to the Spanish Republic.

General Lami Dozo said that, as he understood it from the UK, paragraph 6 was more important than paragraph 10. We must make new efforts to find wording that would satisfy the Argentine government on paragraph 6. As he recalled it, the problem was the integration or composition of the local government. They should seek a formula acceptable to both parties.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez said that he is suggesting now to cover the Admiral's concern that withdrawal be contemplated immediately. We should seek to consider whether the Special Ad Interim Authority might be the only local government.

Secretary Haig said he would like to offer another alternative. As he saw it, Argentine concern was that wording of paragraph 10 might lead to independence or some other exotic solution after the interim period. President Galtieri said that there are many countries smaller than the Malvinas and showed an article in the Magazine "Gente" which covered this matter.

Secretary Haig said that anyone who viewed this matter understood that the direction of movement was toward a solution the Argentines wanted. It is impossible to sell in London a wording that contained the phrase "territorial integrity." He felt that we should continue to explore the matter.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez asked what if there was no result from the negotiations by December 31, 1982.

Secretary Haig said he was confident on two matters:

1. We would push the British toward a solution.
2. He was certain that the British in the long run wanted to get rid of the islands, wanted to get them off their plate.

General Lami Dozo said he feels it is essential to sit down once again and work things out, work out the differences on paragraph 10.

Admiral Anaya said that is his point of view, and he did not know if it was shared by the President or General Lami Dozo. He would want them to be consulted on any new draft to make sure it was satisfactory. Something would have to be done to make sure that there would be a final disposition by December 31. From that they could not step back. He would like to talk to the other Chiefs about some ideas which might be acceptable.

General Lami Dozo said he believed that halting the British fleet and the withdrawal of the Argentine forces to their respective bases is vital, but it should be intrinsically linked to a solution by December 31, not only for the UK but also for Argentina.

Secretary Haig said he agreed, and we must conclude as military men that there is nothing in paragraph 10 that precluded the Argentines from saying that they had obtained satisfaction. We had to put this

thread of history through the eye of a needle. He felt that the concept of withdrawal was doable, and it was extremely important.

President Galtieri said that he agreed with that.

Admiral Anaya said that their concept is not far from ours, but he asked us to remember that the Argentine Navy had men killed because they had been ordered not to fire on the British. His son was willing to die for the Malvinas. He felt we must find an acceptable solution.

Secretary Haig said history is watching us. What we did would be important for decades. We should sit down and try to find wording for 6 and 10 that would be palatable for both sides. This is very important.

It was then agreed that the Americans and Argentines would meet at the Casa Rosada Situation Room to try and find the proper wording for a new paragraph 2.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Following this sentence, Goldberg wrote: “(or 10?)”

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**143. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1982

SUBJECT

The Falklands: Beyond Buenos Aires

This memorandum lays out considerations and examines the options for U.S. policy should the Secretary’s meetings in Buenos Aires not produce a breakthrough in the negotiations sufficient to stem the gathering momentum towards confrontation. After addressing U.S. interests and the dilemmas we face in protecting them, the memorandum suggests an approach to guide U.S. policy both before hostilities erupt and after.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, Unlabelled Folder. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Haass. At the top of the memorandum, Burt wrote: “Larry: I think this is a good first cut. Let’s talk. RB.”



You are well aware of the U.S. interests involved: preserving our relationship with the UK and its role in the defense of the West; maintaining the Thatcher Government in power; nurturing our new relationship with Argentina; insulating our hemispheric policy, particularly in the Caribbean, from this crisis; and minimizing opportunities for increased Soviet influence in the region.

Each of these interests is obviously important. The temptation, of course, will be to continue to attempt to protect all of them simultaneously and in particular to balance any support for the UK with efforts to maintain good relations with Argentina. This temptation must be resisted. Our interest in deterring confrontation is not as important as having the British emerge victorious should confrontation occur. At some point we will have to judge when our objective to prevent conflict (which requires a good deal of even-handedness) has been overridden by our requirement to manage a conflict (which requires major support of the UK).

An unsuccessful UK would gravely weaken the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance at the same time it distanced Britain from its EC partners who would be unwilling to retain sanctions against Argentina after a UK failure. Trident would be abandoned but not to increase conventional defense spending; the BAOR would lose much of its credibility; INF deployment could be fatally undermined; the Thatcher Government would fall. Little Englandism would be given a major push and Tony Benn a major victory. Alliance cooperation in Europe and out-of-area alike would have been dealt severe setbacks, which the USSR would successfully exploit. In short, we could well lose the special relationship and Britain's unique ability to bridge and at times heal differences across the Atlantic. The U.S. must be prepared to do what is necessary to see the UK prevail, and must be seen to be doing so at the appropriate time.

There would be risks and costs associated with a pro-British policy. The Soviets would try to exploit the situation to increase their influence, U.S. attempts to build an anti-Cuban consensus would be weakened, and our long-term relationship with Argentina jeopardized. There would be risks as well in a decision to associate ourselves with the UK if it then lost.

At the same time, none of these outcomes, bad as they might be, should be decisive in our decision-making. The Hemisphere is not a homogeneous political entity. Brazil, Chile and the English-speaking countries would be unlikely to mourn an Argentine defeat. Caribbean states will continue to need our backing if they are to survive the Cuban and Nicaraguan challenge.

Nor is it clear the Soviets would prosper. Historical factors which have limited their influence and presence in Latin America will remain



in effect after any crisis. Moreover, if Argentina loses, the fact that the Soviets supported it would not reflect well on Moscow as a patron. It is not even certain that a post-crisis Argentine Government would turn to the Soviets; indeed, given Argentina's history and mistrust of radicalism any such reorientation would be most surprising. Lastly, we do not believe the interests of the United States would suffer from a clear demonstration of our will and ability to stand unambiguously by our friends; indeed, even if Britain were to fail, by having supported it we would be better placed to guide its political and military recovery than had we acted evenhanded throughout.

*Before the Battle:* The period between the Secretary's departure from BA and the actual initiation of hostilities could be as long as two to three weeks. This calculation is partly political—the British clearly hope that as time passes their concentration of force nearing the Falklands will induce the GOA to compromise. There are military factors too which suggest a pause—it will take the British some two to three weeks before they can bring a fully integrated task force to bear on the Falklands.

The question is how we ought to use this time. The Secretary is of course the best judge of how much of his own time to devote to diplomatic efforts, whether to appoint a special emissary, and whether to involve other parties more directly. We are also not in a position to suggest specific negotiating proposals.

Specifics aside, we believe the U.S. profile ought to retain its public traits of evenhandedness and visibility. We should avoid communicating the impression that we have backed away from trying to solve the problem. A sense of movement will also make it easier for nations not to feel compelled to choose sides. Continued U.S. diplomatic efforts will make it easier for us to argue that neither the UN nor the OAS should serve as an important negotiating venue. Such efforts on our part could also provide camouflage to conceal our private backing of the UK, while avoiding presenting the Soviets with easy opportunities to build contacts with the Argentines or make political capital out of a perceived U.S. tilt towards London. Getting Mrs. Thatcher to go along with this two-track policy on our part would require the Secretary's personal intervention to have any chance of success.

During this period, we should meet UK requests for fuel at Ascension, expanded intelligence, weather information, communications and limited logistics support. We should also be more forthcoming on particular material and equipment requests and engage in more detailed planning with the British so we would be in a position to meet quickly additional requests that would be sure to come in once hostilities were imminent or underway. Creating a special channel to manage such support for the British would be essential. It would reduce

the chance of leaks, assist us in coordinating the myriad British requests, and provide us with plausible deniability.

As regards Argentina, we should continue to avoid any punitive action which would undermine our ability to talk to the GOA with any chance of success. No letters thus ought to go to the Hill claiming GOA violation of U.S. law governing use of U.S.-origin equipment. At the same time, we should continue to withhold certification of FMS eligibility and avoid any imposition of sanctions.

*After Shooting Starts:* As has been apparent, we believe our goal once hostilities begin should be to bring about a rapid, clear-cut British military victory. Prolonged hostilities would not only work against British political and military interests, but the longer hostilities continued the more countries would be forced to take sides and the more opportunities the Soviets would receive. Our diplomacy, both as regards any cease-fire or proposed "solution", ought to be tailored to meet British political and military interests, which in turn will be largely determined by the course of the fighting.

UK requirements for U.S. assistance would be considerable. Possible requests include more fuel and supplies, medical and maintenance support, specialized munitions, ECM capabilities, and increased intelligence (mostly current or tactical). We might also receive requests for long-legged cargo and troop transport aircraft, landing craft, mine countermeasures capability, and other combat-related equipment. We do not expect any request for U.S. combat force involvement in hostilities. Other than suspending the pre-1978 pipeline (some \$3.9 million worth of military items, largely spare parts), we do not see much we could do to affect Argentina's military capability.

Our own military options would depend in part upon circumstances within Argentina and decisions taken in Moscow. Large scale E&E would not be a realistic proposition. The protection of U.S. citizens and personnel will be in the hands of the GOA. We could, however, affect GOA behavior by our own diplomatic and military posturing. That said, we cannot repeat the critical error of our predecessors and have American foreign policy paralyzed by concern for U.S. citizens in foreign countries.

What the Soviets would do remains an unknown. Our objective must be to keep the Soviets away from the area and minimize their role in the crisis. We have asked the JCS to look into possible Soviet options and what we might do to meet them. It is conceivable the Soviets would try to bring air and naval units into the vicinity in an attempt to pose as Argentina's protector; if this became the case, we would want to respond, and perhaps preempt, with more capable forces of our own. The forces we are massing in the Caribbean (including carrier battle groups) for Exercise Ocean Venture provide a possible

reservoir to draw on. An imposing U.S. show of force might not only deter any Soviet military moves, but could lead the Argentines to reconsider any decision to accept Soviet military help or threaten U.S. citizens in country.

This is a rough first cut at the problem. Much of what we have had to say may not mesh with the situation the Secretary finds himself in after his talks in BA. Nonetheless, what does emerge from this analysis is the requirement that we not make short-term decisions—public statements, negotiating mechanisms, warnings to the British, etc.—without reference to our long-term undeniable objective of seeing Britain come out of this crisis with its confidence and close ties to the United States intact.

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#### **144. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

April 17, 1982, 2:30–2:34 p.m.

##### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President (Camp David)  
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (London)

R: Margaret, yes. Listen, I know . . . I understand you've just gotten back to 10 Downing,<sup>2</sup> and I'm a little better off—I'm up at Camp David. But, listen, I wanted to call you about what's been going on, and when I first started to call today, I was a little more discouraged and now,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). Top Secret. In his personal diary entry for April 17, Reagan wrote: "Afternoon interrupted by phone calls—Bill Clark—re the Falkland situation. Al H. is there and as of noon things looked hopeless. I called Margaret Thatcher to tell her I'd cabled him to return home if there was no break in the Argentine position." (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 124)

<sup>2</sup> In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled that she had returned to her office at Number 10 Downing Street from the Prime Minister's official country residence, Chequers, to receive the President's call due to "technical problems" with the direct line from the latter. She added: "I was glad to go over the issues with the President. I was gladder still that he agreed that it would not be reasonable to ask us to move further towards the Argentine position. Al Haig had found the Argentinians even more impossible than on his first visit. The White House had instructed him to tell the Junta that if they persisted in their intransigence this would lead to a breakdown of talks and the US Administration would make clear who was to blame." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 202)

I don't know, because Al is still in meetings; and I wanted to tell you that I had sent him a message that if, there was no break down there, I was calling him home.<sup>3</sup> And maybe that message has had something to do with the length of the meetings now that are going on. But I also wanted to tell you that I know how far you've gone and how much you've compromised in an effort to settle this peacefully, and I don't think you should be asked to go any further than you have.

M: That's very kind of you, because when Al left here Tuesday,<sup>4</sup> he had a workable and fair compromise, undoubtedly. He worked extremely hard for it. He's a very good negotiator, and we think he's done marvelously. And we had hoped that it would be successful. But he's still talking, is he?

R: Yes. We had expected him on the way home at the way things sounded earlier this morning, but the latest word is the meetings are still continuing. It seems that President Galtieri has been more reasonable, but then he gets back with the Junta, and things seem to harden up.

M: Yes, I understand that with Al before, that he can get Galtieri down to something reasonable, but of course Al doesn't talk to the Junta, and they then go back on everything, you see. But you sent the message earlier, Ron, that if the talks broke down there, that Al would come home? Have I got that right?

R: Yes, I asked him to come home, because, as I say, if, at the stage they were, and if there is not some progress on this proposal that he went down there with, I just don't feel that there's any more we could ask of you unless something, unless they inject something new, then, that you might be interested in. But I also wanted you to know that we're sympathetic to what you're going through, and I hope you realize that we are all deeply interested in keeping this great relationship that our two countries have had.

M: That's very good of you—so are we. We want to keep it as well, and thank you very much for phoning and letting me know the positions. I'm relieved, because we heard the talks had broken down and then that they were on again, and I just hope that they will be successful.

R: Oh, I do too, and God bless you, and let's just both keep praying.

M: God bless. Thank you very much for phoning, Ron, and love to Nancy.

R: I certainly shall. All right. Good-bye.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 140.

<sup>4</sup> April 13.

**145. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Buenos Aires<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1982, 2348Z

Tosec 60095/104113. Subject: Timing of UK Task Force Arrival at Falklands.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: It is becoming increasingly clear that the British will take longer than we anticipated to get effective forces on station off the Falklands. The naval forces have broken into four, widely spaced groups. The main body of the task force—carriers—should arrive at Ascension this weekend. Based on the assumption that most of the British ships will need to spend some time at Ascension to resupply and adjust their combat loads, it appears that the carrier and surface action forces could get to the Falklands no earlier than April 29. A fully integrated task force including the slower amphibious ships could not reach the Islands until May 5. However, a smaller strike force could bypass Ascension and reach the Falklands by as early as April 25, or 26. Thus far, we have no firm information that British ships other than the submarines have proceeded beyond Ascension. End summary.

3. Initially we assumed that the UK forces would make a high speed transit to the Falklands and get visible, if not fully effective, forces on station by April 21. It now appears that it could take as much as two and a half weeks from today to get the fully integrated task force on station. However, we still have no indication whether simultaneous arrival of the entire task force is a British prerequisite for initiation of hostilities. The British Navy may not wish to show their hand and may have in mind incremental use of their forces. They could attempt to preserve some element of surprise, and proceed at best speed with selective ships to the Falklands. If they did so, the first surface combatants could arrive on station by April 25 or 26 at the earliest. They could reach South Georgia one or two days sooner.

4. There may be both logistical and political reasons for the relatively slow advance of the British task force. The British may simply be attempting to orchestrate their arrival at Ascension to avoid overloading the limited facilities on the island. We believe it will take as much as two or three days for each group of ships to resupply and make any load adjustments necessary while at Ascension. The British

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

also may be slowing to allow their reinforcements which include a container ship with additional Harriers to catch up, and to ensure that they have an effective supply train before engaging the Argentine forces. The rate of fuel consumption may also be a critical determinant in the speed of advance. However, there might also be a political element, i.e., to give diplomacy a chance to work against the backdrop of the growing military capability of the approaching British fleet.

Eagleburger

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**146. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 18, 1982, 0436Z

Secto 6034. Subject: Falkland Islands Crisis.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Please pass the following message from the Secretary to the Foreign Secretary.<sup>2</sup> Begin text:

Dear Francis:

Based on the unacceptable language which I received, and sent to you last night (Friday),<sup>3</sup> I threatened to break off this process. As a result, I was invited to meet with the Junta, and spent two hours with them this morning (Saturday).<sup>4</sup> The character of the group is essentially as I imagined: Galtieri is the least bright and given to bluster; the Admiral is ultra-hard-line; the Air Force General is bright, political, reasonable—relatively speaking—but clearly third in influence.

3. I impressed on these men in the strongest terms that British resolve was beyond doubt, and that they were on a collision course with military humiliation and economic ruin. With the possible exception of the Admiral—whose definition of glory has little to do with the concept of military success—I would say these men are worried. They

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/18/1982 (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Haig sent a shorter, less descriptive version of this message to the Department in telegram Secto 6032 from Buenos Aires, April 18. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> April 16. See Document 141.

<sup>4</sup> April 17. See Document 142.

are feeling the pressure of your fleet, though it would be a serious mistake for you to assume they are not prepared to fight.

4. The Junta urged me to stay and try to “solve the problem” with the Foreign Minister. In hopes that they would impart flexibility to their negotiators, I agreed to do so. The ten-hour session that ensued was excruciatingly difficult.<sup>5</sup> We spent most of that time on the language dealing with the terms of reference for the negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands. Your language was rejected out of hand. I pressed upon them language that avoids prejudging the sovereignty issue while preserving what you must have with regard to the rights of the Islanders. The Argentines are now developing a new formulation, but I expect it will be pregnant with the concept of assured Argentine sovereignty.

5. The issue of travel, trade, etc., in the interim period was also hotly contested. There will be no agreement unless it involves a clear prospect of genuine promotion of various forms of interaction, with the necessary safeguards to prevent what the Prime Minister fears could occur.

6. We are also encountering difficulty on the question of interim administration, though the integrity of the idea we discussed in London has been maintained.

7. Finally, though we did not discuss it at length, there was a definite foreshadowing of serious problems on the question of military disengagement—i.e. stopping the fleet and removing the submarines. I think this matter can be settled in terms acceptable to the UK, though not without more flexibility than I encountered in London. All in all, as of now the situation is grim. I will receive a new Argentine text<sup>6</sup> during the night and then decide whether or not to break off.

8. I will only consider coming to London if the Argentines give me a text that goes well beyond their position today. I do not want to shift the spotlight onto you if it is clear that the Argentine proposal is

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<sup>5</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this drafting session has been found. Following his morning meeting with the Junta, Haig wrote: “We adjourned to draft yet another new set of proposals. Again the result was impasse. When, late at night, it seemed that progress was impossible, I played a wild card. Although the British in fact told us nothing of their military plans, the Argentinians plainly believed that we knew everything they did. Possibly this misconception could be useful. I called Bill Clark at the White House on an open line, knowing the Argentinians would monitor the call, and told him in a tone of confidentiality that British military action was imminent. At 2:00 A.M. on April 18, new proposals were delivered to me at the hotel together with an invitation to resume the negotiations at the Casa Rosada at two o’clock in the afternoon.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 288) Haig later sent a message to Clark explaining his reasoning for the telephone call and commented that Clark “handled it on the phone precisely as I had hoped.” (Telegram Secto 6047 from Buenos Aires, April 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/18/1982 (3))

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 147.

unacceptable. Even if I do not come to London, I will of course send you the Argentine text.

9. If I suspend my mission tomorrow morning, I will leave no doubt where lies responsibility for the impasse.<sup>7</sup>

Warm regards,

AI

End text.

**Haig**

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<sup>7</sup> On the morning of April 18, Pym replied: "You are clearly making super-human efforts to achieve a reasonable result. We in London are most grateful." "If," he continued, "you were to conclude that you could not continue your mission for the time being, we should need a little time to consider what to do next. If you announced a decision to suspend your efforts before we had decided with you on next steps, the diplomatic initiative might pass to others. We should therefore be most grateful to know your intentions in good time before any announcement. One way of holding the position might be for you to say on leaving Buenos Aires that the Argentines had not tried seriously to negotiate a reasonable outcome and that you would be reporting on the situation to the President and discussing further steps with him." A typewritten copy of the message was delivered by the British Embassy to Eagleburger, under a covering letter from Henderson, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1239). The text of the message was cabled to Haig in telegram 8371 from London, April 18. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2))

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## 147. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 18, 1982, 2:15 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Secretary's discussion of Argentine draft reply: 18 April 1982, 2:15 a.m.  
Secretary's Suite, Buenos Aires, Argentina

### ATTENDEES

Enders, Gompert, Gudgeon, Wayne, Schuette, Adams

(note: notetaker arrived in middle of discussions and was not in a position to hear all the detailed discussions)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Haig's suite. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.



The Secretary characterized the Argentine draft<sup>2</sup> as “a very positive step” noting that it reflected the new attitude that he had found prevalent in the discussions that afternoon.

The discussion centered around paras 6 and 8, and the Secretary said that if we were able to make some headway on these two paras he would personally take the draft to the British. If we were not successful he would cable the draft to London and return to Washington. The Secretary noted several times that “we are getting there fellas, and we’re too close to lose it.”

Enders voiced skepticism on the likelihood of gaining the necessary concessions on paras 6 and 8 but the Secretary held to his positive assessment noting that the will was evident now, and the next step was just a question of words.

Adams asked about the strength of the GOA commitment to the draft—ie. had it been blessed by the junta? The Secretary felt certain that the junta had agreed to this proposal but others at the discussion were less certain. The Secretary said that for the first time in this effort things now looked doable.

The Secretary closed by saying that he would call Costa Mendez at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday and suggest an early afternoon meeting—another round of negotiations.<sup>3</sup> He wanted the early afternoon because he wanted to be certain that the Argentines were fresh after having labored over this response all night. He said that he would tell Costa Mendez that their draft represented a major effort, but that it was still unacceptable to London, and thus it would be a tragedy to send this draft to the British and have them turn it down—the GOA effort would be wasted.

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<sup>2</sup> The text of this revision of the Argentine draft was transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 6038, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0665)

<sup>3</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Haig’s telephone call to Costa Méndez on the morning of April 18 has been found. Haig informed Pym both of the receipt of the revised Argentine text and of his scheduled 2 p.m. meeting at the Casa Rosada to discuss the proposals at 1439Z, April 18. Describing the new Argentine text, Haig wrote: “Although their revisions are still unsatisfactory, I believe we now have—for the first time since we began this mission—some movement toward a workable solution for you and Argentines.” (Telegram Secto 6037 to London, April 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982))

# 148. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, 0829Z

Secto 6044. From the Secretary to the President. Department please pass to the White House. Subject: Message to the President From Secretary Haig.

It is now 3 a.m. and I have returned to the hotel after another 12 hours of up and down talks.<sup>2</sup> Once again we were treated to the now familiar Argentine tactic whereby with agreement almost in hand the Junta stepped in and overruled its negotiators.<sup>3</sup>

There followed a soulful meeting at 10 p.m. with President Galtieri who then reconvened the Junta and the impasse was broken. We returned to the negotiating table and put together a draft text except for the single important paragraph covering the modalities for the respective withdrawal of forces. However, the text as it now stands will in all likelihood give the British genuine problems.<sup>4</sup>

We resume our talks later this morning at the Casa Rosada. At the conclusion of the round, I should be in a position to recommend—on the basis of the text then in hand—whether to proceed to London for consultations with Prime Minister Thatcher and her Ministers or to return to Washington briefly en route to London. As of the evening I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Reagan initialed the telegram, indicating that he saw it. Earlier, Haig had sent a similar summary of the day's discussions to Pym in telegram Secto 6043 to London, April 19. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/19/1982 (1))

<sup>2</sup> No memoranda of conversation of the April 18 discussions have been found. In his memoirs, Haig wrote of the day's negotiations at the Casa Rosada: "On every decision, the government apparently had to secure the unanimous consent of every corps commander in the army and of their equivalents in the navy and air force. Progress was made by syllables and centimeters and then vetoed by men who had never been part of the negotiations. Ten hours of haggling failed to produce a workable text. The Argentines could not agree on the very point the junta had granted the day before: withdrawal of forces. The staffs on both sides were half asleep. At ten in the evening, Galtieri drew me aside. 'If I lay it all on the line,' he said, 'I won't be here.' I asked him how long he thought he would survive if he lost a war to the British." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 289)

<sup>3</sup> Reagan underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word "almost."

<sup>4</sup> Haig later recalled: "[B]y 2:40 a.m. on April 19, we had produced a draft, acceptable to the Argentinians, providing for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces, an Argentine presence on the island under a U.S. guarantee, and negotiations leading to a resolution of the question by December 31, 1982. I believed that Mrs. Thatcher would have great difficulty in accepting this text." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 289) A copy of the draft is in the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert.

think the latter would be the wrong course as it would break our momentum and start press leaking. I'll provide you a detailed message tomorrow when we are airborne after the hectic pace of activity subsides.<sup>5</sup>

Haig

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 150.

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**149. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 19, 1982

SUBJECT

Exports to Argentina

*Helicopters*—The UK Embassy told us on Friday<sup>2</sup> that the Argentine Government was attempting to ship “more than one” S-61 Sea King Helicopter out of the US to Argentina and gave us the names of the firms involved: Heavy Lift Marketing, U.S.A. and Columbia Helicopters Inc. of Aurora, Oregon. The latter firm is a logging contractor and would be a logical source for large helicopters like the S-61.

At our behest, Customs began to investigate last Saturday. So far, it has turned up nothing. Either a Munitions Control or Commerce “validated” license (depending on the helicopter configuration) would ordinarily be required for export but none has been requested. If, however, a *civilian* version of the S-61 were stripped of its avionics, its weight would fall below the Commerce licensing threshold of 10,000 pounds and it could be exported without a license; only a Customs declaration would be filed. No such declaration has yet surfaced. As a matter of interest, Commerce informs us that Columbia Helicopter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Brown.

<sup>2</sup> April 16.

Inc. is British owned, although we cannot confirm it. Customs will continue its investigation. We are keeping the British informed.

*Telephone Equipment*—As you will recall, last week, again from the UK, we were informed that a Bolivian L-100 aircraft was to load “communication equipment” and fly it to Rio Gallegos (due West of the Falklands) on the 20th of April. The consignee is INTEL, an Argentine telephone company.<sup>3</sup>

The L-100 has delayed its departure until 22 April apparently while its owners search for additional cargo. Meanwhile all we know of the communications cargo is that it was manufactured by the Harris Corp., a large respectable electronics conglomerate that does a lot of business with the US Government. It is not a firm likely to try illegally to evade export controls. The freight forwarder in Miami tells us that the equipment is in two very large crates marked “telephone communications equipment” but that he knows nothing more. We are trying quietly to find out from Harris Corp. exactly what is in them. As I noted earlier, an export license would be required only if the stuff is military telephone equipment.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 134.

**150. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, 1614Z

Secto 6045. For the President. Subject: Message to the President.

1. I have just sent the text developed here<sup>2</sup> to London and Washington,<sup>3</sup> along with my analysis of it.<sup>4</sup> I believe we have reached the Argentine bottom line. Mrs. Thatcher will have great difficulty accepting this text; she will probably reach the conclusion that she would be unable to make the case that she has lived up to her pledges to Parliament. But she may feel it is within range of the acceptable.

2. In sending the text to London, I have taken care not to advocate its acceptance. Any hint that we are pressuring the UK to accept the Argentine position—particularly this Argentine position—would be politically explosive.

3. I believe the best course now is to proceed to Washington to report to you, and then go on to London, if Mrs. Thatcher wishes. If she thinks I should divert enroute and come directly to London, I ask your permission to do so. Otherwise I will see you tomorrow morning.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Flash to the Department of State. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram indicates that McFarlane saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Following the previous evening's meetings, which lasted until 3 a.m., (see Document 148), Haig met again with the Argentines later that morning. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. Haig later wrote of the meeting in his memoirs: "Later in the morning, I met with the Argentinians to clear up a number of unresolved points. This, too, was a strenuous session, but by 1 P.M., we had in hand a modified text that anticipated some of the British objections." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 289)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram Secto 6049 from Haig in Buenos Aires to London, the White House, and the Department, April 19, Haig provided a paragraph-by-paragraph annotation of the draft agreement, highlighting the textual changes made as a result of his second round of negotiations in Buenos Aires. A copy of this telegram, as seen by Clark, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115].

**151. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, the Department of State, and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, 1620Z

Secto 6046. Subject: Letter to Pym.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Dear Francis

3. Here as you suggest in your latest message<sup>2</sup> is the current text, along with our gloss on what it means. Costa Mendez has given me a letter saying that Argentina could accept it if the U.S. proposes it, and Britain accepts.<sup>3</sup>

4. My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps back from the text you and I discussed in London in each of the areas of greatest importance: the longterm negotiations, the interim administration, and withdrawal.<sup>4</sup>

5. What has been secured in each case is British control. You would undertake to negotiate and conclude a long term agreement, but your principles as well as Argentine principles are asserted, and there is nothing in the agreement (as the Argentines keep reminding us) that forces you to accept a negotiated settlement you don't want.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> At 1307Z, April 19, the Embassy in London forwarded Pym's response to Haig's previous message (see footnote 1, Document 148). In it, Pym stated: "I remain full of admiration for your persistence in pressing the Argentines to reach a settlement based on the Security Council resolution. But I am deeply concerned by your comment that there will be some problems for us in what you describe as 'the maximum obtainable from the Argentines.'" Pym continued, "In your previous message you said that you would in all circumstances consult us before moving to London or Washington. In view of your latest message, I am sure that the time for this has come. You will understand that we need to think carefully about anything which you may have worked out with the Argentines before giving you our views. I should therefore be most grateful if you could send me as soon as possible a full account of where things stand and in particular the text now under discussion." (Telegram 8387 from London, April 19; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2))

<sup>3</sup> Haig apparently wrote prematurely about receiving the letter, which was to be delivered by Costa Méndez at the airport. When Haig met with Pym in Washington on April 22, he reported that Costa Méndez had failed to provide the letter to him upon Haig's departure from Buenos Aires (see Document 163). For a description of the April 19 airport meeting between Haig and Costa Méndez, see Footnote 2, Document 152.

<sup>4</sup> See Tab A of Document 112.

6. The interim administration is less advantageous than it was, yet here again the essential is saved. The local councils remain sovereign. Recommendations to you on more intercourse with the mainland requires a quick response, but can be turned down. If the temporary administration lasts, it will give full protection to the Islanders.

7. Finally, the withdrawal deal leaves you protected. Your submarines would be outside 150 nautical mile maximum—but they are your guarantee, and 150 NM is only five hours running time. The fleet must stand off to 1750 NM by seven days after agreement, but it could steam at 12 knots some 2100 NM after agreement, and thus in most cases (depending on when agreement were to take place) go on steaming towards the Falklands after agreement.

8. Francis, I do not know whether more can be wrung out of the Argentines. It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, including corps commanders, may be exercising vetos. Certainly, I can do no better at this point.

9. I would not presume to speculate on the equities seen from your point of view. From mine, the agreement, if accepted, would involve the Argentines far more intimately in the affairs of the Islands, yet leave you in charge of the current situation and the ultimate destiny. Above all, Argentina, the United States and United Kingdom would be bound together in the search for an evolutionary solution to the problem, with obvious future costs to each of us if it cannot be found. Only you can judge that outcome against the advantages and disadvantages of armed action.

10. My best immediate judgement in this situation is that I should return to Washington and report to the President. I am available, of course, to go on immediately from there to London, or even to divert from Washington to London, if you wish.

11. Leaving here, I will refuse to characterize the text, and say only that I have finished this phase of my effort, and am returning to Washington to report to the President. I will say that I have given you a full report of the results of my stay in Buenos Aires.<sup>5</sup>

12. I would be deeply grateful if you would be in touch with me before taking any public or other action on the results I am transmitting.

13. Text by septel.<sup>6</sup>

Warm regards, Al.

End message.

**Haig**

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<sup>5</sup> For the text Haig's statement on leaving Buenos Aires, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 84.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 152.

**152. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, 1745Z

Secto 6050. Pass White House. Subject: Draft Text Worked Out in Buenos Aires.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. There follows draft of agreement on South Atlantic crisis worked out in Buenos Aires April 19, 1982.

3. Begin text: On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, and the will of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom to resolve the controversy which has arisen between them, renouncing the use of force, both governments agree on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

1. Effective on the signature of this agreement by both governments, there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

2. Beginning at 0000 hours of the day after the day on which this agreement is signed, the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom shall not introduce nor deploy forces into the zones (hereinafter, “zones”) defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the following coordinate points (hereinafter, “coordinate points”):

A) Lat. 51 deg 40’ S

Long. 59 deg 30’ W

B) Lat. 54 deg 20’ S

Long. 36 deg 40’ W

C) Lat. 57 deg 40’ S

Long. 26 deg 30’ W

2.1. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement the United Kingdom will rescind its zone of exclusion and Argentina will not conduct operations in the zones.

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom will commence the withdrawal of their forces in accordance with the following details.

2.2.1. Within seven days from the date of this agreement, Argentina shall have withdrawn one half of its military and security forces present

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis.



in the zones<sup>2</sup> on the date of this agreement, including related equipment and armaments. Within the same time period, the United Kingdom will have completed the withdrawal of all of its forces from the zones and<sup>3</sup> the United Kingdom naval task force will stand off at a distance of at least 1750<sup>4</sup> nautical miles from any of the coordinate points.

2.2.2. Within 15 days from the date of this agreement, Argentina shall remove all of its remaining forces, equipment and armaments from the zones. Within the same time period, units of the UK naval task force and submarines shall redeploy to their usual operating bases or areas.

3. After fifteen days after the date of this agreement and pending a definitive settlement, no military or security forces shall be introduced by the signatories into any of the zones defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the coordinate points.<sup>5</sup>

4. From the date of this agreement, steps shall be taken by the two governments to terminate simultaneously, and without delay, the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. The United Kingdom without delay shall request the European

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<sup>2</sup> A final meeting between Haig and Costa Méndez occurred at the airport in Buenos Aires, April 19, at which time the U.S. delegation received an Argentine copy of the draft agreement. In this “airport text,” this word is replaced with the word “areas.” A copy of the text, bearing a note in an unknown hand to Enders stating that there were three errors in the text of paragraph 2—“one clearly not a clerical error, possibly all conscious”—is in the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [folder 1]. In his memoirs, Haig recalled that Costa Méndez presented him with an envelope to be read once the Secretary’s plane was in the air. According to Haig, Costa Méndez’s message stipulated that “it is absolutely essential and condition sine qua non that negotiations will have to conclude with a result on December 31, 1982” and that this “result must include a recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 289) This is possibly a mistaken reference to Costa Méndez’s April 21 message (see Document 159).

<sup>3</sup> In the “airport text,” this word is omitted and a period is placed after the word “zones.” Above the period an unknown hand placed “and” in brackets and added an asterisk. A handwritten note in the left-hand margin states the word “and” was “proposed by Gompert/Gudgeon at Rosada 1400 hrs [and] taken to Minister.”

<sup>4</sup> In the “airport text,” the figure is crossed out and “2000” written above, along with a double asterisk. A handwritten note in the left-hand margin, corresponding to the double asterisk, reads: “We agreed on 1750.”

<sup>5</sup> This paragraph is absent from the “airport text.” A note in an unknown hand reads: “Para 3 on demilitarization missing. (KSG [Gudgeon] + GOA lawyer had corrected two typos at Casa Rosada P.M.) Actually in large part redundant of ¶2. In fairness this may have been dropped in confusion since a hole had been left in numbering of Sun night/Mon. a.m. for only a ¶2, and ¶3 was assigned to sanctions paragraph. KSG renumbered US text (including text sent London).”

Community and third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them.

5. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United States has indicated its agreement to appoint, a representative to constitute a special interim authority which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the obligations in this agreement.

6. A) Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the Islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the special interim authority, except in the event that the special interim authority deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue through the executive and legislative councils which shall be enlarged in the following manner: the Argentine Government shall appoint two representatives, who shall serve in each council; the Argentine population whose period of residence on the Islands is equal to that required of others entitled to representation shall elect representatives to each council in proportion to their population, subject to there being at least one such representative in each council. The local police shall be continued under the administration of the councils, with a representative of the resident Argentine population, and shall be subject to the supervision of the special interim authority. The flags of each of the constituent members of the special interim authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

B) Pending a definitive settlement, neither government shall take any action that would be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its implementation.

7. A) Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement of persons and, as may be related thereto, residence and ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between the mainland and the Islands shall, on an equal basis, be promoted and facilitated. The special interim authority shall propose for adoption appropriate measures on such matters, including possible arrangements for compensation of Islanders who do not wish to remain. The two signatories undertake to respond promptly to such proposals. The special interim authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals adopted.

B) Pending a definitive settlement, the rights and guarantees which have heretofore been enjoyed by the inhabitants on the Islands will be respected, on an equal basis, in particular rights relating to freedom of opinion, religion, expression, teaching, movement, property, employment, family, customs, and cultural ties with countries of origin.

8. A) December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the

removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV) and 2065 (XX) and in the light of relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the “Question of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands”. The negotiations here above referred to shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the present agreement.

B) The United States Government has indicated that, at the request of the two governments, it would be prepared to assist them in bringing their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date stipulated in subparagraph (A). End of text.

Haig

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**153. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

April 20, 1982, 0400Z

Secto 6057. Subject: Letter to Costa Mendez.

1. Secret, entire message.

2. Begin quote: Dear Nicanor:

3. I have the first British reaction to the paper developed in Buenos Aires.<sup>2</sup> It is one of disappointment. London, of course, reserves pending

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/20/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Flash to the Department of State and White House. Sent from the Secretary's aircraft. Haig was then en route to Washington from Buenos Aires. The telegram is unsigned.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 152. Regarding this draft, Pym wrote to Haig: “Your herculean efforts have clearly met with a firm determination on the part of the Argentines to hold on to what they have taken by force. We are deeply disturbed by their intransigence.” “First reading of the draft,” he later continued, “leaves the clear impression that the sovereignty issue is greatly weakened from our point of view, that the withdrawal is on a very unequal basis in favour of the Argentines and that the wishes of the Islanders are not protected. You know the basic principles on which we have been working here, and I fear that on any interpretation of the text they cannot be met. On the next immediate steps I am sure that you are right to go to Washington and report to the President.” Pym also provided Haig with the text of off-the-record press guidance that indicated that the British Government would be “studying” the Argentine proposals before getting in touch with Haig. (Telegram 8484 from London, April 20; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/20/1982 (1))

careful study, but it finds the basis for withdrawal “very unequal,” it believes that the sovereignty issue is tilted too much, and above all it finds that the wishes of the Islanders are not protected.

4. London is putting out a restrained press line putting the emphasis on failure to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders, but not closing the door.

5. I shall be in a better position to advise you tomorrow on specific British problems, but I would urge you already to pass this first reaction on to your colleagues in the government. It is clear to me that substantially further mutual adjustment will be necessary if war is to be avoided.

6. When I have seen the British position in detail I will be in touch on possible next steps.

7. Warm regards. Al Haig. End quote.

8. Action requested: London complains that Buenos Aires is putting out line that US and Argentina have an agreement. Please report tonight on that. Please inform Costa Mendez that we will correct if that impression is left.

9. Re your BA 2343,<sup>3</sup> you are absolutely right to decline to go over the text. Our letter is clear.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2343 from Buenos Aires, April 20, Shlaudeman reported: “Costa Mendez is meeting with the Junta (21:55 hrs) on what his office described to me as the ‘disturbing news from London’ (the statement from No. 10).” “The question now arises,” he continued, “as to what you would want me to do when he comes back, as he is perfectly capable of doing, to plead misunderstanding and ask to go over the texts. My inclination would be to give him ours and to say that I am not, rpt not, authorized to discuss it further.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820004–0029)

**154. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

April 20, 1982, 0445Z

Secto 6059. Subject: Falklands Crisis—Message to Foreign Secretary Pym.

1. Secret. Entire text.

2. Please deliver following to Foreign Secretary in response to his latest message (London 08484).<sup>2</sup>

3. Begin text

I can appreciate your disappointment with the Argentine position. Your off-the-record press guidance is entirely proper.

As you know, my aim in Buenos Aires was to squeeze as much as I humanly could out of the Argentines so that you and we could know what we are really up against. At no point did I tell them that what was developed in Buenos Aires would be acceptable to you. Nor did I associate the United States in any way with the position produced. I have not yet received direct reports of the Argentines “agreement” with us. I’ll refute any such claims swiftly and unequivocally, as I warned the Argentine Foreign Minister I would do.

Let me suggest that you now reflect on the text. In identifying specific areas where you believe changes are imperative, I suggest you work up formulations of your own. This will give us a precise idea of where we stand. It would have the additional advantage of denying the Argentines any basis for saying that they and they alone have taken a step toward peace. Needless to say, with the stakes so great, it would be helpful if you could limit your reformulations to the minimum essential points.

I further suggest that you and the Prime Minister consider your coming to Washington as soon as you have arrived at a considered view of the text. I agree with you that this is not the time for me to come to London, but I also believe that we need a face-to-face discussion, so that I can clarify points and convey my feeling of Argentine attitudes and aspirations. I cannot reduce to writing the bitterness, resentment and sense of historic frustration I encountered in Buenos Aires. I could also give you a better sense of the tradeoffs within the text, in particular

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State. Sent from the Secretary’s aircraft. Haig was then en route to Washington from Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 153.

between prospects for sovereignty and those for an expanded *de facto* role in the interim.

If you agree to my idea that you come to Washington, I recommend you not arrive at a definitive position before. I have tried to stay in close touch with you despite being involved in exceedingly long and complex discussions with the Argentines. You certainly would not have found it helpful had I sent every detail in a constantly moving situation in Buenos Aires. Could I ask you to correct the impression that has been created by repeated statements out of London to the effect that I have not been keeping the Prime Minister informed?

You and the Prime Minister have been most sensitive and prudent on the question of American support for actions taken against Argentina. I do not know if I can help avert war, but I am convinced that war would become inescapable if I lose my credibility in Buenos Aires. I see that the British press and some political sectors are becoming increasingly harsh and impatient concerning the US role. Another word from you or the Prime Minister along the line you have previously taken on this delicate issue would, I think, be appropriate.

As I have said before, it is imperative that you maintain military pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position satisfactory to you. It is equally important, as I hardly need to say to you, that we be clear in our minds and with each other concerning those points of disagreement between you and Argentina, including the principles at stake, that are worth the tragedy of war.

As you know, Argentina has asked for an OAS Council meeting to convoke an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The question will be considered and, no doubt, decided tomorrow morning April 20. We propose to abstain on the ground that the Rio Treaty was not designed to apply to cases in which members themselves took acts of force, and in view of our peace effort. We do not expect a date to be set for convoking the Foreign Ministers as long as our peace efforts continue and there is no military action.

Please get back to me shortly on the idea of an early visit by you to Washington, hopefully no later than Thursday.<sup>3</sup> Such a visit will avoid the appearance of diplomatic stalemate while military pressures grow. In the meantime, let me assure you, as the President assured the Prime Minister, that you can indeed count on us. Warm regards. Al.

Haig

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<sup>3</sup> April 22. Pym agreed on April 20 to come to Washington for 2 days of talks concerning the paper developed in Buenos Aires. Haig confirmed Pym's trip in a letter to Costa Méndez transmitted in telegram 105610 to Buenos Aires, April 20. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/20/1982)

**155. Note From James M. Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 20, 1982

SUBJ

Falklands, etc.

In addition to my airborne thoughts on where we now stand with the Falklands crisis (attached), you might want to review the talking points (Tab 1) which Tom Enders prepared for the Secretary's use when the latter briefs the President (perhaps today).<sup>2</sup> Tom, in his usual magisterial fashion, did not see fit to share these with his fellow delegates before they were done up in final. As they stand, I fear they suggest a far too leisurely, even laid-back U.S. posture given the impasse we face at this point in the intermediary process (I am not at all certain, for example, that Pym will want to fly over here,<sup>3</sup> particularly at this delicate juncture in the evolution of events). Whether or not the Secretary follows these points (his instincts are pretty good, and he may take his own tack), I think a number of key questions must now be asked:

—What are the criteria we are using to determine each party's bottom-line and how will we know when we have reached it?

—Don't we need to put some clear (and preferably early) time limit on how long we are willing to continue this process, particularly if both sides maintain the rigidity they have so far displayed?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, NSC Political Affairs Directorate Files, Chron April 1982 (04/20/1982–04/22/1982). No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Haig, Clark, Baker, Meese, McFarlane, and Rentschler in the Oval Office to discuss the crisis from 11:40 a.m. to noon, April 20. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In his personal diary, Reagan noted: "Al H's report doesn't hold out much hope. The Junta is running the show in Argentina but the people when you get behind the phony rallies don't want war." (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 125) Rentschler, in his diary, wrote of Haig's briefing that the Secretary "still sees a chance for the diplomatic route but concedes that the options have greatly narrowed and that the likelihood of imminent hostilities is very high." At Clark's request, Rentschler earlier had briefed Reagan on "all matters Falkland-side," as part of the President's 9:30 a.m. daily national security briefing. (Rentschler, "Falklands Diary," fo. 177) According to the Daily Diary, this briefing also attended by Clark, McFarlane, and Kemp, took place from 11:10 to 11:22 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 154.

—Is this exercise really doable now? Can we, in other words, meet each party's minimum requirements (withdrawal of forces and restoration of UK administration for the Brits, some understanding of eventual sovereignty over the islands for the Argies) and at the same time enable Thatcher to persuade her Parliament (and our own public) that we have not rewarded Argentine use of force?

Incidentally, Tom seems to be in some doubt concerning the location of both the Brit and Argie bottom lines; I am in no such uncertainty myself . . .

**Jim Rentschler**

### **Attachment**

#### **Memorandum From James M. Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, April 20, 1982

#### **SUBJECT**

The Guns of April?—Where we now stand with Argentina, the UK, and Ourselves

The suspension of our peace shuttle and the likely imminence of armed conflict between the UK and Argentina require a very hard look at our next course. En route home from the dispiriting frustrations of Buenos Aires, I offer the following personal thoughts:

—We promised both parties our best shot at assisting them to find a peaceful settlement; we gave them that shot—for the time being, at least, there is nothing more to give.

—Implicit and explicit in our promise was the determination to practice even-handedness so long as the process continued; that stage has now ended.

Tilting toward either of the parties at this moment will undoubtedly damage our relations with the non-tiltee; yet tilting toward neither—i.e., attempting to prolong an appearance of “even-handedness” or even worse, passivity—could put larger US strategic interests at risk.

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<sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Sent through McFarlane, who did not initial the memorandum. Copies were sent to Fontaine and Blair. According to Rentschler's diary, he wrote a first draft of the memorandum on April 16 in Buenos Aires. (Rentschler, “Falklands Diary,” fo. 168)



—The greatest of all such risks may lie in the psychology of leadership: at what point does the US no longer appear “constructively concerned” but instead is perceived by the British and our own public as irresolute, ungrateful, and evasive?

—The bilateral question for us thus boils down, in both policy terms and public perceptions, to pro-UK *or* pro-Argentina; the larger strategic question boils down to Pan-America vs. NATO.

There will be arguments that the choices set out above are, in reality, neither so stark nor simplistic, and that a US policy course which is both prudent and proper will aim to preserve the best of both worlds.

I believe such a course will prove illusory. It is a circle that cannot be squared; both sides of the conflict have too much invested in emotional, geopolitical, and historical capital to allow us a safe passage between them. More important, the moves we make—or fail to make—with respect to one or the other disputant will have a long-term ripple effect throughout our national security environment.

We need, therefore, to decide—on an extremely urgent basis—in which set of relationships (Hemispheric or Atlantic) we are prepared to sustain the most immediate (but perhaps less costly) casualties, recognizing that we cannot escape some significant damage in either case, and could well incur far worse.

This is properly the subject of an early NSC which would carefully weigh a detailed set of options and the consequences likely to flow from each. Meanwhile, in a spirit of total prejudice and partiality, I advance these views:

—It is essential to back Britain, and for reasons which transcend the already compelling ties of history, language, and formal alliance.

—Our strategic imperatives in the East-West context and the stakes we have in asserting the primacy of our Western leadership require it.

—Enforcement and credibility of the UN system—particularly our strong backing for UNSC Resolution 502—justify it.

—Moreover, our support for the UK must be seen as convincingly generous and resolute (this means something far beyond rhetoric in both the military supply and economic sanctions areas).

—Failure to back our most important and forthcoming ally at this critical juncture—to reenact, in effect, a 1980s version of Suez or Skybolt—will have a profoundly adverse effect on an already shaky alliance and at a time when we can least afford such turbulence (we must understand that an Anglo-Argentine war will be bad for NATO and our own East-West interests, but that this unhappy state of affairs will be infinitely worse should we alienate Britain into the bargain).

To the positive factors which dictate a pro-British tilt, I would add a number of negative observations based on our direct and highly

unpleasant experience with the Argentines over the past few days (in connection with which I invite the views of Roger Fontaine, who is a far better informed student of the gaucho psyche than I):

—The talks in Buenos Aires demonstrated, more than anything else, the emptiness of our bilateral “Relationship” with the Argies. (Ambassador Shlaudeman voiced this same view, heartily seconded by every one of us who had to deal with them);

—Even if we achieved a responsible agreement with the Argentines on a politically workable text, there is no assurance that the present junta—quite possibly an ephemeral expression of leadership—could or would deliver;

—None of us ever had the certainty that the Argentine side was negotiating in good faith; indeed, the evidence indicated that we were being strung along (a risk we recognized and were willing to take in the larger interests of averting bloodshed);

—We were deliberately treated to a series of petty but cumulatively significant, not to say contemptuous, derogatives from simple courtesy (manipulated crowd boos, squalid “holding” conditions for delegation members in the Presidential Palace, excessive rudeness on the part of Security and administrative personnel) which called into further question the seriousness and good faith of Argentine negotiating tactics;

—On the larger question of what the South Atlantic crisis will do to the inter-American “system” I favor a fatalistic stance, believing as I do that those who are minded to back us would likely do so in any event, while traditional anti-gringo sentiment would line up a number of states against us no matter what role we played in the peace process (again, however, I would defer to Roger Fontaine).

The Argentines with whom we dealt were not, in sum, nice people; in this sense Mrs. Thatcher and her colleagues may from the start have read Argentine intentions and operating style more accurately than we. That fact simply reinforces my view that the time of even-handedness, indispensable during a period when we were actively engaged in a peace-shuttling effort, may now be past. We must not lose sight of the assertions with which the President addressed his very first message to Mrs. Thatcher in this crisis: “I told Galtieri that initiating military action against the Falkland Islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina” and “while we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we would not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of force.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 42.

Just so. Secretary Haig has undertaken a gallant and gruelling marathon effort to make the Argentines see reason, an effort which I for one strongly supported. But the Argentines have not yet seen reason, and frankly I don't think they ever will—they may, indeed, be incapable of reasonable compromise in the sense that we understand that concept.

Assuming that a miracle rabbit or two will not pop out of our hat (Pym visit to the U.S., etc.), all of this argues for the earliest possible expression of support for the Brits in ways that are politically unambiguous for them. Unless such practical expression is soon forthcoming—and absent the kind of Argentine give which now seems unlikely—I can't imagine that the President would have a comfortable stay in Windsor Castle come early June.

### Tab 1

#### **Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### SUBJECT

Your meeting with the President, April 20

#### CHECKLIST

- Argentine position both very tough and very hard to establish. Some 50 military, including corps commanders, involved in decision making. Military kept jerking diplomats back. Believe I have got as close to Argentine bottom line as is possible this week.

- What we got:

- arrangements or language tilting towards Argentina on the two main questions (future negotiations and local administration), but

- a British veto on both so that London could control the pace of future change.

- As expected, London can't and won't go that far, and we shouldn't in any way push them at this point. As you saw, my message to Pym was neutral.<sup>7</sup>

- Now comes the delicate part of the problem.

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<sup>6</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 154.

—military pressures are rising (Britain may debark on South Georgia tomorrow);

—British will step up pressure on us to back them openly;

—Argentina will start Rio Treaty gambit and try (probably successfully) to get wide Latin support for its position (we doubt that Argentina will try for sanctions under the Rio Treaty now—or that it could get them).

- We need to identify the British bottom line, just as we are close to Argentina's. That is the reason for asking Pym to come over this week.

- Meanwhile, suggest we keep to a neutral press line: we've been identifying respective positions but not characterizing.

- This game is excruciatingly difficult and may well be impossible to win. But every time I recalculate the cost to us of war in the South Atlantic, I cannot avoid concluding that we would be a major loser, on both continents.

**156. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 20, 1982

## SUBJECT

Possible UK Use of Vulcan Bombers in Falklands

There have been press reports alleging UK plans to use Vulcan bombers in Falkland operations,<sup>2</sup> USDAO London confirms planning for use of this aircraft. The attache was told bombers will *practice in Scotland this week*.

Vulcan is capable of conventional bomb deliveries with modifications, but the RAF has *not trained for such missions in eleven years*.<sup>3</sup> The aircraft would need some reconfiguration, which could probably be done in a matter of hours per aircraft. Nonetheless, an RAF source said it would take "*some time*" before the Vulcans would have *operational, conventional bombing capability*. Vulcans would *require refueling* in each direction between the Falklands and Ascension. By reducing bomb capability the combat radius can be increased, but refueling would still be necessary. The UK does have the requisite tanker capability.

There are about fifty flyable aircraft in the UK inventory, of which 36 are *dedicated to SACEUR'S SSP*. Each bomber could carry as many as twenty-one, one thousand pound bombs, but the British could have a *major logistical problem* in getting an adequate supply of ordnance to Ascension. Bombers do not usually fly and land with a full bomb load.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880105–0941. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by T. Miller and M. Austin; cleared by Blackwill and T. Williams (INR). Blackwill initialed for Williams. Haig initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner, indicating that he saw it. Haig also underlined numerous passages in the text of the memorandum. An attachment describing the Vulcan Aircraft is not printed.

<sup>2</sup> On April 18, the Embassy in London sent to the Department an analysis of an article that had appeared in the Sunday *Express* newspaper, which stated that Vulcan bombers had been deployed to the South Atlantic for operations against Argentina. In its comment, the Embassy noted: "MOD sources consistently have refused to discuss contingency plans for military operations in the Falklands area. However, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has not yet phased out its entire fleet of Vulcans and those that remain do have a long-range conventional bombing capability. Moreover, the recent additional task force augmentation of some twenty ground-attack Harriers cannot reach the Falklands area for several weeks. Against this background, it is possible that MOD planners have developed contingency plans for Vulcan deployment along the lines discussed" in the article. (Telegram 8372 from London, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820202–0597)

<sup>3</sup> The Avro Vulcan bomber entered service in 1956 as part of the RAF's "V-bomber" force, designed originally to serve as a platform for the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent.

They could either reduce the number of bombs carried, fly some in by transport aircraft, or, if they have seriously considered this option earlier, bombs may have been loaded aboard ships.

There is speculation as to whether this is merely public posturing, or a valid military option that HMG is considering. While this is a *theoretically feasible mission* for these aircraft, it would be *very difficult*. It would be dangerous for the aircraft, requiring good fortune with weather and timing. Given the conditions, it would be difficult to accurately place the bombs. DIA estimates they would have a good probability of penetrating air defenses at the Falklands, but would have much more of a problem on the mainland.

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## 157. Working Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, April 20, 1982

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Top Secret; Codeword. 4 pages not declassified.]

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## 158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 20, 1982

1. *Falklands Dispute*. The OAS Permanent Council today approved the Argentine request to convene an Organ of Consultation (Meeting of Foreign Ministers) under the Rio Treaty, beginning next Monday.<sup>2</sup> Eighteen of the twenty-one Rio Treaty signatories voted in favor; the U.S., Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago abstained. In explaining our abstention, Bill Middendorf questioned whether the Argentine request

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (03/25/1982–04/21/1982). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Argentina requested an urgent meeting of the OAS Council the evening of April 19. In OAS Resolution 360, April 21, the Permanent Council agreed to convene an Organ of Consultation on Monday, April 26. The text of the resolution is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 85.

was useful at a time when we were still striving to promote a peaceful settlement. Bill also stressed our view that the OAS should use the peaceful settlement mechanisms of the OAS Charter rather than the Rio Treaty, with its collective security emphasis.<sup>3</sup> (U)

2. *Dobrynin on Falkland Islands and U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD)*. Dobrynin delivered to Larry Eagleburger this afternoon the Soviet reply to our April 16 demarche on the Falkland Islands.<sup>4</sup> Predictably the Soviets denied media distortion of our role in the crisis and dismissed our warning against Soviet involvement as inappropriate.<sup>5</sup> On the SSOD, Dobrynin said it was 90–95 percent certain that Brezhnev would not attend the session. Dobrynin wondered if your invitation could be extended to Gromyko; Larry doubted it. (C)

[Omitted here is a paragraph on issues unrelated to the South Atlantic conflict.]

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<sup>3</sup> Middendorf's statement is printed *ibid.*, pp. 84–85.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 135.

<sup>5</sup> The text of the Soviet reply to Eagleburger's April 16 *démarche*, delivered by Dobrynin, was transmitted by the Department to Moscow in telegram 106876, April 21. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/21/1982)

**159. Letter From Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1982

Dear Al:

Thank you for your letter of April 21st., which gives new hopes on such a difficult and serious matter.<sup>2</sup>

The Argentine government and myself are grateful for your efforts and your concern towards peace.

You are aware that Argentina is willing to continue negotiations.

You should also know that paragraph 8 of the paper which was drafted here,<sup>3</sup> or any other similar provision, whichever its wording may be, should state that it is absolutely essential and *conditio sine qua non* that negotiations will have to conclude with a result by December 31st., 1982. As it has been remarked so many times, this result must include a recognition of the Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. Although said recognition may not be expressly stated in the agreement, nevertheless, the principle and the concept should arise clearly and unequivocally from the wording of the agreement.

We will certainly meet in Washington.

Warm regards,

**Nicanor Costa Mendez<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–0211. Secret; Nodis. Printed from an unofficial translation. In his memoirs, Haig recalled that Costa Méndez had presented him with a message upon his departure from Buenos Aires, April 19, which contained much of the text of this message. (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 289) It is unknown whether Haig was mistakenly referring to the April 21 message in this recollection. Costa Méndez was in Washington to attend the OAS meeting scheduled to begin April 26.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a mistaken reference to Haig's April 20 message to Costa Méndez, informing him of Pym's acceptance of Haig's offer to come to Washington to discuss the paper developed in Buenos Aires. See footnote 3, Document 154.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>4</sup> The translation indicates that Costa Méndez signed the original Spanish text.



**160. Note From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

Attached message [*less than 1 line not declassified*] received at 1030 local time. We are aware that the first contingent of British vessels is very near South Georgia at this time.<sup>2</sup> [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the islands to be occupied by no more than a platoon of Argentine troops, if there are any present at all. The harbor at Grytviken is a good one and would offer shelter to the task force in the face of South Atlantic storms.

**James A. Williams**

*Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret. A copy was sent to Iklé.

<sup>2</sup> In an April 21 information memorandum to Haig, Enders wrote that the British seizure of South Georgia would be “likely to harden even further the Argentine position on sovereignty,” “tend to strengthen the Argentine case under the Rio Treaty,” and “would make it virtually certain” that Argentina “would find the required 14 Latin votes.” Enders recommended trying to “take advantage” of U.K. action “to add new momentum and urgency to the negotiating process,” and privately emphasizing to the Argentines “that this action confirms U.K. determination to use force if a diplomatic solution is not found promptly.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982)

## Attachment

**Telegram From the Defense Attaché in London ([*name not declassified*]) to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Burkhalter)**<sup>3</sup>

London, April 21, 1982, 1519Z

1. (S/Noform) at 1440 local London time 820421, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] UK MOD revealed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] quote UK forces will take South Georgia Island tonight or tomorrow unquote.<sup>4</sup>

2. (S/Noform) [*1½ lines not declassified*] In this regard time was not clarified as being London local or South Georgia Island local or where forces would come from or extent/nature of forces or next step.

3. (S/Noform) [*2 lines not declassified*] will stay close in touch particularly during next 24 hours and advise by this or directed means any amplification of info.

4. (S/Noform) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] HMS *Antrim*, one other destroyer, HMS *Endurance* and tanker now in South Georgia area.

5. (S/Noform) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the timing of info provided due to impending Pym visit to Washington tomorrow 820422 would seem to cast some doubt on info.

6. (U) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

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<sup>3</sup> Secret; Noform.

<sup>4</sup> According to the British Official History, authorization to initiate landing operations on South Georgia was given to British forces on April 20. The first reconnaissance insertion was attempted on April 21 and successfully achieved the following day. (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 237–238) British ground troops landed on South Georgia on April 25. See Document 174.

**161. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Latin American Attitudes Toward the Falkland Islands Crisis

*Summary: Popular opinion throughout Latin America has supported Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands, but Hemisphere governments have been reluctant to legitimize the use of force. Reactions to the Argentine invasion among Latin American countries have varied according to the interests of individual states and their perceptions of their relationships with Buenos Aires.*

*Brazil fears that the conflict, if left to run its course, will bring down Galtieri and greatly increase Soviet and Cuban influence in Argentina. At the same time, senior Brazilian officials worry that an Argentine victory would revive Argentine militarism and historical tensions between Brazil and Argentina. Brazil's posture of cautious support for Argentina's claim is governed by its perception of the growing but still fragile friendship with its southern neighbor.<sup>2</sup> Brazil wants to avoid being seen as an adversary by Argentina and has agreed to sell six patrol aircraft to Buenos Aires. The longer the dispute remains unresolved and the greater the potential for conflict becomes, the more pressure Brazil will feel publicly to side with Argentina.*

*Chile has supported Argentina's claim to the Falklands, but the Pinochet government is concerned that the Argentine invasion will set a precedent for resolving the Beagle Channel dispute by force. The Chileans look to the US—through mediation—or to the UK—through military victory—to demonstrate to Buenos Aires that force cannot be used with impunity. Santiago wants to avoid any indication of bias, but its sympathies probably lie with the British. It has increased its military readiness in the extreme south in case hostilities break out.*

*Peru, as Argentina's staunchest ally in South America, quickly justified the seizure of the Falklands and offered moral support. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Peruvian military has contingency plans to aid their*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820066–0656. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by W. Lofstrom (INR/IAA). Haig initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Haig placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

*Argentine allies if fighting occurs, but Peruvian units would not move without Belaunde's explicit order.*

*Colombia supports Argentina's claim to the Falklands but has condemned the Argentine invasion. It has a territorial dispute with Venezuela and also fears that Nicaragua might act militarily to assert its claim to San Andres and Providencia Islands. Colombia, therefore, wants to avoid legitimizing the use of force in territorial disputes.*

*Venezuela's initial reaction to the Argentine invasion was cautious, but official sympathy for Argentina has come to the fore. Venezuela's position is largely the result of the similarity it sees between the British position in the Falklands and Guyana's possession—as the result of British colonialism—of extensive areas that Venezuela claims for itself.*

*Mexico's position is that Argentina has the historic right to demand decolonization of the Falklands, but that it erred by disregarding the doctrine of peaceful settlement of disputes. President Lopez Portillo publicly endorsed UN mediation on April 12 when he reiterated Mexico's sympathy with Argentina's aims but not its methods.*

*Nicaragua and El Salvador support the Argentine takeover. Managua stated on April 5 that Argentine efforts to resolve the "illegal" colonial occupation by negotiation had failed. On the same day, El Salvador announced that Argentine aspirations were "legitimate," but it urged both parties to settle the matter peacefully.*

*Costa Rica wants to avoid alienating either side. Guatemala announced its support for the Argentine invasion and drew a parallel between the Argentine claim to the Falklands and Guatemala's claim to Belize.*

*Prime Minister Price of Belize supports the British. He fears that the upcoming withdrawal of British troops from Belize will make it an inviting target for reassertion of the Guatemalan claim.*

*English-speaking Caribbean countries have been cautious but generally supportive of the UK. Guyana, fearful of Venezuelan irredentism, also has given strong public support to the UK position.*

*With regard to invoking TIAR, Trinidad-Tobago and Haiti are the only Rio Treaty signatories in the Caribbean. Trinidad-Tobago has maintained a cautious but firm position of calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands; Haiti probably will support Argentina's call for invoking the Rio Treaty.*

**162. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 21, 1982

Begins:

In preparation for our talks tomorrow<sup>2</sup> I am asking Nicko Henderson to give you the amendments to the Buenos Aires text<sup>3</sup> which the Prime Minister and I consider essential at first sight. He will be conveying one or two further points to which we attach importance.

As background to our meeting it might be useful for you to have the following summary of the reasons why the latest draft would be far more difficult for Britain to consider accepting than the version which we discussed earlier:<sup>4</sup>

**A. WITHDRAWAL**

The proposed arrangements are unequal and heavily favour Argentina, despite her being the aggressor. For the second week after signature of the agreement Argentina would have several thousand troops with all their equipment in the Falkland Islands, while the nearest British forces (our submarines) would be several hours distant. Within fifteen days the provision that British forces should return to their usual operating bases or areas would apparently exclude most possible deployments in the South Atlantic whereas the Argentines would be only about 200 miles away.

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

To have three nominees of the Argentine Government in the Councils in the Falklands would be undemocratic in the case of the legislative council and disproportionate in the case of the Executive Council. In effect, Government would be shared between Britain and Argentina at the Administrative level, as well as (with the United States) in the special Interim Authority. British administration would thus be re-established to a far lesser degree than under the earlier draft.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982. UK Confidential. The British Embassy in Washington sent the message to Haig under an April 21 covering note from Henderson. According to an April 21 memorandum from Eagleburger to Haig, Thomas delivered Pym's message to the Department the evening of April 21. In the same memorandum, Eagleburger wrote that Pym had "sent word" that he wished to have a "scene setting discussion" with Haig when they met the following day as well as a discussion of a U.S. "military guarantee" to the United Kingdom and "the absolute need to maintain maximum security possible about British military plans." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 163.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 112.

### C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The new draft would have these lifted before the completion of Argentinian withdrawal, thus contradicting the principle that withdrawal in accordance with the UN resolution is the first requirement.

### D. RELATIONS WITH THE MAINLAND

The latest draft opens up the possibility, if not the probability, of an influx of Argentine people and businesses, combined with strong encouragement to the Islanders to leave. Britain would apparently still have the right to block proposals in this field from the special Interim Authority, but the latest draft independently concedes the principle of facilitating contacts between the Islands and Argentina.

### E. FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

The new text would exclude re-establishment of the status quo ante the invasion from the list of possible outcomes of negotiations. This does not preserve the fundamental principle that the islanders must choose their own future. Here too Britain would nominally be free to refuse agreement to any outcome of the negotiations which the islanders did not accept. But there is a bias in the relevant paragraph which would greatly restrict our freedom to press for any outcome not involving early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

All in all, I think I was right to tell my colleagues in the Ten yesterday that the general effect of the latest draft—even presupposing Argentine goodwill, which in our eyes is far from obvious—would be that Argentine withdrawal would be delayed, the Argentine voice in the administration of the islands would be disproportionate, Argentine influence and pressure in the islands would be given free rein, and future negotiations would be organised in a way which could only prejudice the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The result would be that in practice the islanders would face the choice between absorption into Argentina or abandonment of the islands which have been their home in most cases for a [omission in the original].

I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting the Argentinians to accept our amendments. But I thought I should leave you in no doubt about the gap which I see between their present demands and what we can accept.

I much look forward to our meeting tomorrow and to all that I hope will come out of it—including something useful to you in the OAS context, on which I was grateful for your latest message.<sup>5</sup>

Ends.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 154.

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared by the British Government<sup>6</sup>

London, undated

#### ESSENTIAL AMENDMENTS

*Begins:*

*Paragraph 2.1:* Delete “rescind” and substitute “suspend enforcement of”.

*Paragraph 2.2.1 (second sentence):* Delete and substitute the following: “Within the same time period the United Kingdom naval task force will stand off at a distance of at least 150 miles from any of the two co-ordinate points.”

*Paragraph 2.2.2.*

(a) Re-draft first sentence as follows:

“Within fifteen days from the date of this agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall have removed all their forces, equipment and armaments from the zones”.

(b) Re-draft second sentence as follows:

“Thereafter, the UK naval task force and submarines shall revert to their normal duties.”

*Paragraph 4:* Delete “From the date of this agreement, steps” and substitute “On completion of the steps specified in paragraphs 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above, the two Governments shall take measures to terminate . . .”

Second sentence: Delete “without delay” and insert “at the same time” and “shall”.

*Paragraph 5:* Add “Each representative may be supported by a staff of not more than ten persons”.

*Paragraph 6 (A):* Delete the second sentence and substitute: “The traditional local administration shall be re-established, including the executive and legislative councils, each of which shall be enlarged to include one representative of the Argentine population resident on the Islands to be nominated by the special interim authority.”

*Paragraph 6 (A):* Delete third sentence.

*Paragraph 7 (A):* Delete and substitute:

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<sup>6</sup> UK Secret.

“Pending a definitive settlement, the special interim authority shall make proposals to the two Governments to facilitate and promote travel, transportation, communications (including the movement of persons) and trade between the mainland and the Islands. Such proposals shall simultaneously be transmitted to the executive and legislative councils for their views. The two Governments undertake to respond as soon as possible to such proposals. The special interim authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals agreed by the two Governments”.

*Paragraph 7 (B):* Delete “teaching” and “property”. Clarification is required of the meaning of the phrase “on an equal basis”. Pending such clarification, a reserve is put on this phrase.

*Paragraph 8 (A):* Delete and substitute:

“December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall negotiate mutually agreed conditions for the definitive status of each of the three groups of islands in accordance with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and bearing in mind relevant General Assembly resolutions. The negotiations shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the present agreement”.

Ends.

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## 163. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 22, 1982, 11:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Dispute

### PRINCIPALS

British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym  
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

### OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Brian Fall, Mr. Pym’s Private Secretary  
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Enders. The meeting took place at the Department of State.



Secretary Haig opened by describing the negotiating process in Buenos Aires, emphasizing its incoherence, the difficulty of finding a negotiating partner who could speak authoritatively, the relative weight of the Argentine Navy and Admiral Anaya in particular, and the role of the corps commanders. Returning here after three days of negotiation he had asked Foreign Minister Costa Mendez for a letter indicating that Argentines would accept the text established if it were acceptable to Britain, and been promised it, only to have Costa Mendez fail to deliver the letter at the airport, and indeed to advance the specious and unacceptable proposal that Argentina assume the governorship of the islands if the negotiations on their long-term status were to fail.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary described Galtieri as a “Patton-type”, not particularly bright, and intensely worried about his survival. He is under conflicting pressures from the military (for giving too much in negotiations with us) and from a population that clearly doesn’t want war. The Secretary’s contacts with Argentines in church and in the street showed clearly that the mood has changed.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that if it had it was due to British pressure. Secretary Haig agreed, adding that there were no alternatives left to push on.

With regard to South Georgia, Foreign Secretary Pym said that it might be some time before military action occurred.<sup>3</sup> Secretary Haig said that he had an observation to make which was not advice, since he did not want to pressure the British about its national interest. He had talked to the President,<sup>4</sup> and if the British take military action in South Georgia we would have to issue a statement putting us some distance away from Britain but not in any decisive way. Obviously it would be best if the island could be recaptured without casualties, but the Argentine Marines had sustained substantial casualties in taking the island, and there could be little doubt but that they will resist. The Secretary said that the U.S. would put the number of Argentine personnel on the island at 40, much lower than the high, but not very credible, figures the Argentines are putting out. He added that it would not be the best timing for the action to occur while Pym was here or immediately thereafter, or while talks go on with Argentina. But if the island were retaken surgically, it probably would help build pressure for a solution.

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<sup>2</sup> Haig is describing his April 19 meeting with Costa Méndez at the Buenos Aires airport (see footnote 2, Document 152). For the text of Costa Méndez’s proposal, see Document 159.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 160.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 155.

Speaking objectively, but with our deep sympathy for the British position, Secretary Haig said that Galtieri had only limited flexibility. Galtieri had insisted that with a reasonable assurance of sovereignty all the rest was negotiable, and there is a clear trade with this. We had responded we could not provide an assurance of any kind, and could not ask an ally to sacrifice its own sovereign interests. The Secretary concluded that Galtieri's life expectancy as President was very short, that Costa Mendez was not a valid interlocutor and thus that there was no point in having Costa Mendez sit down with Pym, as the former had proposed. The Secretary said that he saw no alternative but to return to Buenos Aires.

Foreign Secretary Pym said he was not terribly optimistic about the Secretary's mission. The British Government and people were genuinely and deeply grateful to him for the extraordinary effort he had made. Foreign Secretary Pym did not think there was any point in trying to produce a completely new proposal, nor did he see any change that could be made in the existing document that would bridge the gap.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that Prime Minister Thatcher had gone through the roof at the thought that confidential information on British military plans vis-a-vis South Georgia might be shared with the Argentines.<sup>5</sup> The weather was bad, and it was extremely unlikely that anything would happen for several days. He doubted that casualties could be avoided when action did occur, but thought that recapture of South Georgia from Argentina would be a dramatic way of keeping up the pressure. Foreign Secretary Pym thought the gap between the British position and the Buenos Aires text was enormous, particularly when it was so hard to tell whom one could deal with. If it were possible for the Secretary's mission to succeed, he would be all for it. But one must face the probable outcome. Clearly time is running out. The mood in Britain is calm and responsible. In their hearts the people don't want

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<sup>5</sup> In her memoirs, Thatcher wrote that the U.K. Government informed Haig through Henderson, April 21, "that a firm decision had been taken to recover South Georgia in the near future." "Mr. Haig," she recounted, "expressed himself surprised and concerned. He asked whether our decision was final: I confirmed that it was. We were informing, not consulting him. Later he told our ambassador that he thought he would have to give the Argentine Junta advance notice of our intended operation. We were appalled. Nico Henderson persuaded him to think better of it." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 204) No U.S. record of Haig's conversation with Henderson has been found. However, Henderson's transmitted reports of this meeting have been published online by the Thatcher Foundation. On April 22, in a meeting with Bosworth, Takacs expressed "apparent concern" that the "USG might have some information on a possible British attack against South Georgia." In response, Haig wrote to Costa Méndez, stating "we have no influence with the British" with regard to their military intentions. "Any decision they might take would be theirs alone, without consultation with us." (Telegram 109457 to Buenos Aires, April 23; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/20/1982–04/23/1982))

war but they understand what is at stake. Prime Minister Thatcher is resolute and not inclined towards further compromise. She feels fortified in this by her conversation with President Reagan April 17.<sup>6</sup>

Foreign Secretary Pym asked the Secretary what possibility of success he saw and what chance of success there is if he returns to Buenos Aires.

Secretary Haig said he was not optimistic and would have given up much earlier if that had been the criterion. He was only going on because of the historic consequence of failure. If there is war, Latin America will (regardless of the finer judgements of some of its leaders) line up against Britain. This would come to a head at the OAS meeting.<sup>7</sup> There would be an opportunity for Soviet mischief, and some ramifications in Central America. More important is the potential impact in Britain. Nothing will come out of the Secretary's mission that will shake the relationship, but we are vitally interested in the long-term viability of the Thatcher Government. Things would go all right up to the point of military action and just beyond. Afterwards Labour and others would pull away.

Foreign Secretary Pym agreed that it could be a very long struggle. The pressure is not strong enough now to get results. More pressure is needed to make the negotiations succeed. It would be decisive if the U.S. came off the fence. Pym noted that the Government had defended Secretary Haig in Parliament against charges the U.S. was too even-handed. But reaction was growing. In his judgment, only U.S. economic or other pressure could make the shuttle work.

Secretary Haig said that there was also no question but that the U.S. would shift if talks collapsed. We had told that repeatedly to the Argentines, and we believe they do not question it. What they do question is whether Britain will actually go to war.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that time was critical and that everything is to be said for applying infinitely greater pressure now.

Secretary Haig said that he thought that the threat could be made even more vigorously and that Britain should not doubt on whose side we would come down. However, financial and trade measures would not have an immediate effect, indeed might take six months to act while in the meantime the whole international financial structure might be shaken as the Argentine crisis came on top of the Polish, Rumanian, and Mexican crises.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that such a crisis might bring Argentina to its senses.

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 144.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 185.

Secretary Haig said that the U.S. must consider the consequences. There would be a north-south as well as an east-west crisis. If pressure is required maybe it would be better to use military pressure. That is the only thing that can bring home that the west is willing to fight. He noted that we have an exceptionally large fleet in the Caribbean.

Foreign Secretary Pym noted that military pressures would topple the government in Buenos Aires.

Secretary Haig said that sanctions would probably have an initial effect of annealing unity in Buenos Aires and making the government more intractable. That would leave Britain with the only alternative of blockading the islands as a means of long-term strangulation. The other alternative is a continuation of the talks. We are down now to a narrow margin of compromise, with peripheral shifts between the withdrawal, interim arrangements, and negotiations paragraphs likely to be decisive. He believed the key was the U.S. role. U.S. involvement was disadvantageous from our point of view as it would make us the focus of animosity of both governments but the U.S. involvement would provide the psychological equivalent of a guarantee, assuring Argentina that it would have a fair shot at influencing the outcome while reassuring Britain that there will be no precipitous action.

Secretary Haig noted the importance of the Falkland Islands company to the Argentines. Foreign Secretary Pym said that he was unaware that Britain had ever opposed share purchases by Argentina. On the other hand, he was worried that the Argentines would attempt to flood the islands with people. Secretary Haig said that we would not permit that.

Secretary Haig said that it would be better if the interim period were 18 months, and Foreign Secretary Pym agreed. Secretary Haig said that the U.S. could take on an active mediating role at the end of the year if the two countries had not negotiated an agreement prior to then.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that he thought that there were only a few days left before time ran out.

Secretary Haig said that the OAS meeting on April 26 presented a problem. The U.S. would argue that there is no legal basis for action when a Rio Treaty member uses force against an outside power, but the Latins would outvote us. One way to trump the OAS would be to go back to Buenos Aires on April 27. He recognized that there were only a few days left, since as soon as the British assembled its fleet, it would have to act, or we all lose credibility. Pym said that there was about a week more before that point was reached.

Foreign Secretary Pym expressed concern that the negotiations could drag on. Secretary Haig replied that a new trip to Buenos Aires would put the onus for failure on Argentina.

Secretary Haig then outlined the possibility of adding language on U.S. mediation/conciliation to the text. Foreign Secretary Pym asked whether that would make unnecessary retention of the tendentious language on negotiations in Paragraph 8. Secretary Haig replied that there was no way to get an agreement unless the language were retained.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that the principle of self-determination must not be put at risk, he was not at all sure that he could get through the House with the concept of a U.S.-sponsored “evolution” on the islands.

Secretary Haig said that he thought the withdrawal process would be readily resolvable once the rest of the agreement were reached, and Foreign Secretary Pym agreed.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that he considered the draft the British had forwarded to Washington the day before to be its bottom line.<sup>8</sup> The Secretary’s suggestions were below that. If they were retained, the Thatcher Government would fall. Secretary Haig said that it was inconceivable we would contribute to such a result.

Foreign Secretary Pym said that if a new trip to Buenos Aires were undertaken it would have to be the last bite, with the U.S. ready to back off thereafter.

Secretary Haig closed by reassuring Foreign Secretary Pym that the U.S. is not, and in the light of its public opinion, cannot be even-handed.

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 162.

# 164. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 23, 1982, 10:35–11:45 a.m.

## SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Framework—Haig/Pym Meeting with Staff

## PARTICIPANTS

### *US*

The Secretary  
 Assistant Secretary Thomas O.  
 Enders  
 Lt. General Vernon Walters  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen  
 W. Bosworth  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L.  
 Funseth  
 Deputy to the Under Secretary for  
 Political Affairs David Gompert  
 Ambassador John J. Louis, Jr.  
 L/ARA—Scott Gudgeon  
 EUR/NE—John Campbell  
 (Notetaker)

### *UK*

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym  
 Deputy to the Permanent Under  
 Secretary, Julian Bullard  
 Ambassador Sir Nicholas  
 Henderson  
 Ian Sinclair, Legal Adviser  
 John Ure, FCO  
 Brian Fall, Private Secretary to the  
 Foreign Secretary  
 Francis Richards, Assistant Private  
 Secretary to the Foreign  
 Secretary  
 Nicholas Fenn, FCO News  
 Department  
 Stephen Wall, UK Embassy  
 Christopher Crabbe, UK Embassy

*SUMMARY:* Foreign Secretary Francis Pym visited Washington April 22–23, his first as Foreign Secretary. His visit followed Secretary Haig's two trips to London (April 8–9 and April 12–13) and two trips to Buenos Aires (April 9–11 and April 15–19) in his search for a diplomatic solution to the South Atlantic dispute between Argentina and the UK. At the April 23 meeting reported here, Secretary Haig and Foreign Secretary Pym considered the attached draft of the Falkland Islands Framework which had been developed out of Secretary Haig's conversations in Buenos Aires and London.<sup>2</sup> This draft (attached) also incorporated working-level US and UK changes made the previous evening. (See separate memorandum of conversation for the afternoon/evening

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Goldberg. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

of April 22.)<sup>3</sup> The two sides worked through the text paragraph by paragraph until the Foreign Secretary ended the meeting to keep a previously-arranged appointment with the British press. The Secretary and Foreign Secretary agreed to resume their discussions at lunch at the British Embassy later in the day. (See separate memorandum of conversation.)<sup>4</sup> Following Foreign Secretary Pym's Washington visit, Secretary Haig transmitted a revised text of the Framework to the Argentine and British governments the night of April 26–27.<sup>5</sup> END SUMMARY.

Secretary Haig opened the conversation by observing that UK and American experts had been working together on the texts. He wanted the UK to understand that we were not trying to advocate the Argentine position. Rather, we were searching for what might be achievable in Buenos Aires, recognizing that such a text might not necessarily also be acceptable in London. The Secretary said that we needed to consider carefully whether or not we should begin another round of negotiations under the current formula—or whether we should try another approach.

The Secretary said that the pressure to achieve a negotiated, political settlement would not dissipate once military action began. Military action was unlikely to be decisive, and would probably drag on. World public opinion would insist on a solution. Pym agreed with the Secretary's observation, but said that once military action began, "people will have different perceptions." Haig commented that it was easy to slip into thinking in terms of negotiations versus war. This was false. A political solution would become even more imperative if a war started. The Secretary then suggested to Pym that they work through the text of the Falkland Islands Peace Framework.

*Paragraph 2.1:* The Secretary said that we agreed with the paragraph as rewritten. Assistant Secretary Enders urged the British that they work within the structure of the Buenos Aires concept—the "elastic band"—combined with US verification. Alternatively, the UK should consider carefully our new, second, concept: here the modalities of

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<sup>3</sup> During the April 22 meeting, held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State, the U.S. and British sides considered proposed British amendments to the text of the draft agreement transmitted by Haig from Buenos Aires, April 19. The memorandum of conversation, along with the Buenos Aires draft text bearing the British amendments, is in the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Enders sent a shorter summary of the discussions, including U.S. judgments of the British amendments, to Haig under a covering action memorandum, April 22. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 165.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 181.

withdrawal were based on how long it would take to reinsert forces into the Falkland area once they had been withdrawn.

Pym said he was interested in the modality for withdrawal based on time rather than distance: “our military people must look at this.” Pym thought, however, that this concept would be possible to sell to British public opinion. The Secretary observed that this operational modality would also help the Argentine military accept the framework. Sinclair objected that this modality retained the principal difficulty of the previous one: it was a-symmetrical. The British would be withdrawing all of its fleet while the Argentines would be withdrawing their forces in stages. The Secretary observed that this became irrelevant once a US presence was established on the Islands. Once we were there, Buenos Aires would not seek to reoccupy the Islands because it would face American power.

Enders noted that this second concept depended on the presence of US personnel to verify that withdrawal was taking place. This would require US personnel on the Islands, with the fleet, and in Argentine ports. The Secretary said that placing American observers on the fleet posed physical problems. It would be foolish of us to propose placing them there because it could not be done. (“Would we drop them from helicopters?”) What was important was to get the US physically present on the Islands. We could also use aerial surveillance with respect to the British fleet and Argentine ports. The important principles were also that the US would assume responsibility for verification. Gompert noted that our redrafted language referred to redeployment of military forces to “normal duties”. This language was more ambiguous than what had appeared in previous drafts. It was designed not to constrict British naval operations in the South Atlantic. Pym observed that he would have to consult his military experts.

*Paragraph 4:* The Secretary observed that with the redrafting, there was a reasonable consensus on this paragraph. Pym observed that the Prime Minister was concerned about initiating approaches of this type before the completion of withdrawal, “but I will put this to her (meaning PM Thatcher). I find it reasonable.”

*Paragraph 5:* Enders observed that the problem here involved the number of personnel. The Secretary said that Buenos Aires accepted the concept of a limitation on numbers. Pym said that Prime Minister Thatcher’s view was that the population of the Islands was very small; therefore, the number of officials should also be small. Pym said that the US suggestion of a distinction between the staff of the Interim Administration and the US verifiers might well meet her concern. The Secretary said that he expected the US presence to be headed by an experienced official of ambassadorial rank. Pym observed that the Prime Minister would not accept an interim administration with offices



on the Argentine mainland. Enders observed that the Argentines had suggested Geneva as a headquarters site. Pym said the suggestion was absurd, given the distance and the tiny numbers involved.

*Paragraph 6 (A):* Enders said that under this rewritten paragraph, local administration would continue, except that the Legislative and Executive councils would be enlarged. This language was designed to let the office of the governor continue—even though there would be no governor on the Island.

Sinclair said that there must be an executive authority in the absence of the governor. This requirement was met by the draft language. Enders said that this concept would be difficult for the Argentines. The Secretary observed that Argentine acceptance of this position would be a major concession on their part. Enders said that the reduced number of Argentine appointments to the two councils under this redraft would also be difficult for Buenos Aires to accept. Sinclair observed that Argentine representation would now be more in proportion to their numbers. There was general agreement that it was preferable that Argentine representatives be appointed rather than elected.

The Secretary emphasized that the entire agreement could fail on this paragraph. Costa Mendez had told him that Argentine flexibility on the negotiations paragraph was directly tied to UK flexibility here. Pym observed that this paragraph contemplated the restoration of UK administration—it did not exclude British administration.

*Paragraph 6 (B):* Pym accepted it.

*Paragraph 7 (A & B):* Pym observed that this paragraph was fundamental to London. London looked for an international authority which would oversee the restoration of normal life on the Islands with self-determination on the future. But Argentina wanted to expand its presence in the Islands, and this would be unacceptable. The House of Commons would see that 7A “opened the door to the Falklands being overrun by a lot of Argentines.” The Secretary observed that here language was more difficult than reality. London would retain what amounted to a veto. Enders argued that by combining 7A and 7B, 7B became a safeguard. But, Pym observed, the flavor here would be unacceptable to the Prime Minister. Pym said that the Argentines were trying to jump the gun on self-determination of the Islands by increasing the Argentine presence. The Secretary observed that this paragraph was not very different from language used by the UK with Argentina in a 1971 agreement. Sinclair observed that the 1971 agreement was quite different in context, and its language was rather restricted in nature.

Pym observed that the Prime Minister was highly sensitive about questions of property. Initially expansion of communication and trade links between the Islands and the mainland had been talked about—

now this was expanded to property. Pym said, “you can imagine what they will say in the House of Commons.” But, Pym went on, “you are saying that we will have a veto.” The Secretary agreed, arguing that B provided a straightjacket around A. Pym observed that therefore the paragraph was really a “slight of hand”—with good intentions. “The Prime Minister will have enormous problems. She is a slight purist.”

The Secretary argued that these paragraphs attempted to approach the question from the point of view of equity. Pym observed that the proposal looked to the Interim Authority making specific suggestions for enlarged links with Argentina. HMG would then say no. “Where would we be after a month or so? Tension would build. Picture the scene on the Islands.” Enders observed that the US presence could function as a shock absorber. Pym returned to his earlier point: the paragraph misled the Argentines. The Secretary said that the paragraph guaranteed the present *status quo* of the character of the Islands.

Pym argued that the question of compensating the Islanders should be left out of the agreement. It provided the wrong kind of flavor and implied that the inhabitants were being bribed to leave.

At this point, Foreign Secretary Pym returned to the British Embassy to meet with the press. He and the Secretary agreed to continue their discussion over lunch and at an afternoon session at the British Embassy.

## 165. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 23, 1982, 2:15–4:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Framework

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *US*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Lawrence S.  
Eagleburger  
Lt. General Vernon Walters  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen  
Bosworth  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L.  
Funseth  
Deputy to Under Secretary for  
Political Affairs, David Gompert  
Scott Gudgeon, L/ARA  
John Campbell, EUR/NE

#### *UK*

Foreign Secretary Pym  
Ambassador Sir Nicholas  
Henderson  
Julian Bullard, Deputy to the  
Permanent Under Secretary  
Ian Sinclair, Legal Advisor  
John Ure, Foreign Commonwealth  
Office  
Brian Fall, Private Secretary to the  
Foreign Secretary  
Francis Richards, Assistant Private  
Secretary to the Foreign  
Secretary  
Nicholas Fenn, FCO News  
Department  
Derek Thomas, Minister UK  
Embassy  
Stephen Wall, UK Embassy  
Christopher Crabbe, UK Embassy

**SUMMARY:** After lunch at the British Embassy, the US and UK sides resumed their meeting, which had been interrupted by the Foreign Secretary's appointment with the British press. (See separate memcon for the earlier portion of the meeting.)<sup>2</sup>

The first part of the formal conversation at the British Embassy focused on the text of the Falkland Framework proposal, which had incorporated in it changes suggested before Pym's press break. (Text attached.)<sup>3</sup> The Secretary and the Foreign Secretary then discussed the Argentine request for NASA LANDSAT photographs of South Georgia, with Pym expressing the hope that the US would not provide the coverage. The Secretary noted that whether to do so would be an

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Goldberg. The meeting took place at the Residence of the British Ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 164.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

American decision.<sup>4</sup> The final portion of the meeting consisted of Pym's summing-up of the UK reaction to the draft framework. Essentially, he argued, the text he would be taking back to London rewarded Argentine aggression. END SUMMARY.

Pym opened the discussion by asking where the concept of "7 days" as a time frame for withdrawal came from.

Gompert responded that our goal had been to find a time frame acceptable to the Argentines.

*Paragraph 4:* The Secretary noted that the redraft of paragraph 4 included the modifications suggested by the British side at the earlier meeting that morning. The Secretary said that while he recognized that the paragraph caused the British problems, he hoped that the Foreign Secretary would take it to London. Pym said that he would do so.

*Paragraph 5:* The Secretary said we specifically referred to ten persons to assure London that the number of Argentines that would be present on the Island would be limited.

*Paragraph 6:* The Secretary said that we want to suggest that the framework document is an integrated whole. Sometimes we have had to split the differences between HMG and Buenos Aires in hopes of achieving something acceptable to both. Here with respect to the composition of the governing councils, HMG would have a decisive majority.

*Paragraph 7:* Pym said that his government would have trouble with the appointment of representatives to the Executive and Legislative Councils by the Argentine Government. In reply, the Secretary reminded Pym that the rest of the paragraph contained what London had asked for. The Secretary and Pym agreed to alter the text to add a colon after "... enlarged to include: ...".

Pym speculated whether or not the Interim Authority could be substituted for the Argentine government as the appointing authority; "it would help us optically." Sir Nicholas Henderson asked what the UK was getting in return for the major concession of allowing the Argentine government appointed representatives on the Executive and Legislative Councils.

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<sup>4</sup> On April 23, Burt sent Eagleburger an action memorandum regarding the Government of Argentina's April 22 request for LANDSAT coverage of South Georgia. Burt recommended informing NASA that the Department had "no objection" to providing the requested LANDSAT coverage and that he, Burt, inform the British Embassy of the U.S. decision. Eagleburger disapproved both recommendations. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982) A later Argentine request for LANDSAT images, presented to Eagleburger on April 30, was approved. See Document 197.

The Secretary replied that it served no purpose for the British to say that there could be no Argentine representation. It was an Argentine decision to say whether “its representation on the councils would come from the mainland or from the Islands.”

The Secretary said that our redraft addressed the concerns which Pym had expressed at the morning meeting. There was no longer reference to personal compensation; the referring of Interim Authority recommendations to the councils had been added, and the word “equal” had been suppressed from paragraph 7.2. But, Pym objected, the word “equal” remained in paragraph 7.1.

Bullard suggested that rather than the word “equal” it might be better to use “equitable”. The Secretary said the Argentines wanted their co-nationals to have an “equal shot” on the Island. But, objected Sinclair, paragraph 7.1 was not restricted to the inhabitants of the Islands. The Secretary then asked if the phrase “on a non-discriminatory basis” would help. Henderson and Pym both agreed that this phrase was better. Gudgeon observed that it was a principle that was being talked about here; it did not obligate HMG to any specific measures. The Secretary said that the British had accepted a similar principle in their 1971 agreement with Argentina but had failed to carry it out. That was why the word “facilitate” was important to the Argentines. He went on to observe that the British have two safety valves: they would dominate the councils, and HMG would have to approve anything which was “operational”. Gompert added that the text left intact already existing discriminatory regulations.

Pym asked what does the phrase “equal basis” really mean? Gompert replied that it meant non-discriminatory. The Secretary agreed that the text proposed opening up the Islands, but HMG would control how the process was carried out. Fall observed that the use of the phrase “on an equitable basis” would really help. But the Secretary said that its use would raise “paranoia” in Buenos Aires. Bullard asked if “equal basis” had to remain in the first sentence. The Secretary replied that it did, because it stated a goal.

*Paragraph 8:* The Secretary began the discussion by observing that this paragraph contained the language which had been the hardest to negotiate in Buenos Aires. In this version, we had taken out the word “territorial”. We had eliminated references to specific UN resolutions and the resulting language was very close to the original London version.

Pym observed that this paragraph was now much more neutral, even so it was bound to cause problems in London. The Secretary observed that to stand any chance of acceptability, the language must be ambiguous. Pym asked if reference could be made to the “rights” of the inhabitants.

The Secretary emphasized that the previous “tilt” in the paragraph toward Buenos Aires had been eliminated; the language is now neutral. For this reason, he would like to make it as close to the Argentine language as he could. He doubted that the text as it presently stood would secure Argentine agreement.

*Paragraph 9:* Pym opened by observing that 9.1 was helpful, 9.2 “a lot of trouble,” as was 9.3.

Pym asked what purpose 9.5 served. Gudgeon responded that the Argentines opposed 9.1 and the inclusion of 9.5 was an attempt to balance it: 9.5 was necessary to sell 9.1 to Argentina.

Both Pym and Fall objected to the proposal to compensate the Islanders who wished to leave. Fall said “it sounds like our color problem solution—you pay them to leave the UK”. Such an approach he said would trigger emotional hostility in the UK. The Secretary suggested that we should consider dropping all of paragraph 9.

Bullard asked about the six-month time frame. The Secretary responded that it was designed to resolve a situation in which there was no UK/Argentina agreement by December 31, it also showed Galtieri that there would be some movement in conjunction with negotiation.

The Secretary reminded the UK side that the original Argentine sovereignty and administration would be reestablished on the Falklands if no agreement was negotiated by December 31, 1982.

Brian Fall observed that we were contemplating a highly activist interim authority. The Secretary agreed, observing that “it would not be a bad thing”.

Reverting to paragraph 9, Pym asked if it would help to change the first sentence to read “. . . after consultations with the Councils, the Authority shall make specific proposals . . .”.

With respect to paragraph 9.2, Gudgeon suggested adding a “;” after the word “Islanders”. Ure supported this suggestion. After further discussions, the Secretary agreed to eliminate 9.2 and add the phrase “. . . including possible arrangements for compensating the Islanders . . .” to 9.4 after “. . . may request. . .”.

At this point the Secretary asked if he could raise an altogether different issue with the Foreign Secretary. He said that Argentina was a participant in the NASA LANDSAT program. Argentina was requesting data on South Georgia Island to be gathered over the weekend, in full accordance with their contract with NASA. The Secretary said that the data produced would be “without discrimination—so you can’t pick up ships on it”. Argentina was, he said, entitled to the data under its contract. If Argentina were turned down, Buenos Aires would take this as a major US signal at a particularly delicate time in our negotiations.

Derek Thomas said that while NASA may believe that the data had no military value, clearly the Argentines thought that it did—otherwise they would not have requested it. Bullard asked if action on the Argentines had provided NASA with sufficient advance notice. Eagleburger said that NASA would normally honor the Argentine request, even though it was on very short notice. Pym asked if he could respond to the Secretary after a twenty five-minute break. At that point, the two sides separated, to reconvene at 4:00 PM.

When the two sides met again, Pym said that he recognized that response to the Argentine NASA request was purely a US decision, but he said “I hope that it does not happen.”

The Secretary said that he understood Pym’s response, but had to point out that he would have to take his decision within the context of what we were trying to do both in London and Buenos Aires. He did not see how providing the data would confer any military advantage on the Argentines.

At that point, Pym said that he would like to make a few general observations about the Falklands framework proposal and then meet again with the Secretary at 7:00 PM. The Secretary agreed.<sup>5</sup>

*PYM’S SUMMING UP:* Pym made the following points:

A. HMG appreciated the Secretary’s efforts to meet London’s requirements.

B. The text under consideration this afternoon was considerably improved over the text transmitted by the Secretary from Buenos Aires.

C. But this text was considerably closer to the Buenos Aires text than the one the Secretary had taken away from London during his first negotiating round.

D. The current text had the following results:

1. It would provide Argentina with a political foothold on the Falklands and a political voice.

2. It established much stronger Argentine economic and commercial influence over the Islands.

3. It ended the status under which the Islands had been living before Argentine aggression.

Therefore, it rewarded Argentine aggression.

Pym said that he well understood the improvements which Haig had extracted from the Argentines. “But it will be difficult for us in London. I will take it to London.”

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 166.

The Foreign Secretary said that he also wished to put down one or two more thoughts on paper which he would give to the Secretary at their 7:00 PM meeting.

Secretary Haig observed that he doubted the text which they were considering had much of a chance of acceptability. Hence, he was particularly concerned that it bear the test of public scrutiny: “We must show we went the extra mile. However,” the Secretary observed, “if the text should be acceptable, I do not believe we will be subject to undue criticism.”

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## 166. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 23, 1982, 7–7:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Framework<sup>2</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *United States*

The Secretary

Lt General Vernon Walters

Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen W. Bosworth

Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L. Funseth

Deputy to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Gompert

L/ARA—Scott Gudgeon

EUR/NE—Keith C. Smith (Notetaker)

#### *United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym

Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary, Julian Bullard

Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson

Ian Sinclair, Legal Adviser

John Ure, FCO

Brian Fall, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

Francis Richards, Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

Nicholas Fenn, FCO News Department

Stephen Wall, UK Embassy

Christopher Crabbe, UK Embassy

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Smith. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> In the space next to the subject line, Goldberg added: “—Haig/Pym meeting w/staff.”



Foreign Secretary Pym opened the meeting by stating that he saw serious difficulties with the draft given to him by the American side.<sup>3</sup> He remarked that Mrs. Thatcher would not accept the appointment of two Argentines to the Falkland's interim administration. The Secretary replied that the language represented our best assessment of what is necessary to achieve an agreement, and that it was his desire that we all be in a position, so that no one can question whether we went the last mile in our quest for peace. The Secretary observed that the draft contained a commitment to reestablish local British authority in the islands; that we were not trying to leave the aggressor in place. Everyone can argue that fact credibly. He pointed out that some cosmetic changes had been made for the sake of peace and to secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary remarked that although there was a 99% chance that the draft would not be accepted by the Argentine authorities, we need to convince everyone in Washington and in London that the failure to reach agreement lies elsewhere.

Pym repeated that the Prime Minister would have great difficulty getting support in Parliament for the draft, and he thought that even her most ardent supporters in the Conservative Party would not support it. The Secretary replied that it was not up to the US to decide whether Britain could accept it, but history must reflect that he had been in contact with both sides and that he had not been excessively supportive of either side. He asked the UK to endorse the proposal as a package.

Pym stated that Mrs. Thatcher would ask whether the President endorses the US draft, and she would say that, "He told me already that I have come as far as I could go in accommodating the Argentines." The Secretary said that he had talked to the President about the proposal, although they had not gone through the text. The Secretary added that he wanted to be able to say that the US supported its British friends; that we are together, and if the Argentines do not accept this package, the consequences are on their head.

Ambassador Henderson then asked whether the Foreign Secretary would send back immediately an analysis of the US text. Pym indicated that he would. The Secretary stated that he hoped the British would then be in a position to say that the text is acceptable to the Argentines. Pym asked whether the Secretary would be stating that he was putting the draft to both sides. The Secretary replied that he hoped to present it on Sunday<sup>4</sup> to Costa Mendez, and that he would tell the Minister it is a fair proposition and it is all the US can do. Pym then asked whether it was the Secretary's intention to give the Argentines a time limit to

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably the draft discussed at the afternoon meeting. See Document 165.

<sup>4</sup> April 25.

respond—something like 48 hours (Tuesday afternoon).<sup>5</sup> The Secretary indicated that this could be done. Brian Fall remarked that the Argentines might want to leak the text to OAS members, such as the Venezuelans. The Secretary agreed that it could happen, but that there might not be any benefit to Buenos Aires in doing so.

Pym said the other sticking point was that of security assurances, and he wanted to give the Secretary a paper with some British ideas on the subject.<sup>6</sup> He added that US acceptance would help him with the Prime Minister who is quite concerned about the security aspects of any agreement. The Secretary said at first glance, the British text appeared to have possibilities, but he would have to consider carefully whether he would be exceeding the authority delegated to him by the President if he agreed to it. He promised to have the lawyers look the text over and flash a US response back to London. In an aside, the Secretary said that the US also has a detailed paper to give the British on voting rights and other technical aspects.<sup>7</sup>

Pym asked the Secretary for his views on dealing with the press after the meeting, adding that he would not want anything described as “the Haig plan.” The Secretary agreed and said that he would prefer to describe the latest draft as a composite of views emanating from his discussions in London and in Buenos Aires, along with his interpretation of those views. Pym remarked that for now, we would say that the draft is the current state of the Secretary’s ideas and those of the British. The Secretary then asked Mr. Gompert to get for Pym a draft statement that the President would use in addressing the Falkland crisis.<sup>8</sup> The Secretary also said that he would give the British a copy of the protocol drafted by the US side.<sup>9</sup> He remarked that, although we have received no substantive comments on the protocol from the Argentine side, we are very interested in securing HMG’s views on the paper. Mr. Gudgeon said we would have a new draft of the protocol by early next week and would send it immediately to London.

Pym then asked whether President Reagan would say anything at this point about the US sending a draft agreement to London. The Secretary answered that we would have to go to the press formally at some point, but the timing would depend on whether or not it would put helpful pressure on the Argentine Government. He said that he did not, however, want to put the press onto President Galtieri at this

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<sup>5</sup> April 27.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> No draft statement has been found.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to a draft protocol on the special interim authority. No copy has been found in Department of State or White House files.

time. The Secretary then remarked that we would have to say that we believe the draft to be just and fair. Pym then asked what would happen if the Argentines accepted after considering it for two days. The Secretary responded that he didn't believe it had a prayer of a chance with Buenos Aires. Henderson then remarked that it was possible the Argentines would simply come back with a great many amendments, and asked whether the Secretary would still go to Buenos Aires. The Secretary said he would not go unless he could carry something favorable enough to submit to the Prime Minister. He remarked that it appeared as if the US had subtly shifted from mediation to arbitration. He then added that knowing the Argentines, he was sure they would ask for more time since desperate men will resort to any tactic.

At that point, Pym said that although the Secretary had tried very hard, the Prime Minister would certainly have great problems with the US draft. Nevertheless, he would face that problem tomorrow. The Secretary said although there is no reaction [*reason?*] to raise expectations, the British have been managing brilliantly this nightmarish situation. Pym then produced a copy of a note which HMG had asked the Swiss Embassy to convey to the Argentine Government, concerning additional measures in the exclusion zone. He said his government was still considering whether or not to go public with the new measures. The Secretary answered that from his reading of the note he did not see any inconsistency with the British force posture; that if the Argentines don't know now where they are headed, it won't be for lack of an explanation.

The Foreign Secretary ended by stating that he wanted to thank the Secretary for all of his time and effort and to say the same for the Secretary's staff. The Secretary answered by stating, "We are with you. God bless you all."

**167. Memorandum From Dennis C. Blair, Roger W. Fontaine, and James M. Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 23, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands

Here is the view of your NSC "Falklands Task Force" on the likely course of future events, the questions that will face the President next week, and the objectives our policy should pursue.

*Assumptions*

—That Pym's counteroffer to the Argentines will not be acceptable to them, and the present phase of U.S. honest-broker efforts will therefore end by the middle of next week;

—That the U.K. task force will blockade the Falklands at the end of next week, and probably also reoccupy the South Georgias, causing casualties on both sides;

—Alternatively, that the U.K. fleet may try to deal a quick and significant "bloody nose" to the Argentines, withdraw the fleet (with intention of returning when seasons change), and in meantime intensify economic measures;

—That Argentina will bring the issue to the OAS next week, seeking the invocation of the Rio treaty against the U.K.

—That a longer-term period of military inconclusiveness will ensue.

*U.S. Policy Decisions Next Week*

—Whether Haig (or some other high-level U.S. officer) should return to B.A. next week bearing an ultimatum (accept U.K. compromise language or bear onus for breakoff of negotiations, with U.S. ending "evenhandedness");

—Whether or not we join the British-initiated, EC-supported economic sanctions against Argentina (we believe we should);

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands (April 1982). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. Clark circled the stamped notation and the typewritten date on the memorandum, drew a line between the circles, and wrote: "Timely, timely—."

—Whether and to what extent we advance other overt support to U.K. (logistical, supply, intelligence, diplomatic, etc.);

—The public stance we take (we believe we need to come down clearly on the U.K. side, on the basis of U.N. resolution 502, but more in sorrow than in anger);

—How we vote in the OAS (this would depend to a certain extent on how the votes were lining up, but we should probably vote against the resolution).

*U.S. Policy Initiatives to Start Next Week*

—In the event that we are out of the mediation business, we should push others forward—Brazil seems the best candidate, or perhaps some larger combination of Latin American countries;

—We need to work hard on other Latin American countries supporting Argentina to try to hold onto our common interests in other areas, particularly Central America.

We would welcome a chance to discuss this business further with you, perhaps on the heels of Pym's visit (particularly if he meets with the President).

**168. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 23, 1982

SUBJECT

*Falkland Islands: Preparing for the Rio Treaty MFM*

**ISSUE FOR DECISION**

In advance of the Organ of Consultation (MFM) meeting called by Argentina for Monday, April 26,<sup>2</sup> *we should try to ensure that the Latin American governments, particularly Argentina,<sup>3</sup> know what our position is with respect to the MFM.*

**ESSENTIAL FACTORS**

The Argentines have succeeded in convening the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty to, in the language of the OAS resolution, “consider the grave situation that has arisen in the South Atlantic.”<sup>4</sup> The twenty-one Foreign Ministers, or their accredited representatives, are to begin deliberations Monday, April 26, unless hostilities prompt the GOA to ask for an earlier meeting. *Once the Organ begins, we expect the GOA, at a minimum, to attempt to gain approval for a resolution which would:*

—*Recognize Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falklands;*

—*Call on both parties to use only peaceful means to resolve their dispute, and refrain from the threat or use of force (possibly tied to a “truce” period as earlier proposed by Peru);*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P90009–0736. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Briggs and Johnson; cleared by Thompson. Copies were sent for information to ARA/PPC and ARA/RPP. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> On a separate action memorandum, sent by Enders to Haig on April 23, Haig approved a recommendation made by ARA and USOAS designating Middendorf to act as U.S. Special Delegate to the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM). “If you are associated with such a debacle,” Enders wrote to Haig on the latter’s need to decline attendance at the MFM, “it could damage your ability (in British eyes) to carry on your mediation efforts.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080–0707) Ultimately, Haig attended the MFM on April 26.

<sup>3</sup> On April 23, Middendorf telephoned Quijano and “stressed” his “hope that he would agree with me [Middendorf] that nothing should occur” in the MFM “which would impair Secretary Haig’s peace efforts.” In response, Quijano “said he fully agreed and that he was heartened by the progress in the talks to date.” (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, April 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080–0712)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 158.

—*Call on all States (i.e., the EC and NATO) to refrain from any action supportive of the U.K.*

—*Call on the U.K. to remove their fleet from the Rio Treaty area, recognize Argentine sovereignty, and cease threatening Argentina; and/or*

—*Call on extra-Hemispheric states and organizations (i.e., the EC) to cease economic coercion against Argentina.*

*The LA's would probably be able to support any or all of these except the last, where several might fall off, but not enough to block passage.*

*If hostilities have occurred, Argentina would doubtless call for sanctions, such as breaking diplomatic and economic relations, and for collective security measures. In this case, it would be a close vote.*<sup>5</sup> Besides the U.S., seven others would have to oppose or abstain to kill the resolution: Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Chile, Trinidad, Brazil, and Haiti *might* oppose for a variety of reasons, including in the case of Mexico and Panama, a clear preference for UN primacy.

We are under no illusions that chances are very good for shaping an outcome that could be supportive, potentially helpful or at least not detrimental, to our peace effort. *It seems unlikely the MFM would be willing simply to reaffirm support for the peace effort, along the lines of last week's OAS resolution.*<sup>6</sup>

A paper outlining in greater detail strategy options for the MFM will be in your hands later today.<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime, to prepare for Monday's Organ of Consultation, we believe *groundwork should be laid now* with the Rio Treaty signatories. A cable starting the process is attached.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In a telephone conversation concerning the MFM, April 22, Middendorf "urged" Thomas "to press hard for major British efforts with the Latin states where the U.K. has some leverage." Middendorf added that the United States "would continue to work for a moderate outcome and no censure from the OAS but that if hostilities break out the going will get considerably tougher." Thomas responded that his government "has worked hard behind the scenes with Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, and Honduras," but "emphasized that his government was not foreclosing the military option as a device to bring the Argentines to the conference table more quickly." (Memorandum of April 22 Telephone Conversation, April 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080-0710)

<sup>6</sup> Reference is presumably to OAS Resolution 359 adopted on April 13. See footnote 2, Document 113.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 172.

<sup>8</sup> Attached but not printed is a draft telegram providing a list of talking points to the Chiefs of Mission in OAS member countries and instructing them to consult with officials "at highest appropriate Foreign Ministry levels" to "ensure that the results of Monday's Organ of Consultation support the peace process and not degenerate into either a censuring of the UK which we would have to resist or, even worse, a search for punitive sanctions against the UK which we would have to oppose." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P900009-0739)

*Recommendation*

That you approve the cable attached.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Haig initialed his approval on April 24. The telegram was transmitted as telegram 111197 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, April 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840780–0318)

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**169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1982, 0428Z

110698. Subject: Falkland Islands Crisis—Message to the Prime Minister.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Please deliver the following message to the PM from Secretary Haig at opening of business, Saturday, April 24.

3. Begin text:

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

—Francis Pym and I have just concluded our discussions,<sup>2</sup> which were characterized throughout by the clear sense of common interests that we have had since the very outset of this crisis. He will be bringing back to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful settlement.<sup>3</sup> Francis made it very clear that some of what I suggested presented problems, and that he could not make any promises on whether you could accept the text as presented.

—As you know, we have been guided all along by the same aims and principles as you, both because the United Kingdom is our closest friend and because we have a common view of what is at stake.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 163, 164, 165, and 166. Haig also dispatched a brief message to Costa Méndez summarizing the discussions with Pym, noting “we have made a serious effort and have done our best to make progress.” (Telegram 111147 to Buenos Aires, April 24; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/24/1982)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 170.



—What follows are our views on the text Francis is carrying. I by no means intend to preempt his report to you but simply want you to know how we in Washington see it.

—The text I have asked Francis to bring to London is, I believe, sensitive to your need to be faithful to your pledge to Parliament. Moreover, if it were accepted by both parties, it would most certainly not leave the aggressor in occupation.

—The text provides all the safeguards needed to block, if need be, the sort of Argentine saturation of the Islands that you, quite rightly, consider unacceptable. It lays open the possibility of relinquishment of British sovereignty at the end of negotiations, while neither prejudging this outcome nor setting aside the wishes of the Islanders. It provides for substantial restoration of the previous administration.

—Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there. I am sure, however, that any text more unfavorable to the Argentines than what we have suggested would stand no chance of acceptance. We are at the point now where we have only the finest tolerance between a peaceful solution and tragedy.

—We have known all along that at some point the United States would need to offer a view on the substance of an agreement. Consistent with our common aims, as well as our assessment of what is required to avert further hostilities, we believe that an agreement based on the text we have offered would be fair, just, and responsible. We are prepared to send it to the Argentines as a US proposal, to press them to accept it, and to defend it in public come what may. Indeed, we would tell them that there is no possibility of further movement on the UK side and absolutely no inclination on the part of the US to seek further movement. The choice would then be theirs.

—Clearly our actions must be able to withstand public scrutiny. This means that positions we take can be defended as fair and just. In our view, this text meets that test. But we must also be able to show that we went as far as we humanly could, without abandoning our principles or historic responsibilities, in order to avoid loss of life. If we can show this, and also that our two countries held a common position, we will have done all that could be asked of us.

—I am sure you will want to give the text careful study. I would like to be in a position to present it to the Argentine Foreign Minister on Sunday morning.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> April 25.

—We would simultaneously present it formally to the UK, telling you, as we would the Argentines, that we consider this a fair proposal that we think both sides should be able to accept.

—Therefore, we would be grateful for a reaction from you by Saturday evening.<sup>5</sup>

—This crisis, and the way we have worked together during it, have made even clearer to me the great strength of our friendship and the identity of our values.

With warm regards,

Al Haig. End text.

Haig

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 173.

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## 170. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 24, 1982

### SUBJECT

Call from PM Thatcher on the Falklands Crisis

As I told you, Francis Pym is carrying back to London a text that represents our best judgment of what is fair and just yet stands at least some chance, albeit slight, of acceptance by the Argentines.<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Thatcher will probably call you about it.<sup>3</sup>

The text (at Tab A) goes quite far toward meeting UK objections to the text we brought back from Buenos Aires. However, Pym warned me that the Prime Minister would have great difficulty with one partic-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/24/1982–04/26/1982). Secret. There is no indication that Reagan saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The draft text is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> On another copy of this memorandum, Goldberg underlined this sentence and wrote under it: “No such call rec’d.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 24, 1982 Falklands)

ular element: the provision (as marked in paragraph 6.1) that the Argentine Government would appoint two representatives to the Executive Council, the senior body involved in local administration of the Falklands before the crisis.

The British have a problem with *any* residual Argentine official presence on the Islands after withdrawal. They have proposed instead that Argentine representatives be selected by the US-UK-Argentine Special Interim Authority.

I believe we must stick with the provision as drafted for several reasons:

—Without this there is absolutely no chance of agreement, especially since we have, for the benefit of the UK, eliminated other provisions that the Argentines told us were critical. In particular, we have removed the bias in favor of Argentine sovereignty from paragraph 8, which establishes guidelines for negotiations on a final settlement.

—The presence of two Argentine appointees does not alter the fact that British authority would be substantially restored, thus meeting Mrs. Thatcher's pledge to Parliament. Indeed, the two Argentines would be clearly out-numbered by British and local appointees in the Executive Council.

—It cannot reasonably be argued that two Argentines represent a reward for aggression. In fact, in her letter to you of April 16,<sup>4</sup> Mrs. Thatcher said we must avoid "a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation." Two out-numbered Argentines hardly constitutes occupation.

—Finally, the presence of two Argentine appointees can be defended in terms of the unquestionable Argentine interest and stake in the Islands. Indeed, giving them such representation could help relieve the total frustration that led to the crisis in the first place.

Apart from this issue, it would be most useful if you could make clear to Mrs. Thatcher that we now face the last chance for a settlement before hostilities escalate, possibly beyond control. She must be clear that you are prepared to advocate acceptance of the current text with the Argentines, and on the public record, but that you are not prepared to stand behind the text if she makes changes that exclude altogether the possibility of Argentine acceptance. You may want to draw on the talking points at Tab B.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 132.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

**171. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1982

SUBJECT

UK-Argentine Confrontation: U.S. Military Options

*Issue for Decision*

Whether to phone Cap<sup>2</sup> to establish a joint State-Defense Working Group to oversee U.S. contingency planning and military assistance for a Falklands contingency.

*Essential Factors*

This memorandum briefly examines U.S. military options, including increased logistics, materiel and equipment support, US force presence and posturing, and direct participation in combat operations, on behalf of the U.K. It does so in two phases: before or during the initial phase of major hostilities and amidst hostilities that had been going on for a week or longer. It also discusses other direct uses of U.S. military force, be it vis-a-vis the Soviets or on behalf of civilians and military personnel on the Falklands or in Argentina. Many of its assessments are rough, given the lack of hard information available to us, and DOD's unwillingness to provide relevant military data and evaluations.

*This memorandum reaches several important conclusions, that:*

—just before or during the initial phase of hostilities, we do not anticipate extraordinary UK requests for materiel or services much beyond the scale already received;

—given long lead times owing to distances and the lack of assured local facilities, US options to inject naval, air or ground forces into the area, whether in direct support of the UK or otherwise, are severely circumscribed;

—decisions must be taken soon, i.e., in the next few days, if the US is to have forces on the scene 2 or 3 weeks hence, and that such

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Haass. Haig initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that he saw the memorandum. Another notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Secretary called Weinberger Sunday afternoon 4/25/82." The text of the memorandum was underlined extensively with a highlighter pen.

<sup>2</sup> Caspar Weinberger.

decisions could have major impact on our diplomatic role and Soviet behavior; and

—Soviet options to assist Argentina appear even more limited, although we are continuing to explore possible actions on their part.<sup>3</sup>

*Initial Phases:*

The UK should not require anything substantially more than we are already doing to accomplish most military tasks short of a direct invasion of the Falklands (i.e., blockade, suasion). However, *to the extent an invasion appeared to be imminent or had actually begun, we might expect considerable requests for assistance.* Although it is only speculative, equipment items the UK might seek could include (in addition to Stinger)<sup>4</sup> SUB-HARPOON, HARM missiles, special munitions (including runway-cratering ordnance), ECM-related gear, and replacement aircraft and parts (helicopters and Harriers). We could also expect to receive UK requests to make use of Ascension for launch and recovery of combat operations and for enhanced operational intelligence. The latter could include [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and use of long-range reconnaissance aircraft, both of which would be very difficult to provide. Other possible requests might include specialized fuel, foul weather gear, technical assistance in mine countermeasures, ECM equipment, amphibious landing craft and assault vehicles.

*One factor which would affect our decision to meet any such requests would be visibility.* The maintenance of U.S. credibility in Buenos Aires, and the U.S. potential to act as a go-between, could depend in large part on our ability to maintain a plausible public position that we were not going beyond our stated pledge not to provide the UK any extraordinary assistance. We should only be willing to compromise this posture if we determine that the U.S. diplomatic role had come to an end for the time being, or that there were more to gain overall by our providing overt assistance to the UK.

Such considerations aside, *establishing a special channel to manage such support of the UK is essential.* It would reduce the chance of leaks, assist coordination, and provide us with plausible deniability should it prove useful.

*Amidst Battle:* Three categories of UK requests for U.S. support can be envisioned once a battle for the Falklands had been underway for more than a few days:

—*increased indirect support*, i.e., equipment, logistics, spare parts, e.g., replacement helicopters, Harriers, special ammunition, air defense

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 184 and footnote 6 thereto.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 111 and footnote 2 thereto.

equipment, sonobuoys, ECM Pods, special fuels, ground sensors, and communications support.

—*direct U.S. involvement in a support mode*, i.e., flying tankers, cargo planes and reconnaissance aircraft, salvage and repair assistance, communications relay, combat engineers and seabees, harbor clearance, and MCM capability.

—*direct U.S. involvement in a participatory mode*, i.e., fly ASW missions, provide tacair and/or naval gunfire support. (The considerable constraints on direct US participation are discussed below.)

As combat continued, the UK, for military and political reasons alike, could find itself facing mounting difficulties and needing an acceptable resolution; i.e., either clearcut victory, or some balance which could be the prelude to an acceptable diplomatic solution. Possibilities for U.S. involvement at this juncture would be two:

—large-scale combat/direct participation to introduce a decisive factor into the battle, e.g., carrier task group or tactical bombing; or

—a U.S. intervention to provide E&E for the inhabitants of the island, or to police some withdrawal of either Argentine or UK forces, perhaps to be replaced by U.S. forces in what could evolve into a peacekeeping operation.

*Two other forms of U.S. military involvement in a Falklands crisis may be more likely.* Although large-scale E&E of U.S. citizens and personnel in Argentina would not be a realistic proposition, the U.S. could signal the GOA (whether in a deterrent or responsive fashion) not to threaten or allow attacks on U.S. citizens in country.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, the U.S. could deploy naval forces to the area to counter any actual or threatened Soviet moves. To preserve this option, however, critical decisions are needed soon on our part.

*The Soviets have a number of "indirect" options available:* intelligence support, provision of easily absorbed stores and supplies, advisors, MANPADS, and even a Soviet-manned air defense network. Airlift could only provide limited quantities, and sea lift would require some three weeks to arrive once underway. More directly, the Soviets could introduce their own combat forces. However, no naval combatant could be on the scene for some 2–3 weeks (and even then the Soviet presence would be minimal), and Soviet submarine options are either severely limited or non-existent over the course of the next few weeks. (We are

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<sup>5</sup> [text not declassified] Earlier, on April 13, the Department created a Contingency Planning Group for Argentina, in order to review emergency action plans of the Embassy in Buenos Aires and the Department as a whole. On April 23, Kennedy sent a briefing memorandum to Haig, outlining steps taken by the Embassy to develop evacuation plans. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850089–0752)

examining the possibility as to whether Soviet long range aviation based on Angola could provide more than reconnaissance support to the Argentines). Thus, *absent prolonged confrontation and a rapid Soviet decision to dispatch combatants or supplies, Soviet involvement is likely to be limited to political and token logistic/materiel support.*

*Any consideration of possible U.S. introduction of force must include the operational realities.* At the moment, there are two CVBGs in the Caribbean which, at best, could arrive in the vicinity of the Falklands in 2 or 3 weeks. Winter weather and rough seas could affect dramatically the speed of advance and the level of operational capability. This introduction of US forces into the immediate area would pose a dilemma, however. Although carrier task forces offer our best if not only means of providing a sustained, capable military presence in the region, their dispatch would provide both Argentina and the Soviets with considerable warning. Deployment of land based air lift and tacair would require overt political and logistic support from a number of Hemispheric states particularly Chile. Again, though, we would have to begin preparing now to give us this option down the road.

Yet absent any US decision to dispatch forces soon—indeed, possibly even with one—a *confrontation would probably evolve long past its critical phase before U.S. military forces arrived on scene. In any case, decisions are needed within several days if we are to possess viable military options in several weeks time.*

Any U.S. military involvement which included sending U.S. Armed Forces into imminent or actual hostilities, or the sending of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat into the area, would be likely to trigger the *War Powers Resolution*,<sup>6</sup> requiring both consultation with and reporting to Congress. Although there would be some opposition, we believe Congress would in large part support such involvement by the U.S. However, resistance would increase parallel to the degree of U.S. involvement, remembering again that significant U.S. capability to introduce forces is at least two weeks away, and that the UK has most likely prepared its plans assuming a largely unilateral, self-sufficient engagement.

For the present, however, our considerations are more narrow. We need to focus on the following:

- the degree and visibility of support we extend to the UK
- the mechanism by which any such support is managed
- decisions/plans regarding any prospective dispatch and use of US forces

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<sup>6</sup> The War Powers Resolution of 1973 (50 U.S.C. 1541–1548) revised the parameters under which a President could commit the United States to a military conflict.

- further assessment of likely Soviet behavior
- improving US preparations for managing the crisis

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Given all that is at stake, the need is manifest for coordinated preparations on our part so that we can respond quickly to any UK request or contingency. You should call Cap and suggest that State and Defense establish an ad hoc group to oversee U.S. military assistance to the UK and U.S. contingency planning for the crisis.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Haig did not approve or disapprove the recommendation; however, the notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that he called Weinberger (see footnote 1 above). No record of Haig's telephone conversation with Weinberger has been found. Informal meetings on the South Atlantic situation between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense took place following Haig's conversation with Weinberger. See Document 184.

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**172. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Falklands Dispute: US Strategy for the Monday, April 26, Foreign Ministers Meeting

Our *options* are (1) to *seek actively to block any resolution* or (2) to *stand back*. The *chances of blocking a resolution which is at least to some extent prejudicial to the UK are near zero*. The only exception: if Argentine demands are disproportionate to situation that exists on Monday (e.g., no hostilities and GOA demands sanctions). In that case, we could probably get a blocking eight and should work for it.

Otherwise, *assuming the diplomatic effort is still alive*, we should *work behind the scenes to try to temper any resolution* as much as possible, while not inviting any expectation that we would vote for it unless it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880050–2070. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bosworth; cleared by Michel. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.



were completely balanced and non-prejudicial. We would *take the same public line* we have taken previously, i.e., *that we believe Rio Treaty framework is inappropriate* and, in any case, *no action should be taken which would complicate or prejudice on-going efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution within the framework of UNSC Res. 502.*

*If our current strategy has progressed to the point at which the GOA has rejected a "US proposal" and seeks Rio Treaty sanctions, we should be prepared to go public with our conclusions:*

- that the proposal was fair and balanced (discussing the key points of substance);
- that we support decolonialization but not recolonialization;
- that a diplomatic solution remains urgent; and
- since sanctions are legally invalid, we oppose the Argentine resolution.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That you approve the approach outlined above.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation on April 26.

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**173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1982, 0612Z

111214. London for Charge Eyes Only. Subject: Falkland Islands Dispute: Letter to PM Thatcher. Ref: State 110698.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret, entire text.
2. The British response to our request as discussed reftel was provided by the British Embassy<sup>3</sup> as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/24/1982–04/26/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 169.

<sup>3</sup> No copy of Thatcher's message as provided by the British Embassy on April 24 has been found. However, the Thatcher Foundation has published online a copy of the text as cabled to Washington.

Message to the Hon Alexander M Haig Jr from Prime Minister, the Right Hon Margaret Thatcher MP on 24 April 1982.

“Dear Al,

Thank you for your message giving your comments on your long discussions with Francis Pym. My colleagues most closely concerned and I have now had a full report from him. We remain most grateful to you for your continuing efforts.

You asked me to send you a reaction this evening. This whole business started with an Argentine aggression.

Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal by the Argentines in accordance with the Security Council resolution. We think therefore that the next step should be for you to put your latest ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine Government’s view of them tomorrow and establish urgently whether they can accept them. Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet’s consideration of your ideas.

With warm personal regards,

Yours ever

Margaret Thatcher”

3. Our response to the British Embassy is as follows:

Dear Prime Minister:

I have just received your message, and am grateful for your quick response.

In light of your reply I shall, tomorrow, present my ideas to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez<sup>4</sup> in precisely the form given to Francis. I will tell the Foreign Minister that HMG has received the same ideas and is now considering them, but that I do not know whether they will prove acceptable to the British Cabinet. I will add that from the U.S. point of view what we have presented to both parties is a delicately balanced and reasonable proposal which we see no reason further to amend.

We will then await the Argentine reply; as soon as it is received I will be in touch with Francis.

Depending on the Argentine reply and the ultimate decision of HMG on the ideas I have presented, we here in Washington will then examine what appropriate next steps we might take.

Once again, I very much appreciate your prompt reaction. Let us all hope that the Argentine Government will react positively to this final effort to avoid bloodshed.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 178.

With warm regards, sincerely, Alexander Haig.

4. To ensure HMG's receipt of our message precisely as we wish to have it read, we would appreciate your providing it to the Foreign Office as early as possible Sunday morning, your time.<sup>5</sup>

Haig

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<sup>5</sup> April 25.

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**174. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1982, 0050Z

111227. Inform Consuls, ZFF Only Jerusalem, DepSec Stoessel. Subject: Falkland Islands Situation Report as of 1700 EST, April 25. No. 36 Todep 20184.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. UK captures port on South Georgia, damages Argentine sub. British forces were in control of the port of Grytviken, following an attack on South Georgia Island, according to UK's Defense Minister John Nott. He indicated British forces landed by helicopter, met little resistance and suffered no casualties in the assault. Earlier, according to press reports, British forces, claiming their "inherent right to self-defense under the UN Charter," launched a helicopter attack on an Argentine submarine, which was spotted on the surface in the British-declared "zone" near South Georgia. Reports indicate the sub was damaged but not sunk. There were unconfirmed reports of Argentine casualties in the attack. In a later statement, the Ministry of Defense added that, despite the military actions taken on South Georgia, the UK remained committed to the continuing and intensive search for a solution to the crisis by negotiation based on UN Security Council Resolution 502.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, D820216–0107. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by M. Boorstein (FWG); cleared in S/S–O; and approved by Pendleton. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, and USCINCEUR.

3. Argentine Foreign Minister in Washington. Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez arrived in Washington at midday on April 25 to attend the April 26 special meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers and to meet with Secretary Haig. On arrival, Costa Mendez characterized the British attack on an Argentine sub as having “very grave consequences for peace.” When asked if Argentina were at war with the UK, he answered, “technically, yes.”

Haig

# 175. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

London, April 26, 1982

1. Our repossession of South Georgia<sup>2</sup> has radically changed the situation. In particular it enables us to deal with the Falkland Islands in isolation. Equally it should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating for a settlement, but time is desperately short. Our task force is approaching the MEZ and the next stage of operations will have to start very soon.

2. We may now be able to turn the OAS meeting this afternoon<sup>3</sup> to our advantage. But this requires a simpler approach. There is now no time to negotiate in detail. What we have in mind is as follows. If the Argentinians withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands we will stop our task force and turn it back once Argentinian withdrawal

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982. Secret. Henderson transmitted the message to Haig under an April 26 covering note. On the covering note, Bremer wrote: “received in S 10:15 a.m. 4/26/82.” Below this note, Bremer added: “The Secretary discussed the message by telephone with Mr. Pym 4/26/82.” That same day, Bremer forwarded both the message and Henderson’s covering note to Clark under a covering memorandum in which he noted that Haig had spoken to Clark about Pym’s message that morning, adding: “As he [Haig] noted, the proposal has severe disadvantages in our analysis, which the Secretary has already provided to Mr. Pym. Should the Prime Minister call the President about the proposal, it is our recommendation that the President give her no encouragement to pursue this proposal.” “In light of the above,” Bremer concluded, “the Secretary asks that even knowledge of this message be severely restricted.” (Ibid.) No other records of Haig’s telephone conversations with Pym or Clark have been found.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 174. The Argentine garrison on South Georgia surrendered to British forces on April 26.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 176.

is completed, provided that from that time onwards the United States will militarily guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. This would secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and would secure the way for immediate negotiations in a conference to resolve the dispute.

3. In the meantime the traditional Administration would be restored to the Falkland Islands but for the time being we should be prepared not to send back the Governor and to appoint an officer to administer the Government ad interim. We should be ready, during that time, to have an Argentinian Resident at Port Stanley to look after the interests of the Argentinians living in the Falkland Islands. If this proposal commends itself to you we need to decide how it should be launched. It would of course need your own wholehearted agreement and backing. But it might be advantageous to get someone else to take the initiative. We have had some indication that President Lopez Portillo would like to be helpful; thus perhaps the Mexicans can be invited to put the proposal with your and our agreement to the meeting of the OAS later today. The Mexicans might even be prepared to provide the venue for the conference.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Pym sent a follow-up message to Haig on April 26: "I have now discussed with the Prime Minister what you told me about the idea I put to you in my last message. We both accept that you are the best judge of whether such a proposal will run. We therefore accept that there is no chance of its acceptance at present. We are therefore content that you should put the latest set of proposals worked out in Washington to the Argentines on the basis suggested by the Prime Minister in her message to you of 24 April." (Message from Pym to Haig, April 26; Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1])

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## 176. Editorial Note

The first session of the General Committee of the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty (MFM) convened at the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States in Washington on the afternoon of April 26, 1982, to consider the appropriateness of the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to the current conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. addressed the assembly, stating that in the "current conflict, the surest guide to a peaceful

settlement is to be found in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 502,” noting that in support of this resolution the United States had “offered its assistance to both Britain and Argentina.” “President Reagan,” Haig continued, “believes that the United States has perhaps a unique ability to assist the parties. Under his direction, I have made myself available to both, accepting their invitations to sound out their views and suggesting avenues to approach a framework of peace.”

“It is quite clear,” Haig argued, “that the crisis has reached a critical point. New military action has taken place. Unless a settlement can be found in the next few days, more intensive fighting is likely to occur. The conflict over the islands affects us all. As we consider what we can do to help the situation, let us recall these points.

- “• There has been a use of force by an American state already followed by a U.N. Security Council resolution which clearly sets forth the basis for a peaceful settlement. While we should take advantage of the peaceful settlement procedures available to us in this forum, it would be neither appropriate nor effective to treat this dispute within the collective security framework implied by the Rio Treaty.

- “• Any resolution considered for adoption by the foreign ministers should be examined against the criteria of whether it contributes to the peace process, whether it impairs the peace efforts already endorsed by the Organization of American States and whether it strengthens the ability of this organization to contribute in the future to easing crises.

“Our participation in the inter-American system pledges us to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere. In the search for a solution that both parties can accept with honor and responsibility, the United States remains at the disposition of the parties. At this critical hour, we are redoubling out peace efforts. With your help, we may succeed.”

The complete text of Haig’s address is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, pages 85–86. Haig recalled in his memoirs that the speech was “greeted by stony silence.” (Haig, *Caveat*, page 291) The MFM adopted Resolution I at the conclusion of its deliberations on April 28. See footnote 2, Document 185.

