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NORTH AFRICA



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Volume XXIV

North Africa

Editor

Chris Tudda

General Editor

Kathleen B. Rasmussen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. It further

requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the United States Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. Throughout

the course of the project, many, but not all records at each Presidential library were scanned. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

Within each of the five compilations in this volume, the documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Team. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the United States Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2017 and was completed in 2023, resulted in the decision to withhold 11 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 19 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 43 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's approach to North Africa from 1981 until 1988.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.

The Historian

Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D.

General Editor

Foreign Service Institute

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This particular volume is comprised of five chapters—a chapter documenting the United States' approach to the region as a whole, three chapters highlighting U.S. bilateral relations with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and a chapter on U.S. policy towards the disputed area of Western Sahara. Together, these chapters illustrate the Reagan administration's conception of the region as it related to broader United States geopolitical goals and the administration's attempts to address the wide, often interrelated, range of political, economic, and strategic challenges to the United States' interests in the area.

The volume covers the administration's bilateral and multilateral attempts to end the conflict between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) and Morocco in the Western Sahara, and attempts by Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to achieve Maghreb unity and contend with Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi's belligerence, including brief interludes of "union" with Libya. Coverage of the Reagan administration's policies toward Libya convey the administration's concern that Libya's support for terrorism could destabilize Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and that these nations might opt for loose "unions" with Libya in order to placate Qadhafi.

Other volumes in the Reagan subseries document the civil war in Chad, the Arab-Israeli dispute, U.S.-Franco cooperation in the region, hijacking and hostage-taking incidents involving United States citizens, the Soviet Union, and the administration's attempts to work with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) to end the war in Western Sahara. For documents related to the United States' relations with Libya and the Reagan administration's attempts to reduce Libyan involvement in the Chadian civil war, readers should consult *Foreign Relations* 1981–1988, Vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For documentation on the Middle East peace process and bilateral United States relations with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, and Volume XVIII, Lebanon, 1981–1984, Part 1, April 1981–August 1982, and Part 2, September 1982–March 1984. For documentation on overall

U.S. relations with France, readers should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volumes VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984, and VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988. For the United States’ responses to the series of high-profile hijackings in the Middle East or involving groups from the region, as well as efforts to secure the release of United States and other kidnapped foreign nationals taken in Lebanon, readers should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLVII, Counterterrorism, Part 1, 1981–May 1985, and Part 2, June 1985–January 1989.

In addition, readers seeking further context for the Reagan administration’s policies in the Middle East and Africa should consult those *Foreign Relations* volumes that address other, geographically contiguous regions. Of particular relevance are the following: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula; Volumes XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984, and XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988; Volume XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa; and Volumes XXXIV, Afghanistan, 1981–October 1985, and XXXV, Afghanistan, November 1985–February 1989. Readers interested in the Reagan administration’s approach to the global energy market should see Volume XXXVI, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1981–1984, and Volume XXXVII, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1985–1988. For the administration’s approach to “global negotiations” and U.S. efforts to help alleviate the African famine, readers should consult *Foreign Relations* 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance, and Volume XLI, Global Issues II. For the administration’s policy toward the United Nations, see *Foreign Relations* 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues I. For documentation about how the global Cold War competition between the United States and Soviet Union applied to the Reagan administration’s North African policy, readers should see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, Soviet Union, November 1986–January 1989.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV

As with similar volumes in other *Foreign Relations* subseries, this volume documents both the United States’ approach to the region as a whole and its bilateral relations with individual North African countries. The volume begins by examining the North Africa region, where, in almost all respects, the Reagan administration faced the same challenges as, and continued the policies of, the Jimmy Carter administration, as documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa. In particular, the Reagan administration weighed

many issues: the threats that Qadhafi posed to U.S. security and interests, the normalization of relations with Algeria, the divide between Mauritania and Morocco over Western Sahara, and the conclusion of the POLISARIO's guerilla war.

Documentation includes cable traffic between posts and the Department of State; memoranda between principals, especially those from Secretaries of State Alexander M. Haig and George P. Shultz to Reagan; and analyses from members of the intelligence community. Together, this documentation illustrates how the Reagan administration viewed its long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia, and a potential new ally, Algeria; contended with Qadhafi's radicalism, support for terrorism, and ever-expanding military power and ambitions; tried to alleviate the effects of the broader African famine on Mauritania; and explored various attempts at regional unity. Moreover, this volume documents the Reagan administration's perception of U.S. interests in the region (along with adjacent areas of Africa and the Middle East), as well as the region's broader importance as a theater of East-West competition in the global Cold War.

The volume uses chapters to cover the U.S. bilateral relationships with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. While bilateral relations with these nations were influenced to a significant extent by events elsewhere—such as the Middle East peace process, the civil war in Lebanon, and international terrorism, among others—strategic concerns, especially military supply issues, dominated the respective dialogues. Memoranda of conversation involving Secretaries of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis “Bing” West and Richard Armitage, and their Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian counterparts illuminate the political and defense relationships between the United States and its allies. The correspondence between, and memoranda of conversation of, personal meetings between Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, King Hassan II of Morocco, and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba reflects the extent to which the administration valued close relationships with these leaders. Cable traffic between embassy officials in Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis to Washington conveyed the balance the administration needed to strike between maintaining the United States' traditional alliances with Morocco and Tunisia while opening up a fruitful new relationship with Algeria—a difficult task given that each country was important to the United States for different reasons.

From 1979 through 1981, Bendjedid and members of his government had helped to mediate the resolution of the Iran hostage crisis; Bendjedid also exhibited a far less suspicious view of the United States than his predecessor, Houari Boumédiène. The Reagan administration

wished to capitalize on this new dynamic and worked to resolve contentious bilateral issues with Algeria, such as the continued U.S. purchase of liquefied natural gas from Algeria, as the Algerian Government considered the successful conclusion of these sales emblematic of the new and improved relationship between the two countries. Tensions, however, existed over Bendjedid's support for the UN's "Global Negotiations" on the international economy, which the Reagan administration ultimately opposed. The administration also had to balance Algeria's support for, and training of, Palestine Liberation Organization members with its willingness to become a key player in Washington's attempts to secure the release of U.S. hostages taken both in Lebanon and during the numerous airplane hijacking and other terrorist incidents that occurred during the 1980s.

Long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia offered opportunities for, and challenges to, the Reagan administration. Both Hassan and Bourguiba, suspicious of the Soviet Union and concerned about Qadhafi's adventurism, sought to maintain the strong defense relationships that their respective countries had enjoyed with the United States for decades. They also considered themselves leaders of the "moderate" Arab bloc and practitioners of international diplomacy, and sought to leverage these defense relationships with the United States to influence the Reagan administration's policies regarding the Middle East peace process, the civil war in Angola, and the Namibian conflict. The relationship between the Reagan administration and King Hassan had its ups and downs. For example, while the 1984 "Union" between Morocco and Libya angered Washington, Hassan's July 1986 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was warmly received there. The close relationship between the United States and Israel affected the Reagan administration's relationship with Tunisia. Israel's October 1985 attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization's headquarters in Tunis, for example, temporarily threatened to disrupt U.S.-Tunisian relations. Tunisia was later beset by food riots and external crises, such as Qadhafi's expulsion of thousands of Tunisian oil workers from Libya, which exacerbated Tunisia's internal divisions. These crises compelled Bourguiba to request more economic aid from Reagan. In 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office and replaced by Zine Ben Ali, who quickly assured the Reagan administration that he wished to reinvigorate U.S.-Tunisia relations.

The final chapter of the volume documents U.S. policy toward Western Sahara. Like its predecessor, the Reagan administration tried to end the war in Western Sahara. While it worked with the UN and OAU to mediate an end to the conflict, it acknowledged that Algeria's and Libya's material support for the POLISARIO guerrillas, Morocco's continued use of U.S. arms in the conflict, and Morocco's contentious relationship with Mauritania, including charges that the latter allowed POLISARIO

guerillas safe haven, all complicated its efforts and prevented a settlement of the conflict. The conflict also significantly hampered the efforts to encourage Maghreb unity explored in the regional compilation. Reporting telegrams and intelligence memoranda show how the divide between Algeria and Morocco and Mauritania and Morocco hampered the conclusion of a settlement of the Western Saharan war, particularly when the Algerian and Mauritanian governments complained that Morocco was using U.S. military equipment against the POLISARIO.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, especially Lisa Magana and Cate Sewell, for facilitating research in the files of the Reagan White House and National Security Council staff, and Simon Staats at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, who copied relevant documents from the George H.W. Bush Vice Presidential Papers that proved crucial to the completion of this volume. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for arranging access to Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archives Capture declassification project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the CIA was accommodating in arranging full access to CIA files, as was Vincent Kenney, who provided access to records from the Department of Defense. Special thanks are due to the Department of State's Information Programs and Services staff, in particular Ambassador Paul Hare and Kathleen Allegrone of the Senior Foreign Service, for coordinating the review of this volume within the Department of State. The editor also wishes to acknowledge the late Ambassador Harmon E. Kirby, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affairs in Morocco from 1984 until 1987, who, after his retirement from the Foreign Service, coordinated the review of dozens of Foreign Relations volumes during his years of service in the Department of State's Office of Information Programs and Services. The editor is also grateful to the staff at the Records and Declassification Division, Washington Headquarters Service, Department of Defense, for their help in declassifying some of the documents included in this volume.

The Office of the Historian wishes to thank the interagency declassification personnel who conducted the review of this volume, including those at the Department of State, Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), the FRUS Coordination Team at the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSD, Records and Declassification Division (RDD) at the Department of Defense, and the Directorate of Records, Access and Information Security Management at the National Security Council.

Chris Tudda conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the documentation under the supervision of Myra Burton,

then Chief of the Africa and the Americas Division, and Kristin L. Ahlberg, Assistant General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Team Lead of the Declassification Coordination Team. Stephanie Eckroth and Nicole Orphanides did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Team Lead of the Editing and Publishing Team. Both declassification review and technical editing were coordinated by John Powers, Director of the Declassification Coordination, Publishing, and Digital Initiatives Division.

Chris Tudda, Ph.D.

Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Vol. XXIV

The files at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, in Simi Valley, California, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in North Africa during the Reagan administration. In particular, the White House Staff and Office Files Collections were a vital source for this volume. Of these collections, the most important files were the Executive Secretariat, National Security Council (NSC) Files, including the Country File for Africa, the Agency File, which contains memoranda from Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz, and the Head of State File; and the files of the Near East and South Asia Affairs NSC Directorate. Another important collection is the George Shultz Papers, a rich repository of key memoranda of conversation between Shultz and Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, and other leading political figures, as well as the Evening Reports and other memoranda Shultz provided to Reagan.

The Vice Presidential Records housed at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, contain records crucial to documenting the Reagan administration's North African policies. As Vice President, Bush traveled to, and met with, the leaders of every country in the region except for Mauritania. Particularly useful for this volume were the files of Donald Gregg, Bush's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

It would be impossible to document the Reagan administration's North African policies without examining the records of the Departments of State and Defense, as Haig, Shultz, Secretaries of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, and their subordinates exerted considerable influence over the development of U.S. policies toward the region. The Department of State Central Foreign Policy File and institutional lot files are invaluable. The lot file containing the records of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam's Official Files contains his personal notes of meetings for which official minutes were not found elsewhere. The lot file containing the records of L. Paul Bremer II, Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, holds key documentation on the discussion of terrorism. The lot files containing the records of the Department of State's Nodis and Exdis Telegrams, 1985–1988, have invaluable telegrams between the Department and various posts. The Central Foreign Policy File, consisting of D, P, and N reels, replaced the pre-1973 paper subject-numeric file. The D and N reels contain the

cable traffic between Washington and posts and, for the purposes of this particular volume, provide additional background information concerning key concepts and events. The P (Paper) reels consist of microfilmed versions of memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, airgrams, and memoranda to principals. The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, will eventually include the Central Foreign Policy File as part of Record Group 59 (RG 59).

The Department of Defense records contain important memoranda of conversation and other records that document Weinberger's, and his subordinates'—in particular Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis "Bing" West and his successor, Richard "Dick" Armitage—discussions with regional leaders, during which they sought to augment the defense relationship between the United States and Morocco and Tunisia. The editor also examined records at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Lot Files

- Lot 12D215: Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams
- Lot 85D251: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files
- Lot 85D308: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files
- Lot 87D431: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985
- Lot 89D94: Executive Secretariat, Papers of George Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982–1989
- Lot 89D149: Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files
- Lot 89D155: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Official Office Files of the Secretary handled by Under Secretary Allen Wallis
- Lot 89D283: Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism
- Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, 1 January 1984–21 January 1989 Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents
- Lot 93D490: Office of Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Under Secretary's Official Economic Summit Files, 1975–1981

Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents:
Not for the System Documents 1979–1989
Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, 1985 Nodis Memoranda
Lot 94D93: Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Memoranda
Lot 94D432: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda
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Lot 94D552: Executive Secretariat, 1988 Nodis Telegrams
Lot 95D23: Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams
Lot 95D25: Executive Secretariat, 1985 Nodis Telegrams
Lot 95D26: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Nodis Telegrams
Lot 2015D608: Executive Secretariat, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The
Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism

INR/IL Historical Files

NEA/CIA/INR Meetings

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

White House Staff and Office Files

Crisis Management Center, National Security Council

Elaine L. Morton Files

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council

Agency File

Subject File

Country File

Head of State File

National Security Decision Directives

Near East and South Asian Directorate, National Security Council

William J. Burns Files

Burns/Ross Subject Files

Jock Covey Files

Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files

Personal Papers

Frank Carlucci Papers

George Shultz Papers

President's Daily Diary

George H. W. Bush Presidential Library

Vice Presidential Records

Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files

Vice Presidential Daily Files

Central Intelligence Agency

National Intelligence Council

Job 90T00155R

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Job 83M00035R

Job 83M00914R

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Alexander Haig Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-83-0104: 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-85-0023: 1983 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-86-0004: 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-86-0048: 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-87-0007: 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-87-0008: 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-88-0039: 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-88-0040: 1986 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-88-0058: 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library. <http://www.reaganfoundation.org>

Abbreviations and Terms

ABC, American Broadcasting Company
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/C, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/E, Office of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/I, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/W, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, air force base
AFP, *Agence France-Presse*
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/AA/ANE, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Agency for International Development
AID/NENA, Office of North Eastern/North African Affairs, Agency for International Development
AID/PPC, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development
AID/PPC/PPB, Office of Planning and Budget, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AL, Arab League
AMB, ambassador
AMH, Alexander M. Haig
ANO, Abu Nidal Organization
APU, Arab Parliamentary Union
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD/ISA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASST, assistant
ATA, Anti-Terrorism Assistance
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft

C, Confidential; Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CAR, Central African Republic
CBU, Cluster Bomb Unit
CDA, Camp David Agreements
CHEROKEE, communications channel between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe
CMSN, *Comité Militaire de Salut National* (Committee for National Salvation), Mauritania
Codel, Congressional Delegation
Col., Colonel
COM, Chief of Mission
COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Forces, United States Navy
COMSIXTHFLT, Commander, Sixth Fleet, United States Navy

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

CPD, Capability Production Document
CPPG, Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CPR, Chief of Protocol, Office of the Secretary of State
CT, counter-terrorism
CVBG, carrier battle group
CW, chemical weapons
C-130, turboprop military transport and tactical airlifter aircraft

D, Democrat; Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DAO, Defense Attaché's Office
DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
DATT, defense attaché
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration
DEB, Defense Estimative Brief
DefMin, Defense Minister
Del, delegate; delegation
DEPSECDEF, Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAAPPR, Defense Intelligence Agency Appraisal
DOC, Department of Commerce
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DOE, Department of Energy
DOJ, Department of Justice
DOLS, dollars
DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency

EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IEP, Office of International Energy Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, Economic Commission; European Community
ECONCOUNS, economic counselor
EID, Eid al-Fitr, Muslim Feast of Breaking the Fast marking the end of Ramadan
EMBOFF, Embassy officer
ESF, Economic Support Fund
EST, Eastern Standard Time; Emergency Support Team
EUCOM, United States European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and Canadian Affairs), Department of State
EUR/EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and Canadian Affairs), Department of State
EUR/EEY, Office of Eastern European and Yugoslavia Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and Canadian Affairs), Department of State
EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and Canadian Affairs), Department of State
Ex gratia, voluntarily, or without recognizing any liability or legal obligation
EXDIS, exclusive distribution (indicates extremely limited dissemination)

FAR, *Forces Armées Royales* (Moroccan Armed Forces)
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

- FLN**, *Front de Libération Nationale* (Algeria)
FMS, Foreign Military Sales
FMSCR, Foreign Military Sales Credit
FOB, Free or Freight on Board
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FOSIF, Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility
FRC, Federal Records Center
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FROLINAT, *Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad* (National Liberation Front of Chad)
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
F-15, twin-engine tactical fighter aircraft
- GA**, General Assembly, United Nations
GB, George Bush
GIRM, Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
GK, Geoffrey Kemp
GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GOA, Government of Algeria
GOI, Government of Iran; Government of Israel
GOM, Government of Morocco
GON, Government of Niger
GOT, Government of Tunisia
GPS, George P. Shultz
GRH, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
GSOMIA, General Security of Military Information Agreement
GUNT, *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* or Transitional Government of National Unity (Chad)
- H**, Bureau of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HIM, His Imperial Majesty
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
HQ, headquarters
HQUSAFE, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa
HRF, Hostage or Hostile Rescue Force
HT, Howard Teicher
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IEEPA, International Emergency Economic Powers Act
IG, Interdepartmental Group
IIM, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
IMET, International Military Education and Training, Department of Defense
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/AA, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/AR/GIS, Office of Assessments of Research, Global Issue Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/C, Office of Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/IL, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

INR/INC/IC, Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/IRE/CGC, Collection Guidance Center, Office of Intelligence Resources, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/NESA, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/PMA, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/PMA/RF, Regional Forces Division, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/RCRS, Reports Coordination and Review Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IntSum, intelligence summary

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IO/UNA, Washington Office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IO/UNP, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

ISA, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

ISA/NESA, Office of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

IVP, International Visitors Program

JANA, Libyan News Agency

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCW, John C. Whitehead

JEC, Joint Economic Commission

JMC, Joint Military Commission

JP, John Poindexter

KIA, killed in action

KU, Kuwait Airways

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/AF, Office of African Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/EBC, Office of Economic, Business, and Communications Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/NEA, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/PM, Office of Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

LIMDIS, limited distribution

LITF, Libya Interagency Task Force

LNG, liquid natural gas

LPB, L. Paul Bremer; Libyan People's Bureau

LTF, Libya Task Force

M-60, main battle tank of the United States Army

M/CT, Office of Counter-Terrorism, Department of State

MA, Michael Armacost

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MAU, Marine Amphibious Unit

MDS, *Mouvement Démocratique et Social* (Democratic and Social Movement), Morocco

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MILAN, light anti-tank infantry missile

MILATT, military attaché
MMBTU, one million British thermal units
MNF, Multinational Force (Lebanon)
MOD, Ministry of Defense
MPLA, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MTI, *Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique* (Movement of Islamic Tendency), Morocco
MTT, Military Training Team
MUSLO, Morocco-United States Liaison Office

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NB, *Nota Bene*, note the matter at hand
NDCP, National Disclosure Policy Committee, Department of Defense
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/AFN, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/ECON, Office of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/EGY, Office of Egyptian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/MEN, Office of Middle East Negotiations, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NIACT, night action (indicator of precedence level in a telegraphed message)
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NM, nautical miles
NOCONTRACT, no dissemination to contractors
NODIS, no distribution
NOFORN, no foreign dissemination
NOTAL, not all (telegram A, referenced in telegram B, was not sent to all the recipients of telegram B)
NSC, National Security Council
NSDD, National Security Decision Directive
NSSD, National Security Study Directive

OAU, Organization of African Unity
OFC, office
OIC, Organization of Islamic Countries
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ORCON, Originator Controlled
ORIG, original
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OV-10, turboprop light attack, forward air control, and observation aircraft
OVP, Office of the Vice President
OVP/NSA, Office of the Vice President, National Security Advisor

P, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State; President
PanAm, Pan American World Airways
PCLS, People's Committee for Libyan Students
PDRY, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PERMREP, Permanent Representative

XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PKF, OAU Peacekeeping Force

PL/P.L., Public Law

P.L. 480, Public Law 480; Food for Peace

PLF, Palestine Liberation Front

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime Minister

PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/P, Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/SAS, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNC, Palestine National Congress

POLAD, political advisor

POLISARIO, *Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro* (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro)

POLOFF, Political Officer

POLTO, Series indicator for telegrams sent from the Under Secretary for Political Affairs while on travel

PRG, Policy Review Group

PriMin, Prime Minister

QTE, quote

R, Republican

RCM, Robert C. McFarlane

RDF, Rapid Deployment Force

RDJTF, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

REF, reference

REFTEL, reference telegram

REP, representative

RESO, resolution

RG, Record Group, National Archives and Records Administration

RP, Bureau of Refugee Programs, Department of State

RPT, repeat

RR, Ronald Reagan

RVA, Richard V. Allen

S, Secret; Office of the Secretary of State

S/CPR, Chief of Protocol, Office of the Secretary of State

S/CT, Office of the Ambassador-At Large for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, (Policy Planning Council during the mid-1980s), Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-O, Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

SADR/SDAR, Sahrawi (Saharan) Arab Democratic Republic/Sahrawi (Saharan) Democratic Arab Republic

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government

SAM-6/8, Soviet mobile surface-to-air missile systems

SARG, Syrian Arab Revolutionary Government

SecDef, Secretary of Defense

Secto, Series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State (used for telegrams from the Secretary or his party while he is on travel)

SecGen, Secretary General, United Nations

SEPTel, separate telegram

SF, Special Forces

SIG or S/IG, Senior Interdepartmental Group

SPECAT, special category (message requiring special handling)

SSG, Special Situation Group

STADIS, State Distribution Only

SYG, Secretary General

T, Bureau of Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Department of State

TAP, *Tunis Afrique Presse*

TIWG, Terrorist Incident Working Group

TOPOL, Series indicator for telegrams sent to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs while on travel

TOR, terms of reference

Tosec, Series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State or his party while on travel

TOW, wire-guided anti-tank missile

TOW night sights, wire-guided anti-tank missiles with night vision

TWA, Trans World Airlines

U, unclassified

UAE, United Arab Emirates

UGTT, *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (General Union of Tunisian Workers)

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR, United Nations High Commission on Refugees

UNITA, *União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence for Angola)

UNQTE, unquote

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNSCR, United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSYG, United Nations Secretary General

UNTT, *Union Nationale de Travailleurs Tunisiens* (National Union of Tunisian Workers)

U.S./US, United States

USAF, United States Air Force

USASAC, United States Army Security Assistance Command

USCENTCOM, United States Central Command

USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, European Command

USCINCSOUTH, United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command

USDAO, United States Defense Attaché's Office

USDOC, United States Department of Commerce

USDOCOSOUTH, United States Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe

USG, United States Government

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIS, United States Information Service

USN, United States Navy

USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

XXVIII Abbreviations and Terms

VADM, Vice Admiral

V/R, Very Respectfully

VIP, very important person

VIZ., namely or that is to say

VOA, Voice of America

VP/V.P., Vice President

WPC, William P. Clark

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

- Abbas, Abu (Muhammad Zaidan)**, founder of the Palestine Liberation Front, 1977; mastermind of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, 1985
- Abdelghani, Mohamed**, Algerian Prime Minister from March 8, 1979, until January 22, 1984
- Abramowitz, Morton**, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985, until 1986; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, from 1986 until 1989
- Al-Sabah, Jaber Al-Ahmad**, Emir of Kuwait from 1977
- Allen, Richard V. "Dick"**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982
- Anderson, G. Norman**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from 1982 until 1986; U.S. Ambassador to Sudan from August 12, 1986, until October 24, 1989
- Arafat, Yassir**, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization
- Armacost, Michael H.**, UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs from May 18, 1984 until March 2, 1989
- Armitage, Richard "Rich" or "Dick,"** Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, from June 5, 1983, until June 5, 1989
- Assad (Asad), Hafez al-**, President of Syria from March 14, 1971
- Babamine, Cheikh Sid Ahmed Ould**, Mauritanian Foreign Minister from December 12, 1984
- Baccouche, Hédi**, Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs, 1987; Tunisian Prime Minister from November 7, 1987, until September 27, 1989
- Baker, Howard**, Senator (R-Tennessee) until 1985; Senator Majority Leader from January 3, 1981, until January 3, 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 3, 1988
- Baker, James A., III**, White House Chief of Staff from January 20, 1981, until February 3, 1985; Secretary of the Treasury from February 4, 1985, until August 17, 1988
- Baldrige, Malcolm H. "Mac,"** Secretary of Commerce from January 1981 until July 25, 1987
- Baly, Slaheddine**, Tunisian Minister Defense from 1980 until 1988
- Bargach, M'hamed**, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from 1986 until 1989
- Basri, Driss**, Moroccan Minister of the Interior from 1979
- Begin, Menachem**, Israeli Prime Minister from June 21, 1977, until October 10, 1983
- Belkheir, Larbi**, General and Head of the Algerian High Council for Security and Senior Adviser to President Bendjedid
- Beloucif, Mostafa**, Algerian Defense Secretary General
- Ben Ali, Zine El Abdine**, Tunisian Prime Minister from October 2, 1987, until November 7, 1987; President of Tunisia from November 7, 1987
- Ben Yahia, Habib**, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States from 1981 until August 1988; Tunisian Deputy Foreign Minister from August 1988
- Bendjedid, Chadli**, President of Algeria from February 9, 1979
- Bengelloun, Ali**, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from 1977 until 1984
- Benouniche, Saadeddine**, Director of Algeria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Bensouda, Ahmed**, Counselor-Advisor to King Hassan II of Morocco
- Berrada, Mohamed**, Moroccan Minister of Finance from 1986
- Bessaih, Boualem**, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1988 until 1989
- Bishop, James K.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 until 1987
- Biwott, Nicholas**, Kenyan Minister of State from 1979 until 1982
- Block, John R.**, Secretary of Agriculture from January 23, 1981, until February 14, 1986

- Bnejjara, Sid Ahmed Ould**, Mauritanian Prime Minister from December 12, 1980, until April 25, 1981
- Bongo Ondimba, El Hadj Omar**, President of Gabon from 1967
- Borg, Parker**, Director of the Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1979 until 1981; U.S. Ambassador to Mali from September 18, 1981, until July 8, 1984; Deputy Director of the Office of Combating Terrorism, Department of State, from 1984 until 1986
- Bosworth, Stephen**, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from March 27, 1979, until June 22, 1981
- Bouabid, Matti**, Moroccan Prime Minister from March 22, 1979, until November 30, 1983
- Boucetta, Mohamed**, Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1977 until 1983
- Boumediène, Houari**, President of Algeria from 1965 until 1978
- Bourguiba, Habib**, President of Tunisia from 1957 until November 7, 1987
- Boverie, Richard**, Major General, USA; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from June 1981 until June 1982
- Bremer, L. Paul "Jerry" III**, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from February 2, 1981, until March 27, 1983; Ambassador to the Netherlands from August 31, 1983, until August 25, 1986; Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism from October 16, 1986, until May 25, 1989
- Bruce, Robert**, Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Burkhalter, E.A., Jr.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Burleigh, A. Peter**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1987 until 1989
- Burns, William J.**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council, from 1986 until 1988
- Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1981, until January 20, 1989
- Carlucci, Frank Charles, III**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1978 until February 4, 1981; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, 1981, until December 31, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 2, 1986, until November 23, 1987; Secretary of Defense from November 23, 1987, until January 20, 1989
- Carter, James Earl "Jimmy,"** President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Casey, Mary Ann**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from 1981 until 1984; Deputy Director, Office for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, Department of State, from 1984 until 1986; Director of North African Affairs, Department of State, from 1986 until 1989
- Casey, William J. "Bill,"** Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981, until May 6, 1987
- Chain, John T. "Jack,"** General, USAF; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, United States Air Force, from 1981 until 1982; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, United States Air Force, from 1982 until 1984; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985; Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, from 1986
- Cherkaoui, Mohamed**, Moroccan Foreign Ministry State Secretary
- Cheyssson, Claude**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 until 1984
- Chirac, Jacques**, French Prime Minister from March 20, 1986, until May 10, 1988
- Christopher, Warren**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977 until January 20, 1981
- Clark, William P. "Bill," Jr. or "Judge,"** Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, 1983

- Clarke, Walter**, Director, Office of Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Cohen, Herman J.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from 1980 until 1984; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council, from 1987 until 1989
- Coon, Carleton**, Director, Office of North Africa, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1981
- Courtemanche, Jack**, Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the First Lady from February 1986 until January 20, 1989
- Covey, James P. "Jock,"** Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1982 until 1984
- Crocker, Chester**, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1981 until 1989
- Curran, Robert "Tad,"** Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, from 1981 until 1984
- Cutler, Walter**, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from March 2, 1982, until January 2, 1984
- Daddah, Abdallah Ould**, Mauritanian Ambassador to the United States from 1980 until 1983
- Dam, Kenneth W.**, Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985
- Darman, Richard "Dick,"** Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff from January 1981 until August 1981; Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff from September 1981 until February 1, 1985; Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 until 1987
- De Marenches, Alexandre**, Head of French Intelligence from 1970 until 1981
- Deaver, Michael K. "Mike,"** White House Deputy Chief of Staff from January 20 1981, until May 1985
- Diallo, Issa**, Senior Deputy to United Nations Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar
- Diouf, Abdou**, President of Senegal from 1981; Chairman of the Organization of African Unity from July 18, 1985, until July 28, 1986
- Djerejian, Edward**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1986 until 1988
- Dlimi, Ahmed**, Chief of Moroccan Security Services until 1983
- Dobriansky, Paula**, Member, Office of Political Affairs, National Security Council, from 1981 until 1982; Deputy Director in the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1987
- Dos Santos, José Eduardo**, President of Angola from 1979
- Draper, Morris**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, until 1983
- Dubenstein, Kenneth "Ken,"** Deputy White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988; White House Chief of Staff from July 1, 1988, until January 20, 1989
- Duke, Angier**, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from December 20, 1979, until February 28, 1981
- Dur, Philip A.**, member, National Security Council Staff from 1982 until 1984; Deputy Director of NSC Political-Military Affairs Directorate from 1983 until 1984; Director of NSC Political-Military Affairs Directorate, 1984
- Eagleburger, Lawrence S. "Larry,"** Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 14, 1981, until January 26, 1982; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982, until May 1, 1984
- Eanes, António Ramalho**, President of Portugal until 1986
- Eastham, Alan**, Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from 1987 until 1988
- Eckert, William "Bill,"** Military Assistant to the Vice President from 1981 until 1984

- Edwards, James B.**, Secretary of Energy from January 23, 1981, until November 5, 1982
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1953, until January 20, 1961
- Essebsi, Beji Caid**, Tunisian Foreign Minister from April 15, 1981, until September 15, 1986
- Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud**, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia from 1975 until 1982; King of Saudi Arabia from 1982
- Feldman, Harvey**, Alternative U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1981 until 1986
- Filali, Abdellatif**, Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1985
- Flaten, Robert**, Director of the Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1981 until 1982
- Fortier, Donald**, Deputy Director for Policy, Department of State, from 1981 until 1982; Director for Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council, from September 1982 until June 1983; Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs and Special Assistant to the President from June 1983 until December 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President from December 1983 until December 1985; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 10, 1985, until spring 1986
- Fraga Iribarne, Manuel**, President of the People's Alliance/People's Party (Spain)
- Fuller, Craig**, Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs from September 14, 1981, until December 31, 1984; Chief of Staff to the Vice President from 1985 until 1988
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Gnehm, Edward**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Near East and South Asia
- Goldberg, Sherwood "Woody,"** Special Advisor to the Secretary of State from 1981 until 1982
- González Márquez, Felipe**, Spanish Prime Minister from 1982
- Gorbachev, Mikhail S.**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, from 1985
- Green, Grant**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1986 until 1987
- Gregg, Donald "Don,"** member, National Security Council Staff until from 1979 until July 1982; Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from August 1982 to January 1989
- Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, until 1985
- Guédira, Ahmed Reda**, Royal Counselor-Advisor to King Hassan II of Morocco
- Habib, Philip**, President's Special Envoy to the Middle East from 1981 until 1983
- Habré, Hissène**, President of Chad from June 7, 1982
- Haidalla(h), Mohamed Khouna Ould**, President of Mauritania from January 4, 1980, until December 12, 1984
- Haig, Alexander M., Jr.**, Secretary of State from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982
- Hassan II**, King of Morocco from 1961
- Hawes, John**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from 1985 until 1987; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, from 1987 until 1989
- Hedda, Ali**, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States
- Helm, Robert**, Director of Defense Programs, National Security Council, from 1982 until 1984
- Hill, M. Charles**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; Executive Aide to Secretary of State Shultz from 1985 until 1989
- Hodel, Donald P.**, Secretary of Energy, November 5, 1982, until February 7, 1985

Holmes, H. Allen, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from July 19, 1985, to April 13, 1986; Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from April 14, 1985, to August 8, 1989

Hussein bin Tal, King of Jordan from 1953

Ibrahimi, Ahmed, Algerian Foreign Minister from 1982 until 1988

Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2, 1981, until January 17, 1988

Jallud, Abdelassalam, Deputy Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council

Jobert, Michel, Minister of Foreign Trade of France from 1981 until 1983

John Paul II (Karol Jozef Wojtyla), Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church and Sovereign of Vatican City

Johnson, Susan, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Johnstone, L. Craig, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from September 9, 1985, until July 10, 1988

Jones, David C., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 1982

Jorio, Maati, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from 1984 until 1985

Kampelman, Max, Counselor, Department of State, from 1987 until 1989

Kaunda, Kenneth, President of Zambia; Chairman of the Organization of African Unity from July 27, 1987, until May 25, 1988

Keel, Alton G., member, National Security Council Staff; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kemp, Geoffrey, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council

Kerroum, Nuruddin, Algerian Foreign Secretary

Khashoggi, Adnan, Saudi businessman involved with Iran-Contra affair

Khediri, El-Hadi, Algerian Minister of Interior

Khellef, Abdelaziz, Commerce Minister and Special Emissary of Algeria

Kimmitt, Robert M. "Bob," member, National Security Council Staff, until 1983; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985

Kirby, Harmon E., Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Morocco, from 1984 until 1987

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from February 4, 1981, until April 1, 1985

Klibi, Chedli, Secretary General of the Arab League from 1979

Kohl, Helmut, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 until 1988; Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1982

Korn, David, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, from July 1982 until July 1985

Lakehal-Ayat, Medjedoub (Madjdoub), Algerian Central Director of Military Security

Lamrani, Mohammed Karim, Moroccan Prime Minister from November 30, 1983, until September 30, 1986

Lantos, Tom, Congressman (D-California) and member of the House Foreign Relations Committee

Larijani, Mohammad-Javad, Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ledsky, Nelson, Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning, Department of State, from 1985 until 1986

Levitsky, Melvyn, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1987 until 1989

Lilac, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983

- Mabrouk, Hedi**, Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1986 until 1987
- Mack, David**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from 1979 until 1982; Director, Office of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from 1982 until 1985
- Malek, Redha**, Algerian Ambassador to the United States; one of the main negotiators during the U.S. hostage crisis in 1980
- Mauroy, Pierre**, French Prime Minister from 1981 until 1984
- McDaniel, Rodney**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from March 1985 until January 1986; Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from January 29, 1986, until 1987
- McElhany, Samuel**, Director, Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, Department of State
- McFarlane, Robert C. "Bud,"** Counselor to the Department of State from February 28, 1981, until April 4, 1982; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1982 until 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 17, 1983, until December 4, 1985
- McKinley, Brunson**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1983 to 1986
- McMahon, John N.**, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1982 until 1986
- McManaway, Clayton E., Jr.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, 1981 until September 1983
- McNeil, Francis J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1983 until February 1987
- Meese, Edwin "Ed," III**, Counselor to the President from January 1981 until January 1985; Attorney General of the United States from February 1985 until August 1988
- Menarchik, Douglas**, Military Advisor to Vice President Bush
- Mengistu, Haile Miriam**, Chairman of the Derg and Head of State of Ethiopia until 1987
- Mestiri, Mahmoud**, Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1987 until 1988
- Minni, Ahmed Ould**, Mauritanian Foreign Minister from 1981 until December 1986; Chief of Staff, Army of Mauritania, from December 1986
- Mitterrand, Francois**, President of France from 1981
- Moi, Daniel arap**, President of Kenya from 1978
- Montgomery, Hugh**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 19, 1981, to January 6, 1985
- Morton, Elaine**, Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1978 until July 1985; member of Crisis Management Center, National Security Council, from August 1985 until October 1986
- Mubarak, Hosni**, President of Egypt from 1981
- Murphy, Richard W. "Dick,"** Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from August 19, 1981, until August 21, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from October 27, 1983, until May 15, 1989
- Mzali, Mohamed**, Tunisian Prime Minister from April 23, 1980, until July 8, 1986
- Nance, James W. "Bud,"** Admiral, USN; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1981 until January 1982
- Nassif, Thomas**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from 1985 until 1988
- Newlin, Michael**, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from October 28, 1981, until July 21, 1985
- Nidal, Abu (Sabri Khalil al-Banna)**, Founder of The Fatah Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal Organization), a splinter group of the Palestine Liberation Organization
- North, Oliver "Ollie,"** Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs, National Security Council from 1981 until 1986

Oakley, Robert, Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State, from September 10, 1984, until October 12, 1986; Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia from January 1, 1987, until August 1988

Onu, Peter, Acting Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity from 1983 until 1985

Ouko, Robert, Kenyan Foreign Minister from 1979 until 1983 and from 1988

Pearson, W. Robert, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1985 until 1987

Peck, Edward, U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania from February 19, 1983, until July 7, 1985

Pelletreau, Robert "Bob," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia from 1980 until 1981 and from 1985 until 1987; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1983 until 1985; Ambassador to Tunisia from July 1, 1987

Peres, Shimon, Prime Minister of Israel from 1984 until 1986

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982

Perito, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff

Platt, Nicholas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1981 until 1982; Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1985 until 1987

Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1981 until 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 17, 1983, until December 3, 1985; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 4, 1985, until November 25, 1986

Powell, Colin, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1983 until 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 1, 1986, until November 23, 1987; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 23, 1987, until January 20, 1989

Qadhafi, Muammar, Leader of the Libyan Arab Republic

Quinn, Kenneth, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

Raphel, Arnold "Arnie," Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from June 1982 until 1984; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1984 until 1987; Director of the Libya Task Force, 1986; U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from May 4, 1987, until August 18, 1988

Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States from January 21, 1981, until January 20, 1989

Reed, Joseph Verner, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from November 7, 1981, until May 21, 1985

Rentschler, James M., member, National Security Council Staff

Ringdahl, Philip "Phil," member, African Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1984 until 1986

Rixse, J. H. "Jay," Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Roberts, Owen, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa from July 1980 until May 1982

Robinson, Davis R., Legal Adviser of the Department of State, from 1981 until 1985

Rodman, Peter W., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from 1984 until 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1986 until 1987; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Counselor of the National Security Council from 1987

Ross, Christopher W.S., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Algiers, from 1979 until 1981; Executive Assistant Secretary to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1985 until 1988; Ambassador to Algeria from September 20, 1988

- Saadi, Moussa**, Moroccan Minister of Energy and Mines
- Sadat, Anwar**, President of Egypt until October 6, 1981
- Sahbani, Taieb**, Tunisian Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1986 until 1988
- Sahnoun, Mohamed**, Algerian Ambassador to the United States from 1984 until 1989
- Salek, Ould**, Polisario Representative to Algeria
- Savimbi, Jonas**, founder of *União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence for Angola) or UNITA
- Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 1, 1982
- Schneider, David**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1981 until 1985
- Schneider, William, Jr.**, Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget, from January 1981 to August 1982; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from September 1982
- Schrager, Stanley**, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott from September 1980 until July 1982
- Schweitzer, Robert L.**, Brigadier General, USA; member, National Security Council Staff, from January until October 1981
- Sebastian, Peter**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, from 1980 until 1982; Director of the Office of North Africa Affairs, Department of State, from 1982 until 1984; U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from July 3, 1984, until February 19, 1987
- Seitz, Raymond, G.H.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1982 until 1984
- Sékou Touré, Ahmed**, President of Guinea until March 26, 1984
- Sfar, Rachid**, Tunisian Prime Minister from July, 1986, until October 2, 1987
- Shamir, Yitzhak**, Israeli Prime Minister from October 10, 1983, until September 13, 1984, and from October 20, 1986
- Shoemaker, Christopher "Chris,"** member, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1981 until 1982
- Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of State from July 16, 1982, until January 20, 1989
- Solomon, Richard**, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1986 until 1989
- Speakes, Larry**, White House Press Secretary from March 30, 1981, until February 1, 1987
- Stark, James**, member, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1985 until 1986
- Stevens, Paul Schott**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council from January 1987 until November 1987; Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from November 1987 until January 20, 1989
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1981 until January 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982
- Taft, William Howard IV**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1984, until April 22, 1989
- Tanter, Raymond**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1981 until 1982
- Taya, Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed**, President of Mauritania from 1984
- Tazi, Abdelhaq**, Moroccan Minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Teicher, Howard**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983; Director of the Near East and South Asia Directorate, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985; Senior Director, Political and Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1985 until 1986
- Thatcher, Margaret**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979

Tower, John, Senator (R-Texas) and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1981 until 1986

Turayki (Treki), Ali Abdelssalem, Libyan Foreign Secretary from 1976 until 1982

Tyson, Charles, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ussery, Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, from 1985 until 1988; Director, Libya Task Force, 1986; U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Morocco from December 22, 1988

Veliotis, Nicholas A., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1981 until 1983; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from October 7, 1983, until April 1, 1986

Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1982 until 1985; Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs from 1985 until 1989

Walters, Vernon A. "Dick," U.S. Ambassador-at-Large from 1981 until 1989; U.S. Ambassador and Representative to the United Nations from 1985 until 1989

Wayne, Earl Anthony, Special Assistant to Secretaries of State Haig and Shultz

Weinberger, Caspar W. "Cap," Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1981, until November 23, 1987

West, Francis J., Jr. "Bing," Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until April 1981, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April 1981 until May 1983

Wettering, Frederick "Fred," member, Political Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1981 until 1982; Director of African Affairs, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1984

Wheeler, Michael O., Staff Secretary, National Security Council from 1982 until 1983

Whitehead, John, Deputy Secretary of State from July 9, 1985, until January 20, 1989

Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency from 1981 until 1989

Williams, James A., Lieutenant General, USA; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1981 until September 1985

Wisner, Frank G., U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 28, 1979, until April 19, 1982; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1982 until 1986; Ambassador to Egypt from August 28, 1986

Wolfowitz, Paul, Director of Policy Planning Staff from January 1981 until December 1982

Woods, James "Jim," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs from 1986 until 1994

Yaker, Layachi, Algerian Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1982; Ambassador to the United States from 1982 until 1984

Zweifel, David, Director, Office of North Africa, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1984 until 1987; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Yemen from October 24, 1981, until June 20, 1984

North Africa Region

1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 21, 1981

1. *My Meeting With Warren Christopher*: I met with Warren Christopher when he returned today and congratulated him on the completion of a very difficult negotiation.² He praised the Algerians for their role and suggested that we have a special opportunity to develop further this relationship. We agreed that we should wait a decent interval after this agreement before new arms shipments (OV10 aircraft) or sales of new items (M-60 tanks) to Morocco. I have this question under study. On the agreement, I assured him that, while we wished to study it and learn more of its implications, we recognized it generally as a binding obligation.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (06/06/1981-07/02/1981). Secret.

² Reference is to Christopher's role in negotiating the Algiers Accords. See footnote 3, Document 97. No memorandum of the Haig-Christopher conversation was found.

2. **Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State**¹

Tunis, January 29, 1981, 1232Z

737. Subject: (U) Libyan Foreign Secretary's Visit. Ref: Tunis 685.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. A Tunisian cabinet minister directly involved in the visit of Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki has highlighted for the Ambassador the main results. Source said that the meeting between Turayki and Prime Minister Mzali included several acrimonious exchanges and was dominated by each side's interpretations of the reasons for sour relations in the past. An element which strongly contributed to the tense atmosphere throughout Turayki's visit was the refusal of President Bourguiba to receive the Libyan emissary. According to source, it was Bourguiba who had invited Turayki to Tunis, and the latter for his part clearly did not believe the medical excuse proffered as the reason for President's failure to receive him.

3. In a foretaste of the next step in Libyan diplomacy toward Tunisia, Turayki pushed hard for a follow-up visit to Tripoli by a Tunisian Minister. This would probably be Mzali's close associate Mezri Chekir. The latter is not enthusiastic, especially since he would have to discuss the prospect for a visit by the Prime Minister himself. President Bourguiba, for his part, is inclined to delay any further diplomatic moves, primarily to gauge the evolving international situation following upon the Libyan invasion of Chad. On the other hand, there is a strong school of thought within the GOT that Tunisia can expect help from no one if Libya turns against it. Tunisia must, therefore, establish whatever relationship with Libya is necessary to protect its security.

4. Regarding Tunisia's specific disputes with Libya, Turayki seemed to have an answer of sorts for each one. With respect to the dispute over the continental shelf,³ he simply noted that Libya had made in 1972 the same proposal for joint exploration which Prime Minister Mzali has now put forward. In 1972 it was the GOT, led by then Prime Minister

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810048–0591. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Khartoum, Lagos, Niamey, Paris, Rabat, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 685 from Tunis, January 27, the Embassy reported that, according to the press, "Turayki's meetings centered on expansion of bilateral economic and commercial cooperation, as well as on desire to increase tourism by opening border. Tunisians describe visit as being 'psychological.' Libyan follow-through will be seen as test of Qadhafi's declared intent to improve relations, especially with respect to Tunisian proposal for joint exploitation of petroleum resources in contested continental shelf." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810043–0663)

³ For more on the Libyan-Tunisian dispute over the continental shelf, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Documents 4 and 5.

Nouira, who rejected such an arrangement. He agreed to take another look at the proposal in the light of current conditions. Answering Tunisian charges that Libya maintains camps to train Tunisian dissidents, Turayki denied that the camps have any evil intentions. They have been established, he claimed, to process the papers of Tunisians who have crossed the border into Libya looking for work.

5. Turayki's line on Libyan involvement in Chad was that Libya had responded both to an appeal for help from the Chadian Government and to protect Libya's own security. He said that the help being extended to FROLINAT by Egypt, Israel, and others, was posing a clear danger to Libya's southern border areas. Far from having an interest in staying in Chad if it were not wanted, Libya had proposed to Nigeria that the latter replace Libyan forces in Chad with Nigerian troops. The Lagos government refused. Libya was still prepared to withdraw its troops whenever President Goukouni asks it to do so. As for the references to unity in the recent agreement between Goukouni and Qadhafi, this was nothing more than a standard rhetorical formula common to many exchanges between African brothers.

6. Subsequent conversations with two separate Foreign Ministry officials yields line that Libya would have to engage in confidence-building measures in order to encourage further detente. Prior to a Mzali visit to Tripoli, there would have to be visible evidence of Libya's good intentions.

Bosworth

3. Memorandum From Frederick Wattering of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, March 16, 1981

SUBJECT

Unsuccessful Coup Attempt in Mauritania (S)

The US Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, advises that an attempted coup against the Mauritanian President Haidalla by unidentified armed forces, led by a "Colonel Kader" on March 16 has

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (01/24/1981-04/17/1981). Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Kemp. An unknown hand initialed for Kemp. Copies were sent to Schweitzer and Shoemaker. A stamped notation at top of the memorandum reads: "RVA has seen."

apparently failed.² Haidalla is blaming the Moroccans for the coup. Embassy Rabat reports that the Moroccan Government has denied any involvement.³ (S)

President Haidalla, who with his government came to power via the military coup route himself, has been increasingly pro-POLISARIO Front and Algeria to Morocco's dismay. Moroccans have been planning possible attacks against POLISARIO concentrations in Mauritania, using Mauritania as a safe haven. (S)

Whatever the facts, any allegations by Haidalla of Moroccan complicity with the coup will be strongly supported by Algeria, Libya, the POLISARIO, and probably the Marxist-Leninist states in Africa.⁴ This affair will unfortunately increase the paranoia of all parties. It is not unlikely that Haidalla *et al.* will also blame the US (since he perceives us as Morocco's patron).⁵ (S)

² In telegram 1150 from Nouakchott, March 16, the Embassy reported that Bnejjara had announced on national radio that "suicide commandos led by Col. Kader at the orders of Morocco have attempted to seize power and this morning attacked the Presidency. He called it 'aggression perpetrated by Morocco against Mauritania'" and "said the matter will be taken to the U.N. Security Council and Arab League." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810123–0529)

³ In telegram 1840 from Rabat, March 16, the Embassy reported that "a representative of Moroccan military intelligence" had "'guaranteed' there was no Moroccan involvement" in the attempted coup. The Embassy commented: "Moroccan officials point out that there are many possible explanations for the coup attempt, including plots by Libya, Libya and Algeria conjointly, the Polisario, and Prime Minister Bnejjara himself." The Embassy said it "prefers check further before offering our views on what Moroccans may or may not be doing to GIRM." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810124–0230) In telegram 2023 from Rabat, March 23, the Embassy reported: "Some degree of Moroccan involvement in March 16 coup attempt in Nouakchott now seems evident. We now in position here to corroborate GIRM story of Moroccan training of putschists at Ben Guerir, although scope of Moroccan role in coup attempt itself (degree of control, planning, timing) remains cloudy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810136–0418)

⁴ In telegram 73398 to Algiers, March 23, the Department stated that, during a March 18 meeting with Stoessel, "Malek expressed Algeria's strong concern about coup attempt in Mauritania which he characterized as attempt by Morocco to expand its influence to the south." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810137–0083)

⁵ In telegram 67424 to Nouakchott, March 17, the Department authorized the Embassy to inform the GIRM "The U.S. is deeply distressed to hear of reports of an attempt today to undermine the Government of Mauritania." The Department continued: "USG has applauded recent efforts of President Haidalla and the GIRM to restore democratic institutions and civilian government to Mauritania, and cherishes the warm and friendly ties which exist between our two countries. The U.S. continues firmly to support Mauritanian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810125–0712)

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria¹

Washington, March 27, 1981, 0318Z

77983. Subject: Tension Between Morocco and Mauritania. Refs: A) Rabat 2113² B) Rabat 2153³ C) Nouakchott 1349.⁴

1. (S) Entire text.

2. We appreciate Embassy Rabat's alert (ref A) highlighting Moroccan charges that the recent Polisario attack on Guelta Zemmour was launched from Mauritania and Moroccan reference to possible retaliation and hints of possible pre-emption of future attacks. We have also noted Moroccan Prime Minister's reference to "right of hot pursuit" (ref B) while continuing charges and counter-charges may simply be posturing, we agree with Embassy Nouakchott (ref C) that it is only prudent to encourage restraint before the situation gets out of hand.

3. We have asked INR to assess the situation on the ground, but we understand that varying local perceptions may ultimately determine policy. In any case, the U.S. position should be made clear ASAP. Therefore Charges should make the following points at the highest possible level in the MFA:

4. (For all action posts) The USG shares the concern of many states and regional organizations (notably the Arab League and OAU) about a

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810044-0751. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN) and Edward Brynn (AF/W); cleared by Coon, Veliotis, George Harris (INR), Draper, Morton, Seitz, Borg, and W. Scott Butcher (S/S-O); approved by Stoessel. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Dakar, and Paris.

² In telegram 2113 from Rabat, March 25, the Embassy reported that the Moroccan press had published "the unequivocal official statement" by the GOM "that the Polisario units launched their attack on Guelta Zenmour from Mauritanian territory, Morocco's reservation of the right of self-defense and attribution in advance of responsibility for any consequences to the Mauritanian leadership, and the publication of the instructions to Foreign Minister Boucetta in Tunis to include this development in the Moroccan complaint against Mauritania to be presented at the League of Arab States Ministerial meeting." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810141-0420)

³ In telegram 2153 from Rabat, March 26, the Embassy reported that according to an AFP item, Bouabid had warned Bnejara "that Morocco 'has information at its disposition which permits it to affirm without risk of error that the (March 23 attackers on Guelta Zemmour) crossed the Mauritanian border from the locality of Bir Moghreïn, situated in Mauritanian territory.' Such acts belied Mauritanian claims of neutrality including those made by Bnejara to King Hassan at Ta'if." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143-0384)

⁴ In telegram 1349 from Nouakchott, March 25, the Embassy reported: "It is saber-rattling time in the continuing war of words (with considerable risk of escalation) between Morocco and Mauritania. For past nine days, listeners to Mauritanian radio have been treated to non-stop condemnation of Moroccan 'perfidious aggression' ordered by the 'blood-thirsty King Hassan II' whose 'immoral maneuvers bring shame to the Moroccan throne.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810142-0720)

possible escalation and widening of the Western Sahara conflict. In the past, the U.S. has worked evenhandedly to limit the fighting. (For Rabat: We have urged Algeria, with some success, to discourage attacks by the Polisario into undisputed areas of Morocco from Algerian soil.) (For Algiers: We have discouraged any policy of hot pursuit by Morocco into Algeria.) While we regret any fighting anywhere in the region, it is particularly important to avoid confrontations between the states of the region.

— We welcome the Arab League's Secretary General's reported intention to visit Mauritania and Morocco to establish a dialogue on this subject.

— At this stage, we believe it would be helpful for all parties to reduce the level of public statements and pursue their concerns through private channels.⁵

— Your government should be aware that we have made our concern known to the other two governments bordering the Western Sahara.

5. For Rabat only. In addition to general points above, you should inquire about Moroccan intentions re hot pursuit in a way which expresses our concern. Also stress the following point:

— The U.S. has publicly announced its support for the independence and territorial integrity of Mauritania. We note that Morocco has reiterated its respect for Mauritanian sovereignty and territorial integrity. We strongly discourage any action which might put into question Moroccan policy in this regard.

6. For Nouakchott only. While we are expressing our concern to Morocco about acts that could enlarge the conflict, we are also concerned about recurrent reports of Polisario movements in Mauritania. We consider it imperative that GIRM make every effort to ensure that its territory not be used for Polisario attacks into the Western Sahara or for refuge and resupply. Share our concern with GIRM and make the following point:

— Mauritania has assured us that it intends to maintain a policy of neutrality towards the Western Sahara conflict and opposes use of its territory for attacks on Moroccan forces by the Polisario. We welcome all measures within GIRM's power designed to underscore Mauritania's neutrality and oppose violation of Mauritanian sovereignty by any outside forces.

7. For Algiers only. In discussing this issue with the GOA, ask about reports that Algeria has provided arms to Mauritania and seek clarification of the type of arms and intent of these shipments.

Haig

⁵ Not further identified.

5. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 28, 1981, 6:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation With General Walters on His Recent Trip to North Africa. Tuesday, April 28, 1981, 6:20 p.m.

General Walters said his visits to Morocco and Tunisia had gone as forecast.² On Algeria, it appeared that President Bendjedid was recuperable.³ Bendjedid had said that he did not want King Hassan overthrown but he had not given an answer to Walter's urging to reopen negotiations with Morocco.⁴ Walters had a long discussion with Bendjedid about Qadhafi, in which he felt that Bendjedid showed considerable disdain and understanding for the problem that Libya poses. Bendjedid expressed his clear opposition to the proposed Libyan-Sahraoui Union. Walters said that he had been extremely impressed by the Sudanese—they have no complexes whatsoever. Walters added that we needed to get Ambassadors to Algiers and Morocco quickly.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

At the end of the meeting, General Walters raised the question of providing C130s to Algeria.⁵ He suggested that he might be able to offer Bendjedid the C130s in return for a commitment to reopen negotiations with Morocco. The Secretary agreed that Walters could pursue this.

E. Anthony Wayne⁶

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 36, April 28, 1981. Secret; Nodis.

² In telegram 2744 from Rabat, April 17, Walters reported that during their meeting, Hassan's "real interest" was Algeria: "When I told him that I was going there, he commented that not only did he approve but was delighted that I was the emissary." Walters continued: "He said that if it was not incompatible with my mission he would like me to tell Chadli that he had been disappointed by the Algerian interruption of the talks between them and the Moroccans. He would like to resume them and very much wanted to know what the Algerians real objectives were in respect to Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810184-0508)

³ For Walters's meeting with Bourguiba, see footnote 3, Document 287.

⁴ For Walters's meeting with Bendjedid, see Document 105.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 106.

⁶ Wayne initialed "EAW" above this typed signature.

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Tunisia¹

Washington, May 21, 1981, 3347Z

133439. Subject: Analysis of Algerian-Tunisian Relations.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Recent reporting from the field and contacts in Washington have drawn attention to dramatic improvement in Algerian-Tunisian relations since Gafsa incident in 1980.² Some have characterized developments as a “sea change.” Department is aware of some elements of the improving relationship, e.g. “hot line” between Tunis and Algiers, reciprocal high-level visits of security officials, and completion of gas pipeline to Italy via Tunisia. We have tended to interpret rapprochement as a common response to Libyan threat both because of timing and substance. We would appreciate your in-house assessment of this subject to complete our understanding of its extent and significance. We would invite you to address as well the following questions:

— What opportunities do these developments offer the US in the context of regional problems, i.e. Qadhafi and the Western Sahara, and our bilateral relations?

— What impact does this rapprochement have on the Soviet position in North Africa?³

3. Many thanks for your help.

Haig

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810044–0751. Confidential. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN); cleared by John Hamilton (NEA/AFN) and for information by Lillian Harris (INR); approved by Flaten. Sent for information to Rabat.

² See footnote 2, Document 107.

³ No response from either Embassy has been found.

7. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, June 30, 1981, 1207Z

3060. Subject: President Haidalla Returns to Mauritania After Moroccan-Mauritanian Reconciliation. Ref: (A) Nouakchott 3022,² (B) Nouakchott 3034.³

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Defeat and dismay had been the prefaces to the small diplomatic victory that President Haidalla brought back with him from Saudi Arabia late at night on June 29. There was an almost palpable feeling of accomplishment in the air. It was almost as if Mauritanian officials were welcoming home a victorious football team. Haidalla and his delegation, tired from an all-day and half-the-night plane ride from Saudi Arabia, seemed to feel, for the first time, that they had acted rather than reacted. As if to cap off their contribution to this reconciliation, the Mauritanian delegation arrived in a Saudia Airlines Boeing aircraft. Haidalla's antiquated puddle-jumping and gas-guzzling Caravelle is probably still making its way back to Nouakchott.

3. As per ref (B), there had been no official GIRM media announcement of the normalization of relations between Mauritania and Morocco. Haidalla, responding to a question from a Mauritanian reporter at the airport, said that normalization of relations had been agreed to "in principle" as an outgrowth of King Hassan's call for a "just" referendum in the Western Sahara. (Comment: Haidalla made no mention of the "controlled" referendum proposed by King Hassan.) Prior to this, in an airport statement, Haidalla praised the "significant and courageous

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810306-0344. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Jidda, Riyadh, Nairobi, and Rabat. Sent for information to Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Khartoum, Paris, Tunis, USCINCEUR, and Lagos.

² In telegram 3022 from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: "June 28 announcement from Riyadh of reestablishment diplomatic relations between Morocco and Mauritania is a positive step." The Embassy continued: "GIRM appears to have finally demonstrated the basic moderation of its April 25 government, helped along by Saudi largesse, uncertainty about Qadhafi and Polisario, and King Hassan's basically accommodating speech at the OAU." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304-0075) Reference is to Hassan's call for a referendum on the Western Sahara. (See Document 378.)

³ In telegram 3034 from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: "Although it is common knowledge around Nouakchott, there has been no official word on GIRM media concerning reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Morocco," likely due to the fact that "President Haidalla and his delegation are not scheduled to return until 1930 this evening" from Riyadh. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810305-0021)

decision” taken by King Hassan at the OAU summit and outlined once again the concrete steps, as seen by Mauritania, to bring peace to the Western Sahara conflict. He repeated what he had said in his speech in Nairobi, emphasizing the long-standing GIRM policy of advocating direct negotiations between the “conflicting parties—Morocco and the Polisario” with Algeria and Mauritania cooperating closely. Haidalla called for a cease fire between Morocco and the Polisario and the “withdrawal of foreign forces to certain points to be determined” and their replacement by neutral forces.

4. I chatted at the airport with former Prime Minister and now presidential counselor Sid’Ahmed Ould Bnejara who characterized the OAU summit as a summit of “reason and not of extremism.” When I asked him if this reconciliation meant that the GIRM was going to “forgive and forget the 16th of March,” Bnejara said that “we are going to try to forget the 16th of March.” He then added, with a grin, “there is always the 16th of something.”

Schrager

8. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 6, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

4. *Moroccan Ambassador’s Reassurances about Contacts with Libya.* Ambassador Ali Bengelloun saw me today with King Hassan’s reassurances that he had not changed his mind about Qadhafi as a threat to peace and stability.² Hassan wants us to view the Moroccan-Libyan exchanges before the OAU Summit as Libyan initiatives intended to advance Qadhafi’s OAU ambitions. The Libyans did help Morocco at the Summit by not objecting to the King’s referendum plan for the Western Sahara but “no deals were made” for the future.³ (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (07/03/1981–07/29/1981). Secret; Sensitive.

² A record of the Haig-Bengelloun discussion is in telegram 180293 to Rabat, July 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810328–0364)

³ See footnote 2, Document 7.

9. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan**¹

Washington, July 13, 1981

SUBJECT

Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci: Trip to North Africa

At Tab A is a memorandum from Frank Carlucci to you,² stating that:

- *Egypt* wants to expand its relationship with us into a partnership.
- *Sudan* has no air defense and fears a Libyan air strike. (The air defense situation is currently being improved through U.S. assistance.)
- *Tunisia* has limited defenses, fears another Libyan incursion, and wants stepped up training, equipment deliveries, and joint exercises.
- *Morocco* professes to heed our advice to seek a negotiated solution in the war with the Polisario in Western Sahara.
- *Algeria* indicates that assurances we seek on the sale of our C-130 transport aircraft to them will soon be forthcoming.
- *Libya's* Qadhafi is vulnerable to our strategy that: 1) stresses the rising casualty rate from Libya's invasion of Chad; 2) challenges Qadhafi's territorial waters claims; 3) builds cohesion among anti-Qadhafi exiles; 4) convinces our West European friends to decrease their cooperation with Qadhafi; and 5) increases assistance to Libya's threatened neighbors. Our Bay of Sidra exercise will send a signal to our friends that this strategy is being implemented, and that we mean business.³
- Finally, the threat from Libya can only be met by our friends if we continue to provide them with military assistance and to display leadership in pressuring Libya to cease its threatening behavior.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, a stamped notation reads: "The President has seen." Underneath this, Reagan wrote: "OK RR." Carlucci's trip took place during the third week of June.

² Attached but not printed is Carlucci's memorandum, dated June 25.

³ Documentation on U.S. exercises in the Gulf of Sidra is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, August 10, 1981, 1600Z

2828. Department/Rabat also for Ambassador Walters. Department pass CINCEUR for Polad. Subject: Algeria Consults USG on Tensions Between Libya and Egypt/Sudan.²

1. (Secret Entire text.)

2. Summary: MFA Secretary-General Dembri called Charge in urgently August 9 at express request of President Bendjedid and in context of dialogue established with Ambassador Walters to express GOA concern over escalation of tension between Egypt/Sudan and Libya and danger of superpower confrontation. GOA plans to send very high level delegation to Tripoli shortly to urge moderation on Qadhafi but wishes to benefit from USG analysis of and reaction to situation before delegation departs, especially since USG is well placed to urge moderation on Egypt/Sudan. Charge responded that he would report Dembri's request to Washington and hoped to be back in touch shortly. Dembri said prompt response would be extremely useful and appreciated. We believe GOA prefers Qadhafi to unknown successor and is seeking help in protecting and at same time taming him. We also believe GOA wishes to forestall both USG action against Qadhafi (which would force it and others back into anti-American posture and arrest momentum toward more genuine non-alignment) and Soviet intervention on behalf of Qadhafi (which would bring superpower confrontation to Algeria's doorstep). We recommend as rapid and forthcoming a response as present policy will allow. End summary.³

3. MFA Secretary-General and Acting Foreign Minister Mohamed Salar Dembri called me in urgently August 9 to discuss the situation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. MFA Director of West European and North American Affairs Benouniche and PolCouns Thompson were also present.⁴

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 51, August 13, 1981. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Khartoum, and Tunis. Sent for information to Damascus, Jidda, Lagos, London, and Paris. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram reads: "AMH." Below the notation, Haig wrote and circled "8/13/81."

² Haig underlined the subject line.

³ Haig underlined the portion of this paragraph beginning with "We believe GOA" to "on behalf of Qadhafi."

⁴ Haig underlined the first sentence of this paragraph. In the right-hand margin next to numbered paragraphs 2 and 3, Haig wrote: "Gerry. Had urgent meeting *Thurs* A.M. [August 13] with Walters, NEA & AF—Hope draft has been started [studied?].—A fascinating msg & an even more fascinating Ambassador who clearly knows or thinks nothing! AMH." No record of the meeting has been found.

4. Dembri emphasized several times at the outset and in the course of our discussion that he was taking this initiative at the express request of President Bendjedid⁵ and in the context of the dialogue that the GOA and the USG had established thanks to Ambassador Walters on such issues as regional stability and Libyan over-armament. He went on to say that the proximate cause of his initiative was the GOA's concern over the escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan on one hand and Libya on the other.⁶ It is particularly disturbing, he said, that the traditional verbal exchanges are now being engaged in by military-leaders as well as civilian politicians and are being accompanied by troop concentrations along the borders. It would be disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to develop,⁷ particularly since this could trigger superpower involvement and drag the region into a conflict between East and West. Algeria itself, he said, could not stand idle in a crisis involving a neighboring state.

5. Dembri then stated that the GOA plans to send a very high level delegation to Tripoli in a week or ten days specifically to put pressure on Libya to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Before doing so however, he wishes to benefit from the USG's analysis of and reaction to the developing confrontation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. The USG, Dembri said, has good relations with Egypt and the Sudan and can help moderate their actions. The GOA would like to contribute to a solution of this matter in a strictly African context and is seeking the views of others about their possible contribution to such a solution.

6. Dembri observed finally that the problem of the Libyan presence in Chad seems to be moving toward solution in an OAU context with everyone agreed that the Libyan troops will be withdrawn when an African peace force (to which the GOA is prepared to contribute) is formed. The GOA has been encouraging Libya to withdraw from Chad, he said, and it would be very unfortunate if an African resolution of the Chadian crisis foundered in armed confrontation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. Libya, Dembri said, was seeking to improve its relations with countries in the Middle East and in Africa, and its assumption of

⁵ Haig underlined: "initiative at the express request of President Bendjedid."

⁶ Haig underlined: "He went on to say that the proximate cause of his initiative was the GOA's concern over the escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan, on one hand and Libya on the other" in this sentence and drew an arrow pointing to where he wrote "Woody" in the right-hand margin.

⁷ Haig underlined: "would be disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to develop."

the OAU presidency would encourage its shift to greater responsibility and pragmatism.⁸

7. I told Dembri in response that I had no recent information on the state of affairs between Libya and Egypt/Sudan and would therefore not attempt to comment, but would instead report his initiative to the Department and request any information and analysis that I could share with him before the GOA delegation left for Tripoli. Dembri immediately agreed that a prompt response before the departure of the delegation would be extremely useful and appreciated.

8. I asked Dembri whether it could be said that the situation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan had been discussed with Major Jallud during his August 6 visit (Ambassador Walters had been told August 4 that Jallud was coming to discuss Algerian-Libyan border problems). Dembri responded that the situation in “the entire region” had been discussed with Jallud, as it had also with French Minister of External Relations Cheysson August 8–9.

9. Dembri brought our meeting to a close with the affirmation that the USG has a clear responsibility to work (by implication with Egypt and the Sudan) to dampen the escalation of tension, keep it at a verbal level, and even reduce it, while the GOA for its part has a responsibility to put pressure on Libya to moderate its actions.

10. Comment: We are not aware of any basis in fact for Dembri’s assertion that there has been a dramatic escalation of tension between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, although we do note that, in an August 4 memorandum to the President of the Security Council, Libya accused the USG of seeking to overthrow the Qadhafi regime, and liquidate Qadhafi himself and cited as evidence, *inter alia*, greater U.S. military assistance to Egypt and the Sudan and joint Egyptian-American military maneuvers near the Libyan border.

11. Dembri’s initiative follows closely on the visits of Ambassador Walters to Algeria (August 4–6) and Major Jallud to Algiers (August 6) as well as a telephone conversation between President Bendjedid and Colonel Qadhafi (August 3), and two possibly complementary explanations suggest themselves:⁹

— A) President Bendjedid and his advisers, sensitized to the Libyan arsenal during the Walters visit, asked Jallud to explain its purpose. Jallud responded that Libya faces a major threat from Egypt and the Sudan and must thus arm itself accordingly. Through Dembri’s initiative, the GOA is seeking to inform itself, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, get the USG to commit itself to work for a mutual dampening

⁸ Haig underlined the first sentence of this paragraph.

⁹ Haig underlined most of this paragraph.

of tensions, and then use this commitment to urge greater moderation on Qadafi.

— B) Jallud presented Algeria with its “proof” of U.S./Egyptian/Sudanese intentions and solicited the assistance of the GOA. Through Dembri’s initiative, the GOA is trying to get the USG to clarify its intentions, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, and urge the USG gently not to work for the overthrow of Qadhafi.

12. Both of the above explanations are plausible, and both may indeed play their part. Algeria is becoming more and more of a status-quo power, and the GOA undoubtedly feels more at ease dealing with an unruly, but tamable, Qadhafi than with an unknown figure. It wants to continue its efforts to protect and at the same time domesticate Qadhafi and is seeking all the assistance it can get.

13. Whatever the genesis of the GOA’s concern may be, it probably sees itself as working as an honest broker to try and defuse a situation that threatens not only Qadhafi himself, but regional peace and stability as well. The Algerian leadership knows the USG has no particular admiration for Qadhafi, and it is almost certainly afraid that the USG intends to do something about him directly or indirectly (through Egypt and the Sudan). It most likely wants at all costs to avoid such an American move against Qadhafi, not just to save his skin, but for two other important reasons as well. Firstly, a move against Qadhafi whose origin the GOA perceived to be the USG would force it (and certain other Arab states as well) to consider providing him with concrete assistance and retreat into a more or less virulent anti-American stance that would arrest the momentum towards more genuine non-alignment that has been developing in Algeria. Secondly, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies would, given the slightest opportunity (such as that caused by an unexpected delay in an anti-Qadhafi action), intervene themselves and activate the Soviet-made arsenal now stockpiled in Libya to support Qadhafi. This would result in a superpower confrontation on Algeria’s doorstep, a situation that Algerian foreign policy has consistently sought at all costs to avoid.

14. Action requested: We are not conversant with all the policy ramifications involved in the GOA request for information and consultation on ways to dampen the high tension it adduces between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. We do believe that it is in our interest, to encourage the GOA to continue to consult with us on issues such as Libya. Ambassador Walters’ two visits have created a basis on which the GOA professes to want to build, and we should take this profession at face value unless it proves insincere.

15. We believe Algerian-American bilateral relations and our desire to see the GOA cure Qadhafi's ambitions would be well served by a prompt response setting forth our analysis of the situation between Egypt/Sudan and Libya, and if our present policy permits, giving the GOA the assurances it is seeking that we are indeed encouraging Egypt and the Sudan to avoid an open conflict with Qadhafi. Even if we cannot give the GOA full satisfaction with regard to our policy, we would like to be able to respond by the end of the Muslim work week (i. e. Wednesday)¹⁰ if possible.

Ross

¹⁰ August 12.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 17, 1981, 0933Z

6867. Subject: Tunisian Mediation Between Algiers and Rabat.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi told me on Sept 15 that Tunisia has accepted Algerian request to assist in improving relations between Algiers and Rabat. When Prime Minister Mzali visited Algiers Sept 3–4, President Bendjedid asked that President Bourguiba help set up a meeting with King Hassan. Bourguiba has agreed to play this role. Caid Essebsi visited Rabat on Sept 8 to feel out Moroccan attitudes. Hassan, who received him, was positive. Tunisians are now working on time and venue.

3. Tunisians made effort to broker Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement some two years ago when Bourguiba sent previous Foreign Minister to Algiers with what was thought then to be Moroccan offer for a Hassan-Bendjedid summit.² Algerians rebuffed gesture, and Tunisian

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810493–0116. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers and Rabat.

² In telegram 7304 from Tunis, September 17, 1979, the Embassy reported: "Bendjedid had declined President Bourguiba's invitation to meet with King Hassan in Tunis in search of peaceful settlement of Western Sahara dispute." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790424–1010)

officials said at the time that they would resume mediation only when it was desired by both sides.

4. Caid Essebsi said that several developments may help explain what he referred to as the "Algerian initiative". The Algerian regime is becoming more internally stable and self confident, while it is increasingly clear that continuation of Sahara conflict is in the interest of neither Morocco nor Algeria. Caid Essebsi agreed with my observation that only area state which is gaining by current impasse is Libya, and he noted increasing Algerian irritation with Qadhafi following the Libyan occupation. The Foreign Minister stressed fact that Algerian willingness to seek Tunisian mediation reflects a new closeness in Tunisian-Algerian relations after a year of careful fence mending. High level contacts now occur every two or three months, and confidence building measures in economic and technical areas have finally overcome the mutual suspicions which grew out of the ambiguous Algerian role in the Libyan-organized Gafsa raid.

5. Essebsi asked that the foregoing information be only for "the eyes of Secretary Haig". Addressees—please protect his confidences.

6. Comment: Bourguiba has long aspired to play the role of peace-maker between Algiers and Rabat. Morocco has been Tunisia's most reliable friend in the area, but Tunisia's strategists know that good relations with Algiers are essential for Tunisian security. They see the long running Algerian-Moroccan feud as a source both of regional instability and of Algerian reluctance to take a firm stand against Libya. Caid Essebsi has had sufficient experience in the politics of the Maghreb to arm him against false optimism, and the Tunisians will undertake a more ambitious good offices role only after they are convinced that both Algeria and Morocco want this. For the moment, it appears that the Tunisian role is limited to arrangements for a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting.

Mack

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and the Embassy in Turkey¹

Rabat, December 5, 1981, 1730Z

9008. Ankara for SecDef Weinberger. Dept pass: Ambassador Walters; CIA (Admiral Inman); *[name not declassified]* and to Ambassador Reed (in care of Assistant Secretary Veliotis). Subject: Secretary Weinberger's Meeting With King Hassan: Foreign Relations Items. Ref: Rabat 9004.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. Hassan told Secretary Weinberger that a Moroccan-Algerian summit is likely within three weeks, and that Hassan is "75 percent sure" it will lead to an understanding that will deny further Algerian help to the Polisario. That summit, plus the anticipation of a favorable referendum result all countries would respect, made Hassan optimistic about prospects for resolving the Sahara problem. In other views expressed during the audience Hassan urged the U.S. to bring more pressure to bear on Libya by cutting off oil transactions; disclosed (please protect) that the Fez Summit would reconvene after April, perhaps with Egypt in attendance; and urged that the U.S. involve Spain in NATO to the fullest extent as soon as possible, as insurance against a socialist victory in the Spanish elections of 1963.

Hassan indicated that he looks forward to the visit of Secretary Haig³ and to a very substantive "working visit" of his own in the U.S. early next year so that he may meet and confer with President Reagan. End summary.

3. This message reports various aspects of Morocco's relations with third countries discussed during the meeting of Secretary Weinberger with King Hassan at Fez December 3. Bilateral items are reported septel.⁴

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jun–Dec 1981). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: "Sec Def has seen ca 12/6." Underneath the note, a stamped notation reads: "13 DEC 1981 SECDEF HAS SEEN."

² In telegram 9004 from Rabat, December 4, the Embassy reported that during a 90-minute meeting in Fez, Weinberger and Hassan "covered a full agenda of bilateral security issues," including "access and transit for contingent U.S. use," although Hassan "made it clear that he was sympathetic but concerned that such cooperation could make Morocco vulnerable to Soviet and Arab actions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810577–0643)

³ See Document 199.

⁴ See footnote 2 above.

4. Western Sahara.

The King described the situation as likely to acquire some significant new aspects "in the next three weeks." He explained that, based on impressions derived from talks with Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia at the Fez Summit, Hassan and Chadli should be meeting at some point on the frontier "in twenty days". The Algerians are excited about this meeting and want it well publicized. He and Chadli will discuss the Saharan situation; economic cooperation (movement of iron ore from Tindouf to Moroccan Atlantic ports and of Algerian natural gas to Europe via Morocco and Gibraltar); resumption of the Fez Summit; and regional security matters, a "hot issue". Algeria, Hassan continued, is concerned about both the Saharan problem and the anticipated reaction of Libya if Algeria and Morocco reach an understanding on the Sahara. Relations between Algeria and Libya were very strained at present, and Qadhafi could become the sole supplier of the Polisario. Hassan added that it was important the referendum in the Sahara not be a "reflection" of hostility between Morocco and Algeria.

5. Thus, Hassan continued, after six years of war Morocco seems to have two breakthroughs for ending it. If things go well at the Chadli meeting, and Hassan was "75 percent sure" that they would, there was one way to resolve the Sahara problem; another way, should the Chadli meeting misfire, would be the referendum, whose results everyone would have to accept. Hassan hoped that both means would succeed, for it is better to have a little margin of safety. Hassan declined to make any precise predictions about the Saharan situation until after the Chadli meeting had occurred. Meanwhile, Moroccan forces must remain on the alert in the Western Sahara.

6. Secretary Weinberger expressed the appreciation of the U.S. for the peacemaking initiatives of the King and indicated we were happy to hear of the prospective meeting with the Algerian President. Hassan remarked, somewhat ironically, that it had taken some courage to put forward a proposal that Saharan Moroccans be asked if they wanted to remain Moroccans. However, once the problem was solved, regional security problems would be reduced greatly. Morocco would have friendly relations with all countries of the area, Mauritania excepted. "For some decades" there would be difficulties between Morocco and Mauritania. (He did not elaborate.)

7. Libya.

Hassan asked the Secretary to urge the President to continue the "U.S. oil policy" concerning Libya. That policy had had more impact than realized, according to Hassan, so that in a matter of months Qadhafi "will be brought to his knees". The Secretary responded that the administration is considering suspension of all oil transactions with

Libya. As President Mubarak had told the Secretary,⁵ Libya constitutes a great danger to all of us. It appears that Libya is becoming isolated. The King rejoined that Mr. Hammer,⁶ of Occidental Petroleum, should join in “turning off the taps.”

8. Fez summit.

The King volunteered an analysis of what had occurred at the recent, brief Fez Summit of the Arab League. He said that most countries had favored the 8-point plan of Saudi Crown Prince Fahd;⁷ a small number of countries opposed it and were closed to persuasion, and a small number opposed it because they were holding out for more money. Only one country—Iraq—had opposed it but remained open to persuasion. The Iraqi Vice President had told Hassan this was the case. Soon Fahd will visit Baghdad, proof of close Saudi-Iraqi relations, and the persuasion may occur then.