**177. Action Memorandum From Robert E. Service of the Department of State Falklands Working Group to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request to NOAA for Additional Weather Satellite Data

REFERENCE

My Memo of April 25, 1982<sup>2</sup>

*UK Request*

The British Meteorological Office has made two formal requests and one telephone request for changes in the type of information they receive from the polar-orbiting satellite. One of the requests clearly comes under the bilateral agreement signed in 1974 between the Meteorological Office, NASA and NOAA, and can be implemented quickly. This is a request for satellite low altitude selection which would permit them to see through the clouds and make some estimates of sea state. The other two requests would require additional effort by NOAA, but still could be read as coming under the agreement. One is for mathematical data to permit them to properly analyze the satellite information. The third request is for all the raw data from the satellite's infrared sounding unit for the South Atlantic area. Implementation of these requests could take 1–2 man-months, unless given priority handling by NOAA. The British have not asked for expedited treatment, but may when they find out how long some of the requests could take.

*Bureau Positions*

ARA, EUR and PM agree that we should tell NOAA the Department has no objection to fulfilling the UK's requests. The requests fall within the range of continuing cooperation covered by international agreements.

EUR and PM would also like to ask NOAA to take whatever steps necessary to implement the requests as soon as possible, on grounds that this is what the UK expects and requires.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820071–1389. Secret. Drafted by S. O'Connell (FWG); cleared by Bosworth, Kanter, and J. Earl (L/ARA) and in substance by Holmes. Service initialed for the clearing officials. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 27.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

ARA believes the Department should not go beyond approval, leaving the timing and priority to be worked out between NOAA and the British Meteorological Office. A Department recommendation for priority handling would be viewed by the GOA as going beyond the formal requirements of existing agreements and the USG position as previously enunciated.

*Recommendations*

1. That we inform NOAA the Department has no objection to its implementing these requests (supported by ARA, EUR and PM).

2. That we go a step further and urge NOAA to meet the requests as quickly as possible (EUR and PM support; ARA opposes).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Eagleburger initialed his approval of both recommendations on April 27.

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**178. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis—Proposed Call to General Galtieri

While we cannot be sure, the only safe assumption at this stage is that the British will attack the Falklands as soon as their forces are positioned to do so. If they choose to wait until they have all or most of their Task Force on-scene, this could be a day or two away. If instead they decide to bombard the airfield, in order to neutralize Argentine air power before they bring in the bulk of the Task Force, the action could begin within the next twelve hours.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Sensitive. There is no indication that Reagan saw the memorandum. A typewritten notation on another copy of the memorandum indicates that a copy was sent by LDX to Clark at 1820 hours and another copy to the NSC by special courier at 1838 hours, both on April 26. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982)



I have proposed to Costa Mendez that I come to Buenos Aires tonight.<sup>2</sup> There is, however, a serious chance that the junta will reject this, particularly coming via Costa Mendez, whose instructions are to avoid discussions. Only a call from you to Galtieri would give us a reasonable chance of convincing the junta to receive me. I recommend you call Galtieri. You may wish to draw on the attached talking points.<sup>3</sup>

My going to Buenos Aires may at least cause the British to refrain from attacking the Falklands for another day or two. Whether we can achieve a negotiating break-through is more problematical. Our proposal should now look much more appealing to the Argentines, considering the alternatives. However, this would require a higher level of rationality than may prevail in Buenos Aires. The military hard-liners may now hold the view that no agreement is possible until Argentine pride can be avenged.

Nevertheless, we have no choice but to make this move. If we wait, the British will adopt a more lop-sided negotiating position—of the sort they floated, then retracted, this morning.<sup>4</sup> And, of course, once the battle for the Falklands commences, there will be no room for effective US diplomacy.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting, held following the OAS MFM on April 26, has been found. In his memoirs, Haig wrote of this meeting: "I met with Costa Méndez, telling him that within forty-eight hours, the British would almost certainly strike again, bombarding airfields, launching commando raids. 'We have no more time,' I said. 'The American proposal is fair and reasonable. If necessary, we will go public with it and let the world judge why these negotiations have produced no result.' In Costa Méndez, I sensed a reluctance to forward the U.S. proposal. He told me that there was a virulent anti-American and anti-Haig atmosphere building in the country and in the junta. I offered to return to Buenos Aires and deliver the text to Galtieri and the junta myself. Although I did not disclose the thought to Costa Mendez, I believed that the British would not carry out further attacks if the American Secretary of State was in Argentina or en route. I asked that the junta inform me within twenty-four hours whether they could receive me. Costa Mendez promised to pass on the message." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 291)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 175 and footnote 4 thereto.

<sup>5</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, no telephone call was placed by Reagan to Galtieri. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

# 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 27, 1982, 0037Z

112085. For the Ambassador from Enders. Subject: Falkland Islands.

1. C–Entire text.

2. Events are moving quickly here and we will have to take action tonight to continue our effort to find a peaceful solution. The Secretary has talked to Costa Mendez and proposed that he travel to Buenos Aires immediately with the agreement text, as it has been refined since we departed Argentina.<sup>2</sup> The President is prepared to call Galtieri if that is necessary.<sup>3</sup>

3. If Galtieri still refuses, we will send you the text of the agreement as it now stands for delivery to the GOA, asking for a response within 24 hours.<sup>4</sup> We will also send you talking points at that time.<sup>5</sup>

4. You should be aware that we now consider UK military action against the Falklands to be imminent 24–48 hours. If we send text to GOA we will also send it to HMG, and we will be prepared to make it public very soon thereafter. Because of the very real danger at this point that our peacekeeping effort will not succeed, you should begin immediately to consider the necessary steps in the event of major conflict.

Haig

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/27/1982 (1). Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 178.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 178.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 181. Haig recalled that “as the hours passed, no reply came. On the telephone, Costa Mendez said he was awaiting Galtieri’s decision. As the deadline approached, we phoned the Argentine embassy and were told that Costa Mendez was dining with the ambassador and could not be disturbed. Finally, Costa Mendez informed me that his government could not receive me in Buenos Aires at this time.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 291)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 112303 to Buenos Aires, April 27, the Department dispatched to Shlaudeman a set of talking points to use in his meeting with Galtieri. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Haig wrote of this action: “We were not certain that Costa Mendez had transmitted the American proposal to Galtieri. I instructed Ambassador Shlaudeman to deliver the draft to the Argentinians.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 291)

**180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1982, 0044Z

112102. London for Ambassador and Charge only. Subject: Falkland Islands: Message From the Secretary to Foreign Secretary Pym.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to the FCO for Foreign Secretary Pym.

3. Begin text:

Dear Francis:

Thank you for your message of April 26<sup>2</sup> and your concurrence that we should put to the Argentines the proposals we worked out during your visit here. We believe that your success on South Georgia may now give us greater reason to hope that the Argentines will regard the presently drafted framework as a preferred alternative to further armed conflict. If this hope is not misplaced, we may have an extremely critical opportunity—perhaps the last—before an escalation of the fighting takes place and the scenario changes in a way which plunges Argentina and Britain into an armed conflict which—whatever its immediate outcome—will create long-term instability, insecurity and hostility.

As Nicko has no doubt told you, we have proposed to the Argentines that I leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that can be arranged—perhaps in the next few hours.<sup>3</sup> I will, in line with the Prime Minister's message of April 24,<sup>4</sup> and your second message today, present our ideas to President Galtieri and the Junta. I am not going to Buenos Aires to negotiate; rather I will be prepared to explain our ideas and seek a prompt response. Needless to say, I will not remain in Argentina an inordinate period of time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Pym's follow-up message on April 26. See footnote 4, Document 175.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 178.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 173.

Obviously, all of the above is predicated on the assumption that the Argentines agree to receive me. If they do not, we must nevertheless make an effort to present our ideas, if only to make clear that the Argentines had a fair proposition before them which they chose to decline. Therefore, if I do not go to Buenos Aires, I will instruct our Ambassador there to deliver our text and ask for a prompt Argentine reply. Thus, whether or not I go to Buenos Aires, we should know within the next day or two whether there is reason to hope that a settlement can be reached before new, more intense hostilities erupt.

I will of course stay in closest contact with you. With warm personal regards to you and Prime Minister Thatcher, Al. End text.

4. FYI: The Secretary's message replies to the following message from Pym received in Washington from the UK Embassy Monday afternoon.

[Omitted here is the complete text of Pym's second April 26 message to Haig (see footnote 4, Document 175)]

Haig

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# 181. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 27, 1982, 1350Z

2534. For the Secretary. Subject: Falkland Islands. Ref: State 112303.<sup>2</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. Galtieri alone received me at 0850 hours local (ARMA accompanied me). I went over the talking points in the reftel and called his attention to the explanatory annotations to the proposal.<sup>3</sup> Galtieri

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that Clark saw it. Poindexter also initialed the telegram and indicated that Clark had seen it.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 179.

<sup>3</sup> The Department transmitted the latest draft texts of the Memorandum of Agreement and related documents, for Shlaudeman to present to the Junta, in telegram 112304 to Buenos Aires, April 27. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/27/1982) The draft MOA is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, pp. 1304–1306. Spanish-language texts of the documents were transmitted in telegram 112305 to Buenos Aires, April 27. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/27/1982) Annotations to the draft MOA were transmitted separately by the Department in telegram 112306 to Buenos Aires, April 27. The Department authorized Shlaudeman to pass along the annotations to the Junta as a “non-paper” and stated that the annotations were also being provided to Costa Méndez. (Ibid.)

seemed particularly struck by the statement that we are not<sup>4</sup> prepared to describe the text as a U.S. proposal and will publish it if necessary. He made no other comment on the proposal but promised me a response before 2400 hours today.<sup>5</sup>

3. Galtieri did add that no one wanted war but that if the British attacked, Argentina would resist with all means at hand. He also said that the GOA could not understand why the USG with all its resources could not stop Mrs. Thatcher from launching this attack so that a peaceful solution could be found. I reiterated that you had done everything possible to achieve a peaceful solution and that this was the last chance. He seemed to accept that.

4. Galtieri is meeting now with the Junta and they have the proposal and the other documents before them. I have sent word that I am available for further consultation whenever they might wish.

5. Galtieri appeared tired but composed. I sensed an air of resignation<sup>6</sup> about him.

**Shlaudeman**

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<sup>4</sup> Poindexter circled this word, drew a line from it to the right-hand margin, and wrote: "State is checking this."

<sup>5</sup> See Document 189.

<sup>6</sup> Poindexter circled this word, drew a line from it to the margin below the paragraph, and wrote "?" in the space below the paragraph.

## 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 27, 1982, 2032Z

113054. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Exclusion Zone Warning.

1. Please pass the following personal message from me to President Galtieri:

Begin text: During the present critical period as we make a final search for a peaceful solution to the current British-Argentine dispute, it is important that both sides avoid any incidents in the maritime exclusion zone. I am therefore asking both parties to exercise restraint with regard to the exclusion zone for the time being. I do not ask for nor expect a response from either side to this suggestion. End text.

2. In delivering this message, please pass on orally that I do not know if the British will accede to this request and would not want the President to assume that Argentine forces can operate safely in the exclusion zone.<sup>2</sup>

Haig

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/27/1982. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Gompert sent a draft of the telegram to Haig for his approval under an April 27 covering note, stating: "The British DCM just called to say that they understood how you wanted to proceed with regard to warning Galtieri about the exclusion zone. He asked again why it was important to say that both sides had been requested to exercise restraint, to which I responded that it was your judgment that this was the best way to produce the desired result. The DCM said that they understood how we would handle this but wanted to be sure that we understood that British forces would continue to operate under their current guidelines. In light of this, I believe we can go ahead with the attached message from you to Galtieri." Haig's stamped initials appear on the covering note, indicating that he saw it. Gompert added a handwritten note: "Sec approved going ahead." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982)

<sup>2</sup> On April 28, the British Government announced that from 11:00 GMT (1100Z) on April 30, a "Total Exclusion Zone will be established round the Falkland Islands," the outer limit of which corresponded to the Maritime Exclusion Zone established on April 12. "From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal operation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found in this Zone without due authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will therefore be regarded as hostile and liable to be attacked by British forces. Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and accordingly is liable to attack." (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 257–258)

**183. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Fischer) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Public Sides with Britain in Falklands Dispute

Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of Argentina's takeover of the Falklands and favor "backing" Britain in the dispute. These findings come from an ABC poll, the first on this issue publicly released, conducted April 8–10.

Nearly four-fifths of those polled said they were aware of the dispute. Their views: (1) Argentina did *not* have "good reason" to seize the Falklands (by 61 to 15 percent). (2) Britain would be justified in using military force to try to recapture the Falklands if negotiations failed (by 46 to 36 percent). (3) The U.S. should "back" Britain in case the dispute resulted in a war between Argentina and Britain (50 percent favored backing Britain, only 5 percent favored backing Argentina; a substantial minority, 30 percent, volunteered a preference for neutrality).

Previous polls on attitudes toward other U.S. security commitments suggest that the public supports "backing" in the form of diplomatic and economic measures, but almost certainly opposes direct U.S. military involvement. What attitudes would be to U.S. military facilitation of the British fleet are less certain.

Additional details are attached.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820066–0303. No classification marking. Drafted by Alvin Richman (PA/OAP) on April 26. Haig initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed is a page entitled "Falkland Islands Poll: The Q's and the A's," which contained the text of the questions asked by the ABC poll as well as the answers given by those polled.

**184. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1982

SUBJECT

U.S. Contingency Planning for the Falklands Crisis

If fighting erupts between the UK and Argentina, we will need to preserve what we can of our diplomatic objectives and to limit the damage to our broader foreign policy. It would be essential that a British defeat be avoided and in our best interest to facilitate a quick and decisive British victory. We will want to proceed in a way, however, that will strengthen the role of diplomacy during the conflict and contain the long-term damage to our Latin American policy.

*Introduction*

This memorandum surveys the military support and operational options available to us which could:

- help avert a British defeat (or stalemate) and facilitate a quick, decisive British victory if hostilities erupt;
- protect U.S. citizens and property in Argentina (and elsewhere in Latin America) from reprisal;
- block Soviet efforts to use its forces to play a direct military or political role during the crisis.

The memorandum is based on informal discussions with DOD representatives (which were arranged after considerable arm-twisting, including your personal intervention). Although these exchanges proved very useful, they were confined to generalities because Cap has ordered that no detailed information or written analyses be provided to the Department without his prior personal approval.<sup>2</sup>

*Diplomatic Stakes and Objectives*

A British defeat in the Falklands would have a devastating effect on the political coherence and military effectiveness of the Alliance, as well as risk undermining the special relationship and Britain's unique ability to be a bridge across the Atlantic. A prolonged conflict, which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. Below the stamped initials, Haig wrote: “Right on.”

<sup>2</sup> On the origin of these State-Defense discussions, see Document 171. No records of these discussions have been found.



bled the British Treasury and toppled the Thatcher government, would be just as bad.

Open, and possibly substantial, support for the British undoubtedly would damage our relations and policies in Latin America and possibly expose U.S. citizens and property in Argentina to reprisals. But our stakes in Latin America as well as in Europe argue that we should be prepared to do what we can to ensure that the result is a quick UK victory rather than prolonged stalemate. A more restrained U.S. approach could spawn a continuing, inconclusive conflict which not only toppled Thatcher, but also multiplied opportunities for Soviet mischief and steadily increased the pressure on Chile, Brazil and other potentially sympathetic Latin American countries to turn against us. In brief, a prompt British victory could go a long way toward limiting the long-term damage to our Latin American policy.

#### *Summary Conclusions*

The information supplied by DOD substantially confirmed the conclusions of our April 24 memorandum to you on this subject:<sup>3</sup>

—*We are unlikely to receive British requests for support which go much beyond what we already are providing:* The UK force is largely self-sufficient and is capable of being re-supplied using UK assets. Moreover, because of incompatibilities between U.S. and UK inventories, we are not in a good position to provide spares, ammunition, etc. Finally, we do not know what the British plan of operations is, but it is very unlikely to depend for success on favorable U.S. responses to requests for assistance which have not yet been broached with us.

—*U.S. options to deploy the posture forces in the area are very limited.* Absent access to bases in the area, the leading candidate would be naval assets, especially one or both CVBGs participating in the Ocean Venture naval exercise in the Caribbean. Steaming time, however, would be on the order of 18 days from a decision to redeploy. B-52 operations (including maritime reconnaissance) are feasible, but difficult and complex.

—*Soviet options are probably no better.* They, [less than 1 line not declassified] would be largely limited to providing intelligence and reconnaissance support. Their options, however, would be considerably expanded if the Argentines permitted the Soviets access to the air facilities and/or accepted Soviet advisors or crews.

—*The major decisions you are likely to face in the next several days about military support and deployments will be concerned with relocating U.S. naval assets.*

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 171.

The basis for these conclusions is presented in the following sections on:

- U.S. support for British military operations;
- U.S. options to counter Argentine threats to U.S. citizens and property;
- Soviet options and possible U.S. counters;
- Considerations bearing on decisions to redeploy U.S. naval assets.

#### *Support for the UK*

The U.S. could offer three broad categories of support to the UK: logistical support, political-military posturing, and airlift. (Direct combat support is not considered in this memorandum.)<sup>4</sup>

In the case of *logistic support*, we have not had many requests to date; nor do we anticipate them. UK forces appear to be relatively self-sufficient except for JP-5 fuel, which we are resupplying, and isolated exceptions such as Stinger and runway matting (for possible use in constructing an airfield on South Georgia or conceivably in the Falklands). Moreover, many UK items which might become critically short are not items which we could replace, e.g., even their Harriers and ours are not compatible. Only a major military reversal or an unanticipated problem/difficulty would be likely to generate substantial requests for U.S. military equipment.

*Political-military* posturing might be provided by flying reconnaissance aircraft [*1 line not declassified*]. Moving a carrier battle group to the vicinity of the Falklands would require several weeks and would upset currently planned deployments.<sup>5</sup> Reconnaissance aircraft missions could be initiated more quickly, but the difficult, complex B-52 maritime patrol missions would provide more a political symbol than a military contribution to the British. P-3 aircraft cannot operate in the South Atlantic without access closer than Ascension.

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<sup>4</sup> In an April 26 memorandum to Enders, Holmes, Pendleton, Service, Gompert, Funseth, and Robinson, McManaway outlined Department procedures for handling British and Argentine military and intelligence requests. The memorandum instructed the recipients to pass all requests to Burt. PM would then staff the request, obtain clearances and views from ARA, EUR, L, and any "other relevant offices," before preparing a memorandum for Eagleburger "stating the views of all parties, pros and cons, and a recommendation." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982) Three days later, on April 29, Eagleburger sent a memorandum to Iklé, noting that the Department had established a single point of contact for coordinating requests and informing him to direct to Burt "until further notice" all inquiries on British requests "received in the context of the Falkland Islands issue," with the exception of "sensitive" intelligence. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 1982)

<sup>5</sup> Haig underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "several weeks," and wrote "So what!" in the right-hand margin next to it.

*Airlift support* could assist the UK in moving supplies (from either the UK or the US) to Ascension with relative ease, but the long sea transit from Ascension to the Falklands would limit the impact of such support. Airlifting supplies beyond Ascension would be virtually impossible unless and until the UK were able to develop a C-141/C-5 capable field at South Georgia. Furthermore, air-dropped resupply would also be difficult, given the problems of terrain, weather, and air cover (not to mention the greater degree of U.S. involvement in hostilities).

#### *The Argentine Dimension*

U.S. exposure in Argentina is considerable. Economic and political stakes aside, there are some twelve to fifteen thousand American citizens in country. SOUTHCOM has a plan for their evacuation under permissive circumstances; any opposed exodus, however, is unrealistic. One possible purpose for sending the fleet towards the area would be to signal the GOA—to remind them of their responsibility to protect U.S. lives and to warn them of the consequences if they do not. The fleet would also be able to attack selected sites in Argentina in retaliation should U.S. citizens be harmed. In contrast to the naval option—which would require about 18 days to implement—B-52s operating from CONUS bases could be available much more quickly.

#### *Soviet Options*

Soviet capacity to affect the course of a Falklands contingency directly probably is less than our own. The Soviets could not introduce surface vessels or submarines into the area for some 3 weeks at best. They could, however, provide [*1 line not declassified*] reconnaissance support (using Bears out of Angola or Argentina). Bears or Backfires operating out of Argentina could also conceivably threaten UK or U.S. assets in the vicinity.

Another possibility would be Soviet assistance to the GOA, e.g., advisors, easily absorbed stores and supplies, and air defense equipment/systems with or without Soviet personnel. (An intelligence assessment detailing possible Soviet support of Argentina is attached at Tab A.)<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed are three undated briefing papers prepared in the DIA. An intelligence cable sent by the CIA to multiple recipients, April 29, also discussed the possibility of the Soviet Union providing military escort to vessels carrying grain from Argentina to the Soviet Union. ([*text not declassified*]; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, Job 87T00623R: Policy Files (1973–1986), Box 2, Folder 9: SECOM Minutes of Agenda 1984)

*Redeploying the Navy*

The most important decisions concerning U.S. military assistance and support which you are likely to face in the coming days will be related to redeployment of USN assets. There is no way, however, to determine *a priori* when and how to use U.S. naval forces during the Falklands crisis.

Moving U.S. Navy combatants into the area could support all three of our objectives;

- providing political support (and some real military capability) on behalf of the British;

- putting the Soviets on notice;

- deterring Argentine reprisals against U.S. citizens and property by posing a serious threat of reprisals.<sup>7</sup>

At least 18 days would elapse between the decision to redeploy carriers to the area and the time by which they would be in range of potential targets. Given the unavoidable visibility associated with that movement of aircraft carriers, however, the political messages would be sent almost immediately. Of necessity, those signals would be seen by all three audiences—the British, the Soviets, and Argentines—but it is unlikely that we would want to use the naval instrument of policy at the same time for our three different purposes.

DOD believes that two carrier task groups would be required to achieve the capability for 24-hour, sustained operations in the area. Two CVBGs are currently operating off Puerto Rico as part of the Ocean Venture naval exercise. The upcoming winter weather in the South Atlantic will be severe and debilitating. Carrier operations would be particularly hazardous under such conditions when airfields to which aircraft might be diverted were unavailable.

Bearing in mind that the naval option could have a conflicting impact in London, Buenos Aires, and Moscow, a decision to redeploy the fleet should be carefully considered. Nevertheless, as this new phase of the crisis unfolds, it may be an option that we might want to execute in the next week or so.

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<sup>7</sup> Haig placed a checkmark at the end of each of the three points.

# 185. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

London, April 28, 1982

*Begins:*

Nicko Henderson has told me of the terms of the Resolution adopted by the OAS earlier this morning.<sup>2</sup> I am most grateful for all your efforts, as well as those of other friendly countries in the region, to head off a result which would further exacerbate the situation and complicate your own peace efforts, which we continue to regard as vital. The difficulties of your position in the OAS are fully appreciated here and we are therefore doubly appreciative of your forthright intervention and your abstention in the vote.<sup>3</sup> However, you will understand that the Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as the Resolution suggests we should.

The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on similar lines. We have so far been successful in keeping the issue out of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. This has in our view been important in helping your efforts and maintaining maximum pressure on the Argentines. We therefore continue to hope that the Council will stand fast on 502.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. UK Confidential. Henderson sent the message to Haig under an April 28 covering note.

<sup>2</sup> On April 28, in Resolution I, "Serious Situation in the South Atlantic," the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS resolved to "urge" the British Government "to cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4" of the Rio Treaty and "to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security," to urge the Argentine Government to "refrain from any action that may exacerbate the situation," to urge both governments to call a truce, to "express the willingness of the Organ of Consultation to lend support through whatever means it considers advisable" to new initiatives directed for "the just and peaceful settlement of the problem," to "take note" of the information received about Haig's negotiations and to "express its wishes that they will be an effective contribution to the settlement" of the conflict, to "deplore" the European Economic Community's "coercive measures of an economic and political nature" directed at Argentina, and to present this appeal to the British and Argentine Governments as well as the Chairman of the UN Security Council. The full text of this resolution is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, pp. 86–87.

<sup>3</sup> Explaining the U.S. abstention, Thompson stated that the "United States is not in a position to express views on many of the issues addressed by the resolution and, therefore, has abstained." He ended his statement by reaffirming "the fervent hope, shared by each of us, that all the actions of this distinguished body will truly facilitate peace." (*Ibid.*, p. 87)

We will be working hard to achieve this, I hope with your help. If the Council nevertheless meets again, I hope I can count on the United States to work closely with us, both in New York and in Security Council capitals, to head off support for any unhelpful and unacceptable Resolution. If we failed you know that we might have to use our veto. We would of course look for support from you in that event.

*Ends.*

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**186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

EUR 82–10046

Washington, April 1982

UK-Falklands: Pressures on Thatcher  
*[portion marking not declassified]*

*Summary*

The Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands is seen throughout the United Kingdom as an affront to British sovereignty and national pride that cannot go unanswered. Therefore, despite initial criticism that government negligence allowed the dispute to reach this point, most of Parliament, the media, and the public reacted by enthusiastically supporting the government's determination to use force if a settlement could not be negotiated.

As the Argentines reinforced the islands and the British fleet steamed south, however, the potential for a disaster reminiscent of Suez and for major loss of life began to sink in. Criticism became more pronounced and cracks began to appear in the government's seemingly solid support. The Tory right wing warned Thatcher not to make too many concessions in pursuing a negotiated settlement, while the opposition cautioned her against military action if any hope for a peaceful solution remained. Public opinion, although split, seemed to favor a tough response as long as the risks were minimal. Opposition leaders and some influential voices in the media began to question fundamental

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 83B00228R: Production Case Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 16: UK-Falklands: Pressures on Thatcher. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. The memorandum was prepared in the Office of European Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence based upon information available as of April 28.

British positions, in particular whether it was necessary to restore British administration to the Falklands or to guarantee self-determination for the islanders.

Since the successful retaking of South Georgia Island earlier this week, criticism within the Conservative Party has died down and public opinion seems to have swung once again solidly behind Thatcher. The South Georgia operation, however, has made the opposition parties even more nervous about military operations than they were earlier, and the Labor Party in particular is pushing hard for continuing negotiations. Despite opposition nervousness, Thatcher will pursue the military options she believes needed to restore the Falklands to British rule as quickly as possible as long as she has the support of the Conservative Party and the public. In the absence of a sudden diplomatic breakthrough, therefore, the United Kingdom is likely to pursue military action beyond the blockade as soon as technically feasible.

If the extended blockade and related military actions do not produce results very soon or if they lead to heavy British casualties, criticism will rise within the Conservative Party, public support will plummet, and the government's survival will come increasingly into question.

*[less than 1 line not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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#### **187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1982, 0145Z

115266. Subject: Falkland Islands: Secretary's Meeting With Costa-Mendez.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez the afternoon of April 28.<sup>2</sup> Ambassadors Enders and Figueroa and Mr. Service (notetaker) were present.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to London.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

3. The essential message Costa-Mendez conveyed was the following: the GOA believes the Rio Treaty MFM resolution<sup>3</sup> strengthened its position with Argentine and world opinion, but realizes there are only two options for resolving the Falklands dispute: a continuation of the U.S. effort or through the U.N. The U.N. route would require major readjustments in Argentine foreign policy which the GOA does not want to make (and Costa-Mendez even less), and the outcome would be uncertain. Therefore, Argentina wants the U.S. effort to continue. However, it cannot accept the proposal as it stands;<sup>4</sup> the GOA has difficulties with what it perceives as lack of a deadline for resolving the sovereignty issue, with the administrative arrangements for the interim period, and with the political resolution article, particularly the reference to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants.

4. The Secretary told Costa-Mendez that only the U.S. is in a position to achieve a satisfactory solution. He understood the reference to adjustments in Argentina's foreign policy, but did not believe any Argentine Government could undertake a close alliance with the Soviets. As for the text of the proposal, the Secretary told Costa-Mendez that we see no prospect for any significant changes being accepted by the British. The UK has serious problems with it as it stands; however, if the GOA agrees to the proposal, we are confident that we can prevail upon the UK to accept, provided full-scale fighting has not yet begun. According to our information (the Secretary stressed again that the British are keeping their plans to themselves), a British attack could begin as early as Friday.<sup>5</sup>

5. The Secretary and Enders went over the three points Costa-Mendez had listed as stumbling blocks, pointing out that the essential concerns of the GOA have been preserved with only minor modifications from the text at the time the Secretary departed Buenos Aires. In other respects, particularly the reference to the Falkland Islands Company, the text has been improved. It is in our judgment a fair and reasonable proposal, one which the U.S. can stand behind. The Secretary then told Costa-Mendez the problem boils down to the question of whether the GOA has confidence in the role of the U.S. He told Costa-Mendez that the U.S. does not act for the U.K., that we have our own interests at stake, both in Europe and in Latin America, and that his government should have no doubts where this process will lead and will be completed within the prescribed time periods. However, if the GOA concludes definitively that it cannot accept the proposal,

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 185.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 181.

<sup>5</sup> April 30.



there should also be no doubt that the U.S. will have to come down strongly on the side of the UK.

6. Costa-Mendez said he would consult with his government and get back to the Secretary as soon as possible with the most essential changes that the GOA requires in the proposed agreement. The Secretary stressed that we must have that response tonight.

**Haig**

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**188. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, April 29, 1982, 1322Z

Dear Ron,

The Cabinet considered Al Haig's current proposals on the Falkland Islands for the first time this morning.<sup>2</sup> We were all very grateful for his tireless efforts.

I explained to my colleagues that Al had put his proposals to the Argentine Government only on 27 April; that, as he made clear to Francis Pym, he had given them a deadline for accepting the proposals without amendment or rejecting them;<sup>3</sup> and that this deadline had passed more than 24 hours ago with no Argentine reply.

In the Cabinet's view, the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty.

Al made clear to Francis last week that, if Argentina did reject the proposals, the U.S. would consider its current peace-making efforts to have ended and would from then on give full public support to Britain.<sup>4</sup> In the Cabinet's view, this point has now been reached. I cannot conceal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/29/1982 (1). Secret. Sent in a telegram via Cabinet Office channels from the Cabinet Office to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Under an April 29 covering note, Henderson transmitted to Haig Pym's summary of the Cabinet's consideration of the proposals. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 1982)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 163, 164, 165, and 166.

from you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these circumstances the U.S. were not now to give us its full support.

You will remember that when we spoke on the telephone on 17 April,<sup>5</sup> about the earlier proposals which Al and we worked out in London on 12 April,<sup>6</sup> you told me that in your view we had been as accommodating as we could have been and it would not be reasonable to ask us to go further. Against that background, you will not be surprised to know that the Cabinet saw fundamental difficulties from Britain's point of view in Al's latest proposals which we regard Argentina as having now rejected. These difficulties lay in the essential areas where the latest proposals differed from the 12 April proposals. It was, of course, just these areas which Francis discussed so thoroughly with Al in Washington last week.

One stage in the effort to settle this crisis has now ended. It seems to me essential that, as we enter the next stage, the U.S. and Britain should be seen to be unequivocally on the same side, staunchly upholding those values on which the Western way of life depends.

Warm personal regards,

**Margaret**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 144.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 112.

**189. Letter From Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

We have carefully considered the document that you transmitted to us,<sup>2</sup> comparing it with our previous proposals and with the points of view that we have maintained in our various meetings. That analysis reveals significant differences, some of which raise problems that must be overcome.

As my government has already indicated to you, Argentina's objective is the recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. That central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification for the actions undertaken by my country and, as I have had the opportunity of stating to you on many occasions, is for us an unrenounceable goal.

Along with the question of sovereignty, the current crisis raises the immediate need to establish a provisional regime for the administration of the islands as an essential step in the process of separating the two military forces and as a reasonable pause in view of the logical impossibility of formally agreeing upon their final destiny at this time.

The talks that we have held have been fundamentally based on these two questions—recognition of sovereignty and regime of provisional administration. The remaining problems can be solved more readily if there is agreement on the two points that I have just mentioned.

What is certain is that both are closely related. To the extent that the provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, we deem necessary, if we wish to avoid a return to the frustrating situation that existed prior to April 2, the establishment of mechanisms that give us greater powers for the administration of the islands.

If, on the contrary, it were clear that Argentine sovereignty will ultimately be recognized, we will be more flexible with respect to provisional administration.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83S210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. Printed from a translation by the Department of State. According to telegram 116672, which forwarded the text of the letter to Buenos Aires, April 30, Takacs delivered the original letter to Enders on April 29. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982 (2))

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 181.

The document that you sent falls short of Argentine demands and does not satisfy its minimum aspirations on either of the two points. On the contrary, unfavorable changes have been introduced in both. Regarding administration of the islands, the number of Argentine representatives has been reduced, and there is no longer the possibility of increasing my country's control in the event that negotiations on the substantive question drag on without a solution being found. We thus face the definite possibility that a predominately British administration will be established with no fixed time of expiration.

As concerns the question of sovereignty, all precision regarding the concept of territorial integrity has been abandoned, and a new element has been introduced, a virtual referendum to determine the "wishes" of the inhabitants, in open opposition to United Nations Resolution 2065<sup>3</sup> and to the position unwaveringly maintained by Argentina.

You realize, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot accept these changes. In my opinion, other formulas must be found, a task for which we will always remain at your disposal. They should reflect the equilibrium to which I referred earlier in order to balance adequately the data regarding the question of sovereignty with provisions for the provisional administration of the islands. These provisions should be of fixed duration and allow for progressive Argentine participation or, failing that, of such precision that they assure recognition of the rights of Argentina within a given period of time.

If this Argentine position were understood, agreement would be enormously facilitated, and the final drafting of the document would present no insurmountable difficulties.

I thank you again for your arduous efforts, and assure you, Mr. Secretary, of my highest consideration.

**Nicanor Costa Mendez<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 141.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature and an indication that Costa Méndez signed the Spanish text.

**190. Draft Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1982

Dear Maggie:

In view of the military and diplomatic developments of the past few days, as well as your recent letter of this morning,<sup>2</sup> I wanted you to know my views on where matters stand and how the United States will proceed.

We have just now received an Argentine response which in effect rejects our proposal.<sup>3</sup> We will therefore issue a statement Friday<sup>4</sup> on our view toward the crisis and on the steps we are taking in light of the Argentine position.

I am sure you agree that it is essential now to make clear to the world that every effort was made to achieve a fair and peaceful solution, and that the Argentine Government was offered a choice between such a solution and further hostilities. We will therefore make public a general account of the efforts we have made. While we will describe the US proposal in broad terms, we will not release it because of the difficulty that might cause you. I recognize that while you see fundamental difficulties in the proposal, you have not rejected it. We will leave no doubt that Her Majesty's Government worked with us in good faith and was left with no choice but to proceed with military action based on the right of self-defense.

You have made clear throughout this crisis that, while you have wanted above all a peaceful settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 502, your government was prepared to use military means to remove Argentine forces from the Islands. Neither your good will in wanting peace nor your readiness to use force if necessary were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 1982. Secret. A typewritten notation at the top of the draft indicates that it was produced at 2:30 p.m., April 29. No additional drafting information appears on the letter. Bremer sent the draft to Clark under an April 29 covering note, noting that it was for “urgent” approval by Reagan and stating that the message should be transmitted “as soon as possible.” A typewritten note on the covering note states that the draft was transmitted to Clark by LDX only. (Ibid.) No copy of the letter as approved and sent from Reagan to Thatcher has been found in Department of State or White House files. However, Thatcher quoted extensively from the letter in her memoirs, indicating that she received it, and noted that Reagan’s message was “very satisfactory.” (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 211) A British copy of the message, as sent to London, is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 188.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 189.

<sup>4</sup> April 30. See Document 196.

ever in doubt. I know that you are as saddened as I that it has not been possible to avert hostilities, and I am heartened that you have made clear that no more than minimum essential force will be used.

It is as important as ever that we preserve the ground for a negotiated solution. While it may be possible forcibly to remove Argentine forces, the future will be fraught with instability, animosity, and insecurity if a mutually acceptable framework for peace is not ultimately found. Therefore, we should continue to work to secure a just peace. For our part, we will make clear that we stand ready to assist the parties toward this end.

Our shared principles have assured from the outset that we would work with common purpose. As you know, we have refrained from taking those actions in direct support of your position that would have made our diplomatic mission impossible. You have shown clear understanding for our judgment on this and have offered every encouragement to our effort to find a peaceful solution. This reflects the highest degree of statesmanship and confidence on your part.

There can be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance. We will also announce that Argentina's refusal to withdraw its invasion force and to negotiate in good faith have made it necessary for the United States to adopt a new posture toward Buenos Aires. Al Haig will be in touch with Francis Pym concerning the specific measures we will take.<sup>5</sup>

We will of course want to stay in very close touch in the days and weeks ahead. I remain convinced that our combined efforts can yield a just settlement which will strengthen the principles for which we stand, and I can only hope for the least amount of bloodshed before that goal is reached.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 191.

**191. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1982

Dear Francis:

I refer to your letter of April 29<sup>2</sup> which Nicko delivered to me.

I now also have a letter from Nicanor Costa Mendez.<sup>3</sup> He states the US proposal does not meet Argentina's minimum requirements on the issues of ultimate recognition of Argentine sovereignty and provisional administration of the Islands.

I am writing Costa Mendez that it is clear that Argentina has rejected the US proposal.<sup>4</sup>

We have taken note of your statement that the British Cabinet has fundamental reservations about the US proposal. At the same time we believe your decision not to reject it reflects the good faith which you and the Prime Minister have shown since we began our efforts.

Nicko has already informed you that because of the President's address to the nation this evening,<sup>5</sup> it will not be possible for us to make a public announcement of the US position before Friday.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, there are certain actions we must take within our own government before that time. Because of this requirement, it would gravely jeopardize our efforts in support of the United Kingdom if there should be any premature disclosures of this intention. Therefore, I know we can count on you to order an absolute lid in London on any comments.

The thrust of our statement will be that Argentina declined a fair American peace proposal and continues to make demands that cannot be accepted. We do not intend to release the text of our proposal because of the difficulty that might cause you. But, we will describe it in general terms and state that your government has acted in good faith throughout our effort.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Nodis. A typewritten notation at the top of the letter indicates that the original was given to the British Embassy by Eagleburger at 9 p.m., April 29.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 188.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 189.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 192.

<sup>5</sup> On April 29, Reagan addressed the nation on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1983. For the text of the address, which was broadcast on radio and television, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 532–535.

<sup>6</sup> April 30.

We will, of course, continue to support you in the OAS and in the UN and will be prepared to veto in the Security Council or vote against in the General Assembly any resolutions which in our judgment depart from Security Council Resolution 502.

We also plan to announce the following steps in support of the United Kingdom:

- suspension of all military exports to Argentina;
- withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales;
- suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees;
- suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation loans.

Finally, we will announce that the President has directed that the United States will respond positively to requests for materiel support for British forces.

We have shared all along the profound hope that we could find a basis for peace, consistent with the principles of international law and order for which our two nations stand. I know you are as disappointed as we, and that we will continue to work together toward a peaceful solution. We stand ready to assist in whatever way we can.

Sincerely,

**Alexander M. Haig, Jr.<sup>7</sup>**

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<sup>7</sup> Haig signed the letter “Al” above his typed signature.



**192. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1982

Dear Nicanor:

Thank you for your letter of April 29.<sup>2</sup> I deeply regret that your Government is still not able to accept the proposal for a diplomatic solution that we have developed in close consultation with yourself and President Galtieri and with British leaders.

I understand your continuing concerns. I have come to have a deep appreciation for the Argentine commitment to this national cause, and for the frustration you have felt in the long years of negotiations. But it has always been clear that a solution acceptable to both sides could not satisfy the most basic demands of either, at least during the initial period during which forces would be withdrawn and peace reestablished.

I am grateful for your expressions of friendship and satisfaction with the effort I have undertaken at the direction of President Reagan. We did so not only out of our friendship for both countries, but because our own national interest required us to do everything possible to prevent further conflict. We have been guided in this effort by UN Security Council Resolution 502, by our own firm principles regarding the use of force, and by the imperatives of the rule of law.

In carrying out this difficult task, we have attempted to treat both countries on an equitable basis. The proposal we presented to the two governments on Tuesday morning is a fair and reasonable solution.<sup>3</sup> We are convinced that it would have brought peace and that its long term results would have been acceptable to your government as well as the Government of the United Kingdom.

While we continue to hope that a peaceful solution will be found, and will do everything that we can to assist such a solution, we have now entered a new phase in this difficult and tragic confrontation. As we discussed yesterday, the United States will have to make clear that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. Drafted by Service; cleared by Enders and in substance by Gompert. Service initialed for both Enders and Gompert. A typewritten note at the top of the letter states that the original was given to the Argentine Embassy by ARA, April 29. The text of the letter was also transmitted by the Department to Buenos Aires in telegram 116645, April 30. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/28/1982–05/04/1982))

<sup>2</sup> See Document 189.

<sup>3</sup> April 27. See footnote 3, Document 181.

we do not support the settlement of such disputes by the use of force.<sup>4</sup> In this respect, it was your Government which precipitated the crisis by its use of force April 2.

Accordingly, I will make a public statement April 30 explaining our efforts to obtain a peaceful solution and noting your Government's failure to accept the proposal we put forward.<sup>5</sup> I will point out that we had reason to hope that the UK Government could consider a settlement along the lines we proposed. I will also indicate the steps the U.S. believes it must now take in the economic and military fields.

In addition, because of the possibility of hostilities, we are today advising American citizens not to travel to Argentina. In that regard, I am concerned that United States efforts to achieve a peaceful solution may not be fully understood in Argentina and that some elements may take actions that could endanger the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens. If that should happen, the reaction in this country would be swift and overwhelming.

President Galtieri assured me during my most recent trip to Buenos Aires that all precautions would be taken to prevent any such incidents against official or private American citizens.<sup>6</sup> We depend on that assurance and on the determination of the Government of Argentina to fulfill its obligations under international law.

I must tell you frankly that we will be considering other measures in the coming days which would have even greater impact on your country and our relations. I hope that it will not be necessary to take such additional steps, but you must know that we are considering them and that if the situation continues to deteriorate, they will become a very real possibility.

I pray that your people and those of the United Kingdom can be spared the hardship and human tragedy of renewed conflict. We remain prepared to assist in achieving a diplomatic solution at any time your Government believes we could again serve that role.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 187.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 196.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 131.

<sup>7</sup> Haig signed the letter "Al" above his typed signature.

**193. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, April 30, 1982, 0527Z

2640. Subj: Falklands Crisis: Prospective US Measures. Ref: Gillespie/King secure telephone call.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret entire text.

2. Following receipt of subject phone call, I asked to see President Galtieri and was received at midnight. ARMA accompanied me as he has throughout these critical meetings.

2. I told Galtieri that we came without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During more than an hour's conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever on the proposal.

3. I repeatedly asked him what he saw as a way out of this impasse. His response was, as might be expected, that there should be a stand down to give an opportunity for negotiations. I just as repeatedly pointed out to him that such a back off would give Argentina the victory it sought.

4. At the end of our conversation, and on my own initiative, I suggested to Galtieri that the GOA might announce unilaterally a withdrawal of its troops from the Malvinas as a first step toward a peaceful solution and as a gesture of good faith. He seemed to take this suggestion seriously, wrote it down, but said again, as he had several times before, that he was only one of three who made these decisions.

5. I recommend most strongly that we not repeat not announce the measures contemplated until I have had a chance to follow up with Galtieri tomorrow morning.<sup>3</sup> I think there is still a chance, although a slight one, that we can hold these people off.

6. Both ARMA and I (and Galtieri particularly listened to the former) bore down very heavily on the absolute necessity for Argentina not repeat not to take the first offensive action. Galtieri said that he had already stopped such actions three times in the last few days, but indicated that he could not do so for much longer. He made a point, as we all know, that the navy is hungry for action. He also said that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 194.

the Argentines plan to resupply the Islands tomorrow (April 30) by air escorted by military aircraft.

7. Galtieri seemed to me and to ARMA anxious to find a way out within the very tight constraints in which he operates. He said again that Argentina would not be the first one to fire and emphasized to us that he has spent considerable political capital in preventing the Argentine armed forces from going on the offensive. He closed the conversation by promising to keep in close touch with me, particularly on the idea of a unilateral withdrawal from the Malvinas. I think that we may have gotten through to him and if we are able to offer him a little time that we might be able to move forward.

Shlaudeman

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#### 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, April 30, 1982, 1433Z

2658. Subject: Falklands Crisis: Galtieri's Position. Ref: Buenos Aires 2640.<sup>2</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. I went back to see Galtieri this morning. He said he had thought over my suggestion of a unilateral withdrawal and had discussed it early this morning by telephone with the other two members of the Junta. Their conclusion was that Argentina could not rpt not take such a step unilaterally because it would appear to be ceding to U.S. pressure. Galtieri made a point of showing me the headline in today's "Conviction," which reads "Reagan opts for Mrs. Thatcher." In response to my question, he confirmed that this reflected the navy's position.

3. Galtieri said he would be willing to announce withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Malvinas if he could get something simultaneously from the other side. He did not know what that might be but thought it would have to be a statement from London indicating a British disposition to match his move.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 193.

4. I said this appears unlikely but I would pass it on. Galtieri left me in no doubt that he wants peace. He also left me in no doubt that he is under extremely heavy pressure from the navy. I should note that his naval aide in the Casa Rosada tried to prevent me from seeing the President by refusing to pass on the call asking for an interview.

5. With respect to a possibility of intervention by General Meyer, I think that would only be useful in the event we had something to offer from the British side. In that case, it would be very useful indeed.

Shlaudeman

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## 195. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 30, 1982, 9:35–10:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

South Atlantic Crisis

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

*State*

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders

*OSD*

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

*CIA*

Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman

*OMB*

Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

*USUN*

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

*JCS*

General David C. Jones

*White House*

Mr. Edwin Meese III

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Richard G. Darman

Admiral John M. Poindexter

*NSC*

Col. Michael O. Wheeler

Mr. Roger Fontaine

Mr. James Rentschler

### *Minutes*

*Mr. McFarlane* opened the meeting by observing that all parties to the Falkland Islands dispute had reached a watershed. The United States had solicited views from both sides and has made a proposal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting File, NSC 00048 04/30/1982 [Falkland Islands]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. No drafting information appears on the minutes.

of its own. We have received responses to the proposal from both sides. It is now time to decide our next steps. Mr. McFarlane reviewed the agenda and then asked for an intelligence update from Admiral Inman, followed by a diplomatic and political review from Secretary Haig.

*Admiral Inman* reviewed the military situation by detailing first the disposition of British forces in the area. He said the major problem the British now face is making the airfield at Port Stanley inoperable, and he suggested how the British intend to do it. Admiral Inman noted that a large-scale landing is not imminent, but the British are prepared for the long haul. Nevertheless, distance and deteriorating weather will make the British position difficult even as they build up their forward base on Ascension.

*Admiral Inman* then detailed the position of Argentine forces. Their plan is to stay out of the Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and keep their naval units protected by air cover. He also suggested the Soviets have placed in orbit a new ELINT satellite and that, coupled with TU-95s in Angola, could track the U.K. naval force. Meanwhile, the Argentine air force is positioned in its southern bases and it could be used in an attempted air strike on the fleet. As for the Argentine strength on the Falkland Islands, there are 7,000 to 8,000 troops, with the possibility of reaching full strength at 13,000. He also gave other details of the military buildup on the Islands, noting that the Argentines had no high performance aircraft on the Falklands now.

On the political side, Admiral Inman added that in the U.K. the Labour backbenchers support Prime Minister Thatcher, and her support in general is strong. In the absence of a diplomatic breakthrough, she will pursue military action beyond a blockade. Should Britain suffer heavy casualties, however, Mrs. Thatcher's support could crumble. In Argentina, President Galtieri's support is narrowing, and he has little room for maneuver, perhaps even less than Prime Minister Thatcher.

*Secretary Haig* then outlined the current diplomatic situation and what the United States proposes to do now. He began by describing the situation as tragic with both sides, similar to a demented man on a ledge ready to jump, reaching for help but unable to grab our hand. He then described the elements of the American plan which in effect would give ultimate sovereignty to Argentina but under evolutionary conditions which the Islanders could ultimately accept. Unfortunately, the Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. In that sense, Argentina is the opposite of a pluralistic, democratic government where the lowest common denominator is consensus; in the Argentine case the lowest common denominator is extremism. The Navy holds the veto and is even more intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison surrendered without firing a shot—a fact known to the Argentine government, but not to the Argentine people.

Our proposal, the Secretary affirmed, gave Argentina a great deal. It was very difficult for the British to consider, yet the Argentines turned it down. With that turndown may come fighting. Argentina may test the MEZ and although the British are not expected to take near-term action, they will if they are probed by Argentina—sea or air. That could happen today, because there are reports that cargo planes will come into the Falkland Islands with fighter cover.

Despite this outlook, the Secretary said, we do not want to close the door on diplomacy. But there is a dilemma. There are growing pressures at home and abroad to support Britain. At the same time, we need to work with Argentina and keep the American community in Argentina protected. Moreover, if this pro-American government falls in Buenos Aires, it may well be replaced by a left-wing, Peronist regime. Therefore, the Secretary said, we need to be careful in how we raise our tilt. Mrs. Thatcher is reasonably satisfied with our position until now. She wants more than we can give, but she does understand the need for a negotiated solution.

The Secretary then said the President's letter to Mrs. Thatcher<sup>2</sup> was a measured response to a brittle note from the Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup> (She, in fact, was reacting to press reports that we were controlling her forces by having them slow down, reports which were not true.)

The Secretary then outlined the press statement prepared for an 11:30 a.m. release Friday, April 30, following the NSC meeting.<sup>4</sup> He added that the Argentines will actively seek another resolution at the U.N. Security Council that goes beyond 502. The Secretary characterized as prudent the measures we will take today. Both the right and the left in this country want us to take stronger measures against the Argentines. But even what we do today will cause great resentment in Argentina. Stronger measures like default are, however, out of the question. Our interests will be best served by keeping up pressure on Argentina to meet its international commitments.

At this point, Secretary Haig passed out copies of the revised press statement for NSC principals' consideration.

*Mr. McFarlane* then asked for comments or questions.

*Secretary Weinberger* commented on evacuation plans. In a benign environment it would be simple and quick. If hostile, there is little we could do. As for our naval forces, it would take at least 15 days steaming time for the *Eisenhower*, now in Tunis, to reach the South Atlantic from the Mediterranean—the minimum cover we could provide.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 190.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 188.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 196.

*Mr. Meese* asked about protection for the embassy.

*Secretary Weinberger* said sensitive material has been removed and our diplomatic personnel are Argentina's responsibility, noting there was not much we could do short of a full-scale invasion. Secretary Weinberger then asked Secretary Haig to indicate the changes in the revised press statement.

*Secretary Haig* said there were no significant ones except more accurately describing the Argentine position, listing the U.K. position, and giving a longer account of the American plan without going into detail.

In response to a question from Admiral Inman on providing U.S. military aid to the U.K., *Secretary Weinberger* said that nothing was pending but believed more fuel would be requested for Ascension, plus ground support on Ascension and perhaps more specialized ammunition.

*Mr. Carlucci* questioned the paragraph that mentioned communist subversion of the hemisphere. It is certainly true, but he suggested that the perception would be that the U.S. is interested in Latin America only when there is a communist threat.

*Secretary Haig* agreed with that comment. The original statement went much further on this aspect. On balance we need a reference to it. It is the minimum we can say. Further, it serves as a warning to the Argentines about Soviet intentions.

*Mr. McFarlane* informed the NSC meeting that he had been in touch with Judge Clark by phone, whose judicial eye had drawn attention to the paragraph in the draft statement dealing with the question of force. The Judge suggested that, drawing on the experience we had with our own Revolution, we be careful about how we characterize the use of force—there is a distinction between "lawful" and "unlawful" use.

*Mr. Carlucci* then asked if our contemplated actions were being communicated to the Argentines.

*Secretary Haig* said our ambassador told Galtieri what we would do, but Galtieri is not a free man.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* said there will be movement at the U.N. soon. The Secretary General is intensely interested in this question. He is sensitive to his diplomatic limitations as a Latin and a Peruvian. His first choice as a special mediator would be Aga Khan, a man of no national identity who is nevertheless widely respected. Ambassador Kirkpatrick is convinced the Argentines are now interested in the U.N. and will accept a U.N. initiative. Argentines, she added, respond negatively to pressure. They won't really go to war because they're not ready to. Therefore, they will accept a U.N. move. The U.N. too will



work better than in most cases because it is an issue that breaks the usual pattern of U.N. politics. This will also be hard for the British to turn down because this time the U.N. will be evenhanded.

*Secretary Haig* added that until now, we had wanted to avoid the U.N. Now it is different. He added that the Argentines have always suspected us of being on the side of the British. Our imperative has always been to get a settlement. The Argentine strategy is to string out the process and hope the weather will prevent the British from taking action. Meanwhile, their position remains rigid. Their final offer, if accepted by the British, would cause Mrs. Thatcher's fall. Our proposals, in fact, are a camouflaged transfer of sovereignty, and the Argentine foreign minister knows this, but the junta will not accept it.

At this point there was a general discussion of the specific economic and other sanctions to be applied to Argentina, reflected in the agreed upon press statement.

*The President* interjected that he had no objection to giving materiel support but wondered if that would not significantly undercut any future role for the U.S. as mediator.

*Secretary Haig* observed the Argentines have been told what we would do if they refused this offer. They must not think they can play with us. Meanwhile, we have a problem in Britain and with our other allies. The popular perception is that we are too neutral, too tepid.

*Secretary Weinberger* said we need to come out of this getting credit for something; we need to get credit for our support of the British.

*Secretary Haig* said that the President will not have a problem with the materiel assistance paragraph; the real problem with the Argentines will be the sanctions—that will be politically tough.

*Admiral Inman* emphasized that one sour note had come out of recent developments, namely, press leaks about the U.S. ability to read Argentine military communications, which in turn have led to a changing of the Argentine cipher. Admiral Inman hoped we would soon be able to regain our capability in that area, but the leaks had been damaging.

Then ensued a general discussion of how we would explain our new position to the press. Secretary Haig then added, if this gets rougher, the British will want more from us.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* said it won't go that far. The Argentines will find a way to avoid war through a face-saving device in some forum perhaps by the weekend.

*Secretary Haig* said that unless Argentina softens on sovereignty, the British will go ahead and do some damage.

*The President* concluded the meeting approving the specific actions outlined in the press statement and noting that it would be nice if, after

all these years, the U.N. could accomplish something as constructive as averting war between the U.K. and Argentina.

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m.

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## 196. Editorial Note

Following the National Security Council meeting held on the morning of April 30, 1982 (see Document 195), Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. made a statement to the press at 11:30 a.m., outlining both the course of U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the South Atlantic crisis to that point as well as the future direction of U.S. policy toward Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig noted that the crisis was “about to enter a new and dangerous phase in which large-scale military action is likely” following Argentina’s April 29 rejection of the draft framework agreement offered by Haig. “The United States has thus far refrained from adopting measures in response to the seizure of the islands that could have interfered with our ability to work with both sides in the search for peace. The British Government has shown complete understanding for this position. Now, however, in light of Argentina’s failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes.”

Haig continued: “The President has therefore ordered the suspension of all military exports to Argentina, the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales, and the suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees. The President has also directed that the United States will respond positively for requests to materiel support for British forces. There will, of course, be no direct U.S. military involvement.”

The Secretary concluded his statement: “American policy will continue to be guided by our concerns for the rule of law and our desire to facilitate an early and fair settlement. The United States remains ready to assist the parties in finding that settlement. A strictly military outcome cannot endure over time. In the end, there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested parties. Otherwise, we will all face unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.” The complete text of Secretary Haig’s statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1982, pp. 87–88.

In addition to this statement, the new direction of U.S. policy was also spelled out in a message from Haig to the Foreign Ministers of

all American Republics, which was transmitted by the Department of State in telegram 116903 to all American Republics diplomatic posts, April 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820227–0109) A corrected text was transmitted to the same recipients later that day in telegram 117273. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982 (3)) Copies of the Secretary's message were also sent to Secretary General of the United Nations Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, transmitted in telegram 116904 to the Mission to the United Nations, April 30, and to the Foreign Ministers of all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain, transmitted in telegram 116907 to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Tokyo, Wellington, and Madrid, April 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820227–0125 and D820227–0141) Also on April 30, Secretary Haig signed a Determination formally suspending Export-Import Bank credits to Argentina on non-economic grounds. A signed copy of the Determination, attached to a covering April 30 action memorandum sent to Haig by Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State Alvin P. Adams, is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 1982.

In response to the U.S. statement, Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez delivered a formal letter of protest to Secretary Haig on May 2. The text of the letter, which described the U.S. action as "highly unfriendly" and "surprising," was transmitted by the Department of State to the Embassy in Buenos Aires in telegram 118584, May 3. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982 (1))

**197. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1982

SUBJECT

Argentine Request for LANDSAT Coverage of Falklands Area

NASA has received a “routine” request from Argentina for LANDSAT coverage of the Falklands Islands and surrounding area. The Argentines have requested coverage of:

- the open ocean area west of the Falklands on May 7–8;
- the Falkland Islands on May 9–11, and
- South Georgia on May 10–12.

As you know, we are obliged to honor all such requests under the terms of a US-Argentine Memorandum of Understanding. You also should know that the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) has requested the same coverage on behalf of the UK through an existing liaison arrangement.

NASA tells us they are obliged to honor all such DMA taskings. Since all LANDSAT photos are in the public domain, it is not practical to reject the Argentine request while honoring the request from DMA.

NASA is expected to reply to the Argentine request promptly, and would appreciate learning our position no later than COB today.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize me to inform NASA that the State Department has no objection to favorable action by NASA on the Argentine request.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820071–1690. Confidential. Drafted by Kanter; cleared by Service, Smith, and Funseth. Kanter initialed for the clearing officials.

<sup>2</sup> Burt added the following notation below the recommendation: “Larry: The critical issue here is the ‘depoliticized’ character of NASA’s programs. I think we must protect it. RB.” Eagleburger initialed his approval of the recommendation, April 30.

**198. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for Support (TS)

1. (TS) The UK has requested (TAB A)<sup>2</sup> assistance in converting RN SUB HARPOON missile for air launch. Specifically, they request conversion kits (20), necessary test equipment, training for weapons personnel, OT and E data HARPOON from Navy P3 A/B/C aircraft, and missile employment advice from Navy HARPOON-experienced aircrew. The intent is to make 2 NIMRODS HARPOON capable; however, the decision to incorporate this capability has not yet been made.

2. (TS) The data requested by MODUK has been prepared by the Navy Staff (TAB B).<sup>3</sup> This data and the referenced missile training and employment assistance can be made available to the UK if the request is approved.

3. (TS) Request your agreement<sup>4</sup> on fulfilling the UK request.<sup>5</sup>

**David C. Jones**  
*General, USAF*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. Iklé forwarded the memorandum to Weinberger under an April 30 covering memorandum in which Iklé recommended that Weinberger agree to the British request. Iklé also noted that the response to Jones (see footnote 5 below) had been coordinated with Burt. A stamped notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw the memorandum on April 30. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982)

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>4</sup> This word was added as a handwritten replacement for the word “decision.”

<sup>5</sup> Weinberger signed an April 30 memorandum to Jones, which reads in part: “I agree with your recommendation, as detailed in your 30 April 1982 memorandum, to provide the requested information to the UK concerning the conversion of RN SUB HARPOON missiles for air launch.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982)

## Managing the Conflict, May 1–June 15, 1982

### 199. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

London, May 1, 1982, 1219Z

9696. Subject: The Falklands Dispute: Pressing the Diplomatic Option.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: Having come down on their side, we should press HMG not to seek only a military solution, but also to focus on future diplomatic options. End summary.

3. HMG has little faith in a negotiated agreement. They doubt there is a coherent Argentine regime to reach agreement with and, in any event, see the Argentines as playing diplomacy exclusively for time. FCO sources were telling us last week that, aside from the Secretary's mediation efforts, no serious planning was underway on diplomatic options.

4. HMG now hopes that US pressure will bring an Argentine back-down. But more realistically, their goal will be to force surrender of the troops on the Falklands with a series of demoralizing but relatively low-risk military steps and worry about diplomatic solutions later. The strike on Stanley Airfield,<sup>2</sup> which has just been announced, fits such a strategy.

5. For political reasons, Thatcher needs to keep some diplomatic activity alive if she means to use military force. Otherwise, parliamentary unity will dissolve, and the public, which is still split on risking British lives, could turn against her. Hence, Pym is going to New

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom 04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> On the morning of May 1, two British Vulcan heavy bombers based at Ascension Island attacked the airfield at Port Stanley. This was followed by separate daybreak strikes by British Sea Harrier aircraft against other targets in the Falklands/Malvinas, including the airport at Goose Green. The same day, [text not declassified], reported on a briefing by a British Ministry of Defense official on the air raids. During the briefing, the British official informed [name not declassified] that preliminary reconnaissance indicated that "substantial" damage had been inflicted on the airfield at Port Stanley and that it would be "quite some time" before the runway damage would be repaired by the Argentines. (Telegram [telegram number, recipients, and date not declassified]. Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/01/1982) An earlier assessment of the raids was sent by [text not declassified]. (Ibid.)

York—but with a limited brief. According to the FCO, Pym will simply explore the UNSYG's ideas and take stock.

6. U.S. approach. The weakness of other diplomatic options, and the risks inherent in an all-out search for a military solution threaten to keep us on the spot. If Thatcher can't budge the Argentine forces, she may turn to us for ever tougher measures. If she can, she may want to hold the Islands militarily without looking for a long-term solution. Either way, she will want to keep us in the grinder—protecting British interests in the South Atlantic.

7. Hence, we have an interest in encouraging the British to think hard now about diplomatic arrangements (a) to complement the present military steps and (b) to give the British alternatives should present pressures bog down—or prevail. We should not let the UK bureaucracy lock onto a solution that depends entirely on military pressure. Accordingly, we recommend that in his meeting with Pym,<sup>3</sup> the Secretary:

—Put the British on notice that, even as we aid them to pressure Argentina for a settlement, we will expect the diplomatic track to be pursued diligently in the days ahead,

—Encourage hard thought about long term options, e.g. trusteeship, to avoid “unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.”

**Louis**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 205.

**200. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Exports to Argentina

Our game plan for implementing the arms embargo,<sup>2</sup> is as follows:

—Munitions Control (MC) has in hand a list of all companies holding valid export licenses for Argentina and has called them to say their licenses have been suspended, effective immediately. MC will follow up the calls with a written notice of suspension. All pending licenses are being returned without action.

—MC has also called Customs to inform them of the license suspension and request that it take appropriate action to stop any export of Munitions List items to Argentina. This, too, will be followed up in writing.

—Customs has been asked to pay particular attention to the two warehouses in Maryland used by Argentina to store materiel destined for air shipment out of Andrews AFB. Argentina holds title to at least some of the materiel in these warehouses and does not need an export license to ship it home. Customs does have the authority, however, to prevent its export which we have requested them to exercise.

—We have set in motion an early warning system to ensure that Argentine requests for clearance of cargo (or other) flights into Andrews are passed to PM and EB for review before they are granted. We are also looking into the possibility that there may be other military controlled facilities used by Argentina for picking up cargo that might require special attention.

—Finally, with respect to the FMS pipeline, PM has directed DSAA by phone and in writing to suspend deliveries of FMS materiel to any Argentine entity in the US or anyone in the US acting on behalf of the GOA and to store such materiel in US controlled facilities.

—With respect to Commerce-controlled items, EB is the action bureau, with whatever help PM can offer. Under the NSC decision,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Brown on April 30; cleared by D. Kursch (EB) and Robinson (PM/MC). Brown initialed for both Kursch and Robinson.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 196.



Commerce, unlike MC, will not revoke outstanding licenses for dual use items but only delay issuance of new ones. We can expect, therefore, some leakage that could cause embarrassing publicity. The recent flaps over the 32 jet engines<sup>3</sup> and the S-61 helicopters<sup>4</sup> are prime examples of what we can confidently look forward to. We have been in touch with Commerce to see what can be done to deal with the problem. Initially, Commerce will attempt to identify for us any dual use items for Argentina covered by valid export licenses. Commerce has warned us, however, that its computerized case file is backlogged by several months and it will be almost impossible to identify all outstanding Argentine licenses.

*Jet Engines*—We have no new information on the 32 jet engines in San Francisco. So far as we know Customs has them all in custody.

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<sup>3</sup> During the April 29 Department press briefing, Fischer was asked about “reports that the United States approved a license for the export of some number, probably about 30 jet engines, for Skyhawk fighter planes—I think their designation is A-4—for Argentina within the last month, probably around April 8.” Fischer responded: “Last December the Department of Commerce issued a license for \$2 million worth of aero engine parts applicable to J-65 engines. This Korean War vintage engine powers the early models of the A-4. Because of its age and its potential application to civilian non-aircraft uses, it was removed from the Munitions List in 1980 and falls under commerce export licensing procedures. It is our understanding that the exporter, who planned the supply relationship with Argentina, purchased 32 engine assemblies from the Navy last March. The exporter planned to ship these engine assemblies to Argentina in April under the December license. We also understand that Argentina intends to have 12 of these engine assemblies overhauled in Italy, and recently submitted a second application for a license to cover this export. No action has been taken on this license and to our knowledge no engine assemblies have been shipped out of the United States.” (Telegram 118259 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229-0298)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 149.

**201. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Next Steps in Negotiation

*1. Alternative Paths*

There are several immediately available.

—*UN good offices*, including appointment of a mediator (which Perez de Cuellar has now offered);<sup>2</sup>

—*A joint US-Latin American effort* (Belaunde's suggestion that Perez act for Argentina and the U.S. for Britain)<sup>3</sup> won't do as such,—it increases our alienation from the Latins<sup>4</sup>—but *might work if both the U.S. and Peru acted together* as a joint go-between; note that the possibility of military intervention by Peru could offset Lima's acceptability in London);

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 118553 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 1, the Department reported that a UN spokesman stated on April 30 that Pérez de Cuéllar had offered his "good offices" to the Argentines and British in order to resolve the conflict. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0299) In telegram 149840 to USUN, May 2, Haig observed to Kirkpatrick: "Clearly over the next few days we will face the probability of renewed efforts in the Security Council to help resolve the crisis in the Falklands." As a result, Haig continued, he had instructed the Acting Secretary "to be in close touch" with Kirkpatrick "so that we can be prepared to react appropriately to specific language and developments." He added, "our previous instructions and the basic principles of our position remain valid. Our aim is to uphold the principles of Resolution 502: cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Argentine forces, and a diplomatic solution between the two sides." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820286–0326)

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> The Government of Peru had also protested the shift in U.S. policy announced on April 30. Arias Stella responded to Haig's April 30 message sent to all Latin American governments (see Document 196) with a May 1 message to the Secretary of State, which reads in part: "The Government of Peru deplores the fact that the Government of the United States has adopted measures that clearly place it in favor of one of the involved parties and that, in effect, virtually concludes Your Excellency's exercise of good offices. Furthermore, my government considers the offer made by the Government of the United States to offer material military aid to one of the parties as contravening the purposes of Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations by potentially contributing to the aggravation of the hostilities." (Telegram 4460 from Lima, May 1; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/01/1982)

—A *joint US-Latin American-European effort* (purpose here would be to bring greater pressure on Thatcher to compromise; the Germans and Italians are already getting restive; we could bring those pressures directly to the negotiating table);

—A *four member version of the preceding* (two Latins, plus U.S. and one European, to overcome Argentinian perception of a pro-British tilt in the tripartite formula);

—*Renewal of the U.S. solo* (this is *not* incredible, despite our tilt; the Argentine response has been measured—so far; however maybe we need more leverage on *both* Britain and Argentina).

*We need to get Brazil involved, to build pressure on Argentina:* The tripartite formula, say with Germany, Brazil and the U.S., and convening in Washington under our chairmanship, would give us the best continuing forum. But it may not be acceptable to Argentina and have to deal with the UN somehow. Also, we must include the Spanish speakers. Perhaps our *best formula is the U.S., Germany, Brazil, Peru, meeting in New York as a Contact Group.*

## 2. Timing and Procedure

*Action should be immediate*, because otherwise some other formula—Perez de Cuellar or the OAS—will press forward.

Thus the *first step* would be for the *British to pass up the UN offer*, agreeing to thinking about it but remaining non-committal.

The delicate question is *who should propose the formula*. Probably there is *no alternative to our doing it, but there is a risk of a turndown*. One danger is that the Argentines insist on having Perez de Cuellar as the leader of the effort. We can guard against that by including Peru in our original proposal.

## 3. Substance

*Logical point of departure would be our last proposal*, which now becomes negotiable. It is a flexible matrix and can be reweighted and complicated as necessary to achieve a result.

We should, however, *be prepared to switch to the short five point form, when both parties to the conflict have become desperate enough*. Shlaudeman cables me now (see attached) that we might give it a try even in the immediate future.<sup>5</sup> I would await a clash of British and Argentine forces before doing so.

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is a May 1 backchannel message from Shlaudeman to Enders, in which the former stated that the Junta's communiqué in response to Haig's April 30 statement "was surprisingly soft and notable for its gentle treatment of the U.S.," which suggested to Shlaudeman "that I may have been wrong in my reaction to your idea of a partial solution through mutual withdrawal, a third party presence, etc. I think Galtieri at least still sees us as pulling him out of the hole. In the circumstances perhaps we should try him out on the outcome you suggested." (Backchannel message 976 from Buenos Aires, May 1; *ibid.*)

There remains the question of *how to give the right tilt to the negotiation paragraph* to attract both Argentina and Britain to the short five point form. Here is *one possibility, which tilts slightly toward Argentina*.

*Quote:*

The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting claims to the sovereignty to the islands. They also acknowledge conflicting views as to the role the wishes of the inhabitants should play in a settlement. The purpose of the negotiations will be to reach a definitive disposition of the sovereignty question within a framework of guarantees of the rights of the inhabitants. Negotiations will be conducted with the assistance of the Contact Group and shall conclude no later than April 30, 1983. *Unquote.*

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize us to proceed along the lines outlined above.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Haig neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

**202. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Lima, May 2, 1982, 0629Z

4507. Subject: South Atlantic Peace Proposal: Peruvian Text. Ref: Lima 4506.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret entire text.

2. Following are texts in English and Spanish languages prepared by Peruvian President Belaunde and Prime Minister Ullua based upon conversation with the Secretary evening May 1.<sup>3</sup> These texts conveyed to Argentine President Galtieri, who had them recorded as they were read to him. Reftel reports upon Belaunde/Galtieri conversatiton.

3. Begin text: South Atlantic Peace Proposal

1) An immediate cease fire.

2) Mutual withdrawal of forces.

3) Introduction of third parties to govern the Islands.

4) The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting views with respect to the Islands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4506 from Lima, May 2, Ortiz reported that Belaúnde called him to the Palace for a meeting during which Belaúnde telephoned Galtieri in order to present the terms of the Peruvian peace proposal, which he had earlier discussed with Haig (see footnote 3 below). Belaúnde noted that the "events in the South Atlantic" had caused "alarm and dismay" in Peru and that the "seriousness of the situation was also of profound concern to the US." In the course of their conversation, "Belaunde asked Galtieri to meditate on these proposals and if it was possible for him to accept these points Belaunde was standing by to convey the Argentine acceptance to Secretary Haig." (Ibid.) Shortly before his meeting with Belaúnde, Ortiz had transmitted to the Department an earlier version of the Peruvian proposal, which Arias Stella had conveyed to him. (Telegram 4505 from Lima, May 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229-0309)

<sup>3</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this telephone conversation has been found. Although he recalled the conversation as having occurred on May 2, likely conflating the May 1 call with a follow-up call the following day (see Document 207 and footnote 3 thereto), Haig wrote in his memoirs that Belaúnde telephoned him with "the proposal that one final attempt be made to stop the fighting and find a peaceful solution." "Speaking over an open line," Haig remembered, "we worked all day on a new draft." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 293) Belaúnde recalled that his May 1 conversation with Haig lasted for three-quarters of an hour and that he asked Haig "to please dictate to me the essential points from Britain's viewpoint. Haig read them over to me, and I for my part told him what word was unsatisfactory and what conditions unacceptable for Argentina. We finally agreed on a plan which covered seven points, and I left it that I should call President Galtieri at once to put that formula to him." (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, p. 316)

5) The two governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views and the interests of the Islanders in the final solution.

6) The third parties—or contact group—would be composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany, and the United States.

7) A final solution will be reached not later than April 30th, 1983, under the guarantee of the contact group. End text.

4. Begin Spanish text: Propuesta de Paz en el Atlantico Sur.

1) Cesacion inmediata de hostilidades;

2) Retiro mutuo de fuerzas;

3) Presencia de representantes ajenos a las partes involucradas en el conflicto para gobernar temporalmente las Islas;

4) Los dos gobiernos reconocen la existencia de reclamaciones discrepantes y conflictivas sobre la situacion de las Islas;

5) Los dos gobiernos reconocen que los puntos de vista y los intereses de los habitantes locales tienen que ser tomados en cuenta en la solucion definitiva del problema;

6) El grupo de contacto que intervendria de inmediato en las negociaciones para implementar este acuerdo estaria compuesto por Brasil, Peru, Republica Federal de Alemania y los Estados Unidos de America; y,

7) Antes del 30 de Abril de 1983 se habra llegado a un acuerdo definitivo, bajo la responsabilidad del grupo de paises antes mencionado. End text

Ortiz

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### 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1982, 0904Z

118563. Subject: Peruvian Initiative. Ref: A) Lima 4506;<sup>2</sup> B) Lima 4507.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sherman (S/S-O); cleared in L and in substance by Haig; approved by Enders. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820004–0036)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 202.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 202.

1. Please pass following ASAP to President Belaunde from Secretary Haig:

2. Quote. Dear Mr President: I am most grateful for your message transmitted through Ambassador Ortiz earlier this morning. The text of the agreement which you presented to President Galtieri, I believe, should be modified in only one minor point, that being substitution of the word “deseos” in place of “puntos de vista” in paragraph five of the Spanish text which we consider at this point the only authoritative text. I agree that the actual composition of the contact group called for in the agreement is open to further discussion.

3. If the text is agreeable to President Galtieri and to the other members of the governing Junta, I will be pleased to present it to Foreign Secretary Pym with whom I will meet at 10 o'clock this morning.<sup>4</sup>

4. I look forward to word from you that such agreement has been obtained.<sup>5</sup> With warm regards, Alexander Haig. End quote.

**Haig**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 4510 from Lima, May 2, Ortiz reported that Belaúnde had telephoned at 10 a.m. (11 a.m. Washington time) to inform him that Costa Méndez had asked Belaúnde to convey that the Government of Argentina “in general” found the seven points of the Peruvian plan acceptable with “two changes on which the Argentines were very insistent.” The first was a textual change to paragraph 5. The revised formulation read: “The two Governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views concerning the interests of the Islanders in the final solution.” The second revision proposed the replacement of the United States with Canada as a member of the contact group, “because the United States was firmly on the side of the UK.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982) Belaúnde later telephoned Galtieri to discuss the revisions and reported the outcome of the conversation to Ortiz. (Telegram 4511 from Lima, May 2; *ibid.*)

## 204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1982, 1530Z

118569. Subject: Letter to President Figueiredo.

Following is text of letter from President Reagan to President Figueiredo.<sup>2</sup> Request Embassy arrange delivery at earliest appropriate time. There will be no signed original. If queried Embassy may advise GOB that we do not intend to release text but would have no objection if GOB wishes to do so.

Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

It was with a very heavy heart that I acted April 30 to register the clear opposition of the United States Government to Argentina's use of force to establish its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. This was a painful decision, deferred for several weeks, and one which we had hoped could be avoided. It became unavoidable after our efforts to help both parties find a peaceful solution had failed to prevent increasing prospects of armed conflict.

Please understand, Mr. President, that the measures ordered on April 30 relate only to the issue of the use of force to resolve territorial disputes. This is a serious violation of fundamental law which cannot be accepted without grave peril to the peace and the integrity of the Hemisphere and the entire world order.

The United States has taken no position on the issue of sovereignty over the Islands or any of the associated questions. It is our judgement that a peaceful resolution of the basic issues is achievable only through

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Confidential; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Kilday; cleared by Einaudi, Enders, McFarlane, Fontaine, Bremer, and in S/S–O; approved by Haig. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>2</sup> Variations of this letter were sent to Presidents Royo, Herrera Campíns, and Belaúnde on May 2. In a May 1 memorandum to Clark, forwarding drafts for approval, Bremer noted: "Initial reactions of Latin governments to U.S. actions [in the South Atlantic crisis] reflect concern about continued U.S. commitment to the inter-American system. Many predict a weakening of hemispheric relationships." The purpose of the letters would be to "answer these concerns and to keep opinion from crystallizing against us." (Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) Telegram 118568 to Caracas and Panama City, May 2, transmitted the letters to Royo and Herrera Campíns. (Ibid.) Reagan's letter to Belaúnde, sent to Lima in telegram 118571, May 2, added that he was "particularly appreciative" of Belaúnde's efforts to "gain agreement by the Government of Argentina for a peace plan that would prevent further conflict and provide for a definitive solution to the problem." (Ibid.)



negotiations between the interested parties. However, such negotiations can only proceed under a climate of mutual respect for the rule of law.

Like Brazil, the United States believes that UN Security Council Resolution 502 provides the framework in which this crisis must be addressed. We are pledged to continue to do everything in our power, including resumption of the mediation effort if the parties so wish, to help establish the basis for a negotiated settlement and to prevent this crisis from reaching tragic proportions.

Your long-awaited visit to Washington May 12 will provide opportunity for a further exchange of views on the crisis as well as a review of other international and hemispheric issues of mutual interest.<sup>3</sup> We look forward to your arrival with great anticipation and know that we will benefit from your counsel. Sincerely yours, Ronald Reagan.  
End text.

Haig

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 255.

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## 205. Editorial Note

On May 2, 1982, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met with British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym at the Department of State. According to British Ambassador to the United States Sir Nicholas Henderson, Pym had traveled to the United States for meetings with Haig and United Nations Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the purpose of which, Henderson thought, was “largely” to “assuage parliamentarians” in the House of Commons who “were calling on him to be more active diplomatically.” (Henderson, *Mandarin*, page 456) Although a British telegram reporting on the meeting has been published on the Thatcher Foundation website, no U.S. record of Haig’s meeting with Pym has been found. However, a Department of State situation report (as of 1800 Eastern Daylight Time, May 2) included information about the meeting: “British Foreign Secretary Pym met Sunday morning with Secretary Haig for more than two hours. Emerging from the meeting, Pym reported that the two men had explored the possibilities ‘for a negotiated settlement, however difficult they

may seem.’ In a news conference later in the afternoon Pym reported that he had not asked for any action by the US at this time.” (Telegram 118577 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0521) In the complete transcript of remarks made by Pym and Haig to the press following the morning meeting, the Foreign Secretary stated that he “came here last week to negotiate with Mr. Secretary Haig, as a mediator” and had “come back this week to consult with him as an ally,” and that he and Haig had “discussed the whole area together.” (Telegram 118572 to all American Republic posts and all OECD posts, May 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0472) In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled that Haig had “put to” Pym the Peruvian peace plan in their meeting (dated somewhat uncertainly on “1 and 2 May”), “though we had no sight of it until later.” (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, page 216)

Following the meeting with Haig, that afternoon Pym also met with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger at the British Embassy. No memorandum of conversation or other official record of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs, Weinberger wrote that he discussed with Pym and Henderson “the supply of arms, ammunition and war supplies for the British seaborne counterattack convoys approaching the Falklands.” “I made clear that we would supply them with everything they needed that we could spare, and that we would do it very quickly.” (Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, page 208) Recalling that Haig’s commitment to a “diplomatic solution” was “not quite what the President had in mind, nor what I envisioned,” Weinberger continued, “I had told Mr. Pym that our arms supply effort would intensify, and that we would work as effectively as we could to support the British counterattack.” (Ibid., page 209) Weinberger also wrote in his daily diary of the meeting: “Met with Francis Pym and Nico Henderson on porch at British Embassy. They made no requests for aid now—hope for [illegible—on own?] big victory—possibly at sea & then they can discuss how to settle in permanently—They may, after 60 days, need a carrier to use as a floating airfield for their fighter planes.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Appointment and Diary File, May 1982)

**206. Situation Report Prepared in the National Security Agency**

Washington, May 2, 1982, 2158Z

[Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Top Secret; Codeword. 8 pages not declassified.]

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**207. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Lima, May 2, 1982, 2326Z

4512. Subj: Peruvian Initiative: Belaunde Speaks With Costa Mendez. Refs: Lima 4513.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Upon conclusion of conversation with the Secretary afternoon May 2,<sup>3</sup> President Belaunde called Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez in Buenos Aires. The Argentine was finally reached while on his way to a meeting with President Galtieri and the Junta at 1730 EDT.

3. While Prime Minister Ulloa listened on an extension, Belaunde told Costa Mendez that the Secretary informed him that Foreign Secretary Pym appears prepared to accept the structure of the proposed agreement.<sup>4</sup> Belaunde read for Costa Mendez the slight modifications the US side proposed: a) In paragraph three, inserting “dos” between “las partes involucrados”—a style change—; and, b) replacing the word “gobernar” (govern) with a “administrar” (administer) in the last part of paragraph three.

4. Turning to the troublesome “wishes” vs “point of view” disagreement in paragraph five, Belaunde conveyed the language agreed upon

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4513 from Lima, May 2, transmitted the revised Spanish text of the Peruvian proposal. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> No other record of this conversation has been found. See footnote 3, Document 202.

<sup>4</sup> For Haig’s May 2 meeting with Pym, see Document 205.

in his talk with the Secretary: replace “deseos” (desires/wishes) with “aspiraciones” (aspirations).

5. Belaunde then discussed various modifications in paragraph six to meet Argentine concerns about nations participating in the contact group. There was no final agreement on wording. Belaunde eventually suggested that if the Argentines could not accept the current wording, the best solution might be to leave the matter with an undertaking to reach subsequent agreement on membership. In Spanish the text would read

Begin text: El grupo de contacto que intervendría de inmediato en las negociaciones para implementar este convenio estaría computo por varios países a designarse de común acuerdo. End text. An unofficial English translation would be: Begin text: The contact group which would immediately begin negotiations to implement this agreement would be composed of several countries designated by common consent. End text.

6. Belaunde told Costa Mendez that while he understood President Galtieri had to listen to various views from the Junta, nonetheless, time was running out quickly. The goal was to complete some sort of an agreement today. The Peruvian President stressed that the absence of armed conflict today was a direct result of the progress being made on these negotiations. Renewed conflict would surely follow if no solution found.

7. In urging Costa Mendez to get Junta approval for the proposed agreement, Belaunde described it as an “Argentine triumph although not a UK capitulation”, “a dignified and timely” peace. Belaunde suggested that in order to get something signed today, the GOA might like to consider the possibility of instructing its Ambassador at Lima (and the UK, its Ambassador) to sign the document here.

8. Comment: In subsequent conversation with Ulloa, the Prime Minister said that Costa Mendez “was noncommittal,” he had “taken careful note of the revised proposal” but that “final decisions” were “in the other hands”.

9. Reftel transmits current Spanish text.

**Ortiz**

**208. Significant Event Report Prepared in the National Military Command Center<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1982, 2000 EDT

SUBJECT

Falklands (U)

1. (S/US/UK only) British intelligence reported to NSA that at 021856Z May 82, the UK submarine *Conqueror* attacked the Argentine light cruiser *Belgrano* with torpedoes in the southern sector of the exclusion zone. The report indicated that the *Belgrano* was hit.<sup>2</sup> (Source: NSA NOIWON)

2. (U) Reuters and Dow Jones news services report that Peruvian President Belaunde announced that both the UK and Argentina had agreed to a cease-fire in the Falkland crisis. President Belaunde who said he was acting as mediator between the US and Argentina, said a seven-point document has been agreed on by Argentina and the US, which acted in coordination with Britain. Belaunde further stated the document was drafted by Secretary of State Haig and passed to Argentine authorities by him. State Ops has not confirmed the report. (Reuters 162 021932 EDT, DJ-05-02-82 2317 GMT and PhonCon State OPS/NMCC)

3. (U) Selected notifications made as directed by J-30.

**P.M. Hekman Jr**

*Rear Admiral, USN*

*Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC)*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Falkland Islands Situation Report Number 46, as of 0600 EDT, May 3, noted that the *General Belgrano* was struck "just outside the 200-mile zone," adding: "The UK MOD said the cruiser is believed to be severely damaged, but the sub suffered no damage and had resumed its patrol. Argentina acknowledged the *General Belgrano* was 'damaged.'" (Telegram 118587 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820230-0196) The Argentines confirmed the sinking in a communiqué issued later on May 3. (Department of State Falkland Working Group Situation Report Number 47, May 3; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981-1982, Lot 82D370, unlabeled folder)

## 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Lima, May 3, 1982, 1434Z

4515. Subject: End of the Peruvian Initiative.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. At 2345 EDT<sup>2</sup> President Belaunde telephoned me to advise me he had just finished speaking with President Galtieri. He reported that Galtieri stated that the Argentine Government was prepared to study the Peruvian peace proposal with serenity and thoroughness. However, Galtieri said that owing to the quote unspeakable unquote British military actions of today's date, specifically the torpedoing and presumed destruction of the Argentine flagship "Belgrano"<sup>3</sup> there was nothing left for Argentina to discuss. All that remained was to fight.

3. President Belaunde said that with this message from President Galtieri he considered the Peruvian peace initiative to be terminated. The President said it was very lamentable that the British actions should have occurred when serious negotiations were underway with a high chance for success. He condemned the UK's attacks and said they would enflame the Hemisphere.

4. Belaunde plans to call the Secretary to advise him directly of the termination of his efforts.<sup>4</sup>

Ortiz

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982. Confidential; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> May 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 208.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 211. Before talking with Belaunde on May 3 (see Document 211) Haig met Inman for a breakfast meeting in which they discussed "at great length" the "potential mediation efforts via the U.N. Secretary General and the Peruvians." According to the memorandum for the record of the breakfast, produced by the CIA, the discussion concluded that the "battles over the weekend appear to have thrown cold water on any of these efforts which may not have had any real chance of success in any case." (Memorandum for the Record, May 3; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec 85))

**210. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, May 3, 1982, 1522Z

2708. Military handle as Specat Exclusive. Subj: Evacuation Contingency Planning. Ref: Buenos Aires 2248.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. As I told Ambassador Enders on the telephone, we have a report from a reliable source in the Presidential Palace that the mood in the top levels of the military has turned very ugly against the U.S. The story is that the cruiser “Belgrano” was “pulverized” with heavy loss of life. Allegedly, the U.S. located the ship for the British and gave its permission for the use of a “special weapon” against the “Belgrano” (the implication being a nuclear weapon). The source advised one of our attaches “to get out of town.”

3. We are making appropriate representations to remind the GOA of its responsibility for the security of this mission and its personnel. However, in view of the “Belgrano” incident and what seems to me the likelihood of new naval engagements in the South Atlantic, I request the Department’s authorization to declare the post in Phase II of the relevant emergency levels. I ask for authorization for the departure of dependents of our military personnel, both DAO and MILGP, given the understandable anxiety among these officers. I also request authorization to prepare for the reduction in non-essential personnel and their dependents as indicated in para two reftel. The dependents of our military will depart by road or ferry for Montevideo once the Department has given its approval. We shall be in touch with the Department on the method and timing for the larger evacuation.<sup>3</sup>

**Shlaudeman**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; Specat; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Montevideo, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM. Printed from a copy that was received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff message center.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2248 from Buenos Aires, April 15, the Embassy described the staffing pattern it would adopt should a reduction in personnel be required. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820196–0571)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2727 from Buenos Aires, May 3, the Embassy transmitted its plan for the initial evacuation of dependents of Embassy military personnel, followed by an “across-the-board reduction of personnel.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820231–0432) In telegram 120585 to Buenos Aires, May 4, the Department authorized the Embassy “to proceed with evacuation of all dependents and non-essential personnel. We recommend, however, that departure be expedited preferably over a period of three days.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820233–0885)

**211. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Peruvian President Belaúnde and Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

May 3, 1982, 3:32–3:40 p.m.

H: Mr. President?

B: Yes, how are you? How are things going?

H: They are still very worrisome. I wanted to share some thinking with you and get your opinion. You recall last night we agreed to reconsider what we might be able to do.<sup>2</sup> I think we came so close in the effort you had launched that it would be a tragedy not to keep that possibility alive. I am very worried that in the days ahead, the situation is going to become very extreme. What I thought was perhaps—just talking unofficially, ad referendum—perhaps we could get the British—and I don't know that I can, but I could even have the President try—to offer to have a period of ceasefire.

B: That would be very, very good.

H: . . . during which a Contact Group, composed of Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, the Federal Republic, Jamaica and the US, would then prepare and put forward proposals to the two governments.<sup>3</sup>

B: You mentioned Jamaica?

H: To try to keep some balance and keep it in the Hemisphere.

B: That would not be to administer the Island? Only to advise?

H: It would be a Contact Group. You recall, when we stopped the discussions, the Argentines wanted to add two additional parties.

B: Do you think, in that case, it would be just a few days for a truce? How long do you think it could be?

H: Even a 24-hour period, after the Contact Group put together a proposal which we would then furnish to the two capitals from the Contact Group and during the consideration of those proposals there would be a ceasefire so we would have to move quickly.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; Belaúnde was in Lima.

<sup>2</sup> A possible reference to the conversation between Haig and Belaúnde described in Document 207.

<sup>3</sup> A draft timetable for the convening of the Contact Group and the Peruvian submission of the 7-point peace proposal to the Argentines and British, as well as for the subsequent consideration of the proposal by the two parties during which a ceasefire would be imposed, was produced by the Department on May 3. A copy, bearing a handwritten time of 2:30 p.m., is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder.



B: That might be a solution. Last night, Galtieri talked to me.<sup>4</sup> They were discouraged; with the hostilities, the climate is not appropriate for any discussion. I am not hopeful. Two emissaries from President Galtieri arrived in Lima a few hours ago. I have not seen them yet. I am seeing Ambassador Ortiz at 3:30. I have to talk to all of them. Evidently, if the truce can be obtained, that would give the proper climate for further discussions.

H: Perhaps the British could make this initiative so the onus is not on the shoulders of Buenos Aires.

B: Were the British receptive to the 7 points?

H: They did not reject them; they did not accept them.<sup>5</sup> It might be possible. They did not take them seriously because they did not think the Argentine side would accept them.

B: In those conditions, it's so hard to get a solution. If one side rejects and the other also rejects, it is hard to get it started. Perhaps the solution could be proposed by a third party.

H: I thought it could be convened at the Ambassadorial level—here at the OAS perhaps—the six Ambassadors I spoke of who would put together a proposal drawing from the work you did to just put it to both capitals. During consideration of that, I would try to see if I could get the British Government to announce a ceasefire, or a standdown.

B: If the British would announce they are ready to accept a ceasefire without any conditions or without any documents for, let's say, 48 or 72 hours, immediately I am sure we could set up the basis for a solution. But it is essential that they announce they are ready to stop. Naturally, the hostilities are continuing to go on. Do you have any news today? I heard about a Mirage plane being shot down and a small Argentine ship being sunk. I don't know what to believe. The British say one thing, and the Argentines something different.

H: I understand there is a rumor in Buenos Aires that we were colluding with the British on the torpedoing of the cruiser.<sup>6</sup> There is no truth to that at all. We are not providing intelligence nor are we collaborating on anything military.

B: I understood the ship was drifting—not completely sunk. What do you know?

H: I expressed concern to the British side and they decided not to sink it—they could have—but it is just damaged.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 209.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 210.

B: Do you have any idea how many people are on the cruiser? I heard 750.

H: It's closer to 1,000.

B: Very shortly, I will talk to the two Argentines sent by General Galtieri and then to your Ambassador.<sup>7</sup> I recommend the British announce they are ready for a ceasefire for 1, 2 or 3 days. That would give us time to move around.

H: Let me do some further work. I have no assurance I can get the British to do this. But before I do anything, I will send you a message telling you what I'm doing.

B: Costa Mendez talked to our Minister this morning and while they were going through the 7 points, they got the news about the cruiser, and they ruled the whole thing out.

H: I can understand that very easily. I would feel the same way.

B: I think the next move should come from Britain—willingness to have a ceasefire. We know the Argentines are ready to accept it.

H: Let me put a plan together and be sure you are comfortable with it. In the meantime, would it be helpful for me to send General Walters to be at your side during this?

B: I don't think it is essential because we can communicate by phone. There is always so much publicity. We can get in touch and, if necessary, something like that could be done. I have complete confidence in Ambassador Ortiz—he is a good friend.

H: He was very carefully picked for that position. All right, Mr. President, I will be in touch with you.

B: We will be in contact. Thank you for calling.

H: Good-bye, Mr. President.

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<sup>7</sup> No record of this discussion has been found.

**212. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1982

Dear Francis:

In his letter to the Prime Minister last Thursday,<sup>2</sup> President Reagan expressed the view that, whatever happens militarily, there must be a negotiated solution to the Falklands crisis if we are to avoid open-ended hostility and instability. The Prime Minister and you have made clear to the world your commitment—which has never been in doubt here—to reaching a settlement.

We are concerned that your military successes have not had the desired effect of making the Argentines more reasonable. Our assessment is that the fatalistic mentality characteristic of the Argentines is becoming stronger with each setback. Paradoxically—and tragically—the Argentines may well be waiting, and trying, for a military success of their own before making a serious move toward a settlement. Such a strategy would be consistent with everything we know about the Argentines.

This confronts us with the danger that as the military situation gets worse for the Argentines—whether or not Galtieri survives—you will be left with no alternative but a major long-term military burden. We know that you are prepared for this, but also that you would strongly prefer to secure your objective through an agreement.

We are also concerned that international opinion will increasingly reflect a belief, however untrue, that British military action is the principal obstacle to a peaceful solution. This misperception will grow if it appears that the United Kingdom, in light of its recent victories, is not prepared to take an initiative to achieve peace. This line of argument will only make it easier for the Argentines to evade the onus for the diplomatic impasse, not to mention harder for you to sustain international support. A final concern is that our decision clearly and fully to support you requires that we defend your actions in the face of an increasingly hostile hemispheric reaction. We will both need to do all we can to conserve support.

It therefore seems to us that this is the best moment to show concretely that you are exhausting the possibilities for a settlement, and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> April 29. See Document 190.

indeed, perhaps the last clear opportunity for an actual breakthrough, if our forecast of Argentine reactions to further military reverses is true. We would like to offer a suggestion in this spirit.

We suggest that the United States and Peru make a further peace proposal to the parties, stipulating that they have forty-eight hours in which to accept or reject it, with it understood that no response constitutes rejection. This period could begin at noon Washington time Wednesday.<sup>3</sup>

To maximize the pressure on the Argentines to accept a fair proposal, and to deal with the political problems I outlined above, we suggest that Her Majesty's Government announce, at the time of presentation of the proposal by the United States and Peru, that British forces will take no offensive action during the forty-eight hour period, provided the Argentines show corresponding restraint. I have enclosed a suggested statement that reflects our best sense of how this offer might be cast so as to avoid any potential for Argentine humiliation and therefore rejection.<sup>4</sup> The choice of the Wednesday noon starting point would give you time to verify that the Argentines give the appropriate orders.

You would obviously want to enter such a period knowing that you would not bear the blame if it failed to produce results. The proposal we would make is enclosed.<sup>5</sup> It reflects our recent discussions, and we believe it ought to be acceptable to you. If you agree to this approach, I am confident we can get Peruvian agreement to co-sponsor the proposal.

Unless there is an arrangement for suspending military action for a brief, fixed period of intensive diplomatic effort, I am afraid that the Argentines and others will succeed in blaming failure to achieve a political settlement on your military actions. Conversely, if there is a UK initiative of the sort I have suggested to accompany a new proposal, you will have shored up your international support and, if it succeeds, established a basis for an acceptable settlement. Having given the Argentines temporary relief from hostilities so that they could consider the new proposal, and being in a position to accept it yourselves,

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<sup>3</sup> May 5.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed, the text of the proposed statement reads: "British forces would be ordered to refrain from offensive action in the general area for a 48-hour period commencing at 1600 GMT Wednesday, May 5, provided that Argentine naval and air forces would be willing to stand clear of the islands by at least 200 nautical miles, would not take threatening action against British forces elsewhere, and would not resupply units on the islands during this period. Should agreement not be reached by the end of the 48-hour period, existing rules of engagement would be re-established."

<sup>5</sup> The seven-point peace proposal is attached but not printed.

it would be clear that you have done everything possible to avert further conflict.

We are convinced that an initiative along these lines is what it will take to open up the possibility for a peaceful solution.<sup>6</sup>

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On this new set of proposals, Henderson later wrote that “the Americans were not at all deterred by the sinking [of the *General Belgrano*] from pursuing their attempts at a diplomatic solution. Haig sent Enders, the Under-Secretary at the State Department dealing with Latin America [*sic*], round to see me to discuss amendments to the Peruvian plan. This was followed by a lengthy session I had with Haig after which he put fresh proposals to London and Buenos Aires.” (Henderson, *Mandarin*, p. 456) A British record of Henderson’s May 3 meeting with Haig is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

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### 213. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1982

#### SUBJECT

UK Requests for Military Support

I approved on May 3 the British request for the expedited sale of the following US military equipment:

—*One Phalanx weapons system*,<sup>2</sup> with support, spares and ammunition: \$15.8 million (no Congressional notification required as MDE portion of sale is \$9.4 million).

Delivery will take place by *May 10*.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by J.M. Gibney (PM/SAS); cleared by Ogden and Brown.

<sup>2</sup> Burt drew an asterisk after this word, which corresponds to the following handwritten note at the bottom of the memorandum: “Larry: This is a shipborne, rapid-firing gun for air defense. RB.”

**214. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1982

SUBJECT

Delivery of Civilian Helicopters to Argentina

Customs informed us today that a Hughes 500–D helicopter was on the dock in Los Angeles awaiting shipment to Buenos Aires where the acknowledged end-user would be the Argentine Air Force. Three engine spares also may be involved.

The 500–D is an unarmed civilian helicopter comparable to the Army’s Cobra attack helicopter. The 500–D, however, does not require either a munitions control or a Commerce Department export license.

I have contacted the Commerce Department which has agreed to hold up shipment on the pretext of clarifying whether the helicopter in question is a model 500–D or a model 500–MD (which would require an export license).

I think we have plugged the dike on this one, but it obviously was a close call. We probably will not be so lucky in the future, and we should expect to experience some leakage in our “arms” embargo to Argentina.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Kanter.

**215. Telegram From the Mission to United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 3, 1982, 2319Z

1214. Subject: (U) Falklands Crisis: Ambassador Kirkpatrick Confers With UN Sec Gen and Security Council President.

1. Secret–Entire text.

1. Ambassador Kirkpatrick met with SYG and President of SC, PRC PermRep Ling Qing, May 3, to consult about Falklands crisis. Meeting was held at request of Ling Qing and SYG who have been consulting SC members in groups and individually.

2. Meeting began with announcement by SYG that Argentine cruiser, Belgrano, had sunk with as many as 500 men on board. On this most somber note, SYG said that his efforts to assist in the peaceful resolution of the conflict would be made much more difficult. Equally, the urgency of the UN's task had been greatly increased by the Belgrano developments and the US decision to support the UK. These greatly increased the urgency of a UN mediating role.

3. Specifically referring to his consultations with Pym and Roca in the past 48 hours, de Cuellar said he had developed some proposals, so far procedural, repeat procedural, only, which he had presented to the parties which they were now considering; he expected answers by May 5.<sup>2</sup>

4. De Cuellar and Ling Qing solicited US views as to possible SC actions. Ambassador Kirkpatrick replied that US would welcome appropriate UN initiative. The conflict in the South Atlantic was dangerous. In an interdependent and volatile world, the danger that the conflict could spread must be taken most seriously, and the UN had been created to deal with such problems.

5. Ambassador Kirkpatrick agreed that effort now focusing on procedural aspects of a solution was the correct starting point. This was wise and correct. She thought it was necessary that the President of the Council and the SYG work aggressively at finding a way towards stopping the conflict. While there was a need to push ahead, it was perhaps better not to call an SC meeting immediately. Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820231–0500. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London.

<sup>2</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar began meeting separately with the two sides on May 2, proposing measures that included simultaneous force withdrawal and negotiations toward a diplomatic solution. He continued to meet with both parties until May 21. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1328)

Kirkpatrick concluded by stating strongly that the SYG could count on strong US support for his efforts.

6. Footnote: While the consultations were chaired by SC President, it is perhaps noteworthy that he appeared to be working very closely with the SYG. During the conversation, the SYG usually took the lead.

Kirkpatrick

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**216. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé), the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DeLauer) and the Directors of Defense Agencies<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1982

SUBJECT

Materiel Support to the UK (U)

(S) The following procedure should be followed in processing British requests for support related to Falkland Island operations:

—As is normally the case, specific requests will be sent by the British to the appropriate Service and processed in accordance with current laws and procedures. The British will use the words “UK Op Corporate” to identify Falkland support requests. The Services will process these on an expedited basis. Requests that cannot be referred to a specific Service or that fall outside of current procedures will be sent to OASD/ISP (Dr. Zakheim/3D777/697-0209).

—At the same time the requests are forwarded to the appropriate Service, copies will be provided by the British to OASD/ISP (Lt Col Walker/3D777/697-0209), the OJCS (Col Brudvig/2C867/697-2656)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218-92-0030, 820 United Kingdom Mar 81–17 Jun 82. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Haig. Attached to another copy of the memorandum is an undated covering memorandum from Iklé to Weinberger stating that the procedures were worked out with representatives of the British Embassy, the Department of State, the OJCS, and OSD. A stamped notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on May 4. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0004, UK (May) 1982) Weinberger was in Brussels for a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee.



and State/PM (Mr. Ogden/Rm 7419/632-3882). These offices will be the focal points for their organizations in tracking support requests and preparing integrated lists, which will be handled on a close-hold, need-to-know basis.<sup>2</sup> Any exceptions taken by these organizations to specific requests should be immediately forwarded to Lt Col Walker.

—Services will notify the above points of contact when actions are completed.

—By COB each day, OUSD/P will provide to me a summary of requests received that day, noting any exceptions made and corresponding policy recommendations.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the daily report will list completed actions and those still outstanding.

**Frank Carlucci**

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<sup>2</sup> Burt informed Eagleburger of the agreed arrangements in a May 3 memorandum, adding: "The British will continue to make sensitive requests through the high-level channels they have been using thus far." (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1])

<sup>3</sup> See Document 241.

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## **217. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, May 4, 1982, 1916Z

2785. Subject: Sinking of the *Belgrano*: Alleged U.S. Role.

1. (C–Entire text.)

2. We continue to make no headway in our efforts to put at rest the story that the U.S. provided satellite intelligence which permitted the British to locate and sink the "*Belgrano*." Army Chief of Staff Vaquero sent me word this morning that the Argentines have "concrete proof" that such was the case. Has Mallea Gil been briefed on this issue?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820233–0368. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Attached to another copy of the telegram is a May 4 note from Poindexter to Howe that reads: "Anything you can do to stop discussion of intelligence would be appreciated." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982))

3. Telam, the government wire service here, is carrying a story quoting an unnamed informant in the Pentagon to the effect that the U.S. has “at least one spy satellite” in the South Atlantic and that a great part of the information which it obtains is transmitted to the U.K.

4. Another of our problems is created by the NOAA satellite photographs of the weather over the Falklands which are appearing in the local press. The distinction between weather satellites and those used to obtain military information is not one likely to be grasped very easily by the Argentine public.

5. The press here has also picked up a purported statement by Secretary Weinberger that we would provide the U.K. with every kind of support, including logistical, material and information. This last is taken as confirmation of the allegation.

Shlaudeman

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**218. Memorandum From James M. Rentschler, Dennis C. Blair,  
and Roger W. Fontaine of the National Security Council  
Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1982

SUBJECT

The Falkland Islands: What Now?

*Situation*

The sinking of the Belgrano brings the South Atlantic conflict to an alarmingly new and perhaps desperate stage, one which throws into sharper relief the negative strategic factors which the U.S. will increasingly confront as the hostilities persist. We are in a situation where only an act of sanity may now save not only the belligerents from further loss, but larger U.S. strategic interests as well.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/28/1982–05/04/1982). No classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it.

With this in mind, your own private “Falklands Task Force” provides a rundown of judgments we consider relevant and outlines what we consider to be the necessary act of sanity (which really depends on the U.K., by far the saner of the two disputants at this point). In brief, we feel the moment has been reached in this conflict when the Brits can declare victory on the military level and demonstrate some magnanimity with a political offer designed to stave off an Argentine Götterdämmerung (in which we would all substantially suffer). Urgency is now *the* issue: as this goes to press the wires are reporting another Vulcan attack on Port Stanley. . . .<sup>2</sup>

#### *Key Judgments*

—Contrary to British hopes, tightening the screws on Argentina will *not* make them more amenable to negotiations. On the contrary, Galtieri is a high-stakes gambler who will keep putting chips on the table as long as he has them, hoping for the lucky strike to bail him out;

—What is true of Galtieri is probably also true of anyone who succeeds him (with the possible exception of Orfila, who might favor a diplomatic route but whose margin of maneuver would be tightly constrained by the military).

—Continuation of the British blockade with sporadic military action will result in a grave setback to all our policies in this hemisphere as Latin American positions harden, while tying the Royal Navy down 8,000 miles away from its NATO responsibilities.

—Now that we have come down on the British side, our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher is greatly increased; we are a *de facto* partner in the enterprise and can use that position to push our own interests in ways denied to us in our previous “honest broker” role.

#### *Proposal*

—That the United States initiate another peace offer, this time through the OAS. The offer would link ultimate Argentine sovereignty after a reasonable protracted period (say, 20 years) with immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops and a third country or mixed administration during the transition between now and then.

#### *Rationale*

—To the U.K., the plan offers a chance to escape from having to defend the Falklands forever, should the Brits succeed in retaking them.

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<sup>2</sup> A May 4 intelligence memorandum for the record reported the May 4 British air attack on the Port Stanley airport was conducted by one Vulcan bomber in order to make the airport “unusable for light transport and communications aircraft from the Argentine mainland.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

The 20-year grade period will allow the Falklanders sufficient time to make up their minds to become Argentinian or emigrate, or otherwise take advantage of whatever resources and options the Brits can put at their disposal during the period in question—a kind of qualified self-determination (the Brits must—and probably do understand that the desires of 1800 shepherders cannot eternally dictate the larger strategic interests of the United Kingdom, let alone the United States). Part of the agreement could also be a bill of rights for the Falklanders.

—To Argentina, the plan offers a way to realize its core objective of ultimate sovereignty. It will not have the sovereignty by the end of 1982, as it had wished, but that is the price it pays for losing a war Argentina itself precipitated. [If] Galtieri (or a successor regime) is implored to accept this plan by a unanimous resolution of the OAS, it will have a face-saving way to do so.

#### *Implementation*

—We need to clear this plan with the Brits first. It should be done by private message to Mrs. Thatcher—we do not need more shuttle diplomacy now.

—We then need to send a message from the President to Galtieri once it looks as if the plan is gaining momentum.

#### *RECOMMENDATION:*

That you discuss the above outline with Secretary Haig, with a view toward gearing the diplomatic machinery in that direction.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Clark neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

**219. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 4, 1982, 2036Z

Dear Ron,

Francis Pym has told me about the very useful talks he had with Al Haig about the Falkland Islands during his visit to Washington on Sunday.<sup>2</sup> We are all tremendously heartened by the way you have come out in our support.

As I see it, the main lines of our strategy remain fully appropriate in this new stage of the crisis. We should continue to build up the diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Argentina to put an end to its unlawful military occupation and, thereafter, to negotiate with us in good faith about the long term future of the islands.

On the diplomatic front, I can assure you that we remain committed to the search for a negotiated solution which accords with the principles which our two countries have defended for so long. We are looking urgently today at Al Haig's latest ideas.

In the military field, let me emphasise how much we appreciate your generous offer of material support for our forces. This will be of the greatest value to us, and our people will be in touch with yours to follow up in detail Francis Pym's more general discussions with Al Haig and Cap Weinberger.<sup>3</sup>

I am sure that, without effective military pressure, the Argentine leaders will not be brought to implement Security Council Resolution 502. But, with so many young lives at risk—British and Argentine—I feel that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. That is why I attach so much importance also to the economic pressure which we and other friendly countries are bringing to bear.

The measures you have announced, suspending supplies of military equipment and denying new export credit guarantees, will show the Argentines that you are in earnest.<sup>4</sup> I hope that the measures on military supplies will enable your people to prevent the export of any equipment which might be used for military purposes. I would like to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret. Sent in a telegram to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> May 2. See Document 205.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 196.

urge you also to go further and to impose a complete ban on imports to the United States from Argentina.

I have no doubt that this would greatly strengthen the pressures on Argentina to agree to a peaceful solution. Your own action would not only be of great value in itself, but would encourage our Community and Commonwealth partners to maintain their own bans and induce others—in particular the Japanese—to follow suit. Whatever the difficulties, I feel sure that it is in our economic as well as our political interests to resolve this conflict as quickly as possible; and the early announcement of U.S. measures against imports will have more impact than a more gradual building up of economic pressure. Francis Pym will be seeing his European colleagues over this weekend, and it would be a great help to us if he could tell them that this is a step which you intend to take.

Finally, let me thank you once again for your splendid support. It will make all the difference.

With warmest regards

Margaret

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**220. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 4, 1982

*Begins:*

I found our discussions in Washington<sup>2</sup> very useful and am grateful for the continuing efforts you are making to promote a peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.

I have discussed with the Prime Minister and other colleagues the ideas you put to Nicko Henderson last night.<sup>3</sup> I am conscious, like you, of the value of simplicity in any new diplomatic initiative. If further

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. UK Secret. Henderson sent the message to Haig under a May 4 covering note. The message was included as part of a set of briefing materials prepared for the May 5 NSPG meeting. Bremer sent these materials to Haig under a May 5 covering note. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 212.

conflict is to be avoided and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag on. At the same time, we cannot accept a ceasefire on the basis of an agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina could accept the proposal, and thus escape military pressure, and then play for time in negotiations and prolong the occupation.

I attach a somewhat expanded version of your points, which takes account of this consideration. Because the provisions on withdrawal and the involvement of third parties in the interim period are expressed more fully, we have omitted your sixth point giving a role to the contact group in negotiations to carry out the interim agreement. We have also gone back to a contact group composed of only Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, which is the list given by Peru to our Ambassador on 3 May. I take it that the United States and Peru would approach Brazil and the FRG about their participation. In our view the group should work by consensus and have US or rotating chairmanship. We have also provided a version of the final point which takes account of the plain fact that it might prove impossible to reach agreement on the future of the Falkland Islands by 30 April 1983.

If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am enclosing, the British Government would immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ unless directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft but that we would revert to earlier rules of engagement if Argentina failed to accept your proposals within 48 hours. We would need from you an advance assurance that Argentina at the same time would announce that the same orders had been issued to her forces and that her ships and aircraft would not be present in the TEZ in the 48 hour period.

As you know it is essential for the British Government that there should be a United States guarantee of the security of the Falkland Islands. It would need to last from the 7th day after the signature of an interim agreement until the implementation of a definitive agreement about the future status of the Islands, and perhaps beyond. For this to deter Argentina, the government in Buenos Aires must be in no doubt of the guarantee. That suggests that it might take the form of a public statement by the US Administration at the time when the interim agreement entered into force.

Subject to your very early comments I would like out of courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President.

*Ends.*

## **Attachment**

### **Draft Proposal Prepared By the British Government<sup>4</sup>**

London, undated

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:
2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:
  - (a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area.
  - (b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland.
  - (c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.
3. The immediate introduction of a contact group composed of Brazil, Peru, The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the group's tasks being:
  - (a) To verify the withdrawal.
  - (b) To ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.
4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.
5. The two governments agree that the views of the Islanders must be determined, and that their interests and wishes must be respected in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands.
6. The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this.

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<sup>4</sup> UK Secret.



**221. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982, 0204Z

Dear Margaret:

The decisions I made last Friday<sup>2</sup> were aimed at putting you in the strongest possible position to achieve a peaceful settlement in line with the basic principles and values to which we are both committed. I believe there is now a chance to realize that aim, and that we must seize it before more lives are lost.

Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires.<sup>3</sup> I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis.<sup>4</sup> Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect.

I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by US and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope.

Sincerely,

**Ron**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret. Sent in telegram WH02767 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it. A handwritten notation in an unknown hand reads: "Sent out at midnight."

<sup>2</sup> April 30. See Documents 195 and 196.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 222.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 220. An unknown hand circled the word "not."

**222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982, 0606Z

121030. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Letter to Francis Pym.

1. Please deliver at opening of business Wednesday<sup>2</sup> the following message from me to Francis Pym:

Dear Francis:

I appreciate the efforts your government has made to react quickly to the suggestion we made.<sup>3</sup> But I must tell you with a candor possible only between closest allies that the ideas you have conveyed can lead to only one outcome: Argentine rejection and therefore resumption of hostilities after the forty-eight-hour period, with the prospects for eventual settlement having been damaged in the process. Beyond that, we have no reason to believe that the Peruvian Government would associate itself with your proposal. Indeed, our assessment is that even presenting it to them would drive Peru to a more pro-Argentine posture.

Tragic as recent events have been, I believe we now have an opportunity to achieve an agreement which is consistent with our shared principles and impossible to construe as a success for the aggressor. Your willingness to offer a 48-hour pause makes that opportunity all the more real. We may not have another such chance before many more lives have been lost—if then.

I am sending you a revised version of the seven points which attempts to take more of your concerns into account. As Nicko will explain, it includes our best effort to meet your concerns about a security guarantee. I will not deny that it is closer to the ideas we sent you<sup>4</sup> than to those you sent us. The most important difference between your ideas and ours is not that ours abandon principle and reward aggression, for they do not, but rather that ours have a reasonable chance of acceptance provided the Argentines are now of a mind to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the White House. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Gompert; cleared by Bremer and Stern; approved by Haig. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>2</sup> May 5.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 220.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 212.

show greater flexibility. While I remain doubtful that they would accept ours, I am certain they will reject yours.

In particular:

—The arrangements for withdrawal of forces do not provide for the parity that was embodied in the plan we discussed when you were in Washington a week or so ago.<sup>5</sup>

—The explicit reference to quote restored administration unquote is both unnecessary and, in and of itself, enough to guarantee rejection.

—The formulation on self-determination would be no less difficult for the Argentines to accept than it would be for you—or us—to accept a flat assurance of eventual Argentine sovereignty.

—The commitment only to make every possible effort to reach a definitive settlement would be read in Buenos Aires as a recipe for stalemate, even though I do not doubt for one minute that HMG would negotiate in good faith. I also attach a proposed timetable for moving this initiative forward which I discussed with Nicko.<sup>6</sup> I hardly need to say that we have left no doubt about where we stand: the Argentines committed aggression; they have been inflexible in negotiations; and the US supports the UK, explicitly and concretely. We have never contemplated asking you to agree to anything that would undermine the rule of law, weaken our relationship, or be seen as less than a success for your country and your government. It is in this spirit that I must tell you that we are prepared to proceed on the basis of the revised version I am sending to you, but could not associate ourselves with your version.

Recognizing the burden it places on you, may I ask that you give me an indication as quickly as possible as to whether you would like us to proceed.

Sincerely, Al

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>6</sup> After he had received Pym's May 4 message (see Document 220) as well as the news about the May 4 sinking of the British destroyer HMS *Sheffield* by Argentine aircraft (see Document 224), Haig met with Henderson at the Department on the evening of May 4 to discuss the U.S.-Peruvian proposals. No U.S. record of this meeting has been found, although Henderson's telegraphed report of the meeting is published on the Thatcher Foundation website. In his published diary, Henderson described the meeting as a "tense" three-hour session in which Haig "implored" him to accept the seven-point plan. Haig, Henderson wrote, "torpedoed our proposals as being quite unnegotiable with either the Peruvians or Argentinians. I had to tell him once again how strongly Mrs Thatcher felt on some of the issues, e.g., respect for the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands and the restoration of the previous administration. Al said that if we were seen to be missing the chance for peace we would lose much US and world sympathy." "Al was in a very nervous state, barking at anyone who entered the room. He allowed Enders to join us; Enders was practical in suggesting language that might bridge the gap. Al kept insisting that it was not a question of language but of principle." (Henderson, *Mandarin*, pp. 456–457)

Attachment 1: Text of proposal.

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:
2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces, according to a schedule to be established by the contact group.
3. The immediate introduction of a contact group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement. The contact group will assume responsibility for:
  - (A) Verification of the withdrawal;
  - (B) Ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the local administration, which would contravene this interim agreement; and
  - (C) Ensuring that all other provisions of the agreement are respected.
4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.
5. The two governments acknowledge that the aspirations and interests of the Islanders will be included in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands.

6. The contact group will have responsibility for ensuring that the two governments reach a definitive agreement prior to April 30, 1983.

Attachment 2: Proposed timetable.

May 5—1200 EDT—London to reply to Washington. US transmits the proposal to Lima and requests an answer not later than May 6 at 1200 EDT.

May 6—1200 EDT—US and Peru transmit the single text to London and BA. On receipt, London announces that it will order a cease fire beginning May 7 at 1200 EDT provided Argentina accepts this procedure, takes similar action and notifies Peru and the US it will do so.

May 7—1200 EDT—Cease fire begins.

May 8—1200 EDT—Both parties must have replied accepting the proposals. If not, each party is free to revert to earlier rules of engagement.

**Haig**

**223. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 5, 1982, 1259Z

9849. Subj: Falklands Dispute: The Turning Point for Britain?

1. S—Entire text.

2. With the sinking of the Sheffield,<sup>2</sup> Thatcher may be approaching the limit of the human losses she can take without losing considerable domestic support and, after the sinking of the Belgrano,<sup>3</sup> she may be at the limit of the casualties she can inflict and hope to maintain international backing.

3. That is not to say that Argentine losses will not count against her here too. There is considerable uneasiness and some distress about the Belgrano. But British losses are what will turn the tide.

4. Labor is shifting—but we don't yet know how far. We were told that a petition calling for an immediate truce and U.N. negotiation had over seventy signatures, including some of non-doves, by mid-morning May 5. But we understand the Trade Union Congress does not plan any immediate declaration. The Labor Shadow Cabinet is meeting at noon. Balancing conflicting pressures within the party, Michael Foot has supported sending the fleet only to back up diplomacy, and last week he was distancing himself from the use of force. Speculation that Thatcher would use a Falklands triumph for electoral gain has been rife among Labor. And that party will not hesitate to use a Falklands failure against the Conservatives.

5. For the moment, Conservative ranks are holding—according to our quick soundings. The word is that Britain has been brought back to earth after the euphoria of South Georgia; that Britain must expect to take losses; and that the fleet will hang in. But our contacts are uneasy.

6. Thatcher rode the crisis to new political heights through last weekend. But now, as she surveys the domestic and military battle, the choices become harder. Even a quick “victory” in taking the Falklands will probably entail losses, and may leave Britain saddled with Islands to protect against continued Argentine pressure.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820234–0977. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to NATO Collective, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Caracas, Santiago, Brasilia, Moscow, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 224.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 208.

7. However she plays it from here, she is likely to have peaked. And she may face growing problems if she does not show that she has an end-game plan in mind.

8. As we have said repeatedly, Thatcher's determination and toughness should not be underestimated. For a pragmatic politician the choice now might be to back off. But Thatcher is not always pragmatic. And if she can keep her own ranks in line, she can beat back any challenge in Parliament.

9. But she may be ready in the face of the last two days' developments to look seriously for a way out.<sup>4</sup> Thatcher and Britain were aware of the risks, but the reality of war, as always, is different from expectations. The new mood here may leave her grasping for a way to prove peaceable intent in the face of British deaths and pressures from other allies.

**Streator**

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<sup>4</sup> Citing a "well-informed" FCO source, Streator reported that following a meeting of the War Cabinet on the morning of May 5, "things are 'moving in the right direction' for a positive response to the Secretary's Falklands proposals by late this afternoon, accepting them 'without amendment.'" (Telegram 9848 from London, May 5; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982))

**224. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations,  
National Military Command Center (Hekman) to the  
Director of Operations, Joint Staff (Gast)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982, 0930 EDT

SUBJECT

Sinking of British Destroyer—SHEFFIELD

REFERENCE

Memorandum for J–30, 050109 EDT May 1982<sup>2</sup>

1. (U) This memorandum contains updated information not contained in the original memorandum.

2. (U) At 041020 EDT May 1982, the British destroyer HMS SHEFFIELD received a direct hit by an Exocet missile, was set ablaze and subsequently sunk. Reports indicate that two AM–39 air launched Exocet Missiles were fired with one direct hit in the control room area, on the SHEFFIELD. As many as 30 British sailors of the 270 man crew were reportedly killed. The remainder of the crew were picked up by other UK ships in the area after they abandoned ship. The attack on the SHEFFIELD occurred in an area to the southeast of the Falkland Islands, at about 52415/5741 W.

3. (U) The Exocet missile that hit the SHEFFIELD was apparently launched from an Argentine French-built Super Etendard fighter-bomber from a point outside 20 miles. The Super Etendard is designed as a carrier based aircraft with an estimated operating range of 400 NM. The aircraft has in-flight refueling capability and can be refueled from a tanker-configured A–4 as well as the KC–135. Fourteen of these aircraft were ordered by Argentina from France in late 1979.

4. (S) Some analysts believe the Etendard may have been operating from the Argentine aircraft carrier 25 DE MAYO when it engaged the SHEFFIELD. This would have required in-flight refueling. Another possibility is the aircraft originated from NAS Rio Grande, on the Island of Tierro Del Fuego. SHEFFIELD was within the extreme unrefueled range of the aircraft if originating from NAS Rio Grande.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret. Carlucci initialed at the top of the memorandum; a stamped notation indicates that he saw it on May 5.

<sup>2</sup> The referenced memorandum provides a less detailed report of the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*, based upon earlier information, and is *ibid*.

5. (S) The Exocet Missile is a 1450 pound weapon with a high-explosive war head. It is a sea-skimmer which is designed to fly about 10 feet above the surface of the ocean. It is believed to have a maximum operating range of about 42 miles. The missile uses a radar altimeter and a radar guidance device for homing in on its target in final stages of flight. It must be guided by the launch aircraft in all but the terminal phase.

6. (S) SHEFFIELD's position indicates she was probably in a forward air defense picket station ahead of the British Task Force. SHEFFIELD carried the SEA DART anti-air missile system with a range of 20 miles (15 miles effective range). She carried radar equipment capable of detecting the attacking aircraft well outside of her own self-defense radius but was not capable of reaching the aircraft with on board weapons systems if the aircraft remained outside 20 NM. SHEFFIELD sensors could also have theoretically detected the incoming missile, however, considering the weather and sea state conditions existing at the time, such detection is doubtful. SHEFFIELD's missile guidance Radar jamming capabilities are not known at this writing but are being researched.

**P.M. Hekman, Jr**

*Rear Admiral, USN*

*Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC*



**225. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the National Security Planning Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982, 9:45 a.m.

## SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on the Falkland Islands, 9:45 a.m., 5 May 1982

1. Present at the meeting: Counselor to the President Meese, Judge Clark, Secretary of State Haig, Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Chief of Naval Operations Hayward, and the undersigned.

2. The meeting opened with a CIA briefing on the status of the military situation/disposition of naval forces and the domestic scene in both the UK and Argentina on the issue. Noted that the Sheffield was struck 60 miles off the Falkland Islands, well within the exclusion zone while the Belgrano, the Argentine cruiser, was sunk 26 miles outside of the zone.<sup>2</sup> At the conclusion of my briefing I suggested that our analysts were becoming somewhat concerned that if the situation worsened the relationship with the United States and Latin American nations will deteriorate and may never return to the status quo antebellum. Further, that with the Argentines looking about for help, they may gravitate towards the Soviets, offering the Soviets opportunities they would not have otherwise. While the political philosophies of Argentina and the Soviet Union certainly differ, special arrangements might be made which would be beneficial to the Soviets, and to the detriment of the U.S. Both Carlucci and Secretary Haig agreed.

3. The Secretary then spoke of the negotiating efforts that he has underway. He pointed out that Prime Minister Thatcher was holding to a very hard position—that the Argentines must totally surrender the Falklands. Secretary Haig sent to the Prime Minister a very strong and steely memorandum which might promote some conciliation towards peace.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary urged that the British agree to a ceasefire effective at noon on 7 May which would be followed by a troop withdrawal from the Falklands by the Argentines and the return of the British ships to England. A “contact group” composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany and the United States would then move into the area and establish a government with the locals. The contact group would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982), Box 7, Folder 180: NSPG Meeting re: Falkland Islands Situation. Secret. Drafted by McMahon on May 6. Copies were sent to Casey, Inman, and [name not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 208 and 224.

<sup>3</sup> Likely a reference to Haig’s May 5 message to Pym. See Document 222.

then try to negotiate a settlement by 30 April 1983. The Secretary was waiting for the British reply and if favorable he would then forward the proposal to the Argentines through Cuellar in Peru to seek Argentine agreement.

4. There was some discussion whether or not there should be any publicity on this effort. [*2½ lines not declassified*] It was suggested that DoD advise the British counterparts not to come forward with a request at this time and that Secretary Haig, through his channels, would ask the British not to ask us because we wanted to be in a position of saying we were not asked.

**John N. McMahon**  
*Executive Director*

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**226. Memorandum From Norman A. Bailey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis

Considering the immense damage we have already suffered from the Falklands crisis and the likelihood of continuing damage in the future to our relations not only with Argentina but with Latin America in general, I believe the time has come now that we have stated our position and the British have demonstrated their military capacity to urge the British to declare a cease-fire, to declare that the question of eventual sovereignty over the islands is one to be negotiated and that although the wishes of the islanders will be taken into consideration, they will not be controlling with reference to the final settlement.

Roger Fontaine concurs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (05/05/1982–05/20/1982). Secret. Sent for action.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you urge this course of action on Secretary Haig.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Under this recommendation, Clark wrote: “not for now. WPC.”

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**227. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 5, 1982

*Begins:*

As you will realise, the proposals for an interim agreement on the Falkland Islands crisis, which you gave to Nicko Henderson last night,<sup>2</sup> still fall short of the sort of agreement which the British Government would like to see, and would not be easy after all that has passed for us to defend publicly. The Cabinet has however considered your proposals against the background of all the issues involved and, because we share your strong desire to reach a negotiated settlement and to avoid further bloodshed, is prepared to accept the proposals as a basis for proceeding, subject to the following points.

The first point is that the proposals should be headed “Draft Interim Agreement on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas”. This makes clear the scope of the agreement. The second change is to insert “all” before “forces” in point 2, so as to make clear that Argentina cannot leave any forces in the Falkland Islands. The third change concerns point 3(B). We would like this to be amended to say “administering the government of the Falkland Islands in the interim period in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands and ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands which would concentrate<sup>3</sup> this interim agreement, and”.

These are the only points which we want to make on the draft agreement itself. But there is an important practical point concerning

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. UK Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 222 and footnote 5 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand crossed out the word “concentrate” and substituted “contravene” above it.

the timetable for implementation of the agreement, which you also put to Nicko. There must be a specific moment of time when both parties state formally in writing to the US and Peruvian governments that they accept the agreement. The ceasefire can only take place after that moment, given Argentina's unreliability and record in this crisis. Instructions for a ceasefire should be issued immediately after that moment, to come into effect as soon as both parties could guarantee compliance by their forces. For our part, we could accept an interval of 24 hours provided that Argentina could also undertake to abide by that. If you found it possible to shorten the timetable before an agreement is concluded in writing, we could support that.

You told Nicko last night that in your view the third point in the draft agreement incorporates a guarantee on the part of the United States of the non-reintroduction of Argentine forces into the Falkland Islands pending a definitive settlement. I should be most grateful if you could agree to send me a side letter to this effect, if and when the interim agreement is concluded. I suggest also that the need to deter Argentine re-invasion requires that the US should inform Argentina that such a letter has been sent.

I hope very much that Peru and Argentina will accept the proposals on the basis I have set out. Because of the danger that the Argentine response may be equivocal, like last time, the Cabinet feel strongly that (once you have got the Peruvians on board) Buenos Aires should be asked to signify acceptance by a precise and early deadline. If they fail to do so, or give any reply other than unqualified acceptance, they would be taken to have rejected the proposals and there would be no ceasefire.

Thank you again for all you are doing to end the present crisis.  
*Ends.*

**228. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Fischer) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982

SUBJECT

In Falklands Dispute, Americans Much More Sympathetic to Britain, But Overwhelmingly Favor Neutrality

Listening to the war of words between Argentina and Great Britain, Americans respond sympathetically to the British argument for self-determination by the Falkland Islanders, but not to the Argentine argument against British colonialism. Moreover, Americans react much more sympathetically to Britain's self-justification that it is repelling aggression than to Argentina's self-justification that the British have dragged their feet in negotiations.

All in all, *a far larger proportion of the American public is sympathetic to the British than to the Argentines (60% vs 19%). Hispanics are also more pro-British than pro-Argentine (56% vs 27%). The overwhelming preference, however, is that the U.S. remain neutral in the war (83%), rather than help Britain (favored by 12%) or Argentina (favored by a mere 1%).*

The public's predominantly pro-British sentiment probably disposes it to support Britain diplomatically and economically, but certainly not militarily.

These findings come from a Harris poll conducted April 16–22. Additional details about the poll are attached.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1768. No classification marking. Drafted by Roshco and A. Richman (PA/OAP) on May 4. Haig initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

**229. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982

SUBJECT

Brazilian President's Reply to President Reagan's Letter on the Falkland/Malvinas Crisis

*President Figueiredo's reply* (copy attached)<sup>2</sup> to President Reagan's letter<sup>3</sup> has just been delivered by the Brazilian Embassy. It is *stiffly worded but avoids substance except to state Figueiredo's apprehension over our decision to apply sanctions*. In implied contrast, the letter also describes the positions taken by Brazil as being guided by the objective of maintaining the capacity for dialogue and favoring peace efforts.

The operative part of the letter advises that *Figueiredo wants to cut short his state visit next week and to have it take on a more businesslike tone*. In practical terms *that means conducting program activities in one day* and canceling his return reception, his luncheon and speech at the OAS, and other incidental social functions. However, he will attend the state dinner at the White House.

Although *Figueiredo's letter states a desire to focus his discussions on the Falkland/Malvinas problem*, the Brazilian Embassy asserts continuing strong Brazilian interest in covering the many other items on the agenda.

Our *initial reaction* is that the *tone of the letter and the curtailment of the visit are primarily for the consumption of the Argentines and other Latins*. In fact, it would appear that Figueiredo is preserving in his now abbreviated schedule at least one free day, but in Cleveland rather than in Washington.

Our understanding from the Brazilian Embassy is that the changes will not affect the White House portion of the schedule and should present no major problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1766. Drafted by Kilday on May 4. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote "Wow!" in the top right-hand corner. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. Under a May 5 covering memorandum, Bremer sent Clark an unofficial Department of State translation of Figueiredo's May 4 letter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890006–2306)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 204.

**230. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 5, 1982, 2030Z

Dear Ron,

My Cabinet colleagues and I spent some four hours earlier today considering Al Haig's latest proposals.<sup>2</sup> Francis Pym has replied on our behalf,<sup>3</sup> but I am writing to you separately because I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say.

Throughout my administration I have tried to stay loyal to the United States as our great ally, and to the principles of democracy, liberty and justice for which both our countries stand.

In your message you say that your suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect.<sup>4</sup> But the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles, and I fear deeply that if a settlement based on your suggestions is eventually achieved, we shall find that in the process of negotiation democracy and freedom for the Falkland Islanders will have been compromised.

Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked you earlier that it should be included explicitly.

Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposals a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask—and I do not think that you will turn it down.

I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between the United States and Britain matters very much to the future of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret. Sent in a telegram from the Cabinet Office to the White House via Cabinet Office channels. In her memoirs, Thatcher wrote that her initial draft of this message "revealed perhaps too much of my frustration." She also indicated that she "toned it down before it was sent." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 217)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 222.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 227.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 221.

free world. That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe.

Warm personal regards

Margaret

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**231. Note From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1982

SUBJECT

PM Thatcher's Reply on your Falklands Demarche

Mr President,

Attached is Prime Minister Thatcher's reply<sup>2</sup> to your compromise proposal<sup>3</sup> to achieve a ceasefire and negotiations for the resolution of the Falklands dispute. In a word, Maggie accepts the proposal. She refers, however, to the need to strengthen guarantees of the right of self-determination for the inhabitants.

Foreign Minister Pym has sent Al a parallel message<sup>4</sup> which creates other problems however, with respect to the terms of the ceasefire. Al called Ambassador Henderson in<sup>5</sup> and after further refinement, has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 05/13/1982–06/04/1982. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached. For Thatcher's May 5 message to Reagan, see Document 230.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 221.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 227.

<sup>5</sup> No U.S. record of this meeting has been found. However, a British record of the meeting as sent by Henderson to London is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.



achieved an agreed text which has a chance of being accepted in Buenos Aires. AI has gone ahead to send it to the Peruvians.<sup>6</sup>

The Argentine response is uncertain. They see Thatcher's position eroding somewhat at home. They also see some opportunity for grandstanding among their third world brothers at the UN. Still they have fewer illusions about the ultimate military outcome.

The Peruvians will either opt to send the new text to the Argentines unilaterally or jointly with us. As we receive further word, we will keep you advised.

**Bill**

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 121841 to Lima, May 5, transmitted the English and Spanish-language texts of the seven-point proposal as well as a message from Haig to Belaúnde informing him of the British Government's willingness to "give serious consideration" to the proposal as well as a ceasefire "of short duration" to give time for a decision on a peace plan. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/05/1982 (5))

## 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Lima, May 6, 1982, 0417Z

4681. Subject: (U) South Atlantic War. Ref: (A) State 121841;<sup>2</sup> (B) Lima 4680.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S–Entire text)

2. President Galtieri [*Belaúnde*] telephoned me at 2340 EDT to report on his conversation with President Galtieri. He said he advised Galtieri of the constructive UK response to the peace proposals. He told Galtieri the UK in essence accepted them with some changes. However, before he could elaborate Galtieri told him that Argentina had just communicated its agreement to the UN SecGen to a mediating role for the UN. Galtieri did not reveal to Belaunde the conditions under which the UN mediation would be carried out. Belaunde told Galtieri that the British position on the Peruvian peace proposals would give the Argentines some idea of what would be acceptable to the UK. Galtieri expressed his gratitude for Peru's efforts.

3. Galtieri said he would continue calling Belaunde to keep him advised of the status of the peace process.

4. President Belaunde asked me to transmit the above to the Secretary with his personal thanks for the enormous good will and great effort the Secretary is showing throughout the crisis.

Ortiz

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 231.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4680 from Lima, May 6, Ortiz transmitted a report of his meeting with Belaúnde held at 1900 EDT, May 5. Ortiz reported that when delivering the text of Haig's letter and the draft seven-point proposal to Belaúnde, the latter stated "he did not believe he could convince the Argentines to accept them." After Ortiz discussed with Belaúnde the Peruvian President's observations on the shortcomings of the draft proposal, Belaúnde telephoned Haig to repeat his views and suggested "that there be a simple announcement that both sides agreed to a cease fire to be followed by renewed negotiations with the 7-point proposals as the working document. After further discussion the President agreed that he would call President Galtieri but that he must be truthful and tell Galtieri that this proposal is what the UK wants." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982)

**233. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, May 6, 1982, 8–8:30 a.m.

## ATTENDEES

*U.S.*  
Secretary Weinberger  
Ambassador Bennett  
Defense Advisor Legere  
General Smith  
General Lasater

*BRITISH*  
MOD Nott  
Ambassador Graham  
Mr. Hastie-Smith

MOD Nott briefly commented on the Falkland situation, indicating that he had no fresh news as of this morning, but that the situation was fluid and progressing on a minute-to-minute basis. He indicated that his letter to Secretary Weinberger<sup>2</sup> should have been delivered this morning and he wanted to briefly reiterate some of its contents. The United Kingdom is most grateful to the United States for undertaking to respond positively to a request for materiel support for British forces in the current crisis. Britain is now considering separately her needs for intelligence and logistic help and is preparing a list of items of weapons and equipment<sup>3</sup> and will be making special arrangements both in London and in the Embassy Washington for processing their needs. It is not clear now whether or not Britain will need or use all the items listed. It would greatly simplify the administration and accelerate the action if the United States could agree at the outset that such items as the US does provide be supplied on the basis that the UK pay only for those items which it uses or retains. An alternative would be for the UK to pay the US on a “sale and return” basis. By way of illustration, the two immediate requests which the UK has in mind are for 300 AIM 9L sidewinder missiles and 2 Vulcan/Phalanx guns.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lasater. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to NATO. Copies of the memorandum of conversation were sent to the ISP Desk Officer and the ASD/ISD Special Assistant. Weinberger sent a summary of the meeting, held before the opening session of a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, as well as the text of Nott’s May 5 letter to Weinberger (see footnote 2 below), to Clark, Carlucci, and Haig in telegram 279 from Brussels, May 6. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (May) 1982)

<sup>2</sup> A signed copy of Nott’s May 5 letter to Weinberger, the substance of which is summarized in the memorandum of conversation, is *ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> For a summary list of U.K. defense requests, May 6–7, along with the status of Department of Defense action taken, see Document 245.

Secretary Weinberger said he saw no problem with the UK request. Our overall aim was to be helpful and to make that assistance available as quickly as possible.

Secretary Weinberger and MOD Nott then discussed in general terms current diplomatic initiatives ongoing to try and settle the crisis with Argentina. Both were uncertain about the status of the Peruvian recommendations. MOD Nott indicated that the latest Haig proposals were acceptable to the United Kingdom but did not see how Argentina could accept them. However, the UK took some heart in the fact that the US State Department had sent the proposals to the UK and would not have done so had they not felt them to be somewhat acceptable to Argentina.

Secretary Weinberger asked Nott if he had other matters to discuss and Nott responded with his gratitude for DoD support and for the very successful discussions on the Trident matter. Secretary Weinberger agreed that the subcontractor arrangements appeared to be promising and the talks in London in mid-May should help considerably.

MOD Nott said that timely intelligence from the South Atlantic was particularly critical. ELINT information was satisfactory but [*less than 1 line not declassified*] left much to be desired. SecDef alluded to press reports that SR-71 coverage was being obtained on the Falkland Islands every half hour. This is, of course, ridiculous. He indicated that [*3½ lines not declassified*].

MOD Nott said that one area where the UK needed some practical assistance very quickly was in air-to-air refueling between Europe and the Ascension Island; Britain has only nineteen Victor tankers and was strapped for refueling capability. This was a serious need and one which they needed quickly. He wanted to reiterate that the UK does not want *direct* military assistance from the United States in theater because that would invite others into the conflict, but refueling assistance between Europe and the Ascension Island was being requested from the United States.

SecDef raised the issue of out-of-area threats to NATO's interest and the requirement for NATO committed forces to be utilized for contingencies in other parts of the world. The Falklands crisis was indeed just such an example and he asked MOD Nott's views on using the current crisis to underscore that need. MOD Nott responded that he had no objections but would caution against the United States making the case that Europe was more dependent on mid-East oil than was the United States. Ambassador Graham added that one must keep in mind when making a case for Southwest Asia as a threat to NATO that we bear in mind that we also open the doors to the European nations demanding the right to be consulted and to approve of all deployments outside the NATO area. ASD Perle inquired whether or

not in the British view it would not be possible to draft a simple and straightforward statement recognizing threats to NATO's interest and the need to plan to meet those threats. The British side did not respond.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the crisis in the South Atlantic.]

**John R. Lasater**

*Brigadier General, USAF*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Europe/NATO Policy (Acting)*

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#### **234. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Peruvian President Belaúnde<sup>1</sup>**

May 6, 1982, 9 a.m.

(not on for first minutes)

H: Right. That is a shame but it is understandable.<sup>2</sup>

B: They think that all the terms and timetable are very tight so they told me they were going directly to the UN. I know they are going to see the same problems there.

H: Of course. There is no question about it and perhaps the only thing we can do is be as helpful as we can. Unfortunately the situation will continue.

B: I find there is a very emotional attitude in Argentina this time. I am afraid it will continue to be so for a number of days until it quiets down.

H: Yes.

B: I think they do not realize that this is such an urgent matter. I am very much afraid that time is being lost.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; Belaúnde was in Lima.

<sup>2</sup> Haig's answer is presumably in response to Belaúnde's report of his May 5 telephone conversation with Galtieri in which Galtieri stated that Argentina would be seeking mediation from the United Nations instead of accepting the seven-point proposal. See Document 232.

H: I share that view and want you to know I spoke to the President<sup>3</sup> after our discussion last night<sup>4</sup> and he is extremely grateful to you for your statesmanship and your efforts here. We are always ready to do whatever we can and will continue to hold that position. I think now it is best to let the UN consider the matter and they will find in a few days what I learned in three weeks and that is that there are still fundamental differences in the substance between the two parties and despite the sacrifices that have occurred, neither side is willing to make the concessions that are necessary. I only hope a cooling will occur and I am not optimistic.

B: Yesterday afternoon was rather quiet. I hope that it remains. What do you know about this morning?

H: There was activity yesterday. It was anti-submarine activity so there was no truce yesterday.

B: I told General Galtieri what to expect. I told him eventually he was going to have to face different conditions and what they were. I said that they were very close to what we were talking about. There were little differences and pointed out what differences but he seemed hopeful about the UN. What he has done really is to say that he is ready for negotiations in the UN but when those negotiations come, he will find the same problems as he found with me.

H: Exactly. And even more rigidity in the terms of no ceasefire until immediate withdrawal.

B: I told him I was open in this channel and ready to do whatever I could and to feel free to call me. I am always available but not too optimistic.

H: No, not for the next 24 to 48 hours. Unfortunately, I hope that there are not more lives lost in the interim. You have been magnificent and I want you to know how much I admire what you have done and am grateful.

B: I know of your wonderful intelligence [*intention?*] to be helpful and I know naturally your great responsibilities.

H: We will keep a close watch and if anything develops, we will be in touch immediately.

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<sup>3</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this exchange between Reagan and Haig has been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, the Reagans hosted a private dinner with Cabinet officials from 7:20 to 9:58 p.m., May 5, and records no other conversations between the President and Secretary of State that day. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 232.

B: I will always be ready. Please give my regards to the President.<sup>5</sup>

H: I will.

END TELCON

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<sup>5</sup> The Embassy transmitted an informal English translation of the text of a letter from Belaúnde to Reagan, delivered to the Embassy on May 7. In the letter, Belaúnde provided his own summary of Peru's role in the peace initiative. (Telegram 2415 from Lima, May 8; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Peru (05/03–1982–05/06/1982))

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### **235. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym<sup>1</sup>**

May 6, 1982, 9:28 a.m.

H: How are you this morning?

P: I am okay. How are you?

H: All right. I just called to touch base with you briefly. I talked to Nicko.<sup>2</sup> We got, as I anticipated, a turndown from Galtieri.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; Pym was in London.

<sup>2</sup> No U.S. record of Haig's exchange with Henderson has been found. The British Official History of the conflict states that Haig telephoned Henderson at 2300 hours, May 5, "saying that Argentina was no longer interested in the US/Peruvian plan but was now committed to the UN route. The Argentines considered that they were securing growing international support, for example from Ireland, and that the European Community was cracking. The sinking of the *Sheffield* had greatly emboldened them, with the result that they were now convinced that they would triumph militarily and politically.

P: I see, you have.

H: He said he has moved it to the UN and that is it.

P: It looked like that this morning.

H: Yes. You know clearly what the efforts are going to be there. A ceasefire period.

P: Yes.

H: Of course, we cannot accept and I have instructed our ambassador that the basic premises of their work must be withdrawal and ceasefire simultaneously.

P: That was in the Secretary General's proposal which he put to me.<sup>3</sup>

H: You better read that very carefully.

P: Okay.

H: It is sort of not exactly that, if you look at it carefully.

P: I will have a look at it but, of course, that is absolutely vital.

H: Of course.

P: Right. I absolutely agree, Al, about that.

H: In any event, I think you are not going to be totally negative.

P: No. I cannot afford to be. I think we are going to give a positive response. The part you and I were working on was virtually the same framework with the necessary terms added.

H: Yes. They are going to try for a quick and dirty to get it stopped, knowing you cannot start it up again and that is all they want to do.

P: We must obviously work together there, Al.

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Haig intended to wait for a formal answer from Peru and then, if it was negative as he expected, decide how to publicise the British readiness to support this effort. 'We will have to be sure,' Henderson suggested, 'that they do not pull their punches in attributing blame where it belongs for their breakdown.'" (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, p. 329) A British record of the meeting, as sent by Henderson to London, is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

<sup>3</sup>Presumably a reference to Pérez de Cuéllar's May 2 proposals. See footnote 2, Document 215.



H: Yes and I wanted you to know I talked with Belaunde a few minutes ago.<sup>4</sup> They are going to have to learn what we have learned in three weeks. That is fine. We are going to cool it here.

P: When are you going to make it public?

H: I don't think it is a good idea to do that. It is not really as good as the first proposal.

P: The one they have just rejected. You don't intend to make it public?

H: No.

P: Do you mind if I do?

H: I assumed that you would.

P: You don't mind?

H: Not at all.

P: It seems to me it would be helpful here and indeed with some of our overseas friends to indicate what it was we were prepared to do. I think it would help us.

H: You go ahead. I think it is not good for us to do it.

P: No. You don't mind if I do?

H: No.

P: Look at it from our point of view. I think it would help.

H: Yes, remembering it was not as forthcoming as the other.

P: No, not from their point of view.

H: No.

P: I think it is probably helpful to get something out. I might do it later today.<sup>5</sup>

H: All right. We will stay in touch.

P: How do you see things now? Is it inevitable the UN has to get going? There is no further line you can take in the meantime?

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 234.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 10174 from London, May 7, the Embassy reported: "In Parliament May 7 Foreign Secretary Pym described the U.S./Peruvian proposals, said that they had been acceptable to HMG, but that Argentina had rejected them and was obstructing progress by asking for a ceasefire without a clear link to withdrawal of Argentine troops. Pym categorically rejected any ceasefire without a timetable for Argentine withdrawal." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820240–0696)

H: I think ultimately, for the reasons that you know, that it will have to come back here because I don't think the UN is going to find it any easier to solve the problem than we did.

P: Our worry is the time it takes discovering that.

H: I think it very important—I talked to Nicko and he will be in touch with you about the situation locally.

P: Apart from this, if you will not publicize the document that has been rejected, when will you say publicly that this latest proposal has been rejected?

H: We are afraid that . . . we are not singling out any particular approach. We have been pursuing every opportunity that could lead to a solution. It will sort of drift out.

P: Can I say the proposal that was put to the Argentines by Peru have been rejected, proposals which we would have accepted have been rejected?

H: Yes, I think so. Sure.

P: Okay.

END TELCON

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**236. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 6, 1982

SUBJECT

Latin Reaction to Falklands Developments

*U.S. support for Britain has shaken Latin America. With the notable exceptions of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Peru, official criticism publicly has been muted. But in private, many Latin leaders were shocked by what they saw as an abrupt U.S. shift that jeopardizes the Inter-American system.*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820108–0125. Confidential. Drafted by J.W. Swigert (FWG); cleared by W. Lofstrom (INR/IAA), D. Johnson (P), Briggs, S. Block (ARA/AND), Kilday, Einaudi, G. Jones (ARA/RPP), and Service. Swigert initialed for all clearing officials except Service, who initialed his clearance. Haig initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw the memorandum.

The sinking of the *Belgrano* helped to solidify sentiment for Argentina. Talk of military assistance to the GOA in Peru, Guatemala and Venezuela<sup>2</sup> is out in the open, although Herrera is still playing coy. While maintaining official neutrality, Brazil has tilted toward Argentina and responded favorably to an Argentine request to purchase patrol aircraft. Colombia and Costa Rica have counseled moderation, but outgoing Costa Rican President Carazo delivered us a farewell gift with his May 4 suggestion that OAS headquarters be moved out of Washington.

The President's letter helped.<sup>3</sup> Panama's President Royo assembled Latin American ambassadors to discuss the crisis and read the President's letter to them—a unilateral Panamanian communique which followed omitted criticism of the U.S. But Panama is still active in attempting to drum up a collective Latin response to sanctions toward Argentina.

Individual reactions are colored by specific circumstances (proximity to Argentina, revanchist claims), but *resentment toward the U.S. is simmering*, fueled by latent Anglo-Spanish tensions and nationalism. *Future U.S. relations with the hemisphere will suffer the longer the conflict drags on.*

Attached is a cable providing Latin American reaction by country.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On May 6, Hayward (as acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) sent a memorandum to Carlucci discussing Venezuela's decision to loan C-130 military cargo aircraft to Argentina, some of which had been sold to the Venezuelan military under FMS, and considering on what basis the United States could object to the decision. Hayward determined that it was "highly conjectural whether the U.S. could object to the temporary provision of these aircraft to Argentina. But over and above that, there is the larger question of whether the U.S. *should* object, regardless of the legalities, to the loan of these aircraft. Our declaration of support for Great Britain and our sanctions against Argentina have exacerbated the already frayed relations with our neighbors to the south. We should probably let this one go by." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 204 and footnote 2 thereto.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed. The cable was sent as telegram 123749 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, May 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850037-0116)

### 237. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 6, 1982, 1926Z

123255. Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. For Ambassador Kirkpatrick from Secretary Haig. Subject: Falklands Dispute, Action by the Secretary General. Ref: A) USUN New York 1252,<sup>2</sup> B) USUN New York 1256.<sup>3</sup>

1. (Confidential–Entire text)

2. As the focus of diplomacy now shifts to New York, it is important that certain fundamental principles and objectives be clear and constant. I would appreciate your conveying these to the Secretary General, in response to the points he made to you yesterday (Ref A) and urge that he take these into account as he considers his role and the UN's in any future peacemaking effort.

3. We believe that a ceasefire and a total withdrawal of military and security forces within a short, definite period, must be linked. Partial withdrawal, or de facto partition of the Islands, or any ceasefire/withdrawal arrangements that could be interrupted by the Argentines are not acceptable solutions. This would have unfortunate future ramifications in other territorial disputes, and compromise the UK's legitimate invocation of the right of self-defense in light of Argentina's non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 502.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850030–0736. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to USUN, all American Republic diplomatic posts, all OECD capitals, UN Security Council capitals, USSOUTHCOM, and USCINCLANT. Drafted and approved by Thomas; cleared by Gillespie and in S/S–O.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1252 from USUN, May 6, Kirkpatrick transmitted a report of her May 5 meeting with Pérez de Cuéllar. The Secretary General informed Kirkpatrick that he had “urgent appeals” from the King of Spain, the President of Colombia, and the Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Venezuela to “take initiatives to bring peace to the South Atlantic.” Pérez de Cuéllar added that Argentina had accepted his mediating role and accepted “in principle” his proposal for a ceasefire, that “several EC representatives, including France and Germany, have turned around on the question,” that “opinion in the Security Council and in the U.N. has turned strongly against the U.K., whom everyone feels is resisting settlement,” that “the U.S. is not seen as a potential referee since they have taken a partisan role,” and that the “so-called Peruvian initiative is seen as nothing but Secretary's Haig's proposals translated into Spanish.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850020–0147)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1256 from USUN, May 6, the Mission reported: “Security Council met 5 May 1982 in response to Irish call for consideration of Falklands crisis. The Council agreed for the moment not to hold a formal meeting but to issue a statement by the President on behalf of the Council and to meet again Thursday, May 6.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820236–0184)

4. We believe that all other issues, in particular the question of sovereignty, are and must be negotiable. We have been unable to date to get agreement from Argentina on a negotiation mandate that does not prejudice the sovereignty issue. The United States has adopted no position regarding the competing claims of the UK and Argentina to the Islands, and we do not intend to. We likewise take no position on the underlying legal theories and their application in this dispute. We have stated only that the wishes of the Islanders should be taken into account.

5. We are open about possible UN peacekeeping, administration and negotiation roles, which are all negotiable. The US would be willing to continue to participate in the negotiations under UN auspices, if the Secretary General sought the assistance of a personal representative or contact group.

6. We will oppose any proposed elements that would appear to reward aggression, encourage military action in the many other outstanding cases of territorial dispute, or which derogate from the rule of law, in particular the principle that disputes must be resolved peacefully consistent with the UN Charter, and the right of self-defense. We will stand by these principles even if isolated.

7. As for the Secretary General's desire to pursue his initiative at this time, we want him to know we understand the pressures he is under to act now. However, we want to emphasize our view that until there is a closer agreement by the UK and Argentina on the conditions and terms of reference for any initiative and the modalities for ceasefire, disengagement, administration and negotiations, it would be harmful to launch such an initiative. We understand that whereas the UK and Argentina have expressed interest in Perez's proposal, it will require further elaboration and understandings between the parties before it could go forward. Moreover, we do not dismiss the possibility that the UK and Argentina may prefer to proceed along other lines. It is important to wait until both sides have the understandings they need and agreement on the best approach before proceeding. Our interest is in finding the most promising route to a settlement, whether under the SYG's auspices or otherwise, even though this may take more time.

8. Our position in further consultations of the Security Council should be, in accordance with the above, to discourage any further formal action by the Council at least until informal contacts with the parties produces agreement on an acceptable approach to negotiations.

Haig unquote Eagleburger. Unquote

Eagleburger

## 238. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 6, 1982, 2040Z

123449. Subject: Message From Secretary Haig.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Please pass the following message to the Foreign Minister from the Secretary.

3. Begin quote

Dear Mr. Minister:

I know you feel, as President Reagan and I do, that the tragic loss of life in the sinking of the Belgrano and Sheffield and other military actions makes it all the more urgent to find a basis for peace in the South Atlantic.

Over the last five days President Belaunde of Peru and I worked out a possible approach, involving these elements:

(1) Immediate cessation of hostilities concurrent with

(2) Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces;

(3) Introduction of third parties on to the Falkland Islands to verify withdrawal, administer the Islands, and make sure all elements of the agreement were implemented;

(4) Acknowledgment by the two governments of differences over the status of the Islands;

(5) Acknowledgment by the two governments that the aspirations and interests of the inhabitants would have to be included in a final settlement; and

(6) Negotiation of a definitive solution by 30 April 1983, with the assistance of the third parties.

On May 5, Francis Pym informed me that Britain was prepared to give the most serious consideration to acceptance of this proposal, provided Argentina did so as well, and was prepared to order a cease-fire in the near future if Argentina did accept.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D850030–0740. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Wellington, and Tokyo. Sent for information Immediate to London. Drafted by Enders and Gompert; cleared by Bremer and in S/S–O; approved by Haig. A similar message from Haig was transmitted in telegram 123533 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, except Managua and USINT Havana, May 6, for delivery to the Foreign Ministers of each country. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982 (5))

<sup>2</sup> See Document 227.

These proposals had been discussed at various points with Argentina, receiving an encouraging reaction. But when they were presented by President Belaunde to President Galtieri late May 5, he refused to consider them. Argentina, he said, wants a UN mediation.<sup>3</sup>

Regrettable as it is that a plan carefully developed with the leadership of a country very supportive of Argentina was not addressed seriously, the effort has not been lost. We understand that Britain will not pull back from the position taken and will make it the basis of his [its] response to the United Nations Secretary General's offer of mediation to reach a peaceful settlement of the war.

From the very beginning of this crisis, the United States has been guided by the principle that force must not be used to seize what cannot be obtained peacefully. The prompt actions of the EC Ten reflected an equally principled stand. The integrity of this norm is of vital practical importance. Historically, its erosion has only led to further disorder and war. Disputes throughout the world could turn violent if the principle of peaceful settlement is undermined. Your insistence on an immediate withdrawal of all forces and a simultaneous ceasefire is crucial in upholding this principle.

Based on our common interest in the rule of law and our common desire to stop this war, we must all strive to assist the parties to achieve a settlement. UN Security Council Resolution 502 continues to provide the basis for such a settlement. My country will actively support efforts to implement this resolution through the Secretary General or any other mechanism. End quote

**Haig**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 232.

**239. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 7, 1982

RE

Memorandum of Conversation with the Secretary General

Ambassador William Sherman of USUN conveyed to the Secretary General's Deputy the contents of Secretary Haig's views as expressed in State 123255.<sup>2</sup>

Later the Secretary General spoke with Ambassador Kirkpatrick and asked her to convey the following views:

1. The Secretary General thanked the Secretary of State for his observations and advice.

2. The Secretary General asserted that he was working under Article 40 of the UN Charter<sup>3</sup> toward provisional measures which could serve as preconditions for the ultimate peaceful resolution of the conflict.

3. He asked me to assure the Secretary of State that it seemed clear to him that a cease fire, withdrawal of Argentine forces and redeployment of the British Navy would all necessarily take place simultaneously. Any effort by Argentina to impose resolution of the sovereignty question as a precondition would doom the UN effort.

4. Finally, the Secretary General believes that any other initiatives would be counterproductive at this time and would have the effect of undermining his efforts.

The Secretary General assured me he would keep me fully informed about developments over the weekend.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Confidential. There is no indication that Haig saw the memorandum, although a notation in the bottom right-hand corner indicates that it was received in S on May 7.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 237. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word "Haig's" and ending with "State."

<sup>3</sup> As part of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which addresses "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," Article 40 states: "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39 [which empowers the Security Council to identify any threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression], call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable."



**240. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces (Atkeson) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Inman)<sup>1</sup>**

DDI #3773–82

Washington, May 7, 1982

SUBJECT

What's Next in the Falklands?—(Part III) The Long View

1. The first battles are over; the two sides are licking their wounds and angling for political advantage among cease-fire proposals. The progression of the Falklands crisis from its comic operatic stage into the grim business of killing has sent shock waves throughout both governments and around the world. The immediate future rests on a knife's edge; war and peace seem equally likely.

2. The impressive celerity with which the British launched their response to the Argentinian challenge has proved that the UK is yet a military power with global reach. For their part, the Argentines have shown a readiness to stand up to the superior edge of the more modern force. Britain's strength lies primarily at sea, her opponent's on land; they overlap in the common environment of the air. The Argentines have a sizable air force, but the air is primarily the domain of high technology, and here the British have the edge, particularly in total systems integration. While the Argentines may be capable of mounting a spirited defense and perhaps a few surprises, they must face the very bitter probability of tactical defeat as the British bring additional force to bear in the area.

3. But tactical defeat may not be as conclusive an outcome as some observers suppose. The Falklands still lie a scant 300 miles from Argentina and 8,000 miles from the UK. The Argentines probably assess that the strategic imperatives operate on a different vector than those of the battles. Whatever course the military action may take, they have reason to believe that the key issue of sovereignty has been decided in advance by geography and reinforced by the momentum it has attained through worldwide notoriety. While the junta has undoubtedly been surprised by the vigor and scale of the British reaction, they may calculate that the opponent must eventually recall his fleet and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 85T00757R: Chronological Files (1982–1983), Box 1, Folder 5: NIO/GPF Chrono May 82. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Sent through Rowen. Copies were sent to Gorman and Howells. For Parts I and II of Atkeson's report, see Document 126 and footnote 1 thereto.

his ability to influence events along with it. If such is the case, they may feel that they have essentially won their war. They may have confidence that now that the issue of sovereignty has been so visibly drawn, it is not likely to sink back into the limbo of the past century, but will be decided in one manner or another between the contestants. Even in their worst-case scenario in which a “victorious” Britain undertakes to garrison the recaptured islands with something more formidable than the 80 marines who met the original invasion force, the junta may sense a certain inevitability to its cause.

4. Much now depends upon the political strength of the junta and the quality of its nerves. It must hold the support of the masses and maintain internal cohesion. The members probably recognize that if they crack visibly under pressures from within, or under the battering of the British, they jeopardize the best chance in a century and a half for fulfillment of an historic ambition of the nation. An awareness of this mission probably stiffens their resolve.

5. Barring a cease-fire, the prospect is for more fighting and increasing British tactical advantage. ([less than 1 line not declassified] most of their troop transports are at some distance from the Falklands, but the possibility of disinformation should not be discounted. [1 line not declassified])<sup>2</sup> The loss of the *General Belgrano* has been a severe psychological blow to the Argentines, and provides the stuff from which monumental hatreds are made. They have returned stinging blows upon the British, sinking the *Sheffield* and damaging other vessels. The action outside the 200 mile exclusion zone raises the danger that the war could widen to feature more actions outside the area, or perhaps additional participants or supporting players. Sentiment is running high in favor of the Argentines in Peru, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela. In addition, there is always the risk that the Soviets will find opportunities to play a complicating role.

6. The British employment of Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island is reminiscent of American basing of B-52 bombers on Guam in the early phases of the Vietnam conflict. There will be temptations for the Argentines to request third party early warning services (for

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<sup>2</sup> In a May 8 report prepared for [name not declassified], [name not declassified] concluded: “British task force momentum has slowed and the British appear to have blinked at the prospect of an early assault on the Falklands. Should diplomatic efforts not yield withdrawal of Argentines from the Falklands during the next 7–10 days, however, we currently see the British proceeding with their assault plans both to satisfy British objectives for the Falkland Islands and to facilitate an honorable return of the task force. In the meantime, the task force will take prudent measures to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone and to bolster its capabilities for assaulting the Islands.” The Department transmitted to Enders the complete text of the report in telegram 125472 to San Jose, May 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820242-0134)

both bomber and troop ship sailings), through the stationing of AGI intelligence ships or other suitably equipped vessels in the vicinity of Ascension, and perhaps on the periphery of the exclusion zone as well. [2 lines not declassified] Alternatively, other Latin American navies could play a role. The British would have to decide how they would want to deal with such indirect intervention. Of course, an Argentine initiative, such as the sinking of a British ship outside the exclusion zone—a merchant vessel, for instance—or the extensive employment of high performance aircraft by the Argentines from the mainland which would tempt the British to strike back, could accelerate any trend toward a wider war.

7. Over the longer term, the danger is that the war will have lasting unfavorable impact upon Pan-American relations. With the United States abandonment of its neutral stance and open support for the British cause, there is high likelihood that the animosities engendered in the current conflict will extend to English-speaking peoples in decades to come. In Argentinian eyes, and perhaps others' as well, UK tactical success may demonstrate British war-making potency and their ability to humble the Latins, but it is likely to evacuate any serious basis for amicability in international affairs. The full extent of the damage is almost impossible to foresee. Whether the matter will be remembered only in a sullen Argentina, or throughout an outraged South American continent, the totality of the impact will unfold only with time.

8. There are other matters which are likely to be affected by the experience of the Falklands war. Some of these are:

- Third World appetite for sophisticated weaponry.
- The shape and form of power projection weapons systems.
- Intelligence priorities and collection capabilities.

9. For many years an important concern of US foreign policy has been the magnitude of the international arms trade, particularly in sophisticated weaponry. The appetite of many Third World countries for showpieces of high technology is legendary. The effect of the Falklands war may well be interpreted as a vindication of those (in many cases impoverished) states which have opted for such dangerous instruments. We can probably expect an added impetus to the market of modern weapons in coming years.

10. Also for a number of years, major western powers have been debating the elimination of costly old weapons systems from their arsenals. The British carrier *Hermes*, for example, was scheduled for removal from service before being committed to the South Atlantic expedition. We can expect that the Falklands experience will give many countries reason to reexamine their force structure, perhaps to decide in favor of retaining some of the older systems. The US may find new

enthusiasm for reviving the battleships as a result of the apparent shortage and small caliber of naval guns in the British task force. Missiles do not make good substitutes for shore bombardment, and other inadequacies may yet come to light.

11. [*4 lines not declassified*] the Falklands episode should give us some understanding of the need for balance in our collection programs and a glimpse of the magnitude of the uncertainties which can evolve in a crisis when it occurs in an area which has been chronically left off of the priorities lists.

12. In sum, there is much that will be different when the war is over. Barring a crack in the junta, the Argentines are likely to get the sovereignty they seek over the Falklands in one form or another. Our Latin American affairs will be more complex and difficult, and the Soviets may have gained certain inroads if they have played an active part in assisting the Argentines. The Third World arms market is likely to grow more intense as countries realize their vulnerabilities to major power attack. In advanced countries, requirements for maintenance of a full spectrum of traditional and modern weaponry will probably be more clearly defined. And in the US and UK we are likely to recognize an increased need to balance our intelligence efforts. There will be other changes, some undoubtedly of considerable import. These will be revealed as events take their course.

**Edward B. Atkeson**

**241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Materiel Support to the UK (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The attached paper contains summaries of new requests for materiel support, requests outstanding, and requests recently completed.

**Fred C. Ikle<sup>2</sup>**

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

*REQUESTS RECEIVED 6–7 MAY 1982*

<u>REQUEST</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>EXPECTED DELIVERY</u>
(TS) 12 NESTOR (KY-8/KY-28) Equipments with spare sets (Secure Voice Encryption Device)	In Staffing	Unknown—10 NESTORs previously delivered on 21 April.
(TS) 1 AN/ALE-40 Chaff Dispenser for trial installation on a Sea Harrier	Approved	Air Staff working

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on May 10. At the bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: “Fred. Please let me know when all the ‘In Staffing’ is completed. We should not require longer than 36 hours to act on any UK request.” Another copy of Iklé’s memorandum bears the handwritten date of May 7. (Ibid.) Smith returned the memorandum to Iklé under a May 13 note, which reads: “Can you please respond to SecDef’s question by COB today?” (Ibid.) Additional summary papers tracking the status of British military requests were regularly produced by the Department of Defense until the end of June and are *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

<sup>3</sup> Top Secret; Eyes Only.

(TS) 15 AN/ASQ-81 (v) Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) Sets plus spares and auxilliary equipment	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) 15 MJU-7 infra-red flares	Approved	7 May 82
(TS) Temporary two-day loan of 3 to 4 UK shipwrights employed by the USG (Administrative leave) in the UK to assist in retrofit activities	Approved	7 May 82
(TS) Direct relay of weather satellite information to Sunnyvale AFS, CA. Requires a demodulator to be shipped from the Global Weather Center to Sunnyvale.	Approved	10 May 82
(TS) Request for quotation for 20,000 SSQ 41B Sonobuoys	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) 3 CV 3333 UHF secure speech (SATCOM, units plus plugs, handset and vocoder	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) Diversion to the UK of the first available RD-433/SSH Receiver under FMS case UK-P-BGO	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) 2 VOE-82C Antennae for WSC-1 (SATCOM)	Approved	Expect mid-June 82 delivery
(TS) 10 AN/PVS-5 (Night Vision Goggles)	Approved	Expect 7 May 82 delivery
(TS) 50 Maritime Limpet Mines (Hand-transported Underwater Anti-Ship Demolition Weapon)	Approved	JCS considers availability to be uncertain
(TS) 350 exhaust valves for use on helo-launched MK 46 Torpedoes (MK 46 is a semi-active anti-submarine torpedo with 5–6 mm range)	Approved	Manufacture expected 11 June 82
(TS) 2 Vulcan/Phalanx Close-In Systems (Vulcan/Phalanx is a point defense system against an anti-ship missile threat. UK will mount the weapon on the aircraft carrier ILLUSTRIOUS currently undergoing sea trials.)	Approved	Expect mid-May 82 delivery
(TS) 200 MK 46 Mod 2 Torpedoes (Semi-Active ASW)	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) 200 MK 535 Containers (Torpedo Transport)	In Staffing	Unknown
(TS) Availability of 600,000 sq. ft. AM-2 airfield matting	In Staffing	Unknown

(TS) 1:250,000 scale maps of the Argentine mainland developed by US and Argentina (Bilateral agreement requires both countries approve release)	DMA, OSD and State recommend disapproval. (See Tab A) <sup>4</sup>	Awaiting decision
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*REQUESTS RECENTLY COMPLETED*

<u>REQUEST</u>	<u>DELIVERY</u>
(TS) 10 Crypto Support Kits	4 May 82
(TS) 16 Lightweight 60 mm Company Mortars and 1600 rounds	5 May 82

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<sup>4</sup> Tab A was not found attached.

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**242. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig**

London, May 7, 1982

[Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 7, 1982. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

243. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 8, 1982

## PARTICIPANTS

Carlos Guillermo  
 General Sanchez Mason, retired from Argentine Army  
 Mr. Francisco Aguirre, Co-owner, *Diario de las Americas*  
 Vernon A. Walters, Ambassador-at-Large

## SUBJECT

Falkland Islands

At the request of Francisco Aguirre, a co-owner of *Diario de las Americas* and perhaps the best informed man in Washington on Latin American affairs, I met with retired Argentine General Sanchez Mason at the Army Navy Club. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bosworth concurred that the meeting should take place.

Sanchez Mason contended that former Argentine President and retired Army General Viola sent him to alert me that many Argentine officers, particularly Army officers, are extremely disturbed by the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands and the subsequent events.<sup>2</sup> He explained that he now works for MACK trucks and is using his business connection as a pretext for his visit. Prior to his retirement, however, he was, consecutively, in charge of suppression of the guerrillas, Commander of the Fifth Corps (the forces used in the Falklands), Commander of the Third Corps in Cordoba, Commander of the First Corps in Buenos Aires, and Chief of Staff of the Army.

When Anaya was Chief of Navy Planning, he developed plans for the occupation of the three Beagle Islands and another for the Falklands; but Videla<sup>3</sup> rejected them in 1978 because of the damage either would have done to Argentine relations with Great Britain and the U.S. When Admiral Anaya became head of the Navy, he allied with Galtieri to oust Viola from the Presidency. (Anaya is the most belligerent of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the Army-Navy Club. At the top of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote: "Import—the message of unrest in B.A." Also at the top of the memorandum, an additional notation in an unknown hand reads: "Final version 5/12/82. ARA probably will send by cable to B.A."

<sup>2</sup> Goldberg drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>3</sup> Goldberg circled "Videla" and drew a line from the circle to the bottom of the page where he wrote "Viola?"



three Junta members, Galtieri, the most excitable, and Lamidozo, the most thoughtful and moderate.) For some reason, perhaps church pressure, Anaya then pressured Galtieri to support him in the seizure of the Falklands as a repayment. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez assured the military that (a) the Soviets would veto any kind of anti-Argentine resolution in the UN, (b) that Argentina could rely on Soviet assistance and (c) in any event, the British would not fight. He knew the British and could guarantee they would not go to war over the Falklands. [General Sanchez Mason added as an aside that Costa Mendez is the biggest liar in Argentina.<sup>4</sup> Sanchez Mason knew the Foreign Minister pretended to the U.S. that he knew nothing of the operation before it happened.]

The original plan called for the occupation to occur in May, but the Navy forced the issue early by sending Naval personnel ashore in South Georgia disguised as civilian workers to dismantle the whaling station. The British reaction coupled with domestic strife with the Peronistas triggered the landing. Of the five corps commanders, only General Garcia of the Fifth Corps knew of the operation well in advance. The others were given only 48 hours notice. Troops moved under cover of exercises and maneuvers. The corps commanders, who were kept in the dark, harbor a certain amount of resentment.

Since the landing and occupation General Galtieri announced to a meeting of active and retired generals of the Army, that he told Secretary Haig that Argentina, if backed to the wall, would take help from any source, including the Soviet Union. This greatly disturbed the generals. They now perceive the Junta, Sanchez Mason explained, as having led Argentina into a foolish fight with old friends in Great Britain and the United States over islands Argentina would inevitably get anyway. Argentina is running the risk of destroying the OAS and endangering the ability of the West to defend its values—values prized by the Argentine military.

I asked him which officers felt this way. He cited General Vaquero, Chief of Staff of the Army; General Nicolaidis, Commander of the First Corps in Buenos Aires; General Trimarco, Commander of the Second Corps, and many junior officers.

General Sanchez Mason stressed that he came to seek no assistance but merely to ask for understanding “when something happens”. He feels that the Argentine Junta will not negotiate under the present

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<sup>4</sup> Goldberg underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “Costa Mendez” and ending with the word “Argentina.”

circumstances. They must be “knocked around a little more”. He is convinced the British can do it. He also pooh-poohed the claim that the U.S. gave the British information that led to the sinking of the cruiser, *Belgrano*, saying that he had some knowledge of British intelligence—they were quite capable of doing all these things by themselves. He felt that after the Argentines had sustained a few more reverses, they might be ripe for listening to something reasonable. He again hinted that he hoped he would have our understanding if and when “something happened”. Viola is anxious to keep the U.S. advised of developments in Argentina. He had also been in touch in Buenos Aires with Mr. Friedman and Ambassador Shlaudeman. The Navy got Argentina into the mess; the Air Force has helped save the Navy’s face by sinking the *Sheffield*. The moderates plan to move after the Junta sustains further reverses.

Mr. Aguirre, LCDR Martiny, General Sanchez Mason, Carlos Guillermo, and myself were the only people present.

**244. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1982

## SUBJECT

Brazilian Reply to your May 6 letter on the South Atlantic

Attached is an informal translation of Foreign Minister Guerreiro's May 7 reply<sup>2</sup> to your letter of May 6.<sup>3</sup> The reply makes three points worth noting:

. . . restraint is essential, not only on the part of the U.K. and Argentina, but also of "countries that may help tip the balance of the current military situation . . ."

. . . the time has arrived to seek a solution involving force withdrawal, a temporary U.N. presence on the islands, and U.N. sponsored negotiations with purposefully vague guidelines on self-determination and sovereignty.<sup>4</sup>

. . . Brazil is concerned about the impact of the crisis on inter-American relations.

Guerreiro's May 7 letter is his second to you on this issue, both sent in reply to your letters to him.<sup>5</sup> President Figueiredo also replied to President Reagan's May 4 letter on the crisis.<sup>6</sup> In this exchange of correspondence the Brazilians have made clear their hope that the crisis and associated questions will be explored thoroughly during Figueiredo's visit. Your breakfast with Guerreiro on May 12 may provide the best opportunity for a full discussion.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1749. Confidential. Drafted by Kilday. Haig initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached. The complete texts of the Department's unofficial translation as well as the Portuguese original of Guerreiro's May 7 letter are in the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820076–1145.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 238 and footnote 1 thereto.

<sup>4</sup> Haig underlined "self-determination and sovereignty" and drew a checkmark next to these words.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 196 and footnote 1, Document 238.

<sup>6</sup> Likely an erroneous reference to Reagan's May 2 letter to Figueiredo (see Document 204). For Figueiredo's May 4 response, see footnote 2, Document 229.

<sup>7</sup> Haig underlined this sentence and wrote "agree" in the right-hand margin.

**245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1982

SUBJECT

Delivering and Financing Materiel Support to the UK (U)—ACTION  
MEMORANDUM

(TS) Following upon your meeting with Secretary Nott and his subsequent letter to you,<sup>2</sup> the British requested that we approve a type of “lend” or “lease” arrangement that would facilitate the transfer of U.S. equipment to them without the need for British prefinancing of such transfers, and with the provision that all unused equipment be returned to the U.S.

(TS) We have held several meetings with Major General Boam, Head of British Defense Staff, his staff, and members of the OSD staff and have established the difficulty, both legal and legislative, of implementing a “lend” or “lease” agreement.

(TS) Instead, together with the British, we have worked out an arrangement,<sup>3</sup> subject to your approval, that would have the United States transfer to U.S. depots, whether in Britain or Ascension Island, such equipment as the UK might anticipate requiring during the conduct of its operations. The materiel—whether POL, spares, or munitions—would remain under U.S. control until the day the British determine they actually need it. At that point title would be transferred to the UK and payment would be forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank.<sup>4</sup>

(TS) The British have agreed to cover the costs of the equipment that is transferred, as well as of transportation of that equipment. In such cases where a transfer would not be effected, the UK would still cover other possible ancillary costs once these are determined.

(TS) I recommend that you approve the arrangement which has OSD(C), General Counsel and DSAA support. Any sort of “lend” or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the memorandum is an undated note to Weinberger from Iklé that reads: “Cap. The word ‘ancillary costs’ in penultimate paragraph is deliberately vague. Will Taft’s rep approved the memo here. F.” Also attached to the memorandum is a May 11 note from Zakheim to General Smith that reads: “State has coordinated on this memo and has no objections.”

<sup>2</sup> See Document 233 and footnote 2 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word “together” and ending with the word “arrangement.”

<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Weinberger wrote: “Fred—are they really agreeable to this? CW.”

“lease” scheme could harm the credibility of our Congressional requests for new materiel. On the other hand, by retaining U.S. ownership to the last possible second, we avoid forcing unnecessary expenditures upon the UK at a time when their financial position is under heavy strain.<sup>5</sup>

Fred C. Ikle<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Iklé and Weinberger initialed their approval.

<sup>6</sup> Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

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## 246. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 11, 1982, 10:30 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Esteban Takacs, Argentine Ambassador to the U.S.

J. William Middendorf, II—U.S. Ambassador to the OAS

Takacs called me this morning after, he said, trying unsuccessfully to reach me at home last night. He said that following a conversation he had with Dick Walters Monday<sup>2</sup> he was afraid the Department misunderstood the GOA’s negotiating position. Therefore, Takacs said he wanted to emphasize that there has been a definite Argentine change—Argentina has deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating process and he asked that I pass this message

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to Enders, Bosworth, Briggs, Service, Walters, Bremer, and Haig. At the top of the memorandum, Haig wrote: “Tell Larry to read carefully—for msg. Be *sure* UK *understands*.” A typewritten notation below this indicates that Haig’s comment was written on May 12. An attached undated note by Goldberg reads: “AMH read en route to Turkey. Key *message*.” Haig was in Turkey for meetings with President Evren and other officials May 13–15, before traveling to Greece May 15–16, and then to Luxembourg for a NATO Ministerial Meeting May 16–18.

<sup>2</sup> May 10. No other record of Walters’s meeting with Takacs has been found.

on.<sup>3</sup> He said this de-linkage was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that “nobody should take us out of our islands.” Takacs added that he feels with this display of Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court. (I pointed out to Takacs my impression that the British also had displayed flexibility on the issue of the future of the inhabitants of the islands.)

COMMENT: (While Takacs clearly wanted to portray to me a flexible GOA, probably in hopes we would pressure the British, he also seemed genuinely fearful that the Department is misreading Argentina on this score. At lunch, Monday, May 10, with GOA OAS Ambassador Quijano, I was the recipient of much the same message. Quijano told me Costa Mendez had called him Saturday the 8th, to ask his view on what sort of instructions Deputy Foreign Minister Ros should have for the UN. Quijano said he had told Costa Mendez that Ros should not bother with the UN unless he was able to present a real sea change in the Argentina position, de-linking sovereignty from negotiations. Quijano told me he strongly believes this is now the GOA’s position. I have politely refrained from asking either for assurances that the Junta is firmly on board with the Foreign Ministry but I would add that both men, so far as I can recall, have been very straight with me.)

On other related subjects, Takacs:

—thought it a hopeful sign that negotiations at the UN now are in their third day;

—expects a cease-fire announcement by the weekend;<sup>4</sup>

—said Henry Kissinger was to meet Pym today to urge the UK to yield on the sovereignty issue;<sup>5</sup>

—reported the Garcia Bustillos-headed Venezuelan delegation in Buenos Aires will offer military aid—but not troops because the GOA hasn’t asked;

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<sup>3</sup> In an interview on CBS-TV’s “Face the Nation” on May 9, Costa Méndez, speaking from Buenos Aires, said that Argentina had no other goal but “sovereignty” over the Falklands, but that sovereignty was “not a precondition” for beginning negotiations with the United Kingdom. (Jackson Diehl, “Argentina Charges Survivors Strafed,” *Washington Post*, May 10, 1982, p. A1) Subsequently, on May 10, Pérez de Cuéllar gave Parsons a draft of the peace agreement then under negotiation that had been prepared by the Argentine UN delegation. Paragraph 2 of the draft states: “The agreement to which the parties commit themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties.” (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, p. 349).

<sup>4</sup> Haig underlined this point and circled it along with the following point. In the right-hand margin next to it, he wrote: “!”

<sup>5</sup> Haig underlined this point and circled it along with the preceding point. In the right-hand margin next to it, he wrote: “!!!!!!”

—stressed that Argentina doesn't want to internationalize the war, saying, "as you know, we've had offers from others which we have turned down;"<sup>6</sup>

—suggested, that as a signal to the Latins that we wish to avert the growing buildup of animus against us, that the US seek somehow to return to a neutral position before an actual settlement is completed—"even if such a return takes place only five minutes before announcement of a settlement;"<sup>7</sup>

—emphasized (as Quijano also has done) the need to look beyond the immediate problem to ways to rebuild hemispheric solidarity.

Returning to the present state of hostilities and prospects for a cease-fire, Takacs claimed the GOA has been observing a cease-fire for sometime<sup>8</sup>—that the action against the Sheffield was only in retaliation for the Belgrano. He also said that continued British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation in hostilities. He said thus far ten islanders had been killed; many more were in peril if the British do not stop. He said he was very skeptical that by continuous shelling the UK improves chances for a peaceful settlement although no doubt the British have a different viewpoint. He said that if negotiations go on over the next week or longer, and the British at the same time show no signs of halting, he would hope the US would weigh in and ask the UK to stop.<sup>9</sup>

I told Takacs I was heartened by his receptivity to a cease-fire. I told him that speaking very personally as one not involved in the negotiating process, it seemed to me important that any cease-fire should be accompanied immediately by at least a partial withdrawal of forces and that a total withdrawal would be much better. I said such a signal of good will would go a long way to speed the negotiation process. I said a cease-fire without an Argentine pull back probably would not have much appeal to the British.<sup>10</sup>

(COMMENT: I tried to pin Takacs down on this point, knowing that time is against the British military position. He refused to be drawn out, however. Quijano, incidentally, has commented to me that if the UN resolution works, we should be proud since it essentially is little more than the Haig initiative. He also has said that in his opinion the only reason last week's US-Peru initiative fell flat was because neither

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<sup>6</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this point, Haig wrote: "!!!"

<sup>7</sup> Haig underlined most of this point and wrote in the left-hand margin next to it: "Key. They will settle!"

<sup>8</sup> Haig drew a line from this word and wrote "Bull!" in the margin under it.

<sup>9</sup> Haig bracketed this paragraph, drew a line from the bracket to the top of the page, and wrote: "Key message. Keep shelling. Get some reason in B.A.!"

<sup>10</sup> Haig bracketed this paragraph and wrote in the left-hand margin: "Jerk!"

party then believed the other was serious about fighting. Events since have sobered both sides, Quijano said, producing a better climate for a peaceful solution. I told Quijano I was glad at least some realize that it has been the Secretary's efforts which have sown the seeds of peace.)

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**247. Telegram From the [text not declassified], Embassy in the United Kingdom ([name not declassified]) to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Burkhalter)<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 11, 1982, 1538Z

Personal for Director and/or Deputy Director. SUBJ: Falkland Island military options (C).

1. (S/NoFORN) [2½ lines not declassified] the escalating British military option list is Argentine mainland surgical takeout of balance Exocet missiles and French Etendard aircraft [less than 1 line not declassified] ashore on mainland. [less than 1 line not declassified] although unconventional takeout of selected military targets on Falklands and aircraft strike on mainland has long been on list of possible options [1 line not declassified] same source confirmed current presence of "some" [less than 1 line not declassified].

2. (C) [less than 1 line not declassified] current/near future reporting will attempt to concentrate on military options and selective comments relating to the saturation of press reports and British MOD official announcements which continue to be the bulk of info flow on Falkland developments.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; NoFORN, Eyes Only. A typewritten notation on the telegram indicates that copies were sent to Weinberger, Carlucci, and Jones on May 11.



**248. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

## SUBJECT

Falkland Crisis

It comes as no surprise that the UN initiative is running aground. Here are some thoughts on the consequences and on how we should proceed.

The Argentines have now had three clear opportunities to settle, and their position is as unacceptable as ever. They wouldn't settle before hostilities; they wouldn't settle in the wake of military setbacks (South Georgia, the *Belgrano*); and they are no more flexible now that they have shown they can hold their own militarily (with the destruction of the *Sheffield*). We have to conclude that only a major setback—and quite likely not even that—will cause them to negotiate in earnest. The British have surely reached this conclusion.

This has several implications:

- A major UK military move is likely. We would not be able to restrain HMG—through direct pressure, a new peace initiative or both—even if we wanted to do so.
- The British may present us with more difficult requests as hostilities become more severe.
- A new peace proposal by Peru, the UN, the US or any other party will suffer the same fate as the others, absent a major change in the military situation.
- As fighting escalates, pressures for a straight ceasefire will mount, putting the UK and its supporters, especially us, on the defensive.
- European support for the British may unravel quickly.

In view of these prospects, we should:

- Warn the British not to be the first to break off the UN talks. Those talks are the best protection against a major UN push for a ceasefire, and condemnation of British military action will be worse if they first cut off the SYG's effort.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Eagleburger placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and wrote: "You've already done this."

- Urge other Allies to support the UK even if things get nastier. Western cohesion is being tested; moreover, our position will be less exposed if others maintain support for London.<sup>3</sup>

- Engage the British now in a discussion of how to proceed after a major military success. It is important to get through to them that they must be at least as forthcoming on settlement terms after success as they are now or there will be no settlement at all. In this context, we should warn the British not to expect us to relieve them of their South Atlantic burden if there is no agreement.

- Do not launch a new US initiative,<sup>4</sup> even with some other party. It would be doomed. If the Argentines, or someone on their behalf, seek our involvement, we'll have to consider it. But we should not rush to fill a vacuum, or let the British push us into another futile effort simply to provide political cover for their military action.

- Without any appearance of US orchestration, we should urge those with any influence in Buenos Aires (Peru, Brazil, Spain) to warn the Argentines that they now have their last chance for a reasonable settlement before catastrophe.

I would like a chance to discuss these ideas before you leave.<sup>5</sup>

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Eagleburger placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and wrote: "Best done in the NATO mtg."

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger drew an asterisk after this word, which corresponds to a notation he wrote at the bottom of the page: "But be prepared to come back in when asked—as I believe you will be! LSE."

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Haig's travels to Turkey May 13–15 and Greece May 15–16, prior to attending a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg May 16–18.

<sup>6</sup> Eagleburger initialed "LSE" above his typed signature.

**249. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1982, 4:30 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ricardo Zinn, Argentine businessman (former President—Banco de Italia)  
Lynn Bouchey, Council for Inter-American Security  
J. William Middendorf II, US Ambassador to the OAS  
Alberto Piedra, USOAS Senior Policy Advisor  
Philip Johnson, USOAS Political Advisor

*Comment:*

As a follow-up to telephone representations made last week from Buenos Aires to Alberto Piedra by a group of key Argentine businessmen, Dr. Zinn, accompanied by Mr. Bouchey, called on me this afternoon. His purpose was to convey some messages from what appeared to be top levels of the Argentine government. I promised to pass on his messages; I also took the opportunity to drive home a few messages of my own.

In opening the conversation Dr. Zinn spoke of his hope for the ongoing negotiations at the UN but he also spoke of fears in Buenos Aires of British escalation. He said actions against the islands are one thing, but massive Vulcan attacks against the mainland would be quite another—in such an event Argentina would be sure of US mid-air refueling assistance to the UK. He also claimed that British resort to nuclear weaponry is feared in Buenos Aires. He said in such a state of total war the Argentines would turn suicidal; they would not back down; they would seek outside assistance—such as the Soviet Union.

I sought to turn the conversation to peace. In this connection, Zinn said he thought he may have played a useful part in getting Junta support for Costa Mendez's de-linking sovereignty and negotiations.<sup>2</sup> He said he had gotten acceptance of this concept last weekend from the Navy and Air Force members of the Junta. (He said, incidentally, that Air Force General Lami Dozo is very strong for flexibility in negotiations—that Lami Dozo, preoccupied with regional problems, has no desire to see his Air Force whittled down in encounters with the British.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis—1982. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to Thompson, Piedra, Enders, Bosworth, Briggs, Service, and Bremer. At the top of the memorandum, Haig wrote: "Msg. to Bill M—thanks for vitally important reporting. Please keep it up! Al." Attached to the memorandum is a May 11 note from Middendorf to Haig, sent through Bremer, that reads: "Al—Zinn is clearly a messenger sent to pass on a message. Let's hope they're sincere—Bill."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

Zinn added that the Army Commander on the island might be the toughest to convince to back off.)

I then probed Zinn for his impressions of Argentine negotiating flexibility. He laid out for me an elaborate, fuzzy scenario in which ceasefire seemed to be followed by negotiations on withdrawal and then, after that, negotiations on the islands. In response to this I repeatedly stressed to Zinn that a ceasefire and an Argentine troop withdrawal had to accompany each other—that the British would not likely go for anything less. Zinn claimed Argentine withdrawal was simple; it could be verified easily—“But how could a British fleet withdrawal be verified?” I said it was inconceivable to me that Britain would go back on their word—if they did and the fleet stole back into position, international opinion would be outraged. I emphasized again to him the importance of an immediate Argentine withdrawal. In response, Zinn said he would pass that word to Ros at the UN and to Junta members and that he would emphasize the need for a simple, quick agreement.<sup>3</sup>

Zinn then said he had one other major point to make. He urged that as soon as a settlement is reached that the US appeal to Argentine and Latin public opinion by quickly announcing several steps—withdrawal of our economic measures and certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales. These steps, he said, if taken immediately would do a great deal to repair the damage done to US-Argentine relations. I promised to pass on his views.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand, likely Haig's, drew two parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> Middendorf wrote his initials “JWM” in the margin below this paragraph.

**250. Memorandum From the Intelligence Community Staff to  
Director of Central Intelligence Casey**

Washington, May 11, 1982

[Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, System Four Files, 1982 SYS 4 INT 40101–40150. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

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**251. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

*POINTS FOR GUERREIRO*

1. Suggest you *not* go over the framework set with Figueiredo; Guerreiro's attitudes on the Soviet and Peronista dangers are much more relaxed. Merely say we should start where the President left off.<sup>2</sup>

2. Put matrix forward as our understanding of where two parties are now (Promise copies of earlier US position but first address matrix). Cite as main problems:

—On *geographic coverage*, Argentines want the three groups included: Brits only one. Don't see how the Argentines can prevail.

—On *interim administration*, Argentines want no role for the local elected representatives. British insist on it, although we have brought them to accept that the colonial administration cannot be reintroduced. Obvious compromise comes from our earlier proposals: add elected representatives proportional to the Argentine population but not less than one in each Council. "Respecting" the wishes of the inhabitants in some clear manner is a major Thatcher aim. This Argentine demand is tougher than in our discussions: BA should give.

—On *freedom of movement and property purchase*, Argentina wants a blanket commitment in the interim period, Brits want none. This is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Secret; Sensitive. The talking points, prepared for Haig for his scheduled May 12 meeting with Guerreiro, were forwarded to the Secretary by Enders under a May 11 briefing memorandum. No memorandum of conversation of Haig's May 12 meeting with Guerreiro has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan was scheduled to meet with Figueiredo. See Document 255.

the “Sudetenland” question.<sup>3</sup> Too controversial to be settled in the transitional agreement itself. Should be topic of negotiation.

—On *withdrawal*, Argentines want mainland vs. 2000 NM; Brits want parity in miles: We had thought of parity in redeployment time. This fencing reveals a radical lack of mutual confidence. A UN role in the agreement may not be enough. Should others in some form “guarantee” the agreement (that was the case in the Rio Protocol on the Peru/Ecuador dispute),<sup>4</sup> e.g., by assisting in verification.

—On *sovereignty and self-determination*, each side wants a commitment. Compromise should acknowledge differing views of both.

—On *length of the agreement*: Argentines fear a new deadlock, and want assurance they will receive—or again act to claim—the islands. Brits don’t want to be put in a position in which, when time runs out, they either have to agree—or send a new task force. Our earlier solution was to go for decolonization, and give Argentina a veto on the future status of the islands—but to otherwise leave the negotiations unimpaired. Think we ought to reintroduce this position, with the notion that if the negotiations do not succeed, both parties would submit again to mediation or other measures consistent with Article 33 of the UN Charter, and Resolution 502 would continue to apply.

3. (Mr. Secretary: *You may or may not want to go on, depending on what Guerreiro says.*) Main point is this: Secretary General will now try his formulation to bridge the gap. We don’t know whether that will work or not.<sup>5</sup> But odds seem against it. Shouldn’t the two of us, or maybe four (with say Peru and W. Germany), or six (with Venezuela and France) now tell both sides how concerned we are, and what we can support? Idea would not be to propose another plan, but rather to have approaches, you to BA, us to London, saying essentially the same thing, in *private*, with a view towards encouraging a deal. You would say what we are pushing in London; we would say what you are pushing in BA. Otherwise the conflict can get out of control and damage us all—needlessly. In other words, we should try to take control of events, rather than merely submit to them.

4. If you agree, we could try to work out ideas to promote while you are here, in a working group.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia which was ceded to Germany under the 1938 Munich Agreement.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the 1942 agreement that ended the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1941–1942.

<sup>5</sup> Haig drew a parallel line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and the previous two sentences. Next to the line, he wrote: “?”

**252. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1982, 0210Z

222303/TDFIR-314/00731-82. Dist: 11 May 1982.

Country: Argentina/United Kingdom/USSR/El Salvador.

Subject: Comments of Argentine Government officials on relations with the United States and other countries as a result of the dispute over the Falkland Islands (DOI: Late April—4 May 1982).

Source: [3½ lines not declassified].

1. On 27 April 1982, Argentine Army General Alberto Carlos ((Lucena)), Director of the Military Academy, said that President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) had recently told Army generals that he (Galtieri) felt “cornered” by the pressure being exerted by the U.S. Secretary of State and felt he had to “break out” from under the pressure. Lucena added that it was a well-accepted idea within the army that the U.S. Government wants the Falkland Islands to be independent so the United States can establish a base in the South Atlantic similar to its base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (Source comment: Lucena did not specify that the comment about the independence of the Falklands had been made by Galtieri.)

2. Between 1 and 3 May, Raul ((Quijano)), Argentine Ambassador to the Organization of American States, said that he expected Argentina to break relations with the United States because of the latter’s announcement on 30 April of its support for the British position in the dispute over the Falkland Islands.

3. On 3 or 4 May, Army Colonel Mario O. ((Davico)), Deputy Chief of the Army Intelligence Service (SIE), said that Galtieri and Foreign Minister Nicanor ((Costa Mendez)) were solely responsible for the fact that diplomatic relations had not been severed with the United States.<sup>2</sup> Davico said there had been a great deal of pressure for Argentina to break diplomatic relations, but he did not specify the nature or the source of that pressure.

4. Davico said the general opinion within the Argentine Army was that Argentina should accept assistance from the Soviet Union only in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 12, 1982 Falklands. Secret; Noform; Wnintel. Sent to the National Security Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the White House Situation Room, the NSC Staff, the CIA Office of Current Operations, JSOC, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT. Haig initialed the first page.

<sup>2</sup> Haig drew a line from the end of this sentence to the right-hand margin next to the paragraph and wrote: “Bull!”

the case of absolute necessity; in such a case, it would be accepted.<sup>3</sup> Speaking personally, Davico said he believed that British bombing of the Argentine mainland would constitute a case of “absolute necessity”.

5. Davico said it was unclear what effect the current problem over the Falkland Islands would have on Argentine activities in El Salvador; he said that Argentina had a major political investment in El Salvador, but the Argentine Government might decide to withdraw.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Haig wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: “Tell them to do so!”

<sup>4</sup> Haig wrote in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Tell them again to do so!” A typewritten transcription of this notation next to the handwriting indicates it was made on May 12.

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**253. Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Shlaudeman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders)<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, May 12, 1982, 1540Z

[*telegram number not declassified*] For Assistant Secretary Enders from Shlaudeman. Subject: Walters Visit.<sup>2</sup> Ref: [*less than 1 line not declassified*].<sup>3</sup>

On Tuesday May 11 at 7 p.m. I<sup>4</sup> saw President Galtieri at his private apartment at 179 Calle 11 de Septiembre in Buenos Aires. Present were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> Haig wrote that Walters’s mission to Buenos Aires “eliminated any possibility that the desperate leaders of Argentina would collaborate in their last moments with the Soviet Union.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 295)

<sup>3</sup> In the reference message, Shlaudeman conveyed a brief summary report of Walters’s May 11 evening meeting with Galtieri and his May 12 morning meeting with Lami Dozo. Shlaudeman noted that Walters had “so far detected no dramatic breakthrough” with the Argentines. Walters, the Ambassador continued, “does perceive somewhat less emphasis on sovereignty and more on ‘equal rights’ for Argentines and British on the Islands during the interim period. You know what that means.” Shlaudeman also reported that Galtieri was attempting to arrange a meeting between Walters and Anaya. (Telegram 990 from Buenos Aires, May 12; Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1])

<sup>4</sup> Walters.



President Galtieri, General Sotera—G-2 Argentine Army, Ambassador Walters and LCDR. Martiny. The entire conversation was in Spanish.

President greeted me effusively with a big bear hug and said that before anything else he wanted to thank me for having traveled so far.

I said that 20,000 klms was a small distance to travel if it could save one human life. Secretary Haig asked me to say that we have an enduring desire that some way can be found, in the United Nations or elsewhere to solve honorably the Malvinas problem. The Secretary is convinced that we must look beyond this problem to our important long term relationship. We must prevent a scission of the OAS into Spanish speaking and English speaking factions. I said Secretary Haig asked me to tell Galtieri of our continuing desire to see this war between friends settled peacefully. NATO remains a vital barrier to Soviet expansion in Europe.

He noted the remarks I made yesterday in Washington about the machismo of women being even more sensitive than that of men.<sup>5</sup> He agreed the war is a pointless conflict between two nations whose interests everything [*everywhere?*] should bind them together. He looks forward to the day when he can shake hands with Mrs. Thatcher. General Sotera said that she was through. President Galtieri disagreed. The British do not react that way and she has just won her municipal elections.

I answered that we believed that he alone has the authority to achieve a settlement favorable and fair to both sides. Any rumors he might have heard that the U.S. is plotting against him at any level, are absolutely false. I gave him my word of honor as a U.S. Army officer that there is no truth to those rumors. (Embassy told me before my meeting that rumors of the CIA plotting against him are widespread in Buenos Aires). He accepted my assurances. I said such action would be folly on our part. He had proved his leadership and his friendship towards us.

He then assured me that the Argentines would continue to support us in Central America. In fact General Sotera had just returned from there.

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<sup>5</sup> In a May 10 briefing at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Walters was reported to have described the South Atlantic crisis as a “silly war” and a “conflict of two machismos.” Citing a British press report of the event, the Embassy in London reported that Walters “said he was not attributing blame but, in an obvious reference to Mrs. Thatcher, added ‘The machismo of woman is even more sensitive than the machismo of men.’” (Telegram 10420 from London, May 11; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820247–0421)

Galtieri said that Secretary Weinberger's blunt statements<sup>6</sup> are causing anti-American feelings to grow in the armed forces and while he understands that we might feel the need to side with Britain, he hopes we can tone down these statements. President Galtieri observed that the evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel from Buenos Aires<sup>7</sup> caused an unfavorable impression in the armed services. He had assured me previously that Argentina is not Iran. It is a civilized Western country and he will not tolerate any terrorism against U.S. citizens.

President Galtieri said that Argentine public opinion is inflamed by the armed conflict, not only against the UK but against the U.S. as well. He said that while he understood that the U.S. would eventually have to side with the UK, it could have been done more gently. If Spain and the UK get into a conflict over Gibraltar he will have to side with Spain. I said that he should not have seemed surprised. The Secretary had told him several times that if the negotiations broke down, we would have to do this. He acknowledged that fact but regretted the strong language used.

He said that after the sinking of the *Belgrano*, the Argentines badly needed a success. I pointed out the sinking of the *Sheffield* was a considerable success and that now we have a unique opportunity to overcome the major obstacles to an agreement. These are the Argentine insistence upon prejudging the sovereignty issue and the British insistence upon self determination for the inhabitants. I thought we were moving on the latter and we had sensed, perhaps mistakenly, some Argentine movement on the former. If we could overcome these two difficulties we would be well on the way towards an honorable solution.

He asked what guarantee the Argentines would have of eventual sovereignty. What could he tell his people they had gotten for their sacrifices. Several hundred Argentines have been killed. I said that the contact group, as I understood it, would ensure that the negotiations were successfully concluded in a predetermined period of time.

General Sotera said that the fighting made this problem more difficult. I replied that more fighting would further complicate it. I am not trying to negotiate wording merely to point out, as a friend, our perception of the sticking points. I appealed to them to seize this opportunity before the conflict escalates further.

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<sup>6</sup> Not further identified, but possibly statements that Weinberger may have made in Brussels at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting. A communiqué issued on May 6 by the Defense Ministers strongly supported the United Kingdom and condemned Argentina's "armed invasion" of the Falklands. (Paul Lewis, "Briton Demands Total Withdrawal by Argentina," *New York Times*, May 7, p. A15)

<sup>7</sup> See Document 210 and footnote 3 thereto.

President Galtieri asked how long I planned to remain in Buenos Aires. I answered that I planned to leave on the evening of May 12; but if there is anyone he wanted me to see, I am entirely at his disposal and can remain another day. I told President Galtieri that Air Force Commander Brig. Lami Dozo called the Embassy in Buenos Aires to ask to talk to me. I delayed answering him until I could ask President Galtieri if he wanted me to talk to him. Galtieri replied that he told Lami Dozo I was here and had no objection whatever to my talking to him.<sup>8</sup> Galtieri said he would be busy tomorrow morning but would keep in touch with me through General Sotera, if he wanted me to talk to anyone else. He said the Navy is absolutely convinced that we are passing ship locations to the British in the area around the Falklands. I replied that our exchanges with the British are normal ones, involving primarily the Soviets and the Chinese. The British have excellent and sophisticated sources of their own for the South Atlantic.

President Galtieri said he heard that the British asked U.S. for KC-135 air-to-air refueling tankers for their aircraft in flight.<sup>9</sup> I replied that I personally did not know of any such request. The British have Victor tankers that enable them to refuel their Vulcan bombers. He said the British had not used any Vulcans in the fighting at the Islands. That the bombing had all been done by Sea Harriers. I told him that the British did not tell us of their military operations in advance; but I was quite sure they had used Vulcans. (Comment: He let the matter drop but if he really believes that they did not use Vulcans it would seem Argentine commanders in the Islands are not reporting accurately.) He commented humorously that he was looking for a substantial contribution from Exocet as their stock had gone way up following the sinking of the *Sheffield*.

He spoke of his attachment to the United States and for Army Chief of Staff Shy Meyer in particular. He wanted to look beyond current events to continuing our close association. I reminded him that I told him earlier that I did not know who would win the battle for the Malvinas, but that the only winner of the war would be the Soviet Union. He agreed. So did Sotera, reluctantly.

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 254.

<sup>9</sup> A May 11 *New York Times* article, which cited comments by "Administration officials" the previous day, reported that the United Kingdom "asked the United States to lend the Royal Air Force a long-range KC-135 aerial tanker to refuel British bombers and reconnaissance planes based on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic." The article continues: "The officials said that no decision had been made on the request but that a reply to London was expected within the next 48 hours. They emphasized that no United States airmen would fly the plane, if the loan were made." (Richard Halloran, "Britain Asks U.S. to Lend It an Air Force Tanker," *New York Times*, May 11, p. A7)

I thanked him for the efficient and discreet way in which my arrival at the airport was handled. He said that he much appreciated the Secretary's sending me such a great distance. He knew I was a friend. He would be pondering what I told him and would get back to me on May 12 through Sotera, probably in the afternoon. In the meantime I was free to talk to Lami Dozo.

As I left, he said that he would seek help but not at the price of letting the Soviets have any say in Argentina.

He again assured me that U.S. personnel would be protected.

Any massive invasion of the Islands would greatly aggravate the problem.

He accepted my assurances that neither the Ambassador nor anyone else in the Embassy was plotting against him, but suggested that they keep a low profile at present.

He noted what I told him about the sticking points and looked forward to talking to me again. He asked me to convey his best wishes to the Secretary and General Meyer.

His attitude while not evidencing any additional give was as friendly toward me as it has ever been. He, too, clearly looks beyond the present crisis and wants to control damage to U.S./Argentine relations. He was clearly very pleased by my reassurance of friendship toward him and his government. Conversation lasted two hours.

He gave me a bear hug as we parted.

**254. Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Shlaudeman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders)<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, May 12, 1982, 1540Z

[*telegram number not declassified*] For Assistant Secretary Enders from Shlaudeman. Subject: Walters Visit. Ref: [*less than 1 line not declassified*].<sup>2</sup>

Memorandum of Conversation

Place: Air Force Commander-in-Chief's Office, Buenos Aires

Time: 0800 hours, 11 May 1982<sup>3</sup>

Present: Brigadier General (Lieutenant General Lami Dozo, Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Air Force, and Ambassador Vernon Walters)

1. At his request, I<sup>4</sup> saw General Lami Dozo and explained to him that the Secretary had sent me to express to the Argentines the importance we attach to the relationship between our two countries over the long term and beyond the present situation. He replied that this made him very happy; for he feels strongly that Argentina is part of the West and that relations with the U.S. are of capital and vital importance to Argentina. He said that in the current situation the Soviets are offering equipment and assistance at very low prices; but he realizes that the money is only part of the price for Soviet assistance. The Argentines are not prepared to pay that price. I assured him that the U.S. is not in any way dabbling in internal Argentine affairs, nor will it do so; we had been burned once with the Peron-Braden controversy.<sup>5</sup> Our main interest is in finding a peaceful and honorable solution for two of our major friends and allies, both of whom are important parts of the free world. He asked me what I thought are the principal difficulties in the negotiations and whether the U.S. objects to the U.N. forum. He said he believes that the UN negotiations are at a dead end.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 253.

<sup>3</sup> The meeting actually took place the morning of May 12, the day after Walters's evening meeting with Galtieri. See Document 253.

<sup>4</sup> Walters.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the 1945 political controversy resulting from charges that U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden was organizing political opponents of Argentine leader Juan Perón. For documentation relating to this incident, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, The American Republics, pp. 366–559.

I replied that obviously we would have preferred results from the Haig mediation but we would be delighted to see a just and peaceful solution in any forum. I believed that the principal sticking points are, on the British side, the importance they attach to self-determination for the inhabitants and, on the Argentine side, the demand for recognition of Argentine sovereignty before the negotiations. I believe that we will be able, through the use of the wording “aspirations and wishes” of the inhabitants, to overcome some part of the British objection. I sensed movement on the Argentine side on the precondition of sovereignty. General Lami Dozo said that the sticking point on sovereignty is a result of the contacts the Junta has with the leaders of the political parties. They are the ones who are very tough on this issue, particularly the Peronistas. He believes that for the Argentines the freedom of access and the opening up of the Islands during the interim period before a final settlement is essential. I said the British feel that the Argentines will flood the Islands with Argentines during this period. He said that will not happen but that it is very difficult for the Argentines to accept a requirement for them to have to get a visa from the British to go to the Falklands. He said that it is cosmetically very important that there be equality of rights for Argentines and British. I pointed out to him that the latest proposal, seemingly accepted by the British, would for the first time sever the administrative link between London and the Falklands. Lami Dozo said that it is terribly important that we work together to limit the damage from the present controversy. The Navy is extremely agitated, and he feels it would be useful if I could see and talk to the Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Anaya. I said if the President and he feel this is important I would be glad to do it. He called President Galtieri who agreed to try to set up the appointment for later today.<sup>6</sup> Lami Dozo said that the Navy is convinced that the U.S. is passing great amounts of intelligence to the British. I explained that our intelligence exchange with the British is the normal one, chiefly directed at the Northern Hemisphere. My own impression is that currently they have far better intelligence on the South Atlantic than we do. He said that this is his impression also and that their knowledge of ship movements is absolutely astonishing; but feels it will be useful if I could talk to the Navy. He believes that the negotiations should now be continued in two phases: the Secretary General of the U.N. should call for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Britain

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<sup>6</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Walters’s meeting with Anaya has been found. In his memoirs, Haig wrote of the Walters-Anaya exchange: “‘No matter what happens,’ Anaya said, ‘I will never, repeat never, turn to the Soviet Union. It would betray everything for which I stand.’ Anaya spoke of the dead sailors and of his long friendship with Galtieri; they had been comrades since the age of twelve.” (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 295)

with a Latin American country, a West European country, and perhaps one or two others. I said the advantage of having the U.S. in such a group was that we had considerable influence over the British, even though they did not advise us in advance of their military operations. He agreed and then said as second step President Galtieri and Mrs. Thatcher should get together in some third country under UN auspices to work out final details of an agreement. He did not seem to have a sense of urgency like Galtieri's. He said that the evacuation of U.S. dependents had produced an unfavorable impression among the Argentine military, who felt that service families should be the last to leave, not the first. He has been asked to remove or limit the flying of the U.S. Air Attache's aircraft and has refused to do so, saying that Argentina was a Western country and should not make the task of restoring relations with the U.S. after the present situation any more difficult.

2. He was very composed and moderate throughout and gave me the impression that the long-term relationship between the U.S. and Argentina is more important to him than the Malvinas. He addressed me as Dick and asked me to call him Arturo. (I have known him for several years) The meeting lasted about one hour and was conducted in Spanish. He said that either he or Galtieri would get back to me about the appointment with Admiral Anaya later in the day. He is quite an impressive figure, showing a considerable degree of thoughtfulness and moderation, a most unusual quality in the present circumstances here.

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## 255. Editorial Note

On May 12, 1982, Brazilian President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo began a 2-day State visit to Washington, the first for a Brazilian head of state in 11 years. In a May 11 action memorandum to President Ronald W. Reagan, prepared in anticipation of Figueiredo's arrival, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William P. Clark indicated that the visit was "designed to cap a rapprochement" with Brazil "that began early in this administration." "Brasilia," he continued, "even before the Falkland crisis erupted, remains cautious. Few in the Brazilian establishment expect to return to the days of 'automatic alignment' with the United States." He concluded: "The issue that will probably dominate the discussion is the Falkland crisis. Figueiredo will explain Brazil's position which does not support Argen-

tina's use of force, but does accept Argentina's claim to the Malvinas. You should know, too, that Brazil is concerned about our tilt toward Britain. Moreover, President Figueiredo's interest is directly engaged because he is the author of Brazil's rapprochement with Argentina begun several years ago—a policy which ended decades of strained relations between Brasilia and Buenos Aires. Therefore, he wants to preserve good relations with Argentina. He will also express concern over the future of inter-American relations. Above all, he does not want this hemisphere polarized. He does not want to have to choose between friendship with the Spanish speaking republics and the United States." The memorandum forwarded a May 6 briefing memorandum prepared by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig as well as eight background papers prepared in the Department of State and a list of talking points and public statements for Reagan's use, and recommended that Reagan read them. All of Clark's recommendations outlined in the May 11 action memorandum were approved. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Brazil—President Figueiredo Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (2))

According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Figueiredo on four occasions on May 12 and again on the morning of May 13, although no memoranda of conversation of any of these meetings have been found. The talking points prepared for Reagan's first meeting with Figueiredo, held in the Oval Office from 10:42 until 11:38 a.m., May 12, addressed the situation in the South Atlantic: "But as encouraged as I am with the state of our relations, Mr. President, a great tragedy is engulfing our hemisphere. In the South Atlantic two friends of Brazil and the United States are locked in combat. This matter has personally concerned me more than any other as President. My greatest wish which I expressed in my speech to the OAS in February was making this hemisphere secure, prosperous, and at peace because the peoples of this hemisphere have so much to offer the other. That dream is threatened and not by an alien and hostile power. But it is threatened by a quarrel by two friends of this country and yours. There is right on both sides. We need to find a just solution to this problem. I welcome your advice and counsel. My government will welcome your government's cooperation in peacefully resolving this dispute." The talking points continued: "(If asked) Mr. President, as you know my country does not support the first use of force in resolving disputes. If this were permitted in this hemisphere, there would be no end to the mischief created. At the same time, we are neutral on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. We have tried and Secretary Haig has made enormous efforts to help mediate this tragic situation. We still wish to help and again I welcome your views and advice." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Department of State



Briefing Book Re: Visit of President Figueiredo of Brazil 05/11/1982–05/14/1982)

Following this first meeting, an expanded meeting between Reagan and Figueiredo, which included the full U.S. and Brazilian delegations, took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:38 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. The talking points prepared for Reagan's use in this meeting are *ibid.* Reagan and Figueiredo then participated in a meeting with a group of U.S. and Brazilian businessmen in the Roosevelt Room from 12:07 to 12:24 p.m.

On the evening of May 12, President Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan hosted President Figueiredo and his wife at a State dinner at the White House from 7:31 until 10:57 p.m. Although no official record of discussions between the two Presidents that evening has been found, Reagan wrote in his personal diary that he and Figueiredo discussed the South Atlantic at the dinner: "Tonight—State dinner—Sergio Mendez entertains. A really nice dinner & evening. The Pres. [Figueiredo] told me he had a call from his Ambas[sador] in Buenos Aires to the effect the British were about to attack mainland bases in Argentina—that he (The Pres.) must try to intervene with Pres. Galtien [*sic*] & I should get to the British." (Reagan, *Diaries*, page 131) Reagan telephoned British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher the following day, May 13. For the memorandum of conversation of the telephone call, see Document 257.

A final meeting between Reagan and Figueiredo occurred over breakfast, from 9 until 9:43 a.m. on May 13. A copy of the talking points prepared for Reagan's use at the meeting, initialed by Reagan, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Brazil—President Figueiredo Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (1). On the South Atlantic, the document made three points: "Understand you [Figueiredo] and Secretary Haig agreed we should both support Secretary General's efforts for now," "If it appears he [Pérez de Cuéllar] needs help, we should consult again," and "If he does not succeed, we must then consider what we can do together or with others to bring about a peaceful solution." No record of the referenced meeting between Figueiredo and Haig has been found.

256. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 13, 1982, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Esteban Takacs, Argentine Ambassador to the U.S.

J. William Middendorf II, U.S. Ambassador to the OAS

SUBJECT

*Current Status of the Negotiations at the UN*

*Comment:*

This memorandum of a telephone conversation with Takacs also weaves in a corroboratory call I got shortly thereafter from Ricardo Zinn (Argentine businessman apparently sent here as an emissary by the Junta). *This report of these two talks may help shed some light on the confusion here produced by the General Iglesias statement to the Washington Post which cast doubt on whether Argentina is stalling or has been sincere in delinking sovereignty from negotiations.*<sup>2</sup>

Takacs made (and Zinn underscored) the following points to me on the status of the negotiations:

—The GOA has only one consolidated position. As he had told me on the 11th and as I reported,<sup>3</sup> sovereignty and negotiations are delinked. The Iglesias statement was drafted before Costa Mendez's weekend statement.<sup>4</sup>

—He and Raul Quijano have recommended that Galtieri himself go public with this stance in Buenos Aires. (He also has asked the Brazilian Foreign Minister to give assurances to Secretary Haig of Argentine sincerity) and he himself has so stated this yesterday on NBC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger Fontaine Files, OAS [Organization of American States] [May 1982]. Confidential; Limdis. Fontaine wrote at the top of the memorandum that he saw it on May 17.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to a written statement released by Iglesias to the *Washington Post* after an interview with the newspaper on May 11, which stated: "We have said that we pursue only one objective: restore the Malvinas [Falklands] to our national patrimony, place those territories under our sovereignty. We are demanding, therefore, that whatever agreement is arrived at for a peaceful solution should constitute a sure and guaranteed route so that sovereignty will be total and full within a reasonable time." (Jackson Diehl, "Control Is the Only Goal, General Says," *Washington Post*, May 12, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 246.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

—The British now accept Argentine sincerity on the delinking and understand that for the GOA sovereignty is a *goal* but not a *pre-condition* for negotiations.<sup>5</sup> Talks in New York have gone beyond that point.

—In New York, elements of a cease-fire are agreed upon including the timing and conditions of phased withdrawals by both sides under UN supervision during a ten-day period with certain percentages of forces on day one, day three, day five, etc. (Zinn, by the way, confirmed to me that the British negotiators accept these withdrawal terms which would have elements of the fleet pulling back to Ascension Island.)

—The only remaining hang up now is disagreement over the composition of the Advisory/Administrative Council which would serve under UN Commissioners. Argentina wants Argentine/British/Islander representation. The UK wants a Council composed solely of Islanders, which the GOA finds totally unacceptable. To the GOA this British insistence is a clear signal of British intentions to push for self-determination. (Takacs commented that if the UK pushed Independence through this device, it would negate 17 years of negotiations. He added that Galtieri's string has run out so far as concessions are concerned. One more concession and he's out, leaving a Junta absolutely determined on war.)

Takacs then made a plea for U.S. help with the British. He said that the UK may be more inflexible than necessary on this final detail, knowing it has "the indiscriminate support of the U.S." If the U.S. were to soften its support—publicly or privately, the British would compromise on the Advisory Council issue and the rest of the steps could begin—"benefiting the U.S. in Latin America for years to come." I promised to pass on his views.

Takacs then turned to his ideas on repairing damage. With a cease-fire and negotiations almost in place he urged we consider ways to improve our position in the region. He suggested we immediately announce lifting our economic measures.<sup>6</sup> (The same point Zinn made

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 10604 from London, May 13, the Embassy reported that a "well-informed" British FCO source said that "HMG could live with the latest Argentine formula on sovereignty, provided the other major outstanding issues could be resolved satisfactorily. He identified these other issues as: (1) Provision for interim administration; and (2) modalities of withdrawal." In telegram Tosec 70015/130169 to Haig in Ankara, May 13, the Department transmitted the text of telegram 10604. (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1])

<sup>6</sup> Middendorf drew an asterisk after this word, which corresponds to the following handwritten notation at the bottom of the page: "when the ceasefire is in place."

in his talk with me on the 11th). Even before that, however, we should announce that we will not support any escalation of the war by the British—such an announcement would enhance the Secretary's image and have a very positive effect in the region. He commented on the very bad impressions being created by speculation that we were assisting the British military. He mentioned a recent *Time* story and comments by a DOD spokesman he had seen. (I made no substantive comment, merely saying, again, that I would pass on his views).

Takacs added that he had lunched the other day with Rowland Evans and had told him of his fervent hope that "not all that we have sown is lost; not all that we have built is broken." He said that if the U.S. does not participate now in the solution by indicating we will not support escalation, years will be lost in our Hemispheric relationships.

*Comment:*

Takacs obviously is very worried about what may come from escalated hostilities. For what it is worth, however, most of what he had to say to me suggests that a cease-fire perhaps as early as this weekend appears feasible—although, of course, I am not in a position to corroborate his account of the status of the negotiations. If he is right, however, we then can get on with repairing the damage this tragic dispute has caused for the inter-American system.

**257. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

May 13, 1982, 1:40–2:05 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Ronald Reagan (calling from Washington, D.C.)

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of England

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Well. And you?*The President:* Well, I'm fine. I just thought, I knew you'd been in with Parliament, and I thought you might want to hear a friendly voice.*Mrs. Thatcher:* Oh, how kind of you. We've had, yes, we've had quite a difficult time today, as you know you do sometimes with Parliament.<sup>2</sup>*The President:* Yes. Well, listen, I wanted to call and discuss with you some. . . .*Mrs. Thatcher:* . . . negotiations we've done. We can't say what they contain, and Parliament's getting pretty restless. And this is that, where we've come up the crux of the real problem in negotiation. And Argentina wants sovereignty and administration, almost as a condition of her withdrawal, and of course that is what we can't grant.*The President:* Well, now, here is the latest that we have heard here, and then I want to tell you something that came up with the presence here of President Figueiredo of Brazil, who has been here in Washington.<sup>3</sup>*Mrs. Thatcher:* Yes.*The President:* It seems that the Secretary General's talks with Ambassador Parsons and his Argentine counterpart have produced some movement, and specifically, Argentine willingness to enter negotiations now without preconditions, at least, this is what their negotiator in New York says. Now what the junta thinks is less clear. But. . . .*Mrs. Thatcher:* Ah, well, we never know who we're negotiating with.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (May 1982). Secret. All brackets are in the original. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke to Thatcher from the Oval Office from 1:44 until 2:01 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Thatcher was speaking from London. In his personal diary, Reagan wrote of the discussion: "I talked to Margaret but don't think I persuaded her against further action." (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 131) For Thatcher's account of the conversation, see Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, pp. 220–221.

<sup>2</sup> Of the day's proceedings in the House of Commons, Thatcher wrote: "In the debate on Thursday 13 May Conservative back-benchers showed evidence of restlessness about our negotiations. Francis Pym continued to pursue a weaker line than I did and it was not liked." (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 220)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 255.

*The President:* I know. Well, we. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Ros [Enrique Ros, Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs] was saying that yesterday, but then of course Costa Mendez said something different on television.

*The President:* Well, now we didn't get a completely clear signal in Dick Walters' talks yesterday with Galtieri.<sup>4</sup> And . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* You didn't.

*The President:* No, and I understand that the remaining issues center on the composition of interim administrative authority and the number of island groups and freedom of movement between the mainland and the islands.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Yes, they're very important things to us, obviously.

*The President:* Yeah. Well. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* . . . In the interim period can very much affect what happens afterward.

*The President:* But now, just recently, we've been on the phone with the Secretary General, and he now suggests that the two sides are quite close.<sup>5</sup> Is this the way it looks to you? . . . One new element, of course, is the willingness of. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Wouldn't have said the two sides were quite close because there are two very big outstanding things, one, the interim administration. And of course they want an administration that is much, much more Argentinian. . . .

*The President:* Ah, huh.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* . . . than would suit us or our people. [*The President:* Yeah.] And also want to have movement of Argentinian people in constantly and possibly, and so on, and, and that just, just would not suit the Islanders at all. And, also, there's a question of South Georgia, which of course the title is totally different from that of the Falklands.

*The President:* Ah, huh.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And we're in possession of South Georgia. And, so, those are two very, very big points at that moment. But there is the other thing as well, that you don't know quite who you're negotiating with and that what Ros says, we're ready to negotiate without any preconditions about sovereignty, we don't know whether it's true. But the other thing is, if they're saying that, what their ploy obviously is, is to try to arrange an interim administration and conditions to that administration, which would lead inevitably to sovereignty at the end of the period. And the third thing is, there's absolutely no guarantee

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 253.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

that at the end of the period, if they haven't got what they want, they won't just invade again. [*The President*: Uh, huh.] There's quite a long way to go.

*The President*: I see. Well, now, uh. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher*: Now, you tell me what your information is, particularly from General Walters.

*The President*: All right. Well, no, mainly this is what, from President Figueiredo. [*Mrs. Thatcher*: . . . of Brazil.] He admittedly is closer to the Argentine position on the interim administration, but he will support you on a number of, the groups of islands, and on the movement of people between the mainland and the island which he thinks should be subject of negotiation rather than decided in the agreement. And, he. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher*: They're trying to get it into an agreement, of course.

*The President*: Yes. And he thinks that he might be helpful with Galtieri because of the familiarity they have with each other, and he's willing to go ahead on that. But last night, when he came over to the White House, he took me aside immediately. We'd been together during the day, and he said he had just heard from his ambassador in Buenos Aires. And he said the ambassador was telling him that . . . that you were preparing to attack targets on the mainland, in Argentina, and that the admirals down there were underway in movements and so forth, and he told the President that he was the only one who could intervene and have any impact on the Argentinians, and then suggested that I should be doing the same thing with you. And both the President and I, he has agreed and is going to, if he hasn't started already, to get in touch and to try and ask them to hold off as to any further action. And I don't know whether what he said was true about what your plans were or not, with regard to that, but if there is any way in which we can hold off military action, in view of what we're getting from the Secretary General, we can contact him some more and stay in touch with this.

*Mrs. Thatcher*: They attacked our ships yesterday, so they're not holding off on military action. But even if they were, it's easy for them to hold off knowing that I with a task force bobbing around on the sea have not got the length of endurance on the sea which they have on the mainland.

*The President*: Yes, that's right.

*Mrs. Thatcher*: It makes sense for them to say, look, don't have any military action while you're negotiating. And all they've got to do then is to go on and on and on. And we'd be able to get nowhere and have our capacity to take military action steadily whittled away.

*The President*: Yeah.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* So I've said, continuously said, and still say, that the negotiations have not stopped military action nor can they, because the fact is, Ron, we're only getting anywhere as the military pressure builds up. Uh, until it has built up, we've got nowhere.

*The President:* Well. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* But did I understand you, that their president, that the Brazilian president is talking to Galtieri?

*The President:* Yes. Yes, he's doing what he can. You know, Margaret, the one thing with them down there, as it builds up, what we are concerned with very much, you know where we come down, and we've made it very plain where we come down with you, but it is, and it's had a price on what we've been trying to accomplish in creating a better relationship with the Latin states, the South American countries, but we're worried, and so is the president of Brazil, about the original feeling that they were the aggressors, the Argentine, and that was why they did not invoke the Rio Treaty and so forth, but each time they're creating a kind of David-Goliath image now, in which you're Goliath.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Well, I can hardly be Goliath when I have to go eight thousand miles.

*The President:* (laughing) I know, but that's their perception, and I don't know how important it is, the sympathy of the rest of the countries are [or?] not, but this is a great concern of ours as we see them. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Ten per cent of rest of the country is important, but this is what happened: our people did not want to live under an Argentine military rule, nor under Peronista. They've consistently said so, that they would live under democracy. And you wouldn't like to put any of your people to live under a military junta, nor, one, I can't see, which goes to the military junta to Peronistas and terrorists. I can't put mine under that either, without their consent. And I don't think that having had the Islands occupied, the Falklands occupied, and the Falklands is a long way further from the mainland than Trinidad and Tobago are from Venezuela. . . .

*The President:* Yes. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* I don't think that our people having been occupied would be very ready to welcome Argentinian.

*The President:* No. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And it's like the Channel Islands in wartime, when they once had been occupied by the Germans, they're only too delighted to get rid of them.

*The President:* Yep.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* But the title of the Falklands, you know, is not necessarily by a long chalk the Argentinians, they've always refused



to take it to the International Court of Justice. And knowing the title, I can see why. But as they say, because an island four hundred miles, is four hundred miles off the coast, there are a lot of islands, including Trinidad and Tobago, who would shake in their shoes, because they're much, much nearer South American continent.

*The President:* Yes. . . . Well, Margaret, I agree with you that one thing that has been neglected, particularly on the part of the Argentinians, in this whole thing, is consideration for the people on the island who live there. And when I talked to him that first night, trying to get him to turn his task force, his invasion fleet around, when we knew it was on its way, oh, he swore to me up and down that the culture and the lifestyle and the rights of the people on the island would go on just the same as they had always been.<sup>6</sup> Well, we know that isn't true and we know they've made great changes already under this occupation.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* There you are, anyone in the government of Argentina who says that! But, you see, some of our people have been in the Falkland Islands for far more generations than some of the people in Argentina. I had some one in my room just a few days ago—seventh generation in the Falklands.

*The President:* Good Lord.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Now his ancestors were in the Falklands, British. . . .

*The President:* Yeah. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* . . . when many of the ancestors of the Argentinians were still in Spain and Italy. There are only forty Argentinians on the Falkland Island, of whom twenty return regularly to the mainland because they're only there temporarily.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* A country is its people. There are eighteen hundred of ours, five thousand in wartime.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Because it was a very, very important port. And, as a matter of fact, Ron, which I don't know that people have really got hold of: the Falklands are important strategically. You've only got to have the Panama Canal closed and that would be easy. You need a passage through the Magellan Strait.

*The President:* Yes. Yeah.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* You need Port Stanley, and you need it in the hands of an assuredly friendly power. And you need South Georgia. So you can have South Georgia as a summer harbor and Port Stanley as a winter harbor. And it was very important during the last war to the

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 41.

Western world, and it was very important in World War One. Now, you know that the Argentines are getting very close to the (garbled), very close indeed. And one day the junta will fall and the Peronistas will be in control. And you'll then have the Peronistas plus the trade, all with the Soviets. And at that point of time, you and the Western world will need to know that the Falklands are true. And that you can use their Port Stanley.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* It's very, very important, and I thought the last thing anyone wanted was the Russians in Cuba and Russians controlling the Falklands. So there really is a tremendous strategic point and also on South Georgia. Because when the Antarctic is developed, and one day it will be, the port that will be the best port for that development which does not get iced up, is the port in South Georgia. So let's not just tack the thing up to a country that could go under communist rule by the fall of a junta and into the hands of the Peronistas.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And who's never had its people in the Falklands—never, never, never.

*The President:* Yes. I, I. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Anyway, if they say we have no right to be in the Falklands, what right have the Spaniards and the Italians to be in Argentine?

*The President:* (laughing) Yes, yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* That was one of our Venezuelan friends the other day (both laughing) [*The President:* Well. . . .] On weak ground, as far as title is concerned—I've always been prepared to go to the International Court of Justice. And the idea that our people could be put under a junta that might become Peronista, (garbled)—so would you if one of your islands were taken back.

*The President:* Yes, yep.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And they simply cannot say, right, we're prepared to withdraw, but we want to keep what we went and invaded for, namely, sovereignty, and administration.

*The President:* No, they can't have that. That must be in the negotiations. Well, listen, we'll keep on here with the Secretary General and keep in touch and doing whatever we can.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* All right, but Al Haig really was extremely good, and we were very happy to have him as a mediator. But of course we're trying to negotiate, but we cannot say, right, if you withdraw, you will have the very things for which you invade. . . .

*The President:* No, no, it was only that the impression [*Mrs. Thatcher:* Yeah.] we got from talking to the, up at the U.N., was that those main

points now that they had conceded, but, as you say, who are we negotiating with. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Oh, we're negotiating with, and there's quite a bit more to negotiate. But it is conceded that, the arrangement they're trying to get on the interim settlement, is that there're so many extra Argentines going in there with rights and property rights, et cetera, that our people leave. And that maybe is what they want. . . .

*The President:* Well. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* . . . or get it that way.

*The President:* Yeah, well, we know you. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* You know, it's a bit tough on our people, Ron.

*The President:* No, you can't give on that.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* They're hard-working, they've done everything which you and I say in our speeches, they've been loyal, they've been true; all they want is to live their own lives in their own way under a government of their own choice.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And I think it's terrible if the two greatest democracies in the world, yours, as it's the largest and the most powerful, and ours the oldest, don't listen (garbled). . . . [*The President:* Well. . . .] To say that they have to be handed over, to some one they don't want to be handed over to—in the name of what?

*The President:* No, no, I can't quarrel with that.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* I know, you and I make the same speeches.

*The President:* (laughing) Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Well, I'm trying to apply mine to this particular problem. [*The President:* All right. . . .] But it's terribly, it's very helpful to know—it's simply helpful to know what General Walters finds with General Galtieri also. Brazil is, we regard as a friend, you know.

*The President:* Yes.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And, so, it's good to know what their views are and that they will be trying to bring pressure to bear on Galtieri.

*The President:* Well, we'll, we'll convey that to you, when we. . . .

*Mrs. Thatcher:* All right, Ron. Yes, do ring up again, it's marvelous to hear your voice.

*The President:* Well, it's good to talk with you.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* And one does need cheering up now and then.

*The President:* O.K., all right.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* I very much enjoyed seeing George Shultz.<sup>7</sup>

*The President:* Oh, that's fine. Good.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* It's good to say that I think you're absolutely right to try to reduce the deficit by getting expenditure down.

*The President:* Yeah, we think we're gonna succeed in that.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* I think you're going to succeed. All right, Ron, look forward to seeing you soon.

*The President:* O.K., good luck.

*Mrs. Thatcher:* Good bye.

*The President:* Bye.

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<sup>7</sup> Traveling as a Presidential envoy, Shultz met with Thatcher at Chequers on May 9, where the two discussed the upcoming Economic Summit at Versailles and NATO issues. According to a memorandum of conversation, based upon a telephoned report to Eagleburger, they also discussed the Falklands/Malvinas issue, with Shultz reporting that Thatcher was "clearly not overwhelmed by the Falklands" and that she "went out of her way to say some very nice words about Secretary Haig for his efforts to help resolve the Falklands problem." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982)

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## **258. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, May 13, 1982, 2144Z

Secto 7018. Subject: Message From the British on Falklands.

1. The Secretary received today, May 13, 1982, the following message from the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Quote (classified Confidential) (title) Falklands: E.C. Import Embargo. The British Government welcome Mr. Haig's offer to put further pressure on Europeans, and would be grateful for anything further he can do to encourage our EC partners to renew the embargo.<sup>2</sup> The situation is on a knife-edge in a number of capitals. Although most would probably join a consensus if all others favor renewal, there is a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/13/1982. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Haig was in Ankara May 13–15 for meetings with Turkish officials before traveling to Luxembourg for the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 16–18.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 98.

danger of a domino effect if a significant minority comes out against renewal. American influence could be particularly useful with the Italians (although here is the socialists who are chiefly causing problems) and with the Irish (where Mr. Haig will appreciate that our own influence is extremely limited). The Danes are also a problem, but chiefly because of hang-ups over type of Community instrument to be used. The Belgians and Luxembourgers are firm, and we are reasonably confident of the French, Dutch and Greeks. However, there will seem to be some doubts in Bonn and anything Mr. Haig can do to stiffen Germans would also be helpful. End quote.<sup>3</sup>

**Haig**

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<sup>3</sup> The EC, meeting after the NAC meeting, renewed the embargo on May 17. See Documents 268–270.

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**259. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Ankara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982, 0247Z

Tosec 70052/130920. For the Secretary from Acting Secy. Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

1. Nicho came in this afternoon<sup>2</sup> to brief me on where things stand. Basically he confirms that it is clear the two parties are far apart on a number of key issues despite the fact that the Argentines did make an important move on sovereignty two days ago.<sup>3</sup>

2. The specific issues which remain undecided are what happens if there is no agreement by December 31st, the Argentine insistence on free transit from the mainland, the Argentine inclusion of South Georgia and Sandwich Islands, and the formula for consulting the Islanders. On this last point he said Perez has come up with a formula which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> May 13.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

the British are not very keen on which would allow consultations with equal numbers of Islanders and Argentinian residents.

3. He said it is also not clear how the UN administration of the Island which Perez proposes would work.

4. Nicho also said that the formula for the modalities for withdrawal are not agreed; the Argentines insisting the British must withdraw 2000 miles while they withdraw only to the mainland. The UK believes however that if agreement is reached on other elements of the package, the withdrawal modalities will fall into place.

5. Henderson said it was not clear to him what Perez's next move would be. He has heard that the SYG may be preparing a paper on what kind of package he thinks is possible, which paper he might present to the two parties as early as Friday or Saturday.<sup>4</sup> However Henderson said that with the two sides still so far apart, Perez may decide not to do so.

6. Henderson also said the British continue to question whether Ros in New York has authority to speak definitively for Buenos Aires.

7. Henderson stressed that the mood in London is "very bloody-minded". The debate in Commons today was particularly rough with lots of criticism of FCO weakness and willingness to negotiate away the British position.<sup>5</sup> Apparently there was also criticism of the rumored possible inclusion of the Germans in the contact group. Nicho said there was some concern in London about our attitude, with some questioning whether we might be tilting back towards Buenos Aires. (He raised with me, as I gather he had with you, several recent public statements). I assured Henderson that this was not the case and told him you would be sending letters as requested by Pym to the EC,<sup>6</sup> encouraging the maintenance of sanctions. He was pleased to hear this.

8. Henderson said the British are still not clear on what the Argentine strategy is. They suspect Buenos Aires is still playing with them and stringing the British along. This he stated London will not allow; military action in that event would be very likely. He stressed this point several times.

9. Henderson said if there is military action London expects there will be a call for a Security Council meeting out of which might emerge a resolution calling for a ceasefire with no provision for withdrawal. He noted that the British would in that event veto the resolution and would expect us to do so as well.

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<sup>4</sup> May 14 or 15.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 257.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 258.

10. Nicho was warm—even effusive—in his praise for your efforts throughout the crisis. He and I agreed to see each other again Friday to compare notes.

Stoessel

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**260. Telegram From the Defense Intelligence Agency to [text not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982, 0300Z

Subj: DIA Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN) (U).

US-Latin America: Impact of the Falklands Crisis. (U)

1. (S/Nofo) Early signs suggest the Falklands crisis will have negative repercussions on the inter-American system, but bilateral relations with the US will ultimately be driven by each nation's perceived self-interest. Only the multilateral system will be critically affected, although it will probably survive.

2. (S/Nofo) In Costa Rica, Former President Carazo reacted to US support of the UK in the crisis by calling for relocation of the Organization of American States (OAS) headquarters out of Washington. In Venezuela, where the reaction against US support for the UK has been particularly strong, various officials have called for action to reconfigure the OAS into a strictly Latin American body excluding the US. As a more immediate demonstration of official displeasure, the Venezuelan Government canceled a scheduled visit by the USS "Peterson" to Puerto Cabello from 17 to 21 May, giving "political reasons" as the excuse. Venezuela has also announced its decision not to participate in this year's US-South American combined naval exercise UNITAS XXIII.<sup>2</sup> While only Venezuela has officially withdrawn so far,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0067, Falkland Islands April 1982. Secret; Nofo.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 65. In a May 11 memorandum for the record, Forster reported a conversation he had with Robayo and Gilly regarding the rumored Venezuelan abstention from UNITAS XXIII. The Venezuelans also elaborated on their government's attitude toward U.S. South Atlantic policy: "The thrust of the message was that all South American nations were grieved over the US's support of the UK in the Falkland issue. USA's sudden and inexplicable shift from a position of neutrality to pro-British had dealt a fatal blow to the Inter-American System. South America would now have to look elsewhere for leadership." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others may well follow suit, threatening cancellation of the entire operation.

3. (S/Nofofn) Many of the more strident public statements and symbolic diplomatic reactions can be attributed to the high degree of emotionalism surrounding the crisis and a pervasive Latin American feeling of abandonment by the US. With time, these emotions will subside and tensions lessen as more pragmatic concerns come to the fore. In this context, each nation's perceived self-interest and reliance on assistance from the US will weigh heavily in forming policies and actions regarding Washington. Thus, except for the nations most immediately affected by Washington's backing of the UK, bilateral relations are not likely to be severed unless the US commits itself to active military involvement on the side of the British.

4. (S/Nofofn) The long-term impact of the present crisis will be felt most in the multilateral arena. The inter-American system—structured around the OAS, the Rio Treaty, and a web of mutual agreements—has been in a weakened condition for years. US actions in the present crisis will weaken the system further. But its total disappearance is not yet likely. The OAS serves a useful purpose, if only as a common forum for exchanging views, airing problems, and seeking relief from a multitude of pressures. Thus, it is likely to survive, although it may well be reconfigured. The US role within the organization will probably be further eroded, as will US influence. On the other hand, the tendency of Latin American nations to pressure in unison for concessions from the US will clearly be strengthened. Any significant additional crisis could well weaken the system beyond its ability to sustain itself.

5. (S/Nofofn) Regarding the Rio Treaty, the nations in the Hemisphere have grown more realistic over the years. They realize their own dependence on the US security umbrella, and until they find a better substitute, they will continue to depend on US protection in the nuclear age. The Rio Treaty will retain some function and will be called on by signatories in crises where it is perceived helpful. But other associations and bodies will also be asked to participate, and the Rio Treaty role is not likely to be exclusive.

6. (S/Nofofn) To some extent, repercussions of the present crisis are a hemispheric coming of age. Reliance on the old systems for all solutions is no longer seen as practicable, and of necessity. Each nation will seek its own friends in international affairs.



**261. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Ankara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982, 0310Z

Tosec 70054/130929. For the Secretary from Enders. Subject: Next Steps in the Falklands.

1. We are not sure what the British deadline is for starting landing operations on the Falklands, but it is probably no later than May 17.<sup>2</sup> By then (barring a storm) all amphibious units in the South Atlantic will have closed on the islands, and the May 15 EC meeting should have extended the sanctions for a month.

2. The costs go up drastically for us when the British land on the Islands. Some action against mainland airfields is almost bound to precede landing, but may not be very effective. Once landed, it is likely to be some time before the outcome is known. There will be casualties, possibly on a large scale, and a storm of anti-American feeling in the Hemisphere. It is possible that Britain will not succeed—the worst of all possible outcomes for us, confronting us with the choice of doing what is necessary for Britain to succeed—and going down to defeat with the “colonialist” power. If the British do succeed, on the other hand, we are locked into a long term “anti-colonial” struggle on (in Latin terms) the wrong side. We lose either way.

3. The current negotiating position does not look promising. Thatcher on the phone to the President today was pessimistic.<sup>3</sup> So apparently was Pym to you.<sup>4</sup> Guerreiro also is not very hopeful, based on his contacts today.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the right-hand margin of the telegram, Gompert wrote: “Enders thoughts on Falkland: Next Steps. *Enders* recommends you contact Pym; *Eagleburger* believes we should wait it out.” Haig wrote at the top and in the right-hand margin of the telegram: “*Dave*: It might be possible. However, I fear neither side is ready for final big steps required—what do you think? Larry should meet w/Henderson ASAP—review bidding and provide me refined thinking by mid-afternoon. *Larry only* w/Henderson.—He should discuss cautiously Option A (substance) thru modalities but only as (what if?).”

<sup>2</sup> Gompert wrote “(Monday)” in the space above the date. A report sent by USDAO in London to the DIA, dated May 13 and forwarded to Weinberger by General Brown the same day, concluded: “British task force is now nearing readiness for assault on Falklands and, barring diplomatic breakthrough and/or unfavorable weather conditions, probably will strike within seven to ten days of 820517.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 257.

<sup>4</sup> No record of this exchange between Haig and Pym has been found.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably May 13. See Document 255.

4. Walters reports<sup>6</sup> the Junta unified on the current Argentine position of exclusive UN administration, freedom of movement and land purchase. By implication the neutral sovereignty paragraph may be acceptable. Walters did not directly bring up the South Georgia issue, because of its sensitivity.

5. You have Henderson report by septel.<sup>7</sup> It is coordinate with the others.

6. It seems clear that without massive outside pressure, the Secretary General's effort will fail. That leaves us with three alternatives:

A.<sup>8</sup> To attempt, with Brazil, to push the two parties into agreement—on the basis of one set of Islands, an essentially UN administration (the inevitable counterpart of a neutral negotiations paragraph), and freedom of movement to be made one of the subjects of negotiation.<sup>9</sup> The problem is that the Secretary General's effort may already have lost credibility, and we may be throwing good money after bad. On the other hand, Brazil would no doubt prefer.<sup>10</sup>

B. To encourage Britain to tell the Secretary General that its flexibility is at an end (as I understand Argentina already has), without waiting for Perez to put forward a single piece of paper, thereby provoking an end to the mediation effort and a new Security Council meeting. Way would then be open for an immediate new negotiating proposal, which<sup>11</sup> might be Brazil-US telling the two sides what they can support. You and Guerreiro would meet in New York on Sunday<sup>12</sup> for the purpose; the two Presidents would approach Thatcher and Galtieri. Galtieri idea of a summit meeting could be dangled as bait, provided agreement can be reached beforehand.

C. Let nature take its course. Perez fails, Thatcher must land. And something like (B) emerges next week. The problem then is that Hemispheric opinion is even more violently opposed to US, we have a new

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<sup>6</sup> Not further identified and not found.

<sup>7</sup> Gompert drew a line from this word and wrote: "(not yet rec'd)." See Document 259.

<sup>8</sup> Haig circled A, B, and C in this and the following two paragraphs.

<sup>9</sup> In this sentence, Haig underlined "one set of Islands" and numbered it "1," underlined "an essentially UN administration" and numbered it "2," numbered "the inevitable counterpart of a neutral negotiations paragraph" with "3," and numbered "freedom of movement" with a "4."

<sup>10</sup> In the last two sentences, Haig underlined "have lost credibility" and "On the other hand, Brazil would no doubt prefer." In the right-hand margin, he placed a bracket next to the whole paragraph and wrote "this will be formula but not this way."

<sup>11</sup> Beginning with this word, Haig underlined the rest of the paragraph. Gompert wrote "?" in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>12</sup> May 16.

separation of forces problem, and we would be open to Suez-like charges of having stopped a winning operation at the critical point.

7. My own recommendation is that you seriously consider (A) or (B).<sup>13</sup> In that case, you should call Pym immediately to set up the play. We would approach Figueiredo in Cleveland.<sup>14</sup> I am not able (too late) to report to you Walt's<sup>15</sup> view. My basic reasoning is that we should nail B.A. with the neutral negotiating paragraph now it is on the table.

8. Undersecretary Eagleburger's comment: Tom's description of the possible consequences of failure to reach a settlement may prove correct, but we have known of those possible costs for some time. Apparently Mrs. Thatcher reacted badly to today's call<sup>16</sup> (so Henderson says). Unless we are prepared to put whatever pressure is necessary on HMG to settle, I see little reason to believe any US-Brazilian move can succeed. Maggie is not going to budge. Suez cuts two ways. I recommend we wait it out.<sup>17</sup>

**Stoessel**

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<sup>13</sup> Gompert underlined "seriously consider (A) or (B)" and wrote "*Enders*" in the right-hand margin.

<sup>14</sup> Figueiredo left Washington on May 13 and traveled to Cleveland for a private visit.

<sup>15</sup> Stoessel.

<sup>16</sup> See Document 257.

<sup>17</sup> Gompert placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to the paragraph and wrote "*Eagleburger*" next to it.

## 262. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Ankara<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 14, 1982, 1817Z

Tosec 70069/132007. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.  
Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. As you requested,<sup>2</sup> Larry and I met with Henderson this morning. We began by expressing our concern that yesterday's events<sup>3</sup> not be seen as anything more than an attempt by the President to stay in touch at the highest levels with the British Government. Henderson said he understood but once again repeated he thought it had been a mistake to have made the phone call. I said in light of situation you had asked me to say that you would be happy to change your plans in Athens Saturday<sup>4</sup> to enable you to meet earlier in the day with Pym in Luxembourg for an intense exchange of views on the situation if Pym wanted that. Henderson told me that he was very grateful for the offer. He said there will be an important Cabinet meeting at Chequers Sunday morning<sup>5</sup> to which he and Tony Parsons are returning tonight. He did not know how long the meeting would go and, additionally, there was the complication of the EC meeting Sunday afternoon. He said he would get back to us quickly with Pym's answer.

3. At the Cabinet meeting he said he would be asked to give his view on the US Government's position on the crisis now. He said he was somewhat concerned that there might be a shift both in US public opinion and a possible tilt within certain parts of the administration

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Stadis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 7024 from Ankara, May 14, Haig instructed Eagleburger to meet with Henderson "as soon as possible" to "clear the air" in the aftermath of the Reagan-Thatcher telephone conversation (see Document 257) and "review the bidding on substance and procedure." On the first objective, Haig told Eagleburger: "you should explain that the sole purpose of yesterday's call was simply to stay in touch at the highest level, as the President and Prime Minister have done throughout the crisis." On the second, Haig provided a list of talking points, adding that Eagleburger "should engage Henderson" in "a manner that contains no hint that we are pressing new formulae on the British." (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]) The instructions followed the outline prescribed by Haig in his handwritten note on telegram Tosec 7005. See footnote 1, Document 261.

<sup>3</sup> A reference to the May 13 telephone conversation between Reagan and Thatcher. See Document 257.

<sup>4</sup> May 15. Haig was scheduled to be in Athens for talks with Greek officials.

<sup>5</sup> May 16.

(he was referring to yesterday's events and the President's letters to Latin Americans<sup>6</sup> as well as to some high-level administration statements.) Henderson noted this came when there was a "considerable stiffening" in British opinion. Here he cited the Times editorial Wednesday<sup>7</sup> which attacked the US-Peruvian plan as a "sell out". He was concerned that the idea was being allowed to develop in the US press that the Argentines had been forthcoming on the issue of sovereignty and therefore now it was time for the British to compromise. We reassured him that there had been no change whatsoever in US policy and encouraged him to remember what we are doing in the way of materiel support for the British. We stated we thought the British were okay in US public opinion as long as there was no US direct military involvement and as long as the British still look to be trying to resolve the issue peacefully.

4. As you asked, I then took him through your specific suggestions per reftel. During the course of our conversation it became clear that in London the key stumbling block remains the interim administration on the Island. On this issue, Nicko said even the left wing would attack Mrs. Thatcher if she gave in. He noted that she had already moved back considerably from her initial insistence on returning the British Governor to the Island. While it was true that the Argentines had come forward with a reasonable compromise on sovereignty, they were trying to take back everything on the interim administration. (At the same time, he noted that Galtieri's statements to the press Thursday had been contrary to the Argentine position on sovereignty presented in New York Tuesday.)<sup>8</sup> Henderson stated that the key concern in Parliament is over the role of the Islanders in any eventual outcome. The present Argentine position, he asserted, would in effect allow them de facto control over the Islands. He again referred to an idea which apparently is circulating at the UN Secretariat for the UN administration to consult "equal numbers of British and Argentines" on the Island. This, given the disproportion in numbers, would be entirely unacceptable.

5. Henderson was interested in your formula (para 5B reftel)<sup>9</sup> on the pragmatic issues of freedom of movement. He took them down

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 204.

<sup>7</sup> May 12.

<sup>8</sup> In a television interview on May 13, Galtieri said of the sovereignty issue: "We are not going to renounce this objective." (Leonard Downie Jr., "British Plan No Halt in Hostilities," *Washington Post*, May 14, p. A1)

<sup>9</sup> The paragraph in telegram Secto 7024 reads as follows: "With regard to terms of reference for negotiations, we believe the current neutral formulation is best and should be preserved. Indeed, we should try to lock this up while it is on the table. However, as is surely clear by now to HMG, this will require tradeoffs with other provisions, especially interim administration and freedom of movement." (See footnote 2 above.)

carefully and thought they might be acceptable to the British but doubted very much the Argentines could accept it. He also noted that the Falkland Islands Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of another British company whose stock is publicly held and traded in London so that anybody can presumably buy stock at least in the parent company.

6. On withdrawal, Henderson again said he did not think this would be a problem if there was in place a mechanism to prevent the reintroduction of forces onto the Island.

7. This brings us to the other main concern which, not surprisingly, Henderson stressed—the issue of guarantees. What happens, he asked, if the Argentines decide to send their navy back and on the Island there are only UN technocrats or what if, as in 1967, there is a UN presence but they are withdrawn as the Argentine armed forces were reintroduced onto the Island. Finally, he noted the same problem arises if there is no agreement by January 1.

8. On the question of guarantees, Henderson's clear emphasis was on the need for some kind of US involvement on the Island as the only guarantee which in the end would be acceptable to HMG. However, he stressed that this issue has not yet really been addressed by London where, as noted above, the primary sticking point is interim administration.

9. On next steps, the British expect PDC to put forward his ideas to both parties on Saturday and ask them to respond within 72 hours. At the end of that time, if there is no agreement, he will consider his mission to have failed. There will be an informal Security Council meeting Friday afternoon<sup>10</sup> called by the Chinese Security Council President whose activities are making the British somewhat uneasy. Henderson is concerned that there could be a call for a Security Council session early next week though he agreed that it was not likely before the SYG's efforts had failed. He stressed again that the British will be counting on US support if there is an unbalanced Security Council resolution and we reassured him on this count.

10. At the end of the meeting, Henderson came back again to the problems over the interim administration and stated that he was confident that if we could get around that problem we could resolve the issue. But he stressed that Mrs. Thatcher has given a lot already on this issue and has significant pressures on it from both right and left.

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<sup>10</sup> Stoessel summarized the day's Security Council meeting in his May 14 Evening Reading Report to Reagan, "The UN Security Council, meeting this afternoon in informal consultations, heard a perfunctory report from Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on his mediation efforts, and encouraged him to continue." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982)

11. Walters. Your call<sup>11</sup> came through at this point in our conversation. Larry will be going over Dick's conversations this afternoon with the British DCM.<sup>12</sup>

12. PDC. Right after our meeting, I called Perez as you requested to tell him that there was no truth in the London Times story about our deciding to embark on a new peace initiative. Although Perez had not seen the article (and I assumed Henderson had not either), the SYG was grateful for my call. He said he thinks he needs a few more days to work and considers it a good sign that Parsons and Henderson are going back to London this weekend. He expressed the hope that the decision taken by the Cabinet there will be constructive and added that the Argentines were showing "some signs of wisdom" though he did not specify what these were. The SYG said he would be back in touch if there was anything else he wanted us to do and I expressed again our willingness to help him in any way possible.

**Stoessel**

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<sup>11</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been found.

<sup>12</sup> No memorandum of conversation of a meeting between Eagleburger and Thomas has been found.

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## **263. National Security Decision Directive 34<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982

### *U.S. ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS*

Pursuant to the decisions reached at the meeting of the National Security Council of April 30, 1982,<sup>2</sup> we are taking, effective immediately, the following actions in connection with the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 34 [South Atlantic Crisis]. Top Secret. Clark sent the NSDD to Haig, Regan, Weinberger, Baldrige, Stockman, Casey, Kirkpatrick, and Jones under a May 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) The NSDD was also sent to Bush.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 195.

—Issuance of an NSC-approved press statement which summarizes the U.S. position in the South Atlantic crisis, is supportive of the UK position and includes the announcement of concrete steps underscoring U.S. determination not to condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes.

—The suspension of all military exports to Argentina. This action covers deliveries of all items remaining in the FMS pipeline, primarily affecting spare parts in the amount of \$3.9 million; it also covers the suspension of existing licenses for export of Munitions List items to Argentina and the withholding of further export licenses for such items. This suspension will affect non-government as well as government end-uses in Argentina, thereby reaching a category not covered by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment or the subsequent legislation.

—The withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales and export licenses under section 725(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981.<sup>3</sup>

—The withholding of non-Munitions List export license requests for dual-use and related COCOM-type items.

—The withholding of new Export-Import Bank credits, insurance and guarantees.

—The withholding of new Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees (which affects agricultural products worth approximately \$2 million).

—A private warning to Argentina that the measures announced do not encompass the full range of economic sanctions which the U.S. has at its disposal and which could be applied depending on circumstances.

—The withholding of any required U.S. consent for third-country transfers of U.S. origin items the export of which from the U.S. would not be approved under the above decisions. (Note: Withholding of consent for transfer of FMS origin items sold to third countries is compelled by existing law).

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<sup>3</sup> The International Security and Development Cooperation Act (S 1196—P.L. 97–113), signed into law on December 29, 1981, provided foreign aid authorizations for FY 1982 and FY 1983 and reduced congressional involvement in reviewing overseas arms sales by doubling the thresholds for reporting individual arms sales to Congress and reduced from 30 to 15 days the time Congress had to review and veto U.S. arms sales to NATO member countries, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. Prior to the law's passage, the Reagan administration was forced to abandon its request for the repeal of a law banning covert aid to warring factions in Angola in order to get congressional Democrats to agree to lift arms sales bans on Argentina and Chile. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. VI, 1981–84, p. 132) For Reagan's statement upon signing the legislation into law, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1981*, pp. 1202–1204.



**264. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982

**SUBJECT**

UK Request for AIM 9L Missiles (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(TS) Yesterday the British officially requested 300 AIM 9L air-to-air missiles, with a priority on delivering 100 missiles to Ascension Island by today.<sup>2</sup> In keeping with our alternative financial arrangement, the British requested that the missiles be kept in US stores at Ascension until they were needed.

(TS) The JCS, together with the Air Force and the Navy, have recommended that the request not be approved (Tab A). Their rationale is: (1) the Service inventories are currently far below requirements; (2) adequate facilities for storage, etc. at Ascension are not available; and (3) since the UK currently has 200 AIM 9Ls, their requirement is questionable without further knowledge of their strategy. The JCS propose as an alternative the transfer of 50–80 missiles for delivery to the UK either at Charleston AFB (preferred) or at Ascension. If the missiles are not required immediately, we could provide pre-positioned storage at Charleston AFB from which delivery could be made to the British at Ascension within 24 hours of notification.

(TS) Since Service inventories total more than 9,000, I see little meaningful difference between the 50–80 missiles the JCS have offered as an alternative and the 100 that constitute the immediate request. My recommendation is that you agree to the transfer of 100 missiles to the British with delivery at either Charleston AFB or Ascension, *or* US storage of 100 missiles at Charleston AFB to be available for delivery to the British at their request. We would honor the British choice of delivery alternatives.

State (PM) concurs with this recommendation.<sup>3</sup>

**Fred C. Ikle<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of United Kingdom Defense Procurement Office Letter P–1025, sent from the British Embassy on May 13, formally requesting the missiles.

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger initialed his approval of the recommendation.

<sup>4</sup> Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

**Tab A****Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hayward) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>5</sup>**

CM 1262–82

Washington, May 14, 1982

**SUBJECT**

United Kingdom OP Corporate Request for AIM-9L Missiles (S)

1. (TS) Reference United Kingdom Defence Procurement Office letter P-1025 of 13 May 1982<sup>6</sup> which requested the US provide 300 SIDEWINDER AIM-9L Air-to-Air missiles under “United Kingdom OP Corporate”.

2. (TS) The Joint Staff and Services have seriously considered the UK request for 300 AIM-9L missiles including 100 to be pre-positioned at Ascension Island as soon as possible. In view of current inventory shortfalls, procurement leadtime, impact upon sustainability of US Forces, and other reasons outlined below, it does not appear to be in the US’ best interest to fulfill this request.

3. (TS) The current status of US and projected UK inventories of AIM-9L missiles and supporting data is at Enclosure 1.

4. (TS) In addition, a serious problem exists with control, security and storage of sensitive ordnance at Ascension. Without adequate storage capability at Ascension, any ordnance transferred to the USAF Facility would have to be delivered immediately to the British upon arrival, unless elaborate and expensive facilities are constructed and additional US personnel are assigned. Equally significant, it is unclear as to the UK requirement for AIM 9–L missiles beyond the 200 already obtained from the USG. Further, it is questionable if the USG should support a requirement for 300 AIM 9–L missiles without knowing more about the UK grand strategy. Additional UK justification seems appropriate.

5. (TS) If the decision is made to transfer these missiles to the UK, a possible alternative is to provide a maximum of 50 to 80 missiles which could be ready for delivery to the UK at Charleston, S.C. This proposal would satisfy our stated policy to provide material support to the UK. This lesser number would significantly reduce the impact upon US inventories and leave open the door to later procurement should circumstances dictate.

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<sup>5</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>6</sup> United Kingdom Defence Procurement Office ltr of 13 May 82. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 2 above.]

6. (TS) If US delivery to Ascension is required, we can pre-position these 50 to 80 missiles at the Naval Weapons Station Charleston, S.C. Adequate storage can be provided at this location and delivery directly to the UK at Ascension can be made by the Military Airlift Command through Charleston AFB. If a decision is then made, delivery can be accomplished within 24 hours.

7. (U) At Enclosures 2 and 3 are Position Papers prepared by the USN and USAF.<sup>7</sup>

**Adm Thomas B. Hayward**  
*USN Acting Chairman*  
*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

**Enclosure 1**

**Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>8</sup>**

Washington, undated

*US AIM-9L (SIDEWINDER) STATUS*

	<u>REQUIRED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>% REQUIRED</u>
(1) USAF	8800	5498	65%
USN	<u>6460</u>	<u>3575</u>	<u>55%</u>
TOTAL	15260	9073	59%

(1) Represents 1982 requirements. USAF 1988 requirement increases to 15,620 missiles.

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<sup>7</sup> The position papers are attached but not printed.

<sup>8</sup> Secret.

*UK AIM-9H & 9L (SIDEWINDER) STATUS*

QUANTITY ON HAND  
(FMS ESTIMATE)

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AIM-9H	750
AIM-9L	<u>200</u>
TOTAL	950

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**265. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Multiple Military Recipients<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1982, 0600Z

CJCS sends. Subject: Execute Order—Shipment of AIM-9L Sidewinder Missiles. (FMS case UK-P-LCL). (S)

Deliver upon receipt.

1. (S) This is an execute order by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

2. (TS) Situation. The British officially requested 300 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles with priority delivery of 100 missiles to Ascension Island ASAP. The SecDef has directed transfer of 100 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles to the British under UK OP Corporate arrangements with immediate delivery to Ascension Island. Department of State concurs in this action.<sup>2</sup>

3. (TS) Mission. Action addressees are requested to transfer via fastest means 100 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles from NAVWPNSTA Yorktown VA to NAS Norfolk VA FFT to Commander Ascension Aux AF via SAAM FLT 2434.

4. (S) Execution.

A. (S) NAVMTO coordinate with COMDR MAC terminal to ensure timely transfer of missiles from ground vehicles to air cargo pallets

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Releasable to UK. Sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, CINCMAC Scott AFB, NAVWPNSTA Yorktown, COMDR MAC Terminal Norfolk, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Ascension AAF, and NAVMTO Norfolk. Sent for information to the Department of Defense, Department of State, COMNAVSUPSYSCOM, NAS Norfolk, COM 21AFCP McGuire AFB, and AFLC WPAFB.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 264.

and onload to aircraft. Expeditious movement of the shipment is of paramount importance.

B. (S) Commander Ascension Aux AF take appropriate actions to insure physical transfer of the missiles to UK title.

C. (U) Coordinating instructions.

(1) (S) Missiles in this transfer are being provided from USN stocks for expediency reasons. Adjustment of actual inventory follows: USAF—75 AIM-9L missiles; USN—25 AIM-9L missiles.

(2) (S) Packaging, crating, handling and transportation charges to cover this shipment will be credited to FMS case: UK-P-LBZ.

(3) (S) Advise ALCON of flight mission data to indicate manifest and ETD/ETA Ascension Island.

(4) (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

5. (U) Administration and logistics.

A. (S) Movement priority 1A3 assigned. Cargo total wt 36,100 lbs and 1735 cu ft. net explosive wt by class: A—610 lbs; B—6010 lbs; C—126 lbs.

B. (S) Delivery to be completed NLT 160800Z May 82.

C. (S) POC for receipt of shipment at Ascension Island is LTC Bryden, USAF, Commander Ascension Aux AF, Autovon 234-3760.

D. (S) The quantity and value of AIM-9L missiles physically transferred will be reported to DSAA within three days of the date of transfer.

E. (C) Note to addressees and users of this message. The matters discussed in this message are exceptionally sensitive. Distribution should be limited to only those who have an absolutely essential need to know.

F. (S) Classify all movement messages Secret.

6. (U) Command and signal.

A. (S) Commander Ascension Aux AF is supported commander. CINCMAC and COMDR NAVWPNSTA are supporting commanders.

**266. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hayward) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM-108-82

Washington, May 15, 1982

## SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis (U)

1. (S) While the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the policy of providing materiel assistance to the United Kingdom in connection with the Falklands crisis, they are increasingly concerned about the long-term impact on our relations within the Hemisphere resulting from the changing nature and greater degree of assistance requested. Clearly, the crisis will make it more difficult to pursue US regional security policies on a coalition basis and will provide the Soviets and Cubans additional opportunities to undermine hemispheric collective security with weapons, advisors, and significantly increased influence. Finally, the perception of an unlimited US commitment may provide the British with little incentive to negotiate a prompt resolution of the issue.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully reviewed the list of weapons, equipment, and supplies requested by the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> The early requests involved relatively small quantities, with emphasis on logistical support. The current requests are characterized by more visible and considerably greater quantities of lethal weapons and could lead to direct involvement of US combat support forces. For example, the two fully abeam underway replenishment capable oilers and the prototype ARAPAHO containerized aviation facility vessel could directly involve operational support by US elements. The 20,000 SSQ41B sonobouys and 200 Mk-46 Mod 2 ASW torpedoes to combat two Argentine diesel submarines and 300 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles<sup>3</sup> (when coupled with the 200 AIM-9Ls recently purchased and their additional 750 AIM-9Hs) to destroy less than 140 Argentine fighter/attack aircraft, seem far in excess of numbers required.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on May 17. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: "CC—hand-delivered to Bill Clark 5/17."

<sup>2</sup> A possible reference to a paper, dated May 14, summarizing new British requests for matériel support, outstanding requests, and requests recently completed as of that date. Iklé sent a copy of the paper to Weinberger under a May 14 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on the covering memorandum indicates Weinberger saw both the covering memorandum and the paper on May 17. Both are *ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 264 and 265.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that the NSC address, as a matter of priority, the US policy of arms and equipment transfer to the United Kingdom in connection with the Falklands crisis with full consideration of its impact on our longer term hemispheric security interests.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**T.B. Hayward**  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy*  
*Acting Chairman, JCS*

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**267. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Athens<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1982, 2147Z

Tosec 70117/133560. For the Secretary from Enders. Subject: Next Steps on Falkland Islands.

1. Secret/Sensitive–Entire text.

2. Should Perez de Cuellar fail, you may wish to consider a contact group effort to impose a solution as the next step: Under this concept, the contact group would call on Argentina and Britain to accept a formula consisting say of:

(A) Perez de Cuellar negotiation paragraph;

(B) Withdrawal paragraph from your April 27 proposal;<sup>2</sup>

(C) Negotiations explicitly to apply to three groups of Islands, but withdrawal and interim administrator to only one;<sup>3</sup>

(D) Interim administration paragraph clearly stating that administration will be carried out in consultation with<sup>4</sup> local inhabitants but not restoring the councils;<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Haig initialed at the top of the telegram and wrote: “Dave [Gompert] see me.” The text of the telegram was marked extensively with a highlighter pen. Haig was in Athens May 15–16.

<sup>2</sup> Haig drew a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point. Reference is to the proposals Haig took to Buenos Aires. See Documents 179 and 180.

<sup>3</sup> Haig wrote “No!” in the right-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>4</sup> Haig inserted the handwritten phrase “elected reps of” after this word.

<sup>5</sup> Haig placed brackets around the phrase “but not restoring the councils.”

(E) Contact group would be responsible for the interim administration, and could extend it beyond the deadline for negotiations if it thought it necessary;

(F) Facilitation of contact [group] paragraph along the lines of your April 27 proposal (i.e. establishment of the general principle, contact group to make recommendations to the two parties);<sup>6</sup>

(G) Built in agreement by contact group members to verify and guarantee the agreement, per your May 5 proposal through Belaunde.<sup>7</sup>

3. The contact group would be called together by the US and Brazil (maybe by Reagan and Figueiredo) and include France and Germany, and Mexico and Peru. Peru is inflamed; but Belaunde is rational and can be helpful. So is his Prime Minister, Ulloa, who would probably be the main player. Mexico can be useful because it is emphatic in non-use of force, supports the Argentine claim, and will want (at this late stage in the Lopez-Portillo sexenio) to earn international recognition. Venezuela would prove so intractable that it would probably render the contact group ineffective. Note that the members would not be chosen according to the wishes of the disputants.<sup>8</sup>

4. On the assumption that Perez de Cuellar throws in the towel Tuesday May 18, the contact group could be convened immediately—or only after some significant military action. A Security Council meeting would convene, in which Britain and the US would veto a resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities. The disadvantage of immediate convocation is that the group may lose its credibility if it can't stop the action forthwith. The advantage is that it may be harder to convene later (if Britain hits the mainland),<sup>9</sup> and immediate convocation may help curtail pressures for a cease fire.