9. Everything at the Fez Summit revolved around the Fahd plan, Hassan continued. As he saw it, the great danger had been that Saudi credibility might have come into question because of the summit proceedings. So, although told it was unprecedented, Hassan had decided that the wise course was suspension of the summit. The latter will reconvene “after April”. He said that timing was highly secret, as was the hope of the Arab moderates that the Camp David Accords will be observed on schedule, so that perhaps Egypt can be persuaded to attend the resumption of the summit. He reiterated that secrecy of this was the key to success, and that Fahd’s Baghdad visit will be most important for the cause of Arab unity. Hassan, Fahd, and King Hussein are to remain in close touch during the adjournment of the summit.

10. Spain.

As described in greater detail in septel, Hassan advocated military cooperation between Spain and Morocco, holding that a military agreement between them would not only serve their own interests, but provide a context facilitating Moroccan contingency planning with the U.S. Hassan maintained that he and Juan Carlos were on the best of terms, telephoning each other frequently, sometimes only to inquire after the respective families. The importance of Spanish membership in NATO was such that Hassan would advise the U.S. to push Spanish participation as fast and as far as possible. Thus by the Spanish elections of 1983, when the socialists might come into power, Spain would have passed the “point of no return” on NATO. So, it is essential to “get Spain involved to the hilt”. Hassan also asked

⁵ No record of the Weinberger-Mubarak conversation has been found.

⁶ Arnold Hammer, President of Occidental Oil.

⁷ Documentation on Fahd’s eight-point plan for the Middle East is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

the U.S. to speak with Spain about the increasing use of the Canary Islands by the Soviets as a base for surveillance by their "fishing boats". Secretary Weinberger took note of these points and said that we would act on them.

11. Greece.

Mention by the Secretary that Greece was a possible hold-out against Spanish affiliation with NATO prompted Hassan to mention a message passed to him by former President Tsatsos. When attending the recent session of the Royal Academy of Morocco, Tsatsos had sent word that President Karamanlis retained a great deal of influence in Greece, even after the elections. Hassan suggested that the U.S. keep this in mind.

12. Comment. It was noteworthy that Hassan did not make a single reference to Moroccan needs for additional military equipment to be used in the Western Sahara. Instead, in consonance with remarks to Admiral Inman two days earlier,⁸ the King seemed to be placing all his hopes on diplomatic leverage, i.e. a favorable outcome of his anticipated talks with President Chadli. As reported above, Hassan exuded optimism about that meeting and the favorable consequences that would flow from it. In his tour d' horizon with the Secretary, Hassan repeatedly vouchsafed confidences that were surprising before so large an attendance. That he did so is testimony to the increasingly close, yet discreet, relationship he seeks to establish with the U.S. The meeting was also a preview of the topics he will want to take up with Secretary Haig two weeks from now, after the NATO Ministerials.⁹ Hassan's current mood is self-assured, both over the Western Sahara and inter-Arab affairs, so that, as he repeatedly indicated, he is greatly looking forward to meeting with President Reagan on the occasion of the King's "working visit" to the U.S., presumably in January. End comment.

Sebastian

⁸ A record of the Inman-Hassan conversation is in telegram 8907 from Rabat, December 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810009-0490)

⁹ The NATO Ministerial meeting took place December 8-12.

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 24, 1982, 1616Z

303. Subject: Qadhafi Leaves Algeria After Largely Failing to Achieve Algerian-Libyan "Unity". Ref: Algiers 256.²

1. C—Entire text

2. Summary: At the end of his January 18–23 visit to Algiers Qadhafi may have achieved some symbolic steps toward greater cooperation, but not the "unity" he apparently sought. So far there has been no public Algerian comment on the visit, and atmospherics have indicated Algerian displeasure. End summary.

3. While Qadhafi's arrival was covered by Algerian press and TV, there has since been very little media coverage and virtually no Algerian commentary. President Bendjedid met Qadhafi on arrival and saw him off as he left for Tunisia, and the two leaders had discussions several times during the five-day visit. However, the traditional dinner hosted by the President which would be expected for such a guest did not take place, and the Algerians gave other indications of treating the visit with reserve.

4. Qadhafi had a meeting the morning of January 21 with FLN party leaders led by Abdelhamid Mehri, Chairman of the Party Information and Culture Committee (substituting for External Affairs Committee Chairman Sliman Offman, who is ill). That afternoon Qadhafi met with 800 Algeria students for a "dialogue". Neither of these meetings was reported in the press.

5. We assume Qadhafi's objectives were largely set out in a Tripoli radio broadcast of January 21 (LD212126, Tripoli Jana in Arabic 1730 GMT 21 Jan 82)³ which reported Qadhafi as stating to the FLN Party leaders that "we are putting forward a proposal for unity between Algeria, Libya and Syria". Qadhafi also reportedly told this group that a

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820040–1039. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Sent for information to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Niamey, Rabat, Tel Aviv, and Tunis.

² In telegram 256 from Algiers, January 20, the Embassy reported: "While there are several theories floating about regarding the object of Qadhafi's unexpected trip to Algiers with an assortment of Lebanese and Palestinian politicians and Libyan technocrats, one thing clear is that the Algerians are not overjoyed to see their neighbor." The Embassy continued: "Libyans have reportedly floated talk of union between Algeria and Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820033–0359)

³ Not found.

joint meeting would be held in February between the General People's Committee in the Jamahiriyah and members of the GOA, that the two Parliaments would meet at the end of March, and that "joint theoretical meetings" would be held between the popular cadres of the two countries. These moves, Qadhafi said, would be steps toward a complete merger of the two countries. (We have no confirmation that the above exchanges were in fact agreed.)

6. On a practical level, the Algeris press reported that on January 19 several members of Qadhafi's delegations met with their Algerian counterparts "to strengthen cooperative and economic and commercial relations between the two countries". Algerian Finance Minister Boualem Benhamouda met with Secretary of the People's Committee for the Economy Abou Zey Dourda, as did Algerian Minister of Commerce Abdelaziz Khellef. Algerian Minister of Primary Education Cherif Kharroubi received Libyan Secretary of the People's General Committee for Education Abdelatif Zlitni, while Algerian Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research Abdelhak Bererhi and Libyan Secretary of State for Culture agreed on inter-university exchanges of scientific research in the areas of agronomy, oceanography, fishing and housing in a framework including Tunisia.

7. Presidential Press Counsellor (and Central Committee member) Mohieddine Amimour told an Embassy contact that no joint communiqué will be issued. He went on to say that various objective political, economic and social conditions would have to be satisfied before unity could be achieved. Amimour added that the matter had to be studied carefully, without emotion, to avoid setbacks such as have occurred in the past. Amimour explained the lack of publicity given to the January 21 meetings by saying they were "unofficial". He said the leftist Lebanese that came with Qadhafi (reftel) were not officially received by anyone. On the Algerian attitude toward Qadhafi, he stated "even if the results are negative, it is important to talk".

8. We can only speculate as to additional topics the two leaders might have discussed: Middle East developments, U.S. policy toward Libya, border problems, Chad, and the Western Sahara conflict. One source in a position to know has told us that agreement was reached to have a joint border committee meet in the near future.

9. Comment: Algeria, like other Arab countries, supports the ultimate goal of Arab unity. At the same time Algeria has made it clear that any movement in that direction, especially involving Qadhafi (whose unpredictable, volatile nature is well understood here) will be considered with great caution. Nevertheless, while Libyan-Algerian unity is out of the question, Qadhafi's visit comes at a time of high

Arab frustration, following Israeli actions in the Golan and the recent U.S. Security Council veto. The MFA issued a strong statement on the latter occasion (Algiers 126).⁴ While Algeria, like other Arab states is frustrated by what are perceived to be Israeli unilateral actions to impose de facto conditions favorable to Israel, we as yet see no signs that Algeria in the face of lobbying by Qadhafi (and presumably Assad in the near future) is prepared to alter its basic position on the Middle East. That is, strong rhetoric but private opposition to proposals for economic retaliation against the United States.

Newlin

⁴ Not found.

14. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Meeting [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Between the DCI and Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Ambassador Cutler and the Tunisian Ambassador to Washington)

1. From this meeting it is clear that Mzali is among those Tunisian leaders who oppose Libya's Qadhafi and have no illusions about Qadhafi's objectives. Mzali characterized the Tunisian/Libyan "normalization" as superficial, at best. He is convinced that Qadhafi's objective in normalizing relations with Tunisia is for the purpose of lowering the Tunisian guard. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

2. Mzali believes that the visit of Qadhafi has actually helped Tunisia without giving Libya any substantial benefit. However, he noted that neither the Tunisians nor the Libyans have realized any gains from the Qadhafi visit. A number of economic and social projects were agreed to during the visit, but they are meaningless. [*4 lines not declassified*] Tunisia will continue to attend these agreed upon meetings,

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C-384, Tunisia. Secret. Prepared on May 4 by [*name not declassified*].

but they know nothing will come of them. On the other hand, Qadhafi views these meetings as some form of union.

3. The new open border policy with Libya has helped Tunisia win the war of minds with Libya. Since the Qadhafi visit some 30,000 Tunisians have visited Libya in the hope of obtaining economic benefit. Almost all of these Tunisians have returned from Libya somewhat shocked by the economic disorder they found in Libya. Tunisians are now more convinced than ever that their regime is far superior to Qadhafi's Libya.

4. Turning to Libyan terrorist attempts against Tunisia, Mzali believes that Tunisia is in a much better position today than it was two years ago [*13 lines not declassified*].

5. Turning to Algeria, Mzali indicated that President Bendjedid is a serious, constructive leader who is trying to steer his country along a moderate course. However, Bendjedid has a variety of influential Algerians who are trying to take him off the moderate course; he does have an impossible task. [*8 lines not declassified*]

6. Finally, Mzali let it be known that he believes U.S. policy in the area is making it difficult for moderate Arab countries like Tunisia. For instance, he noted that groups in Tunisia had pressed him to postpone his U.S. visit because of the series of U.S. vetoes in the U.N.

15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mauritania¹

Washington, June 5, 1982, 1830Z

155115. Subject: GIRM Ambassador Meets With Acting Secretary Stoessel.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. Ambassador Ould Daddah's meeting with Acting Secretary Stoessel covered essentially same ground as his earlier

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820294-0224. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Melinda Kimble (AF/W); cleared by Bruce, Bishop, and Bremer; approved by Stoessel. Sent for information to Rabat, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Paris, Abidjan, Algiers, and Cairo.

conversations with DAS Wisner² and AF/W Director Bruce.³ Session served to underscore continuing U.S. interest in maintaining good relations with GIRM, particularly as this is the first time Ould Daddah has been received above the level of Under Secretary. End summary.

3. Ould Daddah reiterated standard litany of Mauritanian concerns about U.S. policies in Northwest Africa as follows:

— U.S. tilt toward Morocco is destabilizing, particularly our increased military aid, as it ensures Algeria, Libya and the Soviets will continue their support of Polisario.

— Mauritania recognizes U.S. African policy is shaped by our myriad interests in the region and our world role. Nonetheless, GIRM believes resolution of Saharan problem would benefit everyone. To this end, U.S. should encourage Morocco to seek a negotiated settlement rather than arming itself.

— Mauritania also desires better relations with Morocco, but the Moroccan stand on the Western Sahara makes it difficult.

— The GIRM is constantly criticized about its moderate position in the Sahara and its efforts to improve relations with the U.S. as there is no clear sign the U.S. wants better relations. Only naming a U.S. Ambassador can change this perception and enhance the level of dialogue between our governments.

— The OAU, according to Ould Daddah, is the best hope for a solution.⁴ The U.S. must have patience. An OAU failure would seriously damage efforts toward inter-African cooperation and indirectly complicate U.S. relations with many African nations. Thus, it is essential that we keep OAU process alive.

— President Haidalla is anxious to sustain dialogue between Mauritania and U.S. and suggests sending a special envoy to the U.S. if we would receive him.

4. Stoessel responded stressing importance USG places on good relations with GIRM, noting we have welcomed its moderate stance on regional issues of mutual concern.

— U.S. hopes to ask for agreement for a new Ambassador in the near future as first step in mutual effort to strengthen our relations.

² In telegram 137047 to Nouakchott, May 19, the Department transmitted a record of the Wisner-Ould Daddah conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820263–0191)

³ In telegram 131971 to Nouakchott, May 14, the Department transmitted a record of the Bruce-Ould Daddah conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820255–0546)

⁴ For the OAU's role in attempting to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara crisis, see Documents 396, 397, and 400.

— As GIRM will recall, we earlier proposed visit by General Walters which could still be useful at some point if President Haidalla would agree to receive him. After we have completed these two steps, we can examine the idea of a special Mauritanian envoy to the U.S.

— On Morocco, Stoessel noted long history of close U.S.-Moroccan relations, emphasizing that U.S. can only play an advisory role in Morocco, but not dictate policy.

— Our military agreements with Morocco are designed to enhance our ability to respond to threats in Southwest Asia—a strategic essential in U.S. global security design.

— We agree OAU role has been helpful generally, but positions taken at Addis recently have seriously complicated the process. U.S. hopes next session proves more fruitful, but we remain concerned about negative role Qadhafi, in particular, may play.

— Nonetheless, U.S. strongly desires to continue dialogue with Mauritania on these and other issues as we believe better communication among all parties concerned is key to negotiated settlement.

5. FYI. Ould Daddah's extensive contacts since his consultations in Mauritania have enabled him to outline GIRM's position at various levels in Department. Given immediacy of these contacts, plus fact that Secretary will be in Europe for beginning of SSOD session in New York,⁵ Department suggests Foreign Minister Ould Minnih would profit more from Washington visit at another time.⁶ If he asks to see Department officials, however, we will seek to arrange usual meetings. End FYI.

Stoessel

⁵ Reference is to the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament held June 7–July 10.

⁶ In telegram 2569 from Nouakchott, May 21, Schrager commented: "It is equally noteworthy that Ould Daddah visits come at same time as King Hassan visit to U.S. and are intended, in some way, to offset enhanced U.S.-Moroccan relations sure to come about as result of visit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820267–0478)

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, July 30, 1982, 1358Z

5728. Subject: Deterioration of Tunisian Relations With Libya. Ref: (A) Tunis 5706,² (B) Tunis 4826.³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: According to SecState for Foreign Affairs Mestiri, implementation of Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement is now “frozen” and the GOT believes it is re-entering a “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi primarily as a result of Tunisia’s refusal to attend the OAU summit in Tripoli. End summary.

3. During my meeting July 30 with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Mestiri, he assessed current and prospective Tunisian relations with Libya as poor. He acknowledged that the principal reason was Tunisia’s refusal to participate in the Tripoli OAU meetings along with the SDAR. Qadhafi had tried hard to get the GOT on board, finally resorting to warnings that Tunisia’s continued boycott would have negative impact on Libyan bilateral cooperation. Such threats had only served to strengthen the GOT’s resolve to stick to its OAU position.

4. Mestiri acknowledged that Foreign Minister Essebsi and Economy Minister Lasram had got nowhere when they visited Libya July 19 primarily for the purpose of exploring Qadhafi’s willingness to strike a deal on the continental shelf question. While during the visit dates for future bilateral meetings had been fixed and announced, all implementation of rapprochement had now been frozen. In fact, the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820399–0627. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 5706 from Tunis, July 30, Cutler reported: “Mestiri told me that message had been received this morning, July 30, from Tripoli informing the GOT that SDAR had agreed to refrain ‘voluntarily and temporarily’ from attending OAU summit and urging Tunisia to attend. Mestiri said GOT regards this as ruse to secure attendance by Tunisia and others who had refused to attend on basis that SDAR did not qualify for OAU membership. In effect, Mestiri said, attendance on basis of SDAR’s voluntary withdrawal would constitute implicit acknowledgment of SDAR’s right to membership. GOT therefore has no intention of attending.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820396–0969)

³ In telegram 4826 from Tunis, June 25, the Embassy reported that a “Senior Foreign Ministry official responsible for the continental shelf dispute” said that Tunisia and Libya “now have until August 25 to reach an accord on demarcating their offshore boundary. He did not anticipate, however, that Libyans would be responsive during this period to Tunisian requests for an accommodation” to their expected suggestion of joint exploration of the shelf. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820333–0050)

GOT considered that it was re-entering a “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi and that Libyan subversive activities against Tunisia—which had never really been halted—were likely to be increased. Mestiri said the GOT wanted the U.S. to know of its assessment.

5. Comment: As we have reported, there have all along been divisions within the GOT on how to deal with Qadhafi. Mestiri has been particularly skeptical of rapprochement, and his assessment must therefore be viewed in that light. Bourguiba was reportedly indignant at Qadhafi’s failure to receive his foreign and economic ministers earlier this month, and Bourguiba himself has made clear to us his unaltered distrust of Qadhafi’s intentions. Certainly Qadhafi must be unhappy about Tunisia’s OAU stance, particularly if he views Tunisia’s refusal to participate as influencing others and possibly spelling defeat for the summit. We believe the Tunisians have some reason for concern re prospects for retaliatory actions by Qadhafi, although the actual extent to which rapprochement may give way to confrontation will depend on further developments including how the OAU summit finally comes out. Mestiri’s intent on sharing with us the GOT’s assessment seems expressly designed to assure continued U.S. support for Tunisian security, current policy differences re Lebanon notwithstanding.

Cutler

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, August 27, 1982, 0900Z

6444. Subject: Some Thoughts on Future US Policy Directions in the Maghreb.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: The purpose of this cable is to share with the Department and our colleagues in North Africa some thoughts and questions we have about U.S. bilateral and multilateral policies in North Africa after the success at the OAU summit in helping prevent a

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820447–0499. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Paris, and Tunis. The document is misnumbered in the original.

Qadhafi victory.² We believe the present situation offers us opportunities. End summary.

3. Introduction: It seems to us that what has taken place at Beirut and Tripoli may constitute significant turning points for the Maghreb.³ In taking stock at this time, we offer some thoughts for next steps in the evolution of U.S. policy. We send these observations from Rabat for further discussion, and we will welcome comments from the Department and advice on next steps.

First, we believe that Qadhafi's fiasco with the OAU meetings can prove a highly satisfactory development in terms of U.S. policy objectives. Whatever the reason African leaders stayed away from Tripoli—opposition to Polisario membership of the OAU, rejection of attempts by Libya since at least February to manipulate and control the OAU, or avoidance of seemingly chronic inter-Arab quarrels—the result is clear: a rebuke to Qadhafi's ambitions and long record of intervention. The "non-summit" was for the Polisario a major political setback, for it failed to win confirmation of the "Kodjo coup" by which it obtained access to the OAU February. Moreover, as the ostensible reason for the failed summit, the Polisario has caused discord between its prime backers, Algeria and Libya, and the particular resentment of the latter.

With the Tripoli fiasco and some modest military successes against the Polisario in July 1982, the Moroccan outlook has now rebounded sharply from the low point experienced after the Polisario blow at Guelta Zemmour in October 1981.⁴ Thanks to the Tripoli outcome high officials here regard the Saharan problem as in better balance. Recent talks with Moroccan leaders lead us to believe, however, that Morocco is not inclined to move rapidly away from what is essentially a static position. A standoff, or stalemate, that is, the status quo is probably acceptable for us over the short run; however, we believe it is not too early to discuss what might at some point reinvigorate the process of peaceful settlement of the Saharan dispute.

² Reference is to the ceasefire in Lebanon brokered by Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East Philip Habib that resulted in the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut. Documentation on the Habib Mission is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982.

³ Because a two-thirds quorum did not attend, the OAU meeting scheduled for August 5 in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that "most of the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara." Others had "misgivings about Colonel Qaddafi's assumption of the OAU membership for 1982–83;" they considered his policies in Africa "too radical." (Geoffrey Godsell, "OAU Summit Fizzles in Qaddafi-land," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9, 1982) See Document 403.

⁴ See Document 387.

In the meantime, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and even Libya probably perceive they have a far more important issue before them now—the greatly altered balance of power in the Middle East by virtue of the dispersal of the PLO. It is not as contenders within the OAU but as members within the Arab League that we believe the Maghreb states will conduct themselves at least through September.

We also believe that more time will be required for the OAU to begin to regroup itself and resume the Nairobi mandate or some other solution for a Saharan settlement. We see no catalyst within the OAU at this juncture. Arap Moi has internal problems to address, and no other cohesive, broadly acceptable leaders of the African states has yet emerged. In a few months, perhaps, it may be opportune to relaunch the implementation committee processes, but it seems too early to make that judgment now. Perhaps, in fact, we shall have to wait until Sekou Toure assumes the OAU presidency. Active OAU attempts to settle the Saharan question may lie in abeyance in the meantime. End introduction.

4. With this as introduction, we suggest the following areas for consideration in the design of U.S. policy in the coming months:

A. The Sahara issue: The U.S. should continue to provide straightforward support for political settlement of the Saharan conflict under OAU auspices. This support, as in the pre-Tripoli summit period, should be expressed selectively and with relative restraint, particularly as long as a continuing Qadhafi candidacy is a possibility.

B. Stability in Morocco: The U.S. should pursue and expand the closer association with Morocco begun at the advent of the Reagan administration. Morocco remains a threatened state, subject to destabilization by adverse economic conditions combined with the military challenge presented by the Polisario. Helping to strengthen Morocco while encouraging the King to seek a political settlement of the Sahara conflict should be an important part of U.S. policy in the region. (We ought to bear in mind the military and economic imbalance faced by the Kingdom relative to Algeria and Libya.) In simple terms, we should continue to help deter some new Guelta Zemmour-like escalation of sophisticated weaponry supplied to and used by the Polisario.

C. Morocco-Algerian relations: In parallel with the above, the U.S. should continue to recognize that the best—perhaps sole—way to obtain a Saharan settlement lies with an eventual improvement of relations between Morocco and Algeria. We know that the King was disappointed by inability to bring about a meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid last December. Perhaps the Arab League context, soon to become highly active, may provide additional opportunities for high level Moroccan-Algerian contacts. The Saudis might be helpful.

The Egyptians also. If there are appropriate ways to do so, we should encourage such contacts.

Visits by the new U.S. Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary might advance the better relations concept. On a less dramatic scale, we offer some other lower profile suggestions in the following paragraphs.

D. Some practical possibilities: In unspectacular but practical ways, there may be opportunities for lessening Algero-Moroccan animosities. For example, the establishment of technical, economic, and other non-confrontational relationships is a possibility we should consider and urge forward when appropriate. Given the high sensitivity here of any contacts with the Algerians, we must, of course, move very carefully indeed. Nonetheless, the matter seems worth exploring. Perhaps folding such emergent relationships within a wider context—triple association of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, for example, or within the Arab/Muslim framework—would help to reduce the controversiality of such undertakings. Tunis with its “neutral” cast in North Africa and its Arab League credentials might be a good site for meetings.

E. Public affairs and AID initiatives: We hope that the U.S. Information Agency will use its new look⁵ to see how its resources can be applied to keeping up the pressure on Libya’s dictator Qadhafi on the one hand and to encouraging regional trust in the Maghreb on the other.

Morocco doesn’t hear VOA well. But we understand that Arabic medium wave broadcasts reach North Africa east of here. If correct, such broadcasts are an important element in convincing Libyans of their country’s failing foreign policies and the benefits of moderation and association with Western countries.

At the same time USIA and AID could do more, we believe, in promoting regional conferences and meetings to foster contacts among Americans, Europeans, (e.g. relations with the European Community, the Iberian connection with the Maghreb), Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians and others) thus hopefully reinforcing the benefits of association with other free world nations. The Salzburg Seminar and Aspen Institutes programs might be an appropriate model for consideration.

English teaching conferences for ministerial level officials are a prime opportunity in the Maghreb. So are workshops on television and radio production and distribution systems.

AID is engaged in matters of vital importance to the region: water resource management; dryland farming; population; alternate sources of energy. Many Maghreb officials have a shared background in U.S.

⁵ Reference is to the International Communications Agency returning to the name United States Information Agency.

colleges and universities. We believe here that this mix offers significant opportunities for advancement of regional relationships and thereby USG interests in the areas.

F. Mediterranean initiatives: It seems evident to us that the U.S. should continue to work both sides of the Atlas and Gibraltar, as it were. Security acceptance for Morocco is essential if we are to reduce the apprehensiveness of those here towards the Algerian arsenal. Adding Morocco to the countries who take part in U.S. assisted military exercises for the defense of the Mediterranean basin is a constructive step to undertake. Now that we have a Joint Military Commission with Morocco, we have a means of enhancing military cooperation as we have already done with Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time, continuing a carefully structured military sales program with Algeria may help to loosen its Soviet connection and encourage intensification of Algerian ties with the West. We must, of course, keep Rabat and Algiers judiciously informed about our respective doings, so as to allay suspicions to the maximum extent possible.⁶

G. A special perspective: France: We also believe it important to be sure our policies complement those of France, which does and should retain the extent and depth of its relations with the states of the Maghreb. (Our purpose may well be to avoid the kind of cross purposes represented by the contrasting French and U.S. positions on African attendance at the Tripoli OAU summit.) We understand that the essence of French policy is often precisely its deliberate independence, but we feel that sustained consultation and, where possible, cooperation with France are very much in our North African interests. France also should be encouraged to avoid stimulating speculation that the U.S. is preparing to invest heavily in North Africa—a ploy we think might be designed to foster inevitable disappointment and thus strengthening of French influence.

7. Department may repeat as desired to other posts and agencies.

8. Ambassador Reed has seen this message and concurs.

Curran

⁶ See Document 203.

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, December 10, 1982, 1228Z

9160. Subject: Moroccan-Algerian Relations: Some Signs of Thaw?

1. (C)—Entire text.

2. Summary: There are a number of indications that Morocco perceives its relationship with Algeria as on the mend. Official sources have spoken favorably of Algerian participation in Arab League activities at Fez² and subsequently, of the Algerian role at the failed Tripoli II Summit of the OAU,³ and of the Saudi mediation effort. Meanwhile, in its treatment of Algerian matters, the Moroccan press has shown considerable restraint during recent weeks. There is, of course, a strong element of wishful thinking involved; no tangible evidence of a more conciliatory Algerian position on key bilateral differences—in particular, over the status of the Western Sahara—has yet lent substance to the expectant mood at Rabat. End summary.

3. A statement to a Saudi newspaper by Foreign Minister Boucetta to the effect that Morocco stands ready to respond “forthrightly” to the mediating role of King Fahd, received prominent coverage in the local press. (Certain pro-palace dailies headlined it, after the official Maghreb press agency filed the item.)

4. MFA Political Affairs Director Cherkaoui expressed gratification over the warming trend in the overall relationship with Algeria, during a meeting with PolCouns and former Ambassador Robert Neumann December 4.⁴ Cherkaoui said that Fahd had detected at Algiers a more practical and supple GOA approach towards Morocco than heretofore. Furthermore, the Saudis reportedly concluded that Algiers had come to consider its domestic problems and the Libyan threat as more urgent policy priorities than the Saharan question.

5. Constructive Algerian participation at the Fez Arab League Summit and the later delegation visit to Washington was appreciated by King Hassan, Cherkaoui continued.⁵ At Tripoli II the Algerians had conducted themselves with dignity and statesmanship. (Cherkaoui

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820642–0330. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Nairobi, Paris, USLO Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and USUN.

² Reference is to the Arab League summit held in Fez, Morocco, September 6–9.

³ See footnote 3, Document 17.

⁴ No record of the Neumann-Cherkaoui discussion was found.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 116.

said that the Algerians had scheduled the Fahd visit adroitly, so as to provide themselves a reason to limit their stay in Tripoli.)

6. Comment: These statements of position, together with a fairly prolonged absence of anti-Algerian comment in the local press, suggest to us that the Moroccan official line is to show the maximum restraint about its long-time adversary. We sense a kind of expectant optimism, in which Moroccans look to King Hassan and President Chadli Bendjedid to reach some sort of normalization with each other. Because they assume that secrecy and negotiations at the highest level are indispensable preconditions for any such normalization, otherwise knowledgeable Moroccans do not seem concerned that they have no specifics about the process. Combined with the sustained relative calm of the Western Sahara military situation and the successfully thwarted Tripoli summits, the possibility of a rapprochement with Algeria seems to have given Moroccans more confidence in the country's diplomatic prospects than at any time since the Polisario tried to obtain OAU membership last February.

7. This relatively euphoric mood cannot, however, obscure the very tangible problems to be overcome in moving toward some kind of accommodation with Algeria. For example, the Moroccans seem to have discounted, for the moment, the implications of the usual Algerian resolution on the Sahara at UNGA, on the grounds that the resolution was ritualistic Algerian behavior, and, in any event, the resolution enjoyed less support than in previous years.⁶ To be sure, the Moroccans have had their hopes high before. Just a year ago they expected an imminent Hassan-Chadli summit. None occurred. Instead, there were a number of reminders, most notably the Algerian attempt to slip the Polisario into OAU membership, that differences between Rabat and Algiers are deep and not easily surmountable. Good feelings notwithstanding, the Western Sahara remains the proving ground of Algerian intentions as far as this Kingdom is concerned. End comment.

Curran

⁶In telegram 3408 from USUN, November 13, the Mission reported that on November 12, the "Fourth Committee adopted the Algerian Resolution on Western Sahara," which urged direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820590-0172)

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 16, 1983, 1442Z

1274. For Secretary Shultz and Judge Clark only from Ambassador Reed. Subject: Moroccan-Algerian Talks.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. During a meeting with King Hassan February 15, he asked that I pass to you two, for the most restricted possible number of readers, the following message:

3. Quote:

— I plan a final review with my top advisors of the Algerian situation February 18/19.

— If the review goes well, and I expect it will, on or about February 23/24 I will have a secret meeting with President Bendjedid at a place on our common border.²

— I have very much in mind your (U.S.) interest in improving Moroccan-Algerian relations as a part of our shared concern for improved regional stability.

— I do not expect or indeed think it desirable that the U.S. have any role or even comment on the upcoming meeting, but I wanted you to know about my definite plans as soon as I was able to give them to you.

— Please convey my personal best regards and respects to President Reagan.

End quote.

3. This message has had extremely limited distribution in Rabat.

Reed

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (02/16/1983–04/28/1983). Secret; Nodis.

² In telegram 857 from Algiers, February 27, the Embassy reported: “Reliable sources in the Presidency and MFA this afternoon confirmed to us that King Hassan and President Bendjedid met February 26 in an Algerian village close to the Moroccan border.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830108–0337)

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 22, 1983, 1700Z

1258. Subject: Bendjedid in Tunisia: Implications for Northwest Africa. Ref: (A) Algiers 1147,² (B) Algiers 1227,³ (C) Tunis 2299.⁴

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Algerian reaction to Tunisia visit of President Bendjedid has been extremely positive. The treaty of fraternity and loyalty, as well as the border agreement, are viewed not only as an important bilateral development, but also as a major step forward in the normalization of regional relations. This visit—following on the heels of the Bendjedid-Hassan summit—is seen as a concrete manifestation of Algeria's blossoming good neighbor policy (ref A), with implications for the greater Sahelian region as well as the Maghreb. Special emissaries have already been dispatched to neighboring countries (ref B), a clear signal of Algerian intention to engage the totality of its regional partners (Libya excluded) in the quest for enhanced stability and cooperation in Northwest Africa.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830158-0037. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Bamako, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 1147 from Algiers, March 15, the Embassy reported: "After meeting with King Hassan February 26, President Bendjedid will go to Tunisia March 18 for a long-awaited visit. In so doing, Bendjedid will lay the last stone in the foundation of Algeria's reinvigorated good neighbor policy. This initiative supports two objectives: first, building regional stability which will allow Algeria to focus tranquilly on its own internal development, and second, creating a unified front against Libyan adventurism." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830143-0662)

³ In telegram 1227 from Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that the "Algerian Press Service (APS) announced noon March 21 that special emissaries would carry messages from President Bendjedid to neighboring countries. APS says messages deal with 'results of President Bendjedid's trip to Tunis and regional matters.'" The Embassy commented: "Not surprisingly, the two heavyweights are sent to Morocco and Mauritania thereby fueling speculation that the messages deal, at least in part, with next steps on the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830155-0509)

⁴ In telegram 2299 from Tunis, March 22, the Embassy reported that "President Bendjedid's visit appears to have been a great success from the Tunisian point of view. Bendjedid's pragmatic approach to cooperation suits the Tunisians well, and they pulled out all the protocol stops for him. Two agreements were signed, on a final demarcation of the border, and the second a treaty of brotherhood, in which the two sides agree to respect each other's political independence and promise not to allow their territory to be used against the other. It is too early to say that a new age has dawned, but the big loser is obviously Qadhafi." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830157-0993)

3. The Tunisian visit has been very well received by the populace at large who consider improved relations as both natural and desirable. Unlike many themes in GOA foreign policy which leave the common man cold, rapprochement with Tunisia and Morocco generates excitement. There is certainly a factor of Maghrebian kinship in this reaction, but there is also the expectation of relaxed travel restrictions and easier access to neighboring markets where consumer goods are plentiful.

4. There is also a strong economic element in GOA determination to push ahead with its good neighbor initiatives. Regional cooperation is viewed as a potentially important factor in Algerian economic development. Such cooperation should flow naturally from normalization of relations; even if it does not, improved regional stability will have provided a more favorable environment for Algeria's own development programs.

5. The Western Sahara remains the principal obstacle in this search for regional harmony. Algeria and Tunisia have called publicly for application of the resolutions adopted at the 1981 Nairobi summit. In fact, the Algerian approach is not so much aimed at reinvigorating the implementation committee as at "transcending" the problem. As explained to us by Director for International Political Affairs Kerroum, the central idea is to establish first a general atmosphere of growing cooperation and harmony at the wider, regional level. Concessions on the Western Sahara should then become easier as contributions to the advancement of this regional objective, rather than as outright concessions to the opposing party in the conflict.

6. From the Algerian perspective, Bendjedid has taken most of the risks thus far. He is determined to pursue GOA efforts to promote regional cooperation, but looks to Morocco to take the necessary first step toward a peaceful resolution of the Saharan problem. Algeria is ready to assist in whatever way it can, but remains insistent that the two parties to the conflict find some ways of talking to one another. Kerroum said that Algeria was not likely to agree to the restoration of diplomatic relations—which Morocco would like to do immediately—until Morocco had made some positive move with regard to the Sahara.

7. We agree with ref C that Qadhafi is odd man out. Although probably not the principal reason behind Algeria's good neighbor offensive, Libyan containment is an important by-product of the process and recognized as such by the GOA. There are some who now expect increased Libyan agitation in retaliation for Qadhafi's exclusion. Libya's expected treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union may also be explained in part by Qadhafi's increasing regional isolation.

Newlin

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, June 2, 1983, 1010Z

2305. Subject: Libyan and Mauritanian Actions Reportedly Behind Hassan's Failure to Attend Maghreb Summit.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. According to Tunisian Ambassador (protect) who took part in all of Bourguiba's meetings in Algiers, King Hassan originally proposed that he join Bendjedid and Bourguiba in Algiers in a symbolic show of Maghreb unity. Algerians accepted with alacrity and asked if Haidalla and Qadhafi could also be invited. Hassan agreed but just before scheduled meeting informed Algerian and Tunisians that he had discovered existence of arms shipments from Libya and Mauritania which made it impossible for him to meet with these two Chiefs of State.² End summary.

3. Tunisian Ambassador states that initial proposal for Bendjedid-Bourguiba-Hassan summit came from King Hassan. Idea was for King to join other two Chiefs of State at guest villa where Bouguiba was staying in order to symbolize Maghreb reconciliation. Both Algeria and Tunisia warmly welcomed Hassan's suggestion.

4. Algeria next asked if there were any objection to invitations being extended to Haidalla and Qadhafi. King Hassan reportedly replied that there was no problem with Haidalla. He was less enthusiastic about Qadhafi [but?] eventually agreed he could also be included.

5. Shortly before the scheduled Grand Maghreb summit, Hassan informed the Algerian and the Tunisians that shipments of arms via Libya and Mauritania had been discovered in Morocco and that, under the circumstances, he could not meet with Qadhafi and Haidalla. Reportedly, the King stated that the Libyan shipment was to Casablanca

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830313-0902. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Addis Ababa, Bamako, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 2302 from Algiers, May 31, the Embassy reported: "Algerian attempts to arrange a grand Maghreb summit collapsed late May 30 when King Hassan and Qadhafi failed to join Bendjedid, Bourguiba and Haidalla in Algiers. Algerian officials are taking the line that they did their duty in extending invitations to other Maghreb Chiefs of State to join the Presidents of Algeria and Tunisia at their long-planned summit to promote regional cooperation and that it is a shame only Mauritania's Haidalla seized the opportunity. We assume Moroccan concern over the Western Sahara caused the non-appearance of King Hassan. The invitation to Qadhafi was probably more of a gesture than an expectation he might accept." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830308-0213)

in a British ship. Apparently, the shipment via Mauritania was a separate operation.

6. Tunisian Ambassador considers Qadhafi is behind efforts to sabotage Maghreb reconciliation. He says Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco all share same analysis of Qadhafi problem.

7. Tunisian confirmed impression Algerian-Tunisian relations continued to improve. Bourguiba and Bendjedid had established close personal relationship and policy of improved relations was very popular in both countries.

8. Polisario seating issue at OAU summit was not a factor in King's non-appearance. Tunisians expect that Algeria and Morocco will maintain their respective positions in Addis but that Algeria will not mount a major campaign on behalf of the Polisario. Ambassador Baccouche remarked that the U.S. position on the OAU Summit was "wise".³

9. Comment: This is a curious development at a curious time. We would appreciate any confirmation from any source that arms shipments did in fact take place. While we would not put it past Qadhafi to engage in such antics, we are surprised that a British ship was supposedly involved. We are also surprised that Mauritania is allegedly involved in shipping arms to dissidents in Morocco.

Newlin

³In telegram 140422 to the OAU collective, May 20, a repeat of telegram 18758 from Paris, May 18, the Department stated: "The US asserts that it: 'continues to believe that the admission of the SADR to the OAU would be a grave mistake.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830288–0096)

22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad¹

Washington, July 14, 1983, 0208Z

195758. Following Rabat repeated for your action dtd Jul 6: Action SecSte info Algiers Cairo Lisbon London Madrid Nouakchott Paris Tel Aviv Tunis.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830399–0442. Secret; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 5283 from Rabat, July 6, which has not been found. Drafted by Terrell Otis (NEA/AFN); cleared by Sebastian, Bishop, and William Garland (S/S–O); approved by Schneider. All asterisks are in the original.

Qte: Rabat 5283. Subject: Qadhafi Visit to Morocco—King Hassan's Views. Ref: Rabat 5211.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to spend the evening with him after the ceremonial breaking of the Ramadan fast on July 5. The King believes that while Colonel Qadhafi is mentally unstable, he is intelligent and, for the time being, Morocco and the Arab world will have to get along with the Libyan. Some diplomatic activity is envisaged.

— The King and Qadhafi reached no agreements either on providing assistance to Morocco (as had been rumored) or on the Western Saharan and Chad matters.

— The King said his sources in Israel have told him the Begin government is planning a de facto occupation of southern Lebanon and is putting the infrastructure in place to accomplish this.

— The King sent his warm personal greetings to President Reagan. End summary.

3. King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to join him for an evening at home after the "harirar" or breaking of the fast at the end of the day on July 5. The Ambassador was accompanied to the meeting by Foreign Minister Boucetta and Chamberlain Frej. Neither man stayed for the conversation which took place from 8:20 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. in the King's private apartment in the palace compound in Rabat.

4. The King said he wanted to be sure the U.S. and President Reagan had an early and authoritative read-out on Qadhafi's visit.

5. It was Qadhafi, according to Hassan, who insisted on coming to Morocco. He originally came for a two-day visit and stayed for four. The King found Qadhafi's behavior erratic and bizarre, sometimes rude. (The flaunting of female bodyguards who apparently glowered at guests over their weapons at formal dinners seemed particularly to have irritated the King.)

"Schizophrenic" was a word used by the King several times to describe Qadhafi. The Libyan "tunes out" at regular intervals and

² Telegram 196717 to Ndjamena, July 14, repeated the text of telegram 5211 from Rabat, July 5, in which the Embassy reported: "Qadhafi's unexpected visit to Rabat ended on Sunday, July 3. To the end, the visit was played as being at the 'working level', but the lavishness and breadth of the reception given Qadhafi left many with the impression that it was a full State visit. Efforts were made, our sources tell us, to keep the frenetic (one high Moroccan called him 'schizophrenic') Libyan from getting out of hand, and most with whom we have spoken thus far express their skepticism about the sincerity of Qadhafi's new-found moderation and friendliness. It would appear that all expected issues were in fact covered." The Embassy continued: "We fear that the U.S. position in North Africa may have been a Moroccan bargaining chip." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830402-0613)

makes curious and inappropriate noises and sounds at other times, according to Hassan.

6. However, said Hassan, Qadhafi may be “unstable” but he is not stupid and he, Hassan, has decided (we understand from other sources the Saudis share this view) that Qadhafi will be around for a while and the Arabs will have to learn to live with him.

7. As a start, Hassan has decided to send a special envoy to Libya to explore the possibility of setting up diplomatic relations with the Tripoli government. This special envoy may be the brother of Education Minister Laraki. Hassan said he and Qadhafi also agreed it would be a good idea to have a meeting of Maghreb leaders. Hassan proposed Algiers as a site. Qadhafi was taken aback at this and said he wasn’t “getting along with the Algerians.” These were the only “concrete” results of the visit. On Chad and Western Sahara, both sides spent a lot of time sparring and seem to have ended up hinting to each other that Morocco would stay out of the Chad situation if the Libyans stopped interfering in the Western Sahara.

— Qadhafi told Hassan there are no Libyan troops currently in Chad.

— As an aside to a description of the talks on Western Sahara/Chad, King Hassan said Qadhafi would giggle and ask him when the referendum would be held. Hassan said he finally asked when the Libyans would be holding a referendum in Chad and that this had caused one of Qadhafi’s tune-outs.

8. The King said he did not ask for Libyan financial assistance and refused to discuss a Libyan idea to refuse Moroccan military facilities to imperialists. (“What cheek* do you Americans know what the Russians have in Libya?”)

9. Hassan sent Qadhafi to meet the father of the current Polisario chief, Mohammed Abdelaziz, who lives in Rabat. According to the King, the father gave Qadhafi an “earful on the abuses of the Polisario and their mistaken goals.”

10. In sum, the King said, he had spent rather too much time on Qadhafi but perhaps it would be useful to have a dialogue. The difficulty of such a dialogue was illustrated, Hassan said, by the departure scene. Qadhafi has said he was going on to Mauritania. However, his aircraft took off due east**

11. On another subject: King Hassan continues to be gloomy about the Middle East. He claims to have highly placed sources in Israel who say the Begin government is preparing the de facto annexation of southern Lebanon and is installing the infrastructure (roads, schools, etc.) to accomplish this*

12. The Ambassador discussed weather modification, VOA enhancement and security matters which will be handled in septels.³

13. The King looked well and seemed relaxed and at ease. There is no sign of any tension or unusual security on the palace grounds.

14. The redoubtable Moulay Hafid, however, is showing signs of age. He has developed a slight tremor and in dealing with senior Embassy officer has been uncharacteristically forgetful and sloppy about details.

15. The King thanked the Ambassador for delaying his departure to meet at the palace and provided a private aircraft to fly the Ambassador to London.

Curran

Unqte

Shultz

³ No other record of the July 5 Reed-Hassan meeting has been found.

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, July 19, 1983, 1400Z

5400. Subject: Prime Minister Mzali Visits Tripoli. Ref: Tunis 5244.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Prime Minister Mzali left Tunis July 19 for Tripoli to attend a session of the Tunisian-Libyan High Commission. Although as late as July 15 Foreign Minister Caïd Essebsi told the Ambassador that no final decision had been made that Mzali would go, it has been increasingly apparent that the Libyans would take great offense if he failed to show.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830409–1130. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 5244 from Tunis, July 11, the Embassy reported an impending visit by Mzali to Tripoli in order to attend the Tunisian-Libyan High Commission meeting. The Embassy's source said that "Libyan pressure for a Mzali visit has been intense. In exchange, the Tunisians want tangible progress on several fronts, including the treatment of Tunisian workers in Libya and the continental shelf." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830392–0836)

The Tunisian Ministers of Economy and Plans have been in Tripoli since July 17 to prepare the High Commission meeting.

3. The High Commission has existed for some years, but it had been dormant until it was revived by Qadhafi's visit to Tunisia in February 1982. Although the communique issued at the conclusion of that meeting specified that the High Commission would meet every six months, presided by Mzali and his Libyan counterpart, no formal meeting of the High Commission has taken place until now because there has been no progress on the two issues of primary concern to the Tunisians: the enrollment of Tunisian workers into Libyan backed "liberation movements", and the continental shelf.

4. It is not clear why Mzali has now agreed to go to Tripoli. We are told that Libyan pressures have been intense, and it may be that Mzali concluded that his continued refusal to go to Libya would have provoked an unnecessary crisis with the Libyans. That one Mzali advisor was hoping he would not go, and the Foreign Minister's statement to the Ambassador July 15 that no final decision had been taken,³ indicate that there may have been a debate on the issue within the government, which Bourguiba would have had to resolve.

5. One thing is certain, Mzali's visit does not mean that the Tunisian view of Libya has changed. From Bourguiba on down, the Tunisian Government regards Qadhafi's Libya as a continuing security threat. Mzali can be frank and tough when he wants to be, and his meeting with Qadhafi may well be acrimonious. With regard to Chad, the PLO, and relations with Algeria, Mzali can be counted on to speak his mind, while concentrating on the problems of Tunisians in Libyan Camyu and the continental shelf. If Qadhafi is prepared to make concessions, particularly on the shelf issue, relations could improve. If not, as seems more likely, Mzali's visit risks aggravating already strained relations and threatening the rather threadbare "normalization" which began in February 1982.⁴

Cutler

³ No record of Mzali's statement has been found.

⁴ In telegram 5476 from Tunis, July 21, the Embassy reported: "Prime Minister Mzali appears to have emerged unscathed, at least publicly, from his recent visit to Tripoli for the first meeting of the Tunisian-Libyan Joint Commission. Progress on the difficult political issues which divide Tunisia and Libya appears to have been minimal. While agreement was reached on certain economic and commercial questions, we can expect that Tunisia will watch closely to see whether or not Libya intends to follow through on its commitments." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830415-0832)

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, July 25, 1983, 1232Z

3475. Subject: Qadhafi's Mauritania Visit. Ref: Nouakchott 3437 (Notal).²

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: In his 45 hour visit to Mauritania, Libya's Colonel Qadhafi found officials wary and a populace relatively indifferent. Qadhafi minded his manners. Important issues addressed—Chad, Western Sahara, and the Middle East—apparently prompted no startling revelations. In all Mauritanian officials made it quite clear that they were not susceptible to the Libyan leader's grand schemes for Africa, Islam, or the Arab world. End summary.

3. Mounting a hasty but credible reception to accommodate Col. Mummar el Qadhafi's auto-invitation to visit Mauritania, Chief of State Mohammed Khouma Ould Haidalla welcomed the Libyan leader to Nouakchott for a forty-five hour visit beginning July 22. Trailer trucks transported several thousand inhabitants of Nouakchott's tent-and-shack suburbs to ringside seats on the airport road. French and Arab editions of *Chaab* carried a photo of Haidalla and Qadhafi in a fraternal embrace. Qadhafi boarded one of the four aircraft which transported his entourage at 9 a.m. on July 24.

4. Authentically Arab: In apparent contrast to his disastrous public relations effort in April, 1981,³ when he chastised Mauritians for their defective claims to membership in the Arab-Islamic world, Qadhafi this time round celebrated the authenticity of Arab culture and Islamic values in this "most western bastion of the Pan-Arab nation". Haidalla, whom he had earlier asked to step aside in favor of more zealous Pan-Arab nationalists, was described as "a true guide to the revolution".

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830421-1051. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 3437 from Nouakchott, July 21, the Embassy reported: "In meeting this morning, Foreign Minister Minnih noted that Qadhafi had asked leave to visit Mauritania following his trip to Rabat; GIRM had replied Mauritania's friends were always welcome. GIRM officials were visibly relieved when Qadhafi's entourage headed east from Rabat." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830415-0655)

³ Reference is to Qadhafi's "unexpected" April 21, 1981, visit to Mauritania. In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April 22, 1981, the Embassy reported that Qadhafi publicly declared that Mauritania had accepted "in principle, to join Steadfastness Front" which opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as "the possibility of Mauritania-Libya merger." The GIRM informed the Embassy, however, that Mauritania had not agreed to any of Qadhafi's claims. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810189-0944)

During a hastily arranged meeting with leaders of Mauritania's structure for the education of the masses, a year-old political consciousness-raising effort, Qadhafi drew some flattering parallels between the SEM and his own successes since coming to power in September 1969.

5. Matters of substance: Apart from two dinners and a breakfast (offered in a tent 20 miles into the desert), visits to two small Libyan-supported projects, and meetings with Mauritania's sizeable contingent of Libyan secondary school teachers, Qadhafi's schedule consisted primarily of two hour long meetings, one with Haidalla and Prime Minister Taya, and another with Foreign Ministry officials on both sides. At the latter, according to one report, Qadhafi stoutly contradicted reports of Libyan troops' presence in Chad, and urged Mauritania to play a more active but unspecified role in the "anti-Zionist" camp. Haidalla and Qadhafi reportedly discussed Western Sahara options in their private talk; little more is known except for a GIRM official's comment that Haidalla sought new assurances that a settlement should not prejudice Mauritania's sovereignty or the Sahara's right to self-determination.

6. Comment: In a nice touch, the front page of the July 23 Chaab managed to juxtapose Haidalla welcoming Qadhafi with a picture of Foreign Minister Ould Minnih receiving Ambassador Peck. The airport scene projected another message: Several French military aircraft parked alongside the runway, prompting rumors they were carrying supplies to Chad. Mauritanian officials noted with relief and astonishment that Qadhafi and his party of 200 brought their own food—even lambs for the traditional *meschoui*; Nouakchott's food markets are notoriously short on basic supplies this time of year, and news of Qadhafi's impending arrival had prompted a mini-run on what delicacies were available. For the rest Nouakchott's attention remained steadfastly fixed during Qadhafi's stay on Mauritania's first-ever soccer tournament in their new stadium. From what we can see at this point, in substance and in form, Qadhafi's return to Mauritania was a modest affair; we will assess the significance of the visit in septel.⁴

Brynn

⁴ In telegram 3555 from Nouakchott, July 28, the Embassy reported: "According to GIRM and foreign observers, Col. Qadhafi left Mauritania not a happy man. His departure, however, may have raised Haidalla's spirits. Qadhafi found no audience for federation schemes, and Chief of State Haidalla took umbrage at his demeaning assessment of Mauritania and its efforts to mobilize its own resources." The Embassy continued: "Qadhafi was heard urging his aide-de-camp to hasten their departure from 'this miserable country.' It was not a productive visit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830430-0191)

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, July 27, 1983, 1310Z

3148. Subject: Qadhafi in Algeria. Ref: (A) Algiers 3102.²

1. (U) Qadhafi departed Algiers morning July 26, after two-day stay labelled "working visit" by GOA. President Bendjedid met several times with Libyan leader and hosted a dinner limited to the Politburo, high FLN officials, and African and Arab Ambassadors. Qadhafi also appeared before FLN officials at party headquarters, where he was reportedly criticized for encouraging internal PLO dissension.

2. (U) No details concerning the bilateral talks have filtered out as yet—even the rumor mill remains dry. Highlights of the joint communique include:

- Reaffirmation of the Saharan peoples' right to self-determination and independence and support for the Addis Ababa OAU Summit resolution as the best means for "an urgent and peaceful political solution";

- Support for the July 16 OAU bureau resolution on Chad, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and national reconciliation;

- Agreement on the continuing need for supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and unique representative;

- Reaffirmation of solidarity with Syria as it faces "provocations and challenges."

3. (C) Comment: We doubt that Qadhafi's visit broke new ground. For the Libyan leader, however, it provided a useful occasion to refurbish his regional credentials and to breathe new life into a dwindling dialogue with the GOA. Algeria shares in particular the latter objective, believing it safer to at least remain in communication with the unpredictable Qadhafi. On substance, Bendjedid surely reiterated the Algerian conception of the great Arab Maghreb, i.e., a community of interest to be patiently developed through increased regional cooperation over

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830428–1045. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 3102 from Algiers, July 25, the Embassy reported that during remarks made upon his arrival "Qadhafi called Algeria 'his second country' and said the time has come for Arab nations to face up to their problems, i.e. 'the march of Zionism backed by American imperialism.'" The Embassy noted that while no details were available concerning Qadhafi's talks with Algerian officials, nonetheless, "Maghrebi cooperation and Western Sahara are thought by nearly all observers to figure among major points of discussion." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830421–0583)

several generations—the antithesis of Qadhafi’s grandiose visions of immediate fusion into one great Arab nation. Other topics of discussion probably included Qadhafi’s impressions—in the wake of his Rabat visit—of Moroccan intentions in the Western Sahara, the current state of play in Chad, and recent developments in the Middle East.³

4. Nouakchott minimize considered.

Newlin

³ See footnote 2, Document 22.

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the White House¹

Algiers, September 14, 1983, 0135Z

93. For: NSC/Judge Clark Office of the Vice President. From: Vice President’s Traveling Party. Subject: September 12 Meeting Between King Hassan II and Vice President Bush.

1. The Vice President and King Hassan met on 12 September in the Royal Palace in Rabat. Ambassador Walters was the only other person present. Since this was a very private meeting, distribution should be held to minimum.

2. Lebanon. After the amenities, the Vice President said we had received very alarming news yesterday from Lebanon. The King interrupted to say he had just heard that Prince Bandar had obtained a cease-fire from the Syrians, Druzes, and Shiites, and was currently in Larnaca (Cyprus) talking to President Gemayel of Lebanon. He did not think that Bandar would have made his proposal in the first place if he did not have Lebanese agreement.

3. The Vice President asked whether such a cease-fire in place would hold. King Hassan replied that it would “for a while.”

4. The Vice President then asked what the King thought we should do and the latter replied that we should above all not put our tail

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Niact Immediate; Via Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Bush visited North Africa September 11–16, Yugoslavia September 16–18, Romania September 18–19, Hungary September 19–20, and Austria September 20–21.

between our legs and "bug out." The Vice President then asked whether the King thought a government of national unity could be formed in Lebanon. The King said it could and when it was formed then the countries having forces in Beirut could withdraw honorably. However, to bug out would cause tremendous U.S. loss of face. Long term the King was not optimistic about the durability of the government of national unity and he added reluctantly, "In the end it may result in a partition of Lebanon between Syria and Israel." The King was most concerned about the activities of the Shiite Moslem Iranian volunteers. The Syrians were egging them on. Arming and supplying them.

5. King Hassan said that he had advised the Saudis to cut off the Syrians' money to force the Syrians to cooperate with Bandar. They had done so and six hours later Assad had indicated willingness to resume talks with Bandar. The Vice President said that this jibed with our information.

6. Iran-Iraq war. The Vice President then asked the King what he thought of the Iraq-Iran war. The King replied that the Vice President would recall that when he was in Washington that had been the subject about which he had talked the most as it could easily degenerate into a much more serious conflagration. The Saudis were most concerned. There were more than 100,000 Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. They were demonstrating and causing trouble, but they could not be kept out because they were Moslems visiting the holy places. However, when the demonstration began, Prince Abdallah, the head of the National Guard, had been most concerned and had curtailed his month-long vacation in Morocco and rushed home. In addition, said the King, there were a lot more Iranians who had entered Saudi Arabia through Bahrain and other places and it was difficult for the Saudis to keep track of all of them.

7. Libya. The King then spoke of Qadhafi's recent visit to Morocco.² The Libyan leader had sent him a message saying he would like to come to Morocco. King Hassan had asked what he wanted to talk about and Qadhafi had replied about a number of things. So the King had agreed that he could come for a day and a half. He had, in fact, stayed for four days.

8. He had promised King Hassan that he would cease all support to the Polisario. King Hassan said that he had kept that promise up to now but he was very skeptical for the future.

9. "Qadhafi is a schizophrenic" the King added. "All of us are to some degree. But in most cases our schizophrenia amounts to ripples. In his case, it is tidal waves." The King had introduced Qadhafi to the parents of most of the Polisario leaders. These people are Moroccans living in Morocco.

² See footnote 2, Document 22.

10. King Hassan said that Qadhafi was still determined to hold on to large pieces of Chad and would not give up those territories he had acquired by force.

11. Qadhafi had been so taken with the uniforms of the Moroccan parachutists that the King had to have a number made overnight for the Libyan leader's female party who were not, contrary to popular belief, bodyguards but students ranging from 19 to 25 that Qadhafi took with him on his travels on a rotating basis so that "they could see the world."

12. The King said to Qadhafi at the outset of the visit that he would talk very bluntly with him since he would not ask the Libyans for money or cheap gas. He concluded that Qadhafi was schizophrenic and a dangerous man, unpredictable and irrational. His relations with Algeria were deteriorating because of border problems along the 1,000 kilometers of common frontier.

13. Western Sahara. The Vice President then asked about the Sahara. The King went through the history of the area and the grounds of the Moroccan claim. He said he had promised a referendum before the end of the year and he would go through with it. It would be supervised by the UN and the OAU. The Algerians had indicated to him that they were not keen for a referendum because they knew that Morocco would win.

14. The King said he had offered the Algerians a free port and fishing rights on the Atlantic coast. He had told them that they had things Morocco needed such as energy and petroleum technology and Morocco had food and other resources Algeria needed. Why should they not join together to build the great Maghreb. He believed President Bendjedid would have to go along with all of this and build a natural gas pipeline to Europe via Morocco and Spain that would unquestionably be viewed favorably and perhaps helped by the U.S. which would be delighted to see Europe less dependent on Siberian gas. The difficulty was that the Algerians were still searching for their national identity and it was difficult to get a consensus of those who governed Algeria.

15. The Vice President asked what he could do to help while in Algiers. The King replied, "emphasize all of the foregoing."

16. The King then gave the Vice President a copy of his letter to OAU Chairman Mengistu indicating that he would hold the referendum in the Western Sahara but would not go to Addis Ababa.³

17. The King said that all parties in Morocco supported his position on the Sahara and he was quite sure that Morocco would win the referendum. The July and September 3 and 9 attacks on Morocco were

³ Telegram 7313 from Rabat, September 12, contains the text of Hassan's letter to Mengistu. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

Algerian-supported.⁴ Earlier on one occasion the Polisario had fired 3,000 rounds of Katyusha (122 mm) rockets in one day. That represented an expenditure of some 20 million dollars and the Polisario simply did not have that kind of money. It had to come from Algeria.

18. The King said that the form in which the question was posed for the referendum was important. The Algerians would demand the withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and armed forces. He would reply that the referendum which gave independence to Algeria had been posed simply as "do you want to be part of France or Algeria?" and in the Sahara it should be phrased: "do you want to be part of Morocco or of an independent state?" he also pointed out that the referendum had been held in Algeria with the French administration and armed forces in place.

19. If a majority decided for an independent state in the Sahara. He would hold free elections and turn the country over. Not to the Polisario, but to whoever won, just as the U. S. felt that the Palestinians had a right to a homeland but was not in favor of turning them over to the PLO.

20. Invitation to King Hassan. The Vice President said that President Reagan was looking forward to a working lunch in the United States with the King. King Hassan then said that he would probably go to the United States on September 23. He would speak the day after the President.⁵ He knew that the President had 37 leaders who wanted to see him, and he was delighted that the President had accepted this meeting with him.

21. The Crown Prince. The Vice President and the King then spoke about the Crown Prince and how the King was more and more putting him into public life and possibilities in a non-deferred future of his spending some time in the United States.

22. Conclusion. The Vice President and the King agreed to exchange information on Lebanon later in the day when they met for dinner. At the end the Vice President handed the King the letter from President Reagan.⁶

⁴ For information concerning the July incident, see footnote 2, Document 411. No record of attacks in September has been identified.

⁵ Reference is to Reagan's September 26 address to the UN General Assembly.

⁶ No record of Reagan's letter to Hassan has been found.

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State and the White House¹

Belgrade, September 17, 1983, 1630Z

280. Fm Admiral Murphy. To Judge Clark for the President and Secretary Shultz. Subject: The Vice President's Bilateral With Prime Minister M'zali of Tunisia.

The Vice President met with PriMin M'zali on September 15 for a discussion of bilateral issues. The meeting lasted approx. 30 minutes. The atmosphere was cordial. The following record was compiled from the interpreters notes.

The Vice President: I may be useful to make some observations on my private meetings with President Bendjedid² and King Hassan.³ There are no secrets but we can talk alone and you may have some questions. We are determined to improve our relations with Algeria and I told President Bendjedid that that is what President Reagan wants. I found the Algerian President to be a very reasonable man. There were no polemics and little rhetoric. He is a reasonable man who wants us to do more with King Hassan regarding the Sahara. I told him anything we do with reference to Morocco should not be viewed as a threat against Algeria. Bendjedid asked about U.S. bases in Morocco and I explained the access and transit concept for the RDF (rapid deployment force). I made sure Algeria knows that this is not designed to threaten Algeria. There was another matter which came up. One of our officials had made a statement to the effect that Algeria is a satellite of the Soviet Union. I made clear to President Bendjedid that that is not the view of the USG and that it does not reflect the attitudes of the President, or the Vice President, for that matter. Concerning King Hassan's talking to the Polisario, I told Bendjedid that that is a Moroccan decision.

I told the President that we support the referendum and think this is the right approach. In my talks with King Hassan and President Bendjedid both, whenever the referendum was mentioned it was cited in a very favorable light. Finally, I told Bendjedid that we wanted to cooperate. We are disgusted with Qadhafi and have no use for him but he is not ten feet tall. We do not trust him and consider him unstable. If there are any threats, we can exchange information and contribute

¹ Source: George H. W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Eyes Only; Via Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 130 for Bush meeting with the Algerian Prime Minister.

³ A record of the Bush-Hassan meeting is in Document 26.

to the security of Tunisia, we shall be glad to do it with you as we have offered to do it with other countries. Bendjedid replied you are making Qadhafi bigger than he is. The Vice President responded that if in the future you in Tunisia are concerned about the movement of Libyan forces or if there is any concern over a threat to Tunisia we will be glad to pass or share information with you concerning your security. Now we understand that Qadhafi comes to visit. He is a neighbor with whom you must deal. This will pose you no difficulties in the United States. However we do not trust him; we do not want a dialog with him as long as he subscribes to international terrorism. So if you want to have this information we will give it to you because we feel very strongly about Tunisia's integrity and independence. We will go the extra mile for you. But we will not involve you in any of our disputes. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation and interest in these proposals. He said that Tunisia has excellent relations with both Morocco and Algeria at present. Relations have been good with Morocco for many years. With Algeria they have been based on trust and brotherhood. There are a number of industrial and commercial projects. This is good for Tunisia because after Gafsa Tunisia felt caught in a pincer between Algeria and Libya. Bendjedid is indeed a moderate who wants to raise the standard of living of his people. He does not have the imperialistic vision of his predecessor, President Boumédiène. However, Bendjedid needs time to wipe out the Boumedienne legacy. There are still militants in the party structure. He hoped, the Prime Minister said, that the United States might develop a privileged relationship with the three countries of the Maghreb on a basis of equality. On the Sahara, the Prime Minister said that he was in Morocco and talked to King Hassan, who was concerned. Next week he (the PM) will go to Algiers to talk with President Bendjedid and the Prime Minister. He is convinced that if these problems cannot be worked out there will be no peace, no confidence, no cooperation in the Maghreb. "We want the U.S. to exert as always its influence in favor of an honorable compromise".

The Vice President responded that the U.S. would like to see that too, but that we cannot lean heavily on King Hassan by asking him to do something that is not in his interest. We asked what kind of a compromise does Tunisia envisage? Mzali responded that he had asked Hassan how far he could go, mentioning a formula like that used in the southern Sudan, i.e. a sort of confederation. King Hassan said that he wanted to bequeathe his son a Morocco of six or seven laender rpt laender, as in the FRG. "If I gave in to the Sahara then the people in the Rif which has been under Spanish domination would ask for the same thing". National unity would crumble. However, said Mzali, the King did not rule a confederation out. In Tunisia, continued the Prime Minister, we will continue to try and hope that the solution will ripen.

Like you, we cannot take any initiative which will arouse the two countries. Why don't we stay in touch, said the Vice President, to see what kind of initiative develops that we can both support.

The Prime Minister then talked about U.S. assistance to Tunisia, economic and military, the "close" commission, etc. He referred to problems in Congress.⁴ He said that for FY83 "we're ok" but he hoped that the administration would keep pushing its line with Congress to keep aid at a more substantial level for Tunisia. Tunisia is a country that has needs for equipment, at least for its army. With respect to economic aid, Tunisia apparently is no longer eligible but given the plan it will need to do a great deal to create jobs and raise the level of young people's standard of living. Otherwise the young will listen to Libya and believe that Libya is some sort of a paradise. On Libya, we'd rather talk but we will remain vigilant. We'd rather talk than close the borders or create tension. We recall the Arab saying that you should have the Koran in one hand and a stone in the other. We do not lack stones. The PM gave a few words about Qadhafi's visit. He met and talked with young party members and said "the U.S. is attacking you". I (M'zali) said what about the Russians? And Qadhafi has changed on Maghreb unity. He used to say that it is an imperialist U.S. plot. Now he says that it must be built by changed policies. So we take note of his change of position and attitude. If it persists so much the better. If it does not we shall not be surprised. The Prime Minister then raised at President Bourguiba's request the possibility of setting up an American university in Tunis and replacing the flag ship of the Tunisian navy. "We were told that a World War Two vintage destroyer is available." A 15 or 16 million dollar overhaul will be required. President Bourguiba would like to receive it in good working condition. The Vice President said he would have Admiral Murphy look into that when he gets back to his office.

⁴ Not further identified.

28. Telegram From Vice President Bush to President Reagan¹

Belgrade, September 17, 1983, 1635Z

281. Copies only to: Judge Clark and Sec State. Positively no other distribution. Subject: Herewith My Capsulized Personal Impressions on Magreb Countries.

1. Morocco. King Hassan showed me unprecedented hospitality. The foremost symbol of this was very small dinner at which his wife and four children were in attendance.²

2. His main problem is—Morocco, quite simply, is broke. His Majesty could not bring himself to discuss the gory details. His Finance Minister had prepared a letter, but the King's pride and his innate belief that friends will help friends kept him from passing the letter to me.

3. Morocco has given us access to bases for rapid deployment. Others would have traded hard and exacted a price—not Hassan.

4. It seems imperative to me that we help Morocco now in their hour of critical need.

5. Algeria. I had a very long one-on-one with President Bendjedid followed by a family lunch at which we were joined by just Barbara and the seldom seen Mrs. Bendjedid.³

6. I was impressed—Bendjedid is much more moderate and reasonable than I had expected. He is far different than Boumédienne, a judgement confirmed by the Moroccans and Tunisians. All subjects were discussed in a very realistic non-polemical way.

7. I left Algeria feeling it is well worth the effort at high levels to work with them. Someday I would love to see Bendjedid come to meet you. I guarantee you will like him and find him sensible.

8. He has some big problems steering Algeria away from its more radical past, but I believe he wants to do just that.

9. Tunisia. Our friend Bourguiba is out of it. He was pleasant and emotional but he kind of comes and goes.⁴

10. Example: Right in the middle of my somewhat boring toast given at a lunch for his top people, Bourguiba yelled out "What about Israel? They ought to do what's right in the Middle East." All his top

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 26.

³ See Document 27.

⁴ See Document 27.

people and his wife tried to calm him down and shut him up. My heart ached for the poor guy.

11. I saw a good deal of his designated successor Mzali, who sends his regards to you. Mrs. Bourguiba, a very warm and engaging woman, came unexpectedly to Mzali's dinner for us. She clearly overshadows them all—they all defer to her, even Mzali.

12. Our relationship with Tunisia is excellent. They have huge financial problems.

13. All three countries worry about the Polisario problem, but Algeria and Morocco are still pretty far apart.

14. They all detest Khadafi, though all have contacts with him.

15. Except for their actions in the various multilateral organizations which often go against us, our relations with Tunisia and Morocco are excellent and the relationship with Algeria has great potential.

16. One side note—I survived, barely, a challenging press conference in Tunisia. It was like every questioner was representing Arafat in philosophy and acting like Sam Donaldson⁵ in performance.

17. They blamed us for the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla.⁶ I just lucked out by being questioned on the anniversary of the massacre.

18. They all stated that Habib had made an agreement that we would protect the Palestinians when their fighters pulled out.⁷ They were emotional and unreasonable. Come to think of it though, I'd rather have done that, than call John Loeb.⁸

19. Oh yes, Yassir Arafat, in Tunisia, called Mzali, Tunisia's Prime Minister, offering to drop by to see me.

20. This concludes my report from the Magreb. May all your dates be free of dromedary dung. May your fruits be devoid of sand. May the finger of peace be aimed in the right direction.

George al-Bush

⁵ Reference is to the White House Correspondent for ABC News.

⁶ Reference is to the September 16–19, 1982, massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Shiites in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp by a Lebanese Christian Phalange militia allied with the Israeli military. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 17.

⁸ Reference is to John L. Loeb Sr., a wealthy financier, philanthropist, and strong supporter of Israel.

29. **Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**¹

Washington, September 29, 1983

SUBJECT

Report on the Vice Presidential Trip to North Africa and Eastern Europe

As you know, I accompanied the Vice President on his recent trip to North Africa² and Eastern Europe, covering seven countries in ten days. I found the trip to be fascinating, challenging and immensely rewarding. I was proud to have been able to partake in this important endeavor.

On this visit, the Vice President sought to clarify U.S. policies and objectives in a regional and global context and to gain new insight into Magreb and East European thinking. Specifically, in North Africa, the Vice President discussed such issues as the Western Sahara, the Lebanon crisis, and prospects for a Middle East settlement, as well as bilateral trade and economic matters.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

In addition to the private exchange of views, the trip had an important public diplomacy dimension. The Vice President's presence in individual North African and East European countries underscored the importance which we attach to maintaining an informed and assertive policy in these regions. The Vice President delivered two major foreign policy speeches. His speech in Algiers cogently affirmed U.S. support for a policy of genuine non-alignment and reiterated our position that the fostering of a free market economy represents the best hope for Third World economic development.³ The Vice President's speech in Vienna provided the most authoritative exposition to date of the Administration's policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Africa General (07/20/1983–10/01/1983). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Printed from an initialed copy. A copy was sent to Bush.

² See Document 28.

³ Excerpts of Bush's September 14 address at the El Aurassi Hotel are in telegram 3935 from Algiers, September 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830533–0534) The address is printed in full in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1983, pp. 11–14.

⁴ A transcript of Bush's September 21 speech in Vienna is in telegram 11579 from Vienna, September 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830545–1038) For text of the speech, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 168.

In sum, the trip to North Africa and Eastern Europe was a resounding success. The Vice President established a personal rapport with the primary leaders in these countries and thus, contributed to the furtherance of our bilateral relations. He also succeeded in conveying both frankly and convincingly Administration views on significant bilateral and international issues.

Morocco

Given Morocco's strong ties with the United States⁵ and King Hassan's successful meeting with President Reagan in 1982,⁶ it was not surprising that the Vice President was warmly welcomed in Rabat. In fact, he was treated as a head of state. He was greeted with a 19-gun salute and was received immediately by King Hassan without the customary waiting period. Their meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and covered a wide range of issues such as Lebanon, Qadhafi, the Middle East settlement and the Western Sahara. In these discussions, the King purposefully chose not to request any economic assistance. However, our Ambassador and other Embassy officials clearly described the critical state of the Moroccan economy and strongly recommended urgent U.S. assistance. (See Ambassador Reed's letter to the Vice President at Tab A.)⁷

During our stay in Rabat, most of us found Moroccan officials to be somewhat uneasy. In private conversation, one got the impression that they were concerned about the Vice President's stop in Algeria and hoped that the potential strengthening of U.S.-Algerian relations would not develop at Morocco's expense. The Vice President's trip to Morocco was capped by a visit to the ancient city of Fez where he was cheered by the local inhabitants.⁸

Algeria

The Vice President's meetings in Algeria were marked by a cordial atmosphere and represented a significant milestone in the development of U.S.-Algerian relations. As this was the first visit to Algeria of an American official of such rank, the Algerians perceived this event as a manifestation of our interest in intensified bilateral political dialogue. The Vice President engaged in very fruitful exchanges with both President Bendjedid and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi.⁹ In fact, Bendjedid

⁵ We have enjoyed the longest unbroken treaty relationship with Morocco dating back to 1787. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ Reagan and Hassan met at the White House on May 19, 1982.

⁷ Not attached is Reed's September 13 letter.

⁸ I was pleased to learn that we are building a VOA transmitter in Rabat to broadcast to the USSR/East Europe. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ A record of Bush's September 14 conversation with Ibrahimi is in telegram 9899 from Bucharest, September 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830540–0309)

invited the Vice President and Mrs. Bush to dinner at his home and introduced them to his family.

In the various discussions, the Algerians stressed the importance of the principles of self-determination and non-alignment in Algerian foreign policy which stem from their revolutionary experience. Of the issues discussed, the topics of Western Sahara and Moroccan-Algerian relations were the most prominent. The Algerians expressed some concern that U.S. military assistance to King Hassan might diminish his incentive to negotiate on the Western Sahara settlement and that the existence of U.S. bases in Morocco might prejudice U.S. reaction to a possible Moroccan-Algerian conflict. The Vice President vigorously refuted both claims.

The Algerian visit was concluded by the Vice President's address on U.S. views of non-alignment and North-South economic issues. His remarks were well received.

Tunisia

A model of economic and social development in the Arab world, Tunisia continues to emphasize domestic progress. Thus, most of the discussion focused on such issues as education, family planning and the role of women in social and economic development. In his meeting with the Vice President, President Bourguiba proudly pointed out that Tunisia has done more for women's liberation than any other Arab country. Specifically, they have ensured equality of educational opportunities, have promoted women's political participation, and have outlawed polygamy.

President Bourguiba also chided us for grain sales and technology transfers to the USSR and stated that we should show greater interest in transferring technology to our friends such as Tunisia. Lebanon was briefly discussed. During the luncheon, President Bourguiba interrupted the Vice President's toast and asserted that Begin refused to withdraw from Lebanon. In reply, the Vice President aptly pointed out that the U.S. is committed to the withdrawal of all foreign troops and that it is primarily Syrian intransigence that poses the main obstacle to a Lebanese settlement.

Even though it was not originally scheduled, the Vice President consented to meet with the Secretary General of the Arab League, Klibi, at his request.¹⁰ This encounter was very useful as the Vice President strongly communicated U.S. resolve in seeking a peaceful Lebanese settlement and indicated that if attacks on the U.S. Marine contingent persist we would do what was necessary to ensure their security.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

¹⁰ A record of the Bush-Klibi conversation is in telegram 9893 from Bucharest, September 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830540-0296)

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 13, 1983, 1053Z

5506. Subject: Mauritania to Join Algerian/Tunisian Friendship Treaty. Ref: Nouakchott 5653 (Notal).²

1. Confidential—Entire text

2. During December 13 meeting with DAS Schneider and Ambassador Newlin, MFA Deputy Secretary General Kerroum said that Mauritania was expected to sign on today to Algerian-Tunisian friendship treaty. Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali is arriving Algiers 1100 hours, December 13, to join with President Bendjedid and President Haidalla for ceremony. It is also reported that Haidalla and Bendjedid will sign border agreement formalizing Mauritania-Algerian frontier.

3. Comment: Mauritania's adherence to treaty further crystallizes division of Greater Maghreb into two camps—Morocco (supported by cooperation with Libya in certain areas) on one side Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania on the other. Although Algerians remain hopeful that concept of Greater Maghreb cooperation can be revitalized, they are discouraged by events of last six months during which no progress has been made. The expansion of the Algerian-Tunisian treaty also represents a political coup for Bendjedid, less than one week before the 5th Party Congress.

Newlin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830733–0734. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Nouakchott and Tunis. Sent for information to Bamako, Niamey, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 5653 from Nouakchott, December 12, the Embassy reported on Haidalla's impending visits to Algiers and Tunis. The Embassy stated: "The primary issues on the agenda, regardless of who initiated the visits, are probably the current crisis in Lebanon and the resolution of the Sahara question." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0293) Reference is to the ongoing fighting between the PLO and the Lebanese Government and intra-PLO fighting. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Parts 1 and 2, Lebanon, 1981–1984.

31. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 20, 1983

SUBJECT

NEA/CIA/INR Meeting, 16 December 1983

PARTICIPANTS

NEA—Ambassador Murphy
Ambassador Schneider

CIA/DDO—[*name not declassified*]
INR/C—Walter Clarke

The following subjects were discussed in the NEA/CIA/INR weekly intelligence coordination meeting held in Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy's office on 16 December 1983:

North Africa. Deputy Assistant Secretary Schneider accompanied the Secretary on his visit to Morocco the previous week and subsequently left the Secretary's party to make a personal visit to Algeria. His travels provided the focus for some very interesting observations on changing alliances in North Africa. On the Secretary's trip,² it was considered unfortunate that the Secretary did not raise with King Hassan [as suggested in his briefing notes]³ the matter of King Hassan's apparent rapprochement with Libyan leader Qadhafi. There is some irony in the fact that Libya's diplomatic success in becoming reintegrated to the Arab world began with initiatives taken by Saudi Arabia.

Obviously the *quid pro quo* for Moroccan assistance to Libya [recall the ongoing Moroccan efforts to arrange a meeting between a senior USG representative and the Libyan Qadaf al-Dam]⁴ is Libyan compliance on the Western Sahara. This has led to closer cooperation between Algeria and Tunisia as well as to strange moves by Morocco.

Schneider reported the Algerian comment that Hassan is so emboldened by his Libyan tie that the Algerians feel compelled to stand firm on Western Sahara.⁵ The NEA Deputy asserted that the USG is troubled

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 1983. Secret; Sensitive; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Drafted by Clarke (INR/C).

² See Document 221. A complete record of the Shultz-Hassan conversation is in telegram 9409 from Rabat, December 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830736-0509)

³ Briefing notes were not found. Brackets are in the original.

⁴ Brackets are in the original.

⁵ In telegram 5522 from Algiers, December 14, the Embassy reported that during a December 13 meeting with Schneider and Newlin, Kerroum said "Qadahafi's visit to Rabat may have left the impression that the Polisario would fade away without Libyan support. Kerroum said that such an assumption is wrong. Regardless of Algerian logistical support, the Polisario has large stockpiles of Libyan-supplied armaments." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830738-0115) No record of Schneider's concern about the Hassan/Qadhafi relationship was found.

by the evident warmth in the Hassan/Qadhafi relationship. He is concerned that we have not mentioned this preoccupation to Hassan.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 30, 1984, 1425Z

93445. For the Charge. Subject: Libya and our Bilateral Relations With Morocco. Refs: A) State 77312² B) State 78924³ C) State 91389⁴ D) State 76067.⁵

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Refs A–C have provided you with the tenor of our recent exchanges with Algerian emissary Khellef. Ref D instructs you to brief

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005–0248. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Pearson, Schneider, and Hill; approved by Murphy. Sent for information to Algiers and Tunis.

² In telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16, the Department transmitted a record of Khellef's March 12 conversation with Shultz during which Khellef "outlined current GOA views on U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations and a range of foreign policy issues. The Western Sahara and Algerian relations with Morocco were the key topics, with Khellef stressing Algiers' conviction that Morocco's hardening position on the Sahara, in particular its apparent choice of military rather than political means to achieve a solution, risked further deterioration in Morocco's already difficult domestic situation." Khellef speculated that Hassan's "reconciliation with Qadhafi and continuing assistance from Morocco's 'friends' had led to a stiffening of his position." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806)

³ Telegram 78924 to Algiers, March 17, transmitted a record of Reagan's and Bush's conversation with Khellef. See Document 135.