5. The leverage of the group would be essentially political, but it could take the position that it would cease all assistance, including sanctions, to the parties if the proposal were turned down.<sup>10</sup>

**Stoessel**

<sup>6</sup> Haig drew a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>7</sup> Haig drew a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point. See Document 232.

<sup>8</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Haig wrote: "Why Mexico suddenly[?] Why not Brazil[?]"

<sup>9</sup> On May 15, the Department transmitted to Haig a memorandum from Enders, Scanlan, and Howe, through Eagleburger, which analyzed options for a U.S. response if fighting in the South Atlantic escalated, including British attacks on the mainland. (Telegram/Tosec 70091/132520 to Haig in Ankara, May 15; Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1])

<sup>10</sup> Haig wrote "No!" in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.



**268. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

May 18, 1982, 1530Z

Secto 7104. Subject: Secretary's Bilateral With Italian FonMin Colombo, May 16.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Summary: The Secretary's May 16 bilateral with Italian Foreign Minister Colombo focused primarily on the Middle East and the Falklands. On the former, the Secretary laid out U.S. views concerning three interrelated aspects of the Middle East situation, including the Iran/Iraq conflict, Lebanon, and the autonomy talks. Concerning the South Atlantic crisis, the Secretary underscored the necessity of solid EC support for the UK at a particularly critical juncture (which resulted in an urgent follow-up demarche in Rome, personally recommended by Colombo). In addition, the two Ministers briefly discussed START, NAC consultations, and credit restrictions. End summary.

3. The Secretary met for an hour on the margins of the Luxembourg Ministerial May 16 with Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo. Accompanying the Secretary on the U.S. side were U.S. NATO PermRep W. Tapley Bennett and NSC Senior Staff Member James R Rentschler. Joining Colombo on the Italian side were Foreign Ministry Political Director Bottai and Italian NATO PermRep Tornetta, plus an interpreter. The following subjects were discussed.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

6. Falklands. The Secretary stressed that the situation in the South Atlantic had reached a very critical point where it was essential for Britain's allies to support her. The situation was increasingly dangerous, not because Britain had failed to make concessions but because of Argentine intransigence. The Argentines had softened their rigidity on only one point, the question of sovereignty, but they had then compensated for that by insisting on de facto arrangements on the Islands during the interim period of administration which would ensure the same outcome.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/18/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the Secretary's aircraft. Haig was then en route from Luxembourg to Washington. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

7. Colombo responded that he had received the Secretary's letter on this subject<sup>2</sup> and had carefully read and understood it. He said that he recognized the importance of what the Secretary was saying but that in present circumstances he was not permitted to join an EC consensus favoring renewal of economic sanctions. This fact was very disagreeable for him, but if he said yes, there would be a major political crisis in Italy. It is the military escalation in the South Atlantic which has caused great problems in his country from psychological point of view; the reactions of the Argentine population to the sinking of the *Belgrano* had had a major impact on Italian public opinion, given the fact that millions of Argentines were of Italian origin and that many of these even held dual citizenship. Colombo added that the issues were very clear in his mind and that the points which the Secretary had made about the need to support the UK were correct but that unfortunately irrational situations sometimes prevailed in [garble—one's] country, and the present situation was one of them.

8. The Secretary noted that he was sensitive to Italian concerns and understood them; the U.S. itself has great difficulties with the present situation albeit for different reasons. The great tragedy, however, is the fact that such a position will only lead to more bloodshed, with the loss of many young men on both sides. Our major concern at the moment is that a breaking of EC ranks with the UK will gravely diminish the influence of more moderate forces in Argentine society which are beginning to favor a negotiated solution; at the same time, it will strengthen the extremist elements—the Peronistas and the Navy—who will be emboldened by the perception of Allied disunity and become even more intransigent, thereby increasing the likelihood of military escalation. We hope the Secretary General will succeed in his efforts in New York, and we are prepared to do everything we can to help; but unless these efforts achieve some agreement this week, the chances for avoiding more violence look bleak.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

12. Falklands footnote. Shortly following the bilateral, Colombo phoned Rentschler and asked him to convey an urgent recommendation to the Secretary which he did not want his own people to know. In the interests of generating changed instructions for Colombo to use during EC deliberations on sanctions renewal, it would, he asserted, be useful for the Secretary to instruct Ambassador Rabb to seek an urgent appointment with Prime Minister Spadolini and the secretaries of the coalition parties and make the same points to them concerning

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 238.

the South Atlantic crisis which the Secretary had made to Colombo himself, placing particular emphasis on the effect which the perception of Allied disunity would have on extremist forces in Argentina (on the basis of this message the Secretary approved Secto 7058).<sup>3</sup>

Haig

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<sup>3</sup> Sent to Rome, May 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820005–0001) In telegram 11692 from Rome, May 17, Rabb reported on his meeting that morning with Andreotti at which the former Prime Minister stated he “would attempt to maintain Christian Democratic support for sanction renewal, and elicit Socialist leader Craxi’s acquiescence.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820005–0002)

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## **269. Message From the Embassy in Luxembourg to the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Luxembourg, May 17, 1982, 1330Z

32. Fm Jim Rentschler. To the White House, for Judge Clark, Immediate. Si [Situation] Room please pass copies to Dennis Blair and Roger Fontaine. SUBJECT: I pass along, quick and dirty, the following lights (high and low), dictated in decreasing order of priority:

Falklands. Despite some opening-ceremony pep talk earlier this morning by the Ministerial’s Luxembourg hosts, the mood here is somber and dominated by the South Atlantic issue. Though NATO is the nominal headliner, most eyes are on the following EC meeting scheduled later today and the uncertain status of the sanctions renewal. Leaving Ireland aside, the key to continued support for the UK may hinge on Italy. During last night’s bilateral,<sup>2</sup> Colombo told the Secretary he simply could not join a pro-sanctions consensus without bringing down the Spadolini government. Al told him that a break in EC ranks now would have the certain effect of emboldening extremist elements in Argentina (Peronistas and Navy), hardening their intransigence, and drastically increasing the likelihood of military escalation. A sobered Colombo called me shortly after the meeting and asked me to convey

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/17/1982. Secret; Sensitive, Immediate. Sent via privacy channels.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 268.

an urgent message to Haig which he wished to keep secret from his own people, namely, that a change in his EC instructions might be possible if Max Rabb were to weigh in immediately with Spadolini and the secretaries of the coalition parties and make the same points which Haig had made to Colombo himself (this resulted in the Rome demarche you may have seen last evening—it's a long shot, but it could help).<sup>3</sup> A few other Falkland-related items of direct concern to us:

—Al's talks with Pym last night were one on one,<sup>4</sup> but the Secretary said he was going to phone you and provide you with a complete fill-in. No one in our del here has the complete story except the Secretary himself, but two nuggets did filter down: 1) the Brits are reportedly incensed at what they see as less than wholehearted U.S. support for their position; and 2) the negotiating process still has some time, but not much (one hears a great deal of talk around the other delegations and in the press about May 19 being South Atlantic D-Day).

—An old friend of mine in Pym's party told me he had seen a transcript of the President's last phone call to Mrs. Thatcher,<sup>5</sup> which he termed "terrifying"; since this characterization is greatly at variance with both the tone and contents as reported to me (via Haig) from Washington late last week, is it possible for me to see the text on a close-hold basis? Or are British sensitivities simply verging on the neurotic?

—Thanks to some indiscreet glomming of Stadis traffic, I have learned that Tom Enders and his ARA people are pushing Haig to adopt a kind of contact group approach to the crisis emphasizing much heavier pressure on the UK than on Argentina.<sup>6</sup> I think this is a calamitous idea, guaranteed to give us the very worst of both worlds. God knows, the wicket we have with the Brits right now is sticky enough, but if this hare-brained lucubration were ever leaked (let alone acted upon), we could kiss a successful Presidential visit to London next month goodby. And that's just for starters.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

Warm regards, Jim

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 268.

<sup>4</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Haig's May 16 meeting with Pym in Luxembourg has been found. Telegram Secto 7063, May 17, transmitted to the Department and USICA a transcript of the public statement made by the two men to the press following their meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820257–1013)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 257.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 267.

**270. Memorandum From Roger W. Fontaine and Dennis C. Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 17, 1982

SUBJECT

Pressure on the Argentines

The overriding objective of the United States in regard to the crisis in the South Atlantic remains the peaceful resolution of the dispute without at the same time alienating either our principal ally Great Britain or our good friend and for the first time, cooperative ally in Central America, Argentina.

In recent days we have taken steps that are throwing us off course. First, we sent our Ambassador to Italy around to the parties in the government coalition to urge them to support a continuation of EC economic sanctions against Argentina. We argued that the ending of the sanctions would encourage the extremists and undercut the moderates in Argentina. The Italian politicians told us they would not change their position, and told the press that we had strong-armed them. So we ended up with the worst of both worlds: the Italians fell off their sanctions, and everyone knows the Americans asked them not to.<sup>2</sup>

We doubt that the unanimous application of EC sanctions would have the desired effect within Argentina—they have so far not had any noticeable effect in encouraging moderates and discouraging extremists. But more importantly, the Argentinians will feel that, in carrying water for Britain in the EC (of which we are not even a member), we have gone beyond appropriate support for any ally. Our action will be seen as a further act of betrayal and will help harden not soften Argentine attitudes. It will make an even rapprochement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Argentina (May 1982). Secret. In a May 20 memorandum to Clark, Rentschler “reluctantly” took issue with points raised by Fontaine and Blair and outlined his objections to their characterization of the Rome démarche, of Argentina’s perceived flexibility, of Italian actions regarding the EC sanctions, and of the extent to which Reagan could go to further encourage flexibility on both sides. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (05/05/1982–05/20/1982))

<sup>2</sup> Italy took this step at a May 17 meeting of EC Foreign Ministers to discuss the renewal of economic sanctions against Argentina. According to telegram 739 from Luxembourg, May 18, the Italian and Irish representatives at the meeting had “agreed to avoid ‘distortions of trade’ which they and most others interpret to mean that Italy and Ireland may resume imports from Argentina, but not for cross-trade purposes.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820258–0902) The EC, except Ireland and Italy, renewed the sanctions for another week.

with Buenos Aires by us all the more difficult if not impossible. Britain is expected to do this kind of thing—not us. Thus the matter of continuing EC sanctions should be a matter of the members only.

Second, the President's May 13 press conference statement that heretofore only one party has proven intransigent<sup>3</sup> has greatly irritated the Argentine government, which—rightly or wrongly—feels it has shown recently a certain amount of flexibility. We believe it is important that the Argentines be encouraged by a more positive statement in the near future. We do not believe a "correction of the record" is in order—only an amplification. Such a statement from the President would be as follows: "The South Atlantic situation remains very dangerous. We all have a great deal to lose. In the last few days, both sides have shown flexibility, but both sides need to do more if we are to avert war."

Unless we begin to provide more in the way of incentives for the Argentines we will make them more inflexible and make more difficult the improvement of bilateral relations when this issue is resolved.

*RECOMMENDATION:*<sup>4</sup>

1) Cease any further attempts to persuade the EC on the sanctions question—for or against.

2) Amplify the President's remarks on the South Atlantic question by encouraging further flexibility on both sides.

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<sup>3</sup> As part of his response to a question about the progress toward a negotiated South Atlantic peace settlement asked at his May 13 press conference, Reagan stated: "Up until now the intransigence had been on one side, and that is in wanting a guarantee of sovereignty before the negotiations took place, which doesn't make much sense. I understand that there's been some agreement now on, awaiting negotiations on that. So, we'll continue to hope and pray." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 620)

<sup>4</sup> Clark neither approved nor disapproved either recommendation.

**271. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Luxembourg, May 17, 1982, 2154Z

Secto 7068. Eyes only for Bremer from the Secretary. Subject: Message for the President.

1. Please have the following message hand delivered eyes only to the President.

2. British Foreign Secretary Pym has just shown me the UK negotiating position approved today by Mrs. Thatcher's War Cabinet. It is to be delivered to the UN Secretary General tonight as a final UK position which the Argentines have forty-eight hours to accept or not.<sup>2</sup>

3. The British have made a serious effort. But the position is less forthcoming than the proposal we put to the two sides at the end of April. In that the Argentines rejected that earlier US proposal, the British must realize that their current position is unlikely to be accepted. My own assessment is that the Argentines will not accept this, unless there has been a substantial change in the political mood within the Junta as a result of recent hostilities and the imminence of a British landing on the Islands. I find it hard to believe that such a change has occurred.

4. The forty-eight hour deadline may well coincide with a British landing on the Falklands. The British probably think that they can mop up a demoralized Argentine garrison if they can execute a successful landing though they must be acutely worried about the Argentine subs and mainland-based air power. Pym did assure me that London is not now contemplating strikes against the mainland.

5. There is of course the possibility that the Argentines will respond with relatively modest changes to the British text, which could give Mrs. Thatcher pause before ordering a landing. While London has anticipated this possibility by stressing that this is the final UK position, they may behave differently if the Argentines come a long way. However, I doubt that the Argentines will come far enough to avert a British assault. Odds are that the battle for the Falklands will begin as early as this Wednesday or Thursday.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 17, 1982. Secret; Alpha; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Gompert; approved by McManaway. Haig initialed the first page of the telegram.

<sup>2</sup> A British copy of their May 17 position is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

<sup>3</sup> May 19 or 20.

6. We have begun our own contingency planning. We will want to consider a new initiative—though not necessarily a US initiative—in the event that the Secretary General ends his own effort when the forty-eight hours expires. In the meantime, any hint that we might make a move once the UN effort collapses would create a crisis between us and the British, by dooming their own proposal and by compounding the political problems Mrs. Thatcher will face if the British go ahead with their landing. Indeed, we will have to think through carefully whether we should move at all should the Secretary General give up his effort.

7. The British are as resolute as ever. Mrs. Thatcher is acting on the basis of military confidence, domestic political support, and most of all an unshakeable commitment to the principle at stake. They are counting on us—and perhaps only us—for support.

Haig

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## 272. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 18, 1982

### PARTICIPANTS

Esteban Takacs, Argentine Ambassador to the U.S.

J. William Middendorf, II U.S. Ambassador to the OAS

### SUBJECT

*South Atlantic Crisis*

During our talk, Ambassador Takacs made the following points:

*UNSYG Position:* Perez de Cuellar spoke to Ros late May 17, after his meeting with Ambassador Parsons. The SYG was pessimistic about the prospects for his effort because Parsons had brought back only small concessions from London, and at this moment, the sides are too far apart. Perez de Cuellar has decided to shorten his effort with a view to making a decision on Wednesday, May 19, as to whether he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to Haig, Stoessel, Eagleburger, Clark, Enders, Briggs, Bosworth, Service, Kirkpatrick, and Walters.



can produce a position workable for both parties as a basis for negotiations or must announce he has failed to do so.

If the SYG decides he can proceed, Takacs envisages his proposing a formula bridging the positions sufficiently to form the basis for a cease-fire to take effect next weekend; followed immediately by a phased withdrawal and subsequently by negotiations. This, in effect, would implement UNSC Res. 502.

*Issues in Cease-Fire Negotiations:*

*Sovereignty*—Takacs wanted me to understand that both Perez de Cuellar and the UK say that the Argentine de-linking of the sovereignty issue has been accomplished and that this issue is not a problem.

*Withdrawal*—Simultaneity has not been agreed. The UK wants Argentine forces withdrawn first. Nevertheless, he urged me to believe that agreement on arrangements for withdrawal of forces will not represent a problem and should be settled by the SYG's May 19 deadline.

*Interim Administration*—The main problem in the negotiations now is UK insistence that the islanders be represented through the councils as separate units. He said for Argentina to accept the British position would negate seventeen years of negotiations. The rights of the islanders constitute an issue to be settled in the subsequent negotiations—not as a precondition to the negotiations. To my query as to why Argentina could not demonstrate integrity on this issue by offering to include the islanders in the Argentine administrative element, Takacs said he assumed there would be no Argentine objection.

Despite what he had said about the UK position on representation of the islanders, Takacs insisted that none of the remaining issues—especially that of the interim administration—presents major difficulties. (In what I took to be a rather rueful second look at a missed opportunity, Takacs remarked that it had even been suggested by Costa Mendez that Secretary Haig's trilateral (Argentina/US/UK) formula for the interim administration, made on his first visit to Buenos Aires, was not a bad formula.)

I said I assumed Argentina would not attempt a *Sudetenland* solution during the interim administration and would therefore not seek to change the national composition of the island population. Takacs agreed.

*Scope of Negotiations*—Takacs noted the lack of agreement on whether the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands are to be included. He argued that British documents have lumped these islands in the UK jurisdictional claim to the Malvinas Islands. He speculated that perhaps the timing for the transfer of these islands could be worked out in the course of the negotiations to come. In any case, he said, the Malvinas Islands are the real issue.

*Argentina-U.S.:* Takacs asserted that the Argentines are far more sensitive to what President Reagan says than to what Prime Minister Thatcher says. Argentina had no real difficulty with President Reagan's remarks last week, that one side "*had (once) been*" intransigent.<sup>2</sup> This was an effort to improve the situation. But the Argentine press misquoted the President to say "*is (now) intransigent.*" As a result, the Argentines feel they are getting a "bum rap" from us. They feel they have shown flexibility over the past week, while not getting credit for it, at a time when the British have done all their negotiating *ad referendum* and did not answer Perez de Cuellar from Wednesday, May 12 to Monday, May 17, and, in the meantime, have attacked the islands and merchant ships.

*Walters Visit:* Takacs appraised the Walters visit<sup>3</sup> as "very successful." He said it had been very timely because it helped cool down public opinion and prevented Argentine over-reaction to the misinterpretation of President Reagan's remarks. Public opinion "took the Walters visit to mean the U.S. sent a message."

*Definitive Negotiations (Following Cease-Fire):* Takacs surmised that the long-term negotiations could well be something like a continuation of the Perez de Cuellar effort and totally separate from the elements of the interim administration. However, he was unsure of the mechanics of the negotiations. As a practical matter, he anticipated that they could go on for as much as a year or two.

*Public Relations:* Takacs said he would receive a last-minute briefing this morning from Ros and then do a tape for BBC. He also visited Senator Laxalt on Thursday.<sup>4</sup>

*Comment:* If we learn that Perez de Cuellar is about to abandon his effort, with all that implies for military escalation and risks/costs for us, I wonder if it would not be greatly to our advantage to make one more desperate effort to induce both sides to be more flexible.

As an additional fallback, it would seem desirable to have another negotiating vehicle ready to be activated in the event the Perez de Cuellar effort collapses.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 270.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 253 and 254.

<sup>4</sup> May 13.

**273. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1982

1. *British Ambassador's Assessment on Falklands.* I had a long talk with UK Ambassador Henderson today. He expects the Argentinians will not accept the latest UK proposals, but will come back tomorrow with suggested changes. Henderson anticipates that these in turn will be unacceptable to the British and that the UN Secretary General will thereupon declare his mediation mission at an end. Henderson intimated that a major UK assault on the main island would ensue on the heels of the SYG's declaration; he predicted with confidence that the operation would be successful and that the battle—while possibly involving high casualties on both sides—would be over “sooner rather than later.” Henderson thought that when the assault takes place there will be pressure in the UN Security Council for a simple ceasefire without withdrawal (which would be unacceptable to the UK) and that—in his “personal view”—the time would then be appropriate for the US again to come forward as the only power capable of bringing about a settlement.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982. Secret; Sensitive.

**274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 19, 1982, 1629Z

1384. For Secretary of State Haig and NSC Director Clark

1. Entire text Secret.

2. I met last night with my Argentine opposite number, Amb to the UN Eduardo Roca. He was accompanied by Ros and Bunge to review the current situation of the negotiations. Jose Sorzano was also present.

3. Ros provided a copy of the Argentine response<sup>2</sup> which I had already read from our sources.

4. I attempted without success to persuade them that the British proposal is not so bad; that Argentina could, if she chose, accept it and declare she had won by the establishment of a UN authority responsible for the government. (Both Bunge and Ricardo Zinn had been persuaded of this during the afternoon, and also of the feasibility of “selling” this position to Argentine public opinion. Zinn returned last night to Buenos Aires to attempt to persuade key members of the Junta.) Bunge reported that Ros said later that he understood I was a friend of Argentina but nonetheless I “sounded like Haig.”

5. This morning I spoke with SYG Perez de Cuellar. He described the Argentine response as “terrible” for this stage of the negotiations, and the British proposal as rigid but fundamentally “not so bad,” saying the Argentines must accept the fact that however justified their position may be, juridically they were wrong. They should also accept the fact that they have won by securing a UN authority.

6. He said Ros is looking forward to a Security Council meeting; that Costa Mendez (whom he characterized as “a man almost wholly without influence”) will speak; that they are not too bothered by a veto; that they will get a special session of the General Assembly and perhaps win 75 votes—but what difference will it make?

7. He said he would present some proposals to the Argentines this morning and if they “can live with them” he will ask the British for 24 hours more. He will give me a copy after he has presented them. I will pass them to you and to Bunge who will carry them to Buenos

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/19/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 275.

Aires to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force with whom he is in continuous contact (I have learned).

8. Bunge believes Galtieri, Lami Dozo, even Anaya want a peaceful settlement, and that certain officers at the level below do not. He thinks his personal safety may be in some danger when he returns because "if they can pick up six foreign journalists they can dispose of me entirely." He sees Masera as the head of this faction. He proposes to leave a sealed statement with me that I can release in case he disappears at the hands of those who regard it as treason to look for a settlement.

9. Bunge is a key figure in the "pro-U.S." foreign policy group. He believes, as Zinn believes, that some of this group are ready to deal with the Cubans. Now, he says, the Foreign Office is an obstacle. But Bunge and Zinn are in direct touch with the Commanders in Chief of the Junta, whom they believe may desire to settle.

10. Rumors continue to circulate broadly here that the British will attack the Argentine mainland. Perez de Cuellar said he told British Ambassador Parsons that "everyone" would strongly condemn the British for this. He said Parsons assured him this would not happen.

11. Bunge reported this morning that Lami Dozo and colleagues are awaiting eagerly the SYG's proposal.

12. I emphasized my view that Britain was serious: she would make war, and that time had run out. Ros said he agreed and estimated they were no more than 24 hours from a British invasion.

Comment: If the British attack the Argentinian mainland, Argentinians and Latin Americans will assume that such an attack had American support and that the U.S. had prior knowledge. Argentina will break diplomatic relations with the U.S. Three sets of consequences will probably follow:

(A) Probable overthrow of pro-U.S. government by leftist, nationalist, violently anti-U.S. government. Cuban/Soviet supplying of arms and associated advisors.

(B) Hemispheric consequences. Continent-wide orgiastic anti-U.S. demonstrations. Anti-U.S. policies and positions adopted throughout Hemisphere. Real possibility of Peru, Venezuela and others to be drawn into war sphere with hemispheric consequences.

(C) Destruction of inter-American system and Rio Treaty with obvious consequences for our Central American and hemispheric strategic position.

Therefore, British attack on Argentina mainland will have far more severe consequences than an invasion of the Falkland Islands and should be seen as an extremely high-cost operation.

P.S.: Argentines assert that U.S. refueling of British bombers will be tantamount to U.S. bombing of Argentina.

**Kirkpatrick**

**275. Letter From the British Ambassador (Henderson) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1982

Dear Al,<sup>2</sup>

I have just received from New York and am letting you have in strict confidence the enclosed unofficial translation of the Argentine paper handed to us by the UN Secretary-General's staff this morning.

As you will see, the Argentine paper falls well short of the proposals we asked the Secretary General to convey to the Argentinians on 17 May. In particular it contains no language on the question of not prejudging sovereignty or the outcome of negotiations. It insists on the inclusion of the dependencies in an interim agreement. So far as the interim administration is concerned, there is no reference to the traditional representative institutions of the islanders, but a proposal that the UN Administrator might appoint as advisers equal numbers of Argentine and British residents on the islands, despite the fact that the former number no more than 30 in a population of 1800. The proposals would also render it possible for the Argentine authorities to flood the islands with Argentinian residents during the interim period. In short, the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they adopted at the beginning of the UN Secretary General's initiative.

As usual I am available for discussions whenever you want.

**Nicholas Henderson<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. UK Secret and Personal. A notation in an unknown hand at the bottom of the letter reads: "Rec'd in 'S' 5/19/82 5:05 p.m."

<sup>2</sup> Henderson added this salutation by hand.

<sup>3</sup> Henderson wrote "Yours ever, Nicho" above his typed signature.

## **Attachment**

### **Unofficial Translation Prepared in the United Nations Secretariat<sup>4</sup>**

Undated

#### **TEXT OF THE UN SECRETARIAT'S UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE ARGENTINE PAPER PASSED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON 18 MAY**

The Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereinafter referred to as “the parties”,

In response to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982, and taking into account the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and other Resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, have accepted, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and have engaged in negotiations and arrived at the following provisional agreement relating to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, hereinafter referred to as “the Islands” for the purposes of this agreement.

I.1. The geographical scope of the area within which the withdrawal of troops is to be carried out shall comprise the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

I.2. The withdrawal of the forces of both parties shall be gradual and simultaneous. Within a maximum period of thirty days, all armed forces shall be in their normal bases and areas of operation.

II. With effect from the signature of this agreement, each party shall cease to apply the economic measures which it has adopted against the other and the United Kingdom shall call for the same action by those countries or groups of countries which, at its request, adopted similar measures.

III.1. Supervision of the withdrawal of the forces of both countries shall be carried out by specialized personnel of the United Nations, whose composition shall be agreed with the parties.

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<sup>4</sup> UK Secret.

III.2. The interim administration of the Islands while the negotiations for final settlement of the dispute are in progress shall conform to the following provisions:

(a) the administration shall be exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations with an appropriate presence of observers of the parties.

(b) The said administration shall perform all functions (executive, legislative, judicial and security) through officials of different nationality from that of the parties.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of 2(a) and (b), and in order not to cause unnecessary changes in the way of life of the population during the period of the interim administration by the United Nations, local judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation in force on 1 April 1982 to the full extent compatible with this agreement.

Similarly, the United Nations interim administration may appoint as advisers persons who are members of the population of British origin and Argentines resident in the Islands, in equal numbers.

(d) The flags of the parties shall fly together with that of the United Nations.

(e) During the period of interim administration, communications shall be kept open, without discriminatory restrictions of any kind for the parties, including freedom of movement and equality of access with respect to residence, work and property.

(f) Freedom of communication shall also include the maintenance of freedom of transit for the state airline (LADE) and for merchant ships and scientific vessels: in addition, telephone, telegraph and telex communications, Argentine television transmissions and the state petroleum (YPF) and gas services shall continue to operate freely.

IV. The customs, traditions and way of life of the inhabitants of the Islands, and their social and cultural links with their countries of origin, shall be respected and safeguarded.

V.1. The parties undertake to enter immediately into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful and final settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982, with a single option to extend until 30 June 1983, in order to comply with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and other relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas Islands. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights and claims or positions of the two parties and in recognition of the fact that they have divergent positions on the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.



V.2. The negotiations shall be held in New York.

V.3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may be assisted in the negotiations by a contact group composed of representatives of four states members of the United Nations.

To that end, each party shall nominate two states and shall have the right to a single veto of one of the states nominated by the other.

V.4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall keep the Security Council assiduously informed of the progress of the negotiations.

VI. If the period specified in point V (1) above expires without the attainment of a final agreement, the Secretary-General shall draw up a report addressed to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in order that the latter may determine, as appropriate and with the greatest urgency, the lines to which the said final agreement should conform in order to achieve a speedy settlement of the question.

276. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

*THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS: IMMINENT EVENTS  
AND U.S. CONTINGENCIES*

In the event that the British attack the Falklands in force within the very near term, and accepting as given 1) a militarily indecisive performance, with the possibility of drawn-out conflict;<sup>2</sup> 2) disruption of Pérez de Cuéllar's UN track; 3) no British move against the Argentine mainland; and, most important, 4) the fact that our major objective will best be served by the earliest possible British success, coupled with the least possible damage to Hemispheric interests, the following judgments assume critical relevance:

*Military Factors*

—We cannot diminish or interrupt—indeed, we should redouble—our current efforts in support of the Brits involving logistics, intelligence, and communications activity.

—We should continue to avoid any direct combat participation and ensure that this fact is publicized.

*UN Track*

—Pérez de Cuéllar's effort will collapse by the force of events, and become pretty much of a dead-letter (though for public consumption we should continue our line that we hope the SYG will remain involved and that we stand ready to help—see Public Affairs/Psychological Factors below).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falkland/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret. Rentschler, Blair, and Fontaine sent the paper to McFarlane under a May 19 covering memorandum that reads: "Attached as you requested are our collective judgments concerning the issues you have raised vis-à-vis the South Atlantic crisis, cast in the form of a contingency paper." A stamped notation at the top of the covering memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. McFarlane requested the paper in a May 19 note to Rentschler and Fontaine. (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Country File, United Kingdom 1982 (05/01/1982–07/31/1982))

<sup>2</sup> In a May 19 memorandum to Howe, which discussed the possible outcomes of a British assault on the Falklands/Malvinas, Tom Miller (PM/P) wrote: "The crux of the subject is, *we cannot predict a British victory in an assault on the Falklands*, and the consequences of their attempt with accompanying failure would be dire; given the geography, and British assets, they will get one chance, and if that fails, then would come managing extrication, salvaging what can be salvaged, and some hard decisions by all concerned." (Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, unlabelled folder)

—Should, as is likely, the issue be remanded to the Security Council, we should work closely with the UK and follow their lead (including a veto, if any adverse resolution is pushed), maintaining *UNSC 502 as our bottom-line*;

—With or without activity in the Security Council, movement toward the UNGA is likely, where Argentina can probably count on considerable G-77 support; in this case, we should work for a Western consensus but not be overly concerned at a negative vote (Pérez de Cuéllar himself has dismissed the meaningfulness of any activity in that forum).

#### *Diplomatic Factors*

—We should recognize that, in all probability, only the U.S. has the will and the capacity to promote a settlement *once the Brits have secured themselves on the islands*. The question of *timing* will be all important in that effort (attempts to resuscitate a direct U.S. mediatory role will prove counter-productive *before* and *immediately after* sizeable landings; chances for success will then improve if and when the Brits have demonstrated a creditable capacity to lodge themselves in strength).

—Much of our critical diplomacy, at least so far as the Brits are concerned, will probably have to be conducted at the Presidential level (via phone and letter); Dick Walters or Jeane Kirkpatrick (or both) may be the best interlocutors vis-à-vis Galtieri (Judge Clark himself or you should also be considered in that capacity).

#### *U.S.-U.K. Bilateral Factors*

—Assuming the Brits land and lodge themselves in strength, it will be essential to convey a number of clear signals to them at the highest level:

—We have fully supported you; we will continue to do so *over the near-term*;

—We are partners in the enterprise you have undertaken in support of a basic principle—even to the extent of jeopardizing our own significant strategic interests and the safety of our citizens—and this basic fact gives us the right to provide friendly counsel on (and help influence) the course of events;

—We simply do not believe that you have the capability to sustain an indefinite sway over the Falklands, either militarily or politically, and you should know that we are *not* prepared to support you in any such project;

—There must be, in other words—and in the not too distant future once the dust from the initial military operations settles—a *negotiated* solution.

—An explicit U.S.-U.K. understanding is therefore required concerning your middle- and long-term intentions, recognizing that the

U.S. continues to support compliance with UNSC 502 and will simply *not* provide either blank-check (money) or open-ended (time) assistance on behalf of UK operations in the South Atlantic.

—Likely requests for escalating military assistance should be on a case-by-case basis and explicitly linked to the quality of the U.K. commitment to a post-invasion negotiated solution.

*Public Affairs/Psychological Factors*

—Congressional briefings—a sound idea—should stress our adherence to UNSC 502, the major efforts we and others went to in order to turn around Argentine intransigence (which recently has begun to soften, at least slightly), the good-faith attempts Britain made to bridge the gap, and the fact that while this has been an agonizing and very difficult area of decision for us, we have determined that our strategic interests in the traditional North Atlantic/East-West context outweigh considerations in the Hemisphere (though we will actively pursue damage-control activity in that area). In addition, we should emphasize—probably in executive session—that our support for the UK is *not* open-ended and is tied to the commitments we will elicit from Great Britain for credible post-hostilities exertions directed toward a negotiated solution.

—We should harp on UNSC 502 as often and as insistently as we can as the only viable basis for a settlement, emphasizing the prior use of force to which Argentina resorted;

—We should reiterate support for the relevance of the Secretary-General's role and our readiness to help in any way the parties might consider helpful;

—We should consult regularly with our Allies and impress upon them the line Haig used in Luxembourg,<sup>3</sup> the necessity for a perception of solid Western backing for the UK.

—In background briefings and public Presidential statements we should continue to push for the earliest possible negotiated solution (again citing UNSC 502 as the base-line point of departure).

*Summary Conclusions*

—*There is little or nothing we can do in a pre-invasion period apart from what we are already now doing;*

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<sup>3</sup> At a May 16 press conference in Luxembourg after his meeting with Pym (see footnote 4, Document 269), Haig said that "the U.S. stands ready at any moment to make any contribution that it can make to bring about a political solution in accordance with the United Nations resolution." (Steven Rattner, "Common Market Delays Vote To Retain Argentine Boycott," *New York Times*, May 17, p. A1)

—Our maximum leverage with the Brits (and possibly also with the Argentines, though this is less sure) will come *after UK troops have landed in strength*, and we should not hesitate to push that leverage as forcefully as possible;

—The U.S. will have to take the direct lead in any post-landing diplomatic effort.

—We should be ready for a worst-case outcome—ignominious Iran rescue-raid type failure—and help the Brits in any Dunkirk-like withdrawal (and not hesitate to push for that if things turn really catastrophic).

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**277. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Warning  
(Cochrane) to the Chairman of the National Intelligence  
Council (Rowen)<sup>1</sup>**

DDI #4242–81

Washington, May 20, 1982

SUBJECT

Military Showdown in the Falklands: Alternative Outcomes

1. With the failure of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's mediation efforts<sup>2</sup> and with both Britain and Argentina placing the blame for the impasse on each other, the Falklands crisis will be settled by a test of military strength, skill and resourcefulness and by a potentially more decisive trial of political stamina in London and Buenos Aires. There are so many variables in the balance of assets and liabilities—ranging from unexpected changes in weather and sea conditions to the indeterminate location of two Argentine attack submarines—that the outcome could be determined as much by the random play of Murphy's Law as by the measurable military capabilities and political competence of the two sides.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 4: C/NIC Chronological. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar informed the Security Council President the evening of May 20 of the failure of his negotiation efforts. For a summary of his efforts between April 19 and May 20, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, pp. 1328–1329.

2. Another possibly decisive but unpredictable determinant may be the perceptions and psychological predispositions of the Thatcher government and the Argentine junta. [7 lines not declassified]

3. Both governments have locked themselves into positions that cannot be compromised without fatal domestic consequences. Thatcher's original calculation that "diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if backed by military strength" has been refuted by the junta's performance during the past eight weeks. The junta's gamble that the U.S. or the United Nations would somehow broker a compromise that would preserve at least a reasonable prospect of vindicating Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the islands has backfired. Now that their mutual bluffs have been called, London and Buenos Aires are left with an immensely risky roll of the iron dice.

#### *Alternative Outcomes*

A. *An unambiguous British military victory.* The British are counting on a prompt collapse of Argentine resistance following initial engagements with the invasion force and on a surrender of the Argentine garrison without substantial casualties. The failure of Argentine forces on South Georgia and Pebble Islands to offer more than token resistance will have encouraged the British to expect little effective or prolonged opposition. At the outset, the British may elect to avoid engaging the main body of Argentine forces in the Port Stanley area by staging their initial landings in outlying areas such as Port Darwin and Fox Bay. The British believe that the rapid defeat or surrender of these outposts will demoralize the Port Stanley garrison and soften it up for either quick defeat or surrender. [9 lines not declassified] Thatcher's confidence in a quick and relatively painless victory was reflected in her remark on 17 May that if Galtieri does not make major concessions, "We make him go."<sup>3</sup>

B. *An inconclusive initial round of combat leading to a war of attrition with heavy casualties on both sides.* Successful British landings will be countered by all-out retaliatory strikes by the Argentine Air Force and Navy that will avert an early demoralization and collapse of Argentine resistance on the ground. The junta is determined to maintain resistance regardless of the costs in lives and equipment, and it is gambling that a British failure to force a prompt surrender and the shock of heavy losses of British personnel, aircraft and ships will bring down the Thatcher government. The junta has persuaded itself that Argentina can outlast the British in a costly and inconclusive war of attrition,

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<sup>3</sup> Thatcher made her statement in a radio interview on May 17. (Glenn Frankel, "Britain, Argentina Pessimistic About Peace Prospects," *Washington Post*, May 18, p. A1)

and that support for Thatcher's policy will evaporate quickly in these conditions, politically disarming Britain from continuing the war.

*C. British landing operations will be defeated* by a combination of stiff resistance by the Argentine garrison and damaging air and naval attacks on the British invasion force and fleet. Thatcher will be forced to resign and her successor will have no choice but to order the evacuation of the invasion force.

#### *Argentine Political Initiatives*

The Argentines will respond immediately to a British invasion by announcing acceptance of Perez de Cuellar's final proposal for a compromise agreement. Following Britain's expected rejection of this proposal, Argentina will request a UN Security Council meeting at which it will propose, through Panama's delegate, an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in place without provisions for a mutual withdrawal of forces. This move will be aimed at forcing a British veto, supported by the U.S. The Argentines believe these initiatives will place the onus squarely on Britain for a continuation of hostilities and greatly strengthen Argentina's position in negotiations under the Secretary General's aegis that will be renewed. The junta also will calculate that British rejection of these two "peace moves" will stimulate a backlash in British public opinion and parliament that will bring Thatcher down, even if she is not forced out by heavy British combat losses.

#### *Weighing the Odds*

The variables mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 preclude a confident forecast, but a plausible case could be made that the most likely outcome will be something that could be called a British military success tempered by important Argentine political gains that may eventually prove to be more significant than the military test of strength. Even the military outcome may be considerably short of an unambiguous British victory, and it may fall between the first and second scenarios. The Argentines may well demonstrate an ability to deny the British a prompt victory. If they can impose substantial losses on the British invasion force, aircraft and warships, Thatcher's domestic political vulnerability may prove to be greater than that of the junta. If the encounter settles into a costly war of attrition, the junta may surprise the world by showing greater staying power than the Thatcher government.

The third scenario—a British defeat and forced withdrawal—cannot be completely ruled out. The greatest threat to British prospects would seem to be overconfidence. [*4½ lines not declassified*]

**Harry Cochran**

*Special Assistant for Warning*

**278. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 20, 1982

**SUBJECT**UK Request for Replenishment by Three US Ships (U)—ACTION  
MEMORANDUM

On 13 May the United Kingdom forwarded a request that the United States provide two underway replenishment capable oilers (T-AO) and one combat stores ship (T-AFS) to replenish UK ships in the South Atlantic. All three of the ships operate under control of the Military Sealift Command; they are primarily civilian manned, but have a small USN complement.

The White House, the Joint Staff and the Navy oppose acceding to the British request. The request goes beyond current policy guidelines, in that it clearly involves operational support. The Joint Staff is concerned that one of the U.S. ships could be attacked (Tab A). Furthermore, it is unlikely that such support could remain out of the public eye for long.

As an alternative arrangement, we could provide replenishment support to UK ships, operating in a purely NATO role within the NATO area, thereby freeing their remaining replenishment ships for operations in the Falkland Islands. The JCS is prepared to countenance this approach, if set under strict guidelines as to the nature of each replenishment that the British would require. The arrangement would be similar to the KC-135 tanker support that we currently are providing the UK.

Accordingly, I recommend that we deny the British request as it has been put to us, but offer an alternative arrangement for replenishment of UK ship operating in a NATO role.<sup>2</sup>

**Fred C. Ikle<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached note from Cormack to Iklé, dated May 24, returned the memorandum to the latter with instruction to note Weinberger's guidance.

<sup>2</sup> Weinberger did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but wrote next to the approval line: "Let us offer the alternative arrangement w/o formally denying them their request yet."

<sup>3</sup> Iklé signed "Fred" above his typed signature.



**Tab A****Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Dalton) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle)<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

United Kingdom OP Corporate Request for Naval Underway Replenishment Assistance (S)

1. (TS) Reference British Defence Staff messages<sup>5</sup> which requested that two fully abeam underway replenishment capable oilers (T-AO) and one combat stores ship (T-AFS) be made available to UK. The requests are for MSC ships to proceed as far south as possible in the South Atlantic to conduct underway replenishment with Royal Navy (RN) warships and/or support ships engaged in operations near the Falklands. The British have informally informed COMSC that the US ships might also be used to provide support between Ascension Island and a replenishment area 1000 to 1200 nautical miles north of the Falkland Islands for up to six months.

2. (TS) The Joint Staff has considered this request. In view of current US policy to provide materiel assistance to UK, with no direct involvement of US forces, it does not appear to be in the best interest of the United States to fulfill this request. Fulfilling the British request would appear to go beyond policy guidelines and could lead to direct attack on US ships by Argentine forces. These ships are primarily manned with US civilian crews, however, they do have an onboard contingent of active duty USN personnel. Additionally, such direct combat support, should it become a matter of public knowledge, would further damage our ability to pursue regional security policies in the Western Hemisphere.

3. (TS) UK currently has 11 RN underway replenishment, materiel, fleet support ships, as well as 8 amphibious ships, deployed in support of their Falkland operations. These are augmented by as many as 40 requisitioned or chartered merchant vessels operating in the same roles. The RN possesses 12 additional operational replenishment and fleet

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<sup>4</sup> Top Secret. A signed copy of this memorandum, dated May 20, along with a copy of the May 17 action memorandum upon which both Hayward and Small initialed their disapproval of the British request is in the National Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218-92-0030, 820 United Kingdom Mar 81-17 Jun 82.

<sup>5</sup> The two messages, May 13 and 14, are attached but not printed.

support ships of various types in the NATO area not committed to the Falklands operation. In view of the substantial totality of vessels dedicated to support of the Falkland Islands contingency, denial of requested US assets is not likely to impact significantly on UK operations in that theatre.

4. (TS) The present request is too broad and open-ended. The OJCS considers that if the UK has a requirement for US replenishment ships, that the US ships would only be considered for a NATO role in replacing UK ships currently operating in the NATO area. Further the UK request should have specific justification for US assistance and include; name of UK ship to be replaced, specific operating location, duration of support and planned employment/concept of operations. A specific request of this nature could then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

5. (S) The OJCS concern relative to this request is primarily based on policy considerations rather than operational impact on US forces. There would be no significant impact on US forces for the next six months if a decision is made to fulfill the UK request.

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## 279. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Situation Group<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 20, 1982, 9:50–10:40 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The Falkland Islands

### PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

*State*

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Mr. Thomas O. Enders

*Defense*

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Mr. Fred Ikle

*JCS*

General David C. Jones

*White House*

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Mr. William P. Clark

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: Special Situation Group (SSG) Meeting on the Falklands, 5/20/1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes were forwarded to Clark by Fontaine under a covering memorandum, July 14. (Ibid.)

CIA  
Mr. William Casey  
USUN  
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

NSC  
Mr. Roger W. Fontaine  
Mr. James M. Rentschler

*Minutes*

The *Vice President* called the Special Situation Group to order at 9:50 a.m. He stated the purpose of the meeting was to get opinions on next steps regarding the Falkland crisis and to develop agreement, if it exists, among the group and let the President know where the current situation stands. He then asked the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to open the meeting.

*Judge Clark* stated the President had suggested a review of the problem by the SSG and that today's meeting would begin with an intelligence update by the Director of Central Intelligence.

*Director Casey* said that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the British were ready to go into East Falkland Island. [*4 lines not declassified*] the Argentine troops are ready to fight but they are not good quality. The Director believes the British intend to helicopter-drop troops at several points on East Falkland. The British are worried about Argentine air attacks but believe the Harriers and SAMs will fight them off. The British will fight but they are ready to talk at the same time. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Argentines believe the strike is ready and there are plans for a massive naval and air retaliation. [*1 line not declassified*] In the meantime, Moscow continues to play it cautiously. [*5½ lines not declassified*] In South America there is a rising feeling of support for Argentina, except in Chile. [*1 line not declassified*] the Hondurans are uptight regarding our posture, but the Argentines have let them know that it was business as usual in Honduras.

The *Vice President* then called for questions. There were none and *Judge Clark* said that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was scheduled to give at this time an update on the UN but that she was at the moment on the phone with the UN Secretary General.

After a brief pause *Secretary Haig* gave an intelligence update which consisted of the following: Last night General Pinochet (Chile) called General Vernon Walters and said the Soviets were providing military equipment indirectly to Argentina.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Haig could not confirm this; he remained somewhat skeptical until we assessed the motives of President Pinochet.

*Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders* observed that Peru on its own had already supplied materiel to Argentina.

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<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been found.

At this point, *Ambassador Kirkpatrick* reviewed the situation at the UN. She said three things had occurred: First, the British had given to the Secretary General their final proposal on May 17, establishing a May 19 noon deadline. The Argentines had responded before noon and the response was negative. Ambassador Kirkpatrick characterized that response as “ridiculous.” The British, in turn, had rejected the Argentine response. Consequently, the Secretary General was working hard on his own three-point resolution. In passing, Ambassador Kirkpatrick believed that the last British proposal was “not irresponsible.” It was Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s belief that the Argentines should accept the British proposal and consider themselves the winner of this dispute. She believes that it may be helpful to pass along a list of concessions the British have already made. It should impress the Argentines.

The Ambassador to the UN also said there was a lot of evidence to show that the Argentine Foreign Office is now taking a harder, even sillier, line than the junta. The Foreign Office is spinning out silly, legalistic formula. Enrique Ros (Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs) has been arguing, for example, that without mention of all the relevant UN resolutions in the final agreement it would mean Argentina and the Foreign Office would have little to show for seventeen years of negotiations.

Regarding the Secretary General’s messages to President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher, there was no response as yet. The Secretary General was at first encouraged by Thatcher’s willingness to accept a fresh Argentine proposal. The Secretary General also believed that Thatcher might agree to his own three-point solution. Those three points include the geographical scope of the agreement, the role of the local councils and the question of termination, i.e., what happens after December 31, 1982, if there is no agreement? There is no longer a question regarding sovereignty. There is no real problem on withdrawal. We are left with the above three problems.

It was Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s opinion that the junta was ready to eliminate the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands from the agreement. We are now left with the question of interim administration. If we lived in a responsible world we would be close to a solution. The question regarding the interim administration is this: What is the role of the local governing council? Specifically, what is the role and composition of that local council? The British want the old council to continue as before, although they have agreed to add two Argentine advisers selected from the 50 Argentine residents on the Island to the heretofore six-man council. The Argentines do not accept this. Ambassador Kirkpatrick then observed that there was a sleeper in all of this. The question is, will the UN administration permit during the interim period free

Argentine immigration to the islands? There is no immigration now and hasn't been for one hundred years. This is one of the principal laws governing the islands. The Secretary General wants to finesse this question by considering it later.

In the last twenty-four hours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated the presidents of Venezuela and Peru will call Galtieri. The Air Force member of the Argentine junta seems to be agreeable to the Secretary General's proposal but, according to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, chances are less than fifty-fifty the Argentines will accept it. At the moment, there will be no meeting of the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, among the delegations friendly to the British, there is growing impatience with the British position.

*Secretary Weinberger* then asked if Ambassador Kirkpatrick could outline the agreed upon portions.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* replied that she believed there was a consensual agreement though no formal agreement had been reached. There was, for example, agreement on parallel and simultaneous withdrawal. The British had quietly dropped an earlier insistence on a previous Argentine withdrawal. In the May 17 British proposal the plan was withdrawal of the Argentines to the mainland while the British withdrew to 150 nautical miles, followed by total British withdrawal within fourteen days. The Argentines want a withdrawal of 300 nautical miles and total withdrawal within thirty days. Ambassador Kirkpatrick insisted that the remaining differences were not a major issue.

*Secretary Haig* then outlined what he thought the prospects were for agreement. He believed the Secretary General had played it very well. He also noted the Secretary General's proposal is basically our final position. The major thing he got was agreement on the sovereignty issue. As for the geographical scope, he is finessing the problem but leaving it for later negotiations. He is, by doing so, letting the British remain in the South Georgias, which is essential to the UK. Secretary Haig, however, is not as sanguine about the withdrawal question. The Argentines do not want to withdraw under British guns. As for the Security Council, we are back to where we were. Regarding termination, the Argentines do not want to negotiate another seventeen years, and the British want assurances they will not be subject to another invasion. Secretary Haig's personal guess is that the Argentines will accept the Secretary General's proposals today and put the onus on the British. Meanwhile, the British are convinced the Argentine Government cannot make and stick to a decision. The British may also come back today and inform the Secretary General there are too many unanswered questions. Therefore, they would like a detailed Argentine response. At the same time, the British will not change their own military plans because time has run out.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* stated that if the British attack the Falklands there would be an immediate call for a Security Council meeting and there would be a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The British would veto and the whole thing would come at a high cost to us. On the question of geographical scope, *Ambassador Kirkpatrick* said the Argentines have an installation on the Sandwich Islands, but if we finesse this right we will leave things as they are and this would be a reasonable situation. She also believes that if the Argentines accept the Secretary General's proposal, there will be an immediate UN mission sent to the area.

*Secretary Haig* then outlined several basic questions we need to answer. First, if the Secretary General succeeds, how do we rebuild our relations with Argentina and in the Southern Cone? If the British attack we need scenarios for this because the UN effort will be discredited and we will need to go at it in another way. If the British succeed, Galtieri may well fall and Argentine Air Force Chief, General Lami Dozo, could move in. The Secretary also observed there is a problem with London now because they are nervous about our support. There was general questioning as to why the British should be nervous since we had given them materiel and diplomatic support, and *Director Casey* observed that nervousness had, in effect, been reflected by Prime Minister Fraser.<sup>3</sup>

*Secretary Haig* then said that if the British assault the Islands and there are no attacks on the mainland—we have assurances on this—we will issue a public statement reaffirming UN Security Council Resolution 502.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* then said a meeting of the Security Council would call for a cease-fire and simultaneous withdrawal. For us to veto that will be "interesting."

*Director Casey* then asked, where does the Rio Treaty come in?

*Secretary Haig* replied, if the Argentine mainland is attacked, it certainly would come into play. Secretary Haig added that Jeane was right, if the British land then the shoe is on the other foot.

*Secretary Weinberger* added, if the British land and encounter serious problems and we pull back our support, we will have another Suez.

The *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* then said he believed Prime Minister Thatcher had given an O.K. to her forces, depending on the weather. The weather is now bad and will be so until Saturday.<sup>4</sup> There are no safe predictions after that. The British are confident they will

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<sup>3</sup> Fraser, on a private visit to the United States, met with Reagan on May 17. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>4</sup> May 22.

succeed but they don't know how severe the losses will be. We have provided them tons and tons of equipment. One question remains controversial, about two replenishment ships.<sup>5</sup>

*Judge Clark* interjected and said the President has decided not to supply them.

*Secretary Haig* then said we need to check on the Pinochet story and added the British will have problems on any Security Council resolution.

The *Vice President* said it would be very hard to veto such a resolution. Would the British really do it? There was general agreement that they would.

*Judge Clark* then asked, are there contingency plans on post-invasion support for the British?

*Secretary Haig* said we will continue to support them but we will be very careful. We also have the War Powers Act to consider. He noted, too, that if the British succeed quickly they (the British) may welcome a cease-fire. We must move hard at the United Nations and while Galtieri may be gone, the Argentines may accept a UN order to cease-fire.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* then said that first there will be within hours of an attack on the Falklands a resolution calling for a cease-fire. It will be difficult for us to veto the first resolution and then later support the second resolution contingent on a successful British attack.

*Secretary Haig* said that the Soviets won't veto anything and that at some point the British will want the U.S. to guarantee the agreement reached won't be violated, and that may mean the use of American forces.

*Secretary Weinberger* then asked, what about a multilateral force?

*Secretary Haig* said that would soften the blow but it would still require a commitment from us.

The *Vice President* then asked, what happens if they hit the mainland?

*Secretary Haig* replied, it would make it a much more difficult situation.

*Secretary Weinberger* observed that hitting the mainland was, in fact, a logical extension in solving Britain's military problem.

*Secretary Haig* said that it would give us enormous problems in the hemisphere and give us cause for concern for American citizens in Argentina.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 278.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* said, in Argentina and in the rest of Latin America as well. Ambassador Kirkpatrick added that Latin America has recently sided with the Argentines on this. Venezuelans are active; they sent a delegation to the European Economic Community. The Peruvians are involved and even the Chileans, who hate the Argentines, cannot take a public position opposed to the Argentines. Even the Nicaraguans are playing a pro-Argentine role. A war in that area involving the mainland would reorient the hemisphere against us for twenty or thirty years.

*Judge Clark* then asked for consideration for recommendations to the President. Should there be an IG working group chaired by State to pull together some of our options?

*Secretary Haig* replied, we have the elements, we need to pull them together.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* then said she had not seen the USUN strategy, nor had she been consulted on it.

*Judge Clark* then said we need to move on this.

*Mr. Meese* asked if there had been any threats to American citizens in Argentina and do we have contingency plans in case of a deteriorating situation?

*Secretary Haig* replied there were no threats as such, and that contingency plans have been worked out.

A general discussion of the problem ensued.

The *Vice President* then asked, do we want an IG process on the matter?

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick* said the most urgent question facing us was our next move once the Secretary General's proposal had been responded to by both parties. She observed there was a feeling at the UN that we don't really support the Secretary General.

*Secretary Haig* replied that that was not true, in fact, he said that it was hog wash and malicious hog wash at that.

There was then consideration of the question whether or not the President should publicly call on both sides to accept the Secretary General's proposal.

*Secretary Weinberger* opposed a public appeal because that was an act of a neutral.

*Secretary Haig* said that it would depend on how the British responded, but in any case we cannot do so publicly.

The meeting then adjourned at 10:40 a.m.



**280. Memorandum From Oliver L. North of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 20, 1982

SUBJECT

Response to President Reagan's Query on 18 May Regarding Vulcan OPS

During our Crisis Management briefing on 18 May in the Oval Office, President Reagan asked about the U.K. Vulcan refueling OPS during the Falklands strikes.<sup>2</sup> I indicated that 12 refueling OPS had been required. The following information is provided as amplification for your "hip pocket" use as appropriate. Sources: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] DIA.

- Only 2 VULCANS are based on Ascencion

—For each mission, both A/C sortie to a decision point approximately 1800 miles SW. There, the pilots determine which A/C is in best shape for mission and other A/C returns to Ascencion.

- Single A/C continues to target, 3500 nm at 600 Kts in high/high/high flight profile (35,000'+)

—Bomb load: 21 1000 lb. bombs, loaded internally (necessitates removal of internal fuel cells—thus refuel requirement).

—Time of flight: 6–7 hours each way.

- VICTORS used for refueling 8 to 14 times per VULCAN on each mission.

—Range to abort fields and removal of interior fuel cells generates frequent refueling.

- Last week, both VULCANS were returned to UK for refit to accommodate SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles.

—SHRIKE refit did not work (Avionics problems) so VULCANS equipped with MARTEL (NATO anti radar missiles) instead.

—Anti-Radiation missiles to be used to attack Argentine RO-LAND SAMS.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/20/1982–05/24/1982). Top Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that McFarlane saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to the President's national security briefing, attended by Bush, Clark, and McFarlane and held in the Oval Office from 10:10 until 10:25 a.m., May 18. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation or other record of this briefing has been found.

- Two days ago, both VULCANS launched, but problems with A/C (probably MARTELS) caused mission to be aborted.
  - One VULCAN scheduled to return to UK *today* (20 May) for unspecified repairs/rework.
    - Possible refit for Precision (Laser) Guided Munitions (PGM).
    - Brits have hand-held and A/C mounted Laser Target Designator.
  - If A/C cannot be repaired and returned, Amphib OPS may be delayed. Plan was to have VULCAN sortie soften up/disrupt Argentine C<sup>3</sup> concurrent with landing.
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**281. Memorandum From Vice President Bush to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

South Atlantic Crisis: U.S. Posture

Following last night's collapse of the Pérez de Cuéllar mediation effort,<sup>2</sup> the events we have been forecasting for the past few days have begun to unfold. British forces launched a series of low-level commando probes on the Falklands under cover of darkness early this morning, accompanied by naval bombardment and tactical air attack. As weather conditions further improve in the area, we can anticipate significant escalation and the strong probability of British landings in much greater strength (1000 British troops have already been inserted according to press reports).

In the meantime, the inter-agency follow-up to the SSG<sup>3</sup> which I chaired yesterday has examined four related areas of the crisis where coordinated U.S. action is now or soon will be required (public affairs, UN, Congress, response to UK requests for additional support). AI

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/20/1982–05/24/1982). Secret. Reagan initialed at the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. Another notation on the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 277.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 279.

Haig's memo (Tab A) summarizes this work and suggests the posture we should take in each of the areas concerned.

George Bush

**Tab A**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

US Posture Toward the Falkland Crisis

Now that military action on the islands has begun, we should take the following actions:

—Our *public* spokesmen should state that we have been concerned all along that failure to implement UN Security Council Resolution 502 would lead to intensified fighting, and that we are ready to help work toward a political solution. We should steer clear of any statement of concern about the British action itself, which they are taking in accordance with their right of self-defense.<sup>5</sup>

—In the *UN* we must be prepared to join the British, and probably one or two others, in voting against a cease-fire resolution. We will find it harder to vote against a resolution which provides for a cease-fire, withdrawal of all forces, and introduction of a UN force, though we must think carefully before abstaining on any resolution the British vote against.<sup>6</sup>

—We will want to keep *Congress* informed, and, if necessary, head off unhelpful resolutions (e.g, call for cease-fire only).

—We should continue to be responsive to *British requests* for materiel assistance, even in greater quantities drawing the line at impairing our own readiness, while not agreeing to operational participation, e.g., refueling or resupplying British ships or aircraft in the South Atlantic.

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<sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>5</sup> That day, May 21, Speakes read a statement on the conflict in the Falklands at the White House daily press briefing. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 662.

<sup>6</sup> Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: "Al—Wouldn't this (underlined) be hard to explain? RR."

If British action produces a quick surrender of Argentine forces on the Falklands,<sup>7</sup> we—and no doubt the British—will want a cease-fire resolution passed by the Security Council. This could help avert an extended conflict. The Argentines—by then, probably a successor to Galtieri—*may* go along with a cease-fire. The key may be our ability to get assurances from the British that they will show magnanimity, by not, for example, reintroducing such symbols of British rule as the former governor and by committing themselves to resuming negotiations toward a political solution. We will want to approach the British with this idea early on if things go well for them militarily.

If it appears that the struggle for the islands will be long, with casualties growing and the outcome in doubt, we will want to consider a new negotiating initiative.<sup>8</sup> We and the Brazilians could take the lead, working with the Secretary General. We should confer first with the British. They may well want a new initiative if they get bogged down and their support in Europe and at home is evaporating; but they may object to a new initiative as long as they think they have a reasonable chance of military success. We cannot decide now how best to pursue our interests in such a situation; but we can and will continuously refine our contingency plans.

The danger to Americans in Argentina will increase steeply with a British landing(s). We are therefore instructing our Ambassador to cut back, in an orderly way, to a skeletal staff with no dependents.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you approve the above plan of action.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 11384 from London, May 21, the Embassy provided evaluations of what the British would do if they were successful in retaking the Islands and if they were not successful, concluding: "Either way, we expect Britain's future will have been skewed by the Falklands affair in ways that Britons can now only dimly grasp. As they grope for answers, Thatcher and her government will rely heavily on our counsel and our support. If hard pressed, Britain may at times expect more from us than we can deliver." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (1)) In telegram 3236 from Buenos Aires, May 21, the Embassy reported: "Whether or not the Junta survives, it seems to us entirely possible that the Argentines will coalesce around the military in an attitude of defiance. The crisis could thus be considerably protracted." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820267–0826)

<sup>8</sup> In a May 21 memorandum to Haig, Enders outlined a negotiations scenario, which suggested the participation of U.S. military forces, along with forces from Brazil, in a joint peacekeeping force, in order to make negotiations "more attractive from the British point of view," as well as a number of suggestions that "would help the Argentines come to terms quickly." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982)

<sup>9</sup> Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. Below this, he wrote: "But note question on p.1. RR." (See footnote 6 above)

**282. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 21, 1982

We have direct confirmation of the views of General Lami Doso concerning Argentina's response to Belaunde.<sup>2</sup>

1. He asserts they,<sup>3</sup> accepted all of Belaunde's proposals, including the specifications that the administration of the islands would be under United Nations administration.

2. That negotiations would take place in the framework of a United Nations Security Council resolution, the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 502 and other pertinent resolutions.

3. That a Contact Group of four nations should oversee (or guarantee?) the negotiations with two nations to be chosen by each side.

We are particularly warned against mischief making in New York. Contact with chiefs necessary.

Evacuation of American dependents is widely interpreted as foreshadowing a new US hard line.

Finally, principal and continent feel United Kingdom will escalate only with assurances of United States support. They deeply fear a hard line from New York and current debate.

**Jeane J. Kirkpatrick<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Confidential. Drafted by Kirkpatrick. A handwritten time of 1:30 p.m. is in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand in the bottom right-hand corner indicates the memorandum was received in S at 1:50. The date of the receipt is unclear.

<sup>2</sup> On the afternoon of May 20, Belaunde presented the Argentines and British with a "new formula" for a peace settlement in the South Atlantic, which stipulated: "1. Each nation subscribes unilaterally to their latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations; 2. The Secretary General fulfills the clauses in which there are points of agreement, such as: (A) a ceasefire; (B) the mutual withdrawal of forces; (C) administration of the government of the Islands by the United Nations or by a contact group, formed by various countries, within a period which is agreed in the two proposals; 3. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Perez de Cuellar, or the contact group, acceptable to both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for organizing and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone of conflict of the forces of both countries." (Telegram 5234 from Lima, May 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820265–0589) The U.S. response to the proposal, which the Department believed would not resolve the dispute, was transmitted in telegram 139656 to Lima, May 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850186–0311)

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand inserted the word "chiefs" above "they."

<sup>4</sup> Kirkpatrick initialed "JJK" next to her typed signature.

**283. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State—Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

The UK—Alone

As the UK enters a bloody phase of the Falklands crisis, Margaret Thatcher's government will be increasingly isolated diplomatically as other governments calculate the damage to their interests of continued support.

—The EC is unlikely to renew economic sanctions against Argentina when they expire next week.

—The UK also faces estrangement from its EC allies on the economic front because of the breakdown this week over agricultural prices and hardening divisions over the EC budget.

—The UK faces excoriation from Latin America and the neutral and non-aligned in the UN, the OAS and other international fora. The Soviets and Cubans will try to use the rising tide of anti-Western sentiment.

—Cancellation of the Pope's visit—a high visibility event—remains possible despite British Catholic and HMG efforts to keep it on track.

Thus far, the Prime Minister's domestic political position has been strong, with the public approving her policy of negotiation while building up British military strength in the South Atlantic. The popular media continues to be bellicose. But her support is probably softer than it looks and could erode quickly if British casualties are high or fighting is protracted. The suspension of efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution may tempt the Labor party to oppose the Prime Minister's South Atlantic policy in the House of Commons. A dramatic set-back—the sinking of the *QEII* or the *Canberra*<sup>2</sup>—or a prolonged stalemate could lead Tories to replace her as head of government, perhaps by Francis Pym.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by J. Campbell (EUR/NE) on May 21; cleared by Blackwill, R. Morris (EUR/NE), and Smith. Campbell initialed for the clearing officials. Bremer's stamped initials appear on the first page of the memorandum. The memorandum bears an erroneous stamped date of March 21. Burt had been nominated Assistant Secretary on May 10, although his nomination was not yet acted upon by the Senate. He would not formally enter on duty until February 18, 1983.

<sup>2</sup> The passenger ships *Queen Elizabeth II* and *Canberra* had been requisitioned by the British military and deployed to the South Atlantic for use as troop transports.

Convinced that her moral position is unassailable and her policy right, the Prime Minister initially is likely to be less flexible and more dependent on her right-wing allies in the cabinet as the war heats up. The influence of Francis Pym and the FCO will decline with the MOD on center stage. Her likely response to early reverses will be to intensify UK military actions in the South Atlantic. She will ask the US for more political and materiel support, seeking our greater involvement as an ally. The support of the US will assume heightened domestic political importance to her as international isolation deepens.

If the British do not achieve a quick victory, this will be a dangerous period for US/UK relations:

—The right-wing Conservative backbench mood will be that the US is not doing enough and therefore shares the blame for UK reverses. (The Prime Minister will do her best to fight this.)

—The Labor opposition and international opinion will call for immediate negotiations and a cease-fire, seizing on peace initiatives as a means of attacking the Prime Minister's war,

—The President, in London June 7–9,<sup>3</sup> will be the focus for increasing British ambivalence about the US/UK relationship if victory has eluded HMG. The Prime Minister may present him with a "shopping list" of military and political measures while the public's mood could be increasingly critical of the US.

In these circumstances, a US peace plan might provide HMG with the framework for diplomacy even while it continued military action. Indeed, it might make fighting more politically acceptable at home while reducing international pressure on the UK for a cease-fire. But the timing of a new US diplomatic initiative would be crucial:

—US moves should not accelerate any softening of UK domestic support for the Thatcher government.

—We must be aware of British sensitivities to a UN or OAS role, which they will perceive as weighted against them.

—In any event, we should think carefully about initiating a new diplomatic round without specific HMG agreement. To do so would risk a historic rupture in US/UK relations.

At stake is much more than the fate of a UK government which has proved more supportive of US policies than any of its recent predecessors or likely successors. Anglo-American relations revived relatively quickly from the trauma of Suez. British national self-confidence did not. The Thatcher government's primary achievement has been to

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<sup>3</sup> Reagan was scheduled to visit London as part of a European trip that would take him to France, Italy, and West Germany.

reverse the thirty-year trend of British withdrawal from global responsibility. Failure in the Falklands will undo all that the Rhodesian settlement has done to revive UK national pride. It will leave us with no ally, save France, willing to share the risks and pay the price needed to protect global western interests.

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**284. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for 50 Maritime Limpet Mines

On May 15 the UK requested that the United States transfer 50 maritime limpet mines to British forces by May 24th.<sup>2</sup> These mines are hand-transported underwater anti-ship demolition weapons for use against moored targets. The UK has not indicated the nature of the targets against which these mines might be used; it is possible, however, that the targets might be ships in Argentine mainland ports.

This request raises a larger policy issue of the nature of US materiel support for the UK during a post-invasion phase of the Falklands conflict, when the mines are likely to be employed. The State Department recognizes that a decision on the mines, because of the possibility that they might be used against mainland ships, begs that larger policy issue.

In my view we must proceed with greater caution when carrying out British requests that clearly are geared to the second phase of the conflict. We have several such requests that have been broached, if not formally tabled, in addition to the request for mines. These include a request for matting that might be sufficiently large to support Nimrod operations from an expanded Port Stanley airfield, and for magnetic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. At the bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: “Fred: We support the UK in this conflict.—As long as we do not get our troops involved—we shouldn’t try to guess when and for what reason they might want limpet mines, airport matting, etc.” Weinberger’s note was also transcribed in an attached May 24 typewritten note from Cormack to Iklé.

<sup>2</sup> The request was enumerated in the Department of Defense’s May 14 list of British requests for military assistance. See footnote 2, Document 266.



anomaly detectors, whose requested delivery of late June points to a British desire to husband anti-submarine warfare assets to protect resupply ships to the Falklands over the next few months.

Secretary Haig has already been apprised of the implications of a decision on mines, and I have contacted Larry Eagleburger to establish what State's views are with respect to the particular request and the general policy.<sup>3</sup>

Fred C. Ikle<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 290.

<sup>4</sup> Ikle wrote "Fred" above his typed signature.

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**285. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

British Landing on Falklands May 21

Nicho Henderson has just given me a readout on the results of the operation today in the Falkland Islands.

As of 7:30 p.m. this evening, Henderson reports the following Argentine losses: Nine Mirages, Seven A-4s; two Pucara close ground support aircraft and two helicopters. British losses from a substantial Argentine air effort were: One Harrier, two Gazelle helicopters and five vessels damaged, including two frigates which were hit seriously but are now under tow.

The British, according to Henderson, are optimistic. They consider their losses as minimal given the high risks they ran with this operation. A beachhead, with a large force, has been established on East Falkland Island at San Carlos Cove where they now plan to operate their Har-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (05/21/1982–06/15/1982). Confidential. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, which was received in the White House at 11:41 p.m.

riers. (San Carlos is on a sheltered bay and has a 600-meter grass airstrip.)

Heavy Argentine air attacks are expected tomorrow on the British Task Force.

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**286. Information Memorandum From Robert E. Service of the Department of State Falklands Working Group to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)**

Washington, May 23, 1982

[Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820074–2373. Secret; Exdis; Noform. 2 pages not declassified.]

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**287. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director of Operations, National Military Command Center (Tobin)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1982, 0530 EDT

SUBJECT

AM–2 Airfield Matting (U)

1. (TS) SECDEF called the DDO (NMCC) at 232220 EDT May 82 indicating he had just received a request from Mr Nott, Secretary of State for Defense, United Kingdom, for 150,000 square yards of AM–2

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. A stamped notation at the bottom of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on May 24.

airfield matting.<sup>2</sup> SECDEF stated he supported the request and that *speed* in providing the equipment was essential. SECDEF stated financial details had to be worked out but UK was ready to buy now and long term future of matting would be worked out later. He requested the DDO take action to fulfill the request and brief him telephonically on the expected availability of the equipment prior to his departure for Detroit early morning, 24 May 1982.

2. (TS) At 240430 EDT May 82 the DDO read the draft JCS execute order (atch 1)<sup>3</sup> and a message to Mr Nott (atch 2)<sup>4</sup> to the SECDEF which he approved. The message to Mr Nott was dispatched. The execute order will be further coordinated prior to dispatch.

**Thomas G. Tobin**

*Brigadier General, USAF*

*Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC*

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<sup>2</sup> Nott's May 23 message reads: "I am very grateful for the helpful way in which, following our talks in Brussels earlier this month [see Document 233], your Department has approached the question of material support for UK forces. In particular, my officials have been in touch with yours about the possible release of 150,000 square yards of AM2 airfield matting, which I understand the US Marine Corps hold as war reserve. I should be very grateful if you could agree to this release at a very early date, in which case our officials could jointly work out the details. We would propose that the matting should be transported from the United States in a ship we would charter. We should also look to you for any special training required. As to the financial basis of the release, perhaps this could also be discussed between our officials: since you would need, I understand, to arrange for resupply you may wish to consider an arrangement under which you would supply to us initially on the basis that the matting would be returned if unused. If it were used, then when the Port Stanley airfield was permanently repaired we would recover it to become a useful enhancement of the UK's capability, for use either within NATO or out of area." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0004, UK (May) 1982)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed. In his message to Nott, sent to the British Ministry of Defense at 0901Z, May 24, Weinberger stated that the request had been approved and "will be met with maximum speed." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982)

**288. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to British Defense Secretary Nott<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1982

Dear John:

In your letter of May 5, you asked if certain equipment could be provided on the basis that you would pay only for that used or retained.<sup>2</sup> As an alternative, you proposed a “sale and return” basis for the equipment’s release.

I believe that the financing arrangement worked out between our respective staffs substantially accomplishes what you propose. This arrangement calls for us to position agreed-to items of equipment at U.S. facilities for subsequent draw-down by the UK. The UK would reimburse us for all costs of those items actually issued to you; in other cases if there should be any major costs required for us to position any items at U.S. facilities, I understand that our staffs have agreed that the UK would bear these costs. If this does not state your understanding, please let me know.

Your letter also addressed the immediate requirement for two specific items. The first, the two Vulcan/Phalanx guns, were delivered on 14 May. The second request for 300 AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles, formally came to us on May 13, as an immediate request for 100 missiles, with the likelihood of 200 more being required at a later date. On May 14, I approved the delivery of the 100 missiles, which were flown to Ascension Island that same night for delivery to the UK as you requested.<sup>3</sup>

Please let me know what else we can do.

Sincerely,

Cap

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Henderson. Iklé sent a draft of the letter to Weinberger under an undated action memorandum, requesting that Weinberger sign the letter. Both the draft of the letter, with Weinberger’s handwritten revisions, and the action memorandum are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 233.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 265.

**289. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 24, 1982, 1528Z

1440. For Secretary of State Haig, Asst Sec Enders, NSC Director Clark, Ass Sec Newell, IO/UNA Tillman, and USOAS Amb Midden-dorf. Dept pass CIA Director Casey. Subject: Falkland Islands: Possible Resolution in Security Council.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Until now expected tabling of one or more resolutions on the Falklands dispute has been delayed by an unexpected conjunction of three factors. To the anticipated British reluctance to have Security Council action at an early stage of the fighting has been added the desire of the left mischief makers (USSR, and friends including Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua) to prolong the debate to permit maximum opportunity to attack UK and US, and the less expected cooperation of Argentina FoMin and delegation in this “slow down.”

3. Despite the clear indications that Argentine military chiefs desire UN action, the FoMin has not encouraged prompt action by such likely resolution authors as Brazil, Ireland, Japan, China, etc.

4. At the end of the day Sunday,<sup>2</sup> three possible scenarios appeared. First, a resolution calling for a cease-fire with a renewal of the Secretary General's mandate. This is apparently favored by Panama possibly Ireland as well. Second, a more elaborate resolution that incorporates the elements of agreement SYG thinks were essentially present in his mediation efforts: ceasefire; simultaneous, rapid, mutual force withdrawal; introduction of UN force and interim administration. Third, same as two plus a new element: creation of a “contact group” under Article 29 of the UN Charter probably consisting of four countries with two each chosen by the UK and Argentina. This approach is favored by Brazil, Venezuela, and various others, probably including France and China.

5. It is understood that UK would veto first approach, but would have problem with two and three.

6. Brazilian PermRep reported that Costa Mendez has said if there is no UN action by Tuesday<sup>3</sup> they will turn to OAS and Rio Treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 2]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> May 23.

<sup>3</sup> May 25.

This of course would be a great blow to the inter-American system regardless of the number of votes Argentina is able to mobilize.

7. Delay favored by Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua is doubtless in part stimulated by this possibility. Cuba is out of sight in this discussion but its presence is felt at all points, including in the invitation already extended to Costa Mendez to speak at the upcoming meeting of the non-aligned in Havana.<sup>4</sup> (I understand Costa Mendez currently intends to go and has approached Venezuela about accompanying them.)

8. There will presumably be a resolution tabled today. UK will ask for 24 hours and probably get overnight.

9. Comment: Many fears are being expressed that US might join UK in a veto. I recommend we closely consult with France and Japan and carefully consider the UK record in UNSC on US vetoes (e.g., Nicaragua complaint, Dome of the Rock, etc). At best they abstain. In the process they build national credit for later use in situations such as this.

10. Incidentally, Parsons has turned in a virtuoso performance throughout the Falklands crisis.

11. One version of possible resolution follows:

(A) 1. Immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. Simultaneous withdrawal of Argentine forces to continental Argentine territory and simultaneous withdrawal of British forces in the northeast direction to a minimum distance equivalent to that between Argentine continental territory and the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; plus (B) and (D)

3. Appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of a provisional administration of the islands with exclusive competence which will hold consultations with the representatives of the inhabitants to be designated by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom; plus (C) and (E)

4. Establishment, under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, of a committee presided over by the Secretary General of the United Nations and composed of the two parties and of four other member states, two of which to be appointed by each of the parties, and with the mandate of conducting urgent negotiations with a view to a permanent settlement of the question; plus (F)

(B) The withdrawal of the British and Argentine forces will be initiated 48 hours after the adoption of the resolution;

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<sup>4</sup> A Ministerial conference of the Non-Aligned Movement countries was scheduled to begin in Havana on May 31.

(C) The administration of the United Nations will be established simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of Argentine and British forces;

(D) All Argentine and British forces would have withdrawn from the area within 21 days and one third of the forces of each party would have withdrawn at each seven days in accordance with criteria established by the Secretary General;

(E) All United Nations member states will grant the Secretary General the support required to the establishment of the provisional administration and to the monitoring (supervision) of the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;

(F) The committee to be established in accordance with paragraph four will begin its work the day following the completion of the withdrawal of the forces from the area and will submit its report to the Security Council not later than 31 January 1983.

12. Friendly nations regard it as extremely important that fighting not be permitted to continue until one side is humiliated. It is feared that British humiliation would enhance the risk of direct US participation, while Argentine humiliation would further inflame anti-US passions in Latin America and enhance the risk of Soviet participation in the conflict.

**Kirkpatrick**

**290. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1982

SUBJECT

*Limpet Mines*

We have looked at the question of whether transfer of Limpet mines to the UK could be traced back to us if the British used them in their Falklands operations.

Our current information indicates that Limpet mines manufactured by the U.S. have *not* been transferred to any other country. Several countries including the UK, however, make similar devices.

This suggests that (1) disabling or sinking a ship with a Limpet-type device would not point the finger at the U.S., but (2) if a U.S.-manufactured Limpet mine was recovered intact and examined by experts, it probably could be traced back to us.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by T. Miller (PM/P). An unknown hand initialed for Miller. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on May 25. A notation in the top left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “CC to DCG [David Gompert] 5/25.”

<sup>2</sup> Below this paragraph, Eagleburger wrote: “OK. Let’s give them what they want. LSE.”



**291. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (Train) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)<sup>1</sup>**

Norfolk, May 24, 1982, 2300Z

0047. Eyes Only Personal for Gen Jones info Gen Rogers from Train.  
Subj: Impact on NATO Forces Due Falklands Crisis (S).

A. JCS Washington DC 221502Z May 82.<sup>2</sup>

1. (TS) The Falklands crisis has caused perturbations to NATO capabilities as discussed Ref A and references thereto. Further comment/assessment follows:

A. (U) Readiness impact:

(1) (S) Ground: The principal loss is the availability of a forward deployed NATO landing force, comprised largely of the Third Royal Marine Commando Brigade deployed to the Falklands, which totals approx 5700 pers with 42 helos. One RNLMC amphibious combat group remains available, provided shipping can be provided by a NATO nation. (None of 8 UK committed amphibious bottoms are avail.) The critical feature is not numbers but the lack of a forward deployed amphib force in Northern Europe.

(2) (TS) Air:

—Impact on UK strategic bombing/air refueling capability, and potential loss of Northern European Command tactical air support of maritime operations capability upon commitment of land-based tacair to Falklands is deferred to CINCEUR.

—The commitment of a majority number of MPA, offensive air and Sea King ASW assets reduces numbers available to SACLANT with totals fluctuating downward daily. Currently 20 MPA, 29 offensive, 30 air defense and 6 Sea King aircraft are committed to SACLANT.

(3) (TS) Navy:

—The commitment of all UK CV-based ASW air reduces available forward deployed protection for STRIKFLTANT. Currently, 2 CVS/21 ASW escorts are committed to SACLANT w/in 48 hours; however, only 5 ASW escorts are now available, and they may soon be deployed to replace losses.

—The majority of surface ship ASW protection would also be eliminated. Of the 10 ASW escorts committed to SACLANT w/in 48 hours, only 1 escort is available.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218-92-0030, Message Traffic May 82—CINCLANT May 82. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information to USEUCOM.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

—A major reduction is sustained in SSN task group protection. Of 7 SSN's committed to SACLANT w/in 48 hours, only 2 SSN's are available.

—Of the majority of the 20 various MLSF ships assigned to NATO support only 7 are available. That MLSF shipping remains under national OPCON is acknowledged.

B. (TS) Other UK forces to support Falklands crisis: It is estimated that 4 to 5 DD/FF types, RAF F-4 and Harrier, and additional ground forces could be withdrawn for further contingency support. The DD/FF types would be replacements for losses, while the F-4 and Harrier A/C would be land based to allow CV sea room. Ground forces would be employed for expanded Island occupation.

C. (TS) US/Allied compensating forces: Barring NOREUR crisis declaration or specific NCA direction, no NATO peacetime compensation is recommended. Current Northern flank force gap is a temporary reduction similar to that on Southern flank when a US CVBG redeployed to I.O. in January 1980. In NOREUR crisis all NATO forces avail are committed; estimate UK forces would rejoin under this scenario, leaving Falklands crisis as is.

D. (TS) Sources of US/Allied force compensation: In the event of general war or directed peacetime compensation, UK A-1 NATO sea commitment could be partially covered by early availability of earmarked US and other NATO A-3/A-4 Navy forces, ground forces compensation should be air mobile to the maximum extent.

E. (U) Replacement of UK forces by US: Paragraphs C and D above are germane.

F. (C) US fulfillment of other UK/NATO commitments/NATO related support ops:

(1) (TS) Navy/Air:

—Caribbean station ship—fill by COMNAVFORCARIB duty ship.

—STANAVFORLANT ship—fill from I.O. commitment.

—GIUK MPA—fill by forward deployment of P-3 to UK vice I.O.

—UK air defense—fill by forward deploy USAF F-15/F-4 to UK.

—Aerial refueling—fill by forward deploying strategic tanker assets.

(2) (S) Ground: While US ground forces could backfill for their UK counterparts in the Northern European Command, protection of the Atlantic Islands would be left in doubtful status.

2. (TS) It is worthy of note that the UK is planning significant naval force reductions in 1983, and that the Falklands crisis merely surfaces the NATO impact issue early. Similar involvement of another major NATO member would severely degrade NATO's ability to respond in a crisis of any magnitude.

**292. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 26, 1982, 0200Z

1470. For Asst. Sec. Enders from Amb. Kirkpatrick. Subj: Falkland Islands Situation: Amb. Kirkpatrick's Meeting with Gen. Miret.

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. At his request, Amb. Kirkpatrick and Amb. Sorzano met with Argentinian Air Force General Jose Miret evening of May 24. Alberto Manen, Air Attache's aide with Argentina's Embassy in Washington, accompanied Gen. Miret but did not attend meeting.

3. Gen. Miret began by acknowledging that Argentina had committed "original sin" in invading the Falklands and continued by repeating the well-known Argentinian views on the history of the Falklands over the last 150 years, British inflexibility and the failure of more than a decade of negotiations which eventually culminated in the invasion. Miret then gave Argentinian version of the respective mediating efforts of Secretary Haig and SYG Perez de Cuellar. The failure of these efforts had led to the present situation and raised the concerns which he wanted to discuss.

4. According to Gen. Miret the military situation was developing favorably for Argentina. Just that morning 21 Argentinian warplanes had attacked British ships and had inflicted severe damage to the Canberra troop carrier. Yesterday they had sunk a frigate.<sup>2</sup> British were not accurately portraying their losses and he was skeptical that their San Carlos beachhead was as well established as they claimed. Although presently the military situation favored Argentina, Argentina was aware that ultimately Britain would prevail because Argentina could not expect to defeat a world power. Argentina naturally did not want to lose but neither did it find comfort in the thought of winning in a manner that would humiliate Britain.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/26/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Argentine air attacks on May 24 struck numerous British vessels in San Carlos Water, although *Canberra* was not among those hit. (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 477–479) On May 23, the British frigate HMS *Antelope* was attacked by Argentine aircraft in San Carlos Water and struck by two bombs which failed to explode. One bomb exploded during an attempt to disarm it, forcing the ship's abandonment and ultimate sinking the following day. Situation Report Number 68 (as of 1700 hours, May 24), transmitted in telegram 142578 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 25, described the ship as "abandoned." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820271–0728)

5. Yet the prolongation of the war had its own danger. It provided opportunity for the Cubans and Soviets to increase their meddling in Hemispheric affairs. Britain's expansion of the war zone to include the River Plate estuary necessarily dragged Uruguay and probably Brazil into the conflict. Uruguayan Foreign Minister was coming to New York to raise the issue. As the conflict expands and its intensity increases, it will become increasingly difficult to foresee its consequences or to find an acceptable solution.

6. Gen. Miret said the Argentinian Government is convinced that the U.S. must play a mediating role in the conflict. This role could be either a public or a behind-the-scenes one, but either way U.S. mediation is necessary because only the U.S. can influence the U.K. to adopt a position conducive to the termination of hostilities. Without an American restraining influence, Britain will insist on pursuing its military objectives until the bitter end. The bitter end will be bitter indeed for all except the Communists.

7. Within Argentine Government, the U.S. has friends as well as foes. There are those—the hardliners—who are advocating an escalation of diplomatic measures starting with the withdrawal of Argentinian representatives to the Inter-American Defense Board and culminating with the withdrawal of Ambassadors. This rupture of relations was opposed by another faction of military chiefs that see this as necessarily leading to an Argentinian embrace of the Soviet Union. After the violent struggle against domestic guerrillas and terrorists it would be ironic to hand to the Soviets what they had been denied by effective counter-terrorist action.

8. Finally, turning to the U.N. Security Council situation, Miret indicated that Brazilian draft was acceptable to the chiefs of the Argentina Junta.

**Kirkpatrick**

**293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1982, 0153Z

142586. Subject: Falklands and Security Council: Further Guidance. Ref: A) USUN New York 1440,<sup>2</sup> B) USUN New York 1439,<sup>3</sup> C) State 139097.<sup>4</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. In light of Security Council debate and prospect that resolution(s) unacceptable to US may soon be introduced (Ref A), the following amended guidance is provided for USUN.

3. Our objective remains to encourage all constructive efforts for a settlement while avoiding any UN action which would prejudice the UK's right to use force under Article 51 of the Charter or which would amount to a de facto imposition of change in the Islands' status prior to negotiations. We continue to wish to preserve the UN as an impartial intermediary in case it is needed in the future, and wish to avoid any unbalanced resolution that one side would reject.

4. We should continue in our talks with others to hold that Res 502 remains basis for a just solution and that we would oppose any action which superseded 502. Of resolutions likely to be advanced at this point we could accept only one which (A) limited itself to reaffirming 502 in a way not prejudicial to UK's right to recover Islands entirely and/or (B) gave SYG new mandate to continue his mediating efforts but without calling for cease-fire or a substantive prescription for a settlement that would prejudice British right to self-defense or impose other terms unacceptable to the UK. This means that we should discourage others from believing that we might find acceptable a cease-fire resolution made somewhat more positive by the inclusion of selected elements for a settlement already agreed upon but whose effect

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London and for information to all UN Security Council capitals. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 289.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1439 from USUN, May 24, transmitted a summary of Kirkpatrick's May 23 meeting with a high-level Venezuelan delegation on the impact of the South Atlantic conflict on the inter-American system. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820269–0665)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 139097 to USUN, May 21, Haig conveyed guidance for the Mission to use in the event of a request for a meeting of the UN Security Council, an announcement by Pérez de Cuéllar of an impasse in his mediation effort, or a British landing. Haig suggested that as a "first effort," the United States "should discourage any further, formal action by the Council." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820266–0219)

would be to call for a halt in UK's legitimate exercise of self-defense and leave British in unsatisfactory position on the ground. British would veto such a resolution, and we would support them.

5. We also believe that the British at this stage will veto any resolution that would stand in the way of their complete recovery of the Falklands and restoration of a UK administration or at least traditional local administration. Since there is probably no substantive formula which could bridge the gap between the UK and Argentina at this stage, we want to discourage efforts to do this in a resolution. We do not wish to be placed in a position of having to vote on a reasonable sounding resolution that contains ostensible concessions to the British, but which the British will veto in any case.

6. As for possible resolution described in Ref A, para 11, it would fall into the category of resolution described in para 4 above which we would veto, assuming the British did.

7. We have just learned that Irish draft resolution calling for a temporary cease-fire and for SYG to contact parties to discuss extended cease-fire and possible UN observers has been tabled.<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the above, U.S. should urge other members of the Council to oppose this draft. If, however, it obtains nine votes, and as we assume UK plans to veto it, we should also vote against.

**Haig**

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1454 from USUN, May 25, Kirkpatrick reported that the Irish resolution would be tabled the evening of May 25. "The Irish argue that it is like a wedge—it asks little of either party and builds confidence." Kirkpatrick continued that Parsons "has already informed us that the resolution is unacceptable to them. They will veto. A ceasefire is unacceptable in principle; unworkable in practice. Panamanian resolution is not acceptable. The Japanese version of a resolution is least acceptable to British because it provides nothing. Parsons did not comment to me concerning the 'Brazilian' approach which I think we should expect after Irish draft is rejected, but clearly they prefer no action at all. Vote is likely to come tomorrow afternoon on Irish draft. In considering US vote, I urge that we carefully consider our distinctive interests and hemispheric friends. And also, especially, that we look at UK record of support for US. On Nicaraguan complaint for example, of which we were target—we vetoed, they abstained, also Salvador, and on a whole series of Middle East votes." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) For a summary of the Irish and Japanese resolutions, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1330.

**294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1982, 0417Z

142651. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Secretary's Letter to Foreign Secretary Pym.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Please deliver as early as possible Tuesday morning,<sup>2</sup> your time, the following message from me to Foreign Secretary Pym:

Begin text:

Dear Francis:

At this crucial moment in the course of the Falklands crisis, I wanted you to have my latest thoughts on the opportunities and risks we face together. First and foremost, I want you to know that you can continue to count on US support as you do what is necessary.

We are fast approaching the point at which the UK will have a decisive local military advantage, with success clearly within your reach. At that point, which even Argentine self-delusion cannot hide, the Argentines could feel compelled to turn to the Cubans and Soviets as their last hope to avert total humiliation. Should Galtieri resist these pressures, he could be swept aside and replaced by those far more hostile to fundamental Western interests. Even if the Argentines do not open themselves to the Soviets and Cubans, they are virtually certain to want to continue a state of war, which they will pursue with whatever means they can acquire.

If this occurs, however successful you are on the Islands, we will unquestionably face a future of open-ended conflict, possibly supported by the East and at considerable risk and cost to your interests and ours. Whatever disposition to settle there may now be in Buenos Aires will evaporate. Moreover, however unjust, we will together be left isolated in the international community, with relentless pressures to settle on terms favorable to Argentina notwithstanding the justice of our position and the success of your forces.

In the face of these long-term prospects, I see major advantages in an effort by you to put forward terms of a just and reasonable settlement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> May 25.

as soon as you are sure that you can and will succeed militarily. I appreciate fully your reservations about agreeing, in a settlement, to withdraw British forces without an assurance that the Islands and the inhabitants would be absolutely safe from renewed aggression if a negotiated settlement broke down. Therefore, and in the interest of averting dangerous political developments in Argentina, the US would be prepared to provide a battalion-size force for the purpose of ensuring that there would be no violation of any interim agreement preceding a final settlement. Because of what has happened to our standing with the Argentines as a result of our support for you, there is no chance that a US-only force would be acceptable. We would therefore need to persuade the most trustworthy major hemispheric power—Brazil—to join us. A combined force would present a credible deterrent and assure the security of the Islanders for the period of an interim agreement.

No doubt you are aware of the proposal the Brazilians have introduced in New York.<sup>3</sup> We can appreciate that London would have difficulty with this proposal, particularly as it pertains to force withdrawal and interim administration. However, at the point at which British military success is at hand, it may well be possible to bring about an agreement based on a British proposal that contains elements of the Brazilian text, with provisions for withdrawal and interim administration adjusted to meet your concerns, and with the US and Brazil ready to provide peacekeeping forces. If you agree that such an effort would be worthwhile, we would be ready to assist in such an initiative, perhaps in conjunction with the Brazilians.

I have asked the Brazilians if they might consider participating in a peacekeeping force under a negotiated solution, though without, of course, giving them any reason to believe that you are interested in their proposal, nor commenting in any way on their text.<sup>4</sup>

I would appreciate your personal reaction as soon as possible to these ideas, with regard both to substance and timing. If our willingness to provide a substantial peacekeeping component makes the prospects for an early negotiated settlement more attractive to you, I would welcome your thoughts on other necessary provisions. As you can appreciate, circumstances may alter our ability to offer peacekeeping forces if radical changes occur in Buenos Aires. This argues for moving quickly enough to forestall any such changes.

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<sup>3</sup> Brazil's proposal was in a May 24 letter to the Secretary General. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1334.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 295 and footnote 2 thereto.



I hope you will appreciate that what I am suggesting would serve our long-term interests, if it made agreement possible, as well as put you in a better position politically if and as you do what you must militarily.

Sincerely, Al

End of text.

Haig

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**295. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Brasilia, May 25, 1982, 1532Z

4334. Subject: Demarche on Falklands. Ref: (A) State 142593.<sup>2</sup>

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. I secured a private audience with President Figueiredo at 0900 May 25 as instructed reftel. I made all the points in the reftel with following preliminary additions: President Reagan's pleasure at news of excellent bill of health that President Figueiredo received at Cleveland Clinic, and our interest in the most recent Brazilian initiative at the UN regarding a negotiated settlement. Figueiredo would interrupt and comment as we proceeded in the discussion.

3. Figueiredo concurred in our assessment of British posture and intransigence of both parties but he felt that once the British control the Islands the tables would be turned and the main challenge to the British would be to resupply and maintain a large garrison on the Islands. He felt that realization of this major problem might lead Britain to want to negotiate.

4. President Figueiredo responded positively to suggestion that Brazil join with US in any manner possible to achieve a negotiated solution. He said, quote I'll do whatever President Reagan feels needs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/27/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Clark wrote "President has seen" at the top of the telegram. In a May 26 memorandum to Reagan, Haig stated that the *démarche* decision was reached during a May 24 discussion between the two; see Document 298.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 142593 to Brasilia, May 25, Haig instructed Motley to contact Figueiredo, following on the exchange between Figueiredo and Reagan in Washington concerning the "possibility of joint action to end the South Atlantic crisis," and provided the Ambassador with a list of talking points. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) Regarding Figueiredo's visit, see Document 255.

to be done. I'll send emissaries. I'll talk to Galtieri. I'll even go to the border at Uruguaiana to meet him. I'll work within normal channels and outside normal channels.<sup>3</sup> Unquote.

5. Figueiredo said that he did not believe Argentina would welcome the presence of Brazilian troops on Falklands. He feels longstanding Argentine suspicion and fear that Brazilians have designs on Antarctica and the age-old rivalry between the two countries as dominant forces on the continent would lead Argentines to reject this aspect of the plan. In fact, he said, it could inhibit Brazil's influence in other aspects of helping in the negotiated settlement. Figueiredo proposed a four-nation force: two countries picked by each side; and he suggested that Argentina would probably feel more comfortable with forces from either Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia or Bolivia. He felt that Venezuela had tilted too much in Argentina's favor and that Peru was joining those ranks.

6. He forecast that either Argentina or Great Britain might pick South Africa, and he thought this selection would be very important. He said that his Foreign Office was always shying away from relations with South Africa because this was the quote price charged unquote by Black Africa for good relations with Brazil. Nevertheless, Figueiredo felt that any South Atlantic solution must draw South Africa into the deal, because he considers South Africa a key to the security of the South Atlantic in the long term, especially now that we have seen that things can get out of hand in this region.

7. When I brought up the OAS meeting and the possibility of Figueiredo's talking to the Argentines, he reacted quickly and positively. He said GOB posture for that meeting was to concentrate on solidarity and a minimum of sanctions necessary to placate the Argentines. When I reiterated our concern that an OAS meeting could block a negotiated settlement, he volunteered that he would call Galtieri and ask him quote not to put any more wood on the fire. Unquote.

8. Comment: Figueiredo saw me on short (40 minutes) notice, squeezing me in between presentation of Ambassadorial credentials and his regularly scheduled staff meeting at 0900 with Leitao, Venturini, Delfim and Medeiros. He sent a GOB car to pick me up at the Embassy to take me to the private Presidential entrance to avoid any public knowledge of the visit. Figueiredo was alert, interested and decisive. I did not have to prompt him, nor did he seem to cogitate on any of the actions that he proposed or volunteered. He spoke at length on the dilemma facing the British once they had established themselves on the Islands and also on the reaction of Galtieri and the Argentines

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<sup>3</sup> Clark underlined the quotation.

regarding the possibility of Brazilian troops on the Falklands. He also addressed at length the thinking of the Argentines at this moment and the necessity of leaving them with the impression that they had achieved a principal goal, to wit: deny the Islands to the British (in the case of simultaneous withdrawal). He emphasized that this denial was the quote public-relations-out unquote for Galtieri with the Argentine people when he had to explain to them a simultaneous Argentine withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting I asked him if it would be useful for me to talk with Foreign Minister Guerreiro. He replied yes, and that he would tell Guerreiro that I would brief him on our conversation. On my departure Figueiredo reiterated how pleased he was with his state visit and especially with the warmth, candor, and personal courtesies of President Reagan. He also said that he was very impressed with Vice President Bush and Secretary Haig, and jokingly asked if he could borrow one or both of them as he needed people of that calibre.

9. As I was shown out I was the recipient of some good-natured kidding by the nine o'clock staff meeting group for having delayed the important business of state for 30 minutes.<sup>4</sup>

**Motley**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 4372 from Brasilia, May 25, Motley reported on his meetings with other Brazilian officials: "On the basis of separate meetings with Ministers Medeiros (Intelligence) and Venturini (Military Household) on the one hand and with FonMin Guerreiro on the other, it appears that President Figueiredo may pursue a two-track course on the Falklands crisis. FonMin Guerreiro is to take a normal diplomatic track; Medeiros and Venturini are proposing that they personally pursue a face-to-face with Galtieri." (Reagan Library Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982)

**296. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands: Strategy for the Reconvened XX MFM

ISSUE FOR DECISION

US posture at the reconvened XXMFM beginning Thursday morning, May 27.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

We know what *Argentina is going for: condemnation of the UK*, call on all members of the inter-American system to refrain from support for the UK, call for *optimal individual sanctions* on the UK, *probably censure US* or at least urge us to lift sanctions and cut support for the British. *Nicaragua and Panama may up the ante* and try to go for *mandatory sanctions*.

Whether the resolution is mandatory or optional, it needs 14 votes to carry. We went out today in an effort to pick up the 7 votes which, in addition to that of the US, could block. Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad & Tobago are sure. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are possible. In addition, *we are approaching Brazil to see whether it would not sponsor some moderate alternative resolution to prevent a deep split in the organization.*<sup>2</sup>

Once the meeting convenes, *we should make a long and detailed exposition of our views*, using the conciliatory and, to a considerable degree, even-handed language you approved for the UNSC. In addition, *we should remind members, as we already have in capitals, of what the inter-*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820078–0673. Secret. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson, Bolton, and Morley. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Figueiredo sent a message to Reagan, May 25; Enders forwarded a translation of this message to Haig under a May 25 information memorandum, in which he summarized the message: “The thrust is that new Security Council action will be required within 48 hours to head off unfavorable developments at Thursday’s OAS MFM” and that Brazil’s new resolution “contains the basic elements for UNSC action.” Noting that Brazilian participation was “placed back within a UN context,” Enders noted, “surprisingly, Figueiredo does allow for possible Brazilian participation in a peace-keeping force, if invited by one of the parties.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982)

*American system has achieved.* After all, South and Central America and the Caribbean are that part of the developing world that has the least per capita military expenditures, the least incidence of war in the post-war generation, and has been under the least pressure from the communist bloc.

*We will, of course, if the Irish-Ugandan resolution makes it,<sup>3</sup> argue that a new UNSC mandate creates new opportunities for peace, and that no action should be taken in Washington at the OAS which might prejudice it.*

*We should participate in negotiations on the resolution, although it is unlikely that anything will be worked out that we can support.*

*In sum, we should attempt*

*(a) to get the blocking minority in place to prevent the worst excesses, and*

*(b) to use the occasion to reassert our interest in, and the value of the inter-American system.*

Clearly whatever we do, the chances are that the outcome will be to some considerable degree unfavorable to our interests. Within 48 hours we should know whether we can let on that there is some Brazil/US peace activity underway, and that could go far towards controlling damage.<sup>4</sup>

We expect that the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua, and Uruguay (Chairman) will attend. Of them, we recommend you see only the Venezuelan (useful to keep the dialogue open even if he will not listen to reason now).

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That you approve the approach outlined above.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The resolution introduced by Uganda was adopted as UNSC Resolution 505. See Document 301.

<sup>4</sup> Haig underlined a portion of this sentence beginning with the word “within” and ending with “underway.” He added “?” in the right-hand margin next to the sentence.

<sup>5</sup> Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation on May 26. Below this, he added the following notation: “See me re our intervention! AMH.”

## 297. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

London, May 26, 1982

*Begins:*

Thank you very much for the message which I received yesterday morning.<sup>2</sup> You have raised some very important and difficult questions.

I do of course understand the danger of Argentina turning towards the Soviet Union. And we in London are naturally concerned about the risk of Argentine military strikes against the Falkland Islands after we have repossessed them. I was particularly grateful for your generous and important offer of an American battalion to help in deterring any Argentine move to invade the Islands again in the future. We are thinking hard about all these problems.

In the meantime I should like to give you something of the flavour of the political situation here.<sup>3</sup> With the continued refusal of Argentina to negotiate seriously and with the establishment of the British bridge-head in the Falklands, there has been a major change in parliamentary and public opinion in Britain. It would no longer be realistic to ask people here to accept the ideas of an interim administration or mutual withdrawal from the Falklands. They are just not political starters now. After the events of recent days, and the British losses as well as our military progress, what people want to see is the repossession of the Islands and the restoration of British administration. The achievement of those will of course enable us to consult the Islanders in due time about their wishes for the future.

One question I am therefore considering is whether some of the ideas mentioned in your message, and particularly your offer of a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. UK Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the message indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 294.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 11615 from London, May 25, the Embassy provided its own assessment of the Thatcher government's outlook: "Thatcher wants to take the Islands fast. She also may want us to help Britain keep them. Military stalemate or a frontal assault with high casualties might heighten Thatcher's interest in a ceasefire and negotiations. But she forcefully rejected a ceasefire Tuesday in the Commons and it is far from clear she envisages early negotiations." "In reconquest," the assessment continued, "we should not expect magnanimity. On the contrary, Thatcher will want to celebrate a victory that will be a political triumph." The "Foreign Office and probably Pym would be glad to see Britain eventually rid of the Islands and back to its real business in this world." "Indeed, we are told, the Foreign Office favors the Secretary's proposal, but doubts Thatcher will buy it." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982)

battalion, could be used at a somewhat later stage. I may want to come back to you on this.

Meanwhile, let me stress that I am very conscious of the need for Britain and the US to maintain the best possible relations with the Latin America countries—especially the moderates. I have spoken today on the BBC Latin American Service in terms which I hope will go down well in those countries. The Prime Minister and I have been in contact with our opposite numbers in Brasil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and elsewhere. British Ambassadors throughout the area have today been instructed to make approaches about the OAS meeting later this week.

I greatly value our exchanges of messages and your frequent talks with Nicko Henderson.<sup>4</sup> Without your support, things would be far harder for us in these difficult days.

*Ends.*

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<sup>4</sup> Henderson sent a handwritten note to Haig regarding Pym's message on May 25: "I expect Walter [Stoessel] and Larry [Eagleburger] passed on the personal message: that Francis found plenty of food for thought in your message, however different the present mood in London. Francis asks me to tell you personally how much he values your frank talks with me which enables him to keep in touch with your thoughts. So, they certainly are considering your ideas in London; and the way you have expressed them has forestalled any nervousness." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982)

## 298. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 26, 1982

### SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis

Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. After my conversation with you on Monday,<sup>2</sup> I put to them the idea of a US-Brazilian peacekeeping force as a way of enabling them to contemplate withdrawal of British forces as part of an interim agreement.<sup>3</sup> The reply I just received from my British counterpart, Pym, states that the ideas of mutual withdrawal and interim administration are “no longer realistic,” given the major change in British mood resulting from their successful landing.<sup>4</sup>

In the meantime, the UN Secretary General has asked the two parties for their positions on a ceasefire within 24 hours. The Argentines have replied that they could accept a ceasefire first, followed by discussions of *mutual* withdrawal. The British position, which has not yet been given officially to the Secretary General, is that a ceasefire is acceptable only if there is a simultaneous *Argentine* withdrawal. The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Country Files, Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. Eagleburger initialed the memorandum on behalf of Haig. McFarlane prepared an undated draft covering memorandum to Clark, summarizing Haig's memorandum, stating Clark's agreement with its contents, and suggesting that Clark could include it with Haig's memorandum for submission to Reagan. A stamped notation indicates that Clark saw McFarlane's draft memorandum; however, an attached handwritten note from Poindexter to Clark states that it was not sent to Reagan per Clark's instructions. A further notation in an unidentified hand reads: “overtaken.” (Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982)

<sup>2</sup> May 24. No memorandum of conversation of the discussion has been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Haig met with Reagan on two occasions on May 24. The first was for a meeting of the National Security Council from 10:35 to 11:28 a.m. The second was during a meeting to discuss Senator Baker's upcoming trip to China, which was also attended by Senator Baker, James Baker, Clark, Meese, and Duberstein, from 3:05 until 3:45 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 295.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 297.



It would be a major error for us to pressure the British at all at this point. Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; we should conserve our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher until it can be used to produce results, i.e., when the islands are effectively in British hands.

At my suggestion, the British will try to delay responding to the Secretary General on the ceasefire question. At a minimum, we would hope to have the OAS meeting—which begins Thursday<sup>5</sup> and could last for several days—behind us before the Secretary General declares that the British position makes a further effort on his part impossible. As it is, we will not find it easy to get through the OAS meeting without a bad resolution. If the latest UN effort aborts—and the British are blamed—our support from moderates in the OAS will disintegrate.

There is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. They will want a ceasefire, and they are sensitive to our concerns about further damage in the Hemisphere and new opportunities for the Soviets and Cubans. But they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of victory.

At the right time, we should go back to the British with suggestions regarding the sort of offer they should make once they have retaken the Islands. A British victory on the Islands, unless followed by an effort to reach a negotiated solution, would lead only to further conflict and an unhealable wound in our relations with our Latin neighbors. We are now working on ideas for such an offer.

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<sup>5</sup> May 27.

**299. Memorandum From James M. Rentschler and Dennis C. Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1982

SUBJECT

Proposed Presidential Mediation in the South Atlantic

*Issue*

Should the President call for a summit peace conference for the Falklands, inviting Mrs. Thatcher and General Galtieri to Washington or some neutral location to solve the dispute?

*Pros*

—If ground were properly prepared, could bring an end to hostilities (depends on readiness of two sides to compromise—right now, little likelihood of success);

—Could, if properly timed, return the U.S. relationship with Argentina some distance toward what it was before the breakdown of the Haig mission;

—Could have a similarly restorative and/or reparative effect vis-a-vis our relations in the rest of the Hemisphere, improving our chances for resuming cooperative initiatives there;

—Would, if successful, enhance President's image as man of peace. Even if unsuccessful, could possibly enhance the image, as long as properly handled and did not end in U.S. and one country ganging up on the third.

*Cons:*

—If there were not a readiness to compromise on the two sides, the President's attempt would go the way of the Haig mission, the Perez de Cuellar mission, the Peruvian president's mission: just one more unsuccessful peace attempt with the difference that the President's personal prestige would be tainted with the stigma of failure;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Sent through McFarlane. A stamped notation indicates that Clark saw the memorandum. On another copy of the memorandum, Poindexter wrote in the upper right hand corner: "5/26 Judge read and agrees. JP." (Ibid.) According to a May 26 NSC routing slip, McFarlane sent the memorandum to Poindexter for delivery to Clark, who was in Santa Barbara, California. Poindexter wrote on the routing slip: "Have Jim Rentschler go see Jesse Helms on the Hill tomorrow and explain. JP." (Ibid.)

—If the attempt were made before a British military victory, it would do great damage to relations with the U.K., amounting to another Suez (depriving U.K. of the fruits of success at the critical moment);

—If the President's proposal, once the conference has convened, failed to meet the minimum conditions of either the U.K. or Argentina, that country could pull out of the conference with increased bitterness and resentment towards the United States.

—The President himself is not the sort of "detail" man who is best suited to negotiating personally a complicated peace settlement, as Carter did at Camp David.

### *Conclusion*

A Presidential call for a summit peace conference is a good idea *if* we have reason to believe that the U.K. and Argentina are ready to compromise their differences and *if* we have prior assurance that both parties want the President in between. A call for a summit peace conference before British success on the ground, and before the two sides show signs of a readiness to compromise, would pose too many risks to be worthwhile.

Roger Fontaine concurs.

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### **300. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) and the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1982

#### **SUBJECT**

UK Use of US Facilities at Lajes

#### **ISSUE FOR DECISION**

This memorandum recommends that you approve UK use of US facilities at Lajes.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter; cleared by Blackwill. Kanter initialed for both Burt and Blackwill.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

As you know, our agreement with the Portuguese permits third countries to have access to facilities at Lajes subject to GOP approval. In response to a British request, the Portuguese have agreed in principle to permit up to one Nimrod per day to land at Lajes for staging and refueling. The UK will make a written request to the Portuguese for each Nimrod transit.

OSD and JCS concur in the recommendation that we permit UK access to Lajes.

*RECOMMENDATION*

That you approve UK use of facilities at Lajes for transiting Nimrod aircraft, and that you authorize Jon to so inform the British.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Howe. Eagleburger initialed his approval of the recommendation.

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**301. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1982

*UN Security Council: New Falklands Resolution.* The Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 504<sup>2</sup> calling upon the Secretary General to resume his negotiations and report back to the Council within a week. The resolution was based on a tougher draft which included a 72-hour ceasefire and language which directed the sides to leave previous concessions on the table. Both provisions were opposed by us and the UK. We had pushed for just this kind of outcome in order to head off resolutions that would have interfered with the UK's right of self-defense by ordering a ceasefire and/or would have compromised the UN's neutrality by producing a resolution with which the British would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Mistaken reference to United Nations Security Council Resolution 505 adopted unanimously on May 26. For the texts of the resolution and Kirkpatrick's statement after its adoption, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1982, p. 87. A summary of the Security Council debate that culminated in adoption of the resolution is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, pp. 1329–1332.

not have complied. The existence of an approved resolution may also help us in our efforts to moderate the outcome of the OAS Foreign Ministers' meeting which starts tomorrow.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

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### 302. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1982

#### SPOT COMMENTARY: Falklands Situation—British Commence Attack Against Darwin/Goose Green

British paratroopers are attacking Darwin/Goose Green this morning, [1 line not declassified]. UK forces apparently were waiting to construct a Harrier runway at their East Falklands beachhead at Port San Carlos before beginning the operation. [less than 1 line not declassified] the container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* is still afloat and that salvage operations are underway.<sup>2</sup> [portion marking not declassified]

*Comment:* The British have been suggesting for the past two days that large-scale combat operations would begin shortly on the Falklands. The Argentines had an estimated 600 troops at Darwin/Goose Green when the British landed last Friday<sup>3</sup> and some limited reinforcement has probably occurred since then. Darwin/Goose Green sits astride a motorable trail that provides the single best access from the western part of the island to Port Stanley. The major portion of the British force probably will use this route, although some British troops may be airlifted across country by helicopter. [portion marking not declassified]

Harrier jets probably will be quickly moved to the island now that the San Carlos airfield has been completed. These aircraft will have several missions, but they probably will be used principally to protect

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> On May 25, Argentine aircraft attacked and sank the British container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* with an Exocet anti-ship missile. For a detailed account of the battle for Darwin and Goose Green from the British perspective, see Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 546–576.

<sup>3</sup> May 21. See Document 285.

the beachhead and support the movement of the land forces. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The *Atlantic Conveyor* brought Harrier jets to the Falklands but we believe they were transferred to the aircraft carriers before the ship was struck by an Exocet missile. The *Atlantic Conveyor* apparently still contains helicopters and ammunition—some of which may be recoverable. [*portion marking not declassified*]

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### 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, May 27, 1982, 1606Z

3312. CINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT for POLAD, Rome for Vatican. Subject: Argentina: Galtieri Replies to Reagan's 25 May Message.

1. (U) President Leopoldo Galtieri has addressed a message to US President Ronald Reagan in response to his note on the occasion of the commemoration of 25 May.<sup>2</sup>

2. (U) Following is the text of Galtieri's letter to President Reagan: Quote If our people and government were surprised over the never expected attitude that the United States has adopted in supporting Great Britain in its conflict with Argentina, on receiving your congratulations on occasion of the 25 May celebrations today, the Argentine people and government cannot be more surprised. The assertion made therein, "that never before has it been so important to reassert the common interests and values which the Argentina and the United States and to reiterate the commitment we made to cooperate in this Hemisphere and in the entire world," is not in keeping with the attitude of your government and is something which cannot be understood under the present circumstances. Unquote.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Country Files, Argentina (May 1982). Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the South Atlantic Sitrep Collective and for information to Panama City, USCINCSO, USCINCLANT, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. According to a June 18 note from Bremer to Clark transmitting the signed original of Galtieri's letter to the White House, Reagan's May 25 message was sent to Galtieri to mark the occasion of the Argentine National Day. Bremer added that a response to Galtieri's letter "would not serve any useful purpose." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820091-1421)

3. (C) Comment: Galtieri's harsh reply, which received heavy media coverage here, is not surprising in view of what we know to be Galtieri's and the Junta's anger at the USG. It is also consistent with the stream of criticism directed at US policy by various GOA officials, and the guidance and backgrounders given to the local media which hold the US to be largely responsible for Britain's strong military response in the present crisis.

Shlaudeman

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**304. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 27, 1982

SUBJECT

Falkland Islands Dispute

There have been several developments this morning which you should know about. I attended the opening of the OAS meeting which featured a vicious anti-American speech by Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez.<sup>2</sup> He was relentless and vitriolic in his attack. The Panamanian and Nicaraguan Ambassadors led most of the OAS members in a standing ovation.

As you know, we have been coordinating with the British on how to handle the UNSYG's diplomatic efforts. The Secretary General has asked both parties to give him their conditions for a ceasefire by this evening. We have just received the British reply, which is clearly an attempt to buy additional time (for the OAS meeting to pass unaffected). But the reply also indicates that the British have begun to reassess their position on the long-term arrangements for the Islands in response to my prodding them (per your authorization) in this direction. The last paragraph of their reply to the SYG suggests that they would be willing to accept international security arrangements on the Islands, provided

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bremer; cleared by Eagleburger. A typewritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "LDX'd to Mr. McFarlane 1540 hours, 5/27."

<sup>2</sup> Haig also addressed the OAS Foreign Ministers. For the text of his speech, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1982, pp. 87–90.

such arrangements involved the participation of the United States (reply attached).<sup>3</sup> This is a reference to our offer to provide a battalion to a peacekeeping force. (I have alerted Cap to begin thinking about this contingency.)

The British apparently now hope to be able to clean up Port Stanley in the next three or four days. Hopefully then they will be willing to put forward some constructive ideas for longer-term arrangements. Without some eventual British flexibility we will find the Argentines and other Latins increasingly embittered, with corresponding opportunities for Cuban and Soviet mischief. In such circumstances, British forces on the Island would be hostage to future Argentine attacks. Thus the fact that the British are willing to consider alternative long-term security arrangements on the Islands is significant for our interests in the hemisphere.

It is clear that we are not yet at the point where you should weigh in with Mrs. Thatcher but that point may be coming soon.

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of the May 27 message from Pym to Pérez de Cuéllar.

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### 305. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1982, 3:30 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Major Brigadier Miret, Argentine Air Force  
Vernon A. Walters, Ambassador-at-Large

#### SUBJECT

Falklands/Malvinas

During a phone call from Ambassador Gerardo Schamis, Argentine Ambassador to France, whom I have known for many years, he indicated he had received a call from Air Force Commander Lami Dozo

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the office of the Argentine Air Attaché. Copies were sent to Haig and Enders.



in Buenos Aires telling him to ask me to get in touch with Major Brigadier Miret, who was currently in Washington for the OAS meeting. After discussion with the Secretary and Ambassador Enders, I saw Miret at the Argentine Air Attache's office on I Street at 1530. I spoke with him alone.

He confirmed that he had received instructions from Brigadier Lami Dozo to get in touch with me as he was very concerned that the door not be slammed by either Argentina or the United States. We would have to live together after the Falkland conflict was over. He said it was ironic that the Air Force, which was doing all of the fighting, was the service in favor of negotiations, while the Army and Navy, who had done very little fighting, were still blustering. He said that a series of unfortunate events had led to the escalation of this conflict and I pointed out that to us, it was a particular tragedy that every young pilot who was killed, whether he be British or Argentine, was one less to defend values in which we both believed. He said that the first problem was the escalation of rhetoric. Galtieri made intemperate and incendiary statements and had also made a rude reply to President Reagan's message of congratulations on Argentina's independence.<sup>2</sup> He indicated clearly that the Air Force had tried without success to temper this reply of Galtieri's. He shrugged and said Galtieri was very impulsive. Brigadier Miret then indicated that he had also tried without success to tone down Foreign Minister Costa Mendez' statement to the OAS this morning. This had been triggered by Secretary Haig's statement of his conviction of British victory.<sup>3</sup> He supposed that the Secretary would now answer in the OAS with some asperity. I told him I believed that the Secretary would answer with "dignity and elegance". I said we Americans viewed this conflict as an enormous tragedy bringing conflict between two of our most important alliances—NATO and the OAS. We certainly had tried and would continue to try to find a peaceful and honorable solution to the crisis for both our friends. We had no interest in seeing either one humiliated. Miret said almost in despair, "How are we going to put things together after this conflict?" I said we must strive in every way to do so. He then appealed for a moderation of rhetoric on our side and said they would

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 303.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 304. Haig asserted the inapplicability of collective security under the Rio Treaty: "With full respect for the views of others, the U.S. position is clear: Since the first use of force did not come from outside the hemisphere, this is not a case of extracontinental aggression against which we are all committed to rally." On May 29, the OAS Foreign Ministers adopted Resolution II, which condemned the U.K. attack and demanded that the United Kingdom cease its "act of war" and withdraw its forces "immediately." The United States abstained in the vote. For the texts of the resolution and Middendorf's statement on the U.S. abstention, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1982, pp. 90–91.

continue to try and moderate the rhetoric on their side. Brigadier Miret then said he wondered if we could do several things:

1. Encourage UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's efforts. I said that we had never ceased to do so and would continue to do so.

2. He then repeated his request about moderating rhetoric and requested that we bring pressure on the British to moderate their position. I said we had always brought pressure on the British as we had the Argentines. The Secretary told them in Buenos Aires that neither side could get everything they wanted. There would have to be some give.

3. Finally, Brigadier Miret brought up an idea that had been brought up by Lami Dozo and Galtieri in Buenos Aires of a summit between Presidents Reagan and Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher.<sup>4</sup>

I said I would convey this message to the Secretary and assured him that the U.S. deeply desired to maintain its good ties with Argentina and on our part we would do nothing if we could help it to damage those ties. He replied that on the Argentine side there were some who were saying that in the present juncture that Argentina should turn to the Soviet Union and receive Soviet assistance. I said very quietly but looking him right in the eyes, "You realize that if that were to happen, it would change everything as far as we are concerned." He said he understood this and would resist. He knew that the situation was difficult, adding, "The British are a tough and warlike race and will not yield to pressure." I replied that the Argentine Air Force had proved the courage and skill of its young pilots and that it was a tragedy that countries which should be friendly were killing one another. The only long term winner in such a situation could be the Soviet Union. He said to me as I left, "Lami Dozo, unlike the other two, looks beyond tomorrow." He thanked me for coming. I said I would be back in touch with him after consultations with the Secretary.

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<sup>4</sup> Miret had earlier suggested this to Kirkpatrick. (Telegram 1479 from USUN, May 26; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/26/1982 (4))

**306. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 27, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for 50 Maritime Limpet Mines (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(TS) On May 15 the UK requested a transfer of 50 maritime limpet mines (hand transported underwater anti-ship demolition weapons for use against moored targets). At that time, in my conversation with Larry Eagleburger, State had concerns about the timing. UK has now formally requested these mines again and State is now willing to grant them.<sup>2</sup>

(TS) According to the Navy's analysis, given the developments on the Falkland Islands, the opportunity for possible use on moored targets on the Falklands seems past. This suggests that the intended use for these mines would be Argentine ships moored in mainland ports. In accordance with your instructions, however, we have not pressed the British on their intended use.<sup>3</sup>

(TS) It seems likely that the President will again be confronted with the future of the South Atlantic war and the Falkland Islands crisis in a major way. Hence, it might be desirable for the President to have his options kept open for either supporting or discouraging follow-up British attacks on the Argentine mainland. It is my recommendation to you that we should inform the British that at this time we are not prepared to transfer the mines.

**Fred C. Ikle<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Carlucci.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 290.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, Document 284.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature.

### 307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1982

1. *OAS and Falkland Islands Dispute.* The first day of the reconvened Rio Treaty meeting of Foreign Ministers witnessed a procession of speakers, headed by Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez, who criticized harshly the US for its support of Great Britain and called for OAS action in support of Argentina, including condemnation of the UK, lifting of US “sanctions,” and cessation of US materiel support for the British. Venezuela, Panama and Peru were also critical. Nicaragua was vitriolic. More moderate expressions came later from Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica. I reiterated the US commitment to a strong inter-American system but rejected the argument that UK action constituted “aggression by an extra-continental power” as defined in the Rio Treaty.<sup>2</sup> (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 305. Haig also held bilateral meetings with Zambrano and Arias Stella in his office at the Department of State, May 27. Meeting before the OAS meeting, Zambrano and Haig discussed Venezuelan “concerns about damage to hemispheric and bilateral relations caused by the continuing warfare and the Latin American perception of all-out US support for the UK.” Haig responded “that we have not taken sides on the merits of sovereignty in the Falklands and have done our best to avoid favoring either party,” and while acknowledging fuel transfers to the United Kingdom, added that “newspaper reports of various weapons transfers to the forces are incorrect.” (Telegram 149225 to Caracas, June 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820284–0988) Haig and Arias Stella discussed the need for a solution “ASAP,” and discussed “possibilities for a peace-keeping force which could supervise the administration of the Islands.” (Telegram 149224 to Lima, June 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820284–1002)

**308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

I have worked with Tom Enders on putting together the attached proposal, but I want you to be aware of a few reservations.<sup>2</sup> One basic problem with this approach in my view is that it is a “total” plan for resolving the dispute, and thus asks the British to make a number of concessions all at once. As we discussed last night,<sup>3</sup> I think it makes much more sense to focus on the near-term question of terminating the conflict in such a way to avoid the complete humiliation of the Argentines. Thus, even if you buy off on the total package I think in your discussions with the British, you should only focus on near-term steps.

This said, we must be aware that the attached proposal makes some major assumptions about British behavior:

—It assumes that the British will be willing to reach an agreement along the lines sketched out in the proposal “short of surrender.”

—It assumes that the British would be willing almost immediately to allow U.S. and Brazilian forces to organize the evacuation of Argentine prisoners, thus denying the British the use of these prisoners in follow-on negotiations. (It goes without saying that prisoners have become a standard form of negotiating capital in modern conflicts, e.g., Viet Nam, Indo-Pakistani conflict, Egypt-Israel.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P900060–0778. Secret. A May 28 covering note by Enders indicates that the memorandum and its attachment had been prepared by Burt, Gompert, Gudgeon, and Enders. Enders also added two observations: “(a) We *don’t* want to participate if we do only the military part (i.e. let ICRC handle repatriation, which would be politically damaging to us). (b) We *don’t* want to present all of this to Henderson now, but only the military ideas, saying that of course the other aspects would have to be covered.” A stamped notation on the note indicates that Haig saw Burt’s memorandum. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P900060–0777)

<sup>2</sup> Burt crossed out the typewritten word “revisions” and replaced it with “reservations.” On May 27, Burt sent to Haig an information memorandum with an attached draft non-paper intended for Henderson. According to the memorandum, it and the non-paper were produced for Haig following a May 27 morning meeting and made many of the same points as the May 28 proposal. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982)

<sup>3</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.

—It assumes that the British, in hours following the end of the fighting, would be willing to announce a total military withdrawal within two months.

—It assumes that the British, within two months, would be willing to turn over executive authority to the U.S. and Brazil and to announce this soon after a ceasefire.

—Finally, it assumes that the British would permit the creation of a contact group without British participation.

One last note, in the event that no final solution to the problem is reached, the contact group would administer the Islands indefinitely, along with the U.S. and Brazilian peace-keeping forces. Are we willing to take on such an open-ended commitment, particularly if, as seems likely, we would find ourselves constantly at odds with the Kelper-dominated councils? We know that we must ask a great deal of the British in any proposal, but overloading the circuits is one sure way to guarantee failure.

**Richard Burt<sup>4</sup>**

*Assistant Secretary-designate for European Affairs*

## **Attachment**

### **Draft Proposal Prepared in the Department of State<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *Dates:*

- T Date of agreement on package of measures
- T<sub>1</sub> Date of cease-fire and reciprocal announcements
- T<sub>2</sub> Date of Argentine evacuation from islands
- T<sub>3</sub> Date of completion of UK withdrawal of forces

#### *Agreement*

When the UK is confident of its control of the military situation, but short of surrender of the local Argentine commander, the US and Brazil would propose to the military commands of the UK and Argentina, and obtain agreement of both governments (on date T) on the following integral package of immediate and deferred steps:

<sup>4</sup> Burt signed "Rick" above his typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> No classification marking. Drafted by Gudgeon on May 28. All brackets are in the original.

*Military Situation*

—A cease-fire (effective  $T_1$ ) [A general—not local—cessation of hostilities and lifting of declared operational zones];

—Immediate introduction of small contingents of US and Brazilian peace-keeping forces

(i) to verify the cease-fire;

(ii) to ensure the separation of forces (i.e., concentration of Argentine forces in given areas from which they can be evacuated);

(iii) to organize the exchange of prisoners;

(iv) to provide medical services; and

(v) to organize the departure of Argentine combatants. [Latter three steps might involve coordination with the ICRC].

—On date  $T_1$ , the UK would announce its intention to phase the total withdrawal of its forces, commencing after the evacuation of Argentine forces (date  $T_2$ ) and to be completed within a short time, e.g., two months, by date  $T_3$ ; on date  $T_3$ , the UK would replace the interim military administration it will have established with a restoration of local self-government under the Councils [the office of Governor would remain vacant].

*Negotiations*

—The UK and Argentina would both announce on date  $T_1$  their preparedness to resume negotiations to find a peaceful, definitive solution;

—Each would announce their commitment to respect the cease-fire, not to reintroduce forces onto the islands after their respective evacuation/withdrawal, and to take no steps that might prejudice or prejudice the final outcome of the process;

—Each side might announce that the economic measures they (and third countries) have taken would be terminated on a specified date (e.g., date  $T_2$ ).

*Contact Group*

—The UK, Argentina, the US, and Brazil would announce on date  $T_1$  their agreement to create a Contact Group composed of Brazil and the US to:

(i) assist the two parties to establish the modalities for their negotiations;

(ii) as of date  $T_3$ , to assume the function of promptly ratifying all actions by the local administration except those inconsistent with the agreement; and

(iii) provide required peace-keeping forces.

The Contact Group would assume its functions pending a definitive settlement.

—The Contact Group would determine its own procedures, making decisions on the basis of unanimity.

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**309. Memorandum From Roger W. Fontaine, Christopher C. Shoemaker, and Richard T. Childress of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1982

SUBJECT

Additional Suggestions on the Falkland Mess

We recognize that the momentum of battle and of our own diplomacy is very much in favor of a British victory in the Falklands and is very much against vigorous US action to forestall or mitigate such a victory. However, in the interest of our long-term relations with Latin America which will become increasingly crucial in the future, we need to review one last time what options could be available to us in dealing with the conflict.

*Background*

We will soon reach the critical stage of the South Atlantic crisis. The British can probably secure the Island and inflict a humiliating defeat on the Argentines within the week, although at greater cost than they or others apparently realize.

That kind of victory—which will shatter the prestige of the Argentine armed forces, the only coherent political institution in the country for the last century—will come at great cost to us, the British, and the Western world over the long run. A total victory in the Islands, followed by harsh peace terms (which is what Prime Minister Thatcher was laying out in Parliament Tuesday, May 25) would be the peace of 1870 and 1918—a peace, in short, that invites revanchism and ultimately further warfare, both hot and cold.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/27/1982). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it.



Specifically, such an outcome would all but guarantee the following effects—all negative:

1. For the British:

—possible additional British naval losses, since there will be no incentives for the Argentines to cease air attacks against the British fleet.

—the provisioning of a permanent garrison on the Islands which would mean a permanent deployment of scarce NATO assets 8,000 miles from where they should be. Even a “small force” which the British Ministry of Defense now envisions would be important owing to the thinness of British conventional strength now and in the future—especially under a Labour Government. It is likely, however, that the MOD will underestimate Argentina’s capabilities and intentions after this round of the fighting which means a greater force will be required than currently planned.

—given the above, a greatly reduced capacity to meet its current or future NATO commitments and concomitant pressures on the US to make up the shortfall.

—Negotiations would prove impossible while a form of permanent warfare would develop with Argentina which would become a permanent strain in NATO relations with Argentina and the other Spanish-speaking republics in this hemisphere.

2. For the Argentines:

—Under the above conditions, that country would not hesitate to accept any and all help, no matter what the source. The consequences of Argentina taking Soviet and Cuban aid is clear to all. The consequences of accepting aid from its Latin neighbors are not so well understood but are equally damaging to US interests. Such an arrangement would also greatly contribute to the permanent estrangement of the Spanish-speaking countries from the English-speaking world.

—The present government would be replaced by perhaps a series of weak military governments, to be replaced ultimately by an elected Peronista government *a la* 1973/74. If not the Peronistas, then a weak radical government would probably accede to power. Neither would be pro-American, and both will be bad economic managers. Good US-Argentine relations are historically an anomaly, and it will be easy for many Argentines, including a large portion of the military, to return to old habits.

—A strong Peronista regime would try to form an anti-American South American bloc as Peron did in the 1940s. Brazil-Argentina, Argentina-Chile relations would be ruptured.

—A nuclear weapons capability would be virtually guaranteed, as both Brazil and Argentina would seek ultimate security in nuclear arsenals.

—In short, a defeated and humiliated Argentina would almost inevitably go in directions inimical to our interests and at direct, heavy, and prolonged cost to us.

The US cannot meet the Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan/Grenadian/ and now Surinamese challenge in the Caribbean Basin *and* simultaneously face a hostile, irredentist, and Peronist Argentina while continuing to meet its global commitments. All of post-war US foreign policy has been premised on the availability of a secure and non-hostile hemisphere while we met our Asian, Middle Eastern, and European commitments.

What can we do? Whatever is done must be done soon if we are to mitigate the damage of the above scenario. Whatever we do must also be bold and involve some unorthodox moves. Our objective remains finding a peaceful resolution of the dispute with no victors or vanquished.

The problem is that the British do not see it our way. They see themselves as winning a just war—why negotiate anything? We must force them to recognize that there are larger interests at stake. Tactically, we are where the Nixon Administration was in October 1973 at the moment the Egyptian Third Army was about to be exterminated.

The following needs to be understood:

—The Argentines are anxious for us to do something and probably would accept almost anything at this point provided they were approached properly.

—It is the British who need convincing to return to the negotiating table. Right now they are at their best and worst, best because they are fighting hard for a good principle in a remote spot on the globe, and the government has the support of most of the people. The British are at their worst because they smell and want unconditional surrender with a humiliating aftermath and, therefore, have not thought through the larger problems. (The suggested return of the British Governor is rubbing much salt in very big Argentine wounds.)

All of this is being driven by another factor: namely, the President's trip to Europe,<sup>2</sup> which will occur at precisely the time the Argentines are being overrun at Stanley—a development that will strongly enhance the perception of US-UK cooperation in bringing about Argentina's greatest military disaster and the splintering of hemisphere unity. Moreover, for the sake of a good European meeting, we will be tempted to say and do things that will exacerbate this already difficult situation.

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<sup>2</sup> Reagan was scheduled to leave on June 2 to travel to France, Italy, Vatican City, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. During the trip, he planned to attend the Economic Summit in Versailles and the North Atlantic Council meeting in Bonn.

In short, our policy as it evolves through the next critical week will be distorted through the prism of the President's European trip. What drives us (legitimately) to make this a successful trip in terms of our Atlantic interests may have disastrous consequences for our hemispheric interests.

#### *A Proposal*

If we are to affect the outcome in the Falklands and mitigate the damage to US-Latin American relations, we need to move vigorously and immediately. In effect, we need to interpose ourselves between the belligerents so that Argentina has a face-saving mechanism to stop fighting and negotiate, and Britain has a reason to do the same.

Accordingly, we recommend the following steps be taken:

1. The President should simultaneously send letters to Galtieri and Thatcher. In his letter to Galtieri, the President should stress that one of his primary purposes in going to London now is to bring about a cease fire and the beginnings of a negotiated solution. In his letter to Thatcher, the President should forcefully stress the importance of an immediate cease fire and of an equitable, negotiated solution. He should urgently ask for an immediate cessation of hostilities and promise that he will bring with him a new proposal for beginning the negotiating process.

2. Prior to his departure for Europe, the President would make a public plea for both of our friends to stop killing each other. He would also promise new and vigorous US action to stop the fighting.

3. The President should follow the letters by a letter to President Figueiredo outlining what we propose to do in Britain and informing him of the contents of our message to Galtieri. He would also outline a new proposal for symbolically interposing an inter-American naval force (primarily composed of Brazilian and US ships)<sup>3</sup> between the belligerents.

4. Upon receipt of Figueiredo's agreement in principle for the proposal, the President would communicate again with both Galtieri and Thatcher asking both to accept the interposition of the naval force and outlining a new diplomatic mechanism for starting the negotiating process again. This mechanism would entail two US teams,<sup>4</sup> one in Buenos Aires, the other in London.

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<sup>3</sup> Clark placed an asterisk after the parenthesis, which corresponds to his handwritten notation at the bottom of the page: "Neither country acceptable to Arg."

<sup>4</sup> Clark placed a double-asterisk after this word, which corresponds to his handwritten notation at the bottom of the page: "Probably unworkable."

5. Should these proposals be accepted, we would then use the US Navy to assist in the withdrawal of combatants in the Falklands and the policing of the cease fire. Only under these conditions can we hope to make any progress toward a negotiated solution, and position ourselves for the damage repair that will inevitably be necessary in the foreseeable future.

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**310. Memorandum From Ambassador at Large Vernon A. Walters to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands/Malvinas

At 1445 today I received a phone call from Brigadier Peña who told me he was calling at Major Brigadier Miret's request. He said the Argentine delegation to the United Nations had just received the British conditions for an agreement. They had been delivered to the Argentines, not by Ambassador Parsons, but by a low-ranking official. The conditions were the following:

1. Argentine forces must be withdrawn by a fixed date.
2. The British do not accept simultaneous withdrawal of forces.
3. The withdrawal of the UK forces will be subject to four conditions:
  - A. Reoccupation of the Islands;
  - B. Re-establishment of the administration of the Islands;
  - C. "Reconstruction" of the Islands;<sup>2</sup>  
Consultation of the population.<sup>3</sup>
4. The withdrawal of the UK troops will follow an international security agreement which must involve the participation of the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Not For the System. Haig initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and underlined the text of the memorandum extensively.

<sup>2</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this point, Haig wrote: "(damage done)."

<sup>3</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this point, Haig wrote: "UN Res 71[?] on self-determ."

Brigadier Peña said he had no comment to make but was simply transmitting the conditions to me, at Major Brigadier Miret's request. I told him I would pass them on to the Secretary at once. I personally did not have knowledge of them prior to his call.

Brigadier Peña's phone number is 452-8707.

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**311. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

Jon Howe and I met with Fred Ikle on the problem of leaks about weapons deliveries to the British. As a result, DoD will tighten up its procedures by restricting drastically the number of persons with access to the daily list of outstanding and prospective requests.<sup>2</sup>

It is hard to be sanguine, despite these steps. The number of people involved at one stage or another in processing each request is substantial, especially at the physical handling end. Compartmentalization will reduce the dangers of leaks about the entire flow of material, but not about individual items. And, of course, we cannot exclude that someone from the now-smaller circle with access to the full list has been the chief culprit all along.<sup>3</sup>

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. Haig initialed at the top of the note, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Haig underlined the phrase: "list of outstanding and prospective requests."

<sup>3</sup> Haig underlined the last two sentences and wrote at the bottom of the page: "Too late to leap said the little frog!"

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger initialed "LSE" above his typed signature.

**312. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1982

SUBJECT

Thatcher's Approach to the Falklands

You will have seen Ed Streator's telegrams from London relating his conversations in the last 48 hours with FCO Permanent Under Secretary Antony Acland and Conservative Party Deputy Leader Willie Whitelaw (attached).<sup>2</sup> Messages make it abundantly clear that Mrs. Thatcher is determined to achieve a military victory in the Falklands before taking any decisions on next steps.

These conversations tell me that any comprehensive U.S. proposal for ending the dispute is simply not in the cards in London for now. Indeed, if we put forward such a proposal, we are likely to elicit an immediate rejection from Thatcher and sour the atmosphere for the President's meeting with her in Versailles next week and his visit to Britain.

Instead, I believe that we should concentrate our efforts on persuading the British to stop short of a total humiliation of Argentina. (If I remember correctly, Lincoln let the Confederates retain their horses and the officers kept their swords.) If we try for much more than that now, as was envisaged in the paper you saw this morning, I fear that we will come up entirely empty.<sup>3</sup> Thus, I suggest that you focus Nicko's attention on the question of how the U.K. might act in the context of an imminent military victory to leave the Argentines with a shred of dignity and a barely plausible denial that they had been conquered by British force of arms.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Blackwill.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached. In telegram 11986 from London, May 28, Streator conveyed a summary of his May 28 meeting with Acland. In addition to expressing Thatcher's desire for a "quick, clean military victory" and stating that "there are no plans to resume negotiations of any kind," Acland also informed Streator of the Prime Minister's "interest in meeting with the President during the Versailles Summit for an extended discussion of the Falklands issue." (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]) Streator's May 27 conversation with Whitelaw was described in telegram 11904 from London, May 28. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See the attachment, Document 308.

**313. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to Secretary of State Haig, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark), and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 8, 1982

SUBJECT

Comments of a Senior Argentine Air Force Officer on U.S. Attitudes Toward the Falkland Islands Crisis

1. The following information was received on 28 May 1982 [*1½ lines not declassified*].<sup>2</sup>

2. [*1 line not declassified*] a senior Argentine Air Force brigadier, commenting upon U.S. official attitudes over the Falkland Islands crisis, said that it was difficult for Argentina to assess the U.S. Government's real thoughts on the crisis because there were two opposing viewpoints over the issue within the U.S. Administration. The first faction, he said, was led by Secretary of State Alexander Haig and was European-oriented (i.e. pro-British). The other, which includes Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Judge William Clark and Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, was Latin America-oriented (i.e. pro-Argentine).

3. The brigadier went on to say that the Argentines were considering sending an emissary from Buenos Aires to discuss the question with the U.S. but that, until this faction-fighting in the U.S. Administration resolved itself and the situation clarified, they did not intend to do so.

4. No further distribution of this information is being made.

**William J. Casey<sup>2</sup>**  
*Director of Central Intelligence*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (06/08/1982–10/25/82). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. On his copy of the memorandum, Haig wrote: "Disaster!" (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982). A typed notation at the end of the memorandum indicates the information was received in FIRDB-312/0147–82.

<sup>2</sup> Casey initialed "WJC" above his typed signature.

314. Draft Proposal Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 29, 1982

*Ideas for an Approach*

When British military success is at hand, the US and Brazil would propose an agreement to the UK and Argentina containing the following elements taken as an integrated whole.

1. General and permanent ceasefire (including provisions for the non-resupply and the regrouping of Argentine forces); establishment of a temporary British military administration; lifting of sanctions by Argentina, the UK and third countries;

2. Immediate introduction of a peacekeeping force consisting of contingents from the US and Brazil to verify the ceasefire and ensure the separation of forces;

3. Rapid withdrawal of Argentine forces;

4. Creation of a Contact Group consisting of the UK, the US, Brazil and Argentina;<sup>2</sup>

5. End of military administration and start of local self-government by the local councils with the Contact Group ratifying all decisions not inconsistent with the purposes of the Agreement;

6. Phased withdrawal of British forces, with the peacekeeping force to assume responsibility for the security of the islands for a limited period;

7. Negotiations, without preconditions, on the definitive settlement of the dispute with the assistance of the other members of the Contact Group;

8. Undertaking by both parties not to take any action that would prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 29, 1982 Falklands. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the proposal, and the date is handwritten. At the bottom of the first page, Goldberg wrote: "Ideas presented to Henderson on 5/29/82 by AMH. As UK moves to milit[ary] victory—objective—avoid Argent[in]a's humiliating surrender." No U.S. record of Haig's meeting with Henderson has been found. For a British account of the meeting and the FCO's consideration of the proposal, see Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 514–516. A British record of the meeting, as cabled by Henderson to London, is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

<sup>2</sup> In a later version of this proposal, presented to Haig at 2215 hours on May 31, this point was removed. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/SSpecial Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982)



*POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY*

1. RESTORATION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INCLUDE RETURN OF A GOVERNOR;
  2. AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICLY ESPOUSING INDEPENDENCE OR SEMI-INDEPENDENCE AS THE BRITISH GOAL;
  3. AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES.
  4. CONTACT GROUP TO STAY ON INDEFINITELY.
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**315. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

May 31, 1982, 6 p.m.

President: Margaret?

Thatcher: Yes, Ron?

President: Could you hear me alright?

Thatcher: We could hear you very well. Can you hear me?

President: Yes, seems to be a little echo but I guess that goes with the line we're on. Listen, I'm looking forward to our meeting next Friday,<sup>2</sup> when we can talk about situations that are better in detail.

Thatcher: I think we should need a good long meeting, we don't want to be hurried.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (May 1982). Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan telephoned Thatcher from the second floor Residence at the White House; their conversation took place from 6:03 p.m. to 6:20 p.m., May 31. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Thatcher was speaking from London. An attached White House Situation Room routing slip indicates that copies were sent to Clark, McFarlane, and Poindexter; Poindexter also received the original. Poindexter forwarded a copy of the transcript to Bremer under a June 1 covering note, requesting that distribution be limited to Haig only. On his copy of the covering note, Goldberg wrote: "On 6/1/82, the Brits were concerned that Thatcher was too tough on RR on the call." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982) In his diary, Henderson recalled that Haig had proposed the telephone conversation. Haig "used his accustomed convoluted language: 'It's getting like duck soup down there.'" Henderson responded, "I said that normally I thought these heads of government telephone talks were apt to lead to trouble and acrimony as had occurred over a previous call from Reagan, but as the PM would have read in detail Haig's ideas for a settlement I did not think a call could do any harm now. How wrong I was." (Henderson, *Mandarin*, p. 466) For the previous call, see Document 257.

<sup>2</sup> June 4.

President: I hope it can be, although I know they've got me on a schedule that I think will send me home about a foot shorter than I am.

Thatcher: Well yes, but I think you just have to take the most important things first.

President: Yes. And listen, could I impose and be presumptuous and give you some thoughts right now on the Falkland situation?

Thatcher: Yes, of course.

President: Because, well your impressive military advance could maybe change the diplomatic options, as we see them, that would be available to us between now and next Friday. Incidentally, I want to congratulate you on what you and your young men are doing down there. You've taken major risks and you've demonstrated to the whole world that unprovoked aggression does not pay.

Thatcher: Well not yet, but we're half way to that. We're not yet half way, but a third of the way anyway.

President: Yes, yes you are. I know that Al Haig has passed on some of our ideas on how we might capitalize on the success you've had with a diplomatic initiative,<sup>3</sup> and I back the concept that . . . Hello?

Thatcher: Yes, I'm still here.

President: . . . given Argentina's performance through this whole affair, a new initiative may not succeed, but even if they turn it down, I think an effort to show that we're all still willing to seek a settlement, consistent with our principles would undercut the efforts of some of the leftists in South America who are actively seeking to exploit the crisis. Now, in thinking about this plan

Thatcher: This is democracy and our island, and the very worst thing for democracy would be if we failed now.

President: Yes,

Thatcher: There is always a way through for the Argentines and that is just to withdraw their forces from the island and that is not surrender it's just asking them to withdraw to the mainland.

President: Well, this is just what this idea has in mind, but we believe that it's only chance of success might be prior to the capture of Port Stanley, we wanted Latin cover and we've been talking, when he was here, we talked with the Brazilian President, Figueiredo<sup>4</sup> and he wants to be of help but he believes, know them and knowing the Argentinians that the best chance for a peaceful solution at this point, would be prior to a complete Argentine humiliation and that's why I just wanted to say, I know you're meeting with the cabinet tomorrow

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 308 and footnote 1 thereto.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 255.

and you've got some tough decisions to make. I don't know if the junta can make a deal, but even if it can't be struck I believe you will put yourself in a very favorable position, if I could be so presumptuous to say that, and

Thatcher: (garbled) lies, because they refused to accept the deal before we had to re-enter to take the island. I have to retake them now. I didn't lose some of my finest ships and some of my finest lives, to leave quietly under a cease fire without the Argentinians withdrawing.

President: Oh. Oh, Margaret, that is part of this, as I understand it. This latest proposal that they would want to come from Brazil and ourselves to see if, and it would be that they would have to withdraw.

Thatcher: Ron, I'm not handing over (garbled) I'm not handing over the island now, to anyone else other than to whom the people want. And that would be intolerable. We will therefore(?) . . . we have some of our best ships lost, because for seven weeks the Argentines refused to negotiate on reasonable terms.

President: Yes.

Thatcher: It's not only the one thing, we lost some of our best British guard(?) and some of our allies in NATO. When we repossess the island and restore the people to democracy and then we will discuss with them what they want. There can be no question now, of us quietly moving out of the island to hand them over to a contact, local or United Nations or anything like that, before we had the real thing, before we had to do that thing, yes, that's what we were offering to stop the fighting. I can't lose the lives and blood of our soldiers to hand the islands over to a contact. It's not possible.

President: Well, Margaret, I just thought that are we talking about the same thing, because my understanding was that they would have to withdraw. That the cease-fire would have to be followed with their withdrawal and you, your forces would not have to withdraw until a binational or multinational force arrived then as the housekeeping force.

Thatcher: Yes, but I think the point is this Ron, and you would understand it, we have borne the brunt of this alone. To hand over the Queen's islands to a binational, multinational force immediately and that we must restore our British administration. We must then try to see what kind of security we can get for the islands. And then with a kind of Sinai force. And not to hand the people over to anyone . . .

President: No . . .

Thatcher: We wish to reinstate their existing laws, their customs. And I don't know what their wishes will be until the hostilities are complete, are over and we could talk to them and we could get some developments in the islands which would be of help and then we could

get some security. What I simply can't have now is having borne the brunt of this totally alone, if we choose to say, alright the Argentines withdraw and when they've gone we go. Having lost British guard(?) we hand over to someone else all we've got in the future that the island is one. We don't believe we're not being (familiar with the future) (?) under Britain, I think it will be a kind of independence or semi-independence or quasi-independence so that they will go the way that former colonies have gone. They'll come with self-government, which they were on the way to doing. Now, the situation once you've gone through battle is very very different than if you have one with varied offers, (?) before we had actually to do battle.

President: Margaret, but I thought that part of this proposal,

Thatcher: (words garbled) . . . our young men fighting . . .

President: But part of the proposal,

Thatcher: (words garbled) to withdraw, that would be marvelous.

President: But part of the proposal, as I understand it, was that local self-government and the local councils would be established to govern the islands and at the time of this, they would have to, the rapid withdrawal. And yours would be a phased withdrawal after the peacekeeping force came in to assume just the security of the islands for a limited period and then the negotiations, without any preconditions would go forward.

Thatcher: Yes, but why now negotiations without any preconditions? That time, I think is over, Ron. I can't emphasize too much, how would you feel if you put in a large part of your navy, some of the best of your armed forces to secure and repossess those islands to restore the people with its administration, (words garbled), under democracy and all of a sudden they say "No you can't have that. We know you've lost your blood for it, but you can't have that. We're going to put in something else." Gradually we will put in something else. But when our people have gone so that we can't repossess British (word garbled) territory with British people on it, any (words garbled) Argentinians there ever. (sentences become garbled) . . . we will see what the islanders want. That must be our objective now, and if the Argentinians wish to withdraw from Port Stanley and from the other places, then nothing will please me better. It was ridiculous that they didn't do it before. (sentence garbled) So we are really saying, please return to the mainland.

President: I thought you were in a sufficient position of power that there wouldn't be any doubt in anyone's mind that they, what they had done was a retreat in the face of defeat. I don't think there is any question, that anyone doesn't know that victory could happen. I was just thinking of how, how much, well I'm worrying about what happens

if you have to retain an occupancy, military occupancy against a possible attempt on their part to do it again. Or I'm also wondering about what happens if the present government, as bad as it's been in this whole affair, if it falls and is replaced as it would be by the leftist Peronists.

Thatcher: Yes. I understand that we do need help with the security of the island. I'm the first to admit it. But you are surely not asking me, Ron, after we've lost some of our finest young men, you're surely not saying, that after the Argentinian withdrawal that our forces and our administration become immediately idle? (I had to go immense distances) (?) and mobilize half my country. I had to go there to (word garbled) the invader, because no one else could do it. I just had to go.

President: Yes.

Thatcher: (words garbled) and he must not gain in his aggression. I wonder if anyone over there realizes, I'd like to ask them. Just supposing Alaska was invaded, it's a long way away from you, it's next door to (words garbled) who didn't (garbled) United States. Now you've put all your people up there to retake it and someone suggested that a contact could come in. And if the invader left and if you left and you couldn't stay. (words garbled) and you've lost a lot of men and you ships. You wouldn't do it.

President: No, no although Margaret I have to say that I don't quite think Alaska is a similar situation.

Thatcher: More or less so.

President: It was always my understanding or feeling that you had in the past been prepared to offer independence to the islands or,

Thatcher: Yes, but I think now, I think gradually, Ron, I think this really is fairest thing for the Argentines. But eventually I think I'd be able to say alright we haven't got the islands and I think that (words garbled) they might have been a possibility, they've simply not done that. They've done awful things to our island, we've had a terrible time with them, (word garbled) and Goose Green and Darwin and I think the best thing for the Argentines is that we have repossess the island we shall gradually sympathize. (Sentence garbled) And try to get multinational force there. Not with a view of colonialism but with a view to independence or quasi-independence which will leave the margin there for recognizing a quasi-independence and get the last vestige of colonialism out, and that is what we will try to do. A hundred ships, three to seven times as many young men, some of whom are dead. The Argentinians have done everything possible to try to sink the ship with (word garbled) men(?) along with many, many others. You will surely recognize that they need almost as much material help as they can possibly ask. (Sentence garbled)

President: Margaret, I,

Thatcher: The conditions that exist, (word garbled) you had to go in and your (illusionary) (?) young men are quite different from the conditions that offered before but I would be delighted if the Argentini-ans said, alright, save our young men and perhaps on the understanding that we would bring the islands gradually to independence.

President: Well,

Thatcher: That would be marvelous. But as things are, our blood and then ask us that if the Argentines withdraw then the British automatically withdraw, before we manage to arrange the future that the islanders want, because after all you and I are democracies. It's self-determination we're after.

President: Yes, well,

Thatcher: Mr. President (you have tried your round,) (?) that's why I'm here.

President: Yes.

Thatcher: You really do think that when our people have lived through the most blameless lies (sentences garbled) there can be any choice that they be put under anything other than their own choice. (sentence garbled) otherwise you have perpetual trouble down there. You yourself said on television the other evening, I would remark, if the aggressor wins anything out of this, there would be fifty other (word garbled) risk.<sup>5</sup> But I would think that you would be delighted if Port Stanley without a death. It would be the most sensible both for them and for us.

President: Well, Margaret, I know that I've intruded and I know how, I know,

Thatcher: You haven't intruded at all, and I'm glad you telephoned. I will talk to my people about it tomorrow and maybe we can have a broader talk on Friday.

President: Alright, I'll look forward to it and I, I know how

Thatcher: Understand that when you've lost some of your wonderful regiment.

President: Yes I know what this, I know how, how tragic this has been for you. I look out here at some of our own young men at some

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<sup>5</sup> During a question-and-answer session with reporters in Santa Barbara, California, on May 28, Reagan said: "The only thing that we have to face here is the issue, and the issue is not really those lonely islands down there. The issue is whether we can allow armed aggression to succeed with regard to such territorial claims. There are 50 places in the world right now where, if this succeeds, could be opened to the same thing happening. And the armed aggression, I'm sorry, did start by the action of one of our neighbors here in the Americas." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 705)

of the formations you've seen and I know how I would feel if that were happening to them. So I do know.

Thatcher: And you know how you'd feel if you went through the same conflict.

President: Yes, I know.

Thatcher: (sentences garbled) Anyhow I will see on next Friday and we will have a long talk then.

President: Alright and God bless you.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> In his personal diary, Reagan wrote of his conversation with Thatcher: "The P.M. is adamant (so far). She feels the loss of life so far can only be justified if they win. We'll see[.] she may be right. (Reagan, *Diaries*, p. 135) Following the conversation, Henderson recorded, Thatcher telephoned him to discuss it: "She spoke on an open line, but this in no way attenuated the criticisms she made of the Americans." For Henderson's detailed reconstruction of his conversation with Thatcher, see Henderson, *Mandarin*, pp. 466–467.

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**316. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the  
Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Takacs Call

Argentine Ambassador Takacs met with Tom Enders late last night, to float the attached proposal,<sup>2</sup> which he said was fathered by Air Force Chief Lami Dozo.

The proposal is like the "Peruvian" plan of May 5, except that it does not allow for a role for the local councils.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Blair forwarded the memorandum and attached proposal to McFarlane under a June 3 covering memorandum, commenting: "Al Sapia-Bosch believes the proposal is worth a try, but doubts that it will work." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina (05/21/1982–06/15/1982))

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a Department of State translation of the Argentine proposal which included a ceasefire; "immediate installation of an interim authority in

Enders told Takacs that he did not believe that London would accept simultaneous withdrawal, although it might accept sequential withdrawal, and that the restoration of the councils appeared essential to Britain.

Takacs, reflecting Lami Dozo, continues to have unrealistic news of the military situation. He believes the carrier was in fact seriously damaged, that Argentine troops on the islands can hold out for 3 or 4 weeks, and that "15 or 20" British ships more will be sunk. He is talking about continuing the war after the British win in the Falklands.

Takacs had learned (through a Senate staff source) that the President had called Prime Minister Thatcher, and that the call "had not gone well."

**L. Paul Bremer, III**  
*Executive Secretary*

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the person of an Administrator, designated by the United Nations Secretary General, for the government of the islands during the negotiations;" mutual withdrawal of British and Argentine forces "an equal distance under the conditions established by the Administrator;" agreement from both parties "not to reintroduce any armed forces in the demilitarized zone;" the creation of a group of four countries (the United States, Peru, and two other countries, "one to be named by each of the two parties") to ensure the withdrawal; agreement by the two parties to cease the "economic measures they have taken against the other party on their own initiative or through third countries;" and the beginning of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General with the "assistance" of representatives of the four countries referred to above.



**317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for AN/ASQ-81 (V) Magnetic Detector Sets (TS)—ACTION  
MEMORANDUM

After considering the Navy's recommendation,<sup>2</sup> I have decided to approve the British request for the following equipment, with delivery as previously specified by the UK:

- 15 AN/ASQ-81 (V-2) Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) Sets with 9 shipboard spare kits<sup>3</sup>
- 9 AN/ASM-454 Test Sets
- 9 MX/956 Cable Maintenance Fixtures
- 1 Magnetic Detector Noise Kit
- 24 Shipping Containers

**Caspar W. Weinberger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. At the bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: "This request was sent to us on May 8. We should have acted on it in no less than 1 week. 3 weeks is *far* too long in a wartime situation. I want all of these requests *presented to me* within 1 week of receipt. CWW."

<sup>2</sup> In a May 29 memorandum to Weinberger presenting the British request for action, Iklé summarized the Navy recommendation: "Originally, the Navy recommended providing 11 of the sets, but not the remaining 4, since these would have to come off active or reserve aircraft. Subsequently, the Navy discovered that the 11 sets were not complete and, as a result, changed its recommendation to disapproval." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> On June 2, Hayward replied to Weinberger with a memorandum stating that the Navy staff had "initiated appropriate action" to provide the requested sets "expeditiously." On the memorandum, Hayward added the following notation: "As Capt. Cormack can explain to you, we are being very responsive to these British requests, including this case which on the surface appeared to be excessively delayed." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0004, UK Jun-Jul 1982)

**318. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Military Requirements in Defending the Falklands

Even after the British take control of the Falklands, Argentina may continue the struggle and refuse any peace-keeping force.<sup>2</sup> The UK would face a sustained requirement to defend and supply the islands. In a continuing war scenario, the defense of the Falklands over the long-term could be a high-cost burden on the British, both financially and militarily. The UK could be forced to bring direct pressure on the Argentine mainland through air raids or SSN blockade if faced with intensified Argentine attacks. The UK probably still would be dependent upon the US for key materiel support, thereby providing us with some additional *leverage in discussions* with the British concerning the *future status of the islands*. The British must also recognize the long term drain of maintaining a war footing indefinitely.

This memorandum provides a preliminary estimate of what US materiel support the British may require following their seizure of the islands.

*Continuing War of Attrition*

Argentina may continue the war following the British conquest of the islands. Assuming they do so, the Argentine military options are:

- *commando operations* against British positions on the islands;
- continuing *air raids* against the islands and the British sea lines of communications (SLOCs); and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 1–7 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Clarke; cleared by Kanter and Haass.

<sup>2</sup> In a June 1 briefing paper, entitled “Falklands Posture,” Enders noted: “It is likely that a state of war will persist for some time following the surrender of Port Stanley, maybe indefinitely.” (Ibid.)

- small scale *naval engagements* against isolated RN shipping.<sup>3</sup>

The British should be able to handle the commando operations. The other two threats may require a continued large-scale British presence, although it is difficult now to estimate force size precisely. The Argentine threat will vary significantly, depending upon its ability to *acquire additional military equipment*.<sup>4</sup> Most important would be additional aircraft, “smart” weapons such as EXOCET, and submarines. British refusal to compromise on the future status of the islands could increase the willingness of third countries to supply Argentina. Although there have been reports of offers from Peru, Cuba, Nicaragua and others, we do not have any confirmation that Argentina has taken control of aircraft from those sources. Nonetheless, *Argentina’s ability to acquire new arms over time will probably be greater than its limited success in the last few weeks*. Brazil has apparently sold at least two maritime patrol aircraft.

Argentina’s ability to pay for new weapons is limited, however, because of the effect of economic sanctions and reduced ship traffic compounding the difficulties of an already deteriorating economy. Thus, economic considerations may lead Argentina to accept weapons from those who would offer them free or at low cost, i.e., Cuba, Libya, and the Soviet Union. There are no reasons for such countries to exercise restraint if Argentina decides to accept their offers.

The availability of aircraft of the type with which the Argentine Air Force is already familiar is shown at Tab 1, as is a summary of submarine availability from likely potential suppliers.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In a June 2 memorandum to Casey, Menges similarly argued that Anglo-Argentine hostilities might continue “in an open or clandestine way” after the United Kingdom reestablished control over the Islands, including “periodic harassment by air attacks, bombing runs, and commando raids.” Menges added: “Clandestine operations which could supplement or substitute for such open Argentine warfare could include the use of the 601st intelligence group and other similar units for anti-UK or anti-US terrorism in other parts of Latin America or even in the United Kingdom—perhaps operating jointly with the Irish Republican Army. The Soviet Union might well encourage either Cuba or Libya (with which a weapons-supply relationship has begun) to act as the intermediary for supplying Argentine needs for either type of warfare which could go on for many, many months.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files (1982), Box 16, Folder 1: C-353 Argentina)

<sup>4</sup> On June 1, in a breakfast meeting with Casey, Inman, Eagleburger, and Montgomery, Haig “voiced his concern regarding a future Soviet role in Argentina as a result of the Falklands crisis. It was agreed that Cuban and/or other proxy roles might be the likely first step except if Argentina requests arms which only the Soviets could provide.” (Memorandum for the Record, June 1; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/ Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec 85))

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is a short summary paper entitled “Potential Suppliers of Aircraft and Submarines with Which Argentina is Already Familiar.”

*British Ability to Handle Continuing Presence and a War of Attrition*

British *land-based air defenses* on the Falklands are *limited*. British aircraft on the islands will be concentrated at one or two small airfields and will be highly vulnerable to air attacks while on the ground. Their ships are in need of repair and their logistics burden will grow once they are on the islands. Thus, the British could have a need for:

- *Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft*. Grumman has already received informal requests for information on AEW aircraft. The UK now has only test-bed aircraft in its NIMROD AEW program and has retired all of its GANNET AEW aircraft from its carriers. There are E-2Bs in the US Navy Reserve. Six would be required to maintain one continuous orbit. E-2Bs can operate from relatively short airstrips. Less capable alternatives would be radar on balloons or on high hills on West Falklands.

- *I-HAWK SAMs*. Despite press reports that HAWKs are on the Falklands, Britain does not operate the HAWK or any other medium to long-range land-based SAM. The US could only provide HAWK by diverting from inventory and/or deferring the sale to Egypt. I-HAWK could relieve some of the requirement to keep British anti-air capable ships near the islands for that purpose.

- *Airfield Equipment*. We have already agreed to provide runway matting and some “bare base” parts. The British will probably construct at least two main operating bases because of the extreme vulnerability of small airfields to aerial attack. We can anticipate that we will have additional requests for similar equipment and for other items such as revetments, radars, and spare parts for certain aircraft (F-4, C-130). The British will need an extensive spares supply on hand, given the great distances involved in resupply. The F-4, for example, has a very high requirement for maintenance-per-flight-hour and an extensive number of replacement parts.<sup>6</sup>

- *Naval Support*. Because the Argentine Navy remains essentially intact, it poses a threat-in-being that will require a continued RN presence. If the Argentine submarine threat grows or if Argentine surface ships armed with EXOCET begin raiding tactics on the SLOC from

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<sup>6</sup> Howe produced a memorandum for Eagleburger on May 29, which considered the possibility of the British redeploying F-4 fighter aircraft from Ascension to the Falklands/Malvinas. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive May 25–31) Later, during a June 4 breakfast meeting, Weinberger informed Inman and Calucci that “the UK had submitted a new request for the short-takeoff version of the F-5, which the British would like to base at Stanley once they regain control.” (Memorandum for the Record, June 4; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec Defense (May 81–Dec 85))

Ascension, the British may need to maintain their fleet at high levels in the South Atlantic. Currently, of RN ships in A–1 status (i.e., not in for repairs) 23 surface combatants and 18 naval auxiliaries are in the South Atlantic and only 20 surface combatants and 18 naval auxiliaries elsewhere. The best RN ships are those in the South Atlantic. Many of the ships in the South Atlantic will probably need repairs soon, thus necessitating a return to the UK. The Task Force's supplies of anti-aircraft missiles may be running low, necessitating further resupply at sea. A continued high naval presence and long supply line to the South Atlantic may mean that the UK will continue to need the US to support RN ships in the North Atlantic.

- *Logistics Support.* Supplying a British garrison on the Falklands will require continued aerial and sea-borne supply. US estimates of the daily supply requirements for a 3500 man force in peacetime are 63 tons of consumables and 25,000 gallons of fuel. A 5000 man force would require over 90 tons and 36,000 gallons daily. In light combat, those requirements would almost double. Depending upon the size of the garrison, the supply effort could strain UK assets. Already they have chartered 43 commercial ships for South Atlantic supply duty. If the British can establish a 6000–7000 foot runway, they may request US C–141 flights to ease their resupply problem.

MOD sources say that there is no firm estimate of what the war is costing (some sources say most of the 2.2 billion pound government contingency fund has been spent), nor are there yet cost estimates for replacing lost ships. Nonetheless, there is already talk of a “*Falklands tax*.” The British have been leaking stories about “internationalizing the defense of the Falklands” and a US role along the lines of Ascension (i.e., their island, our airbase). Thus, the British may already be thinking they will need our help in the longer term.

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### 319. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>

New York, June 3, 1982, 0549Z

1550. Dept for Deputy Secretary Stoessel, AS Enders, White House National Security Advisor Clark, CIA for Casey from Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820288–0201. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London.

Kirkpatrick. Subject: Falklands: Amb Kirkpatrick's Meeting With Generals. Ref: USUN 1549.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text)

2. At the Argentinians' request, Generals Jose Miret and Miguel Mallea Gil met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano.

3. Miret began with Argentinian version of recent military events in the South Atlantic. Both sides had inflicted damage and suffered casualties but the British continued their skillful manipulation of military reports. Miret challenged British figures indicating that sixty Argentinian aircraft had been destroyed. Half that number was more accurate. Miret also dismissed British denials of damage to the carrier *Invincible*. Finally, while acknowledging that British forces were closing around Port Stanley, Miret asserted that British success would not come easily.

4. Miret continued by outlining a four point proposal which included: A) immediate ceasefire, B) mutual withdrawal, C) creation of a four-nation UN administration for the islands, and D) negotiations with a specified time-limit. This proposal, if accepted, would prevent the continuing degeneration of the situation. Even if Argentinian forces were defeated in the Falklands, this would be but the initial chapter of a very long story. Argentina would have lost the battle but not the war and it would continue to fight from the mainland. In turn the UK would have to fortify the Islands and to defend them would have to attack Argentinian forces at their bases in the mainland. This would precipitate a Hemispheric confrontation with Britain which would surely destroy the interAmerican system. The US should, therefore, urge the UK to accept the proposal.

5. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that the same proposal had already been presented to, and rejected by, the UK. At the request of AS Enders she had personally conveyed this information last week to Amb Takacs in Washington.<sup>3</sup> Events had overtaken that proposal and attention was now focused on two new proposals before the UN Security Council. The first proposal—being moved by Spain—simply called for a cease fire. (Reftel) It would be voted on tomorrow (June 3) and the British had indicated that they would veto it. The second proposal had not yet surfaced. It was a British text mentioning Resolutions 502 and 505

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1549 from USUN, June 3, the Mission reported Spain's submission to the Security Council of a draft resolution, co-sponsored by Panama, calling on the parties to "observe an immediate cessation of hostilities, authorize the SYG to use his offices to secure the ceasefire, and request that he report back to the Council within 72 hours." The Mission added that the Spanish Permanent Representative, de Pinies, "told UK Amb Parsons, in the presence of Amb Kirkpatrick, that his purpose is to provide an appropriate 'fig-leaf' that would permit Argentina to take the decision to withdraw its forces from Port Stanley." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820287–1083)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 316.

and proposing a ceasefire once Argentina indicated its willingness to withdraw its forces from the Falklands within fourteen days. (Reftel)

6. Both Miret and Mallea coincided in regarding the British proposal as a totally unacceptable ultimatum.<sup>4</sup> Miret claimed that if Argentinian troops were withdrawn from the Falklands under those terms they would march on Buenos Aires to depose the government upon their return to the mainland. Mallea added that it was not a question of just being unacceptable to the government but that the Argentinian people as a whole would also reject it. They both concurred that it would be preferable to fight and lose than to accept those terms. In their estimation being defeated after a valiant fight at least had the advantage that it would unify the Argentines. But a dishonorable surrender would tear the nation apart.

7. The Spanish proposal, on the other hand, was entirely acceptable to Argentina. In their view, however, Britain would veto it. They also believed that France would vote for it and that Japan would follow the US lead. Their only question was how the US would vote. They hoped the US would support it or, at least, abstain. An American veto would send an unmistakable signal that the US had totally sided with Britain against Argentina. The Spanish resolution only called for a ceasefire and a US vote against it could only be interpreted as a US desire to see the war continued to its ultimate consequences. While US-Argentine relations are currently strained there is still the possibility of repairing the damage. That damage would be exceedingly, perhaps even impossibly, difficult to repair if the US voted against the Spanish resolution.

8. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that she understood their views but that she supposed that the US would vote against the Spanish resolution. Nevertheless, she would immediately convey their views to Washington. She knew that US relations with Argentina have been stormy and that there have been periods (such as the one characterized by the chant “O Braden O Peron”) that could only be characterized as antagonistic. Perhaps we are now entering one of those unfortunate periods.

9. The meeting concluded with Miret forcefully reiterating that an American veto would damage US-Argentinian relations to a much deeper extent than even the worst periods in the past.

10. Comment: SYG Perez de Cuellar has informed Amb Kirkpatrick that Argentinian Foreign Ministry is thinking of a UNSC veto with a subsequent call for an emergency session of the GA. She believes that

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably the May 17 proposal. See Document 271.

conversation with Miret and Mellea was pro-forma perhaps because they also favor such a scenario.

Kirkpatrick

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320. **Message From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (Nutting) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Allen), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Barrow), the Chief of Staff of the Army (Meyer), and the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward)**<sup>1</sup>

Quarry Heights, Panama Canal Zone, June 3, 1982, 1620Z

Nutting sends. Subject: Falklands/Malvinas Crisis.

Ref A: USCINCSO msg 011905Z Jun 82.

Ref B: *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Jun 82 0238.

Ref C: AmEmbassy Buenos Aires msg 021824Z Jun 82 3408.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S/NF) In the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, I believe strongly that US interests demand that neither party be annihilated or humiliated. Argentina should not be placed in an even more desperate situation than prevails today. Many people forecast an internal Argentine crisis very likely resulting in a new government. An internal power vacuum would very likely be filled by Peronistas and any change at this time provides an opportunity for increased Soviet access and influence. I submit that General Galtieri is undoubtedly a better government head for us to deal with than any likely alternative.

2. (S/NF) *[less than 1 line not declassified]* in which reported on the specific message sent to us regarding the Argentine junta's estimate of the situation. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* further recognized the possible futility of the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* of communication and proposed for your consideration an initial message which might be transmitted.

3. (C/NF) I call Ref B to your attention as an additional *[less than 1 line not declassified]* indicating that several Argentine military officers believe that the fighting will be over within a week and call for the US

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret; Immediate; Noforn.

<sup>2</sup> None of the reference messages were found.



to help find a way out, diverting a total British kill which will plunge Argentina into chaos. Ambassador Shlaudeman comments that this 31 May conversation at least opens a line of military-to-military communication that could prove useful to the future.

4. (S/NF) I call [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to your attention as a new [*1 line not declassified*] appealing for US intercession to arrange an “armistice” now. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is presented as a possible indicator of wider defeatist sentiment in the Argentine military. The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] state that USCINCSO Nutting should be apprised of the desire of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to quit, so that he could communicate it to Washington, invoking some sort of political intercession with the belligerence to halt the fighting now.

5. (S/NF) I acknowledge that the thesis that things will be worse if Argentina is defeated is not proven. It is equally possible that a sound defeat might bring the Argentines to their senses. Letting them down easily might permit them to continue down the self-destructive path they have been following. Nevertheless, our strategic interests in Latin America very likely will only be further damaged by continuation of the present course. I urge that:

— We immediately cease all actions which have a negative political, economic, or military impact on Argentina.

— Convince British authorities that further prosecution of the battle will mainly result in grave strategic damage to the Americas.

— Renew US Government efforts to devise a formula which will be face-saving for both sides.

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### **321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 3, 1982, 2341Z

152723. Exdis ZFF Brasilia & Secretary only. Subject: UK Vulcan Bomber in Brazil. Ref: (A) Streator/Smith Telcon on June 3, (B) Motley/Kilday Telcon.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850288–0106. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Haig as Tosec 80053. Drafted by K. Smith; cleared by Morns (EUR/NE), Blackwill, Kilday, Kantor, Service, and in S/S–O; and approved by Eagleburger. Haig was then in Paris with Reagan for bilateral talks with French officials and the forthcoming June 5–6 Versailles Economic Summit.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of either of these telephone calls has been found.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. UK Defense Minister John Nott passed to Embassy London “as courtesy” the following information regarding emergency landing of British Vulcan bomber at Rio de Janeiro June 3:

—The Vulcan had to make emergency landing in Brazil due to failure of in-flight refueling;

—The plane carried a Shrike missile (AGM-45) which the pilot could not jettison before landing;

—The Brazilians are being helpful in getting the plane on its way back to UK territory;

—The Brazilians, however, will not allow the plane to take off with weapons aboard (including Shrike);

—Pilot has been instructed by UK MOD to comply with Brazilian request.

3. Nott said that it was in interest of US and UK to recover the Shrike before it could be taken apart by Brazilians.

4. UK Embassy later informed Department that the missile is in a lethal state since firing mechanism had been activated. MOD was sending radio instructions to crew on how to disarm the Shrike, and the UK had asked the Brazilians for permission to send a transport aircraft to recover the Shrike and other ordnance that may have been on the aircraft.

5. The British are hopeful that they can recover the plane and its weapons quickly and with little public notice. We want to avoid, if possible, any public mention of the Shrike, particularly since it is of US manufacture and was supplied to the UK after start of Falklands dispute. Embassy Brasilia should maintain as low profile as possible during the Vulcan Shrike recovery and treat issue as bilateral UK-GOB matter to greatest extent possible.

6. We understand that Embassy Brasilia has been in contact with UK Embassy which confirms that FAB is cooperating with British in this matter, leading Embassy Brasilia to conclude that British will be able to arrange for Shrike recovery without US assistance. Nevertheless, the Shrike contains sensitive US technology and we must assure that the weapon is not inspected or taken apart for study. If US assistance appears essential to maintain security of technology, Embassy should approach GOB confidentially at high level and register our strong desire for the immediate release of the Shrike to UK authorities.

7. Buenos Aires minimize considered.<sup>3</sup>

Stoessel

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<sup>3</sup> On June 14, the British Air Attaché in Brasilia informed the Embassy that the Shrike missile had been removed from the Vulcan by the Brazilians and detailed the security arrangements that were being provided. (Telegram 4931 from Brasilia, June 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850363–0040) In telegram 166547 to Brasilia, June 17, the Department advised the Embassy that “the technology contained in the missile in the hands of the BAF is not sufficiently sensitive or advanced for USG to risk a negative diplomatic impact by even addressing the Brazilians on this issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850378–0800)

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**322. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, undated

## SUBJECT

Your meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher at the Versailles Summit

Although you obviously need none, it might be helpful to review some ideas associated with Falklands that you might draw upon in your discussion with Prime Minister Thatcher.<sup>2</sup> She will come to you concerned that you will join with Bonn and Paris in (1) urging a cease fire and negotiations before she has secured the Falklands or, (2) the longer term, a more magnanimous position on the ultimate status of the Islands to avoid a protracted conflict. It goes without saying there

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. At the top of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote: “6/4/82 at U.S. Amb. Resid.” and “1½ hr.” Below this notation, Goldberg added: “Written by AMH [unclear] midnite 6/3/82.”

<sup>2</sup> No U.S. record of this meeting has been found. For the entire period of Reagan’s June 2–11 European trip, the President’s Daily Diary only records Reagan’s movements and not his individual meetings. In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled of the June 4 meeting: “My first and most important meeting was, of course, with President Reagan who was staying at the US Embassy. We talked alone, as he preferred it. I thanked him for the great help we had received from the United States. I asked him what the Americans could do to help repatriate the Argentine PoWs. I also requested that the American vote should support us in the Security Council.” (Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 231) Of Haig’s meeting with Pym on the South Atlantic which took place in Paris, the British Official History records: “The Secretary of State was still expressing his view that Galtieri would continue with hostilities from the mainland as the best way of keeping his job, and was not sure, as the British hoped and Reagan seemed to accept, that the return of prisoners would provide much leverage. He was still worried largely about the US position in Latin America.” (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, p. 531)

has been much on the airways, in the press, and from the French to contribute to such a state of mind on the part of the British.

Basically, Mrs. Thatcher will only really listen to you because, from the outset, she has sought to engage the United States in the role of guarantor for the future security of the Islands. It would be wrong, however, to assume that she would abandon her principles in order to achieve such an American guarantee. At the same time, we must be very careful not to find ourselves in the middle of an arrangement which would be totally unacceptable to Argentina and thus lead to a permanent state of crisis.

Mrs. Thatcher's success thus far in the crisis will obviously loom large in her own calculations. Her popularity is at its peak, and she could well be contemplating the calling of an early election to strengthen her mandate even further. Thus, she will be reluctant to deviate from her strong, principled course which has served her well so far, especially in the face of the sacrifices it has entailed. Beyond that, I believe the character of the woman is such that she will be very reluctant to join the Labor or Social Democratic opposition parties or even the troublesome moderate wing of the Conservative Party in an alignment against her more loyal constituency on the right.

Attached are talking points drawn largely from the draft message I gave you enroute to Paris.

### **Attachment**

### **Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State<sup>3</sup>**

Undated

#### **TALKING POINTS**

—Admire your courage and determination: your military campaign has been impressive. With courage and great sacrifice, Britain has defended the rule of law.

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the talking points, which are typed in all capital letters. The content of the talking points was also reflected in a June 1 draft letter, which had been prepared in the Department of State for Reagan to send to Thatcher but was not sent. According to a handwritten comment by Goldberg which appears on a copy of the draft: "RR decided against sending this letter while aboard AF #1 [Air Force One] enroute to Paris on 6/2/82 because of his planned meeting w/ Mrs. T. [Thatcher] on 6/4/82 & RR's desire to 'keep her thinking' per Clark." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, June 2, 1982 Falklands)

—We are proud to have assisted you in this endeavor, for your case has been ours. I know you recognize that because our support has remained steady, we have suffered political setbacks in Latin America.

—Right now it is important for both of us to look to the future. Once you accomplish your military objectives on the Islands, Buenos Aires is likely to dig in its heels—refusing a ceasefire and declaring that Argentina has lost a battle but will continue the war.

—Thus, you, and to a lesser extent, we, could face the beginning of a painful, prolonged war of attrition in the South Atlantic.

—You know our position: We continue to support a political settlement based on Security Council Resolution 502, of which negotiations form an integral part.

—We need to know your position as this stage of the conflict nears an end.

—I am told that you too still support Resolution 502. What is your attitude toward negotiations?

—You have been quoted as favoring independence or “quasi independence” for the Falklands. Would it be best, at this stage, to suggest that the Islanders will remain British or become independent? Doesn’t this risk convincing the Argentines that they have no choice but to continue the conflict?

—How do you see handling the sovereignty issue? Wouldn’t ambiguity on this and the question of self-determination assist a political settlement?

—Also, what is your thinking on a peacekeeping force? Would you permit Latin American participation and how would the peacekeeping nations participate, if at all, in the process of reaching a political settlement?

—I know these are difficult questions and that you are undoubtedly focused on the course of the battle on the ground. But I believe we also need to think about the longer-term implications of the conflict.

—Beyond getting the Argentines off the Islands, I believe we should decide together how best to restore peace in the South Atlantic by putting Resolution 502 into practice in such a way as to reduce the potential for protracted hostilities. This is in your interest as well as ours.

—I welcome your thoughts.

**323. Message From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

New York, June 5, 1982, 0231Z

265. From Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. To: Flash for White House (NSC for Clark–Eyes Only.)

1. Evening Wednesday June 2. In the Security Council. Spain circulated a simple cease-fire resolution<sup>2</sup> and the Council was called to meet the following morning June 3rd.

2. British announced their intention to veto and USUN received instruction to veto along with the British (State 8005).<sup>3</sup>

3. Thursday June 3rd. Amendments were introduced to Spanish text calling for implementation of Resolutions 502 and 505 simultaneously with the establishment of a cease-fire, that is, linking the cease-fire to a withdrawal of Argentine troops as called for in Res. 502, as UK desired.

4. Since the U.K. had asserted that they wanted implementation of Res. 502, there appeared to be a chance of acceptance.

5. The U.K. said they would only consider it seriously if Argentines agreed. By cutting through various levels and complications of Argentine bureaucracy to the top, we were able to get a clear cut Argentine affirmative, conditioned on U.K. acceptance.

6. There were morning and afternoon Council sessions on June 3. At approximately 6:00 p.m. that day, it was agreed that the Security Council would reconvene at 4:00 p.m., today, June 4, to vote on the revised draft resolution. The final amended text was sent to the Department in USUN cable 1558.<sup>4</sup>

7. Many of us, including me (Amb Kirkpatrick) believed that the U.K. might accept the draft resolution possibly with minor revisions.

8. At 11:30 a.m. today (June 4) I spoke with Acting Secretary Stoessel who said that the U.K. Foreign Office had sent the draft resolution to PM Thatcher along with two proposed amendments. He said he had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982. Secret; Flash. Sent via Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed at the top of the telegram, indicating that he saw it. The telegram is unsigned.

<sup>2</sup> See Footnote 2, Document 319.

<sup>3</sup> A mistaken reference to telegram Secto 8005 from Haig in Paris, June 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820288–1087)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1558 from USUN, June 3. (Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 05/13/1982–06/04/1982)

sent Haig the draft resolution. Stoessel and I agree that I was instructed to vote “no” in case the British rejected the resolution.

9. At 2:00 p.m. in New York, I received word from the British that A) they would veto the resolution; B) that they would entertain no amendments on the draft resolution.

10. After confirming the British position, I called Assistant Secretary Enders who was as unhappy as I with U.K. decision. We agreed that a U.S. veto would be a catastrophe.

11. I spoke with Walt Stoessel and Tom Enders at 3:00 p.m. to inform them that Japan and Ireland would vote “yes” and that France was abstaining. I said that I wanted written instructions, and then spoke with Stoessel again to inquire if they were very sure that I was instructed to vote no. I reiterated what a disaster I thought a “no” vote would be, how unnecessary it was, how the U.K. frequently did not vote with US in the SC. Again, I said that to avoid any possible confusion, I wanted written instructions.

12. I asked if they had spoken with Sec. Haig about the draft. They said yes. Again I repeated that I thought it would be an extremely controversial vote. I said that I thought they should discuss this again with Sec. Haig.

13. At 4:00 I once again called Stoessel and Enders to say that I had received no written instructions. They said that my instructions were clear—I was to follow the British—but they could understand that I wanted written instructions. ExecSec Bremer said that they were sending written instructions since Acting Sec Stoessel had just signed them. (Now at 9:00 p.m. USUN has still not received such written instructions. State at first said they were sent. And now ExecSec is looking).

14. At 5:00 I called to report everything we knew about the line up: Japan, Ireland, Spain, USSR, Poland, Panama, Zaire would vote yes, and the U.K. would veto. I then said that the SC meeting was about to begin. They said that Sec. Haig was still out at the dinner and they had not yet heard from him.

15. Later at 6:00 they said that they had spoken to Sec. Haig, explained the situation to him, but that he (Haig) wanted to reflect. I explained that the vote was rapidly approaching. (Later it was explained Haig had wanted to consult with Pym).

16. At 6:30 I heard that the Secretary wanted to reflect further. I replied that time had run out, the SC meeting had been called for 4:00 and we had been delaying for 2 and a half hours by that point.

17. At 6:35 the vote occurred, and we voted no.<sup>5</sup>

18. An open phone line was maintained the entire time of the SC deliberations between the Security Council and the Secretary’s office. It was interrupted only after the vote.

19. Amb. Kirkpatrick had specifically ascertained from AS Enders and Acting Sec Stoessel whether she should vote “no” or not at all if written instructions did not come in time. She was told specifically to vote “no”. They said written instructions were on the way.

20. The message to abstain came minutes after the SC vote. Since SC votes cannot be changed, Amb. Kirkpatrick was instructed to announce that we wished to record the change in any case.

21. Amb. Kirkpatrick followed these instructions and added change of intention to the explanation of vote. Since then Kirkpatrick has explained the confusion was a result of short time and long distance.

22. At 9:10 p.m. USUN received written instructions to abstain.<sup>6</sup> At 9.35, on request from Enders to take all reasonable steps to mend relations with Argentines, Amb. Kirkpatrick, accompanied by Amb. Sorzano, had dinner with Generals Miret and Gil. End.

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<sup>5</sup> In the final vote on the Spanish/Panamanian resolution, nine voted for the resolution, two against (U.S. and U.K.), and four abstained. (Telegram 1570 from USUN, June 5; *ibid.*) In the same telegram, Kirkpatrick transmitted the text of her statement to the Security Council explaining the U.S. vote. A summary of the June 2–4 debate in the Security Council on the resolution is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, pp. 1335–1337.

<sup>6</sup> The Department transmitted the instructions to abstain in telegram 154071 to USUN, June 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850288–0118)

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### 324. Telegram From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick) to the White House<sup>1</sup>

New York, June 6, 1982, 1311Z

1. White House Situation Room for President Reagan and Judge William Clark Eyes Only. From J. Kirkpatrick.

1. This letter and a parallel one from the Secretary General were delivered last night to their respective Ambassadors at approximately 11 p.m.

2. Note that the deadline on the reply is 8:00 pm this evening

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Top Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. [*text not declassified*] A notation in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram reads: “SAVE UN folder.”



3. Basically this proposal spells out the modes for implementing Resolution 502 which was the British resolution and one which they have repeatedly described as the only basis for peace.

4. The proposal addresses the U.K. objection that the “Spanish” resolution provided no specific time frame for withdrawal of Argentine troops.

5. It provides for removing all Argentine troops in 15 days and only makes a reference to British plans for “reducing” its forces.

6. That is, it leaves the U.K. in control of the Islands, but it also provides for future negotiations.

7. This gives the British everything they have said they wanted, but provides a fig leaf for Argentine pride (the fig leaf being, basically, the right to surrender and withdraw under U.N. auspices instead of British).

8. It is also being transmitted directly to top Argentine decision makers.

9. If the President can help Mrs. Thatcher decide to accept this, lives and the U.S. interests would be saved.

10. I am not repeat not sending this to any other part of our government—from concern for leaks or sabotage.

Quote:

Message to Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Excellency,

The armed conflict in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) threatens to enter into a new and extremely dangerous phase that is likely to result in heavy loss of life on both sides. This would gravely prejudice, for the foreseeable future, any prospect for a settlement of the underlying dispute. Tension and conflict would continue, in contradiction to the interests of all concerned.

I feel it my duty in this situation, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, to appeal directly to Your Excellency and to President Galtieri, in the hope that a way can still be found to bring the fighting to a halt and to initiate negotiations towards a settlement of this crisis. At this late stage, further exchanges with the parties are not likely to be productive. I therefore wish to suggest the following plan which should be considered as an integral whole:

1. A truce comes into effect as of 11:00 a.m., New York time, on Monday, 7 June 1982.

2. On Wednesday, 9 June, the two military commanders on the Islands meet in the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General

for the purpose of agreeing on the modalities of the cease-fire, which is to come into effect by 11:00 a.m., New York time, on Friday, 11 June.

3. Simultaneously with the cease-fire, withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Islands will commence to be completed within 15 days. Argentina will inform the Secretary-General of the withdrawal schedule.

4. Within this time frame, the United Kingdom will inform the Secretary-General of plans for the reduction of its forces in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). In the light of these plans, the Secretary-General will undertake consultations on the possibility of security arrangements under United Nations auspices.

5. The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome. The negotiations will be held in New York or at a mutually acceptable location in the vicinity thereof.

6. These negotiations will be inaugurated on 1 July 1982.

7. Should the Secretary-General, after taking account of the course of negotiations and the views of the parties, determine that the achievement of the negotiated settlement will not be possible within the time frame envisaged, he may establish a new target date which will be in keeping with the urgency of a diplomatic solution to which the parties are committed.

To be effective, the above plan will require that the two governments communicate their unqualified acceptance by 8:00 p.m. New York time, on Sunday, 6 June 1982. Upon receipt of such positive responses, I will immediately report to the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Javier Perez de Cuellar

Unquote

**325. Telegram From the Defense Intelligence Agency to the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1982, 1740Z

245. Subj: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*/ Argentina/United Kingdom/Falkland (Malvinas) Islands/ Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* pins hopes on Reagan (U). This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

1. (U) Ctry: Argentina (AR)/United Kingdom (UK)/Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (FA).

2. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

3. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

4. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

5. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

6. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

7. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

8. (C/NoFORN) Summary: An Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* officer stated that his fellow officers are frustrated and angry; they blame Secretary Haig for the failure of initial Malvinas negotiations and subsequent deterioration of the situation. However, they are optimistic that President Reagan can convince ((Thatcher)) to negotiate.

9A. (C/NoFORN) Details: *[less than 1 line not declassified]* an Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* had stated earlier on the same day that the Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* are very frustrated over the Malvinas situation and in their frustration believe that Secretary Haig is the person responsible for the collapse of the initial negotiations and the subsequent deterioration of the situation. However, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, most Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* officers believe that the frustration and anger is temporary and will pass with time. Furthermore, many Argentine *[less than 1 line not declassified]* officers are optimistic that President Reagan can convince ((Thatcher)) to take a more flexible approach to the problem and consider a negotiated settlement. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* if Reagan does succeed, the frustration and anger will pass quickly—perhaps in as little as three months.

9B. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

10. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

11. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 06/07/1982 (1). Confidential; Sensitive; NoFORN. The telegram repeats an earlier telegram from *[text not declassified]* to the Defense Intelligence Agency, sent at 1337Z, June 7. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

12. [less than 1 line not declassified]
  13. [less than 1 line not declassified]
  14. [less than 1 line not declassified]
  15. [less than 1 line not declassified]
  16. [less than 1 line not declassified]
  17. [less than 1 line not declassified]
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**326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, Undated

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, June 9, 1982

I. *SETTING*

The focus of the Prime Minister for the past two months has been the Falkland crisis. Her firm handling of it has paid important political dividends at home, where her Conservative party did well in May's local elections. She is also benefitting from the slight improvement in the economy. But if the South Atlantic war with Argentina drags on with increasing casualties, she will find her electoral support fickle. She must call elections by May, 1984, but may go to the country as early as this autumn if she achieves a South Atlantic settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (6). Confidential. On June 7, Reagan and Haig were in Rome for meetings with Italian Prime Minister Spadolini and Pope John Paul II, before flying to London. They remained in the United Kingdom until June 9, where Reagan met with the Royal family at Windsor Castle and addressed Parliament. No memorandum of conversation of Reagan's meeting with Thatcher has been found, and the President's Daily Diary does not record individual meetings during the entirety of Reagan's European trip. In his diary, Henderson recorded that Reagan, Thatcher, Haig, and Pym took part in a private breakfast meeting at Number 10 Downing Street, June 9, before being joined by British officials and the remainder of the U.S. delegation for a plenary meeting. At the plenary, Henderson recorded, there was "little discussion about the Falkland Islands, which I presume must have been discussed at the restricted breakfast." (Henderson, *Mandarin*, p. 473) In remarks to the press after the June 9 breakfast meeting, Thatcher's only mention of the Falklands was to thank "our American friends" for the U.S. "staunch" support. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 753)

## II. ISSUES

### 1. *Falklands*

Mrs. Thatcher appreciates both our strong support in the crisis, and our earlier mediating efforts. She will welcome your reconfirmation of support.

- WE HAVE MADE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE UK CLEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WHERE OUR STARTING POINT IS THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.

- A DIFFERENT STANCE ON THE MERITS OF THE RECENT CONTROVERSIAL UN RESOLUTION DOES NOT DIMINISH OUR SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN.<sup>2</sup>

- WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR A MILITARY PAUSE—THIS IS A JUDGMENT FOR THE UK. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED PUBLICLY THAT THE OPTION OF HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL IS OPEN FOR ARGENTINA.

[Omitted here are sections on Lebanon, the Middle East Peace Process, US/UK Economic Relations and the Versailles Summit, East/West Issues, the State of the NATO Alliance, Arms Control, US/UK Military Cooperation, Northern Ireland, and Africa.]

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 323.

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## 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 8, 1982, 2245Z

157414. Subject: Message to LTG Galtieri.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Request you deliver following message from U.S. Army Chief of Staff to Commander of Argentine Army, LTG Galtieri.

Begin text: Dear Leo: Despite the current differences between our countries, we cannot forget that our two nations have a common future.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Specat; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center.

I believe deeply that we must look ahead toward a situation that will bring about the restoration of the good relationships which previously existed. I hope the present difficulties will soon be behind us so that we can again cooperate and resume our constructive associations of the past. Warm regards. Signed Shy, E.C. Meyer, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff. End text.

3. Suggest, if you concur, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] make delivery personally pointing out that message was transmitted to Ambassador by General Meyer to be passed to LTG Galtieri.

**Stoessel**

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**328. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

UK Request for Vulcan/Phalanx Systems (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

Yesterday we received a formal request from the UK for six single-gun Vulcan Phalanx Systems. The Vulcan/Phalanx is a radar guided 20 mm gatling gun system for last ditch, close-in protection of ships against incoming missiles and aircraft. The British currently lack adequate close-in support. This shortcoming, coupled with the lack of long-range defenses, has resulted in British losses of two destroyers (including the Sheffield), several frigates and the transport ship Atlantic Conveyor to Argentine attacks in the Falklands theater.

On 14 May we provided a two gun Vulcan/Phalanx system to the British at a price of \$9.3M.<sup>2</sup> The UK will mount this system on the HMS Illustrious, one of their Harrier capable cruisers. The sale of any of the six additional systems would require Congressional notification under Section 36B of the Arms Export Control Act. Under this Section, we are required to notify the Vice President (President of the Senate), the Speaker of the House, and the Armed Forces Appropriations and Foreign Relations / Affairs Committees of both houses of Congress. This

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Weinberger informed Nott of his support for the sale of the system to the United Kingdom during their May 6 meeting. See Document 233.

can be done on a classified basis, but we cannot be certain the request will not soon leak to the media.

Section 36B notification would entail a 15 day delay while awaiting Congressional approval. Thus far, the Congress has not pressed us for details concerning our materiel support for UK operations, keeping partisan politics out of the support process. Processing a request that falls within the provisions of Section 36B might well open a floodgate of interest.

On the other hand, Congressional action under Section 36B confirms our willingness to work within the Congressionally imposed restrictions. Furthermore, Vulcan/Phalanx is strictly a defensive system, and thus less likely to evoke an emotional response from potential critics of our policy. As a result of these conflicting factors, I recommend that we approve the request for the Vulcan/Phalanx systems but begin immediately to work with friendly Congressional leaders to ensure the information regarding the sale does not become public.<sup>3</sup>

Fred C. Ikle<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Weinberger initialed his approval on June 9 and added the following notation: "Why do we have to notify Congress? Could we not sell them the 6 guns, one at a time?" The notation was also transcribed in an attached June 10 note from Cormack to Iklé. According to a June 16 correspondence report, Weinberger's questions were "taken care of w/ phone call from Dr. Iklé to SECDEF." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982)

<sup>4</sup> Zakheim signed for Iklé above his typed signature.

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### 329. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>

London, June 9, 1982

#### *TEXT OF MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY DATED 9 JUNE 1982*

Begins.

I am very concerned to ensure that, once Argentine forces have been obliged to leave the Falklands, all military action by Argentina

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falklands Files of Luigi Einaudi, Lot 90D400, Falklands Crisis Consequences. UK Confidential; Exdis. The British Embassy sent the text of the message to Stoessel under a covering note from Thomas, June 9. An unknown hand crossed out the number "8" in the date and wrote in the number "9," the date the message was received in the Department.

against us in the South Atlantic should come to a complete stop. We want the next period to be one of rehabilitation and reconstruction and not one of continuing bitterness and hostility. I would hope that this would also be the Argentine mood, and presumably they will be concerned for the return of their prisoners of war.

I have greatly appreciated the support you have given us with measures against Argentina in the economic field, including arms supplies. Economic measures are having a substantial and cumulative effect. No arms supplies have reached Argentina from major western suppliers. Argentina has been denied up to 25 per cent of her export markets and has been unable to compensate by increased sales to the Soviet Union. She has received no new bank lending since the invasion and government supported export credit has been widely withheld. All this has shown Argentina the economic penalties of her aggression.

Naturally, we would all like to give up these measures as soon as it makes sense to do so. However, we do not want a situation where we have regained the Falkland Islands but Argentina refuses to give up fighting against us. There may be a need to maintain economic measures until Argentina agrees to cease all hostilities in the South Atlantic. The embargo on arms supplies might remain rather longer, so that we can be sure that Argentina has finally abandoned her aggressive intentions.

You will recall that we discussed this subject at Versailles.<sup>2</sup> This message is intended to take our consideration a stage further, bringing in all countries who have adopted economic measures against Argentina. We expect to discuss this with our Community partners on 14 June and would be glad of your views by then. If our joint consideration results in agreement that there should be a link between the cessation of all hostilities and the lifting of economic measures, we could discuss ways of bringing this to the notice of the Argentines, so that they can draw the consequences. In parallel, the Argentines could also be told that the ending of hostilities will ensure the early return of their prisoners taken in the Falklands. This could exert a strong pressure on them to abandon their aggression and restore peaceful relations.

I look forward to hearing your views.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, until we have had our consultations I hope we could all be careful not to prejudice their outcome and in particular avoid saying anything in public which could lead to an appearance of disunity among us or send the wrong signals to Argentina.

Ends.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 322.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably at the June 9 U.S.–U.K. meeting. See Document 326.



**330. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Seitz) to Acting Secretary of State Stoessel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 9, 1982

SUBJECT

Public Supports “Siding” with Britain Over Falklands, But Opposes U.S. Military Involvement

SUMMARY

The first available poll taken since the start of British-Argentine hostilities and the announcement of U.S. sanctions against Argentina shows: (1) A large majority of the public credits the U.S. with having done “all it could” to prevent the British-Argentine war (by 64% to 22%); (2) a smaller majority approves the U.S. “taking sides with Great Britain” rather than Argentina once hostilities had begun (by 53% to 35%), but the question underestimates the strength of neutrality sentiment; and (3) the public overwhelmingly opposes sending American forces to “help fight with the British against Argentina” (only 6% were in favor). *END SUMMARY*

NBC asked respondents these four questions on May 10–11—after the British capture of South Georgia, but before the invasion of the Falklands:

(1) “Do you think the United States has done all it could to prevent war between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands?”

Yes	64%
No	22
Not sure	<u>14</u>
	100%

(2) “Do you approve or disapprove of the United States taking sides with Great Britain and against Argentina in the Falklands dispute?”

Approve	53%
Disapprove	35
Not sure	<u>12</u>
	100%

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820082–1867. No classification marking. Drafted by A. Richman (PA/OAP) on June 8. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Stoessel saw it on June 11.

(3) (Asked of the 35% who answered “Disapprove” on Q. 2):

“Do you think the United States should have remained neutral or should the United States have taken sides with Argentina against Great Britain?”

Remained neutral	33%
Sided with Argentina	1
Not sure	<u>1</u>
	35%

(4) (Asked of the 53% who answered “Approve” on Q. 2):

“Do you think the United States should send American troops to help fight with the British against Argentina?”

Don’t send troops	45%
Send troops	6
Not sure	<u>2</u>
	53%

Polls taken before the start of hostilities also showed hardly any Americans want the U.S. to side with Argentina in the Falklands dispute. When the neutrality option was explicitly provided, however, a large majority favored U.S. neutrality instead of siding with Britain. A Harris poll, conducted in mid-April, asked:

“If war were to break out between Argentina and Great Britain—and assuming that the U.S. would not actually fight in that war—do you think the U.S. government should help Argentina, should help Britain, or should remain strictly neutral?”

Remain neutral	83%
Help Britain	12
Help Argentina	1
Not sure	4

**331. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Bonn<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 10, 1982, 0203Z

Tosec 80380/159041. Eyes Only for Richard Burt from Blackwill.  
Subject: Falklands Strategies.

1. Entire text Secret.

2. The following paper is for your reflection on your way back,<sup>2</sup> and before a meeting with the Secretary (whenever it takes place). It does not take into account any conversations you may have had on the other side of the water.

3. It seems likely that Prime Minister Thatcher will refuse meaningful negotiations with the Argentines after she has cleared them off the Falklands, that her goal will be to improve the Islands' economy and increase immigration. She may reaffirm Kelper right to self-determination, and keep open the possibility of independence.

4. If the Prime Minister no longer seeks a negotiated settlement, we must decide whether to continue to support negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 502, or to embrace the principle of self-determination for the Falklands. Nearly as important as the policy we adopt will be the degree we choose to be diplomatically involved in this next stage of the crisis.

5. From these perspectives we see four possible US diplomatic strategies in the near-term. (In all cases we would return materiel aid to the UK to normal, pre-crisis levels.)

6. Vigorously support self-determination: (All our money on the special relationship).

—At the UN we would aggressively support the UK position, vetoing as necessary resolutions calling for negotiations.

—We would contribute to a UK-sponsored peace-keeping force in the Falklands.

7. Support self-determination, but with a low diplomatic profile: (Trying to have it both ways).

—We would minimize public comment.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820302–0048. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Blackwill; cleared by Bremer and in S/S–O. Haig was then in Bonn, accompanying Reagan for talks with West German officials and to attend the North Atlantic Council Summit.

<sup>2</sup> Following stops in Bonn (June 9–11) and West Berlin (June 11), the U.S. delegation traveling with Reagan returned to Washington on June 11.

—At the UN we would abstain on resolutions calling for UK/Argentine negotiations.

—No US contribution to the peace-keeping force.

8. Vigorous support for negotiations: (Assumes we can persuade the Prime Minister to be flexible).

—We would actively and publicly argue that Western—and US—interests require the UK to talk to the Argentines about the future status of the Falklands, and that applying the principle of self-determination to 1800 people is impractical.

—At the UN and the OAS we would support resolutions calling for negotiations.

—We would maintain intense dialogue on the problem with Argentines, British, UN, Brazilians, other Latins, etc.

—We would support Perez de Cuellar's negotiating initiatives and keep actively open the possibility of another US negotiating effort.

—We would repeat our willingness to contribute to a peacekeeping force.

9. Advocate negotiations, but keep a low diplomatic profile: (Assumes no movement on Thatcher's part).

—So far as events allow, we would reduce our diplomatic involvement and minimize our public comments on Falklands developments. But when asked we would reaffirm our support for 502.

—At the UN, we would vote for resolutions consistent with 502 and abstain on ambiguous texts like 506.<sup>3</sup>

—We would gradually allow our bilateral conversations on the problem to peter out.

#### Conclusions

10. Given geographic and demographic realities, self-determination with eventual independence for the Falklands is not a viable alternative. We should make clear to the Prime Minister we could not support her if she chooses it.

11. An eventual resolution of the South Atlantic crisis will require negotiations, and we therefore believe that our policy should continue to be based on UNSC 502. Our emphasis on UNSC 502 underscores an important principle—the unacceptability of force. This approach also probably enjoys more public and congressional support in the US than any other. It commands the respect of the other European allies. Its costs in terms of our bilateral relations with the UK—while real—would perhaps be manageable. The US position would essentially be

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<sup>3</sup> An erroneous reference to UN Security Council Resolution 505. See Document 301.

the same as the rest of the UK's NATO allies and EC partners, as well as that of the opposition parties in the House of Commons. Indeed, sections of her own Conservative Party are sympathetic to this stance. Under these circumstances, while the Prime Minister's personal relations with the President might cool, she could not risk a break with us.

12. The degree of our diplomatic involvement will inevitably be affected by the levels of violence following British reoccupation of the Falklands. A high-profile US diplomatic stance is heavy with risk of failure. At least in the short-term, it is unlikely that we can convince the Prime Minister to accept a negotiated settlement. Hence we should seek to keep our diplomatic profile low whatever substantive position we choose. If the Argentines actively pursue the war, we face the risk of escalation of the conflict, perhaps to the Argentine mainland, and still wider damage to our position in the Hemisphere. Under these circumstances active US diplomatic effort to persuade the British to negotiate—despite the costs to our bilateral relationship—may be required.

**Stoessel**

### 332. Transcript of a Telephone Conference of the Special Situation Group<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 11, 1982, 9:35–9:47 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of events relating to the crisis in Lebanon.]

Kirkpatrick: De Cuellar informed me yesterday. He's been in touch with Pope. New initiative on Argentina.<sup>2</sup>

VP: Anything new on Falklands.

Jones: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] 22–26 A–4 Skyhawks have been delivered to Argentina from Israel.

Cap: May want to ask Israelis.

Casey: Have [unconfirmed?] reports of EXOCET from Libya to Argentina.

Stoessel: Will follow up on Israel.

[Omitted here is discussion of events relating to the crisis in Lebanon.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Philip A. Dur Files, [Crisis Pre-Planning Group/Special Situation Group] CPPG/SSG: Lebanon—06/11/1982–06/13/1982 (2). No classification marking. Bush, Stoessel, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Casey, and McFarlane participated in the telephone conference. Poindexter prepared the handwritten transcript.

<sup>2</sup> Pope John Paul II paid an official visit to Argentina June 11–12, where he met with "leading Argentine political figures, top-ranking Argentine churchmen, the presidents of the bishops conferences of Latin American nations, and cardinals and archbishops from some neighboring countries." The Pope "said that the Church must speak out against 'hatred and discord, which constantly shatter unity and peace.'" (Telegram 162990 to all diplomatic and consular posts, June 12; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820308–0564) In telegram 12533 from Rome, May 26, the Embassy confirmed that the "sole purpose" of the Pope's visit was to "balance out" his scheduled visit to the United Kingdom, which began the same day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820274–0312) Earlier, the Pope had called for a South Atlantic ceasefire, which was rejected by the British on May 24. (Telegram 142578 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 25; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820271–0728) He also sent letters regarding the situation to Queen Elizabeth II and to Reagan on April 17. (Telegrams 9408 and 9409 from Rome, April 19; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820203–0926 and D820203–0934)

**333. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations (Clarey)<sup>1</sup>**

Ser 00/MFR-092

Washington, June 11, 1982

SUBJ

CNO Meeting with Argentine Officials on Friday, 11 June 1982

1. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward met with Argentine Ambassador Esteban A. Takacs, Air Attache BGEN Pena, and the DATT/Naval Attache VADM Franco at 0930 on Friday, 11 June 1982.<sup>2</sup> The meeting had been suggested by former Secretary of the Navy Hidalgo and was encouraged by ASSTSECSTATE Enders during discussions with Admiral Hayward Thursday evening, 10 June 1982.<sup>3</sup>

2. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward explained that historically military relations between the U.S. and Argentina have been maintained despite the periodic ups and downs of our political relationships. He, like the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has a great interest in ensuring that these communications channels continued to function, especially during crisis situations when relations are strained, and that our long-term relationships, after the Falklands situation was resolved, were very important to both countries. He welcomed the opportunity for this meeting in order to gain a better perspective on the Argentine views of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis.

3. (S/NF) Ambassador Takacs noted that he and ASSTSECSTATE Enders had discussed opportunities for such an exchange of views and he was pleased to meet with the CNO. As recently as ten days ago he had been optimistic about the possibilities for a negotiated settlement. However, over the past few days, he saw the Argentine and British positions diverging, and he was particularly concerned at the current lack of diplomatic activity.

4. (S/NF) The Ambassador stated that the British were misrepresenting the military situation in the Malvinas and were predicting a quick military victory. This misrepresentation had removed the pres-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret; Noform. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 14. Copies were sent to Jones, Carlucci, Enders, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. A notation in an unknown hand reads “Hand carried.”

<sup>2</sup> Takacs, Peña, and Franco also had a similar discussion regarding the military situation in the South Atlantic with Burkhalter on June 11. The record of this conversation, produced by Burkhalter, is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

sure for continued negotiations. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have an appreciation for the true military situation in the Malvinas and hoped that the United States would do all in its power to help force a diplomatic resolution. The Argentine position is that the conflict cannot be resolved on military terms and the political consequences of a long-term conflict would be very damaging for all three countries. The Argentines hope that negotiations can resume very quickly in order to end a war that has caused many casualties and is more “stupid than either country ever could have envisioned.”

5. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward asked if the U.S. should resume the role of mediator or would a third party or the United Nations be a better vehicle to encourage continued negotiations. Ambassador Takacs replied that without strong U.S. encouragement, the U.N. was impotent in this situation. Perez de Cuellar had no leverage with either Argentina or the U.K. and thus was ineffective. The U.S. alone has that leverage. Ideally, the U.S. would disassociate itself politically from the U.K. in terms of supporting a continued military conflict. Many European countries were currently doing this. Without political support, the U.K. could not continue its military operations and would be forced to negotiate.

6. (S/NF) BGEN Pena presented the Argentine military's view of U.K. military casualties and Argentine air operations to date. He reviewed ship and aircraft losses during the major engagements on 1 May, 24–25 May, and 8 June. He reported that 442 Argentine Air Force sorties had been flown through the 6th of June, 225 of which were anti-shipping missions, 85 of which were air-to-ground missions. British losses during these engagements were much more severe than had been reported,<sup>4</sup> particularly during the 8 June engagement. Concerning the loss of Argentine aircraft, he indicated that approximately 25% of their Air Force had been destroyed, not the 60% reported by the British. Many of their pilots had been rescued, and their Air Force would be able to continue its operations in equipment being obtained from other countries. He opined that the overstated air losses were part of the British efforts to create the impression that a military victory was near at hand. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have a different perspective so that he would understand that such a victory was not imminent and that the Argentines were both prepared to fight and could fight for a long period of time. He pointed out that the British already were being pushed back from the Port Stanley area and that

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<sup>4</sup> In the conversation with Burkhalter, Peña specified that the Argentine Air Force had “sunk six British destroyers; six frigates; and damaged several other ships, including both the HERMES and INVINCIBLE,” the two British aircraft carriers. (See footnote 2 above.)



the Argentines had retaken Mount Kent. Thirty C–130 resupply missions had been flown into Port Stanley last week.

7. (U) Admiral Hayward commented that throughout all of his studies of military conflicts, including World War II and his own experiences in Korea and Vietnam, that damage reports were always overstated by both sides. He said it was important for both Argentina and the U.K. to avoid a miscalculation based on self-serving over-optimistic estimates of damage.

8. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador Takacs commented that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to present the Argentine views on the conflict and stressed the importance of U.S. assistance in the resumption of negotiations. Admiral Hayward indicated that he would relate the Argentine concerns over the misrepresentation of the military situation in the Falklands, their desire that negotiations be revitalized as quickly as possible, and that the U.S. was being asked to play a key role in this effort.

**S.S. Clarey**

*Captain, U.S. Navy*

*Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations*

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### **334. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1982

#### **SUBJECT**

UK Inquiry on KC–10 Aircraft (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

On 27 May the Joint Staff received an informal inquiry on the potential purchase, lease or hire of KC–10 aircraft from the U.S.<sup>2</sup> The attached JCS package, based on the recommendations, conveys the view that the U.S. should discourage a formal U.K. request.<sup>3</sup> This view

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 14.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a May 27 note for the record signed by Dick regarding the U.K. MOD's preliminary inquiry into the "purchase, lease, or hire" of KC–10 aircraft.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed, the JCS package consists of an undated memorandum from the JCS to Iklé and a point paper on the impact of KC–10 lease or purchase.

is based on the concern that a sale would significantly degrade our capability to support contingencies directly involving the U.S. Furthermore, meeting the request in any form would be a highly visible sign of U.S. support for British operations. From a policy viewpoint, the Air Force is concerned that the British could not operate the refueling system without first receiving appropriate training. Thus, at least initially, U.S. aircrews may be needed to provide instruction to the British on the operation of the system.

Support of the KC-10 itself would probably require either direct U.S. involvement or the use of civilian contractors. The sale of KC-10s would require Congressional notification under Section 36B of the Arms Export Control Act and could prompt Congressional concern as to why Service recommendations were overruled. A lease is more palatable to the Services and it would not require Congressional notification.

The argument against sale of the KC-10s is cogent, but the case against a lease is weaker. The possibility of a direct U.S. role in the aircraft's operations should be avoided, however, in order to be consistent with the President's directive.<sup>4</sup> The addition of KC-10s to the support force would greatly increase British ability to deploy rapidly aircraft and equipment to the Falklands. Since we are not being asked to provide the aircraft at this time, our response should be that a number of important details, in particular the question of avoiding U.S. involvement in either the aircraft's support or operations, would need to be worked out if a formal request was received.

The British request was recently changed to the purchase of two aircraft. Thus, I would further recommend that we inform the British that, while a purchase does not appear feasible in light of U.S. operational requirements, we would be willing to discuss the possible lease of two KC-10s for a period not exceeding 90 days. A lease in excess of 90 days would adversely impact plans that incorporate KC-10 support.<sup>5</sup>

Fred C. Ikle

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 263.

<sup>5</sup> Weinberger highlighted the paragraph with a vertical line drawn in the right-hand margin. Next to this, he wrote: "*agree*." At the bottom of the page, he initialed his approval of the option "Approve Positive Reply on Availability for Lease."

**335. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, June 11, 1982, 2127Z

1633. Dept. for Deputy Secy. Stoessel, Asst. Secy. Enders, NSC for Director Clark, CIA for Casey. Subject: Amb. Kirkpatrick's Meeting with Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. At his request, Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano. (FYI: Perm Rep Roca is in Buenos Aires recuperating from an illness. Amb. Listre indicated that for health reasons, Amb. Roca will not be returning to New York. Amb. Listre is here for 90 days but he intimated that he might stay through the GA. End FYI.)

3. Amb. Listre said that he was exceedingly pessimistic about the situation in the Falkland Islands. He was convinced that the British had decided to press on and were seeking a military victory or an unconditional Argentine surrender. He itemized the consequences of such an action, including enormous bloodshed, potential political upheaval in Argentina, possible realignment of Argentine foreign policy and prolongation of the war. He asked Amb. Kirkpatrick whether she saw any possible non-military solution to the conflict.

4. Amb. Kirkpatrick said that it was not very likely that the British would stop before taking Port Stanley. If there was any possibility, and it had to be regarded as a very remote possibility, it would be for Argentina to make very clear: a) that it wanted peace; b) that it was willing to withdraw its troops; c) that it was willing to take the initiative in withdrawing its troops; and d) that it would be willing to accept an international (not necessarily UN) administration of the Island. In her opinion, however, Argentina should have taken previous British offers and it was now too late for hoping for a non-military solution to the conflict. Amb. Listre said that he agreed with Amb. Kirkpatrick that this was the only remaining alternative. He also concurred with her assessment that it was not likely to have the expected outcome but that he would, nevertheless, transmit it to Buenos Aires.

**Kirkpatrick**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, [Argentina-Falkland Islands] (05/02/1982–06/14/1982). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Poindexter wrote: "Judge—P." Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

**336. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

ALA-M-82-10077

Washington, June 11, 1982

*The Falklands Dispute:  
Implications for US Relations With Latin America*

*Summary*

*The final outcome of the Falklands crisis will determine the extent and duration of related damages to US ties with Latin America. The broadest and most lasting impact would be caused by heavy Argentine casualties or Argentine humiliation. [portion marking not declassified]*

*Even if the crisis were to be resolved under conditions well short of that worst case, the US decision to support the United Kingdom—and especially Washington's imposition of sanctions on Argentina—will leave the US position in Latin America somewhat impaired. Relations with several countries probably will be cool for a few years. Over time, losses can be partially, even substantially redressed. Much will depend on the efficacy of US damage-limiting measures—and, again, on the severity of the outcome on Argentina. [portion marking not declassified]*

*The principal abiding consequence of the crisis in both bilateral and regional terms will be to reinforce factors that have progressively reduced the once great US influence in the region. The extent of deepening of that gradual but persistent effect will vary from country to country and from sub-region to sub-region. It will be more pronounced in South America than in the Caribbean Basin, where the net effect on US interests will be minor. [portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the intelligence memorandum.]

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T01067R: Production Case Files ('81-'82), Box 1, ALA M Projects 82-10068 through 82-10081. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was requested by Inman. The memorandum was prepared by the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis of the Directorate of Intelligence, based upon information available through May 31. The memorandum was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the National Intelligence Council, and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.

**337. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 12, 1982

SUBJECT

The Other War: Growing Political-Military Problems for the United Kingdom

*Summary*

Even before their losses at Fitzroy Bay,<sup>2</sup> the British were facing military problems in their Falklands operations. Recent evidence suggests that those problems will continue. Nonetheless, there is no public sign that these difficulties are being translated by London into increased diplomatic flexibility on the long-term status of the Falklands.

*The Military Damage to Date*

Precise cost estimates of what the British are spending on the Falklands are not yet available, probably even to HMG, because orders are being placed for procurement as required, with *bills following later*. British press speculation places the cost to date *in excess of \$3 billion*.

The greatest financial cost will be for the repair and replacement of surface combatants. The British have not shared with us the extent of damage to ships that remain operational, but we have seen repeated reports of ships being hit by Argentine attacks. We have reports of four destroyers, two frigates, and two Logistic Landing Ships being damaged. Some have already been forced to leave the area of operations for repair.

A list of RN ships lost to date, in addition to the commercial Atlantic Conveyor, is attached. As a result of these losses, the RN will probably keep in service many of the older ships that were scheduled to be "paid off." We also can anticipate a major HMG review to decide how to replace rapidly the ships which have been lost. Some in London probably will take the opportunity to suggest the crisis proves a need

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 8–16 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Clarke and Beers on June 11; cleared by Kanter and Williams (INR) and in substance by Blackwill.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the June 8 Argentine air attack on the British Logistic Landing Ships RFA *Sir Galahad* and RFA *Sir Tristram* during British amphibious operations near the settlements of Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. For a detailed account of the attack from the British perspective, see Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 604–609.

for more conventional naval power. Increased pressure on the Trident program seems inevitable.

### *Continuing War of Attrition*

The Argentines, of course, have suffered substantial losses and continue to confront serious military problems. Less well appreciated, however, are the difficulties which the British are experiencing and which may increase in the future.

In our earlier memo to you we predicted that the Argentines probably would continue the war—and damage to UK forces—even after they had lost Stanley, and would require the British to maintain a large presence on the islands (possibly including US-provided air defense equipment).<sup>3</sup> Recent events have given further credence to that analysis:

- While the UK decision to attempt a landing without air cover is uncharacteristic and difficult to understand, sinkings at Fitzroy demonstrated the need for earlier alerting of air raids (such as could be provided by airborne early warning or a network of mountain top radars). They also showed the need for longer range SAMs, such as I-Hawk.

- Those few RN ships which have modern and effective air defense have been badly attrited by the Argentine Air Force. Major ships have been sunk, others damaged, and the supply of surface-to-air missiles greatly reduced.

- Argentine efforts to acquire additional aircraft and missiles are beginning to meet with success.

- Slow British advance during the last ten days underscores their logistical problems and may reflect an awareness of their “thin edge.” Recent low levels of Harrier sorties also may indicate damage to the INVINCIBLE, which, in any case, is now standing off the Falklands an additional 50–75 miles.

- Attack on the tanker 400 miles north of the Falklands may be the beginning of Argentine raids against the British SLOC.

- Public statements and private discussions have indicated that the Argentines are planning a continuing war after Stanley. There is also evidence that they are considering a 2000 man reinforcement of the West Falklands.

### *HMG Consideration of the Military Problem*

Although we continue to receive British requests for assistance, they have not yet formally sought additional air defense equipment. Recent intelligence indicates, however, that they are beginning to look

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 318.

at the long-term garrison requirements (including a naval task force, land-based F-4s, a brigade, and other forces).

Despite these demanding military requirements (and without knowing the results of your discussions with Pym and Thatcher), we can see little indication that HMG is showing any sign of diplomatic flexibility. Indeed, sentiment within Commons and the Cabinet seems to be hardening around a prolonged period of UK control in one guise or another.

If our assessment of the military situation is correct and the long term political, military, and economic consequences gradually dawn on the British, their willingness to reach an accommodation and end of hostilities may increase. The possibility of more dramatic actions (e.g., attacks against the Argentine mainland, refusing to repatriate Argentine prisoners), however, cannot be ruled out.

The British probably are hoping that the growing pressure on the GOA resulting from political disarray, economic crisis, and declining military morale will cause the Argentines to yield on the Falklands issue soon after Port Stanley falls. As our analysis indicates, however, the British also will face increasing political, economic, and military costs. The relative ability of the two protagonists to sustain a prolonged, low level war of attrition is likely to be a primary factor which determines the evolution of the Falklands crisis and the environment for US diplomacy following the battle for Port Stanley.

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

*Cost of RN Ships Lost to Date*

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Replacement Cost (\$ 82)</u>
Sheffield	Destroyer	1975	\$202 M
Coventry	Destroyer	1978	\$202 M
Antelope	Frigate	1975	\$ 86 M
Ardent	Frigate	1977	\$ 86 M
Sir Galahad	Logistic Landing Ship	1966	?

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<sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

**338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1982, 0023Z

163586. Subject: Letter to President Reagan from President Figueiredo.

1. (Secret–Entire text).

2. Following is informal translation of President Figueiredo's June 12 letter, delivered to the Department June 13:

His Excellency

Ronald Reagan,

President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

As you know, since the beginning of the Malvinas crisis I have vehemently insisted before the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Argentina upon the prevention of a solution by force to that conflict. I have also exchanged messages with you in an effort to help find a means of negotiation. At this moment, more than ever, it is necessary to review that urgent effort so that a cease-fire be reached and a purely military solution be avoided. In this context, I wish to encourage you to resume urgently and vigorously the efforts aiming at a cease-fire, putting an end to the escalation of violence, and ensuring a peaceful solution to that bloody conflict, in light of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

It is my strong belief that, if conditions leading to a process of negotiation are not created to prevent the evolution and the uncontrolled continuation of the conflict, the risks for those in our region and in the entire Western world will be intolerable.

Sincerely,

Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo

President of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

**Haig**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 06/15/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Kilday; cleared by O'Connell and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Enders. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850363–0055)



**339. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, June 14, 1982, 1430Z

3543. CINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT for POLAD, Rome for Vatican. Subject: South Atlantic Crisis: Sitrep as of 1100 Local June 14.

1. Summary (U): The battle for Port Stanley rages on, but we sense that Argentines now recognize it is probably just a question of time before they are defeated, although they say it will be a Pyrrhic victory for the UK. Neutral zone for civilians established. Pope's visit still reverberating.<sup>2</sup> Galtieri probably benefited and John Paul's message of peace apparently fell mostly on deaf ears.

The War

1. Today's dailies reflect a mixture of concern about the British offensive and pride at Argentine resistance. According to the GOA, the British during the last three days advanced 3.5 kilometers (UK claims 8) and the front has stabilized after fierce fighting. Artillery duels continue. The British have evidently opted for consolidating their position after each small advance. The British reportedly secured a new beachhead at "Enriqueta", 5 kilometers south of Stanley. Meanwhile, the GOA alleges intense bombardment of English positions by the Argentine Air Force. Everyone is waiting for the next British assault. The general expectation is that the UK will eventually prevail. Many senior GOA officials have publicly conceded the possibility of losing Stanley, but they want it to cost the British dearly.

Protection of Civilians

2. The Argentine Government agreed to establish a neutral zone of two square blocks in Port Stanley at the water's edge, to protect civilians and wounded. This was a result of ICRC representation that commenced June 11.

Pope's Visit

4. (U) The visit of John Paul II continues to reverberate. It was considered a major success by most commentators. Apart from unprecedented crowds (estimated by police at over 4 million in the two days) most events were carried out without significant problems, a credit to the organizers, particularly church authorities and Interior Subsecretary Col. Bernardo Menendez.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820309–0989. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to South Atlantic Sitrep Collective and for information to USCINCSO, USCINCLANT, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 332.

5. (U) The Pope's frequent statements urging a peaceful solution to the South Atlantic conflict were more direct than many predicted and were echoed by some in the crowd who chanted "we want peace." The regular columnist on religion for Clarin, Jose Ignacio Lopez, noted that the Pope did not mince his words. Quoting extensively from the Pope's homilies and public statements, Lopez points out that the Pope brushed aside all rationalizations for violence or war and called for peace without qualifications.

6. (C) But this was ignored by most of the press, which devoted scores of pages to John Paul II's comings and goings but none to reflection on what he said. Similarly, many spectators, particularly the young, treated the affair as a "happening". On the other hand, His Holiness' message was crystal clear, we have no doubt that the Junta understood it.

7. (C) Galtieri was the consummate politician. He received John Paul II on arrival, met with him twice, received communion and was seen by millions of TV viewers receiving the Pope's blessing on departure. There is little doubt that the visit paid political dividends to the President.

#### The Roller Coaster Mood

8. (C) The visit of John Paul II was undoubtedly the most popular and gratifying event for this country since winning the world soccer cup in 1978. But only two days later, the Argentines were blue again. Their highly-touted football team lost to longtime cellar-dweller Belgium in the World Cup. And now it is evident to all that they are losing what many Argentines see as the biggest prize of them all, in the Falklands.

**Shlaudeman**

**340. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts and the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 14, 1982, 2327Z

163554. Manila please pass to Deputy Secretary Stoessel/Todep 30009. Subject: South Atlantic Crisis: Situation Report as of 0800, June 14, 1982 No. 88.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. Cease-fire around Stanley. British Prime Minister Thatcher and the Argentine military high command have confirmed that an effective cease-fire went into effect around Port Stanley the afternoon of June 14.<sup>2</sup> Thatcher told the House of Commons that the Argentine commander on the Islands is discussing the surrender of Argentine troops on East and West Falklands with the deputy British commander; the Argentines are flying white flags over Stanley; and British troops have orders not to shoot except in self-defense. The Argentine high command issued a communique indicating that after exchanges between the British and Argentine military commanders on the Islands a *de facto* ceasefire, “not formally agreed”, went into effect in the Stanley area.

3. British losses. The MOD announced June 13 that British losses from Argentina’s June 8 attack at Fitzroy Bay<sup>3</sup> totaled about 100 men killed or wounded. Another nine were lost in a weekend attack on a British destroyer.<sup>4</sup>

4. Argentine prisoners: the British turned over to the ICRC in Montevideo about 1,000 Argentine prisoners captured in the Falklands in the May 28/29 battle for Goose Green and Darwin.<sup>5</sup> In a night attack

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850363–0048. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to European POLADs Collective, USSOUTHCOM, the Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, and USCINCLANT.

<sup>2</sup> A Significant Event Report produced by the NMCC on June 14, added that the ceasefire was put into effect until 1300Z, June 15, “while the Argentine commander goes to Buenos Aires to confer with the Junta on the terms of the surrender of Argentine forces on both East and West Falkland Islands.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 337.

<sup>4</sup> The British destroyer HMS *Glamorgan* was damaged by an Argentine land-based Exocet missile while providing fire support to the British advance on Port Stanley, June 11, ultimately killing 13 and injuring 15 British personnel. (Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 616–617)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 302.

June 12 British troops, advancing five miles to the outskirts of Stanley, reportedly captured several hundred more Argentine soldiers.<sup>6</sup>

5. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

Haig

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed account of the battles around Port Stanley from the British perspective, see Freedman, *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 611–644.

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**341. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 14, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for AIM-9M Seeker Heads (TS)

On Jun 9 the UK requested two AIM-9M SIDEWINDER seeker heads for trial installation.<sup>2</sup> If the trial is successful, an order for 20 seekers is expected.

The Navy and JCS recommend that the request be denied (see attached)<sup>3</sup> for the following reasons:

a. The AIM-9M will not reach its IOC until Oct 82. Only prototype seekers are on hand, and these are required for the test program. The possible follow-on buy of 20 seeker heads cannot be met because of the low level of initial production.

b. There is a high risk of compromise of the seeker technology.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of the June 9 request delivered by the British Embassy.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is the June 10 action memorandum upon which both Hayward and Small initialed their disapproval of the British request.

<sup>4</sup> At the end of this sentence, Weinberger wrote: "We must make every effort to keep secure. I think the UK will agree to our terms on this."

c. The added operational capability that the AIM-9M yields over the AIM-9L currently provided by the US to the UK is not required in the Falkland conflict.

d. Release of the AIM-9M seeker could lead to the European Consortium demanding authorization to build the AIM-9M. This has not been approved by the Foreign Disclosure Review Board and is opposed by the Navy.

The British requirement for the AIM-9M is indeed questionable in light of the military situation in the Falklands. Furthermore, the risk of technology compromise is of great concern: one need only consider the example of the SHRIKE missile in Brazil.<sup>5</sup> Providing the AIM-9M seeker heads at this time will slow their introduction into the NATO theater where their unique capability is required. As a result of these considerations, I recommend we inform the British that the AIM-9M seeker heads not be provided for the foreseeable future.<sup>6</sup>

**Fred C. Ikle<sup>7</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 321 and footnote 3 thereto.

<sup>6</sup> Weinberger approved the release of the AIM-9M on June 17 and added the following notation: "OK [unclear] reaction + query again if they need it now."

<sup>7</sup> Iklé signed "Fred" above his typed signature.

**342. Report Prepared in the National Military Command Center<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1982

SUBJECT

Argentina Forces Throughout Falklands Surrender as of: 150430 Jun 82

(U) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's office issued the following statement from BGEN. J. Moore, commander of British land forces. "In Port Stanley at 2100 hours 14 June, MGEN. Menendez surrendered to me all Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their arms and equipment and to mark and make safe their munitions".<sup>2</sup>

**M.F. Tidwell**

*Brigadier General, USAF*

*Deputy Director for Operations NMCC*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218–92–0030, 820 Argentina 22 Oct 80 to 8 Jul 82. Unclassified. The report's sources are noted as Dow Jones and UPI.

<sup>2</sup> The report transposes the ranks of the two referenced generals. Moore was, in fact, a Major General; Menendez was a Brigadier General. Jones wrote the following at the end of the report: "I would like to have a confidential msg to Adm Lewin sometime today."

## Postwar, June 15, 1982–November 6, 1984

### 343. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

London, June 15, 1982, 1314Z

13122. Subj: Falklands Dispute: Securing the Peace.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Thatcher is triumphant and revelling in victory. Public support for her leadership is firm and overwhelming. The shock of the early war losses has long since worn off. The public, reconciled to casualties, credits her boldness that they were not greater. Critics inside and outside the Tory Party are at bay. Parliament, even the Opposition, is paying tribute.

3. She knows, however, that letdown will follow euphoria, and that to consolidate her political base she must secure peace. She wants, above all, to be Prime Minister for a full ten years, and she knows, despite her patriotic myopia, that protracted conflict in the South Atlantic sooner or later will undercut her.

4. Yet the current aim of British policy is to hold the Falklands for Britain. Thatcher and her closest advisers have argued that it is wrong to contemplate any Argentine participation in the future of the Islands; recent official statements have hardened public opinion on this theme. British casualties are cited, and the costs of war are said to dictate the terms of peace. On the issue of keeping the Falklands British, Thatcher is confident she can defeat any dissenters: buoyed by military success and outraged at Argentine aggression, she is optimistic that the political and military costs of restored British rule can be kept in bounds.

5. For all her rhetoric, Thatcher, we believe, will not be inflexible—particularly on tactics. But she will be swayed less by advice than by experience and her sense of the possible. Just as retaking the Islands has led her narrowly to want to hold them, the experience of keeping them will shape her later policy.

6. The immediate British objective will be to lead Argentina to accept that hostilities are over. Recent ideas include:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 06/15/1982 (2). Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

—Offering to negotiate a non-use-of-force pledge, which Argentina would likely turn down, but with detriment to its international support; and

—Delaying prisoner return pending Argentine affirmation that it will end hostilities, though this of course could backfire on Britain.

These ideas may be dropped as Britain seeks to handle the surrender with some generosity, in ways it hopes will help make the armistice stick.

7. Meanwhile, in the medium term, Britain also will seek to force Argentina to accommodate to British victory through:

—Substantial garrisoning of the Islands; and

—Winning allied backing (including sanctions, if necessary) and Latin American support for self-governing Falklands, with fewer colonial trappings.

Officials here seem confident that they can afford a period of economic and political consolidation, including consultations with the Falklanders; that the costs of a British garrison are sustainable; and that relations with the Latin Americans will improve as they become bored with an Argentina that will be increasingly isolated if it remains recalcitrant.

8. While Thatcher will not calibrate her policies toward promoting a favorable evolution in Argentina, she in due course will likely make some gestures towards Argentina to gain international support that also might be developed toward genuine accommodation. Certainly, the FCO will press her in that direction, just as Pym carefully—for it is risky given Thatcher's mood—has left room in recent statements for possible Argentine involvement in the Falklands' future. But the FCO is cowed now by her contempt and will be in no position to make its views prevail. Various approaches may be tested and dropped, as was the notion of a peacekeeping force patterned on MFO.

9. If, on the other hand, Argentina digs in for a crusade, Thatcher's options shift. As Argentina lashes out militarily, Thatcher will strike back.

10. U.S. aims parallel those of Britain in seeking a definitive end to hostilities. But beyond that we may diverge. Thatcher wants our and allied support for some sort of non-Argentine future for the Islands and will be willing for Britain to skew its future if necessary to achieve that end. We, by contrast, will want Britain to be responsive to Argentine and Latin American aspirations and to work for a situation in which our hemispheric relations do not suffer and Britain returns to its primary North Atlantic concerns.

11. We also will continue to be plagued by competing loyalties. We can best ease these tensions by encouraging Thatcher to begin a



dynamic process of involving interested countries rather than stonewalling. To this end, she could offer to discuss the Falklands' future with any interested parties, especially Latin Americans. Should the Argentines refuse the bait, they would appear intransigent and lose support for their militancy.

12. In dealing with Thatcher, we should bear in mind that in a while she will be testing her options not only with us, but also against the political mood at home, among other allies and Latin Americans, and in Argentina. We probably should not press her too hard now, since she will show flexibility only to the degree she sees it in Britain's interest. And she will want gestures of moderation to seem to spring from her.

13. More effective now, we believe, would be for us to make an offer directly to her personally while she is in New York for the UNSSOD of general U.S. support in working closely with Britain to find ways to abort Argentine hostility and restore British and U.S. relations with Latin America. It may take months to work through the post-Stanley phase. In this period, the U.S. can be most effective through a sustained dialogue to edge Thatcher gradually toward a settlement with Argentina. The way to begin will be in private consultations directly with Thatcher herself, if possible, where she and we can explore the options and the realities obscured by battle.

Louis

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#### **344. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1982

##### **SUBJECT**

Breakfast meeting with Secretary Haig, Eagleburger, DCI and DDCI  
on 15 June 1982

The following subjects were discussed:

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec 85). Secret; Eyes Only.

—*Falklands*. The DDCI reported on a CIA cable indicating coup plotting is underway against Galtieri.<sup>2</sup> Haig believes Galtieri will last no more than a week. Meanwhile, there is general belief that Thatcher has been the one to push hard and that we need to encourage her to be more moderate. Eagleburger said that the Salvadoran Ambassador and other South American officials have relayed their belief that the U.S. will not be damaged very much by the Falklands crisis and that the Latin American countries in general will continue to look to the U.S. for leadership and economic support. Haig did voice his concern about the Salvadoran Army setback yesterday in their operation against the guerrillas.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

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**345. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-Designate (Burt) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1982

SUBJECT

The Falklands: Next Steps

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

Whether to recommend that the President dispatch letters to Prime Minister Thatcher and General Galtieri, and whether to meet in the building as soon as possible to define our own post-ceasefire policy towards the Falklands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 8–16 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Eagleburger. Bosworth initialed the memorandum for Enders. Drafted by Enders and Campbell; cleared by Gompert, Haass, and Service. Haass initialed for the clearing officials. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it.

## BACKGROUND

*We will need the next day or two to clarify the situation on the ground and to get some sense of Argentine and British intentions. The range of possibilities is quite wide. The key is what happens in Buenos Aires. At one extreme, Lami Dozo could refuse to continue the conflict and political confusion in Buenos Aires could diffuse Argentine policy toward the islands. At the other, the Argentines might continue a low-level but hot war and keep the cause very much alive throughout Latin America. Obviously developments in Buenos Aires will have a major impact on our diplomatic choices.*

However events unfold in the next day or two, the following basic propositions can form a rudder for US policy:

- We want a complete and lasting end to hostilities.
- We want to keep open the possibility of negotiations.
- We want to avoid announcement of a definitive UK plan for the Islands' future.
- We want to emphasize reconciliation and rehabilitation.

### *What to Expect from London*

The conclusion of the South Atlantic war is a triumph for the Prime Minister. Her success has silenced critics within her own party, and she enjoys overwhelming public support. She is praised even by the opposition in parliament, and there are as yet few complaints about the cost of the war.

*In the short term* the Prime Minister will be tempted to garrison the islands, restore the traditional administration—even sending Rex Hunt back—and promote economic development. *She will be uninterested in negotiations with Argentina.*

However, the Prime Minister is also a political realist who badly wants her party to win the next elections, which must take place by May, 1984. She is shrewd enough to know that following current popular euphoria will come a period of public disillusionment with deep UK involvement in the South Atlantic. She also knows the costs to British (and Western) interests of permanent estrangement from Latin America. *Hence she may come to be more flexible in the months ahead.* She will be receptive to our cautions against closing off her options by rash public statements. This process will accelerate if Argentina ends all hostilities. However, if violence continues—even at a relatively low level—the Prime Minister is likely to be unbending.

### *What to Expect from Buenos Aires*

The direction the Junta takes should be set over the next few days. *Air Force chief Lami Dozo is the key.* The war cannot be continued unless

he is willing to sacrifice more planes and pilots. On the other hand, as the chief of the only service that did well in the conflict, Lami Dozo can be the arbiter (although probably not the head) of the next iteration of the Junta. *Ambassador Shlaudeman expects Lami Dozo to go for a de facto end to hostilities.*

A reshuffle of the Junta could come early. At the same time the Junta will almost surely reach out for a wider popular tolerance through wage increases, import protection and other populist economic measures.

A period of weak government by the Junta, probably marked by public demonstrations on economic issues, will follow. We do not expect entry of the Peronistas into the government in the immediate future. But it is a good bet in the medium term (one to two years) if the economy doesn't improve.

If these predictions prove accurate, the Junta's resistance to Soviet offers of an arms relationship may well weaken. Populist economics will cause the international banking community to reassess what up to now has to be considered to be a highly credit-worthy underlying situation. If that happens there will not be sufficient cash to finance large-scale rearmament. And the ongoing state of war, especially if there are serious clashes, may be enough to enable the UK to restrain some continental suppliers from providing advanced items.

*It is not clear how Argentina will play the negotiations issue.* As of yesterday, Lami Dozo's representatives were taking the line that now that the first two parts of Resolution 502 are being implemented, what about the third (i.e. negotiations)? However, it is doubtful that Argentina will simply return to the negotiating table at any early time. To do so, without British commitments on withdrawal and interim administration, would be to admit that the whole operation had been a fiasco. *We do not expect the UK to make such concessions in the near future.*

Unless the UK goes for self-determination and independence—or attacks mainland bases in retaliation for Argentine harassment—support for Argentina among other Latin American countries will fall rapidly. However, Argentine media and possibly the Junta—depending on the reshuffle—will continue to use the US as the scapegoat for defeat.

### *Conclusions*

1. Complete termination of hostilities is highly important for us, since continued violence would make it both more urgent for us to press the UK to take a reasonable stand and more difficult to succeed at that task.

2. Chances appear poor of getting underway in the coming months a process of settlement of the kind we have considered earlier, i.e., some multilateral force in the double role of assuring security and in

some sense embodying sovereignty, plus negotiations without preconditions.

3. Instead we should concentrate on reinforcing those in Argentina urging restraint, and on convincing Thatcher to avoid statements or actions which prejudice the future; i.e., a commitment to absolute self-determination and a flat rejection of eventual negotiations.

4. In the case of Argentina we should consider moving early to end the sanctions. If there have been no further hostilities by June 21 (and we have no reason to expect them), we could do so then, stating explicitly that we are doing so in anticipation of no future hostilities. Presumably the EC will take a similar action this week.<sup>2</sup> Immediately afterward, we and the Europeans would encourage our bankers to roll over short-term debt, thus avoiding an immediate credit crunch. Clearly this latter action would have to depend on the economic policy adopted by the Junta. If we move early enough, we may head off some populist measures that otherwise will be taken. Throughout this period, however, we should maintain as low a profile as possible in Argentina. We will have to consider how to best handle this with the UK.

5. We should seek from Britain agreement to refrain from any action or statement which rules out negotiations or decides the Islands' future. In return, we would continue for a time our current arms relationship (i.e. accelerated delivery out of US-owned inventory) in order to enable Britain to establish a serious defense of the islands in short order. We would discontinue our special support if the British are unreasonable.

If this first phase succeeds, a new effort at a settlement, involving negotiations and perhaps a multilateral force, could be undertaken toward the end of the year.

In line with the foregoing, we recommend the following:

1. That you ask the President to send a brief note congratulating Prime Minister Thatcher and gently noting our expectation of continuing consultations with HMG over the South Atlantic. At Tab 1 is a draft letter.<sup>3</sup> This would be an interim communication only, bridging the period between the President's meeting with the Prime Minister at the Summits<sup>4</sup> and the fall of Stanley. It would not be a major substantive communication, which would follow later. In the meantime, you might

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<sup>2</sup> Haig drew a parallel line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and the sentence that preceded it.

<sup>3</sup> The undated draft letter from Reagan to Thatcher, along with a draft covering memorandum from Bremer to Clark, is attached but not printed. For the letter as sent, see Document 352.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 322 and 326.

wish to call in Ambassador Henderson to get a better sense as to how best tailor a major Presidential intervention with the Prime Minister.

*RECOMMENDATION*

That you ask the President to send to the Prime Minister the letter at Tab 1.<sup>5</sup>

2. Regardless of the outcome of Argentine political uncertainty, we want to restore US-Argentine relations as quickly as possible, and we also want to make clear to Galtieri or his successor that the United States continues to seek a permanent end to the hostilities and a peaceful settlement of the underlying dispute. There is risk however that any message at this time will be viewed by the Argentine leadership as hypocritical and, perhaps, used to further arouse public opinion against us. It might also be seen as explicit backing for Galtieri in a situation we are not sure he can survive.

On balance, we believe that we should hold any message until the internal situation is more clear. The attached draft (Tab 2)<sup>6</sup> reflects the type of message which should be sent as soon as circumstances warrant.

*RECOMMENDATION*

That you decide that we should *not* sent a message to Galtieri now.<sup>7</sup>

3. US policy:

*RECOMMENDATION*

That you meet with us to consider the outlines of our post-Falk-lands policy.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved. Below this sentence, a notation in an unknown hand reads: "approved in principle—Burt to re-draft."

<sup>6</sup> The undated draft letter from Reagan to Galtieri, along with a draft covering memorandum from Bremer to Clark, is attached but not printed.

<sup>7</sup> A checkmark in an unknown hand indicates that the recommendation not to send a letter to Galtieri was approved.

<sup>8</sup> A checkmark in an unknown hand indicates that the recommendation was approved. Beneath the recommendation, Bremer wrote: "Given your schedule, I suggest Larry hold the meeting while you're in NYC. LPB 6/15." In the space next to the approval line, Eagleburger wrote: "done 6/16/82." No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

**346. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

UK Falklands Terms

Argentine Foreign Office official Bunge called Ambassador Kirkpatrick this afternoon to detail the terms Britain has proposed to Argentina.<sup>2</sup> According to Bunge, they include:

—No formal ceremony (in the mind of the Argentines, this means no actual surrender);

—“withdrawal of the flag;”

—Argentine units to withdraw *with* their weapons, except for those made prisoner;

—Definitive end to hostilities, including a specific commitment against overflight by Argentine Air Force units.

Bunge says these terms are “totally acceptable” to Argentina. Junta is now discussing how they could be made public at Argentine initiative.

Idea in Buenos Aires would be to present these terms as implementation of Resolution 502. Argentines continue to hope that British can be persuaded to engage in “negotiations.”

*Comment:* If this report is accurate, the British have been very sensitive. Bunge attributed this to US influence.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Confidential. Drafted by Enders on June 15. Copies were sent to Bremer, Burt, Service, and Gompert.

<sup>2</sup> Kirkpatrick transmitted a summary of her June 15 conversation with Bunge to the Department in telegram 1668 from USUN, June 16. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 06/16/1982 (1))

**347. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, June 16, 1982, 2332Z

1685. Subject: Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Meeting with General Ricardo Pena. Ref: USUN 1668.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text)

2. Air Force Gen. Ricardo Pena called on Amb. Kirkpatrick evening of June 15. Amb. Sorzano was also present.

3. Gen. Pena began by recounting military events during the last few days in the Falklands. He indicated that 775 Argentinian soldiers had been killed in the last 24 hours. Those casualties led to an Argentinian cease fire. He itemized the terms of surrender (as reported in USUN 1668) and indicated that in their view, the US had prevailed in softening UK terms. Pena continued by saying that these would be difficult times for Argentina, with domestic turbulence probably leading to the departure of Gen. Galtieri.<sup>3</sup> Argentina was most interested in continuing US support for Security Council Resolution 502, and asked what could Argentina do in the immediate future? Amb. Kirkpatrick responded by saying that they should continue their intensive dialogue with the SYG, with their neighbors and with appropriate American officials such as Asst. Secretary Enders.

4. Gen. Pena predicted that US/Argentina relations would be difficult for "the next five to ten years". The sooner we started rebuilding these relationships the better. He suggested that prompt removal of US economic sanctions would be a very powerful and positive signal which could get the process started.

5. Finally, Gen. Pena provided Amb. Kirkpatrick with an Argentine analysis of the military losses inflicted by the air force on UK forces. This analysis is as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850378–0742. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 346.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 344.



## Argentine Air Force Actions

## Offensive Actions

1 May 1982–10 June 1982

Navy Materials	Argentina's Claims	UK Claims
Destroyers		
Coventry	sunk	sunk
Brilliant	sunk	sunk
Sheffield	sunk	sunk
Broadsword	damaged	damaged?
Exeter	?	—
Frigates		
Antelope	sunk	sunk
Ardent	sunk	sunk
Plymouth	sunk	damaged
Argonaut	damaged heavily	damaged
Light Cruiser		
Antrim	damaged heavily	—
Ships		
Sir Galahad	sunk	damaged heavily
Sir Tristan	damaged heavily	" "
Sir Belvedere	damaged heavily	—
Canberra	damaged	—
Oiler (N.U.)	damaged	—
Light Carriers		
Hermes	damaged	—
Invincible	damaged	—
Airplanes		
Sea Harrier	15 shot down 1 damaged 7 unconfirmed	13 shot down
Sea King Helicopter	12 shot down 5 damaged 1 unconfirmed	5 shot down
Lynx Helicopter	2 shot down	
Gazelle Scout Hel.	4 shot down	4 shot down
Wessex Helicopter	2 shot down	2 lost—bad weather

Kirkpatrick

**348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel) in Singapore<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1982, 2218Z

Todep 30046/166414. For Deputy Secretary Stoessel. Subject: Falklands Crisis: Update for the Deputy Secretary.

1. C–Entire text.

2. It appears that fighting on the Falklands has ended.<sup>2</sup> However, Argentina will not renounce its claim to the Islands. Unless Argentina and the United Kingdom agree on a permanent solution, a future resumption of fighting cannot be ruled out.

3. Prime Minister Thatcher seems set on self-determination for the Falklands which would preclude serious negotiations with Argentina over sovereignty, at least in the short term. She is prepared to maintain sufficient forces in the area to thwart another invasion.

4. The White House issued the following statement on June 15, subsequent to the British recapture of Port Stanley:

Begin text:

The United States welcomes the ceasefire which is now in place in the Falkland Islands. We hope the tragic loss of life which has thus far occurred in this crisis can now be brought to an end. For its part, the United States continues to stand ready to assist in any way it can to help resolve this conflict. End text.

5. Talking points for use with foreign leaders:

Ceasefire

—We welcome the ceasefire and hope that there will be no further hostilities.

—The fighting has just ended and it is still too early to comment on such aspects of US policy as sanctions.

6. US policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820315–0692. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by T. Carter (FWG); cleared by Service, Bosworth, Blackwill, K. Shirley (S/S), A. Friedt (D), and in S/S–O; approved by Bremer. Stoessel was in Singapore for an Association of Southeast Asian Nations post-Ministerial meeting June 16–19.

<sup>2</sup> Discussing the end of hostilities on the morning of June 18, Casey, Weinberger, McMahon, and Carlucci agreed “that it was surprising that the surrender came so easily.” (Memorandum for the Record, June 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Boards, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 410: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec Defense (May 81–Dec 85))

A. Throughout the tragic conflict in the South Atlantic between the UK and Argentina, our policy has been to work for implementation of UN Security Council Res. 502:

- Cessation of hostilities;
- Withdrawal of Argentine forces;
- Diplomatic solution to the conflict.

B. The Reagan administration led the effort to find a peaceful solution.

C. At President's direction, Secretary Haig undertook intensive discussions with London and Buenos Aires to help parties find a solution. While UK would support the peace framework which emerged, Argentina did not.

D. We have strongly supported subsequent efforts by others, most recently UN Secretary General.

E. We are neutral on the sovereignty of the Islands, the issue which Argentina and the UK are disputing.

F. But basic principle at stake: Use of force to settle disputes cannot be accepted by world community. This is why we have supported the UK.

G. When Argentina rejected our peace proposal for settlement based on UNSC Resolution 502, we took steps to make clear our opposition to first use of force.

H. We provided the UK with materiel support as a part of our over-all defense relationship. But no direct US military involvement.

I. If Argentina and the United Kingdom cannot resolve underlying issues that led to this crisis, there will be continuing tension and further hostilities.

**Haig**

**349. Note From the Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Gompert) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1982

LSE:

SUBJECT

Falklands

Putting substance aside, there is currently a communications gap between us and the British. Even allowing for a legitimate UK pre-occupation with war termination, they are simply not keeping us informed well enough.<sup>2</sup> In particular, Mrs. Thatcher is making announcements (see attached *example*)<sup>3</sup> with regard to sensitive political questions—e.g., the return of Rex Hunt, the rejection of negotiations, the rejection of future Argentine “participation” on the Islands—without giving us any fore-warning, let alone consultations. I can’t believe that the FCO is so completely cut out that they can’t give us any advance information. This is not only unfair to us, given what we’ve done, but also a severe handicap.

Now that the Islands are in British hands, there is no excuse for this to continue. If you agree, I can—or ask Bob Blackwill to—convey to the Embassy here on a strictly personal basis the opinion that we will need to be kept better informed in the future. My relationship with Robin Renwick is such that he would welcome a personal heads-up if we foresee a need for a more timely information flow.

DCG<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the note indicates that Eagleburger saw it on June 16.

<sup>2</sup> Gompert added the word “UK” by hand.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a statement made by Thatcher to the House of Commons on June 15.

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger drew an arrow to Gompert’s initials and wrote: “See me!”

**350. Situation Report Prepared by the Department of State  
Falklands Working Group<sup>1</sup>**

No. 91

Washington, June 17, 1982, 5 p.m.

*Falklands Situation as of 1700 EDT, June 17, 1982*

1. *Galtieri Out.* The Argentine Army announced June 17 that General Galtieri has offered his resignation as Army Commander in Chief and will be replaced tomorrow as Army CINC by First Corps commander General Cristino Nicolaides. There is no official word yet on Galtieri's future as President, but the private news service DYN has reported that Galtieri will also submit his resignation as President. Interior Minister Saint Jean will then serve temporarily as President until a new one is appointed by the junta. Army Chief of Staff Vaquero, next in line after Galtieri, was offered the top army job but, according to DYN, turned it down. Galtieri is expected to brief the cabinet on these changes and to ask government ministers to remain in their posts until a new president is appointed. Dissatisfaction with Galtieri was widespread following the week's events. According to Argentine press, Galtieri's rejection of a total cessation of hostilities with the UK met stiff opposition within the army with all but two of fourteen senior generals favoring a definite termination of hostilities. Galtieri's decision to "convoke the people" for his June 15 speech also drew substantial criticism.<sup>2</sup> The text of the surrender document released by London received front page coverage June 17 in most Argentine dailies.

2. *EC To Review Sanctions.* USEC reports that the EC countries have decided that the Argentine sanctions will be maintained so long as there is any doubt about continuation of hostilities in the South Atlantic. EC public solidarity is strong, but privately some are pressing for early lifting of sanctions. EC Foreign Ministers will discuss the sanctions issue in Luxembourg June 20.

3. *Soviet Ties.* Private agricultural trade sources in Montevideo report that the USSR has re-entered the Argentine grain market in the last few days, purchasing up to one million tons of corn and sorghum as of June 15. An Argentine Air Force spokesman rejected as "ridiculous" a press report that Argentina has plans to purchase 100 MIG aircraft.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, unlabeled folder. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In his June 15 televised speech, Galtieri responded to British demands for a ceasefire by declaring there would be no peace if the United Kingdom restored "colonial rule" in the Falklands. (Edwards Schumacher, "Galtieri Bars Peace if Britain Restores Its 'Colonial Rule'," *New York Times*, June 16, p. A22)

4. *Prisoner Count*. The UK now puts the total number of Argentine prisoners presently under British control at about 8,000. Argentina has thus far refused to allow the prisoners to be returned directly to Argentina, asking instead that they be taken to Montevideo.

**Robert E. Service**  
*Falkland Working Group*

**R. Stern**  
*Senior Watch Officer*

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**351. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 17, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands Prisoners

Nicko Henderson has passed on the following information:

The British have 8–9000 prisoners in hand. They are rounding up others, all of whom have stopped fighting, on West Falklands. The total will be well below the 15,000 that the Argentine commander reported. The main problem is not starvation but exposure. They will load as many as 7000 on the Canberra and another ship in order to provide immediate relief from the elements.

The Argentines have replied through the Swiss that they are prepared to accept repatriation and want it done through Uruguay “without precondition”. HMG will have to decide now what to do. One option is to send the 7000 back through Uruguay; the preference

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 16–30 1982. Secret; Sensitive. In Tosec 90018/168048, June 18, Eagleburger transmitted the text of the memorandum to Haig, who was in New York for the UN Special Session on Disarmament. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Box 35, Falkland File 06/18/1982)

remains to send them into Argentine ports, but that is excluded by the Argentine non-response on cessation of hostilities, unless HMG relaxes its condition.

Even if a way is found to return the 7000, and possibly more, the UK will keep 10% (officers, including Menendez); it is not clear where they will be kept or under what conditions they would be returned.<sup>2</sup>

Henderson thought that any US assistance that might be requested would be in connection with those prisoners (i.e., the 90%) that HMG is trying to repatriate as soon as possible.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 16716 to Buenos Aires, June 17, the Department reported that the British Embassy had requested U.S. assistance in obtaining Argentine agreement to permit repatriation of captured Argentine troops through the Argentine port of Comodoro Rivadavia or the Chilean port of Punta Arenas. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 06/17/1982 (2)) Later, the Argentine Foreign Ministry announced that repatriation of prisoners would be undertaken through Montevideo beginning June 18. (NMCC Significant Event Report, June 18; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982) On June 18, however, the Argentine and British Ambassadors in Montevideo informed the Uruguayan Government that repatriation would be through Argentine ports. (Telegram 2349 from Montevideo, June 21; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820325–0485)

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### **352. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1982, 1520Z

Dear Margaret:

Let me extend my congratulations on the success of British arms in the South Atlantic. Your victory was both a brilliant military feat and a defense of our shared principle that disputes are not to be resolved by aggression. The minimum loss of life and the generous terms of withdrawal were also in the finest British tradition.

A just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you and to assisting in building such a peace. It must of course

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret. Sent in telegram WH04195 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels.

take into account the sacrifices of your men in battle. Its elements in my judgement must include enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic, mitigation of Argentine hostility and improvement in the relations of both our countries with Latin America.

It was good to be with you in Paris, London and Bonn.

Warm regards,

Ron<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this handwritten signature, written in an unknown hand.

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**353. Memorandum From Dennis C. Blair, Roger W. Fontaine, and James M. Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands

Following are the assessment and recommendations of the informal NSC Falklands working group:

*Where we are now:*

*UK:* Mrs. Thatcher has taken personal charge of all aspects of Falklands policy. The Foreign Office is doing no staff work, or at least none that the Prime Minister supports. As late as last week, according to our British contacts, there was not even an options paper in circulation on long-range plans for the area.

Right now Mrs. Thatcher is thinking short-term, i.e., consolidation of the military victory. Her plans for the longer term are not well formed, but do not sound encouraging ("We have not retaken the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Falklands (May 1982–September 1982). Secret. Sent for action. Sapia-Bosch initialed his concurrence.



islands to turn them over to the UN," "the future of the islands will be decided by the U.K. and the Falklanders themselves.")

*Argentina:* The new Argentine government will not be a strong one; it is highly unlikely that prominent civilian politicians will join it. Its priorities will be with the economy, rebuilding its military, particularly the Air Force, unless it is forced to keep the Falklands on the front burner.

*U.S. Objectives:*

A peace settlement and agreement for negotiations for final settlement of the status of the islands that will allow the new Argentine government to transcend failure in the Falklands; allow the British to return their forces to the North Atlantic area where they contribute to NATO deterrence; and allow the U.S. to resume constructive relations with Latin American countries (including Argentina) unfettered by the Falklands experience.

*U.S. Leverage:*

Since Mrs. Thatcher is so personally in charge, it will be necessary to do business with her directly, which means the President will have to be involved. In the final analysis, the President will simply have to make it clear that we will not provide any support to a long-term peace settlement that does not at least include an approach to solving the sovereignty question.

*Tactics:*

Timing is tricky. It is clearly premature to approach Mrs. Thatcher right now while the flush of military victory is still strong. However, we cannot wait too long, since a rigid British peace settlement will be difficult to reverse.

Mrs. Thatcher will be visiting the United States on June 22, 23 to address the SSOD in New York. We suggest that she be asked to Washington for a meeting with the President in which he asks point blank what her plans are for the future, and presents not only what U.S. objectives are for the future, but a number of alternative schemes which would meet our objectives and would be acceptable to the U.K. We should not get back between the UK and Argentina again, but the British need to know just how far our support goes and what our requirements are.

Al Sapia-Bosch concurs.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That an NSC (or NSPG) session be convened as soon as possible to assess U.S. policy options in the weeks and months directly ahead, and to formulate specific guidance for a Presidential meeting with Mrs.

Thatcher next Tuesday or Wednesday<sup>2</sup> on the margins of her SSOD visit to New York.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> June 22 or 23.

<sup>3</sup> Clark neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

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**354. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Lehman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1982

SUBJ

Falklands' Lessons Learned—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The fighting in the South Atlantic provides another opportunity to capitalize on the combatants' experiences by reviewing our present and future capabilities in the context of the different successes and failures during the conflict. The geography is similar to the Northern Flanks of NATO and the North Pacific.

There are inherent dangers in making hasty judgments before all relevant *facts* are sorted out from the value judgments. While much of the Falklands interaction had more in common with World War II (we lost four destroyers per day at Okinawa to cruise missiles (kamikazes) than with star wars, there is much to learn from the real-world interaction of new electronic technologies and materials in combat for the first time.

Since the engagement was essentially maritime, I have assembled a team of the best Navy and Marine warfare specialists, military and civilian, from the relevant commands, labs, and bureaus to exploit completely the lessons learned as fast as the data permits.

Arrangements have been made with the Royal Navy, using well established channels for a rapid and complete flow of data. This comprehensive study of the naval and amphibious operations will be fully

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret. Copies were sent to Carlucci and Iklé. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 21.

coordinated with the Defense-wide effort to address other aspects of the engagement and the engagements in the Middle East.

Our effort will be accomplished in two phases. The first step is well in progress and designed as a quick-look review identifying areas for thorough study such as aluminum superstructure in naval ships and identifying current or FYDP-projected USN/USMC hardware capabilities which would have provided our forces significant advantage or resulted in combat deficiencies if we engaged in a scenario similar to the Falklands. The initial effort will be complete in early July, and I will be prepared to brief you as soon thereafter as your schedule permits. In this briefing, I will also discuss from the Navy vantage point the effectiveness of U.S. direct support/intelligence products provided to the U.K. during the conflict. In our review, we will be looking not only at how the U.S. Navy would conduct offensive and defensive operations in a Falklands-type of scenario, but also operations at a relative level of effort equivalent to that put forth by the Royal Navy (e.g. significant percentage of forces committed). We also intend to take a close look at the U.K. naval command and control structure and at the maritime Rules of Engagement, both of which were apparently very effective. The initial stages of Phase One of our review have highlighted some significant lessons, set forth below, which I believe are of immediate interest.

#### *Background*

The following lessons learned, which generally may be characterized as “already known but reinforced,” have been identified in the initial review of British and Argentine experiences in the Falkland Islands crisis.

#### *General*

The historical effectiveness of the Navy/Marine Corps team as a primary instrument for enforcing foreign policy was reaffirmed, as was the absolute necessity for the “Defense in Depth” provided by the U.S. Navy carrier battle group concept which provides the flexibility and self-protection required to support combat operations.

The United Kingdom’s inability to deter the Argentines from aggression dramatically illustrates the importance of maintaining a proper balance between strategic and conventional forces. Britain’s emphasis of strategic capability at the expense of conventional naval forces most certainly had a profound impact on the original decision by Argentina to invade the Falklands.

#### *Fleet Operations*

From data available thus far, the concept of defense-in-depth as employed by U.S. Navy CV Battle Groups would have provided a

layered force defense with reduced penetrability and fewer leakers/hits. Without this redundant and multi-mission capability, the Royal Navy had insufficient early-warning, distant intercept, and local air superiority. Thus, the burden of defense against the essentially airborne threat fell almost entirely on the inner-most point defenses. The countermeasures the Royal Navy had available proved inadequate to the task in several cases.

Assuming that some antiship missile leakage will always occur against the best of defenses, the low-altitude, antiship missile successes (EXOCET) demonstrated the need to continue development and adequate testing of improved fuzing, EW capability and decoys as part of our defense. It may suggest also that the DRB should consider speeding up deployment of such effective defenses as we do have such as Phalanx. Efforts in this regard should not be focused solely on the Soviet family of missiles.

"Stores-in-depth" became an issue for both protagonists even though the conflict was relatively short-lived and episodic in nature. For example, the supply of air-launched EXOCET and SEAWIND was inadequate to meet requirements.

Iron bombs, bullets, and sophisticated weapons all played a large role in the conflict. Naval gunfire support was used extensively and effectively in both the pre- and post-landing phases of the amphibious operation.

Rapid mobilization of commercial shipping and industrial support appears to have been critical to British success. According to the First Sea Lord, 50 commercial ships were modified to support these operations. In his words, these modifications were "expensive, ingenious, and effective." U.S. surge capability in this regard should be carefully developed and exercised.

Survivability is and will remain an issue in any war at sea. Based on the Royal Navy experience, issues to be studied in depth include the adequacy of armor, compartmentation, seaworthiness, watertight integrity, electrical power distribution and redundancy, and permanent and portable damage control capability.

It appears wider availability of secure communications would have aided both sides in executing various engagements and in maintaining security of operations overall.

The capability of nuclear-powered submarines to transit long distances at high speed and to conduct naval operations including blockage with minimal support provided a significant tactical advantage and was apparently successful at intimidating Argentine surface forces. The very good modern Argentine diesel-electric submarines apparently were ineffective.

*Amphibious Operations*

The Falkland Islands campaign provided a classic example of the value of maritime force projection through amphibious operations.

The objective area was isolated; time was allotted to plan, prepare, and rehearse the assault. Advance Force Operations included the use of unconventional forces which provided the commander with extensive tactical intelligence.

The Advance Force operations were conducted by means of shore bombardment with naval guns and aircraft to reduce enemy defenses and to deceive the Argentines.

The San Carlos Bay landing was conducted under adverse conditions by a combined arms action designed for the single purpose of projecting power ashore. By landing where the “enemy was not” a beachhead was established as the base for future offensive operations.

Of particular interest during the transition ashore is the role of the Harrier aircraft. This crisis should provide significant information on the Harrier in the air-to-air role, as well as its ability to operate without the advantage of an airfield.

The Royal Marines and paratroopers revalidated the striking power and mobility of light infantry supported by light armor. Under the cover of naval gunfire and mobile field artillery, key objectives were seized—many at night.

The ability to move from one side of the island to the other has once again highlighted the versatility of the helicopter.

Casualties on both sides supported the need for hospital ships and deployable medical facilities.

So far, evidence indicates U.S.-designed equipment and weapons worked as advertised with a higher success rate than we would have predicted.

**John Lehman**

**355. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in New York<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1982, 0126Z

Tosec 90052/169712. Stadis—For the Secretary from Blackwill, Enders, and Howe. Subject: Falklands: Analysis of Key Issues.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Begin text of Action Memorandum:

To: The Secretary

Through: P—Under Secretary Eagleburger

From: EUR, Robert Blackwill, Acting

ARA—Tom Enders

PM—Jonathan Howe

Subject: Falklands: Analysis of Key Issues.

Issue for Decision: What approach we should now take to sanctions against Argentina, materiel support for the UK and what line the President should take with Mrs. Thatcher should he see her next week.

Background: The change of government in Buenos Aires, the continuing euphoria in Britain, the rash of public statements on both sides, and Prime Minister Thatcher's pending visit and possible meeting with the President here make it imperative that we sort out our thinking on the key issues of sanctions, materiel support for the UK, and our approach to the Prime Minister. Although the situation is fluid, and our prescriptions will have to be reviewed in light of changing circumstances, we propose the following approach at this time. (We have sent separately a proposed message from you to the President with a draft letter to the Prime Minister;<sup>2</sup> also sent separately was our analysis of how we should respond to the current PDC initiative.<sup>3</sup> The humanitarian issue appears on its way to being solved.)

Sanctions: The EC is likely to debate the sanctions issue either 20 or 21 June. Indications are that economic controls on imports from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Haass; cleared by Blackwill, Enders, Howe, Bremer, Gompert, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger. Haig was in New York for the UNSSOD.

<sup>2</sup> For the message as sent to Reagan, June 19, see Document 356.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

Argentina will be lifted.<sup>4</sup> If the EC does in fact go this route and the de facto cease fire holds, there would be a strong case for us to follow suit.

We should, however, hold off making any decision or announcement until after a meeting between the President and Mrs. Thatcher. Indeed, Pym asked as much in his letter which requested that we not act on this issue until after further “consultations” between us had taken place.<sup>5</sup>

On our part, any lifting of economic sanctions—which cover credit and financial guarantee arrangements—would be of major symbolic importance. As regards controls on dual use or military items that come under Commerce, Munitions List, or FMS regulations, we believe we ought to lift the April suspension on previously issued licenses of items on the Munitions List (which would permit about \$6 million in the pre-1978 pipeline to be exported) and resume normal Commerce Department licensing-procedures (which would still permit case by case review) for export of dual use equipment. We would also hold off certifying Argentina as eligible for new FMS or commercial sales of items on the Munitions List. This mix would open up some channels with the new government, but not give the UK very much cause for legitimate unhappiness.