⁴ In telegram 91389 to Rabat, March 29, the Department instructed the Embassy to "brief GOM at high (political) level on Khellef's Washington visit" and included talking points for such a meeting. The Department continued: "When Moroccans digest line we have taken supporting them they will, of course, be pleased" and instructed the Embassy to ask Moroccans "given formal position Morocco and Algerians have taken on dispute, we are perplexed how Rabat expects to reach objective of negotiated political solution of Saharan conflict as mandated by OAU Reso based on King's Nairobi offer which we both support and Algerians purport to accept. We would welcome GOM's further thoughts." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840206–0898)

⁵ In telegram 76067 to Algiers, March 15, the Department informed the Embassy about Schneider's March 13 discussion with Khellef, during which Schneider "repeated expressions by both the Secretary and the Vice President that in U.S. view the Moroccans wished a negotiated as opposed to a military solution to the problem. We did not believe, however, that King Hassan had the political latitude to engage in direct negotiations with the Polisario." The Department continued: "given the formal and fixed positions Algeria has taken on the dispute, we are perplexed about just how Algeria might play this role. Consequently, we wondered what strategy Algeria intended to pursue in the quest of an objective which it appeared Algeria, Morocco and the U.S. share." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840170–0644)

Moroccans thereon and invite their thoughts on how to inflect current drift towards more confrontation and dangerous situation in North Africa as a result of current Libyan activities.

3. You will note that Libyan aggressiveness is once again rising abruptly. London and Omdurman bombings are illustrative.⁶ Several of these Libyan machinations now in course could lead to actions targeting Americans (e.g. AWACS in Sudan) or NATO installations,⁷ as at COMISO, others could lead to sharp or sharper confrontations with allies such as Britain, France or Italy.

4. Since we value our relationship with Morocco, we have been at pains to follow Morocco's rapprochement with Libya with understanding for Morocco's needs. We remain convinced that it is tactical. But we are also becoming aware of rising costs which Morocco is incurring as a consequence of its new ties with Qadhafi (e.g. Rabat 2401⁸ and Niamey 1723⁹).

5. Given the disruptive potential of Libya's overt and covert offensive which may well touch major U.S. interests still more directly and painfully, we think it is timely to draw palace attention to our rising sensitivity with respect thereto. (FYI. The Vice President's comments in reftel are indicative. End FYI). You should therefore see Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor drawing on following talking points:

6. Begin talking points for use with Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor:

— Although we consider that Morocco's attitude toward Libya and Rabat's interest in improved relations with Tripoli are entirely matters

⁶ In telegram 5809 from London, March 12, the Embassy reported that "seven bombing incidents occurred in London and Manchester over the weekend which authorities believe were sponsored by the Libyan Government." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840162-0631)

⁷ An unidentified plane dropped five bombs on the Sudanese city of Omdurman on March 16, killing five people and wounding two. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiri accused Libya of ordering the attack. Documentation on this incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa.

⁸ In telegram 2401 from Rabat, March 14, the Embassy reported that regarding Morocco's attempts to prevent the admission of the SDAR to the OAU, "privately, the GOM is working to retain support of moderate black African states which have traditionally favored Morocco on this issue, but whose backing appears to be eroding from frustration over inflexibility of Morocco's position and suspicion of the 8-month détente between Qadhafi and King Hassan." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840168-0789)

⁹ In telegram 1723 from Niamey, March 20, the Embassy reported that MFA Political Director Hama had told the DCM "the GON is increasingly disenchanted with Morocco and has so informed the Moroccan Ambassador personally. Hama says the King is speaking out too much, and that there is a duplicity in the King's acquiescence to Libyan aggression in Chad vs. Libyan aggression elsewhere. According to Hama, there are many black African states which consider the Moroccan stance racist, and this undermines their support for Morocco on the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840183-0177)

for the GOM to decide, we are for our part increasingly disturbed by continuing Libyan subversion and aggression in and beyond Africa.

— Libyan efforts to absorb northern Chad, Libyan attacks on Sudan and Jordan, threats towards Egypt, Libyan attempts upon opponents of the Qadhafi regime residing in third countries—as in the London bombings—adversely affect American interests.

— We have long worked to help Morocco create and preserve a situation in North Africa conducive to a negotiated solution to the Saharan question, along the lines proposed by His Majesty King Hassan II and accepted by the OAU in Nairobi, which we support.

— Accordingly, we welcomed the diplomatic initiatives which led to the border meeting between King Hassan and President Bendjedid in February 1983. We subsequently urged Algiers to seize the opportunities offered by the rapprochement and to avoid rigid positions likely to impede the achievement of acceptable outcomes.

— We judge by what we are now hearing in African capitals, including Algiers, of concerns about the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, that Morocco is paying a rising price in terms of the support that it enjoys on the Saharan issue and the potential for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

— In light of these concerns, we would appreciate Morocco's views on how a negotiated solution can be achieved under current circumstances.

Shultz

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, May 9, 1984, 1049Z

2085. Subject: The Situation in the Maghreb: Mauritania's Views.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: In an open and wide-ranging discussion, Chief of State Haidalla told Ambassadors Peck and Reed that his principal external concern is a peaceful resolution of the Sahara conflict. He fears

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840303–0284. Secret. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, Banjul, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

that Morocco is determined to seek an unattainable military solution, which places the entire region at risk, and is particularly concerned about the burgeoning relationship between King Hassan and Qadhafi. End summary.

3. At their initiative, Chief of State Haidalla and FonMin Ould Minnih met with Ambassadors Peck and Reed on May 7, immediately prior to the latter's departure. The meeting was friendly and relaxed, marked by a very evident Mauritanian interest in ensuring that Ambassador Reed was fully informed on Mauritania's view of the regional situation.

4. Ambassador Reed opened the discussion with a description of the effect of his drive up from Rosso and flight to Tidjikja. He said that reading reports on the drought was totally insufficient in terms of understanding its dreadful impact. He was now able to comprehend the magnitude of the catastrophe, and in his forthcoming session with President Reagan he would strongly support continued American assistance.² Ambassador Reed added that President Reagan is interested in Mauritania and admires President Haidalla, which made this meeting particularly propitious. Haidalla replied with a request that Mauritania's profound gratitude be conveyed to President Reagan along with the hope for success in the forthcoming elections.

5. Ambassador Reed then brought up the subject of the congressional proposal to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He said that King Hassan had told him he believed that the letter from President Reagan on this subject had been instrumental in securing the moderate position reached at Fez.³ He said that the U.S. was grateful for Mauritania's position and volunteered to answer any questions that might remain on the subject. FonMin Ould Minnih replied that the GIRM had been kept well informed, and was gratified that so many other Muslim nations evidently shared a complete understanding of the administration's firm stand.

² Reference is to the persistent drought that affected much of the African continent. In telegram 150550 to Addis Ababa, May 22, the Department reported: "We have followed the course of the serious and prolonged drought in Africa and have provided a rapid and generous response. To meet the short term needs of the affected populations, the administration has approved more than dols. 135 million in emergency food assistance under PL-480 Title II to Sub-Saharan African countries this fiscal year (more than in all of fiscal year 1983) and plans to provide yet more as additional needs are identified." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840333-0694) Documentation on the U.S. response to the drought and famine in Africa is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II.

³ On April 28, Reagan wrote Hassan: "As I have earlier assured you, I am strongly opposed to moving our Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. We are continuing discussions with the Congress regarding this issue." (Telegram 125030 to Rabat, April 28; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840277-0703)

6. Ambassador Reed raised the subject of the OAU and asked how Mauritania viewed the prospects for the next summit. Haidalla said that like many other countries, Mauritania was unsure of where or when the meeting might take place. He believed that the principal obstacle to a decision was the unresolved question of the SDAR and how the issue of seating would be handled. He felt that some form of consensus would be reached with the passage of time, but the whole matter was obscured by the dangerous developments in the Sahara itself.

7. Ambassador Reed replied that the King had reacted to Mauritanian recognition of the SDAR,⁴ as a personal setback and affront. He added he is positive that the King wants only the best possible relations with Mauritania and had therefore been distressed by the move, which he saw as strongly anti-Moroccan. Haidalla replied that one of Mauritania's key difficulties was a continuing inability to have its neutrality properly perceived in Rabat. When the CMSN took the country out of the Saharan war to save it from total economic and political ruin, it was seen as an anti-Moroccan move. When, in subsequent years, Mauritania staunchly, and at some cost, maintained its neutrality in the conflict, Rabat insisted that this too was anti-Moroccan. Haidalla ruefully pointed out that Morocco apparently sees all those who are not strongly aligned with it as strongly opposed to it, an attitude which is neither reasonable nor productive.

8. For five long years, he went on, Mauritania had done whatever it could in facilitating a peaceful solution. It had steadfastly refrained from extending recognition to the SDAR because it wished to ensure that King Hassan knew he had an opening to the South and was therefore not isolated. Even though Moroccan actions before and after the signing of the Taif Accords⁵ clearly indicated a continued interest in destabilization, the GIRM had refrained from taking any steps which would limit the opportunities for an eventual peaceful solution. However, Mauritania and many other countries had finally become convinced that Rabat was only interested in military means. This fear was confirmed by the extensions of the berm, with the greatly increased risk of an expanded conflict, and the sudden reestablishment of good relations with Libya, a nation which poses serious threats to every country in the region, including Morocco. Ambassador Reed interjected that King Hassan has no illusions whatsoever about the dangers of dealing with Qadhafi, and is well aware of them. He wanted to secure the cessation

⁴ The GIRM recognized the SDAR on February 27. See footnote 5, Document 417.

⁵ Reference is to the resumption of relations between Mauritania and Morocco in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Mauritania in March 1981, which was brokered in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia. See Document 7.

of arms deliveries to the Polisario, a goal worth the price of improved but cautious relations.

9. Recognition of the SDAR was intended to accomplish a number of steps, Haidalla went on, none of which were inimical to Morocco's interests. He said Mauritania wished to add momentum to the efforts of those seeking implementation of the OAU consensus decision and, at the same time, act to reduce the greatly increased isolation of Algeria which resulted from the Morocco-Libyan rapprochement. It was also intended to reduce the likelihood of a conflict with Morocco by forcing the Polisario into a reciprocal recognition of and respect for Mauritania's borders. Haidalla said that this action, taken to protect Mauritania's neutrality, is of short term benefit rather than harm to Morocco. In making the announcement of the recognition, he went on, he had heavily stressed that there was absolutely no change in Mauritania's stance of total neutrality.

10. Haidalla said that no military solution is possible, however, particularly in the long run. He feels that Morocco is making a serious mistake and placing the entire Maghreb in danger by increasing the risks of an expanded war. Ambassador Reed interjected that King Hassan had personally assured him that under no circumstances would there be a war with Algeria. Haidalla said that Mauritania has no self-interests at stake and seeks nothing for itself, insisting only that the people of the region be allowed to determine their own future. He said his government still hopes for some form of political solution in which all of the Maghreb peoples, specifically including the Polisario and Morocco, could together find some way to solve the problem. (Comment: He clearly sees this as a means of avoiding the direct negotiations impasse, which was not specifically mentioned. End comment). Ambassador Reed stated his belief that the King would be satisfied with the flag and stamp solution proposed to Bendjedid in February, 1983. He added that the U.S., for one, would not wish to see a weak, independent and unstable state established in the area which could provide a base for hostile interests. Ould Minnih replied that while independence is not required, it must remain one of the options in a referendum.

11. Ambassador Reed said that he would like to be able to take to King Hassan some idea of the steps that would need to be taken for the reestablishment of relations between the two countries, something that he knows the King is very desirous of having. Haidalla did not answer directly, but replied with a low-key discussion of Mauritania's constant, deep-seated fears of Moroccan intentions. He said that there has always been a strong desire to include Mauritania in the greater kingdom. A major effort was made in this direction both before and after independence, and the Moroccans have never tried to conceal their

objective. The Istiqlal, in particular, has never ceased urging Morocco's claims. Haidalla also quoted a remark attributed to the Crown Prince who has allegedly said "my grandfather liberated Morocco, my father liberated the Sahara, and I will liberate Mauritania." Haidalla said that this basic attitude, and active destabilization efforts directed from Rabat, leaves his government to operate under constant threat from a large and powerful neighbor. Mauritania has therefore always tried to ensure that it did nothing to provoke the monarchy, with which it seeks the best possible relationship. (Comment: At dinner the preceding day with three senior MFA officials, Ambassador Reed asked the same question. The reply in this case was the full implementation of the Taif Accords, specifically an end to involvement in the internal affairs of the other party. Morocco has never stopped harboring and supporting Mauritanian dissidents, according to the Mauriticians, which violates that agreement. They added that Morocco's aggressive intentions toward Mauritania are well known. End comment).

12. Ould Minnih drew attention to the fact that Mauritania cannot and will not be ignored as the Sahara conflict moves into a very critical phase. Underlining his belief that no military solution will be possible, a belief that he stressed was supported by a vast amount of modern history, Ould Minnih said that Mauritania is prepared to defend its sovereignty and dignity against all comers. While the resources for this purpose are limited, the intent should not be underestimated. The nation's future is at stake and would be defended at all costs.

13. The session ended with a brief discussion of regional tribalism. Ambassador Reed said he had heard that one of Haidalla's close relatives held a high position in the Polisario; Haidalla replied that as far as he was aware there were none.

14. Comment: The GIRM was clearly interested in explaining its views to Ambassador Reed, given his position in the USG and well-known access to the King. Ambassador Reed's obvious, active and attentive interest in the issues discussed was very effective in securing from Haidalla a frank expression of his views. This message was drafted subsequent to Ambassador Reed's departure.

Peck

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, May 14, 1984, 1512Z

3712. Subject: Libyan-Tunisian Tensions—Qadhafi Signals That There is Still Room for Negotiations but His Threats Escalate. Refs: Tunis 3665² Tunis 3685.³

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. As of the morning of May 14, Tunisian officials seemed to be hoping that the crisis with Libya would evaporate. Chargé spoke briefly at an airport reception for President Abdou Diouf of Senegal with MFA Secretary General Fezzani, a former Tunisian Ambassador to Libya. Fezzani said that he felt it was a positive element that the Libyans had admitted holding three Tunisian personnel in their statement of May 10 (Tunis 3665). He indicated that negotiations for the return of the three had reached an impasse, however.

3. Fezzani did not seem to be aware of two Libyan statements released late May 13 and just received here which are the clearest Libyan public threat of retaliation against Tunisia to date. The first is a JANA statement which is moderately worded (LD 132209, notal).⁴ It expresses Libya's continued desire for good relations, and says Libya does not doubt that Tunisia shares this desire. However, "as their passports have shown", a handful of terrorists infiltrated Tunisia, and there can be no doubt that "a Tunisian side or sides" facilitated their entry into Libya. It

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840313-0208. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Cairo, Khartoum, London, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 3665 from Tunis, May 11, the Embassy reported that the Libyan Foreign Ministry had released a statement repeating the Libyan charge "that a group of three terrorists was arrested coming from the direction of the Tunisian border on May 6." The statement, according to the Embassy, indicated that "members of another group, presumably those involved in the attack on May 8 in Tripoli, have admitted under interrogation that they infiltrated from Tunisia on March 1." The Embassy continued: "On an equally menacing note, we understand that Libyan radio has broadcast interviews with Tunisians in Libya in which they call for the overthrow of the Tunisian Government and the ruling party." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840307-0899) In telegram 966 from Valletta, May 9, Price reported that the Egyptian Chargé said a "coup attempt" had occurred in Tripoli on May 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301-0124)

³ In telegram 3685 from Tunis, May 12, the Embassy reported that in an official statement issued by the Tunisian Press Agency that day, the GOT responded to the Libyan Foreign Ministry statement, "reiterated previous GOT denial of involvement" in the incident involving the Libyan exiles, and "stressed GOT desire for good relations with Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840310-0940)

⁴ Not further identified.

is our joint task, the statement concludes, to “discover those sides which aim to harm relations between the two sister countries”. The second Libyan statement purports to represent the views of Libyan “masses” who demonstrated in Tripoli on May 13 (LD132037 notal).⁵ This violently worded statement accuses “the traitors from Egypt and Sudan’s rulers and the bad symbols conspiring within the Tunisian regime”, and calls for battle with the “agent reactionary regime” in Sudan as well as with “all other Arab regimes which helped in any form cooperate with the stray dogs”. Libya is, of course, a state of the masses. Taken together, these statements indicate the line Qadhafi is taking towards Tunisia: unless the Tunisians admit that infiltration took place from Tunisia, he may be unable to prevent the angry Libyan masses from retaliating. The implication in both statements is that while the Tunisian Government itself may not have facilitated the infiltration, elements within the Tunisian Government knew what was going on.

4. We continue to believe that a negotiated solution of the crisis is possible, but that the Tunisians will have to give Qadhafi some satisfaction in the form of an official expression of regret and private assurances that they will not allow infiltration from Tunisia. Statements like the Foreign Ministry’s flat denial of May 9 reiterated by the Tunisian News Agency May 11 are unlikely to have the desired effect. As time passes, the two sides are hardening their positions, but Qadhafi is signalling that there is still time to talk, provided the Tunisians are prepared to talk seriously.⁶

5. Finally, we hear from the Foreign Ministry that Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim is expected here tomorrow. His presence will give the Tunisians moral support in the face of escalating Libyan threats.

Anderson

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ In telegram 3779 from Tunis, May 16, the Embassy reported: “Senior Tunisian security officials have told us that there was a clash between Libyan troops and the Tunisian National Guard May 15 at the border post of Dehibat in the far south.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840318–0504) Later that day, the Embassy reported that according a Tunisian Foreign Ministry statement, “Bourguiba has decided to recall the Tunisian High Commissioner (Ambassador) from Libya.” The statement suggested that the Libyan official media “have persisted in trying to implicate Tunisia in the events which took place in Tripoli.” (Telegram 3791 from Tunis, May 16; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840318–1034)

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 23, 1984, 0746Z

5590. Military for Polads. Subject: Algerian-Moroccan Relations: Increased Tensions. Ref: (A) Rabat 5382 (Notal),² (B) Rabat 4683,³ (C) Rabat 5063.⁴

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: although there has been no apparent increase in the level of Moroccan military activity following the June 15 incident along the Moroccan-Algerian border, the incident itself and resulting publicity underscore increased tensions between Rabat and Algiers. The June 15 incident, as well as preceding events over the past two months, has been interpreted by most Moroccans as evidence of a shift in Algerian policy related to Moroccan military successes in the Western Sahara. The present atmosphere could further erode political and economic relations between Rabat and Algiers, increasing the possibility of more serious incidents. End summary

3. Public reaction to the June 15 skirmish between Moroccan and Algerian troops at the border near Anaguir (ref A) has been muted. The GOM has deliberately downplayed the incident in public statements

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840405-0401. Secret; Priority; Noform. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Cairo, Casablanca, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, USUN, Dakar, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 5382 from Rabat, June 16, the Embassy reported that the Moroccan news agency had issued a communiqué. According to the unofficial Embassy translation, the communiqué stated that on June 15, a Royal Armed Forces unit "mistakenly took a trail located along the border in Algeria. The unit was then intercepted by an Algerian unit thus provoking a minor skirmish." The Embassy commented: "The Moroccan communiqué seems to accept Moroccan responsibility for the border incident while at the same time minimizing its importance." The Embassy continued that the reaction by both governments "implies that neither side wants to give the impression that the incident has major military or foreign policy implications." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840390-0713)

³ In telegram 4683 from Rabat, May 24, the Embassy reported that on May 17, Karim-Lamrani, "in a frank exposition of his views," told Weinberger "while Morocco had made great progress in its fight with the Polisario in the Sahara, it now has to be alert to possible action of some kind by Algeria in the northern sector. The Prime Minister asked the Secretary to give consideration to special, urgent military and economic assistance, with emphasis on grant aid rather than loans. The Secretary indicated that the USG hopes to be helpful in the longer term and to improve the mix of grant and FMS assistance in FY 85." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840339-0122)

⁴ See also Document 225.

and has not encouraged editorials or speculation by the Moroccan press. Press coverage has been largely limited to reprinting an official communiqué on the incident, and only one paper, the Istiqlal Arabic-language daily “Al Alam”, carried information on reported casualties and prisoners taken by the Algerians. The article, summarizing coverage in the European press, attributes deterioration in Morocco’s relationship with Algeria to military exercises conducted by Algeria in mid-May. “Al Alam” also emphasizes publicity given the incident by the Algerian media and downplays the importance of the actual clash.

4. Privately GOM officials have described the June 15 incident to us as an “ambush.” A senior counselor to the Prime Minister, for example, told EmbOff on July 19 that Moroccan troops, sent to resupply the Moroccan outpost at Hassi Lebraber, have used the same road twice a month for years. The official acknowledged that the road passes through Algerian territory for several kilometers, but said that the Algerians, while aware of the Moroccan resupply efforts, have never objected to Moroccan use of this short-cut in the past. The GOA, he charged, deliberately set a trap for the Moroccan unit using the road on June 15. The same counselor told us June 21 that the Moroccan military is taking a particularly hard line on the incident. He said that he had attended a meeting late into the evening June 20 with Colonel-Major Achabar, Secretary General of the National Defense Administration, to discuss the incident. Achabar, he said, was taking the incident very seriously. Asked whether the GOM is considering exchanging Algerian prisoners captured in 1976 for the 31 Moroccans captured by the Algerians June 15, our interlocutor said that he and the Moroccan military would oppose “handing concessions to the Algerians after such an incident,” but that any decision on such an issue would have to be made at the level of the King and Royal Counselor Guedira.

5. Senior Moroccans tend to view the June 15 incident and recent military activity by the Algerians as a consequence of Morocco’s expansion of the berm and military defeats Morocco has inflicted on the Polisario. Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani told Secretary Weinberger on May 17 that Algeria will no longer be able to put pressure on Morocco through the Polisario and may, therefore, shift the focus of its efforts to the northern sector. In the past, Karim-Lamrani explained, Morocco’s task has been defense of the Sahara; now the GOM may be faced with the need to shift assets to the more vulnerable north. Senior military officers tend to share the Prime Minister’s views on the increased likelihood of incidents along the border, and there is a possibility that several units have already been shifted from the south to Oujda.

6. The June 15 incident did not take place in isolation but climaxed several months of activity and tension along the entire border. In late April, Algeria conducted a series of overflights in Moroccan airspace and over the Western Sahara, coinciding with a large-scale

Moroccan effort to further extend the berm. King Hassan told Secretary Weinberger shortly thereafter that Bendjedid had let him know that he had personally ordered the MIG-25 flights. In mid-May, following joint U.S.-Moroccan exercises, the GOA conducted well-publicized exercises which, according to official GOA statements, constituted a "warning to potential enemies."

7. Comment: Moroccan-Algerian relations, which appeared to offer promise following the resumption of high-level contacts between Rabat and Algiers in early April, have clearly deteriorated. The GOM will probably continue to downplay the June 15 clash and subsequent publicity in large part because Moroccan leaders realize that, in a direct military confrontation with Algeria, the odds would be considerably against them. Nevertheless, while reaction to recent incidents in both Algiers and Rabat suggests that the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, current tensions could well provoke further, more serious incidents. A face-saving exchange of prisoners could defuse tensions, but at present the Moroccan military appears in no mood to pursue this option.

Kirby

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, July 5, 1984, 1120Z

5882. Subject: King Hassan on State of Relations With Libya and Algeria.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Following July 3 meeting with Air Force Chief of Staff, General Charles Gabriel,² King Hassan took Ambassador aside for one-hour private audience. The exchange, which covered multiple topics (septels)³ included review of present Moroccan relations with both Libya and Algeria. While aware of limited Libyan resupply of Polisario, Hassan remains most concerned by Algerian intentions. Dialogue with President Bendjedid, he said, has reached highly sensitive

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840008-0401. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² A record of the Gabriel-Hassan conversation is in telegram 6009 from Rabat, July 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840441-1090)

³ No other record of the Reed-Hassan meeting has been found.

phase even including exploratory discussion of Maghreb “confederation”. End summary.

3. At the conclusion of audience on military issues with General Charles Gabriel, King Hassan continued discussion for one hour with Ambassador Reed. While conversation covered many subjects, Hassan clearly wished to provide highly sensitive, close-hold up date on state of play with Libya and Algeria. The King began by indicating his awareness of resumed, but still limited, Libyan resupply of Polisario guerrillas. Hassan stated that, following the recent attempted coup in Libya, Colonel Qadhafi was convinced of Moroccan complicity and recalled his Ambassador in Rabat. Hassan subsequently sent an emissary to Qadhafi to make clear that, effective July 16, 1983, he had ceased all training for Libyan opposition elements. He further requested and received Qadhafi’s agreement for reassignment of the Libyan Ambassador who is well regarded locally. The King continued that he is aware that Libya has since dispatched several plane loads of supplies to the Polisario, but the assistance, he said, is limited and he is not yet concerned. War in the Sahara, he summarized, had ended in a military sense with expulsion of the Polisario from the territory.

4. Turning to Algeria, Hassan said that Libyan resupply could not take place without Algerian approval. Recalling his meeting with President Bendjedid in February 1983, he reiterated that Morocco’s interest in the Sahara remains only the symbolism of the Moroccan flag and postage stamps. He said that Morocco is already a large country and difficult to manage, implying that a successor to the throne would be best served by an autonomous Sahara within a confederated Morocco. Speaking in strict repeat strict confidence, he reported that the dialogue begun over a year ago with Bendjedid is now entering a delicate stage. The Algerian President had sent Foreign Minister Ibrahim to Morocco with tentative proposals for a confederation of Algeria and Morocco as part of a larger Maghreb. Hassan had received the proposal and immediately ordered separate studies on the viability of (1) an Algerian-Moroccan confederation, and (2) a confederation of the two countries with Tunisia and possibly other Maghreb states. Before replying to Bendjedid, he also requested Algeria’s more detailed thinking on the two prospects. The next step, Hassan noted, asking that the Ambassador not take notes, will be a further exploratory meeting in Paris July 6 between Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister Ibrahim.

5. Asked by Ambassador Reed what confederation with Algeria would mean in practical terms, Hassan replied that Bendjedid is conscious of growing human restraints in the present authoritarian political system adapted from the Soviet model. Confederation could thus imply a shifting away from such a system with political adjustments and flexibility expected from Morocco as well. Algeria, the King said, appears to favor a confederation with Morocco as the first step toward Maghreb unity, since the two countries are the major regional powers.

6. As a parenthesis to the above, the King brushed aside the June 15 border incident with Algeria as inadvertent and entirely Morocco's fault. He implied that it resulted strictly from poor judgment by an individual, local commander.

7. Comment: We suspect Rabat and Algiers remain a long way from confederation, but are encouraged that secret dialogue is continuing at the Guedira-Ibrahimi level. Hassan, who prides himself on being a geopolitical and abstract thinker, frequently takes the long-term view and in this conversation was clearly thinking ahead to a future in which an untried successor will be faced by domestic and regional pressures working against continuation of the traditional and autocratic Moroccan system of government. Confederation, as a symbolic rather than practical concept, probably thus appeals to him in the abstract as a will-o'-the-wisp to achieve sovereignty in the Sahara while making peace with Algeria.

Reed

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and the Embassies in Tunisia and Algeria¹

Rabat, August 14, 1984, 1749Z

7071. Military for Polads. Subject: August 13 Hassan-Qadhafi Meeting: Conclusion of a Treaty Forming a Union Between Morocco and Libya. Ref: (A) Rabat 7035,² (B) Rabat 7069.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Further to ref (A), reports that Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, and perhaps King Fahd, would join the August 13 meeting in

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840518–0422. Secret; Immediate. Sent Niact Immediate to Tunis and Algiers. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda and USLO Riyadh. Sent for information Priority to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Casablanca, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tangier, USUN, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, USCENTCOM, Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Lagos, Kinshasa, and Libreville.

² In telegram 7035 from Rabat, August 13, the Embassy reported: "King Hassan arrived early August 13 in Oujda, near the Algerian border, where he was joined by Colonel Qadhafi. AFP reports here indicate that Algerian President Bendjedid, and perhaps King Fahd, are expected to join the summit today." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840514–0702)

³ Telegram 7069 from Rabat, August 14, contains the text of a joint Libyan-Moroccan communiqué announcing the union of the two nations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840517–0979)

the Moroccan border town of Oujda between King Hassan and Colonel Qadhafi proved incorrect when neither appeared during the course of the day. The Hassan-Qadhafi meeting broke up late in the afternoon with Hassan departing for Fez, and Qadhafi going to Algiers and, on August 14, to Tunis for consultations with Algerians and Tunisians over the principal result of the Hassan-Qadhafi meeting: the conclusion of a treaty instituting a union of states between Morocco and Libya (ref B).

3. The conclusion of the treaty, which was announced almost 24 hours after Qadhafi's departure from Oujda, is the single most important step Hassan has taken in his 13-month-old rapprochement with Libya. As we have reported, there have been increasing high-level contacts between Morocco and Libya in recent weeks, although there has been no indication that the subject of the discussions was a treaty of union. Indeed, this matter was handled in the greatest secrecy, with senior GOM Ministers, in response to our inquiries, regularly denying that there was anything special going on (French and Spanish Embassies tell us they were wholly unaware that union was in the works). Even in the aftermath of the announcement of the treaty's conclusion, no details have been released specifying the practical effect of the treaty, which will not be implemented until ratified separately by Morocco and Libya according to the procedures of each country. Nevertheless even as a purely symbolic gesture, Hassan clearly intends through this decision to signal to his opponents in the region that Morocco continues to enjoy strong support; he also probably hopes that through agreement on this treaty, he will reinforce Qadhafi's interest in continued rapprochement with Morocco, and continued political and diplomatic support for Morocco's position on the Western Sahara dispute. From Qadhafi's point of view the treaty will presumably serve his own need to decrease Libya's isolation.

4. Foreign Minister Belkeziz, who is now in Fez with the King, telephoned Chargé afternoon of August 14 to say that he hopes to meet to discuss these developments as soon as possible after his return to Rabat late August 14 or early August 15. Apart from Belkeziz, as senior GOM and palace officials—all of whom accompanied the King to Oujda—filter back to Rabat in the days to come, we will attempt to learn additional details regarding the consequences of the treaty of union and the substance of the Hassan-Qadhafi talks. Based on recent form, we can predict with some confidence that the GOM will be at pains to try to reassure us that while the agreement with Qadhafi offers Morocco certain temporary material and political advantages, there is, in a profound sense, less to it than meets the eye.

5. Comment: Given the paucity of available facts and the recentness of this development, we shall not attempt major instant analysis in this telegram. On the other hand, some quick reflections are in order:

(1) one of Hassan's major motivations in entering this union, we think, is to bolster Morocco's position in its jockeying with Algeria, broadly for predominance in the Maghreb, but particularly with respect to the Western Sahara; (2) Morocco sees some practical near-term economic value in specific cooperation agreements that either have already been concluded or are rumored to be upcoming under the union umbrella (e.g., civil air and other transport agreements); and (3) purely speculatively, and admittedly without any proof, we wonder whether the main bait for Hassan may have been a promised Libyan quick fix for Morocco's difficult cash flow problems. Hassan, by all accounts, remains supremely confident of his ability to outmaneuver Qadhafi and even to moderate his maverick behavior. In our view, it would thus not be out of character for the King to attempt to solve economic problems by commitment to loose association with Qadhafi which recent Arab history suggests would be non-binding and short-lived.

6. After all foregoing has been said, we enter caveats: (1) from late ticker reports we note that Moroccan Royal Counselor Guedira has accompanied Qadhafi in his August 13–14 conversations in Algiers and Tunis; and (2) we recall Hassan's comment to Ambassador Reed some weeks ago⁴ that Rabat and Algiers were quietly exploring the possibility of a Greater Maghreb grouping under which a Western Sahara solution might be arranged. Thus, it seems to us that Qadhafi and Guedira could arguably have gone to Algiers and Tunis either (a) to explain the Morocco-Libya Union and argue that it is not directed against anyone; or (b) to try to put the finishing touches on some broader arrangement. If their purpose is the latter, the analysis suggested in para. 5 in this cable would not necessarily hold in its entirety. In the absence of any real evidence one way or the other, and purely on the basis of instinct, we think their travels can best be explained by (a) rather than (b), however.

Kirby

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 36.

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, August 24, 1984, 1352Z

7380. For Secretary: NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy. Also for S/AL. Department please pass to DCI and SecDef. From Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters. Subject: Ambassador Walters' August 23 Meeting With King Hassan.

1. Secret/Nodis entire text.

2. Upon arrival in Casablanca at 1430 on 23 August 1984 I was met by Chargé Kirby and taken directly to the Casablanca palace where I saw King Hassan for one and one half hours.

3. King Hassan said that he knew the U.S. Government was concerned and he wished to review with me the genesis leading to his signature of the agreement with Qadhafi on August 13. He said that his primary responsibility was to the people of Morocco. They had become isolated as a result of the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian pact (which he had not been invited to join and which seemed to him to encircle Morocco).

4. The last time he had talked with Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim, the latter had proposed a Maghreb confederation between at least initially, Algeria and Morocco. King Hassan said he had been enthusiastic. Whereupon Ibrahim had asked him to put down on paper his ideas on how such a confederation could be organized. He had agreed to do so and had sent the papers to the Algerians more than two months ago. There had been no comments or reply from the Algerians since then.

5. King Hassan then strongly felt the need to take some balancing action of a similarly spectacular nature. Qadhafi had addressed to him, Mubarak, Bourguiba, Bendjedid and Haidalla similar letters saying that he wanted to do something for Arab and Maghrebian unity. Qadhafi said his conscience was bothering him for he seemed to be bothering other Arab leaders and he wondered what he could do. The King had then on 12 July sent Guedira to propose to Qadhafi a plan for union not repeat not merger in which the sovereignty of member nations was intact and which other Arab and African nations could join. To his surprise, Qadhafi had accepted and asked Hassan to come to Syrte to sign

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped and handwritten notation indicates that Weinberger and Taft saw the telegram.

the agreement. Hassan had refused to go to Syrte because of past U.S.-Libyan clashes and Qadhafi had proposed that he come to Oujda—right on the Algerian/Moroccan border—to see the King.

6. King Hassan said that all of this had transpired in the greatest secrecy and none of his Ministers with the exception of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Minister of Interior Driss Basri was informed until they were on the train and approaching Oujda. He then said that it was important to read the agreement carefully point by point and he proceeded to read it to me commenting on certain points. He pointed out that the presidency of the union would be exercised jointly by the leader of Libya and King of Morocco and in consequence Qadhafi could not take rash actions without his consent. He then said “I have no illusions about Qadhafi. Either I tame him or the union breaks up. And because of his past behavior. He will be blamed for the break-up.” There was perhaps only a ten percent chance that he would succeed in taming Qadhafi, but that was still ten percent more chance than had existed previously. The Libyan leader said he was sure his signature of this agreement would infuriate the Soviets and cause Hassan difficulty with the U.S. Hassan had replied that he was sure the U.S. was not just a fair-weather friend but a real friend.

7. Hassan said he and Qadhafi had agreed that the question of the union (not merger) of the two states should be subject to a referendum as soon as possible. In Morocco that referendum would take place on August 31.

8. The union would also have a joint court and if agreement on disputes could not be reached, both parties would accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. King Hassan pointed to Article 11, which reads, “In the unbounded reservation of their respective sovereignties each of the two states undertakes not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other state.”

9. When I asked about the mutual defense aspects of the treaty and what would happen if there were to be a Libyan attack on U.S. forces in the Gulf of Syrte and the U.S. struck back, Hassan said that in such a case he might write a letter of concern to President Reagan and that would be all.

10. King Hassan said that Qadhafi had insisted on including in the text an article on economic cooperation. Hassan had replied “My people think you are rich. I know you are broke.” Qadhafi had not demurred. Hassan also pointed out that he had invited Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia to join—something they had not done with him in their tripartite treaty.

11. King Hassan said that secrecy had been indispensable and this was why he had not notified us, the French, or Egyptians until after the signature of the agreement. He repeated that the treaty was not a

merger. Could be denounced at any time, and gave Qadhafi no hold over him. There had been no mention in the treaty of “imperialism or colonialism”. And that the preamble of the treaty indicated that it was a point of departure for other states to join. King Fahd had been informed and was enthusiastic at the idea of taming Qadhafi.

12. He then asked me how the U.S. felt about this agreement. I replied that I had conveyed to President Reagan and Secretary Shultz² his message that he would not change his relationship with us whatever happened, but I would be remiss in our personal friendship if I did not tell him how concerned we were about this matter. Qadhafi was viewed in the U.S. as an unscrupulous killer very much in line with the opinion the King had expressed to me the last time we met when Hassan said to me, “If you go to see him, do not take anything to drink or eat. He will give you something that will kill you a year later.” The King nodded wryly as I reminded him of this. Then he said “You have not been able to get rid of him or to silence him. Why not give my plans a chance?”

13. I said Qadhafi was a thug who killed, subverted and was actively plotting against King Hussein, King Fahd and President Nimeiri. We had been taken by surprise by this announcement of which we had no advance knowledge. Qadhafi was still in northern Chad and there was serious evidence that he was connected with the mining of the Red Sea and his terrorists were operating all over Western Europe.

14. King Hassan then said, “You have not been able to stop this kind of behavior. Why not give me a chance to see if I can tame him. If I can’t, the union will break down.”

15. I said that we were concerned that this move would play into hands of the Algerian hardliners to the detriment of Bendjedid.

16. King Hassan said he could reassure me on that score. The Algerians had been astounded at the Moroccan riposte to their tripartite alliance.³ He had called President Bendjedid after the signature and the Algerian President had accepted Hassan’s proposal for a meeting between the two Chiefs of State and would send an envoy to Morocco to work out the details on August 29.

17. King Hassan also indicated that he had been in touch with President Mitterrand who would be coming to Morocco for a week’s

²Not found.

³ In telegram 3766 from Algiers, August 18, the Embassy reported: “Algerians are staying cool and taking the high road in the wake of the Hassan-Qadhafi agreement on union. Rather than denouncing the agreement (which Qadhafi and Guedira did not announce during their stop here), Algeria is pointing to the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian Treaty of Friendship which is open to other adherents as the true model for building the Grand Arab Maghreb.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840528–0402)

vacation on the 29th of August. Mitterrand did not want to be in Morocco on the day of the referendum on the treaty. So he would fly to the Canary Islands for that day and then return to Morocco on the following day.

18. I then pointed to the difficulty of coordinating the policies of Morocco and Libya. Hassan replied, "I will do the coordinating."

19. I mentioned the questions that this union would raise for us in the matter of aircraft. Hassan said Qadhafi had intended to buy 25 Airbuses but they had American engines and perhaps the Moroccans could lease them, get them maintained and return them to the Libyans. Hassan had told Qadhafi that the Americans were not children, would see through this scheme at once and it was out of the question. He understands the problem of maintenance for Libyan aircraft.

20. Article 12, according to the King, would not in any way affect his relationship with us. Qadhafi had said, "You have your friends and I have mine".

21. Joint maneuvers:

I then told the King why we had postponed the joint maneuvers.⁴ He listened carefully and wished us well. He did not seem at all upset nor did he protest in any way the postponement.

22. Western Sahara:

I expressed our concerns to Hassan about his statements on "hot pursuit". He replied that he knew any serious attack on Mauritania could well draw Algeria into the war. Algeria had overwhelming superiority over Morocco in all areas of military hardware and only in the quality of its men did Morocco have superiority. He certainly would not provoke a conflict with Algeria. In reply to my question as to whether President Bendjedid was really in charge, Hassan replied "More so now than at any time since he succeeded Boumédiène". He was looking forward to this next meeting with the Algerian President and hoped they could move forward together. Certainly he did not have the hardware to match vast quantities of Soviet equipment in the hands of the Algerians and more was arriving.

23. I asked whether he did not believe that the signature of this agreement with Libya would antagonize the moderate black Africans and hasten the Polisario's admission to the OAU. We had been watching the strength of Morocco's position on the ground and its deterioration politically among the OAU members. King Hassan said Mubarak had urged him to take some political action on the Sahara and he would soon hold a referendum on the future of the territory. I could not elicit

⁴ After it learned of the Moroccan-Libyan union, the Reagan administration postponed the joint maneuvers.

the forms in which the question would be asked nor a date for such a referendum. Nor would he discuss what he would say if the SDAR was seated. He did note that it was almost impossible for anyone to attack Dakhla without crossing Mauritanian territory. I asked him whether he had a direct threat of a military nature from the Algerians and he said “No”. There had been no threat. Saharaouis will vote in the parliamentary elections and in the referendum on union with Libya.

24. The King said “My agreement with Libya is wide open to the Algerians, Tunisians and Mauritians and even the Egyptians”. As an aside he said, “After I see you, I am receiving the Major General who is the head of the Egyptian Intelligence Service. He has told me that the Egyptians view this union as a real possibility to get Qadhafi back in the corral”. Hassan then said, In all such deals there is a locomotive and freight cars and I am a locomotive. If the union is unworkable, I will break it”.

25. It was clear that he did not want to be drawn out on what he would do politically about the Sahara. But seemed fully aware of what would happen at the next OAU meeting.

26. Then King Hassan said, “You Americans often do things I don’t like or do not fully understand without consulting me in advance and I don’t expect you to. We now have a 10 percent chance of being able to tame Qadhafi. That is not much, but it is 10 percent more than we used to have. Fahd and Mubarak understand what I am doing. The Tunisians have been odious.⁵ I will work on the black Africans and we will see what we shall see. Every nation has its problems. You have your Russians and your Chinese. Algeria is my Russia and Qadhafi is my China. You must show understanding and give me a chance to tame this madman. You must show that you are not just fair-weather friends but friends in difficult times also.”

27. Finally. The King said he was sending his Counselor Reda Guedira to Washington on September 4 to explain to those in the U.S. Government who might be concerned about his agreement with Qadhafi,⁶ and why Morocco had taken this step, and would be grateful if the appropriate appointments could be scheduled.

⁵ In telegram 6326 from Tunis, August 16, the Embassy reported: “Taken aback and obviously irritated by the Moroccan-Libyan decisions to form a union, the Tunisians are being pushed toward Algeria. Qadhafi is maintaining that the union was King Hassan’s idea, and has urged the Tunisians to consider joining. Tunisia is not about to do anything of the sort, but it is caught in the middle and will continue to attempt to keep all of its neighbors—especially Libya—off its back.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840523–0506)

⁶ See Document 228. A record of the Shultz-Guedira meeting is in telegram 267326 to Paris, September 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010–0334)

28. After my meeting with the King I met separately with Guedira⁷ and flagged the various points of our concern so he could be ready to answer them in Washington.

29. Comment: King Hassan looked serene and relaxed. The only tone of sharpness crept in when he said, "You must show that you are not just fair-weather friends." He seemed pleased to be able to tell me that following this agreement he would be meeting with French President Mitterrand (who will spend a week in Morocco), Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and that the Chief of Egyptian Intelligence was waiting to see him as I left. He said he looked forward to further discussions with me at the time of his daughter's wedding on September 15. That will give him some time to reflect on our concerns and at that time I will press further on what he intends to do about the Sahara. He may have seen Bendjedid by that time and will certainly have seen Mitterrand. My plate was quite heavy this time.

Kirby

⁷No record of the Walters-Guedira meeting has been found.

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, September 20, 1984, 2253Z

279876. Subject: Tunisian Ambassador's Call September 19 on DAS Nassif.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia called at his request September 19 on NEA DAS Thomas Nassif. Ben Yahia reviewed intra-Maghreb relations in light of the Moroccan-Libyan accord, counseling the U.S. not to react too harshly against Morocco. Ben Yahia's major concern was that the U.S. do what it could to avoid further Maghrebi polarization, the main short-term result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia also observed that the announced

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840600-0276. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eisenbraun; cleared by Zweifel; approved by Nassif. Sent for Information Priority to Algiers, Rabat, and Paris.

Libyan-French troop withdrawal from Chad was welcome news but did nothing to settle internal strife in Chad. End summary.

3. Ben Yahia began the meeting by requesting the U.S. reaction to the recent Washington visit of Moroccan Royal Advisor Redi Guedira.² Nassif summarized the visit, stressing that Guedira had been told plainly of U.S. displeasure with the accord. Nassif noted some congressional dissatisfaction on both sides of the Hill and in both authorizing and appropriating committees. Nassif stressed that the Department would be watching developments closely but that we wanted the traditionally close relationship with Morocco to continue, if possible. We do not like the resulting polarization of the Maghreb and do not believe the accord bodes well for a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is using Libya to give political legitimacy to the strategic gains Morocco had achieved by constructing the berm. Nassif also said new questions are raised on whether the Western Saharan conflict would become more an Arab than an OAU problem. Nassif concluded by noting the new French-Libyan agreement on troop withdrawals from Chad and wondered what relationship, if any, that event had to the Moroccan-Libyan agreement.

4. Ben Yahia responded that while the troop withdrawal agreement was a positive development, it did not necessarily suggest that Qadhafi was being more moderate, as Hassan said might happen as a result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia cautioned that Qadhafi's traditional pattern is to withdraw in one area and to be aggressive elsewhere. At any rate, noted Ben Yahia, the internal situation in Chad had not been resolved; Habre's position was still weak and further civil conflict was inevitable. Nassif concurred that this would probably be the case.

5. Responding to Nassif's question, Ben Yahia turned his attention to relations among the Maghreb states. He said that Tunisia does not want strained relations with Morocco and that the 1983 Tunisian-Algerian Treaty of Friendship, later joined by Mauritania, should not be seen as directed against any country. Ben Yahia thought Algerian President Bendjdid had been weakened vis-à-vis his hard line domestic critics by the accord.

6. The meeting was concluded by Ben Yahia's advice that the U.S. avoid the instinct to punish Morocco for its accord. Instead, Ben Yahia suggested an extended period of observation to see whether in fact the accord would survive and whether Qadhafi would in fact moderate his views. Punitive U.S. action might only exacerbate

² See footnote 6, Document 38.

Moroccan-Algerian relations and polarize further the Maghreb.³ He suggested that the French could perhaps play a role in improving Moroccan-Algerian relations.

Shultz

³ In telegram 7361 from Tunis, September 21, Sebastian replied: "I see King Hassan's union as primarily a tactical move. He has gambled on shuffling the deck in order to break the deadlock—in his favor, of course." Sebastian continued: "Algeria and the Sahara remain his main focus, and he has taken his precautions with Chadli with whom he hopes to meet even now. He is not likely to hesitate in dropping the union when it has served his purposes. We should not allow our ties to Morocco to be unduly distended by Hassan's misstep, for we are central to his calculation and strategic orientation. We must therefore try to preserve our balancing Maghrebi relationships—all of them." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0026.

40. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Reed) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Rabat, September 21, 1984

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This is a hard letter for me to write but, given your past interest in Morocco, I feel that I owe you my best assessment of where we stand in light of the Oujda Accord and of the long-term implications of King Hassan's "Union" with Libya for the relationship with the United States. Frankly, my first reaction, as the President's Envoy in Morocco, was that the Libyan Treaty, with one stroke, put at risk three years of steady progress in U.S.-Moroccan relations on which I have so often counted on you for support and counsel.

Now that I have had the opportunity, however, to discuss the Libyan Treaty during two lengthy audiences with King Hassan and to exchange views with virtually every Moroccan decision-maker during the recent five-day wedding festivities for the King's eldest

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. No classification marking. A stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: "1984 SEP 28 PM 1:47 Office of the Secretary of Defense."

daughter,² I have a better sense of Moroccan thinking and objectives in this unlikely union. The road will not be easy for us, and Morocco's alliance with Libya has clearly harmed Hassan's improving image in the United States. We should recognize, however, as the King has repeatedly stressed to me, that the Treaty does not represent a formal union or federation, much less a merger of the two states.³ Despite regular dialogue with us on Libya, Hassan and Moroccans generally, also clearly underestimated the depth of U.S. reactions.

In my conversations here, I have left Moroccan officials in no doubt concerning U.S. opposition toward any steps giving legitimacy to the Libyan regime. They now understand our position clearly, and I believe that we should watch developments closely in the coming months. While it will not be a time for dramatic new U.S. projects, equally we must work to preserve what we have built up and put in place in Morocco.

The Kingdom remains a strategically located, moderate Arab state in a volatile region. Its command of the Straits of Gibraltar and location on flight paths to the Persian Gulf will continue to make it a valuable partner, although not one we can take for granted. In political terms, Morocco remains chairman of the major Arab and Islamic organizations and will inevitably be important to the United States. It was King Hassan who worked behind-the-scenes to set up Anwar Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem⁴ and who, last January at Casablanca, worked to end Egypt's isolation from the Islamic Conference.⁵ With the largest Jewish population in the Arab World, King Hassan has also set an example of harmony for his divided region, hosting a conference of Moroccan Jewish communities in Rabat last May, attended by members

² In telegram 8038 from Rabat, September 15, Reed summarized his meetings with Hassan, Karim-Lamrani, and "a number of Moroccans within the King's inner circle. I conclude that, while the treaty is signed and was approved in a referendum by 99.9 percent of the population, there are serious private doubts and divisions within the palace and government over the relationship with Libya." (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/07/1984–09/20/1984))

³ In a September 11 letter to Reagan, Hassan wrote in part: "We are anxious to assure you that the new Treaty affects and modifies in no way the nature of our relations." He continued: "We made a point of it to inform Colonel Kaddafi beforehand of all there is between the U.S. and Morocco and to express to him clearly our firm determination not to modify any of it." (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/31/1984–11/19/1984))

⁴ Reference is to Sadat's November 1977 visit to Jerusalem, during which he addressed the Israeli Knesset. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 147, 149, 150, 152, and 153.

⁵ Reference is to the Arab leaders summit held in January during which the Arab League voted to allow Egypt to rejoin the organization. Egypt was suspended in 1979 after it signed a peace treaty with Israel brokered by President Carter. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, footnote 3, Document 248.

of the Israeli Knesset and world Jewish leaders. In the economic field, Morocco's current liberalization policy and increasing reliance on the free market process hold promise of long-term stability and reflect precisely the policies which we are urging the developing world to follow.

Given these long-term interests, I believe that both in personal contacts with key Moroccans and in our overall policy toward the Kingdom we should strike a careful balance between recrimination and acceptance of a *fait accompli*. After signature of the Treaty with Libya and its approval by 99.9 percent of the population in a national referendum, it would be hard to disavow without loss of face in the short term. There are also tactical reasons which impelled Morocco toward Libya. Among them I would cite:

- Pressure on Algeria to offset the recent Algerian/Tunisian/Mauritanian Agreement.
- Libyan support on the Western Sahara and agreement to cut off its flow of Soviet arms to the Polisario.
- Possible improvement of Morocco's diplomatic situation in the OAU by neutralizing Qadhafi's proteges (Ethiopia, Bourkina Fasso, Madagascar, etc.) and offering weary Africans an alternative Arab or Maghreb forum for the Western Sahara.
- Libyan financial support at a moment of acute austerity.
- Access to Libya's one-half million foreign workforce for Moroccans and potentially troublesome Moroccan returnees from Europe.
- Increased Moroccan bargaining power to strike a subsequent deal with Algeria, Saudi Arabia and others.

As Hassan measures these possible advantages against adverse reaction from the United States and others, I suspect that there will be a period of trial and error in the union with Libya. In the longer run, I believe that political "unions"—and even for that matter Qadhafis—come and go in the Arab World, but that the ties forged over two centuries between the United States and Morocco are likely to prove more lasting.

I wanted particularly to share these preliminary thoughts with you and know that I can count on your support for basic United States interests in Morocco and your continuing interest during the difficult period ahead.⁶

With every best wish,

Joseph

⁶ In an October 22 letter to Reed, Weinberger wrote: "Thank you for your assessment of the Oujda Accord." He continued: "An interagency group is studying our future policy in the area to see what limitations or constraints the Oujda Union has placed on current or future plans and programs. Personally I hope the 'Union' ends very shortly." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco)

41. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

S-0611/DIO

Washington, October 25, 1984

SUBJECT

Meeting with Moroccan officials—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(C) On 22 October I met with the Moroccan Ambassador, Mr. Maati Jorio, and his Defense Attaché, Colonel Mohammed al-Kostali.² Ambassador Jorio had requested the meeting, primarily to discuss Morocco's rationale for the recent agreement with Libya. Throughout the meeting Ambassador Jorio emphasized his fervent belief that the Morocco-Libyan treaty should not change the close historic relationship between our two countries. In particular, he made a strong plea that our bilateral military programs continue as before.

(C) Jorio said he understood US concerns about Morocco's alliance with Qadhafi. He added that, of all north African countries, "Morocco has been the most damaged by Libya." After more than ten years of trouble with Qadhafi, King Hassan concluded that "dialog is better than confrontation" and thought the time had come to introduce Qadhafi into the circle of Arab moderates. Jorio acknowledged that Morocco may not succeed in influencing Qadhafi but thought it worth trying.

(C) Jorio did not advance economic considerations in support of the treaty with Libya, but the implication was clearly there. Both Jorio and Kostali were pessimistic about Morocco's economy: high rate of population growth, five years of drought, and no real export potential besides phosphates (which are facing a shrinking world demand). Even a further reduction in oil prices will be of little help, according to Jorio, because any small savings in purchase price will be eroded by climbing dollar exchange rates.

(C/[*distribution not declassified*]) When asked about the impact of the Morocco-Libyan treaty on Algeria, Ambassador Jorio replied that President Bendjedid is "very upset." He quoted Bendjedid as saying "No one can imagine a union of North African states without Algeria."

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-86-0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Sent for information. Drafted by [*name not declassified*]. Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum read: "1984 26 OCT 09:19 Office of the Secretary of Defense" and "SEC DEF HAS SEEN OCT 29 1984." Copies were sent to Taft and Iklé.

² No other record of the meeting has been found.

Recalling that I was the first US general officer to visit Algeria since independence, I suggested that the improvement in US-Algerian relations might enable the United States to play a helpful role in North Africa; however, the Moroccans were not very receptive to the idea. Kostali said [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Jorio and Kostali went on to express concern over the sale of C-130s to Algeria and their potential effectiveness in supporting the Polisario insurgency.³

(C) With regard to Western Sahara, the Moroccans seemed fairly optimistic over the military situation. Kostali thought the planned final extension of the berm will do much to cripple future Polisario raiding activity. He denied that Polisario units had succeeded in crossing the berm in their raid on 13 August; "all the wreckage was on the outside." Jorio and Kostali thought the rubber ZODIAC boats used in three recent attacks on Moroccan fishing craft either came from Algeria or were launched from nearby ships, perhaps Soviet ships.

(C) On the diplomatic side, Jorio noted that Morocco's position was unfavorable in that most African states were lining up in support of admitting the Polisario to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).⁴ Jorio did not directly relate the question of Polisario recognition to the Morocco-Libyan treaty. He implied, however, that Morocco was hoping Libya would help out on this issue in one of two ways: (a) by urging some of the more radical OAU members to accept Moroccan claims in Western Sahara; or (b) by supporting Morocco in an effort to shift the question of Western Sahara from the OAU to the Arab League, which is likely to prove a more sympathetic forum from Morocco's standpoint.

(C/[*distribution not declassified*]) Of particular interest were Jorio's comments on Libya, where he had previously served as ambassador. He described the difficulty of doing business in a country like Libya which in theory has no governmental structure, only committees, and does not recognize the governmental institutions of other countries. Nonetheless, Jorio opined that Qadhafi is neither crazy nor fanatical; rather, he is a very clever man who is "good at giving shows" when he wants to dramatize a point. Furthermore, Qadhafi, who lives simply and sleeps in a barracks or a tent, is not avaricious; he uses money solely to further his own brand of revolutionary Islam. Jorio downplayed the importance of any other Libyan figures such as former Prime Minister Jallud: "There is no number two man in Libya."

(S/[*distribution not declassified*]) Comment: An experienced diplomat with previous government service at cabinet level, Ambassador Jorio carefully articulated the official Moroccan position on the

³ See footnote 3, Document 106.

⁴ See Document 422.

alliance with Libya. Both in his generally unfavorable treatment of Algeria's role and his more positive attitude toward Libya, he was clearly trying to put the best possible face on the Morocco-Libyan treaty. His portrayal of Qadhafi as role-player rather than madman is intriguing and probably valid up to a point; Qadhafi has shown the necessary flexibility and survival capacity to outlast all but four Arab heads of state. Nonetheless, Jorio has ignored (or chosen not to mention) other aspects of Qadhafi's track record which do not suggest a lasting or productive relationship between the two countries: Qadhafi's abrupt and sometimes erratic shifts in alliance; his propensity for suddenly turning against former allies (Sadat, Nimeiri, Bourguiba, and perhaps Assad); and his disregard for accepted rules of international behavior as demonstrated this year in London⁵ and—most likely—the Red Sea. King Hassan may be able to exert some temporary restraining influence on his new partner, but a long-term reformation is unlikely.

(U) Coordination within OSD is not required.

James Williams
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director

⁵ During an April 17 demonstration by Libyan dissidents in front of the Libyan People's Bureau in London, shots were fired from a window of the building, wounding 11, including a British police officer who later died. British anti-terrorist forces later landed on the building, leading to a stand-off between British authorities and the Bureau. (Telegram 113541 to Instum Collective, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840255–0296) In telegram 9232 from London, April 23, the Embassy reported that the United Kingdom had broken relations with Libya. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840264–0240) Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

42. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 17, 1984

SUBJECT

Response to a Letter from King Hassan II of Morocco

Issue

Whether to sign a letter (Tab A) to King Hassan of Morocco.

Facts

Following the visit, of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira, King Hassan II wrote you a letter (Tab B)² reaffirming his desire for close friendship with the U.S. and assurances that Morocco will maintain its independence from Libya.

Discussion

Your response (Tab A) candidly explains our political, legal and security concerns related to the Moroccan Union with Libya. You express disappointment and apprehension regarding Qadhafi's intentions. As you know, an interagency review of our policy toward North Africa is underway, and we plan to make policy recommendations regarding U.S.-Moroccan relations in mid-November for your consideration. Your letter does not address our future relationship.

Recommendation

OK No

That you sign the letter to King Hassan II.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/31/1984–11/19/1984). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Teicher. A copy was sent to Bush.

² Attached but not printed. See footnote 3, Document 40.

³ Reagan checked and initialed the "OK" recommendation.

Tab A

Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan II⁴

Washington, November 17, 1984

Your Majesty:

I was pleased to receive your letter of September 11; I read it with care. I have discussed with Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Director Casey, and National Security Advisor McFarlane the conversations they held with your trusted adviser, Royal Counselor—Reda Guedira. I am sure that he has conveyed to you the essential points and issues covered during his discussions here in Washington. My views and concerns have also been communicated to you directly by Ambassadors Reed and Walters.

The friendship which historically has bound our two governments and peoples is both important and enduring just as is my great and continuing personal regard for Your Majesty. With this foremost in mind, I am compelled to express my disappointment and apprehension concerning the step which you have taken with the Libyan regime.

I appreciate your assurances that Libya will not derive benefits from existing or future agreements between our two countries. In particular, I am encouraged by your solemn pledge that sensitive items will not be shared with Libya. The possibility that material may be obtained by the Libyans is still worrisome, and we must strive to prevent this.

U.S. foreign policy is conditioned and influenced by Congressional action and open to public scrutiny and criticism. I know you are well aware of this basic characteristic of the American system.

We are dealing presently with both of these aspects, but we are faced with mounting pressures in both fora to consider the impact of your new union, and future actions which ensue from it, on our bilateral relations.

Equally important to these considerations are my continued apprehensions about what this agreement may portend. My concern is deep because I feel so strongly about the strength and importance of the relationship which we have forged together over the past four years. This relationship must be preserved and safeguarded insofar as possible from interference and harm.

Your Majesty, you understand better than most the true nature of the Qadhafi regime. The record establishes that he is not a man to be trusted. In his 15 years of turbulent and erratic rule, there have been times when Qadhafi has tried to appear both reasonable and

⁴ Secret.

responsible. Whether in the Arab, African or global context, these periods, regrettably, have been all too brief. The record confirms that episodes of “good behavior” are short-lived and, if the past is repeated, Qadhafi’s real nature as an inveterate troublemaker and enemy of the West and of moderate governments such as yours will soon re-emerge with the dangerous and unacceptable behavior which is a trademark of his rule. This is why I am so deeply troubled by the prospect that he will betray Your Majesty as he has other governments with whom he has made such arrangements in the past.

I know that you have set yourself the noble goal of reforming the Libyan leader. You are a wise, honorable and skillful leader as has been so often and amply demonstrated. Yet, in this instance I must express to you my conviction that nothing of real or lasting value can come from your association with Qadhafi. Failure to achieve your stated goal could entail significant costs, and I fear that your great and richly deserved reputation may be tarnished by the efforts on which you have embarked.

Your Majesty, I speak with a heavy heart and out of deep friendship. In the interest of preserving and enhancing the friendship and cooperation between our countries, it is my earnest hope that a way can be found to dispel quickly the pall cast on our relationship by your treaty with Qadhafi.

I remain your sincere friend,
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

Washington, December 11, 1984, 0053Z

363217. For Ambassadors. Subject: Démarche to Governments of Algeria and Morocco.

1. Secret—Entire text
2. Algerian-Moroccan relations have degenerated to a point where the possibility of conflict cannot be ruled out. Algerian FonMin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840789-0766. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wukitsch; cleared by Schermerhorn (NEA/AFN), Zweifel, Sheldon Krebs (S/S-O), Johnson (P), and Covey; approved by Nassif. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis and Nouakchott.

Secretary General Kerroum told you November 23 that the GOA would not be the first to engage, and seeks to calm the situation.² The GOM likewise disclaims aggressive intent. Nonetheless, there is little prospect for meaningful dialogue, even though King Hassan recently told Ambassador Reed that he is in almost daily telephone contact with Bendjedid.

2. Among negative indicators are:

— A significant buildup of Algerian and Moroccan military forces along the shared border.

— Moroccan Ambassador Jorio's statement that war fever is building in Morocco.³

— The Moroccans reportedly are on the verge of expanding the berm to within 35 km of the border—a move bound to appear provocative to the GOA.

— In mid-September, the GOA reportedly ordered a reduction in the number of non-official Algerians in Morocco; some apparently have left.

— Moroccans claim Polisario has obtained SAM-6 missiles and other sophisticated weaponry, operable only by Algerians or outsiders.

— GOM sources claim that the GOA has flown CAP for recent Polisario attacks against the berm. (We do not have independent confirmation.)

— Bendjedid is under domestic pressure to take more direct action to assist the Polisario.

— There has been one recent reported incident of cross-border firing, initiated by the Algerians.

3. For Rabat: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make the following points to the highest level of authority available:

— Various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations.

— We are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area.

²No record of Kerroum's November 23 comment has been found. In telegram 5699 from Algiers, December 8, the Embassy reported: "Kerroum told Ambassador Dec 8 Algeria seeks to reestablish dialogue with King Hassan on a political solution for the Western Sahara." The Embassy continued: "Speaking officially on behalf of President Bendjedid, Kerroum said Algeria does not seek confrontation with Morocco, and it will not take the initiative to raise tensions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840786–0643)

³In telegram 356507 to Algiers, December 5, the Department noted that in a December 3 meeting with Nassif, "Jorio stated his personal belief that there is a growing popular sentiment in Morocco for going to war with Algeria" even as Moroccans admitted "Algerian military superiority." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840779–0474)

— Although your government has assured us that Morocco has no aggressive intentions, misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.

— We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take steps to dispel current tensions.

— Our Ambassador in Algiers is making a similar demarche to the Government of Algeria.

4. For Algiers: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make highest level demarche to your host government making the following points:

— Various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations.

— We are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area.

— Although FonMin Secretary General Kerroum and others in your government have assured us that Algeria has no aggressive intentions, misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.

— We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take steps to dispel current tensions.

— Our Ambassador in Rabat is making a similar demarche to the Government of Morocco.

5. We are calling in Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors for similar presentation by Under Secretary Armacost.⁴

Shultz

⁴ In telegram 366367 to Algiers and Rabat, Dam reported: "Armacost made démarches to Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by mischance and unfortunate incident could develop." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840796-0666)

44. Memorandum From Phil Ringdahl of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, December 12, 1984

SUBJECT

Coup in Mauritania

Information

There is still no information on the new government in Mauritania, which overthrew the previous leader, Lt Colonel Haidalla, in an apparent bloodless, palace coup² (Haidalla was attending the Franco-African summit in Burundi, thus violating one of the cardinal rules of staying in power in Africa which is to stay at home—always). There is a curfew, the airport is closed. Our Embassy has no problems.

We will be looking to see whether Libya was involved—recall yesterday's comments by President Kountche³ that neither Libya nor Morocco liked the recent regime; Morocco because of non-support on Western Sahara, and Libya because of opposition to its Chad occupation.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (09/21/1984–01/11/1985). Secret. Sent for information.

² In telegram 5905 from Nouakchott, December 12, the Embassy informed the Department about the coup: "According to the information being given out, the CMSN voted Haidalla out unanimously." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840794–0878)

³ No record of Kountche's comments has been found.

45. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 12, 1984

*NSSD 6/84: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MAGHREB**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

The treaty of union between Morocco and Libya has readjusted the political situation in North Africa in a troubling manner. Hassan and Qadhafi apparently each felt politically isolated, and perceived the union to be a way out of their respective dilemmas. Through union, Hassan may have won time during which to consolidate his position on the Western Sahara. Qadhafi gained an unmerited measure of respectability. Despite his subsequent diplomatic maneuvering, we anticipate continuation of habitual Libyan adventurism and use of terrorism focussed on Libyan dissidents.

The GOA perceives Algeria to be the primary target of the union. In response, it has increased support for the Polisario attacks against Moroccan positions, and deployed regular military forces in greater strength along the entire length of the common border with Morocco. In Morocco there is a growing presentiment that military confrontation is possible. Meanwhile, the GOM apparently intends to proceed with further extension of the term; this further will provoke the GOA. Both governments disavow aggressive intentions, but missteps could lead to escalating clashes. Meanwhile; the Tunisians have adopted essentially a wait-and-see posture in reaction to the treaty while privately voicing their unhappiness.

We are concerned by the damaging political respectability conferred on Qadhafi by the Union with Morocco. Beyond this consideration, our primary specific concerns relate to the potential transfer of US intelligence, military equipment and technology, or other controlled items from Morocco to Libya. King Hassan repeatedly has assured us that no such transfers will take place. This bears close monitoring. We are also concerned that enhanced Libyan access will pose long-term security problems for Morocco and that additional Libyan dissidents or intelligence concerning them might be turned over by the Moroccans to the Qadhafi regime.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret. Drafted by Sheila Lopez (S/S-S); cleared by Nassif, Zweifel, and Johnson. Sent under a December 12 covering memorandum from Hill to Senior Interagency Group No. 48. Platt forwarded the draft NSSD, which he noted was "fully cleared interagency and can be drawn on when preparing the NSDD on this subject," to McFarlane under a January 25, 1985, covering memorandum.

Despite these concerns, we have concluded that the treaty poses no immediate legal impediments to continuation of present US programs with Morocco. Likewise we conclude that Hassan wants the union (which stemmed from *his* initiative) to work and, hence, will not soon abrogate it.

We strongly desire that the union collapse at the earliest possible date; in the meantime, our objective is that Hassan so circumscribe his relationship with Libya that the treaty remains relatively meaningless. To achieve this, we should carefully avoid too much overt pressure on the King; politically, he cannot be seen to be backing down in the face of US pressure. Instead, we should underscore Qadhafi's actions which may be contrary to the spirit of the treaty and focus Moroccan attention on our concerns about implementation of the union.

In addressing the changing regional situation, other key conclusions are:

— The Bendjedid Government in Algeria continues to move in cautious fashion along a path of pragmatism and away from pedantic socialism. There is some dissatisfaction with the Soviet arsenal and support which we might be able to exploit. However, this dissatisfaction does *not* reflect a deep-seated GOA desire to abandon either good relations with the Soviet Union or its carefully burnished non-aligned credentials.

— Political malaise in Tunisia continues to grow. Bourguiba's tenacious hold on power complicates the transition already in train. Tunisia's near to mid-term future may be turbulent. A successor government may move to associate Tunisia more closely with the Arab mainstream. Continued US support and assistance, especially in the military field, is a positive stabilizing factor against radicalism.

— Qadhafi may change tactics, but not his basic objectives. Knowing this, area governments presumably will act accordingly to protect their national interests, but may concomitantly engage in closer relations with Qadhafi than we believe are prudent. This will continue to complicate our own policy toward Libya.

— Following seating of the SDAR by the OAU summit in Addis November 12, Morocco walked out as anticipated.² When the Western Sahara issue subsequently was debated in the Fourth Committee at UNGA, the Algerian resolution was passed, *inter alia* calling for direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. Although no move was made to extend UN membership to the SDAR, this could come in the future. Meanwhile on the ground, Moroccan military control continues to be strengthened.

— Across the area, longer term, endemic challenges to stability stem largely from problems of population growth, poor agricultural

² See Document 423.

outputs, sluggish markets for petroleum and phosphate exports, and maldistribution of resources. Unrest growing out of deteriorating social and economic conditions, especially in Morocco and Tunisia, is likely and easily exploitable by Islamic fundamentalists and other groups inimical to US interests. We recognize these factors, but cannot unilaterally offer sufficient resources to resolve the basic, interrelated problems. Nevertheless we should work to increase our resource flows in the area. (OMB Comment: "This judgment lacks analytical justification. There is no necessary correlation between increased economic aid to the Maghreb and reduced political instability. While it may be necessary periodically to increase aid in response to a country's specific economic needs, there is no justification for a policy assumption that higher economic aid levels will substantially correct the complex social-political-economic problems that are endemic in the region.")

Despite troubled prospects, we retain strong, healthy relations with Morocco and Tunisia and improving ones with Algeria. Important US interests are served by relevant programs.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

- To foster political stability and economic and social development through preservation and strengthening of moderate regimes.

- To limit regional subversion, particularly to neutralize relevant Libyan-sponsored activities, and restore Qadhafi's isolation.

- To assure passage through the area for commercial and strategic military purposes.

- To deny the area to further Soviet penetration; to diminish existing Soviet influence.

- To guarantee Western access to the area's material resources; to expand the market for American goods and services.

- To limit regional polarization.

- To reduce Algerian-Moroccan tensions and prospects for conflict.

- To help bring about abrogation of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Morocco:

- [2 lines not declassified]

- Do not press Hassan publicly to abrogate the treaty, but periodically remind him of our concerns and of his statement that if attempts to "tame" Qadhafi fail, he will sever the union.

- [3 lines not declassified]

- Conclude a General Security Of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) with Morocco.

— Continue visible cooperation under the Joint Economic (JEC) and Joint Military (JMC) Commissions at current levels (DOD would delete “visible cooperation” and substitute “all on-going economic and military cooperative programs”.)

— Unless or until we determine that treaty implementation unacceptably harms US interests, economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should be determined on criteria other than the GOM’s relations with Libya. (OMB Comment: “The proposed separation between assistance levels and Moroccan-Libyan relations is artificial and unrealistic. US efforts to convey our deep dissatisfaction with the Oujda Agreement will be severely undercut if we propose increasing security assistance to Morocco in 1986. Furthermore, Congress will probably oppose the proposed increases. Such a request could set off a politically counterproductive public debate on the merits of aid to Morocco at a time when the King is pursuing policies contrary to US interests.” DOD would reword second clause to read “. . . economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should not be contingent on the GOM’s current relationship with Libya.”)

— Proceed on schedule with joint US/Moroccan military exercises, keeping in mind Algerian and Spanish sensitivities as to time and place and notifying those governments in advance as appropriate. (DOD would reword first clause to read: “Proceed on schedule with planning and execution of the joint US/Moroccan military exercises program, . . .”)

— In the short-term (through March 1985), continue working level visits pertaining to JEC and JMC activities but discourage Cabinet level and other US high visibility visits. (DOD proposes rewording “In the short term . . . continue working level visits to Morocco but discourage Cabinet level, high visibility visits.”)

— Do not invite, but respond positively should King Hassan propose to come to Washington for private meetings with the President; use such meetings to reiterate our concern about the Moroccan-Libyan union.

— Prepare for the 4th Annual Joint Economic Commission meeting to take place on schedule in May 1985. (DOD would propose same treatment for Joint Military Commission meetings.)

— Proceed to negotiate texts for the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Bilateral Tourism Agreement (BTA) to be signed no earlier than March 1985. (USTR position is that BIT should be signed as soon as it is ready.)

Algeria:

— Seek further to improve relations through the visit by President Bendjedid in 1985, by increasing Sixth Fleet port calls, and by other gestures as appropriate.

— Expand military cooperation by issuing a Presidential determination permitting access to defense articles and services via FMS, increasing IMET funding for career professional training, and modifying policy to permit GOA acquisition of “lethal items”.

— Stimulate US private sector participation and transfer of technology by establishing a Joint Economic Commission.

— Intensify efforts to persuade the GOA to shift its gas export policy to a market-oriented basis so as to increase likelihood for future sales in Europe and the US.

Tunisia:

— Demonstrate continuing, visible support by Sixth Fleet port calls, occasional joint military exercises and other gestures as appropriate; reaffirm publicly that these actions are in support of Tunisian security and independence. (NSC supports an increase in military exercises and other gestures.)

— In planning security assistance levels, take into account Tunisia’s need to limit debt service on military procurements and obtain additional military training. (NSC supports an increase in economic and security assistance levels.)

— Continue to identify and expand contact with potential leaders, whether in power or in the opposition; make clear in such contacts that we continue to support the established GOT.

— Offer appropriate military/logistical support in the event of a Libyan move against Tunisian territorial integrity, preferably in support of the lead of France or other interested countries but unilaterally if necessary.

— Enter into discussions with the GOT and other concerned governments to establish realistic USG responses should Libya attack Tunisia.

Libya:

— While maintaining current levels of political pressure and economic sanctions on Qadhafi, continue to review possibilities for increasing such pressure.

— Continue a policy of containment based on strengthening ties with Qadhafi’s neighbors and utilizing our rhetoric to advance our goals while avoiding elevating his status in the international arena.

— Publicly now reiterate our existing NSDD 16 policy encouraging US nationals to depart from Libya.³ Should future Libyan actions be sufficiently egregious, consider the use of mandatory measures to

³Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

require Americans to depart Libya. (USDOC urges that this be done as routinely and discreetly as possible.)

— Continue our intelligence sharing and cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism. (DOD proposes alternate wording “Continue our intelligence sharing and expand political-economic cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism and other unacceptable behavior.”)

Regional:

— Continue to endorse publicly a political settlement of the Western Sahara issue by an expression of self-determination.

— If necessary, veto SDAR membership in the UN Security Council.

— Proceed with implementing the VOA modernization agreement with Morocco.

— Within approved budget levels, pursue expansion of public diplomacy and educational/cultural programs with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

— Morocco and Tunisia should have access to the blended credit programs rather than increased PL 480. (State opposes) (Treasury proposes alternate wording as follows: “Morocco and Tunisia should have access to blended credit programs to an extent dependent upon both need to counter subsidized competition and periodic assessments of their creditworthiness.”)

New Recommendations:

During the policy-level clearance process, the following new recommendations were put forward. Some of these may not have been addressed in the NSSD study/analysis. None of them has been formally agreed to by the IG. The proposing department or agency should be prepared to explain and defend the respective recommendation in the context of the SIG.

— Make every effort to assist Tunisia’s external security and economic vitality. (DOD proposes)

— Continue to search for opportunities to exploit Qadhafi’s weaknesses, internal instability and paranoia. (DOD proposes)

— The task force on Libya established by NSDD-16 should be reconvened to explore the entire spectrum of feasible political, economic and military options available for dealing with Libya.⁴ (DOD proposes)

⁴In a January 3, 1985, briefing memorandum to Armacost, Murphy wrote: “In negotiations leading up to the January 8 S/IG on North Africa, Arnie Raphael achieved Rich Armitage’s agreement to drop two DOD-proposed new recommendations.” (Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985) No record of the S/IG has been found.

— A policy of “correctness” toward Qadhafi is recommended which places the onus on him to conform to acceptable standards of international behavior. (DOD proposes)

— Encourage Hassan to cooperate visibly with the US in a manner that will “irritate” Qadhafi. (NSC proposes)

— Prepare *internal* paper on diplomatic options for US to try to reduce Moroccan/Algerian tension and conflict potential.⁵ (NSC proposes)

— The NSC wishes to discuss a possible recommendation relative to the “Stairstep” program in the Gulf of Sidra.⁶

— The Office of the Vice President wishes to discuss the merits of pressing for a UN initiative to resolve the Western Sahara dispute.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

⁵ No record of the paper has been found.

⁶ Reference is to the operational name for naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. Documentation on the exercises is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, December 12, 1984, 1733Z

5910. Subject: Effects of the Coup. Ref: Nouakchott 5905.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Based upon our knowledge of the members of the reconstituted CMSN, and on the assumption that there will be no wholesale changes in the membership—at least in the near term—we offer the following preliminary and tentative assessments of what the ouster of Haidalla may mean.

3. For the U.S. continued good and improving relations. The key players are still well disposed towards us. Our economic assistance, especially the emergency food aid, is very much appreciated, and the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840795–0430. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USCINCEUR.

² See footnote 2, Document 44.

other phases of the relationship (IMET, internal security, the USIS program, Peace Corps, etc.) are equally solid and on the upswing.

Haidalla was an enthusiastic backer of the orientation in our direction; we believe that the vast majority of the committee was and is in full and complete agreement. Taya, as the new President, is clearly in that grouping.

4. For the West. More of the same. If the anticipated purges focus on those who have always been rumored to be the most nearly out of step, i.e. Boukreis, the pro-Libyan, the solidly pro-Western stance that Mauritania has followed will be maintained.

5. For the Maghreb. A more difficult call, but probably a continuation of the present course. There is a slightly improved chance of a gesture of some minor kind toward Hassan, which the timing could make more meaningful, as long as Morocco does not make any unfriendly noises in the interim.

6. Internally. To the extent Haidalla's removal reflected discontent with specifics of his stewardship, there are two candidates for consideration as possible results.

The rumored move, toward democratization/legitimization of the government. The CMSN announced a return to democratic rule as one of its three goals when it overthrew the Ould Dada regime five years ago (end the war with the Polisario and economic recovery were the other two), and made an unexpected, almost fatal effort in 1980 that involved a projected constitution, civilian government and a discussion of political parties. It was being rumored that Haidalla wanted to try again, using the Structure for the Education of the Masses (SEM) as the vehicle, in the belief that it was ready to serve that function. We understand that not very many people on the CMSN agreed (for good reason, in our opinion) and therefore suspect that the experiment will be postponed.

Islamization. The cautious but steady implementation of the Sharia may be accelerated by the removal of Haidalla as one of the cautious but steady proponents. Mauritania is not at all a hot bed of fundamentalism, but Maurs have been strongly advocating a more rapid and more strict application of Islamic laws. The black community has been somewhat apprehensive about the potential impact on their marginally more liberal habits, and too much of a too rapid change could precipitate problems, especially if the Maur dominated CMSN does not maintain its cohesion.

7. Unless the CMSN does itself in as the result of the departure of Haidalla, matters will go on much as before. We speculate that there may well have been an accumulation of minor dissatisfactions that finally led his colleagues to vote him out. Perhaps he was beginning to enjoy his role a bit too much, and offending his colleagues by tending

to forget he was only *primus inter pares*, as tends to happen to people in similar positions. (The recent proliferation of large-sized portraits of Haidalla prompted quiet expressions of disapproval in some quarters.) To the extent this is the real reason he was dethroned, and the rather thin list of domestic and external issues mentioned above lends some credence to the thesis, the eventual results of the change may not be numerous.

Peck

47. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 27, 1984, 0707Z

6014. Subject: Maghreb Diplomacy: Algerian Moves. Ref: A) Nouakchott 6160,² B) Algiers 5952.³

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Although Algerian FonMin Ibrahimî's visit to Morocco has been reported from here by Agence France Presse (AFP) and apparently "leaked" in Morocco, the Algerian media have been silent. However, they have reported the visit of Mauritanian FonMin Cheikh Ould Babamine, his meeting with President Bendjedid, his onward travel to Tunis, and the departure today (Dec 26) of FonMin Ibrahimî for Nouakchott.

3. The visit of Ibrahimî to Morocco has been rumored here for about a week. The lack of official Algerian acknowledgement that Ibrahimî actually went, reflects a desire to open a private dialogue with King

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840824-0766. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Nouakchott, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 6160 from Nouakchott, December 24, Peck reported that in their first meeting since the coup, "Babamine said he was empowered by his government to state that Mauritania wanted to deepen and strengthen every facet of the relationship that now existed" with the United States "and would actively seek new areas for fruitful cooperation in the best interests of the two countries. He stressed these latter points twice." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840821-0750)

³ In telegram 5952 from Algiers, December 23, the Embassy reported: "To the extent that we are able to read the views and preoccupations of decision-making Algerians, we are struck by the extent to which they too are scratching their heads and trying to make sense of the recent ineptitude of Moroccan diplomacy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840820-0438)

Hassan that might lead to concrete steps on the Western Sahara. The GOA is cognizant of Morocco's bellicose atmosphere (ref B) and probably believes that little effective diplomacy can be achieved by adding further public pressure to Hassan's situation. The local foreign press has also noted Algeria's restraint thus far during the latest phase of the berm construction. The reported Moroccan "leak" of Ibrahimi's visit may be seen by the GOA as unhelpful to initiating a fruitful dialogue.

4. On the other hand, Mauritanian special envoy FonMin Babmine's visit has been publicly welcomed. While Babamine reportedly carried a message from new Head of State Col. Ould Taya, the participation in the Presidential meeting of the Mauritanian Chargé d'Affaires may have precluded much frank discussion. FonMin Ibrahimi's trip to Nouakchott will provide an opportunity for an authoritative response to Taya's message and also discussion of Ibrahimi's visit to Morocco. Thus year our Algerian contacts appear relatively relaxed about the Mauritanian change of government but, nevertheless, are exerting characteristically energetic diplomatic efforts to maintain the good relations it has with the Mauritanian ruling council (CMSN).

Newlin

48. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 31, 1985

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

4. *Tunisian Ambassador on Maghreb Summit.* This morning Ambassador Ben Yahia outlined for Mike Armacost Tunisia's hopes to host a Northern African Summit.² He stressed that while agreement to hold a summit had been reached in principle with each of the other Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya), no time-frame or specific agenda has yet been set. Discussions probably would center heavily on face-saving ways to settle the Western Sahara dispute and thus improve bilateral relations between Morocco and Algeria. Armacost pointed out our reservations over according Qadhafi any

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading January–June 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² A record of the Armacost-Ben Yahia meeting is in telegram 32886 to Tunis, February 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850074–0970)

opportunity to enhance his “respectability” and reiterated our policy of not dealing with Qadhafi until he demonstrates a change of methods. Ben Yahia responded that Tunisia shares such reservations and will do all it can to keep Qadhafi from exploiting a summit. (C)


49. Defense Intelligence Estimate¹

DDE-2200-290-85

Washington, February 1985

[Omitted here are a title page and preface.]

Unclassified



NORTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY (U)

KEY JUDGMENTS

(C) North African stability will continue on a downward trend over the next three years. Pandemic problems, including high population

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Defense Intelligence Estimate: North Africa: Prospects for Stability, February 1985. Secret; Noform. Prepared in the Middle East/South Asia Division, Directorate for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, and coordinated with the Service Intelligence Chiefs, based on information received as of mid-January 1985.

growth rates, agricultural inadequacy, economic constraints and regime legitimacy questions, will plague the North African regimes. Strained relations and the prospects for interstate conflict will contribute to the instability equation.

(S) Each regime faces problems sufficiently serious to topple the leadership given the right catalyst; however, barring such unpredictable events as assassinations, we judge that most incumbent rulers will remain in office over the next three years. The lifespan of Tunisia's aging President Bourguiba is a major uncertainty.

(S) Tunisia's future is likely to be increasingly turbulent. The likelihood for an abrupt change of regime will increase greatly once the Tunisian President dies. On the other hand, his continued rule will also increase the longer term prospects for a revolutionary, not evolutionary, transformation of Tunisia.

(C) Over the very long term, Algeria appears to have the prerequisites to support a substantially improved standard of living for its populace. Its success will depend on the implementation of pragmatic economic and social policies over the near term.

(S) Interstate hostilities are a distinct possibility. Although none of the governments seek such conflict, only the catalytic event is missing in the cases of Algeria-Morocco and Egypt-Libya. A substantial military defeat could cause the losing government to fall. Morocco's King Hassan would not survive the loss of the Western Sahara in a war with Algeria.

(S) The United States will face challenges; the possibilities range from a friendly state distancing itself from the United States, through interstate conflict, to the emergence of an anti-Western regime. The internal threats to Morocco, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt appear to loom larger than those to Algeria or Libya. The loss of US access to Egypt or Morocco, for example, would seriously affect US contingency deployment planning. Should an Algerian-Moroccan war erupt, improving US-Algerian ties would likely suffer. Any such developments would provide opportunities for the USSR to exploit.

(C) A change in Libyan leadership would not necessarily portend a reversal of Libya's international behavior or a warming of relations with the United States, especially if the new leadership perceived itself in need of Soviet goodwill.

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 21, 1985, 1043Z

1561. Subject: Algerians Tell Tunisians That Maghreb Summit Must Wait Indefinitely. Ref: Tunis 1507.²

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. FonMin's Special Assistant Hassen el Ghouayel (protect) told Political Counselor late February 20 that Algerian Ambassador Messaoud Ait Chaalal had asked to see GOT Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi earlier in the day with an "urgent" message. Ait Chaalal, who had just been in Algiers on consultations, informed the GOT that the GOA could not accept the two-month time limitation proposed by the Tunisians to give the Moroccans and Algerians time to work out their differences prior to the holding of a Maghreb Summit of Five. El Ghouayel offered no further details on the contents of the message, but in response to questioning he said that the exchange was friendly. He gave the impression that Algeria's decision was based on its judgement that their bilateral contacts with Morocco were not advancing.

3. Comment. Although we cannot predict for certain how President Bourguiba—who had strong hopes for a summit—will react, we believe that the Tunisians will almost certainly put their efforts on hold for the time being, while not abandoning hope for the concept over the longer term.

Sebastian

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850118-0640. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 1507 from Tunis, February 19, the Embassy reported that Algerian officials insisted that "Tunisia should not issue invitations to Maghreb summit yet" as the Algerians "said they needed more time in their bilateral exchanges with the Moroccans." The Embassy commented: "The GOT has had to accept the fact that the Algerian-Moroccan dispute cannot be papered over by elegant rhetoric, however well-intentioned." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850113-0318)

51. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

I-21945/85

Washington, March 20, 1985

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Moroccan Ambassador Jorio (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S) On Tuesday, 19 March, I met with Moroccan Ambassador Jorio² to clarify what Ambassador Jorio had said to DAS Nassif³ about changed attitudes in Morocco concerning the Moroccan-Libyan union.

(S) Ambassador Jorio explained Morocco now believes there is a change in the *US* attitude about Morocco's treaty with Libya as a result of Foreign Minister Filali's discussions with USG officials, particularly in the State Department.⁴ Apparently, these officials gave Foreign Minister Filali the impression that, even if they do not support it, they better understand Morocco's position with Libya, and that this arrangement was dictated by national and regional circumstances. Ambassador Jorio explained further that Morocco wanted first, to counter Algeria's efforts to isolate Morocco, and second, to stop Libyan supply of the Polisario. He characterized the treaty as a "treaty of neutralization not friendship".

(S) I told Ambassador Jorio that, despite announcement of the treaty, we have continued to recognize the strategic importance of Morocco and maintain good relations, while giving Morocco time to justify this act. I pointed out that the consistency of our relations with Morocco was demonstrated with the expedited delivery of the M48A5 tanks Morocco

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-87-0007, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 42, Morocco 1985. Secret. Sent through Iklé. Drafted by [name not declassified] (ISA/NESA). A stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: "21 MAR 85 10:08 Office of the Secretary of Defense." Underneath that notation, a second stamped notation reads: "SECDEF HAS SEEN MAR 21 1985."

² No other record of the Armitage-Jorio conversation has been found.

³ No record of the Nassif-Jorio conversation has been found.

⁴ Reference is presumably to the February 21 meeting between Filali and Shultz, during which Filali "conveyed to the Secretary King Hassan's earnest desire to give a quote new dynamic unquote to the bilateral relationship, which he said, had quote settled unquote since last August's Libya-Morocco treaty. Filali said the treaty had achieved its two objectives: neutralizing Libyan support for the Polisario and forcing Algeria to talk directly to Morocco." Shultz "agreed that it is important to renew and reenergize periodically all elements of a relationship. He said it is time to put problems behind us and to move and build the relationship." (Telegram 56991 to multiple recipients, February 26; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850129-0199)

requested. However, we still are displeased with the Moroccan/Libyan treaty, and our policy toward Qadhafi has not changed.⁵

Richard L. Armitage⁶

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)*

⁵ Weinberger drew a line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence, underlined the sentence, and wrote: “yes” underneath it.

⁶ Armitage signed “Rich” above this stamped signature.

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, April 14, 1985, 1502Z

02093. Subject: Mauritanian-Moroccan Ambassadorial Exchange. Ref: A) FBIS London UK (131226Z Apr 85)² B) Nouakchott 00414.³

1. C—Entire text.

2. April 13 announcement of an exchange of Ambassadors between Mauritania and Morocco (ref A) represents the culmination of an important phase in the reorientation of GIRM foreign policy launched in the wake of palace coup four months ago. At Mauritania’s instigation Morocco and Mauritania recalled their Ambassadors in April, 1981, after the Haidalla regime saw Moroccan complicity in the aborted attempt to seize power (during which Taya narrowly escaped plotters’ attempt to assassinate him). The announcement indicates that the alleged disappearance of extensive Moroccan assets consigned to escrow has either been resolved, or was not a problem in the first place. The resumption of ties will be popular in many quarters here. The capacious Moroccan

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850256–0626. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Dakar, Rabat, and USCINCEUR.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 414 from Nouakchott, January 23, the Embassy reported that in the wake of the December coup which removed Haidalla (see Documents 44–46) “the most important new initiatives have related themselves to international relations. The new government has pledged a return to impartial neutrality; the effect will be to weaken ties to the Polisario, examine ways to resume a dialogue with Rabat and if possible insulate Mauritania more effectively from the ramifications of any Algerian-Moroccan conflict.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850050–0142)

mosque, vacant these past four years, will now open. Many Mauritians with close family ties to Morocco will welcome the decision. An extensive commerce diverted since 1981 to the Canaries will likely resume.

3. The news also constitutes tangible evidence—and there is little enough of it—that the Taya regime is determined to implement, albeit carefully, its objective of a truly neutral relationship to the Western Sahara conflict (ref B). The high-profile Algerian presence which prevailed during much of the four year hiatus in Moroccan-Mauritanian ambassadorial level relations has already diminished, and may diminish a bit more. Nonetheless, as the concurrent visit of Minister of Interior Djibril O. Abdallahi (the former Cimper)⁴ to Algiers suggests, Taya will make every effort to insure that the pendulum does not swing too far the other way.

Peck

⁴ Djibril Ould Abdallahi, also known as Gabriel Cimper.

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 29, 1985

SUBJECT

NSDD on U.S. Policy Towards North Africa

Issue

Whether to sign the NSDD on U.S. Policy Towards North Africa (Tab A).

Facts

Following the conclusion of the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union (Oujda Accords), an interagency review of U.S. policy toward North Africa was conducted.² The review examined the changing regional situation, U.S. goals and interests on a bilateral and regional basis, and policy recommendations for U.S. relations with each Maghreb state.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 168 [U.S. Policy Towards North Africa]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Teicher. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

² See Document 45.

Discussion

The interagency review concluded that the situation in North Africa poses opportunities and risks for American interests. The fundamental challenges to regional stability stem from an array of political-military and socio-economic factors, which reflect internal and external developments.

The NSDD provides policy directives on a country-by-country and regional basis. Some of the directives are already accomplished, primarily as a result of the visits of Algerian President Bendjedid and Moroccan Foreign Minister Filali. Of special note is a directive to undertake a review of U.S. strategy toward Libya. The NSDD concluded that further work is required to focus on overcoming Qadhafi's continuing subversive and adventuristic behavior. We hope to have policy options ready for review by early summer.

Recommendation

OK No That you sign the NSDD on U.S. Policy Towards North Africa at Tab A.³

Tab A**National Security Decision Directive 168⁴**

Washington, April 30, 1985

*U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA (S)**Assessment*

The evolving situation in North Africa poses opportunities and risks for American interests. The fundamental challenges to regional stability stem from an array of political-military and socio-economic factors, which reflect internal and external developments. In light of the region's geo-strategic position opposite NATO's southern flank, the potential for increased Soviet regional influence and the dangers of Libyan adventurism, the United States must pay special attention to recent developments in the Maghreb and devise appropriate policies to protect and promote American interests. (S)

As a result of the August 1984 Oujda Accords, the regional balance of power was upset and Colonel Qadhafi succeeded in easing his international isolation. We shall continue to make clear to the Government of Morocco our disapproval of its union with Libya. However, based on our interests in Morocco and continuing close cooperation with Rabat in many important fields, as well as King Hassan's personal assurances

³ Reagan checked and initialed the "OK" option.

⁴ Secret.

that sensitive activities will not be placed at risk, we shall maintain correct and friendly working relations. (S)

Over the past several years, the Government of Algeria has demonstrated a growing eagerness to strengthen our bilateral relationship. In part as a result of the changed regional balance, as well as a degree of Algerian dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union, we shall seek to improve our position in Algiers. Nonetheless, we do not anticipate that the Algerian government will abandon its relations with Moscow, at least for the foreseeable future, nor will it act in a manner that diminishes its non-aligned international standing. (S)

The war in the Western Sahara represents the most important factor contributing to the changing balance of power and Moroccan-Algerian tensions. A political solution remains elusive. Moroccan military dominance continues, but, in part responding to the Oujda Accords, Algiers has increased its direct support for the Polisario as well as its military readiness along the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. The danger of immediate hostilities seems to have temporarily abated, though miscalculation could lead to rapid escalation. The U.S. shall continue to work with Morocco, Algeria and other interested parties to encourage a negotiated settlement of the Sahara war. (S)

Qadhafi has exploited the Oujda Accords to ease his international isolation at the same time that his adventuristic policies intensify. His support and use of terrorism, both in and beyond the Middle East, continues, along with a preoccupation with regional subversion. Libyan relations with the Soviet Union are also being enhanced (although intermittent tensions are evident) through the development of naval support infrastructure and BACKFIRE-capable airbases. New measures must be considered to overcome the challenges posed by Qadhafi. (S)

The situation in Tunisia bears special attention. Islamic fundamentalism, Libyan intrigues and socio-economic unrest combine to create dangerous challenges to the Tunisian government and its pro-West orientation. Against this backdrop, political malaise is growing, even as the presuccession political struggle intensifies. President Bourguiba's successor may feel compelled to move away from a close political relationship with the U.S. towards the more independent Arab mainstream. (S)

U.S. Objectives (S)

- To foster political stability and economic and social development through preservation and strengthening of moderate regimes.

- To help bring about abrogation of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union.

- To limit regional subversion, particularly to neutralize relevant Libyan-sponsored activities, and restore Qadhafi's isolation.

- To reduce Algerian-Moroccan tensions and prospects for conflict.

- To limit regional polarization.
- To deny the area to further Soviet penetration and diminish existing Soviet influence.
- To assure passage through the area for commercial and strategic military purposes.
- To guarantee Western access to the area's material resources, and expand the market for American goods and services.

Policy Directives (S)

Consonant with existing circumstances and U.S. interests in the Maghreb, the U.S. Government will pursue the following policies:

Morocco: (S)

— Without pressing Hassan publicly to abrogate the treaty, persistently impress upon him our concerns, develop with Hassan criteria to judge Qadhafi's behavior—remind him of his statement that if attempts to "tame" Qadhafi fail, he will sever the union. U.S. cooperation with the Government of Morocco should be such as to make the union less palatable to Qadhafi.

— [2 lines not declassified]

— [2½ lines not declassified]

— Conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Morocco.

— Continue cooperation under the Joint Economic (JEC) and Joint Military (JMC) Commissions at current levels.

— Economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should be determined on global criteria, but will reflect any Oujda treaty implementation which unacceptably harms U.S. interests.

— Revert to pre-treaty procedures in planning and execution of the joint U.S./Moroccan military exercise program, keeping in mind Algerian and Spanish sensitivities as to time and place and notifying those governments in advance as appropriate.

— In the short-term (through mid-June, 1985), continue working level visits pertaining to JEC and JMC activities but discourage Cabinet level and other U.S. high visibility visits.

— Reschedule Joint Economic Commission and Joint Military Commission meetings.

— Proceed to negotiate and conclude texts for the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Bilateral Tourism Agreement (BTA).

Algeria: (S)

— Seek further to improve relations enhanced by the State visit of President Bendjedid in April, 1985, by increasing Sixth Fleet port calls, and by other gestures as appropriate.

— Expand military cooperation based on the Presidential Determination permitting access to defense articles and services via FMS, increase IMET funding for career professional training, and modify policy to permit GOA acquisition of “lethal items”. FMS sales will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account our objective to reduce Soviet influence in Algeria, U.S. relationships with other area states, and our interest in fostering a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

— Emphasize private sector pursuit of Algerian markets while responding affirmatively to GOA interest in establishing a Joint Economic Commission.

— Intensify efforts to persuade the GOA to shift its gas export policy to a market-oriented basis so as to increase likelihood for future sales in Europe and the U.S.

Libya: (S)

— An NSC chaired interagency group shall be established to review U.S. strategy toward Libya, and to prepare policy options to contain Qadhafi’s subversive activities.

— Pending the strategy review, continue to strengthen ties with Qadhafi’s neighbors while calibrating our rhetoric to advance our goals without elevating Qadhafi’s status in the international arena.

— While maintaining current economic sanctions on Qadhafi, State Department chaired interagency committee will review possibilities for increasing such pressure, e.g. reducing U.S. economic participation in the Libyan economy, more stringent restrictions to prevent Americans from working in Libya, and possible multilateral sanctions.

— [*less than 1 line not declassified*] expand political-economic cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism and other unacceptable behavior.

— The Department of Defense will review the Stairstep Exercise Program and forward options and recommendations to the NSC for interagency review and coordination.

— Ensure that the onus to conform to acceptable international standards rests with Qadhafi. Our posture should be conveyed through diplomatic channels and public statements by U.S. officials.

— Hold systematic, high-level discussions with the French government in order to achieve Libyan withdrawal from Chad.

Tunisia: (S)

— Demonstrate continuing, visible support by Sixth Fleet port calls, occasional joint military exercises and other gestures as appropriate; reaffirm publicly that these actions are in support of Tunisian security and independence.

— In planning security assistance levels, take into account the GOT's need to limit debt service, the desire to obtain additional military training, and the external security to Tunisia.

— Continue to identify and expand contact with potential leaders, whether in power or in the opposition; make clear in such contacts that we continue to support the GOT.

— Offer appropriate military/logistical support in the event of a Libyan move against Tunisian territorial integrity, preferably in support of the lead of France or other interested countries but unilaterally if necessary.

— Enter into discussions with the GOT and other concerned governments to establish realistic U.S. Government responses should Libya subvert and/or attack Tunisia.

Regional: (S)

— Continue to endorse publicly a political settlement of the Western Sahara issue by an expression of self-determination.

— If necessary, veto SDAR membership in the UN Security Council.

— Prepare an internal paper on possible U.S. diplomatic moves designed to reduce Moroccan/Algerian tension and conflict potential. Specifically focus on options for resolving the Western Sahara dispute.

— Proceed with implementing the VOA modernization agreement with Morocco.

— Within approved budget levels, pursue expansion of public diplomacy and educational/cultural programs with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

— Morocco and Tunisia should have access to blended credit programs to an extent dependent upon both need to counter subsidized competition and periodic assessments of their creditworthiness.

Ronald Reagan

54. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 20, 1985

SUBJECT

King Hassan's Comments on Libya; Possible Adherence by Chad to Moroccan-Libyan Union

Summary: At the end of a wide-ranging May 16 discussion with Assistant Secretary Murphy and NSC staffer Teicher,² King Hassan confided that during Ramadan, he, Qadhafi, and Habre will sign an "international agreement" bringing Chad into the Moroccan-Libyan "Arab-African Union."³ Hassan stressed that this secret should be shared only with President Reagan, Vice President Bush and you. The King said this proposal originated with him—his vision of an opportunity to solve the long-festered Chad problem. He claimed at least tacit acquiescence of Mitterrand. End summary.

During lengthy audience with King Hassan May 16, Assistant Secretary Murphy raised Qadhafi's growing boldness in challenging U.S. interests. There are contradictory tendencies—on the one hand Qadhafi has made overtures to the USG for improved relations, and on the other he continues to work actively against Libyan citizens in the United States and elsewhere and against American worldwide interests. Teicher elaborated, providing examples of Qadhafi's actions and rhetoric in various areas of the world. He noted that President Reagan has become increasingly concerned about the mounting evidence of Qadhafi's continued subversive behavior and insults directed against the President himself and against the American people.

Murphy then invited Hassan's views on how to deal with Qadhafi in order to try to change his behavior.

In reply, Hassan said that Qadhafi is an "unbalanced child"; he has his own peculiar mind-set based on "Bedouin law." He mused

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (05/18/1985–05/31/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Teicher on May 18; cleared by Bishop, Johnson (P), and Zweifel. Bishop initialed for Crocker. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: "20 May."

² A record of the portion of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to bilateral relations is in telegram 4624 from Rabat, May 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850348–0373) A record of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to Algerian-Moroccan relations and the Western Sahara is in telegram 4623 from Rabat, May 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850348–0348)

³ Hassan's statement to Murphy about Chad's possible adherence to the Libyan-Moroccan treaty is in telegram 159491 to Rabat, May 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

that the USG ought to ask some "trusted friend" to pose to Qadhafi the following question: Leaving U.S. support for Israel aside (which is a question concerning all Arabs and not just Qadhafi), what is Libya's specific grievance against the United States? Hassan would be willing to undertake this mission if the President so desired. He then expressed his strong belief that if Qadhafi were ever to make an explicit promise to the United States with regard to his behavior, he would live up to it.

Murphy commented that one of the most disturbing things is that Qadhafi has never foresworn terrorist activity. Hassan responded that Qadhafi is not, in any case, responsible for all such activity in the world.

Hassan then continued that President Reagan is a great friend and almost a brother. Qadhafi, on the other hand, is a temporary associate because of temporary circumstances. Last year Hassan had seen himself threatened by two strong enemies, Algeria and Libya. He had sensed an opportunity to neutralize perhaps the more dangerous of the two—i.e., Qadhafi. Given his responsibility to the Moroccan people, he had seized the opportunity to do so via the Oujda accord.

Hassan wanted the President to know that he, Hassan, is willing to give his head and heart to any effort that the President might request. He hopes that the President will have NSC Adviser McFarlane prepared, when he visits Morocco in June, to tell Hassan what we wish him to do with respect to Qadhafi, the Gulf, or any other area. He wants to help the President and believes that a searching "unofficial" conversation with McFarlane could usefully explore how he might be of assistance.

After a pause, Hassan said that he wished to inform the President, Vice President and you of a matter in strictest confidence. (He stressed this need for secrecy several times.) Sometime in the weeks just ahead he, Qadhafi and Habre will sign an agreement bringing Chad into Morocco and Libya's "African-Arab Union". Hassan said he had proposed this to Habre as a way of ending the thankless, unavailing conflict in Chad. Habre had agreed, provided Hassan himself would strongly back the undertaking. Hassan had then proposed Chad's incorporation to Qadhafi, stressing that (A) this would be an "international agreement" which would commit Qadhafi, and that (B) Morocco would march out of the union if undertakings arrived at were not adhered to. After six days' reflection, Qadhafi had agreed. It now appears that the deal will be signed during Ramadan. Hassan said that French President Mitterrand has been informed and in effect accepted; with French parliamentary elections coming up, Mitterrand is not interested in getting further bogged down in Chad. (Comment: Implicit in Hassan's account is that Habre will continue as President of Chad.)

In response to a question by Ambassador Reed, the King said that he thought he probably will have to visit Tripoli "some day, but not right away."

In subsequent conversation over lunch with Foreign Minister Filali, Murphy explored further the Libyan question. Filali said Qadhafi still operates from a sense of isolation and continues to seek international acceptance and legitimacy. He contended that Libya is interested in improving relations with the U.S. for precisely that reason. Qadhafi will not necessarily moderate his fiery rhetoric while seeking acceptance; he sees no contradiction between the two.

Murphy pointed out that the GOM should be under no illusion that the USG will moderate its views on Qadhafi. Teicher cited the extremely dangerous nature of the “Voice of Vengeance” broadcasts, Libyan subversion in Tunisia (apparently in anticipation of the post-Bourguiba era), and the Libyan provision of Scud rockets to Iran. He also reviewed the heavy-handedness of Libya in post-Nimeiri Sudan.

Comment: Since the issue of Chad’s possible adherence to the “Arab–African Union” previously has come to our attention, we will be able to probe Habre about the matter without betraying Hassan’s confidence. We will pose to him (and separately to Hassan) questions as to what Chad may stand to gain from this move. Our earlier information was that Habre had decided *against* the union, and there may still be some maneuvering taking place. End comment.

55. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, June 13, 1985, 1546Z

3167. Subject: Regional Tensions: Taya is Worried. Ref: A) Nouakchott 3043,² B) DIA Wash 130028Z Jun 85.³

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. Chief of State Taya is extremely ill at ease over what he perceives to be the increased regional dangers resulting from

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850417–0048. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Casablanca, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 3043 from Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: “There is a faint sense of unease in the unfolding of the new relationship with Morocco. The exchange of Ambassadors and the opening of the Moroccan mosque have not generated the appropriate levels of enthusiasm, and it is possible that the Western Sahara question is adversely affecting the GIRM’s view of things.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850400–0393)

³ Not found.

Morocco's 5th berm. The Polisario is insisting on transit rights, Algeria is as yet unwilling to state its position on the subject, Morocco is seen as increasingly menacing, and the possibility of Moroccan-Algerian collusion is considered serious. Taya sought assurances of U.S. support in the event of trouble and an increased information flow in the interim. End summary.

3. Chief of State Taya called me in June 13 and started the discussion with an inquiry as to what is going on in the area. He said he would appreciate being informed on what the US knew, with particular respect to Morocco-Algerian relations and the current status of wall-building in the Sahara.

4. I provided a brief update on American perspectives, and reminded Taya that our position with respect to resolving the Saharan conflict had not changed since being clearly re-enunciated (and briefed to Taya) at the time of the Bendjedid visit.⁴ I added that there was something in the air which suggested that developments were taking place (ref A), and asked what the Mauriticians knew about the situation. Taya waffled around with generalities until I asked point-blank if the Polisario had recently demanded transit rights: The conversation became more focused.

5. Taya brought from his desk a map showing the Western Sahara and the locations of all the berms. He pointed to the work that has already been accomplished with the 5th berm (south to and around Guelta Zemour) and to the future plans for its completion (west to Dakhla). What Morocco has done, he said, is to take all the Sahara that is even marginally habitable, leaving the Polisario only sand. That organization, however, is totally unwilling to abandon the struggle and has therefore told the GIRM that it must have access to Mauritanian territory in order to be able to launch attacks against the new southern wall. Mauritania has refused and has informed Algeria of its position. (The Polisario demand was delivered by Mohamed Ould Salek—Nouakchott 2928;⁵ the Mauritanian demarche was made by FonMin Ould Minnih.)

6. Responding to questions, Taya said that the Algerians professed ignorance of this new development, and have since refused to make their position clear. (Taya saw Amb Djadri on June 11.) This has left the GIRM feeling particularly uneasy because they are no match for the Polisario unless Algeria cuts the supply lines. Taya added that Mauritania has many friends that it can count upon for support and asked what the United States would do in the event of a conflict.

⁴ Bendjedid visited Washington in April and met with Reagan, Bush, and Shultz. See Documents 147 and 148.

⁵ Reference is to the defensive perimeter—an earthen wall—built by Morocco in the Western Sahara against the Polisario guerrillas. See footnote 2, Document 431.

I replied that the U.S. was committed to Mauritania's territorial integrity and would be opposed to any armed aggression, but that our efforts would be restricted to diplomatic and political channels, leaving any other measures to other countries more directly involved. Taya seemed quite satisfied with assurances of our political support.

7. Taya said he was particularly concerned by Morocco's intentions. He remarked that he had been present when King Hassan had made a remark which had left him ill at ease ever since: "*La mechoui du probleme Saharaoui sera cuit sur le does de la Mauritanie.*" He said that in building the 5th berm, unnecessary since Morocco already controls the only parts of the Sahara that have any meaning, the King was intentionally forcing the Polisario to confront Mauritania in order to be able to continue the struggle. Morocco, in his view, would be the only one that would stand to benefit from such a development. I pointed out that to the extent this last point was correct, Algeria would be unlikely to let a conflict break out. Taya said he would feel a lot better if Algiers would make its position clear. (I asked if he had any plans to see Chadli, and he said there were none.)

8. Everyone had been hopeful that the reestablishment of relations with Morocco would remove all tensions with the northern neighbor, Taya said, which has not proven to be the case at all. King Hassan sees matters from a different perspective than do others, which makes his actions difficult to predict, but Mauritians do not doubt that his interests in the country, while minimal, are inimical.

9. Taya was also deeply concerned over the possibility that Morocco and Algeria were working together to resolve the overall problem at Mauritania's (unspecified) expense. I remarked that I doubted relations between the two countries were good enough right now to permit such a development, adding that Algeria, in particular, would be unlikely to benefit from any difficulties developing within Mauritania proper.

10. Comment. Taya was somewhat distraught, and stressed that he was the only one in the government that was concerned over these matters. He said he hoped that the U.S. would keep him informed of any developments of which it becomes aware bearing on the Sahara question. He was visibly pleased when he was reminded of the commitment to Mauritania's territorial integrity and sovereignty which the U.S. made at the time of the March 16, 1981, coup attempt.⁶ He also understood why we would give to France, Algeria and others the lead role in

⁶ In telegram 2928 from Nouakchott, May 30, the Embassy "utilized" the Polisario's demand "to direct attention to a point that appears to be relatively little-known: there is no official Polisario/SDAR representation in Nouakchott, nor has there been." The Embassy continued that despite pressure from the SDAR and Algeria, the GIRM had refused in order to "avoid provoking Rabat." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850382–0042)

efforts to resolve—by whatever means—any armed struggle involving Mauritania. Taya seems to believe that the possibility of such a development is fairly strong.

11. He is also beset with a serious case of the jitters. If the Polisario is actually going to be let loose to undertake armed efforts to cross large segments of Mauritanian territory, then Taya is jittery for very good reasons. That would mean that Algeria's policy (as seen from here) of keeping Mauritania out of the war may have changed, altering a major regional equation to a significant degree. It is for this reason that I think a real clash with the Polisario is unlikely: I do not see how it could benefit Algeria.⁷

Peck

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 3.

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, July 12, 1985, 0316Z

212472. Subject: Discussion With GOM on State of Libyan-Moroccan Relations.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. We wish to discuss with GOM officials recent developments which may present risks and opportunities for U.S. efforts to dissolve the Moroccan-Libyan relationship.

Reports that the recent Libyan-Iranian accords have resulted in strains in the Morocco-Libya relationship are intriguing;²

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel and Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); cleared by Van Heuven, Sokolsky, Otto, Nassif, Johnson, and McKinley; approved by Raphael.

² In telegram 6009 from Rabat, July 1, the Embassy reported: "A working level security official of the Sûreté Nationale told EmbOff on July 1 that 'we are being careful because things between Morocco and Libya are heating up and are very tense.' He said King Hassan had sent Royal Counsellor Ahmed Reda Guedira and Interior Minister Driss Basri to Libya on June 26 to convey displeasure over a Libyan-Iranian 'strategic alliance' announced by Libyan Press Agency (Jana) on June 24." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850464-0055)

— Signs that Qadhafi is upset with Moroccan reluctance to pursue military cooperation are also encouraging. Whether or not reports of renewed Libyan support to the Polisario are credible is of interest;

— On the other hand, the report that a trip to Libya by Hassan might occur in the near future is worrisome;

— Was the reason behind Basri's trip to Tripoli to take issue with Qadhafi on his Iranian ties, or was it to arrange for visit by the King?

— What are we to make of the just-concluded joint Moroccan-Libyan parliamentary sessions, in particular the establishment of a "defense affairs committee"?

3. Should Hassan carry through with his on-again, off-again plans to visit Qadhafi, this would cast a new pall over the U.S./GOM relationship—regardless of when such a visit took place. It would be particularly unfortunate if it occurred immediately before or after JEC and JMC meetings or if a Hassan/Qadhafi meeting resulted in discussion or agreements on military cooperation. It is our hope that Hassan never make the trip to Tripoli. In theory, stiff-arming on this issue might so displease Qadhafi that it might lead to an explicit or implicit demise of the union.

4. To review the bidding and to alert the GOM to our concerns about and potential consequences of a possible Hassan trip to Libya, you should seek an early appointment with FonMin Filali to make the following points.

— The Iraqis and several other Arab governments have reacted sharply to Qadhafi's policy of increased support for Iran. We understand the GOM might also have problems with this. We would be interested in the GOM assessment of Libyan-Iranian policies, especially in the area of weapons supplies. What, if anything, is the GOM doing vis a vis Qadhafi on this one?

— We likewise are concerned by the reported military agreement between Libya and Sudan. What are GOM views?

— The news that the joint Libyan-Moroccan parliamentary meetings established a "defense affairs committee" is troubling. Any discussion or agreements on Moroccan/Libyan military cooperation would present us with particular difficulties, given the nature of our bilateral relationship, we request information about the proposed powers and importance of that committee.

— There have been unconfirmed reports that Qadhafi may have recently renewed at least financial support to the Polisario. Is there any validity to these reports?

— As GOM is aware, we have serious reservations about any expansion of Qadhafi's influence. This was the basis for our concern about the King's intention to bring Chad into the Arab-African union.

Has that issue been laid to rest? (FYI: We have one report that Hassan may still be pressing for a Habre-Qadhafi meeting. End FYI.)

— Renewed activity to implement the Oujda accords and official visits between the two capitals have led to speculation that King Hassan may soon visit Tripoli.

— It strikes us also that such a visit, coming in the wake of Libya's accords with Iran and Sudan, could strain Morocco's relations with its Arab friends.

— Such a visit would be most unfortunate, especially at a time in which we both are working for successful and productive meetings of the JEC and JMC.³

Whitehead

³ Kirby met with Filali on July 15 and relayed the Department's instructions. In telegram 6576 from Rabat, July 16, Kirby commented: "Twice during the Libyan portion of our conversation I pointedly reminded Filali that Washington continues to be very concerned about Qadhafi's terrorist efforts world-wide and that the Moroccans must understand that we are, therefore, concerned about any new or continuing initiatives with Qadhafi that friends of ours like Morocco might undertake." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis)

57. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, August 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Managing U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and Algeria

You requested my thoughts on the U.S.-Moroccan-Algerian relationship.²

In the nature of things, our relationships with Morocco and Algeria are not symmetrical. While both are important countries, our relations with the two cannot really be equated. We derive strategic, military,

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–31, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky. Copies were sent to Murphy and Holmes.

² No record of Armacost's request has been found.

and political benefits from Morocco that Algeria presently is either unwilling or unable to provide. Thus, Algeria could not substitute for a loss of our assets in Morocco.

In my view, it would be a mistake to risk the tangible benefits of our links with Morocco in the quest for intangible benefits from an improved tie with Algeria. Indeed, on two central cross-cutting issues on which Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict—the Western Sahara and arms sales—it is difficult to discern any other choice for us than to tilt toward Morocco.

General Considerations

King Hassan has his own agenda and will play the balance of power game in North Africa according to his perception of Morocco's interests. The Union with Libya and Hassan's less than enthusiastic support for the Hussein-Arafat initiative underscore his willingness to act in ways inimical to U.S. interests.³

Nonetheless, Morocco makes a significant contribution to our overall defense strategy and there is no other country in the region that can replace it. It offers the United States important support for our security strategy in Southwest Asia, the Mediterranean, and NATO; we have paid a relatively moderate price for our access agreement, use of Moroccan facilities, exercise program, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and VOA facilities.

Moreover, Morocco still attaches considerable importance to its relationship with the United States. It relies on us for military, economic, and diplomatic support and believes that the bilateral relationship is central to Morocco's overall security position in the region. Morocco's dependence on the United States continues to provide us with a measure of influence over Hassan's policies—for example, implementing the Oujda Accord in a way that does less harm to our interests in Morocco than might have been feared.

Algeria, on the other hand, offers us modest benefits—a partial counterweight to Libya, denial of extensive Soviet access to its facilities, modest support for the peace process—but does not desire open or close strategic cooperation with us. While it will continue to provide limited access to its port facilities for U.S. forces, domestic constraints, the ideology of the leadership, its position within the nonaligned movement, and its relationship with Moscow will sharply limit its military cooperation with the United States.

Algeria is interested in expanding its relationship with us, especially in the areas of military procurement and economic and trade relations. But its limited need for our assistance will not give us significant

³ See Document 37.

leverage over Algerian policies. Indeed, there are a number of issues on which U.S. and Algerian interests will continue to diverge despite improved bilateral relations:

- continued terrorist training of Palestinian, radical Lebanese Shia, and other guerrilla groups;
- encouragement of Polisario demands on Mauritania to allow use of its territory for operations in the Western Sahara;
- support for the Sandinistas;
- support for Third World positions in the UN and other international forums.

We do not possess sufficient carrots or sticks to effect a change in Algerian positions on these issues. It is also unlikely that Algeria is prepared to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union significantly in return for greater military and economic assistance from us. Finally, we cannot give Algeria what it really desires: an end to U.S. support for Morocco.

The Western Sahara Problem

We should avoid a shift in U.S. policy on the Western Sahara in favor of the Polisario or Algeria; indeed, the creation of an independent Polisario state in the Western Sahara would be a potentially strategic blow to our interests. It would contribute to continuing instability in the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks into Moroccan territory, and possible Soviet strategic access to facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

The risk of an escalation of the Western Sahara conflict has increased in the wake of Morocco's extension of the berm; nonetheless, the war is unlikely to spread in ways that would threaten important U.S. interests in the region.

I suspect that a more active U.S. role in trying to resolve the Western Sahara conflict would inevitably be seen as partisan and thus antagonize one or another of the major parties. Each would probably misperceive the U.S. as siding with its adversary; we would bear the burden if failure occurs. Algeria would urge us to use our leverage over Hassan to get him to the negotiating table and to make substantive concessions. It is not in our interest to lean on a friend like Morocco to make compromises with a potential enemy like the Polisario. Hassan would expect us to support his position, which would only strain our relationship with Algeria. The conditions simply do not exist for successful U.S. mediation.

We should continue to emphasize our bilateral relationships with Morocco and Algeria and subordinate settlement of what is essentially a regional dispute to our larger strategic objectives in the region. The U.S. should not play a more active role in the negotiating process until the Moroccans and Algerians are closer to finding their *own* solution—and

then only if both parties request direct U.S. participation. At present, neither Algeria nor Morocco is interested in a settlement except on terms unacceptable to the other. We should therefore maintain our present policy of encouraging Morocco and Algeria to resume their high-level dialogue in search of a negotiated settlement.

Arms Sales

Our first priority in our military programs in North Africa should be to help meet Morocco's security needs. Algeria's advantages in the quantity and quality of military equipment give it clear military superiority over Morocco. Moroccan forces are inadequate to defend the country from a large-scale Algerian offensive due to severe logistic shortfalls in maintenance, spare parts, fuel, and munitions. Morocco depends on U.S. assistance to maintain the operational effectiveness of its armed forces. And, unlike Algeria, Rabat does not have its own resources to finance its force requirements.

In contrast, Algeria is in the middle of a major force expansion and modernization program based upon the acquisition of large quantities of front-line Soviet equipment. Its requirement for U.S. military assistance is limited to the upgrading of Soviet-origin weapons and the acquisition of advanced technology to modernize existing equipment. Algeria's interest in developing an extensive military supply relationship with us is limited at best. Algeria will not, however, take any steps in the shortrun to jeopardize its military supply relationship with the Soviets—a dependency which provides Moscow with a large degree of leverage over Algerian policies.

Our fundamental strategic interests in North Africa are to keep the Strait of Gibraltar under pro-Western control, to preserve a regional balance of power between Morocco and Algeria, and to ensure the continuation of a moderate, pro-Western regime in Morocco. These interests require, in my view, favored treatment for Morocco on issues where Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict, rather than a balanced or even-handed approach. This does not mean that we should forgo the threat of a U.S. "tilt" toward Algeria as a means of exerting leverage over Hassan. But this threat is more effective if it is not carried out.

Clearly, we must avoid placing ourselves in situations where both Morocco and Algeria expect us to solve their problems with the other. At this early stage in our evolving relationship with Algeria, the best way to proceed is to expand cooperation with Algeria in areas that do not pose a threat to Morocco and where we have a competitive advantage over the Soviet Union. The most promising areas for such U.S. assistance are technology transfer to modernize Algerian industry and agriculture, greater contacts in the scientific, cultural, and educational fields, the upgrade of Algeria's Soviet-made equipment, and training programs for Algerian military personnel.

58. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 27, 1985

Libya-Tunisia: What are Qadhafi's Intentions**Summary**

The Libyan expulsion of Tunisian workers—26,000 so far this month—threatens Tunis with its most serious domestic crisis since the January 1984 bread riots.² Qadhafi probably is using the expulsion in part to cover the infiltration of Libyan trained Tunisian dissidents.³ We believe he will use the dissidents to help destabilize Tunisia and influence the Presidential succession when Bourguiba dies. The return of large numbers of workers will ripen the climate for destabilization by adding to an already record pool of urban unemployed. Even while Bourguiba is alive, Qadhafi probably will try to intimidate Tunis into a more pro-Libyan posture, perhaps using terrorist attacks or a small-scale military demonstration near the border. Tunisian fears of a Libyan invasion, however, are unwarranted for the present. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We believe that Tunisia has exaggerated the threat of an imminent Libyan invasion, but its fears of Libyan-sponsored destabilization are well founded. A key unknown involves the extent to which Libya's accelerated two-year effort to build a subversive network has succeeded in developing assets in the Tunisian armed forces. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-87-0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern Analysis, based on information received as of August 27.

² See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 329.

³ See footnote 2, Document 312.

59. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McNeil) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead¹

Washington, August 30, 1985

SUBJECT

Morocco and Algeria: Sources of Tension—Chances of Change

You discussed with Mort the fact that Morocco was in part motivated in its Libyan union by a desire to check Algeria and Algerian aid to the Polisario.² We have looked at the Moroccan-Algerian relationship to examine the prospects of a cooling of tensions in the Sahara dispute and an improvement in overall relations between Morocco and Algeria. A thorough analysis is attached,³ summarized by this memorandum.

○ *The Border.* Before the French relinquished their protectorate over Morocco in the mid-1950's, they readjusted the border in Algeria's favor. In 1962, the Moroccans wanted redress from newly independent Algeria. In its absence, a border war ensued in 1963. The Moroccan parliament has never ratified a subsequent treaty fixing the common boundary.

○ *The Saharan War.* Algeria provides most of the weapons and funding for the Polisario guerrillas seeking to wrest control of the Sahara from Morocco. The Moroccans view the conflict as a military engagement with Algeria by proxy. The Algerians may well regard their support for the Polisario as an element in containing the "expansionist" Moroccans.

○ *Economic and Social Disparities.* Morocco has a traditional social structure, a mixed economy with a broad private sector, and a varied press. Algeria stands in marked contrast. After independence, Algeria became a leftist-oriented state in which the government controlled both the economy and the press. Despite some preliminary moves toward reform, Algeria remains a one-party socialist state, uncomfortable with Western pluralism.

○ *Prospects for Reducing the Tensions.* Morocco and Algeria have kept their rivalry within bounds for 20 years, but the fundamental

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, August 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Otto on August 23; approved by Richard Clarke (INR). Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: "8/30."

² No record of the Abramowitz-Whitehead discussion has been found.

³ The undated paper, entitled "Longstanding Differences Between Morocco and Algeria," is attached but not printed.

differences between the two could be difficult to resolve. Some benefits to the US in North Africa may derive from the enduring Moroccan-Algerian friction, so long as it does not get out of hand. We might sharpen our assessments of the potential for a major confrontation through exchanges with the Spanish and French, whose long association with the region gives them considerable insight.

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 12, 1985, 1515Z

8285. Military addresses handle as Specat Exclusive. Department please pass to HQ EUCOM Vaihingen GE for Polad. USCINCEUR for Polad. DIA for the Director. Subject: Tunisia's Confrontation With Libya After Oujda. Ref: Algiers 4737.²

1. S/Exdis—Entire text.

2. Summary. In light of comments of Tunisian Ambassador in Algiers on Tunisian-Algerian planning vis-a-vis Qadhafi (reftel), Embassy will be alert to and report on any indications here. Tunisia finds itself increasingly isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb, while remaining weak militarily and vulnerable to Libyan actions. At the same time, many Tunisians remain suspicious of Algerian motives, while recognizing need for Algerian support and goodwill. GOA/GOT coordination has seen an upsurge, and we do not exclude planning for clandestine options against Qadhafi, should this ever be deemed opportune in light of Libya's own capabilities against Tunisia. Introduction of Egypt into the equation, an eventuality unclear at this writing, could change the situation significantly. End summary.

3. Reftel reports conversation in Algiers between US A/DCM and well plugged-in but clearly uninstructed Tunisian Ambassador Hached. Latter left inference of active Algero-Tunisian planning for conflict with

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850648-0637. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat Exclusive. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 4737 from Algiers, September 11, the Embassy reported that Hached said Tunisia and Algeria "were now coordinating their military strategy toward Libya, that they would like to 'make an end of the Qadhafi problem now' and urged the U.S. to support this effort. Hached characterized Algerian assurances of military support as a blank check of which the Tunisian Government feels fully confident." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850644-0872)

Libya and removal of Qadhafi. We will, of course, be alert for indications here that bear on this inference and will report our findings.

4. Meanwhile, it will not have escaped Department's notice that the Tuniso-Libyan rupture, following the Oujda Accord and the apparent failure of Moroccan mediation (the Guedira/Filali mission) has left Tunisia more than ever isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb—a marriage of unequals. However that may work itself out,³ Tunisia's traditional political recourse in an "open" Maghreb, viz., the uses of the Moroccan and Libyan relationships to counterpoise Algeria, is badly constrained for now—and the ramifications of this bear watching. Seen from here, the situation thus created could open the GOT to a reexamination of its distant relationship with Cairo as well as further efforts in the direction of Rabat.

5. Within this framework lie realities which must in any case be taken into account in evaluating Hached's assertions. First, on the military side, Tunisia remains immensely vulnerable and quite incapable of major offensive military operations (as opposed to raids or clandestine paramilitary actions). Second, politically, suspicion of Algeria's ultimate motives remains widespread here, cohabiting uneasily with the recognition—equally pervasive—that Algerian support and goodwill are more than ever important to Tunisia's ability to resist Libyan threats. Finally, and we, of course, defer to Algiers on substance at this point, we assume Tunisians calculate that bulk of Algiers military capabilities likely to remain deployed against Morocco, whatever happens here.

6. This said, there has been an upsurge in GOA/GOT coordination: political, military and economic and we can safely assume that contingency plans for meeting various forms of possible aggression are being discussed. We would speculate, moreover, that thought is also being given to clandestine options against Qadhafi. While there are many, here, who would welcome a successful American preemptive initiative, vis-a-vis Qadhafi, it seems reasonable to assume, in the light of our often expressed posture of restraint, that the governments in Tunis and Algiers do not really expect us to take such an initiative, although they might well hope for some form of U.S. support should they choose to do so.

7. In summary, then, Tunisia is more exposed to Algerian pressure than heretofore and is trying to adapt while harboring traditional concerns lest the relationship become too burdensome. Notwithstanding greater coordination between Tunis and Algiers, we do not see Tunisia

³ In telegram 8006 from Rabat, August 27, the Embassy reported: "King Hassan has offered his good offices in a bid to relax current tensions between Tunisia and Libya" which included visits by Filali and Guedira to Tunis and Tripoli. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850608–0255)

prepared for offensive military action of scope. This said, we think Tunis would seek to respond to localized Libyan military initiatives, should they materialize—preferably in some form of coordination with its friends, Algeria prominently included. Finally, we do not exclude planning here for clandestine action against Qadhafi should this ever be deemed opportune in the light of Libya's own capabilities against Tunisia. It has come to our attention that Tunisian military planning includes retaliation for commando-type operation. Algerian support would be essential in case of escalation. These thoughts have focussed mainly on Tunisian-Algerian cooperation. If, as some indications suggest, an Egyptian role is to be considered, the equation could change significantly.⁴ This factor remains unclear at this writing.

Sebastian

⁴In telegram 287750 to Tunis, September 19, the Department noted that on September 13, Ben Yahia had told Whitehead "this crisis has brought about a fundamental change in Tunis' policy towards Libya—from 'crisis management to crisis prevention.' GOT's former 'open door' policies have given way to a much firmer position. The GOT has concluded that even the economic benefits from Tunisians working in Libya are more than offset by the long term risks from 'brainwashing' to which they are subjected in Libya. Accordingly, the GOT has decided to call on Tunisians to depart Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850664-0919)

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State and Multiple Recipients¹

Tunis, September 27, 1985, 1216Z

8860. Subject: Tunisia Breaks Relations With Libya. Ref: Tunis 8845 (Notal).²

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Summary. GOT for the first time ever has broken relations with Libya, following nearly two months of steadily deteriorating relations. Blatant terrorist acts traced to the Libyan Embassy proved to be the catalyst.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850689-0183. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Priority to the Arab League Collective, London, Paris, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 8845 from Tunis, September 26, the Embassy reported that both AFP "and local Embassy sources confirm report of letter bomb explosion in down-town Tunis this morning," the second such report in 2 days. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850686-0249)

Expected mediation efforts may succeed in reducing tensions, but relations between the two will not return to normal for the foreseeable future. The GOT, breaking with its posture of recent weeks, has chosen to accentuate the support it enjoys from the U.S. in the latest stage. End summary.

3. The GOT announced evening of September 26 its decision to break relations with Libya. An item in the official news agency TAP cited “Libya’s policy of aggression and permanent hostility towards Tunisia which aims at threatening its accomplishments, its security and the stability of its institutions.” It [went] on to cite the crisis launched by Libya in August with the expulsion of Tunisian workers and the subsequent deterioration in relations due to Libyan acts including subversion, hostile press campaigns, explicit threats to employ force, and repeated violations of Tunisian airspace.³ It said the GOT had “irrefutable” proof of Libyan use of its diplomatic presence to foster terrorism, espionage and subversion.⁴ It noted the most recent incident involving the dispatch of letter bombs to Tunisian press figures by Libyan diplomats.

4. This is the first time relations between the two states, sporadically troubled since Qadhafi’s accession to power in 1969, have been formally cut. At this writing, Tripoli has yet to react, although it issued unconvincing denials of complicity in the letter bombs. The latest chapter in the deterioration of relations in fact began early this year and may well, as many Tunisians believe, have reflected a decision by Qadhafi to turn the pressure on after Bourguiba’s late 1984 illness. Whatever, pressures against the workers by way of limiting their remittances were instituted. In March a clandestine radio station began broadcasting encouragement to Tunisians (and to a lesser extent other Maghreb peoples) to kill people of the Jewish faith among their population. This promoted a scene in which a furious President Bourguiba dismissed Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki from his office, prompting further threats from Qadhafi. Meanwhile, Qadhafi’s media had been railing against Arab Chiefs of State (e.g. Mubarak, Hussein, Bendjedid) who were “humiliating” the Arab world by rendering homage in Washington. Subsequently, the Bourguiba visit was announced. The final phase in this downward trend in relations was, as the GOT statement noted, the expulsion of workers in early Aug

³ See Document 58.

⁴ In a September 26 information memorandum to Shultz, Abramowitz wrote: “There are currently no new signs Libya intends to launch a conventional ground attack on Tunisia, and we continue to believe an outright invasion is unlikely. However, Libya could easily bomb targets throughout the country, or launch a variety of terrorist or unconventional operations, with little warning. Should Libya nonetheless stage a major ground attack, it would bog down after initial gains—because of Libyan deficiencies. Before Libya could do much Algeria, not Egypt, would likely act.” (Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, September 1985)

the blatant actions of Qadhafi this week actually left the GOT little choice but to break relations.

5. Throughout the summer, but particularly since the expulsions began, Qadhafi has shown unusual sensitivity to perceived insults against him in the Tunisian press. Indeed, the Tunisian press has become more strident since early September, when major gestures of support by the Algerians and Iraqis seemed to mark a watershed in Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's traditional tendency to temporize with the Libyans. Mzali and the GOT rather effectively used the tensions to rally the country. In doing so they were not above pushing recalcitrant trade unions into submission. Meanwhile, there is no question that the Tunisian press became more personally insulting to Qadhafi, on one occasion in recent days terming him a "bloodstained madman."

6. It is unclear where things go from here. We would expect any number of mediation efforts to be launched in coming days. The regional propensity to be able to kiss and make up is legend. But even if some sort of reconciliation is achieved steps have been taken which will not permit things to go back where they were anytime soon. There are probably only 15,000 or so Tunisians still in Libya. They are, to be sure, potential hostages, but most probably have deeper roots than those that have left, just as the 10,000 or so Libyan passport holders in Tunisia have deep roots here. Short of an unlikely all-out military move, Qadhafi has the Omdurman option or, more likely, the possibility of carrying out more terrorist incidents. Some gimmickry such as a repeat of his previous "green marches" on the Egyptian frontier area are also possible. Whatever hostile actions he takes will continue to have negative effect on the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian people already disenchanted with his acts to date. Even those who have criticized Mzali's exploitation of the crisis are now silent. Thus, his hopes of creating internal problems for the regime have, at least for the short term, backfired.

7. The U.S. has for the moment been thrust into the prominent role as Tunisia's supporter. Pictures of the Ambassador calling on President Bourguiba September 26, coupled with his reiteration of U.S. support to the local press and replays of the State Department spokesman's September 26 remarks, were prominently featured on TV and the local Arabic and French press. This contrasts with desire to downplay U.S. in public demonstrated up to now, and GOT preference to be seen as relying in the first instance on Arab brothers. The Prime Minister's trip to Algiers this weekend will take us out of the limelight somewhat, but the GOT appears to have decided that, at its lowest point to date in its relations with Libya, it wants its big friend seen up front.

Sebastian

62. Interagency Intelligence Assessment¹

IIA 85–10006

Washington, October 10, 1985

MOROCCAN-LIBYAN UNION: ONE YEAR LATER

SUMMARY

The year-old Moroccan-Libyan union was a product of pragmatic considerations on the part of two Arab leaders who continue to have divergent long-term interests in North Africa. Both partners have achieved what they perceive as useful benefits from the union, although the costs so far have been far greater for Moroccan King Hassan. We see nothing on the horizon to suggest an early end to the union.

Hassan claims the union is a means to eliminate Tripoli's support to the Polisario Front. More importantly, it should be seen as a strategic challenge to Algeria, and as an attempt to ease Morocco's pressing economic and social problems that had sparked riots in January 1984.² Libyan leader Qadhafi views the partnership as a major coup in his efforts to enhance his international standing, isolate Algeria, and in turn to counter US attempts to isolate him. He also hopes to use Morocco as a conduit to obtain restricted US equipment and spare parts, particularly for Libyan aircraft.

Hassan's benefits so far have been primarily economic. Since the union, he has received around \$150 million in aid from Qadhafi as well as a growing, but still small, market for Moroccan agricultural exports and jobs for Moroccan workers. These gestures, however, have fallen far short of making the union the great economic panacea touted by Hassan at the time the agreement was signed.

The benefits to Qadhafi have been several, and have entailed little cost. Morocco is no longer a center of Libyan dissident activity and Hassan has toned down considerably his comments on Libyan subversion in Sudan and Chad. Algeria has been strategically challenged. Morocco is less supportive of moderate Arab efforts related to the peace process. Moreover, Moroccan goods have helped ease a crippling shortage in Libya of essential consumer goods that has prompted

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (10/01/1985). Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Information available as of October 9 was used in its preparation.

² See Document 222.

unprecedented criticism of Qadhafi's policies. Nonetheless, increased Algerian animosity may ultimately prove to be the biggest drawback to Qadhafi.

The union's drawbacks have been almost exclusively borne by Hassan. He has suffered a public and nettlesome setback in his relations with Washington and has exacerbated an already deteriorating situation with neighboring Algeria. [2 lines not declassified] Moreover the union has strengthened Algerian determination to challenge Morocco, and Algiers has successfully widened diplomatic recognition for the Polisario during the past year.

On balance, we believe that Morocco would be the more likely of the two to end the pact. Hassan might allow the treaty to atrophy if Qadhafi does not continue to provide sizable amounts of economic aid, particularly if the opposition tries to develop Libyan assistance into a major political issue. The King might even break openly with Libya if Qadhafi insisted on closer military cooperation or on Rabat's adopting a more anti-US and anti-Israeli stand. Hassan almost certainly would denounce the union if Moroccan security uncovered clear evidence of Libyan-sponsored threats to his regime or if Qadhafi resumed supplying the Polisario. If Rabat did abrogate the pact, Qadhafi would turn sharply on Hassan, and seek to overthrow him.

Hassan wants to maintain close relations with the United States, but fears Washington will take more significant punitive action against him. Of particular concern would be a large cut in US economic and military assistance; he is already sensitive to slights in protocol to himself and senior Moroccan officials. If Moroccan-US relations were to severely deteriorate, Hassan could terminate the joint military access agreement and US use of [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities in Morocco, despite the strategic and financial costs such a step would entail.

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, December 18, 1985, 1622Z

11620. Subject: FonMin on Libyan-Algerian Contacts, Tunisian-Libyan Relations. Ref. A) Tunis 11215,² B) Tunis 11500,³ C) Tunis 11578⁴ (all Notal).

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. Ambassador took occasion of session with GOT FonMin Caid Essebsi December 18 to discuss state of Tunisian relations with Libya and Algeria, in light of FonMin's one-day visit to Algiers December 17 where he met with Algerian President and FonMin. Discussions with Algerians focussed on Algerian-Libyan rapprochement and possible Qadhafi visit to Algeria. GOT raised standard concerns over Libyan intentions. While Caid Essebsi indicated understanding of "pressures" on Algeria to improve its relations with Libya (including possibly inviting Qadhafi to visit) he stressed Tunisia's intent not to resume diplomatic relations with Tripoli, unless Libya proved willing to compensate Tunisia for losses caused by expulsions. Caid Essebsi thought Algeria's new interest in Libyan relations stemmed primarily from "Moroccan decision to opt for a military solution in the Sahara." All in all, GOT seems increasingly worried about pace and tenor of recent Libyan-Algerian contacts. One response to Qadhafi's much publicized African tour has been to dispatch Deputy FonMin Mahmoud Mestiri to several African countries in effort to keep Tunisian-African relations on track. End summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850907–0347. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Accra, Algiers, Cairo, Moscow, Ouagadougou, Paris, Rabat, Warsaw, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 11215 from Tunis, December 6, the Embassy reported: "It is too early to be certain, but Tunisia's friends—especially Algeria—may be nudging Tunisia towards a slightly less confrontational posture vis-à-vis Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850877–0368)

³ In telegram 11500 from Tunis, December 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisia Press Agency had announced that "Essebsi was received by President Bourguiba on the morning of December 16" and that he "will travel to Algeria December 17 as Special Envoy of President Bourguiba to President Bendjedid." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850902–0269)

⁴ In telegram 11578 from Tunis, December 18, the Embassy reported that Mzali, whom the Department, before the Libyan crisis, had "seen as one of the more conciliatory elements in the GOT vis-à-vis Libya," had "seized on the crisis" in September and "set the GOT tone of never letting relations 'go back' to where they were before." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850906–0712)

3. FonMin Beji Caid Essebsi received Ambassador Dec 18, the morning after FonMin's return from quick visit to Algiers. PolCouns accompanied Ambassador.

4. Ambassador said he would appreciate having the Minister's impressions of his visit to Algiers of the previous day. He said we had also had some exchanges with the Algerians and were aware of Bendjedid's decision to receive Qadhafi eventually. We had exchanged points of view on the region. The Algerians said they posed conditions for the meeting but had no confidence in Qadhafi's assurances. We had stressed our concerns over Qadhafi's intentions in the region, especially as concerned Tunisia and we had urged Algeria to continue its support. We had also voiced our concerns over possible Libyan mischief vis-a-vis Egypt, Sudan and Chad.

5. Caid Essebsi noted he had just spoken to Bendjedid the previous day. The Algerians were under a lot of pressure—from Qadhafi and "others"—to receive the Libyan leaders. It appeared the Soviets had talked to Qadhafi in Moscow about Tunisia and Algeria, reminding them of their concerns for stability (sic) and disapproving of Libyan pressure on Tunisia. One of the purposes of MFA SecState Mahmoud Mestiri's current trip to Moscow (Tunis 11395),⁵ Caid Essebsi said, was to get readout on what Soviets had said to Qadhafi.

6. GOT understood, Caid Essebsi said, that Libyans had sent a high-level delegation to Bendjedid and had urged him to see Qadhafi. Bendjedid had at first refused. But when Algerian FonMin Ibrahimi came he said Algerians had reversed themselves. Caid Essebsi had told Bendjedid yesterday that Algeria is of course sovereign. He noted that Algiers, unlike Tunis, still had relations with Libya. But Tunisia wanted things to be clear. There was no hope of resumption of relations by Tunis with Tripoli. Tunisia would not exclude a possible eventual resumption of normal ties if there were compensation by Libya for costs Tunisia had to assume due to Libya's expulsions of Tunisian workers. But in future Libya must stay out of Tunisia's affairs and renounce such actions and allow Tunisia to live side-by-side (read: passively) with Libya.

7. Caid Essebsi said he told Bendjedid Algeria's receiving Qadhafi would help get latter out of his isolation. Algeria, after all, was not

⁵ In telegram 11395 from Tunis, December 12, the Embassy reported that on December 11, the Tunisian Official News Agency (TAP), "carried an item citing 'official source' which announced that MFA SecState Mahmoud Mestiri would be 'transmitting an oral message to Soviet leaders.' The message, TAP continued, would express gratitude for Soviet assistance following the Israeli raid, as well as touch on other questions of mutual interest." The Embassy commented: "The unusually suggestive GOT/TAP announcement of the Mestiri visit leads one to conclude that the Tunisians are doing a little siren act on the Soviets, at least in part for our benefit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850893-0610) For more on the Israeli October 1 raid on the PLO's headquarters in Tunis, see Documents 331-334.

Burkina Faso. Others would now see receiving him as less of a stigma. Who knows, he might even visit Egypt next since Mubarak had inexplicably offered to receive him. In any case, Tunisia was different and would not accommodate Qadhafi.

8. Bendjedid had told FonMin he had no confidence in Qadhafi either. He noted Qadhafi would not be received in Algiers but at an unspecified location elsewhere. But, Caid Essebsi sighed, Algeria was concerned about the Sahara war and worried that Morocco had opted for a military solution, so it had to try to manage Qadhafi a little.

9. Caid Essebsi mentioned that Mestiri would be making stops in Burkina Faso and Ghana on his way back from Moscow as a follow-up to the earlier mediation meeting those countries had undertaken to lessen tensions between Libya and Tunisia. The GOT does not seem to have taken these efforts very seriously, but based on Caid Essebsi's comments and other impressions we have gotten from the MFA the GOT is anxious to maintain its own relations in Africa, especially after Qadhafi's recent trip there.

10. Comment: The Tunisian concern reflected over Algerian-Libyan contacts has not been relieved since on Dec. 4 meeting with Caid Essebsi. If anything, it has been heightened.

Sebastian

64. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M 86-20005

Washington, January 10, 1986

North Africa: The Power Equation

Summary

The two major alliances of North Africa are undergoing internal strains which could lead to a shift in the balance of power in the Maghreb. Morocco's King Hassan and Libyan leader Qadhafi are increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation of their union; longstanding differences among Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania have prevented their loose pact from taking root. We do not anticipate a dissolution of the current

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, North Africa. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Analysis, based on information received as of January 10.

groupings in the near term, but friction, if unchecked, could lead the countries to realign their foreign policies. Tentative signs are that change in the alliances would involve rapprochement between Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties between Morocco² and Tunisia. We believe Algeria and Libya are the most likely countries to benefit from any major changes, while Morocco and Tunisia would be more isolated and vulnerable. Overall, the balance of power in the Maghreb would not change appreciably, unless in the unlikely event that Algeria and Libya form some sort of an alliance. Such shifts in the region would provide opportunities for Moscow to expand its influence and produce mixed results for Washington. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

² In the left margin an unknown hand drew a line bracketing "realign their foreign policies. Tentative signs are that change in the alliances would involve rapprochement between Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties between Morocco and Tunisia."

65. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Breaking the Moroccan/Libyan Accord (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S/NF) Recent events, including indication of Libyan involvement in the Rome/Vienna airport bombings,² appear to have further strained the delicate Moroccan-Libyan Union. Several Moroccan government

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-88-0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; NoFORN. Sent through Iklé. Drafted by Charles (ISA/NESA). A stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: "SECDEF HAS SEEN JAN 24 1985." Taft also initialed the memorandum.

² Reference is to the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985-January 1989. The United States believed that Qadhafi supported the suspected mastermind of the attack, Abu Nidal. See also footnote 2, Document 156.

officials (GOM) have vigorously criticized Qadhafi for his support for terrorist groups, as well as for his position on rapprochement with Algeria. King Hassan has commented privately that he believes Qadhafi's support for terrorism will lead to his undoing.³ These incidents may have given us an opening for weaning Morocco away from its Libyan union.

(S/NF) US/Moroccan relations are valued highly for both strategic and political reasons. It is a country with which we have shared a "special relationship" for 199 years, even if strained recently by the Oujda Accord. The United States benefits directly from Morocco's agreement [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and host to a major VOA relay station. In the longer term, it will serve US interests for Morocco to be strong enough to balance revolutionary Algeria in the Maghreb. A radical or pro-Soviet state at the western approaches to the Mediterranean would weaken our geo-strategic posture. These considerations argue strongly for some tolerance on our part toward the Union for now, but also for our taking appropriate action whenever possible to sever the Libyan tie.

(S/NF) Despite recent embarrassments by Qadhafi, King Hassan still sees value in the Union as a means to both preclude Libyan support to the Polisario and to divert Algerian forces to the Libyan border. There also are some modest economic benefits accruing to Morocco as a result of the Union, but these are not substantial. There are good indications that King Hassan would dissolve the Union openly if renewed Libyan support for the Polisario or other Libyan actions against Moroccan interests could be proven publicly.

(S/NF) King Hassan continues to have the highest regard for his US connection, and for what he believes is his close rapport with President Reagan. He also realizes that the distance between Rabat and Washington since the Oudja Accords has grown significantly, as evidenced by his inability to be guaranteed a meeting with the President when he planned to visit the US last year, and by our declining economic and security assistance program.

(S/NF) POSSIBLE INCENTIVES TO WEAN MOROCCO FROM LIBYA: We need to send a positive, unequivocal signal of US support for Morocco,⁴ one that assures the King it is possible to restore our "special's relationship" to its former vigor, and that shows him he has a better alternative than the Accord. Such a message must be political primarily, but must include economic inducements as well.

³ No record of Hassan's comment has been found.

⁴ Armitage wrote five vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to the phrase "We need to send a positive, unequivocal signal of US support for Morocco."

(S/NF) Some specific steps we should consider:

— Given the King's feelings of political isolation, send a Presidential invitation for King Hassan to visit early this year, a visit replete with the pomp and ceremony the King enjoys.⁵

— NSC proposed such a visit, but scheduling has been held up until dates for the next Reagan/Gorbachev meeting are resolved.

— If we delay until later in the year, we could miss the opportunity offered by the latest Libyan debacle;

— Send a US emissary to Morocco. Given his close relationship with the King, we recommend UN Ambassador Dick Walters;⁶

— Selectively expand or redirect our intelligence exchanges to provide explicit proof to the GOM of Libyan support for terrorism and any other evidence of Libyan actions that adversely affect Moroccan interests;

— Readdress the idea of a referendum to resolve the western Sahara problem, offering US assistance in negotiations between Morocco and Algeria, and in the UN;

— While Gramm-Rudman⁷ poses obvious obstacles, consider providing additional concessionary or grant FMS for much desired and much needed equipment, e.g., an advanced US fighter aircraft, armored vehicles and ammunition (US assistance summary at TAB A);⁸

— As an "access" (but not "base rights") country, Morocco should receive a higher level of priority in the security assistance allocation process than it currently does. This may be because the access agreement has received relatively little publicity, which the Moroccans prefer.

— Explore the possibility of doing more for Morocco as part of our transit access and joint exercise agreement by offering to "lease" Moroccan facilities based on existing levels of US usage for transits and exercises, an arrangement similar to the Oman "Operations and Maintenance Agreement".⁹

— Morocco did not request such payments when we concluded the Access Agreement,¹⁰ primarily because they believed

⁵ Armitage made two vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote: "This is important point." Weinberger wrote: "agree" underneath Armitage's comment.

⁶ Weinberger wrote: "OK" in the right-hand margin next to this point.

⁷ Reference is to the Budget Deficit Reduction Act, December 12, 1985, authored by Senators Phil Gramm (R-Texas), Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire), and Ernest Hollings (D-South Carolina), which provided for automatic spending cuts in the federal budget if discretionary funding exceeded budget spending thresholds in a given fiscal year.

⁸ Attached but not printed is an undated information paper entitled "Morocco—Security Assistance Program."

⁹ Not further identified.

¹⁰ See Document 207.

by giving us such privileges, they in turn would receive higher levels of concessionary FMS and grant aid.

— In view of impending Gramm-Rudman cuts to their overall O & M budgets, we expect the military services will oppose this idea strongly as, you may recall, they did the Oman O & M payments. If you support this idea, and if Morocco shows interest in receiving such remittances, you most likely will have to direct the Services to make these payments.

(S/NF) If you believe these ideas should be pursued further, we could include the subject as a topic for your next breakfast meeting with George Shultz and John Poindexter, or prepare a memorandum for you to send to them.

Richard L. Armitage¹¹

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)*

Breakfast topic: _____¹²

Prepare a memo: _____¹³

Other: _____

¹¹ Armitage signed “VR/Rich” above this typed signature. Below it he wrote: “Mr. Secretary, A visit to the White House would do more than all the other items combined—Rich.”

¹² Weinberger wrote: “OK” next to “Breakfast topic.”

¹³ Weinberger drew a line from “Prepare a memo” and wrote: “Brief talking points.”

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 30, 1986, 1508Z

510. Subject: Qadhafi Message to U.S.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: I met for an hour with President Bendjedid Jan. 30 at his request to discuss a variety of regional issues, most significant

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate, Nodis.

of which was his Jan. 28 meeting with Qadhafi.² After expressing condolences on Challenger explosion,³ Bendjedid described commitments made by Qadhafi on regional issues. He also passed on message from Qadhafi dealing with latter's reputed desire for decreased tensions and willingness to deal with Soviet presence in Libya and terrorism. End summary.

3. Bendjedid traced history of difficult relations Algeria has had with Qadhafi but noted that Algeria had as a geopolitical imperative to maintain friendly relations with the Libyan people. As a result, he said, Algeria took a nuanced position on Libya—standing up to Libyan transgressions such as in Tunisia while maintaining friendly “official” relations to prevent the mobilization of Libyan public opinion against Algeria. In this context, Bendjedid said, he had met with Qadhafi after having stalled the meeting for over three months and having rebuffed dozens of pointed requests.

4. Bendjedid found Qadhafi agitated and troubled by current events—he expressed a strong desire to rebuild the bilateral relationship with Algeria. Bendjedid said he had told Qadhafi that there were a number of preconditions to an improved relationship, all of which Qadhafi said he would agree to. Qadhafi had even offered to sign a protocol listing the preconditions in detail, an offer which Bendjedid had rejected, saying that Libyan promises were meaningless—only actions counted. I asked Bendjedid about those preconditions. He said they related to Tunisian security and Libyan conduct. I asked if Qadhafi's support for Ben Bella had not been discussed. Bendjedid said he had raised it and that Qadhafi has promised that this support was a thing of the past and would not be continued.

5. On Tunisia, Bendjedid said Qadhafi had expressed shock that Algeria had sided with Tunisia against Libya. Bendjedid had said that the merits of the case left no choice. Libya was the aggressor party, Tunisia the victim. He warned Qadhafi that Algeria would stand by Tunisia in every possible way should it be confronted by Libya. Qadhafi expressed hope for normalized relations with Tunisia. (In response to my query, Bendjedid said contacts between Tunisia and Libya had already begun through the two countries' Ambassadors in Paris and would likely increase soon.) Algeria was undertaking to provide a

² In telegram 497 from Algiers, January 29, the Embassy noted that “Algerian media gave GOA version of January 28 Bendjedid-Qadhafi meeting, indicating Algerians gained some ground in putting distance between Morocco and Libya on the Western Sahara. While Algeria reaffirmed its support for Libyans' territorial integrity, the U.S. was not condemned.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860073–0223)

³ Reference is to the January 28 explosion of the U.S. space shuttle *Challenger*. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues I.

list to Qadhafi of the assets of Tunisians which had been left behind by expelled workers. Qadhafi had promised to review such a list to arrange satisfactory settlement.

6. I asked if Bendjedid had pressed Qadhafi on terrorism. He said he had and was told by Qadhafi that although he strongly supported the Palestinian cause he had not been involved in any way in the recent events in Rome and Vienna.⁴ Bendjedid said he had gone over with Qadhafi the terrible damage done to the Palestinian cause by such incidents.

7. Discussion of terrorism provided Bendjedid with opportunity to get to the point of our meeting. Bendjedid said Qadhafi was preoccupied by the deterioration of his relations with the U.S. Despite his opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East, Qadhafi did not want his relationship with the U.S. to deteriorate to the point that he would have to subordinate himself to the Soviets in order to buy a measure of protection. Qadhafi had said that Soviets had been after him for a long time to grant basing rights and that he had always resisted this “infringement” on Libyan sovereignty. Qadhafi said that U.S. fleet actions and menacing acts could leave him no choice but to capitulate to Soviet demands.⁵ Qadhafi had expressed great dismay over such a prospect. (Bendjedid noted in passing that such a development would also be viewed by Algeria as a direct challenge to its interests given fact that Qadhafi would sooner or later leave the scene but Soviets, once based in Libya, would be difficult to extract.)

8. Qadhafi had said that he wanted to see if the U.S. would be prepared to lower the tensions and work to establish better relations. He asked specifically if Bendjedid would pass on his concerns and offer to the U.S. Ambassador. Bendjedid said he had agreed to act as a message-carrier only. He said he told Qadhafi he was sure the U.S. would want to know what they would get in return. Qadhafi had said that, aside from Soviet role and potential pressure, he knew that U.S. had certain other concerns (a clear reference to terrorism, Bendjedid noted) and that he was prepared to deal with these as well. Bendjedid said there were no more specifics.

9. Dropping his role as message-carrier, Bendjedid observed that Algeria wanted reduced regional tension—it did not want a Soviet base in Libya or the U.S. fleet engaged permanently off the North African coast and was therefore prepared to play any role the U.S. might find useful in relaying messages. He said he was always skeptical of what Qadhafi said—he had known him a long time—and would never

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 65.

⁵ Documentation on U.S. naval actions is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

guarantee the sincerity of Qadhafi's commitments. But, Libya's problems were acute enough to cause even Qadhafi to seek a better way to do business and therefore, Bendjedid said, there might be something useful which could be accomplished—based on deeds, not words. He thought the U.S. should give it a serious look, particularly given the lack of serious alternatives for dealing with Libya. On this issue, Bendjedid noted that although Qadhafi faced internal dissent and economic problems that might someday bring him down, the fact was that no external opposition leader appeared to have the necessary internal connections or abilities to get the job done. Bendjedid thought that when Qadhafi disappeared it would be from internal opposition, not from anything stimulated by exile groups. In the meantime, Bendjedid implied somewhat circuitously, the U.S. might best show some flexibility and not allow Qadhafi to exploit U.S. rhetoric and menacing acts to rally Libyan opinion. Bendjedid thought that Qadhafi commitments obtained Jan. 28 with regard to Tunisia and Ben Bella and, by implication, regional stability, would give Algeria some leverage to contain Libyan activities. I expressed great skepticism, which he accepted. I promised to be back in touch with him with our views.

10. Comment: From Algerian perspective, Qadhafi meeting looks like a substantial success. By stalling meeting date, Algerians were able to prevent element of surprise which Qadhafi has used to his advantage elsewhere. Remote desert location of meeting allowed Algerians to control media coverage and prevent any possibility of pro-Qadhafi demonstrations. On substance, Algerians obtained concessions (however hypothetical) on Tunisia, support for Ben Bella, and on the Western Sahara, in the latter case, thereby throwing something of a monkey wrench into the Morocco-Libya relationship. In return, they allowed Qadhafi his much-solicited meeting and agreed to transmit his message to the U.S. I doubt they expect us to snap up the Qadhafi offer and do not believe it makes much difference to U.S.-Algerian relations whether or not we respond negatively. The remaining question, as yet unanswered, is whether Qadhafi-Bendjedid meeting will lead to cooling of Algeria's relationship with various Libyan exile leaders. For the time being, Algerians are likely to take wait-and-see attitude and, given Algerian skepticism over anything Qadhafi says, not discard any options for dealing with the Libya problem. I will have the further opportunity to explore this issue with the President's Secretary General (Belkheir) on Saturday.⁶

Johnstone

⁶February 1.

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, April 10, 1986, 0314Z

110910. For Ambassador From Under Secretary Armacost. Subject: Reply to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 2912.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Basic message relayed to Ambassador Nassif by MinInt Basri (reftel) also sent via Director Casey.³ In latter case Hassan asked that President and Secretary Shultz be assured that “The message of solidarity sent today was the minimum that should be done. It was at the same time the maximum. King Hassan II.”