—Materiel support for the UK: We believe we ought to make available to the UK the equipment it requests and not as a matter of principle oppose providing items useful to garrison the Islands. However, we should avoid approving major items for that purpose until we have assessed our talks with Mrs. Thatcher. In any event, we should not expect to exact any leverage from our arms supply relationship. US assistance for Falklands-related purposes is not so crucial that threats to reduce or terminate it would have any significant impact on UK capabilities but would reduce US influence. Moreover, the Argentines have already discounted our help for the UK; they are much more likely to be affected by our policy on sanctions and the

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 169785 to Brussels, Rome, Dublin, Copenhagen, Athens, Luxembourg, and The Hague, June 19, the Department argued that the removal of EC sanctions against Argentina, “in absence of Argentine agreement to cessation of hostilities, could seriously undercut British at crucial time in Falklands crisis.” The Department therefore instructed the posts to contact Foreign Ministries “at highest possible level” to “urge that EC put off any decision at this time to remove sanctions.” The text of this telegram was repeated in Todep 30103/169785 sent from the Department to Stoessel in Canberra. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850398–0438) Separate messages from Haig to the Foreign Ministers of France and West Germany urging the same were transmitted in telegram Tosec 90061/169787 to Paris and Bonn, June 19. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820006–0077)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 329.

larger diplomatic issues. We may, however, want to consider ending the emergency procedures that have been established and reverting to normal FMS practices. We would tell the British that the emergency is over and it would be hard to justify drawdowns of US stocks or our failing to meet our commitments to other purchasers.

—Approach to Mrs. Thatcher: Nothing we have seen or heard changes our impression that the Prime Minister remains euphoric and disinclined to compromise. She has made clear that something akin to the status quo ante bellum will be restored, and that the only arrangements the UK would consider would have to guarantee the security of the Islands against Argentine aggression and give the Islanders an upgraded role in the government of the Islands. She has said that she will not negotiate with Argentina about the future status of the Islands.

The above notwithstanding, we continue to believe that it is as much in Britain's interest as our own to reach a rapid political settlement of the Falklands dispute. In the current circumstances, however, the President's immediate aim ought to be modest, to keep things from getting worse, i.e., to reassure Mrs. Thatcher of our support and to dissuade her from taking irrevocable steps or making controversial statements which would preclude a future settlement and perhaps bring about highly nationalistic, xenophobic and inflexible leadership in Buenos Aires. Mrs. Thatcher should be encouraged to stress rehabilitation, reconciliation, and self-government; but self-determination, independence, and any rigid blueprint for the Islands' future ought to be discouraged.

We should avoid too ambitious a strategy. Pushing for negotiations or UK force withdrawals would fail, sour US/UK relations and make Thatcher even more intractable.

At most the President might explore her willingness to permit contact with the GOA on aspects of the issue other than the future status of the Islands. This might, of course, over time evolve into negotiations, or at least give encouragement to Argentine moderates.

Accomplishing even these limited aims with the Prime Minister could prove difficult. The fact that we will continue to provide materiel support and that we will not push now for negotiations should help. Lifting sanctions will make the President's task more difficult; he might assuage British concerns, however, by pointing out that the military impact of so doing would be negligible.

In short, we ought to damp down jingoism in Britain while encouraging moderation in Argentina. If we can manage to steer ourselves through the immediate situation to such a juncture, the opportunity may arrive for a more active diplomatic role by ourselves or others acceptable to both parties.



Recommendation: That you approve the above approach, which, in turn, would dictate the strategy we would recommend to the President should he meet with Mrs. Thatcher.

Agree

Disagree

Eagleburger

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**356. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis

Our objectives at this point are to end hostilities and to begin to heal the wounds in US/Latin American relations, while continuing to give the British as much support as possible.

The uncertain political situation in Buenos Aires may make it impossible for the Argentines to agree to end hostilities, though they do not appear to have the stomach actually to go on fighting. There is, however, a chance the new junta will come to terms. Most of the top army generals are reported to support an end to hostilities.

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher is understandably riding the crest of the wave. Thus far, we have not pushed her on the longer-term aspects of the Falklands crisis, recognizing her need to deal with the immediate military problems. However, the time is now approaching when we must discuss with Mrs. Thatcher issues such as the U.S. sanctions against Argentina, levels of future US support for UK activities and long-term British plans for the Islands.

Mrs. Thatcher currently plans to arrive in New York June 22 for the SSOD. I suggest you invite her to stop in Washington on her way home to discuss the Falklands. She is lunching with the Secretary-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (06/16/1982–06/30/1982). Secret. Attached to another copy of the memorandum is an undated draft message from Reagan to Thatcher, inviting her for a June 23 visit to the White House for an exchange on the South Atlantic. (Ibid.)

General on Wednesday<sup>2</sup> but would be available for a meeting in Washington Wednesday afternoon or evening.

If you agree to a meeting, I could issue the invitation quickly through Ambassador Henderson.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> June 23.

<sup>3</sup> Clark initialed his disapproval of the recommendation and wrote: "Have Pres. call her in NY when she is here."

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### **357. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts and the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1982, 0001Z

172069. ZFF Canberra only. Subject: South Atlantic Crisis. Situation Report as of 1700 Edt, June 21, 1982, No. 93. Canberra also for DepSec Stoessel/Todep 30116.

1. C—(Entire text).

2. Thatcher visit to Washington. Prime Minister Thatcher is scheduled to meet with President Reagan in Washington on June 23, to discuss the Falkland Islands and other issues. Mrs. Thatcher will fly to Washington from New York, where she will address the United Nations Disarmament Conference.

3. The aftermath of war. Argentine POW's began arriving at Puerto Madryn in southern Argentina over the weekend. The Canberra carried 4,200 men and some 2,700 others are on the ferry Norland and on Argentine ships. There is still no formal cessation of hostilities. The UK Defense Ministry announced June 20 that 10 Argentine military personnel, who had manned a weather station on Thule in the South Sandwich Islands since 1976, had surrendered to British forces.<sup>2</sup> According to the Ministry, there was no fighting. (Along with the Falklands and South Georgia Islands, the Argentines claim sovereignty over the South Sandwiches.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820324–0505. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to European POLADs Collective, the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, USCINCEUR, and USCINCLANT. Drafted by M. Schmidt (FWG); cleared in S/S–O; approved by Service.

<sup>2</sup> On the origins of the Argentine presence on Thule, see footnote 5, Document 1.

4. Argentina internal. Interior Minister Saint Jean took over as acting President June 18, but the Junta (Nicolaides replacing Galtieri) is having a tough time agreeing on a more permanent replacement. Both the navy and air force appear to be leaning toward a civilian; reportedly the army continues to hold out for one of its own, even if a retired officer. While basic issues of future policy may be at stake, the prolonged indecision probably owes as much to institutional and personal rivalries among the services and their top brass.

5. EC lifts sanctions. The EC Ministers today announced that economic sanctions against Argentina would be lifted as of June 22, but that individual member nations' arms embargoes remain in force for the time being. The UK retains all of its sanctions against Argentina. No decision has been made on the lifting of US sanctions.

6. Barring dramatic new developments, this will be the last South Atlantic crisis sitrep.

7. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

**Haig**

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**358. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1982

SUBJECT

UK after Port Stanley

Opinion is divided in the UK about the long-term impact of the Falklands crisis. Some, such as Julian Bullard, see the Falklands war as an ephemeral episode with little lasting significance. Others, including Sir Michael Palliser, suggest that victory in the South Atlantic has restored the confidence of the British people, ending the "little England" cycle of retreat from responsibility initiated by failure at Suez. Although the wish may be the father to the thought, we believe that Palliser & Co. are the closer to the mark.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falklands Crisis Files of Luigi Einaudi, Lot 90D400, Falklands Crisis Consequences. Secret. Drafted by Campbell on June 21; cleared by Haass and Dobbins.

*The Retreat from Isolation*

A new cycle of British assertiveness dates from the 1979 election. Prime Minister Thatcher and the Conservative party promised higher defense budgets and greater emphasis on foreign affairs. Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary became a media star, ending the Rhodesia embroglio. Diplomatic activism for the British public became fun again. The Thatcher government took on the EC—and won more than half a loaf on the budget question; it also played a leading role in Europe in orchestrating condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and meddling in Poland. The UK opted for the Trident II missile, guaranteeing membership in the nuclear club into the next century. The opposition Labor party moved in the opposite direction, toward unilateral nuclear disarmament with pacifist and isolationist overtones. This approach is now out of synch with the British public and contributes to the party's inability to capitalize on Thatcher's economic mistakes with the electorate.

*The Falklands Factor:*

For the time being, British Falklands policy is the creature of the Prime Minister. The influence of the FCO is likely to take some time to reassert itself; many in the Tory party regard the crisis as the result of FCO incompetence. For the Prime Minister, the FCO's cautious approach to the conduct of the war has been utterly discredited by the success—thus far—of her uncompromising stand.

Military victory in the South Atlantic is bound to reinforce her Tory activism. The UK is the only Western country to have won a real war since 1945. For the time being, the polls show the Thatcher government enjoying extraordinary public support. Gen. Galtieri may have secured a Tory victory in the next elections. The Falklands accomplishment—building on previous foreign policy successes—has the potential of confirming the new national assertiveness. But if the Prime Minister fails to win the peace and British forces become bogged down in a guerrilla war in the South Atlantic, there will be a resurgence of isolationism—to the benefit of the Labor party.

*Predicting the Future*

If the British victory in the Falklands holds, we expect:

- greater UK assertiveness vis-a-vis the EC;
- a slight cooling of the UK's relations with its European allies—though this process will be nuanced;
- greater diplomatic interest in the world outside Europe;
- no change in frosty UK/Soviet relations.

These developments will have minimal impact on our interests, though an increase of UK concern about non-European regions might

widen areas of US/UK cooperation in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean.

The Prime Minister is likely to judge the US role in the crisis as a vindication of the “special relationship”. Her frequent contact with the President, and her good relationship with him, may tempt her to approach the White House directly with greater frequency. The Prime Minister dealt with the South Atlantic crisis largely without our advice—or contrary to it. Thus, while she will continue to emphasize the trans-Atlantic connection, she may be more willing to pursue initiatives different from ours in the Middle East, Southern Africa and on international economic questions. But occasional differences would be a small price to pay for an outward looking UK prepared to advance general Western interests around the world.

### *Military Impact*

If hostilities are not renewed, we expect in the short term:

- an upsurge of the military’s prestige within the UK;
- high levels of military spending becoming more politically acceptable but inhibited by economic weakness;
- enhanced recognition in political and military circles of the importance of forces in place to deter aggression, with perhaps a greater willingness to maintain a military presence in Belize or the Persian Gulf;
- a new defense debate, not over the pros and cons of levels of spending but over the most effective way the UK can allocate its resources.

### *The US Approach*

Our ability to affect these diplomatic and military trends or UK defense planning is marginal because of the crucial role played by purely domestic factors.<sup>2</sup> The weak economy means that the UK probably cannot assume a substantially larger military out-of-area role, replace assets lost in the South Atlantic, and maintain normal force levels in Europe all at the same time. But in the short-term the UK could do much of significance in Third World areas with only a modest diversion of resources. Continuing to maintain a small force in Belize

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 13606 from London, June 22, the Embassy transmitted an analysis of the forthcoming announcement of the U.K. annual Defense White Paper: “In light of the Falklands, there is intense interest here in both the timing and substance of Defense Secretary Nott’s annual Defense White Paper which is being published June 22. It is basically the same paper that was drafted in the early months of 1982, for release in April, and held back because of the crisis. Publishing it now is seen as a daring move—one aimed at dampening pressures for early changes, while leaving room for some modifications after further reflection.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820325–0391)

would have a significant deterrent value, for example, and promote regional stability. The UK retreat from areas such as the Persian Gulf over the past two decades was due in part to a lack of political will. We should capitalize on the change of mood produced by the Falklands crisis to take such steps as:

- encourage the British not to withdraw their forces from Belize;
- urge them to maintain and enhance a naval presence in the Indian Ocean;
- ask them to provide more military training to friendly out-of-area countries.

In the longer term we are considering how we want to influence the upcoming UK defense debate, the nature of the British NATO defense commitment and their mix between conventional and nuclear weapons.

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**359. Memorandum From Alfonso Sapia-Bosch of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1982

SUBJECT

Lifting Economic Sanctions on Argentina

The sanctions on Argentina should be lifted without delay. As you know, the European Community has already done so.<sup>2</sup> From the U.S. perspective the sanctions are symbolic. The de facto ceasefire between the two belligerents probably will hold, as there seems to be little disposition on the part of Argentina again to take up arms. State's position is to use the sanctions issue to derive a larger gain from Prime Minister Thatcher, e.g., agreement to negotiate with Argentina over the final disposition of the Islands. Additionally, State would like to deal with a functioning government. Both of these are good points; State does not expect much success with Thatcher, however.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (06/16/1982–06/30/1982). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 357.

If we lift the sanctions after her visit with the President it will be viewed in Argentina and Latin America as if we needed her permission to go ahead. Alternatively, if we act now we would give a signal that we are taking a more neutral position on the sovereignty question. We will eventually lift the sanctions, so our objective should be to derive the most benefit for our side from the timing. By taking the initiative immediately we would: reduce strains between the U.S. and Argentina; strengthen the hand of the moderates in Argentina; assist the U.S. banking community, thereby speeding up the restructuring of the Argentine debt; perhaps bring some stability to the Argentine government, whatever it turns out to be; prevent a further shift toward anti-Americanism among the military; and, finally, remove sanctions as an issue.

Lifting the sanctions is not without danger. Mrs. Thatcher probably would not like it. She could hardly suggest that we have been unsupportive, however. There is always the danger that some Argentine leader will misinterpret our action. Notwithstanding these problems, I urge that you suggest to the President that the sanctions be lifted soon.

Blair and Fontaine concur.<sup>3</sup> Rentschler does not.<sup>4</sup> He believes that cancellation of the original sanctions decision, a product of inter-agency deliberations, is a significant step which needs to be thoroughly addressed in existing inter-agency fora, preferably NSC, but perhaps in this case the NSPG.

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<sup>3</sup> Blair and Fontaine initialed their concurrence by signing their initials over their typed names.

<sup>4</sup> Rentschler wrote "Jim" above his typed name, indicating that he did not concur.

**360. National Security Study Directive 10–82<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1982

*U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE AMERICAS AS A RESULT OF THE  
FALKLANDS CRISIS<sup>2</sup>**INTRODUCTION*

The conflict over the Falklands has resulted in strains in our relations with Latin America that have serious implications for U.S. interests and objectives in the region. Among the major tasks to be undertaken to repair this damage are the following: rebuilding and advancing positive diplomatic and military relationships with Latin America; reinvigorating the Inter-American system; gaining the active cooperation of other states to prevent further Communist inroads in this hemisphere; preventing other territorial disputes from erupting into armed conflicts; ensuring an appropriate role in the region's acquisition of weapons for legitimate self-defense without fostering an arms race; and limiting/monitoring the introduction of high technology weapons and the development of nuclear devices.

This National Security Study Directive (NSSD) establishes the guidelines for a basic reassessment of U.S. political, economic, military and intelligence programs and policies in the hemisphere, including arms and technology transfer, economic policies and the conduct of diplomacy. The result should be a series of policy measures in each of these areas designed to ensure a dynamic program to promote U.S. interests now and over the next decade together with implementing strategy.

*SCOPE*

This NSSD will address as a minimum the following topics:

—U.S. interests in the region together with the priority in which they should be pursued in view of the crisis.

—The nature of the damage to U.S. interests brought on by the crisis and the additional damage that would accrue if the Argentine-U.K. confrontation is not definitively resolved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Study Directives (NSSD), NSSDs 1982. Secret. Clark sent copies of the NSSD to Bush, Haig, Regan, Weinberger, William F. Smith, Baldrige, Edwards, Stockman, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Brock, Vessey, Rostow, McPherson, and Wick, under a June 23 covering memorandum. (National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files, NSSD 10–82)

<sup>2</sup> This NSSD will build upon and embrace policy previously established by this Administration. [Footnote is in the original.]



—Assessment of the major threats to our interests in the region from whatever quarter.

—Assessment of the threats within the region, e.g., conflict, instability, terrorism.

—Specific U.S. objectives, both regionally and bilaterally.

—Political, economic and other means/resources for securing these objectives.

—Overall U.S. strategy inside the hemisphere, to address the problems, including:

- political/diplomatic strategy
- security strategy, including security assistance for the Americas
- intelligence strategy
- economic/trade strategy

—Priority initiatives, which should be undertaken to support the overall strategy.

—U.S. public/private declaratory policy.

—Review of applicable U.S. laws, e.g., the Security Assistance Act, Arms Transfer, Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, restrictive amendments, etc.

#### *ADMINISTRATION*

This study will be conducted by the Interagency Group on Latin America, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. It should include representatives from the Departments of Treasury and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the International Communication Agency, the office of the United States Trade Representative, and the National Security Council staff.

**Ronald Reagan**

### 361. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 23, 1982, 5–6 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

President's Meeting with U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Haig

National Security Affairs Advisor William P. Clark

NSC Senior Staff Member James Rentschler

Prime Minister Thatcher

British Ambassador to the United States Sir Nicholas Henderson

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Clive Whitmore

Undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for Defense Affairs

David Gilmore

Private Assistant to the Prime Minister Coles

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the South Atlantic.]

Turning to the Falklands, Mrs. Thatcher described the situation which the U.K. faced with the Argentine POWs. There were 10,000 of these, many of them in very bad condition. Argentine military tradition was apparently much different from that of the U.K. or the U.S. in that the officers had very little concern for the troops under their command. The Argentine officers were all sleek and well-fed but had treated their men abominably. Indeed, it was necessary for the British troops to allow the officers to keep their side arms so that they would not be attacked by their own troops. Dysentery, trench foot, and parasites were among the afflictions which the Argentine POWs had to suffer. Their own military medics had given them very poor treatment and during the hostilities at Goose Green had not even cut away the bad gangrenous flesh which some of the victims had. Mrs. Thatcher added that she had told Galtieri that the U.K. wanted to lift sanctions, end the exclusion zone, and send back Argentina's troops, but as yet there had been no reply. In response to the President's question, Mrs. Thatcher said there was no confirmation of the story that some of the Argentine troops had shot themselves through the feet so that they could surrender. She said that the British are holding 600 officers, pilots,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/26/1982–09/29/1982) [Too Late to File]. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

and engineers, and hope to get an explicit message from the Argentines indicating that hostilities are formally over in the South Atlantic. Mrs. Thatcher went on to say that the British were experiencing great difficulty with the plastic mines which the Argentines had sown around the Islands, apparently without leaving any maps to pinpoint their location. There was also evidence that the Navy and the Army had worked at cross purposes while setting up their mine fields. (C)

*The President* recalled that during World War II we had a kind of bulldozer with a raised blade which had proved useful in clearing terrain of mines. (U)

*Secretary Haig* agreed and asserted that there are all kinds of specialized equipment at Fort Belvoir for the specific purpose of mine-clearing operations. (C)

*The President* offered to provide assistance to the British with whatever equipment we could make available. He jocularly recalled that in times past mules were used on mine fields, but the animals were very canny and never detonated any of the mines, although it often happened that the troops marching directly in their footprints did so. (U)

*Secretary Haig* noted that the Vietnamese customarily sent their prisoners into mine fields. (U)

*Ambassador Henderson* said that the Russian practice was to use their own men. (U)

*Mrs. Thatcher* laughingly suggested that she would use the Falkland sheep for that purpose. (U)

In a more serious vein, the *President* noted the change of government that appeared to be taking place in Argentina and suggested that it was a development which might make it easier for Mrs. Thatcher to resolve, on a definitive basis, the situation in the South Atlantic. He said that he assumed that Mrs. Thatcher wanted a peace which did not have the British standing guard duty indefinitely so far from home. (C)

*Mrs. Thatcher* replied that the British would likely be in the Falklands for a very long time. The British had been caught napping once, but they would not be caught a second time. She asserted that her government is sending back Rex Hunt very soon as civil commissioner. The two priorities in the Islands now are rehabilitation and reconstruction; at some point, it might be desirable to bring the Falklands into a self-governing status, similar perhaps to the formula the U.S. worked out on Guam. She added that she and her government will do everything they can to restore normal relations with Latin American countries—"we will have to be gentle." Mrs. Thatcher noted that with the exception of Argentina, all British ambassadors remain at their posts.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the South Atlantic.]

### 362. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 24, 1982

#### SUBJECT

UK Request for 20 Harpoon Missiles—ACTION MEMORANDUM

In light of your conversation with Al Haig at this morning's breakfast<sup>2</sup> we have decided to go forward with the transfer of 20 air launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles to the UK. In addition, we will also fulfill the UK request for various equipments that will permit them to launch those missiles from aircraft.

To recapitulate, the issues surrounding this particular transfer arise from Navy and JCS opposition to the further degradation of US readiness.<sup>3</sup> Present Harpoon inventory is about 75 percent of air and shipfill requirements with only deploying units assured of a full loadout. While it would be possible to reconfigure missiles from the Iranian Harpoon inventory, the Navy would need up to 30 days to transfer the missiles to the UK in order not to remove missiles already with the fleet. The British requested that the first eight missiles be delivered within the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 24.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of the meeting has been found. However, a "debrief" paper on the June 24 Haig-Weinberger breakfast meeting, prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, indicates that arms for the United Kingdom were discussed although it does not indicate that a specific decision about the British request for Harpoon missiles was taken. In addition, the meeting discussed three other issues relevant to the Falklands/Malvinas: hemispheric relations in the aftermath of the war, Thatcher's request for assistance with plastic mines planted by the Argentines, and the restoration of military-military ties between the United States and Argentina. (Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Files of the Special Assistant to the Director of Politico-Military Affairs, June 1981-June 1983, Lot 83D229, Haig-Weinberger Meetings: March 1981-June 1982, Haig-Weinberger 6/24/82 S-S Submission)

<sup>3</sup> In a June 18 memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé noted that "State counsels that we not expedite meeting the request, at least until our policy regarding the wider issues had been reviewed." Iklé continued: "A SIG on the South Atlantic has been scheduled for Tuesday [June 22]. I would, therefore, propose that we not move ahead with the transfer of the Harpoon missiles until after the SIG has met." On this point, Weinberger made the following notation: "Please let me see recommendations of SIG as soon as possible." (Ibid.) A June 18 information memorandum from Howe to Eagleburger regarding the U.K. request for Harpoon missiles is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memo 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive June 16 thru 30. A memorandum of conversation of the June 22 SIG meeting on U.S.-Latin American relations following the South Atlantic crisis is in the Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982.

next week, however. I should add that CNO opposes the transfer of any Harpoons at this time because the P-3C units at Brunswick require the Harpoons every bit as badly as the British do.

The Navy also voiced its concern about the transfer of some of the support equipment, especially test set simulators. Each of the four simulators that will be transferred to the UK will deprive a Navy squadron of test capability.<sup>4</sup>

Fred C. Iklé<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Weinberger concurred with the transfer and wrote: "Ambassador indicated they could get along with 8 Harpoons at first—so let's get those + 2 sets of equipment, to the [illegible] a.s.a.p. CW."

<sup>5</sup> Iklé signed "Fred" above his typed signature.

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**363. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 24, 1982

SUBJECT

UK Request for 6 (Additional) Super Rapid Blooming Overhead Chaff (SRBOC) Launchers Plus 1200 Hycor Rounds (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

On June 10, 1982 the Navy released 6 Super Rapid Blooming Overhead Chaff (SRBOC) launchers and 1200 Rounds. We are now in receipt of a request for an additional 6 launchers and 1200 more rounds. Navy has indicated that this second request for Hycor rounds has a direct impact on Navy readiness. Navy is already understocked with 44 percent shipfill and no reserves. Fulfilling the British request would reduce Navy readiness by a further 10 percent. Apparently the UK plans to use the launchers and rounds to protect the next task force against a possible attack by Exocet missiles. The release of the additional rounds would place the UK at 100 percent shipfill with 115 percent in reserve.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 25.

While British concern about a possible Argentine attack is understandable, the urgency of the situation does not appear to necessitate dipping further into Navy readiness. Additionally, the stock of rounds which has already been provided should be sufficient for UK needs. I recommend that we offer to provide the launchers to the British but deny their request for the additional rounds.<sup>2</sup>

Fred C. Ikle<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Weinberger indicated neither approval nor disapproval of the recommendation, although he crossed out the word “only” at the end of the “Approve release of launchers only” option and wrote: “& query UK about their real need for 1200 more rounds, in view of our own shortage.” In response, Iklé submitted another memorandum to Weinberger on July 2, which stated that the British rationale for seeking 1,200 rounds was that the United Kingdom required “twice the number of rounds to fire against Exocet missiles as against Soviet missiles, which are the basis for our own threat assessment and requirements,” that the U.K. requirement “is also increased because its launchers have been inefficiently placed; they had to be grafted onto ships that had already been outfitted,” and that the British “are, in any event, quite nervous about incoming aircraft since the sinking of the Sheffield.” In light of this, Iklé recommended offering 900 rounds, a recommendation Weinberger approved. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

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#### 364. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 24, 1982

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

2. *Senior Interagency Group (SIG) Meeting on Post-Falklands Policy Toward Latin America.* Larry Eagleburger chaired a SIG meeting to address next steps in Latin America in the wake of the Falklands episode.<sup>2</sup> While there has been short-term damage to our relations with the hemisphere, it was generally felt that as emotionalism subsides most countries will resume business as usual with the United States—but with some new twists that require further analysis. Demands for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—June 1982. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 362.

advanced military technology may increase, but the deep indebtedness of many countries may limit expansion of military budgets. Cuban opportunities for mischief will be few but the Soviets will have several, particularly through military sales to Argentina.

The Group concluded that our basic priority in favor of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin should not be changed. On the contrary: Latins will view our ability to follow through on the Caribbean Basin Initiative as a litmus test of U.S. attitudes toward the hemisphere. Overall, we should continue careful application of existing policies within our present guidelines, rather than begin any special U.S. programs or policies in the wake of the Falklands war. Finally, the Group believes that public relations efforts toward Latin America, such as those suggested by President Monge to you today,<sup>3</sup> can help rebuild an atmosphere of trust in the hemisphere. (C)

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<sup>3</sup> Likely a mistaken reference to Reagan's June 22 meeting with Monge at the White House. According to the President's Daily Diary, the two leaders met in the Oval Office from 11 a.m. until 12:03 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

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**365. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 25, 1982

SUBJECT

Materiel Support for the UK

*Issue for Decision*

We have a number of outstanding British requests for military equipment. This memorandum recommends a strategy for responding to each of them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive June 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on June 26.

*Essential Factors*

The British are continuing to press their requests for assistance. Since the fighting in the South Atlantic has stopped, the grumbling and resistance at the working level in the Pentagon have increased. The Services resent the diversion of equipment from their own forces in order to meet UK requests, and believe that the British are taking advantage of the Falklands conflict to get immediate delivery of equipment which would play no role in the South Atlantic.

As you know, Secretary Weinberger wants to be responsive until there is a clear cut agreement to end the conflict. Although Secretary Haig is prepared to return our arms supply relationship with the UK to a more normal pace, foreign policy reasons do not provide a compelling rationale for objecting to most individual UK requests supported by OSD.

*Harpoon*

The British have requested early delivery of 20–34 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and the equipment needed to convert UK Nimrod aircraft into Harpoon platforms. (We had previously approved the transfer of information and equipment to assess the feasibility of Nimrod conversion.)

Following a personal appeal from Nikko Henderson on Thursday,<sup>2</sup> Secretary Weinberger has decided to provide eight Harpoon missiles and related equipment immediately.<sup>3</sup> This sale would not require Congressional notification. No decision has been made about the additional Harpoon missiles which the British want to buy.

*Recommendation.* That you concur in Secretary Weinberger's decision to provide eight Harpoon missiles to the UK immediately.<sup>4</sup>

*AIM-9M*

The British have requested twenty of these improved Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The British want the AIM-9M to counter an alleged Argentine capability to degrade the capability of the AIM-9L. The AIM-9M is so new, however, that there are only three of them in the US inventory.

Contrary to our earlier information, we now understand that Secretary Weinberger is prepared to give the British test data about AIM-9L and AIM-9M capabilities against various countermeasures (which presumably shows that AIM-9L performance is adequate), but has not

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<sup>2</sup> June 24.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 362.

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger approved the recommendation.



decided to provide the AIM-9M missiles themselves. Should he decide to go ahead on the missiles, there do not appear to be any strong foreign policy reasons to object to the sale. (However, I personally think this is going a bit far in a non-conflict situation.)

*Recommendation.* That the State Department not object to providing AIM-9L/M test data to the British, nor to providing AIM-9M missiles should Secretary Weinberger decide to do so.<sup>5</sup>

#### *KC-10 Tankers*

The British believe they need additional tanker capabilities to help meet their refueling requirements in the South Atlantic. They may be considering conversion of UK-owned DC-10 aircraft to a tanker configuration to meet these needs. The British also inquired about the availability of USAF KC-10 tankers. Before the fighting stopped, DOD was prepared to offer two KC-10s on a 90-day lease.<sup>6</sup> The British have not yet replied to our question about whether they would be interested in the possibility of a short-term lease.

Although KC-10s would be consistent with the President's policy on materiel support, they would be unmistakable and highly visible evidence of continuing US support for the UK after the *de facto* end of hostilities. That impression could be mitigated if the KC-10s were leased solely for *training* purposes (i.e., to give the British crews experience in flying converted DC-10 tankers) and were *not* operated in the South Atlantic. On the other hand, the KC-10 is not threatening in itself and would be very helpful to the UK in maintaining their presence.

*Recommendation.* That we defer a decision on KC-10s until the British renew their request.<sup>7</sup>

#### *F-4J Aircraft*

The British have inquired about the availability of up to twenty-four F-4J aircraft which we assume they would deploy at Port Stanley. We understand that any F-4s we sold would have to be diverted from US forces, and that F-4s already in the UK inventory are of a type which would be suitable for deployment in the Falklands.

Should the British renew their request, we should first confirm with them that their RAF and RN F-4s also would be suitable for deployment to Port Stanley. If the British believe they do not have enough F-4s both to perform their NATO missions and to meet their

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<sup>5</sup> Eagleburger approved the recommendation and added the following notation: "(re providing data) *Hold* on providing missiles."

<sup>6</sup> See Document 334.

<sup>7</sup> Eagleburger approved the recommendation.

Falklands requirements, we should consider filling in behind them in Europe before agreeing to transfer F-4Js for deployment in the Falklands.

*Recommendation.* That should the British renew their F-4J request, we follow the strategy described above.<sup>8</sup>

*Alternatively,* that the State Department concur in a DOD decision to transfer F-4s (should one be taken).<sup>9</sup>

*Alternatively,* that we defer a decision on F-4s until the British renew their request.<sup>10</sup>

*Overall Policy*

The time may have come to move away from our emergency rearming effort. If the current situation holds for a few more days, I will forward recommendations on how to move toward a more normal arms relationship with the UK.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Eagleburger neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

<sup>9</sup> Eagleburger neither approved nor disapproved the alternative.

<sup>10</sup> Eagleburger approved this alternative.

<sup>11</sup> Eagleburger highlighted the paragraph by drawing two parallel lines in the right-hand margin. Beneath the paragraph, he wrote: "John: I have my doubts. How do we assure some leverage over UK behavior if there is no coherent focus? LSE."

**366. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 28, 1982

## SUBJECT

A Message from Argentina's General Nicolaides

General Nicolaides has transmitted a message via informal channels to my office.<sup>2</sup> The message, I believe, is genuine.

General Nicolaides made three points:

—First, he wanted better U.S.-Argentina relations, but the current situation is difficult. Opinion among officers and civilians is still embittered.

—Second, *the* critical short term problem for the military, especially the army, is the return of the remaining Argentine POWs held by the British on the Falklands.

—Third, if the U.S. could persuade the British to release them without a formal written armistice then “the door would be open for good relations.”

We may have an opportunity here. The British are beginning to be more flexible on this question. A nudge from us might do it. But we need to act quickly if we are going to get any credit with the Argentines. I know the President would appreciate your thoughts and recommendations on this.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1206. Secret; Sensitive. There is no indication that Haig saw the memorandum; a notation in an unknown hand in the bottom right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Received in S/S-I 4:45 on 6/28 by VH Dove.”

<sup>2</sup> According to a June 25 memorandum from Fontaine to Clark, relaying the substance of Nicolaides's message, it was transmitted to Fontaine by telephone from Jorge Juárez Dover in Buenos Aires following a conversation that Juárez Dover had with Nicolaides. In the memorandum, Fontaine stated: “I think this is important and gives us an opportunity. The British seem to be increasingly flexible on this question, but if we move fast we can get some credit with the new government for having brought it about—and we should get that credit. Admiral Poindexter suggested (and I strongly concur) that a message from you to the Secretary of State sharing the contents of this message would be the next step.” (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (June 1982–July 1982)) Fontaine also relayed the substance of Nicolaides's message in a June 25 note to McFarlane. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Clark signed “Bill” above his typed signature.

### 367. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1982, 11:45 a.m.–noon

#### SUBJECT

Summary of Judge Clark's Meeting with Prime Minister Manuel Ulloa of Peru

#### PARTICIPANTS

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Roger W. Fontaine, Senior Staff Member National Security Council

Manuel Ulloa, Prime Minister of Peru  
Roberto Danino, Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Economy, Peru  
Alfonso Rivero, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Peru

*Judge Clark* welcomed Prime Minister Ulloa to the White House and conveyed the President's regards.

*Prime Minister Ulloa* remarked that with the events in the South Atlantic, the way might be cleared for fresh approaches and thus create the possibility of a dialogue. The Prime Minister remarked he had only talked to Secretary Haig by phone, but he had met with Secretary-designate Shultz<sup>2</sup> on several occasions.

Prime Minister Ulloa then conveyed the feelings and mood of the region as he expressed these to Deputy Secretary Stoessel at State.<sup>3</sup> He stated the problem of Argentina is a problem for us all. He is not optimistic about Argentina being able to pull together an effective government and that this would have a negative impact financially, inter alia, on the world system. If Argentina slides into anarchy, this will have a negative effect on all of us trying to make democracy more permanent.

*Judge Clark* stated our support for democratic and constitutional government and that we are helping as much as we can. He expressed the hope that our interruption of relations—in the broad sense of that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Peru [May 1982–July 1982]. Confidential. The meeting took place in Clark's office at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan announced Haig's resignation as Secretary of State on June 25. For the text of this announcement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p. 819. In his memoirs, Haig wrote that his "efforts in the Falklands ultimately cost me my job as Secretary of State. As I had forewarned my wife, the work I had done was perceived to be a failure, and those in the Administration who had been looking for an issue on which to bring me down recognized that I had given them one. Knowing that this would be so, I accepted the consequences when they came, very soon afterward." (Haig, *Caveat*, p. 298) Haig's resignation formally took effect on July 5, and Stoessel served as Acting Secretary from July 5 until July 16. Shultz, whom Reagan nominated on June 25, succeeded Haig as Secretary of State on July 16.

<sup>3</sup> No memorandum of conversation of Ulloa's meeting with Stoessel has been found.

term—will be short lived. But it depends on what government emerges. The Judge then asked the Prime Minister, what should we be doing that we are not doing?

*Prime Minister Ulloa* said that it was a delicate matter. There is a limit as to what the U.S. can do. Brazil and Peru can speak more directly and openly about political matters.

As for change in the OAS and the inter-American system, that should be played very coolly. The issue should remain dormant for a while. There is no unanimity of views, in any case.

The U.S. might place more emphasis on multilateral institutions. Issues like graduation that affect Mexico and Argentina are best handled by the World Bank, the IDB, and the IMF.

In general, nerves are irritated. Some realize there is no preferred relationship and that the U.S. has a global strategy. Argentina's defeat also caused Latin resentment against the U.S. and the British.

But there are fundamental ties, and setbacks are inevitable. The U.S. should try to soothe feelings and still not be patronizing. In the meantime, Brazil can exert a quiet influence.

At the same time, the left will fish in Argentina's muddied waters, but we should remain cautious and careful.

Finally, we should maintain our bilateral relations with individual countries in Latin America.

Returning to the Argentinian problem, the Prime Minister added that they have brought much of this upon themselves, but we cannot let Argentina go. Argentina remains a western nation—more so than most.

*Judge Clark* thanked the Prime Minister for his views and expressed strong support for U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz.

*Prime Minister Ulloa* said the U.S. Ambassador was doing well and had come out of his first months in Lima relatively unscathed.

**368. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 29, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Military Lessons of the Falklands and Israeli Actions

The Falklands conflict and the Israeli military actions against Syria and the PLO could have important lessons for U.S. defense planning. This issue has already received a great deal of coverage and analysis by the media. Moreover, the military lessons of these conflicts could become topics of discussion during Congressional consideration of the Administration's defense request and ultimately influence public attitudes towards U.S. defense policy.

Therefore, it would be helpful if DOD would conduct an in-depth analysis of the military lessons to be learned from these two conflicts and their implications for current and future U.S. defense programs. It would be appreciated if you would provide the results of this analysis by September 15. It would also be helpful if you would provide suggested interim public affairs guidance by July 7.<sup>2</sup>

It may also prove useful to brief the results of the in-depth analysis at a future meeting of the National Security Council.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT:****William P. Clark<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in Weinberger's office on June 30.

<sup>2</sup> Weinberger responded to Clark's memorandum on July 8, stating that the Department of Defense "has started to conduct in-depth analyses of combat experience both in the Falklands and Lebanon conflicts. [See Document 354.] In the case of the Falklands, I already have promised the President to have preliminary findings of lessons learned to him by the beginning of August. A longer-term, in-depth effort also is underway that may require at least six months. Our suggested Public Affairs announcement of the Falklands effort is attached." Helm forwarded the memorandum, along with the draft announcement, under a July 13 covering memorandum, in which Helm summarized Weinberger's response and indicated that the NSC Staff would monitor the study. All of the memoranda and attachments are in the Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. On this "longer-term, in-depth" study of the South Atlantic conflict, see Document 378.

<sup>3</sup> Clark signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

**369. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
(Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

SUBJECT

Falklands Follow-up

In the memo at Tab B, Tom Enders recommends a Presidential message to the new Argentine President, early lifting of economic sanctions, and non-involvement in the POW issue, except to encourage UK flexibility.<sup>2</sup> I disagree with these recommendations:

(1) On the Presidential message, until we have taken some concrete steps (e.g., on sanctions and/or POW's), the Argentines will dismiss friendly words, which will appear empty and condescending.

(2) On sanctions, this is too soon after the latest Reagan-Thatcher conversation.<sup>3</sup> We'll have a more natural opportunity—perhaps quite soon—if the British release the POW's.

(3) On the POW's themselves, we should try to get all the credit we can for their release. Pym's current notion is to announce their release when Perez de Cuellar visits London on July 12–13. I believe we may be able to facilitate an earlier release, and in any case, we have every right to ask the British to share the credit with us, particularly since the Argentines have asked for our help.

I recommend the following approach:

- no Presidential message until we have taken some positive step;
- responding to Nicolaides, through Shlaudeman, that we have taken note of their message<sup>4</sup> and will do what we can with the British;
- calling in Nicko to encourage an early move on the POW's and to ask that the British use us as the intermediary;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1216. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a June 29 action memorandum from Enders and Blackwill to Haig. On the memorandum, Bremer indicated Haig's disapproval of the recommendation to forward the attached memorandum to the President seeking authorization to lift economic sanctions and added the following notation: "Secretary signed an alternative memo to the President on the subject." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1218)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 361.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 366.

—holding off on lifting sanctions until the UK decides on the POW's—or, if it appears that they will not move soon on that, at least another week or so.

At Tab A is a memo to the President outlining this course of action.<sup>5</sup>

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1225)

<sup>6</sup> Eagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed signature.

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**370. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to  
President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1982

SUBJECT

Rebuilding Relations with Argentina

General Bignone is scheduled to become the new president of Argentina on July 2. The threat of a coup by disgruntled military officers is still real but seems to have receded; Bignone has selected some moderates for his cabinet, and he has held positive talks with responsible civilian political leaders, promising a return to elected government by 1984.

Bill Clark has had a message from Argentine Army Chief Nicolaides, asking that we attempt to arrange the return of the remaining 1,000 prisoners.<sup>2</sup> It appears that the British are contemplating an early repatriation even in the absence of an explicit Argentine acknowledgment of an end to hostilities, which the British now realize is unrealistic. We want to be sure that we get all the credit we can with the Argentines for a prisoner release. I therefore propose:

—that we have our Ambassador tell Nicolaides that we will do what we can with the British;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 366.



—that I call in Nicko Henderson to encourage an early move on the prisoners and to ask that they use us as the intermediary.

If we succeed on the prisoners, we will have an early and natural occasion on which to lift our own economic sanctions against Argentina. If the British are not prepared to return the prisoners soon, we should lift economic sanctions anyway in another week or so, after advising the UK. These sanctions, while largely symbolic, are a serious obstacle to restoration of US-Argentine ties, and it will be hard to justify their continuation if the *de facto* ceasefire holds. We should not, however, reopen the military pipeline until we have a clear idea of where the new Argentine Government is heading.

Once we have taken these steps, a message from you to President Bignone would be in order. Before we have taken some concrete steps, I am concerned that sending a Presidential message would be leading with our chin.

I will also instruct Ambassador Shlaudeman to initiate a dialogue with the new Foreign Minister.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the course of action outlined above.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reagan neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. However, at the bottom of the page, he wrote: "I'd like to have British agreement on the prisoner return & on the sanctions. In view of the fuss over the pipeline I'd like to know the U.K. would have no reluctance about our lifting sanctions other than mil. of course. Asking them to let us be the intermediary on prisoners should be on basis that if & when they (U.K.) are ready it could help us with our other Latin Am. interests. RR."

**371. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Materiel Support for the UK

This memorandum reports on the status of several British requests for assistance.

*Mine Clearing.* During her meeting with the President, Mrs. Thatcher raised the possibility of US assistance in clearing plastic anti-personnel mines emplaced by the Argentines on East Falkland.<sup>2</sup> As you know, Secretary Haig raised this during the June 25 breakfast with Secretary Weinberger.<sup>3</sup> The British military attache has followed up with DOD personnel on this issue.

For the present, the British primarily are interested in discussing techniques and procedures for clearing the mines. They have not yet requested any equipment to assist them in this task. Bulldozers apparently are too heavy for the soft bogs. I have confirmed that the UK Embassy is satisfied that the Pentagon is being responsive on this issue.

*Harpoon.* As you know, we have agreed to provide eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles which the British plan to install on their Nimrod aircraft. These eight were part of a British request for twenty Harpoon.<sup>4</sup> The UK now wants the twelve additional missiles.

We understand that OSD staff will recommend to Secretary Weinberger that he *not* approve immediate delivery of twelve more Harpoon. OSD staff believes that the British do not have an urgent requirement for the additional missiles. They also are concerned that the Navy—whose objections were overruled when sale of the first eight missiles was approved—will use the requirement for Congressional notification of the proposed Harpoon sale to air their reservations more publicly. (Our soundings do not indicate that this is a big issue with the Navy.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive July 1–10. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 361.

<sup>3</sup> Likely a mistaken reference to the June 24 Haig-Weinberger breakfast meeting. See footnote 2, Document 362.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 362.

I will keep you informed about the status of the Harpoon issue and will ensure that DOD seeks your concurrence before approving transfer of any additional missiles.

*AIM-9M.* You will recall that the British have asked for twenty AIM-9M air-to-air missiles, a model which is so new that there are only three such missiles in the US inventory. We have responded with a proposal to exchange test data on the performance of AIM-9L and AIM-9M missiles.<sup>5</sup> We also understand that OSD—which is very skeptical about the UK's asserted need for the AIM-9M—is actively discouraging the British from pursuing their request for the missiles themselves.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 365.

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**372. Memorandum From Roger W. Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 6, 1982

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation with Argentine Ambassador, Esteban A. Takacs and Brigadier General Miguel A. Mallea Gil, Military Attache

Over lunch with Ambassador Takacs and General Mallea Gil on July 1 these points were made:

According to both the attache and the ambassador, General Bignone was a moderate and he had chosen a relatively strong cabinet under the circumstances. AGUIRRE Lanari, the foreign minister, is inexperienced but is conservative. He has spent little or no time in the United States. The new finance minister, DAGNINO Pastore, served under President Ongania after Krieger Vasena, and he is a moderate. His views do not differ much from Alemann, but he is easier to deal with than his predecessor. The Ambassador believes Dagnino will give the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (June 1982–July 1982). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. The meeting took place at the Ambassador's residence.

industrial sector “a little oxygen” to revive business and restore private sector confidence.

General Mallea worried aloud about the President’s statement on the Argentines during his press conference,<sup>2</sup> wondering why the President “was so hard on us.” Both felt we needed a public gesture like lifting the sanctions which would strengthen Bignone. Even at that, it would be four to six months before any U.S. delegation should be sent to Buenos Aires. In the meantime, General Mallea suggested the new Secretary of State could meet with all the Latin American ambassadors as a sign of his interest.

Later, alone with Takacs, the ambassador admitted that Malvinas was a disaster brought on by the Argentines themselves. He felt the civilians were at the greatest fault—Costa Mendez in particular—because they did not have the courage to warn the military of the consequences of such an action. He added he would be returning to Buenos Aires “to smell out the new government.” He was not sure he would be asked to stay in Washington.

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to a remark made by Reagan in his June 30 press conference. In response to a question about the direction of U.S. foreign policy, Reagan stated: “Secretary Haig did a superhuman job in trying to prevent bloodshed in the South Atlantic situation regarding the Falklands. We were unable to succeed in that to persuade the aggressive party to leave the islands and then have a peaceful solution to the problem.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, p 829)

**373. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Warning, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency (Cochran) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)<sup>1</sup>**

DDI #5624–82

Washington, July 8, 1982

SUBJECT

Short-term Argentine Intentions

1. President Bignone's government intends to maintain the de facto ceasefire with Britain, but it cannot, for domestic political reasons, accede to London's demand for a formal statement acknowledging a cessation of hostilities. Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari stated publicly on 5 July that "There is in fact a ceasefire by Argentina in the South Atlantic, but that does not mean that we are giving up the defense of the 100-year-old rights." The highest priority of the Argentine leaders is to protect their claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, and they are therefore unwilling to take any steps, such as a formal cessation of hostilities, that in their view would prejudice this claim. Army Commander General Nicolaides told a military audience on 3 July that recovery of the islands, using "the most appropriate measures possible," would continue to be the main objective of Argentine foreign policy.

2. The Argentines apparently are confident that the British eventually will release the remaining Argentine prisoners of war, lift the maritime restrictions, and end economic sanctions without securing a formal declaration ending hostilities. This calculation probably is correct because the Thatcher government is searching for a way to end the impasse and to return the last 590 prisoners. According to press reports, London is considering a unilateral declaration on the cessation of hostilities, assuming that Argentina would not challenge such an initiative. In a move to facilitate a British declaration, the Argentines on 7 July released a Harrier pilot, their only British prisoner.<sup>2</sup>

3. The Argentine government apparently does not intend to take early action to bring the Beagle Channel dispute to a head. Although

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files (1982), Box 16, Box 1: C–353 Argentina. Secret. Sent through Hutchinson.

<sup>2</sup> On July 8, the Embassy in London reported that the FCO had informed them that the sole British prisoner of war remaining in Argentine custody had been released. (Telegram 188898 to Buenos Aires, July 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820006–0398)

Argentina has scores to settle with the Chileans over their assistance to the British during the Falklands conflict, the Bignone government does not seem to be under any immediate domestic pressure to provoke a test of strength with Chile. Army leaders appear to see no alternative but to proceed with their pledge of 22 June to lead a “short-term transition government” aimed at restoring civilian political rule “by the early months of 1984.”

4. Argentine policy on the dispute with Chile, however, may be influenced more heavily by political infighting within the Army than policy with respect to the Falklands. The state of affairs in the Army is too uncertain to allow confident long-term judgments. There is great bitterness in the officer corps over Argentina’s defeat and strong sentiment for punishing those senior generals who are responsible for the debacle. Army politics could still generate an upheaval in the senior command that might impel General Nicolaides to provoke a conflict with Chile as a means of defending his position and protecting the Army’s political primacy.

Harry C. Cochran

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**374. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 8, 1982

SUBJECT

Lifting of US Sanctions on Argentina

Based on your reaction to our earlier memorandum on this subject,<sup>2</sup> we advised the British that we were considering the possibility of lifting economic sanctions on Argentina but wanted their views before making a decision. In response, the British expressed the hope that we would maintain sanctions for the time being, while they attempted to clarify the Argentine position with regard to a formal ceasefire and return of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Secret. Fontaine forwarded the memorandum to Clark as the second of two tabs under a July 8 covering memorandum. The first tab is Document 375.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 370 and footnote 3 thereto.

prisoners.<sup>3</sup> The British also asked that, if and when we lift sanctions, we continue our arms embargo and make clear that sanctions would be reimposed if the Argentines resume hostilities.

In the meantime, evidence has mounted that the Argentines will not explicitly accept a ceasefire, but also that they will not resume hostilities. In addition, the new government has made clear that our continuation of sanctions is a serious obstacle to US-Argentine reconciliation, which they profess to want.

We have just learned from the British that they are about to propose to the Argentines, via the Swiss, that the prisoners be returned without precondition.<sup>4</sup> The British have asked us to make no public disclosure of this until they have worked out the modalities and made their own announcement. They also ask that we not lift sanctions until the prisoner problem is settled, which should take no more than a day or two; but they say they would understand if we lifted sanctions promptly thereafter. We will look for an opportunity to get some credit for the prisoner move with the Argentines. We have, in fact, been instrumental in convincing the British that they could not secure a formal ceasefire by holding the prisoners.

In view of these developments, we recommend that you authorize the Department to advise the British that we plan to announce the lifting of economic sanctions as soon as we receive word that the Argentines have agreed to arrangements for return of the prisoners. The announcement would specify that the sanctions will be reimposed if the *de facto* ceasefire is breached.

If there is a hitch in the prisoner deal, we should nevertheless lift the sanctions promptly, in view of the high political price we are paying in Argentina and the fact that our sanctions give us no useful leverage. Thus, we propose also to tell the British that even if the prisoner problem is not resolved we will lift sanctions by Tuesday, July 13.

#### *Recommendation*

That you authorize us to advise the British of our intention to lift economic sanctions on Argentina as soon as arrangements for the prisoner return are agreed, but in any event by Tuesday, July 13.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The approach was made by Eagleburger in a July 2 meeting with Braithwaite. (Telegram 185205 to London, July 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820006–0286)

<sup>4</sup> The text of the British message to the Argentines, conveyed through the Swiss, was given to Eagleburger by Braithwaite on July 2, and transmitted in telegram 184638 to Buenos Aires, July 3. (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Falklands (May 1982–September 1982))

<sup>5</sup> The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved.

**375. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Lifting U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Argentina

*Issue*

U.S. economic sanctions against Argentina imposed on April 30 served a useful purpose, but it is time to lift them without further delay after giving notification to the British.

*Facts*

The British asked us to keep the sanctions in place for another ten days or so, as leverage on the prisoner return/cessation of hostilities issue. The Argentine government has not been receptive, however. In Buenos Aires' view, any further Argentine *public* statement on formally ending hostilities—London's quid pro quo for the Argentine prisoners—would greatly undermine the new government, absent some British agreement to negotiations over the Islands' future status. Meanwhile, the Argentine government has made clear through public and private channels that a public gesture (lifting the sanctions) on the part of the U.S. is a sine qua non to begin improving Argentine relations.

*Discussion*

Our sanctions show signs of becoming a political football in this country. There are new questions as to why U.S. sanctions continue and what U.S. interests they serve.

U.S. economic interests include \$10 billion in U.S. private bank lending which must be protected as part of the \$35 billion total Argentine foreign debt restructuring about to get underway. Japan and the European Economic Community have already lifted their sanctions,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Confidential. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Prepared by Fontaine. Fontaine forwarded the memorandum to Clark as the first of two tabs under a July 8 covering memorandum. The second of the two tabs is Document 374. The covering memorandum and its tabs were attached to a July 9 transmittal form sending the package of documents to Clark in Santa Barbara. On this transmittal form, Poindexter wrote a note, dated July 12: "President essentially approved second option. Sanctions lifted on 12 July 82." (Ibid.) Reagan's July 12 statement announcing the termination of economic sanctions against Argentina is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book II, p. 914.



and their exporters have a competitive jump over U.S. firms. This could cost us as much as \$100 million per month.

Finally, and most importantly, the sanctions jeopardize our efforts to restore our relations with Argentina and the rest of Latin America. Each week that passes is time lost in the difficult process of rebuilding working relationships in the hemisphere. Specifically, lifting such sanctions would improve relations with Argentina, Peru and Venezuela.

We have gone to great lengths to consult with the British on this issue and to take account of their interests. We will continue to keep them fully abreast of our plans, but it is time for us to move now.

*Recommendation*

That you authorize the immediate lifting of economic sanctions against Argentina after notifying the British of our intentions.

That you authorize us to advise the British of our intention to lift economic sanctions on Argentina as soon as arrangements for the prisoner return are agreed, but in any event by Tuesday, July 13.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Neither recommendation was approved or disapproved, but see footnote 1 above.

**376. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1982

SUBJECT

Eximbank and Post-Falklands Argentina

*Issue*

Now that sanctions against Argentina are being lifted,<sup>2</sup> we need to begin rebuilding relations with Latin America and demonstrate our desire to normalize relations with Argentina. Lifting the Chafee Amendment determination blocking Exim credits to Argentina<sup>3</sup> is an important step, but we must also encourage Exim to go forward as soon as feasible with lending in Argentina.

*Essential Factors*

Revocation of the Chafee Amendment finding is itself an important signal to the Argentines, but they will also be anxious for an actual renewal of Exim lending. Argentina's precarious financial situation will make it difficult for Exim to approve new loans. It could even threaten disbursement of loans approved prior to the Falklands war.

The key case pending is a giant \$500 million loan for the Yacyreta hydropower project, of great symbolic and economic importance to Argentina and to major US suppliers. Due primarily to Argentine delays, the loan agreement for Yacyreta has not yet been signed. Exim is extremely reluctant to sign it now because of Argentina's diminished credit-worthiness. Lifting the Chafee Amendment sanctions will be seen as a hollow gesture if Exim then refuses to do business in Argentina.

If we press Exim to move rapidly toward disbursement on Yacyreta or other loans to Argentina that may be swept up in an Argentine rescheduling, Exim would have every legal basis for refusing and we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830007–1119. Confidential. Drafted by J.S. Monier (EB/IFD/ODF) on June 24; cleared in draft by Constable, McMullen, G. Rase (EB/IFD/OMA), Penfold, S. Smith (ARA/SC), and Johnston. Monier initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner indicates that Eagleburger saw the memorandum on July 10.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 375.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 69.

would risk the same sort of criticism we received on the Polish CCC default issue.

However, we believe that Exim can be persuaded to sign a loan agreement in the near future for Yacyreta provided it can protect itself by delaying actual disbursements until Argentina's financial outlook has stabilized. The Yacyreta project has already been much delayed, and even without Exim footdragging, is likely to suffer further delays of a year or more before disbursements could begin. In addition, the negotiations on the loan agreement are still open. Exim could protect itself from disbursing into a default by inserting provisions that would allow it to postpone disbursement in the event of a rescheduling.

*Recommendations*

1. That you call Bill Draper to inform him of the rescission of the April 30 Chafee Amendment Determination. (Mr. Draper will be at home—338-1504—over the weekend. Monday he will travel to Seattle and can be reached through his office—Linda Putnam at 566-8144.)<sup>4</sup>

2. That you sign the letter to Exim Chairman Bill Draper urging him to proceed with signing the Yacyreta loan agreement (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger initialed his approval of the recommendation on July 12.

<sup>5</sup> The letter, with handwritten edits, is in the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830007–1122.

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**377. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, July 14, 1982, 1230Z

4140. ARA only for Assistant Secretary Enders. Subject: Malvinas/ Falklands: The U.S. Peace Effort.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. In the various suggestions I have seen from our missions around the hemisphere on repairing the damage, little attention has been given to one problem: the distorted view in Latin America of the Haig mission and our efforts to promote a peaceful settlement while there was still

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820365–0542. Confidential.

time. Costa Mendez and his crew assiduously promoted the notion that the negotiations were fatally flawed from the outset by our pro-British bias and that the proposals we made were manifestly unfair. There are even some here who profess to believe that the entire exercise was a fake on our part, designed to throw the Argentines off their guard and allow the British to bring their forces into place.

3. The best response from our side is the text of the April 27 proposal itself.<sup>2</sup> Particularly in the aftermath of the Argentine debacle in the South Atlantic it appears fair, balanced and even generous from the Latin American perspective. I do not favor a formal white paper or high-profile press presentation at this point, but it does seem to me that we should try to promote a better understanding in Latin America of our efforts. Perhaps we could release to the press up there the April 27 proposal, along with a brief explanatory note on the course of the negotiations and the text of Costa Mendez's response (published here) which so clearly demanded a pre-determined outcome.<sup>3</sup> The material could then be used selectively by our missions in the region.

4. There are a few signs of second thoughts here. Alvaro Alsogaray, prominent economist and political figure, has questioned the GOA conduct of the negotiations. Columnist Igelsias Rouco, a fervent supporter of the war until it was lost, in his July 13 piece concedes that Argentina missed the boat in mid-April. The polemic will go on for a long time in this country, and, given the emotions involved, may not be subject to much reasoned outside influence until a later stage. But elsewhere in Latin America perhaps we can correct some of the distortions more quickly.

**Shlaudeman**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 181.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 189.

**378. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1982

## SUBJECT

Military Lessons from the Falklands (U)

(C) As reported to you in my activity report of 4 June 1982,<sup>2</sup> we have begun to study the issues and implications of the battle in the Falklands. A long-term study effort has been established along the lines of our analysis of the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. While an interim report is expected in mid-September,<sup>3</sup> some very early observations are now possible.

(TS) The first conclusion evident from the experience in the Falklands is the danger of attempting to draw conclusions too quickly. The widely-mentioned “lesson learned” concerning vulnerability of ships with aluminum superstructures, which followed the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD, is a case in point. In the rush to draw conclusions, many supposedly knowledgeable people assumed that the SHEFFIELD had an aluminum superstructure. This was not, in fact, the case. Although we have little data to go on, it appears that the EXOCET missile did not explode but instead penetrated a space next to a main engineering plant and may have ignited a fuel fire, which spread beyond the control of the ship’s fire fighting organization. The central fact is, though, that we now believe that the presence or absence of aluminum in SHEFFIELD was not a contributing factor in her tragic loss. At least

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Top Secret. Iklé forwarded the memorandum to Weinberger under a July 16 covering memorandum, noting that Weinberger had promised “an informative memo” in a June 4 weekly activity report to Reagan and recommending that Weinberger sign the memorandum. Clark forwarded Weinberger’s memorandum to Reagan under a July 27 covering memorandum. Reagan initialed the covering memorandum, indicating that he saw it. (Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) In response to this memorandum, Clark sent a brief note to Weinberger on July 27, informing him of Reagan’s appreciation of the memorandum and noting: “Elaboration on these initial points and subsequent assessment, in association with lessons resulting from the DOD examination of the Lebanese conflict, will enable the Administration to present future defense requests to Congress from the perspective of the most recent combat experience.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982)

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger submitted an interim report on the status of the Department of Defense effort to identify lessons learned in the South Atlantic conflict under an October 15 covering memorandum to Clark. (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Falklands (October 1982–December 1982))

two other British combatants with aluminum superstructures were lost due to conventional bombs, but we will not know the full story behind these losses until the Royal Navy completes its investigation.

(C) We intend to proceed carefully in arriving at lessons learned and using them in briefings or other communications. I have established the appropriate mechanisms in DOD to achieve these objectives.

(S) The progress of our study effort will depend on the pace with which the British and Argentines go about collecting, organizing, and analyzing pertinent data and reports from those that participated in the conflict. The British are well along in organizing their lessons learned effort which will be a centrally controlled, integrated MOD study. We can expect that the British will be helpful in conveying to us what they are learning.

(U) There appears to be consensus on the following preliminary lessons:

(S) —Flexible and skilled forces capable of multiple tasks can be decisive. Although the British had inadequate or no contingency plans for such an effort, they did extremely well in developing ad hoc plans, devising appropriate operations and tactics, and carrying out their objectives. They were able to load depot stocks aboard 58 civilian ships by the end of May using requisition, charter, and conversion where necessary. Furthermore, the first elements of the Task Force sailed in five days, two days less than the British thought necessary for a contingency in Europe.

(U) —The usefulness of naval forces has been reconfirmed in dealing with contingencies like the Falklands conflict. British actions demonstrated the need to be able to project naval power to remote geographic areas and to engage in amphibious operations, for which British operational concepts and tactics proved very successful, especially in the assault and ground actions.

(TS) —The importance of gaining and maintaining air superiority in maritime/amphibious operations was also reconfirmed. The British used small carriers capable of deploying limited numbers of Sea Harrier aircraft, but lacking any bases close enough to the action to be usable, the small carriers provided only a small volume of air offense and defense. In fact it was the lack of long-range air defense warning systems, and air attack systems, that made this such a close run thing. One of the first lessons seems to be the inestimable value of large carriers, with their air defense provided by ships of the carrier groups, in such situations. If the British had not been lucky in several instances when Argentine MK-82 bombs struck six ships and did not explode, the outcome would have been much worse. We do not currently know the reasons for these Argentine failures, but we are looking into the following possibilities:

- fuzes may have been defective
- Argentine pilots may have delivered the bombs at too low an altitude

(S) —The ability to improvise in the midst of conflict resulted in many unplanned successes. Britain modified quickly a large number of commercial ships for use as mine-sweepers, troop carriers, aircraft transporters, hospital ships and other purposes. The Argentines managed to improvise the mating of the EXOCET missile to the delivery aircraft, without prior training, and after the French technicians had left. And they also appear to have launched the land version of this missile under much the same handicaps.

(S) —The difficulty of Britain—and possibly other allies—to support over time non-NATO military actions without reliance on U.S. assistance. This is due not only to inadequate forces, but the refusal of many NATO allies to consider any NATO planning for activities outside the NATO area. Ironically enough, the only NATO country to accept our pleas for such planning has been England.

British logistics capabilities were severely stressed by the long distances involved, and their stocks of some conventional warfare materials were quite limited, especially so for the latest, higher technology items. This required the early provision of U.S. material as well as the use of Ascension Island.

(S) —British need for U.S. support tells us something important. Our NATO allies have designed their own forces with few reserves and supplies. This is likely to result in requests for U.S. augmentation in any non-NATO contingency. A drawdown of NATO and U.S. stocks and capability results. We may not have planned adequately for this.

(U) In addition to these lessons, the following observations and preliminary assessments now seem noteworthy:

(S) —Mobile and man-portable surface-to-air U.K. missiles systems, such as Rapier and Blowpipe, were quite effective. These systems are currently credited with downing a large number of Argentine aircraft. Realizing that about seventy percent of all free world produced anti-ship missiles have been exported to the Third World, we should not be too surprised that the Argentines also downed at least two U.K. helicopters using Blowpipes previously supplied by the British.

(S) —The value of good training was demonstrated. The value of good leadership was even more conclusively demonstrated. The outnumbered British forces outperformed and defeated conscript Argentine ground forces in defensive positions. The British believe this high level of performance was due to the rigorous and active training their troops undergo, and the excellent leadership qualities of their officers and NCOs. By contrast, Argentine officers were widely reported, by Argentine soldiers, to have neglected the soldiers' welfare.

(S) —The need for timely and secure communications was evident. The British were able to take advantage of existing communications systems, with U.S. intelligence assistance, to coordinate military operations and to exploit Argentine weaknesses. U.S. assistance in this area gave the British a distinct advantage.

(S) —The British set and conveyed clear objectives that were understood and implemented by the British military leadership. This allowed necessary authorities to be delegated, unequivocal rules of engagement to be established, and on-scene field commanders to proceed as they believed required.

(S) In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have been a closer call than many would believe. The British won primarily because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in training, leadership and equipment. But luck also played a significant role. The failure of the Argentine bombs is but one example; others exist. The British prevailed and pushed to victory just in time as they were critically low on artillery rounds and other supplies (8 rounds per barrel of artillery and no helicopter fuel) when they retook Stanley.

(S) Finally, it must be said that one of the factors in the British success was the strong and very rapidly delivered and effective help from us. Their requests for various items frequently resulted in deliveries within less than 3 to 5 days. And many of the items we supplied so rapidly were vital, such as air landing runway matting.

(S) As to the lessons to be learned from the conflict in *Lebanon*, I have established a coordinated study effort. But since that conflict is still in a delicate stage we have held back from approaching the Israelis. I realize that Prime Minister Begin promised you that his government would make data available to us. When the time is right, we will send some experts to Israel.

Cap



**379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 3, 1982, 1617Z

215502. Subj: The Secretary's July 29 Meeting with Pym: The Falklands.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: During a two-hour meeting July 29, the Secretary and UK Foreign Secretary Pym discussed the war in the South Atlantic and the prospects for reconciliation. Pym said that as a result of the war, the UK could not discuss the Falklands with Argentina for at least another year, and it would be even longer before the issue of sovereignty could be on the agenda. Pym also asked for the continuation of the US arms embargo. The Secretary encouraged Pym to move quickly to repair relations with Latin America, and he said that at some point the US may have to reopen its military sales pipeline to Argentina, but promised to consult closely with the UK before taking any action. End summary.

3. The Secretary congratulated Pym on Britain's conduct of the war. He remarked that he had been struck by how quickly a dispute in an isolated area became the center of world attention. Pym said that although HMG believes that the conflict has resulted in only slight long-term damage to the UK's relations with Latin America, they realized that the US and Europeans were worried about their own ties with the hemisphere. The Secretary said the US may have been hurt in Latin America more than the UK, since there was some feeling that the US betrayed its hemispheric neighbors. He said that the US had no second thoughts about its support for great Britain: A clear principle had been involved. Nevertheless, he added, the US needs to proceed with repairing its relations in the region, particularly with Venezuela.

4. Pym remarked that the UK no longer expected to secure a formal cessation of hostilities from the GOA, and that the UK will probably go ahead soon and lift its economic measures against Argentina. He said that no one in Britain will be able to think about the long-term future of the Falklands until sometime next year. In the meantime, there will be a new Shackleton commission to study the future of the Islands. Pym added that although HMG will attempt to normalize

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820007–0183. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Buenos Aires. Drafted by K. Smith; cleared by Pendleton, Burt, McManaway, and in S/S–O; approved by Seitz.

relations with the GOA, after what has happened, no government, at least in the foreseeable future, could negotiate on sovereignty.

5. Pym stated that the UK will forever continue its arms embargo on Argentina, and asked the US to keep its embargo in place for some time. He said that they did not want to see direct sales to Argentina by the allies, and had spoken to France about it. The Secretary remarked that the US is considering the question of military items sold to Argentina prior to 1978 but never delivered, adding that there may be a time in the future when we will want to reopen the pipeline. He said on new arms sales, we first have to make a judgement regarding human rights conditions in Argentina. In any case the Secretary said he would consult with the UK before taking any action.

6. The Secretary and Pym then discussed the broader effects of the South Atlantic crisis. Pym thought the war had had a significant impact in Britain, by unifying the country and increasing Mrs. Thatcher's popularity. It had also helped end the recent rail strike. The Secretary wondered whether war had not had a broader effect on world affairs—and whether it could be compared in some respects to the President's firm action during the air controllers strike since both had injected a new reality into the resolution of disputes. He added that fighting for a principle and making it stick could have an effect far beyond the dispute itself. Pym made a point of expressing HMG's appreciation for US intelligence assistance during the crisis.

7. Also present for the UK were Ambassador Henderson; Brian Fall, Pym's Private Secretary; DCM Derek Thomas; and Embassy Political Officer Christopher Crabbie. From the US side were Under Secretary Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary Designate Burt, and EUR/NE Keith Smith.

**Shultz**

**380. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

The Falklands and Lebanese crises have illuminated the need to have standard, though flexible, crisis management procedures in the Department. Improvising procedures as a crisis develops simply ensures that we all spend valuable time sorting out procedures instead of sorting out policy. It also leads to make-shift procedures, confusion, and bureaucratic turf-fighting.

Attached is an outline of what I think would make sense.<sup>2</sup> If you are interested, Jerry Bremer and my staff, in my absence, could work up a full-blown scheme for your final approval and promulgation in the Department.

You will see that this addresses crisis management *within* State and not on a government-wide basis. I wouldn't advise you to tackle the latter issue head-on, as Al did—to his regret. Besides, sound State procedures that are put in place the moment a crisis erupts are the best safeguard against NSC over-management. The attached plan does, however, suggest how the State crisis management system should relate to other agencies, including the NSC.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve development of a detailed State crisis management system based on the attached outline.<sup>3</sup>

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 25A, Official Memoranda 08/06/1982 (4). Confidential; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated outline.

<sup>3</sup> Shultz approved the recommendation on August 23.

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger initialed "LSE" above his typed signature.

**381. Memorandum From Alfonso Sapia-Bosch of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 10, 1982

SUBJECT

Improving Relations with Argentina

I have had a number of conversations with State and there has now been some movement to improve relations with Argentina.<sup>2</sup> In recent testimony on the Hill, Tom Enders made the following statement: "With regard to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute itself, we hope the two parties will find a process by which they can reach a peaceful solution of their dispute in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter."<sup>3</sup> The Argentines, of course, are aware of this statement. Since it was buried in text, however, it has not received much publicity within Latin America, which would help us in the UN.

With regard to the military pipeline items Argentina ordered before hostilities broke out in the South Atlantic and certification for arms sales, Tom Enders will meet with Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre in Santo Domingo and raise these issues. Enders will tell Aguirre the U.S. will accept a resolution at the UN calling for negotiations between the two parties so long as the language of the resolution is moderate.<sup>4</sup> If the language is acceptable we will press on the pipeline items and certification.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (07/16/1982–08/15/1982). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Rentschler and Fontaine. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> In an August 4 memorandum to Clark, Sapia-Bosch recommended that Clark sign a memorandum to Shultz requesting that Shultz convene a SIG to consider "a low key statement that the U.S. favors negotiations between Argentina and the UK to reach a peaceful and definitive resolution of the status of the Falkland Islands acceptable to both sides," "releasing the military pipeline items for Argentina that were embargoed when the conflict began in the South Atlantic," and "whether we should be the middleman between Argentina and the UK to get the latter to lift the financial sanctions on Argentina and vice versa." Clark disapproved Sapia-Bosch's recommendation. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> The text of Enders's August 5 statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the background and consequences of the South Atlantic crisis, including a description of the Haig mission efforts to prevent hostilities, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1982, pp. 78–82. The text of a paper on the legal aspects of the April–May negotiations, which Enders submitted to the subcommittee, is *ibid.*, pp. 82–85. Also released were the various U.S., Argentine, and U.K. proposals and notes; see *ibid.*, pp. 85–90.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 385.

We should hold in reserve giving publicity to Enders' statement on the Hill until after he can report on his meeting with Aguirre.

I will let you know whatever further action needs to be taken early next week.

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### 382. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

SNIE 90/91–3–82

Washington, August 10, 1982

#### IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT FOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

#### KEY JUDGMENTS

Argentina's use of military force in an effort to impose its claim on the Falkland Islands has raised concern that force might be used by other governments in the hemisphere to settle their territorial and maritime disputes. The Falklands conflict has heightened irredentist rhetoric in some Latin American countries; but, on balance, we believe it has had a dampening effect on prospects for an outbreak of hostilities elsewhere in the region.

Argentina's defeat in the Falklands has made it even more imperative to avoid an unfavorable settlement of its Beagle Channel dispute with Chile. Argentina, however, is not likely to initiate military action during the period of this Estimate—the next year or so—and probably will continue the delaying tactics that have thus far frustrated papal mediation. We believe the Argentine military will be preoccupied with replacing its losses, obtaining more sophisticated equipment, and revamping its strategy, tactics, and force structure. The process of political transition and economic reconstruction will pose additional constraints.

We believe Chile has no intention of initiating conflict. Chile has significantly improved its overall military capabilities over the past few years, but the Argentine military retains a numerical edge over the Chileans despite recent losses. If conflict broke out as a result of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA History Staff Files. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The Estimate was prepared using information available as of August 10.

unplanned escalation, Chilean forces would offer stiff resistance, but eventually would succumb to a determined Argentine assault.

Neither Peru nor Bolivia is likely to attack Chile, even if it is embroiled in a conflict with Argentina. The current Peruvian Government has shown little interest in pursuing its century-old territorial claim, and the military would have serious logistic problems supporting a major assault. Bolivia is in no condition—politically or militarily—to try to regain its access to the Pacific Ocean. Ecuador is not likely to act militarily against Peru, even if Peru were engaged in combat with Chile.

Prospects for an outbreak of territorial conflict elsewhere in the region will be affected mostly by events within the countries involved, not by disputes elsewhere. Although the Falklands conflict has heightened concerns with regard to the disputes involving Venezuela and Guyana, Guatemala and Belize, and Nicaragua and Colombia, we believe domestic and international political/military considerations will continue to restrain the governments of those countries from using force. Lesser disputes in the region have continued to lie dormant or are moving toward negotiated solutions on their own merits.

Moscow will try to use the Falklands conflict to stimulate hemispheric distrust of the United States and to expand its own influence in the region. It almost certainly sees the crisis as providing an opportunity for gaining a military supply relationship with Argentina and for consolidating its military supply relationship with Peru. Moscow offers a full range of weaponry at attractive prices and more rapid delivery rates than Western suppliers. However, the preference of the Latin Americans for Western military equipment, along with their suspicions of the USSR and its surrogates, will limit Soviet Bloc opportunities.

Any new conflicts would serve to reinforce Moscow's efforts and provide increased opportunities to be exploited. If hostilities broke out involving Chile, Moscow would support Argentina and Peru in international forums and probably would offer arms to both countries as well. The USSR, however, is likely to try to avoid being drawn into other territorial disputes.

Additional hemispheric hostilities would adversely affect US interests in the region. There would be greater political and economic instability; disruption of trade, finance, and commerce; additional constraints on the OAS; and a new emphasis on arms acquisition. Most Latin American countries, however, will look to the United States to play a role in helping to resolve intraregional conflicts. While the decades-old trend toward greater independence from Washington will continue, there remains recognition that the United States will remain the most important influence in the hemisphere for years to come.

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the Estimate as well as attached Annexes A–C.]

**383. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1982

**SUBJECT**

British Economic Sanctions on Argentina and Position on Belize

As a result of discussions I had with Tom Enders regarding a strategy to get movement on the British/Argentine economic sanctions issue, I met with British Charge Derek Thomas this afternoon to urge that HMG phase its lifting of financial and trade sanctions in order to accommodate Argentine political constraints. I also took the opportunity to verify that HMG has no immediate plans to withdraw its military forces from Belize (Prime Minister Price had told the Vice President that the British planned to pull out September 21, which was in conflict with what UK Minister of State Cranley Onslow told us last week).

Given Argentina's inability, for political reasons, to accept simultaneous lifting of financial and trade sanctions and its assurances that it could accept removal of the trade embargo within 30 days of lifting of the financial sanctions,<sup>2</sup> I urged that the British try to accommodate the Argentines by separating the two issues and moving quickly on the financial part. In the absence of any movement, the entire debt rescheduling effort would be endangered, threatening banks in both our countries. Thomas described the political constraints facing the Thatcher Government and its skepticism regarding the GOA's ability to live up to its commitments. He understood our position, however, and promised to report our concerns and recommendations to the FCO promptly. He also noted that if HMG accepted our recommendation, it would probably be necessary to obtain a more formal commitment for follow-on action on the trade side from the GOA.

[Omitted here is discussion of British policy on Belize.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL-15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. Confidential. Drafted by J.R. Binns (EUR/NE). Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> On August 10, Shlaudeman met with Dagnino Pastore on the issue of Argentina and the United Kingdom mutually lifting sanctions, a proposal the latter viewed as "impossible." Shlaudeman transmitted a summary of the meeting to the Department in telegram 4632 from Buenos Aires, August 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850588-0150)

### 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 13, 1982, 1942Z

227203. Subject: Falklands-Related Drawdown of UK NATO Forces. Ref: London 17463.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Reftel notes that UK Government has yet to decide size and composition of permanent garrison in Falklands and South Atlantic, and that a number of possibilities are under consideration. It is our view that both US and UK interests would be best served by UK opting for relatively small presence.

3. We recognize the inherent sensitivity of this issue for UK and the controversy surrounding the decision. As a result, a formal demarche to MOD or FCO officials could be resented or even counterproductive. However, in conversations and exchanges on this subject, US representatives should use occasion to make our preference known.

4. In so doing, US officials should draw upon the following points:

—USG recognizes necessity of continued UK military presence in South Atlantic.

—A smaller UK presence would have military advantages of minimizing NATO drawdown, lessening UK operational expenses, and freeing UK forces for other contingencies.

—A smaller presence would also have political advantages of appearing less provocative to new government in Buenos Aires and not putting UK in bind down the road of having to make difficult decisions to reduce presence in the South Atlantic which could communicate unwanted signals to GOA.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (3). Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USNATO. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Haass; cleared by Raphel, Enders, Zakheim, Dobbins, and Binns; approved by Burt. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820422–0243)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 17463 from London, August 10, Streater reported that the U.K. Government planned to “detach six frigates for the foreseeable future from NATO-assigned roles in order to maintain a naval presence in the South Atlantic” and that the six ships would represent a “net deduction from NATO-assigned forces.” Streater added that the “initial plans” for the size of the permanent garrison on the Islands was pegged at 3,000–4,000, although “a strong MOD faction is arguing for a much smaller, less expensive, and less disruptive garrison. Officials arguing for a smaller presence dismiss the Argentine military threat as insignificant; they fear that once established, a large garrison will drain assets, but be politically difficult to reduce without appearing to send the wrong signal to Argentina.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820415–0319)



—A smaller presence in South Atlantic coupled with capability to reinforce rapidly should be sufficient to indicate UK resolve, deter Argentine military action, and defeat any military challenge should deterrence fail. UK should know that USG remains prepared in principle to offer logistical support in peacetime and in contingencies to ease UK operational requirements.

Shultz

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**385. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 16, 1982, 2200Z

5572. Subject: UNGA Resolution on Falkland Islands; Argentine/UK Economic Sanctions.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. In a private meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre, Assistant Secretary Enders conveyed USG willingness to seek a consensus text on UNGA resolution on the Falkland Islands,<sup>2</sup> within limits of U.S. position. He also conveyed the hope that Aguirre and Secretary Schultz could meet at the UNGA session. Aguirre (who showed a monomaniacal interest in the UN question and was obviously not in play on British sanctions) rejected proposals from the British which Enders conveyed seeking to bring about lifting of mutual economic sanctions. Neither side mentioned U.S. military sanctions. End summary.

3. At Assistant Secretary Enders request, he met for one hour with Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Ramon Aguirre Lanari at the Argen-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820426–0735. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the draft resolution, which had been placed on the UNGA agenda at the request of the Mexican UN Representative on behalf of 21 Latin American countries on August 16, was transmitted by the Department in telegram 234980 to Buenos Aires, London, and Mexico City, August 20. In the same telegram, the Department advised the posts that the draft “includes objectionable references to Non-Aligned Movement declarations” which “support Argentine claims to sovereignty over the Falklands and calls for negotiations to begin as soon as possible.” It added: “At this time the US does not intend to take an activist role in negotiating an acceptable text, although we recognize that we may want to reconsider this at a later stage.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820435–0106)

tine residence in Santo Domingo the day before the Presidential inauguration. After general expressions of concern at the poor state of U.S.-Argentine relations, Aguirre made a pointed pitch for “positive gestures” by the USG, in light of the adverse impact on Argentine public opinion of U.S. support for Great Britain in the Falklands crisis. When Ambassador Enders referred to the broad range of issues in our relations, Aguirre insisted that the principal question was U.S. policy on the Malvinas issue. He urged that greater accommodation on this matter be achieved in order to undercut the forces on the extreme left and right who were working against the process of democratization now going on in Argentina.

#### UN Resolution: Inscription and Substance

4. When Aguirre referred to the proposed UNGA resolution on the Falkland Islands, Ambassador Enders identified the two principles of the U.S. position, namely that the resolution not prejudice the sovereignty issue and that it not impose an unrealistic time-table on negotiations. Within those limits, the United States Government would be interested in exploring whether a consensus existed.

5. Aguirre described the substance of the resolution (the text of which was not available at the meeting) which he summarized as calling on the parties to renew negotiations on the Malvinas dispute, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General who would report to the next session of the UNGA. Ambassador Enders, commenting that a detailed consideration of the text would be inappropriate at this point, noted that it appeared that the introductory paragraphs of the resolution contained language which might prejudice the sovereignty issue, and the operative part contained possibly prejudicial timing instructions. He concluded that his purpose was to indicate a possible direction for bilateral consideration working towards a possible convergence on this matter.<sup>3</sup>

6. With regard to inscription of the agenda item, Ambassador Enders also conveyed a positive inclination to consider U.S. support for inscription, provided the proposed text of the item did not prejudice

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<sup>3</sup> On August 17, Streator met with Bullard in London to discuss the draft UN resolution and the proposal for the resumption of negotiations under UN auspices. In telegram 18181 from London, August 17, Streator provided a summary of the meeting, noting that Bullard had stated “that the British intend to stonewall in New York. Bullard said that, at the political level in the U.K. Government, there was no question of resuming negotiations with the Argentines for the foreseeable future. Thatcher is unalterably opposed, and there is no support within the Tory party, or indeed in the Opposition, for fresh talks.” Streator responded: “Though I was without instructions, I believed that the British might be taking an unnecessarily stiff position, in view of the fact that there is such widespread international support for new talks. Bullard agreed that even the Europeans would be clamoring for talks, but, he said, ‘They are just not going to happen.’” (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (08/01/1982–10/03/1982))

the sovereignty question. Aguirre responded that, in light of the August 19 deadline to submit the inscription request, the proposal would best move ahead as a Latin American request, but a public position of support by the U.S. Government would be a welcome positive gesture.

7. In sketching the principal points of the U.S. position for a possible UNGA resolution, Ambassador Enders expressed the hope that Secretary Shultz would be able to meet with Aguirre at the General Assembly session. Aguirre confirmed that he would be attending and looked forward to the possibility of such a meeting.

#### Lifting of Argentine/UK Economic Sanctions

8. Ambassador Enders told Aguirre that the British Government now understood that it would be difficult for the Argentine Government to terminate its trade embargo as a pre-condition to the unblocking of Argentine accounts. The British now looked for a commitment to an "early" end of the trade sanctions combined with specific action in the field of civil aviation, either the reestablishment of the London-Buenos Aires route or the Argentine extension of overflight rights to Great Britain pending signature of a new civil aviation agreement. Aguirre said the proposal was impossible, as it granted Great Britain something of significance first. While the Argentine funds were blocked, it would be intolerable for Argentina to make such a gesture. When Ambassador Enders suggested the possibility that all sanctions be lifted at the same time, Aguirre responded that, as Great Britain had taken the first step in imposing sanctions, it should take the first step in lifting them. Ambassador Enders said he believed that Great Britain would be ready to take a first step, provided that it was agreed that Argentina would act immediately afterwards. Aguirre concluded that the matter should be studied. While it was his personal view that the renewal of flights would be impossible, steps to end the economic sanctions should be considered. Of course, he added, the issue of the economic sanctions could be resolved more quickly if Great Britain indicated a willingness to begin negotiations on the sovereignty issue.

#### Public Description of the Meeting

9. At Aguirre's request he and Ambassador Enders agreed on the contents of the description of the substance of their conversation should there be any press inquiries. The meeting would be described as a conversation on bilateral relations and the subject of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, a meeting between Aguirre and the Secretary in the context of the General Assembly was proposed, and the United States promised to study the resolution on the Falkland/Malvinas which would be presented at the General Assembly. Aguirre asked explicitly that no specific reference be made to any economic issues, as such references would be sure to raise suspicions in Argentina.

**Anderson**

### 386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 18, 1982, 2239Z

232383. Subject: Enders-Onslow Letter.

1. C–Entire text.

2. Septel provides “revised text” (as of August 12) of letter from UK Minister of State Onslow to Assistant Secretary Enders, dated August 9.<sup>2</sup> Following is reply which Embassy requested deliver to Onslow. Quote.

Dear Cranley:

It was a pleasure to have had such a useful first exchange with you on subjects which are of great interest to us. I look forward to examining these and other matters in greater depth in the coming months.

In response to your letter of August 9, it might be useful for me to re-state or elaborate upon several points we addressed during the August 6 meetings.<sup>3</sup> I believe we understand one another’s views on handling the Falklands UN resolution. We recognize you are not prepared now to enter into negotiations with Argentina. You should not be pressed to do so. For our part, we would not support a resolution which prejudged the question of sovereignty, nor one which attempted to impose an unrealistic timetable for future negotiations. Our public position remains unchanged and is, as stated in my August 5 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs committee,<sup>4</sup> that “we hope the two parties

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820430–0045. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC); cleared by Haass, Smith (EUR/NE), and Bosworth; approved by Enders.

<sup>2</sup> The Department transmitted the revised text of Onslow’s August 9 letter to Enders in telegram 232374 to London, August 18. In the letter, Onslow discussed his August 6 talks with Enders and expressed his appreciation of Enders’s offer “to help over the restoration of our commercial and financial relations with Argentina, which I am sure must be in all our interests in the longer term.” “One point we discussed,” he continued, “was the question of arms sales to Argentina. I know that this is a difficult issue for you, and that you have particular problems with those arms (such as the Skyhawk engines) which are not formally covered by the 1978 arms embargo. But we face difficult problems too. We must expect Argentina to rearm. Equally, however, we must provide a credible defense for the Falkland Islands against the possibility of further Argentine military adventures.” After noting some other difficulties, Onslow added, “I would therefore be most grateful for your help in ensuring that the difficulties we face are fully understood, and that Argentina does not receive arms from the United States that would oblige us to divert additional resources to counter the increased threat to our position.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820429–1171)

<sup>3</sup> No memoranda of conversation of these meetings have been found.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 381.

will find a process by which they can reach a peaceful solution of the dispute in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.” If possible, we would prefer not to take an active role in drafting a UN resolution on this subject. However, we would make our position known and are prepared to involve ourselves on a substantive text later if that appears essential to achieve a non-prejudicial resolution.

We recognize, of course, the delicacy and importance HMG attaches to the arms transfer issue. As you know, we anticipate phased actions later this year, following further talks with you. With the Argentines, I have informed the Foreign Minister only that we hope events will permit the Secretary to discuss with him in September the possible removal of our embargo on spare parts already purchased by Argentina.

Submission of our congressional certification report, required for new sales, is now planned for around the end of the year, depending on diplomatic and congressional developments. We will have ample opportunity to discuss this further. I want to make clear, however, that submission of a certification report would not, by itself, mean approval for specific arms transfers, these would be considered case-by-case and decided on the basis of a careful review of relevant US policies and interests.

Overall, I believe we share a common objective in preventing the introduction of Soviet weaponry into Argentina. More broadly, I think we can both agree that an enhanced United States position in that country would serve the interest we both have in maintenance of peace in the area.

Finally, I was pleased also to have an opportunity to review with you our position on the question of Belize. I will be writing you separately on this issue in the near future.

Thomas O. Enders. End quote.<sup>5</sup>

**Shultz**

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 18455 from London, August 20, the Embassy reported: “FCO welcomed Enders response and is interpreting portion on UN resolution to mean that for now the USG plans to play a behind-the-scenes role which recognizes the need for realism on sovereignty negotiations. British presume we will be working with them in New York and elsewhere on this issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820433–1002)

**387. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 18, 1982

SUBJECT

Strategy Toward Argentina

*ISSUES FOR DECISION*

What steps should be taken next on Argentine issues, including the UN Falklands resolution and our military sanctions.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

*(A) The UN and Falklands Negotiations*

Argentina and other Latin American countries have proposed inscription of Falklands negotiations at the UNGA. Inscription appears certain. We have taken the position that we could only consider supporting a resolution provided it did not prejudice the sovereignty issue nor impose an unrealistic deadline for negotiations. I conveyed the substance of this position to British FCO Minister of State Onslow August 6 and he indicated no difficulty with this point, while making clear HMG's opposition to any resolution calling for negotiations. I also discussed it on August 16 with Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari. We now need to formalize our posture and review specific texts for acceptability. A pre-UNGA meeting between you and Aguirre would be very helpful.

*(B) Military Pipeline*

US military sanctions against Argentina include suspension of the small pipeline of FMS and commercial sales, primarily aircraft and ship spares, plus export licensing of certain defense items, valued at about \$7 million in total. The French removed their pipeline embargo last week. The UK has asked us and the other EC countries to maintain a complete military ban. Onslow made a particular point about the sensitivity of replacement engines for the A-4's, which are included in the pipeline. The British say the French have promised no immediate sales, but intelligence reports indicate the French apparently plan to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 25, Argentina. Secret. Sent through Stoessel. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. At the top of the memorandum, Stoessel wrote: "Sir: ARA and EUR are in agreement on this approach. WStoessel."

deliver aircraft and missiles relatively soon. We recommend further soundings on use of our pipeline. You may want to discuss this in September with the Argentine Foreign Minister. Meanwhile, we should consult with the UK further on this issue.

*(C) Certification:*

Congress imposed a certification requirement on human rights and related matters in 1981 when it repealed the ban on security assistance and military exports to Argentina and Chile.<sup>2</sup> If the political structure in Argentina stabilizes, the government's recent promise of elections by March 1984 will help its case, although its use of US-furnished material in the Falklands will hurt. Chilean certification is more difficult because of the Letelier case<sup>3</sup> and Chile's rigidity on human rights. We prefer joint certification because regional balance is important to the maintenance of peace between Argentina and Chile.

We propose to discuss Argentine certification with the British and propose to begin a diplomatic effort to convince President Pinochet to take steps to improve Chile's human rights record. We need to consult extensively on the Hill on both certifications before moving ahead. We will return to you for a decision to certify when we are further along. Our target date is late November. Certification would not mean that we would resume military sales; it would only make that possible, with each specific sale requiring a separate decision on our part.

*RECOMMENDATIONS*

(1) That you invite Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari to meet you in Washington in September.<sup>4</sup>

(2) That we continue to indicate we would not oppose inscription of a resolution that does not prejudge sovereignty or try to impose an unrealistic deadline for negotiations.

(3) That we discuss with Aguirre in September the conditions under which we could reopen the military pipeline.

(4) That you authorize the initial steps indicated herein looking toward a subsequent decision on certification in late November.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 263.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 69.

<sup>4</sup> Shultz approved the recommendation on August 25, adding the following notation: "but setting dates can be difficult." He also approved the other recommendations on August 25.

**388. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, September 3, 1982, 2052Z

5148. Subject: Lifting Falklands Military Sanctions Now. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 5133,<sup>2</sup> (B) Bonn 19076.<sup>3</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. Strongly urge that hold on FMS pipeline established at end of April be lifted with public announcement made Sept. 8 after notification to British and GOA.

3. As indicated Ref A, struggles within each Argentine military service continue. Lack of any US move to indicate we are prepared to renew relationships, provided of course Argentines follow responsible and peaceful policies, cuts against our interests of maintaining peace and blocking the Soviets and their friends. Those within the services who argue against strong nationalistic policies (for example keeping economic sanctions against the UK) are undercut by the lack of a clear US signal to the military that we are prepared to move toward cooperation. We serve all our interests here (and we believe thereby UK interests as well) by lifting our Falklands sanctions before the EC takes a decision to lift on Sept. 9.

4. There have been several small signs from all three services in the past 10 days that they want closer relations with the US. The most significant move was yesterday's long-delayed air force authorization to return the attache aircraft. Contacts with official Americans have recently been more extensive and frank. But in many cases those moderate officers who talk with our attaches and who are critical of the irrational nationalistic line indicate they simply cannot understand why we cannot take a much smaller step than those already taken by France and the FRG (shipment of spares).

5. In Washington consideration of this issue we believe the following additional factors have considerable weight:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (September 1982). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn and London. Printed from a copy that was received in the National Security Council Message Center.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5133 from Buenos Aires, September 3, the Embassy provided a lengthy assessment of the state of the new Argentine Government. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820459–0807)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 19076 from Bonn, September 1, the Embassy summarized an August 30 meeting between Pym and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820454–0396)



A. our sanctions are of very limited military significance with only \$6–7 million of spares in the pipeline, much of which will not be delivered for many months. EC sanctions are of great military significance as the delivery of FRG major ships and modern French aircraft and missiles (underway) will have a major effect on Argentine military capabilities. There will probably be more UK rpt UK components by value in the first frigate delivered by the FRG than the value of the US FMS pipeline. New orders to the US are foreclosed by Kennedy-Humphrey legislation<sup>4</sup> and it is not clear that the EC decision will foreclose new orders.

B. The only military item which the UK has indicated particular interest in blocking to our knowledge is A–4 engines and none are in the FMS pipeline. We understand Commerce licensed the export of 32 excess A–4 engines on July 19 and they are being shipped (not under sanction because used engines are not on the Munitions List). Thus we are in the ludicrous position of supplying Argentina with the one item the British have urged we not supply while we deny ourselves the positive leverage of lifting the formal restraint which blocks normal contact with the Argentine military.

C. Our April sanctions have out-of-proportion psychological and political effect with the Argentine military because they were taken by the Reagan government while H-K is understood as a policy of the Carter administration tied into complex congressional and Chilean considerations which had made change difficult. Should the Reagan administration fail to move on this matter of minor practical significance when the UK's European allies who had applied tougher sanctions during the war remove the military sanctions moderate and constructive military officers will have little basis to support movement towards the US with all the constraint that implies. With major promotions and retirements in each service to be decided in the next couple of weeks, a US move now might well help the careers of those leaning toward international cooperation. Lack of any US move could contribute to the advancement of nationalistic and isolationist officers with long-term negative implications for both peace in the South Atlantic and the political opening. Not to mention such short-term issues as a mutual lifting of financial sanctions.

6. We believe a strong case should be made to the British immediately that our lifting of the FMS hold is in their interest because:

—The items affected have minimal military significance;

—The lifting of the sanctions will strengthen moderate groups within the military and enhance US leverage for movement toward

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 50.

permanent peace. (We should not, however, overpromise; lifting our sanctions will not cause the air force to provide immediately British Airlines with overflight rights for example. Although it will help on such issues in the medium and long run.)

7. We need to lift the pipeline sanction by September 8 in order to achieve the desired effect. The FRG Ambassador confirmed to me that his government will lift the ban on delivery of the naval units irrespective of what action the EC takes on the 9th and has so informed the GOA. We are thus in effect already behind the French and the Germans, just as we lagged behind all the Europeans except the British in lifting our economic sanctions. It does great harm to our position in general here, not just to our military relations, to be seen as the most compliant of HMG's allies. There is simply nothing to be gained in this case by reinforcing the Argentine myth that the US has from the outset been HMG's indispensable ally in the South Atlantic.

8. The timing is critical. Now is the moment to make the small but important gesture of opening the pipeline. Doing so will advance the cause of normalization, and thereby the prospects for a more stable peace.

**Shlaudeman**

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**389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1982, 0027Z

252648. Subject: Message From Foreign Secretary Pym Regarding UNGA Resolution on Falklands. Ref: London 19530.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text).

2. For Embassy's information, there follows the text of a letter from Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary Shultz, delivered on September 3:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820465–1255. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Buenos Aires, USUN, and Mexico City. Drafted by K. Smith (EUR/NE); cleared by Pendleton, O'Connell, McManaway, and in S/S–O; approved by Blackwill.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 19530 from London, September 7, the Embassy noted FCO sensitivities concerning U.S. actions, reporting: "We have just learned that the British Embassy has instructions to deliver a message from Pym to Secretary Shultz urging that the U.S. exercise caution concerning Argentina's Falklands resolution at the UNGA. (We have not seen the text.)" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820462–0791)

Begin text: I have read with interest the exchanges between Tom Enders and Cranley Onslow about the Falkland Islands.<sup>3</sup> I have been thinking about the handling of the debate at the United Nations which will result from the Mexican initiative<sup>4</sup> and I thought you might like to have this personal account of our thinking on the matter which is, I know, also of great interest to you.

As you know, we are more than willing to live at peace with Argentina and to normalize our economic and commercial links as soon as this is possible. But I do not suppose that you will be surprised to hear that we shall oppose any call on us to enter into negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands with Argentina. As you know, we had embarked upon a new attempt to reach a negotiated settlement when Argentina chose to break off the negotiations and attack us. The physical and psychological effects of that attack will be with the Islands for a long time to come, as will the constant risks from the mines so indiscriminately scattered by the occupying Argentine forces. The personal and economic cost to this country has also been great and neither parliamentary nor public opinion would understand if we were to contemplate resuming negotiations in the circumstances that now exist.

After a reasonable period of reconstruction we shall want to take soundings of Islander opinion about the future. I would be surprised if, after what has happened, they opted for any closer association with Argentina. Britain will certainly not be prepared to push them in this direction. Given our responsibilities towards the people of the territory under the UN Charter, and against the background of Argentine insistence that negotiations must lead to a transfer of sovereignty despite the Islanders' clear opposition, it would be irresponsible for us to allow others to think that negotiations between the UK and Argentina offer a realistic way ahead for the foreseeable future. I believe that our position will be widely understood in the many countries which have shown sympathy and understanding for us in the events of recent months.

The draft resolution which Argentina and Mexico have been working on is wholly unacceptable. The references to previous General Assembly resolutions and to Non-Aligned pronouncements do not help. But even if they were taken out and any suggestion of a timetable for the completion of negotiations removed, we would still vote against anything which calls on us to negotiate with Argentina and which fails to accord to the Falkland Islanders the fundamental right to determine

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 386 and footnote 2 thereto.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 385.

their own future. I should like to feel sure that the United States will not consider giving its support to any such text.

I look forward to the talks which we shall be having on this and other subjects this month. End text.

Shultz

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**390. Note From Roger W. Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 7, 1982

Embassy Buenos Aires strongly urges (see attached)<sup>2</sup> we lift the hold on pipeline military items to Argentina imposed on April 30 after notifying the British and Argentine governments.

Embassy Buenos Aires persuasively argues to do this quickly, i.e., by September 8, before the E.C. lifts sanctions on September 9.

ARA strongly supports this move now, and the European Bureau seems to be softening its negative position on this matter.

My reading of Argentina's political mood is such an action will improve relations and strengthen the hand of moderate officers. Many Argentines seem prepared to forget their anti-U.S. resentment and, in fact, are looking for reasons to move closer to us (Foreign Ministry excepted). But moving after E.C. acts (their sanctions are far more significant militarily) will gain us little—an opportunity wasted.

A final decision will be made probably today. ARA suggested (and I agree) that a call from you to Larry Eagleburger voicing White House concern on this would be most helpful.

*Recommendation:* A call to Larry expressing our interest in this decision.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (September 1982). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached. Reference is to Document 388.

<sup>3</sup> Below this sentence, McFarlane wrote: "Done 9/7. They waited til the last minute to consult. We will move 9/9."

**391. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

SNIE 91–2–82

Washington, September 8, 1982

**ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE  
FALKLANDS DEFEAT**

[Omitted here is a Scope Note for the Estimate.]

**KEY JUDGMENTS**

Argentina's determination to complete an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle which could serve military as well as civilian purposes has been amply demonstrated in recent years. The momentum to achieve this goal appeared to be intensifying in the months prior to the Falklands conflict. The defeat in the Falklands undeniably has raised fundamental issues of sovereignty, prestige, and security that will preoccupy the Argentine military leaders and any possible successor regime for several years to come. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The immediate impact of the Falklands defeat cuts two ways. Emotionally, it has probably increased the desire to develop a nuclear weapons option. Politically and economically, however, it has reduced Argentina's capability to fulfill this desire. Consequently, we have great uncertainty concerning the future course of Argentina's nuclear policy decisionmaking, especially over the coming months and possibly for the next several years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We judge, nevertheless, that unfavorable economic prospects and political turmoil will not prevent the Argentine Government from achieving the technical capability to make nuclear explosives before the end of this decade. The historic momentum and the sustained progress of the program over a generation despite recurrent crises support this judgment. At the same time, as indicated above, we cannot predict with confidence how effectively Argentine leaders will be able to provide budget support to the nuclear program or the rate at which nuclear goals will be achieved. [*portion marking not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA History Staff Files. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The Estimate was prepared based upon information available as of September 1. The Estimate was issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The Estimate was prepared with the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, also participated in the preparation of the Estimate.

In the meantime, Argentina's need for external resources may well provide opportunities to generate pressure on its leadership to keep its nuclear development within peaceful bounds. US efforts, however, to exert such pressure, whether applied directly or through other countries, would be constrained by the frequently demonstrated Argentine resistance to any external attempts to influence its nuclear ambitions. *[portion marking not declassified]*

The strength of Argentina's commitment to its nuclear program has its origins in a decision, taken more than 30 years ago, to develop an indigenous nuclear program:

—Its decision to develop a completely independent fuel cycle first became evident in the mid-1960s when it built its first laboratory-scale reprocessing plant. A reprocessing facility now under construction is scheduled for full operation in 1986 and could permit separation (from safeguarded fuel) of sufficient plutonium to construct a nuclear explosives device in 1987. A diversion of the plutonium for this purpose, however, would constitute a violation of international safeguards and carry grave consequences for Argentina's commercial nuclear program.

—Argentina is acquiring other facilities and materials that are unsafeguarded and could be used in a nuclear weapons program. A planned research reactor, if eventually built, would give Argentina a plutonium production capability free of safeguards. *[portion marking not declassified]*

There are three ways Argentina could produce plutonium. The most likely approach is for Argentina to produce plutonium by reprocessing spent fuel under safeguards. This would provide Buenos Aires with maximum political and diplomatic benefit from foreign perceptions that it could build nuclear explosives on short notice. Under its bilateral accord, Argentina needs West Germany's permission to reprocess the spent fuel from the German-built Atucha reactor. If the Germans give their approval, Argentina could start to implement this plan in 1986. Bonn, however, would face strong international opposition to its grant of permission, regardless of the assurances Buenos Aires may be willing to provide. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Should Germany deny reprocessing, Argentina could move to a second alternative, which would be to acquire plutonium through an unsafeguarded approach. This would require the completion of a planned research reactor and would probably take at least five to six years, once construction of the reactor began. *[portion marking not declassified]*

As a third alternative, Argentina could choose to divert fuel from operating power reactors, either clandestinely or in open violation of safeguards, and thereby acquire a nuclear explosive capability in four to five years. We judge pursuit of this option to be unlikely because

of the severe political and economic costs it would entail. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The attainment of a nuclear weapons capability by whatever means will not necessarily require the testing of a nuclear device:

—Such a test would alienate other principal countries in South America, especially Brazil and possibly Venezuela and Peru. Additionally, Argentina would be reluctant to offend the continent generally by challenging the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which aims to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America.

—Argentina could also be deterred by the prospect that an overt test could easily lead to a nuclear arms race with Brazil. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the Estimate.]

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### 392. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

London, September 8, 1982, 6:40–7:30 p.m.

#### ATTENDEES

US

Secretary Weinberger

Ambassador Louis

Major General Carl Smith

UK

Prime Minister Thatcher

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

9. The Secretary then complimented Mrs. Thatcher on the performance of British troops in the Falklands. Mrs. Thatcher responded that “You were absolutely marvelous” in response to UK requests for support. The Secretary observed that the Argentinians had misjudged the strength of feeling in the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister described the feeling of agony that prevailed in the UK as their task forces set sail for the Falklands. The Secretary observed that the Falklands had once again proven the utility of the large aircraft carrier, which could provide a floating base so necessary in the absence of land bases in areas such as the Falklands. He was very complimentary

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK 16 Jul–Sep 1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Number 10 Downing Street. The memorandum was prepared by Major General Smith.

of the way the British task force had been formed so quickly and efficiently, and he was full of praise for the morale, training, discipline, and leadership exhibited by the British forces. The Prime Minister responded that she could not thank us enough for our generous and prompt assistance.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

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**393. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

London, September 16, 1982

*Begins:*

When we met on 29 July you told me that you would ensure that I was consulted before you took any decision to release the military supplies, which were held up by the US during the Falklands conflict, to Argentina.<sup>2</sup> I understand that the State Department have recently told our Embassy that a decision is now imminent.<sup>3</sup>

I still believe as firmly as I did when we met at the end of July that it is important that Argentina should continue to be denied arms and military supplies. The Argentine Government still refuses to accept any proper cessation of hostilities and is still keeping open the possibility of a further resort to force. To resume any supplies now, even on a limited basis, would give them the wrong signal and encourage those elements in Argentina advocating an irresponsible approach. Giving them such a signal could only make it harder to secure a return to the stability and good sense in the South Atlantic that is in all our interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, unlabelled folder. Confidential. The message was delivered by the British Embassy under a September 16 covering note from Wright to Shultz. A handwritten notation on the covering note indicates that the message was received in the Secretary's office at 2:30 p.m., September 16. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 379.

<sup>3</sup> On September 11, Eagleburger informed Thomas "we would probably re-open the FMS pipeline to Argentina in the near future, and the move could come as early as this week." In telegram 257198 to London, September 14, the Department transmitted a summary of the meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820473-0526)



We also have to bear in mind that the more Argentina is able to re-equip her forces, the more of our own military resources, already stretched, we shall have to devote to the defence of the Falklands. That will inevitably mean that we shall find it more difficult to devote resources fully to our joint defence efforts in NATO.

Many other countries are watching American policy in this area closely. Any decision by you to resume supplies would make it very difficult for us to keep with us our EC partners, with whom we will be discussing this on 20 September, especially following France's unilateral decision to lift her embargo. Some EC countries would be able to supply particularly sensitive equipment.

I hope, therefore, that you will not take any early decision to release this equipment. If you do decide that you have no alternative then I would urge that you delay this as long as possible, certainly until after the EC meeting and that you release the equipment in stages over a period of time and with minimal publicity. It would also be very important to us that there should be no rush of new US contracts to supply military goods to Argentina in the categories not covered by the congressional embargo.

With best wishes.

*Ends.*

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**394. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 21, 1982

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Memorandum on "Strategy Toward Argentina"

*Issue*

We are about to take two steps that will improve U.S.-Argentine and U.S.-Latin American relations following the Falklands crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (08/16/1982–03/31/1983). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Fontaine. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Clark under a September 15 memorandum requesting that Clark sign it. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum. A typewritten notation also indicates that Reagan saw it.

*Facts*

Secretary Shultz's information memorandum at Tab A describes two measures we are about to take with respect to U.S.-Argentine relations. The first would be a favorable U.S. vote on a U.N. General Assembly resolution on the Falklands to call for a peaceful solution to the problem, provided that resolution did not prejudice the question of sovereignty and did not impose an unrealistic timetable on the British regarding future negotiations. The second step will reopen the pipeline for small military items to Argentina which has been closed since April 30. The British have been informed of both decisions.<sup>2</sup>

*Discussion*

These two steps will help in repairing relations with Argentina. The first step will have a positive impact in Latin America as a whole. Both measures fall within the principles and guidelines that have directed our policy since the beginning of the crisis in early April. Both measures will also strengthen the hand of the moderates, particularly in the Argentine military, at a critical time in Argentine history. Such strengthening may help us avoid that major South American country lurching completely into a highly nationalistic and anti-American position with only the Soviets and Cubans being the clear winners. As Secretary Shultz explains, the British are not keen about these measures but have acknowledged acceptance of the second. These are clearly in our national self-interest, and the NSC strongly supports them.

*Recommendation*

That you read Secretary Shultz's memo at Tab A.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On September 17, Shultz informed Wright "that we intend to release on September 24 the small pipeline of military spare parts to Argentina (including FMS and Munitions List transactions). However, we will say nothing to Argentina or key congressional leaders until after we have a readout from the September 20 meeting of EC Ministers, following which we expect the FRG and others to lift their military sanctions. The Secretary said we would act quietly, with no formal announcement, by simply informing Munitions List suppliers and being prepared to answer press queries." In reference to a UNGA resolution on the Falklands, Shultz noted that, "while we could well end up differing with the UK on a resolution calling for negotiations, we would not support any resolution that prejudices the issue of sovereignty or imposes an unrealistic deadline on negotiations." (Telegram 263770 to London, September 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (08/01/1982–10/31/1982) (3)) In Shultz's later account of this "stormy" meeting, he recalled that Wright "read me off like a sergeant would a recruit in a Marine Corps boot camp. I felt Mrs. Thatcher was wrong to oppose us for taking a reasonable position on a critical issue in our neighborhood. And Wright was wrong to lay it on so thick." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 152)

<sup>3</sup> Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation.

**Tab A****Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to  
President Reagan<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1982

## SUBJECT

Strategy toward Argentina

We are making progress on two issues essential to improving relations with Latin America—our position on the Falklands question at the UN and a phased resumption of military sales to Argentina.

*UN Falklands Resolution*

At the UN, we support inscribing the Falklands issue on the agenda but will only support a resolution on negotiations that does not pre-judge Falklands sovereignty or impose an unrealistic timetable on the British. This is now a central political theme for Latin America. We have positioned ourselves to gain support in the hemisphere while attempting to make sure we are in very close touch with the British about their own interests. Francis Pym has asked that we not support any resolution on negotiations. The European Community countries are expected to turn down a similar request. Led by the French, Germans and Italians, the EC may offer to vote for a simple call for negotiations. This is our traditional position as well. We would find it impossible, from a political and international legal standpoint, to fail to support a resolution calling for peaceful settlement. The British will continue to press us. Their diplomats seem to understand the political necessity of our position in Latin America but Mrs. Thatcher may feel much stronger on this issue than her diplomats.

*Military Sales*

We plan very soon to remove the embargo on our small pipeline of spare parts and reinstate munitions control sales, hopefully in step with action by key European states. The French have resumed deliveries of Mirage aircraft and Exocet missiles. The Germans have told the Argentines they soon will authorize shipments of naval craft but prefer official EC action first to lift the European embargo on military sales. The British remain strongly opposed but will not be too surprised. Our own FMS pipeline and munitions control licenses are more modest,

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<sup>4</sup> Secret.

about \$6 million in assorted spare parts for ships and aircraft. Again, we will consult with the British and carefully phase our actions with those of key Europeans. We should act soon to regain needed influence with the Argentine military.

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**395. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Watkins) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM-213-82

Washington, September 22, 1982

SUBJECT

Resumption of Military Exports to Argentina (U)

1. (C) On 30 April 1982, the President imposed military and economic sanctions against Argentina as a result of Argentina's refusal to accept the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 502. With the cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the clear need for the United States to rebuild its relationships within Latin America, it is appropriate now to rescind the suspension of military exports to Argentina. This action would permit the delivery of materiel required by the Argentine forces for operational and safety purposes. It would not impact on the separate, more complex issue of certification and would not directly threaten the UK operations in or near the Falkland Islands.

2. (C) While it is clear that measures were necessary to express the US Government's displeasure over Argentine actions in the Falklands, the measures should not be retained to the detriment of broader US interests. Additionally, for the following reasons, lifting the military sanctions imposed on Argentina is in the interests of the US Government:

a. Economic sanctions, which consisted of the suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees and the suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees, have been lifted.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (June-Sept) 1982. Confidential. Stamped notations on the first page of another copy of the memorandum indicate that Weinberger saw it on September 23. However, a stamped notation on the first page of another copy of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on September 24. Both of these copies are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 375.

b. The United States would not be alone in resuming military deliveries. France has recently lifted its ban on military exports, and it is probable that Italy and the FRG will soon follow.

c. It would send a positive signal to other Latin American countries indicating that the United States places a high value on its relationships with the region and on the defensive capabilities of regional powers.

d. It would preempt any Soviet initiative in developing a military supply relationship with Argentina.

e. It would enhance US influence with the evolving new Argentine government by providing positive US control over military deliveries.

3. (C) Although US support for Great Britain in the Falklands dispute was in harmony with longstanding US policy opposing the use of force for the resolution of disputes, it is appropriate that the United States take a positive step toward improving bilateral relations with Argentina. Lifting the ban on export of military goods imposed on Argentina over 4 months ago would demonstrate the desire of the United States to return to the close relationship it enjoyed with Argentina prior to the Falklands conflict, while respecting British concerns.

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially like that in the Annex,<sup>3</sup> be sent to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**James D. Watkins**

*Admiral, USN*

*Acting Chairman*

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. An attached undated correspondence tracking sheet indicates: "Action closed with JCS by Telecon. No written response required since requested SecDef memo to State was obviated by State's lifting of sanctions against Argentina on 24 September."

**396. Note From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
International Security Affairs (West) to the Under Secretary  
of Defense for Policy (Iklé)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 24, 1982

Fred—

State sent out a cable lifting (on 24 Sept.) the sanction on the FMS pipeline to Argentina.<sup>2</sup> No public announcement is planned. State did not coordinate with us. I remonstrated. State apologized, admitting the error. No calculated oversight was intended. State was treating the action as routine because it had been discussed for several months at various levels between our two buildings.

Francis J. West, Jr.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Confidential. A copy was sent to Major General Smith. A stamped notation on the note indicates that Weinberger saw it on September 27.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram 265773 to Buenos Aires, September 21, which informed the Embassy that it was authorized to inform the Argentine Government that the United States intended to lift military sanctions against Argentina effective September 24. Speakes announced at the September 28 White House press briefing that the sanctions had been lifted. (“U.S. Easing Curbs Against Argentina,” *New York Times*, September 29, p. A12)

<sup>3</sup> West initialed “FJW” above his typed signature.

**397. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 2, 1982, 0413Z

278457. Subject: (U) Secretary's Bilateral Meeting With Argentine Foreign Minister, September 27, 1982. Ref: Secto 13008.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

2. The Secretary opened by recalling how much he had enjoyed several visits to Argentina, a country which had impressed him greatly. Aguirre Lanari also recalled several prior visits to the U.S., particularly his first, as Vice President of the Argentine Senate in 1964 to address the U.S. Congress. Aguirre invited the Secretary to Buenos Aires and said he hoped to visit the U.S. often in the future, but with less pressing and troubling concerns than he had now. The Secretary replied that Aguirre was, had been, and would be on very friendly territory whenever he visited the United States. He asked Aguirre to tell him of his principal concerns.

3. Aguirre said that Argentina, as a government and a nation, was deeply preoccupied by the Malvinas war and its far reaching implications. The focus was now on the UN. It was more necessary than ever to ask the UN Secretary General to help the parties sit down together to negotiate the future status of the Malvinas. He was deeply gratified to have an opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary and seek U.S. collaboration in this effort. U.S. posture on this issue was of particular importance, to Argentina and to many other countries. Argentina recognized that the U.S. did not want to prejudice the substantive question of ultimate sovereignty but he hoped the U.S. would be able to support the Malvinas/Falklands resolution which had emerged from consultation with many countries. Aguirre then gave the Secretary a revised text of the Argentine draft resolution (reftel) pointing out the deletion from the operative paragraphs of all references to past UNGA resolutions. With this deletion, he said, he believed the United States should be able to support the resolution, even with our concern that it not prejudice the question of sovereignty. Aguirre said

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820510–0519. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC); cleared by Adams, Wayne, and in S/S–O; approved by Enders.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 13008, September 28, transmitted to the Department and Buenos Aires the text of the revised Argentine draft of the Falklands/Malvinas resolution given to Shultz by Aguirre Lanari at their September 27 meeting in New York. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820500–0927)

Argentina also hoped some West European states would vote for the revised draft.

4. The Secretary received the text, saying the United States would study it carefully and looked forward to getting back to the GOA and working together on the resolution. The Secretary underlined the importance attached to assuring that the resolution not prejudice sovereignty and, coming after a very tense situation, not put too immediate time pressure on the negotiating process.

5. The Secretary commented in this connection that the U.S. was pleased the GOA had been able to reach an understanding with the British Government on mutual lifting of financial sanctions.<sup>3</sup> He understood U.S. Treasury representatives had been helpful in this process. Aguirre nodded, saying the contributions of U.S. Treasury representatives in the negotiations had been very positive; their actions were widely known and appreciated by the GOA.

6. Aguirre asked whether the Secretary had any reaction to the revised text. The Secretary said he preferred to review the language carefully prior to making specific comments. The Secretary then commented that he had learned that often in such resolutions preambular sections were as important as operative ones. In this case, references to NAM declarations seemed to have the effect of prejudging the outcome of the sovereignty issue. Aguirre recognized that possibility but pointed out that the United States could make a formal declaration at the time of its vote, noting its non-acceptance of sections of the preamble yet nonetheless voting for the resolution because the operative paragraphs were consistent with the U.S. position. In that way, he said, the U.S. vote would not be seen as prejudging the sovereignty issue. The Secretary responded that in his experience reservations did not count for much. In the end, what mattered was how one voted. We would be happy to review the entire resolution and to provide the GOA with our views on its contents.

7. Aguirre thanked the Secretary, reiterating that Argentina had changed the resolution to try to make it acceptable to the U.S. and that with our long tradition of supporting negotiated solutions to threats to the peace, U.S. support for the call to negotiate the Malvinas/Falklands dispute was especially important. The Secretary replied that we always favored negotiation as the way to solve problems instead of hostilities. At the same time, if a resolution prejudged the issue it would not help

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<sup>3</sup> On September 14, Argentina accepted a U.K. proposal to mutually lift the economic sanctions. ("Falkland Sanctions Removed," *New York Times*, September 15, p. D20)



achieve those objectives. He again assured Aguirre that we wanted to work with the GOA to find an acceptable resolution.<sup>4</sup>

8. The Secretary commented that other issues were also highly important to our relations with Argentina. Aguirre agreed but reiterated his view that the UN resolution was indeed the overriding issue for Argentina because of its profound impact on the future of his country's most basic institutions, on the military and the body politic. The deep frustrations of Malvinas conflict could be exploited by extremists, with historical consequences. Casualty rates had been high; the Argentine people had suffered; the impact had been traumatic. Success at reopening negotiations was essential to assuring that this painful issue did not fester and do serious damage to the country's process of normalization and to its important relations with traditional friends.

9. The Secretary said we had followed closely Argentina's international financial situation and were pleased to have been able to play a constructive role in helping channel Argentina's important debt discussions in a positive manner.<sup>5</sup> He was well aware of the underlying strength of the Argentine economy and hoped that after all the recent turmoil, Argentina would be able to retain its traditionally high standing in the international financial community. Aguirre stated emphatically that Argentina would assure its just debts were met, as it always had, and the present troubles would not lead to a default. He said Argentina had applied the same determination in fighting for the Malvinas, against great odds, resisting the temptation to internationalize the conflict (e.g. by turning to the Soviets); it would take a responsible attitude also on the debt issue.

10. Argentina's vote on the Puerto Rico issue at the UN came up several times during the conversation.<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Kirkpatrick made clear our displeasure with the Argentine vote by quipping early that we would review Argentina's resolution on the Falklands more seriously than they had considered our views on Puerto Rico. Aguirre initially responded that Argentina had nothing to be ashamed of, but

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<sup>4</sup> Later revisions to the text placed the question of the Falklands/Malvinas on the provisional agenda of the 37th UNGA and deleted the detailed listing of NAM resolutions. Discussing this text with Garcia del Solar on October 6, Enders informed him "in a blunt exchange, that the U.S. has serious problems with the revised UN Falklands resolution." (Telegram 283693 to Buenos Aires and USUN, October 8; Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Telegrams 1982)

<sup>5</sup> Argentina was negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for a standby loan after acknowledging that it could not meet its debt payments.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Argentina's September 24 vote in favor of Cuba's unsuccessful appeal to the UNGA to place the issue of Puerto Rican independence on the 37th UNGA agenda. In telegram 271295 to all diplomatic posts, September 25, the Department summarized the voting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820498–0416)

when the Secretary interjected on the merits, he quickly changed focus. Aguirre said that while he had no doubt that any plebiscite in Puerto Rico would demonstrate the popularity of some form of continued association with the U.S., Argentina believed it had no choice but to support “those who had gone to great lengths to support Argentina at its time of need.” That did not mean Argentina would change its basic ideological orientation. The Secretary replied that there had never been a problem with Puerto Rico having an opportunity to express itself. The Cuban resolution was nonsense. He wanted to record with Aguirre his disappointment over Argentina’s vote on the issue. At the same time he assured Aguirre that our review of the Falklands text would be a serious one, based on its merits.

11. Aguirre noted ruefully that Argentine opinion was still highly critical of the U.S. role in the Falklands dispute, so much so that some would criticize him at home for the smiling photo of the Secretary and himself, which had just been taken. It was important, however, that both countries look to the future. Positive movement on the UN issue would strengthen the prospects for democratic institutionalization which could still suffer a serious reverse in Argentina. If the Argentine people could become convinced that a serious process were under way on the Islands that would undercut leftist extremists who would otherwise wrap themselves in the banner of nationalism in order to take center stage in Argentine politics. The Secretary said we very much wanted improved relations with Argentina and had taken steps to demonstrate that. He recognized the importance of containing extremism under difficult circumstances. He very much appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with Aguirre and was pleased that their photographs had been taken smiling together.

12. In a personal aside at the end of the meeting, the Secretary expressed his sympathy for the families of Argentines killed or wounded in the conflict. Aguirre expressed his appreciation. Aguirre also stressed that Argentina would continue to meet its international obligations and specifically would welcome foreign capital participation in its development.

**Dam**

**398. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 29, 1982, 1800Z

Secto 13019. Subject: (U) Secretary's Sept. 28 UNGA Bilateral With UK Foreign Secretary Pym: The Falklands.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: During his Sept. 28 bilateral breakfast with the Secretary on the margins of the UNGA, Pym rehearsed British objections to an UNGA resolution on the Falklands in familiar but forcefully animated terms. Pym asked for help in encouraging the Argentines to agree to a formal end to hostilities and said the UK could see no point in discussing a resolution for the immediate future. Now is not the time to talk with the Argentines about the long term, he argued. The Secretary told Pym that it is difficult for the U.S. to oppose a moderate resolution that does not prejudice the sovereignty issue or set an unrealistic deadline for negotiations. End summary.

3. The Secretary informed Pym that he had met the previous day with the Argentine Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup> A resolution on the Falklands that prejudices the sovereignty issue or sets an unrealistic deadline will not have U.S. support, the Secretary said. It is, however, difficult for the U.S. to oppose a moderate resolution that does not prejudice the sovereignty issue. We had, he added, held up at British request our decision to reopen the small pipeline of FMS sales to Argentina until after the EC Ministers met on September 20–21.

4. Pym said the UK does not know what the Argentine resolution will say. The UK is attempting to normalize relations with Argentina, but is finding it difficult to do so. The key point is that Buenos Aires has not yet ended hostilities. UK soldiers and sailors continue to be at risk. Mines remain in and around Port Stanley. The scars have to heal, and the UK is asking all its friends to use their influence to convince Argentina formally to end hostilities. In the meantime, the idea of talking about a resolution has no appeal. Perhaps prospects will be better in a year. Pym added that he hoped we could not be faced with a waffling resolution that the U.S. thinks it could support. It would be better to have one that is clear cut and vote on it as such.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Shultz Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz—Memcons September 1982. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and Mexico City. Drafted by Pendleton; cleared by Burt, Wayne, and Johnston; approved by Shultz.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 397.

5. Ambassador Kirkpatrick observed that changes in the Argentine draft had been made the previous day. The preambular material is particularly bad. The Secretary observed that the Argentines appear to be aiming at a resolution with an operative paragraph that does not prejudice but with preambular material that does. Pym interjected that the UNGA resolution effort is an Argentine smokescreen. The weak Argentine Government is attempting to use it for domestic purposes. There is no way the UK can go along until there is a better atmosphere between the two countries and the mines are picked up. In Latin America there is some support for the Argentine resolution because of Latin solidarity. Pym repeated that there is no way the UK can delude itself into agreeing with any resolution, even one that does not prejudice the sovereignty issue. To do so would be an illusion of the kind that Perez de Cuellar had written about in his report.<sup>3</sup>

6. Pym said the UK is more than willing to talk with the Argentines, but now is not the time to talk about the long term. What about the rights of the Islanders, he asked. UK PermRep Thompson said he had been surprised by the extent of the sympathy the UK had received for its position, especially from the African delegates. A clear majority is on the UK side. There may be a great deal of discussion and debate, but in the end Argentina will come down to saying the dispute is over sovereignty. However, many African, Caribbean and Asian representatives will see it as a dispute over the future of a people.

7. The Secretary reiterated that the US supports the principle the UK fought for in the Falklands war, to which Pym said he wondered how far back one must go to unroll history—to the incorporation of Texas into the U.S.? The Latin Americans didn't do anything to support Argentina for a century and a half, he said. The meeting ended with Ambassador Kirkpatrick noting that Venezuela has now asked Perez de Cuellar to mediate the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute.

8. Also present at the meeting were: UK Ambassador Wright, UK PermRep Thompson, FCO Political Director Bullard, Private Secretary Fall. U.S.: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Under Secretary Eagleburger, EUR Assistant Secretary designate Burt and EUR/NE Deputy Director Pendleton (notetaker).

**Shultz**

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably the report that Pérez de Cuéllar submitted to the Security Council on June 2 in response to Resolution 502. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1335.

**399. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

I-24529/82

Washington, October 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Negotiations for Transfer of F-4 Aircraft to UK (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) We have completed staff talks on the British request for 15 U.S. Navy F-4 aircraft. The request derived from a UK requirement to deploy F-4s to the Falkland Islands. The British can only do so if they draw down their own British based forces; the U.S. Navy F-4s are intended to serve as a backfill. Concurrently, the Secretary of the Navy expressed a strong desire to obtain a number of UK Hawks to serve as pilot trainers for the VTXTS program.

(S) The U.S. and UK teams reached agreement ad referendum, that:

—(S) The United Kingdom will purchase 15 F-4J aircraft, subject to the ability of the U.S. Navy to upgrade the radars currently on those aircraft from an AWG-10 to an AWG-10A variant. The upgrade is necessary for UK operations; without it the agreement will have to be revised. In addition, the U.S. Navy has undertaken to satisfy the UK that the United States can provide 18 months spares support for the upgraded F-4Js; that is, until a logistics line can be fully established.

—(S) The United Kingdom formally requested price and availability information on the aircraft, and will reply to DOD in three weeks time as to whether the upgrade is satisfactory. At that point the U.S. will furnish the UK with a letter of offer.

—(S) The cost of the F-4s could exceed \$14 million; should that be the case, the DOD will inform the Congress of the sale at the earliest possible time. Thus, the letter of offer will not necessarily be delayed by Congressional action.

—(S) The United States will lease, at fair market value, 12 British Hawk aircraft for a period of 3 to 5 years. The actual period of the lease, and the costs associated with the lease, are to be developed by the UK in the next few weeks.

—(S) The F-4 sale is not contingent on the Hawk lease. The Hawk lease is contingent upon the F-4 sale, however.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0004, UK (1 Oct-31 Dec 82) 1982. Secret. Sent through Iklé. Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum indicate that Weinberger and Carlucci saw it on October 4.

—(S) The three week period required for the UK response should provide us with sufficient time to assess UK support for our positions at COCOM and, if necessary, to review the terms of the above agreement should that support be less forthcoming than we anticipate.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, we would like support for the creation of a military subcommittee in COCOM, for tightening the COCOM net, for action on silicon, and for immediately providing additional funding for strengthening COCOM (whose total budget is only \$200,000).<sup>3</sup>

Richard N. Perle<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand, likely Weinberger, crossed out the word “anticipate” and wrote the words “were given to believe” in the left-hand margin.

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger initialed his approval on October 4.

<sup>4</sup> Perle signed “Richard Perle” above his typed signature.

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#### 400. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 5, 1982

##### SUBJECT

Argentina’s Nuclear Policies After Falklands

##### *Issue*

The intelligence community has examined Argentina’s capability and intention to manufacture nuclear weapons after its defeat in the Falklands.

##### *Facts*

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) reviews Argentina’s technical capabilities for developing nuclear explosives and presents three scenarios that could lead to production of plutonium in the years 1986–88.<sup>2</sup> It also assesses the impact on the Argentine nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (October 1982–December 1982). Secret. Sent for information. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation on the memorandum also indicates that Reagan saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 391.

program of the political disarray and economic stress that have resulted from the Falklands defeat.

*Discussion*

The defeat's immediate impact on Buenos Aires' nuclear program has had two effects. First, it has increased the desire to develop a nuclear weapons option. But, second, it has reduced Argentina's capability to carry out that objective politically and economically—at least for the short term. Nevertheless, the SNIE reports the Argentine government will still be capable of building at least a crude nuclear device by the end of the decade. The historical momentum of the 32 year Argentine nuclear development program, despite recurrent crises, strongly supports this conclusion. Meanwhile, Argentina may be susceptible to outside pressures because of its need for external resources. U.S. leverage is very limited in this regard and, moreover, Argentina's susceptibility to any foreign pressures will decline as Argentina moves closer to nuclear self-sufficiency.

For Argentina to develop and—more importantly—to test a nuclear weapon would, however, raise tensions considerably in the region. Such a test would alienate the major South American states, including those now friendly to Argentina (Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela). Moreover, it is virtually certain that Brazil would soon match Argentina's capability and that a nuclear arms race with that country would prove likely and costly.

At your request, the Special National Intelligence Estimate is available for your review.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reagan initialed that he wished to review the Estimate.

#### 401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 9, 1982, 0403Z

285386. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Resumption of Military Intelligence Exchange With Argentina. Ref: (A) State 247107 DTG 020416Z Sep 82;<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 5222 DTG 091546Z Sep 82;<sup>3</sup> (C) London 19432 DTG 031700Z Sep 82.<sup>4</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. For Buenos Aires: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is authorized to resume the military intelligence exchange with Argentina, under terms of National Disclosure Policy–One (NDP–1)<sup>5</sup> when the Ambassador deems it appropriate and with the Ambassador's approval of each exchange. Please advise when exchange is reinitiated.

3. For London: At your discretion, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that we intend to resume our military intelligence exchange with the Argentines. The intelligence exchange will consist as in the past primarily of items drawn from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] intelligence summary dealing with Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere, as well as information on Cuba and Nicaragua. Under the terms of NDP–1, Argentina is not authorized to receive information on non-Communist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Telegrams 1982. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Drafted by C.S. Shapiro (ARA/RPP); cleared by Bosworth, Raphael, D.W. Cox (ARA/RPP), K. Smith (EUR/NE), S. Smith (ARA/SC), R. Wharton (INR/IC/CD), C. Brown (DOD/ISA/IA), and McManaway; approved by Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 247107 to Buenos Aires, September 2, the Departments of State and Defense jointly informed the Embassy that the Department of State and [*text not declassified*] “which was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities with the United Kingdom.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820455–0839)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5222 from Buenos Aires, September 9, Shlaudeman advised: “Given the sensitivities involved, I think it would be best to defer approaching the British on this issue [resumption of intelligence sharing] until the dust settles after the removal of our hold on the small FMS pipeline.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820467–0050)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 19432 from London, September 3, the Embassy recommended: “If we are going to make commitments to resume [*text not declassified*]” with Argentina, “we should talk to the British first. They will want to know that such an exchange can be handled in a way that does not threaten the British military position in the South Atlantic.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820460–0818)

<sup>5</sup> NDP–1 established policies and procedures for the disclosure of classified U.S. military information to foreign governments and international organizations, pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,” July 20, 1971.



governments unless a specific determination has been made that such a disclosure will result in significant benefit to US objectives. FYI: Exceptions to NDP–1 must be approved at the inter-agency level in Washington.

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**402. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt), and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newell) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 14, 1982

SUBJECT

*U.S. Position on the Draft Argentine Resolution on the Falklands*

*Issue for Decision*

How should we respond to the latest Argentine draft resolution on the Falklands in a manner that: (a) is consistent with the USG position, which you outlined to Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari, and (b) enhances prospects for a moderate UN resolution, which may help promote a peaceful settlement of this conflict.

*Essential Factors*

During your bilateral meeting at the United Nations with Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari on September 27,<sup>2</sup> you underlined the USG position that any resolution not prejudice sovereignty or put immediate time pressure on the negotiating process. You informed Aguirre that the USG would study carefully the text of Argentina's draft Falklands resolution and provide our views. You noted that the preambular sections of resolutions were often important. In the case of the Argentine draft, you specifically noted that references to Non-Aligned declarations seemed to have the effect of prejudging the outcome of the sovereignty issue. Since your meeting, we have received

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820159–1853. Confidential. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by R.B. Howard (ARA/SC) on October 8; cleared by M. Kozak (L).

<sup>2</sup> See Document 397.

a revised draft of the Argentine resolution (Tab A).<sup>3</sup> It still contains objectionable material. We could not support it in its present form. In a subsequent meeting with Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar, Assistant Secretary Enders engaged in a more detailed discussion regarding our problems with the current Argentine draft, noting that we would provide an official response after you had reviewed the issue (Tab B).<sup>4</sup>

We have prepared the attached USG response to the Argentine draft (Tab C) to be delivered to the Argentine Ambassador here.<sup>5</sup> The response notes that concerns have been expressed regarding both the preambular and operative sections which would impede broad support for the resolution and jeopardize the possibility of initiating a process of peaceful settlement. It states that the current preambular references to statements and communiques of the Non-Aligned Movement should be eliminated. It makes three additional points:

—That it would be advisable to remove pejorative references in the preamble to colonialism.

—That the recalling of prior UNGA resolutions in the preambular section, while consistent with usual UN practice, does not advance building a consensus given the contentious nature of the cited documents.

—That the reference to “sovereignty” in the first operative paragraph of the draft is unnecessary given the self-evident nature of the dispute and counter-productive in terms of resuming the process of negotiation.

The proposed reply, while outlining our objections to the current Argentine draft, is consistent with the policy we have stated regarding the conditions for U.S. support of a resolution (Tab D).<sup>6</sup> It, therefore, concludes with a statement that the USG is prepared to support a resolution calling for negotiations, so long as it does not prejudice the question of sovereignty or impose an unrealistic deadline for negotiation.

#### *RECOMMENDATION:*

That you authorize the response attached at TAB C.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram 2731 from USUN, October 5.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is telegram 283693 to Buenos Aires and USUN, October 8. Also, see footnote 4, Document 397.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the undated text of the U.S. response. The Department transmitted the text in telegram 301044 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 26. See footnote 2, Document 404.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is an excerpt from telegram 244710 to multiple posts, August 31.

<sup>7</sup> Bremer initialed approval of the recommendation on behalf of Eagleburger, October 26, and added the following notation: “as amended by LSE instructions.”

**403. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, October 25, 1982

*Begins*

We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on 4 November. This is, as you will appreciate, of considerable importance to us and I wanted to let you know personally how strongly we feel about it.

The Argentine draft<sup>2</sup> is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and to the British people. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want: it recalls three earlier Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us and which the United States also declined to support: it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands: and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.

Negotiations were of course in progress earlier this year<sup>3</sup> when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter.

I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires (whatever their spokesman may say in New York) to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover it is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain—the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until there is a fundamental change of heart on the part of Argentina. You will understand our insistence that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, [Falklands 11/01/1982–11/14/1982]. Confidential. Wright sent the message to Clark under an October 26 covering note. (Ibid.) Printed from a copy found attached to Document 405.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 397.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 11.

the non-use of force, are as applicable to this as to other international problems.

We have deeply appreciated the great help and understanding which we have received from the USA since the crisis burst upon us at the beginning of April. I now ask for your help once more in supporting us in the vote on the resolution at the United Nations.

*Ends.*

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**404. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt), and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newell) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1982

SUBJECT

*U.S. Position on Falklands Resolution*

*Issue for Decision*

Whether we should vote for a modified Argentine UN resolution on the Falklands.

*Essential Factors*

On October 25, we communicated to the Argentines our approved position on the UN Falklands Resolution (Tab 1).<sup>2</sup> They responded October 27 in two separate channels. Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari told Ambassador Shlaudeman that Argentina would eliminate all references to the Non-Aligned Movement if we would commit ourselves to vote for the resolution (Tab 2).<sup>3</sup> This change would remove the draft

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890116–0020. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by N.S. Smith on October 27; cleared by M. Kozak. Neither Smith nor Kozak initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab 1 but not printed is telegram 301044 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 26, which summarized Enders's October 25 meeting with Garcia del Solar at which Enders presented the U.S. position approved in Document 402.

<sup>3</sup> Attached at Tab 2 but not printed is telegram 6146 from Buenos Aires, October 27, in which Shlaudeman related an exchange with Aguirre Lanarri on the UN resolution at a social occasion the previous evening.

language which clearly prejudged the sovereignty issue, thus meeting one of our two key requirements (see Tab 3).<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the Argentine Ambassador here, under instructions, offered to drop the offensive term “colonialism” from the preamble, substituting the more neutral phrase “colonial situations.” Other changes he offered were less important (see Tab 3 and Tab 4).<sup>5</sup>

*L believes* that the amended Argentine draft resolution is sufficiently flexible that it need not be interpreted in a manner that is legally prejudicial to the position of either party to the dispute. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the UK may argue that such a legal prejudice exists. At the same time, Argentina will obviously give the preambular and operative paragraphs together an interpretation consistent with its own objectives.

If Argentina is definitely prepared to make these two changes, *ARA believes* it will have complied with the essential elements of our position. The resolution as now drafted clearly commands a UN majority. Moreover, recent reporting indicates that most of Britain’s EC partners and Canada also tend toward voting in favor of a modified resolution (Tab 5).<sup>6</sup> The Argentines view it as a key to our future relations and would react very negatively to our failure to support a moderate resolution. Moreover, a U.S. vote to abstain on such a resolution would isolate us from most of Latin America and signal—shortly before the President’s trip to the region<sup>7</sup>—that we attach primacy to our relations with the UK over those with Latin America. Thus, *ARA* strongly recommends that we now inform the Argentines we will support the resolution as modified. A cable of instructions is attached at Tab 6.<sup>8</sup>

*EUR believes* that the Argentine changes, while welcome, do not go far enough to warrant US support for the resolution. It is irrelevant whether “colonialism” or “colonial situations” is used. The Argentines are using the language to refer to the Falkland situation because it has come to project an image of illegality, force, or denial of political free-

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<sup>4</sup> Attached at Tab 3 but not printed is the text of the new Argentine draft of the resolution as revised October 27, an undated legal analysis of the draft produced by Gudgeon, and an undated position paper on the draft produced in EUR.

<sup>5</sup> Attached at Tab 4 but not printed is telegram 302505 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 27, detailing the proposed changes to the draft resolution which were made by Garcia del Solar and incorporated into the revised text at Tab 3.

<sup>6</sup> Attached at Tab 5 but not printed is telegram 7840 from Copenhagen, October 22, which summarized the discussion of the Falklands/Malvinas at the October 16–17 EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Denmark; and telegram 6078 from Buenos Aires, October 25, which relayed draft language for the resolution developed by the Canadians.

<sup>7</sup> Reagan traveled to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras November 30–December 4.

<sup>8</sup> Attached at Tab 6 but not printed is a draft telegram, which N.S. Smith drafted on October 27.

dom. EUR believes that our objection to prejudging the *question* of negotiation (sovereignty) has not been addressed by the Argentines, nor has the issue of references to earlier UN resolutions not supported by the US. Therefore, EUR insists that the specific references to sovereignty as the subject of negotiations and to earlier UNGA resolutions and the use of the words “colonial situation” demonstrate that the resolution is still not sufficiently balanced in political terms for the US to support over the strong objections of HMG (Mrs. Thatcher has just sent an appeal to the President for support on this issue; see Tab 7).<sup>9</sup>

At a time when our relations with our closest ally and vital defense partner are seriously strained, EUR believes we should not bend to the Argentine wish to put the British on the defensive politically on an issue which cost them so much in terms of lives and fortune. We know the resolution, even if passed with a large majority, will not advance the cause of reconciliation between Britain and Argentina. Nor will it bring about early negotiations. In fact, it will have the opposite effect. EUR welcomes the Argentine changes, but they simply do not go far enough to warrant voting against the British.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick*, despite great exasperation with Argentine behavior in the UN, feels strongly that we should vote for the resolution as now amended. Stressing that this question is a major concern to all Latin American countries (virtually all their foreign ministers have spoken directly to her), she believes our vote will be seen not as a vote for Argentina but as a vote for Latin America—an action which would demonstrate U.S. concern for and solidarity with this hemisphere. She notes a vote in favor of the resolution as now amended would not derogate from the two preconditions we have laid down from the outset.

Although the current resolution is somewhat prejudicial in political terms against the UK, *IO considers* it basically “neutral” from the UN legal and procedural angle—and IO supports Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s position. IO also believes it is vital that we inform the UK of our position at the same time as we tell Argentina.

*“Self-Determination” Issue:* IO also believes we should be prepared to vote for a reference to self-determination if the UK seeks to insert this into the text in accordance with its position that this must be an important element in accomplishing a resolution to the dispute. ARA and L point out that this is a very complex issue, which was a central

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<sup>9</sup> Attached at Tab 7 but not printed is the text of Thatcher’s October 25 message to Reagan. See Document 403.

component of Secretary Haig's mediation effort (see Tab 8).<sup>10</sup> It would be necessary to be sure that the text of the particular amendment in question did not prejudice the sovereignty issue—either for Argentina or for the UK. The bureaus concerned will submit a full analysis of this issue for your consideration prior to our having to vote on any self-determination amendment.

*RECOMMENDATIONS:*<sup>11</sup>

1. That you authorize us to inform the Government of Argentina that we will support the resolution as modified (ARA and IO favor).

2. *Alternatively*, that you authorize us to inform the GOA that we will support the resolution as modified, provided the words “colonial situation”, “sovereignty” and references to earlier UN resolutions are dropped. Otherwise, that we will abstain (EUR favors).

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<sup>10</sup> Attached at Tab 8 but not printed are two memoranda drafted by Gudgeon on October 28 and May 10 analyzing the applicability of the concept of self-determination to the Falklands/Malvinas.

<sup>11</sup> Shultz neither approved nor disapproved the two recommendations. Below the recommendations, Bremer wrote on October 29: “Secretary wants a SecPres [i.e., a memorandum from the Secretary to the President] to address proposed course of action. LPB.” On October 29, Eagleburger sent a memorandum to Shultz expressing his agreement with the recommendation to support the Argentine resolution. At the end of the memorandum, Eagleburger wrote: “G.S.—This is a *close* call and will cause problems no matter which way we come out. If you agree with ARA and me that we should support the Argentines if the changes are made, there is still a strong chance that the Pres. will want to support Thatcher. LSE.” A stamped notation at the top of Eagleburger's memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Memos/Letters/Press 1982) For Shultz's October 30 memorandum to Reagan, see Document 405.

**405. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1982

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Memo on the U.N. Falkland Resolution

*Issue*

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memorandum (Tab C) recommending we support an Argentine-sponsored U.N. resolution calling for negotiations to resolve the Falkland Islands dispute.

*Facts*

The resolution, which has wide Latin American support,<sup>2</sup> will be voted on at the U.N. next week. Our support for any such resolution has been contingent on its being moderate in tone and not prejudging the outcome. The Argentine Foreign Minister has now accepted our key demands.<sup>3</sup> Although the British will be disappointed with a U.S. vote favoring any resolution, Secretary Shultz believes US-UK cooperation in other areas will not be affected.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, [Falklands Nov 1–November 14, 1982]. Confidential. Sent for action. Drafted by Fontaine. McFarlane initialed the memorandum on behalf of Clark. McFarlane also drew an arrow from his initials to the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote "Fontaine."

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3119 from USUN, October 29, the Mission reported that on October 28, representatives of the Governments of Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Brazil met with Kirkpatrick, on behalf of the UN resolution's 20 Latin American sponsors, "to request (A) A U.S. vote in favor of the Falklands resolution, (B) U.S. good offices to persuade the British to forego amendments and keep the parliamentary situation in the UNGA Plenary as simple as possible." The Mission also summarized the conversation that followed: "They explained and emphasized their conviction that the U.S. vote would have a large effect in healing or exacerbating U.S. relations with Latin America. Amb. Kirkpatrick assured them she understood their views but noted that the U.S. position was not yet decided; and said she had found the British to be strongly opposed to any resolution that proposes negotiations. The Ambassador stated that, while she would be very happy to raise the Latin concerns with the British, she was not optimistic that we would have any influence." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820562–0058)

<sup>3</sup> Garcia del Solar presented to Bosworth on October 30 a revised text of the resolution that omitted "offensive language on colonialism," as well as "objectionable references to the Non-Aligned Movement declarations," and added three new paragraphs on the cessation of hostilities, non-use of force, and the interests of the Islanders. The changes were transmitted by the Department in telegram 306086 to USUN, Buenos Aires, and London, October 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820563–0810)



*Discussion*

A favorable vote will greatly help our relations with Argentina, which were strained nearly to the breaking point during the South Atlantic war last spring. The Argentine government, in fact, has made such a U.S. vote a *sine qua non* to improved relations. At the same time, Buenos Aires after extensive negotiations with us has softened considerably the original language of the resolution. (The text remains in flux;<sup>4</sup> a copy will be provided once it becomes firm.)

Moreover, a supporting U.S. vote would also do much to improve relations with other Latin American Governments who felt, despite Argentina's aggression, that the U.S. reverted to form by favoring Europe over the Americas. Our vote would significantly help to dispel that suspicion—a development especially welcome on the eve of your visit to Latin America.

The British Government, Mrs. Thatcher in particular, will not welcome this U.S. vote despite the considerably softer tone of the resolution. Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher may telephone you in the next few days to register her concern as a follow-up to her message to you dated October 25 (Tab B).<sup>5</sup>

The newly worded resolution calls for negotiations, but does not set a date for their beginning nor does it prejudice the question of sovereignty. It thus falls well within our principle favoring peaceful resolutions of disputes.

I therefore concur with Secretary Shultz that we should support a moderately worded U.N. resolution on the Falkland Islands despite anticipated British objections.

*Recommendations*<sup>6</sup>

That you approve Secretary Shultz's recommendation favoring the upcoming Argentine-sponsored resolution on the Falkland Islands subject to final review of the text.

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<sup>4</sup> Kirkpatrick received a revised text, prepared by the representatives of Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Cuba, and forwarded it to Shultz, Eagleburger, Enders, Newell, and Clark in telegram 3152 from USUN, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820565–0397)

<sup>5</sup> Printed as Document 403.

<sup>6</sup> Both recommendations were marked as approved. Below the second recommendation, McFarlane wrote: "Left with Pres 11/1." In telegram 306937 to USUN, November 2, the Department authorized Kirkpatrick to inform Aguirre Lanari, the Latin American co-sponsors, and others "as appropriate" that the United States was prepared to vote for the resolution as modified on October 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820566–0031)

That you use the talking points attached at Tab A<sup>7</sup> for your use in the event Prime Minister Thatcher calls you to discuss the question. (A reply<sup>8</sup> to her message is being staffed separately.)

**Tab C**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to  
President Reagan<sup>9</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1982

SUBJECT

U.N. Falklands Resolution

Argentina and Great Britain have both been lobbying hard for our vote in the U.N. next week on the Falklands. The resolution, sponsored by 20 Latin American countries, asks both sides to try to resolve their dispute through negotiations. The resolution now has a comfortable majority. The British nevertheless have made it clear that they do not intend to negotiate in the near future. This has put Canada, Britain's EC partners and us on the spot. We want to support an ally who was the victim of aggression, but it is difficult, legally and politically, to vote against peaceful negotiations.

For many in Latin America, this vote is a key test of our future attitude toward them. Even an abstention would create great resentment in the area. We have been under heavy fire since the Falklands for "favoring Europe" over this Hemisphere. On the eve of your visit there, we want to demonstrate our deep interest in and solidarity with the Americas.

We have told Argentina and Britain that we would not support a resolution that prejudged the outcome of negotiations or set an unrealistic timetable. We also warned the Argentines that we could not support a resolution loaded with anti-colonialist rhetoric. The Argentine Foreign Minister has now agreed to our key demands. The Foreign Minister still has to sell the more moderate proposal to the military junta and the other Latin sponsors, but it is probably an acceptable package.

It is a close call, but I believe we should support the Argentine-sponsored resolution. There is no doubt Mrs. Thatcher will be dis-

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<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 407.

<sup>9</sup> Confidential.

pleased, but I do not think this will affect U.S./British cooperation in other areas, such as the pipeline sanctions question. We understand that Canada and most of the other EC countries now intend to take positions similar to ours.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

I recommend we inform the Argentines that we can support the resolution they sponsor, with the modifications to which the Argentine Foreign Minister agreed.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved.

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**406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1982, 2006Z

306409. Subject: Message to the Prime Minister From the President on UNGA Falklands Resolution.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Embassy is requested to deliver today, November 1, the following message from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher. There will be no signed original.

Begin text:

Dear Margaret:

I have given careful consideration to the issues raised by your letter of October 25.<sup>2</sup> I understand the importance to you of the United Nations resolution on the Falklands, and appreciate your concerns.

When we were first approached by the Argentine representatives on their proposed resolution, we made very clear our objection to much of its content. They were the same objections which your letter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (10/04/1982–11/01/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted from White House text; cleared in substance by Smith (ARA) and by Bremer, Sherman, and Binns; approved by Blackwill. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820008–0633)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 403.

identifies.<sup>3</sup> We emphasized that the United States could not accept any resolution which prejudged the questions of sovereignty or the outcome of any negotiation. We further stressed that we could not support any resolution with unrealistic deadlines on negotiations or other processes of peaceful settlement.

Argentina, however, now proposes to delete references to the Non-Aligned Movement's communiques which specifically prejudice the question of sovereignty, to reaffirm expressly principles of the UN Charter concerning non-use of force in international relations, and to make other changes which make the resolution more moderate.<sup>4</sup> While the revised version suggests negotiations at an earlier rather than later date, we do not consider this to be a strict deadline. We conclude that the resolution in its revised form does not legally prejudice the position of either party in the dispute.

The United Kingdom is justifiably concerned that there was no reference to the recent hostilities or to self-determination in the resolution. The most recent revisions to the draft expressly refer to the cessation of hostilities and the intention of the parties not to renew them, coupled with reaffirmation of the principles of non-use of force and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States assumes that any negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina would necessarily take into account the views of the Falkland Islanders. The reference to Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly underscores the principle of self-determination, and the revised draft now expressly refers to the necessity of taking the interests of the Islanders into account.

Our support for your position during the hostilities was based on our strong belief that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. We continue to hold that belief and support your position that any solution to the problem must be accomplished in the context of all relevant elements of the UN Charter. We do not believe, however, that the resolution, as currently written, prejudices that position and consider that it is moderately positive in reaffirming the fundamental obligations of the Charter concerning the non-use of force. For these reasons we believe it reasonable now to vote for the substantially modified resolution.

We understand your reluctance to enter into negotiations when loss of life remains fresh in everyone's mind. We can appreciate your desire for a cooling off period and more concrete evidence from Argen-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 403.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 405.

tina that it will not resort again to further use of force. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the options of negotiations or other means of peaceful settlement not be foreclosed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government of Argentina now suggesting negotiations is a different one from the one which launched the aggression.

Margaret, I know how you have anguished over this conflict from the beginning. Your courage and leadership throughout have been a source of deep personal inspiration to me. I count it as a privilege to have been able to support you and Britain at this critical moment. You may be absolutely confident that I would do it all again the same way.

Sincerely, /S/ Ron. End text.

Shultz

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**407. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, November 2, 1982, 1315Z

Dear Ron,

I received your message about the Falklands<sup>2</sup> just as I was going into a meeting of my Cabinet this morning. I discussed it with my colleagues and I must tell you at once that we are utterly dismayed by its contents.

If the United States votes for a resolution on the lines of the Argentine draft, you will encourage the Argentines in their ambition to secure the transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands to themselves, against the wishes of the inhabitants. Their sole purpose in putting forward this draft is to further that ambition.

The resolution misrepresents the situation completely. It mocks the concept of self-determination by saying that the “interests” of the Falkland Islanders will be “taken duly into account”. It retains references to previous resolutions which prejudge the issue. It calls for early negotiations but you and all our friends know why negotiations are not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, United Kingdom: Prime Minister Thatcher—Cables (1). Secret; Flash. Sent in telegram MISC 222 from the Cabinet office to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 406.

acceptable to us. And it does this against the background of continuing bellicose statements by representatives of the Argentine regime.

You rightly refer to the staunch support which you gave us during the conflict in the South Atlantic. I remain deeply grateful. May I say that we have also supported you at the UN and elsewhere in matters of prime concern to the United States.

The vote on this Argentine resolution is a matter of prime concern to Britain. That is why I must make an urgent and personal appeal to you to think again. A vote by the United States for the resolution would be received here with incomprehension. Worse, it would be seen as an affront to the government and the people of Britain and to me personally. I cannot believe that you would consider delivering such a blow to the right of self-determination which means so much to the democracies of the free world. I had greatly hoped that you would vote against this hypocritical text. But if you cannot, I must ask you, with all we have done together in mind, at least to abstain.

With best wishes

Margaret

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#### **408. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 2, 1982, 2027Z

Dear Margaret:

I have just received your message<sup>2</sup> and would like to respond immediately, given the importance of the issue to both of us.

I fully understand that negotiations are not acceptable to you, having just paid so much in blood and treasure to repulse the Argentine invasion. We have no intention to press you—or to see you be pressed—into negotiations before you are ready. Equally, we have no intention to take a position on the substance of the matter that is in any way prejudicial to your position on the questions of sovereignty and self-determination. Indeed Resolution 1514 contains stronger references to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (11/02/1982). Secret; Flash. Sent in telegram WH07645 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 407.

self-determination than it does to the principle the Argentines proclaim, "territorial integrity."

Margaret, my country has always supported you and always will in defeating any effort to solve the Falklands dispute by force. You know that we have always been neutral on the question of sovereignty. And we have always favored peaceful solution of the issue by negotiation. I am well aware that it was the Argentines that interrupted negotiations by attacking the Islands. But I do not think that in itself is reason not to support a solution by negotiations sometime in the future. It is hard for the United States to have any other position.

Reading your message, I believe more weight ought to be given to the text of the resolution as it now stands. The Brazilian amendments have made it much less objectionable. It was on the basis of this new text that my colleagues informed Argentina and other sponsors that we would support it. In particular, the references to *de facto* cessation of hostilities and the intention of the partners not to renew them takes us a good ways towards the formal renunciation of hostilities we both have been working for, although I would agree with you that they are not equivalent.

At the time of the vote, our representative will put clearly on record our views that force must not be used again to solve the dispute, that the underlying question of sovereignty is not and cannot be prejudiced by the resolution, and that the aspirations of the Islanders must be taken into account.

I am truly sorry that we disagree on this matter and for my part will do everything in my power to make sure this resolution is not abused. You may be confident that the United States will continue to abide by the jointly shared principles which guided both our countries through the Falklands crisis to its successful conclusion.

With best wishes,

**Ron**

**409. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, November 4, 1982, 1322Z

Begins

I delayed replying to your message of 2 November about the Falklands<sup>2</sup> until my Cabinet meeting this morning. My colleagues and I have now discussed it and I want you to know our unanimous view.

The British people would see your vote for this resolution as an American decision to support Argentina against Britain, to support a dictatorship against the home of democracy.

The issue of self-determination is at the heart of Western democracy. Nothing could be more fundamental. The Falkland Islanders want to stay British. The object of these Argentine manoeuvres at the UN is simply to start a process which will deny them that choice.

Negotiations? Argentina simply wants to achieve by negotiation what it failed to achieve by military aggression which cost so many young lives.

I have supported you in every way I know because of my faith in the Anglo-American relationship and your personal commitment to fundamental principles. Nothing can shake my belief in the values for which you and I stand. But if America votes in the way you propose, my task will be immeasurably harder.

I know very well how difficult a change would be for you now, with all the publicity that has been given to your intentions. But the free world would understand and applaud a decision to abstain.

I do urge you to look at this again urgently and personally. So much depends on it.

**Margaret Thatcher**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Secret; Strictly Personal. Sent in a telegram from the Cabinet Office to the White House. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 408.



**410. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, November 4, 1982, 1906Z

3236. For the Secretary, Eagleburger, and Newell; NSC for Judge Clark; from Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Subject: Revised Text of Explanation of Vote on Falklands. Ref: USUN 3233.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

Below is revised text of draft explanation of vote on the Falklands resolution for use after the vote in the UNGA plenary November 4.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. President,

The United States has always supported a negotiated settlement between the United Kingdom and Argentina in their tragic conflict over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). At the outset of the conflict, my government made sustained efforts to bring the two parties to the negotiating table. We said at that time the United States stands behind the principle that the use of force to settle disputes should not be allowed anywhere, and especially in this hemisphere where a significant number of territorial disputes remain to be solved diplomatically. For the United States, the Falkland crisis has been and still is a particularly agonizing, tragic event. As the whole world knows, we have a long-standing alliance and, beyond that, the closest relations of friendship with Great Britain, the country from which our political institutions, law and language derive. But we have not forgotten for a moment our close geographical, economic and political relations with our Latin neighbors. We do not only care about this hemisphere, we are part of this hemisphere, and we share many of the aspirations, goals and dreams of all nations of the Americas . . .

That is why the United States tried so hard to avoid the conflict on the Falklands, why we hoped so intensely to reduce and isolate it, and why we were eager and ready to back any realistic diplomatic initiative which would put a just end to it. The search for a negotiated

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820571–0494. Confidential; Flash; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3233 from USUN, November 4, transmitted an earlier draft of the explanation of the U.S. vote on the Falklands/Malvinas resolution. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820571–0220) The statement, as delivered by Adelman before the UNGA, November 4, is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1363.

<sup>3</sup> The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 37/9 by a vote of 90 (including the United States) to 12 (including the United Kingdom), with 52 abstentions. The text of the resolution is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1347. For a summary of the debate in the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, pp. 1341–1346.

settlement to this conflict led the United States to support Security Council Resolution 505 of May 26 which called for the simultaneous cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces, and negotiations. The essential elements of that resolution remain the framework of the search for peace. The same vital need for a negotiated solution that would put this conflict once and for all behind us underlies our vote today.

This resolution, in its revised and final form, expressly reaffirms the principles of the UN Charter concerning non-use of force in international relations. We welcome its references to cessation of hostilities and to the intention of the parties not to renew them. The cost, in blood and treasure, to both Argentina and the United Kingdom dictates that force must never again be used to attempt to solve this dispute. We assume, therefore, in supporting this resolution a shared responsibility for preventing the use of force in the future. The United States would not have voted for any resolution which prejudged the question of sovereignty or the outcome of negotiations. We have never taken a position on the question of sovereignty and we do not now do so. We conclude, however, that the resolution before us does not legally prejudice the position of either Argentina or the United Kingdom and, in fact, opens the way toward negotiations in good faith without any preordained result.

Finally, in calling on the parties to negotiate, let us not forget, Mr. President, that these Islands are and have been for generations the home of a small, but resolute, population of Island people. The United States assumes that negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina will necessarily take into account both the interests and the views of the Falkland Islanders. In supporting this resolution, the U.S. affirms that this dispute like all others should be settled by discussion and never by force and that the fate of peoples should never be settled without due account being taken of their views, values and interests. Let these principles and those of the UN Charter itself governing peaceful resolution of disputes serve as a basis for negotiation to close this unhappy chapter and move forward again toward peace, understanding and development in this hemisphere.

End text.

**Kirkpatrick**

**411. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 4, 1982, 2159Z

Dear Margaret:

Reading your message of November 4,<sup>2</sup> I realize that our understanding of these events is indeed quite different. I can assure you, Margaret, that the United States did not make a decision to support Argentina against Britain, or to support dictatorship against democracy. Neither did we abandon the principle of self-determination. We reaffirmed our support for a negotiated settlement to a long-standing conflict. We have supported the principle of negotiation throughout this long, difficult dispute. It is the principle to which Britain herself has adhered for so many years with regard to this and other disputes. Certainly, we will never alter our view that a people must ultimately determine their own future and certainly we mean this with regard to the people on the Falklands.

Finally, you and I have supported each other in the past because of our shared faith in the Anglo-American relationship and our shared commitment to the same fundamental principles and values. I feel sure neither you nor I will abandon those principles and values nor the effort to help our peoples understand their application in this complex, difficult world.

I assure you we stand as firmly with you on the principles of non-use of force, of negotiation and self-determination as ever.

**Ron**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Secret; Flash. Sent for immediate delivery in telegram WH07725 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 409.

**412. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf), and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Blackwill) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 12, 1982

SUBJECT

Proposed Argentine Resolution on Falklands/Malvinas Issue

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

Whether to accept the Argentine draft OASGA Resolution at Tab A<sup>2</sup> or abstain at the OASGA on a much stronger Resolution which will pass overwhelmingly.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

Prior to our vote for UNGA Res. 37/9 on November 4,<sup>3</sup> the Argentines had circulated to selected Latin OAS Delegations the draft OASGA Resolution at Tab B.<sup>4</sup>

Argentine Ambassador to the OAS Quijano returned from Buenos Aires on November 10. He reports the GOA recognizes and appreciates the effort we made in our vote at the UNGA. They have reassessed their relationship with us and their position in the hemisphere and wish to cooperate with us on a broad front and to avoid confrontation. Their first step was to throw their support to Honduras Foreign Minister Paz Barnica, our candidate for the Chairmanship of the OASGA. The next was to prepare a Falklands/Malvinas Resolution for the OASGA designed to meet their minimal requirements while attempting to accommodate our concerns so as to permit us to support the Resolution. The text at Tab A, supporting UNGA Res. 37/9, is the result.

The GOA recognizes that, given the position of the Caribbean members of the OAS, even that text cannot be approved by consensus. Nevertheless, they are prepared to withdraw the earlier draft Resolu-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890116–0107. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson; cleared by Gompert, D. Toussaint (IO), Kirkpatrick, and M. Kozak (L). Thompson initialed for Toussaint, Kirkpatrick, and Kozak. He also initialed for Middendorf. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 410.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed. The OAS General Assembly was scheduled to convene November 15–20.

tion (Tab B) and present the new text (Tab A) if we find it acceptable. This position responds to the importance they attach to our support and their desire to avoid any conflict with or embarrassment to us at the OASGA.

If the United States is unable to accept the new Argentine text the Foreign Minister has said the GOA will understand and there will be no hard feelings. However, in that event Argentina will have to revert to a somewhat strengthened version of the earlier draft containing the references to "Argentine sovereignty," "colonial situation," "injury to the territorial integrity of a member state," etc., which we find objectionable. Regrettably, Argentine support for this stronger text will also require the Foreign Minister's speech on November 17 to sound more harsh and confrontational than would be the case if we can agree on a text. (You follow the Argentine Foreign Minister in the speaking order that day.)<sup>5</sup> Argentina is assured of all twenty Latin American votes for the stronger Resolution.

Given the tactical decision Argentina must make, Ambassador Quijano requests an urgent response.

#### *BUREAU POSITIONS*

EUR believes that the US should abstain on the attached draft language and that we should not negotiate a Resolution with the Argentines.<sup>6</sup> The latest draft is unacceptable because it (a) prejudices the outcome by referring to previous resolutions that recognize Argentine sovereignty and criticize US measures adopted in response to the Argentine use of force; (b) by calling on the parties to carry out the UNGA Resolution it violates the President's promise to Mrs. Thatcher that the US would not press the British to negotiate; and (c) coming so soon after the UN vote it would confirm British fears that the US cannot be counted on to support an ally resisting aggression. In light of the deep wounds in Britain resulting from our UN vote, we must be sure that our actions on the Falklands/Malvinas conform to our assurances to HMG that the US will play a neutral and detached role in the ensuing controversy. US support for the proposed Resolution will not promote a peaceful resolution of the problem. On the contrary, it will stiffen the resistance of London to negotiations with Buenos Aires. Lastly, if Mrs. Thatcher attends the Brezhnev funeral, we are going to recommend that you and the Vice President meet with her to put the Falklands/Malvinas issue behind us. That effort at reconcilia-

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<sup>5</sup> For the text of Shultz's November 17 speech to the OAS General Assembly, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1982, pp. 64–67.

<sup>6</sup> Shultz underlined "EUR," and the portion of the sentence beginning with "US."

tion would obviously be incompatible with a vote at the OAS which will be certain to send Mrs. Thatcher around the bend again.

L advises that the draft Resolution is substantively consistent with our position at the<sup>7</sup> UN: It contains nothing that prejudices the UK legal position and sets no deadline for negotiations. Like the UN Resolution, it contains preambular references to resolutions we did not support. As in that case, however, mere recalling of action taken by the same or related body is consistent with international practice and does not prejudice our position of non-support for the previous resolution. L would recommend that we seek two small changes in the draft: using the accepted UN practice of referring to the Malvinas (Falklands) in *alternat*, or simply avoiding specific references to the Islands' name; and ensuring wording or translation of operative paragraph 2 that does not connote a legally binding nature to the UNGA Resolution (i.e., "carry out" rather than "comply" with the Resolution).

P (David Gompert on behalf of Larry Eagleburger, who favored supporting the Argentine Resolution in the UN) believes that supporting the moderate Argentine Resolution in the OAS would spark a new and potentially more bitter British reaction, particularly because of the preambular reference to previous OAS resolutions that flatly endorsed Argentine sovereignty. It would not be at all inconsistent for us to abstain on this Resolution after having supported the UN Resolution;<sup>8</sup> indeed, it could usefully show that we draw the line when language becomes more prejudicial—politically, if not legalistically—than the UN text. At the same time, if we intend to abstain, we are far better off doing so on the *less* moderate Argentine Resolution, which no one could possibly expect us to support or seriously criticize us for failing to support. Therefore, the best approach, in P's view, is to tell the Argentines that, in addition to the changes L recommends, *all* reference to the earlier OAS resolutions<sup>9</sup> must be dropped if we are to support the Resolution. If, as would seem unlikely, they can make such a change, we can and should support the Resolution. If they cannot and therefore put forward the less moderate Resolution, our abstention will be fully

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<sup>7</sup> Shultz underlined "draft Resolution is substantively consistent with our position at the."

<sup>8</sup> Shultz underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "would" and concluding with "Resolution."

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to Resolutions I and II on the situation in the South Atlantic adopted at the 20th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations on April 28 and May 29, respectively. For Resolution I, see footnote 2, Document 185. For Resolution II, requesting that the Rio Treaty states give Argentina "the support that each judges appropriate," see footnote 3, Document 305.

understood.<sup>10</sup> IO concurs in P's position, and points out that one of the OAS resolutions cited in the Preamble criticizes the US by name for "coercive measures"<sup>11</sup> against Argentina in support of the UK.

ARA and USOAS believe the Argentine Text represents a major conciliatory effort. They have gone far in producing a moderate draft, one that is in some respects more moderate than the UN Resolution we supported (e.g., the OAS draft contains *no* reference to the "colonial situation" on the islands). While the preambular part of the draft does refer to the previous action taken by the XX MFM, it would be difficult to conceive of an OAS resolution that did not mention an action taken by an OAS body on the identical subject. ARA and USOAS would emphasize L's advice that *legally*, and in their view *practically*, the "having seen" reference to the MFM resolutions does not constitute endorsement of their content. USOAS also points out that our explanation of vote can expressly declare that our positive vote does not imply acceptance of the previous MFM resolutions. USOAS believes it may be possible to persuade the Argentines to make the two changes suggested by L but not to delete all reference to the previous OAS resolutions. ARA and USOAS believe we should work with the Argentine text. Like EUR, ARA thinks the verb "calls upon" is too strong to square with our commitment to the British not to press them on implementation of the UNGA Resolution. ARA proposes that we seek to modify that verb to "expresses the hope." A positive US vote would not only strengthen the improvement in our relationship with Argentina but would significantly strengthen the OAS by a show of US/Latin American unity after a divisive period. It would greatly contribute to the atmosphere for the President's trip. A US abstention on a Falklands/Malvinas Resolution at this time would be perceived by the Latin Americans as a reversal and would undo much of the reconciliation achieved up to now.<sup>12</sup> It will be exploited by Nicaragua and our opponents in the hemisphere to detract from the President's trip.

#### RECOMMENDATION<sup>13</sup>

1. That you instruct USOAS to inform Ambassador Quijano that we can vote for the Argentine text at Tab A, with the adjustments proposed by L and ARA. (ARA, USOAS and Ambassador Kirkpatrick favor.)

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<sup>10</sup> Shultz drew a double line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence in order to highlight it.

<sup>11</sup> Shultz underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "one" and concluding with 'measures.'"

<sup>12</sup> In this sentence, Shultz underlined "A US abstention" and "would be perceived by the Latin Americans as a reversal and."

<sup>13</sup> Shultz neither approved nor disapproved the three recommendations. Below the recommendations, Bremer wrote on November 13: "Sec's action reported Tosec #2 + 4." Shultz left Washington that day to accompany Bush to Moscow to attend the November 15 funeral of Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev.

2. Alternatively, that you instruct USOAS to inform Quijano that we can vote for the new text only if *all* references to earlier OAS resolutions are dropped, in addition to making the changes in (1) above. (P and IO favor.)

3. Alternatively, that you instruct USOAS to refrain from negotiating with Quijano and to abstain on either of the attached drafts. (EUR favors.)

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#### 413. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 17, 1982

1. *OAS General Assembly*. Today's plenary session was devoted to formal statements by Heads of Delegations. The Latin American Foreign Ministers dealt in familiar terms with protectionism, the Falklands crisis, the North-South dialogue and the future of the inter-American system. My speech stressed democracy as a recurring ideal and practical standard.<sup>2</sup> I pointed out that one of the principal objectives for your upcoming trip is to underscore our firm commitment to democratic processes. I also observed that the US is now poised for economic recovery and that this hemisphere should provide a substantial impulse to the renewed momentum for global expansion. (U)

2. *Falklands*. The Argentines have taken a conciliatory tack at the OAS meeting and are supporting a mild Falklands resolution. Our vote for the resolution will create a positive atmosphere for your trip.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Sec. State Evening Report (11/04/1982–11/23/1982). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 412.

<sup>3</sup> Reagan traveled to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras November 30–December 4. At a November 23 meeting of the National Security Council, held to brief the President on his trip, Shultz commented on the trip's implications for U.S.-Latin American relations in the aftermath of the South Atlantic war. Shultz informed Reagan: "Your trip will conclude the post-Falklands/Malvinas—our votes in the UN and OAS have helped. The British initially were unhappy with us over the UN vote, but they are now thanking us and will be glad over the long run that we have helped moderate this issue. We have, over many years, had a close military relationship in South America; weapons training in the US. This was extremely beneficial. It has dropped off dramatically. We are losing our close relations with the younger officers. Historically, we have sold 60 percent of their [South America's] weapons; now it is only six percent. The close personal contacts have been the glue of our relations with these nations. They must be rebuilt." (Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council, November 23; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, NSC 00067 11/23/1982 [President's Trip to Latin America])



We have consulted on the text and tactics repeatedly with the British Embassy, which is pleased with our results and appreciative of our efforts. That said, we cannot guarantee that our vote will not elicit a negative response from Mrs. Thatcher, who has been more outspoken than her Foreign Office on the Falklands. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

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**414. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, the Embassy in the United Kingdom, and the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1982, 1654Z

325184. Subject: OASGA—Falklands Resolution Passed.

1. (LOU) In General Committee at 8:25 pm Thursday evening,<sup>2</sup> the item long seen as potentially the GA's most heated issue, Argentina's draft resolution on the South Atlantic, came out of the corridors and onto the table for approval but with the heat missing. By 9:30 after a series of brief non-controversial speeches, the meeting was over and the resolution approved 21–0–7. The seven abstentions were: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad-Tobago. El Salvador and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were absent accidentally. Both had thought the resolution would not come up until Friday morning at the earliest. It will next go to the GA Plenary for a final rubber stamp of approval.

2. (LOU) According to one knowledgeable source, the Caribbeans in an effort at conciliation had planned to sit quietly and let the resolution pass unopposed by consensus. However, Panama's OAS Ambassador called for the resolution's approval by acclamation, a motion the Caribbeans could not support and which produced their request for a recorded vote.

3. (LOU) Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari in presenting the resolution sounded familiar themes. He was brief and low-key however, and wound up by expressing full support for UNGA Resolu-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820602–0235. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson, R.W. Drexler (ARA/USOAS), and S. Smith (ARA/SC); approved by Middendorf.

<sup>2</sup> November 18.

tion 37/9 and offering thanks to the supporters of that resolution, including the US. Over three-quarters of the resolution's 20 sponsors made brief statements, all supportive of peaceful settlement, of UNGA Res. 37/9, and of Argentina's claim to the Falklands. After the vote most of the abstainers spoke—but briefly and without challenging the Argentine version of events. Aguirre Lanari in thanking the GA for the resolution took special pains to thank the Caribbean states for not voting against it.

4. (C) Coming hard on the heels of the UNGA vote and the good feeling which it evoked among Latin Americans, this companion move at the OASGA should go a long way toward further clearing the air. The resolution was produced after much quiet Argentine-US negotiation over the last week during which it was clear that Argentina badly wanted US support and was willing to make major concessions.

5. (U) The text of the resolution and Ambassador Middendorf's explanation of the US vote<sup>3</sup> follow:

[Omitted here are the texts of the OAS resolution and Middendorf's statement.]

**Shultz**

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<sup>3</sup> The texts of Resolution 595 (XII-0/82), adopted by the OAS General Assembly on November 20, and Middendorf's November 18 statement to the General Committee of the OAS General Assembly are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*. 1982, pp. 1365 and 1364, respectively.

**415. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 24, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Argentine Secret Report Criticizes the Army's Conduct of Falklands War

Former President Leopoldo Galtieri and his general staff led Argentina into a war it could not win, according to an internal army appraisal of the army's role in the Falklands war. Details of the formal report, which was sent to Army CINC Maj. Gen. Nicolaides on November 16, have been provided [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Implicit in the document is the conclusion that no further military attempts should be made to capture the islands.

The US is cited as providing key "tactical" advantages to the UK. The report contains no hint, however, of the refrain that Argentina might have won had it not been for the US.

The fundamental mistake of invading the islands is attributed to faulty intelligence and reasoning. The Argentine army, the report concluded, is structured and trained to fight a neighboring South American adversary and thus, had no chance against the UK. The estimate that the UK would not fight was a very serious miscalculation. As a result, senior officers sent to the islands were chosen for their administrative and technical capabilities and knowledge of English rather than for their ability to command combat troops.

The report has been in preparation since June by a team under the direction of Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Calvi. Only Calvi and Nicolaides received copies, and the drafters strongly recommended the report not be made public.

*INR Comment:* Most Argentines believe that the Calvi Commission's work has not been made public because it is a whitewash. On the contrary, the report is unlikely to be published because it is an embarrassingly frank and accurate appraisal. Any soldier or journalist who lent himself to unauthorized publication of the document probably would be risking his life.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820172–0851. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on November 29.

**416. National Security Decision Directive 71<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 30, 1982

*U.S. Policy Toward Latin America In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)*

The Falklands crisis has strained relations with several Latin American countries and resulted in uncertainty regarding the long-range policy goals of the United States in the region. This in turn has increased the potential for instability in Central and South America. (C)

U.S. national interests in Latin America and the region dictate policies that achieve the following objectives:

- a region free of Soviet-dominated or hostile governments;
- the development of stable and democratic political systems and institutions which promote respect for basic human rights;
- cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other issues flowing from geographic proximity;
- advancement of major U.S. trade and investment;
- access to raw materials;
- prevention of nuclear proliferation;
- maintenance of stable balances of power among the states in the region; and
- receptivity to U.S. leadership. (S)

Achieving these objectives has been complicated by the Falklands crisis. Accordingly, our policy must be aimed at ameliorating the following specific problems:

- Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which implies new opportunities for the USSR to gain access to a strategic position in the Southern Cone;
- Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela and elsewhere, which provides tempting opportunities for Cuba to reduce its inter-American isolation;
- The need to improve U.S. relations with Brazil, recognizing Brazil's increased importance as a potential stabilizing factor in South America at a time when mounting economic and financial difficulties

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, NSDD 0071 U.S. Policy Towards Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis. Top Secret. The NSDD was sent to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Vessey under a December 2 covering memorandum from McFarlane on behalf of Clark, informing the recipients of Reagan's approval of it.

are eroding our ties and influence there and in the region as a whole.

- The vulnerability of burgeoning free enterprise economies and developing political institutions to radical insurgent movements supported by the Soviet Union and/or its surrogates.

- The interdiction threat to U.S. aerial and maritime routes in the Caribbean Basin by potentially hostile airbases and the introduction/augmentation of Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft and weaponry. (TS)

In redressing these problems, the highest priority for the United States will continue to be the reduction—and eventual elimination—of the influence and presence of the Soviet Union or its client states in our immediate environs—Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. This will be accomplished through a coordinated application of our diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence and informational resources in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. (TS)

Our second priority is to restore and reassert United States influence in South America. To this end we will:

- Maintain our diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands issues as it existed prior to the crisis. Specifically: The U.S. will continue as a neutral on the question of sovereignty over the islands and support negotiations, mediation or other peaceful efforts to resolve this dispute;

- Attempt to preserve a regional political and military balance, by seeking certification for Argentina and Chile, as eligible for U.S. military sales, jointly if possible, and as early in the new Congress as feasible. In order to progress on this initiative, the State Department will intensify efforts to resolve those issues that currently proscribe arms transfers to Chile and Argentina.

- Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, through:
  - increased Cabinet-level, government-to-government consultations
  - renewed cooperation in economic trade and military training
  - enhanced cooperation in science and technology (particularly space activities)
  - a dialogue on nuclear issues, and
  - exploration, over time, of arms co-production agreements.

To develop this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate positive action by Brazil on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation (e.g., restraint in exports to sensitive regions and progress in discussions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and safeguards). We will further attempt to resolve the matter of nuclear supply and permit resumed nuclear cooperation with Brazil. As contacts on these issues show progress, in order to encourage significant movement on non-proliferation concerns, consideration will

be given to seeking waivers to the Glenn/Symington amendment,<sup>2</sup> permitting enhanced military training cooperation.

- The U.S. will continue to seek prevention of regional arms races, to preserve sub-regional arms balances and to upgrade bilateral military ties. In order to support the legitimate security needs of democratic governments, the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will use flexibility, within NSDD-5 guidelines,<sup>3</sup> to respond promptly to arms transfer requests. Measures will specifically be taken to reduce Peru's dependence on Soviet arms supplies.

- Within resource constraints, the U.S. will maintain assistance efforts in such economically weak states as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. (S)

The aforementioned program—aimed first at the Caribbean Basin/Central American region, and second at South America—will be effected in concert with the following overall hemispheric actions:

- The United States will pursue more active bilateral diplomatic contacts throughout the continent in order to stay efforts to alter the Inter-American System. We will use a series of *ad hoc* bilateral cabinet-level meetings with substantial—though not exclusive—economic focus to show that dialogue with the U.S. is possible. Our Caribbean Basin Initiatives will serve as the framework for these discussions with the Central American States. In South America, the U.S. will lead with Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and then Argentina. Throughout, our goal is to support free enterprise economies and foster the investment and trade necessary to their growth.

- U.S. global sugar policy will be reviewed to assess its foreign and domestic impact on states in the region. If advantageous to our foreign policy goals, consideration will be given to establishing more flexible sugar import levels.

- We will use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels to promote development of democratic institutions and human rights in order to facilitate U.S. public support for expanded, closer relationships with the governments concerned.

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<sup>2</sup> The Symington Amendment of 1976 and the Glenn Amendment of 1977 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit U.S. military assistance to countries that acquire or transfer nuclear reprocessing technology outside of international non-proliferation regimes or explode a nuclear device. The provision was included in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

<sup>3</sup> National Security Decision Directive 5, signed by Reagan on July 8, 1981, outlined the objectives of and criteria for U.S. conventional arms transfers. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 5 [Conventional Arms Transfer Policy])

- A concerted effort will be made to increase U.S. military influence in the hemisphere through promotion of U.S. military training and doctrine, greater use of small mobile training teams, expanded military personnel exchanges and increased International Military Education and Training (IMET) resources. To implement this program the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of State and the Director of Central Intelligence will develop a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by country, and propose a strategy for implementation.

- In order that we can take a pro-active stance in our relations with Central and South American states, the DCI will improve intelligence collection on and analysis of Soviet bloc and Cuban actions which may create internal instability or problems in bilateral relations with the U.S. (TS)

**Ronald Reagan**

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**417. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

December 18, 1982, 2000Z

Secto 17149. Subject: My Meetings in London. For the President from Secretary Shultz.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. I completed my two week swing through Western Europe<sup>2</sup> today, December 18, after a day of talks in London with Mrs. Thatcher and her Foreign Minister, Francis Pym. The British remain as staunch friends as ever, but I found both Mrs. Thatcher and Pym preoccupied with concerns about economic developments, no doubt in part in view of the national elections which many expect Mrs. Thatcher to call next fall.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820010–0095. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the Secretary's aircraft. Shultz was en route between London and Washington.

<sup>2</sup> In the course of his European trip, Shultz traveled to West Germany (December 7–9), Belgium (December 8–11), The Netherlands (December 11), Italy (December 11–14), France (December 14–15), Spain (December 15–16), and the United Kingdom (December 16–18).

4. Mrs. Thatcher also made it clear that the Falklands are still a serious issue in British politics.<sup>3</sup> She said that the UK was not prepared to enter into negotiations with Argentina at this time, nor to discuss the question of sovereignty. She argued that the Islands were too small to become independent, that the inhabitants are British, and that UK control offered strategic advantages for NATO. I restated our position—the Falklands issue should be settled by negotiation rather than by force of arms.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South Atlantic.]

**Shultz**

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<sup>3</sup> Shultz recorded in his memoirs that he discussed the Falklands/Malvinas with Thatcher on December 17. Of the meeting at Number 10 Downing Street, his first with Thatcher since becoming Secretary of State, Shultz wrote: "I was apprehensive that I would run into an argument about the Falklands. Again, she [Thatcher] met me at the door. We sat and talked in a living room where a fire burned brightly. The Falklands were on her mind, and she spoke of their strategic significance. What if the Panama Canal were to be closed, requiring shipping to go 'around the Horn,' as in clipper-ship days? The location of the Falklands in the shipping lanes of the South Atlantic would then be vital. I thought that was farfetched, but there was no point arguing about it. I agreed with our decision to support her, but I felt it was time to repair the damage done to our interests in South America. I stated my views firmly; she listened, but not sympathetically." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 153)

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#### **418. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State and the Department of Defense<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 20, 1982, 1600Z

27573. Subject: Falklands White Paper: Reversing Naval Cutbacks.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: The release of the Falklands White Paper on 14 December was overshadowed by press treatment of EUCOM wartime headquarters relocation, the floating of the Soviet INF proposal, the emergency Commons debate on nuclear issues, and the nearness of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820659–0444. Confidential. Sent for information to NATO Collective, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSNAVEUR, and CINCLANT.



holidays. Moreover, HMG has adopted a course—emphasizing strengthened naval forces and out of area capability—which capitalizes on the Falklands factor and coopts both Tory “Little England” back-benchers and the opposition. For the US and NATO the new policy is confirmation that HMG has moved away to a degree from the scope and timing of the Nott-proposed cutbacks of last year. End summary.

3. Nott announced a billion pound package of orders for new ships, aircraft and military hardware in his parliamentary presentation of the White Paper. The main items are:

- Six new ships costing 585 million pounds, four of them are Type 22 frigates replacing the lost destroyers and frigates;

- Cancelling of planned mothballing of four ships;

- Reaffirmation of the continuing operation of the carrier *Invincible*, the assault ships *Fearless* and *Intrepid* and the patrol vessel *Endurance*;

- Limiting cutbacks at the large Portsmouth naval base to save 1,500 jobs;

- Replacement of all aircraft lost in the campaign plus purchase of at least 12 F-4s;

- Purchasing six Tristars (L-1011S) from British Airways for use as air refueling tankers;

- Strengthening of the 5th Infantry Brigade for airborne operations;

- Purchasing an additional 5 Chinook helicopters to improve rapid movement of troops and equipment.

4. The White Paper put the Falklands in a larger perspective and emphasized that responding to the Soviet threat has first call on British resources. The announced purchases of major equipment are to avoid any major diversion of effort from NATO roles by increasing the mobility, flexibility and operational readiness of the forces. The modest out-of-area capability is being significantly enhanced. Financing of the equipment is in addition to the annual three percent real growth to which the government is committed until 1986. The report concludes that British will, resolve, and fortitude have been proved again and “we and our NATO allies can draw confidence from this. The deterrent posture of the NATO alliance as a whole has been strengthened.”

5. The general response to the report has been favorable. Even Keith Speed, who was fired in May 81 as Royal Navy Minister due to his opposition to navy cuts, proclaims himself “80 percent happy” with the report. SDP’s David Owen, from Devonport, was glad to see the readjustment. Labor’s current focus on nuclear issues, however, colored its position even on this issue. Shadow Defense Secretary Silkin’s main thrust was that the whole of the administration’s maritime policy was put at risk by HMG’s commitment to Trident. In a time of growing

unemployment, much was made of the shipbuilding employment and dockwork that would arise from continuing the active service of four ships past the 1985 mothball date announced last year.

6. Still, Labor opposition was clearly muted, in part because more ships mean more jobs, in part because other issues are diverting attention. Thus, so far, the Falklands White Paper has had a bare 24 hours of media play. Nott may have made his substantive farewell as Defense Secretary with the White Paper release and, in a week marked by leaks and surprises on other fronts, perhaps the best surprise was that there were no surprises in it.

Louis

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#### **419. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, January 12, 1983, 1555Z

239. Subject: Argentine Intentions: Military Actions Concerning the Falklands. Ref: FBIS DTG 102140Z Jan 83.<sup>2</sup>

1. S–Entire text.

2. Taking into account recent intelligence reports and statements of Argentine officials, the Embassy Intelligence Committee reviewed current Argentine capabilities, intentions and views on potential US position. We conclude:

A. There are sufficient indications that some Argentine military move could possibly be afoot to merit concern and increased intelli-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830020–0706. Secret. Sent for information to London, USUN, CINCLANT, and USCINCSOUTH.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

gence activity.<sup>3</sup> Presumably whatever action might be intended would be directed against the British in the South Atlantic, although some kind of scheme for confronting the Chileans is not completely inconceivable.

B. Argentina does not have the military capability to mount a large-scale invasion of the Falklands in the near future. Those in the armed services who are thinking rationally know that the equipment and joint operations capability for such an undertaking are lacking. In our view statements about retaking the Islands have a longer-term perspective, are designed to build military and civilian morale, as well as to justify arms purchases and to pressure the British to negotiate.

C. Any of the services has the capability of provoking or creating an [garble—incident?] involving force. Destroying a British helicopter outside the 150-mile limit has been mentioned by some officers. A commando landing or sapper attack against British aircraft are examples of other conceivable possibilities. The rationale would be to pressure the British to negotiate while—most important—restoring the honor and domestic reputation of the armed forces. While it would be normal for the Argentine military to be planning, training and practicing for various possible contingency operations against the Malvinas, such activities do not necessarily mean that any operational or political decisions have been made. But, given what is seen here as highly provocative action by the British<sup>4</sup> and given potential domestic considerations which could place the military under great pressure, it is conceivable that the Junta or some part of the armed forces would decide to go ahead with some kind of military operation such as those mentioned above.

D. Despite repeated statements here and in Washington of the US position opposing the use of force, many in the government and the military may believe that US would not react adversely to a small

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<sup>3</sup> Among the reports of possible Argentine military activity against U.K. targets include a December 23, 1982, report that asserted that “those members of the naval staff involved in the planning of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April were all back in Buenos Aires and engaged in planning further action against the islands.” (White House Situation Room Note, January 5; Reagan Library, White House Situation Room Files, Series III: Notes, Notes 01/07/1983–01/12/1983) A December 28 report prepared in the CIA indicated evidence of secret training of underwater demolition teams involving “infiltration by submarine to place explosives on aircraft and buildings.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, Job 95B00915R: Leak Data Base Files (1976–1991), Box 5, Folder 14: Leak Investigation Chrono—January–May 1983) A January 10 White House Situation Room Note conveyed a British report that stated that the “Argentine armed forces were actively preparing for a renewal of hostilities,” were “re-equipping for this purpose,” and were practicing air attacks in the Andean foothills “against targets similar to those on the islands.” (Reagan Library, White House Situation Room Files, Series III: Notes, Notes 01/07/1983–01/12/1983)

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to Thatcher’s January 9–13 visit to the Falklands/Malvinas during which she toured the sites of battles and honored the U.K. war dead.

action, given what they see as the British provocation and a strong US desire to strengthen Latin American ties.

3. We shall take every opportunity here with both military and civilians to disabuse any of the notion that our strong views against the use of force have changed. We shall also intensify our efforts to develop additional intelligence.

Shlaudeman

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**420. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 18, 1983

SUBJECT

Franks Committee Report on HMG's Falklands Policy

In response to Parliamentary demands during the Falklands war, Mrs. Thatcher agreed to establish an independent commission to study the period up to the April 2 Argentine invasion in order to determine responsibility for Britain's surprise.<sup>2</sup> The political opposition hoped that it would show that the Conservative Government was largely responsible for not foreseeing Argentine intentions and for the lack of military preparedness in the South Atlantic. They had expected the conclusions to hurt the Conservatives in the next general election. We had been concerned that the report might weaken the Foreign Office, damage the Thatcher Government, and adversely affect our attempt to improve relations with Latin America. The final report is welcome on all counts even if it is too early to gauge the political fallout in Britain or Latin America.

Following are general conclusions and implications for the US:

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Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive January 16–31 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by K. Smith (EUR/NE); cleared by Haass, R. Howard (ARA/SC), and Einaudi. Smith initialed for all clearing officials. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> The six-member Franks Commission, headed by Lord Franks, issued its report on January 18. (R.W. Apple, Jr., "British Inquiry on Falkland War Clears the Thatcher Government," *New York Times*, January 19, p. A1)

*The Thatcher Government's lack of warning:* The report states that the information available “demonstrates conclusively that the Government had no reason to believe before March 31 that an invasion of the Falkland Islands would take place at the beginning of April.” It also states that the actual invasion (April 2) could not have been foreseen. One reason given is that the Junta did not issue an order to invade until at least 31 March.

*The Foreign Office:* The committee found no evidence that the FCO had pursued a Falklands policy independent of the Government in the period prior to the invasion. The report indicates that the FCO had been handicapped in trying to reach a negotiated solution by Conservative backbenchers opposed to any change in the islands' status. The report states that the FCO might have done some things differently, but there is no evidence that it could have influenced the Argentines into changing their plans. Since Mrs. Thatcher blamed the FCO for much of the UK's unpreparedness, the conclusions come as a relief to Lord Carrington, Francis Pym and the rest of the Foreign Office.

*Role of the US:* The report documents the major diplomatic exchanges between the USG and HMG, including the President's call to President Galtieri and the subsequent cabled report to Mrs. Thatcher.<sup>3</sup> The exchanges reveal nothing new or damaging. An implicit criticism of the US is contained in the statement that, “It is likely that the Argentine Government came to believe that the United States Government were sympathetic to their claim to the Falklands Islands and, while not supporting forcible action in furtherance of it, would not actively oppose it.” The report implies that the US was overly ‘evenhanded’ in talks with both sides before the invasion.

*Effect on US-Latin American relations:* While the report will stir up unhelpful memories in Latin America about US assistance to the UK during the war, the report itself contains little that is damaging to our interests. It documents the extensive US-UK diplomatic communication before the invasion, including our Naval Attache in Buenos Aires, but that is not likely to surprise the Latin Americans. Since the report only analyzes events prior to April 30, it says nothing of our extensive cooperation during the fighting. When discussing intelligence sources, the US is not mentioned except to state that “there was no intelligence from American sources or otherwise to show that the [Argentine] force at sea was intended other than for normal naval exercises.”

*Comment:* It is a relief that the Committee's report does not provide fuel for the Thatcher Government's Labor Party critics. The Conservatives will have a difficult time as it is winning re-election during a

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 41 and 42.

deep recession. The US needs its continuing help on a host of European security issues. We are pleased as well that the Foreign Office comes out as well as it did. Further weakening of the FCO is not in our interests. Fortunately, the report does not talk more about intelligence sources or exchanges with the US. We have enough problems healing the scars in Latin America without such revelations. It is possible that the lack of criticism of HMG may reflect the protection by the British establishment of its own. The FCO had refused before April 2 to believe that the Argentines would invade.

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**421. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 19, 1983, 1621Z

16069. Subject: Clarifying Argentine Perceptions of U.S. Policy Regarding Falklands/Malvinas Dispute. Ref: A. Buenos Aires 246,<sup>2</sup> B. State 12311,<sup>3</sup> C. London 1155.<sup>4</sup>

1. C–Entire text.

2. The Department continues to coordinate efforts aimed at reminding the Argentines that there has been no change in our policy with regard to the use of force under any guise in the Falklands.

3. Efforts to convey this position began January 13, when ARA/SC Alternate Director spoke with Argentine DCM Herrera Vegas (Ref

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830031–0608. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USUN. Drafted by R. Walser (ARA/SC); cleared by Johnson, K. Smith (EUR/NE), L. Barnett (IO), R. Howard (ARA/SC), and C. Brown (DOD/ISA); approved by Enders.

<sup>2</sup> Sent January 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830018–0984)

<sup>3</sup> Sent January 14 to Buenos Aires and USUN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830024–0916)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1155 from London, January 18, the Embassy suggested briefing the FCO on U.S. approaches to Argentina regarding U.S. Falklands/Malvinas policy “before they learn of these efforts independently.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830029–0443) Summarizing the subsequent briefing, the Embassy reported: “We briefed FCO on the steps taken by USG to make clear that ‘we would not countenance Argentinian use of force in any guise.’ FCO thinks our actions have been just right, and we were told Thatcher is aware of and welcomes what USG is doing. We were told that Thatcher and Pym are taking Argentine threat of harassment in deadly earnest and are following developments closely in frequent high-level meetings to assess intelligence, develop contingencies, etc.” (Telegram 1574 from London, January 21; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830037–0421)

B.). On the same day, Ambassador Middendorf pursuant to request (Ref A.) took the opportunity of the OAS Permanent Council meeting to raise the issue of U.S. opposition to the use of force with Argentine OAS Ambassador Quijano. Ambassador Quijano replied that he completely understood the U.S. position based on our previous statements before the OAS and UN.

4. As indicated, ARA has relayed concerns to DOD and requested that message be passed to Argentine attaches. DOD/ISA stated that the message on US inflexibility regarding the use of force in the South Atlantic has been passed formally and informally on numerous occasions since November, most recently in conversations with both the Argentine air and naval attaches on January 10 and 14 respectively. DASD/IA has also indicated that he will host a luncheon for the Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar. DOD/ISA will make separate approach to Argentine army attache. DOD/ISA feels that it is adequately reinforcing Department's efforts and in further discussions will reaffirm US position as suitable opportunities arise and has little doubt that Argentine Washington officials understand US position on issue.

5. Department is awaiting update on USUN efforts to contact Argentine delegation.

6. Embassy London may share information contained in this cable and in Ref B with FCO.

Shultz

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**422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 22, 1983, 1815Z

20587. Subject: Bilateral Discussion of UK Concerns Regarding the Falklands and Other Issues.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. UK Minister Derek Thomas met with Assistant Secretary Enders morning of January 21 to discuss Franks Commission Report,<sup>2</sup> British

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830039–0813. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Drafted by R.B. Howard (ARA/SC); cleared in S/S–O; approved by Enders.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 420.

concern about possibility of new Falklands incident and future evolution of dispute. (Outlook for Belizean negotiation of territorial dispute with Guatemala and joint US-Honduran Ahuas Tara exercise will be covered septel.)<sup>3</sup>

3. After discussing the general content and major conclusions of the Franks Commission Report, Assistant Secretary Enders and Thomas briefly reviewed efforts which USG had made (March 30–April 2, 1982), including the personal intervention by President Reagan, to ensure that Argentina understood adverse consequences which action against the Falklands could have both in terms of GOA's bilateral relations with US and in context of Latin American sensitivities.

4. Referring to current UK concerns over a new Falklands incident, Thomas stressed importance of Argentina fully understanding the US Government's position in opposition to any such action.<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Enders agreed, noting, however, that Argentina's decision regarding Falklands invasion showed the limit of US influence with that country earlier.

5. Ambassador Enders observed that the Falklands conflict and the USG's subsequent position in support of the UK's resistance to Argentina's resort to force is still having negative fallout on US-Latin American relations. As example, he said that the new government in Colombia has seized on this issue as a justification for developing closer ties with the non-aligned nations and Cuba and that Venezuelan President Herrera Campins during their recent meeting still showed great sensitivity toward the conflict and Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to Falklands.

6. Turning to British concerns about the danger of Argentina provoking a new incident, Ambassador Enders assured Thomas that the USG has reiterated to the GOA through a variety of channels our position opposing the use of force under any guise in seeking a solution of the Falklands dispute. In response Thomas briefly reviewed recent intelligence reports concerning possible Argentine intentions.<sup>5</sup> He said the only new information which the UK had received concerned a possible Argentine plan to create an incident in the Antarctic, adding that the UK had raised this issue at the Antarctic Treaty meeting in Wellington, New Zealand and that Argentina had responded that it would strictly comply with its treaty obligations. Thomas said that the UK nonetheless remains concerned about an incident and hopes that Argentina will not miscalculate Great Britain's resolve to preserve its

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 421.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 419.



position in the Falklands. Ambassador Enders said that it may be necessary for the US periodically to reaffirm its opposition to the use of force.

7. Ambassador Enders, noting that over time something must happen to resolve the Falklands dispute, asked Thomas' assessment of future prospects for a negotiated settlement. Thomas replied that there is no possible basis for negotiation until Argentina and this, or some future government in Great Britain, can establish normal relations. He stated that the wishes of the Islands have now become a major consideration with broad public and political support and that it would be difficult to reconcile this fact with Argentina's position. In response to a question, Thomas indicated that the Shackleton report, if its recommendations are implemented, would bring an increase in the islands' population.<sup>6</sup> He reiterated the importance of restoring relations with Argentina before any movement on the dispute could occur. Thomas observed that there would be a heated debate in Parliament next week and hoped that the Argentines would not over-react by provoking an incident. This portion of the meeting concluded with Ambassador Enders stating that the United States continues to favor a negotiated settlement when the time and circumstances are right.

**Shultz**

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<sup>6</sup> On September 13, 1982, the Shackleton Commission released an updated version of its 1976 report on the Falklands/Malvinas economy.

**423. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 9, 1983

SUBJECT

CPPG Meeting: Possible Argentine Moves Against the U.K. in the South Atlantic/Antarctic (S)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Argentine military may be contemplating the use of force against the British in the Falklands,<sup>2</sup> or other U.K. bases in the South Atlantic/Antarctic. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] even a relatively low probability is disturbing considering the consequences of any attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Such an event would have serious consequences for U.S. interests in the region as well as within NATO. Our responses to Argentine military action against the U.K.—or even the threat of same—will be carefully scrutinized. These developments require that we prepare contingency plans to prevent—or ameliorate the consequences of—such an event. Our planning should address the full spectrum of options available to deter the Argentines or, failing that, to mitigate the adverse impact of such action. (S)

The CPPG will address this issue at a meeting in the White House Situation Room, tentatively set for Friday, February 18, 1983.<sup>3</sup> In preparation for the meeting, would you convene on a “close hold” basis an Interdepartmental Group (IG) comprised of representatives at the Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) level from the Office of the Vice President, the Department of Defense, the JCS, DCI and NSC Staff to develop a paper on this issue.<sup>4</sup> (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive February 1–10 1983. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Gregg, Iklé, Gates, Gorman, Fontaine, and North. The memorandum was found attached as Tab A to a February 10 briefing memorandum from Enders to Eagleburger. Also attached to the February 10 briefing memorandum at Tab B is an undated paper entitled “Assessment of Possible Argentine Military Actions;” at Tab C is an uncleared first draft of a memorandum for the CPPG entitled “Possible Argentine Moves Against the UK in the South Atlantic/Antarctic: Assessment and U.S. Options.”

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 419.

<sup>3</sup> According to the February 10 briefing memorandum from Enders to Eagleburger (see footnote 1 above), the date of the meeting was moved to February 11. No memorandum of conversation of the CPPG meeting has been found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 424.

It is requested that the format at Tab A<sup>5</sup> be used, as appropriate, in preparing the paper and that the paper specifically address the issues indicated at Tab B.<sup>6</sup> Copies should be delivered to CPPG principals by noon, Thursday, February 17, 1983. CPPG principals will be contacted by Oliver North, NSC Staff, regarding a specific time for the meeting to discuss/decide the paper prepared by the IG.<sup>7</sup>

**Robert C. McFarlane<sup>8</sup>**

*Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs*

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<sup>5</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated list entitled "Issues for Consideration CPPG Issues Paper," which contains ten items: "likelihood of attack and when and how," "nature of U.K. response: military, economic, diplomatic," "effect on U.S.-U.K. relations," "effect on U.S.-Argentine relations," "effect on U.S.-Latin American relations," "opportunities presented to the Soviets and the Cubans," "effect on U.S. international credibility as 'peacemaker,'" "measures U.S. can take to prevent Argentina action," and "risks and viability of each option."

<sup>7</sup> A note in an unknown hand under this paragraph reads: "S/S: Paper to Eagleburger (COB today)."

<sup>8</sup> McFarlane signed "Bud" above his typed signature.

424. Draft Interagency Group Paper<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

*POSSIBLE ARGENTINE MOVES AGAINST THE UK IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC/ANTARCTIC: ASSESSMENT AND U.S. OPTIONS*

## I. SITUATION:

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] elements in the Argentine Armed Forces may have contemplated earlier this year the use of force against the British in the Falklands or at other UK installations in the South Atlantic. There could be a recurrence of such planning in the months ahead. Any such action would have consequences for U.S. interests, particularly in Latin America, within NATO and perhaps in a broader context.

—A significant military operation is considered virtually out of the question for this year. Argentina does not have the capability or the will for such action in the foreseeable future. The most likely range of possible Argentine actions would seem to involve some sort of small scale symbolic raid, such as a frogman landing/flag planting for photos, the strafing of an isolated patrol boat, or provocative overflights. Any such actions would be intended, in part, to have a political and psychological impact domestically within Argentina—to offset the drama of Mrs. Thatcher's visit and redeem a vestige of military pride.

—The likelihood of even such a small-scale, limited-objective military action in the near future is remote—although it can not be ruled out given the Argentine military's past record of erratic behavior.

—The U.S. took a series of actions in January 1983 to indicate the unacceptability of any further Argentine hostilities against the UK.<sup>2</sup> Our actions are believed to have had an important and sobering effect on those elements in the Argentine Navy and Air Force most likely to contemplate rash action. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on this issue had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, CPPG 0030. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC) on February 17; cleared by Blackwill, Raphael, Knepper (INR), Enders, Sanchez (DOD), Fontaine, Grusin (CIA), and Negroni (JCS). Smith initialed for all the clearing officials except Enders. Bremer sent the paper to Gregg, Wheeler, Stanford, Stanley, and Cormack under a February 23 covering memorandum, stating that the draft was a revision of an earlier draft shared with the OVP, NSC, DOD, JCS, and CIA, produced in response to McFarlane's request of February 9 (see Document 423). An earlier draft, dated February 15, is in the Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina [02/15/1983–03/31/1983]. McManaway sent a "final" version of the paper to Clark under a covering memorandum on May 5. (Reagan Library, Oliver North Files, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (2 of 2))

<sup>2</sup> See Document 421.

an important political impact in Buenos Aires, causing the Argentine government to reaffirm its decision to pursue a negotiated solution.

## II. ISSUES:

This paper provides an updated assessment of the likelihood and nature of any potential Argentine action against the British. It reviews the impact of such actions on U.S. interests in NATO, Latin America and elsewhere, as well as the opportunities possibly presented to the Soviets and Cubans. After describing likely reactions by the nations involved, a final section analyzes the options open to the U.S. to counteract damage to our interests.

### A. LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK:

Argentina's desire to recover the Falkland Islands, by negotiations if possible, and by force if ultimately necessary, remains undiminished. [6½ lines not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] we have concluded:

—Full-scale military action in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely. [1½ lines not declassified] Argentine military leaders probably share our assessment that they do not have the military capability to execute successfully an assault on the British defenses. From a non-military perspective, the armed forces have enough problems managing a transition to civilian rule at a time when their credibility has reached a post-1976 nadir.

—While an Argentine raid is more likely than a full-scale assault, there is not a significant chance of one occurring in the near future. The probability increases, however, in the presence of UK actions such as Mrs. Thatcher's visit to the islands. A raid would probably be a commando operation targeted against a largely unpopulated area, perhaps West Falkland Island. The intent would likely be to get in and out quickly, perhaps after planting a flag and taking some pictures to embarrass the UK.

—The possibility of an incident involving an unplanned air encounter arises out of Argentine charges that UK aircraft are flying outside the exclusion zone, and reports that flights into the exclusion zone may be undertaken by the Argentines in order to harass UK forces and keep them edgy and on alert.

—Some Argentine activities are intended to force the UK into increased expenditures on island defenses and ultimately into the conclusion that hanging on is not worth the cost. [3½ lines not declassified]

—The likelihood of an Argentine offensive in Antarctica is considered remote because Argentina probably does not want to go against broader Antarctic Treaty commitments involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

—While military action to retake the Islands does not appear imminent, the Armed Forces, nonetheless, can be expected to prepare contingency plans in the event diplomatic initiatives fail. Given the volatile internal situation in Argentina, military posturing and threats probably will continue, from time to time, and apprehensions regarding Argentine intentions will periodically escalate.

—We should carefully monitor developments and evaluate scenarios of possible action and reaction as a basis for determining what posture the United States may be required to adopt in the future.

A list of U.S. initiatives taken in January 1983 to make clear to the Argentine Government the U.S. position on further military activity is at Tab B.<sup>3</sup>

#### *B. NATURE OF PROBABLE UK RESPONSE:*

Any UK response, of course, would depend on the nature of the Argentine action. In the unlikely event of an invasion, the UK would respond at least as vigorously as it did last year. Aircraft, ships and troops would be rushed to the Falklands, the UK would call for a meeting of the UN Security Council to condemn Argentina and to impose sanctions. Mrs. Thatcher would call on the U.S. and European Community to stop military shipments and economic trade with Argentina.

In the more likely event of a small-scale commando raid, or Argentine air penetration of the exclusion zone, the UK would likely do the following:

—Combat any immediate threat with its forces already in the Falklands area. These would be sufficient for such a task, if the Argentine action/incursion were to be detected.

—Ask the UN to condemn Argentina. HMG would expect U.S. support.

—At the highest level, HMG might call on the U.S. to stop any remaining shipment of military equipment in the pipeline and to maintain a hold on certifying Argentina for new sales. We might also be asked to consider selected trade sanctions, but would not be requested to do anything which would threaten a default on Argentine bank debts. That would damage UK interests as well.

—HMG would ask the U.S. to use its diplomatic influence in Latin America to isolate Argentina. They would also ask us to warn Buenos Aires at the highest level that the U.S. would, if necessary, assist the British in opposing any further military action or encroachment.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found attached. A version of this list is in the Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina [02/15/1983–03/31/1983]. See also Document 421.

—If the operation were considered a military success by Argentina, the UK might well call on the U.S. to provide future early warning assistance in the South Atlantic area, in addition to increased logistical support out of Ascension Island. Such U.S. assistance would become public knowledge within a short time.

*C. EFFECT ON US-UK RELATIONS:*

Mrs. Thatcher is perhaps our staunchest supporter in Europe. In the event of Argentine military action in this pre-electoral period in the UK, she would expect swift and unequivocal U.S. backing. It would be costly to our security, economic, and other interests among our friends and allies if the U.S. were to appear to temporize or take a neutral position. Public support for our security policies is already weak in the UK. If we failed to appear to support HMG, it would be difficult for the government to resist those who want to distance Britain from the U.S. on these and other issues.

The danger to our relationship, however, would be proportional to the severity of the military action. In the event of a low-level symbolic operation by the Argentine Navy—such as a small commando raid or systematic violations of British air space—the UK would expect only limited measures on our part. If the Argentines mounted a larger operation—such as the seizure and occupation of a British dependency—the British almost certainly would mass sizeable forces to rebuff the Argentines. The U.S. would be expected to provide at least the same level of assistance given after April 30, 1982, i.e., accelerated military sales, open support to the UK in international fora, and a cut-off of credits and military supplies to Argentina.

The British recognize that our interests in Latin America suffered as a result of our Falklands stand, but take a politic stance that the U.S. has exaggerated the damage. They also claim that we were overly concerned about the possibility of the Soviets increasing their presence and influence in Argentina. Therefore, we should be prepared to provide compelling evidence to justify any refusal of requested support in order to limit a deterioration in US-UK relations. Of course, no rationale would be publicly acceptable to Mrs. Thatcher's Government.

*D. NATO IMPLICATIONS:*

During the Falklands crisis, there was considerable concern about the implications to NATO over the relatively large number of British units involved in the conflict. The outcome was that the British acknowledged their NATO commitments and pledged to withdraw whatever might be needed for a NATO contingency from Falklands duty. There would have been considerations of time and readiness, but not one of commitment. Barring major hostilities, we do not foresee a situation

where large scale British forces would be needed in the South Atlantic. We anticipate, therefore, no negative impact upon NATO readiness. The British currently maintain in the South Atlantic a force of some four to six frigates or destroyers, two nuclear powered submarines, 12 fighter aircraft, plus a few thousand ground troops.

#### *E. EFFECT ON US/ARGENTINE RELATIONS:*

Following our post-mediation political and military support for the British, U.S. relations with Argentina were seriously impaired. Many in the Argentine military (and the general public), unable to cope with their glaring mistakes and humiliating loss, believed (or chose to believe) that U.S. intelligence, petroleum supplies, missiles and other arms were largely responsible for Argentina's defeat. As a result, we presently have very little influence with Argentine military leaders and potentially reduced influence with their civilian successors.

The U.S. undertook a series of post-Falklands initiatives to improve relations with Argentina and other Latin American countries.<sup>4</sup> There was no expectation of substantial US-Argentine improvement in the short run, but rather the hope that we could exert some degree of future influence to prevent further hostilities in the Falklands, or an attack against Chile. The removal of most U.S. sanctions and our subsequent efforts to round up international support for IMF and private bank arrangements for Argentina's damaged economy had a positive impact on the government. Broad public perceptions of the U.S. continue to be strongly negative, however.

More significant was our vote in the UN in favor of a moderate Argentine resolution which demonstrated to the GOA the feasibility of working with the U.S. to secure future diplomatic progress on the Falklands/Malvinas. Mrs. Thatcher's strong reaction to our UN vote helped dramatize our shift.

Argentina today is feeling its way through a delicate political transition.<sup>5</sup> The military government announced elections by November, and a transfer of power to a constitutional president soon thereafter. Difficult relations are anticipated with the civilian government, whether led by the Peronist or Radical party. It is likely to adopt foreign policy positions more closely aligned with the third world—a shift which has

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1087 from Buenos Aires, February 18, the Embassy transmitted to the Department a study of U.S.-Argentine relations in the 8 months since the end of the fighting in the Falklands/Malvinas. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830094-0188)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1162 from Buenos Aires, February 23, the Embassy transmitted to the Department a study of the prospects for Argentine stability, the institutionalization of democracy, and U.S.-Argentine relations over the next 8 months. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830100-0438)



already occurred to a great extent. Populist/statist/nationalist economic policies will create difficulties for U.S. economic interests. While the new government may be less to our liking, and its rhetoric more anti-American, it is not likely to be extremist/radical along the lines of Nicaragua, Libya, or the PLO. The likely Peronist presidential candidates are middle-aged, bourgeois, and strongly anti-communist. They seem to understand the necessity for dealing with the U.S. to achieve their own objectives, despite public rhetoric. We expect a less hospitable atmosphere toward the U.S. than with the pre-Falklands military, and there will be a very bumpy time. Nevertheless, the new Argentine government is expected to recognize essential U.S. interests as it develops its future policies.

The range of actions discussed below to help deter an Argentine military raid on the Falklands is unlikely to have a significant negative impact on US/Argentine relations because they would be private approaches which reiterate well-known U.S. positions. On the other hand, the likely U.S. response should Argentina launch a small scale raid would have an important negative impact on our relations and the public attitude of the Argentines. In that event, U.S. actions could include: (a) a strong, *post facto* demarche; (b) condemnation at the UN and in the OAS; (c) closing of the small FMS pipeline; and (d) freezing for the immediate future U.S. consideration of Presidential certification of Argentina required for a renewal of future U.S. arms sales. Such actions also would make it difficult to deal with a successor civilian regime in Buenos Aires.

#### F. EFFECT ON US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS:

The Falklands War initially had a strongly negative impact on our relations with Latin America. Few Latins thought wise Argentina's resort to force, but supported, or felt forced publicly to side with Argentina. The U.S. was viewed critically for having materially supported the UK's war effort against a Rio Treaty partner. Much of the rancor seems to have dissipated, but residual resentments remain acute in some countries.

U.S. actions taken privately to prevent renewed Argentine adventurism from breaking out would have no significant adverse impact on our hemispheric relations.

The reaction in the event of renewed hostilities would probably depend upon the extent of conflict. Given an incident that involved neither casualties nor major property loss, the U.S. would be condemned if we reacted strongly. The Latins would probably view such an incident as a legitimate part of the diplomatic game and a harmless face saver. However, if hostilities provoked by the Argentines involved casualties there would be less sympathy from most Latin capitals

(except perhaps Venezuela and Peru). Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada would respond, predictably condemning a strong U.S. reaction. We would face in the UN and OAS renewed strains, which could make it difficult to secure cooperation on some hemispheric issues of importance.

*G. OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS & CUBANS:*

Any festering of the old wounds of the Falklands crisis could provide some new opportunity for initiating military cooperation by the Soviets and Cubans, depending upon the extent of renewed hostilities. Given the limited possibility for anything more than an isolated incident, however, there probably would be little opportunity for the USSR or its clients. In the diplomatic area, Argentina has moved toward NAM positions already in order to gain support for Falklands/Malvinas negotiations. In the economic field, it agreed to Aeroflot service, increased trade with Cuba, and heavy Soviet grain purchases continue. But so far we have not seen signs that Argentina is seriously considering any arms transactions with the Soviets. This is the most sensitive area, and we doubt that a small symbolic and basically ineffectual raid would add meaningfully to arguments on either side for a new arms supply relationship.

*H. EFFECT ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AS A PEACEMAKER:*

If there is some restricted, symbolic, or low-level action by the Argentines against the British, the public and press aspects of the event probably would be the most significant result. There would be governmental and public speculation throughout the world as to whether anyone could have foreseen the hostilities, or whether anyone had reasonable intelligence of such a possibility, and whether peace could have been preserved by private or diplomatic action. The U.S. would be the likely target of such speculation. After any hostilities, our credibility as a peacemaker will be affected by what we might have done to prevent it, how we acted to contain or reduce the violence, and the perception of fairness that we showed.

*III. U.S. OPTIONS:*

The U.S. took vigorous action in January 1983 to warn the Argentine Government that a South Atlantic incident would not serve their own interests, and certainly would not enjoy U.S. acquiescence or support. A chronology of these actions is contained at Tab B.

Beyond such diplomatic activity, the range of additional U.S. steps would appear to be limited. The U.S. seems to have very little ability to directly influence either party in the dispute, as we saw during the

Falklands War. Mrs. Thatcher seems impervious to U.S. suggestions on this subject, and U.S. influence on the Falklands issue in Argentina is even less. We have little or no influence on the military, which probably sees little to be gained from us (with one possible exception) in the brief period remaining before elections.

Obviously, it is essential that we closely monitor Argentine military activities and intentions. And we should not hesitate to express our serious concerns whenever there are indications of potentially dangerous activities.

Theoretically, the U.S. could threaten to undermine Argentina's foreign debt arrangements with the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, and private banks. But that could seriously damage important U.S. interests and does not constitute a credible threat. A reactivation of hostilities and increased tensions would have that effect, regardless of the U.S. position. Argentina's precarious economic situation may work as a broad constraint against adventurous actions, but the military is not likely to be swayed by any U.S. economic leverage.

The one area of potential impact on the military relates to Presidential certification of Argentina's human rights record and U.S. national interests, required by the Foreign Assistance authorization bill of 1981, as a first step to future arms sales. Argentina's democratic opening, its recent releases of political prisoners plus the sharp decline of repression and absence of disappearances would seem to make early certification a feasible U.S. policy. There are, however, Chile-Argentine considerations and a U.S. customs investigation into alleged illegal Argentine arms exports that will weigh negatively on that outcome. With respect to the investigation, we would wish to ascertain if evidence available relating to possible Argentine misdeeds poses major political and legal obstacles before making the certification. Domestically, some Democratic Congressmen have urged us to wait and certify Argentina after the elections so the U.S. does not appear to be encouraging the military government.

We have given preliminary consideration to trying to use the certification issue to help reduce the likelihood of any incident in the Falklands. One proposal is to inform the Argentine Government this spring that we would be prepared to certify before their elections (and perhaps consider sales after the elections) provided there were no "unpleasant surprises", either with regard to action against the Falklands or efforts to thwart the civilian transition.

Potential options on the certification issue, therefore, involve carrots and sticks. While it is difficult to evaluate the impact of U.S. certification on Argentine military thinking, by making it clear that we were prepared to certify in the near term, we would demonstrate that

the Argentine military had something concrete to lose by a rash action in the Falklands.

Major Argentine military procurement has already been arranged with the Germans, French, Austrians and Israelis to provide new and used ships, aircraft, tanks and other armaments. The Argentine military may prefer not to develop a dependence on U.S. suppliers for political reasons. Certification would offer them two advantages however: (1) Political/psychological benefits since our action would be seen by many as symbolic of U.S. approval; and (2) Some military equipment which the Argentines would clearly prefer to buy from the U.S., such as engines and parts for their U.S. airplanes, communications equipment and possibly helicopters.

The question of possible Argentine certification during the first half of 1983 will be examined in more depth in a subsequent memorandum.

Should there be a small-scale incident, the recommended U.S. reaction would be determined by the circumstances. Presumably it would include public declarations and diplomatic demarches as well as activity in the UN and OAS. Whether it would involve the possibility of specific U.S. sanctions would have to be determined at the time.

*[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]*

British moderation, in terms of future visits and public declarations on the Falklands anniversary, could reduce the possibility of hostile Argentine activities. Whether Mrs. Thatcher is prepared to tone down British rhetoric or symbolic actions in a difficult election year is very much in doubt. Still, it is a useful point we could make to our British allies. One possible conciliatory step by the UK would be the reduction of the 150 mile exclusion zone. This would not seem to make sense from a military perspective, however, and there seems to be no reasonable chance we could convince them that this would serve UK interests.

**425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1983, 2020Z

59308. Subject: FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow's February 18 Call on Assistant Secretary Enders.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: ARA Assistant Secretary Enders's meeting with FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow February 18 focussed on Belize and Argentina. On Belize, Onslow indicated HMG firmness on decision to withdraw UK garrison and welcomed Enders's suggestion that an internationally guaranteed freeze on boundary questions be explored as a possible way out. Onslow urged denial of US arms to Guatemala and indefinite hold on certification and arms sales to Argentina. End summary.

3. FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow called on Assistant Secretary Enders of ARA Bureau February 18. Accompanying Onslow were British Embassy DCM Thomas and First Secretary French. Participants on the US side were ARA/SC and ARA/CEN Directors Smith and Johnstone and UK Desk Officer Hughes. Summary of discussion follows.

[Omitted here is discussion of Belize.]

5. Argentina/Falklands: Exchange on Falklands/Malvinas issue was relatively abbreviated because of press of follow-on appointments. In response to question, Enders observed that it was impossible to predict with certainty the views of the post-election government in Argentina, adding that, of course, policy changes also could result from the next British election. Minister Onslow replied that Mrs. Thatcher might well be returned, but that in any event, no British Government would change the current position on the sovereignty issue "within the next five years," regardless of "international pressure." Enders commented that, in all probability, neither would any new Argentine Government. If such conditions prevailed, they noted that the chances of progress toward bilateral solution seemed extremely slim. Enders said prolonged stalemate raised difficulties and urged that HMG carefully weigh situation and consider, for example, whether some form of multilateral involvement might not offer a way out. Following our

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830119–0467. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Belize and for information to Guatemala City, Buenos Aires, and Brasilia. Drafted by P.D. Hughes (EUR/NE); cleared by Dobbins, J. Binns (EUR/NE), C. Johnstone (ARA/CEN), N.S. Smith (ARA/SC), and T. Coony (ARA/BR); approved by Enders.

1982 experience, Enders said, renewed direct involvement was not attractive to us but other formulas might be useful. Onslow asserted that the British do not particularly like the idea of either UN trusteeship or the prospect, for example, of Antarctic Treaty involvement.

6. Onslow also raised briefly the question of US certification and future arms sales to Argentina. (He had not at this point talked to Under Secretary Eagleburger.)<sup>2</sup> Onslow said that while the UK realized that the US might view certification and arms sales as a means of establishing good relations with a new Argentine Government, HMG would be strongly critical if actual arms sales were concluded. Enders responded that arms sales and certification were two very different issues. ARA/SC Director Smith observed that Argentina had made extensive purchases from European suppliers and that we did not expect that Argentina would purchase significant new arms systems from the United States, but primarily ship and aircraft replacement parts. Ambassador Enders stated that as yet we had no fixed view on certification timing, but that we would discuss the issue with HMG when we had a clearer idea of when and how we should proceed.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the economic situation in Brazil.]

**Dam**

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<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Onslow followed up on the subject of Argentine certification with Streater on March 8, at which time he "outlined in detail British concerns that the U.S. might certify human rights progress in Argentina prematurely" and "strongly recommended that Enders visit London in April." (Telegram 5164 from London, March 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830132–0936)

**426. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Stein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt), the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams), and the Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 14, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Significant New Information Available to the Leadership of the Argentine Army on Alleged U.S. Support to the British During the Falklands War

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

Summary: On 9 March, the Commander of the Argentine Army was given significant new information on alleged U.S. support to the British during the Falklands War. Even before that information was received, the leadership of the Army was coming to the conclusion that the United States had indeed provided substantial support to the British and that the U.S. Government is basically antagonistic to the Argentine Government. The next three weeks are likely to produce renewed anti-American sentiments within Argentina and within the Argentine Army.

Text: 1. [3 lines not declassified]

2. On 8 March 1983, an officer attached to the office of the Argentine Army Attache in Washington returned to Buenos Aires to provide General Cristino Nicolaides, Commander of the Army, with new information he had obtained on alleged U.S. support to the British during the Falklands War. The officer, who briefed Nicolaides on 9 March, said he had obtained his information from U.S. officials in Washington. In his briefing, the officer provided extensive information on the alleged U.S. support to the British, including the provision of major materiel support and the widespread passage of U.S. intelligence information, including signals intelligence, reports from human sources, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The officer provided evidence that the alleged U.S. support had been much more extensive than officials of the Argentine Army had previously believed; he also showed that this alleged

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Falklands/Malvinas 1983. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. At the top of the memorandum, Clark wrote: "Staff—WPC." The source of the information is noted as FIRDB-312/00760-83.

U.S. support was extensive both during and after the period when the U.S. was involved in trying to arrange a peaceful settlement of the issue.

3. On the basis of information the officer said he had obtained in Washington, he told Nicolaides that the Argentine Government should not underestimate the extent of British influence within the U.S. Government. The officer said the U.S. Government had been tending toward a decision to give Argentina the certification required to permit U.S. military sales to Argentina. However, the officer said, British pressure and influence on the U.S. Executive Branch and the U.S. Congress had lead the U.S. Government to decide that it would not grant certification unless it could obtain a major concession from the Argentine Government. The officer said this concession probably would be in the form of a request that Argentina provide support to counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador. Such support, the officer told Nicolaides, might prove to be a requirement before any U.S. decision to grant certification to Argentina.

4. Nicolaides said he was very impressed by the information and views provided by the officer.

5. (Source Comments:

a. The officer is considered to be very knowledgeable about the U.S. Government because of his extensive contacts among U.S. military and civilian officials in Washington. Thus, his information and views are considered very credible by Argentine military officials.

b. Argentine Navy officials have long believed that the U.S. provided extensive support to the British during the War; the Navy's refusal to join this year's United International Antisubmarine Warfare (UNITAS) exercise, and the public declaration of the reasons for that refusal, clearly show the Navy's attitude. For a long time, this attitude was not shared by the Army leadership, which believed the Navy was exaggerating the levels of U.S. support to the British. Within recent months, however, the Army has moved closer to the Navy position, not only in its understanding of the extent of alleged U.S. support to the British but also in its view that the U.S. Government is basically antagonistic to the Argentine Government. For the Argentine Army leadership, one demonstration of this alleged U.S. antagonism was the distribution by the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires of a study on Cuban subversion, including Cuban assistance to subversion in Argentina in the 1970s. This study was distributed right after Argentine President Reynaldo Bignone had publicly thanked Cuban President Fidel Castro for Cuba's assistance to Argentina during the Falklands War; the distribution of this U.S. study served to undermine Bignone's statement and his image at the meeting of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) that he was attending in New Delhi. The U.S. Government may believe that there is opposition within the Argentine Army to Argentina's participa-



tion in the NAM and to Bignone's presence at the meeting in New Delhi. This interpretation is erroneous; the Argentine Army supports Argentina's role in the NAM, and the Junta—including the Army—approved Bignone's travel to New Delhi. Thus, the distribution of the U.S. study—which attacked a Cuba that had just been lauded by Argentina—was interpreted by the Argentine Army as a direct affront to Argentina and to the Army itself.

c. The commemoration of the 2 April anniversary of the Argentine landing on the Falkland Islands will be an emotional event for the Argentine Army. This anniversary will also revive bitterness over the alleged U.S. support to the British. The period before and during the anniversary commemorations is likely to produce renewed anti-American sentiments within Argentina and within the Argentine Army.)

6. The above information is being made available to the U.S. Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, and Defense Attache in Buenos Aires; and to principal officers in London.

**John H. Stein<sup>2</sup>**

*Deputy Director for Operations*

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates that Duane R. Clarridge signed for Stein.

**427. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Presidential Certification of Argentina

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

When to initiate steps necessary to certify to the Congress that Argentina has made significant human rights progress, thereby restoring its eligibility for possible future arms sales and security assistance.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

*A. Certification and Human Rights Progress*

Current security assistance legislation permits the resumption of arms transfers to Argentina if the President certifies that the Argentine Government has made significant human rights progress and that such transfers are in the U.S. national interest. (Text at Tab B.)<sup>2</sup>

There have been significant improvements in Argentina's human rights situation: no confirmed "disappearances" for over two years; almost no new detentions for political reasons; and an accelerated release of National Executive Power ("PEN") political prisoners. Most important, national elections are now scheduled for this October, with the new government to take office January 30, 1984. While a Congressional requirement on providing information on the "disappeared" will be difficult, the overall case that there has been significant human rights progress is strong. (Human rights summary at Tab C.)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive March 24–31 1983. Secret. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC); cleared by Brown (PM), Haass, Abrams, Bosworth, Kozak (L), Fox (H), and Schneider (T). Smith initialed for all the clearing officials with the exception of Schneider. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Original was not received in S/S-I." However, a notation in an unknown hand reads: "Treat as original."

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are excerpts from the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Human Rights Progress in Argentina."

*B. Rationale for Certification*

Failure to certify Argentina soon, given human rights progress, will be seen as a political slap at the Argentine military, severely estranged from us since the Falklands. Some argue we should delay certification until after the elections to reward the new civilian government. However, we have a major stake in the military in the years ahead. It will remain the principal arbiter of Argentine politics, a bastion of anti-Communism and essential to eventual peaceful resolution of the dangerous Falklands and Beagle Channel disputes. For the military, certification is the key to future cooperation with the U.S. Our national interests require that we try to establish a basis for working with them, which has proved difficult over the years.

*C. Impact on Regional Peace*

An important U.S. objective is to prevent hostilities between Argentina and Britain in the Falklands, or Argentina and Chile in the Beagle. Since the Falklands, Argentina has made major arms purchases from Western Europe (submarines and frigates from Germany; jet aircraft and missiles from France) and from Israel and Latin America. However, they are not adequate to support a major attack against the Islands. In the Beagle, Argentina retains a significant edge, but Chile's superior discipline, training and defensive mission would make Argentine adventurism potentially costly. The possibility of a significant armed encounter this year is remote.

Certification will not affect the military balance or increase the chances of war in either dispute. Argentina is unlikely to seek major U.S. purchases soon, except for spares, because of its recent major acquisitions elsewhere and its view that we are an "unreliable supplier." Certification does not mean we would approve or act quickly on Argentine requests. We will consider them carefully, case by case. We would not authorize destabilizing or threatening transactions.

*D. Relations with the UK and Chile*

U.K. Mrs. Thatcher, the leader of our closest friend in Europe, would react swiftly and negatively to any early certification. She argues that we should not give this benefit to a country still technically at war with Britain, and especially one led by a military dictatorship that is rearming as fast as possible. Mrs. Thatcher is well aware that we are asking HMG to help maintain European support on INF deployment, in the U.S.-E.C. trade dispute, and in several areas of the Caribbean. Coming on top of our continuing dispute over "extraterritoriality," differences on East/West trade and the likely anti-trust indictment of British airlines and HMG officials, certification of Argentina at this time will curdle an already souring atmosphere. We must keep in mind

that every opinion poll in the U.K. shows confidence in U.S. leadership at a post-war low. Certification would shrink even more the number of our hard-core supporters.

Elections will likely be held in the U.K. this year, and certification, at least before Argentina's October election, could make it an issue in the campaign, placing the Tories on the defensive for having supported the U.S. so consistently on security issues, such as INF. Certification following the Argentine elections would still provoke a negative public reaction by HMG, but the issue would be far more manageable. EUR, therefore, opposes certification prior to the Argentine elections, believing it would be a mistake to trade a notional improvement in our relations with Argentina for the certain deterioration in our relations with the U.K.

EUR believes the scenario suggested by this paper for certification without approval of major sales is faulty. Whatever goodwill we might gain from certifying Argentina will be quickly used up if we fail to deliver on specific weapons requests. Additionally, failure to approve sales will anger third country suppliers, i.e., Israel, who will wish to transfer U.S. origin military equipment to Argentina. Approval of sales will cause a strong negative reaction in Britain. EUR believes it would force the British to transfer more NATO committed forces to the Falklands, and diminish the chances for a negotiated solution. (ARA disagrees.)

*Chile.* A statutory U.S. arms export ban also applies to Chile. To certify Chile, the law requires both Chilean cooperation on the Letelier/Moffitt murders and significant human rights progress. Chilean certification is not now feasible given the lack of positive developments on either issue, and our investigation of military exports from the U.S. to Chile in violation of our laws. In light of Chile's poor performance, its certification would undermine our credibility and thus Congressional support for our Central America policy.

A decision to certify Argentina but not Chile would be a major blow to Pinochet, who has suffered a series of economic and foreign policy reverses in recent months. While he still retains a firm hold on the military, Pinochet has been undermined by the economic crisis and lost civilian backers. Nevertheless, there is little likelihood he would consider internal changes to demonstrate human rights progress to our Congress. His reaction to Argentine certification may be bitter. To ameliorate this, we propose a presidential message and special emissary to Pinochet to underline our desire for good relations and our wish to certify Chile when feasible. We would reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the Rio Treaty in the Beagle Channel dispute and the limited nature of U.S. arms sales to Argentina. We would propose actions to demonstrate publicly the closeness of our relations.

*E. Congressional and Legal Issues*

Argentina's announced elections and human rights progress have mitigated Congressional opposition to certification. There will be concern about selling arms after the Falklands War and dissatisfaction over the lack of information concerning the disappeared.<sup>4</sup> Some will argue that we should wait to certify until after elections there. Congressman Barnes will introduce an amendment to withhold assistance or sales until the new government takes office.

Other relevant issues concern Argentine misuse of U.S. equipment during the Falklands War, a Customs investigation of possible illegal military exports from the U.S. to Chile and Argentina and GOA acquisition of nuclear reprocessing technology from Italy. We believe that the purposes of U.S. laws concerning use of U.S. equipment and exports of munitions list items can be fulfilled and Congressional concerns on these issues minimized by reaching appropriate understandings with the Argentines concerning their observance in the future. The nuclear issue is potentially more serious. If it were established that a transfer of such technology had occurred (which is the preliminary conclusion of a recent internal study), under U.S. law no U.S. economic or security assistance could be provided to Argentina although cash sales would not be precluded. Under these circumstances, Congressional concern could mount. Overall, however, although we may face an emotional and possibly strong reaction, we do not foresee a successful challenge to certification in the Congress.

*F. Next Steps*

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum for the President informing him of our certification plans.<sup>5</sup> Tab E contains a scenario for diplomatic and Congressional discussions prior to certification.<sup>6</sup> This scenario contemplates that certification would occur in July (following British parliamentary elections and prior to the Argentine election campaign). Any significant deliveries thus could not occur prior to the Argentine elections. Few, if any, would be received prior to installation of Argentina's new civilian government in January 1984. We would inform the Argentine Government that we are prepared to certify on the understanding that we would not face any "unpleasant surprises" involving incidents in the Falklands or Beagle Channel, no reversal of the return to democracy and that they observe applicable constraints on the use

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "The Disappeared."

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed at Tab E is a paper entitled "Proposed Certification Scenario."

of U.S.-furnished equipment and U.S. munitions control laws. We would send a special emissary to discuss certification and bilateral relations with President Pinochet, offering to examine steps both countries could take to demonstrate our continued close relations and suggesting steps on human rights which Chile might take to permit future certification.

We would consult closely with the UK, reviewing our assessment of the limited nature of future transactions, our intention not to sell sophisticated weapons that could significantly increase the Falklands threat, our procedures for careful, case-by-case consideration of requests, and Argentine assurances on avoidance of future incidents. We would also engage in extensive Congressional consultations.

### *G. Alternative Scenario*

HA believes that certification can be justified on human rights grounds, but, all issues considered, that we should not certify until October if the UK election does not occur until then.

The timing of certification depends on three difficult political judgments: how much damage will we suffer in Congress and public opinion if we certify before the Argentine election; how much damage will we suffer with the Argentine military if we do not certify until after the election; and how much damage will there be to US-UK relations if we do certify the military regime with which they recently fought a war.

HA believes that, if there is a June election in the UK, certification can be justified so long as it is not “unconditional,” for this would bring us needless trouble with Congress and indeed the UK. The “condition” we would propose is that there be no actual military deliveries until the change in government planned in January. This would mollify the UK and Hill critics of certification, retain the leverage on the military to complete the return to civilian government, and protect us should that return be halted. (If we certify and sell arms and the military halts the election or inauguration, we will have lots of egg on our face. It will be said that we gave the military what they wanted—certification—too soon, giving up our leverage for democracy and contributing to any military decision to interrupt the elections.) We need not “rub the Argentines’ nose” in this, and should say that the lengthy process of military contract negotiations makes deliveries for 1983 virtually impossible. But we must be willing to say that if the military does not permit the election and return to democracy, there will be no sales now, or we will be saying that the military *can* halt the election or inauguration and *still* get the same arms sales. This we cannot say, and we should be clear what our policy is.

If the UK election is not until October, we believe that it makes more sense to postpone certification until then. We will gain more at

home and in the UK than, in our view, we lose with the Argentine military. In HA's view, even certification in July is unlikely to produce a Golden Age in relations with the Argentine military, and the degree of resentment which the delay may cause is speculative.

Timing needs careful consideration. HA believes that we should not begin the process of Congressional consultations and other steps envisioned in the attached scenario until the Congress has finished dealing with the El Salvador and other Central American aid requests currently before it, which we expect would be the end of April.

Further HA believes that Congressional and public opposition to certification will focus on the issue of the failure of the Argentine Government to account for the disappeared. While little can be done for the disappeared who are dead, there are believed to be several hundred live children of the disappeared whose relatives are seeking their return. We believe that at the time we certify we must make a strong demarche to the Argentine Government—military or civilian—urging an accounting of those children.

*RECOMMENDATIONS:*

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A; and that you approve the scenario for Argentine certification proposed at Tab E. (Favored by ARA, S/P, and PM)<sup>7</sup>

*Alternatively*

That the process not begin until Congress has completed action on the Central American aid requests (approximately early May), with certification to follow the British elections. Certification should be based clearly and publicly on the uninterrupted return to democracy. We would state publicly that any interruption of the democratization by the military process will lead us to refuse military sales and deliveries. (Favored by HA)<sup>8</sup>

*Alternatively*

That Argentina not be certified prior to its elections in October 1983. (Favored by EUR)<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Shultz neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

<sup>8</sup> Shultz initialed his approval of this alternative on March 28. Next to the paragraph he wrote: "—wait + bring it up with me again before any movement. GPS."

<sup>9</sup> Shultz neither approved nor disapproved this alternative.

**428. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Report of Intelligence Activities

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

*Argentina*

General Sotera, the Argentine G-2, brought assurance that the armed forces are fully committed to free elections and transfer of power to civilians in Argentina. His primary message was that the time had come to improve relationships between the United States and Argentina and to use three steps:

(a) Certification under the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment to permit military sales. The psychological gesture was said to be more important than access to US military equipment.

(b) The serious Argentine debt problem requires special treatment by IMF similar to arrangements worked out with Mexico and Brazil.

(c) Exert influence on the British to cease “destabilizing” actions in the hemisphere. This seemed to be the most significant of the three requests. Sotera was adamant that the Argentines are not in a position to undertake major military operations and there was no significant support for such an action within their armed forces. In the light of this it would be helpful if the British would ease off or at least play down activities like basing and transportation arrangements involving Chilean naval ports, landing rights in Brazil and Uruguay, the training of the Chilean armed forces, propaganda suggesting that Argentina plans to invade Chile because of the Beagle Channel dispute, declarations about building in the Malvinas a larger airfield and establishing sophisticated radar there. His government hopes that the British might be influenced to lower the tone and scale of these activities in the interest of restoring greater harmony in the hemisphere and minimizing tendencies in Argentina to look to the Soviets for military aid.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

**William J. Casey<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 14, Folder 408: DCI Casey Memo Chrono (1 Jul–31 Aug '83). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



**429. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 1, 1983, 1858Z

214783. Subject: Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar's Call on Ambassador Motley.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. During July 22 courtesy call on ARA Assistant Secretary Motley, Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar raised the question of Ambassador Shlaudeman's replacement, this year's UNGA resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas, British construction of an airfield on the Islands, certification of Argentina on human rights, and the foreign debt problem. End summary.

3. Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar paid a courtesy call on Assistant Secretary Motley July 22 accompanied by Minister Herrera Vega. Richard Howard and Dennis Jett of ARA/SC were also present.

4. Replacement of Amb. Shlaudeman: Ambassador Garcia del Solar opened the conversation by saying that while he had wanted to have a tour d'horizon in this his first meeting with Amb. Motley, a number of specific points had arisen recently. GDS pointed out that the departure of Amb. Shlaudeman had come rather suddenly. Amb. Motley replied that this reflected Dr. Kissinger's insistence on having Amb. Shlaudeman as a condition of taking charge of the Commission on Central America; preoccupation with the Central American problem and the need for first rate people to serve on and staff the commission.<sup>2</sup>

5. Amb. Motley said that time pressure prevented consultation with the GOA on the move. While he had not yet seen the President's decision in writing, Amb. Motley said the GOA would be pleased with the choice of Amb. Shlaudeman's successor who would be proposed within the next few weeks.<sup>3</sup>

6. Falklands airfield: GDS moved on to the recent statement by the Argentine Minister of Defense to the effect that the British construction of an airfield on the Falklands was in reality designed to give NATO a base in the South Atlantic. GDS wanted the U.S. to know that only the President or Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke for the GOA on such

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830438–0079. Confidential. Sent for information to London and USUN. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC); cleared by R.B. Howard (ARA/SC); approved by Motley.

<sup>2</sup> The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was established on July 19.

<sup>3</sup> Shlaudeman left post on August 26. Frank V. Ortiz, appointed on November 18, replaced him as Ambassador to Argentina.

subjects and that the GOA wished to disengage itself from the Defense Minister's statement.

7. Motley pointed out that while he did not wish to criticize the Defense Minister, the allegation about a NATO base was nonsense and reflected a theme being circulated by Soviet propaganda.

8. GDS then delivered a letter containing the statement of protest made by the GOA on the airport issue in the UN.<sup>4</sup> He said that the UK's action adds to tension in the area, is an affirmation of sovereignty and builds up warlike situation on the Islands. He said the Argentine desire, in keeping with the thrust of the UN resolution on the subject, is to freeze the military situation pending negotiations and not to escalate the problem. The GOA believes the USG can exert influence on the British and persuade them not to complicate the problem.<sup>5</sup>

9. In response, Amb. Motley said he had followed the dispute while he was in Brazil and had the opportunity to discuss it with Secretary Haig during his attempts to mediate the crisis. It was also a subject that had come up when President Reagan met with President Figueiredo. On the airport issue, Amb. Motley recognized Argentine sensitivities but noted that the British maintain that the airport's main purpose was not to increase military tensions but to enable resupply by larger aircraft.

10. UN resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas: On the question of the Malvinas GDS said Argentina will again sponsor a moderate UN resolution that will not go further than last year's. He hoped the US could again support it. Amb. Motley said this was encouraging and asked to see a draft as soon as possible. GDS said he would provide a copy ASAP, commenting, however, that while it won't introduce any new elements, there is a need to keep pressure on the British to negotiate. Drawing on his earlier UN experience, GDS described the American "hands off" position as having been constant over the years. Given the US vote favoring this UN resolution, the GOA now believes the US is obligated to continue its efforts as during the war to "pressure" the British to accept negotiations. GDS added that he did not know when the Malvinas problem would ultimately be resolved, but that as long as it continued, it would give the left an opportunity to exploit and increase tensions within Argentina.

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<sup>4</sup> The text of the letter, in Spanish and English, was addressed to Shultz by Garcia del Solar. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830102-2294)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 5279 from Buenos Aires, August 3, the Embassy reported that "Foreign Ministry policy officials have made strong pitch to us to dissuade UK from proceeding with construction of Fortress Falklands." Listre "asked for our support in maintaining 'the status quo' pending some movement toward negotiation. Without that, he hinted, the GOA may take the matter of the UK's new base to the UN Security Council." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830445-0187)

11. In response to GDS's question on the US feeling on the possibilities for negotiation, Amb. Motley said that in Brazil he had discussed the general question at length with the British Ambassador. He noted that he had not yet had the opportunity to deal with the subject in depth here in Washington but plans to do so in the near future.

12. Foreign debt: GDS next raised an urgent problem involving the foreign debt, which had just come to him for action that day. He began by pointing out that Economy Minister Wehbe and Central Bank President Gonzalez del Solar were doing a tremendous job under difficult circumstances. Sectors within the military, especially the air force, did not want to pay the foreign debt. The GOA was subject to constant public and political pressures and criticism. With inflation and increased union demands the economic situation was becoming increasingly difficult. The Junta had earlier allowed the British banks to remit earnings but did not agree to lift the sanctions on other British firms without a reduction in the exclusion zone. The air force, which is very nationalistic, has taken a strong position on this issue. Wehbe and Gonzalez del Solar were the best men available, and it would be a tragedy if they were forced out because of their failure to resolve the IMF issue.

13. GDS said the British were being quite firm on the IMF requirement that Argentina lift the sanctions on remittance of dividends to the UK. If the British don't accept a delay in the IMF's condition, the GOA will be unable to draw on the third tranche or sign the medium term 1.5 billion credit with the commercial banks. The GOA was requesting an extension of the status quo until February 1, 1984. After the elections on October 30, the power of the air force will diminish and there would be room for negotiations, the Ambassador emphasized.

14. Amb. Motley said he understood the dilemma and that it was in no one's interest to see the economic recovery of Argentina jeopardized. The international monetary system would also be affected by this situation. He told Garcia del Solar that the question has been discussed at a high-level and that US concern has been expressed to the British, who were non-committal in response.

15. GDS expressed appreciation for the USG's help, especially the efforts of Treasury Deputy Secretary McNamar on this matter. He said the GOA would be talking to all the IMF member governments but that Argentina believed the American attitude on this question was key. He also appreciated the fact the question was discussed at a high level by the US.

16. Certification: GDS asked how the USG could certify El Salvador on human rights but not Argentina. Amb. Motley responded that Argentina was fortunate not to be engaged in a war or face the Salvadoran certification requirement with its 5 elements which had to be certi-

fied every 6 months. On the question of Argentine certification, he pointed out that there are many factors that must be considered, such as the congressional outlook, accounting for the disappeared, regional balance with Chile, etc.

17. GDS said the Argentine public and political parties do not care about certification but that the armed forces, especially the air force, are sensitive to it. The air force is the hardest on the issue but also has the most material needs if military sales are resumed. Amb. Motley said he was still unsure if Congress can be convinced to accept certification but added that movement on an issue such as the Beagle Channel dispute could help create a better climate for certification. GDS said that any agreement would be difficult to reach until the new government takes over. Pointing out that the military wants to leave power on a positive note, he said that a gesture such as certification would help the US image with the military.

Shultz

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**430. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley), the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newell), and the Acting Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S. Position on the Falklands Resolution in the UNGA

*Issue for Decision*

U.S. vote on the Argentine resolution in the UNGA on the Falkland Islands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830157–1004. Confidential. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC) and C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE) on August 30; cleared by Haass, J.R. Binns (EUR/NE), R.B. Howard (ARA/SC), M.G. Kozak (L), R. Perry (P), Johnson, and L. Kildav (ARA). Jett initialed for all clearings officials except for Kildav. The action memorandum was forwarded by Bremer to Clark under a September 28 covering memorandum which summarized the U.S. position on the resolution and which sought Clark's concurrence. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830157–1003)

*Essential Factors*

We have obtained from the Argentines a draft resolution on the Falklands which they intend to introduce in the upcoming UNGA (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> L has determined that none of the additions or changes in the new version are of any material substantive significance when compared to last year's (Tab B).<sup>3</sup> We expect Mrs Thatcher to raise the Falklands question and this resolution when she meets with the President on September 29.<sup>4</sup>

Since the current version of the Falklands resolution is legally equivalent to last year's, we should support it on grounds of policy consistency. Any backing away from last year's yes vote would have an adverse impact on our bilateral relations with Argentina, which continues to care deeply about the issue. A shift would also have an unfortunate effect on hemispheric perceptions of U.S. reliability and convey the wrong signals regarding U.S. attitudes toward Latin America.

HMG is still opposed to being pressured into any negotiations on Falkland Islands' sovereignty which do not proceed from the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, the British reluctantly accept the need for the USG to be consistent on this issue; they hope, however, that we would oppose any changes to the current version which would be more prejudicial to their position. Our support for the existing Argentine Resolution and opposition to prejudicial amendments should encourage the Argentines to maintain the moderate tone of the draft.

*Recommendation:*

That we vote in favor of the current draft of the Argentine resolution on the Falkland Islands in the UNGA and oppose changes in the resolution which we consider objectionable. If you approve, we will indicate in the briefing materials for the President's conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher that we would take such a stand (EUR, ARA, IO and Ambassador Kirkpatrick favor).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Attached at Tab B but not printed is a September 1 memorandum from Gudgeon to Howard which analyzes the draft Argentine UNGA resolution.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 431.

<sup>5</sup> Shultz approved the recommendation on September 27, adding the following notation: "Clear with NSC maybe by Hill-Clark." On September 28, Hill sent to Clark a memorandum outlining the situation as well as Shultz's decision. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P830157–1003)

#### 431. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 29, 1983, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

Summary of Conversation Between the President and British Prime Minister  
Margaret Thatcher

##### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Peter R. Sommer (notetaker)  
Margaret Thatcher  
A.J. Coles (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion of Lebanon, relations with the Soviet Union, the European strategic balance, and Central America.]

*Mrs. Thatcher* agreed that the Western countries had to do a much better job of explaining their policies in the world at large. Duarte came to see me recently, she observed, and stressed that if democracy is not seen to be working in El Salvador after the next election then the democratic forces would lose out. Mrs. Thatcher added that before leaving Latin America she wanted to urge the President to think carefully before supplying arms to Argentina. (S)

*The President* replied that once Argentina returned to civilian rule the U.S. would be under intense pressure to make it eligible for arms purchases. (S)

*Mrs. Thatcher* rejoined that the last civilian government in Argentina was not a model for democracy and that it would be greatly misunderstood in Britain—America's most loyal and ardent supporter—if sales resumed. (S)

The President and Mrs. Thatcher broke for lunch at 12:30 p.m. (U)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive October 1–8, 1983. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Kimmitt forwarded the memorandum to Hill under an October 12 covering note. (Ibid.) The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.

**432. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 20, 1983, 0404Z

298653. Subject: Assistant Secretary Burt's Discussion With UK Charge Derek Thomas on the UN Resolution on the Falkland Islands, October 18, 5:30 p.m.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Summary: Assistant Secretary Burt called in UK Charge Derek Thomas to inform HMG that the US will vote for the Argentine resolution on the Falkland Islands if no objectionable language is added.<sup>2</sup> Thomas thanked him for the clarification and expressed British concern about possible certification of Argentina. Burt assured him that the USG is mindful of HMG views and explained the basic US position. Thomas was accompanied by Christopher Woodley, while on the US side C.K. Stocker EUR/NE/UKB was notetaker. End summary.

3. As a follow up to Under Secretary Eagleburger's talks with Ambassador Wright on October 13,<sup>3</sup> EUR Assistant Secretary Richard Burt called in UK Charge Derek Thomas to inform HMG of the US position on the Argentine resolution on the Falkland Islands. He stated:

—It appears to us that the draft resolution on the Falkland Islands which Argentina has provided to the Department is legally equivalent to last year's. Primarily on grounds of policy consistency, the US will vote for the resolution if no objectionable language is added to this draft.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830609–0992. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Buenos Aires and USUN. Drafted by C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE/UKB); cleared by W. Montgomery (P), J.R. Binns (EUR/NE), E. Barnett (IO/UNP), D. Jett (ARA/SC), and in S/S–O; approved by Burt.

<sup>2</sup> On October 4, the Department informed the Embassy in Buenos Aires that it was advising the Argentine Ambassador of the U.S. decision to vote in favor of the resolution "provided no objectionable language is added." (Telegram 285699 to Buenos Aires, October 6; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830580–0900)

<sup>3</sup> Meeting with Eagleburger on October 13, Wright presented a British démarche on the Falklands/Malvinas and the certification of Argentina. In telegram 295004 to London, October 15, the Department reported on the démarche: "While HMG recognizes that the US has interests in Latin America, it hopes that our desire to balance those interests and our relationship with the UK would lead to an abstention on the Falklands resolution. The US role, he [Wright] asserted, would have an important demonstration effect on other countries." Wright also "hoped the US would not vote for language which ignored self-determination, a principle enshrined in the US Constitution and the UN Charter." On Argentine certification, Wright added that "sales of US arms to Argentina would force HMG to maintain troops in the South Atlantic rather than where they are needed to confront the common enemy." Eagleburger "termed the question of certification not to be 'if' but rather 'when, before or after the inauguration.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830600–0325)

—We continue to support a negotiated outcome acceptable to both parties as the best means to settle this dispute and do not believe attempting to apply pressure will enhance the prospects for successful negotiations.

—We also hope both sides will refrain from taking steps which will heighten tensions.

Burt commented that he understood Prime Minister Thatcher to believe that the British public would not understand such an action by the USG but he hoped that HMG would.

4. Thanking the Assistant Secretary for his “helpful clarification”, Thomas explained that HMG had hoped that the USG would abstain on the resolution, given the GOA’s refusal to end formally the state of hostilities or to abjure the use of force, and in light of the stronger language in this year’s resolution. He continued that HMG expects the USG to forego the temptation to lobby others to vote for the resolution in the same way HMG believes we did last year. Burt noted the Charge’s remarks and agreed to look into the matter.

5. Thomas observed that the British want to begin talks with the GOA. In the British view as the GOA moves toward democracy, the USG should be in a position to urge wise counsel on them, i.e., lessening of tensions in the South Atlantic through a declared end to hostilities and the renouncing of the use of force. When democratic institutions have returned, the USG will look into all options Burt replied. Both sides have to engage in give and take. Despite the legacy of constraints on HMG on this issue, the USG hopes that the British will do what they can to find a solution; it would be in the British interest as much as ours. Burt suggested that the British position toward Gibraltar might serve as a model. Thomas acknowledged that it had prior to the war.

6. Thomas then raised British concerns about a USG human rights certification of the GOA. Commenting that this is a bilateral issue, Burt assured Thomas that the USG is aware of British views. The US has a law on this; when its requirements are met we will certify the GOA. We are continuing to review the situation regarding certification. He stated that certification, however, is not the same as arms sales. Thomas countered that human rights is an indivisible concept and that infringement of human rights took place on the Falkland Islands. He acknowledged, however, that this is a complex topic. In closing, he thanked Burt again for the clarification of the US position on the UN resolution and said he would report it immediately to his authorities.

**Shultz**



**433. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Rome, November 8, 1983, 1312Z

26714. Dept pass to The Hague Immediate and to AmEmbassy London. Subject: Deputy Secretary Dam's Meeting November 7 With Prime Minister Thatcher.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Deputy Secretary Dam met November 7 with Prime Minister Thatcher for a discussion which covered Grenada, INF, arms control, the Middle East and Argentine certification.<sup>2</sup> British participants, in addition to Thatcher, were Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, and Thatcher's Private Secretary John Coles. U.S. participants, in addition to Deputy Secretary, were Assistant Secretary Richard Burt and DCM Edward Streator.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to Argentine certification and the South Atlantic.]

39. Argentine certification. Thatcher said she was disappointed we appeared ready to vote with Argentina in the UN on the Argentine resolution.<sup>3</sup> She recalled that the UK had abstained on the Grenada resolution.<sup>4</sup> It will put us into acute difficulty, she said, if the US resumes arms shipments; "it will be misunderstood in Britain if the US supplies an Argentine buildup to fight Britain. We would have to be vigorously critical." Moreover, she said, "it could cause repercussions on public opinion in Britain." In view of the recent reports of anti-semitism in Argentina, it would be odd if the US were to sign a certificate on human rights at this point. Howe said that certification would cause a real problem with Anglo-US positions related to INF. He noted that it was curious that there was less anti-Americanism in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, PREL Falklands 1983 (Nov.–Dec.). Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> No U.S. memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. Dam met with Thatcher at Chequers.

<sup>3</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 38/12 on the Falklands/Malvinas was adopted by the UNGA on November 16. In telegram 3345 from USUN, November 17, the Mission provided a breakdown of the voting: "87 Yes (US)—9 No—54 abstentions, as compared to 1982's vote of 90 Yes (US)—12 No and 52 abstentions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, D830675–0405) For the text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1983, p. 1085.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 38/7, adopted November 2, which called for the "immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada." The United States, along with eight other nations, voted against the resolution; the United Kingdom abstained in the vote. For the text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 214.

France where the nuclear weapons were not American. But in Britain, these issues are blurred and plans to sell American weapons to Argentina would impact on INF deployments in the UK.

40. Dam said that the US would resist language going beyond last year's resolution. Moreover, we will take steps to consult closely on this issue as it evolves. Burt said that the US position was to favor a resolution consistent with that of last year; if it is not radically changed, we will support it.

41. On certification Dam said that this procedure derives from congressional concerns about human rights and it applies to various countries. With the emergence of a democratic government in Argentina, it is a foregone conclusion that we will certify. However, he took the Prime Minister's point on anti-semitism. DepSec said that cooperation with Argentina was desirable over the long term for everyone. Certainly the Argentine military should have relations with other military. Thatcher underlined that the Argentines still had not renounced hostilities. Dam said that the US was not rushing into arms sales. The Argentines may try to buy commercially in the US, and the US Government will have less influence in that sphere. Thatcher said that Argentina is strapped for cash. She trusted that none would help to make purchases that would be used against Britain. The UK had unfrozen funds and UK banks were in on IMF loans. If the banks are making loans for the purchase of arms to be used against Britain, HMG would have to tell the banks that they were going ahead against the desires of the government.

42. Howe called attention to two factors in connection with certification. On timing, he said that the further the distance from Grenada the better. Moreover it was important to be sure that Alfonsín was firmly in place<sup>5</sup> and to recognize that if he honored his pledges it would make things easier. Further, he suggested very close consultation on the types of arms to be supplied. Dam said that US thinking was along the same lines. While there were all kinds of stories out of Washington about sales to Argentina, this meant only that discussion was in progress. He agreed that the US and UK should stay in touch so that the British would have a clear view of the emerging US position. Howe agreed that the British needed a clear understanding on how sales would be controlled by the US.

43. Thatcher said that if arms were sold to Argentina it would be a "bad thing". Indeed, she said, it would be "extremely damaging." Alfonsín continues to stress that Argentine-British talks should deal

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<sup>5</sup> Alfonsín was elected Argentine President on October 30.

with the issue of sovereignty. She noted that not a single Argentine had inhabited the Falkland Islands for 150 years.

44. Dam promised to report in detail the evolution of US thinking.

45. This cable has been cleared by DepSec Dam.

Rabb

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**434. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley) and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Middendorf) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1983

SUBJECT

OASGA Vote on Falklands

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

U.S. vote on Argentine draft resolution on Falklands at OASGA.

*ESSENTIAL FACTORS*

The Argentine delegation to the OASGA has circulated a revised version of their draft resolution on the South Atlantic.<sup>2</sup> At the request of the U.S. they have deleted two paragraphs, one preambular and one operative, which went beyond last year's OASGA resolution<sup>3</sup> and this year's UNGA resolution.<sup>4</sup>

One of the paragraphs which the Argentines agreed to drop mentioned "prompt" resumption of negotiations and both noted the willingness of the Argentine Government to carry out "immediately" the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P840001–1649. Confidential. Drafted by L.R. Fleischer (ARA/USOAS) on November 15; cleared by T.J. Dunnigan (ARA/USOAS), Howard, J. Martin (ARA/RPP), K. Stocker (EUR/NE), and Gudgeon. Fleischer initialed for all clearing officials with the exception of Dunnigan who initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on November 16.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the text of the Argentine draft resolution.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a copy of the 1982 OASGA resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas. See Document 414.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is telegram 318076 to USUN, November 7, which conveyed the text of UNGA Resolution 38/7. See footnote 3, Document 433.

two UN resolutions. The clear implication was that the British were not willing to do so.

As it now stands, the draft resolution is essentially the same as last year's with the following changes: 1) one preambular paragraph has been added to reflect this year's UNGA resolution; 2) another preambular paragraph was added which notes that the UN Secretary General's report "indicates the lack of any progress toward fulfillment of these resolutions;" 3) one operative paragraph has been added which expresses "concern over the lack of any progress" (very similar to UNGA resolution which "regrets" lack of progress); and 4) a paragraph has been added which asks subsequent General Assemblies to examine the question until it is settled.

The vote on the resolution could take place as early as Wednesday, November 16.

We believe that since the Argentines have dropped the two paragraphs which gave the British the most difficulty a consensus is developing to approve the text as it now stands.

#### *RECOMMENDATIONS*

That you approve a U.S. position of voting for the Argentine resolution.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Eagleburger initialed his approval of the recommendation on November 16, and wrote under his initials: "Tell the Brits." The OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 669 (XIII-0/83) on November 18. On November 24, the Department circulated a summary of the November 14–18 OASGA session, noting that the Falklands/Malvinas resolution "passed with little debate." (Telegram 335273 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, USUN, and Brussels, November 24; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830692-0311)

**435. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 22, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Presidential Certification of Argentina

**ISSUE FOR DECISION**

When to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights and that certification is in our national interest, thereby making possible the resumption of arms sales. The issue is urgent since the Vice President is considering heading our delegation to the Argentine inauguration on December 10. A decision needs to be made on what steps we are to take before he arrives.

**ESSENTIAL FACTORS***—Certification Requirement*

The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 permits resumption of arms transfers and security assistance to Argentina only if the President certifies that Argentina has made significant human rights progress and that such action is in the national interest of the US. In making this determination, consideration must be given to Argentina's efforts to provide information on "disappeared" persons and to release political (PEN) prisoners.

*—Human Rights Progress*

Argentina has made very significant human rights progress. The October 30 elections were fair, open and honest. President-elect Alfonsín will take office on December 10. There have been no permanent

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive November 24–30 1983. Secret. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC) on November 18; cleared by Kilday, Morley, Howard, P.M. Olson (L/ARA), R. Perry (P), R. Snyder (HA), J. Gravette (DOD/ISA), and F. Lee (ARA/RPP) and in substance by J. Gravette (DOD/ISA). Sent through Eagleburger. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. A typewritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Sec/Pres sent 11/28 advance LDX and via courier. CDJ." Motley sent the memorandum to Shultz under a November 22 covering note, indicating that "ARA and EUR have settled all date differences save one: the Certification and pre-briefing of the Argentines. EUR may address their thoughts in a separate memo to you. ARA believes we should put the issue behind us before the Vice President arrives for the inauguration." (Ibid.) The memorandum was also found attached to Document 436. For the November 28 memorandum from Shultz to Reagan, see Tab A to Document 438.

“disappearances” in the last three years. The “PEN” prisoners have been released or remanded to the courts for trial. The military government has made virtually no effort to provide a full accounting for the disappeared, but Alfonsín ran on a strong human rights platform and has pledged to address this problem.

—*Relations with the Argentine Military*

Certification will help to restore a constructive relationship with one of the most important institutions in Argentina. It will also undercut those in Argentina who argue for a closer relationship with the Soviets. The military will, at a minimum, still influence national security decisions in the future. Since the Argentines have replaced most of the arms lost during the war and given that Alfonsín is committed to slashing the military budget, major arms purchases requests are not expected in the near future. Certification is more important to the Argentine military as a symbolic gesture than as a grant of access to US sources of supply.

—*The Chile and UK Dimensions*

Certification, regardless of the timing, will have serious implications for our relations with Chile and the UK. British public opinion also views certification as synonymous with arms sales which would endanger British troops in the Falklands. The Pinochet regime will require careful handling, regardless of the timing of certification, in light of the difficult internal political situation in Chile and the traditional rivalry between the two countries. A similar certification law now prevents arms sales and military assistance to Chile. Unlike Argentina, however, Chile does not now meet the statutory criteria.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has repeatedly expressed her concern about certification and arms sales, insisting that US arms for Argentina would be “the single most difficult thing for me.” Despite our careful explanations, in the minds of some British officials and much of the British public, certification is confused with arms sales creating an emotional political issue. Thatcher has requested the US to delay certification at least until the inauguration, and to not permit sales until the GOA declares an end to hostilities over the Falklands. In addition, with INF deployments underway in the UK, this is a time of increased sensitivity in US/UK relations. We need to be sensitive to the fact that in the post-Grenada atmosphere certification will present considerable political problems for Thatcher. We have explained to both Chile and the UK that as Argentina successfully completes the transition to an elected government, USG failure to certify would be a negative political act. The USG has promised HMG that we will stay in close touch on the timing and contents of any certification

announcement. We have agreed to consult on major arms requests but have not accepted the linkage of such arms sales with a GOA declaration on a formal end to hostilities.

—*Glenn/Symington Amendment Problem*

There are intelligence reports which indicate the GOA may have received nuclear reprocessing technology from an Italian firm. In addition Argentina announced on November 18 that it had constructed a gaseous diffusion nuclear enrichment facility. We have not reached a firm conclusion whether Argentina has acquired reprocessing or enrichment technology, materials or equipment from another country. If it were found to have done so, under the Glenn or Symington amendments economic and certain security assistance is prohibited. This would prevent an IMET program (budgeted at \$50,000 for FY-84), as well as credits for military sales. We have no plans for any other military or economic assistance covered by the Glenn or Symington amendments. Foreign Military Sales on a cash basis and approval of munitions control export licenses, after certification, are not precluded by either amendment.

—*Congressional Considerations*

Certification will not create significant controversy on the Hill. Most remaining Congressional opposition to certification was disarmed by the election of Alfonsín whose human rights credentials are first rate. There is a strongly held view by some on the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the “benefit” of certification should be granted to an elected government. Some members regard this issue as a test of credibility for the Administration’s policy of support for democracy.

*ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS*

The question becomes what is the best timing for the three steps involved: (1) private contacts with HMG, the GOC, the GOA and Congress; (2) public announcement, and (3) certification itself.

Certification, significantly before or after the Alfonsín government is installed, poses several problems. Certification during the last days of the military government would antagonize the UK. It might also be interpreted in Argentina as a move by the US to bolster the prestige of the military at a time when the Alfonsín government sees as its top priority bringing the military under control. In addition, key congressmen have indicated their opposition to certification before the transition to democracy has culminated in the installation of an elected government.

We could put off certification until some time after the inauguration. We could even attempt to extract commitments from Alfonsín on

human rights, the Beagle Channel, and the Falklands. But Alfonsín would resent any such delay, believing that Argentina deserves certification because of the dramatic changes in that country. Any attempt to use certification as a bargaining tool would be viewed as a political act and become an issue with the new government where none exists now. Even Argentina's severest critics admit that certification should not be delayed beyond inauguration, and that Argentina has met the human rights criteria set forth in the law.

We conclude, therefore, that a scenario culminating in announcement of the President's decision to certify Argentina in the week before the inauguration with actual certification, effective upon installation of the new government, is the compromise that best serves our interests. It:

- puts the issue behind us before the Vice President goes to Argentina and avoids having it cloud his trip;

- emphasizes our commitment to democracy;

- has the most positive effect on our relations with the new government;

- minimizes opposition from the Hill and human rights groups;

- constitutes a gesture to the outgoing government which promised and delivered a return to democracy, and

- will provide time for the necessary consultations.

Announcement of our decision to certify before the inauguration is not without its costs, however, especially in terms of our relationship with the UK.

—*Next Steps*

A proposed scenario for diplomatic and congressional discussions is outlined at Tab B.<sup>2</sup> It calls for careful consultations with all parties and a special emissary and Presidential letter to Chile. In addition, as a first step we suggest that the President immediately send a letter to Mrs. Thatcher to inform her of the decision.<sup>3</sup>

*Recommendation:*

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A,<sup>4</sup> which calls for immediate contact with HMG, the remaining private contacts December 6, and public announcement December 7.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed at Tab C is a draft letter from Reagan to Thatcher, informing her of the U.S. decision. For the letter as sent, see Tab B to Document 437.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed. For the memorandum as approved, see Tab A to Document 437.



**436. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Presidential Certification of Argentina

I support the recommendation that the President certify Argentina for future military sales. ARA and EUR agree on the certification but differ on procedures for informing the British, and more importantly on how much of a check we provide the UK on future US arms sales to Argentina.

I think we should basically follow ARA's recommended scenario, but also meet EUR concerns for adequate consultations with the British to the extent possible.<sup>2</sup> If the President decides next week to certify Argentina, we should consult with the British Ambassador here and Ambassador Price would do likewise in London before we inform the Argentines of our decision. We would tell the UK that certification would be announced shortly before the Vice President's December 10 visit to Argentina for the inauguration. We would also consult with the Congressional leadership and send letters to President Bignone of Argentina and President Pinochet of Chile.