3. You should respond orally to both messages (your choice as to interlocutor but no need to do so directly with the King) using following points:

— I have been directed to convey USG views of King’s message to Qadhafi, as explained to me by MinInt Basri and also relayed to President and Secretary Shultz “by the hand of Mr. Casey.”

— USG cannot accept that Moroccan message of strong support for Qadhafi was “the minimum that should be done.”

— On the contrary, USG notes that some Arab governments did not take public positions; others took courageous course of entering reservations to Arab League resolution on this topic.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Ussery, Teicher, Pearson, Tracy, and McKinley; approved by Armacost.

² In telegram 2912 from Rabat, March 25, Nassif reported: “Acting through Interior Minister Basri, King Hassan has given us advance notice and explanation of what he considers an ‘absolute minimum’ message of support he plans to send to Qadhafi in the context of ongoing Gulf of Sidra incidents. The message, which contains no reference to the U.S., has passages on ‘solidarity’ and Libyan ‘patriots’ and ‘victims.’ It appears to be the minimum which Hassan, as Chairman of the Arab League, Islamic Conference, and Jerusalem Committee considers necessary to avoid outright rupture with Qadhafi and attendant risk of Libyan reinvolvement in the Western Sahara. I pointed out to Basri probable adverse Washington reaction to such a message.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860230–0333) Documentation on the Gulf of Sidra incidents is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

³ Reference is to a March 26 memorandum from Rixse to Shultz and Poindexter. (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject Files, Morocco 1986)

⁴ In telegram 3594 from Rabat, April 11, Nassif reported that he had met with Filali on April 10 and that Filali stated that “Morocco is ‘caught in the middle’ in the present confrontation between the U.S. and Libya. Morocco still has a union with Libya. Although there is little substance to the arrangement. The Libyans, for their part, were not pleased with the King’s message to Qadhafi and wanted more.” Nassif commented: “Despite these protestations, Filali clearly understood, and appeared to expect negative USG reaction to the message, which I believe he will convey to King Hassan.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis)

— USG cannot understand nor accept Moroccan “total solidarity” with Libya which attacked U.S. military units operating in international waters. Such a Moroccan posture can only encourage Qadhafi to continue to pursue his various illegal activities. It is USG’s hope that GOM will reconsider its position.

Shultz

68. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M 86–20054

Washington, April 15, 1986

Outlook for a Maghreb Summit [*portion marking not declassified*]

Summary

A possible meeting in May between Algerian President Bendjedid and Moroccan King Hassan could be the forerunner of a greater Maghreb summit in the coming months. Since the beginning of the year, the five states of North Africa—Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya—have talked increasingly about a “Greater Arab Maghreb” and the necessity for a regional summit to discuss the concept. Leaders in these countries always have paid lip service to Maghreb unity, but meetings between them of late suggest that the prospects for such a forum are better than usual. The impetus appears to be coming primarily from President Bendjedid of Algeria who met with Qadhafi in late January² and reportedly plans to meet soon with King Hassan. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Uncertainties about the stability of alliances in the region are the driving force behind these contacts, rather than pan-Arab or altruistic desires for cooperation. Private agendas would dominate any summit. The Western Sahara problem would be the principal focus of any meeting attended by both Algeria and Morocco. The animosities between the states preclude any comprehensive and lasting political settlement. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, North Africa. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Analysis, based on information received as of April 15.

² See Document 66.

69. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 17, 1986

SUBJECT

Moroccan Delegation Meets With Qadhafi

Ambassador Nassif met today with Moroccan Minister of Health Tayeb Ben Sheikh. Ben Sheikh, Deputy Prime Minister Laraki and President of the Moroccan Parliament Othman travelled to Tripoli April 16. During their seven hour stay, they had a 15–20 minute meeting with Qadhafi.

— Meeting took place at Qadhafi's "office" in the Azizziya compound. Qadhafi was completely uninjured and calm, although obviously shocked by the attack.²

— Qadhafi alleged that his 15 month old adopted daughter killed and two sons *moderately* injured in the attack. GOM delegation did not ascertain where Qadhafi had been at time of attack.

— Qadhafi's home severely damaged but not completely destroyed. Windows in "office" blown out, but not much other damage in Azizziya compound apparent to Moroccans.

— Meeting with Qadhafi took place before his TV appearance (which apparently done from Tripoli). Meeting with Moroccans shown on Tripoli TV.

— Several other Libyans present at meeting, but Ben Sheikh claims not to have been able to identify them (presumably he could have identified figures such as Jalloud).

— Atmosphere was of "state of war", expecting further U.S. attacks. Moroccans judge that Libyan public rallying to "underdog" Qadhafi.

— During stay, GOM given *restricted*, guided tour. Saw damage to French embassy, said nearby "private residences" completely destroyed. Discounted that there was any damage to Libyan intelligence headquarters.

¹Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1 January 1984–21 January 1989 Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents: Lot 92D52, ES Sensitive April 1–30, 1986. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Usery and Rand Beers (LTF). A copy was sent to INR. Raphel sent the memorandum in his capacity as Chairman of the Libya Task Force. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Later that day, Platt, under a covering memorandum, forwarded a summary of the memorandum to Poindexter. (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject Files, Morocco 1986)

²Reference is to the April 15 U.S. air raid on Libya. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For the Moroccan reaction to the raid, see footnote 3, Document 256.

— No estimate, feel for numbers of personal casualties (although Nassif speculates that Ben Sheikh may have been included in delegation to extend offer of medical assistance if appropriate.)

— Ben Sheikh did not credit reports of fighting in Tripoli yesterday, felt that firing was manifestation of general nervousness, state of alert. He stressed that his observations based on *very limited exposure*.

— Ben Sheikh refused to comment on substance of discussions with Qadhafi, but delegation presumably relayed message from Hassan to Qadhafi and may have brought back a reply.

70. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 12, 1986, 1624Z

5833. Subject: June 11 Audience With King Hassan: Dealing With Libya. Ref: State 183331.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary. During a June 11 audience with King Hassan at the Royal Palace in Skhirat, which focused almost entirely on the King's upcoming trip to the United States, I emphasized to Hassan that Washington saw U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya as the centerpiece of discussions. I observed that talks on that subject would set the tone for all other discussions during the visit. Hassan said he understood the importance the U.S. placed on the issue, commenting that he too had many grievances against the Libyan leader who, he emphasized, could turn on Morocco at almost any time. He noted, however, that such cooperation was so sensitive as to require very restricted discussion, since mere mention of the subject heightened the external security threat against Morocco. I told Hassan the U.S. understood

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject Files, Morocco 1986. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: "Save—Have Elaine Morton come & read this—thanks." Below this note, Morton initialed the telegram.

² In telegram 183331 to Rabat, June 11, the Department transmitted talking points to Nassif in preparation for his impending meeting with Hassan, which read in part: "termination of the Moroccan/Libyan union is one of the primary objectives of my mission." The Department instructed Nassif to emphasize that "real progress on the Libyan issue during your Washington visit will be critical to the success of your visit and will color the discussions on all other issues." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006-0285)

the security concerns and would be ready to discuss ways in which to cooperate to meet the threat during the visit. Other subjects reported septels.³ End summary.

3. I met for an hour with King Hassan at the Royal Palace in Skhirat on June 12. The meeting was at my request, and focused on Hassan's upcoming trip to Washington. Hassan was accompanied by Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and FonMin Abdellatif Filali.

4. I opened discussion by making points in reftel and noting to Hassan the importance Washington placed on the Libyan issue in the discussions to be held in the course of his visit. Advising Hassan that I would speak with the candor that has characterized our previous discussions, I said that Washington intended for U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya to be the centerpiece of the talks, and that the progress in these exchanges would in large part determine the success of the rest of the visit. I told Hassan that Washington wanted to see an end to the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, and sought to cooperate with Morocco in opposing Libyan support of terrorism around the world and of subversion against its African neighbors.

5. Hassan at first appeared somewhat taken aback by this direct presentation. He observed that, between chiefs of state, any subject was open to discussion. He understood the importance the U.S. places on the Libyan issue. Warming to the subject, he acknowledged that it was in Morocco's interest as well to discuss the Libyan issue during the visit. He agreed that Libya is a major supporter of international terrorism and seeks to destabilize African neighbors. He added with vigor that Libya had been at the origin of the Sahara problem, as a result of its support for creation of the Polisario guerrilla movement. Noting that the Oujda Accord with Libya had been designed to "neutralize Qadhafi, not just to isolate him," Hassan observed that Qadhafi is so volatile that he could turn on Morocco at any time. He repeated that he was ready to fully discuss the Libyan issue.

6. Hassan then noted that he had one concern about any discussion of bilateral cooperation against Libya: that the discussions be handled with an absolute maximum of discretion. He said it would be necessary that any meeting which discussed the subject might be restricted to a very small group of advisers on either side. "You have your methods of dealing with Qadhafi," he remarked, "and I have mine." He continued that "there are certain subjects of conversation between Chiefs of State that should be discussed 'off the record'." He said that, for example,

³ In telegram 5837 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that he raised the issue of Hassan meeting with Peres. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006-0329) In telegram 5845 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that Hassan "offered a lengthy aside on animosity between Algeria and Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006-0701)

he would have no problem if the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and myself were to participate in this discussion, but emphasized that the group of advisers should be kept small.⁴

7. Hassan explained that Libya, along with Algeria, represented the greatest threat to Morocco. He said that, while he feared no internal threat and was confident that his great-great-grandchildren would continue to occupy the throne in Morocco, he was not confident about external threats, over which he had so little control. It was for that reason that he felt it so important that attendance at any meeting to discuss cooperation against Libya be tightly controlled.

8. I assured Hassan that we would be prepared to consult in advance with him on who would attend the meetings from each side. Reiterating what I have told him in the past, I said that I had made termination of the Moroccan-Libyan relationship a priority goal, but added that Washington understood his concerns over a security threat from Libya should that goal be achieved. I told him that we would be prepared to explore with him in Washington ways to meet an increased Libyan threat resulting from U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya.

9. Comment: Hassan's response to my presentation on Libya did not appear to have been thought out in advance. It was more of a visceral reaction to an unexpected statement of intent.⁵ He was, however, quick to point out that he would face a real threat of Libyan subversion the day he terminated the tenuous union he now has with Qadhafi. Senior Moroccan security officials have often told us of the active Libyan efforts currently underway to put a network of Libyan activists in place for the day the Oujda Accord collapses, and described the enormity of their task in taking effective countermeasures. Hassan did not discuss during our June 11 meeting what exactly he would expect from the U.S. in exchange for terminating the relationship with Libya, nevertheless I suspect he will move cautiously before he takes any such step, carefully weighing the costs and benefits to Morocco. I am confident also that the June 11 audience has left him with no illusions about the importance we will give the Libyan question during the visit to Washington, and what we expect from him. We will need to give careful consideration to increased security

⁴ Morton drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin bracketing the last sentence in this paragraph.

⁵ In telegram 6312 from Rabat, June 26, the Embassy reported "King Hassan's meeting with the President is a major opportunity to advance our objectives of ending Morocco's union with Libya. In reality the agreement is moribund. Hassan prefers a languishing relationship to a public breach. He fears renewed military assistance to the Polisario, concerted action with Algeria, and potential subversion within Morocco by Qadhafi." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis) Hassan ultimately canceled his visit to the United States, scheduled for July, in favor of a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres. See Document 259.

threats to Moroccan and Polisario presence in the Western Sahara, if Libya reverted to past practice following a rupture in the union. Should Hassan raise these issues, we should be ready to respond to his concerns, if we expect forward movement from him. Embassy analysis of the current Moroccan-Libyan relationship follows by septel.

Nassif

71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, July 10, 1986, 0238Z

215666. Algiers for Ambassador Johnstone. Subject: Algeria-Libya. Ref: Algiers 3468.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Gloomy analysis in reftel underscores our growing concern about Algerian-Libyan rapprochement. We endorse your proposal to raise this again with ranking GOA officials; we leave the choice and number of interlocutors, as well as the content of each approach, to you.

3. While making our position on Qadhafi clear, you should—at least at this stage in the internal Algerian debate on this subject—avoid conveying the impression that we now judge an Algerian-Libyan union to be an inevitability that would destroy the progress we have in our bilateral relations.³ From the Washington perspective, it would seem likely that an Algerian decision would be conditioned largely by regional considerations and that our ability to dissuade the GOA from

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Algiers 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher; cleared by Zweifel, Andrew Steinfeld (P), Pascoe, Maura Harty (S/S-O), and Ussery; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Priority to Rabat and Tunis.

² In telegram 3468 from Algiers, July 7, the Embassy reported: "There is a troubling drift in Algeria's policy toward Libya. What started out as a tactical ploy by Algeria to 'neutralize' Qadhafi and sow distrust between Libya and Morocco is threatening to turn into a policy with a momentum and a constituency of its own." (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 6999 from Tunis, July 16, the Embassy stated: "At this vantage point, Algero-Libyan union looks like something of a periodically resurfacing trial balloon born of latent conflict between Algiers FLN militants and their allies on one hand and military loyalists and their friends on the other. Key pre-condition to such union, i.e. radicalism ascendant in Algeria remains unmet." The Embassy continued: "this said, any Algero-Libyan 'union' would seem bound to break Oudja alliance, unquestionably an important Algerian goal." (Ibid.)

such a course may thus be limited. Our objective should be to ensure that Algerian leaders understand and take into account our opposition to a union, while at the same time doing nothing to strengthen the hand of those elements who might seek to exploit for their own purposes the sensitivity of Algerians to perceived "threats".

4. Similarly, we should be cautious about overstating a strong negative reaction to a possible Algerian-Libyan union in banking circles. Decisions in the banking community will continue to be based more on judgments about Algerian creditworthiness (reportedly still high) than on any chill in US-Algerian relations that would ensue.

5. Finally, on the Algerian reaction to Hassan's visit (para 9 ref-tel), you should reiterate to your interlocutors that our Libya policy has been made clear repeatedly to virtually all governments with which we have relations. This includes close friends, as well as the Soviets and the Eastern bloc. We have made no secret of our disapproval of the Moroccan-Libyan union and will use the occasion of Hassan's visit to underscore that concern.

Shultz

72. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, July 30, 1986, 1438Z

3942. Eyes Only for NEA Armacost and Murphy only. Subj: Algeria-Libya.

1. Secret entire text.

2. In the past six weeks, the Algeria-Libya relationship has been the subject of intense internal maneuvering within the GOA, leading, it would appear, to a major policy decision by President Bendjedid to largely [1½ lines not declassified].

3. As previously reported (Algiers 3468 Nodis),² internal debate pitted General Belkheir and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, who opposed political rapprochement with Libya, against FLN Party Secretary Messaadia, National Assembly President Rabah Bitat and certain

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, [text not declassified], Algiers, 1986-88. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not declassified].

² See footnote 2, Document 71.

military officers who favored political rapprochement up to and including union with Libya.

4. Debate appears to have been resolved in favor of the anti-Qadhafi group by the President shortly after his return from Brussels. Our first indication of this came in my meeting with Ibrahim on July 17 (Algiers 3722).³ [*3½ lines not declassified*]

5. It now appears that:

(1) Messaadia's planned trip to Libya in July–August has been indefinitely postponed.

(2) [*2 lines not declassified*]

(3) [*5 lines not declassified*]

6. We are, of course, pleased by this favorable turn of events. I think our intensive campaign, both here and in Washington, to convince the Algerians of the damage to U.S.-Algeria relations posed by continued Libya-Algeria rapprochement has been one factor, among others, contributing to the GOA decision. Another possibly more important factor has been the growing sense [*3 lines not declassified*] a successor regime that is even more distasteful.

7. [*1 paragraph (19 lines) not declassified*]

8. We will continue to monitor Algeria's peripatetic relationship with Libya for signs of any further changes of mind. However, for the time being, we are on a roll and should capitalize on it by pressing ahead with our efforts to rid the region of the Qadhafi problem.

Johnstone

³ In telegram 3722 from Algiers, July 18, Johnstone reported: "I had a long, 'relaxed, general policy review of the regional situation' with Foreign Minister Ibrahim July 17 at his request. Ibrahim used meeting to express concern over Tunisia, provide categorical assurances on Algerian policy toward Libya, and to urge a discreet U.S. role on the Western Sahara." Johnstone indicated that Ibrahim "said that, despite what the Libyans might be saying, Algeria would under no circumstances accept political union with just Libya. The only union Algeria would accept was a union that included Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860552–0711)

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, August 29, 1986, 2305Z

8659. White House for NSC. Subject: King Hassan's Decision to Break Union With Libya. Refs: (A) Kirby-Zweifel August 29 Telecon² (B) Rabat 8658.³

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. As reported ref A, Hassan announced in a televised address tonight, August 29, that he has broken Oujda Accord because Qadhafi, in his August 27 communique with Syria's Assad, had accused Hassan of "treason" in meeting Shimon Peres last month.

3. While Morocco-Libya relations had deteriorated badly since the Hassan-Peres meeting, as recently as Tuesday night⁴ Hassan had been determined to do nothing to provoke Qadhafi so as to leave the onus on the latter for any rupture that might occur (ref B). The Qadhafi-Assad communiqué thus seems clearly to have pushed Hassan over the edge,⁵ and he doubtless wanted to get in his licks before the always unpredictable Qadhafi had a further opportunity to snipe at Hassan in his expected September 1 address.

4. While it is speculation on the Embassy's part at this stage, we think another factor weighing in Hassan's decision to break was probably his desire to further improve relations with Washington in advance of a U.S. visit which he still presumably hopes to make at some early stage to discuss, *inter alia*, Morocco's need for economic and military assistance. Regardless of what Washington's current intentions may be, many senior palace and GOM officials believe there is a better than

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860661-0613. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to DOD, the White House, Algiers, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, and Cairo.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 8658 from Rabat, August 29, the Embassy reported that Hassan would be giving a national television address that evening. "Several informed Moroccans," the Embassy noted, "think that the speech will somehow touch on Libya," including an announcement that Morocco would withdraw from the Oudja Accords. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860660-0905)

⁴ August 26. Hassan and Peres met on July 21. See Document 259.

⁵ In telegram 5179 from Damascus, August 29, the Embassy reported: "Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's unexpected visit to Libya August 24 and 25 has been played here as an unqualified success. Asad was able to demonstrate solidarity with Qadhafi at a moment of apparent 'threat,' thus making up for what the Libyans had considered lukewarm support at the time of the April bombing and keeping a promise reportedly made to Qadhafi at that time. Asad was able to elicit from the Libyans a forceful condemnation of the Hassan-Peres meeting." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860659-0741)

even chance that the U.S. will take another hard crack at Qadhafi in the days or weeks just ahead. Hassan may well have calculated that if Oujda was about to be scrapped by one side or the other anyway, and if Washington and Libya were about to clash, Morocco could gain more points with Washington by breaking Oujda before rather than after the clash.⁶ Hassan may also have reasoned that even in terms of his relations with the Arab world, it would be easier for him to abandon Qadhafi before rather than after such an American strike.

Kirby

⁶ Reagan wrote Hassan on September 3 to thank him for breaking the Oudja Accords. See Document 260.

74. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA 86–10037

Washington, September 1986

THE MAGHREB: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL STABILITY

Key Judgments

The serious and deepening social and economic problems in North African—high unemployment, overcrowded cities, and a growing food deficit—are undermining the foundations of political stability in the region. Rapid population growth is a major factor in these problems, and the situation will worsen as the population in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia jumps from 53 million today to a projected 84 million in the year 2000. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The rapid population growth is destabilizing because it is eroding the old land-based, family-oriented, traditional Islamic society of the Maghreb faster than governments in the area have been able to promote development of economically advanced, urban-based societies. The traditional rural economy cannot absorb the population increase, and, as a result, the cities are drowning in an excess of youthful jobseekers.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Information available as of September 11 was used in the memorandum's preparation.

Rapidly expanding public education systems try to inculcate the skills and habits of thought needed to adapt to modern society, but all too often they only broaden horizons and whet ambitions faster than the job market can grow to satisfy them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

As these developments have gathered momentum, increasingly large numbers of people—especially the younger generation—have become alienated from their societies. Some of these socially and intellectually uprooted individuals have started to turn their backs on modernization and reject along with it the United States and other Western countries that they see as principal agents of change. This impulse has been the driving force behind the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist revival in the Maghreb. Other individuals are discontented that their governments are not doing more to promote change, and this group—substantially smaller than the fundamentalists—is the recruiting ground for radical leftists. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Political protest is not yet a major force, but it almost certainly will become so as social and economic conditions deteriorate in the region. Political leaders who fail to accommodate either leftist or fundamentalist aspirations almost certainly will be forced to use more repressive measures to shore up their authority. Leaders who lean too far toward either fundamentalism or leftist radicalism, however, will probably stir up opposition from the other quarter. Moreover, fundamentalism and leftist radicalism imply different political blueprints, and the underlying conflict between them suggests that politics in the Maghreb will become increasingly turbulent. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Maghreb leaders are aware of the dangers that rapid population growth poses to long-term political stability, and they have begun to deal constructively with some of the principal causes and consequences of the problem. In Morocco, family planning is slowly gaining acceptance, especially in the cities and among the better educated. Algeria recognizes the need for family planning, though a national program is still in the initial stages of implementation. Tunisia already has made limited gains in controlling population growth through government-sponsored family planning programs. In spite of these efforts, progress in population control is likely to remain limited in North Africa for some years to come. Inadequate education is a fundamental obstacle, and governments will proceed cautiously in order to avoid offending traditional values. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The strong possibility that rapid population growth will continue and could contribute to increased political instability and anti-US sentiment is of particular concern because of the region's strategic location. Political leaders in the region are well aware of the Maghreb's strategic importance. We anticipate that Morocco, Tunisia, and possibly Algeria will try to exploit that fact by pressing Washington for financial assistance as they struggle with the economic and political consequences of

rapid urban growth. Maghreb governments almost certainly will view Washington's response to their requests for assistance as a measure of US commitment to their needs and—in the case of Morocco and Tunisia—as an indication of US reliability as an ally. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is a map and the body of the memorandum.]

75. Memorandum From James Stark of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, September 12, 1986

SUBJECT

Discussions in Tunisia and Algeria

From September 1–7, I accompanied Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage to Tunisia and Algeria for bilateral political-military discussions. Also participating were LtGen Phil Gast (DSAA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Pelletreau (OSD/ISA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Dave Zweifel (State/NEA) and RADM Tony Less (JCS/J–5) together with representatives from each Service and EUCOM. This memorandum reviews the highlights of those meetings.

Tunisia

The meetings were hosted by Defense Minister Baly and included short private meetings for Armitage with President Bourguiba² and Prime Minister Sfar.³ Armitage reported that conversations with Sfar were more substantive than previous meetings with Mzali, and that Sfar was an impressive interlocutor, dynamic, and articulate.

The meetings went very well. It was obvious that Bourguiba had given directions that U.S.-Tunisian security relations were to be expanded. As a result, agreements were reached on many minor issues and discussions of security assistance for Tunisia centered around a realistic request list.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, Algeria. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Teicher, Ross, Morton, Saunders, and Bohn.

² For the Armitage-Bourguiba discussion, see footnote 3, Document 345.

³ Telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, contains a record of the Armitage-Sfar meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677–0376)

The most important event of the meetings was close-hold Tunisian agreement to commence joint contingency planning. I suspect this decision was due to the success of the April raid on Tripoli, the continuing threat from Libya, and Tunisia's hope that closer cooperation with the U.S. will free up additional economic and security assistance. As a first step, Admiral Less and the Tunisian Army Chief of Staff (General Baraket) met to discuss a draft TOR.⁴ Subsequent meetings will be held and will include EUCOM representatives.

Financially, Tunisia is very worried about the pressures of declining revenues and cuts in U.S. security assistance. In this area, Tunisia has three goals:

- It assumes FY87 security assistance will remain at FY86 levels. The U.S. delegation noted that this would be unlikely. Expect Ambassador Ben Yahia to lobby Congress for an earmark.

- Tunisia raised a possible rescheduling of its FY87 FMS loan principle. We promised to look into this, but noted that this could cause legal and downstream financial problems. They should not expect a positive answer.

- Tunisia wants to reduce the "exorbitant" interest rates on prior FMS loans, which currently run 11–14 percent. This issue is currently being actively worked by NSC, State, DoD, and Treasury. We hope to have some positive answers by the end of September.

While the very ambitious "Bourguiba list" of desired U.S. arms remains Tunisia's goal, the GOT tabled a new, more realistic, list headed by Stinger, anti-mortar radar, and surveillance aircraft. Its total cost would be \$325 million.

Finally, Tunisia expressed interest in receiving counterterrorism training for its army. Armitage noted that such training was not conducted solely by the U.S. Army, and that we would have to have further discussions at the policy level.

Algeria

The meetings with Algeria were hosted by Ministry of Defense Secretary General Cheloufi.⁵ The discussions covered military sales and cooperation, as well as regional political issues.⁶ Embassy officers commented that the high turnout of top Algerian officers was unique and illustrated Algeria's commitment at the highest level to expanding its relations with the U.S.

⁴ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁵ In telegram 4521 from Algiers, September 8, the Embassy reported on Armitage's discussions about military issues with the Algerians. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860680–0680)

⁶ In telegram 4529 from Algiers, September 9, the Embassy reported on Armitage's discussions about political issues with the Algerians. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860683–0479)

Armitage stressed that the U.S. wished to improve and deepen its security cooperation with Algeria, but only at a pace with which both countries would be comfortable. The U.S. is not interested in short-term gains, but rather in a satisfactory long-term relationship. As we expand training, sales, and other contacts with Algeria, we should expect relations to improve.

Cheloufi, while stressing Algeria's independence and non-alignment, also emphasized its desire to diversify weapons sources. Privately, he also acknowledged that the earlier emphasis on a socialist model together with its single product (hydrocarbon) economy was causing problems. Algeria's leaders want to relax the strict socialism, making Algeria attractive to Western investment in order to diversify their economic base.

The Algerians were totally ignorant of FMS regulations. General Gast explained U.S. procedures in some detail. The Algerians proposed, and we agreed, to set up a joint military working group to handle questions about military sales, training, and equipment. After much last minute maneuvering, we signed agreements on a GSOMIA and IMET which had been under negotiation for almost a year. The Algerians also informed us that, in accordance with their sales agreement, the Soviets had said *nyet* to any Bear Spares⁷ program for the Algerian MIG-21s.

Political discussions centered on Libya and Morocco. Both sides openly discussed areas of disagreement.

— Algeria concurred on the nature of the Libyan threat, but disagreed with the U.S. decision to bomb Tripoli. Their approach is to open contacts with political and military circles in Libya and try to moderate Qadhafi's behavior. Privately, they recommended action which would "eliminate the individual" without endangering the Libyan populace. For our part, we explained the rationale behind the April strike and the fact that assassination is not an option for the United States.

— Algeria's only major problem with Morocco is the Western Sahara dispute. They agree that it cannot be resolved militarily and are anxious for substantive political discussions. They will not, however, agree to a meeting if it is solely to buy more time for Hassan. For its part, the U.S. stressed its interest in bringing Algeria and Morocco to a negotiating table, but refused to agree to pressure Hassan into concessions. As a result of the renunciation of the Oujda Accords, the Algerians expect Libya to offer military equipment and financial support to the Polisario, but feel they can control Libya's access and activities. The Algerians stressed that they do not begrudge us our good relations with Morocco and do not expect the Western Sahara question to affect U.S.-Algerian relations.

⁷ Reference is to the U.S. program that provided spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weapons to countries wishing to reduce dependency on Soviet military aid.

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 19, 1987, 1459Z

1856. Subject: Prime Minister Baccouche Discusses Maghreb Issues.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Prime Minister Baccouche said Qadhafi had been on his best behavior during February 5–7 visit to Tunis and appeared willing to allow Tunisia economic benefits from normalization. He did not push for exchange of Ambassadors. While professing readiness to enter Tripartite Accord² if others wished, he readily agreed to Tunisian position that resolution of Western Sahara issue should have priority so that Morocco also could join in a five-state Maghreb. Thus, in Baccouche's judgment the March 19 fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Accord would not witness startling events. Tunisia was exploring how it might helpfully play an intermediary role in the Saharan issue and would welcome U.S. suggestions. End summary.

3. In one hour meeting February 18 PriMin Baccouche briefed Ambassador on Tunisia's relations with Libya and his view of Maghreb developments following recent visits. After reviewing on again, off again background to Qadhafi's February 5–7 visit, Baccouche said Tunisian leadership had not known what to expect from Qadhafi, such as whether he would go on the offensive over reasons which had led to earlier postponements, i.e., Tunisia receiving President Bendjedid first and welcome accorded to visiting French and U.S. Mediterranean fleet commanders. In fact, Qadhafi was on his best behavior while in Tunis, intent on demonstrating his friendship and goodwill. He insisted on treating Ben Ali and Baccouche as "revolutionaries" who had overthrown the hated Bourguiba regime and persistently refused to see continuity of Tunisian policies even when Tunisian leaders had pressed this point. On bilateral economic matters, Qadhafi had been accommodating but very general, leaving the details to be worked out during re-established joint commission sessions which Baccouche thought would take place in late March. Joint commission would include a number of sub-committees on specific issues such as workers, tourism, trade, etc. Tunisia intended to prepare well for this session and seek maximum economic benefits, both in order to provide relief for the hard-pressed south and also, Baccouche implied, in order to recover ground which was being lost to Algeria in exploiting Libyan economic opportunities.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880143–0505. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR.

² See Document 30.

4. In answer to specific questions, Baccouche said that Algeria had supported having the previously agreed Algerian-Libyan gas pipeline pass through Tunisia. This would provide potential energy for Tunisian light industries, as well as western Libyan cities and towns. Minister of Interior Ammar had visited Tripoli Feb. 16 to discuss entry modalities. Ben Ali and Qadhafi had agreed to eliminate visa requirements for each other's citizens as of February 15 but in practice Libya was requiring each Tunisian to have TD200 in hard currency. In the other direction, only twelve Libyans had entered Tunisia thus far, owing to the requirement for a Libyan exit visa, which only proven regime loyalists could obtain. Baccouche did not yet have Ammar's report of his meetings but assured Ambassador that Tunisia had the means and the will to monitor closely all Libyan visitors. The question of naming Ambassadors did not come up during Qadhafi's visit, and Tunisia was in no rush to name an Ambassador to Tripoli. Nevertheless, GOT had identified its current Ambassador to Jordan, said Ben Mustapha el Gharbi, as its likely candidate.

5. Ambassador told Baccouche that Qadhafi's impromptu remarks on Feb. 8³ at Sakiat Sidi Youssef were insulting and unacceptable to the U.S. We knew GOT agreed and did not intend to make an issue of it. Baccouche noted that Qadhafi had gone out of his way to attack all Tunisia's friends and confirmed President Ben Ali's extreme displeasure with Qadhafi's remarks. They had been blacked out in Tunisia. When Ben Ali had taken Qadhafi to task afterward, the Libyan had responded that he was by mentality a revolutionary, not a head of state, and thus could only talk in this way. As for more general impressions of the Libyan leader, Baccouche said, he and Ben Ali thought that Qadhafi was less energetic and aggressive than in the past. Whether the causes were physical or mental, they did not know, but they felt it was harder for Qadhafi to act. In addition, Baccouche said, he estimated that 80–90 percent of the Libyan population was ready for a change of leadership.

6. The Maghreb. Qadhafi had explained to Ben Ali that he was not keen to join the Tripartite Accord and saw no particular value in it, but he would do so if others wished. Tunisia had countered with the necessity of including Morocco in any larger Maghrebian agreement. Qadhafi, said Baccouche, agreed completely that a five-state Maghreb should be the objective rather than a four-state accord. He also agreed that the first step had to be to accelerate a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara. Thus in Baccouche's judgment no startling event would happen on March 19, the fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Accord, as Algeria had hoped. Baccouche added that Qadhafi had told Polisario leader Abdul Azziz during their meeting at Annaba that the Polisario must also work to resolve rather than perpetuate the Western Sahara issue.

7. Baccouche said that Tunisia was examining how it could play a more active intermediary role in the Sahara question. Foreign Minister

³Not further identified.

Mestiri had recently visited Gabon to consult with a senior U.N. official on this issue. Baccouche himself would shortly visit Rabat and Algiers, and President Ben Ali would make an official visit to Algeria on March 2 and 3. The essence of the problem, he said, was to convince King Hassan that he had to help Algeria disengage from the Polisario. A face-saving formula needed to be found. Algeria could not just put 500 or 5,000 Polisario supporters in jail. Baccouche said he would welcome ideas or suggestions from the U.S. regarding how Tunisia might help in this process. He closed by saying Tunisian officials would look forward to discussing this and other subjects with General Walters during his upcoming visit.

Pelletreau

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, March 17, 1987, 1728Z

78524. Subject: Possible Tunisian-Libyan Reconciliation. References: A) Tunis 2615,² B) Tunis 2560,³ C) Tunis 2515.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Embassy should make following reply in response to Prime Minister Sfar's 3/11 briefing on possible Tunisian-Libyan resumption of ties:

— We respect GOT's sovereign right to decide on rapprochement. However, fact that PM broached this subject with us indicates an interest in our reaction.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by O'Neill; cleared by Zweifel, Denis Kiely (PM), Robert Ayling (AF/C), Elen Laipson (S/P), Steinfeld, Robert Downey (S/S-O), Ussery, and Quinn; cleared for information by Jay Bruns (D); approved by Murphy. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 2615 from Tunis, March 13, the Embassy reported: "Reception by Bourguiba of senior Libyan envoy suggests that Libyans have made significant offer to remove outstanding financial differences" incurred after Libya expelled Tunisian workers in 1986. The Embassy continued: "Restoration of diplomatic relations seems a distinct, if necessarily not a near-term possibility. We should not overreact." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870195-0752)

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 2515 from Tunis, March 11, the Embassy reported: "GOT has advised us in confidence of new high-level contacts with Libya, at Libyan initiative. Bourguiba may receive Libyan envoy tomorrow. Senior GOT officials insist that Tunisia will stick to its demands for restitution on various outstanding claims, but that restoration of diplomatic relations, while not in the cards anytime soon, cannot be excluded eventually." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870191-0770)

— USG is concerned that GOT action will diminish pressure on Qadhafi, particularly unwelcome at a time when Libya is engaged in aggression against Chad.

— We share PM Sfar’s analysis that threat to Tunisia from Qadhafi continues and is of serious concern.

— Nonetheless, we are pleased that GOT still intends to proceed with military contingency planning; this is our intention as well.

— We will be especially sensitive to implications of this new GOT-Libyan relationship relevant to this planning, which is premised in large part on threat from Qadhafi.

— We noted well PM Sfar’s assertion that normalization of relations will be contingent on a resolution of all remaining outstanding issues—including that of training camps inside Libya.

— We strongly urge the GOT to maintain this position.

Shultz

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, May 28, 1987, 1205Z

5213. For Secretary, Armacost and NEA Asst Secy Murphy. Department please pass to White House for Vice President and NSC-Carlucci, DOD for Secretary and Armitage. Subject: May 27 Meeting With Foreign Minister: Algeria-Morocco Relations and King Hassan’s U.S. Visit.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary:

— King Hassan sent Foreign Minister to Algeria May 25 for a secret meeting with President Bendjedid. He carried a message urging reconciliation and putting forth a proposal to begin direct discussions on all outstanding issues.

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder 19874-017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In the right-hand margin, Gregg wrote: “This is very helpful.” Underneath this notation, Bush wrote: “agree GB 6-2.”

² Bush circled “Morocco” in the subject line.

— Filali, on King's instructions, also asked that Hassan's U.S. visit take place during last quarter of 1987 since his stay in Great Britain will preclude a July meeting. End summary.

3. I was invited to the home of the Foreign Minister Wednesday evening, May 27. He explained to me that no one else, including members of the government, were aware that he had been sent by King Hassan to Algeria Monday, May 25, carrying a personal message to President Bendjedid that it was time for Morocco and Algeria to resolve their differences directly. The Foreign Minister equated it to the U.S./Soviet relationship: "Regardless of your differences, you meet regularly to resolve them." King Hassan made a proposal to establish two commissions. A foreign affairs commission headed by the respective Foreign Ministers would concern itself with diplomatic relations and the war in the Sahara. A second commission headed by the Interior Ministers would discuss trade, commerce, and open borders. The Foreign Minister found the Algerian President very receptive to this overture. Bendjedid's counterproposal was to establish one commission headed by the respective Foreign Ministers but with the authority to discuss all issues. Filali agreed.

4. Filali then met separately with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, whom he described as "apparently" supportive of the initiative. Ibrahimi spent quite a bit of time discussing Algeria's concerns about Tunisian stability and rising fundamentalism. It was Filali's view that Ibrahimi was more concerned with fundamentalism in Algeria, a popular theme in Morocco.³ Filali believed that it was Algeria's genuine concern in this regard that was changing their thinking with regard to relations with Morocco.

5. Ibrahimi had then discussed the danger that Iran posed. He suggested that Iran was aiming at Syria and Lebanon after Iraq, followed by Egypt and others. Filali explained that in the Iranian definition of the "Islamic Republic of Iran" the "nation" was not confined to the territory of Iran.

6. The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the future of the Maghreb depended upon improved Moroccan/Algerian relations. (Filali commented to me that the 1983 treaty of fraternity and concord between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania was a meaningless document.) They agreed to meet again next Monday, June 1, at the nonaligned Mediterranean Foreign Ministers' conference in Brioni, Yugoslavia to discuss their respective ideas and agenda items. In the meantime, each side would work to come up with proposals of its own. Ibrahimi had also explained to Filali that Algeria's prior proposal to settle the

³ Bush drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence.

Saharan dispute was merely a framework for opening discussion. In principle, Algeria was prepared to open the border with Morocco but the two sides needed to discuss the question of visas.

7. I congratulated the King and Foreign Minister on their initiative and effort to continue the momentum begun at the May 4 summit meeting near Oujda.⁴ I asked how the U.S. could assist and Filali expressed King Hassan's desire for us to encourage those elements in Algeria who support reconciliation. He specifically mentioned the Algerian Secretary General of Defense who would be visiting the Pentagon in July, implying that he would be a good person to talk with. He also asked us to push this line through our Embassy in Algeria. I assured him we always had and would continue to do so.

8. I inquired whether the King's initiative had anything to do with the recent prisoner exchange.⁵ Filali denied any connection between the two and offered that the first the GOM had heard about Algeria's willingness to make the exchange was last week. It had come up in discussions between the Saudis and the Algerian Prime Minister who was in Saudi Arabia for other reasons. The Saudis then contacted the Moroccans, who agreed.

9. I told the Foreign Minister that I would report this news and that of course we fully supported the spirit of cooperation that was emerging from the summit meeting.

10. The Minister then asked if the King could visit the U.S. during the second half of October, November or December. The visit to Great Britain was going to be extended and he would not be able to come in July. I mentioned that those dates were not now being filled by additional visits, given the possibility of a Reagan/Gorbachev summit this fall.⁶ He said he understood but hoped some time during the last quarter of 1987 could be found. He added that after Ramadan and his daughter's wedding in Marrakech June 5–8, King Hassan would like to meet with me. Filali's meeting with Ibrahimi in Yugoslavia would have occurred and hopefully there would be other things to discuss.

⁴In telegram 4354 from Rabat, May 5, the Embassy reported on the Hassan-Bendjedid Summit, which resulted from Saudi King Fahd's mediation efforts. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870345–0097)

⁵In telegram 5124 from Rabat, May 26, the Embassy reported that Red Crescent officials had brokered the exchange of Algerian prisoners captured in 1976 by Moroccan authorities in the Western Sahara and Moroccans likely captured by Polisario forces in 1984 and held by Algeria. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870404–0730)

⁶Reference is to the Washington Summit December 7–10, during which Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 105–115.

He expressed a desire and need to keep in close touch with us on the progress of the talks.

11. Comment:

While I have never been sanguine about the possibility of significant progress in the Algerian/Moroccan dispute, including the Western Sahara, I must say I saw a new attitude developing. There appeared to be a desire and hope that the time is right for improved relations. Both sides have made significant gestures—Algeria, by its agreement to meet at the summit level with Morocco without preconditions and their apparent initiative to move the prisoner exchange question forward; Morocco, by the Foreign Minister's mission to Algeria to put forward a suggested framework for continuing the dialogue. Each side will be looking to us to urge the other party along toward compromise. While we should certainly continue to do so, the problem is still best resolved in a bilateral and Arab context with the U.S. pushing it from behind rather than from the middle.

12. Department please pass to Embassy Algiers and Tunis.

Nassif

79. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, July 24, 1987

SUBJECT

North Africa: Shifting Sands

SUMMARY: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity among the North African states presents both opportunities and risks for our current policies in the region. We are encouraged by Moroccan and Algerian efforts at rapprochement and settlement of the western Sahara problem: we should look for ways to support and strengthen this trend. At the same time, Libyan moves to better its relations with Algeria and

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, July 1987. Secret. Drafted on July 21 by Laipson. Solomon signed "Dick" next to his name in the "from" line.

Tunisia—to date received favorably in Algiers, warily in Tunis—pose a possible challenge to our Libya policy. This memo examines the recent developments in the region and considers their implications for U.S. policy. *END SUMMARY.*

The Maghreb: Between Rivalry and Rapprochement

Underlying most regional activity in North Africa are two fundamental drives: one is the historic geostrategic rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, which keeps them locked in a *pas de deux* aimed at preventing the other from establishing regional hegemony; the second is the continued quest of all the regional states for greater cooperation and integration. The entire post-independence period has been characterized by both the competition between Morocco and Algeria (the Sahara war can be seen as a by-product of this competition) and the search for integration, for Maghreb unity.

In the past, most integration efforts have been at the expense of either Morocco or Algeria. The 1983 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, brokered by Algeria, brought it into alliance with Tunisia and Mauritania, leaving Morocco out. Morocco's surprising (and short-lived) union with Libya of 1984, although driven by complex motivations, can be seen in part as a riposte to the 1983 accord.

At first glance, the current situation seems to fall into this pattern. Algeria's qualified support for Libyan inclusion in the 1983 tripartite arrangement has been interpreted as aimed at isolating Morocco. But there is an alternative view: the willingness of Algeria and Morocco to work towards a new bilateral relationship is more significant than the probably passing reintegration of Libya into the regional system. The fact that the Algerians are working on both fronts at once is promising: their overtures to Libya should not be read as leaving Morocco out of any serious measures to promote regional economic and political cooperation.

Morocco and Algeria: Beginning of a New Era?

Since the Saudi-brokered May 4 summit between King Hassan and President Bendjedid,² follow-up has included:

— May 25 prisoner exchange involving over 200 prisoners,³ the first exchange in over a decade;

— June visit by a U.N. delegation during which Morocco and Polisario agreed in principle to receive a U.N. technical team to prepare

² See footnote 4, Document 78.

³ See footnote 5, Document 78.

for holding a referendum, and subsequent meetings under U.N. auspices in Geneva;⁴

— July 11 public visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Morocco.⁵

Progress in settling the Saharan war is the keystone to improved Moroccan-Algerian relations, and both sides are showing some flexibility in moving the process forward. Most significant is Morocco's reversal of its previous position, now arguing that Algeria is not a direct party to the conflict—allowing eventual direct public contacts with the Polisario and offering the Algerians a face-saving out. In addition, Morocco now embraces more actively the long-standing plan for a U.N. supervised referendum in the territory. Algeria, at the May 4 summit and subsequent secret meetings, has hinted at deals that would provide nominal satisfaction to Polisario and non-aligned aspirations while recognizing Moroccan strategic control of the territory.

While a quick breakthrough on the war may be unlikely—due primarily to pressures within the Algerian and Polisario camps and to recent Polisario successes in breaching the Moroccan berm—Morocco and Algeria are also thinking about other bilateral issues, and this could sustain the momentum in this fragile rapprochement process. There are powerful incentives on both sides to improve trade and economic relations. A natural complementarity exists: trade of Moroccan agricultural products for Algerian oil and gas would be welcomed. Other border problems need to be worked out.

Where Does Qadhafi Fit In?

Libya has only a tenuous claim to membership in the Maghreb club. Its location and different colonial experience, coupled with the peculiarities of its current government, have historically made it a marginal player in Greater Maghreb schemes. Yet Libya has found a role as spoiler, and the regional players have been willing to expand the Greater Maghreb concept.

⁴In telegram 5993 from Rabat, June 22, the Embassy reported that during a June 20 conversation, Filali informed the DCM that "the talks had gone well and that Morocco had given the green light for a UN technical team visit to the Sahara. Filali said in fact the discussions had gone so smoothly that 'you could have written the script.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870494-0109) See also footnote 2, Document 451.

⁵In telegram 4177 from Algiers, July 15, Johnstone reported that he had met with Sahnoun, who reported on Ibrahimi's meeting with Hassan. According to Johnstone, Sahnoun said that "Ibrahimi had not been able to figure out what to make of Hassan's new positions. Sahnoun pointed with satisfaction to Hussein's 'Times' interview in which Hassan said he would accept a Saharan state if that was the will of the Saharan people, noting that Algeria viewed this as a significant statement. Sahnoun was encouraged by this progress but warned that Hassan is a devious poker player." Sahnoun nevertheless "implied steady movement toward normalization with Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870558-0595)

The Algerians have mixed feelings about Qadhafi. They are sensitive to the potential damage to their own image in being too closely associated with him, claim to recognize his unreliability, and are likely to stand firm on the importance of settling their bilateral border differences. At the moment, Algerian leadership is viewing the cup as half full, not half empty, arguing that closer ties to Libya will have a salutary effect. They are also trying to position themselves for a post-Qadhafi period, and prevent Soviet gains. They have argued to the Tunisians that bringing Qadhafi into the club serves Tunisia's interests:⁶ the price for membership will be settling all outstanding Tunisian financial claims. For their part, the Tunisians remain more openly skeptical of Qadhafi's capacity to change, see his so-called moderation as short-term tactics, but will remain engaged in the process in the interests of recuperating financial assets and jobs.

Considerations for U.S. Policy

The current state of intra-Maghrebi relations, albeit in flux, presents both opportunities and risks. Movement for greater regional economic cooperation and for settling bilateral differences is desirable for U.S. interests.

Morocco/Algeria

— We should look for ways to express publicly our encouragement of Morocco and Algeria in their efforts to improve bilateral relations and to settle the Saharan war. We might consider a major speech on the Maghreb by one of the Department's principal officers, or include the two capitals in a senior official's travel plans over the coming months.

— To complement our own public support, we should urge our European allies, France and Spain in particular, to do likewise. We should track closely the Saudi role. The Saudis, motivated by Arab League concerns, are playing the key broker role. We should consult with them and indicate our support.

— We should continue to indicate our support for the U.N. mandate in working for a settlement. Closer consultations with U.N. officials on the Sahara settlement process would send useful signals to the regional players and bolster the U.N.'s commitment to what is likely to be a long process.

Qadhafi's New North Africa Policy

Qadhafi's efforts to reintegrate himself into the Arab world's western flank pose some problems for us. Our policy of isolating him

⁶ In telegram 4184 from Algiers, July 16, Johnstone reported that he had met with Chaker, who said that "Tunisians now have come to a meeting of minds with Algerians on how to handle Qadhafi, and the two countries are moving together in close cooperation." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870564-0068)

while maintaining good relations with his neighbors is under challenge. We need to consider ways of influencing this current phase of intra-Maghrebi maneuvering, although not with a heavy or visible engagement.

We should consider:

— raising with the Algerians the terrorism implications of admitting Libya to the 1983 pact. This is difficult, since our bilateral dialogue over terrorism is complex and under stress because of recent Abu Nidal developments. But despite our sharp differences with Algeria over Palestinian activities, for the most part, the Algerians share our concerns about Libyan meddling in the region and against western targets.

— encouraging the Tunisians to stay the course: they are playing a useful role in keeping the Algerians mindful of both Qadhafi's fickleness and the importance of keeping Morocco included in regional cooperation efforts.

80. Telegram From the Department of State to IntSum Collective and the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, August 3, 1987, 2238Z

238961. The Maghreb: Handling the Islamic Challenge.

1. (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalism draws from common sources but lacks political unity. Government heavy handedness has made Islam a serious problem in Tunisia; more skilled management has blunted the challenge in Algeria and Morocco. Nonetheless, success in Tunisia as Bourguiba leaves the scene could encourage Islamic radicals throughout the Maghreb.

Iron Fist in Tunisia

2. (S/NF/NC) Long opposed to President Bourguiba's political secularism, Tunisian Islamists are exploiting national drift and fear of repression to expand their following. Tunis has responded with

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870621-0110. Secret; Priority; Noform; Nocontract. Sent for information Priority to the Treasury Department. Drafted by Charles Dunne (INR/NESA); cleared by Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA); approved by Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA). Sent for information to DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC, the Mission in Vienna, CINCUSNAVEUR, USCENTCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, COMSXTHTFLT, USCINCEUR, USIA, the Delegation to the MBFR in Vienna, London, Paris, Rome, DOD/ISA, CINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR for INTAF.

extensive, often heavy handed measures to contain Islamists,² closely watching the military for Islamic sympathies and naming efficient hard-liners to head the key Education and Interior Ministries. Rather than deterring fundamentalism, however, these actions have generated sympathy for the Islamic tendency movement among groups with differing philosophies.

Pragmatism Sidetracks Critics

3. (S/NF/NC) Algeria, a self-declared secular republic since independence, jailed Islamists in the 1960s but has since tried generally more moderate tactics to cope with fundamentalism. Algiers has taken steps to give the impression that Islam plays a major role in national life, recasting its national charter to acknowledge Islam's role in Algerian culture, promoting moderate Islam to counter Iranian or Libyan doctrines, and spending large sums on mosque construction. Algiers has also ordered security services to infiltrate home-grown and foreign-inspired groups, including one linked to ousted former President Ben Bella. It has generally limited strong-arm tactics to rooting out one especially violent sect, leaving the mainstream alone. Some on the Algerian left fear the government is not sufficiently sensitive to the threat, however.

Flying Mohammed's Flag

4. (S/NF/NC) Like Bourguiba, King Hassan originally used Islamists in the 1970s as a foil to the Moroccan left. Now, however, like Algiers, he recognizes the threat and has chosen a more considered approach. Hassan wields his role as "commander of the faithful" (and direct descendant of Mohammed) to defuse Islamic critics. He built a powerful Religious Affairs Ministry to oversee religious grants and train imams, uses his Interior Ministry to monitor religion, and tries to exert central political control over religious education and religious scholars.

5. (S/NF/NC) After a major crackdown in 1985, the Islamic movement either ebbed or went underground. More recently, there are signs of reemergence. This spring 90 Islamists were arrested in northern Morocco (frequently the scene of dissident activities) and two incidents of Islamist activity in the Navy troubled the military, thought free of Islamic influence. Rabat does not think Islamists will soon be strong enough to take on the government. It worries, however, that they could exploit social discontent to make new gains.

² Reference is to the government's crackdown on Tunisian Islamic fundamentalists following the August 2 bombings of tourist hotels in Tunis. See Document 352.

The Soft Sell Works—for Now

6. (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalists in North Africa are not linked to one another, but the socio-economic strains and unemployment prevalent in the Maghreb provide potentially fertile soil for growth. And success by fundamentalists in Tunisia could provide a stimulus now lacking among Moroccan and Algerian Islamists.

Shultz

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, August 21, 1987, 0615Z

260613. Milads handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Tunisian Policy re Rapprochement With Libya and Maghreb Unity. Reference: Tunis 8957.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador took right line on Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement and Maghreb unity in August 12 conversation with Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs Hedi Baccouche (reftel). There follows some additional material which you may want to draw on in future conversations with Baccouche on this subject:

3. Libyan Rapprochement:

— We continue to believe that a normalization of relations with Libya will diminish pressure on Qadhafi at a time when he is faced

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870753-0464, D870680-0214. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, DOD, and USCINCEUR. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Casey, Eastham, Laipson, Long, Sharon Wiener (NEA/AFN), Michael Minton (S/S-O), and Mueller; approved by Ussery.

² In telegram 8957 from Tunis, August 13, the Embassy reported: "Tunisia and Libya are still far apart in their negotiations to settle economic claims and security arrangements, according to Social Affairs Minister Baccouche. Meanwhile, Tunisia is nervous about Algerian-Libyan rapprochement which is perceived to have significant support inside Algeria and possibly Soviet backing. For strategic reasons, Tunisia wants Morocco included in any Maghreb unity scheme, but surprisingly Tunisia's recent envoy to Morocco found King Hassan relaxed about the Libyan-Algerian initiatives. Baccouche was mindful of U.S. reaction to improved ties between Tunisia and Libya. Action requested: further guidance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870739-0302, D870655-0481)

with isolation in GOT, the Arab and African worlds and in a military confrontation with Chad, which is supported by France and the U.S.

— Qadhafi's policies of terrorism and aggression have not ended as is evidenced by Libyan attacks against dissidents, by continued aggression in Chad, and by firm support for Iranian terrorist tactics at a time when Tunisia has broken relations with that state.

— Qadhafi is unreliable and cannot be trusted to keep his promises.

— Past experience teaches that once Qadhafi is confronted, he backs off, reappears docile, only to return to his aggressive ways.

— The problems that exist between Tunisia and Libya were created by Libyan aggressiveness. The USG has responded to the Libyan threat with increased assistance to the GOT including even closer military cooperation

— We trust that GOT will firmly maintain its position that normalization is contingent on adequate compensation for expelled workers, a reduction of Libyan military presence along the border, the closing of dissident integrity and sovereignty.

4. Maghreb Unity:

— We remain opposed to Libyan membership in an expanded tripartite friendship agreement. Such a development would lend a false aura of legitimacy to Libya. We do not anticipate that including Qadhafi in arrangements for a greater Maghreb will diminish his aggressive tendencies.

— We are equally suspicious about schemes that would isolate Morocco. We support Tunisia's efforts to keep King Hassan apprised of proposals for Maghreb unity and urge the GOT to continue its efforts to thwart proposals that would result in Morocco's exclusion from a Maghrebi union.

Whitehead

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 8, 1987, 1743Z

9759. Subject: Morocco, Libya and Maghreb Integration. Refs: (A) Tunis 11365,² (B) Rabat 9655,³ (C) Rabat 9694,⁴ (D) Rabat 9680.⁵

1. (Secret/NoFORN—Entire text)

2. Begin summary:

Embassy Tunis reftel on current U.S. loneliness in arguing for isolation of Qadhafi is consistent with what we hear in Rabat. Part of Qadhafi's attraction derives from the structure of intra-Maghreb competition. This being the case, we are unlikely to have much success in dissuading our friends unless and until progress is achieved in lessening active Algeria-Moroccan conflict. That means ensuring that the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870830-0685. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Nouakchott, Paris, Rome, USCINCEUR, and USUN.

² In telegram 11365 from Tunis, October 7, the Embassy reported that Baccouche "stressed that GOT continued to feel pressure" from both Libya and Algeria "and also its own public opinion to restore diplomatic relations." The Embassy continued: "U.S. appears to be alone in urging Tunisia to resist regional pressures to normalize its relations with Libya and bring Libya into closer association with the Maghreb." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870826-0587)

³ In telegram 9655 from Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported that in a meeting with Cherkaoui, Casey "underscored U.S. opposition to steps which would reduce Qadhafi's isolation and assured Cherkaoui that the U.S. understood unity in the Maghreb could not be achieved without Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870830-0863)

⁴ In telegram 9694 from Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that in a "widely reproduced interview given to a Paris-based Arabic weekly," the Libyan People's Bureau representative in Rabat stated: "(A) it was never intended that the Sahara would constitute a state; (B) early Polisario leaders had foreseen reintegration of the territory with Morocco; and the Polisario must revise its position, which constitutes an obstacle in the path of Arab unity." The Embassy continued that this statement "coincides with recent indications in the Moroccan media of stepped-up Moroccan-Libyan contacts between Qadhafi and the Palace. At the same time the ex-Moroccan representative to the now-defunct African-Arab Union, tells us that he expected no major new developments in Moroccan-Libyan relations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870827-0087)

⁵ In telegram 9680 from Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that on October 6, Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Europe/Americas Director Zine El Abidine Sebti told Casey: "Moroccan del at UNGA was talking up possibility of a consensus resolution in the Fourth Committee" on a Western Saharan referendum. The Embassy continued: "Sebti said GOM was exploring a possible African-drafted text which simply would state membership's support of SYG's referendum initiative and steer clear of polemics." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870827-0225)

UNSYG's effort on the Sahara⁶ in fact moves forward productively. End summary.

3. Morocco appears to be taking in stride recent Libyan-Tunisian and Libyan-Algerian talks about closer relations and the possibility of Libya joining the Maghreb treaty of friendship. As reported ref B, the Moroccans say they are not objecting to Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement, nor, according to the GOM's Intelligence Chief in a conversation of October 8, does Morocco fear recent Algerian-Libyan moves toward union or whatever. While some of this could be bravado, the Moroccans, as shown by the Libyan Peoples Bureau Rep statement of support on the Western Sahara (ref C), are capable of playing off the Libyans against Algeria. In addition, the Tunisians appear to be keeping King Hassan informed of their moves with the Libyans (ref A). A Medi I (Tangier) radio report of 10/8 says Hedi Baccouche already is in Rabat.

4. The point in these moves is that none of the Maghreb powers appears to be willing to take a stand against Libya, each for its own special reasons: Algeria because of its Maghreb/Western Sahara and broader Arab agenda interests, Tunisia because of its special economic/security needs, and Morocco to secure its Western Sahara goals and keep Algeria off balance. In fact, Qadhafi seems to have rediscovered in his need to break out of diplomatic isolation that each of his neighbors have some use for him, quite apart from the fact of his unreliability and unsavory reputation. Internal and regional considerations, thus, appear to outweigh U.S. concerns about Qadhafi's breaking out of diplomatic isolation and gaining diplomatic respectability.

5. What is sorely needed is a better set of U.S. arguments, if we are to have any impact on the question of relations with Qadhafi. Given the individual and regional concerns noted above, our arguments need to have some appeal to the interests of the players involved. In the case of Morocco, so long as there is active conflict with Algeria, there will be interest here in playing off Libya. The now defunct Arab African union with Libya was inspired in large part by the desire to secure marginal gain (i.e., neutralizing Libyan support for the Polisario) in the long contest of wills with Algeria. We expect that similar motives are in the minds of GOA leaders as they contemplate closer relations with Qadhafi.

6. If we are to keep Qadhafi in the isolation he richly deserves, we must change the regional perception that he is a necessary, if erratic, make-weight, to a realization that he is a threat to specific

⁶ Reference is to Pérez de Cuéllar's attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the war in the Western Sahara. See Document 451.

and immediate regional interests. We cannot get an audience for our case on Libyan terrorism and subversion so long as our friends believe they have far more important and direct security concerns, with which Qadhafi may be helpful, or at least not harmful. One of these is obviously the agony of the Bourguiba regime. Another is the Saharan war. As a continuing conflict, it has provided both a vehicle for Moroccan-Algerian competition and a durable incentive to their respective diplomatic efforts with Qadhafi, despite their caustic views on his behavior. Removing the conflict would of course not totally remove Qadhafi's freedom of action—there are many other reasons why countries in the region deal with him, including broader Arab and Islamic agendas. But it would significantly reduce the perception in Rabat and Algiers that he could offer something positive in their bilateral competition. And that would, at a minimum, give us more air time for our case.

7. Fortunately, the UNSYG has already taken the initiative on this issue. He will, however need support.

Hawes

83. Editorial Note

On November 7, 1987, the Government of Tunisia announced that longtime President Habib Bourguiba had been removed from power and replaced by a new government headed by Zine El Abdine Ben Ali. (See footnote 3, Document 354.) On November 8, the U.S. Embassy in Algeria commented in telegram 6887 that "the Algerian reaction to the change in Tunis thus far has been both measured and positive" and noted that "given their anxiety over the political drift in Tunis of the past several years, they can only be satisfied with the change." Moreover, "Ben Ali's accession to the Presidency has so far avoided the Algerians' nightmare scenario of an uncertain transition in Tunis which would tempt Qadhafi to intervene." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870921-0471)

The Government of Morocco, the Embassy reported in telegram 10738 from Rabat, November 9, reacted to Bourguiba's fall "with considerable understanding, if not sympathy," which included both a "message of congratulations" from King Hassan II to Ben Ali and a comment that "Tunisia was indebted to 'brother Bourguiba' and that he was confident Ben Ali would work to safeguard Bourguiba's

contributions by introducing changes and reforms as circumstances directed." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870922–0705) The Government of Mauritania, as reported in telegram 4771 from Nouakchott, November 9, "issued a public statement wishing the new Tunisian Government success in its endeavors." The Embassy further reported: "The Taya government is relieved that the problem of Bourguiba's succession has been resolved in an orderly and peaceful fashion." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870923–0039)

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, November 25, 1987, 1751Z

11419. Subject: Filali Sees Upturn in Algerian-Moroccan Relations.

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary: Filali told Ambassador Nov. 25 that Algeria and Morocco are moving toward reestablishing diplomatic relations early next year, and that three joint subcommittees would meet in Morocco in mid-December to work on various political/economic/technical issues. He said the GOA was willing to discuss the Sahara as a bilateral issue. The UN Mission currently visiting the area is a favorable factor for Morocco. Filali thinks that after the mission submits its report to the SYG next month² the SYG will visit Rabat and Algiers in January to help resolve the issue. End summary.

3. I saw Filali November 25 at my request and asked him first about his weekend visit to Algiers (other subjects septel).³ Filali was

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870971–0161. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, London, Paris, Casablanca, USCINCEUR, and USUN.

² In telegram 4503 from USUN, December 24, the Mission reported: "Secretariat official Diallo expects that the report to the SYG of the UN technical team (TT) to Western Sahara, now under preparation, will be factual description of demographic and infra-structural data needed to implement an eventual self-determination referendum in the territory, and will make no specific proposals for achieving a ceasefire or agreement on holding a referendum." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871051–0126)

³ See footnote 5, Document 272.

very positive about his meetings there, saying that this was his first real official visit to Algeria, i.e., there were all the trappings of meetings, press coverage, an official dinner in his honor and a return lunch the following day by the Moroccan side.

4. More to the point, Filali said he felt the Algerians (he met with both President Bendjedid and FonMin Ibrahimi) were for the first time willing to discuss realistically the Saharan dispute and to treat it as a bilateral issue (rather than pretending that Morocco had to deal only with the Polisario). The Algerians, he said, had suggested that both sides think about ways to resolve the dispute. The Algerians had indicated they were tired of the issue and Filali acknowledged Morocco was also. The Algerians would like to see the Western Sahara issue resolved in a Maghreb context. Additionally, both sides have agreed to a cessation of negative press reporting.

5. Filali said prospects are good that Morocco and Algeria can reestablish diplomatic relations after the first of the year. The two sides have agreed to meet again in Morocco in mid-December. Three subcommittees—political, economic/finance and cultural/consular affairs—as envisioned following the Hassan/Bendjedid summit of May, will hold detailed discussions. The talks will be supervised at the Secretary-General/Secretary of State level of the respective MFAs and will include reps from other ministries (Interior, Transportation, etc.) as needed.

6. Filali noted that MFA SecState Moulay Ahmed Cherkaoui had already gone to Mauritania and Royal Counselor Ahmed Reda Guedira would be going to Tunis tomorrow to brief the immediate neighbors on the talks in Algiers.

7. On the current UN Mission to the Western Sahara, Filali said he felt the visit was so far very positive for the Moroccans. Filali envisions that the UN team will be presenting its report around mid-December and that some time in January Perez de Cuellar would very likely plan to visit the region to offer his ideas on a settlement. He said he saw the UN Mission role as not only technical and exclusively focused on referendum modalities but also on the broader political aspects of resolving the conflict.

8. Comment: This is a sharp change from Filali's negative comments to me prior to his trip to Algiers. He has never been so buoyant about prospects for improvement of relations. His readout contrasts considerably with the output of the propaganda machines on both sides during the first days of the UN Mission visit. We have, of course, been disappointed before—notably on the lack of follow-up to the Hassan-Bendjedid summit last spring. It is certainly too early to conclude that

Algiers has decided to drop the Polisario—particularly given the recent combat. Filali seemed genuinely optimistic that the two sides were no longer talking past each other and were beginning to engage on real problems. If Algeria and Morocco in fact move to formal relations next year, it will inevitably mean some redimensioning of the status of the Polisario, at a minimum.

9. Comment continued: We note Hamdani's downbeat assessment of the meeting (Algiers 7248).⁴ This contrast could mean we will be treated to a rerun of the post-Hassan-Bendjedid meeting, when contrasting assessments also reflected competing agendas, not just between Algeria and Morocco but internally as well. Clearly Filali's comments suggest the GOM believes (or wants to believe) that that period is over.

Nassif

⁴ In telegram 7248 from Algiers, November 25, Johnstone reported that Hamdani "called the visit 'unfortunate' since Filali brought nothing new on the Western Sahara. He expressed readiness to improve Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations and said GOM wants to participate in wider Maghreb consultations that Algeria is now promoting. Hamdani insisted that resolution of the Western Sahara problem and those other issues are inescapably linked." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870969–0934)

85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, January 16, 1988, 0630Z

14143. For Ambassador Wisner from INR/NESA-GSHarris.
Subject: Maghreb: Belling the Libyan Cat . . . They Hope.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott will sell Qadhafi admission to their regional pact, but only as long as he meets their price. Rabat, not a pact member, does not see the benefit in objecting. US reservations will not make the Maghreb states seriously reconsider, but the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880041–0790. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Whitaker; cleared by Janean Mann (INR/NESA), Judy Bird (INR/NESA), Donald Mulligan (INR/AA), Charles Jefferson (INR/PMA), Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA), and George Harris (INR/NESA); approved by Harris.

disparate natures of the parties will doom the Maghreb pact sooner or later.

Networking

3. Last month, Algerian Prime Minister Ibrahim went to Libya;² Algerian, Tunisian, and Mauritanian Foreign Ministers considered admitting Libya to the Tripartite Pact;³ and Tunis renewed ties to Qadhafi.⁴ Algerian President Bendjedid then visited Tunis and Tripoli to quash remaining obstacles to his conception of a greater Maghreb. Qadhafi was set to visit Tunis this week, but cancelled when Tunis received the Sixth Fleet Commander January 11–13.

Algeria: Dealing

4. Algeria has made numerous economic deals with Libya, but its chief goals are diplomatic and political. It thinks it can manipulate Qadhafi, and wants to play a role in Libya after he goes. It thinks Libyan membership in the Tripartite Pact would give Rabat a stark choice—join an Algeria-designed regional network or face isolation—which would press Hassan to settle on the Western Sahara. And in Algerian politics, economic gains would mollify technocrats who seek regional trade/cooperation (though most think Morocco—not Libya—offers a more complementary economy).

² In telegram 116 from Algiers, January 9, the Embassy reported Ibrahim's "characterized aim" of his December 18–20 talks in Tripoli "as improving economic cooperation, while Ibrahim referred to political dimension strictly within a Maghreb context: 'we consider (that) the work we have been doing with the Jamahirya over the past year and a half is a positive step toward the building of the Arab Maghreb.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880021–0149)

³ In telegram 5529 from Nouakchott, December 28, 1987, the Embassy reported: "According to the Tunisian DCM in Nouakchott, the December 20 summit in Algiers of the Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia focused chiefly on the Western Sahara war, Maghreban economic integration, and Libya's request to join the Tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and Concord. The Tunisian diplomat stated that Algeria's pressure on Tunisia to let Libya join the Treaty had abated." The Embassy continued: "No final decision had yet been made to allow Libya into the treaty. But given the improvement in Tunisian-Libyan relations, Libya's accession to the treaty was likely: Libya might join as early as March or April 1988, when the treaty members will hold a summit in Nouakchott to mark the fourth anniversary of the compact." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871056–0857)

⁴ In telegram 14462 from Tunis, December 29, the Embassy reported: "The Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released December 28 a joint Tunisian-Libyan communiqué announcing the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations because of the 'positive signs that have occurred in their relations.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871060–0081) In telegram 245 from Tunis, January 8, the Embassy reported that the two nations had "re-established diplomatic relations albeit at less than Ambassadorial level." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880596–0830, D880019–0046)

Tunisia

5. An arm well-twisted: Aware of potential rewards and Algiers' Maghreb designs, Tunis is haggling with Libya over an admission price to the Tripartite Pact. For renewal of diplomatic ties, Libya agreed to pay ousted Tunisian workers and stop giving refuge to Tunisian dissidents. Algeria has given Tunisia a de facto security guarantee, but President Ben Ali is bolstering his southern military command, and is using the Sixth Fleet Commander's visit as a signal of his preference for close US ties.

Morocco

6. Collecting alimony: King Hassan ended "union" with Qadhafi in 1986 in response to US pressure and Libyan criticism of Moroccan-Israeli ties. But trade, financial, and political links remain strong, and may be improving. Despite rumors of new Libyan aid to Polisario, Qadhafi publicly backs Hassan's view of the Western Sahara. And Rabat and Tripoli retain intelligence links.

Indecisive—or Cunning

7. If coaxed Rabat says it fears regional isolation, but has not lobbied its case in Maghreb capitals.⁵ Seeing the Tripartite Pact as Algeria-inspired, it will not seek to join. Its only leverage on Algeria is the Western Sahara, but Hassan is reluctant to use this sensitive issue as a bargaining chip. Rabat thinks Qadhafi suspects Algerian motives, and sees Maghreb politics as a calculated political game. Its current strategy is to hunker down, perhaps suffer a bad year or so, but keep playing its own Libya card, and wait for the newly unified Maghreb to self-destruct.

Shultz

⁵ In telegram 1246 from Tunis, February 3, however, the Embassy reported that in a February 2 interview "Baccouche declared that 'talk of Morocco's isolation presents a pseudo-problem, there will be no Maghreb without Morocco.' Citing the Western Sahara as a major obstacle, Baccouche asked 'How can one envision the creation of a greater Maghreb without a solution to this problem?'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880093–0179)

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 11, 1988, 1556Z

1448. Subject: Moroccan Reaction to Qadhafi Meetings With Ben Ali, Bendjedid and Abdelaziz. Ref: (A) Rabat 1300,² (B) Tunis 1370,³ (C) Algiers 798.⁴

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. Summary: The Moroccans are annoyed but officially remain silent regarding Qadhafi's recent fishing expedition with his Maghreb neighbors. Most galling to the GOM was the GOA-arranged meeting between Qadhafi and Polisario Chief Abdelaziz. The press is highlighting a post-Annaba statement by Qadhafi that he wanted union with all the Maghreb states and had no intention of resuming military aid to the Polisario. End summary.

3. We have been treated to the usual press fulminations attributing the usual motives to the usual suspects (i.e., the Algerians and their purported effort to gang up on Morocco) following the meetings with Qadhafi in Sakiet and Annaba. The GOM, nevertheless, is maintaining public silence while trying to assess the damage, if any. Looking at matters from a Rabat tilt, the local press of February 10–11 has been quick to note that Qadhafi appears to be playing Rabat's game, not Algeria's, in two respects. First, according to Qadhafi's February 9 AFP interview, the Libyan leader referred to the existence of a union agreement with Algeria, presumably indicating he remained uninterested in joining the Tripartite Treaty. The AFP quoted Qadhafi as saying "there will soon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880120–0439. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Casablanca, Nouakchott, Paris, and Tunis.

² In telegram 1300 from Rabat, February 8, the Embassy reported on Filali's February 5 conversation with the DCM: "Lamenting lack of Algerian movement on bilateral relationship and continuing efforts with other regional states, Filali asserted that it would not be in Algeria's interest to construct a Maghreb without Morocco, even if it were able to do so. The further Algeria was able to go in that direction, the more Morocco would have to turn its economic, political and security options with Europe and the U.S." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880109–0102)

³ In telegram 1370 from Tunis, February 5, the Embassy reported: "Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Tunis Feb. 4 proclaiming his intent to discuss unification of the Arab nation." The Embassy continued: "Libya is lukewarm about joining the Tri-partite agreement, and Tunisia will not encourage it. Given Qadhafi's style, Embassy believes Qadhafi's visit is at least as likely to exacerbate Tunisian-Libyan relations as it is to improve them." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880101–0475)

⁴ In telegram 798 from Algiers, February 10, the Embassy reported: "At first glance, Qadhafi's visit yielded little of substance." The Embassy commented: "Latest round of visits apparently advanced the cause of Maghreb unity in only a symbolic sense." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880116–0792)

be further contacts and the proposals (for union) will be submitted to Morocco.” Qadhafi then reportedly added “If Morocco does not want to participate in this union, we are in no hurry to settle the (Sahara) conflict and we will not insist.”

4. On another point important to the GOM, Qadhafi reportedly stated that Libya had not resumed military aid to the Polisario: “We decided a number of years ago not to take part militarily in that conflict. We are only furnishing humanitarian assistance.” Thus, it appears initially to the Moroccans that no great damage to its interests has emerged from any of Qadhafi’s meetings in Algeria or Tunisia over the past week.

5. Officially but not in public, the Moroccan position remains that expressed by Foreign Minister Filali to DCM February 5, i.e., that Algeria is making a mistake in trying to isolate or pressure Morocco and that even if the GOA succeeds in bringing the other Maghreb states into a treaty framework without Morocco, it will not achieve the desired result (ref A). MFA Counselor for Arab/Islamic Affairs Adib Taieb indicated to PolOff February 5 that the GOM continued to be reasonably relaxed about the faint prospects of Libyan adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Taieb told us that the GOM thought Tunisia would continue to oppose such a move, while an Iraqi diplomat said his government had learned from the Tunisians that the GOT had virtually promised as much to visiting Moroccan PM Laraki during his visit to Tunis a week ago.

Nassif

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 21, 1988, 1734Z

2888. NEA for Murphy. Subject: Rabat Mini-COM, March 17–18, 1988.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Begin summary: Ambassadors Johnstone, Nassif, Pelletreau and Pugh, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ussey, met in Rabat March 17–18 for an informal review of Maghreb issues, including prospects in

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880243–0287. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, and USUN.

the Western Sahara, the developments between Mahgreb states, Libya, the role of the Soviets, U.S. commercial interests and other topics. This message reports highlights of the discussion and conclusions. End summary.

3. Western Sahara

While U.S. interests would be served by a resolution of the conflict, it seems clear that outside efforts to promote settlement (UNSYG, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia) have little prospect of success until Algeria and Morocco decide they want to move to a solution, which is not yet apparent. There may, in fact, be some risk that the United Nations will allow an interest in the technical aspects of peacekeeping and a referendum to get ahead of political preparations. We concluded that it would be useful to consult more fully with the Tunisians (the Mestiri visit), the Saudis, and the UNSYG, so as to have a better base of information on how others assess the situation and what they are doing. In talking with the Tunisians and Saudis, we would want to find out what they believe to be agreed elements between the parties. Is there, for example, agreement on Moroccan sovereignty, with some form of local autonomy? Is there agreement that there would be no independent Sahara foreign or defense policy or membership in international organizations? What is the attitude of the parties towards a "Quebec" formula? While much discussion centered on means of resolving dispute, including specific formulas such as "Quebec",² and possible U.S. roles, we do not believe that U.S. interests would be served by identifying the U.S. with any particular formula for resolution of the conflict or by a more visible U.S. role. At the same time, we agreed that the range of solutions potentially acceptable to the parties is quite narrow, probably focusing on detailed arrangements for some form of local autonomy, under recognized Moroccan sovereignty and control.

The Greater Mahgreb

Overall, we believe that an improvement of relations between the countries of the Mahgreb, particularly between Algeria and Morocco, would be in U.S. interests, by enhancing long term regional stability and lessening the opportunity for Soviet involvement. We must recognize that the continuing attraction of the greater Mahgreb idea, and the competitive dynamics of the Mahgreb states, may well lead to the inclusion of Libya in broader groupings despite our arguments in favor of isolating Qadhafi, however limited the effect of such arrangements and groupings may be.

²Reference is to the special protections of the French language and French-Canadian culture in the province of Quebec within Canada's federal parliamentary democracy.

We may, thus, be confronted with the necessity of reevaluating the effectiveness of our Libya political policy in the region, and searching for additional and/or other means of constraining Qadhafi in the Mahgreb. On the economic side, we are concerned that U.S. policies targeted at Qadhafi are having some counterproductive effects, resulting in additional profits to Qadhafi and an expansion of third country oil and other economic activity in Libya. This, too, requires continued evaluation.

Trade and Commerce

— It is clearly in our interests to expand Maghreb-U.S.-commercial relations; fundamental differences between the commercial situations of the regional countries mean that we must approach each situation differently:

— For relatively cash-rich Algeria, we are preparing to intensify our sales promotion efforts, and look particularly at major projects.

— Our approach in cash-poor Morocco and Tunisia should be oriented more toward U.S. direct investment, with the goal of penetration of the EC Market for low-labor-cost manufactured goods.

— In this context, we believe USDOC could profitably prepare a study for U.S. businessmen on the advantages of European penetration through Maghreb investment; we note for instance that each Embassy recently submitted a new investment climate statement, which statements would be useful in such a regional document.

— Current experiences in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia with aircraft sales efforts indicate to us that we must make an effort to be more closely identified with the marketing efforts of U.S. companies.

— Host governments must understand that the USG is firmly behind American companies, even if there are several U.S. competitors for a contract, in order to counterbalance very effective representation by European Embassies on behalf of their national companies.

— We should also begin sharing more information on such regional sales efforts and consider how we can better coordinate our support to these efforts.

Military and Strategic Cooperation

— Our military cooperation programs in each of the countries are an important and useful element of the bilateral relationship.

— This is not a zero sum game; we can and should improve our military cooperation with rivals Morocco and Algeria at the same time, without unduly threatening either. Exercises in Morocco and Tunisia,

the “spare parts” program in Algeria, and the African coastal security program in Mauritania are all examples of successful military programs.

— The Moroccan base line program, if enacted, will be a thorn in the Moroccan-Algerian relationship, but not cataclysmic.

The Soviets

— The Soviet Union’s strategic agenda in the region has been largely frustrated to date; the East-West balance in the Mahgreb remains strongly in our favor.

— The Soviets are marginalized in Morocco and Tunisia, although they may make minor inroads with activities such as the Mjara Dam project in Morocco. Their record on fishing has not endeared them to the Mauritians. And Algeria has moved to a more neutral political position and an increasingly Western orientation in trade and commerce.

— However remote, the risk of future Soviet bases in Libya remains the number one US concern vis-a-vis the Soviets in the area given Qadhafi’s unpredictability and uncertainty about the post Qadhafi era.

Regimes and Bilateral Relations

— Each Ambassador reviewed the state of our bilateral relations and the condition of the host regimes. Both are in good shape in each host country, despite specific problems facing each government, but declining assistance levels are a problem in Tunisia.

Locust Invasion

— More coordination between host countries, as well as our respective aid missions economic sections is needed to meet the immediate emergency. Because of political sensitivities, we may have to lean more heavily on international organizations than we would otherwise prefer. At a minimum, we must do everything possible to foster an effective time-sensitive sharing of information throughout the region.

Nassif

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

Rabat, May 17, 1988, 1121Z

4850. Subject: Restoration of Algerian-Moroccan Relations. Ref: Rabat 4848.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: The decision of King Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic relations is a major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can take some credit. While Interior Minister Basri told Ambassador not to read more into the communiqué language than is evident, King Hassan clearly implied to SecDef Carlucci a month ago³ he expects some movement on the Sahara. Basri said he estimated it would take a year to resolve the 13-year-old conflict, and that the de facto ceasefire in the territory is still holding. Meanwhile, the door is now open for Hassan to attend the Algiers summit. The U.S. should make every effort to stimulate concrete measures by the two sides to improve bilateral trade and economic cooperation, as we have been doing. End summary.

3. The decision to restore diplomatic relations on the terms stated in the communique did not come easily. While Algeria appears to have come the greatest distance in agreeing to normalize without explicit progress on the Sahara conflict, Morocco has committed itself to a solution based on a “free referendum of self-determination . . . without any constraint.”

4. During May 16 dinner at Basri’s home, the Interior Minister told Ambassador that the agreement was no more and no less than what the language stated and cautioned against reading more than that into the communique wording. He stated, for example, that Morocco had not committed itself to recognize the 1972 border agreement, which he said first had to be ratified by Parliament. He did say, however, that the two sides have reaffirmed the validity of other agreements. (Comment: These would appear to include the 1969 Ifrane Treaty of Solidarity and

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0613. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate to Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott. Also sent to Cairo, Riyadh, Paris, London, Casablanca, USUN, and USCINCEUR.

² Telegram 4848 from Rabat, May 17, transmitted the text of the Moroccan-Algerian communiqué announcing the reestablishment of relations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0255)

³ A record of the Carlucci-Hassan meeting is in Document 275.

Cooperation,⁴ which was to be valid for an initial 20 years, plus some ten bilateral accords concluded at Tlemcen in 1969 in the fields of economic, commercial and judicial cooperation.)

5. With regard to the Sahara dispute, the Moroccans so far remain tight-lipped about the substance of any discussions with the Algerians on resolving this central issue of contention between them. It is likely that discussions are moving forward on some referendum modalities. In response to Ambassador's question as to whether the Sahara dispute would be resolved soon, Basri responded that it should take about one year to resolve. He added that there is a *de facto* ceasefire in the desert which appears to be holding. It should also be noted that King Hassan made an optimistic statement about improved relations with Algeria a month ago to SecDef⁵ looking ahead to a return of Moroccan troops from the Sahara—a clear implication that he expects some movement on the issue.

6. The communiqué language indicates that Arab solidarity—in advance of the Algiers Summit—was a major consideration and perhaps determined the timing of the announcement. This suggests a good will gesture by Hassan to Bendjedid, as well as a possible Saudi role in brokering the reconciliation. Whether this means Hassan will change his mind and attend the June 7 summit in Algiers is not known; Basri told Ambassador that Hassan's attendance was not a sure thing, but agreed that the door was open. When the Ambassador offered that it would be contrary to the spirit of the reestablishment of relations for Hassan not to attend, Basri agreed.

7. Whether or not progress is imminent on the Sahara or whether Hassan goes to Algiers, we can take some credit for promoting the reconciliation. Since the Ramadan summit of last year when King Fahd brought Hassan and Bendjedid together on the border, we have been urging the Moroccans and Algerian representative in Rabat to take a different tack. We had suggested that rather than attempt to resolve the Western Sahara problem as a first step, they should begin by reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations. Moving to resolve the Western Sahara problem would then be easier since the climate would have warmed and economic incentives would prevail over purely political goals.⁶ The U.S. should continue to encourage and support this process.

Nassif

⁴ Reference is to the Treaty of Ifrane, signed by Hassan and Boumédiène on June 15, 1969, which settled a long-standing border dispute between Morocco and Algeria.

⁵ See footnote 3, above.

⁶ See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 456.

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, May 23, 1988, 1422Z

5445. Subject: Qadhafi Meets Ben Ali at Jerba: Joint Communiqué Lists Seven Accords. Ref: Tunis 4868.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. At the invitation of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi came to the Tunisian island of Jerba for a two hour tete-a-tete on May 22. Qadhafi arrived in the afternoon and left that evening. According to media reports, King Hassan II of Morocco telephoned Ben Ali to express his congratulations on the meeting and his optimism about the future of North African relations. The King reportedly made a separate call to Qadhafi.

3. Qadhafi was accompanied by Chief of Military Intelligence Colonel Khwildi Humidi, Secretary of the People's General Commission for Services Fawzi al-Shakshouki, and Director of Cooperation of the People's Commission for International Contact Mohamed Sayala. Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche, Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri, Interior Minister Habib Ammar, Transportation and Tourism Minister Abderrazak Kefi, Social Affairs Minister Taoufik Cheikhrouhou, Minister of Information Abdelwahab Abdullah, and the ruling party's Director for External Affairs Mohamed Karboul accompanied Ben Ali to Jerba.

4. The talks were capped by a press communiqué in which the two parties reaffirmed the will to work for North African unity. The communiqué also announced seven agreements which reportedly:

(A) Guarantee freedom of movement for persons between the two countries by means of a common personal identity card which will be prepared by a joint commission;

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880441–0225. Secret; Immediate; NoFORN. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Rome.

² In telegram 4868 from Tunis, May 5, the Embassy reported: "In the first two weeks of April, following Col. Qadhafi's theatrical demolition of the main Libyan border post and before the beginning of Ramadan, tens of thousands of Libyans swarmed into Tunisia. Armed with wads of dollar traveler's checks, these 'tourists' charged up to 2 million per day at the border before proceeding northward on a huge shopping spree. Their numbers dwarfed those of the previously reported flows in the opposite direction—Tunisians headed to Libya looking for work." It continued "Restoration of diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Libya last December has permitted the resumption and expansion of an economic relationship which is of significant value to Tunisia and crucial to the two countries' bilateral relations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880389–0768)

(B) Guarantee free movement of goods between the two countries;
 (C) Guarantee freedom of residence, work, and property for the citizens of the two countries within both countries respectively;

(D) Work to implement the following complementary projects between the two countries:

- connection of the electric network.
- extension of the telephone network.
- the Ras Jedir/Sfax highway.
- the pipeline between the Zaouia refinery and Zarzis.

(E) Cooperate in the implementation and management of economic and pilot development projects such as:

- the Tripoli hospital.
- the Jbel Lakhddhar agricultural project (in Libya).
- the Iron and Steel Consortium at Misrata (in Libya).

(F) Restate the agreement previously concluded on the continental shelf. The final accord on this subject is to be signed during the visit that President Ben Ali will make to Libya in the coming days. (FYI: Ben Ali is now expected in Libya in early June after the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa. End FYI.)

(G) Reaffirm cooperation in the field of information concerning common production and diffusion.

5. In previously-scheduled meeting May 23 with Secretary of State Sahbani (septel),³ Ambassador raised Jerba meeting. Sahbani had not had a chance to get a read out, but noted U.S. interest. On the specific issue of the common identity card, Sahbani opined that it would probably function as a *laissez passer* for individuals whose professional or business interests required frequent travel between the two countries. It would not replace national identity cards.

6. Also on May 23, Central Bank Governor Khelil told Ambassador he wholeheartedly supported the current opening with Libya. Tunisia was benefiting, he said, in terms both of its sales to visiting Libyans and of employment opportunities for Tunisians in Libya. The Central Bank was making foreign exchange available to Tunisians seeking to replace or increase their stocks for the Libyan trade. Private sector would import goods to meet the Libyan demand, pay GOT customs, and sell at a profit to Libyans who had exchanged hard currency for Tunisian dinars. The economic advantages to Tunisia of rapprochement with Libya were greater than they would be, as a practical matter, with Algeria. Politically, too, the cooperation with Libya would give Tunisia a stronger and co-equal voice in dealing with Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb context.

³No record of the Pelletreau-Sahbani meeting has been found.

7. (NF) Comment. Coming shortly before Ben Ali's expected visit to Tripoli, the Jerba meeting is a surprise. The telephone conversations with King Hassan tend to confirm a previous report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Ben Ali took the initiative to play a role in promoting Libyan-Moroccan relations. With the dramatic announcement of renewed Algerian-Moroccan relations, President Ben Ali probably saw an opportunity to increase the momentum toward Maghreb unity and win some credit for Tunisia in the process. As Foreign Minister Mestiri noted to us previously, bringing Libya around is considered a special vocation on the part of the current GOT.

8. The long list of bilateral accords reflects a Libyan desire to rebuild its relations with Tunisia from the ground up and simultaneously derive the maximum economic benefit from the process. They will be popular here—as Khelil's comments to Ambassador testify.

9. The accords appear to renew momentum toward freer movement of goods and people between the two countries. Taken as a whole the agreements seem to go further than those existing between Tunisia and Algeria which provide for free movement of goods and people, as well as rights of residence, work, and property only within a 15-km wide strip on either side of the border. Tunisia can be expected to benefit disproportionately from free trade, at least as measured by relative export levels (reftel). However, as with all free trade arrangements, the consumers of both countries will benefit the most. This may be the motivation behind Qadhafi's making what otherwise would appear to be a one sided concession. Strapped by import restrictions and stagnant production at home, he has opened a safety valve which allows the Libyan consumer to vent his pent up demand abroad, rather than growing increasingly dissatisfied with the limited range of goods and services available in Libya.

Pelletreau

90. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, June 11, 1988, 1305Z

3253. Subject: The Day After: A Maghreb Mini-Summit.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. The day after the close of the emergency Arab summit,² Chiefs of State of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania held their "Maghreb mini-summit" on Friday June 10. Bendjedid and Hassan met before the full gathering, and King Fahd joined the Maghrebians for lunch. Leaders decided to form a committee to study the building of Grand Maghreb. Committee will hold its first meeting in Algiers July 13. Hassan and Bendjedid were stars of the event. Polisario was notably absent, and Western Sahara barely earned a mention in Algerian press commentary. End summary.

Fahd, Hassan, and Bendjedid the Stars

3. The leaders of five Maghreb states—Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania—met in Algiers June 10, day after the closing of the Arab League emergency summit. Session began with a meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid accompanied by their entourages. Algerians attending were the entire top echelon of government: FLN Permanent Secretariat Chief Messaadia; Foreign Minister Ibrahim; Presidential Cabinet Director Belkheir; and Interior Minister Khediri.

4. Following the full session, the two Chiefs of State moved to Bendjedid's beach house in nearby Zeralda, where Saudi King Fahd joined them for a three-way private meeting. Then the other three Maghreb leaders arrived for a lunch with Fahd, Hassan and Bendjedid. Fahd left Zeralda after lunch, and the five Maghrebian leaders held their meeting that afternoon. According to the communique issued afterward, the leaders decided to form a committee to prepare the means of building a Grand Maghreb. This committee will meet July 13 in Algiers.

5. From media point of view, Hassan and Bendjedid were the stars, with King Fahd in a major supporting role. Bendjedid's early morning visit to Hassan on his boat; the latter's gracious thanks to his host at the conference closing ceremony; and the media and official attention

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880503–0454. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the Arab League Collective. Sent for information to Paris and USCINCEUR.

² Reference is to the Fifteenth Arab League Summit held in Algiers June 7–9, which expressed support for the Palestinian intifada. Documentation on this issue is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

lavished on the Moroccans their last day here indicate both sides are determined to maintain the euphoria created by the restoration of relations (now almost a month old). Fahd's presence represented both his blessing the meetings and an acknowledgement of his role as mediator and reconciler.

6. Comment. At first glance, the five-way summit itself produced little of substance beyond forming the committee and the photo-session. Nevertheless, the meeting itself demonstrated that frictions surrounding the summit, especially between Qadhafi and Hassan (see Algiers 3249)³ would not prevent the leaders from meeting under Algerian auspices. End comment.

Wither the SDAR?

7. Mini-summit was most notable for who was not there: the Polisario. It is clear that the Algerians now consider the Grand Maghreb an arrangement of five states and that Polisario's interests will have to be advanced in some other way. The Algerians' message from both the Bendjedid-Hassan and the multi-lateral contacts was clear: the Polisario and the Western Sahara question are not going to interfere with Algerian-Moroccan reconciliation and with Algeria's Arab-based regional diplomacy.

8. Algerian Press Service (APS) commentary in June 11 daily *El Moudjahid* drove home the above message. Its editorial, entitled "On the Way to Unity", made no mention of the Western Sahara and made only oblique references to "painful problems still unresolved."

9. Same editorial also distorted history when it claimed that the FLN Central Committee meeting of June 1987 had issued a call for Maghreb unity. Central Committee had done no such thing, but had instead urged bi-lateral Libyan-Algerian unity as a "natural and historical necessity". Central committee message was suppressed until after FLN Politburo met two weeks later and set the record straight by issuing call for building a greater Maghreb on solid economic and cultural foundations.

10. Comment: We suspect the above example of doublethink from Algeria's Ministry of Truth is an acknowledgement that even those who once urged union with Libya have now joined the bandwagon of a Grand Maghreb of five with Morocco in and the Polisario out.

Brayshaw

³ See footnote 2, Document 180.

91. Defense Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DIAAPPR 23-88

Washington, June 23, 1988

NORTH AFRICA: MAGHREB DIPLOMACY (U)**Summary**

(C) North African leaders from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania held their first summit ever on 10 June and pledged to form a committee charged with building a greater Arab Maghreb.² The committee will convene on 13 July in Algiers. The announcement caps a year-long effort by Algeria to bring Libya into the regional mainstream first by improving its own relations with Libyan leader Qadhafi and then by effecting a Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement. The reestablishment of relations between Morocco and Algeria on 16 May and the continued warming trend in Libyan-Tunisian relations were instrumental in reviving previously frustrated efforts toward a Maghreb alliance.³ For the first time in more than 12 years, a climate has been created that is conducive to regional economic and political stability. All states will try to promote the concept of a greater Arab Maghreb to encourage economic integration and to bolster regional security. Reconciliation, however, will most likely be inhibited by traditional rivalries and animosities. Regional states are motivated by independent and sometimes conflicting agendas, and they harbor as many differences as they do similarities.

Discussion**Saudi Intervention**

(C) On 16 May Morocco and Algeria announced the restoration of bilateral relations, thereby removing a major obstacle to the creation of a greater Arab Maghreb. The decision to restore diplomatic ties following a 12-year hiatus caps efforts initiated a year ago when Saudi Arabia engineered a tripartite summit between the Moroccan, Algerian, and Saudi heads of state. Riyadh has over the years used its good offices to try to mediate a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict. With no resolution of this contentious issue apparent, Riyadh

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: North Africa. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

² See Document 90.

³ See Document 88.

reportedly sought a normalization of relations as the best avenue for pursuing a political deal and for increasing stability in the Arab west. Saudi efforts would not have been possible, however, had Morocco and Algeria not been motivated by self interest and priorities at home to end the impasse.

Self-Motivating Factors

(S) Several converging factors most likely encouraged Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to drop his longstanding demand that the Western Sahara dispute be resolved before he restored relations with Rabat. Under Bendjedid, Algeria has placed great emphasis on maintaining a bridge between Arab nations so that it can negotiate conflicts—for example, between Iran-Iraq and Libya-Tunisia—mediate differences among Palestinian factions, and use its contacts with all parties to negotiate an end to terrorist actions peacefully. Algiers responded emotionally to the uprising in the Occupied Territories, placing much of its prestige on hosting an Arab summit to address the issue. A successful summit, however, requires high-level attendance and, by restoring relations with Rabat, Algiers was able to obtain support from Morocco's King Hassan and his wealthy Arab allies.



(S) The willingness of Algeria to compromise probably also demonstrated its interest in securing closer economic and political ties in North Africa. Although Algiers' relations with both Tunis and Tripoli were much improved, some leaders in the region were reluctant to engage in a relationship that isolated Morocco. Also, Algiers probably concluded that the Western Sahara conflict was yet one more dispute that did not



*(U) Algerian President
Chadli Bendjedid.*

serve Arab interests and that efforts to resolve it could aid in burnishing Algeria's Arab credentials. Moreover, Algeria's priorities have changed. The country is now committed to social and economic reform, and regional disputes only divert resources from these objectives.



*(U) Morocco's
King Hassan.*

(C) Morocco, for its part, had little to lose from the move. It has not yet compromised its position on the Western Sahara but has gained potential leverage over its regional rival by demonstrating that the benefits of economic and political cooperation outweigh those of a protracted guerrilla campaign. The resumption of Algerian-Moroccan relations puts Rabat back into the mainstream of North African affairs and reduces the threat of hostilities with its militarily superior neighbor. Moreover, Morocco has gained an economic partner with whom it can pursue potentially lucrative trade and development projects. Contacts between Moroccan and Algerian firms are already under way. Rabat hopes to market car parts,

tires, fruits, and vegetables in Algeria, and Algeria has already begun exporting tractors, bicycles, and televisions to Morocco.

The Desert War

(C) The Western Sahara dispute remains a potentially divisive issue, although Saudi mediators are optimistic that a breakthrough is near. Rabat and Algiers reportedly reject the idea of sovereignty for the territory but have not yet agreed on a form of autonomy for the Saharan people. Also, King Hassan will apparently not accept diplomatic representation for the Polisario at international organizations or Polisario demands that he withdraw his military and administrative apparatus before a referendum. Both Saudi and Moroccan officials concede a settlement could take a year. An end to the conflict is not, however, inevitable. Morocco and Algeria must overcome years of suspicion and mistrust and competing claims for regional dominance in order to secure a lasting peace. Lack of progress on this issue could well lead to a setback in bilateral relations.

Tunisian-Libyan Relations

(C) The Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement has given impetus to improved Tunisian-Libyan relations. Libyan leader Qadhafi and Tunisian President Ben Ali have now met on four occasions, including their 22 May meeting on the Tunisian island of Djerba.⁴ While on Djerba, the two sides reportedly agreed in principle to allow each country's national goods free passage across the borders; to cooperate in the field of energy; to extend and interlink telephone networks; and to construct a highway between Sfax, Tunisia, and the Libyan border. A common national identity card will also be created and will carry the same information and design but in different colors for each country. In addition, Tunis and Tripoli reportedly agreed in principle to joint exploitation of the Continental Shelf, according to the International Court of Justice ruling, although differences persist over the division of resources.



(U) *Libyan Leader
Qadhafi.*

⁴ See Document 89.

(S) Economic considerations and security concerns were undoubtedly instrumental in Ben Ali's decision to pursue closer ties to Libya. Negotiations on Libyan monies owed to Tunisia, since the 1985 break in relations should net Tunis some \$45 million, although this amount is only half of Tunisia's initial demand. Roughly 20,000 Tunisians have traveled to Libya in search of work since diplomatic ties were resumed in December, but the number who remain in Libya is probably far fewer. More than 200,000 Libyan tourists have visited Tunisia, providing hard currency for the economically depressed southern region. Tunis will also benefit from joint ventures currently under discussion and from Libya's complementary economy, which will provide a market for Tunisian labor, goods, and services.



(U) *Tunisian President
Ben Ali.*

(C) Ben Ali also apparently calculated that more was to be gained by trying to cooperate with, rather than confront, his volatile neighbor. Relations between Tunis and Tripoli have been strained since their abortive 1974 unity agreement,⁵ forcing Tunisia to remain alert to a Libyan conventional military attack or Libyan-sponsored subversion. Tunis most likely believes that by bringing Qadhafi into the North African fold, it can alleviate its security concerns and reduce the threat from the east.

[portion marking not declassified] Qadhafi, for his part, is seeking respectability and a means of ensuring a Libyan role in regional affairs. Economic cooperation with the promise of greater availability of goods, as well as agreements already reached easing travel restrictions, should also bolster his domestic position. He is apt to use relations with his neighbors to try to drive a wedge between them and the US, but North African foreign policy will not be based on the colonel's whims.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 288.

Outlook

[*portion marking not declassified*] The current level of cooperation in North Africa bodes well for near-term regional stability. A stable North Africa also benefits the US by creating a more economically and politically stable environment in which to conduct foreign relations. In addition, it reduces the potential for Soviet intervention and a superpower tug-of-war. The current calm and accommodation will, however, be difficult to preserve. Born of independent tactical considerations, this unlikely alliance joins Hassan, the conservative Monarch; Bendjedid, the pragmatic centrist; Ben Ali, the moderate activist; and Qadhafi, the radical revolutionary. Differing ideological predilections, varying agendas, and ingrained suspicion and mistrust will most likely inhibit any permanent reconciliation.

[*portion marking not declassified*] Qadhafi's entry into the alliance will increase the Libyan leader's respectability but probably not at the expense of US relations with alliance members, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. Hassan, Bendjedid, and Ben Ali perceive the necessity of trying to rein in Qadhafi as a means of enhancing regional security and perhaps reaping economic rewards, but they remain distrustful of the colonel's intentions. Moreover, they are unlikely to sacrifice US support for Qadhafi.

(C) The Western Sahara dispute continues to be a potentially divisive issue, but all sides appear to be tiring of this protracted conflict. In addition, renewed ties between Morocco and Algeria provide a more conducive framework for reaching a political settlement. Both sides will have to compromise, with Hassan offering enough autonomy to the Saharan people to satisfy Algeria's need for a face-saving way out. Realizing that the King's political fortunes are closely tied to the Western Sahara and to ensure that the peace process continues, Algiers will most likely have to relent on its demand that Morocco withdraw its military and administrative apparatus from the territory before a referendum. Failure to reach an agreement would most likely lead to the breakdown of regional reconciliation. For now, all sides can benefit from the current respite to focus on troublesome domestic issues, including their flagging economies, and to bask in the lull in regional tensions.

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, July 22, 1988, 1636Z

7144. Subject: Maghreb Joint Commission: Libyan Role, "Security," and Moroccan-Algerian Normalization. Refs: (A) Algiers 3867,² (B) DIA WASHDC 210010Z Jul 88.³

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

2. Summary: (a) On the Libyan role at the July 14 political commission meeting in Algiers, MFA rep said that Qadhafi's extreme union proposals had irritated the commission and resulted in Libya's receipt of the least important committee assignment; (b) on "security," a subject reported in the Moroccan press as part of Tunisia's committee portfolio, there has been some speculation that the Grand Maghreb will turn its attention to "the presence of foreign military bases in the region;" (c) Foreign Minister Filali reported agreement on the margins at Algiers to set up two new Moroccan-Algerian mixed committees, to meet this September. End summary.

3. Ref wrap-ups of July 14 Maghreb Political Commission results tally well with what we hear in Rabat that, creation of the five committees aside, the Commission took no substantive decisions and focused almost entirely on economic and other non-political issues. At the same time, some additional aspects have emerged at this end:

4. Libyan Role at Algiers

MFA Islamic and Arab Affairs Counselor Benbrahim told us that the commission had been irritated by extreme Libyan integration proposals and, as a result, Libya had been given the least important of the committee assignments, i.e, structure and organization. (The hottest committee assignments, according to Benbrahim, were those dealing with economics, education and culture.) Concerning specific Libyan proposals, the Counselor confirmed that brief Moroccan press reports

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880638-0820. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, Riyadh, and Casablanca.

² In telegram 3867 from Algiers, July 18, the Embassy reported: "Maghreb Political Commission ended work July 14 by setting up five committees, each to be chaired by a different state, to explore different aspects of regional cooperation." The Embassy continued: "While the Libyan delegation pressed theme of union, views of the other four countries on the need to give priority to economic integration prevailed. Meeting further consecrated idea that the Maghreb is a five-nation affair, reinforcing impression that regional cooperation will not be held hostage to the Western Sahara and indeed that progress on the Maghreb may render a solution to the war more palatable to Algeria and Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880615-0692)

³ Not found.

were essentially correct—e.g. A “union of Maghrebian states” in which supreme authority rested with a Council of Heads of State (with authority for war and peace). There would be an Executive Council, a General Secretariat (with large budgetary powers) and Legislative and Judiciary Councils. The “union” would have a common currency, foreign policy and armed forces. Qadhafi had also proposed the unification of economic, cultural, commercial and social sectors.

5. When asked if he thought Morocco would follow Algerian and Tunisian leads in abolishing visa requirements for Libyans, Benbrahim said he could not make a prediction. On the one hand, Morocco was losing Libyan tourism because of its visa requirement; on the other, free circulation of Libyans would present a threat to Moroccan security.

6. “Security”

According to earliest Moroccan press accounts of commission results, Tunisian committee assignment of social affairs and human resources also included “security.” A subsequent unattributed press analysis had it that, according to diplomatic circles, the Tunisian committee assignment would be one of the most difficult, involving as it did “the presence of foreign military bases in the region . . .” All three MFA officials whom we asked about “security and foreign bases” cautiously said they thought the subject had not been discussed at Algiers and, in any event, was a matter which involved the sovereignty of each member state. On the other hand, Algerian Embassy Counselor here said that discussion of this subject was only logical. The term “security,” he continued was vague and was meant to encompass the various insecurities of each member—i.e. for Tunisia it was fundamentalism and the frontier with Libya, for Libya, the Gulf of Sidra, for Mauritania, the threat to its neutrality, and for Morocco the Polisario, etc. An informed Istiqlali journalist told us that discussion of “security” was a natural development within the Maghrebian context, adding that new Maghrebian directions would be toward greater non-alignment, away from the U.S. and the USSR, and toward Europe, if not France.

7. Comment: Although we are not sure whether the subjects of security and foreign military bases were actually brought up in Algiers, it would appear that they may be blowing in the Maghreb breeze, and that some would not be adverse to an airing of them within the confines of the emerging Grand Maghreb. End comment.

8. Moroccan-Algerian Normalization

On his return from Algiers, Foreign Minister Filali told reporters that he had held bilateral discussions with Ibrahimi. The two had reviewed with satisfaction bilateral progress since the resumption of relations, and agreed that the successful work of the mixed committee on the free circulation of persons and goods, should be followed up with further mixed committee meetings on economic relations and on culture and education, to be held in September in Algiers and Rabat respectively. Filali expressed

the hope that the Grand Moroccan-Algerian Mixed Commission would meet this year, whether before or after the meeting of the Maghrebian Commission in Rabat on October 24.

Hawes

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 26, 1988, 1311Z

10356. Subject: Meeting of Maghreb Political Commission Announced for October 27 in Rabat. Ref: Rabat 10124.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Following an October 22 meeting of the four accredited Maghreb reps with King Hassan in Ifrane, the GOM announced that the meeting of the Maghreb Political Commission will be held in Rabat October 27. According to King Hassan's October 14 address to Parliament, the Political Commission will prepare for submission to a Maghreb summit the results of the recent meetings of the five Maghreb Sub-commissions (reftel).

Comment: Hassan's assertion in his parliamentary address that the Commission meeting would not take place until "after October 24" had renewed private and opposition press speculation that the event had been postponed indefinitely, either because of Algeria's internal difficulties³ or Morocco's displeasure over Algerian tactics in the UNGA Fourth Committee.⁴ Hassan's willingness to proceed is a further indication of his determination to prevent Algerian-Moroccan Fourth Committee confrontation from prejudicing Maghreb-building efforts. Initial press

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880951-0415. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Paris, Madrid, USUN, Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott.

² In telegram 10124 from Rabat, October 17, the Embassy reported: "In his October 14 address to Parliament, King Hassan reaffirmed his policy of support for normalization with Algeria, for Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid and for the building of a grand Maghreb. In a visionary portion on international reconciliation, he praised the Soviet Union and foresaw the integration of a united Arab Maghreb with a Europe composed of both East and West." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880921-0560)

³ Reference is to the riots that occurred in Algeria, October 5-11. For additional information, see Document 183.

⁴ Reference is to Algeria's continued efforts to pass a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. See footnote 2, Document 458.

reaction to the October 25 Fourth Committee vote also shows that the GOM is not displeased with the results (further reaction septel).⁵

Hawes

⁵ In telegram 10451 from Rabat, October 27, the Embassy reported that MFA Arab/ Islamic Affairs Counselor Adib Taieb informed the Chargé on October 26 that “despite obvious irritation with Algerian tactics in New York,” (see Document 458) Morocco “was still four-square behind the referendum plan and would cooperate fully with the UNSYG’s newly-appointed special representative. Taieb cited the convening of the Maghreb Political Commission in Rabat October 27 as proof that events in New York had not sidetracked the Maghreb integration process.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880956–0079)

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, November 2, 1988, 1728Z

10690. Subject: Maghreb Political Commission—A Political Bust?
Ref: A) Rabat 10572,² B) Rabat 10532,³ C) Rabat 9654.⁴

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Despite glowing communiqué claims that the results of all five Maghreb Sub-commissions had been approved, the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880973–0439. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, and Casablanca.

² In telegram 10572 from Rabat, October 31, the Embassy reported: “As for the outcome of Maghreb Political Commission, complete agreement was not reached on a political structure document and Morocco has been charged with working out a final draft for presentation to Heads of State.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880965–0390)

³ In telegram 10532 from Rabat, October 28, the Embassy reported: “During its evening session of October 27, the Maghreb Political Commission approved for subsequent consideration a draft treaty establishing a ‘community of the countries of the Arab Maghreb.’ The draft document indicates that the leaders in Rabat have opted for a gradual integration of economic/social policies, retaining considerable political autonomy. The Commission action largely overrode evident Libyan support for a draft whose terms would have provided immediate establishment of a political federation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880960–0189)

⁴ In telegram 9654 from Rabat, October 3, the Embassy reported: “On his return from the Tripoli meeting of the Maghreb Sub-Commission on institutional development, Parliamentary President Ahmed Osmā said that the participants had been divided between the Libyans, who favored immediate creation of a strong ‘supra federal state’ and the rest who favored a gradualist approach.” The Embassy continued: “A Sub-Commission pilot study for a ‘Maghreb Union’ would be presented to the Grand Maghreb Commission, set for October 24 in Rabat. An MFA source said that Qadhafi was ‘relaxed’ and would not lose patience with the slow pace of Grand Maghreb institutional development.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0678)

Maghreb Political Commission, meeting in Rabat/Fez October 27–28, failed to muster sufficient political will to approve a plan on Maghreb structure and organization. The problem of finding a “definitive formula” was kicked upstairs to the Maghreb Heads of State. According to our sources, delegation disagreements over the draft community treaty exposed fundamental differences in approach to Maghreb integration, which foreclosed the kind of political union (but not economic, social and cultural cooperation) proposed by Libya and, evidently, by Tunisia. The unresolved problems of the Western Sahara, Algerian internal difficulties and Libyan institutional and behavioral irregularities contributed to the failure to achieve consensus. End summary.

[Omitted here is the Embassy’s detailed analysis of the communiqué and the prospects for Maghreb integration.]

9. Comment. Given that neither Morocco nor its three non-Libyan Maghreb partners are ready to address the tough issues of political integration (much less union), but cannot afford to disparage it either, the Political Commission meeting was a popular political necessity, but one not to be overplayed. Accordingly, by October 31/November 1, the Moroccan media was already beginning to drop mentions (glowing or otherwise) of this issue. Conceptual and other differences between Libya (and possibly Tunisia) and its neighbors, the unresolved Western Sahara problem and current Algerian internal preoccupations apparently inhibited a serious effort toward institutionalized political cooperation, whether under the rubric of union, community or even assembly. Morocco has been charged with bridging the differences and submitting its findings to a summit (rumored to be put off until early 1989). Given its modest step-by-step approach, one can expect the GOM proposals to be somewhat general, high on integrationist rhetoric and pragmatic.

Hawes

95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, December 13, 1988, 0025Z

401233. Subject: Qadhafi Speech to Tunisian Chamber of Deputies: Demarche Instructions. Ref: Tunis 12622.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Using talking points in para 3 below, Embassy is requested to lodge a protest with GOT over Qadhafi's December 9 anti-U.S. speech in Tunisian Chamber of Deputies (reftel). Department will make parallel demarche Dec. 13 to the Tunisian Ambassador.³

3. Begin talking points:

— The United States Government has noted the anti-U.S. speech Qadhafi made to the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies December 9, as well as the fact that it was broadcast live to the Tunisian people.

— When Qadhafi made a similar attack on the U.S. at Sakiet Sidi Youssef last year, we were inclined to view it as an isolated incident which had arisen in circumstances over which GOT had little or no control.

— Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of this occasion. Moreover, the fact that Qadhafi has been publicly able to attack the U.S. twice on Tunisia soil suggests an unfavorable pattern which does not serve to strengthen our bilateral relations.

— His speech violated the third country rule; we trust the GOT has lodged a vigorous protest with the Libyan Government.

— Qadhafi's abuse of Tunisia's hospitality in such a fashion reaffirms our view that he has not reformed. His insistence on making such

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881086–0609. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Kunstadter (NEA/AFN); cleared by Casey (NEA/AFN) and Wiener; approved by Burleigh. Sent for information to Algiers, Ankara, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and Brussels.

² In telegram 12622 from Tunis, December 9, the Embassy reported: "GOT's worst fears came to pass when Qadhafi delivered a virulent anti-Western diatribe before the Chamber of Deputies December 9. Qadhafi blamed America, 'the master of lies,' for blocking Algerian/Libyan unity and seeking to destroy the Arabs." The Embassy continued: "The Deputies were often ill at ease with the Colonel's rhetoric, and GOT censored TV and radio coverage. Recommend USG lodge official protest." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881079–0084)

³ In telegram 402431 to Tunis, December 14, the Department indicated that Burleigh had delivered a *démarche* to Hamzaoui during which Burleigh noted that "we had carefully studied Qadhafi's remarks, which had drawn considerable attention in Washington. The speech would have been unremarkable had Qadhafi not abused Tunisian hospitality by attacking the U.S. and U.S. relations with the Maghreb." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881090–0110)

a presentation directly to the Tunisian people confirms our view that he has not in the least abandoned his intention of influencing and intervening in Tunisia's internal affairs.⁴

Shultz

⁴ In telegram 12935 from Tunis, December 20, the Embassy reported that Pelletreau "vigorously protested Qadhafi's anti-American speech" in Tunisia's Chamber of Deputies. Ben Yahia "responded defensively that Tunisian society is now immune to Qadhafi's rhetoric. Ambassador also advised Tunisians to inform themselves carefully on Libya's CW capability. Ben Yahia pleaded for U.S. patience and hinted that Tunisia would be conveying specific proposals from Libya in the interest of detente with the new U.S. administration." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881108-0586)

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, December 21, 1988, 1450Z

5532. Subject: Libyan Chemical Weapons Program. Ref: State 399207.²

1. On December 19, DCM, accompanied by PolOff, raised the issue of Libyan chemical weapons production with Ambassador Abderrahmin Ould Hadrami, Director of African Affairs at the MFA, and provided him a copy of the talking points contained in reftel.

2. In response to our démarche, Hadrami replied that Libya had formally denied that its Rabta chemical plant produced chemical weapons and offered to let foreign observers visit the plant. He asked whether the USG is aware of the Libyan denial. DCM replied that the USG has evidence that, despite Qadhafi's disclaimers, the plant is indeed intended for CW production. It would be fairly easy, he continued, to hide the evidence of weapons production at the time of a site visit. Hadrami listened to this explanation but said nothing. He

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881112-0655. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, Cairo, Dakar, Khartoum, Ndjamena, Niamey, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 399207 to multiple recipients, December 10, the Department provided a French translation of the talking points to all African diplomatic posts, November 28, concerning Libya's chemical weapons program. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881080-0836)

did, however, agree that the possibility that such a CW plant exists in Libya is quite important for Libya's neighbors in the Sahel and Maghreb, and the GIRM welcomes whatever information the USG can provide.

3. DCM also left a copy of the talking points on the Rabta chemical plant when making a démarche on December 19 on the upcoming CW conference in Paris with Ambassador Melainine Ould Moctar Neche, MFA Director for International Organizations.

4. Comment: Our impression is that Hadrami is not convinced that the Libyan plant is truly meant to produce CW weapons but is open to persuasion. We do not know at this stage whether this skepticism is shared by his superiors in the MFA. Embassy will attempt to sound out more senior MFA officials on this topic in the weeks to come. In the meantime, we would welcome whatever additional evidence of Libyan use of Rabta for CW production the Department can provide.³ End comment.

Twaddell

³ In telegram 5603 from Nouakchott, December 27, the Embassy reported: "Foreign Minister Col. Mohamed Sidina Ould Sidya convoked the Chargé on December 27 to advise the USG that the GIRM privately asked Libya about its new chemical production plant and received the same denial about weapons production and offer soon to invite international observers that Libya is putting out publicly. The Minister said he was relieved to learn that USG policy is to pursue diplomatic means to dissuade Libya from CW production because military action would not be fitting for a super power and it just isn't worth it. Ould Sidya said he agreed with the USG that Libya's neighbors should be concerned about the possible introduction of CW into the region and seek a consensus against it." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881124–0776)

Algeria

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, January 22, 1981, 2013Z

17215. Subject: Algerian Government Request for Clarification of Remarks Made at January 21 Dept Press Briefing. Ref: Algiers 354.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. In response to GOA MFA Director Benouniche, you should give him text of press guidance prepared for use by Department spokesman on January 22:

"Three points need be emphasized in handling the heavy load of questions concerning the new administration's willingness to implement the agreements entered into in order to effect the release of the hostages.³

"(1) The agreements negotiated between the United States and Iran, as well as the relevant executive orders, are very detailed and complex documents. This administration has already begun an in-depth review of what they entail and require on the part of all parties involved. This review will be conducted as expeditiously as is feasible.

"(2) This administration, consistent with domestic and international law alike, fully intends to carry out the obligations of the United States.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; Flash; Cherokee; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 354 from Algiers, January 22, the Embassy reported that Benouniche said "the GOA is deeply concerned over the Department Press Spokesman's statement that the new administration will have to carefully study the hostage agreements before committing itself to respecting them. As a result of its concern, the GOA is requesting an explanation of these remarks by the USG as soon as possible." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982))

³ Reference is to the Algiers Accords, the series of agreements between the United States and Iran brokered by Algeria that ended the Iran hostage crisis. Documentation on the Accords is in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980. See also Roberts Owen, "Final Negotiations and Release in Algiers," *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985), pp. 297–324.

⁴ In telegram 17547 to Algiers, January 23, the Department transmitted the text of a letter from Reagan thanking Bendjedid for helping resolve the hostage crisis. Reagan wrote: "Algeria will long represent to the American people and to the world that rare combination of compassion and competence of which you have every right to be proud." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810033–0928)

“(3) We must all recognize, however, that the implementation of the agreements will be a complex and time-consuming process, and one which will require the cooperation of all parties.”

3. You should also note that some of implementing steps are underway. The administration sent the executive orders to the Federal Register for publication January 22. In the first court case challenging the agreement, the judge ruled that the President had full authority to reach agreement for the release of the hostages. We expect other similar suits and will continue to defend the agreement.

Haig

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 26, 1981, 1840Z

399. Subject: The Implications of the Hostage Agreement for U.S.-Algerian Relations.

1. (Secret—entire text.)

2. Summary. The GOA probably accepted the role of intermediary in the hostage crisis primarily to protect “the Iranian revolution”, to enhance Algeria’s role as a peacemaker, to strengthen the international position of Algerian diplomacy and the domestic position of Bendjedid and Benyahia, and to change Algeria’s image in the U.S. and in the West, bilateral issues were probably of secondary concern, although the GOA undoubtedly hopes that its new image will yield it benefits over time. In discharging what is essentially a moral obligation, the USG may wish to consider a number of steps: renewal of Bendjedid’s invitation to visit the U.S., a rapid resumption of LNG negotiations, action on military training proposals, and a number of other initiatives, some easy, some not. End summary.

3. In discussing their efforts in the hostage crisis with us, Algerian officials have stressed humanitarian aspects, and we understand MFA officials have been told not to respond to questions about Algeria’s mediation except with general statements about its humanitarian concerns. However, the GOA probably undertook the role of intermediary in the hostage crisis for a number of reasons, among which we see:

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

(A) A strong commitment to protect and support "the Iranian revolution" which Algerians see as similar in many ways to their own struggle for independence. In this context, the GOA probably saw the continuing hostage crisis as dangerous because it (1) invited renewed U.S. military action in Iran, (2) could have led the U.S. toward support for Iraq, (3) hampered the emergence of strong domestic political institutions in Iran, and (4) tempted the Soviet Union to continue exploiting Iranian weakness and the possibility of U.S. military action.

(B) A commitment of principle to the resolution of regional disputes of a strongly destabilizing nature. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the GOA has been sensitive to the destabilization of the Gulf/Indian Ocean region, and it probably saw the hostage mediation as contributing to stability and opening the way to the resolution of other conflicts, particularly the Iran-Iraq conflict.

(C) A strong desire to re-establish the importance of Algerian diplomacy, in the world at large and in the Third World in particular. Since the death of Boumédiène² and the appointment of Benyahia as Foreign Minister, Algerian diplomacy has achieved some modest success on the Western Sahara issue and on relations with France, but there has been no initiative or success spectacular enough to give the Bendjedid regime and its Foreign Minister their own place in the sun. Now, Bendjedid and Benyahia are clearly established on the world scene, and the Boumédiène/Bouteflika³ legacy has been clearly relegated to the past. Bendjedid has been strengthened as President, and Benyahia has been strengthened as Foreign Minister. With the exception of the pro-Moscow Marxists, all elements of the Algerian body politic have probably seen something in Algeria's role to praise. "Progressive" leftists such as Yahiaoui probably saw this role as supportive of Iran. "Liberals" such as Algeria's technocrats probably saw it as a natural opening to the West. The middle-of-the road nationalist majority, including most of the military, probably saw it as a healthy reaffirmation of Algeria's place in the world and of Bendjedid's place in Algeria.

(D) A desire to change Algeria's image in the West in general and the U.S. in particular. The GOA has been working hard to make its policy of non-alignment a truly genuine one, and is convinced that the only way to do this is to enjoy good relations with both superpowers. In this context, it has been hampered by its outdated image as a "radical" state that always supported the Eastern bloc and lost no opportunity to attack the West, even to the extent of supporting certain forms of international terrorism. Without changing its rhetoric, the GOA has gradually taken specific policy actions to alter its course and its image.

² Houari Boumédiène, the second President of Algeria, a proponent of Western Saharan self-determination and of non-alignment in foreign policy, died in 1978.

³ Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1978.

Its mediation effort is the latest of these actions, and perhaps the most eloquent.

(E) A growing commitment of the rules of international diplomacy and genuine shock and embarrassment at the actions of the “Iranian revolution” in this domain.

4. The GOA probably does not expect anything directly from the U.S. as a result of its mediatory role, and it is not likely to make any specific request linked to the hostage agreement. It knows that, now that the hostages have been released, it has little leverage on us beyond that conferred by our intangible moral debt. It is not going to come to us and say “stop selling weapons to Morocco” or “pay more for LNG” instead, it will hope that its improved image in the U.S. will make it possible for U.S. policymakers to respond positively as it tries to strengthen its non-alignment and to respond with understanding as it pursues its national interests in the region and in the world.

5. The obvious terrain on which the GOA will hope to elicit more cooperation from U.S. policymakers is military. The GOA has standing requests for training and equipment which it has justified explicitly in terms of lessening its dependence on the Soviet Union. It undoubtedly hopes that its new image will make it possible for U.S. policymakers to respond positively in spite of continuing disagreement on some areas of bilateral and regional affairs.

6. The GOA will also hope to elicit a more truly neutral U.S. policy on the Western Sahara. In recent months, it has increasingly come to fear that the USG would support King Hassan in anything he did because of the idealized reputation he enjoys as America’s friend. Now, the GOA will hope that it too will be seen as ready to collaborate with the U.S. on certain (but by no means all) issues and will thus also have a claim on America’s friendship. Such friendship would, in the GOA’s view, argue for the U.S. to find ways to support King Hassan short of espousing his claims to the Western Sahara in theory or in practice.

7. Other issues such as the Middle East crisis and the North-South dialogue, while important to Algeria, are not current issues of burning concern in Algerian-American bilateral relations, and in any case the GOA certainly understands that American policy on such fundamental questions cannot be guided by considerations related to U.S. relations with Algeria.

8. Against the background, we believe it would be in the U.S. interest to demonstrate our gratitude and our desire to improve relations by taking several of the following actions, some of which should not be difficult provided we do not renounce the accords through which the hostages were freed:

A) Renew the invitation issued to President Bendjedid by President Carter to visit the United States.⁴ Such a gesture would not only demonstrate our gratitude over Algeria's role in the hostage crisis, but would also show that the new administration is interested in the Third World and would encourage the trend toward more moderation by a key non-aligned leader. This would be particularly important given reported plans for Bendjedid to visit the Soviet Union as early as this March.

B) Promptly put forward a new proposal in the LNG price negotiations,⁵ one which would be as forthcoming as possible but consistent with our fundamental criteria based on market factors. The most recent round of talks in Washington appeared to show such a new U.S. proposal is possible.

C) Authorize cash sale of some military training, thus improving our ties to the dominant element in the Algerian political system. This proposal has already been considered with some care within the Department of State, but no decision has been taken.

D) Consider the sale of C-130 aircraft to Algeria, as the GOA has previously requested and we had previously shelved.⁶ This would admittedly be a difficult policy decision.

E) Promptly act to facilitate GOA rental of purchase of a much-needed larger Chancery in Washington. We have held up such action pending resolution of a property dispute in Algiers, but could now go ahead in Washington and trust the GOA to arrive at a fair settlement of our claim in Algiers. This gesture would be especially pleasing to Ambassador Malek, one of the three Algerian negotiators.

F) Expand educational and cultural exchanges particularly by offering additional Fulbright scholars and facilitating an exhibition of Algerian arts and crafts in the U.S.

G) Review our decision not to participate in the 1981 Algiers International Fair (i.e., institute the biennial cycle of attendance agreed informally with the Department of Commerce in 1981 instead of 1982).

H) Invite Minister of Planning Brahimi and his senior subordinates to Washington for a symposium organized by the Department of Commerce on business opportunities in Algeria following approval of

⁴ Carter extended the invitation to Bendjedid in a February 9, 1979, letter. For text of the letter, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 71.

⁵ See Document 99.

⁶ In telegram 327 from Algiers, January 29, 1980, the Embassy informed the Department about Algeria's request to purchase C-130 aircraft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800051-0664) In telegram 56446 to Algiers, March 1, 1980, the Department informed the Embassy that "time is not ripe not propitious for C-130 sale." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800108-0312)

the new five-year plan (Brahimi and his colleagues participated in such a symposium in London following Queen Elizabeth's visit to Algeria).

I) Consider participation in the reconstruction of the El Asnam region through grant aid to private voluntary agencies such as Catholic Relief Services for assistance to the handicapped and the orphaned.

8. The above are preliminary ideas. We will be happy to elaborate on any of them at the Department's request.

Haynes

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, January 31, 1981, 0027Z

24475. Subject: US-Algerian LNG Talks. Ref: (A) Algiers 408,² (B) Algiers 453.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Reftel A reports El Paso's January 25 communication to Energy Minister Nabi of its imminent decision to write off its LNG project unless an accord is reached between the USG and the GOA on prices

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810045–0601. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN), David Burns (EB/IEP), and Kritzer (DOE/IA); approved by Edward Morse (EB/IEP).

² In telegram 408 from Algiers, January 27, the Embassy reported that El Paso Chairman Petty gave Algerian Energy Minister and Chairman of Sonatrach (the Algerian National Energy Company), Belkachem Nabi, a letter which said "as result of the suspension of deliveries of LNG to our company, which is now going into its 10th month, the situation of El Paso is now entering into a critical phrase. I must frankly tell you that we have reached the crossroads. One road leads us to resumption of deliveries of LNG to our customers in the United States and the other leads us to a cessation of this project." Petty said that if an agreement to resume deliveries were not reached by February 15, "we will have no other choice but to write off the considerable investment that our company has made in the LNG project for the reason that we do not have any assurance that the LNG deliveries will be resumed in the near future." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810039–1079)

³ In telegram 453 from Algiers, January 28, the Embassy cautioned that "the El Paso/Sonatrach LNG price problem must be solved within the next few weeks or El Paso will walk away from the deal. This would cost U.S. companies and the U.S. Treasury many hundreds of millions and would create serious new problems in U.S. relations with Algeria at a time when Algeria is being widely praised for its role in the hostage affair. The Embassy recommends a course of action and suggests a draft USG/GOA agreement on LNG pricing under the El Paso contract." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810041–0776)

prior to the third week of February. Once El Paso has taken this step, we believe it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to resurrect this contract. Unless the basic Algerian position changes subsequently, it would also be very difficult to implement the trunkline LNG project. We, therefore, face a major turning point in our economic/energy relationship with Algeria.

3. Given the very short fuse and magnitude of this decision, we are concerned: (a) that the GOA take seriously El Paso's decision, (2) that a wider GOA circle than just the Energy Minister be aware of the El Paso decision, and (3) that we do everything possible to limit damage to the US-Algerian relationship should an agreement be impossible.

4. For these reasons we believe that it would be useful for the Embassy to acquaint the MFA and other appropriate GOA Ministers of our views at an appropriate level at an early date. Department suggests Charge see Western Europe and North American Affairs Director Benouniche by January 31 or February 1.⁴ We will be pursuing the same objective through Ambassador Malek in Washington. Obviously, care will have to be taken so that the GOA does not perceive this step as an ultimatum. Nor do we want to politicize what we view as basically an economic issue. For good economic reasons on both sides, an accord may not be possible, but we would not want this failure to result from a miscalculation on the Algerian side or come as a particular surprise to government circles beyond the Energy Ministry.

5. Based on arduous negotiations, six rounds over the past ten months, we have to conclude that given the outstanding differences, Round VII may not be decisive. Nevertheless, given the El Paso decision to withdraw from the project absent a U.S./Algerian governmental accord by the middle of February, a USG team is prepared to come to Algiers if the GOA so desires. Given El Paso's intended decision, these talks would have to take place the week of February 16 with an outer time limit of February 18 because of El Paso's corporate procedures to close the books on fiscal year 1980. We will leave it to Boussena to determine advisability and precise timing of seventh round in consultation with DOE's Borre.

6. In discussing this matter with the MFA, you should make the following points:

— Since April, 1980, American and Algerian negotiators have been making persistent and strenuous efforts to reach an agreement on a

⁴ In telegram 476 from Algiers, February 1, the Embassy reported that during a January 31 meeting "Benouniche paid careful attention and restated our points completely and clearly to confirm that he understood the essentials. There is not the least doubt that he did understand the problem, including the fact that El Paso's deadline is neither arbitrary nor tactical." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810048-0553)

framework to permit resumption of LNG supplies to El Paso.⁵ Progress has been made, but significant gaps remain.

— El Paso has now notified the USG that it has decided that it cannot indefinitely sustain the financial drain of maintaining its assets and paying the LNG tanker debt in the absence of assured LNG supplies. It is preparing to write off the project by the third week of February unless an accord is reached.

— We are thoroughly aware of the Algerian pricing goals, although we must question whether they are realistic in relation to the U.S. market and regulatory requirements.

— An interim solution must be consistent with the price provisions of Canadian and Mexican gas trade; regulatory authorities, the Congress and the public simply would refuse to accept an outcome whereby Algeria, after nearly one year of interrupted deliveries, appeared to be accorded better terms than hemispheric trading partners whose reliability is well established.

— Moreover, regulatory precedent constrains the U.S. from approving a price for Algerian LNG that exceeds the ERA's competitive alternate fuels price test.

— We think it would be unfortunate for the project to fail at this point, especially in view of the substantial investment on all sides. We are prepared to work within our stated policy and framework which Algerian officials understand well, to seek to make one last effort to reach an agreement over next few weeks.

— However, we recognize that the U.S. and GOA views on price and on the economic factors involved may differ so widely that in fact no agreement is reached. In that case, the USG would consider this result a decision reflecting the economic policies and interests of the two parties and not directly related to the favorable evolution in the political relationship between our two countries.

7. (FYI Embassy: Department and DOE are reviewing the interesting approach outlined in ref B. We recommend Embassy not pass draft proposal in ref B to the GOA.) We will be cabling specific instructions in a few days.⁶

Haig

⁵ In telegram 87426 to Paris, April 3, 1980, the Department reported that "El Paso's efforts to extend the March 31, 1980, expiration date of their May 11, 1979, LNG price amendment with Sonatrach have failed to produce agreement." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D80168–1066)

⁶ No further instructions were found.

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, February 1, 1981, 1525Z

481. CINCEUR for POLAD. Subject: GOA Protests Sale of M-60 Tanks to Morocco. Refs: A) State 18634 Notal;² B) Algiers 424 Notal;³ C) Algiers 435 Notal.⁴

1. (S) Summary: The GOA has made a low-key oral protest over our decision to begin consultations with Congress on the sale of 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco. Public and private criticism of the substance and timing of this decision has begun to mount. End summary.

2. (C) At the end of a meeting held at my request January 31 to discuss the Algerian-American LNG negotiations (septel),⁵ MFA Director of Western European and North American Affairs Saadeddine Benouniche asked me to stay behind after EconCouns Smith's departure. He then made the following presentation.

3. (S) The GOA has taken note of our explanation of our decision on the M-60 tanks as being grounded in our traditional relations of friendship with Morocco. It is disturbed that our explanation mentions

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981-01/22/1982). Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USCINCEUR. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 18634 to Algiers, January 23, the Department reported that the United States would inform the Algerian Chargé "of our decision to sell Morocco 108 M-60 tanks. At the same time, we will inform him that the title to the first two OV-10 aircraft approved for sale to Morocco by President Carter in 1979 is being conveyed to the GOM as previously scheduled." The Department suggested that the Embassy inform the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "at your discretion," of the decision, "noting that, in keeping with the close relationship between our two countries, we wanted to bring the Algerians up to date on the status of our military relationship with Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810035-0632) For Carter's decision to provide OV-10s and arms to Morocco, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 49.

³ In telegram 424 from Algiers, January 27, the Embassy reported that Benouniche called in Ross "to request clarification of the Department's January 23 notification of recent USG decisions on arms to Morocco." The Embassy explained that based on telegram 18634 (see footnote 2, above) it had chosen not to inform the MFA about the decisions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810040-0211)

⁴ In telegram 435 from Algiers, January 28, the Embassy warned that the impending deliveries of arms to Morocco "is, unless we can give the GOA convincing background elements rapidly or take some of the edge off with a rapid gesture towards Algeria, going to have a chilling effect on bilateral relations as they have emerged from the GOA's role in the hostage negotiations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810041-0428)

⁵ Not found.

neither the clauses of the 1960 Moroccan-American Arms Accord⁶ that restrict the use of arms sold to Morocco for the defense of Morocco's internationally recognized territory nor the language used to justify President Carter's November 1979 decision to sell OV-10 aircraft and other equipment to Morocco—i.e., that this sale was meant to promote negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara dispute.⁷ Indeed, our reference to the non-suitability of these tanks for use in the Western Sahara implies that we have placed no formal restriction on their use there. In the absence of a clear reference in our explanation to either the restrictions of the 1960 Arms Accord or the justification of the 1979 arms sale decision, the GOA believes the sale of M-60 tanks is contrary to the spirit of the resolutions and recommendations of the various international organizations that have pronounced themselves on the Western Sahara issue. Such a sale would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, work against the exercise of self determination in the Western Sahara and contravene the OAU's call on external parties not to prejudice the negotiating process it has defined.

4. (S) On the basis of the above analysis, Benouniche said, he had been asked officially to present a protest over our decision. I told him I had taken note of the analysis and of the protest he had presented and would transmit them to the Department.

5. (S) Comment: Following the return of President Bendjedid and Foreign Minister Benyahia from the Islamic Summit January 29⁸ and publication of wire services reports of our decision in the leading government-owned Algiers daily "El Moudjahid" January 31, both official and unofficial criticism has begun to mount. Benouniche was acting under instructions, and, although both the level and the form of the protest were low-key, civilian and military leaders in the GOA are clearly disturbed. Captain Mahfoud, the Deputy Director of External Relations at the Ministry of National Defense, began a previously scheduled meeting with the DATT February 1 with strong criticism of our decision (septel in DAO channels).⁹ The Director of Higher Air School at Tafaraoui, Major Hamid Abdelli, voiced similar criticism of the substance and timing of our decision to our Vice-Consul in Oran January 31.¹⁰

6. (U) The first press editorial on our decision has also appeared, and it is predictably critical but surprisingly laconic. The government-owned

⁶ Reference is to the 1960 agreement by which the United States agreed to sell arms to Morocco with the stipulation that the arms only be used for Moroccan self-defense.

⁷ See footnote 2 above.

⁸ Reference is to the third summit of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation held in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, January 26–29.

⁹ Not found.

¹⁰ Not found.

Algiers daily "Ash-Sha'b" wrote in a February 1 front-page editorial: "The decision . . . could have passed as a simple, ordinary news item . . . had it not been for the speed with which it was taken and the inopportune circumstances in which it occurred. It had been expected that the requests of the Rabat regime would receive a sympathetic hearing within the new administration, especially after its candid announcement of its hostility to national liberation movements. . . . But the speed with which the Secretary of State rushed to take this decision . . . raises a number of questions about the hidden motives behind this race with time and about whether the new administration may not have had grave reports about the situation in Morocco requiring it to deliver arms on an urgent basis. . . ." End comment.

7. (S) We will continue to report Algerian reaction on this issue and would welcome further guidance from the Department as it becomes available.

Ross

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, February 7, 1981, 1807Z

32945. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Algerian Ambassador, February 6, 1981.

1. Algerian Ambassador Malek met with Secretary Haig February 6 for 50 minutes, primarily for a discussion of Iranian hostage agreements. Also present were DAS Morris Draper, Country Director Carleton Coon (NEA), and Stephanie van Reigersberg, interpreter. After the meeting with the Secretary, discussion of bilateral issues continued in NEA, with desk officer Edmund Hull joining the group (septel).²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981-01/22/1982). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Rabat. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 32071 to Algiers, February 7, the Department reported that after their meeting with Haig, Malek and Draper discussed the sale of M-60 tanks to Morocco and the LNG issue. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810058-0084)

2. Secretary opened meeting by outlining in warm terms gratitude of U.S. Government and President Reagan to GOA for its assistance in securing hostage release, as well as for Malek's personal role. Malek was modest about Algerian role, noting that it was "normal" since Algerian services had been requested by both USG and the Iranians. Algeria had tried to be honest and scrupulous. However, it had been a difficult task, what with changes in the political power struggle in Iran. The Algerians like the Americans had been in a state of suspense until the last moment when the hostages had actually boarded the plane.

From then on things had moved very rapidly, so rapidly that he had not had the opportunity to brief American officials on what had transpired in Tehran during the last crucial three weeks that preceded the release. He said he would be glad to give the Dept a full briefing on that period.

3. Malek noted that the Iranians had in the end made many concessions and that the GOA regarded the final agreement as good from the U.S. point of view. At any rate, the present problem was less one of analyzing the past than one of examining how to implement the agreements from here on out. He cited deadlines and procedures built into the agreements.

4. In response Secretary stressed U.S. awareness of difficulty of job Algerians had taken on, gratitude at outcome, and admiration for Algerian skill, patience, and dedication. He said that history will never record what the consequences of failure of those negotiations would have been, but he said that they would have been "very dramatic" and this provided all the more reason for U.S. gratitude at having the crisis resolved. Secretary noted that inevitably there had been speculation in the U.S. press regarding implementation of the agreements. He assured Ambassador Malek that the Reagan administration intended to meet its obligations, consistent with international law and domestic legal requirements. In the process, he said, the U.S. will be guided by the long term objective of conducting itself in a way that would not force Iran into the arms of the Soviets. He cited reassurances of President Reagan that the U.S. would not proceed in a spirit of revenge. It was normal, however, that a new administration not party to the events leading up to the agreements would wish to study them thoroughly. For that reason, he said, the Department would greatly welcome Algeria's advice and counsel, including any observations Malek had on the difficult period immediately preceding the conclusion of the agreements. He suggested a review with Malek of the implementation of the agreements, and that three-week period, take place with U.S. officials involved with the issue, including some of our new team, at the Assistant Secretary level.

5. The Secretary then referred to strong public feelings in the United States toward Iran and said that the future conduct of the Iranians would necessarily influence the administration's ability to implement the agreements in the spirit in which they were reached.

6. Malek noted that agreements for release of hostages should be seen as a valuable basis not only for settling the immediate dispute at hand but also for gradual normalization of relations between U.S. and Iran. In both contexts it was important that terms of agreement be adhered to. Iranians had been very distrustful during negotiations of whether U.S. would live up to commitments. Malek carefully stressed that the Algerians had placed their own credibility on the line in assuring the Iranians that they could trust the U.S.

7. Malek then analyzed specific portions of the hostage agreements. The U.S. commitment not to interfere in Iranian internal affairs was nothing more than what every country agreed to under the UN Charter. The matter of unfreezing Iran's assets had also been simplified by Algeria's suggestion that Iran leave certain of its funds frozen here in the U.S. under agreed conditions but that it immediately repay its loans to U.S. banks abroad. If this particular formula had not been agreed, months of additional negotiations between Iran and the U.S. banks would have resulted. Malek said he understood the problem for the U.S. involved in the agreement's provision to lift attachments and suits against the assets in U.S. banks here, but added that the arrangement governing the appropriate awards out of a renewable \$1 billion escrow account was a very reasonable procedure, in his view. He said he understood fully the other issues considered sensitive for Americans: (a) the proviso that no legal claims be introduced by the hostages or their families after the hostages were released; and (b) the question of USG cooperation with Iran's efforts within the U.S. legal system to identify and locate assets of the Shah.

8. Malek asserted that what it all came down to was that it was time for Iran and America to "turn the page" in their relations. He drew the analogy of Algeria's protracted conflict with France. Malek assured the Secretary of his willingness, and the willingness of his government, to cooperate in any way toward implementation of the agreements. He also noted that, as the protecting power for Iran, the Algerian Embassy has many problems arising from the large number of Iranian nationals still in the U.S., and expressed the hope that cooperation with the Department would continue on this front too.

9. Referring to "turning the page", the Secretary said that whether we were able to do that gracefully and effectively will be influenced by the outcome of the situation of the U.S. citizens who are still in difficulty in Iran. He noted also in this connection that there had been earlier

telephone threats (perhaps by Iranians) against hostage families; this could complicate matters considerably if continued.

10. Changing the subject, Secretary then referred to a matter that had surfaced virtually at the moment that Algeria's efforts with the Iranians had been crowned with success. This involved the new administration's need to resolve at once a longstanding military sales issue with Morocco. The Secretary said he wanted to assure Malek and the Algerian Government that the decisions taken on delivery to Morocco of aircraft and the sale of tanks had occurred when they did because of such factors as production line deadlines. These decisions also reflected U.S. determination to pursue policies which will consistently and reliably support historic friends of the U.S. However, he stressed, neither the decision itself nor the timing were in any way intended as an act or signal of unfriendliness to the Algerian Government. In practical terms the delivery date of the tanks (two and a half to three years) would occur long after we anticipated a settlement of the Sahara question.

11. The Secretary said that the USG "strongly favors a prompt, negotiated settlement" of the Saharan dispute. Conflict will not settle the issue.

12. He then reiterated that it was the policy of the Reagan administration to seek to build on and consolidate promising recent developments in the relationship between the U.S. and Algeria.

13. Malek said that press accounts and the tank decision timing had created a rather curious impression and had raised questions in Algiers. His government, nevertheless, continued as always to hew to a position of not seeking to destabilize Morocco while favoring self-determination for the Western Sahara. He said he saw a useful place for a USG role in the search for a settlement of this dispute, since the U.S. agrees that it cannot be settled by force of arms. Malek expressed the hope that the U.S. can convince Morocco of the need for a peaceful solution. On the broader issue of U.S.-Algerian relations, Malek said Algeria is ready to work for further strengthening. The U.S. is already Algeria's first trading partner, and Malek hoped that the situation would continue to evolve favorably.

Haig

102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, February 14, 1981, 0612Z

38672. Subject: Algerian LNG: Letter to Boussena.

1. Confidential—Full text.

2. Following is text of letter from DOE Acting Assistant Secretary Peter Borre to Sadek Boussena. Talking points are being transmitted septel. French text follows septel.

3. Begin text of letter:

Dear Sadek:

Pursuant to Round VI of the LNG bilaterals in Washington and our recent phone conversations, I have been authorized by my authorities to present the U.S. position concerning the suspended El Paso Algeria LNG project.² At the outset, I must emphasize that this matter has received a careful, rigorous review by senior officials of the administration. We have carefully developed a position which could permit a constructive negotiation on an issue in which U.S. law and regulatory policy and the realities of the market impose very rigid constraints on us.

— Base Price

I am instructed to convey formally that an FOB price of dols. 3.70/MMBTU, effective on April 1, 1981, for the duration of the entire second quarter, is the limit with respect to pricing, based upon fundamental US gas policy considerations; my instructions on this point are unequivocal.

In the context of understanding on this point, we would be prepared to discuss with you the remaining issues, and advance the following position with respect to them:

— Crude Oil Equivalency for Escalation

We have given very careful consideration to the Algerian objectives with respect to the eventual attainment of crude oil equivalency; we recognize that this is a point of fundamental concern to you. After extensive analysis and review, we are willing to accept an escalation mechanism which is based upon a relationship to the absolute change, rather than to the proportional change, in a basket of crudes defined

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810071-0191. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Ritzer (DOE); cleared by Poore (DOE), Pierce Bullen (EB/IEP), Dennis Sandberg (S/S-O), and Joseph Twinam (NEA); approved by Deane Hinton (EB/IEP).

² See Document 99.

as: Saudi Arab Light, Algerian Saharan blend, U.K. forties, Mexican Isthmus and Venezuelan Tia Juana medium (26 degree). The operation of this mechanism would be subject to a percentage limitation factor, with only a certain percentage of the absolute increase, translated to gas equivalency, to be applied to the FOB price. Escalation would be phased up to this percentage over the course of the agreement.

— Escalation Mechanism

The FOB price will be adjusted on the basis of the relationship of average quarterly changes in the crude oil basket prices. To illustrate, the July 1, 1981 price adjustment for the third quarter would be calculated by taking the absolute difference between the average second quarter and average first quarter 1981 crude oil basket prices, expressed in U.S. dollars per million BTU, with the result multiplied by the applicable percentage limitation factor. The computed figure would be added to previous quarter's FOB price (dols. 3.70 per MMBTU in this case) to derive the new quarter's price.

— Price Ceiling

The escalation provisions would be limited by an alternate fuels price ceiling. Whenever the escalation mechanism for the adjustment of the FOB price yielded a result in excess of the price level yielded by increasing the base FOB price by the change in U.S. alternate fuels prices between first quarter of 1981 and the quarter immediately preceding the date of escalation, the latter would become the ceiling FOB price. The U.S. cities comprising the alternate fuels ceiling are derived from our regulatory review of existing gas imports: New York, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Minneapolis/St. Paul, St. Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle/Takoma. The fuels would be a mix comprised of 20 percent no. 2 fuel oil and 80 percent no. 6 residual fuel oil.

— Sharing of Escalation

The recovery of the U.S. companies proposed 50 cent/MMBTU contribution as well as future increases in operating charges is a commercial issue which Sonatrach, El Paso and the customer companies will have to resolve, provided that all parties remain within the parameters on FOB escalation.

— Duration

Based on a current determination of market need, and on alternative arrangements made by the customer companies since the interruption of loadings, it would be virtually impossible to obtain regulatory approval for an agreement of very limited duration, such as one year. Therefore we propose an agreement for a term of 18 months from the date of first loading, with an automatic renewal for a further comparable period unless both parties agree to replace this agreement with a long-term arrangement for the remaining life of the contract.

During the course of six rounds of negotiations over the past ten months our governments have expended considerable efforts to secure an interim arrangement. The remaining differences between our positions are relatively small as compared to last April. It would be unfortunate if not tragic to continue to incur the sizeable losses which the affected parties have sustained when mutual economic interests call for the resumption of this project and the preservation of the contract which dates from 1969. I look forward to hearing from you via our Embassy confirming the advisability of holding Round VII in Algiers as scheduled early next week.

Sincerely,
Peter Borre
Acting Assistant Secretary
for International Affairs

Haig

**103. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Allen)¹**

Washington, February 17, 1981

SUBJECT

Algerian Liquefied Natural Gas

The seventh round of Algerian-US discussions on a government-to-government framework for the resumption of the import of Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG) into the U.S. under the El Paso Algeria LNG project will take place in Algiers February 17-18.² Attached are copies of the letter cabled to the Algerians outlining our

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981-01/22/1982). Confidential.

² In telegram 38673 to Algiers, February 14, the Department transmitted talking points for the Embassy to use when presenting the letter to the Algerians. The United States wanted the GOA to understand that it was "taking this step of conveying a revised U.S. position in the interest of expediting the upcoming round of talks. Time is short, and we want to do everything possible to give these negotiations a maximum chance to succeed," and hoped that "the GOA appreciates the high priority which the administration has accorded this problem." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810071-0172)

position,³ and the draft of a possible joint announcement⁴ which would embody the US-Algerian understanding on these LNG imports if agreement is reached.

This will probably be the last round of US-Algerian talks on this project, in view of the El Paso Company's financial deadlines. Since the two sides are at this point still far apart, it is quite possible that the talks may not be successful. We do not have a great deal of give in our position because of the possible impact on Canadian and Mexican border prices, and because of regulatory considerations.

On the political side, we have tried to insulate the possible demise of the El Paso project from having any effect on political relations with Algeria, through discussions with the Algerian Ambassador and with the Foreign Ministry in Algiers.⁵

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

³ In telegram 712 from Algiers, February 18, the Embassy reported that the LNG discussions "showed that fundamental differences continue to exist" between the United States and Algeria over the price of LNG. Given the disagreement, the two sides "agreed to end the seventh round of government-to-government discussions without any plans to meet again" unless "either side came up with something new." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810076–1107)

⁴ Not attached. See Document 102.

⁵ Not found.

104. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 18, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

5. *Liquefied Natural Gas Talks with Algeria*: Talks over the price of Algerian LNG shipments to the US concluded today without agreement. We have no immediate need for the gas; the price the Algerians were asking, linked to crude oil, was higher than we pay for Canadian and Mexican imports.

We emphasized to the Algerians that the LNG issue was strictly commercial, and the failure of the talks should not prevent an improvement in US-Algerian relations. So far the Algerians seem to agree. (LOU)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (02/04/1981–03/13/1981). Confidential.

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 20, 1981, 1705Z

1578. For the Secretary from General Walters. Subject: Meeting With Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. At 11 this morning (April 20) I saw President Chadli Bendjedid for one hour at his palace. Charge Ross and Lee Martiny were with me. Foreign Minister Benyahia was the only other person present. The President decided to speak in French and dismissed the interpreter.

3. I opened by thanking him for receiving me, stating that Secretary Haig had asked me to come to brief him on the Middle East trip² and to thank him for Algeria's successful efforts to obtain the release of the American hostages in Iran. I assured him that we intended to live up fully to the terms of the Algiers agreement, supported the territorial integrity of Iran, had no desire to push the Iranians into the Soviet camp, and harbored no spirit of vengefulness toward Iran.

4. I then said that we fully recognized the important role of Algeria in international affairs and that President Reagan very much believed in consultations with others, not just to inform them of our point of view but to listen to theirs and perhaps to change ours in the light of what we learned. A better understanding of one another will help us develop and consolidate those areas where we can cooperate.

5. The purpose of my trip was to brief him on the Secretary's trip and to discuss bilateral and regional matters.³ It was important that he have a clear idea of our strategic views. I then reviewed the Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh stops.⁴ I told him about the F-15 and AWACS sales to the Saudis despite considerable Israeli opposition, the Secretary's cooling the Israelis off an intervention in the Zahle fighting, and our understanding of the importance of solving the Palestinian and Jerusalem problems, which were central to peace in

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810186-0883. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² In telegram 96383 to Rabat and Algiers, April 15, the Department transmitted Haig's talking points for Walters's meeting with Bendjedid. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810179-0764)

³ Haig visited Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh April 4-8 to discuss the Middle East peace process. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁴ Earlier in April, Walters met with Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, and Saudi leaders to explain the U.S. position on the Middle East peace talks. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

that area. When I described the Camp David agreements as not an end in themselves but a first step of a long journey, he smiled understandingly and did not challenge those agreements. I described the concern of many Middle Eastern countries over Qadhafi's irrational and reckless behavior.

6. Then I said that we fear that the Middle East conflict greatly aided Soviets in mischief making in the area, but that even without the Palestinian problem there was the global problem of Soviet expansionism. There were no Palestinians in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, or Central America, but we still had aggressive Soviet pressure in all these areas. Afghanistan, an Islamic and developing country, had been brutally invaded. We sought no confrontation with the Third World, but we were aware of the realities of Soviet aggression. We intended to redress the military balance, strengthen our friends, consult with others, put our financial house in order, get a handle on inflation, and resume the upward move of American productivity.

7. We were concerned about the conflict in the Western Sahara. Morocco is strategically important to us. We do not desire to see the Straits of Gibraltar in unfriendly hands. We know from the Moroccans that there have been talks between them and the Algerians and that these talks were broken off.⁵ We regret this as we very much favored a peaceful solution of this difficult problem between brother nations. We had constantly made this clear to the Moroccans, who seemed disposed and anxious to talk to the Algerians.

8. When I mentioned Qadhafi's proposal for a federation between the Sahraoui and Mauritania,⁶ I got the first really sharp reaction of the whole talk from Bendjedid: "No, absolutely not. Out of the question." I reiterated that we favored a negotiated solution for the Sahara conflict, had offered our support for the integrity and independence of Mauritania, and encouraged direct contacts between the parties to the conflict.

9. We were concerned about Libya now more so than previously. I then again thanked him for receiving me personally and recalled that I had earlier discussed a number of these matters with his Foreign Minister.

10. President Bendjedid then thanked me for coming to see him and said that in the matter of the hostages Algeria had only done its

⁵ Reference is to the ongoing discussions between Algeria and Morocco over the former's support for the Polisario guerillas in Western Sahara.

⁶ In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April 22, the Embassy reported on Qadhafi's "unexpected" visit to Mauritania, during which he publicly made the federation proposal. The Government of Mauritania assured the Embassy that it "did not agree with Qadhafi's public statement." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810189–0944)

duty and that he was pleased to hear that we supported the territorial integrity of Iran. He hoped that the conflict between Iran and Iraq could be peacefully solved within the next few weeks by the good offices mission of the Islamic Conference. He remarked that he felt my visit and the presentation I had made to him were "positive and encouraging".

11. On the Middle East he too believed that solution of the problem of the occupied territories and Jerusalem was essential, without such a solution there could be no peace in the area, and a solution would result in lessening of tensions throughout that region. What I told him of our attitude encouraged him. He was sure that Saudi Arabia would never attack Israel.

12. On Namibia Algeria maintained here as elsewhere the right of self-determination and independence for all peoples. It was conflict in certain areas of Africa and the feeling of some countries in the area that they were threatened that made possible the pressure of "people from other countries". I said that the United States did not threaten any of the newly independent countries. They had brought in many thousands of Cubans, Soviets, East Germans and others: he remarked that they were threatened by South Africa. I said that neither Ethiopia nor Yemen was threatened but they still had tens of thousands of non-Africans or non-Arabs. He smiled ruefully and said, "oh well, Ethiopia is something else". He had, however, gotten my point.

13. On Libya he said he had seen Qadhafi the day before. One should not take seriously all of his rhetoric and impulsive statements. I repeated that I was more concerned by the immense quantities of arms he has brought into Libya and stored in huge depots. Most countries tried to have several pilots or drivers per plane or tank. Libya was the only country which had several planes per pilot and several tanks per driver. As a soldier, I know that he would understand that we were concerned as to the ultimate users of all of this equipment. Qadhafi had already moved on Chad and his neighbors. President Bendjedid said that he was working with Nigeria and other members of the OAU to solve this problem and was confident that they could do it. He indicated the Lagos mini-summit on Chad had been rescheduled to the near future with the agreement of all the parties and asked that "outsiders" give Africa a chance to solve this problem for itself.⁷

14. I remarked that Qadhafi had tried to federate or unite with almost all of his neighbors including Algeria. The President laughed

⁷In telegram 4340 from Lagos, April 10, the Embassy reported that the planned Lagos mini-summit on Chad had been postponed, apparently because Nigerians were unable to persuade Qadhafi and Adhijo to attend. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810171-0519) Documentation on the OAU's mediation efforts is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

and said that with Algeria it would never work. Union was like a marriage, you had to have agreement from both sides. I added that both sides have to be “consenting adults”. He laughed and repeated “consenting adults” with emphasis on the last word.

15. On Morocco and the Western Saharan conflict he said that Algeria sought no quarrel with Morocco. It did not want to see the overthrow of the monarchy, which it considered a factor for stability in the area, since no one could tell what sort of regime would follow. Algeria was not directly concerned in the conflict between the Sahraoui people and Morocco. He would not hide the fact that Algeria had helped the Polisario as it had helped all movements of national liberation. Algeria had often shown its desire for a peaceful solution and was disposed to help, but he made no direct offer to resume negotiations. I decided not to press this point as I was sure he had my message. I said that, if he really wanted to help, he must find some way to get the negotiations started again in a way that would not cause the Moroccans to lose face. After all, every man killed in this conflict is a brother and a fellow Moslem. He agreed, saying that they were all Arabs whether descended from those here before the Arab conquest or not. The Algerians regarded them all as brothers.

16. I took the initiative of closing the conversation by saying I had detained him long enough. He then thanked the President and Secretary for sending me. He felt my visit would encourage cooperation in a number of areas of common interest. He expressed great interest in the President’s recovery⁸ and said that he looked forward to seeing him at the Mexico meeting⁹ or perhaps later in the U.S.

17. Comment. The conversation was much warmer and more cordial than that with Foreign Minister Benyahia the previous day.¹⁰ President Bendjedid was smooth, relaxed, and assured without being cocky. His manner was extremely friendly throughout. Several times he nodded understandingly as I made a point. I was struck by his lack of criticism of the Camp David Agreements. At no time did he consult the Foreign Minister, who took no part in the conversation. He clearly regarded Qadhafi as a troublesome child who will some day grow up, but he implicitly recognized that the Libyan leader’s antics were

⁸ Reference is to the abortive March 30 assassination attempt on President Reagan.

⁹ Reference is to the North-South Summit, or the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development, scheduled to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in October. Documentation on the summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance.

¹⁰ A record of the April 19 discussion with Benyahia, which Walters described as “polite” and “actually less confrontational than I had expected,” is in telegram 1559 from Algiers, April 19; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810185–0989.

disturbing. When I spoke of our concern about whence the crews might eventually come for Qadhafi's vast numbers of tanks and planes, it was clear that he understood what I was telling him.

18. He seems a man sure of himself, an Algerian nationalist not entirely caught in an ideological straightjacket. He has some flexibility. It will be interesting to see if he does anything to resume talks with the Moroccans to support his affirmation of his desire for a settlement with them.

19. I am considerably encouraged by the talk's atmosphere even though I cannot point to any concrete positive development.

20. Department repeat as desired.

Ross

106. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, May 7, 1981

SUBJECT

C-130 Aircraft to Algeria (U)

Ray Tanter tells me you asked for a status report on the sale of C-130 aircraft to Algeria, an issue which is of very long standing. The basic facts, coordinated with Ray, are these:²

— State has agreed in principle to the sale, as a means of a) diversifying Algerian arms dependence (up to now they have dealt almost exclusively with the Soviet bloc); b) easing some of the disgruntlement the Algerians feel for what they perceive as a less than forthcoming attitude following their help on the hostage crisis; and c) demonstrating even-handedness in our regional North African policy. (S)

— *However*, State also feels that the sale can be used to promote some movement toward a political solution in the Western Sahara and want to test the Algerians on that score; (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret. Sent for information. An unknown hand initialed for Rentschler.