On the arms sales issue, I do not support the EUR recommendation that we establish a three month hiatus before any sales are made. We should, however, assure the British that we will *consult* with them on any significant sales to Argentina. While we should be sensitive to their concerns re the Falklands, we should not give them a veto on specific weapons systems that might be sold to the Argentines.

If you approve this course of action, I will set things in motion.<sup>3</sup>

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive November 24–30 1983. Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 435.

<sup>3</sup> Shultz approved the recommendation.

<sup>4</sup> Eagleburger wrote "LSE" above his typed signature.

**437. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1983

SUBJECT

Argentine Certification

*Issue*

Whether to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights.

*Facts*

With the recent elections, Argentina's human rights situation has improved dramatically and certification will signal our strong support for the return of democracy. Certification would be effective upon installation of the Alfonsín government on December 10. The U.K. and Chile will be especially concerned about the Argentine certification. A memo from George Shultz (Tab A) provides a recommended certification scenario. The first step would be a letter (Tab B) from you to Mrs. Thatcher. Cap Weinberger opposes certification (Tab C).

*Discussion*

Cap Weinberger's concerns focus on the reaction in the U.K. On balance, the strategy outlined by George Shultz, in my view, adequately addresses Cap's concerns. Moreover, the question is not whether but when we will certify Argentina. The game plan includes, *inter alia*, Congressional consultation in advance, and dispatching Dick Walters to explain our position to President Pinochet.<sup>2</sup> I recommend approval, and OMB concurs.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the strategy for Argentine certification (Tab A) and sign the proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher (Tab B).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (11/20/1983–12/31/1983). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lilac. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it. The memorandum was found attached to a December 5 memorandum from McFarlane to Shultz informing him that Reagan approved Shultz's recommendation on Argentine certification.

<sup>2</sup> Walters met with Pinochet in Santiago twice on December 12. A record of their first conversation was transmitted by Walters in telegram 7139 from Santiago, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830731–0491) A summary of their second meeting was transmitted by the Embassy in telegram 7184 from Santiago, December 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830737–0184)

<sup>3</sup> Reagan approved the recommendation.

**Tab A**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to  
President Reagan<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, November 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Argentine Certification

I believe you should certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights upon installation of the Alfonsin government on December 10, with public announcement of our intention December 7. The human rights situation there has improved dramatically, and certification will signal our strong support for the return of democracy in Argentina. The Argentine Armed Forces would prefer that certification take place while they are still in power. Our assessment is that, considering all the factors involved, certification should take effect upon installation of the new government. In our announcement of this decision, we will note the contribution of the Bignone government on successfully carrying out the return to democracy.

The UK and Chile are concerned about the political repercussions of certification, but their biggest fear is that subsequent arms sales to Argentina will threaten peace in the region. While certification makes US arms sales to Argentina once again possible it would not result in large, immediate weapons sales. The Argentines have bought heavily in Europe and are short of funds. In addition, President-elect Alfonsin is committed to slashing the military budget. We would handle any new requests on a case-by-case basis with particular attention to the effect of each sale on regional stability.

Mrs. Thatcher has spoken out very strongly against arms sales to Argentina. Until the government of Argentina announces an end to hostilities over the Falklands, we would consult closely with the British on arms sales requests. In her November 14 Guildhall speech, Thatcher stressed that the US is the ultimate guarantor of UK security and that

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<sup>4</sup> Secret.

occasional differences cannot obscure our shared values.<sup>5</sup> This is a retreat from her earlier tough rhetoric and should not be ignored.

As a first step I have attached a letter from you to Mrs. Thatcher informing her of our scenario for certification. General Pinochet of Chile will also be disturbed. We plan to take steps to reassure him of our desire for close relations, even though we cannot now justify certification of Chile. If you approve we will send the letter to Mrs. Thatcher, begin consultations with Congress and shortly send you letters for President Pinochet, President Bignone and the actual certification document for your signature. Thatcher has asked that we delay certification, at least until the inauguration, to help her deal with domestic political pressures.

## **Tab B**

### **Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1983

Dear Margaret:

As you know, Argentina has made steady progress in strengthening its protection of human rights. The fair, open and honest elections on October 30 are the latest manifestation of this progress. When President-elect Alfonsín takes office on December 10, Argentina will have completed its return to democracy.

In view of this and other relevant factors, I will be certifying to the U.S. Congress that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights and that making Argentina eligible for arms transfers is in the U.S. national interest. Our announcement will be made on December 7, just before the U.S. delegation arrives in Buenos Aires for the

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Thatcher's November 14 speech in the City of London's Guildhall in which she "recalled that Europe had been spared the horrors of war for 40 years, and that it is the strength of the [NATO] Alliance, of which Britain is a loyal member, that keeps the peace today. 'Friends, like families, differ at times,' she added, 'but nothing alters these basic truths—that the United States is our ultimate defensive shield, the guarantor of Western freedom, and the best hope for the world's oppressed. To that conviction we hold. We are confident that any differences that may occur will always be infinitely less important than the purposes and loyalties which bind us together.'" (Telegram 24618 from London, November 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830667–0404)

<sup>6</sup> No classification marking.

inauguration. Certification will be effective upon installation of the new government.

I know this announcement will be a delicate question in Great Britain. However, as I suggested when we last met, and as subsequent consultations between our two governments have indicated, it is now appropriate and accurate to certify that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights.

We will be informing U.S. Congressional leaders and Presidents Bignone and Pinochet of our decision on December 6. Because of our special relationship and the importance you personally place on this question, I am notifying you first of our decision.

The decision was based on the following considerations. During the past year, the Government of Argentina has made significant progress in complying with internationally recognized principles of human rights. Argentina's human rights performance now meets the test for certification required by U.S. law.

Certification is not equivalent to arms sales. We will evaluate each request very carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. We would consult closely with your government on any major sales.

Significant sales are not expected. Argentina has replaced most of its losses from a variety of sources and President-elect Alfonsín is committed to a significant reduction of the military budget. Moreover, Argentina's difficult economic situation will not support major arms acquisitions. In any event, should Argentina so desire, arms are readily available from other sources, including the Soviet Union.

In my view, our normalization of relations with Argentina will be in the interests of the United States and Great Britain. Certification will help strengthen U.S. influence with Argentina and enable us to work more effectively to assure regional stability. The climate for dialogue and negotiation will be improved.

I sincerely appreciate your eloquent and timely statement at the Guildhall. I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment of the special relationship between our two nations and the importance of our shared interests and purposes.

Margaret, be assured that I continue to place the highest value on your personal advice, counsel and friendship.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

**Tab C**

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the  
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs  
(McFarlane)<sup>7</sup>**

Washington, November 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Argentine Certification (U)

(C) I do not believe we should issue the certification at this time for a number of reasons:

(1) As you know, Prime Minister Thatcher has repeatedly expressed her concern about certification and arms sales, insisting that US arms for Argentina would be "the single most difficult thing for me." Despite our careful and academic explanations, in the minds of the British general public, certification is considered to be a license for unrestricted US arms sales to the Argentine military. Mrs. Thatcher firmly believes that even a short delay of a few months after the new civilian government takes control in Argentina would be helpful in gaining UK public acceptance of Argentine certification.

(2) None of us know whether the new government in Argentina will show any marked improvement in either human rights or in its attitude to a new invasion of the Falklands. This government has not yet even taken office.

(3) With the INF deployments underway in the UK, this is a time of increased sensitivity in US/UK relations and has far-reaching consequences for the NATO Alliance.

(4) I also fear that certification will add fuel to the smouldering unhappiness that the British have (quite erroneously) about our invasion of Grenada. We need to be sensitive to the fact that in the present politico-military environment, Argentine certification puts an unnecessary strain on an already troubled relationship.

(5) Nor would certification, without arms sales, help our relationship with Argentina.

(6) Finally, there are other countries who have helped us more, such as Chile, with far greater claim to certification now than Argentina.

(C) I understand Secretary Shultz has sent a memorandum to the President recommending that he certify to Congress that Argentina

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<sup>7</sup> Secret.

has made progress in human rights and deserves to be certified. Argentina may make some progress in human rights, but they haven't yet. Indeed there are even reports that their military will not permit the new government to take office. Our need for continued UK cooperation in both the INF deployments and the reconstruction of a viable Grenada, and on many other matters, far outweigh the US interest in such an early certification of Argentina.

(U) Request you convey my concerns to the President before he makes his decision on Argentine certification.

Cap

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**438. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 5, 1983, 1731Z

344532. Subject: Assistant Secretary Burt's Meeting With British on Argentine Certification, December 3, 1983 at 11:45 am. Corrected copy (text: paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and renumbered 7 and 8).

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. Summary: EUR Assistant Secretary Burt called in U.K. Charge Robin Renwick to give him a copy of the President's letter to the Prime Minister on Argentine certification<sup>2</sup> and to brief him on the decision. Renwick gave Mr. Burt a copy of a letter on Argentina from the Foreign Secretary to Secretary Shultz. HMG attaches fundamental importance, he stressed, to the review of all requests by Under Secretary Eagleburger and to consultation with the British prior to sales. Britain is deeply concerned about possible sales to the GOA of spare parts especially for submarines and Skyhawks. He asked if the announcement of certification could be delayed until December 8 given the timing of the Prime Minister's weekly parliamentary question period and the Foreign

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830714–0935. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted by C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE); cleared by Kelly, B. McKie (S/S) and in S/S–O; approved by Burt. Printed from a copy correcting an earlier summary of the meeting between Burt and Renwick sent in telegram 344570 to London, December 4. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830713–0006)

<sup>2</sup> See Tab B, Document 437.

Secretary's dinner with the Secretary. Mr. Burt agreed to look into the request. End summary.

3. Assistant Secretary Burt called in UK Charge Robin Renwick to give him a copy of the President's letter and to brief him on the decision drawing on talking points transmitted to London septel.<sup>3</sup> Renwick responded that HMG attaches fundamental importance to the review of all requests by Under Secretary Eagleburger and to consultations with British prior to sales. He also expressed Britain's deep concern about possible sales of spare parts (particularly for the U.S. submarines owned by the GOA Navy) and of Skyhawks. Such sales, he stressed, affect the resources that HMG has to devote to defending the Island. Even more importantly they may endanger the lives of British troops. He explained that HMG was already working on replies to parliamentary questions on the topic of Argentine certification. Handing over a copy of letter on Argentina from Foreign Secretary Howe to Secretary Shultz (text follows), Renwick pointed out that the letter states HMG's plan to draw on Secretary Weinberger's public comments about the administration's exercising caution over major new supplies to the GOA especially those which could be used in a renewed attempt to invade the Falklands. They realize that they cannot publicly refer to the consultations which will take place.

4. He then remarked that December 8 would be a much better day from HMG's point of view for the announcement of certification. As the Prime Minister's regular time to answer questions in the Parliament is on Thursdays, it would be preferable not to have the announcement made the day before. Secondly, the Foreign Minister will be seeing the Secretary at the Berlin dinner on Wednesday evening and it would be much better for Sir Geoffrey if he could say he had spoken personally to the Secretary prior to the announcement.

5. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kelly said that part of the reason that December 7 had been chosen was to fit in with the Vice President's scheduled travel to Argentina. Assistant Secretary Burt said he would see if anything could be done to meet HMG's request. Renwick asked that a definite answer be given to Ambassador Wright when he calls on the Deputy Secretary on Monday, December 5.

6. Mr. Kelly assured Mr. Renwick that if asked, the US spokesman would state that certification is not a guarantee of sales.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 344288 to London, December 3, the Department sent instructions to the Embassy, including the referenced talking points and the text of Reagan's December 2 letter to Thatcher, to inform the British Government of the President's decision to certify Argentina. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830712-0661)



7. Text of message dated December 2 from Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to Secretary Shultz.

Begin text:

Margaret Thatcher and I discussed the whole question of the probable resumption of US arms sales to Argentina with Ken Dam at Chequers early in November,<sup>4</sup> and Janet Young has since been over the ground with both Ken Dam and Larry Eagleburger.

I do not therefore need to labour our serious concern about the possible implications of US arms sales for our defences in the Falklands particularly while the Argentines continue to refuse to declare a cessation of hostilities. I wanted to let you have this message now to underline the importance we attach to this issue in advance of the installation of the new Argentine President.

We were very pleased to note Cap Weinberger's public assurance that the administration would exercise caution over major new supplies, especially of weapons that could be used in a renewed attempt to invade the Falklands. We also welcome Larry Eagleburger's undertaking to Janet Young personally to veto all export licenses. Michael Heseltine will I know want to discuss this subject with Cap Weinberger in Washington next week, and I would like to have a word with you in the margins of the NATO Ministerial in Brussels.

As regards our policy towards the new government in Argentina, I should like to emphasize that our aim is to re-establish more normal relations between our two countries. The previous Argentine Government failed to respond positively to our various proposals: I hope the new government will be more constructive. Margaret Thatcher has declared publicly her willingness to resume full commercial and diplomatic relations with Argentina. I understand that George Bush will be representing the USA at Dr. Alfonsín's inauguration. I believe it would be very useful if he could take the opportunity to emphasize that the normalization of relations between Britain and Argentina is the most realistic point from which to start building. End text

8. Following is the text of an answer given in Parliament on 22nd November by the Leader of the House of Commons (in the Prime Minister's absence) to a parliamentary question by Mr. Michael Latham MP. It is asked what representations the Prime Minister had made to President Reagan about the possible resumption of American arms sales to Argentina in advance of a formal agreement to end hostilities by the Argentine administration.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 433.

Begin text:

I have been asked to reply. As the House knows, my Right Honourable friend made our position very clear to the President when she saw him in September.<sup>5</sup> The United States administration is very well aware of our concern. We have been glad to note the remarks by the United States Defense Secretary that the United States would exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies. End text.

**Shultz**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 431.

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**439. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

London, December 6, 1983

*Begins*

Dear Ron,

Thank you for giving me advance warning of your decision on certification and Argentina.<sup>2</sup> As you say, this is a delicate question for us. My immediate concern, now that your decision is taken, is that our public line on both sides of the Atlantic should be such as to minimise the difficulties which will inevitably arise.

I shall undoubtedly come under public and Parliamentary pressure. I shall have to say that I would regret any sales of arms to Argentina which are likely to increase the threat to the Falkland Islanders and to our people who are down there to defend them. I would also propose to say the following, without revealing that I am drawing on points in your message:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC, United Kingdom–1983 12/05/1983–12/10/1983. Secret. The Department transmitted the text of the message in telegram Tosec 150041/346473 to Shultz in West Germany, December 7. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Reagan's December 2 letter to Thatcher is printed as Tab B, Document 437.

(i) US law provides a test of human rights performance for certification: it is the judgement of the American Administration that the Argentine human rights performance now meets this test;

(ii) certification permits but does not require sales of arms;

(iii) we know that the US Government will look very carefully at any requests for arms in the light of all the relevant circumstances, including the overriding need to maintain peace in the region; and

(iv) we have been very pleased to note Cap Weinberger's public assurance to this effect.

I hope that this will be helpful in dealing with the likely public reaction to certification. The public reaction to any subsequent sale of arms will be much more difficult, and I remain very concerned also about the substance of the matter.

I am afraid that the Argentine Military will see certification as the thin end of the wedge and that Alfonsín will come under great pressure from them to ask you to sell more than you would think right. Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine will be seeing George Shultz and Cap Weinberger at the various NATO meetings in Brussels this week and will pursue with them our consultations on how best to proceed.

As far as relations with the new Argentine Government are concerned, I note that George Bush will be representing the United States at Dr Alfonsín's inauguration. As you know, I welcome the restoration of democracy in Argentina. I have made it clear that I cannot discuss sovereignty over the Falklands. But our disagreement on this issue should not prevent Britain and Argentina from re-establishing normal commercial and diplomatic relations. If he has the opportunity to do so, I hope that George Bush will tell Alfonsín that we shall be very ready to work with his government to that end.

Best wishes.

Yours ever,

**Margaret<sup>3</sup>**

*Ends*

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1983, 0442Z

348036. Subject: Letter From the President to Prime Minister Thatcher on Argentine Certification.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Embassy should deliver the following letter from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher by 8:30 a.m., Thursday,<sup>2</sup> London time.

3. Begin text:

December 7, 1983

Dear Margaret:

I sincerely appreciate your positive response<sup>3</sup> to my decision to certify that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights. We are sensitive to your concerns on this matter. As we indicated, certification does not mean arms sales and, in any case, any request will be evaluated carefully on a case-by-case basis. We will consult closely with you prior to any proposed major sale.

George Shultz will discuss this issue with Geoffrey Howe in Brussels this week. I agree with the approach you outlined in your letter for the public presentation of our certification decision. We will cooperate fully with your government on all public affairs aspects of the certification process.<sup>4</sup>

George Bush will inform President-elect Alfonsín of our mutual desire to see the Falklands issue resolved peacefully. The Vice President's visit represents our hope that the inauguration of the Alfonsín Government will be a major step forward in the new political process

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Presidential Messages OUT (06/03/1983–01/21/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate as Tosec 150125 to Shultz, who was in Brussels December 7–9 for a NATO Ministerial meeting. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Stocker; cleared by Kelly, Kilday, and Montgomery and in EUR/NE and S/S–O; approved by Richard Kauzlarich (S/S). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N830012–0326)

<sup>2</sup> December 8.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 439.

<sup>4</sup> Romberg announced at the December 8 Department of State press briefing that certification would be effective December 10, the day of Alfonsín's inauguration. He emphasized that resumption of arms sales would be reviewed and approved only if an Argentine request was consistent with U.S. support of a negotiated settlement of the Falklands/Malvinas and Beagle Channel conflicts. ("Reagan to End Ban on Sale of Arms to the Argentines." *New York Times*, December 9, p. A1)

in Argentina—one that will adhere to the democratic ideals we both hold so dear.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

End text.

4. Signed original will follow.

**Dam**

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#### **441. Editorial Note**

On December 9, 1983, during a 35-minute bilateral discussion held at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, where they were attending a Ministerial meeting, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe discussed Argentine certification. According to telegram Secto 15043 from Brussels, December 9, “Howe said HMG appreciated the President’s advance warning on certification of Argentina and noted that Mrs. Thatcher has sent a personal message to President Alfonsín through the Swiss to the effect that, ‘While we have our differences, Britain is pleased with the restoration of democracy in Argentina, and extends its good wishes.’ Howe said the British Embassy in Washington would be getting a copy of Mrs. Thatcher’s letter to Vice President Bush before his departure for Buenos Aires. Howe added that while HMG’s position on Falklands sovereignty will not change, he hoped the installation of a new government would open discussions. The Secretary emphasized that any Argentine arms request would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. In addition, we would consult on major Argentine arms requests with HMG. Argentina, noted the Secretary, has already replaced most of its Falklands losses and Alfonsín is intent on reducing Argentina’s military budget. Furthermore, Argentina does not have the resources for major arms acquisition. We understand your sensitivity, said the Secretary. Howe replied that the British would like to consult closely with the U.S. on Argentine arms transfers and emphasized it would be difficult for HMG to defend any sale publicly.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N830012–0411) Following the conversation, Shultz briefly summarized this exchange as part of a report of his meeting with Howe for President

Ronald W. Reagan, which was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 15041 from Brussels, December 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

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**442. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Rabat<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 12, 1983, 1701Z

Tosec 150344/351672. Subject: Bush-Alfonsin Bilateral Meeting.

1. Confidential—Entire text—Nodis.
2. There follows a summary of conversation of the Bush/Alfonsin bilateral. SecState pass to Defense and AEC.
3. Participants: Vice President George Bush, Ambassador Frank Ortiz, Assistant Secretary Anthony Motley, Admiral Daniel Murphy, President Raul Alfonsin, Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hugo Gobbi, Secretary of the Presidency German Lopez.
4. The meeting took place in Los Olivos, the Presidential residence, from 2030 until 2120 hours on December 10, 1983. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Vice President introduced Deputy Secretary McNamar and General Gorman, and their advisors, who had participated in simultaneous side meetings with Minister of Economy Bernardo Grinspun and Minister of Defense Raul Borras.
5. The Vice President opened by saying he spent an unbelievable day as a participant and spectator in the public jubilation over Argentina's return to democracy. He said now the United States and Argentina could become equal partners in the search for world peace and prosperity. He believed there is a great potential for cooperative actions by two great nations. President Alfonsin replied he was very pleased to hear this. Argentina wants to have increasingly good relations with the United States. Such relations would be between mature partners.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N830012–0498. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. This telegram repeats for Shultz's information the text of telegram WH09366, December 12, sent from Bush on Air Force 2 to the White House and sent for information to Buenos Aires. In telegram 8787 from Buenos Aires, December 11, the Embassy transmitted an earlier version of the summary of Bush's conversation with Alfonsin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830730–0113) On December 12, Shultz was in Morocco, where he met with King Hassan II, before traveling to Lisbon for meetings with Portuguese officials.

The two nations have many common interests. They now shared a commitment to democracy and the freedom of man. There were also differing and contradictory interests which he did not specify. He said we should strive to make the differing points of view become common interests and the contradictory points of view simply become differing points of view. He said bilateral relations suffered because of the Malvinas war, but this same problem could become a possible avenue to improve our relationship. The democracies of the world must be unified. The Malvinas issue divides them. It is important to begin to implement the UN resolution on the Malvinas. Conversations between the U.K. and Argentina should begin, even if with differing agendas, it was important to start talks. There must be an end to the exclusion zone and at all costs the conversion of the Islands into a military fortress must be stopped before the South Atlantic is turned into the North Atlantic. There is a risk that the South Atlantic would, like the Indian Ocean, become an area of contest between world powers. Argentina is decisively opposed to such a development. Argentina hopes the United States will cooperate with the Argentine nation to avoid such a situation.

6. The Vice President replied he believes the U.K. wants to move forward in rebuilding its relations with Argentina. The United States decision to certify to the Congress Argentina's improvements in the observance of human rights was not easy for the British to accept. The United States has demonstrated its support for Argentina. The United States believes it can help in bettering relations between two friends. If the United States sees there is no way it can be helpful, we shall tell Argentina so frankly and tell them why. The United States desires a frank relationship with Argentina. President Alfonsín said he was very delighted to hear the Vice President speak in this manner. He said he also wanted that there be a frank dialogue between the two countries.

7. When the Vice President alluded to some demonstrations of hostility against the United States among those in the great crowds in the center of the city, the President said Americans should not be naive. While it is true there is adverse sentiment in Argentina since the Malvinas war, that was not the reason for whatever isolated instances of hostility the Vice President may have observed. There are groups in Latin America who raise banners that are not national banners but are those of the East/West conflict. Latin America is a battlefield for ideological propaganda. It was East/West not North/South manifestations the Vice President saw. In no way do those who so demonstrated represent the great majority of Argentines. They are only a small group which in Argentina are called "ultras". They have their own agenda, which is not Argentina's agenda.

8. The Vice President said, given the new relationship that is being developed between the two countries, he would suggest that there

be parliamentary exchanges. Alfonsín immediately agreed. The Vice President also extended an invitation to the President to make a working visit to the United States some time late in 1984. He predicted that President Alfonsín would very much like President Reagan. President Alfonsín said it would give him the greatest pleasure to meet President Reagan and to visit the United States. The details could be worked out between the respective Ambassadors.

9. The Vice President said there are specific areas in which the United States hoped it could be cooperative and supportive. He noted that Deputy Secretary of Treasury McNamar was a member of his delegation and was then meeting with the new Argentine economic team. The United States would try to be as helpful as possible in assisting Argentina to meet its great financial problems. President Alfonsín said a lessening of the magnitude of the debt problem is absolutely vital to him. He said there is a danger that his administration could not fulfill the expectations it awakened. He said it was essential to end the limitations on Argentina's development imposed by the huge debt service requirements. He said Argentina always pays its debts. The way for Argentina to pay off its debt is to export. It was vital to find markets for Argentina's exports and to arrange an equitable refinancing of the debt, but there should be no question that Argentina will pay. The Vice President repeated that the United States would try to help. He pointed out that President Reagan very strongly resisted the siren-call of protectionism raised by affected American producers. The United States was doing it not out of generosity but because it was good for the United States. The United States market should be open to everyone. The United States shall continue to resist raising barriers to trade. He assured President Alfonsín that would be the case and that the United States would be a good trading partner. Alfonsín said that this was a basic common interest and thanked the Vice President for his assurances. He noted that even Argentina had to extend help to countries in distress. He said Argentina would have to pay Bolivia \$270 million very soon, a sum that Argentina could scarcely afford.

10. The Vice President noted the economic recovery in the United States and its probable effect on the economies of other countries, especially if the European economies also would improve. President Alfonsín said the top priority must be to expand the economy and to have greater production. He believed it was very important that there be a reduction in interest rates.

11. The Vice President raised the matter of Argentina's nuclear program. He said the United States listened with great sensitivity to the Alfonsín administration's statements on the matter. He noted that purely as a bilateral United States/Argentine question, the United



States could be more forthcoming in assuring there be a steady flow of scientific and technological cooperation if the American Congress and public opinion were less concerned about the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear devices. He said to the degree Alfonsin could find it possible to comply with international nuclear safeguards it would make all areas of bilateral cooperation much easier. The Vice President said this issue was Argentina's business, but President Alfonsin's decisions would have a considerable effect on the degree of cooperation possible between our countries. The Vice President said he could not be less than frank on an issue of such importance. President Alfonsin said the nuclear issue was the converse to the human rights issue. On the nuclear question, the big powers worry about the actions of the little powers. He said he wanted the Vice President to know of his irrevocable and absolute decision that Argentina will not build an atomic bomb. He said Argentina would make agreements with its neighbors which will tranquilize world public opinion.

12. The Vice President, in a forceful manner, conveyed to President Alfonsin the commitment of President Reagan to a major reduction in arms not solely limitation, but a reduction in armaments. He noted that a President with the credentials of President Reagan can make effective agreements with the Soviet Union and obtain ratification for such agreements in the Senate. It is necessary to engage the Soviet Union in discussions leading to such ends. President Reagan feels very strongly about this issue. The United States absolutely wants to reduce arms, however, it takes two to tango. The Vice President said he believed there was growing support in Eastern Europe for arms reduction. He knew that in the United States that President Reagan is strong enough to achieve it. President Alfonsin said that this truly was a message of hope. He wished President Reagan every success.

[Omitted here is discussion of Central America.]

**Dam**

#### 443. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 14, 1983

##### Argentina-UK: Status of the Falklands Dispute

President Alfonsín's recent statements on the Falklands represent a slight softening of his tough campaign rhetoric but do not substantively change Argentina's negotiating position.

—In a press interview Sunday,<sup>2</sup> he repeated the formula of his military predecessors: If the British reduce the protection zone around the islands and halt expansion of the airbase there, he will consider a formal cessation of hostilities.

—A "leaseback" arrangement that he also proposed—Buenos Aires would gain sovereignty but the UK retain control—has been part of the Argentine position since the mid-1970s. It was put forward in the weeks following last year's invasion as a way to resolve the dispute.

Alfonsín has no latitude at this point to make significant concessions and probably has no wish to do so. He nevertheless is likely to see advantages in appearing flexible. Internationally he sets a moderate tone for his foreign policy that could put the UK on the diplomatic defensive. Domestically, his quick moves to address the issue and reduce tensions probably will be used to justify cuts in military expenditures, a vital part of his economic program.

The British have rejected an immediate discussion of sovereignty—and therefore the leaseback proposal—and are continuing airfield improvements. Foreign Secretary Howe, in a radio interview Sunday, left the door open for some reduction of the exclusive zone, however, and the British are likely to be flexible on this point if they conclude that Alfonsín is willing to foster a return to normal economic, commercial, and diplomatic ties. The British will not require a formal declaration of an end to hostilities in order to discuss bilateral relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Job 01T02211R: Intelligence Publication File—Record Copy of Finished Intelligence Pubs., Box 1, Folder 3: Talking Points Argentina-UK: Status of the Falklands Dispute. Confidential; [handling restriction not declassified]. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of the paper reads: "For Secretary of Defense at his request."

<sup>2</sup> December 11.

**444. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Review of Argentine Arms Transfers and Consultations with the U.K.

*Issue for Decision*

Whether to approve a plan for Department review of arms transfers to Argentina and consultations with the U.K.

*Background*

You have undertaken to review major arms transfers to Argentina, and we are committed to consultation with the U.K. prior to approving them.

The Alfonsín Government is committed to cutting military spending, and we do not expect many requests from the Argentines for major new weapons systems. Given the fact that certification ends a five-year legal prohibition against arms transfers, however, we do expect a number of requests for smaller items—especially replacement parts for U.S.-origin equipment. The British have already identified some such items as being of great concern to them. Other items may be clearly non-sensitive.

We can also expect to receive a large number of Munitions Control Export License requests from U.S. companies to market new items or transfer them to the GOA. Some of the marketing requests may involve items that are major by any definition. Under normal circumstances, the Department review of such requests would be handled by PM and the regional bureaus. Controversial items, and those on which bureaus cannot agree, would be sent to the seventh floor for decision.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Memos/Letters/Press 1982. Confidential. Drafted by F.G. Lee (ARA/RPP) on December 13; cleared by Kilday, Perry, Sienkiewicz, Blakemore, Haass, Wenick, Proper, Finegold, and Morley. Lee initialed for all clearing officials with the exception of Kilday, who initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on December 22. Below this, Howe wrote: "This is height of inefficient operations. I oppose creating such a mechanism even for cosmetic purposes. JH."

Given the sensitivity of arms transfers to Argentina, ARA and EUR propose that a special procedure be set up to consider *all* requests involving the GOA. This system would allow us to give prompt, close attention even to small items that may turn out to be relevant from the point of view of regional stability.

The proposal is that a special review committee would meet as often as necessary to review all Argentine arms transfer requests (both direct sales from the U.S. and third-party transfer requests). The Committee would be chaired by PM, with representatives from T, P, PM, ARA, EUR, ACDA, and DOD. PM, ARA, and EUR representation on the Committee would be at the Office Director level, given the intent that the Committee would formulate recommendations to P. The Committee would examine each request case-by-case rather than attempting to define general principle in the abstract. With respect to each request, the Committee would either:

- Approve (no major items or items considered sensitive from the point of view of regional stability), or

- Deny (items on which Working Group agrees should be denied and which would not normally be referred to the 7th floor), or

- Refer through P to T for determination (major and sensitive items recommended for approval, and items on which the Working Group cannot unanimously agree).

Those items that are considered neither controversial nor major might be approved by the Committee without referral to P or consultations with the British. At the beginning of this process, the Committee would confirm its decision at the DAS level in PM.

Approvals/denials resulting from the committee meetings, or from your decisions, would be communicated by PM to the Munitions Control Office (PM/MC) for issuance/denial of licenses and to DOD/DSAA for final disposition of FMS requests.

PM believes that the existing munitions control license application procedure is adequate to screen Argentine cases effectively and efficiently; difficult cases on which positive action was indicated could then be referred to P and T for final decision. If, however, the EUR/ARA recommendations for a special committee to handle all such cases (denials as well as approvals) are accepted, we should, after two months of experience with this approach, review with P and T the necessity of the continuing requirement for reviewing *every* case.

Consultations with the British would normally take place when we have reached a preliminary decision to approve a major sale. There may be situations, however, when publicity surrounding a proposed sale—or potential therefor—will cause the British to raise the issue with us before we have reached even a preliminary decision. In either

situation, where consultations are considered appropriate, they will be undertaken by PM and EUR with the British Embassy in Washington. The process would involve calling in a representative of the British Embassy (Counselor level), giving him a cleared non-paper, and requesting comments from HMG within a specified period of time (normally five days).

*Recommendation*

That you approve the formation of a committee composed of T, P, PM (chair), ARA, EUR, ACDA and DOD to review all Argentine arms transfer requests along lines proposed above.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Eagleburger approved the recommendation on December 22. At the bottom of the page, he wrote: "But, JH's [Jonathan Howe's] concerns are legitimate. Let's review the need for this after 2 months. What I am concerned about is assurances of great care in the review process *and* adequate consultations with the UK. If these can be managed through normal procedures, I'll probably agree to a less bureaucratic system. LSE."

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**445. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Caracas<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1984, 0319Z

Tosec 20078/31649. Subject: British Propose Direct Talks With Argentines. Ref: London 2322.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary. British Embassy has informed the Department that on January 26, they requested the Swiss to approach the Argentines and propose direct official talks between the UK and Argentina about the progressive normalization of relations between the two countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840069–0601. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and USNATO. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC); cleared by Morley, C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE), and R. Davis (S/S); approved by Michel. Shultz was in Venezuela February 1–3 for the inauguration of President Lusinchi and meetings with Central American Foreign Ministers.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2322 from London, January 31, the Embassy reported that the British Government "has indicated to us more explicitly than in the past its plan for a step-by-step approach to improving Anglo/Argentine relations. The plan presumes Argentine willingness to consider concrete diplomatic, commercial, and military steps." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840064–0714)

HMG is not requesting any USG action but is merely keeping us informed. While this initial approach is being kept strictly confidential, the talks, if held, would not be secret in the UK view. As far as the UK Embassy is aware, the GOA has not yet responded other than thanking the Swiss for the discreet way in which they handled passing the message. End summary.

3. British First Secretary Woodley called on ARA/SC Director Morley and Argentine Desk Officer Jett to deliver a paper informing the Department that on January 26, HMG requested the Swiss to approach the Argentines and propose direct official talks between the UK and Argentina about progressive normalization of relations between the two countries. Text of paper follows para 6 along with accompanying press line HMG intends to take.

4. Woodley noted that while this initial approach was being kept in strictest confidence, the talks, if held, would not be secret in the UK view. Woodley said no USG action was being requested but that the US and certain other allies were being kept informed. He did ask for and was given an update on recent statements on the Falklands/Malvinas problem.

5. While the agenda includes no topics directly related to the Falklands/Malvinas, other than return of Argentine dead, Woodley indicated there was some flexibility on what would be discussed as long as sovereignty was left unambiguously aside.

6. UK secret paper—Begin text:

Relations between the UK and Argentina: UK proposal for talks.

On 26 January 1984 the Secretary of State asked the Swiss protecting powers to approach the Government of Argentina to consider means of following up the exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and President Alfonsín.

The Swiss have now passed on to the Argentines our view that the possibility should now be considered of talks between the United Kingdom and Argentina, at official level, about the progressive normalization of relations between the two countries. They have added that it is necessary for both sides to recognize the realities of the situation and the constraints under which the other is operating. With this in mind, the Swiss have proposed on our behalf that any discussions should be without prejudice to the positions of the United Kingdom and Argentina respectively on the question of sovereignty over the Falklands and that sovereignty is not and cannot be on the agenda.

The aim of this proposal is thus to agree to the discussion of practical issues, with sovereignty left unambiguously aside. The agenda for such a discussion on normalization could include:

A) The reciprocal lifting of restrictions on trade between the United Kingdom and Argentina;

- B) The lifting of all outstanding financial restrictions;
- C) Arrangements for the return of the Argentine dead from the Falkland Islands or, failing that, for a next-of-kin visit;
- D) The restoration of the air services agreement between the United Kingdom and Argentina;
- E) The resumption of cultural, scientific and full sporting contacts;
- F) The upgrading of official relations.

In the light of speculation about the possibility of secret talks, the Swiss are telling the Argentines that we would not welcome such a procedure, which could lead to serious dangers of misunderstanding. In the longer term, we consider that there is no need to cloak in secrecy meetings about the normalization of bilateral relations. But we wish to keep the present approach confidential and the Swiss have therefore said that neither they nor we have any intention of stimulating publicity at this stage. We understand that the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs have thanked the Swiss for the discreet way in which the matter has been handled so far. We do not wish to upset this balance but we consider it desirable that the United States Government, and certain other partners and allies, should know in strict confidence of the follow-up action that we have taken. We believe that this represents the only realistic way forward.

1 February 1984. End text.

7. UK press line—Begin text:

Relations between the UK and Argentina: Press line.

In answer to questions from the press about UK/Argentine relations, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is confirming that means are being explored of carrying forward the process initiated by the exchange of messages. No details are being given but attention is being drawn to the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on 25 January that the Prime Minister's message to Alfonsín was intended to pave the way towards more normal relations with Argentina and that "the right way of setting about this process is to seek to improve relationships through the intermediation of the protecting powers and to move from that to try to establish a normal pattern of business between the two countries".

In reply to a press question in Rome on 27 January as to whether we envisaged Italian "mediation", the Prime Minister said "the answer is no. If we feel that we are likely to get any further with resuming better commercial relations and trying to establish more friendly relations, which we would like, we feel it is better to do those negotiations, or explore that fact, direct".

In reply to a question about the Falkland Islands protection zone in the House of Commons on 30 January the Prime Minister said "we

do not envisage keeping the 150 nautical mile protection zone around the Falkland Islands indefinitely, but we will not lift it prematurely. We need to be fully satisfied that Argentina renounces the future use of force, and have noted recent Argentine statements that they intend to pursue their claim by peaceful means.” End text.<sup>3</sup>

**Dam**

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<sup>3</sup> On April 9, the First Secretary of the British Embassy called on ARA/SC and EUR/NE to inform them that the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires had delivered a British note to Caputo on April 6, proposing steps for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The text of the note and the Argentine response was transmitted in telegram 103983 to Buenos Aires and London April 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840233–0607)

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**446. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, July 18, 1984, 1220Z

16002. Subject: UK-Argentine Relations: Talks Begin. Ref: London 14594.<sup>2</sup>

1. Confidential–Entire text.

2. According to FCO, talks began July 18 in Bern between British and Argentine negotiating teams under the chairmanship of Swiss State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brunner. A Brazilian representative will be present as the other protecting power. The stated aim of the talks is normalization of relations between the two countries. In the public

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840465–0296. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Buenos Aires.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 14594 from London, June 29, the Embassy conveyed a summary of Middendorf’s June 28–29 meetings with FCO officials on Central and South American issues in the OAS. On the Falklands/Malvinas, the Embassy reported: “Whitney and Thomas said they were hopeful that Britain and Argentina would find a way to start discussions on improving bilateral relations, using a formula that would protect the UK position that sovereignty could not be discussed without undercutting Alfonsín’s position that this issue could not be excluded. Both emphasized UK firmness on sovereignty. Whitney said the two sides were now playing tennis behind closed doors with the UK making most of the running. Confidentiality was essential at this stage, but the British would brief us as soon as they could.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840421–0226)



announcement (quoted below), no mention is made of whether the subject of sovereignty is to be discussed. If asked, the UK will refer to its previous position on that question.

3. FCO regretted that, at the request of the Argentines, Britain was unable to give its allies advance notice of the talks. UK Embassy Washington has instructions to brief the State Department at 0800 local time, three hours ahead of the public announcement to be made via a written parliamentary question in London, with simultaneous statements in Bern and Bonn.

4. The UK negotiating team is headed by FCO Assistant Under Secretary for the Americas David Thomas; the Argentine group is led by Assistant Under Secretary Delpeche. FCO expects the talks to last two or three days, and hopes this will be the first in a series of meetings with the Argentines. FCO would not provide details of the agenda, but stressed that sovereignty over the Falklands would not be discussed. (This will clearly be the British public position. An FCO staffer has intimated to us in the past that a compromise solution might be found whereby sovereignty would be discussed, but this fact would be kept secret. We don't know whether such an arrangement was part of the Anglo/Argentine deal.)

5. There follows the text of the public announcement to be released at 1600 hours London time July 18:

Quote. At the invitation of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom are meeting in Bern today. The conversation will be under the chairmanship of the State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs with a representative of the Government of Brazil also present. End quote.

Price

#### 447. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Buenos Aires, July 19, 1984, 2207Z

5643. USCINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT also for POLAD. Subj: Argentina Breaks Off Malvinas Talks. Ref: Buenos Aires 5564.<sup>2</sup>

1. (U) According to media reports, Argentina broke off talks with Great Britain over the future of the Malvinas Islands when British representatives reportedly refused to consider the sovereignty question.<sup>3</sup> Foreign Ministry sources quoted by local press said the joint communique which was to have been issued at the end of the two-day meeting would have included the statement that "the British representatives were not yet prepared to study the sovereignty issue." The Argentine source reportedly said that the British replaced that phrasing with "the British representatives were not disposed to study the sovereignty issue."

2. (U) Foreign Minister Dante Caputo released the following statement at noon Argentine time today:

"The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship reports that on July 18 and 19, on an invitation of the Swiss Confederation and with the participation of representatives of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the delegations of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland met in Bern.

"The meetings, which were of an informal nature, were held with an open agenda with the purpose of exchanging points of view concerning the Malvinas, Georgias, and Sandwich Islands, and other points related to the problems affecting the relations between the two countries.

"At the beginning of the meeting, the Argentine delegation reasserted Argentina's sovereign rights over the Malvinas, South Sandwich, and South Georgia Islands. It also asserted that since the sovereignty

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840463–0817. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bern, London, USUN, Geneva, USCINCSO, and USCINCLANT, and for information to Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Santiago, and Sao Paolo.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5564 from Buenos Aires, July 18, Ortiz reported that Caputo had informed him on July 17 of the forthcoming announcement of the direct Anglo/Argentine talks in Bern. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840459–0844)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 16321 from London, July 20, the Embassy reported: "Foreign Secretary Howe and his deputy Baroness Young laid the blame squarely on Argentina for the failure of the Bern talks." The telegram also conveyed a summary of the talks and their breakdown based upon information received from the FCO. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840465–0795)

matter constitutes the substance of the conflict with Great Britain, the other points of disagreement would be resolved in an expeditious and satisfactory manner if a serious and responsible solution was found to the sovereignty issue. In this regard the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine Government's willingness to find a solution to the conflict based on the recommendations made by the United Nations.

"For its part, the British delegation stated that it was not disposed to discuss the sovereignty issue. Since this circumstance impaired the objective of the Bern meeting, there was no purpose in continuing the talks."

3. (C) Comment: Swiss Ambassador Keusch called Ambassador Ortiz this afternoon to report that talks are officially suspended and that there will be no further "official" meetings in Bern. However, he understands that as of late evening Swiss time both sides were meeting together in "private" discussion. As of 5:30 p.m. Buenos Aires time we have heard no further information either from MFA or British Interests Section here concerning the status of such "private" talks.

4. (C) Although a thorough assessment will not be possible until the "private" talks and their substance can be confirmed, the abrupt breaking off of the scheduled discussions could lead Foreign Minister Caputo to raise the Malvinas issue with Secretary Shultz next week.<sup>4</sup> If so, some suggestion of the position he might take with the Secretary may be indicated by local radio reports which have reported the government believes it has "given clear proof of its pacifist and open-to-negotiations stance, a position which is not shared by the British Government." The reported breakdown apparently came as a surprise to most Argentines who earlier today appeared to support the start of direct contacts with the British. End comment.

**Ortiz**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 448.

**448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1984, 0432Z

222720. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Foreign Minister Caputo July 23.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Summary: Secretary's meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Caputo focussed on four issues—Argentina's economic problems and the debt, Cartagena, the Falklands/Malvinas problem and the proposal for a "library group" hemispheric dialogue. End summary.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Argentine economic situation, Cartagena, and an Argentine proposal for a "hemispheric dialogue."]

9. Falklands/Malvinas: Caputo said the GOA was firmly committed to peaceful negotiations as the best way to resolve differences. For example, Argentina was close to an agreement with Chile on the Beagle Channel problem and he expected final agreement soon, possibly within sixty days. The problem with the UK was a tougher one, especially now because of the unfortunate results at Bern. Caputo said the Bern talks failed because the British did not demonstrate minimum flexibility.<sup>3</sup> The GOA's first objective was a resumption of the informal dialogue. It was important to reduce tensions and continued contacts served this purpose. The GOA was and remained disposed to any form of dialogue with the British that would advance the prospects of a permanent solution. In response, the Secretary said we were disappointed with the outcome of this initial effort. We would like to see the dialogue reconstructed, but do not want to get between Argentina and the UK on this issue. The British had told him they would like to see the dialogue resumed also. (FYI. There was no significant discussion of how this issue would be handled in the UNGA during this or any other meeting with USG officials.)

**Shultz**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840482–0333. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Santiago and London. Drafted by Morley; cleared by B. McKinley (S/S), K. Clark, and in S/S–O; approved by Kilday.

<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 447.

**449. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassies in the United Kingdom and Argentina<sup>1</sup>**

Palo Alto, California, August 1, 1984, 1905Z

Secto 8005. Subject: Letter for Foreign Secretary Howe From Secretary Shultz on the Falkland Islands.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Embassy is requested to deliver as soon as possible the following letter from the Secretary to Sir Geoffrey in response to Sir Geoffrey's on the Falklands negotiations dated July 20 (see para 4).<sup>2</sup> No signed original to follow.

3. Begin text of Secretary's letter:

Dear Sir Geoffrey:

Thank you for your timely letter of July 20 on the British/ Argentine discussions on the Falkland Islands. I was very disappointed at the outcome of those talks because I am convinced that direct contacts are the best way to reduce tensions and ultimately to normalize relations.

As always, your assessment of the discussions was valuable and served as useful background for my discussions with Foreign Minister Caputo on July 23. The tone of our conversation on this matter was straightforward and unemotional. He reiterated his government's firm commitment to peaceful negotiations to resolve differences. While acknowledging that the unfortunate outcome of the Bern meetings represented a setback in terms of better relations between the two governments, he stressed his objective of resuming an informal dialogue. He stated that the GOA is disposed to any form of dialogue that would advance the prospects of a permanent solution and improve relations. That presentation was made in a reassuringly non-polemical tone. I expressed to him my regret at the outcome of the discussions.

Given the talent and commitment on both sides I am optimistic that between you, you will find a mutually acceptable way to reestablish direct contacts aimed at resolving outstanding differences.

Sincerely,

George.

End text of Secretary letter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840490–0540. Secret; Immediate. Shultz was with the President in California.

<sup>2</sup> Howe's letter was sent to Shultz by the British Embassy under a July 21 covering note from Wright. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P840174–0231)

#### 4. Begin text of Foreign Secretary Howe's letter:

You will know that British and Argentine representatives met for talks in Berne on 18 and 19 July. I know that the Argentine Foreign Minister will be in Washington on 23 July and I therefore wanted to let you know quickly how these talks went and why they ended so abruptly and prematurely.

As you know, Margaret Thatcher and I have long attached importance to improving our relations with Argentina. For reasons which I think are well understood, we cannot discuss with Argentina the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. We were in the middle of a discussion on that very subject in good faith when the Argentines launched their brutal invasion of the Islands only two years ago. No Argentine Government can escape the consequences of those tragic events. But it is clearly right that we should move towards more normal relations between Britain and democratic Argentina.

We have therefore made a major effort, in exchanges through our protecting power (the Swiss) since the start of the year, to establish an agreed basis for talks which would lead to the progressive normalisation of relations. We recognized of course that Britain and Argentina had different positions on the sovereignty issue. It was clear to us that if talks between us were not to founder at the outset on this issue, we should have to devise an arrangement which met those different positions. After many months of discussions, we finally reached agreement through the Swiss, on the basis of an Argentine proposal, that if the Argentine representatives raised the subject of sovereignty, as they clearly wished to do, the British side would respond that we were not prepared to discuss it. Discussion would then move straight on to the practical issues of concern to both sides and would continue on those subjects. This agreement was specifically agreed by the Argentine Government and confirmed by the Swiss.

We complied scrupulously with this arrangement when the talks opened in Berne. As we had expected, the Argentines raised the question of sovereignty. As we had indicated in advance, we made plain that we were not prepared to discuss it. We then went on to put forward some constructive ideas on a number of practical issues—for example, the resumption of normal commercial and financial relations, the restoration of air services between Britain and Argentina, and the arrangement of a visit for Argentine next of kin to the graves of their relatives on the Falkland Islands. I remain convinced that this is the way to build more constructive relations between Britain and Argentina.

Sadly the Argentine representatives were not willing to continue the talks on the agreed basis. They advanced the new proposition that discussion of the practical issues we had put forward could only take place on condition that we accepted some mechanism to address the

question of sovereignty. They must have known that this was quite inconsistent with the agreed basis of the talks. But they maintained that unless their new condition was met, they were not prepared to pursue the talks. The talks therefore came to an end.

I am saddened and frustrated that, after so many months of careful preparation, the Argentines should have chosen to set aside the agreed basis for the talks as soon as they opened, and to introduce new and unacceptable conditions of their own. An important opportunity has been missed, and the responsibility must rest with the Argentine Government.

The Argentines have spoken of British intransigence. The record simply does not bear that out. Apart from the major effort we made to find and agree a mutually acceptable basis for talks, we have taken a series of steps over the last two years aimed at improving relations between Britain and Argentina:

—In July 1982 we lifted the 200 mile exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, and replaced it with a smaller protection zone;

—In September 1982 I was personally involved in lifting financial restrictions;

—We have stimulated and supported five separate approaches by Presidencies of the EC seeking the normalisation of economic and commercial relations;

—We have made clear our willingness on a number of occasions to accept the return of the Argentine dead, or a visit by Argentine next of kin to the Falklands;

—Margaret Thatcher promptly welcomed President Alfonsín's inauguration last December.

As this list shows, we have not been inflexible, or lacking in ideas. I am still convinced that better relations between Britain and Argentina are in the interests of both countries as well as of our friends around the world. But the events of the last week have not made our task any easier.

20 July 1984

End text of Howe's letter.

**Shultz**

**450. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, August 9, 1984, 1533Z

6299. Subject: Falklands/Malvinas—Argentina's Next Moves.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. On August 8 I raised with Foreign Minister Caputo Argentina's current position on the Falklands/Malvinas, particularly as it would arise in the UNGA. I pointed out to Caputo that an Argentine resolution that was tougher than last year's would make it harder to obtain support and probably would also affect chances for early future talks with the U.K. Caputo said he could assure me that this year's resolution would be much more "to the point" and have fewer adjectives. I asked him what adjectives were being dropped. He said "colonialist" was one of them.

3. Caputo told me Argentina's goal on the Malvinas is to "disactivate" the conflict with the U.K. and return to the situation that existed before the Malvinas war. Argentina wants to "reinitiate" the decisions taken in mid-1977, specifically those set forth in the joint Argentine/U.K. communique issued June 8, 1977. In that statement Argentina and the U.K. agreed to continue negotiations concerning future political relationships—including sovereignty with regard to the Falklands/Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands—and economic cooperation with respect to those territories in particular and the Southwest Atlantic in general. These, Caputo told me, were Argentina's goals. He asked that we treat them on a confidential basis. He agreed that an extreme Argentine position on the Falklands/Malvinas would be inadvisable, but that the U.K. also had to show flexibility.

**Ortiz**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840509-0428. Confidential. Sent for information to London and USUN.



**451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina and the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 12, 1984, 0543Z

302856. Subject: Falkland Islands (Malvinas) UNGA Resolution. Ref: USUN 2458.<sup>2</sup>

1. C–Entire text.

2. Department has studied Argentine draft resolution on the Falklands Malvinas (official translation below) and found it substantially the same as the Argentine resolutions of the last two years.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly you may respond to the Argentine Mission that, if the resolution is submitted as now written, we will be able to support it. You should caution that any revisions to the text will reopen the question of how we would vote. Mission should advise Department when Argentines informed of our position.<sup>4</sup>

3. For London: Embassy should inform appropriate FCO officials of USG position when it receives message from US Mission New York that GOA informed.<sup>5</sup>

3. Text official translation:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840650–0460. Confidential. Sent for information to London. Drafted by J.L. Martin (ARA/RPP); cleared by Proper, Morley, S. Candy (IO/UNP), P. Olson (L/ARA), K. Stocker (EUR/NE), Kelly, Kilday, M. Ranneberger (P), and McKinley (S/S); approved by R. Kirk (IO).

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2458 from USUN, October 2, the Mission informed the Department that Muniz had provided Sorzano with the Spanish text of the “definitive” Argentine draft resolution and conveyed the text of the draft. In presenting the draft, Muniz “insisted that USUN was only recipient of this text, but that the Argentines might brief others verbally on its contents.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840628–0939)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 290252 to USUN, September 29, the Department noted that the text of the Argentine proposed draft resolution contained “several additions and deletions from the resolutions which we supported the past two years. These changes appear to be designed to put increased pressure on the UK to negotiate on the issue of sovereignty over the Islands and to limit the possibility of self-determination for the Islanders.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840621–0101)

<sup>4</sup> Sorzano informed Muniz of the U.S. position on October 12. (Telegram 2761 from USUN, October 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840654–0177) On October 25, the Argentine Foreign Ministry presented Ortiz with textual changes to the draft which were conveyed to the Department in telegram 8538 from Buenos Aires, October 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840683–0610)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 22795 from London, October 17, the Embassy reported its discussions with the FCO on the Argentine draft in which the FCO “viewed US support for latest resolution without enthusiasm, but also without rancor. FCO understands that US position is consistent with past votes and appreciates that it is consistent with points made by USG throughout good and regular consultations with HMG.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840662–0608)

“Thirty-ninth United Nations General Assembly draft resolution on the question of the Falkland Islands.

—The General Assembly,

—Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and received the report of the Secretary General;

—Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), 31/49, 37/9, and 38/12, in addition to Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505 of 1982;

—Reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the obligation of the states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and recalling that in this respect the General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful, just, and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

—Noting with concern that despite the time elapsing since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX), this prolonged dispute has still not been settled;

—Aware of the interest of the international community in the resolution by the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences in accordance with the United Nations ideals of peace and friendship between peoples:

—Taking note of the communique issued at Bern on July 20, 1984, by the Governments of Switzerland and representatives of the Government of Brazil; and

—Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the aforementioned Islands in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), 37/9, and 38/12;

—1. Reiterates its request to the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

—2. Requests the Secretary General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, taking to that end whatever measures are necessary;

—3. Requests the Secretary General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session on the progress made in the implementation of this resolution; and

—4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”.<sup>6</sup>

**Dam**

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<sup>6</sup> By a vote of 89 in favor (including the United States) and 9 against, with 54 abstentions, the UN General Assembly adopted this revised text on November 1 as Resolution 39/6. A discussion of the debate and the voting, as well as the text of the adopted resolution were transmitted to the Department in telegram 3030 from USUN, November 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840700–0907)

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**452. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Buenos Aires, November 6, 1984, 1442Z

8844. Subj: Argentine Intent To Retake Falklands. Ref: (A) State 323919,<sup>2</sup> (B) IIR 6 809 0249 84 (DTG 291812Z Oct 84).<sup>3</sup>

1. (S–Entire text.)

2. Embassy believes GOA will continue to pursue its Malvinas goals through negotiation only. President Alfonsín will not throw away the hard-won improvement in Argentina’s international image on fool-hardy military adventures. We concur also with our DAO assessment that Argentine armed forces do not have the operational capacity and resources to launch any effort to retake the Malvinas.

3. While we would not rule out a possible military action by some part of the Argentine services, perhaps related to internal political disputes, the reference report seems to imply a carefully planned and organized effort with help from other countries. Perhaps the Argentines were using an extreme case to test Brazilian reactions.

**Ortiz**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840710–0556. Secret; Priority; Noform; Nocontract.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 323919 to Buenos Aires, October 31, the Department informed the Embassy that INR requested comment on an October 29 report prepared by USDAO Brasilia concerning the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (reference B). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840697–0545)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

# Index

## References are to document numbers

- Abrams, Elliott, 427  
Acland, Sir Antony, 81, 312  
Adams, Alvin P., Jr., 147, 196, 397  
Adelman, Kenneth L., 410  
Aguirre, Francisco, 243  
Aguirre Lanari, Juan Ramón, 372, 373, 385, 397, 404, 414  
Alberti, Francesco J., 114, 118  
Alemann, Roberto, 55  
Alfonsín, Raúl, 435, 439, 441, 442, 443  
Allen, Carolyn, 114  
Allen, Gen. Lew, Jr., 62, 79, 320  
Allen, Richard V., 279  
Allin, Lyndon K. "Mort", 115  
Alsogaray, Alvaro, 377  
Anaya, Adm. Jorge I., 11, 44, 52, 55, 142, 163, 243, 254, 274  
Anderson, Robert, 385  
Andreotti, Giulio, 268, 269  
Antarctica, 1  
Aragones, Emilio, 90  
Argentina. *See also* British-Argentine prewar negotiations:  
Antarctica claims, 1  
Beagle Channel dispute (1978), 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, 382, 448  
Economic situation, 125, 429  
Human rights certification. *See* U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina.  
John Paul II visit (June 1982), 332, 339  
Military imports, 134, 149, 214, 236  
Nuclear policies, 391, 400, 435, 442  
Political situation:  
Falklands/Malvinas War and, 55, 87  
Postwar, 344, 345, 350, 357, 370, 372, 424  
Prewar, 8, 9, 16, 26, 55  
Sinai MFO participation, 6  
Soviet relations with, 2, 103, 350  
U.S. arms sales to. *See* U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina; U.S. sanctions against Argentina.  
U.S. defense support, 65  
Argentina. *See also* British-Argentine prewar negotiations—*Continued*  
U.S. prewar relations with, 56  
Arias Stella, Javier, 201, 307  
Armstrong, John, 115  
Atkeson, Edward B., 126, 240  
Austin, Cmdr. M., 62, 67, 69, 108, 156  
Bahai faith, 1  
Bailey, Norman A., 226  
Baker, James A., III, 70, 155  
Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr., 263, 360  
Barnes, Michael D., 427  
Barnett, E., 432  
Barnett, L., 421  
Barrow, Gen. Robert H., 320  
Beagle Channel dispute, 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, 382, 448  
Beers, R. Rand, 337  
Beláunde Terry, Fernando:  
Falklands/Malvinas War, 204, 232, 234, 282  
Peruvian peace proposal, 202, 203, 207, 208, 209, 211, 231, 232, 234  
Belize, 161, 383  
Benn, Tony, 143  
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 233, 268  
Bernhardt, J.P.A., 118  
Bernstein, Carl, 115  
Bignone, Gen. Reynaldo, 370, 372, 373  
Binns, Jack R., 425, 430, 432  
Blacken, J.D., 2  
Blackwill, Robert D.:  
Argentine military imports, 134  
Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 424  
British military options, 67, 156  
Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283  
Military situation, 337  
OAS resolution 595, 412  
Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321  
U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 300

- Blackwill, Robert D.—*Continued*  
 U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 331, 348  
 U.S. postwar policy, 355  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50
- Blair, Dennis C.:  
 Argentine invasion plans, 34  
 European Community sanctions against Argentina, 270  
 Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 127  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 276  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts, 34, 136, 218, 270, 276, 299, 316, 353  
 U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 167  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359  
 U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64
- Blakemore, David L., 444
- Block, Herbert, 90
- Block, John R., 62
- Block, S., 236
- Boam, Maj. Gen. Thomas Anthony, 245
- Bolton, Joshua, 296
- Boorstein, M., 174
- Bosworth, Stephen W.:  
 Argentine invasion plans, 35, 38, 39  
 Argentine officers disagreement, 243  
 British South Georgia repossession, 163  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 114, 133, 164, 165, 166  
 OAS role, 113, 172  
 Soviet role, 109  
 UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386, 405  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 249, 272  
 U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 401  
 U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.–Apr. 1982), 25, 35, 39  
 U.S. initial responses, 62  
 U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 110, 177  
 U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 348
- Bouchey, Lynn, 249
- Bowdler, William G., 2
- Braithwaite, Rodric Q., 374
- Brazil (*see also* Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira):  
 Falklands/Malvinas War responses, 161, 229, 236, 244  
 Figueiredo U.S. visit, 255, 257
- Brazil (*see also* Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira)—*Continued*  
 Shrike missile emergency landing, 321  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 294, 295
- Bremont, Marshall, 111, 124
- Bremer, L. Paul, III:  
 Argentine prisoners of war, 351  
 Argentine surrender, 346  
 Argentine use of force, possible, 424  
 British South Georgia repossession, 175  
 Cuban role, 94  
 Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303  
 Forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy, 190  
 OAS role, 175, 304  
 Peruvian peace proposal, 220, 238  
 Soviet role, 94  
 UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 402  
 UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 249, 323  
 U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369  
 U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3  
 U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 229, 238  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 316, 331, 348  
 U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 369
- Briggs, Everett E., 168, 236, 246, 249, 272
- British-Argentine prewar negotiations:  
 Haig-Carrington meetings, 3  
 Louis memoranda, 8  
 Ridley-Cavandoli talks (New York), 2, 4, 5  
 St. Helena labor immigration proposals, 4  
 Shlaudeman memoranda, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16  
 Streater memoranda, 4, 14
- British political situation:  
 Burt memoranda, 283  
 CIA papers, 52  
 Eagleburger-Henderson discussions, 262  
 Elections (1979), 1  
 Haig-Henderson discussions, 71  
 Haig memoranda, 64  
 Haig-Pym correspondence, 297

British political situation—*Continued*

- Haig-Thatcher memoranda, 80
- Intelligence Memoranda, 186
- Louis memoranda, 199
- National Security Planning Group discussions, 76.
- NSC discussions, 195
- Postwar, 343, 345, 420, 427
- Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257
- Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 70
- Special National Intelligence Estimates, 87
- Streator memoranda, 58, 66, 223
- U.S.-Argentine discussions, 90
- U.S.-British discussions, 61
- Brock, William E., III, 62, 360
- Brown, C., 401, 421
- Brown, Maj. Gen. James L., 261
- Brown, Leslie H., 110, 149, 200, 213, 427
- Buckley, James L., 62
- Bullard, Julian, 3, 164, 165, 166, 385, 398
- Bunge, Wenceslao, 274, 346
- Burkhalter, E.A., Jr., 69, 247, 333
- Burt, Richard R.:
  - Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165, 197
  - Argentine military imports, 134, 149, 214
  - Argentine prisoners of war, 351
  - Argentine surrender, 346
  - British postwar foreign policy, 358
  - British postwar policies toward Argentina, 345, 379, 383
  - Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283
  - Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 426
  - Franks Committee report, 420
  - UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 402, 404
  - UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 432, 433
  - U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 432, 433, 438, 444
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts (May-June 1982), 283, 308, 312
  - U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 93, 108, 110, 111, 119, 143, 171, 184, 213, 216, 300
  - U.S. military participation, possible, 171, 184
  - U.S. policy options, 143
  - U.S. postwar policy, 345

Burt, Richard R.—*Continued*

- U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 200
- Bush, George H.W.:
  - Argentine invasion plans, 34
  - British forces in Belize, 383
  - British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361
  - UN negotiations (May-June 1982), 279, 281
  - U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 442
  - U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts (May-June 1982), 281
  - U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 281
  - U.S. policy options, 70, 76
  - U.S. postwar policy, 360
- Bushnell, John A., 2

Camilion, Oscar, 6, 7, 11, 26, 55

Campbell, John, 45, 164, 165, 283, 345, 358

Candy, S., 451

Canosa, Eduardo, Vice Cmdr., 1

Caputo, Dante, 442, 444, 447, 448, 450

Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, 236, 260

Carlucci, Frank C., III:

- Argentine occupation, 52
- Argentine surrender, 348
- British military options, 67, 247
- Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195

Latin American responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 236

Peruvian peace proposal, 225

*Sheffield* sinking (May 4, 1982), 224

U.S. initial responses, 54, 62

U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 86, 216, 233, 287, 306, 318, 399

U.S. military lessons learned, 354

U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 395

Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander Rupert):

Argentine invasion plans, 30, 39

British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 7

Postwar foreign policy, 358

Resignation of, 61, 66, 71

South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 22, 23, 24, 27

U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3, 10, 12, 13

- Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander Rupert)—*Continued*  
U.S. diplomatic efforts, Mar.–Apr. 1982, 27  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51
- Carter, T., 348
- Casey, William J.:  
Argentine occupation, 52  
Argentine prisoners of war, 373  
Argentine surrender, 348  
British military options, 126  
British postwar policies toward Argentina, 428  
Documents not declassified, 250  
Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 344, 360  
Military situation, 240  
Soviet role, 318  
UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 279  
U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 428  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 313  
U.S. postwar policy, 416  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263
- Casteneda, Jorge, 90
- Cavandoli, Carlos R., 2, 4, 5
- Central America, 54, 57, 90
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (*see also* Intelligence Memoranda):  
Antarctica, 118  
Argentine economic situation, 125  
Argentine invasion plans, 32, 33  
Argentine occupation, 49, 52  
Argentine postwar policies, 443  
Battle of Goose Green (May 27, 1982), 302  
British political situation, 52, 186  
Documents not declassified, 157  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, U.S.-Argentine relations, 252  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75  
South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 19, 26, 63  
Soviet role, 100, 121  
U.S. initial responses, 63  
U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64
- Chafee Amendment, 69, 375
- Chaplin, Maxwell, 1
- Childress, Richard T., 309
- Chile:  
Antarctica claims, 1  
Beagle Channel dispute (1978), 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, 382, 448  
Falklands/Malvinas War responses, 161  
U.S. certification for arms sales to, 427, 435, 437
- Christopher, Warren M., 2
- Clarey, Capt. S.S., 333
- Clark, K., 448
- Clark, William P., Jr.:  
Argentine invasion plans, 34  
Argentine occupation, 47, 52  
Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 424  
Argentine prisoners of war, 361, 366, 370  
British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361  
British South Georgia repossession, 175  
European Community sanctions against Argentina, 270  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303, 367, 400, 426
- Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
Haig-Pym correspondence, 146, 151  
Haig-Thatcher discussions, 82  
Reagan briefing, 155  
Reagan-Galtieri communications, 127, 128  
Reagan-Haig communications, 74, 85, 150  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 127, 190  
Rentschler memoranda, 155  
Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 181  
State Department reports, 112  
Suspension proposals, 136
- Latin American responses, 255
- OAS role, 175
- Peruvian peace proposal, 221, 222, 225, 231
- UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 394, 403, 405, 409
- UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430
- UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 272, 279, 295, 323
- U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381

- Clark, William P., Jr.—*Continued*  
 U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 394  
 U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982):  
   Argentine perceptions, 313  
   Bailey memoranda, 226  
   Enders-Takacs discussions, 316  
   Fontaine/Shoemaker/Childress memoranda, 309  
   Haig memoranda, 298  
   Reagan public statement (May 13, 1982), 270  
   Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 315, 322  
   Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 218  
   Summit proposals, 299  
 U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 115, 127, 233, 266, 371  
 U.S. military lessons learned, 368, 378  
 U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76, 155, 167  
 U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 353, 356  
 U.S. postwar policy, 416  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 70, 359, 374, 375, 394  
 U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64  
 Clarke, Richard A., 67, 318, 337  
 Cochran, Harry C., 126, 277, 373  
 Cohen, Herman J., 67  
 Coles, A. John, 80, 361, 431, 433  
 Colombia, 161  
 Colombo, Emilio, 268, 269  
 Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization) (United Nations), 16  
 Congress, U.S.:  
   Falklands/Malvinas War, 171, 276, 281, 328  
   Postwar issues, 381  
   U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 435  
 Constable, Elinor G., 69, 376  
 Coony, T., 425  
 Cormack, Capt. James P., 278, 424  
 Costa Méndez, Nicanor:  
   Argentine invasion plans, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37  
   Argentine officers disagreement, 243  
 Costa Méndez, Nicanor—*Continued*  
   British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 11, 16  
   British South Georgia repossession, 174  
   Falkland/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute, 9  
   Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 196  
   Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
     “Airport paper,” 92, 99, 101  
     Draft text (Apr. 19, 1982), 152  
     Haig communications, 99  
     Haig correspondence, 153, 159, 169, 189, 192  
     Haig discussions, 73, 101, 105, 116, 117, 138, 178, 179, 187  
     Haig-Galtieri discussions, 90, 92, 131  
     National Security Planning Group discussions, 76  
   OAS role, 304, 307  
   Peruvian peace proposal, 203, 207, 211  
   South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29  
   UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 289  
   U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12, 13, 16  
   U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 29, 31, 257  
   U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 116  
 Costa Rica, 161, 236, 260  
 Cox, D.W., 401  
 Crabbie, Christopher, 164, 165, 166, 379  
 Cuba, 2, 52, 426  
   Falklands/Malvinas War role, 49, 90, 92, 94, 98, 289  
 Cummings, E., 84  
 Dagnino Pastore, José Maria, 372, 383  
 Dalton, Lt. Gen. James E., 278  
 Dam, Kenneth W., 397, 401, 425, 433, 451  
 Danino, Roberto, 367  
 Darman, Richard G., 195  
 Davico, Col. Mario O., 252  
 Davidoff, Constantino S., 21  
 Davila, Michael A., 88  
 Davis, R., 445  
 de Pinies, Jaime, 319  
 Deare, Ron, 4



- Deaver, Michael K., 70, 279  
 Defense Intelligence Notices, 260  
 DeLauer, Richard D., 216  
 Dibble, Martin, 1  
 Dick, Air Comm. Ronald, 334  
 Diehl, Jackson, 256  
 Dobbins, James F., Jr., 358, 425  
 Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 94, 109, 135, 158  
 Documents not declassified, 157, 206, 242, 250, 286, 320  
 Douglas-Home, Alex. *See* Home, Lord.  
 Dover, Jorge Juarez, 366  
 Draper, William H., 69, 376  
 Drexler, R.W., 414  
 Duarte, José Napoleón, 431  
 Dunnigan, Thomas J., 434
- Eagleburger, Lawrence S.:  
   Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165, 197  
   Argentine military imports, 134, 149, 214  
   Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423  
   Argentine prisoners of war, 351, 369  
   British military options, 145  
   British postwar policies toward Argentina, 349, 379  
   Cuban role, 94  
   Documents not declassified, 286  
   Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 344  
   Haig shuttle diplomacy, 124, 133, 146, 162, 165  
   OAS resolution 595, 412  
   OAS role, 83, 304  
   Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321  
   Soviet role, 94, 109, 135, 158, 318  
   State Department crisis management systems, 380  
   UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 402, 404, 405  
   UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 432, 434  
   UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 237, 248, 272, 301  
   U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369, 372, 376, 401  
   U.S.-Argentine relations impacts, 104  
   U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3  
   U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 435, 436, 438, 444.  
   U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
     May–June 1982, 248, 261, 262, 267, 298
- Eagleburger, Lawrence S.—*Continued*  
   U.S. diplomatic efforts—*Continued*  
     Postwar, 355  
     U.S. initial responses, 62  
     U.S.-Latin American postwar relations, 364  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 84, 111, 184, 264, 266, 278, 311  
     Burt memoranda, 93, 108, 110, 216  
     Howe/Burt memoranda, 300  
     Howe memoranda, 290, 318  
     Postwar, 355, 365  
     Service memoranda, 177  
     U.S. policy options, 70, 143  
     U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 69, 84, 200, 355, 369, 374, 393
- Edwards, James B., 360  
 Einaudi, Luigi R., 236, 420  
 El Salvador, 161, 429  
 Enders, Thomas O.:  
   Antarctica, 118  
   Argentine invasion plans, 30, 35  
   Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421, 422, 423, 424  
   Argentine prisoners of war, 351  
   Argentine surrender, 346  
   British military options, 67  
   British postwar policies toward Argentina, 345, 383, 425  
   British South Georgia repossession, 160  
   Falkland/Malvinas Islands  
     sovereignty dispute history, 24  
   Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318  
   Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 229, 422, 426  
   Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195  
   Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
     Briefing memoranda, 155  
     Delegation discussions, 147  
     Haig-Costa Méndez  
       correspondence, 189, 192  
       discussions, 73, 138, 187  
     Haig-Galtieri discussions, 90  
     Haig-Henderson discussions, 71  
     Haig-Pym discussions, 163, 164  
     Haig-Takacs discussions, 72  
     Haig-Thatcher discussions, 81, 98  
     State Department talking points paper, 75

- Enders, Thomas O.—*Continued*  
 Latin American responses to the  
   Falklands/Malvinas War, 236  
 Military situation, 240  
 OAS resolution 595, 412  
 OAS role, 168, 295, 296  
 Peruvian peace proposal, 212, 222,  
   238  
 South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
   incident, 24  
 UN General Assembly resolution  
   (1982), 385, 386, 397, 402, 404, 405  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
   246, 249, 251, 272, 279, 295, 323  
 U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369,  
   376, 381  
 U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations,  
   12, 13  
 U.S.-British prewar consultations, 10,  
   12, 13  
 U.S. certification for arms sales to  
   Argentina, 386, 387, 425, 427  
 U.S. citizens in Argentina, 210  
 U.S. communications with Latin  
   American countries, 122, 229,  
   238, 244  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
   Mar.–Apr. 1982, 24, 35  
   May–June 1982, 201, 261, 267, 281  
     State Department draft proposal  
       (May 28, 1982), 308  
     Takacs discussions, 316  
     Walters-Miret discussions, 305  
     Walters mission, 253, 254  
   U.S. initial responses, 56, 62  
   U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
     51, 184  
   U.S. policy options, 70.  
   U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 387  
   U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50,  
     69, 345  
 European Community (EC), 98, 258,  
   268, 269, 270, 329, 350, 355, 357  
 Evans, Rowland, 256  
 Export-Import Bank, 69, 196, 376
- Falkland/Malvinas Islanders:  
 British-Argentine prewar  
   negotiations, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11  
 Elections (1981), 5, 6  
 South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
   incident and, 15
- Falkland/Malvinas Islands:  
 Communications/cargo issues, 1, 6,  
   7, 11, 16
- Falkland/Malvinas Islands—*Continued*  
 Economic situation, 1  
 Political situation, 8  
 Sovereignty dispute, 1, 9, 12, 16, 24  
 U.S. citizens in, 1, 45, 59, 70  
 Falkland/Malvinas Islands Company  
   (FIC), 1  
 Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June  
   1982) (*see also* Falklands/Malvinas  
   War impacts; U.S. diplomatic  
   efforts; U.S. military aid to United  
   Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against  
   Argentina):  
 Antarctica and, 118  
 Argentine economic situation and,  
   125  
 Argentine invasion plans (Apr. 1,  
   1982):  
   Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35  
   Intelligence Reports, 33  
   National Intelligence Daily  
     Reports, 32  
   Reagan briefing, 34  
   Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
     31, 36, 42  
   U.S.-Argentine consultations, 31,  
     37, 39, 40  
   U.S.-British consultations, 30, 31  
 Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165,  
   197  
 Argentine occupation (Apr. 1, 1982)  
   (*see also* Haig shuttle diplomacy  
   *below*):  
   British responses, Streator  
     memoranda, 58  
   CIA papers, 52  
   Clark memoranda, 47  
   Falkland/Malvinas Islands  
     Working Group situation  
       reports, 43  
   Haig memoranda, 45, 59  
   Intelligence Reports, 49  
   Military situation, 48, 59  
   UN Security Council discussions,  
     38, 43, 46, 50, 59, 79  
   U.S.-Argentine consultations, 44  
   U.S.-British consultations, 46  
 Argentine officers disagreement, 243,  
   305, 325  
 Argentine political situation and, 55,  
   87  
 Argentine surrender, 342, 346, 347,  
   348

- Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June 1982) (*see also* Falklands/Malvinas War impacts; U.S. diplomatic efforts; U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against Argentina)—*Continued*
- British military options, 52, 67, 70, 126, 145, 156, 247
- British support requests. *See* U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against Argentina.
- British White Paper, 418
- CIA reports, 100, 121
- Cuban role, 49, 90, 92, 94, 98, 289
- European Community sanctions against Argentina, 258, 268, 269, 270, 329
- Forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318
- Forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 277, 283
- Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195, 196, 201
- Kirkpatrick Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, 1982), 97
- Latin American responses (*see also* OAS role *below*; U.S.-Latin American relations *under* Falklands/Malvinas War impacts), 161, 236, 255, 257, 279
- Maritime Exclusion Zone, 76, 77, 78, 80, 91, 124, 182
- Military actions (*see also* Argentine occupation *above*):
- Argentine air strikes, 292, 302
- Battle of Goose Green (May 27, 1982), 302
- British Falklands/Malvinas landing (May 21, 1982), 261, 271, 273, 279, 281, 285
- British South Georgia repossession, 160, 163, 174, 186
- General Belgrano* strike (May 2, 1982), 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 217, 236
- Sheffield* sinking (May 4, 1982), 222, 224, 235, 377
- Stanley Airfield strikes, 199, 218
- Military situation, 48, 59, 240, 333, 337, 339, 340
- OAS role:
- Bosworth/Middendorf memoranda, 113.
- CIA reports, 52
- Meeting (Apr. 5, 1982), 59
- Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June 1982) (*see also* Falklands/Malvinas War impacts; U.S. diplomatic efforts; U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against Argentina)—*Continued*
- OAS role—*Continued*
- OAS good offices resolution (Apr. 13, 1982), 83, 113
- OAS Resolution (Apr. 28, 1982), 185, 187
- Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 70
- Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (Apr. 1982), 113, 158, 163, 168, 172, 175, 176, 185
- Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (May 1982), 295, 296, 298, 304, 305, 307
- U.S.-British discussions, 71
- U.S. sanctions against Argentina and, 50, 57
- U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals and, 64
- U.S.-Venezuelan discussions, 122
- Peruvian peace proposal:
- Communications with Latin American countries, 238
- Costa Méndez-Beláunde discussions, 207
- Haig-Beláunde communications, 203, 211, 234
- Haig-Henderson discussions, 222
- Haig-Pym correspondence, 212, 220, 222, 227
- Haig-Pym discussions, 205, 235
- National Military Command Center report, 208
- National Security Planning Group discussions, 225
- Ortiz-Beláunde discussions, 232
- Ortiz memoranda, 209
- Reagan-Beláunde correspondence, 234
- Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 221, 230, 231
- Streator memoranda, 223
- Text, 202
- Reagan radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97
- Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321
- Soviet role:
- Burt memoranda, 143, 171, 184

- Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June 1982) (*see also* Falklands/Malvinas War impacts; U.S. diplomatic efforts; U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against Argentina)—*Continued*
- Soviet role—*Continued*
- CIA reports, 52, 100, 121
- Haig-Casey discussions, 318
- Haig-Pym discussions, 79
- Intelligence Cables, 252
- Menges memoranda, 318
- National Security Planning Group discussions, 76
- Reagan-Haig communications, 158
- Special Situation Group discussions, 279
- Stoessel memoranda, 94
- U.S.-Argentine discussions, 92
- U.S.-British discussions, 98
- U.S.-Soviet discussions, 109, 135
- Special National Intelligence Estimates, 87
- Triggering incident. *See* South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982)
- UN Security Council Resolution 502, 50, 59, 62, 64, 68, 79, 82, 176, 201, 276, 293, 348
- UN Security Council Resolution 505, 301
- U.S. arms embargo. *See* U.S. sanctions against Argentina *below*.
- U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 131, 143, 171, 184, 192, 195, 210, 253
- U.S. citizens in Falklands/Malvinas Islands and, 59, 70
- U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122, 204, 229, 238, 244
- U.S. good offices. *See* Haig shuttle diplomacy.
- U.S. initial responses, 54, 56, 62, 63, 79
- U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 368, 378
- U.S. military participation, possible, Burt memoranda, 171, 184
- U.S. policy options:
- Burt memoranda, 143
- Clark memoranda, 70
- National Security Planning Group discussions, 76
- Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June 1982) (*see also* Falklands/Malvinas War impacts; U.S. diplomatic efforts; U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against Argentina)—*Continued*
- U.S. policy options—*Continued*
- Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 53, 70, 167
- Rentschler memoranda, 155
- U.S. political situation and, 90
- U.S. public opinion, 183, 228, 330
- U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals (*see also* Haig shuttle diplomacy), 64, 66, 70
- Weinberger public statement (Apr. 16, 1982), 131
- Falklands/Malvinas War impacts:
- Argentine nuclear policies, 391, 400
- Atkeson memoranda, 240.
- Latin American territorial disputes, 382
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 291, 384
- U.S.-Argentine relations, 104, 252, 303, 327, 424, 426
- U.S. Central America policy, 54
- U.S.-Latin American relations, 367
- Defense Intelligence Notices, 260
- Enders memoranda, 229
- Figuerido U.S. visit and, 255
- Intelligence Memoranda, 336
- Interagency Study Paper, 424
- National Security Study Directives, 360
- State-CIA discussions, 344
- U.S.-British discussions, 422
- Fall, Brian:
- Haig shuttle diplomacy, 79, 163, 164, 165, 166
- Postwar issues, 379, 398
- Fearn, Robin, 8, 14, 16
- Fenn, Nicholas, 3, 164, 165, 166
- Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira, 204, 229, 244, 255, 257, 315, 338
- Figueroa, Gustavo, 11, 73, 187
- Finegold, Edmund S., 444
- Fischer, Dean E., 51, 183, 200, 228
- Fleischer, L. R., 434
- Fontaine, Roger W.:
- Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423, 424
- Argentine prisoners of war, 366

- Fontaine, Roger W.—*Continued*  
European Community sanctions  
against Argentina, 270  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts,  
367  
Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982),  
195  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 127, 136  
UN General Assembly resolution  
(1982), 405  
U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381  
U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
May-June 1982, 218, 226, 256, 270,  
276, 279, 309  
Postwar, 353  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
371  
U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 167  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359,  
374, 375, 390, 394  
U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64  
Foot, Michael, 223  
Forrester, Ricardo, 5, 9  
Forster, Capt. J. R., 260  
Fox, Edward J., 427  
France, 142  
Franco, Vice Adm. Ruben O., 333  
Fretwell, M. John E., 3  
Friedt, A., 348  
Funseth, Robert L., 3, 164, 165, 166, 184,  
197
- Galtieri, Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato:  
Argentine  
invasion plans, 31, 33, 37  
occupation, 52, 63, 68  
officers disagreement, 243  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts,  
252, 303  
Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
Haig communications, 99, 120  
Haig discussions, 89, 90, 92, 131,  
142, 148  
Reagan communications, 127, 128,  
129  
Shlaudeman discussions, 181, 193,  
194  
Maritime Exclusion Zone, 182  
Meyer correspondence, 327  
Peruvian peace proposal, 202, 209,  
211  
Political situation, 26, 52, 55, 344  
Reagan correspondence, 303  
Resignation, 350
- Galtieri, Lt. Gen. Leopoldo  
Fortunato—*Continued*  
South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
incident, 21, 26  
UN negotiations (May-June 1982),  
232, 234  
U.S. citizens in Argentina, 131  
U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
Mar.-Apr. 1982, 37, 40, 41, 54  
May-June 1982, 253  
Garcia del Solar, Lucio, 397, 404, 405,  
429  
Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C., 224  
Gates, Robert M., 423  
Gergen, David R., 115  
German Federal Republic (FRG), 142  
Gibney, J. M., 213  
Gibraltar dispute, 14  
Giffard, John, 17  
Gillespie, Charles A., 237  
Gilly, Lt. Gen. Pedro M., 260  
Gilmore, David, 361  
Gobbi, Hugo, 442  
Goldberg, Sherwood "Woody":  
Argentine officers disagreement, 243  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 74  
Costa Méndez "airport paper," 101  
Haig-Costa Méndez discussions,  
116, 117  
Haig-Galtieri discussions, 142  
Haig-Pym discussions, 164, 166  
Reagan-Haig communications, 170  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
132  
U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (May-June  
1982), 314, 315, 322  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
111
- Gompert, David C.:  
Argentine surrender, 346  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 98, 147,  
164, 165, 166, 192  
Maritime Exclusion Zone, 182  
Peruvian peace proposal, 238  
Postwar issues, 345, 349, 355, 412  
Soviet/Cuban role, 94  
UN negotiations (May-June 1982),  
271  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (May-June  
1982), 261, 308  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
184, 290
- Gorman, Lt. Gen. Paul F., 240, 423, 442

- Gosney, Richard, 5
- Graham, Sir John, 233
- Gravette, J., 435
- Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom.
- Gregg, Donald, 34, 423, 424
- Grey, Robin, 1
- Gudgeon, K. Scott:
- Haig shuttle diplomacy, 147, 164, 165, 166
  - Postwar issues, 404, 430, 434
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts, May–June 1982, 308
  - U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50
- Guerreiro, Ramiro Saraiva, 244, 251, 295
- Guillermo, Carlos, 243
- Haass, Richard N.:
- Haig shuttle diplomacy, 114
  - Postwar issues, 345, 355, 358, 386, 420, 430
  - U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 444
  - U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 84, 108, 171, 318
  - U.S. policy options, 143
- Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr. (*see also* Haig shuttle diplomacy):
- Antarctica and, 118
  - Argentine invasion plans, 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 41
  - Argentine occupation, 45, 46, 52, 59
  - Argentine postwar political situation, 357, 370
  - Argentine prisoners of war, 340, 357, 370
  - Eagleburger memoranda, 369
  - Nicolaides memoranda, 366
  - Pym correspondence, 329
  - Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 361
  - Service/Stern memoranda, 351
  - British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 271, 285
  - British foreign policy, 358
  - British military options, 67, 145, 156
  - British political situation, 61, 64, 71, 80, 297
  - British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361
  - British South Georgia repossession, 163, 174, 175
  - Cuban role, 94
  - Documents not declassified, 242
  - Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr. (*see also* Haig shuttle diplomacy)—*Continued*
  - European Community sanctions against Argentina, 258, 268, 355, 357
  - Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318
  - Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283
  - Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 252, 344
  - Kirkpatrick Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, 1982), 97
  - Latin American responses to the Falklands/Malvinas War, 161, 236, 255
  - Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78, 91, 124, 182
  - Military situation, 337, 340
  - OAS role:
    - Bosworth/Middendorf memoranda, 113
    - OAS Resolution (Apr. 28, 1982), 185
    - Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (Apr. 1982), 158, 163, 168, 172, 175, 176
    - Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (May 1982), 295, 296, 298, 304, 305, 307
    - U.S.-British discussions, 71
  - Peruvian peace proposal:
    - Beláunde communications, 203, 211, 234
    - Communications with Latin American countries, 238
    - Henderson discussions, 222
    - National Security Planning Group discussions, 225
    - Ortiz memoranda, 209
    - correspondence
    - Pym
      - correspondence, 212, 220, 222, 227
      - discussions, 205, 235
      - Text, 202
    - Public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195, 196, 201
    - Public statements, 117, 195, 196, 201
    - Reagan radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97
    - Resignation, 367

- Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr. (*see also*  
 Haig shuttle  
 diplomacy)—*Continued*  
 Shrike missile emergency landing in  
 Brazil, 321  
 South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
 incident, 22, 25, 27, 29  
 Soviet role, 79, 94, 109, 135, 158, 318  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
 237, 271, 281, 293, 304  
 Beláunde discussions, 234  
 Eagleburger memoranda, 248  
 Guerreiro discussions, 251  
 Henderson correspondence, 275  
 Kirkpatrick discussions, 201  
 Kirkpatrick memoranda, 239  
 Middendorf-Takacs discussions,  
 246, 272  
 Middendorf-Zinn discussions, 249  
 Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 326  
 Special Situation Group  
 discussions, 279  
 U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295  
 Walters memoranda, 310  
 U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369,  
 370  
 U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations,  
 12, 13  
 U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3,  
 10, 12, 13  
 U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 131,  
 171, 184  
 U.S. communications with Latin  
 American countries, 122, 195,  
 204, 229, 238, 244  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
 Mar.–Apr. 1982:  
 Carrington correspondence, 27  
 Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35  
 Henderson discussions, 30, 31, 46  
 Reagan-Galtieri discussions, 41  
 Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez  
 discussions, 29  
 Stoessel-Henderson discussions,  
 25  
 Stoessel-Takacs discussions, 25  
 Takacs discussions, 39  
 May–June 1982, 271, 281, 298  
 Argentine perceptions, 313  
 Burt memoranda, 312  
 Eagleburger-Henderson  
 discussions, 262  
 Eagleburger memoranda, 248  
 Enders memoranda, 201, 261, 267
- Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr. (*see also*  
 Haig shuttle  
 diplomacy)—*Continued*  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts—*Continued*  
 May–June 1982—*Continued*  
 Henderson correspondence, 297  
 Pym  
 correspondence, 294  
 discussions, 205, 269, 322  
 Reagan-Figueiredo  
 correspondence, 338  
 Reagan-Thatcher discussions,  
 315, 322  
 State Department draft proposal  
 (May 28, 1982), 308, 314  
 Walters-Miret discussions, 305  
 Walters mission, 253, 254  
 Postwar, 331, 348, 356  
 U.S. initial responses, 56, 62  
 U.S.-Latin American postwar  
 relations, 364  
 U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
 60, 281  
 Burt memoranda, 119, 171, 184, 213  
 Carlucci memoranda, 216  
 Eagleburger memoranda, 84, 111,  
 311  
 Enders/Holmes memoranda, 51  
 Howe memoranda, 318  
 Iklé memoranda, 284  
 Postwar, 355, 362, 371  
 Pym correspondence, 191  
 U.S.-Argentine discussions, 116  
 Weinberger-Nott discussions, 233  
 U.S. military participation, possible,  
 171, 184  
 U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76  
 U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 360  
 U.S. public opinion, 183, 228  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 57,  
 370  
 Burt/Enders memoranda, 345  
 Eagleburger memoranda, 355, 369  
 Enders/Holmes memoranda, 50  
 Henderson discussions, 46  
 National Security Decision  
 Directives, 263  
 NSC discussions, 195  
 Pym correspondence, 191, 329  
 Scanlan/Enders/Hormats  
 memoranda, 69  
 U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
 Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 136

- Haig shuttle diplomacy—*Continued*  
 British South Georgia repossession  
   and, 160  
 Delegation discussions, 147  
 Draft memorandum, 112  
 Draft text (Apr. 19, 1982), 152  
 Enders briefing memoranda, 155  
 Haig public statements, 117  
 Louis memoranda, 123  
 Middendorf memoranda, 133  
 National Security Planning Group  
   discussions, 76  
 Reagan briefing, 155  
 Reagan-Haig communications, 74, 85,  
   96, 130, 137, 139, 140, 148, 150,  
   170, 178.  
 Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine  
   memoranda, 167  
 Rentschler memoranda, 155  
 Rio Treaty meeting of foreign  
   ministers (Apr. 1982) and, 168  
   reports  
 State Department  
   reports, 112  
   talking points papers, 75, 95  
 U.S.-Argentine communications:  
   Costa Méndez "airport paper," 92,  
   99, 101  
   Haig-Costa Méndez  
     correspondence, 153, 159, 169,  
     189, 192  
   Haig-Costa Méndez discussions,  
     73, 101, 105, 116, 117, 138, 178,  
     179, 187  
   Haig-Galtieri correspondence, 99,  
     120  
   Haig-Galtieri discussions, 89, 90,  
     92, 131, 142, 148  
   Haig-Takacs discussions, 72  
   Reagan-Galtieri communications,  
     127, 128, 129  
   Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions,  
     181, 193, 194  
 U.S.-Argentine relations and, 377  
 U.S.-British communications:  
   Haig-Henderson discussions, 71  
   Haig-Nott correspondence, 124  
   Haig-Pym correspondence, 74, 120,  
     139, 141, 146, 147, 151, 153,  
     154, 162, 180, 191  
   Haig-Pym discussions, 79, 102, 106,  
     107, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173  
   Haig-Thatcher correspondence, 91,  
     169, 173
- Haig shuttle diplomacy—*Continued*  
 U.S.-British  
   communications—*Continued*  
   Haig-Thatcher discussions, 80, 81,  
     82, 98, 103, 106  
   Middendorf-Thomas discussions,  
     88  
   Pym U.S. visit, 153, 163, 164, 165,  
     166, 169, 173  
   Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
     127, 128, 129, 132, 188, 190  
   Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 144  
   Shultz-Thatcher discussions, 257  
   U.S. leverage, 114  
 Haiti, 161  
 Hallman, William H., 1  
 Hastie-Smith, Richard, 233  
 Hayward, Adm. Thomas B.:  
   Argentine occupation, 44, 54  
   Documents not declassified, 320  
   Latin American responses to  
     Falklands/Malvinas War, 236  
   Military situation, 333  
   Peruvian peace proposal, 225  
   South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
     incident, 27  
   U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
     264, 266, 278, 317, 341  
 Hekman, Rear Adm. P. M., Jr., 208, 224  
 Helms, Jesse, 299  
 Henderson, Sir Nicholas "Nicko":  
   Argentine invasion plans, 30, 31  
   Argentine occupation, 46  
   Argentine prisoners of war, 351, 361  
   British Falklands/Malvinas landing,  
     273, 285  
   British political situation, 61, 71, 262  
   British postwar policies toward  
     Argentina, 361, 379  
   British South Georgia repossession,  
     163, 175  
   Haig shuttle diplomacy, 71, 73, 162,  
     164, 165, 166, 188  
   Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78  
   OAS role, 71, 175, 185  
   Peruvian peace proposal, 212, 220,  
     222, 227, 235  
   South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
     incident, 22, 24, 25  
   UN negotiations (May-June 1982),  
     259, 273, 275, 326  
   U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3,  
     12  
   U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
     Mar.-Apr. 1982, 25, 30, 31, 46



- Henderson, Sir Nicholas  
     *"Nicko"*—*Continued*  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts—*Continued*  
         May–June 1982, 205, 262, 297, 314, 315  
     U.S. initial responses, 56  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 205, 288, 365  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 46
- Herrera Campins, Luis, 122, 204
- Hervey, John B., 86
- Heseltine, Michael, 439
- Hill, M. Charles, 430
- Holmes, H. Allen:  
     Argentine invasion plans, 30, 35, 38  
     Argentine occupation, 46  
     British military options, 67  
     OAS role, 113  
     Soviet role, 109  
     U.S. arms sales to Argentina, 50  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.–Apr. 1982), 35  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 177, 184  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50
- Home, Lord (Alex Douglas-Home), 1
- Hormats, Robert D., 69, 376
- Howard, R. B., 402, 420, 421, 422, 429, 430, 434, 435
- Howe, Sir Geoffrey, 433, 438, 441, 447, 449
- Howe, Rear Adm. Jonathan T.:  
     Argentine prisoners of war, 351  
     *General Belgrano* strike (May 2, 1982), 217  
     Military situation, 337  
     U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372  
     U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 444  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 267, 276  
     U.S. initial responses, 56  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 290, 300, 318, 362, 365  
     U.S. postwar policy, 355
- Howells, W. Dean, 240
- Hughes, P.D., 425
- Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment (1978), 50, 54
- Hunt, Rex Masterman, 345, 349, 361
- Hutchinson, H.F., Jr., 373
- Iglesias, Brig. Gen. Hector Norberto, 90, 256
- Iklé, Fred C.:  
     Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423  
     British military options, 67  
     UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 279  
     U.S. initial responses, 54  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 184, 241, 245, 264, 266, 278, 284, 306, 328, 334, 341  
     Carlucci memoranda, 216  
     Jones memoranda, 198  
     Postwar, 362, 363, 399  
     Weinberger memoranda, 288, 317  
     West memoranda, 65  
     U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 378  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 396
- Inman, Adm. Bobby Ray:  
     British military options, 126  
     British political situation, 195  
     Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 240, 336, 344  
     Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195  
     Peruvian peace proposal, 209  
     Soviet role, 318  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 318  
     U.S. policy options, 64, 76
- Intelligence Cables, TDFIR–314/00731–82, "Comments of Argentine government officials," 252
- Intelligence Memoranda:  
     ALA 82–10059, "Falkland Islands Dispute: Economic Impact," 125  
     ALA–M–82–10077, "The Falklands Dispute: Implications for US Relations with Latin America," 336  
     EUR 82–10046, "UK-Falklands: Pressures on Thatcher," 186  
     FIRDB–312/00760–83, "Significant New Information Available to the Leadership of the Argentine Army," 426  
     FIRDB–312/01427–82, "Comments of a Senior Argentine Air Force Officer," 313
- Intelligence Reports:  
     TDFIR–314/00539–82, "Partial Chronology of the Argentine Military Action," 49

Intelligence Reports—*Continued*

TDFIR DB-315/06791-82, "Argentine Government Determination to Take Military Action," 33

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 114

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. *See* Rio Treaty

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 429

International Security and Development Cooperation Act (1981), 263

Ireland, 293

Italy, 268, 269, 270

Jett, Dennis, 429, 430, 435, 445

John Paul II, 332, 339

Johnson, D., 236

Johnson, Philip K., 113, 133, 168, 249, 414, 421, 430

Johnston, Ernest B., 50, 376, 398

Johnstone, C., 425

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (*see also* Hayward, Adm. Thomas B.), 264, 265, 266, 395

Joint Chiefs of Staff memoranda:  
JCSM-108-82, "Falklands Crisis," 266  
JSCM-213-82, "Resumption of Military Exports to Argentina," 395

Joint Statement (1971), 1

Jones, D., 118

Jones, G., 236

Jones, Gen. David C.:  
British military options, 247  
Documents not declassified, 320  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 291  
Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195  
UN negotiations (May-June 1982), 279  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 198, 216  
U.S. policy options, 76  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263

Jones, George F., 114, 118

Juárez Dover, Jorge, 366

## Kanter, Arnold:

Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197

Argentine military imports, 214

Military situation, 337

Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321

Kanter, Arnold—*Continued*

U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372

U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 119, 177, 300, 318

Keane, John F., 9

Kelly, John H., 430, 438, 451

"Kelpers." *See* Falklands/Malvinas Islanders.

Kennedy, Col. Richard T., 171

Kilday, Lowell C., 236, 244, 321, 430, 435, 444, 448, 451

Kimmitt, Robert M., 431

King, John F., 9

Kirk, R., 451

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.:  
Argentine surrender, 346, 347  
Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, 1982), 97  
Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88  
John Paul II visit to Argentina, 332  
OAS resolution (595), 412  
UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 404, 405, 410  
UN negotiations (May-June 1982), 239, 282, 289, 293, 323, 324  
Haig discussions, 201  
Haig memoranda, 237  
Middendorf-Takacs discussions, 272  
Miret discussions, 319  
NSC discussions, 195  
Pérez de Cuéllar/Ling Qing meetings, 215  
Roca discussions, 274  
Special Situation Group discussions, 279  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (May-June 1982), 292, 313, 335, 347  
U.S. initial responses, 56  
U.S. policy options, 76  
U.S. postwar policy, 360  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263

Kissinger, Henry, 246

Knepper, Williams E., 424

Koch, Noel C., 54, 56

Konner, M., 110

Koppel, Ted, 115

Kozak, Michael T., 402, 404, 412, 427, 430

Kursch, D., 200

- Lami Dozo, Brig. Basilio, 63, 142, 253, 254, 282, 305, 316, 345
- Lasater, Brig. Gen. John R., 233
- Latham, Michael, 438
- Latin American countries (*see also* OAS role *under* Falklands/Malvinas War):
- Responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 161, 236, 255, 257, 260, 279
  - U.S. communications with, 195, 204, 229, 238, 244
  - U.S. relations with. *See under* Falklands/Malvinas War *and* postwar issues.
- Laxalt, Paul, 47
- Layman, Rear Adm. Lawrence, 86
- Leach, Adm. Henry, 78
- Lee, F., 435
- Legere, Laurence J., 233
- Lehman, John F., Jr., 354
- Leith Harbor landing incident (Mar. 1982). *See* South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982).
- Leonard, John, 1
- Lewin, Sir Terence, 81
- Lilac, Robert H., 437
- Ling Qing, 215
- Listre, Arnoldo, 335, 429
- Lofstrom, W., 161, 236
- Lopez, German, 442
- López Portillo, Jose, 161, 175, 267, 339, 442
- Louis, John J., Jr., 8, 123, 164, 199, 343, 392, 418
- Luce, Richard, 10, 11, 12
- Lucena, Gen. Alberto Carlos, 252
- Luers, William H., 122
- Luns, Joseph M.A.H., 45
- Malby, Greg, 1
- Malby, Polly, 1
- Mallea Gil, Gen. Miguel, 319, 372
- Manen, Alberto, 292
- Marsh, John O., Jr., 56
- Martin, J., 434
- Martin, J. L., 451
- McCulloch, G., 118
- McFarlane, Robert C. "Bud":
- Argentine invasion plans, 40
  - Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423
  - Argentine prisoners of war, 366
  - Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195
- McFarlane, Robert C. "Bud"—*Continued*
- Haig shuttle diplomacy, 82, 150, 155
  - OAS role, 304
  - UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 405
  - UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 276, 279
  - U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts:
    - Mar.–Apr. 1982, 40
    - May–June 1982, 276, 298, 299, 309, 315, 316
  - U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 280
  - U.S. postwar policy, 416
  - U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68, 390
- McKie, B., 438
- McKinley, B., 448, 451
- McLeod, M., 118
- McMahon, John N., 225, 348, 373
- McManaway, Clayton E., Jr., 184, 271, 379, 401, 424
- McMullen, R. Bruce, 376
- McNamar, Robert T., 429, 442
- McNutt, Louise, 118
- McPherson, Melville P., 360
- Meese, Edwin, III, 34, 70, 155, 195, 225, 279
- Menendez, Brig. Gen. Mario B., 342
- Menges, Constantine C., 318
- Mercandetti, Susan, 115
- Mexico, 161
- Meyer, Gen. Edward C. "Shy," 56, 320, 327
- Michaud, M., 2
- Michel, James H., 51, 172, 445
- Middendorf, J. William, II:
- Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421
  - British-Argentine normalization talks, 446
  - Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 133
  - OAS resolution 595, 412, 414
  - OAS role, 83, 113, 158, 168
  - UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 434
  - UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 249, 256, 272
  - U.S. initial responses, 56
  - U.S. policy options, 70
- Miles, Richard M., 93
- Miller, Cmdr. T., 67, 156

- Miller, Tom, 276, 290  
Miret, Maj. Brig. Gen. Jose, 292, 305, 310, 319  
Monge, Luis Alberto, 364  
Monier, John S., 69, 376  
Monroe, Frederick F., 118  
Monroe Doctrine, 16  
Montgomery, Hugh, 161, 318, 426  
Montgomery, William, 432  
Moore, Maj. Gen. Jeremy, 342  
Morley, Robert B., 296, 435, 444, 445, 448, 451  
Morris, R., 283  
Motley, Langhorne A.:  
    UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 429, 430, 434  
    UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 295  
    U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 429, 442  
    U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 435, 444  
Muñiz, Carlos, 451  
Murphy, Adm. Daniel J., 442  
  
Nagler, Vice Adm. Gordon R., 86  
National Intelligence Daily Reports, 19, 32  
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 65, 177, 217  
National Security Agency (NSA), 206  
National Security Council (NSC), 195  
National Security Decision Directives:  
    No. 34, "U.S. Actions in the South Atlantic Crisis," 263  
    No. 71, "U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis," 416  
National Security Planning Group (NSPG), 53, 76, 225  
National Security Study Directives, No. 10–82, "U.S. Policy Toward the Americas as a Result of the Falklands Crisis," 360  
Newell, Gregory J., 402, 404, 405, 430  
Nicaragua, 161  
Nicolaidis, Gen. Cristino, 350, 357, 366, 370, 415, 426  
Nolte, Capt. Ricardo, 44  
Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 1, 52  
North, Oliver L., 280, 423  
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 45  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 233, 278, 291, 384, 424  
Nott, John:  
    British political situation, 61  
    British South Georgia repossession, 174  
    British White Paper, 418  
    Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 98, 124  
    Maritime Exclusion Zone, 77, 78, 80  
    Postwar foreign policy, 358  
    Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321  
    U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 233, 287, 288, 328  
Nutting, Gen. Wallace H., 320  
  
O'Connell, S.K., 13, 25, 177  
Ogden, Richard M., 213  
O'Leary, Jeremiah, 115  
Olson, P.M., 435, 451  
Onslow, Cranley, 383, 386, 425  
Organization of American States (OAS) (*see also* OAS role *under* Falklands/Malvinas War):  
    Falklands/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute history and, 1  
    Falklands/Malvinas War impact on, 260  
    Meeting (Apr. 5, 1982), 59  
    Resolution 595, 412, 413, 414  
    Resolution (Apr. 28, 1982), 185, 187  
Ortiz, Francis V., 429, 442, 447, 450, 452  
Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos, 1, 202, 203, 207, 209, 232  
Owen, David, 418  
  
Pakenham, Michael A., 3  
Palliser, Sir Michael, 3, 358  
Palmer, Gen. Bruce, Jr., 126  
Panama, 236  
Parsons, Sir Anthony, 274, 293, 319  
Peña, Brig. Gen. Ricardo, 310, 347  
Pendleton, Miles S., Jr.:  
    Argentine invasion plans, 38  
    British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379  
    British South Georgia repossession, 174  
    Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75  
    UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398  
    U.S. initial responses, 62

- Pendleton, Miles S., Jr.—*Continued*  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
51, 60, 84, 93, 184  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50,  
69
- Penfold, John H., 376
- Pérez, Carlos Andrés, 324
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier:  
Good offices proposal, 201  
Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982),  
196  
UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
215, 237, 249, 259, 262, 272, 274,  
319
- Perle, Richard N., 278, 399
- Perón, Juan, 90, 254, 309, 319
- Perry, Robert, 430, 435, 444
- Peru (*see also* Peruvian peace proposal  
*under* Falklands/Malvinas War),  
161, 367
- Piedra, Alberto, 249
- Pinochet, Augusto, 279
- Platt, Nicholas, 38
- Poindexter, Rear Adm. John M.:  
Argentine invasion plans, 40  
Argentine prisoners of war, 366  
*General Belgrano* strike (May 2, 1982),  
217  
Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982),  
195  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 85, 181  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June  
1982), 298, 299, 315, 335  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 57,  
375
- Postwar issues (*see also* Falklands/  
Malvinas War impacts; UN  
General Assembly resolution  
(1982); U.S. certification for arms  
sales to Argentina)—*Continued*  
British airbase on the Falklands/  
Malvinas, 429  
British-Argentine normalization talks  
(1984), 445, 446, 447, 448  
British foreign policy, 358  
British military investment, 418  
British policies toward Argentina (*see*  
*also* Argentine prisoners of war  
*above*):  
Burt/Enders memoranda, 345  
Burt memoranda, 383  
Casey memoranda, 428  
Enders-Onslow discussions, 425  
Louis memoranda, 343  
Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 361  
Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine  
memoranda, 353  
Shultz-Pym discussions, 379  
Shultz-Thatcher discussions, 417  
U.S.-British communication  
problems, 349  
British political situation, 343, 345,  
420, 427  
Calvi Commission report, 415  
European Community sanctions  
against Argentina, 350, 355, 357  
Franks Committee report, 420  
OAS resolution 595, 412, 413, 414  
UN General Assembly resolution  
(1983), 429, 430, 432, 433, 434  
UN General Assembly resolution  
(1984), 450, 451  
U.S.-Argentine relations (*see also* U.S.  
sanctions against Argentina):  
Bush-Alfonsín meeting, 442  
Eagleburger memoranda, 369  
Export-Import Bank lending, 376  
Haig memoranda, 370  
Military intelligence exchange, 401  
Motley-García del Solar  
discussions, 429  
Reagan public statement (June 30,  
1982), 372  
Sapia-Bosch memoranda, 381  
Shlaudeman memoranda, 377  
U.S.-Argentine communications,  
366, 370, 372, 397  
U.S.-Latin American relations, 364,  
413, 420

- Postwar issues (*see also* Falklands/  
Malvinas War impacts; UN  
General Assembly resolution  
(1982); U.S. certification for arms  
sales to Argentina)—*Continued*  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
355, 361, 362, 363, 365, 371, 399  
U.S. policy, 345, 355, 360, 387, 416  
Price, Charles H., 446  
Price, George C., 161, 383  
Proper, Datus C., 444, 451  
Puerto Rico, 397  
Pym, Francis:  
  Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165  
  Argentine postwar use of force,  
    possible, 421  
  Argentine prisoners of war, 329  
  British political situation, 297  
  British postwar policies toward  
    Argentina, 379, 417  
  British South Georgia repossession,  
    175  
  Documents not declassified, 242  
  Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
    Haig correspondence, 74, 120, 139,  
      141, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154,  
      162, 180, 191  
    Haig discussions, 79, 102, 106, 107,  
      163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173  
    Haig-Thatcher discussions, 80, 81,  
      98  
    Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
      188  
    U.S. visit, 153, 163, 164, 165, 166,  
      169, 173  
  Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78  
  OAS role, 163, 175, 185  
  Peruvian peace proposal, 205, 207,  
    212, 220, 222, 227, 235  
  UN General Assembly resolution  
    (1982), 389, 398  
  UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
    215, 271, 326  
  U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June  
    1982), 205, 269, 294, 322  
  U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
    191, 205  
  U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 191,  
    329, 379, 393  
Quijano, Raúl, 168, 246, 252, 256, 421  
Rabb, Maxwell M., 268, 433  
Ranneberger, M., 451  
Raphel, Arnold, 401, 424  
Rase, Glen R., 114, 376  
Rashish, Myer, 3  
Reagan, Ronald W. (*see also*  
  Reagan-Thatcher correspondence):  
  Argentine invasion plans, 31, 34, 36,  
    39, 40, 42  
  Argentine occupation, 47  
  Argentine prisoners of war, 361, 370  
  British Falklands/Malvinas landing,  
    285  
  British postwar policies toward  
    Argentina, 361, 428  
  Falklands/Malvinas War impacts,  
    303, 400  
  Figueiredo U.S. visit, 255, 257  
  Haig resignation, 367  
  Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
    Briefing, 155  
    Galtieri communications, 127, 128,  
      129  
    Haig communications, 74, 85, 96,  
      130, 137, 139, 140, 148, 150,  
      170, 178  
    Haig-Thatcher discussions, 82  
    Suspension proposals, 136  
    Thatcher correspondence, 127, 128,  
      129, 132, 188, 190  
    Thatcher discussions, 144  
  OAS resolution 595, 413  
  OAS role, 83, 158, 304, 307  
  Peruvian peace proposal, 221, 230,  
    231, 234  
  Political situation, 90  
  Public statement (June 30, 1982), 372  
  Radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97  
  Soviet role, 158  
  UN General Assembly resolution  
    (1982), 394, 403, 405  
    Thatcher correspondence, 403, 406,  
      407, 408, 409, 411  
  UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
    257, 326  
  Eagleburger memoranda, 301  
  Haig memoranda, 237, 271, 281,  
    304  
  Kirkpatrick memoranda, 323  
  Stoessel-Henderson discussions,  
    273  
  Stoessel memoranda, 262  
  Thatcher discussions, 257, 326  
  U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295  
  U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 370

- Reagan, Ronald W. (*see also* Reagan-Thatcher correspondence)—*Continued*
- U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 428
  - McFarlane memoranda, 437
  - Shultz-Howe discussions, 441
  - Thatcher communications, 431, 437, 438, 439, 440
  - U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229, 244
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts:
    - Mar.–Apr. 1982, 28, 34, 36, 40, 41, 42, 54
    - May–June 1982:
      - Figueiredo correspondence, 338
      - Haig memoranda, 281, 298
      - Public statement (May 13, 1982), 270, 272
      - Thatcher discussions, 257, 261, 262, 269, 315, 316, 322
    - Postwar, 352, 356
  - U.S. initial responses, 56
  - U.S.-Latin American postwar relations, 364, 413
  - U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 110, 127, 280, 281, 361
  - U.S. military lessons learned, 378
  - U.S. policy options, 70, 76
  - U.S. postwar policy, 360, 416
  - U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 370
    - Clark memoranda, 70, 375, 394
    - Haig memoranda, 57
    - Stoessel memoranda, 374
    - Thatcher correspondence, 68, 219
  - U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64
- Regan, Donald T., 263, 360
- Rentschler, James M.T.:
  - British postwar policies toward Argentina, 353, 361
  - European Community sanctions against Argentina, 268, 270
  - Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195
  - Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 82, 112, 155, 167
  - OAS role, 70
  - UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 276, 279
  - U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts:
    - May–June 1982, 218, 270, 276, 299
    - Postwar, 353
  - Rentschler, James M.T.—*Continued*
    - U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76, 155, 167
    - U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359
    - U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64
- Renwick, Robin, 438
- Richards, Francis, 164, 165, 166
- Richman, Alvin, 183, 228, 330
- Ridley, Nicholas, 2, 3, 4, 5
- Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) (1947) (*see also* OAS role *under* Falklands/Malvinas War), 71, 76, 113
- Rivero, Alfonso, 367
- Robinson, Davis R., 93
- Robinson, William B., 93, 184, 200
- Roca, Eduardo, 215, 274
- Rogers, William P., 56
- Ros, Enrique:
  - British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 11
  - Falkland/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute, 9
  - Haig shuttle diplomacy, 90, 138
  - South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, 18, 20
  - UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 272, 274
  - U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12
  - U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 257
- Roshco, Bernard, 228
- Rostow, Eugene V., 360
- Rouco, Iglesias, 9, 377
- Roussel, Pete, 115
- Rowen, Harry, 126, 240, 277
- Royo, Aristides, 204, 236
- Ryan, Robert J., Jr., 114
- Saint-Jean, Alfredo Oscar, 350, 357
- Sanchez, 424
- Sanchez Mason, Gen., 243
- Sapia-Bosch, Alfonso F., 316, 353, 359, 381
- Scanlan, John D., 24, 62, 69, 71, 109, 267
- Schmidt, Helmut
- Schmidt, M., 357
- Schneider, William, Jr., 195, 427
- Schuette, Keith, 147
- Schumacher, Edward, 99
- Seitz, Raymond G.H., 330, 379

- Senior Interagency Group (SIG), 364
- Service, Robert E.:  
     Argentine invasion plans, 30, 31, 35, 38  
     Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197  
     Argentine occupation, 43, 45, 59  
     Argentine postwar political situation, 350, 357  
     Argentine prisoners of war, 350, 357  
     Argentine surrender, 346  
     Documents not declassified, 286  
     European Community sanctions against Argentina, 357  
     Haig shuttle diplomacy, 72, 73, 75, 187, 192  
     Latin American responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 236  
     Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321  
     UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 249, 272  
     U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 13  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 35, 348  
     U.S. initial responses, 62  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 60, 177, 184  
     U.S. postwar policy, 345  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50, 69
- Shapiro, C.S., 401
- Sheridan, Jeanne, 1
- Sheridan, John, 1
- Sherman, William C., 239
- Shirley, K., 348
- Shlaudeman, Harry W.:  
     Argentine invasion plans, 30, 31, 37  
     Argentine political situation and, 55  
     Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 419  
     British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16  
     British postwar policies toward Argentina, 383  
     Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303  
     *General Belgrano* strike (May 2, 1982), 217  
     Haig shuttle diplomacy, 80, 153, 179  
     Costa Méndez "airport paper," 99  
     Galtieri discussions, 181, 193, 194  
     Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 117, 138
- Shlaudeman, Harry W.—*Continued*  
     Haig shuttle diplomacy—*Continued*  
     Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 132  
     U.S.-Argentine relations and, 377  
     John Paul II visit to Argentina, 339  
     Military situation, 339  
     Replacement of, 429  
     South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29  
     UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 404  
     U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 377, 401  
     U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 16, 20  
     U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 210  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
         Mar.–Apr. 1982, 18, 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 37  
         May–June 1982, 201, 253, 254  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 193, 388
- Shoemaker, Capt. Christopher C., 309
- Shultz, George P.:  
     Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421, 422  
     British-Argentine normalization talks, 445, 448, 449  
     British NATO forces drawdown, 384  
     British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379, 383, 417  
     Franks Committee report, 420  
     Haig shuttle diplomacy, 257  
     OAS resolution 595, 412, 413  
     State Department crisis management systems, 380  
     UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386, 389, 394, 397, 398, 402, 404, 405, 407  
     UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430, 432  
     U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 397, 429  
     U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina:  
         Eagleburger memoranda, 436  
         Enders memoranda, 427  
         Howe discussions, 441  
         Motley memoranda, 435  
         Pym discussions, 379, 393



- Shultz, George P.—*Continued*  
U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina—*Continued*  
Reagan-Thatcher communications, 437, 438, 439, 440  
U.S. postwar policy, 387, 416  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 379, 393, 394
- Sienkiewicz, Stan, 444
- Simons, Thomas W., Jr., 109
- Sinclair, Ian, 164, 165, 166
- Small, Adm. William N., 278, 341
- Smith, Maj. Gen. Carl R., 233, 241, 245, 392, 396
- Smith, Keith C.:  
Argentine invasion plans, 30, 35  
Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197  
British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379  
Franks Committee report, 420  
Haig shuttle diplomacy, 71, 166  
Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321  
UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386  
U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 401  
U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 13  
U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.-Apr. 1982), 25, 35  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50
- Smith, Margaret, 1
- Smith, N. Shaw, 386, 397, 404, 424, 425, 427
- Smith, S., 376, 401, 414
- Smith, William F., 360
- Snyder, R., 435
- Sokolosky, D., 67
- Sommer, Peter R., 431
- Sorzano, Jose S., 274, 292, 319, 335, 347, 451
- Sotera, Alfredo, Gen., 428
- South Georgia Islands (*see also* South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident):  
British repossession, 160, 163, 174, 186
- South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982):  
CIA reports, 19, 26, 63  
National Intelligence Daily Report, 19  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 28  
Shlaudeman memoranda, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 29
- South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982)—*Continued*  
Streator memoranda, 17  
U.S.-Argentine consultations, 25, 29  
U.S.-British consultations, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27
- Soviet Union (*see also* Soviet role under Falklands/Malvinas War), 382
- Spain, 1
- Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) (United Nations), 16
- Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 21/91-82, 87  
SNIE 90/91-3-82, "Implications of the Falklands Conflict for Territorial Disputes in Latin America," 382  
SNIE 91-2-82, "Argentina's Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat," 391
- Special Situation Group, 279, 332
- Speed, Keith, 418
- Stanford, Col. John H., 424
- Stanley, Lt. Col. Dennis, 424
- State Department crisis management systems, 380
- Stein, John H., 426
- Stern, R., 25, 350
- Stocker, Carol K., 430, 432, 438, 445
- Stocker, K., 434, 451
- Stockman, David A., 263, 360
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.:  
Argentine invasion plans, 38  
Argentine prisoners of war, 329  
British political situation, 61  
Cuban role, 94  
European Community sanctions against Argentina, 355  
Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 327, 367  
Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321
- South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 24, 25
- UN negotiations (May-June 1982), 259, 262, 272, 273, 323
- U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3
- U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
Mar.-Apr. 1982, 24, 25  
May-June 1982, 261, 262, 267  
Postwar, 331  
U.S. initial responses, 56  
U.S. policy options, 70  
U.S. postwar policy, 387

- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.—*Continued*  
 U.S. public opinion, 330  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68,  
 69, 329, 374
- Streator, Edward J., Jr.:  
 Argentine occupation, 48, 58  
 British-Argentine prewar  
 negotiations, 4, 14  
 British NATO forces drawdown, 384  
 British political situation, 58, 66, 223  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy, 79, 80, 81  
 Peruvian peace proposal, 223  
 UN General Assembly resolution  
 (1982), 385  
 UN General Assembly resolution  
 (1983), 433  
 U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3,  
 10, 17  
 U.S. certification for arms sales to  
 Argentina, 425, 433  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June  
 1982), 312  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 66  
 U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 66
- Suez Canal crisis, 70, 71, 76, 79
- Swigert, J. W., 236
- Taft, William Howard, IV, 245
- Takacs, Esteban Arpad:  
 Argentine invasion plans, 39  
 British South Georgia repossession,  
 163  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy, 72, 73, 189  
 Military situation, 333  
 South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
 incident, 24, 25  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
 246, 256, 272  
 U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 39, 316
- Thatcher, Margaret H. (*see also* British  
 political situation; Reagan-Thatcher  
 correspondence)—*Continued*  
 Alfonsín correspondence, 441  
 Argentine invasion plans, 31, 34, 36,  
 42  
 Argentine occupation, 45, 58  
 Argentine postwar use of force,  
 possible, 421  
 Argentine prisoners of war, 361  
 British postwar policies toward  
 Argentina, 349, 353, 361, 417  
 British South Georgia repossession,  
 163
- Thatcher, Margaret H. (*see also* British  
 political situation; Reagan-Thatcher  
 correspondence)—*Continued*  
 Election of, 1  
 Franks Committee report, 420  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
 Haig correspondence, 91, 169, 173  
 Haig discussions, 80, 81, 82, 98,  
 103, 106  
 Haig-Pym discussions, 169, 173  
 Reagan correspondence, 127, 128,  
 129, 132, 188, 190  
 Reagan discussions, 144  
 Shultz discussions, 257  
 Peruvian peace proposal, 205, 221,  
 230, 231  
 Postwar foreign policy, 358  
 Shultz discussions, 257  
 UN General Assembly resolution  
 (1982), 385, 403, 406, 407, 408,  
 409, 411  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
 257, 326  
 U.S. certification for arms sales to  
 Argentina, 431, 433, 435, 437, 438,  
 439, 440  
 U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
 Mar.–Apr. 1982, 28, 34, 36, 42  
 May–June 1982, 257, 261, 262, 269,  
 312, 315, 316, 322  
 Postwar, 352, 356  
 U.S. initial responses, 56  
 U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
 361, 371, 392  
 U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68,  
 219
- Thayer, Yvonne, 1
- Thomas, David, 446
- Thomas, Derek M.D.:  
 Argentine military imports, 134, 149  
 Argentine postwar use of force,  
 possible, 422  
 Argentine prisoners of war, 329  
 British postwar policies toward  
 Argentina, 379, 383  
 Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 162, 165  
 OAS role, 168  
 UN General Assembly resolution  
 (1983), 432  
 UN negotiations (May–June 1982),  
 237  
 U.S. military aid to United Kingdom,  
 111

- Thomas, Derek M.D.—*Continued*  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68,  
329, 393
- Thompson, Herbert B., 113, 168, 185,  
249, 295, 398, 412, 414
- Tidwell, Brig. Gen. M.F., 342
- Tobin, Brig. Gen. Thomas G., 287
- Tornetta, Vincenzo, 268
- Toussaint, D., 412
- Train, Adm. Harry D., II, 291
- Trinidad-Tobago, 161
- Ulloa Elias, Manuel, 202, 207, 367
- UN General Assembly resolution  
(1982), 397
- Clark memoranda, 394, 405
- Enders/Burt/Newell memoranda,  
402, 404
- Enders memoranda, 387
- Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
403, 406, 407, 408, 409, 411
- U.S.-Argentine communications, 385
- U.S.-British communications, 386,  
389, 398
- U.S. statement, 410
- UN negotiations (May-June 1982):  
Eagleburger memoranda, 248, 301
- Galtieri-Beláunde discussions, 232,  
234
- Haig-Beláunde discussions, 234
- Haig-Guerreiro discussions, 251
- Haig-Henderson correspondence, 275
- Haig-Kirkpatrick discussions, 201
- Haig memoranda, 237, 271, 281, 293,  
304
- Kirkpatrick memoranda, 239, 282,  
289, 323, 324
- Kirkpatrick-Miret discussions, 319
- Kirkpatrick-Pérez de Cuéllar/Ling  
Qing meetings, 215
- Kirkpatrick-Roca discussions, 274
- Middendorf-Takacs discussions, 246,  
256, 272
- Middendorf-Zinn discussions, 249
- NSC discussions, 195
- Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257,  
326
- Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine  
memoranda, 276
- Security Council Resolution 505, 301
- Special Situation Group discussions,  
279
- Stoessel-Henderson discussions, 259,  
273
- UN negotiations (May-June  
1982)—*Continued*  
Stoessel memoranda, 262
- U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295
- Walters memoranda, 310
- United Kingdom (*see also*  
British-Argentine prewar  
negotiations; Falklands/Malvinas  
War; Postwar issues; U.S.-British  
prewar consultations; U.S. military  
aid to United Kingdom):  
Antarctica claims, 1
- Postwar political situation, 343, 345,  
420, 427
- United Nations (UN) (*see also* UN  
General Assembly resolution  
(1982); UN negotiations (May-June  
1982)):  
British-Argentine prewar  
negotiations, 2, 4, 6, 14
- Committee of 24, 16
- Falklands/Malvinas Islands  
sovereignty dispute, 1, 12, 16
- General Assembly resolution (1983),  
429, 430, 432, 433, 434
- General Assembly resolution (1984),  
450, 451
- Security Council discussions (Apr.  
1982) (*see also* Security Council  
Resolution 502 *below*), 38, 43, 46
- Security Council Resolution 502, 50,  
59, 62, 64, 68, 79, 82, 176, 201,  
276, 293, 348
- Security Council Resolution 505, 301
- Ure, John, 28, 43, 164, 165, 166
- U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations:  
Carrington-Haig correspondence, 12,  
13
- Keane-Forrester discussions, 9
- Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez  
discussions, 16
- Shlaudeman memoranda, 20
- U.S.-British prewar consultations:  
Carrington-Haig correspondence, 12,  
13
- Christopher memoranda, 2
- Enders-Luce discussions, 10, 12
- Haig-Carrington meetings, 3
- South Georgia Islands flag-raising  
incident, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 27,  
28
- Streator-Luce discussions, 10

- U.S.-British prewar  
consultations—*Continued*  
Streator memoranda, 17
- U.S. certification for arms sales to  
Argentina (*see also* U.S. sanctions  
against Argentina):  
Argentine postwar use of force and,  
424  
Casey memoranda, 428  
Clark memoranda, 394  
Eagleburger memoranda, 436  
Enders memoranda, 387, 427  
Fontaine memoranda, 390  
JCS memoranda, 395  
Koch memoranda, 54  
McFarlane memoranda, 437  
Motley/Burt/Howe memoranda, 444  
Motley memoranda, 435  
Shlaudeman memoranda, 388  
Shultz memoranda, 394, 437
- U.S.-Argentine communications:  
Bush-Alfonsin discussions, 442  
Enders-Onslow communications,  
386, 425  
Motley-Garcia del Solar  
discussions, 429
- U.S.-British communications:  
Burt-Renwick discussions, 438  
Burt-Thomas discussions, 432  
Consultation proposals, 444  
Dam-Thatcher discussions, 433  
Reagan-Thatcher communications,  
431, 437, 438, 439, 440  
Shultz-Howe discussions, 441  
Shultz-Pym communications, 379,  
393  
West memoranda, 396
- U.S. diplomatic efforts:  
Mar.-Apr. 1982:  
Blair memoranda, 34  
CIA reports, 63  
Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35  
Enders/Scanlan memoranda, 24  
Iklé memoranda, 54  
Shlaudeman memoranda, 18, 23  
Shlaudeman-Williams discussions,  
30  
U.S.-Argentine communications:  
Haig-Takacs discussions, 39  
Reagan-Galtieri communications,  
40, 41, 54  
Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez  
discussions, 25, 29, 31
- U.S. diplomatic efforts—*Continued*  
Mar.-Apr. 1982—*Continued*  
U.S.-Argentine  
communications—*Continued*  
Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions,  
37  
Stoessel-Takacs discussions, 25
- U.S.-British communications:  
Haig-Carrington correspondence,  
27  
Haig-Henderson discussions, 30,  
31, 46  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence,  
28, 34, 36, 42  
Stoessel-Henderson discussions,  
25
- May-June 1982 (*see also* Peruvian  
peace proposal under Falklands/  
Malvinas War; UN negotiations  
(May-June 1982)):  
Argentine perceptions, 313  
Bailey memoranda, 226  
Burt memoranda, 283, 312  
Eagleburger memoranda, 248  
Enders memoranda, 201, 261, 267  
Fontaine/Shoemaker/Childress  
memoranda, 309  
Haig memoranda, 271, 281, 298  
Louis memoranda, 199  
Reagan-Figueiredo correspondence,  
338  
Reagan public statement (May 13,  
1982), 270, 272  
Rentschler/Blair/fontaine  
memoranda, 218, 276  
State Department draft proposal  
(May 28, 1982), 308, 314  
Summit proposals, 299, 305
- U.S.-Argentine communications:  
Enders-Takacs discussions, 316  
Kirkpatrick>Listre discussions,  
335  
Kirkpatrick-Miret discussions,  
292  
Walters-Miret discussions, 305  
Walters mission, 253, 254, 272
- U.S.-British communications:  
Eagleburger-Henderson  
discussions, 262  
Haig-Henderson correspondence,  
297  
Haig-Pym communications, 205,  
269, 294, 322

- U.S. diplomatic efforts—*Continued*  
May–June 1982 (*see also* Peruvian peace proposal *under* Falklands/Malvinas War; UN negotiations (May–June 1982))—*Continued*  
U.S.-British  
communications—*Continued*  
Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257, 261, 262, 269, 315, 316, 322  
Postwar (*see also* UN General Assembly resolution (1982)):  
Eagleburger memoranda, 355  
Haig memoranda, 348, 356  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 352  
Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 353  
Stoessel memoranda, 331  
U.S.-Argentine discussions, 347  
U.S.-British communications, 352  
U.S. military aid to United Kingdom:  
Burt memoranda, 93, 108, 110, 119, 143, 171, 184, 213, 216  
Carlucci memoranda, 216  
Eagleburger memoranda, 111, 311  
Enders/Holmes memoranda, 51  
Haig memoranda, 60, 281  
Haig-Pym correspondence, 191  
Hayward memoranda, 266  
Holmes/Enders memoranda, 51  
Howe/Burt memoranda, 300  
Howe memoranda, 290, 318  
Iklé memoranda, 241, 245, 264, 278, 284, 306, 328, 334, 341  
JCS memoranda, 265  
Jones memoranda, 198  
Layman memoranda, 86  
McManaway memoranda, 184  
Media coverage, 115, 127  
North memoranda, 280  
Postwar, 355, 361, 362, 363, 365, 371, 399  
Service memoranda, 177  
Tobin memoranda, 287  
U.S.-Argentine discussions, 116, 253  
Weinberger memoranda, 288, 317  
Weinberger-Nott discussions, 233  
Weinberger-Pym discussions, 205  
Weinberger-Thatcher discussions, 392  
West memoranda, 65  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina (*see also* U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina):  
Burt/Enders memoranda, 345  
U.S. sanctions against Argentina (*see also* U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina)—*Continued*  
Burt memoranda, 200  
Clark memoranda, 70, 375, 394  
Eagleburger memoranda, 84, 355, 369  
Enders/Holmes memoranda, 50  
Fontaine memoranda, 390  
Haig memoranda, 57, 370  
Instatement of, 196  
National Security Decision Directives, 263  
NSC discussions, 195  
Sapia-Bosch memoranda, 359  
Scanlan/Enders/Hormats memoranda, 69  
Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 193  
Shlaudeman memoranda, 388  
Shultz memoranda, 394  
Stoessel memoranda, 374  
Streator memoranda, 66  
U.S.-British communications:  
Haig-Henderson discussions, 46  
Haig-Pym correspondence, 191, 329  
Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 68, 219  
Shultz-Pym communications, 379, 393  
U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229  
Watkins memoranda, 395  
West memoranda, 396  
Venezuela, 122, 161, 236, 246, 260, 307  
Vessey, Gen. John W., Jr., 360, 416  
Videla, Gen. Jorge Rafael, 8, 243  
Viola, Roberto Eduardo, 8, 55, 243  
Waldheim, Kurt, 4  
Wall, J. Stephen, 84, 164, 165, 166  
Walser, R., 421  
Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. “Dick”:  
Argentine officers disagreement, 243  
Haig shuttle diplomacy:  
Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 138  
Haig-Galtieri discussions, 89, 90, 131, 142  
Haig-Pym discussions, 164, 165, 166  
Haig-Thatcher discussions, 81, 98  
Soviet role, 279

- Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A.  
     "Dick"—*Continued*  
     UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 246, 272, 310  
     U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts, May–June 1982, 253, 254, 272, 305  
 War Powers Resolution (1973), 171  
 Warne, W.R., 2  
 Watkins, Adm. James D., 395  
 Watson, Kathryn, 1  
 Watson, Rear Adm. Thomas C., 108  
 Wayne, E. Anthony, 147, 397, 398  
 Weinberger, Caspar W. "Cap":  
     Argentine surrender, 348  
     British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 261  
     British military options, 67, 247  
     British South Georgia repossession, 160  
     Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195  
     Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75  
     Public statement (Apr. 16, 1982), 131  
     UN negotiations (May–June 1982), 279  
     U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437  
     U.S. citizens in Argentina, 195  
     U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 288, 317  
     Burt memoranda, 171  
     Carlucci memoranda, 216  
     Eagleburger memoranda, 111  
     Hayward memoranda, 266  
     Howe memoranda, 318  
     Iklé memoranda, 241, 245, 264, 278, 284, 306, 328, 334, 341, 362, 363  
     Jones memoranda, 198  
     Layman memoranda, 86  
     Nott discussions, 233  
     Postwar, 362, 363, 365, 371, 399  
     Pym discussions, 205  
     Thatcher discussions, 392  
     Tobin memoranda, 287  
     West memoranda, 65  
 Weinberger, Caspar W.  
     "Cap"—*Continued*  
     U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 368, 378  
     U.S. military participation, possible, 171  
     U.S. policy options, 76  
     U.S. postwar policy, 360, 416  
     U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263, 395  
 Wenick, Martin A., 444  
 West, Francis J., Jr., 65, 67, 396  
 Wharton, R., 401  
 Wheeler, Col. Michael O., 195, 424  
 Wheelock, Jaime, 90  
 Whitelaw, William, 312  
 Whitmore, Clive, 361  
 Whitney, Ray, 446  
 Whittmore, Clive, 81  
 Wick, Charles Z., 360  
 Wilcox, P.C., 38  
 Willcox, B., 35  
 Williams, Anthony:  
     Ambassadorial appointment, 1  
     British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 7  
     South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23  
     U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar. –Apr. 1982), 30  
 Williams, James A., 247  
 Williams, Lt. Gen. James A., 160, 426  
 Williams, T., 156  
 World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 114  
 Wright, Sir J. Oliver, 393, 394, 398, 403, 432, 449  
 Young, Janet, 438  
 Youngquist, Debbie, 1  
 Youngquist, Don, 1  
 Zakheim, Dov, 245, 328  
 Zambrano Velasco, Jose Alberto, 122, 307  
 Zinn, Ricardo, 249, 256, 274