² Tanter wrote his initials in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

— With the above in mind, Dick Walters met yesterday with Algerian Ambassador Malek, pressed him gently on two points:

— We would need assurances that the aircraft would not be used in support of Polisario operations in the Sahara;³ (C)

— We would like to see the Algerians take an initiative to resume bilateral talks with Morocco on a political settlement of the Saharan conflict (Dick handled this part with great tact, suggesting that since Morocco has greater need of a settlement, Algeria would be in a better position to provide a *beau geste*).⁴ (C)

Malek is relaying all of this to Algiers for instructions; pending any response, the ball remains in the Algerian court.⁵ (U)

³ On May 4, Walters told Malek that the “U.S. would like to go forward” with the sale of C-130s to Algeria, “but wanted the planes to be for ‘Algerian purposes only.’ Malek said he assumed this meant ‘not in support of the Polisario’ and Walters confirmed this meaning.” (Telegram 115525 to Algiers, May 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810004–0316)

⁴ Walters told Malek that “the fact of the matter was that Morocco’s fate was at stake, and Algeria’s was not. A resumption of high-level contacts between Algeria and Morocco was desirable. The U.S. was looking for help from the Algerians” to settle the Western Sahara issue. (Ibid.)

⁵ In the margin underneath this sentence, an unknown hand wrote: “Thank you 5/11.”

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, June 17, 1981, 1830Z

2309. Department please pass SecDef and USCINCEUR. Tunis also for DepSecDef Carlucci. Subject: Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci Visits Algeria.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary. DepSecDef Carlucci visited Algiers June 16–17 for discussions with the Algerian Government. At both the MOD and MFA, Carlucci briefed senior officials on U.S. defense policy and its regional implications and described U.S. concern over Libyan activities. His MOD interlocutor avoided a substantive response on these

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810284–0872. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Moscow, Lagos, Nouakchott, Rabat, and Paris. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis.

issues, but raised instead his hopes for further sales of AMC trucks and his expectation that the end-use assurances the U.S. is awaiting regarding C-130 aircraft will soon be transmitted. Carlucci's MFA interlocutor indicated Algerian understanding of the need for strategic balance, stressed Algeria's desire for good relations with the U.S., criticized U.S. sales of arms to Morocco without restrictions, and called for an end to the Western Sahara conflict through negotiations and self-determination. On Libya, he described the threat it poses to the region as overestimated, dismissing such operations as the Gafsa affair² as worthy of a cheap detective novel. Libyan assistance to the Polisario, he said, was fully under Algeria's control. However, Libya's arsenal was indeed a matter for concern, as was the possibility of union between Chad and Libya. For this reason, Algeria was collaborating with Nigeria to find a formula for the departure of Libyan troops. We found Carlucci's visit valuable as a demonstration of U.S. interests in high-level dialogue, as an opportunity for the U.S. to set forth its defense policies, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a cautious expansion of ties and acknowledge certain aspects of the Libyan danger. End summary.

3. Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci visited Algiers June 16-17 to continue the administration's political and military dialogue with Algeria. In the absence of Foreign Minister Benyahia and MFA Secretary-General Dembri in France and of MOD Secretary-General Belloucif in the U.S., the visit and program were approved at the very last minute, and Carlucci was received by middle-level officials of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in their capacities as Acting Secretaries-General. Although President Bendjedid was purported to be out of town and did not receive Carlucci, and although the GOA was unable to provide any formal hospitality, both of the meetings held were extremely cordial, and Carlucci's interlocutors apologized repeatedly for the absence of their principals.

4. In a 40-minute meeting with Acting MOD Secretary-General and Director of Logistics Col. Abdelmalek Guenaizia and in a 90-minute meeting with Acting MFA Secretary-General and Director of Western European and North American Affairs Saadeddine Benouniche, Carlucci reviewed U.S. defense policy, emphasizing the commitment of the Reagan administration to strengthening national defense in the face of an erosion of the strategic balance and a change in Soviet military policies and the resulting need for the U.S. to build up its capacity for flexible response through, among other things, cooperation with like-minded governments. Carlucci stressed that the

² Reference is to the January 26-27, 1980, commando raid by Libyans and Tunisian rebels on Tunisian Government installations in Gafsa. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, footnote 2, Document 204.

forces and capabilities developed in the process were not meant for intervention in the internal affairs of other states or in purely regional disputes. Specifically, the development of further collaboration with Morocco was taking place in the context of U.S. global strategy, not in response to any regional or local dispute. Carlucci took the occasion of both meetings to describe heightened U.S. concern for Libyan adventurism. Although he indicated he had no formula to propose for dealing with this disturbing phenomenon, he invited Algerian views on the subject.

5. At the MOD, Guenaizia (who was clearly not authorized to address broad issues of foreign or military policy and kept glancing at a major introduced as the new Director of External Relations for reassurance) limited himself to a review of the two pending issues in military sales—AMC trucks and C-130 aircraft. On the truck sale, Guenaizia said the MOD was extremely satisfied with the negotiations and U.S. approval and indicated the first purchase of 1,300 units was likely to be merely a beginning. On C-130 aircraft, Guenaizia said the end-use restrictions being discussed in Washington posed no problems to the GOA, and the assurances the U.S. desired would be forthcoming “very soon”. On broader political and military issues, Guenaizia made no substantive response, although he kept nodding understandingly throughout Carlucci’s presentation. He limited his response on Libya to several nods and a broad smile. (Comment: This is the first time a GOA official has initiated a discussion of the C-130 sale in Algiers. That this should occur so soon after President Bendjedid’s visit to Moscow demonstrates the seriousness with which the GOA is approaching this sale.)

6. At the MFA, Benouniche responded to Carlucci’s remarks with a well organized and well reasoned presentation of Algeria’s view of world and regional issues. Although he broke no new ground except on Libya, the following points of his presentation were noteworthy:

— Algeria is fully aware that the continued independence to which it and other small states aspire requires detente and the absence of superpower confrontation. This in turn requires a strategic balance between the two superpowers which it is not appropriate for Algeria to pass judgement on. (Comment: Nowhere did Benouniche take issue with U.S. efforts to restore military equilibrium vis a vis the Soviet Union; indeed, in an airport discussion with the Charge after Carlucci’s departure, he went so far as to say Algeria understands the reasons for U.S. actions in this field.)

— The genuine non-alignment to which Algeria aspires requires good relations with the U.S., and Algeria is heartened whenever new areas of collaboration are found.

— Algeria understands fully the traditional good relations that exist between the U.S. and Morocco. What it cannot understand is the change in U.S arms sales policy that took place in November 1979 and by which Morocco was furnished weapons specifically for use against the Polisario outside its internationally recognized boundaries.

— Algeria seeks proper decolonization of the Western Sahara through negotiations between the warring parties and through the internationally-sanctioned method of self-determination. To do otherwise sets a bad precedent for Africa by bringing inherited borders into question. Algeria fears the continuation of the conflict for two reasons: (a) under certain circumstances, it could escalate into a wider conflict; (b) it threatens the stability of Morocco, and Algeria is keenly aware of the need for stability there.

7. On Libya, Benouniche went somewhat further than GOA interlocutors have gone in the past. He began by excluding Libya's intervention in Chad³ as a special case and went on to minimize the gravity of the Libyan threat in its other manifestations, expressing the view that the destabilizing threat Libya poses to the region has been overestimated. As an example of the absence of danger or serious purpose to be found in Libyan adventures, he cited the Gafsa raid, whose scenario (an armed attack by 40 men on a city of 200,000 some 600 kilometers from the capital in the expectation that this would lead to a wide-scale revolution) he described as worthy of a cheap detective novel.

8. Libya's role in the Western Sahara conflict, Benouniche affirmed, is not an independent one. While it supports the Polisario, it can go no further. To do so would be to challenge Algeria, and this it cannot do. Morocco may try to exploit Libya's present unsavory image to obscure these facts, but this is simply a maneuver to relegate Morocco's own intervention in Mauritania into the background. Algeria does not believe Libya has the capacity to get the upper hand in the Western Sahara issue to change the substance of the problem.

9. Chad, he said, is a different problem. The absence of any state structure had helped give the impression that the Libyan intervention had been a massive, effective operation, but this was not as true as it seemed. In any case, no one in Africa had really found the Libyan intervention at the request of the Lagos Accord, which Algeria continues to support, a really dramatic development.⁴ The announcement of Chadian-Libyan union was an entirely different matter, one on which

³ Reference is to Libya's December 1980 invasion and current occupation of northern Chad.

⁴ Reference is to the August 21, 1979, peace agreement between the warring factions in the Chadian Civil War, which created the *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* (GUNT), or Transitional Government of National Unity.

Algeria had taken a clear position. Unions cannot be achieved in this manner; they must be authentic expressions of the wishes of each country. When they take place in the presence of military forces, this is annexation. Algeria has been working and continues to work with Nigeria to find a solution based on a formula leading to the departure of Libyan troops from Chad. Since, in Algeria's view, Libya intervened for its own motives, not on behalf of "other parties", a solution can be found in a regional setting.

10. In give-and-take following Benouniche's remarks, Carlucci indicated that the Reagan administration indeed has revised U.S. arms transfer policy to make it responsive to overall U.S. interests in the national security field,⁵ but stressed that in Morocco's case this did not mean a change in policy on the issue of the Western Sahara. The U.S. continues to urge a peaceful solution on its Moroccan friends. While the Moroccan military now appears to have greater confidence in itself and in its role, the Moroccan Government also appears to be more willing to negotiate on the Western Sahara issue. However, it is not appropriate for outside powers like the U.S. to make value judgements on the basis of such impressions. It is to be hoped that the Nairobi summit conference of the OAU will start the parties on the road to a peaceful solution.⁶

11. Carlucci also reiterated U.S. concern over the size and continuing growth of Libya's arsenal, again indicating he had no formula to propose to deal with this troubling trend. Benouniche responded that indeed Libya's sizeable arsenal could pose a problem. Algeria had noted U.S. concern over this arsenal as expressed during the visit of General Walters in April, and, when it shared with the U.S. its view that Libya was not a worrisome factor, it limited this evaluation to Libya's activities, not its arsenal.⁷

12. When a member of Carlucci's delegation raised the existence of some difficult-to-verify reports that Libya's support for the Polisario was growing rapidly and might prove an obstacle to a peaceful solution, Benouniche responded that Libya did not have the logistical capability to move in this direction. Only two routes were possible—the existing trans-Algerian route and a theoretical Niger-Mali-Mauritania route. Algeria was firmly in control of the first, while the second was impractical.

⁵ In telegram 84780 to all diplomatic posts, April 3, the Department informed the posts that "the administration is in the process of revising U.S. conventional arms transfer policy to make it more responsive to the new security challenges we face and more supportive of our military, political and economic interests." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810157–1195)

⁶ Reference to the Organization of African Unity meeting held in Nairobi in June.

⁷ See Document 105.

13. Comment: The GOA appears to have taken a calculated risk in approving this visit in the full knowledge that top leadership would be absent. It had to balance its desire to avoid giving a negative signal against the danger of leaving its visitors with the impression they were not getting their due. In spite of the absence of GOA principals, however, the visit was valuable as a demonstration of U.S. interest in continued high-level dialogue, as an opportunity for the U.S. to set forth its defense policies and their regional implications, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a cautious expansion of ties, notably in the military field, and acknowledge for the first time (albeit guardedly) the dangers that Libya presents. It is an interesting coincidence that Algeria nominated its first defense attaché in Washington on the very day of Carlucci's visit.

14. We are not certain why President Bendjedid did not receive Carlucci. It may be that he did not wish to see him because he is a principal of the Department of Defense and such a meeting would have made too much too soon of Algerian-American military relations. It may, however, simply be that the MFA failed to coordinate preparations for the visit adequately. We had several indications large and small that it had failed to do anything until the very last minute, and a Presidential call may have proven impossible to arrange on that basis.

15. In the absence of ministerial or presidential calls, the Algerian press was extremely restrained in announcing the visit June 16. A small front-page item in "El Moudjahid" simply noted that "in the framework of an orientation trip (tournee d'information) in the Mediterranean region, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci is visiting Algeria from June 16 to 17. During his visit, Mr. Carlucci will have discussions with Algerian officials." This short item has already caused foreign journalists in Algiers to call us for more details, but we have limited ourselves to saying that Mr. Carlucci is visiting a number of countries in the Mediterranean region for discussions on issues of mutual interest on the bilateral, regional, and world scene. We suspect the Soviet Embassy would gladly give us several cases of vodka for a fuller report.

Ross

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, August 5, 1981, 0950Z

2752. Pass NEA, S/AL, AF, ARA. Subject: Ambassador Walters Meets With President Bendjedid.

1. (Secret Entire text.)

2. Scarcely had I returned from meeting with Defense Secretary General Belloucif on the morning of my arrival in Algiers² than word came that President Bendjedid would see me at once (in great contrast to the cliff hanger on my last visit in April). I went to Presidential palace with Charge Ross and my executive assistant Nancy Lewis. There was a guard of honor in the courtyard.

3. President Bendjedid greeted me warmly. I told him that the concern I had expressed regarding Libya on my first visit was still present and, in order to let him know that it was well founded, I wanted to show him some photography I felt he would find interesting. As I showed him the pictures, he looked very interested but handled them as though they were pornographic in nature. He thanked me for the confidence that we had indicated by showing him this photography.

4. President Bendjedid said he had talked sternly to Qaddafi at Nairobi³ and the Colonel had promised to be good, as he was very anxious to have the 1982 OAU meeting in Tripoli. Bendjedid said he had told Qaddafi that Algeria would not tolerate any Libyan destabilization of Tunisia, Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta. He did not mention Mauritania. Bendjedid took credit for a good part of Qaddafi's improved behavior since Nairobi.

5. He then spoke of Morocco, saying that King Hassan's offer of a plebiscite in the Western Sahara had been well received but that his last press conference was discouraging. He hoped that Hassan was talking for home consumption only. He denied any desire to weaken Hassan, saying Algeria wanted peace and good relations with Morocco but that the Western Sahara was the only fly in the ointment. Algeria wanted to work with the Moroccans on economic projects, such as a natural gas pipeline to Morocco and beyond to Spain and Europe. He expressed belief that opposition parties were trying to paint King Hassan into

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D81364–0411. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² A record of the Walters-Belloucif conversation is in telegram 2757 from Algiers, August 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810364–0618)

³ See footnote 6, Document 107.

a corner and denying him freedom of maneuver. He recognized that the Istiglal and other opposition groups were more intransigent on the Western Sahara than the King was.

6. I told the President that we were concerned with the situation in Central America and did not want to see clouds on our developing relations with Algeria. He said, "Belloucif has told you the story." Here again, I got the impression that the sale of ten tanks to Nicaragua was a one-time shot. I detailed our post-Somoza aid to Nicaragua and said that the Sandinistas seemed to want to close the door on their relations with us.

7. I then told Bendjedid that we hoped to have a decision on the C-130's soon and were considering the Algerians' other requests to buy military equipment in order to diversify their sources of supply. We would notify them as soon as we reached a decision.⁴

8. He spoke of his visit to China some years ago and, in answer to my question, said he had always seen Mao and Chou En Lai either alone or with only one or two people present.

9. President Bendjedid said it was his feeling that the Ethiopians were ready to talk to the Somalis but the latter did not know what they wanted. After asking for Algerian help in arranging talks, they had added so many new conditions that talks had broken off. He was personally convinced, and the Ethiopians had told him so, that they were looking for a secure way out of dependence on Soviets and Cubans.

10. I told Bendjedid of my visit to Foreign Minister Benyahia in the hospital near Paris, where he was recovering from injuries sustained in a plane crash. He was most appreciative that I had gone. He praised Defense Secretary General Belloucif, saying he was a man who understood the world—"both sides, like you"—a sly reference to the fact that Belloucif and I both speak Russian.

11. Bendjedid said that during his visit to the Soviet Union, Brezhnev had not brought up Afghanistan, but Bendjedid, as a Moslem leader, had. He felt Brezhnev was looking for a way out of the Afghan morass that would not cause him to lose face before the world.

12. I told him I was delighted that the Algerian Government had given agrément for the new U.S. Ambassador. As I left, he spoke of his desire for better relations with us and asked me to convey to President Reagan his warm regards and his hope that they could talk in Cancun.⁵

⁴ In telegram 217122 to Algiers, August 15, the Department informed the Embassy that it "has approved, subject to our legal requirement for congressional consultations, a commercial sale of C-130 aircraft to Algeria." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810381-1215)

⁵ See footnote 9, Document 105.

13. Comment: My reception on this visit to Algiers has been incomparably warmer and the Algerians much more forthcoming than during my previous visit in April. I saw the President and the Defense Secretary General within five hours of my arrival. President Bendjedid was much more relaxed and cordial than on my previous call. The Defense Secretary General was downright friendly. Since I was last here, Bendjedid has removed Yahiaoui and others who opposed his moderate policies, and I believe that an Algerian Government decision has been made to take a certain distance from the Soviet Union and to move toward a more truly non-aligned position. Both Bendjedid and Belloucif were almost sheepish about the tanks and hopeful we would see their action in perspective. The fact that I visited Foreign Minister Benyahia in France did no harm.

Ross

109. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, October 3, 1981

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to take the opportunity presented by the commencement of Ambassador Newlin's mission to Algeria to convey to you my greetings and those of the American people.

North Africa has been an area of considerable interest to my Administration, and I look forward to a strengthening of our relationship. General Walters has told you of our continuing concern about the destabilizing effect that Libyan actions are having in your region and elsewhere in Africa.² In addition, we are most concerned about Libyan support of international terrorism and other forms of lawless behavior. We are, as you know, determined to respond directly and effectively to threats against international order and regional stability and welcome a continuing dialogue with you on this and other subjects of mutual interest.

We also have been watching developments toward a solution of the Western Saharan conflict with great interest. Progress in this regard

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Algeria: President Bendjedid (8105773–8407957). No classification marking.

² See Document 108.

has been encouraging, and I wish to commend Algeria for its very constructive role. Now that a framework for a peaceful solution exists, I hope that a ceasefire can be implemented rapidly to put an end to the human suffering and damage caused by the war and to create the necessary conditions for the conduct of the proposed referendum.

I look forward to joining you and other national leaders at the forthcoming Summit at Cancun.³

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

³ See footnote 9, Document 105. In telegram 3554 from Algiers, October 6, the Embassy advised the Department that "Algeria's main objective at Cancun is an agreement to launch global negotiations. If the U.S. is seen as the principal country blocking such agreement, we can expect sharp criticism from Algeria. Although we would not anticipate our bilateral relations to be seriously impaired, we cannot exclude a setback to our improving bilateral relations if the U.S. is seen to thwart a major Algerian objective in which President Bendjedid is personally involved." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810471-1002)

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, November 15, 1981, 1620Z

4046. Subject: After Cancun: Algerian Views.

1. (C) Entire text.
2. Summary and comment.

In discussion of post-Cancun steps, Algerian MFA official said GOA continues to envision UN as central forum to coordinate disparate technical discussions on global growth and development.² He stressed that GOA has no interest in histrionics in global negotiations and that its intention is to engage in business-like negotiations on specific economic issues. He said next step is up to USG—to accept or reject concept of global negotiations and to propose an agenda.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810388-0828. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Geneva, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN.

² See footnote 9, Document 105. During the Cancun Summit, attendees from 22 nations explored ways to alleviate world hunger, strengthen investment in the developing world, and increase trade between the developed and developing nations.

3. In Embassy's opinion, there is no question that Algeria attaches great importance to a coordinated international approach to critical economic issues, particularly money and finance, raw materials, energy, and food and agriculture. An unwillingness by the U.S. to consult on separate issues under a UN umbrella would certainly be regarded as an effort to avoid or undermine discussions on those issues. Although current Algerian objective of an omnibus agreement encompassing the results of a series of sectoral negotiations is grandiose in the extreme, it provides insight into what GOA believes GN's should accomplish. End summary and comment.

4. In 75-minute discussion on Nov. 11, Econ Off reviewed points in reftel with Mohamed Benhocine,³ Director Economic and Financial Affairs, MFA. Benhocine served in GOA's Mission in New York for six years, and participated in Cancun preparatory meeting in Mexico City.⁴ EconOff was meeting with Benhocine for first time, and assessed him as able, careful, and thoughtful with a good sense of humor.

5. Benhocine said GOA considers Cancun to have been a success in that it clearly was a step down the road toward global negotiations. He noted that "everyone now seems to spell global negotiations with capital letters."

6. EconOff said USG, too, considers Cancun to have been a successful meeting, but that it is still too early to talk of launching GN's. He reviewed four "understandings" in President's Cancun address⁵ and said USG is in process of conducting series of informal discussions at end of which we will determine whether it will be possible for us to engage in a new preparatory process.

7. Benhocine said GOA has not yet arrived at a satisfactory French rendering of USG use of "understandings", and asked what word USG is using in its French translations. EconOff said ICA text of speech uses "point d'accord".

8. Benhocine said that, in general, GOA, could proceed on basis of four "understandings." He added, however, that GOA and most G-77 governments wish to discuss in an open forum the future roles and objectives of the specialized agencies, "of which we are all members" and to discuss those roles and objectives in relation to broad detailed negotiations in the fields of energy, money and finance, agriculture,

³No record of this conversation was found.

⁴The preparatory meeting took place August 1–2. No record of the meeting has been found.

⁵The text of Reagan's October 22 address is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, Book II*, pp. 980–982. Excerpts from the address are also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 68.

trade, etc., i.e., global negotiations. Benhocine stressed that for GOA and G-77 "global negotiations" has two meanings:

1) "Universal" in the sense of covering all the main fields of economic growth and development, and;

2) All-inclusive in terms of participation by all interested governments. He said GOA continues to believe GN's should be held in UN context but stressed that voting procedures would have to be set aside in favor of a negotiating process. He said it would be pointless to try to use UN voting machinery in which the majority could adopt a formula which the minority would ignore, and added that GN's could be successful only if all governments could arrive at negotiated agreements on new roles and strategies which they found it in their interest to support.

9. EconOff said it would be very difficult for the USG to participate in GN's in the UN context on basis existing resolutions and that our emphasis now is on new and as yet unnamed preparatory process as the next step after the informal discussions now underway. Benhocine said he understood clearly USG reluctance regarding GN's in UN, but said it would also be difficult, and probably counter-productive psychologically, to "throw away two year's work" by UN members. He said GOA and G-77 have stressed UN as forum for GN's because they see the need for a central body to coordinate what must of necessity be a series of disparate detailed talks on major issues. He said that in absence of central coordinating body, series of sectoral negotiations on trade, energy, etc. would not take into account the relationships between sectors and between the IMF, IBRD, etc., and would inevitably fail to find the answers the world badly needs. He said GOA continues to envision GN process in UN context as follows: with parliamentary voting machinery set aside, participants would negotiate agenda for talks and broad objectives to be sought; 2) technical negotiations would then be held, including negotiations on specialized agencies; 3) results of technical talks would be referred back to central forum for tailoring if needed and eventual inclusion in coordinated package agreement on all issues. He said GOA has no desire to create new organizations or machinery. On the contrary, GOA hope is that, with parliamentary machinery set aside, existing UN machinery can be used as a forum for negotiation.

10. With regard to follow-up steps, Benhocine said GOA considers next move is up to USG; that is, U.S. should make known its views regarding the concept of GN's, and should propose an agenda. He said that for practical purposes the "new preparatory process" cited in the President's message is already underway and that the sense of urgency shown by all leaders at Cancun had raised "great expectations" that GN's would be launched soon. EconOff said that our usage of "preparatory process"

is different: that it would follow, if at all the informal talks now being conducted and would involve discussions of agenda and procedures for eventual negotiations.

11. In summing up, Benhocine stressed that GOA, both as a government and as chairman of G-77, has no interest in engaging in divisive debate or in trying to conclude a shallow, contentious “global” agreement that would be without meaning. He said GOA wishes to engage in serious negotiations on concrete growth and development issues and subjects, including the specialized agencies, with the prior understanding that changes will be made and new strategies adopted only if and when the participants—particularly the major Western powers—agree that such changes should be made.

Newlin

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 16, 1981, 1630Z

4495. Paris please pass General Walters. Dept pass S/AL. Subject: General Walters’ Discussion With Algerian Officials.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary. General Walters had wide-ranging, worthwhile exchange with Acting Foreign Minister Dembri Dec. 15 which covered C-130’s, Western Sahara, Libya, Chad, Golan Heights and Abu Ain. Dembri revealed bilateral talks with Morocco were going on which could result in Hassan-Bendjedid summit. On Chad, Algeria would send observer detachment. Exchanges were frank but friendly. General Walters later covered much of same ground with the Director of the National Security Council. President Bendjedid, who was tied up,² sent word he hoped to meet with General Walters on his next visit. End summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810388–0828. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Damascus, Lagos, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Rabat, Tunis, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. The document is misnumbered in the original.

² In telegram 556 from Algiers, February 7, 1982, the Embassy attributed Bendjedid’s absence to “GOA unhappiness over the large number of high-level U.S. officials and delegations visiting Morocco and the apparent neglect of Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820068–0014)

3. Acting FonMin Dembri opened the conversation by warmly welcoming General Walters on his third visit to Algeria. Dembri said that visits like his, along with recent fruitful discussions that were held with DAS Constable,³ are indispensable for genuine mutual understanding between Algeria and the U.S. Dembri remarked that he hoped the dialogue would continue and become more intense.

4. Dembri raised the question of Israel's reported decision annexing the Golan Heights.⁴ General Walters asked if he had read the State Department's statement declaring any such move a violation of international law, and Dembri said he had. Algeria, he added, was very satisfied with the position the U.S. had taken, and believed this position would be helpful at the imminent Security Council consideration of the issue. General Walters remarked that the Israeli action was of deep concern to the U.S. since our view remains that any unilateral change in the status of the Golan Heights would be contrary to Security Council Resolutions 242,⁵ and 338,⁶ on which the Middle East peace negotiations since 1967 have been based. He observed that GOA allegations of US complicity were false.

5. Dembri said that one reason for Algeria's great concern over Israel's move was that it came at a particularly bad time in Arab eyes—following hard on U.S. extradition of Abu Eain to Israel.⁷ General Walters responded that Abu Eain's extradition came after the case had

³ A record of Constable's October 16–20 visit to Algeria is in telegram 3752 from Algiers, October 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810494–0656)

⁴ On December 14, 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin successfully pushed a measure through the Israeli Parliament annexing the Golan Heights, which Israel had occupied since the June 1967 War. (David Shipler, "The Golan Heights Annexed by Israel in An Abrupt Move," *New York Times*, December 15, 1981, pp. A1, A12) Documentation on the U.S. reaction to this decision is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁵ No record of such a statement by the Department of State has been found. Walters was likely referring to the White House's contention that the annexation seemed to "violate the United Nations Security Council document," UN Resolution 242, "that has provided the framework for an overall peace settlement in the Middle East for more than 14 years." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Israel's Decision to Annex Golan Upsets U.S. Aides," *New York Times*, December 16, 1981, pp. A1, A13) UN Resolution 242 was a November 22, 1967, UN Security Council Resolution that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories captured during the June 1967 War, the right of all nations in the region to be sovereign, independent, and to live in peace free from the threat of war, freedom of navigation, "a just settlement of the refugee problem," and the guaranteed "territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area."

⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, 1973, called for a ceasefire in the October 1973 War, the implementation of all parts of UNSC Resolution 242, and negotiations among all parties to achieve "a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

⁷ The Government of Israel accused Ziyad Abu Eain of setting off a bomb in Tiberias that exploded on May 14, 1979, killing 2 children and injuring more than 30 others. Eain later became a resident of Illinois. On February 20, 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed his extradition to Israel.

been considered at every level of the U.S. judicial system, including the Supreme Court which was completely independent, and that legal rather than political considerations governed the extradition decision.

6. Dembri replied that his government was not taking issue with U.S. internal legal procedures, but was worried about the political consequences, in particular the inevitable deterioration of America's image and influence in the Arab world. He noted Algeria and other Arab ambassadors had made *démarches* on the case but their views were apparently not given much weight.⁸

7. On the Western Sahara, Dembri noted that Algeria and the U.S. have used much the same language in their support of OAU decisions supporting a referendum.⁹ The principal Algerian objective is stability in the Maghreb. In this context, "we consider U.S. arms assistance to Morocco to be destabilizing and to contain a real threat of escalation."

8. Dembri said that he wanted to reiterate what Foreign Minister Benyahia had said to DAS Constable after Guelta Zemmour¹⁰—that Algerian territory had not been and would not be used by foreign troops for the purpose of supplying arms to the Polisario. The present situation was unstable and dangerous; it was important for the OAU to move as soon as possible to resume the negotiating process and fill the present vacuum. Dembri stressed Algeria's desire for improved relations with Morocco, for economic and commercial as well as political reasons. He added that his government was disturbed about the deteriorating economic situation in Morocco and its implications for internal political stability. "We are the greatest defenders of the Moroccan monarchy", Dembri said. He revealed bilateral talks with Morocco were taking place. If they were successful, a Hassan-Bendjedid summit would take place.

9. Concerning a settlement, Dembri remarked that the problem of direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario remained a difficult problem. He understood the U.S. view that the OAU decision did not call for direct negotiations between the two parties. On the other hand, there was no question but that the UN General Assembly had called for direct negotiations. General Walters interjected that it seemed to him there was no possible way that a body comprising 150

⁸ The Algerian *démarche* is in telegram 3815 from Algiers, October 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810504–0802)

⁹ See footnote 8, Document 386.

¹⁰ In telegram 3743 from Algiers, October 19, the Embassy reported that "in response to King Hassan's allegation of foreign involvement at Guelta Zemmour, Benyahia stated categorically that Algeria did not allow use of its territory by foreign elements in support of the Polisario and Beloucif asserted formally that no foreign elements were involved in that battle." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820513–0671)

nations could make a well-considered decision regarding the negotiating modalities in a complicated regional dispute. As for the U.S., the General continued, America would certainly take no action toward escalating the Sahara dispute. Our arms assistance to Morocco was directly proportionate to the provocation—the introduction of SAM–6 missiles and their use by the Polisario.¹¹ General Walters added that the U.S. hoped for improved relations between Algeria and Morocco, and was pleased that high-level bilateral contacts had been taking place.

10. Dembri commented that the Algerians were disturbed as much by the symbolic effect of all the American visits to Morocco as by the arms assistance itself. He added that his government simply did not understand the need of all the U.S. military advisors in Morocco. To this General Walters responded that the U.S. for its part did not understand why sophisticated materiel, which represented a qualitative change in the military balance, had been introduced into the Western Sahara. General Walters said he well understood the problem of foreign military advisors. For example, the U.S. had some 150 advisors in all Latin America while the Soviets had over 300 in Peru alone. (Dembri got [garble] indirect reference to Soviet military advisors here.)

11. Dembri noted that there would soon be a meeting of the OAU Implementation Committee in Nigeria to consider next steps in the negotiating process. Both the Polisario and Morocco had reservations regarding the original Nairobi decisions, and it would be important at this next meeting to prevent any backsliding. He stated that if the military escalation continues and there is no progress in the negotiations, it will be catastrophic for the region.

12. Dembri reiterated Algeria's wish to intensify consultations with the U.S. The purchase of C–130s was a clear indication of Algeria's desire for improved relations. He stressed that when the planes were formally turned over to the Algerians, it would be useful to make clear that the C–130 sale was in no way related to the Algerian role in the release of the American hostages. We do not want to become professional mediators, he said. General Walters said he understood Algeria's sensitivities on this point, and would make certain no such linkage was made.

13. Dembri turned to the current friction between Libya and the U.S., noting that this deteriorating relationship was very disquieting to Algeria. American rhetoric seemed to be mounting, the press dramatized the situation and the result was a spiral of recriminations. General Walters stressed that the U.S. withdrawal of oil company employees from Libya was not frivolous, but was based on hard information.

¹¹ For more on the arming of the Polisario with SAM–6 missiles, see footnote 3, Document 384, and Document 385.

He noted that the U.S. has evidence that Qadhafi has dispatched two terrorist squads to the U.S. with the aim of assassinating President Reagan or other high American officials.¹² What concerns us most, the General remarked, is that Qadhafi is totally unpredictable; while there is no logic or Libyan interest in assassinating U.S. officials, Qadhafi's pattern of irrationality makes it essential that we take the evidence seriously. The General continued that it was also necessary to keep in mind that Americans had been traumatized by the assassination of six Ambassadors in recent years. No American President could therefore afford to dismiss a terrorist threat from Libya. Still another consideration was that the Reagan administration is determined to cease projecting an appearance of U.S. weakness and to establish America's international credibility. Dembri responded that Algeria was opposed to any kind of terrorism, but from an outsider's point of view the whole U.S.-Libyan dispute appeared to be a mirage. When Dembri noted that there had been press reports of a possible U.S. assassination attempt against Qadhafi, General Walters said he wished to deny categorically that assassination was an option. President Reagan had not only ruled out any consideration of such action, but even discussion of it, as had his predecessors.

15. Turning to Chad, Dembri confirmed that Algeria had agreed to send a detachment of observers to assist the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. He noted also that Algeria had provided considerable aid to the GUNT, principally in the form of medical equipment. Algerian aid, he stressed, was designated for use only by the government itself. He added that Algeria recently had made a demarche to the Sudan,¹³ asking that military assistance to Habre be terminated. General Walters responded that U.S. policy is very similar. We have made representations to both Sudan and Egypt asking them to stop supporting Habre.¹⁴

16. The discussion with Col. Belkeir took place at the Presidency immediately after the meeting with Dembri. General Walters covered many of the same points, essentially reviewing the preceding discussion. Belkheir's main points were related to the Western Sahara. Like Dembri, he emphasized the need for stability in the Maghreb. At the same time he stressed that Algeria strongly believed that a national

¹² Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

¹³ Not found.

¹⁴ In telegram 320522 to Khartoum, December 3, the Department informed the Embassy that during their November 18 meeting, Nimeiri agreed with Haig "that Habre must be induced to cease military activities until the situation in Chad and Libya's intentions become clearer." Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal told Crocker that "Egypt shares this view." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810575–0623) Documentation on the Haig-Nimeiri conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa.

liberation movement like the Polisario must be supported. The FLN could not betray its own experience and ideals—especially that a liberation movement has the right to secure its independence by whatever means it can. Again repeating a point made by Dembri, Belkheir underlined Algerian concern that increased U.S. arms assistance to Morocco could lead to an escalation of the conflict. General Walters reiterated that our response has been proportionate to the escalation brought about by the introduction of SAM-6's, and its purpose is to restore the military balance and prevent further escalation of the Western Sahara conflict while diplomatic efforts for a solution continue.

17. Belkheir emphasized the importance of reinvigorating the OAU negotiating process as the only way of avoiding further military escalation. He said that Algeria, as a developing country, needs to use its resources for social and economic development, and its interest lies in a normal and stable relationship with Morocco. Finally Belkheir noted Algeria's satisfaction that the C-130 sale had been completed. He remarked that this transaction was an earnest of Algeria's desire for closer relations with the U.S.

Newlin

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 16, 1982, 1620Z

288. For Deputy Secretary Stoessel from Newlin. Subject: The Future of US-Algerian Relations—The Lockheed Project.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Negotiations between Lockheed and Algeria on a far-reaching package of aircraft, technical studies, constructions and training/maintenance have reached the point where Lockheed chairman Roy A. Anderson paid a 3-day visit to Algiers for in-depth discussions with senior Algerian officials and Embassy.

3. On March 13 Algerian Air Force Chief Abdelli sketched Algeria's needs, the most urgent of which are approval of eight additional C-130

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

aircraft and FMS training. Abdelli officially requested me to obtain an early reply to Algeria's requests in this area, particularly training.

4. Abdelli reiterated that Algeria had given firm end-use assurances concerning the C-130's. Moreover, Algeria was a huge country whose development needs were as urgent as they were enormous. Algeria, he stressed, had no expansionist aims whatsoever.

5. He then went on to state Algeria's intention to buy a wide-bodies aircraft for presidential use and additional similar aircraft for Air Algerie, as well as technical training and maintenance facilities for its aircraft fleet. As a developing country, Abdelli said Algeria could not afford separate civilian and military maintenance infrastructures.

6. The Algerian Air Force chief mentioned that financing would be an important consideration. He also stated that the USSR, France, the UK and the FRG were all interested in obtaining the contract for this large program, details of which are reported *septel*.²

7. Comments and recommendations:

(a) Having been given end-use assurances, which Algeria is scrupulously respecting, I believe we should promptly approve the request for the pending C-130's.

(b) Logically, we should also approve the USG training which requires a presidential determination to make Algeria eligible for FMS. Algeria considers it has purchased U.S. military equipment which it is currently unable to use for the purpose for which it was bought because of the lack of desired USG-supplied training. (Abdelli rather bitterly referred to the fact that C-130's were currently being used to import eggs.)

(c) If, despite logic, we are currently unable to provide the kind of training Algeria so strongly desires, I believe I should be authorized to tell Abdelli frankly the reasons therefore. I hope that pouring cold water on a request that the Algerian military looks on as a test of American good faith will not materially damage Lockheed's chances for the overall package being discussed, but I cannot be certain.

8. I do not need to underline the potentially fundamental political implications of this project. The largest, richest and most stable North African country is considering entering into a long-term relationship with a major American company which will ultimately end its military dependence on the Soviet Union in a key area. In addition, the economic benefits are considerable. Lockheed has been cautious in this department, but chairman Anderson told me the additional modules for wide-bodied aircraft, spares, training and maintenance facilities would

²Not found.

amount to dols. 600 million and the entire package could eventually cost upwards of dols. 2 billion.

9. Anderson may raise some of these issues at the dinner hosted by Ambassador Malek March 19 which Anderson understands you are also attending. You should be aware that the Algerians have asked us specifically not to mention the planned purchase of a presidential aircraft to Ambassador Malek, even though Malek is aware at least in general terms of the other aspects of the proposed cooperation. As best we know, the only decisions of a military nature that need to be taken now relate to the additional C-130's and the FMS training. Lockheed will soon begin an exhaustive in-country study of the other components of the package. A decision to assist with maintenance of non-U.S. built military aircraft may not be required until several years from now.

Newlin

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, July 15, 1982, 1545Z

2888. Subject: Relocating the PLO. Ref: State 195773.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary, Acting FM Dembri took a hard line in reply to my presentation of points refel. He said no Arab country could receive the PLO when their wish was to return home. The PLO leadership and fighters in West Beirut were prepared to die and if they perished others would rise to replace them. More time for negotiations was needed. Dembri again urged the U.S. to recognize the PLO and to support the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982-09/26/1983). Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 195773 to Algiers, July 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to approach the GOA about helping the United States "seek an honorable way for the PLO in Beirut to depart Lebanon in safety," given that "no Arab country has come forward demonstrating an inclination to receive the 5-8,000 PLO combatants from West Beirut." The United States believed that "the survival of the PLO as a potentially constructive political force in the region is at stake," contended that "to prevent further bloodshed, someone must take these fighters," and sought Algeria's "views on how this question of a haven or havens for the PLO fighters might be achieved. We are profoundly concerned that, should there be further delay, events may take an uncontrollable course." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

achievement of Palestinian rights. Dembri's reply may have been largely tactical. End summary.

3. I saw Acting Foreign Minister Dembri at 1500 local and used points reftel verbatim while stressing our view several times that time was growing short if a catastrophe was to be avoided. Dembri began by saying it was clear the State Department had not taken any account of Algeria's views as expressed earlier. (I denied this and said I thought we both wished to avoid carnage in Beirut and preserve the possibility for a constructive political role for the Palestinians.)

4. Dembri said no Arab country could permit the Palestinians to go further from Palestine when their desire was to return home. The United States should, he urged, recognize the PLO and the right of the Palestinians to their homeland. Secretary-designate Shultz' remarks before the SFRC were encouraging,³ but the U.S. must go further.

5. The U.S., Dembri said, should exercise pressure on Israel. More time was needed for negotiations. The world would not accept an Israeli diktat. It was not Israel, he said, who was threatened by the Arab states, but the Arab states who were threatened by Israel.

6. I noted it was unrealistic to think of the Palestinians returning under present circumstances and again urged Algeria to help find a haven of refuge for the PLO now in West Beirut. Dembri asserted the leadership and fighters were ready to die and that, if they perished, new leaders and new fighters would rise in their stead.

7. Dembri confirmed FM Ibrahim had departed for the Non-Aligned meeting in Cyprus. There would be fifty ministers taking part and a total of eighty delegations. The PLO, he thought, would be in the chair. All other prospective meetings would await the outcome of the non-aligned session.

8. Comment: I believe Dembri's prompt reply was largely tactical. He was, I believe, taking a hard line on the eve of the Non-Aligned meeting which Algeria sees as a major event. He may also have been influenced by the categorical Syrian refusal to accept armed elements expressed to Ambassador Paganelli. We continue to think that Algeria wishes to get the best possible deal for the PLO if it has to leave Beirut. Ideally, this would be recognition by the United States but short of that it could mean enhanced political recognition by the Europeans and others. Finally, Algeria has reacted favorably to Secretary-designate

³ Reference is to Shultz's July 13 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings, in which he declared in reference to the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations: "For these talks to succeed, representatives of the Palestinians themselves must participate in the negotiating process." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1982, pp. 49–53)

Shulz' remarks on the Palestinian question and will be anxious to foster what it considers to be a positive new element in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

9. Dept may wish repeat to addressees reftel.

Newlin

114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Italy and Algeria¹

Washington, September 3, 1982, 1231Z

248777. Subject: Message for President Bendjedid.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Please pass to Ambassador Walters the following text of a letter from the President to President Bendjedid for delivery during his meeting.

3. Begin text:

Mr. President:

I have asked Ambassador Vernon Walters, who has my full confidence, to set out for you and your government the details of the major initiative in the context of the Middle East peace process which I announced September 1.²

As Ambassador Walters will make clear, it is my firm determination to seize the historic opportunity that exists today to move toward

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Algeria: President Bendjedid (8105773–8407957). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was sent from the White House Situation Room.

² Reference is to Reagan's September 1, 1982, Fresh Start initiative for peace in the Middle East, in which he called for a plan to "reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." This, he argued, required a "new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East." The initiative specifically called for "full autonomy" for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza during a 5-year transition period from Israeli to Palestinian rule. Meanwhile, Israel should immediately adopt "a settlement freeze" in these areas, which "more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks." The United States, however, would not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The text of the address is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan 1982*, Book II, pp. 1093–1097, and in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 116. Documentation on the initiative is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. While we believe that the United States has a significant responsibility to seek a resolution of this critical issue, I am aware that in order to achieve progress, the views of all must be seriously considered. For that reason, Ambassador Walters' discussions with you and our similar discussions with other leaders are an important first step.

Our differences in the past have been on means, but not on the goal of securing peace and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. I know that you will listen carefully to the details of my proposals and consider them in the light of your own long dedication to peace and justice. The time is ripe and our actions today can contribute significantly to the achievement of our common goal.³

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan

Shultz

³ In telegram 3610 from Algiers, September 5, Walters indicated that during a September 5 meeting in Algiers, Bendjedid said "this action by the United States was a definitely positive step. He could not be 'more royalist than the King' and whatever was acceptable to the Palestinians would be the Algerian position. The Arabs believe that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian position." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820461–0403)

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, October 9, 1982, 0142Z

285232. Subject: The Secretary's bilateral with the Algerian Foreign Minister

1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: Algerian FonMin called on Secretary October 6 in New York. At Secretary's invitation, Ibrahimi reviewed Algerian views on Mid East. In so doing he stressed Algiers agreement with Fez Arab

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820522–0982. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Peter Sebastian (NEA/AFN); cleared by David Schneider (NEA), Richard Sherman (S/S–O), McManaway (S/S), and E. Anthony Wayne; approved by Shultz. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Rabat, Damascus, and Paris.

League's summit eight points² and its participation in summit committee formed to contact permanent members of UNSC. Ibrahimî qualified American September 1 principles on ME³ as step forward but urged establishment Palestinian state which U.S. could "impose". Secretary disagreed but stressed we also believe in centrality of Palestinian question. On Gulf war, Ibrahimî described Algerian mediation efforts which continue. Progress being made slowly. Regarding Northwest Africa, Ibrahimî reaffirmed GOA's support for OAU's cease fire/referendum formula for ending Saharan war and its desire have good relations with Morocco. Ibrahimî charged U.S. had abandoned neutrality in that conflict when it decided install bases in Morocco. He said GOA is satisfied with its economic tie to U.S. but thought political relations needed to be developed. Secretary affirmed desired friendly relations with both Algeria and Morocco. Ibrahimî asked for help with Algeria's Chancery problem and volunteered to settle question of villa belonging to Embassy Algiers. End summary

3. The Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimî accompanied by New Algerian UN Perm Rep Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian Ambassador to the U.S. Yaker and political director, Algerian MFA called on the Secretary in New York on October 6, 1982. Under Secretary Eagleburger, NEA DAS Schneider and NEA/AFN director also sat in.

4. Secretary opened with an expression of condolences for the passing of Ibrahimî's predecessor. This evoked an expression of personal and official appreciation from the Algerian Minister.

5. Ibrahimî, expressing pleasure at this opportunity to continue a high level dialogue with the USG begun four months ago with the Vice President,⁴ began by characterizing our bilateral relations. These relations, he said, suffer from a contradiction in Algerian eyes in that the GOA is pleased with the state and development of our economic relations but considers that our political relations "remain to be developed." Ibrahimî, continuing, said that Algeria as we knew is attached to its independence and non-alignment. As its war of national liberation from France has clearly shown, it is and remains unprepared to accept domination from any quarter. At present, he said, there is no conflict between Algeria and the U.S. and there will be none so long as these principles are shared.

² Reference is to the Arab League summit held in Fez, Morocco, September 6-9. The eight-point plan in part called for Israeli withdrawal from all lands it had captured in the 1967 war, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a UN Security Council guarantee that would "guarantee peace between all states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state." A translation from the original French is in telegram 6811 from Rabat, September 10, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820469-0512) Documentation on the eight-point plan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

³ See footnote 2, Document 114.

⁴ No record of the Bush-Ibrahimî meeting, which took place June 10, was found.

Ibrahimi considered that current circumstances permit political relations to become more complementary with our bilateral economic cooperation “with which we are satisfied.” So much for principles.

6. The Minister then offered to discuss the Middle East and Northwest Africa. On the Middle East, he said that he had already stressed four [garble] ago “when we were on the threshold of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon” that all efforts to solve the Middle East problem had failed because they had not addressed the heart of the issue—the Palestinian question. He had put it to the Vice President, Ibrahimi continued, that events in Lebanon might lend themselves to the correction of this shortcoming. Since then, the PLO had evacuated Beirut; the Fez summit had convened and the world had witnessed the massacre in Beirut.⁵

7. FonMin Ibrahimi then adverted to the Fez summit. He insisted, in his words, on Algeria’s “responsible and moderate participation in that summit.” He noted that the summit had adopted “a joint resolution reflecting joint Arab positions.” He underlined that this result was achieved despite the fact that “the events in Beirut did not operate to strengthen either Palestinian or Arab moderation.”

8. Ibrahimi then characterized the U.S. role: the U.S. ceased being a simple mediator in the last four months in this context, he asserted. It has now committed its prestige fully which is why a positive outcome is needed. The Minister gave it as Algeria’s view that the international situation now favors the “imposition” of a durable solution in the Middle East by the creation of Palestinian state. The U.S. can exploit several salient features of the situation “to impose a just solution:” there is a strong moderate trend running in the Arab world favorable to such an approach. Domestic Israeli opinion “is hostile to Begin’s policies.” The Algerian people find it hard to understand that the U.S., which has always defended the right of self determination, does not appear willing to vouchsafe this right to the Palestinian people.

9. The Secretary then said that it appears to us, now that various groups have taken positions on the issues, that the [time?] is near for the principals to come together to discuss their differences and propose compromises “particularly in so far as the Palestinian problem is concerned which, I agree, is central to a solution.” The President’s September 1 proposals address the issues. Now is the time for dialogue. We think, the Secretary said, that King Hussein should be centrally involved. This is because the population of Jordan is roughly 2/3 Palestinian; because, historically, Jordan has had jurisdiction on the West Bank and because economic exchanges of scope exist between Jordan and the West Bank. Affiliation thus seems sensible. This said, the Secretary continued, we do not believe anyone is in a position to impose a solution on Jordan or on Israel. One can, however, argue with Israel as we do that there will

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 28.

be no peace in the region without a solution to the Palestinian problem. Israel has a tremendous stake in peace, the Secretary said. Israel's claim of sovereignty over the West Bank/Gaza will not bring peace. We have said as much to the Israelis. There is now a great debate in Israel and within world Jewry on this point. To illustrate, the Australians and New Zealanders told us today that Jewish quarters in their respective countries are deeply engaged in this debate, the echoes of which certainly reach Israel. The Secretary summarized: "We cannot impose a solution but you are correct in saying that the Palestinian issue must be confronted and dealt with. I am interested to hear you say in this connection that moderate views dominated in Fez."

10. Ibrahimi then said he wished to explain that his use of the term "impose" was intended to convey that in Algeria's view the U.S. has the means to give a durable impetus to a solution. Algeria believes that the President's September 1 principles represent an important step forward. Concerned, however, that a further delay in the creation of a Palestinian state, for example by emphasis on some sort of link between Palestine and Jordan, will lose us time. Algeria considers that a Palestinian state must be created on the West Bank/Gaza.

11. At Fez, Ibrahimi said, there was unanimity on the eight points in the Fez summit declaration as well as on the committee which is to be sent to make contact with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and especially with the U.S.

12. The Secretary responded that we looked forward to a visit by the committee. All details have not repeat not yet been settled but we currently anticipate receiving the delegation October 21-23 or thereabouts. Ibrahimi seemed a bit surprised by the dates pointing out that the committee would meet beforehand. The Secretary reiterated that we had responded affirmatively to the request for a meeting to the committee but that timing had to fit with the President's schedule because the President wishes to receive the committee himself. Ibrahimi said that, whatever the date, we hope the dialogue would help to move things forward.

13. The Secretary then asked about the Gulf war and the status of the efforts the Algerian Government was making "to play a constructive role in its settlement. How do you see the prospects and the situation in both of the belligerent countries?"

14. Ibrahimi replied that as soon as the war had broken out Algeria had attempted to offer its mediation. Unfortunately, he said, Iraq began by refusing Algeria's offer "because Arab countries could, in its view, only side with Iraq." Later on, the Minister continued, both belligerents agreed to this mediation and Algeria began this difficult process. The cost to Algeria of this effort is already high because it lost its best sons (in the crash of his predecessor's aircraft).

Despite this the GOA issued a statement at the level of the FLN Politburo of its willingness to persevere. Accordingly, mediation efforts resumed last June. Positions were still soft. There were problems. Iran demanded the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq wished to maintain Baghdad as the venue of the Non-Aligned Summit. In July, during the Iranian Prime Minister's visit in Algiers, the Iranians dropped their major pre-condition to negotiation above cited. Three points remained: (a) the return to pre-war borders; (b) the return to Iraq of Iraq's refugees in Iran; (c) reparations. Algeria continued its efforts "and I can tell you that the atmosphere now is propitious to the initiation of negotiations". The most difficult remaining problem is that of reparations. Algeria, Ibrahim continued, suggested an international fund from which payments might be made to Iran but Iran rejected this suggestion. The Secretary inquired how such an international fund might be financed? Ibrahim replied that the idea was launched by India and accepted by the Gulf states. Algeria believes that the Gulf states would pay. Ibrahim explained that Iran wants the money directly from Iraq. Iran does not care, however, where Iraq gets the funds. The Secretary observed wryly that third parties were being asked to pay for the belligerent and the Algerians responded wryly that as the Arabs were paying for the war, they might just as well pay for peace. Ibrahim pointed out how sad it was to see the return of the status quo ante bellum presented by both sides as a victory after the expenditure of much blood and treasure.

15. Turning to Northwest Africa Ibrahim reminded that he had expressed Algeria's concern to the Vice President last June over the turn of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Algeria. Ria felt that the U.S. had "abandoned neutrality by building bases in Morocco." We believe the U.S. can play a role to achieve a solution of the Saharan problem on the basis of self determination, Ibrahim said. Algeria was pleased in 1981 that King Hassan had finally agreed to accept that basis. The GOA had saluted King Hassan's acceptance of the OAU formula in a speech by President Chadli expressing satisfaction and asking that the details and guarantees of a cease fire and referendum in the Sahara be worked out promptly. President Bendjedid had also discussed the prospect of economic cooperation with Morocco following the end of the Saharan war. Ibrahim explained that such cooperation could involve phosphates, the iron ore in N'gara-Djebilet and a pipeline feeding gas to Europe across the Mediterranean via Spain. Algeria's political leadership had delayed this latter project "in the hope that the end of the Saharan war would allow Moroccan industry to benefit from this Algerian gas."

16. Ibrahim then said that he wished solemnly to reaffirm that Algeria had never had a problem with the Moroccan monarchy. At the time of the attempted Skhirat coup "we could easily have helped to topple it but did not do so because we think each people must be free to choose their own regime." King Hassan had told him, Ibrahim

said, that he would never forget that Boumediene was the only Arab leader to send a delegation to Rabat to wish the King well after Skhirat. Ibrahimi hoped that the Saharan problem would be solved on the basis of the OAU decision and the principle of self determination. Ibrahimi then noted that Algeria has an interest in the survival of the OAU and hopes that efforts now in course would lead to an OAU summit "soon."

17. The Secretary then said that he shares Algeria's views on the importance of the OAU. "We want to see its continuation as a vehicle for solving problems." The Secretary welcomed Ibrahimi's expressions of friendship for Morocco. He said that the U.S. has friendly ties to Morocco and sees no reason why we should not also have friendly ties with Algeria particularly since a reciprocal view seems to emerge from Foreign Minister Ibrahimi's presentation. In so far as the OAU formula and self determination in the Sahara are concerned King Hassan, to our knowledge, still accepts them both. We have the impression that establishing the conditions necessary to carry out these steps is proving difficult "but hope it happens." We would try to help, the Secretary said, although this is an issue at some remove from us. The Secretary then stressed our agreement with Algeria's views of the importance of the OAU and again welcomed Minister Ibrahimi's remarks on Algerian desire for friendly relations with Morocco. It seems to us to follow, the Secretary said, that friendship between Algeria and the U.S. should also be possible. Ibrahimi responded by saying that, although Algeria was disappointed when Hassan after Nairobi II began talking of a "confirmatory referendum", Algeria still favors the rapid organization of a referendum which is also the desire of many African governments.

18. Turning to bilateral relations, FonMin Ibrahimi opined that matters were progressing well. Secretary Baldrige expects to come to Algeria in December and this will further reinforce our ties.

19. As FonMin Ibrahimi prepared to take his leave, he told the Secretary that there was a small problem on which he requested the Secretary's help. There is a villa (Mustapha Rais) belonging to the American Embassy in Algiers. Its status has been a problem "which we will now solve." This [garble] the purchase by Algeria of a new chancery in Washington, D.C. The question of the villa in Algiers will be settled as Ambassador Newlin requests, Ibrahimi said, and reiterated his hope that the Secretary would help Algeria with the acquisition of its badly needed chancery in Washington. The Secretary responded that we would do our best.

20. Ibrahimi told the Secretary he hoped to see him in Algiers in his current capacity. He noted in passing that former Deputy Secretary Christopher would see Sonatrach official Youssefi in a few days and said "things are progressing."

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, October 17, 1982, 1800Z

4230. Subject: U. S. Efforts to Moderate Algerian Behavior and Joint Exercises With Morocco. Ref: A. Algiers 4195² B. State 286172³ C. Rabat 7593⁴ D. State 287167⁵ E. State 290328.⁶

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I believe it important for Washington to understand that the U.S. is at present engaged in two endeavors which in my judgment run at cross purposes. On the one hand are our efforts to persuade Algeria

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Tunis, USCINCEUR, and USUN. Sent for information Priority to Nairobi. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and the Secretary of Defense. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 4195 from Algiers, October 14, Newlin reported that when he informed Acting Foreign Minister Hadj Azzout about the joint U.S.-Moroccan military exercises scheduled for November 9–12, “Azzout replied that such exercises would be viewed with ‘great apprehension’ by the GOA and that he would report the information to President Bendjedid. He anticipated that I might be called back to the MFA for a GOA protest.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820529–0981)

³ In telegram 286172 to Algiers, October 12, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Algerians about the upcoming joint exercises with Morocco and state that “the exercises are not intended to threaten any third country.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820526–0988)

⁴ In telegram 7593 from Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported on the joint exercise conference held between the Moroccan armed forces and U.S. Naval Forces Europe, September 30–October 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820518–0483)

⁵ In telegram 287167 to Algiers, October 13, the Department summarized an October 12 meeting with Ibrahim, in which Bush said the “international situation now offered new opportunities for progress in Mid East. It thus unfortunate that effort under way to ‘kick Israel out of UNGA.’ This would be important error in context Arab as well as American peace plans. Expulsion/suspension of Israel would set back opportunities which now exist for progress on peaceful solution of Palestinian problem. UN would be rendered more irrelevant. Moreover, should expulsion or suspension eventuate, U.S. would not remain behind.” Ibrahim replied: “As matters stood now where even the Fez Arab League Summit speaks in its point seven to the status of Israel, ‘we agree it is an error of strategy (to attempt expulsion/suspension) and this question should not rpt not be posed now.’ Ibrahim added that he was speaking only for Algeria in so stating.” Bush later suggested that “perhaps Algeria could use its undoubted influence to play a moderating role.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820527–0008)

⁶ In telegram 290328 to Algiers, October 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to remind Ibrahim that the “USG is deeply concerned over effort now in course in international organizations, which it considers unfortunate in both substance and timing, to suspend credentials of representatives of the state of Israel.” The Department also instructed the Embassy to “ask that Algeria take action which will avoid a successful challenge” to Israeli credentials at the UN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820533–0561)

to support a negotiated settlement with Israel and to abandon efforts to expel Israel from the UN and its organs. On the other hand is our increasingly high-profile military relationship with Morocco, and in particular the U.S.-Moroccan joint naval exercises scheduled for early November.

3. As reported in ref (A) two high-ranking Algerian officials (one of whom—Col. Belkheir—ranks among the three most powerful men in Algeria) reacted with unaccustomed anger to the information that U.S.-Moroccan naval exercises are to be held Nov 9–12 at Al-Hoceima on the southern Mediterranean littoral. I was asked how the maneuvers met the strategic objectives related to the Gulf which General Walters and other U.S. officials assured Algeria were the purpose of increased U.S. military cooperation with Morocco.

4. As Washington knows, Algeria not only considers U.S. military assistance to Morocco the main impediment to a Western Sahara settlement, but tends to regard the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship (however wrongly) as a strategic threat to Algeria itself. There is still another dimension: the Bendjedid government wants to lessen Algeria's military dependence on the USSR, but considers that difficult to do while its rival for Maghreb preeminence intensifies its defense relationship with the U.S. Algeria may also find it harder to reject Soviet overtures for joint exercises given U.S.-Moroccan maneuvers.

5. In all of this the facts may not be as important as the perceptions. Indeed, Algerian reaction to the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship seems to me both emotional and obsessive. It is, nevertheless, obvious that our influence with the Algerians on matters of importance to us is constrained when we are doing what angers them most.

6. I have some hope that Algeria will help us on the issue of Israeli credentials in UN bodies, largely as a result of the Vice President's intervention with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi. Nevertheless, I cannot be certain that more influential people than Ibrahimi (like Belkheir) will not advise Bendjedid to go slow at a time when the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship appears to have been raised a notch by the invitation of joint amphibious exercises. In present circumstances, clearly the most effective way to assure our multilateral goals would be cancellation of the Al-Hoceima exercises—or at least postponement. I must leave it to others to balance the interests involved—both bilateral and multilateral. I recognize that joint naval exercises must be planned months in advance, but I hope that there is flexibility in such planning to take into account the political climate at the time of the actual maneuvers.

7. Turning to the more general problem of maintaining influence in Algeria while continuing our special relationship with Morocco. It is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between private joint planning between U.S. and Moroccan military staffs and joint exercises which

cannot but come to Algeria's attention. These two kinds of cooperation have very different consequences for our dialogue with Algeria. As we move into a period of Middle East diplomacy when Algerian support (like that of Morocco) will become increasingly important to us, our bilateral relationship with Algeria rests on an uncertain base. Important figures (like the President and Foreign Minister) wish to see that relationship rapidly improve, while other powerful forces perceive U.S. interests as unalterably opposed to those of Algeria. A decision not to proceed with the Al-Hoceima exercises at a time when we are working hard to build an Arab consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict would obviously enhance our influence with an important Arab participant in the Middle East diplomatic scene.

8. Assertions that U.S.-Moroccan joint maneuvers are not directed against third parties (i.e. Algeria) are simply not believed here.

Newlin

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, October 22, 1982, 0022Z

290955. Following sent action Algiers info, USUN, Tunis, Rabat, Damascus, Jidda, Cairo, Nairobi, Tel Aviv 16 Oct.

Quote. Subject: Algerian Foreign Minister's Call on the Vice President. Refs: A. State 287167;² B. State 285232.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary:

3. Algeria's FonMin Mohamed Taleb Ibrahimi accompanied by Ambassador to the U.S. Layachi Yaker and MFA's Political Affairs Director Kerroum called on Vice President Bush October 12 at their request. The Vice President was seconded by senior staff, Messrs Gregg and Hughes; State NEA DAS Schneider and FN Director Sebastian also

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820534–0603. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 290955 to Algiers, October 16. Drafted by Marc Grossman (NEA/ARN); cleared by Gary Usrey (S/S-O), David Mack (NEA/ARN), and Alan Corky (NEA/ARN); approved by Veliotes.

² See footnote 5, Document 116.

³ See Document 115.

sat in. Exchange of views lasted approximately 3/4 of an hour and was cordial throughout.

4. Invited by the Vice President to do so, Ibrahimi opened by summarizing salient events which had occurred in the four months since he last spoke with the Vice President.⁴ He initially introduced these three subject headings (bilateral, gas and military) prefacing Algeria's political leadership wished to have good relations with the U.S. and to pursue a dialogue between the two governments. Bilateral relations, he said, were as he had described them to Secretary Shultz a few days ago (cf ref B para 5).

5. On gas, Ibrahimi said that after signing gas agreements with France, the UK, Italy and Belgium, Algiers wishes to give a new impetus to the conclusions of agreements with American consumers.

6. Regarding military matters, Ibrahimi said that Algeria had decided three years ago on a policy of diversification of military procurement. Purchases of equipment have been made in the U.S. and, the Minister said, he hoped that Algeria's upcoming requests in this area would also be agreed by the USG.

7. Having gone through these bilateral points Ibrahimi then turned to multilateral issues. He again summarized, saying that since his last conversation with the Vice President there had been (unspecified) Moroccan visits to Algiers and his participation in the Fez Arab League Summit.⁵ On the latter, he had, Ibrahimi said, met with King Hassan II "in margins of the conference". They had discussed their countries' bilateral relations in terms of the Saharan issue. Ibrahimi said he had told King Hassan once again that Morocco should support the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Although he preferred not to go over old ground, the Vice President should know of the GOA's wish to renew the dialogue with Morocco and to practice a policy of cooperation with it, Ibrahimi said. The minister explained that Algeria is being logical with itself in giving Maghreb issues priority over broader inter-Arab differences. Ibrahimi said that Algeria thus favors efforts at regional coordination in North Africa along the lines of the Gulf coordination committee, the activities of which Algeria approves. This led Ibrahimi into a discussion of the situation within the Arab world.

8. Since the last conversation, Ibrahimi told the Vice President, the Fez summit and "the events in Beirut" have dominated the Middle East scene. Last June, he said, Algeria had deplored the absence of a joint Arab reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Better late than never,

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 115.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 115.

there now is, as a result of the Fez summit, such a joint Arab reaction and this constitutes a positive.

9. Ibrahimi said he had told the Secretary that the international situation favored U.S. efforts to bring about a durable as well as an equitable solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. These favorable circumstances could prove evanescent, however. The opportunity, therefore, needs to be seized. In any event, the solution to the problems of the Middle East requires a solution to the Palestinian problem. The situation, currently, is favorable—Ibrahimi continued—because “the moderates dominate the PLO; they are ascendant within the Arab world and have the wind in their sails. Israeli public opinion has been powerfully affected by the Beirut events and U.S. public opinion is aware as never before of the issues which agitate the region. The Soviet Union, finally, is focused on its own internal and external problems (Poland and Afghanistan).[”]

10. The Vice President, responding, then said that on the Middle East President Reagan had put forward his own principles since he (Bush) had last met with Ibrahimi. This shows U.S. interest in the region as well as determination to address the Palestinian question. We agree, the Vice President continued, that the climate is more conducive now to positive action than it has been. Paradoxically, the horrors in the refugee camps in Beirut have helped bring a better understanding of the issues. The Vice President agreed with FonMin Ibrahimi's characterization of Israel's public opinion and also accepted that the U.S. is favorably placed to be a catalyst for peace in the Middle East.

11. There then followed the discussion of the Israeli credentials issue reported fully in ref A.

12. The Vice President then returned to a discussion of Middle East developments. He said that we do not know how the conversations between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat are going. However, the mere fact that they are having their discussions is already a plus.

13. Ibrahimi responded that the Algerian Government believes the pursuit of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation would lose us precious time. Sooner or later we will need to face up to the necessity of a Palestinian state, Ibrahimi said. He said that he expected Arafat to make the King understand the validity of this point.

14. The Vice President said that if the federation concept were to be seen as a step towards peace, it would facilitate progress. The Vice President opined that one would expect it to be difficult for Arafat to drop his demand for a state. He noted that negotiations were needed to explore if it were not better to go the federation route. Going that route promised to become a gigantic step forward towards peace.

15. Mr. Gregg then invited Ibrahimi's comments on the state of Algerian efforts to mediate the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq.

16. Ibrahimi opened by stressing that the prerequisite to a successful mediation was secrecy. Too many cooks had too many oars in this issue. For example, the OIC, NAM, the UN and its SYG were all attempting to play a role. Algeria was attempting to make a quiet contribution. The Iranians had posited three conditions which needed to obtain before mediation became possible: A return of the armies behind the pre-war international borders of the two countries; the problem of reparations and the problem of Iraqi refugees in Iran. Since last June's contact between the Vice President and himself, Ibrahimi said, the Iranians had abandoned another prerequisite—the overthrow of the Iraqi regime—and Iraq no longer insisted on becoming the venue for the next meeting of the non-aligned. "We solved that issue by asking India to host the seventh NAM conference." On the first and last point, return of the armies to their home territories and problems of Iraqi refugees, negotiations now seem possible, Ibrahimi continued. The major remaining problem is that of reparations but Algeria hopes to get the parties to the negotiating table nevertheless. The Vice President then said that, once again, Algeria was in a special position to be useful. He recalled the constructive role Algeria had played in connection with the release of the American hostages in Iran and told Minister Ibrahimi that the American people continue to be grateful to Algeria for what it had achieved in that context. "You may not think that we have shown our gratitude appropriately, the Vice President said but the American people remember and are grateful."

17. Ibrahimi thanked the Vice President for these words. He said that it was important to Algeria to know the sentiments of the American people "because the feelings of a people are usually more meaningful than those of their princes."

18. In closing, Ibrahimi noted that Algeria had also attempted quietly to settle current "U.S.-Iranian financial difficulties." (read the Iranian claims payments problem). He was confident that Algeria would succeed in this effort as well. Shultz

Unquote

Shultz

118. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 26, 1982

SUBJECT

C-130's for Algeria

ISSUE FOR DECISION

We must decide whether to approve Algerian purchase of eight Lockheed C-130s. This issue has raised the more basic question of how we best conduct our relations with Algeria to generate greater Algerian consideration of US interests.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

1. We approved the sale of six C-130s to Algeria on August 13, 1981. These planes have been delivered. Algeria then contracted with Lockheed to buy eight more. We have no commitment to Lockheed to license them for export, although Lockheed had apparently assumed we would. The C-130 contract is worth \$146 million. The GOA has expressed interest in further Lockheed purchases worth as much as \$1 billion and up to 12 Boeing 737, 747, 757 and 767 aircraft. A favorable decision on the C-130 aircraft could therefore convey a positive signal to the Algerians. A negative decision at this stage of the sale would contribute to an even stronger negative message.

2. The Department is agreed that current conditions in Algeria justify an effort on our part to encourage greater consideration of US interests by the Government of Algeria. Opinion is divided, however, on our overall strategy toward Algeria and this sale. Ambassador Walters and S/P believe that though the record is mixed, the overall trend of Algerian behavior continues to oppose US interests. They cite:

— Algeria's continued collaboration with Libya in support of the Polisario,

— its shipment of arms to Nicaragua,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (10/26/1982). Secret. Sent through William Schneider and Eagleburger. Drafted by Sebastian and David Schneider (NEA); cleared by Walters, Raphel, Arthur Keys (S/P), and Stanley Escudero (H). Sebastian initialed for the clearing officials. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS."

- its anti-US record at the UN,
- its continued harsh criticism of the US in its government controlled press.

The first sale of C-130s did not alter this fundamental pattern of hostility, and another is unlikely to do so. Though we should not expect one or two deals to work miracles, how can we hope to profit from the overall relationship if we passively accept losses on each transaction? To avoid this, we should use each transaction to impress upon the Algerians that further transactions will require Algeria to demonstrate sensitivity to overall US interests in specific ways.

Ambassador Walters and S/P believe that before we approve the further sale of C-130s, the Algerians should show by an unambiguous gesture that their desire for improved relations reflects a genuine potential for change of policies adverse to US interests. (An appropriate and feasible gesture might be Algerian recognition of the Habre government in Chad or some similar adjustment in Algerian policy. There have been recent disturbing though unsubstantiated reports of Algerian material support for anti-Habre forces; the long range of the C-130s could contribute significantly to such an effort.) Once such a gesture is made, we would approve the sale, making clear at the same time that continued improvements in our bilateral relations will, on our side, reflect Algerian willingness to demonstrate sensitivity to US interests in specific areas of concern. Examples would be: a) moderate their military support for the Polisario to prevent escalations of the Western Sahara war; b) seriously pursue a political settlement of the Western Sahara conflict through direct discussions with Morocco; c) build a record of greater US-Algerian cooperation at the UN; d) encourage a more objective tone in official press coverage of the US.

3. NEA and PM believe that the sale should be approved, as a contribution to our efforts to influence aspects of Algerian foreign policy. They believe that:

- denial of this sale would not provide leverage adequate to induce the GOA to abandon major objectionable elements of its foreign policy;
- substitution of Western for Soviet equipment supports non-alignment and the nationalism which motivates Algerian policy;
- the sale would not be incrementally destabilizing insofar as the Polisario and Morocco are concerned (Algeria uses other means to support the Polisario and CIA believes it wishes to substitute C-130s for its aging Antonov 12s);
- it would serve US commercial interests;

— a soft energy market and Algeria's increased reliance on gas earnings work in our favor;

— we already have a stake in extant positive facets of Algeria's foreign policy (Gulf War Mediation; Iranian claims settlements; adherence to "moderate" Fez Arab League Summit approach to Middle East issues, including PLO withdrawal from Beirut; responsiveness to US request for assistance in defusing the Israeli credentials issue in Nairobi and New York);

— it is an error to relate such decisions too directly to GOA performance while Algeria's leadership is in transition and President Bendjedid is still working to achieve a more consistent, pragmatic GOA policy.

NEA and PM propose that, after a positive decision on C-130s, we seek a sustained political dialogue with the Algerians to explore areas of difference and agreement and create a general understanding that what we can do for Algeria in the future will be affected by the nature of its policies on issues of importance to us. We would reciprocate the stated Algerian desire for improved political relations and proceed in ways which recognize that what we can do to help Algeria is limited in scope and therefore limited in the influence it can bring us. We would note in this connection that one useful step would be a reduction in Algerian public criticism of U.S. policies. We would also recognize that at the outset we will be more interested in the trend we can generate in Algerian policy than its overall balance. Ambassador Walters and S/P note that despite over a year of high-level contacts, including visits by Ambassador Walters as a Presidential emissary, the trend on balance continues to be negative. They believe the dialogue must be more explicitly related to US interests. NEA and PM believe that the balance should only be expected to shift gradually with the evolution of Algeria's leadership and other relationships.

4. Two additional issues are relevant. First is the effect of the sale on Moroccan security and our relations with Morocco. General Walters and S/P question our selling military equipment which would increase Algeria's military capability against Morocco. (Embassy Rabat shares this concern.) NEA and PM argue that this limited sale of aircraft which probably will replace obsolete transports will not significantly alter the military situation in the region (an intelligence study reaches this same conclusion). All agree the Government of Morocco will take exception to this sale and perhaps use it to argue for more US military assistance. NEA and PM consider that this is manageable and believe at least some Moroccans will continue to understand our argument (as they did prior to the first sale) that it is in both US and Moroccan interest that US influence with Algeria increase. We should inform Morocco and Tunisia of our decision to sell the aircraft in advance. While we should not give

these governments a veto over our decision, we should take their views into account prior to informing Lockheed and the Algerians of the sale. PM believes it is essential to obtain King Hassan's reaction before moving ahead with the sale.

5. The second issue is Congressional reaction to the sale. General Walters and S/P believe that Congressional leaders will question such a sale to Algeria and see it as inconsistent with our support to Morocco and likely to generate greater Moroccan demands for US assistance. NEA, H and PM believe that there would also be Congressional support and that, given the modest level of the sale, Congressional concern will be manageable. Should we decide to proceed with the sale we would wish to consult in advance with Congressional leadership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That, before we approve the C-130 sale, we insist that the Algerians make an unambiguous gesture (such as, for example, recognition of the Habre government in Chad). When we convey approval we make clear that future improvements will require Algeria to demonstrate sensitivity to overall US interests in specific ways. These might include steps such as those in the examples mentioned in para. 2 above. (S/P and S/AL favor. NEA and PM oppose.)²

2. Alternately, that we agree to the sale of C-130s and initiate a sustained political dialogue designed to make clear that the future of our relations and the things we can do for Algeria will be affected by Algeria's general readiness to take into consideration US interests. (NEA and PM favor. S/P and S/AL oppose.)³

3. That, if you approve the sale, we inform the Governments of Tunisia and Morocco of our decision and, without giving them a veto, take their views into account prior to informing Lockheed and the Algerians.⁴ That we also consult in advance with Congressional leaders.⁵

² Shultz did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.

³ Shultz initialed the "Approve" option. A stamp next to his initials reads: "NOV 1 1982."

⁴ Shultz initialed the "Approve" option. A stamp next to his initials reads: "NOV 1 1982."

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 108.

119. Memorandum From Geoffrey Kemp of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, October 27, 1982

SUBJECT

Proposed Sale of C-130s to Algeria

State is proposing that the export license permitting the Lockheed Corporation to sell an additional 8 C-130 aircraft to Algeria be approved. Commerce agrees but DoD has expressed some concerns.

Algeria bought 6 C-130s last year and they intend to purchase the 8 additional transport planes to replace obsolete Soviet transport aircraft now on hand. Discussion of the sale has been going on for six months now and by the end of this week a paper will go up to Secretary Shultz for his decision.²

The arguments can be broken down as follows:

FOR:

— We would be enabling Algeria to diversify its military equipment sources (moving away from Soviet purchases) and helping them to achieve a true non-aligned status.

— They have expressed to us their desire to develop improved relations with us and this would provide an opportunity to do so. The Algerians were very supportive of King Hassan during the visit of the Arab League to Washington.³

— The sale would indicate to the Algerians that we, too, are interested in a closer bilateral relationship.

— The Algerians did eventually modify their position on the Israeli credentials issue at the UN and a sale such as this may give us further leverage with them on such other issues as the Polisario and Sandinista movements.

— Despite some Moroccan unhappiness which the U.S.-Moroccan relationship can weather, the sale would enhance our interests and visibility in the North African region.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Attardo. A stamp at the top of the memorandum reads: "WPC has seen." A note from Poindexter attached to the memorandum reads: "Jeff Kemp, 11/5, Judge has agreed to sale of C-130's. State has been notified. JP."

² See Document 118.

³ A memorandum of Reagan's October 22, 1982 conversation with Hassan and other members of the Arab League is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations* 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

— The sale of these 8 C-130s would not shift the military balance in the area at all.

AGAINST:

— We should make explicit certain conditions Algeria must meet prior to the sale. For example, they must:

- take a more moderate position in the Middle East
- cease support for the Polisario
- not oppose U.S. on so many issues at the UN
- be more reasonable with the price of natural gas
- cut off their support for the Sandinista in Nicaragua
- be less tolerant of Libya

- They may use the C-130s in support of the Polisario.
- Algeria has continued to take a confrontational posture against Israel. Will we be fostering this attitude by approving the sale?
- We would be encouraging their oil-price hawkishness.
- We would be encouraging their failures to meet gas supply commitments to U.S. suppliers.
- We would be ignoring their attempts to harbor terrorists.

All arguments aside, the Lockheed C-130 sale to Algeria is much larger than it appears. It has now developed into the issue of how to go ahead with plans for improved relations with Algeria. On balance I support the sale. There is a downside but this is a golden opportunity to strengthen our relations with an important Arab country that has been closely associated with the Soviet Union.

120. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 5, 1982

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

4. *C-130s for Algeria.* Larry Eagleburger called in the Algerian Ambassador today to convey the Administration's decision to license the commercial sale of eight additional C-130s to Algeria.² Eagleburger

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading September–December 1982. Secret.

² A record of the Eagleburger-Yaker conversation is in telegram 315185 to Algiers, November 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820581–0857)

expressed our strong hope that the US and Algeria can work together toward building an improved bilateral relationship. Ambassador Yaker received the news of our decision with pleasure. He accepted Eagleburger's proposal that we proceed with a serious discussion of the outstanding issues between us. (S)

121. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 20, 1982

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

3. *Mac Baldrige's Visit to Algeria.* Mac Baldrige's recent visit to Algeria was a success. Mac, leading a Trade and Investment Mission, saw most of the key Algerian economic decision makers and had a 90-minute meeting with President Bendjedid,² who said that Algeria desires better political and economic relations with us. The Baldrige mission revealed significant commercial prospects in the fields of agribusiness, water resources, telecommunications, aviation and avionics, operations and maintenance services, and manpower training. In the wake of Mac's visit, the Algerian Government signaled its wish to begin negotiations soon on a civil air agreement providing for direct flights from Algeria to the US and is negotiating two large contracts, each in excess of \$200 million, with Lockheed and Boeing. President Bendjedid also indicated his desire for other high level US visits. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading September–December 1982. Secret.

² A record of the Baldrige-Bendjedid conversation is in telegram 42404 from Paris, December 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820637–0093)

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, January 5, 1983, 2013Z

2333. Subject: Letter From President Reagan to President Bendjedid.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Following is text of letter from President Reagan to President Bendjedid that should be delivered at earliest convenience: signed original being pouched. Letter is dated December, 31.

Begin text: Dear Mr. President: Secretary Baldrige has reported to me fully² the views you asked him to transmit. I greatly appreciate your taking the time to meet with him at length,³ and I am grateful to Minister Khellef and the many other Algerian Ministers who met with members of the Trade and Investment Mission. The American business leaders were also very pleased with the intensive series of meetings they had with the heads of Algerian enterprises during their stay.

As Secretary Baldrige informed you, the United States reciprocates your desire for good bilateral relations. Indeed, the U.S. hopes to have good relations with all countries in your area. I also fully share your aspirations for regional stability and cooperation. The United States thus supports a resolution of the Western Sahara problem in conformity with OAU decisions, and we hope that a ceasefire and referendum can be organized soon. I understand that these and other topics will be discussed in the context of the enhanced political dialogue our two governments have begun.

Please be assured that the United States is prepared to assist in all possible ways in the realization of the plans which you have for accelerating the development of your country and for further improving the life of your people.

May I send you, Mr. President, at this holy season of the prophet's birthday and the new year, my best wishes and those of the American people for health and prosperity.

With warm good wishes to you and your country for 1983.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan.

End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830006-0972. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted in NEA with text received from the White House; cleared by Hill and Sebastian; approved by David Schneider.

² No record of Baldrige's report to Reagan was found.

³ See Document 121.

123. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 18, 1983

SUBJECT

President Bendjedid's Invitation to Visit Algeria

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to respond to Algerian President Bendjedid's invitation for you to visit Algeria.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

During his December visit to Belgium, President Bendjedid drew aside our Ambassador to discuss with approval Commerce Secretary Baldrige's recent Trade and Investment Mission to Algeria and to extend an invitation for you to visit Algeria "soon," in the context of our mutual effort to improve relations. In your absence, Under Secretary Eagleburger sent an interim response through the Algerian Ambassador here, noting his own positive, personal reaction and the practical difficulties involved in scheduling your foreign travel.²

Bendjedid's invitation does represent a political gesture of some significance. The Algerians had protested to us a series of US actions in November (our joint amphibious exercises with Morocco, a USN sail-through of Algerian-claimed territorial waters in routine demonstration of our right of innocent passage without prior notification, and our vote against the Algerian-sponsored UNGA resolution on the Western

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (01/18/1983). Confidential. Sent through Eagleburger. Schneider initialed for Veliotes. Drafted by Ann Korky (NEA/AFN) on January 7; cleared by Sebastian and David Schneider. Korky initialed for Sebastian. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." In the right hand margin next to the subject line, an unknown hand wrote: "P staff informed 1/24 9:00 am." Tab 2 is not attached.

² In telegram 354567 to Algiers, December 22, 1982, the Department transmitted the text of a letter from Eagleburger to Yaker. Eagleburger said in part "I am delighted with this initiative and understand full well the political gesture reflected in it. I am sure the Secretary will be equally pleased. You are aware, of course, how crowded his schedule is and the difficulty he faces in planning foreign travel commitments. Nonetheless, I am confident the Secretary would look forward to visiting Algeria at some mutually agreeable time, if it proves possible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820664–0055)

Sahara) that they consider inimical to GOA interests.³ We understand that the GOA had seriously considered cancelling the Baldrige visit, but that its success led Bendjedid to extend his invitation to you. Ambassador Newlin strongly recommends that you accept.⁴

While I believe that you should do so in principle, a visit in the immediate future would be premature. At your direction, we have begun an expanded political dialogue with the Algerians. Both Under Secretary Eagleburger and I have met with their Ambassador, and we have agreed with him on an agenda of issues for future discussion. We have not yet, however, had a sufficient number of exchanges to gauge the direction of the dialogue. A visit to Algiers at the Secretarial level might usefully come at a somewhat later time.

As an interim step, I recommend you send Under Secretary Eagleburger for a round of discussions with the Algerian leadership.⁵ This should be followed or preceded by a brief stop in Tunisia to defuse the concerns a visit to Algiers alone might cause in Rabat. (It could be done in three days.)

As hosts, the Algerians will have a degree of influence with PLO leaders, and it would be useful to have Eagleburger reinforce Algeria's newly constructive approach to the peace process by following up Foreign Minister Ibrahim's participation in the Fez delegation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the cable at Tab 1,⁶ conveying verbally your acceptance in principle of Bendjedid's invitation, subject to future agreement on a mutually convenient date, and proposing that meanwhile Under Secretary Eagleburger visit Algiers on your behalf for high-level exchanges on issues of mutual concern.⁷

³ In telegram 4815 from Algiers, December 1, 1982, the Embassy reported that Newlin had been called in on November 30 "for general discussion of bilateral relationship with Director of North American and European Affairs Chitour. Expressing surprise and regret at recent U.S. actions—joint U.S.-Moroccan exercises, Sixth Fleet penetration of territorial waters, and U.S. vote in U.N. against Algerian resolution on the Western Sahara—Chitour laid down a clear marker that such initiatives do not square with the Algerian conception of improving the political dialogue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820621-0869)

⁴ In telegram 200 from Algiers, January 17, Newlin suggested that given "the unusually warm reception accorded by President Bendjedid to Secretary Baldrige and members of his Trade and Investment Mission," which "offer U.S. opportunities for a gradual and steady improvement in our political and commercial relations," Shultz "should respond affirmatively to Bendjedid's invitation." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830027-0096)

⁵ Eagleburger and Yaker met on January 24. A summary of their conversation is in telegram 24488 to Algiers, January 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830047-0778)

⁶ Not attached.

⁷ Eagleburger initialed below this recommendation.

124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, March 24, 1983, 0512Z

80332. Subject: Secretary Shultz Receives Algerian Ambassador Yaker.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: The Secretary met March 18 with Algerian Ambassador Yaker for a 30-minute review of issues between us. Yaker discussed Algerian efforts to improve relations with its neighbors, reiterating GOA's traditional call for direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. He urged U.S. to adopt a more balanced position on the Western Sahara, to reconsider its policy on contacts with the Polisario and PLO. The Secretary noted that the U.S. position on the PLO was clear and unchanged. On Libya, Yaker said that Algiers does not approve of all Qadhafi's actions, but wants good relations with all its neighbors. U.S.-Libyan strains are a problem for the GOA. The Secretary responded that Libya could easily improve relations with the U.S. by ceasing its destabilizing activities. Yaker termed the results of the Delhi NAM summit "positive,"² and said the GOA continues to look to global negotiations for solutions to pressing world economic problems. He also raised U.S. regulatory action on Algerian gas imports, noting the GOA's strong interest in protecting the integrity of its gas contracts, including pricing provisions. End summary.

3. The Secretary received Algerian Ambassador for twice postponed bilateral March 18. Under Secretary Eagleburger, DAS Schneider and AFN Director Sebastian sat in.

4. Yaker opened by reiterating President Bendjedid's invitation to the Secretary to visit Algeria "when you can."³ The Secretary responded that he would like to come, could not now say when that would prove possible, but appreciated the fact and spirit of the invitation which reflected a desire, reciprocated, for the improvement of our relations. Yaker responded that Algeria is also working in this sense. The Baldrige visit had been a great success opening new

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830162–0971. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by David Schneider, Eagleburger, Hill, and Robinson (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Nouakchott, and USUN.

² Reference is to the seventh conference of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), New Delhi, March 7–12.

³ See Document 123.

perspectives.⁴ However, Yaker continued, there are also problems in our bilateral relations. A question has been raised about the cost of imported Algerian gas; the El Paso negotiations have left some scars.⁵ Algeria has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of its (gas) contracts, including the (price) incentives they contain. Algeria has tried to develop this resource and its import programs are based on its sales. As a result, Algeria's financial situation is good in that its debts are manageable.

5. Moving to Algeria's current regional posture, Yaker said that Algeria has decided to take the initiative to improve its regional relations. It is demarcating borders with its neighbors. Algeria believes that the prospects for rapprochement with Morocco are promising, "providing we find a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara." The Secretary welcomed these remarks. Yaker then said that Algiers is confident the Saharan problem will be resolved if there are "negotiations between the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario," to implement the OAU's cease fire/referendum formula. Yaker then pointed out that President Bendjedid had just arrived in Tunisia where he had been given a good reception. He expected the visit to have a favorable impact on Algerian-Tunisian relations.

6. Yaker then moved on to conclude that the USG should take all of these developments into account. The U.S. should take a more balanced position towards the Western Sahara and a settlement based on self-determination, he said. We should prefer such a settlement to a military solution which is beyond reach. The Secretary commented that we agree on a negotiated solution and share Algeria's interest in peace, stability and regional cooperation in North Africa.

7. Yaker then turned to Libya. U.S.-Libyan relations are a problem for the GOA, he said. "We do not know what to do but are concerned." Algiers does not approve of everything the Libyan regime does but is striving to have good relations with all its neighbors. The Secretary responded by interjecting that it would be easy for Libya to have better relations with us. All Qadhafi needs to do is to stop destabilizing his neighbors, e.g. Chad. "It's his behavior that bothers us."

8. Yaker then inquired about developments in the Middle East. He reiterated the commitment of the GOA to the solutions developed in Fez as a basis for negotiations.⁶ He said that Israeli unresponsiveness to Arab proposals was having an adverse impact. He wondered whether U.S. policy was taking adequate account of Lebanon's need

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 121.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 99.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 115.

for unity, integrity and sovereignty. The Secretary said that the U.S. had been responsive to the Arab Fez initiative. We had received King Hassan and his delegation;⁷ had studied the questions sent us and responded; had met repeatedly in capitals. Key to a solution, the Secretary said, lies in direct talks between the Arab countries and Israel. King Hussein is central to this, as are the Palestinians. We do not yet know what Hussein will do or when but believe he will find his way to the table. As for the recent visits of Lebanese and Israeli delegations, they had gone reasonably well, but problems remain. Withdrawal remains our goal. To achieve it, adequate answers will have to be found on the issue of Israel's security from attack from southern Lebanon. To assure this, a mix of agreed measures will be needed. Some of the job will have to be done by the Lebanese themselves. The MNF and UNIFIL may also play a role.

9. Yaker asked whether we had contact with the PLO. The Secretary said we do not speak to the PLO. Yaker said his government considered we should, that it would be useful and "highly advisable." The Secretary responded that the position of the USG was clear. It had been set forth time and time again. Our conditions had not changed. Yaker said that the PLO wanted contact with us and wanted to talk. Algeria thought it would be helpful. This had been the spirit of the PNC which had given Arafat a flexibility he had lacked. Arafat's position had emerged strengthened.

10. Yaker then turned to the Gulf war. He said Algiers' mediation efforts continued but the conditions posed by Iran remained unacceptable to Iraq. Yaker noted that we had received the Iraqi Foreign Minister and wondered what had come of that. He said that Algeria was in close touch with King Fahd and working in consultation with him for stability in the region. The Secretary replied that we have no relations with Iran and that our tie with Iraq is "thin." The Secretary said he had seen the Iraqi Foreign Minister to discuss bilateral relations and hoped that the GOA's efforts at mediation would prove successful.

11. Yaker turned to the Delhi NAM summit. He qualified the results as "on balance, positive." He thought it possible that global negotiations (GN) would be achieved in stages. The GOA attaches importance to the American position. It thinks that getting GN started would be in our mutual interest even if no new resource flows are immediately triggered. The Secretary said that it was too soon for him to comment on the NAM summit. He said that meanwhile it is good news for the world that the U.S. economy is again expanding. The

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 119.

impact would be felt worldwide in trade and economic development. GN clearly needs further definition, however, the Secretary continued. Can these talks be structured so as to respect the IMF and other international institutions? We have lately seen again the importance of the IMF. Yaker said his government thinks we should be discussing an emergency program for the IMF to increase its lending by 40 percent. There had indeed been positive developments but more needs to be done, given the growing indebtedness of many countries and their unmet development needs. The Secretary said that no single measure will solve the problem. Austerity is needed. Countries must come to grips with themselves.

12. As the conversation was drawing to a close, Yaker raised two further questions: (a) the consequences of U.S. military cooperation with Morocco and (b) whether the U.S. would favor direct contact with the Polisario. The *New York Times*, Yaker said, called the Polisario Marxists. This is untrue. "We know them as nationalists," he said. Yaker added that Algeria intended to replicate with Bourguiba what President Bendjedid had just done with King Hassan.

13. The Secretary responded stating gratification for these Algerian views. He expressed his appreciation of the importance of the efforts at regional stabilization Algeria was making.

Shultz

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, April 12, 1983, 1736Z

99445. For Under Secretary Eagleburger/Topol 20027. Subject: Oral Message for President Bendjedid from President Reagan.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. You should deliver the following oral message from President Reagan to President Bendjedid during your April 13 meeting.²

3. Begin text: Mr. President: the past several days have witnessed important developments in the Middle East peace process, including efforts by some to impede or destroy it. At this critical time, I want to assure you personally that the events of this weekend³ have not swayed my determination to pursue the just and lasting peace that is so long overdue. The proposals I outlined September 1⁴ continue to hold the promise of peace, of a settlement that meets the essential needs of all the parties. There is no substitute for direct negotiations in bringing this long-standing conflict to a close. It is clear that we cannot allow a minority to exercise a veto over the peace process and it is of the utmost importance that Jordan have the full and unambiguous support of all who truly seek an equitable and durable peace. If our current efforts are defeated, the primary losers will be the Palestinian people and their desire to realize their legitimate rights. If we remain firm in our resolve, I am confident that we can achieve a just and comprehensive settlement. In the critical days ahead, the assistance of Arab statesmen will be important to assure that the opportunity for peace now before us is not lost. I appreciated your positive comments when I undertook my initiative last September and Algeria's constructive role in the months since. I hope that I can continue to count on your help at this critical juncture.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830202–0910. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Ann Korky (NEA/AFN); cleared by Pelletreau, Teicher, Katherine Shirley (S/S), Thomas Randall (S/S–O), and Kemp; approved by Veliotis.

² See Document 126.

³ On April 10, the PLO's Palestine National Council rejected Arafat's agreement with Jordanian King Hussein to allow Jordan to negotiate with Israel on the status of the West Bank. Documentation on this issue is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 114.

126. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 13, 1983, 1025Z

1629. From Under Secretary Eagleburger/Polto 2007. Dept rpt as desired. Subject: U/S Eagleburger's Meetings in Algiers: Session With Foreign Minister. Ref: Algiers 1630.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Reftel reported on U/S first session in Algiers. This message reports on second, more restricted meeting.

3. FonMin Ibrahimi, accompanied by MFA SYG Azzout and Political Affairs Director Kerroum received U/S Eagleburger, accompanied by Ambassador Newlin and AFN Director Sebastian for about 45 minutes late morning April 11. Meeting was cordial throughout. FonMin discussed Algerian-Moroccan relations, OAU and Saharan settlement perspectives as well as US-Algerian bilateral ties. Following developed.

A. Algerian-Moroccan relations, OAU, and Saharan settlement perspectives. In response to Under Secretary Eagleburger's question, FonMin described President Chadli Bendjedid's conversation with King Hassan in late February during their border meeting.³ Ibrahimi said that Chadli had opened by telling Hassan that he was not authorized to speak for the Polisario but, as President of Algeria, was prepared to transmit to Polisario any proposal King might wish to make. He invited King's comments. Hassan responded, "Nairobi does not please me much." Hassan said that if a referendum eventuates there will be a winner and a loser. This would leave scars on the Algero-Moroccan relationship. Hashen asked why the Saharans who had chosen the Polisario and those who had chosen Morocco should not talk to each other. Ibrahimi said Chadli responded that in his view, only way to bridge so polarized a position is through the emergence of a Saharan state. King responded that Moroccan man in the street would find Saharan state difficult to accept. Chadli replied that Moroccan public opinion was what King had made it. King could change it. He (Chadli) wished to say to King in front of FonMin Boucetta as representative

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830226-0322, D830224-0138, D830224-0719. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² In telegram 1630 from Algiers, April 13, the Embassy transmitted a summary of Eagleburger's discussions in Algiers on the Middle East, the NAM meeting in New Delhi, and global negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830204-0977)

³ See Document 19.

of Istiqlal that Algeria considered King Hassan, not Moroccan political parties, its only valid interlocutor in Morocco.

According to Ibrahimi, Chadli then said that as President of Algeria he wished to be helpful to Morocco. Algeria considered Moroccan monarchy factor of stability in Morocco and its region and thought what Moroccan people needed now was not more war but more bread. King's eventual agreement to a Saharan state could be made more palatable to Moroccan public opinion, if Moroccans saw direct benefit to themselves in such an outcome. Algeria would be prepared to assist in making this possible by helping to provide a suitable political and economic cover. The King said he was interested only in the flag and the postage stamps. However, he would consider Algeria's proposals. Chadli then said that, politically, a Saharan state together with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, could be fitted into a greater Maghrebi ensemble. Initially, a Maghreb summit might be convened in which the leaders of these countries might participate. This should please the Moroccan people. Economically, Algeria would contribute the iron ore of Ngara Djebilet. This ore needed to be exported via the Atlantic. This would require a port which Moroccan labor could build on Morocco's Atlantic coast with direct benefit to the Moroccan economy. Also, "when Algerian gas crosses Moroccan territory" Moroccan households and industry could burn Algerian fuel. The Moroccan and Algerian people could thus have something in common. In the same line of thought, Saharan phosphates might be exploited jointly between Saharans and Moroccans. The King, Ibrahimi said, asked for time to think it over.

Ibrahimi then told Eagleburger that Chadli had also gone to Tunisia to explore this idea.⁴ Algeria and Tunisia had signed a border agreement and a treaty of friendship. The latter should prove reassuring to the Tunisians after Gafsa. Tunisia's investigation of that incident had shown that there had been no Algerian involvement whatsoever. Algeria had also negotiated border demarcation agreements with all of her other African neighbors, Libya excepted. The GOA hoped to be able to complete the process by signing with Mali and Mauritania before the end of the month. Algiers considered that the border with Morocco had been demarcated and agreed since the King of Morocco had signed the relevant accord in '72. That left only Libya and the Libyan [garble] was expected in Algiers today (Apr 11) to begin negotiations of a frontier accord. Algeria had thus set up a "Maghrebi dynamic". It had been pleasantly surprised to see the scope of the favorable reactions its initiative had elicited throughout the region. Libya was confronted by a choice of either integration (into the Maghreb) or isolation. Algeria hoped Tripoli would chose integration. In Algeria's view the construction of a greater Maghreb and a more solid region should be seen in

⁴ See Document 20.

Washington as a favorable development. The U.S. could help to bring it about. Its assistance (unspecified) would be welcome.

U/S Eagleburger wondered how FonMin Ibrahim saw the Saharan issue play itself out in OAU context? Ibrahim replied that for first time in its history, 1982 had seen two failures to convene an OAU summit. A third attempt is now being readied. Algeria hoped it would succeed. Algeria wanted the OAU to survive, believing that regional organizations had value and that the OAU is best placed to deal with African problems. He hoped the U.S. agreed. The U/S assured him that we do agree. The Under Secretary then asked about Qadhafi's reaction to these developments. Ibrahim smiling said that the first adjective that came to mind was "unpredictable". No one knew what Qadhafi would do. Algiers was counting on the strength of the pro-Maghrebi current now running in area to convince Qadhafi to go along. In reply to further questions, Ibrahim said he could not say how various problems which had plagued the OAU would play themselves out. This was up to contact Group of 12, "mandated" to organize Addis summit. As Ibrahim understood it, Chad would be represented by Habre and there would be no rpt no preparatory ministerial. The summit would be convened directly. All chiefs of state would attend and they would discuss everything. (Comment: He did not go beyond this formulation. End comment)

Under Secretary Eagleburger expressed appreciation. He said that to extent U.S. could be helpful it would be. U.S. wished to contribute to efforts now in course to strengthen the Maghreb and explore ways in which to end the Saharan conflict. Moroccans know this. Tunisians are currently somewhat concerned with respect to Qadhafi's intentions towards them. We are trying to assist there as well. Ibrahim interjected that it is important to contain the Saharan conflict "so close to our frontiers, those of Morocco and Mauritania." We must try to do so without humiliating the Moroccan monarchy, he said. Algeria had had ample opportunities to intervene in Morocco after the Skhirat attempt on King Hassan,⁵ but had not done so. Algeria now hopes to return to the posture prevalent during the decade of cooperation which marked relations between Algeria and Morocco from 1965 to 1975. "The U.S. can help us" settle the Saharan problem, Ibrahim said. Eagleburger noted that Ibrahim had included Mauritania in proposed greater Maghreb. Ibrahim said that Mauritania was widely seen as Achilles heel of Maghreb "the place it can be sundered". It had to be included. Algeria was doing what it could to help the Mauritanian Govt which it saw as nationalist regime. Libyans, Iraqi Baath, Moroccans had all tried destabilize Mauritania at some point. Algeria had told Libyans that it believes in the non-exportability of national "facts" and does

⁵ Reference is to the attempted assassination of King Hassan on July 10, 1971, at his palace in Skhirat in southern Morocco.

not approve of Libyan interference in the affairs of its neighbors. This remains the Algerian view. This is not merely a matter of principle but a position on which Algiers has acted. In fact, Ibrahim said in closing this part of the conversation, Algeria, which is not blessed with unlimited resources, has expended \$200 million last year in aid to other African states “without a quid pro quo”.

B. Eagleburger invited Ibrahim to discuss his view of our bilateral relations. Ibrahim responded that GOA saw them as on the whole satisfactory. Algeria would like to see them expand further. “There is a lot more we could do.” Two areas come to mind: agro-business and cultural/educational exchanges. Algeria *could be?* a long-term customer. It will have to import important quantities of grain for the foreseeable future. Such imports might usefully be put on a solid organized basis. The cultural area is also often neglected. The GOA wants to train Algerians of tomorrow to be at home in Arabic, French and English. The U.S. could send English teachers to Algeria. We should be working on this. Algeria, of course, needed to sell its gas. This too is an undertaking over time.

C. At FonMin Ibrahim’s request U/S also summarized U.S. views on Middle East developments and the Williamsburg Summit as presented at first meeting (reftel). Ibrahim expressed appreciation.

Newlin

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, May 4, 1983, 1515Z

1952. Subject: Growing Algerian Activism in Middle East Peace Process. Ref: Algiers 1937 (notal).²

1. Confidential Entire text.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830251–0912. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Rabat, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Tunis.

² In telegram 1937 from Algiers, May 3, the Embassy reported that Presidential Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi believed that “while recognizing positive elements of President Reagan’s plan, U.S. needed to endorse Palestinian self-determination in order for Arafat make the leap.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830249–0345)

2. Summary: Algerian involvement in the Middle East peace process has entered a more activist phase. Although now willing to engage its good offices—as demonstrated in recent trip of Presidential Emissary Lakhdar Brahimi and message of President Bendjedid to President Reagan³—rather than sit passively on the sidelines, the GOA remains wary of treading on PLO prerogatives. Algerian influence at present derives in large part from a strict policy of noninterference in internal Palestinian affairs and its concomitant success in keeping lines of communication open with more radical Middle East players—within the PLO as well as among Arab states—while increasing its cooperation with moderates, notably Arafat and Saudi Arabia. The GOA remains convinced that the Reagan initiative contains flaws, but—always keeping within the general parameters prescribed by Arafat and the PLO mainstream—is ready to assist more actively in the search for a compromise solution. End summary.

3. The evolution of Algerian Middle East policy has been long and tortuous, but has picked up speed in recent months. Although the GOA had gradually distanced itself from the Steadfastness Front over a number of years, the final break was consummated only in the fall of 1982. Algeria not only resisted Libyan and Syrian pressures for further front activities, but also signed on publicly with the Arab mainstream at the Fez Summit. GOA representatives then played a positive and active role in the follow-up visits of the Fez Contact Group to UNSC capitals.⁴ Previously President Bendjedid had characterized the Reagan initiative as insufficient, but nonetheless a step forward containing positive elements. Most recently, Bendjedid engaged Algerian diplomacy in an effort to find an alternative formulation for self-determination which might help in breaking the Jordan-PLO impasse. To that end he dispatched adviser Lakhdar Brahimi on a special mission to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan and then wrote personally to President Reagan.

4. Among other signs of a more activist Algerian Middle East policy, one of the most striking is the regular series of consultations between Arafat and Bendjedid. This personal relationship appears to have grown steadily in the wake of the PLO evacuation of Beirut—where the GOA placed the totality of its resources at PLO disposal—and to have intensified during the PNC meeting when Algeria provided a no-strings-attached refuge for Arafat in his time of need. Much publicity

³ Telegram Tosec 40208/121121, May 3, summarized Bendjedid's message to Reagan: "Yaker came in to express Algerian President Bendjedid's belief that it is time for the U.S. to take a 'bold initiative' and make a statement acknowledging the fundamental importance of the Palestinian problem and the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. He did not refer to the Moroccan initiative." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830247-0959)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 119.

has also been given to the GOA's 10-million-dollar contribution to the PLO during the battle of Beirut and to the military training provided in Algeria for Palestinian fighters.

5. At the same time, however, Algeria has done its best to keep open lines of communication with other PLO factions, especially those of Hawatmeh and Habbash. They are routinely received at the highest levels and were given no reason to complain of GOA meddling or favoritism during the PNC. Algeria also maintains good contacts with the radical Arab states of its former Steadfastness Front alliance. For example, both Arafat and King Hassan asked Bendjedid to intervene with Assad on the subject of an Arab summit. Finally, building on Bendjedid's November 1982 meeting with King Fahd and his more recent meetings with his Moroccan and Tunisian neighbors, the GOA has increased its cooperation and coordination with moderate Arabs. Lakhdar Brahimi's April 23 meeting with King Hussein seems to have added Jordan to that list.

6. The net result is a substantial Algerian capacity to play the role of honest broker in the Middle East. The GOA is proud of its peacemaking initiatives elsewhere, as in the release of U.S. hostages in Iran and ongoing efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq war. It would be tempted by the possibility of playing a meaningful role in the Middle East in what it sees as the most important of all conflicts. In that context, the GOA feeler on a self-determination formulation represents a cautious toe in the water; Brahimi's positive remarks to King Hussein and Bendjedid's letter to Reagan offer the prospect of significantly greater activism.

7. It is difficult to predict how far Algeria will be prepared to pursue its new role. Its most comfortable position is that of go-between or broker on behalf of the PLO. The GOA firmly believes in the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and has said consistently that it could accept any solution in the Middle East which would be acceptable to the PLO. Thus, support for PLO-sponsored initiatives entails only limited political exposure for the GOA. Beyond that, however, Algeria remains chary of any maneuvering which might hint at usurpation of Palestinian prerogatives.

8. Nonetheless, the GOA is now more receptive to active participation in consultations among its Arab partners and could prove to be a useful link between moderate and radical elements. Lakhdar Brahimi told the Ambassador that Algeria would work discreetly to improve Syria-PLO, Jordan-PLO, and Syria-Jordan relations—all in coordination with the Saudis. Brahimi also welcomed regular consultations with U.S. on the peace process.

9. Overall, the evolution in Algerian Middle East policy is positive from our perspective. The GOA has shown itself already to be a valuable ally for Arafat, helping to free him to some extent from Syrian pressures.

Growing coordination with Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan should improve prospects for the moderate Arab camp. Algeria's ability to talk with all parties—including the U.S.—provides a useful channel and potential influence heretofore unavailable. Although the GOA is likely to be very cautious in its approach, its emerging activism should be carefully evaluated as a new factor in the Middle East equation.

Newlin

**128. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President
Bendjedid¹**

Washington, May 19, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

Once again, we face a period of risk and opportunity in the Middle East, one that prompts me to share my thinking with you and other Arab statesmen and to seek your support.

As you are aware, Mr. President, we have succeeded in concluding an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. This agreement marks an important and necessary first step towards the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory, a requisite condition for the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and authority over all Lebanese territory. It seeks to ensure also that the circumstances that led to Israel's military action last summer will not recur.

From your message of May 2,² which your Ambassador delivered here in Washington, I know of your concern for Lebanon's future. Ambassador Newlin has reported to us also Algeria's consistent support for the restoration of full Lebanese independence and sovereignty. I can assure you, Mr. President, that the United States is firmly committed to that same goal and that implementation of the agreement we have reached is essential to its achievement.

Those who seek peace and stability in the Middle East and who support the Lebanese Government's commitment to reestablishing with honor full authority over its national territory and destiny share

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Algeria: President Bendjedid (8105773-8407957). No classification marking.

² See footnote 3, Document 127.

our interest in the successful withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces from Lebanon. This goal is important in itself and a step towards resolution of the Palestinian problem which, like you, we consider the heart of the Middle East dispute.

We are aware of the recent contacts your government has had with that of Syria and other Arab states. I hope, Mr. President, that your government will use these contacts with Syria to support the withdrawal agreement. The alternative is continued conflict and bloodshed in Lebanon, with risk to the region as a whole and further delay in seeking a comprehensive settlement to the larger problems of the Middle East.

I know from your message of your concern for these issues, and I do appreciate your willingness to receive Ambassador Walters as you did last September.³

With best regards,
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

³ See footnote 3, Document 114.

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, August 12, 1983, 1005Z

222550. Following State 222550 dtd Aug 8, sent action Algiers being repeated to you for your info:

Quote: Subject: Ambassador Yaker's August 1 Call on the Vice President.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: In cordial August 1 conversation, Vice President Bush and Algerian Ambassador Yaker reviewed current African and Middle Eastern questions with Yaker taking predictable Algerian line on Chad, Western Sahara and Algerian-Libyan relations. On the Middle East, Yaker recalled President Bendjedid's message to President Reagan

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830452–0491. Confidential. Drafted by James Vincent (AF/I); cleared by Sebastian and Kenneth Scott (AF/W); approved by Vincent. Sent for information to Bamako, Dakar, Conakry, and Nouakchott.

urging U.S. statement on Palestinian self-determination as key to progress on Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli dispute.² Yaker raised issue of Algerian gas exports to U.S. as potentially serious problem in our bilateral relations. Vice President said he would study the issue in anticipation of his September visit to Algiers.

3. Vice President Bush received Ambassador Yaker at latter's request August 1 for lively but cordial conversation. Following is summary of salient points:

A. Vice President's trip—Yaker reported that Algeria's President Bendjedid is greatly looking forward to the opportunity of an exchange of views with the Vice President on issues of bilateral and international interest. The Vice President replied that he too looked forward to these talks.

B. The Vice President invited Yaker to comment on his government's views in events in Chad. Yaker said that the Algerian Government was concerned by the events and mentioned that during Col. Qadhafi's visit in Algiers on July 25–26 it had been agreed "that there should be no intervention by outside powers in Chad." The Vice President asked Ambassador Yaker how this squared with Qadhafi's intervention? The Ambassador replied that Qadhafi was responding defensively to the "presence of foreigners" in Chad. Yaker said his government believes that the only solution to the Chadian problem resided in the reconciliation of Chad's political factions.

C. Western Sahara—Yaker summarized the results of the 19th Addis OAU summit. He, naturally, laid stress on the fact that the Western Sahara resolution of the 19th summit identified the parties.³ He pointed to King Hassan's speech of July 9 saying that King Hassan says that he is ready to proceed with the implementation of the resolution while making no move to do so.

D. Algeria/Libya—In response to the Vice President's question, Yaker characterized Algerian-Libyan relations as "normal". He pointed to the complementarities in the two countries economies and noted the GOA's interest in the building of a "Greater Maghreb". He said that Algeria was ready to pool her resources with those of her neighbors in order to solve problems.

E. Middle East—Yaker recapitulated his government's current views on the Middle East, without breaking new ground. He pointed out that Algeria had sent a message to President Reagan urging the U.S. to speak out on the issue of self-determination for the Palestinians in a Jordano-Palestinian framework. He stressed his government's view

² See footnote 3, Document 127.

³ See Document 407.

that the basic (Palestinian) problem had to be dealt with if all the other related problems were to be resolved.

F. Lebanon/PLO/West Bank—In response to the Vice President's account of the evolution of Syria's position on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, which included specific reference to Assad's previous assertion that Syria would pull out of Lebanon once the Israelis had agreed to do so, Yaker noted the dilemma of the Palestinians: where would they go? He linked the current split in the PLO to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. He urged the U.S. to declare that it is Washington's view that self-determination for the people of the West Bank is needed; that their future lay in association with Jordan. If the U.S. Government were to make such a statement "then we can get together and solve all the issues now before us in the region." Yaker thought that President Gemayel's writ runs only in Beirut; that the Syrians have security concerns; that Israel should be asked to withdraw its troops unconditionally and that Israeli settlement activities should be stopped.

G. Yaker raised Algeria's gas exports to the U.S. as an important bilateral issue. He informed the Vice President of the presence of an Algerian delegation which had come to study the problem. The Ambassador gave the Algerian Government's view that its LNG contracts with American firms should be fulfilled. Algeria is being asked to review the terms of its agreements with Trunkline. In an effort to be accommodating, Algeria has agreed to set aside a take or pay provision of the contract with Trunkline for two years. It has agreed to reduce the volume of its sales of gas to Trunkline by 40 percent. In so doing, it would earn roughly \$500 million less than it had planned, sums which it would have to borrow on the financial markets as a consequence. Notwithstanding these Algerian concessions it now appears that Congress and the FERC may take positions adverse to Algeria in this context. "This would create difficult problems in our bilateral relations." After hearing Yaker out, the Vice President responded that he would get himself briefed up on details of the gas problem so as to be prepared to discuss it in Algiers. Shultz

Unquote

Shultz

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White House and the Department of State¹

Algiers, September 15, 1983, 1145Z

3937. Tunis for Vice President's Party. Subject: Vice President's visit to Algeria: Meeting With Prime Minister Abdelghani.

1. S/Exdis—Entire text.

2. Vice President, accompanied by his working party, met September 14 with Prime Minister Abdelghani at the Palais du Gouvernement. Algerian participation included Minister of Planning Brahimi, Ambassador Yaker, and MFA Director for Europe and North America Chitour.

3. Abdelghani warmly welcomed the Vice President, calling his visit a major event in the history of our bilateral relations, one which would contribute substantially to the beginning of a new era. The GOA is ready to actively examine all possibilities for enlarging bilateral cooperation and giving it new elan and new dimensions. The Prime Minister recalled Algeria's non-aligned position, a cardinal principal enshrined in the national charter. In that context, Algeria is working to consolidate its independence as well as for peace, progress and the liberty of peoples still under domination. The GOA is ready for fruitful, balanced, mutually beneficial relations with all those who accept cooperation on a reasonable and equitable basis. Abdelghani underlined the importance which Algeria attached to the diversification of its contacts as well as to efforts to better our bilateral exchanges and reinforce our mutual cooperation.

4. The Vice President emphasized our total respect for the principles of non-alignment and national independence, stressing that the U.S. seeks the best possible relations with all the nations of the Maghreb. Finally, the Vice President thanked Abdelghani for the very warm welcome extended by the GOA.

5. Turning to the Middle East, the Vice President said the U.S. understands Algeria's position that there can never be true peace until a solution is found to the Palestinian problem. In our view, the President's Sept 1 initiative is not dead—many countries agree with its general thesis and with a number of its specific points. The situation in Lebanon in particular has prevented progress toward a general Middle

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830573–0711. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.

East settlement. The U.S. seeks a Lebanon free of all foreign forces. Syria, however, is now obstructing progress in refusing to honor the Lebanese request for the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Israel certainly poses some difficult problems, but at this moment it is Syria that needs to cooperate. The U.S. does not want to see its marines in combat, but its forces are there in the MNF context and will defend themselves as necessary, protected by U.S. forces in the region.

6. Abdelghani replied that until the Palestinian problem is resolved, peace in the Middle East will not be possible. This problem has been at the root of Middle East upheaval since 1948.

7. The Vice President agreed, saying the President's initiative was unique for the U.S. in recognizing the need to get to the heart of the Palestinian question through negotiations. Speaking frankly, he said that it is impossible for the U.S. to deal with an organization—the PLO—whose very charter still calls for the destruction of the Zionist entity. The U.S. cannot in good conscience negotiate with an organization that would destroy a good friend.

8. The Prime Minister said that intermediaries can never be as effective as the principal parties themselves. In any case, Israel's existence cannot be realistically threatened militarily. He concluded with the thought that the U.S. could greatly influence Israel.

9. The Vice President replied that Israel's existence is a fact. It cannot be destroyed militarily and therefore the PLO loses nothing by abandoning its call for Israel's destruction—only then would negotiations with the U.S. be possible. The Vice President concluded that we very much need this dialogue which could come from a changed PLO position.

10. Abdelghani thanked the Vice President again for his visit and expressed the hope for continued progress in the bilateral relationship. He mentioned the proposed joint economic commission as a useful tool for expanding the U.S.-Algerian dialogue.

11. Murphy and Gregg have seen this msg.

Newlin

131. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Attorney General (Clegg) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Kimmitt) and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Covey)¹

Washington, November 14, 1983

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Algerian Ambassador Yaker and Attorney General William French Smith

You had requested² that I give you an account of the meeting—held in the Attorney General's office on November 9 from 11:00 a.m. to approximately 11:30 a.m.—between Algerian Ambassador Layachi Yaker and Attorney General William French Smith. (Also present at the meeting were Second Secretary Ahmed Boutache and myself, but we said nothing.)

The meeting began with a lengthy exchange of pleasantries, focusing especially on the Attorney General's past trips to northern Africa. This culminated in the Ambassador inviting the Attorney General to visit Algeria, an invitation which was repeated twice more in the course of the meeting. The invitation was made with special reference to meeting with the Algerian Minister of Justice. The Attorney General expressed interest in visiting Algeria.

The Ambassador then stated that only the United States can bring a just and comprehensive peace to the Middle East, and that if our forces there were replaced by U.N. forces or the forces of a neutral country (he suggested a Scandinavian country) then we would be free to deal with the various actors involved in the conflict. But, he said, this was not what he came to talk about.

Rather, he said what he came to talk about was, first, the Iranian claims situation and, second, natural gas. On the Iranian claims matter, the Ambassador said he hoped Algeria would be able to work things out in its dealings at The Hague soon, and that he was always available to discuss any problems arising from the claims with the Attorney General. He expressed the hope that relations between Iran and the United States would improve, though he recognized this might not be immediately possible. The Attorney General said that the United States greatly appreciated the "essential and valuable" role that Algeria played in getting the hostages released. The Ambassador added that

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Algeria 1983 (2). Confidential.

² Not found.

this was done not for any hope of gain, political or economic, but for humanitarian reasons.

Most of the meeting was spent discussing natural gas issues. First, the Ambassador stated by way of introduction that the Vice President's trip to Algeria was viewed positively. He then began discussing the contract between Sonatrach and Trunkline/Panhandle. The Ambassador said that the situation in Congress was complicated by the fact that so many of its members were already running for reelection. The legislation proposed by Senator Percy and Congressman Young was discussed.³ Later, references were also made to the efforts of Congressmen Dingle and Sharp, and Senator McClure.⁴ The Ambassador said that a \$1.5 billion investment was made by Algeria pursuant to this contract, which was negotiated in good faith, and that Algeria had borrowed a great deal from the Export-Import Bank and commercial banks (including Chase Manhattan). In order to service this debt, Algeria must continue its exports, which the proposed legislation threatens. The Ambassador said that there was no problem with the contracts in the Boston area, because there is no other potential supplier there, but the Midwest contracts pose problems. Singling out the Algerian companies, he said, was like a bill of attainder, violates the sanctity of contracts, and would force Algeria to submit the matter to arbitration, which Algeria has no desire to do. Algeria has already agreed, for the first time ever, to waive the take-or-pay clause in the contract, costing them \$250 million a year and reducing the volume they supply by half.

The Ambassador said that this legislation, then, is a very serious matter, which could affect our relations a great deal; it implicates international law and international relations, and will damage American credibility. Algeria has refrained from making an issue of this in the press, but, considering the legal issues involved, his government thought that the Ambassador should raise the matter with the Attorney General.

The Attorney General, who let the Ambassador do most of the talking throughout the meeting, thanked the Ambassador for his views. He observed that this Congress has not passed much of anything, especially in the House. The Attorney General said that he understood Algeria's concerns and what the problems were. He added that the

³ Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Bill Young (R-Florida), introduced a bill requiring the Department of Energy to suspend Trunkline's authorization to import high-priced Algerian LNG within ten days after enactment of the bill.

⁴ Representatives John Dingle (D-Michigan), Philip Sharp (D-Indiana), and Senator James McClure (R-Idaho) supported efforts to force U.S. companies to import lower-priced Algerian LNG based upon fair market conditions.

legislation is not yet so far along that the Department of Justice has been asked to render a legal opinion on its constitutionality.

The Ambassador said that their lawyers were looking at the constitutional issues raised by the bill. He said that Algeria does not have lobbyists, that it doesn't want to use them, but that American officials should be aware of what the risks in the bill are. That, he said, was why he had asked to meet with the Attorney General. This is a long-term, 20-year contract, he said, and though it may seem you are oversubscribed now, with a recovering economy you may soon want more gas again, as indeed was the case a few years ago. The companies involved here are getting along fine, the Ambassador said; it is only the interference of Congress and the regulatory agencies which has created problems.

These are the problems I wanted to raise, said the Ambassador, and they must be worked out in our countries' common interest.

The Attorney General again thanked the Ambassador for his thoughts. The legislative process is hard to predict, he said, and he did not know yet what involvement the Department of Justice would have. In any event, he was pleased to have the Ambassador's views.

The Ambassador then said that the Secretary of State was also aware of Algeria's views, and was sympathetic. He alluded to the Secretary's recent trip,⁵ and the upcoming trip of Secretary Hodel as well. Secretaries Baldrige and Brock are also sympathetic, he said; we have been keeping in touch with the Administration.

The Ambassador said a formal invitation for a visit by the Attorney General to Algeria would be forthcoming. He mentioned explicitly the possibility of working out a U.S.-Algerian mutual assistance law enforcement treaty, similar to the one recently signed with Morocco. The Ambassador was profuse in his thanks to the Attorney General for meeting with him.

NOTE: IF EITHER OF YOU BELIEVE THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. Thank you very much for the information, written and oral, you supplied us in such timely fashion before the meeting.

⁵Reference is presumably to Shultz's October 26-27 visit to Paris to discuss Lebanon with the French, Italian, and British Foreign Ministers.

132. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, January 6, 1984

FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1984

I had a longish meeting with the Ambassador of Algeria today,² who came in to protest the cancellation by Trunkline, a natural gas corporation, of a natural gas contract with Sonatrach, an Algerian public corporation. This is a contract which involved very large sums of foreign exchange for Algeria, and the cancellation came as a major blow to Algeria. The U.S. Government had not been informed prior to the cancellation by Trunkline,³ which apparently is in very serious financial straits because of the high price of the Algerian contract compared to other sources of natural gas in the U.S. Midwest. I explained to Yaker how the United States was not in a position to force a U.S. corporation to live up to its obligations, nor was it able to guarantee, with money or otherwise, the obligations of this foreign corporation. I also mentioned the fact, without being explicit about it, that when the shoe had been on the other foot and Algeria had been unilaterally increasing the price of natural gas in its contracts with the United States, Algeria had been delighted to obtain the additional money and had not been concerned about compensation to the United States.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983—Sept. 1984. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on January 6.

² In telegram 5072 to Algiers, January 7, the Department informed the Embassy that during this January 6 meeting, Yaker told Dam "the GOA could not accept Trunkline's suspension of LNG liftings, that Algeria expected the USG to help develop 'solutions' to the suspension, and that the Trunkline situation held 'serious political implications' for U.S.-Algerian relations. Citing recent improvements in bilateral relations, Yaker stated the GOA did not want a 'crisis' in relations but would consider 'other courses of action' if the Trunkline contract were maintained." Dam replied that "the U.S. legal system did not allow the administration to dictate actions to American companies involved in international transactions, suggested the GOA consider legal remedies to achieve its objectives in the Trunkline situation, and said the Department remained open to further discussions on the matter if the GOA desired." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840041–0049, D840012–0764)

³ In telegram 363524 to Algiers, December 23, 1983, the Department transmitted the text of a memorandum of conversation of Hodel's December 15 meeting with Yaker. During the meeting, Hodel "said that as soon as he learned about the Panhandle decision to suspend Algerian gas imports he called Minister Nabi" to explain that "this action by the company was totally unexpected. We wanted to make clear that the USG had not been involved in nor directed this action and that it was a private company action." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830760–0434)

133. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Proposed Visit of Algerian Presidential Emissary

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to respond to President Bendjedid's request to send Commerce Minister Khellef to Washington in the period March 12–17 to deliver a message to the President and meet with you for substantive discussions.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Algeria's Acting Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Newlin February 20 that President Bendjedid would like to send Commerce Minister Khellef to Washington in mid-March to deliver a message to the President and hold discussions with you on the situation in the region. Though Khellef's mandate would clearly be broader, the announced purpose of the trip would be to discuss US-Algerian economic/commercial relations. Commerce Secretary Baldrige has set aside time on his schedule March 13 to see Khellef. We will also seek appointments for Khellef with Energy Secretary Hodel² and Agriculture Secretary Block,³ both recent visitors to Algiers.

Bendjedid's proposal is an important step forward in the political dialogue that we have been pursuing with the GOA since late 1982. For

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (02/23/1984). Secret. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by Ann Korky (MEA/AFN) on February 22; cleared by Sebastian, David Schneider, and in substance by Loustonou (USDOC). A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum dated February 27 reads: "GPS." Hill initialed the top right hand corner of the memorandum and wrote: "2/27." Tab 2, telegram 887 from Algiers, February 20, is not attached. In the telegram, Newlin reported that Kerroum had informed him that "Bendjedid wished to send Minister of Commerce Khellef to the United States between March 12–17 carrying a message to the President." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840111–0568)

² A summary of Hodel's November 1983 visit to Algiers, which included a 55-minute meeting with Bendjedid and discussions with Nabi about the Trunkline contract, is in telegram 5147 from Algiers, November 22, 1983. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830687–0281)

³ A record of Block's January 31–February 2 visit to Algeria is in telegram 586 from Algiers, February 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840071–0133)

the first time, the Algerians have taken the initiative to seek consultations with us in Washington through a special Presidential emissary. They have been responsive to previous such requests from us and have received at either the Presidential or Foreign Minister level a variety of senior US officials, including the Vice President, Secretaries Baldrige, Block and Hodel, Under Secretary Eagleburger and Ambassadors Rumsfeld and Walters.⁴ We should be as forthcoming as possible to Bendjedid's request, seeking a brief meeting with the President and a longer appointment with the Vice President, as well as meetings with you and others in the Department.

The cable attached at Tab 1⁵ authorizes Ambassador Newlin to inform the GOA of your general agreement to the proposed visit, indicates specifically that you will receive Khellef and notes that we will work with the White House and others to develop a formal schedule for the March 12–17 timeframe.⁶

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the cable attached at Tab 1.

That you agree to an appointment with Minister Khellef in the period March 12–17.⁷

⁴ See documents 114, 120, 121, 126, 130, and 132. No record of Rumsfeld's meeting with Algerian officials has been found.

⁵ Tab 1, telegram 57544 to Algiers, February 28, is not attached. It is in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840127–0636.

⁶ On March 3, Hill advised McFarlane that the Department recommended that Reagan agree to a "brief meeting" with Khellef on March 13 in order to personally receive Bendjedid's message. (Memorandum from Hill to McFarlane, March 3; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983))

⁷ Shultz initialed the "Approve" recommendation. A stamp next to his initials reads: "FEB 27 1984." Shultz asked his assistant to "work out" a meeting time.

134. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 12, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

2. *The Algerian Emissary*. I met with the Algerian Commerce Minister Khellef,² who is to deliver an oral message to you tomorrow from President Bendjedid. Khellef alleged a Moroccan turn towards a military solution in the Western Sahara and argued that the US should press King Hassan to move towards direct negotiations with the Polisario. I told him we agree on the need for a negotiated settlement, but believe the Moroccans recognize that a military solution is unrealistic and want to proceed with the OAU-mandated referendum. Khellef mentioned the situation in Lebanon but argued that the Palestinian problem and the lack of acceptance of their right of self-determination was at the heart of the dilemma. The US could help, Khellef said, by bringing Israel to recognize this. I told him we continue to believe that Palestinian problems can be best confronted in negotiations between Jordan (with Palestinian participation) and Israel.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading January–March 1984. Secret.

² The Shultz-Khellef conversation is in telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806)

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, March 17, 1984, 0139Z

78924. Subject: Meetings Between Algerian Emissary Abdelaziz Khellef and the President and the Vice President.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian Special Emmissary, Commerce Minister Adbelaziz Khellef presented on March 13 a brief and general oral

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0244. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by David Schneider; cleared by Teicher, Covey, and Gregg; approved by Schneider. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Nouakchott, and Paris.

message from Algerian President Bendjedid to the President at a short meeting in the Oval Office followed by a longer meeting with the Vice President. Bendjedid's message spoke of his desire for friendship, cooperation and dialogue and of his sending Khellef in a quest for further development of a bilateral cooperative relationship in which both bilateral and regional affairs could be discussed. Khellef elaborated on this in his meeting with the Vice President, discussing the Western Sahara at length. He explained that Algeria seeks peace and stability in the Maghreb and the continuation of Hassan's reign. The Algerians see Hassan's extension of the berm, his new understanding with Libya, and his failure to avail himself of opportunities following the 1983 Bendjedid-Hassan summit² as indications that Hassan may be seeking a military solution to the dispute. Algeria wanted to share its views to see if the U.S. might be able to moderate Hassan's position. The Vice President replied that he did not believe Hassan seeks a military solution to the Western Sahara dispute. There is difficulty about direct talks, however. The U.S. supports a referendum and believes that there is much Algeria can do to bring about a negotiated solution. We believe that Hassan has his eyes open about Libya; the U.S. would be troubled if Hassan's understanding with Qadhafi harmed Algerian interests or the U.S.-Algerian relationship. As time ran out, Khellef called for self-determination for Palestinians as the ultimate solution for the Lebanon problem and expressed concern about Iranian intransigence and movement away from negotiations to end the Iran-Iraq war. End summary.

3. The President very briefly met in the Oval Office with Algerian Commerce Minister Abdelaziz Khellef at 3:00 p.m. on March 13.³ Thereafter Khellef met for a longer discussion with the Vice President in his West Wing offices. Also present at the meetings with the President and the Vice President were, on the Algerian side, Algerian Ambassador Yaker and Ambassador Abdelkrim Chitour, Director for Western Europe and North America, MFA; and, on the U.S. side, the Vice President, Donald Gregg Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Charles Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Howard Teicher of the NSC Staff, and David Schneider State/NEA.

4. The President opened the conversation warmly welcoming Minister Khellef, a greeting which Khellef reciprocated with great thanks for the President's making available time for the meeting. Khellef conveyed the greetings of the Algerian President, saying that Bendjedid wished to convey a message of friendship, cooperation,

² See Document 19.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan, Bush, Khellef, and Yaker met on March 13 from 3–3:06 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

and desire for dialogue. He recalled his coming to know the President at Cancun with pleasure. Khellef also noted his satisfaction with his discussions with the Vice President during the latter's visit to Algeria. Khellef said that he had been asked to visit Washington in order further to develop a cooperative bilateral relationship in which both bilateral and regional issues could be discussed. This, said Khellef, briefly, was his message from Bendjedid. The President again expressed his appreciation for the Algerian visit and the message Khellef had conveyed. The group thereupon left the President and the Oval Office; the Vice President escorted the Minister to his office where a more detailed discussion ensued.

5. The Vice President opened the discussion asking Khellef to tell President Bendjedid how much the extra courtesy which Bendjedid had shown the Vice President had meant to him and Mrs. Bush. Equally important was what Bendjedid had said about the relationship he desired with the U.S. The Vice President had returned to Washington and immediately informed President Reagan about this. Khellef replied that Bendjedid had also asked him to speak of his pleasant recollections of the Vice President's visit. He had instructed the Minister to continue the dialogue which the Vice President had initiated. Khellef reported on various visits which had been exchanged between the two countries and the achievements which were being made: setting up a joint economic commission, developing a commercial relationship, signing an agricultural agreement, etc. In his only reference to the natural gas issue, Khellef noted that the only drawback in our commercial relationship was the conflict between Trunk-line and Sonatrach, to which he wished to find a solution so that our commercial cooperation could improve.

6. Khellef then turned to the Western Sahara issue, which clearly was the most important matter he wished to discuss. He explained that the Algerian approach was to find out how Algeria could help King Hassan find a solution. The Bendjedid-Hassan meeting in 1983 was a beginning. Then the Addis OAU resolution "made a solution possible."⁴ This was confirmed in the UNGA, which made an appeal for direct Moroccan discussions with the Polisario. Unfortunately, Khellef said, the direct talks did not take place. Hassan had stepped back. The Algerians fear that he may think that a military solution to the Western Sahara dispute is possible. They disagree. Algeria wishes to see the Mahgreb a region of peace and stability where all resources could be devoted to development. They want Hassan to remain on the Moroccan

⁴ Reference is to a June 11, 1983, OAU Resolution which called for "direct negotiations" between Morocco and the Polisario. See footnote 3, Document 408.

throne. His policy of “non-negotiation” did not help movement toward these objectives.

7. The Vice President interrupted to explain that he had talked personally to Hassan.⁵ We do not feel that he wants a military solution. There is a difficulty regarding direct talks, however. As for the U.S., we wish there would be a negotiated solution. We believe Algeria can do much to bring about this result. We support a referendum. We are quite close to Morocco and don’t believe that it has shifted to military means.

8. In response to a question from the Vice President regarding the basis for Algerian concerns, Khellef replied that Hassan did not seize the opportunities offered in the aftermath of the Bendjedid-Hassan meeting in 1983. Further, Morocco has now extended the berm in the Western Sahara in a way which involves Mauritania. Then, Khellef said, there is the arrangement Morocco has reached with Libya, under which Hassan supports Qadhafi on Chad and Qadhafi supports Hassan on Western Sahara. Khellef added that Qadhafi has many reasons to be unhappy with Algeria. The Vice President intervened to say that he seriously doubted that King Hassan was putting any great trust in anything Qadhafi said. We think Hassan has his eyes open about Libya. Khellef concluded that these were the reasons why Algeria believed there had been a shift in Moroccan policy. Algeria wanted to share these views to see if the U.S. might moderate Hassan’s position regarding a negotiated settlement.

9. The Vice President asked how Algerian interests were affected by Hassan’s understanding with Qadhafi. Khellef replied that Algeria had no objection in principle to any rapprochement in the Mahgreb but it wanted to see a clear foundation for such rapprochement. There should be no alliance which threatens the region. Algeria has improved its ties with Tunisia and wishes to do the same with Morocco and, ultimately, Libya.

10. The Vice President then expressed U.S. pleasure with the direction in which our bilateral relationship with Algeria was proceeding. Ambassador Yaker was helping. We want relations further to improve. We are tremendously impressed by Chadli Bendjedid. Mentioning the natural gas problem, the Vice President said that nothing should interfere. In regard to regional affairs, he said that we would be very troubled if we thought any understanding between Hassan and Qadhafi would harm the interests of Algeria. We would be willing to take this matter up. We see nothing redeeming about Qadhafi; he is behind much of the terror in the world. We understand Libya’s neighbors’ concerns. If the President concluded that Qadhafi was undermining Algerian interests or our bilateral relations, we would want something done about the

⁵ Not found.

matter. Qadhafi is stirring up trouble in Chad and even in this country. Algeria has an extraordinarily important role to play in the Mahgreb, including in the quest for a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

11. As time began to run out, Khellef briefly mentioned Lebanon, expressing the hope that factional dialogue, taking into account the interests of Syria, would improve the situation there. He maintained that the Palestinian issue was the basic cause of Lebanon's difficulties and urged recognition of the right of Palestinian self-determination as important to the solution. The Vice President countered by explaining that the President's September 1 proposals were still an effective approach to a solution of the Palestinian problem. As the meeting broke up, the Vice President said he wished there had been time to discuss the Iran-Iraq situation. There had been great loss of life and threats to our interests. We were very worried about the situation there. Khellef said the Algerians had been surprised by Iranian intransigence. Most recently the Iranians had again "slipped back" from any receptivity to negotiations.

Shultz

136. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Seoul, May 2, 1984, 0013Z

Secto 4063/4554. White House please pass ASAP to Bud McFarlane in Fairbanks, Alaska. Subject: May 2 Algeria Naval Challenge.

To: National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane

From: Secretary of State George P. Shultz

(Begin text)

Quote

I understand that you have agreed to a DOD proposal to carry out an assertion of our navigational rights off the Algeria coast

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 72 [United States Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea]. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Shultz was in Seoul May 1-2 for meetings with South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan.

on May 2.² Since this proposal was discussed at the meeting John Poindexter chaired at the White House April 24,³ tensions along the Algerian-Moroccan border have continued to rise and we have also repeated expressions of Algerian concern that certain aspects of our military relations with Morocco, including the joint exercises now underway, may in fact support current Moroccan operations in the Sahara.

These developments have convinced me we should postpone the May 2 challenge operation until later in the year. At a time when we have asked our Ambassadors in Algiers and Rabat to counsel calm and restraint to their respective hosts, we should take no action that would undercut their efforts. Nor would the purposes of NSDD 72⁴ be served if the Algerian Government views our challenge in the context of the Saharan conflict or U.S.-Moroccan bilateral relations rather than as a neutral, non-political assertion of our navigational rights. A challenge so perceived would exacerbate the regional tensions that we have sought to quiet and put at risk our strategy of seeking improved relations with all the Maghreb states in support of a peaceful settlement of the Sahara dispute. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that the May 2 operation be immediately ordered postponed.⁵

I also would ask you to take another look at the proposed Greek and Turkish challenges and whether now is the best time⁶ to assert our admittedly legitimate freedom of navigational rights.

Shultz

² In telegram Tosec 40380/126762 to Seoul, May 1, Murphy noted that "the Navy periodically schedules transits within 3 and 12 miles inter alia of the Algerian coast to demonstrate that we do not accept the GOA's requirement for prior notification of innocent passage by foreign warships. We successfully challenged the Algerian requirement in November 1982. Since that time, DOD has proposed transits on two other occasions. Both times, the Pentagon was overruled in deference to objections raised by the Department. The NSC decided last week over the Department's opposition to schedule another transit May 2." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840281–0242)

³ No record of the meeting was found.

⁴ National Security Decision Directive 72, "United States Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea," December 13, 1982, stated that "the United States will continue to protect U.S. navigation, overflight, and related security interests in the seas through the vigorous exercise of its rights against excessive maritime claims." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 72 [United States Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea]) For text of the directive, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 192.

⁵ Poindexter underlined the words "I strongly recommend that the May 2 operation be immediately ordered postponed."

⁶ Poindexter underlined the words "now is the best time" and underneath it wrote: "There is never a 'best' time. JP."

137. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, June 26, 1984

SUBJECT

Meeting with Nourredine Kerroum, Secretary General of the Algerian Foreign Ministry

I had a fascinating meeting with Mr. Kerroum which demonstrated once more how valuable our relations with Algeria can be.

I discussed our concerns about Afghanistan. Kerroum agreed with our analysis.² He said he believed that the Soviets now regretted their decision to invade and doubted that it had been inspired by fears of Muslim fundamentalism and said it would be very hard to get them out. Kerroum said that Algeria had worked jointly with India to press an NAM resolution against the Soviet move, but that it was hard for Algeria to pursue the Afghan issue whenever it was placed in an East-West context.³ I said we had no desire to put Afghanistan into that category, adding that our major concerns were to end the agony of the Afghan people and to get the Soviets out so that a neutral and non-aligned country could reemerge. I indicated that you had talked to Mrs. Gandhi about that topic⁴ and urged that Algeria do all in its power to press for a political solution.

We next talked about Libya, and while Kerroum agreed that there was widespread unhappiness within that country, it was not at all certain that Qadhafi would be overthrown. Algeria's distaste for Qadhafi was clear in what Kerroum said, but it was also obvious that at this point they do not intend to take any forcible action.

On Iran-Iraq, Kerroum confirmed that there is a debate within the Iranian power structure, largely between President Khamenei and Speaker Rafsanjani. While Khamenei takes a more reasonable line, he cannot advocate a settlement of the war with Iraq that does not

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778-003, Algeria—1984. Confidential. Sent through Murphy. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, on a copy printed for Kemp, Gregg wrote: "Sorry you weren't there. DG."

² Gregg placed an asterisk after this sentence and in the left-hand margin wrote: "said pressure should be kept on Soviets."

³ Gregg underlined the words "it was hard for Algeria to pursue the Afghan issue whenever it was placed in an East-West context" and in the left-hand margin wrote: "this was stressed."

⁴ Not found.

show to the Iranian people some concrete result of all of the fighting. A recent Algerian delegation was told in Teheran that the Iranians would give up all of their claims in Iraq except for their demand of Husayn Saddam's resignation. Kerroum said he found no reason for optimism in looking at the war.

Kerroum dwelt largely on Algeria's problems with Morocco and urged that the U.S. take a more balanced stance. He said it now appears that King Hassan believes that we will support him no matter what his posture relative to problems in the Western Sahara. Kerroum felt that a more balanced U.S. stand would push Hassan toward a more sensible West Sahara policy.⁵

Kerroum sent his best regards to you and stated that your talks with President Bendjedid and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi were the "clearest milestones" which mark a new U.S.-Algerian relationship. (Just before he left, Kerroum indicated that they are considering seriously the release of the American prisoner, Jay Salby, on humanitarian grounds. I thanked him for this indication of concern.)

Tom Nassif and Alec Toumayan both indicated that the meeting had been interesting and that several new points had emerged.

⁵ After this sentence, Gregg wrote: "He was vehement on this."

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White House¹

Algiers, September 24, 1984, 1522Z

59. For the Vice President Immediate.

Your September 28 meeting with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi will be a critical one for the future of our relations in North Africa. The meeting will provide the first opportunity for an in-depth high-level exchange with Algeria after the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union. This message outlines Algerian concerns and views as perceived here.

The Algerians see the Oujda Treaty² as directed against them. It confirms their belief that the King has abandoned the search for a

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (06/15/1984–12/22/1984). Secret. Sent via Privacy Channels. Also sent Immediate for the Vice President. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Reference is to the August 13 agreement between King Hassan of Morocco and Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, which established a "union of states" between the two nations. For additional information about the treaty, see Document 37.

compromise solution of the Western Sahara conflict and intends to pursue, with Libyan financial help, a military solution.

Thus far, Algeria has reacted with relative restraint. It considers the Oujda Treaty an unnatural union which is unlikely to last, but wonders how the King plans to use it in the Western Sahara context.

Algerians, like others, find it hard to believe that with our extremely close relations with the King he would have taken such a radical step without our foreknowledge and at least tacit consent. I have tried at the highest levels to reassure them that we had no advance notice from Hassan and that our policy toward North Africa and Qadhafi in particular has not changed.

Our public statements and Guedira's reception have gained us credibility in Algiers. However, the situation is complicated because Algeria believes France and perhaps King Fahd were aware that Oudja was in the works. This has reawakened Algerian suspicions of French double-dealing. (The French handling of their deal with Qadhafi on Chad has also had an unsettling effect.) The Algerians say they have no plans to resume high-level secret contacts with the King. Given his search for a military solution, typified by a further extension of the berm near the Algerian border, the Algerians say they have nothing to discuss.

Algeria is aware of the fact that we wish to maintain our traditional close relations with Morocco. They themselves probably are in favor. What they will be concerned about is a deliberate polarization of the region by the King with the object of associating the United States with a Moroccan-Libyan anti-Algerian alliance. Your personal relationship with Bendjedid and Ibrahimi provides an opportunity to clear the air. They would like to believe we were not somehow involved in the Oujda Treaty but they find it hard to do so.

Ibrahimi will be prepared to brief you on Algerian efforts on behalf of Buckley and the other two Americans held hostage in Lebanon. Hopefully he will have seen Kuwaitis in New York before he comes to Washington.

With all of your other responsibilities at the present time, your willingness to see Ibrahimi is deeply appreciated.

Warm regards and all best wishes.

Newlin

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad, and France¹

Washington, October 2, 1984, 1506Z

292635. Subject: Vice President's Breakfast for FonMin Ibrahimi.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Vice President hosted breakfast Sep 28, 1984 for FonMin Ibrahimi of Algeria. The following were participants:

U.S.

- Vice President
- Donald Gregg, Vice President's Office
- Geoffrey Kemp, NSC Staff
- Thomas A. Nassif, DAS NEA

Algeria

- Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Foreign Minister
- Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian Ambassador-Designate to U.S.
- Ahmed Attas, Interim Director, International Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry

3. The breakfast was preceded by a brief private meeting between the Vice President and the Foreign Minister. At breakfast the Vice President offered to discuss whatever subjects were of interest to the Foreign Minister.

4. The Vice President expressed U.S. surprise and disappointment at the Libya-Morocco union. He stressed the point that we had had no advance notice and had given Guedira a harsh message. The United States did not trust Qadhafi and we are looking at the agreement with great skepticism. The Vice President also reiterated the importance the U.S. attaches to its relationship and dialogue with the Algerians.

5. The Foreign Minister said he would like to talk about the Libyan-Moroccan Treaty and to give us both the facts and his analysis. He began by stating that Royal Counselor Guedira of Morocco during talks with Ibrahimi in May of 84 on the Western Sahara had offered a treaty of union similar to the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty. Ibrahimi had told Guedira that it was unrealistic. Unions in the Arab world are done too hastily. It was unacceptable in that it sidestepped the main issue in dispute which was the Western Sahara. Additionally, it made no

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners Files, OA/ID 19777, Folder 19777-129, Meetings with Foreigners—September 1984: Breakfast with Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi, September 28, 1984. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

reference to Mauritania and Tunisia. Guedira insisted that President Bendjedid see the document. Ibrahimi reported that Bendjedid agreed with Ibrahimi's position.

6. In July of '84 Ibrahimi made a counter-proposal to the Moroccans suggesting that the discussion continue in an enlarged meeting which would include Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. The purpose of the meeting would be to find a solution to the Western Sahara. Ibrahimi also suggested to the Moroccans a treaty between Morocco, Algeria and the Western Sahara. Guedira said that was unacceptable because it put the Western Sahara on the same level with Morocco. This conversation occurred about a week before the negotiations began on July 13 between the Moroccans and Libyans.

7. After the Moroccan-Libyan agreement was signed, Qadhafi came to Algeria and told Pres. Bendjedid that King Hassan was proposing a union with Libya and that Qadhafi had it under study. When Qadhafi began reading the text, Pres. Bendjedid interrupted him and began quoting to him the text, explaining that the Moroccans had proposed the same treaty of union to Algeria. Ibrahimi said to the Vice President that the Algerian Government considers to have been lied to twice by Qadhafi. First, by not saying that the agreement between Morocco and Libya had already been signed at the time of Qadhafi's visit, and second, by not revealing the two defense articles, Article 4 and Article 12. The Foreign Minister stressed to the Vice President that the defense provisions had not appeared in the draft offered to Algeria by Morocco and had probably been added by Qadhafi to the Moroccan-Libyan treaty.

8. Ibrahimi told the Vice President that Guedira had called him after the union was announced. He told Guedira that there was nothing more to talk about. Morocco and Libya should conduct their experiment and they would talk later.

9. The Vice President asked the Foreign Minister whether the treaty would require Morocco to assist Libya, if the Libyans went into Tunisia. The Foreign Minister said they were looking at the effect of the mutual defense provisions on many scenarios, the possibility of Libyans and Moroccans going into either the Western Sahara or Mauritania. Ibrahimi reminded us that President Bendjedid had previously notified King Hassan that if Morocco moved against Mauritania, Algeria could not stand idly by and that he had also warned Qadhafi against moving on Tunisia.

10. The Foreign Minister told the Vice President that on two occasions the Moroccans had turned over Libyan dissidents. In one instance they invited to Morocco a dissident who was in Egypt and then on the pretense of going to Saudi Arabia, flew him instead to Libya where he was greeted by Col. Qadhafi. The Moroccans had also been

responsible for fingering Libyan dissidents in Libya. The Vice President expressed his shock and concern at this betrayal by Hassan of Libyan opposition leaders.

11. The Foreign Minister made his assessment that the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty was tactical, based on present circumstances and would be a short-term agreement. He noted that the Libyans had until 1983 been the primary military supporter of the Polisario.

12. There was a brief discussion of the Iran-Iraq war. The Foreign Minister asserted that no progress has been made and even though some Iranian leaders now feel that the war has not been useful nobody can make a move while Khomeini is alive.

13. The possibility of progress with the Syrians was also discussed briefly. The unresolved question being how much flexibility the Israelis will exhibit and how much the new rotating premiership will hinder progress.

14. The Vice President asked the Foreign Minister about President Bourguiba's health. He replied that he was as well as any 80-year old man and that he was very lucid, despite appearances.

15. The Vice President thanked the Foreign Minister for the meeting and offered to meet with him again anytime he was in Washington. The Vice President felt that these were useful exchanges and still remembered fondly his visit to Algeria and the hospitality shown to him by President Chadli Bendjedid.

Dam

140. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, October 29, 1984

Your Excellency:

I congratulate you and the people of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of your struggle for independence.²

¹Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Algeria 1984 (1). No classification marking.

²Algeria's War of Independence began on November 1, 1954.

The peoples of the United States of America and Algeria both fought long wars and sacrificed much for their independence and I am proud to note that, after you achieved independence, the United States continued to participate in the planned and orderly development of Algeria, particularly by opening our institutions of higher and technical education to Algerian students and by participation of American businesses in the expansion of Algeria's industrial and technical infrastructures.

America values the friendship of Algeria. We seek to further improve our relations, and I am aware of the efforts Algeria has made in this direction. America will long remember Algeria's helpful role in achieving the release of American Embassy personnel who were held hostage in Tehran. We also appreciate your efforts to help solve the dispute between Iran and Iraq, and Algeria's contributions on other issues of concern to my government and the international community.

Mr. President, as you know, the United States is one of Algeria's major commercial partners. My country is the second largest customer for Algeria's crude and finished hydrocarbon products, and we are a major supplier of technical, agricultural and consumer products for the Algerian market. We value this relationship and wish it to expand even further.

Allow me to take this opportunity to thank you for the hospitality your country has offered to officials of my administration, particularly the personal hospitality you gave to Vice President George Bush. In keeping with this growing friendship and our shared desire further to develop mutually beneficial relationships between our two peoples and governments, I would like to extend to you an invitation to visit the United States at a mutually convenient date during 1985.³

Allow me, Your Excellency, again to express my warm personal greetings to yourself and to the people of Algeria, and my best wishes for your continued well-being, progress, and prosperity.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

³ In a November 6 letter Hodel, who led the U.S. Delegation to Algiers for the 30th anniversary of the revolution, informed Reagan that, after presenting him with Reagan's letter and invitation, Bendjedid "Without hesitation and with obvious pleasure" had "accepted immediately." (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Algeria 1984(1))

141. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, November 29, 1984

SUBJECT

Secretary General, Algerian Foreign Ministry

This afternoon I received Mr. Nuridin Kerroum, Secretary General (#2 man) of the Algerian Foreign Ministry. At the specific request of Foreign Minister Ibrahim, who wants to keep you personally informed, he updated me on major issues of interest to Algeria. His main points:

— *Western Sahara*. The OAU seated the SDAR/POLISARIO and then Morocco left the OAU.² Yesterday, Nov 28, the UN Fourth Committee (a UNGA committee of the whole) passed an Algerian resolution calling for Morocco to negotiate directly with the POLISARIO (Hassan will not) (Note: US abstained on that vote).³ Morocco needs to move. Algeria wants to help Morocco make progress—not embarrass the King. Union with Libya didn't help. We talk to the Moroccans on the phone when we wish. I saw the Moroccan Foreign Minister daily at the UN. Don't be surprised if Ibrahim appears in Rabat by the end of the year. We are talking.

— *Morocco-Libya Union*. The Union is unnatural, and has objectives Africans oppose. It contributed to Morocco's defeat on OAU seating of the SDAR (which Libya voted for). "We don't say it in public, but I think we were the first to decide that Qadhafi is crazy. The same day he signed the Union with Hassan, he came to Algiers and swore to President Bendjedid that he had signed nothing. I was there."

— *Drought*. Algeria got the OAU to agree to forming a Special Fund to focus Africans on solving their drought problems. Algeria

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778-003, Algeria—1984. Confidential. Sent through Murphy. Bush initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote: "12-1."

² During the November 12–15 OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, Morocco quit the OAU after the SADR's seating. In telegram 2735 from Maputo, November 27, the Embassy reported: "The OAU members were essentially 'tired' of the Western Sahara issue, and wanted to resolve it once and for all at the Addis meeting. The Morocco-Libya pact had also caused consternation among African leaders and alienated the GOM from previous supporters. Moreover, the Africans were unhappy that Morocco had not fulfilled the commitment for a referendum put forth at the last summit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840757-0843)

³ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/40, which the General Assembly ultimately approved on December 5, called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.

contributed \$10 million seed money, and hopes the US will add a symbolic contribution—in addition to its large bilateral aid efforts. Fund HQ will be in Dakar. Next OAU summit will focus only on economic issues—hopefully avoiding divisive political ones.

— *UN*. Algeria would like to have its UN mission coordinate more closely with ours on issues of mutual interest. This would be helpful to both missions.

— *Iran-Iraq War*. The war can end only on the basis of no victors-no vanquished. But with Khomeini and Saddam in power, that is impossible. Things seem hopeless as long as they are in power.

Mr. Kerroum was very forthcoming and glad to see that we were. Talking with these folks continues to be a pleasure, a learning experience, and a clear indicator that we can work together on more and more.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 6, 1985, 1622Z

46. Commerce for Dennin. USDA for Sims. Subject: President Bendjedid Orders a Strengthening of U.S.-Algerian Relations.

1. Confidential—Entire text

2. Summary: President Bendjedid's strengthened mandate after the FLN Party Congress² will apparently be used in part to push forward more rapidly improving relations with the United States. Senior MFA officials are now looking closely at specific actions that can be taken in this area. Mid-February joint commission meeting will be used to signal publicly that U.S. and Algeria are cooperating in more significant ways. End summary.

3. In both a luncheon with Ambassador Sahnoun on January 4 and in my January 6 meeting with MFA SecGen Hamdani; I was told that President Bendjedid had personally ordered that strengthening of Algeria's relationship with the United States be moved forward more quickly now. Hamdani and Sahnoun indicated that the President came out of the FLN Party Congress with a stronger mandate to carry

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860011-0371. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to USDOC and USDA.

² The FLN's 5th Party Congress took place in December 1984.

forward the policies he wants, and further improvement of ties with the U.S. is a very high priority. Hamdani, in particular, left no doubt that he is under instructions to get the job done.

4. Hamdani asked me for my appraisal of where we stand and which areas are most amenable to early improvement. I told him that we have had good policy direction within both governments favoring improved ties but that we suffer from the weight of sluggish bureaucracy. I noted that we have put several offers on the table for the sale of U.S. military equipment but have not yet registered any notable success. I also noted that we have encountered problems in the way our two countries do business in agricultural trade. GOA is state-oriented while we leave sales and technical transfer issues mostly in the hands of the private sector. These two have had trouble connecting, I said, and we have to work harder to find ways of getting them together.

5. I also brought up the Pullman Kellogg Boufarik Airbase case as an example of the frustrations American companies encounter in trying to get business in Algeria. I noted that Pullman Kellogg feels badly treated since it made such a large investment in designing the Boufarik project, only to see the contract go to what can only be called an unqualified bidder.³ These cases are complicated, I went on, by the common practice in Algeria of only starting the “serious” negotiations for a contract once the contract letting and bidding phase is completed. American companies are not accustomed for the most part to doing business this way, and they feel there is an element of bad faith in GOA practice of shaving deals after bids have been accepted or contracts signed. If we want to see more American companies active in the Algerian market, I noted, we have to examine issues like these.

6. Hamdani, and the MFA’s Director for Europe-North America (Mohamed Ghoualmi), seemed anxious to focus directly on specific cases—apparently so that they can tell President Bendjedid that they are taking concrete steps to carry out his order. Ghoualmi asked for an informal paper on the Boufarik Airbase issue. We will provide this soonest on the basis of our knowledge and information provided by USDOC.⁴

7. In a broader sense, Hamdani said GOA is looking forward to Joint Commission meetings in mid-February as an opportunity to make progress and remove blocks. Ghoualmi added that there are some areas

³ In telegram 536 from Algiers, February 7, 1983, the Embassy described the GOA’s cancellation of the contract, under which a U.S. company was scheduled to upgrade Boufarik airbase, as “unprecedented. We are frank to say we do not know for certain what led to this surprising development but suspect that Presidency itself had second thoughts about political advisability of high cost, high visibility aircraft dedicated exclusively to presidential travel.” Nevertheless, the Embassy stated it was “inclined to accept Algerian assurances that cancellation had nothing to do with bilateral relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860069–0511)

⁴ The informal Commerce paper was not found.

where the GOA would like to put particular focus. He was concerned that Algerian use of the U.S. higher education system had been too haphazard, with a large number of students failing to take optimum advantage of their study in the U.S. He proposed that we seek ways to organize and direct this activity. Ghoualmi also brought up the close relationship between Boeing and Air Algerie. He said Algeria was very happy with Boeing as a partner, especially Boeing's excellent record in the area of technology transfer. He thought the Joint Commission might be a venue for stimulating similar relationships and he intimated (albeit vaguely) that there might be some important development for Boeing at that time.

8. Comment: Bendjedid seems firmly committed to path of improving ties with the U.S. and is likely to try to make and portray JEC meeting as a highly successful event. We are pursuing advance preparations at this end via working level meetings among Embassy econoff, commercial officer and ATO with MFA, MinAg and Ministry of External Commerce.

Johnstone

143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Lebanon and Algeria¹

Washington, January 17, 1985, 1701Z

16233. For Ambassadors from U.S. Armacost. Subject: Démarche Regarding Reported Islamic Jihad Plans to put U.S. Citizens on Trial.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. This is an action message.

3. Addressees will have seen by now media reports of January 14 Islamic Jihad statement regarding the U.S. kidnap victims.² An anonymous caller to Beirut news agencies claimed Islamic Jihad's responsibility for the death of two French ceasefire observers the same day and indicated that the five Americans who had been kidnapped in Lebanon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0457. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stanton (NEA/ARN); cleared by Murphy, Raphael, Mack, Oakley, McNeil, Twetten (CIA), Samuel Kryz (M), Poindexter, Platt, Cassius Johnson (S/S-O), and Pelletreau; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to Kuwait City, Bern, Damascus, and Riyadh.

² In telegram 268 from Beirut January 15, the Embassy transmitted the text of the statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850031-0107)

would be tried as CIA spies. According to the January 14 Reuter version of the report, the caller is quoted as having said the following: Quote We wish to notify (State Department Spokesman) Alan Romberg that William Buckley, Jeremy Levin, Benjamin Weir, Peter Kilburn and Lawrence Jenco³ are now in our custody preliminary to trying them as spies . . . these people are using journalism, education and religion as a cover and are in fact agents in the CIA. They have exploited the hospitality accorded to them by Islamic areas to persist in their subversive activities and will get the punishment they deserve . . . the two French spies were liquidated this morning after they were caught red-handed spying on our youths and positions in the Islamic suburb as part of their mission to monitor the movements of our youths and report to Atlantic, Israeli and Falangist intelligence. Unquote.

4. Addressees should approach host governments at appropriately high levels as soon as possible and deliver *démarches* based on the talking points provided below.⁴ Talking points for use with the Syrians will follow by septel.

— The United States Government views with the utmost gravity and concern the January 14 statement by Islamic Jihad in Beirut that the five Americans kidnapped in Lebanon will be tried as spies.

— It goes without saying that there is absolutely no truth to the charge that these citizens have used journalism, education and religion as a cover for spying. Nevertheless, some of the kidnap victims have been in the hands of the terrorists now for almost a year. Their suffering and that of their families is beyond words.

— We do not, however, wish to engage in a debate with terrorists about the lives of our citizens. This latest threat contravenes all

³ CIA Station Chief William Buckley and Jeremy (Jerry) Levin, the Beirut Bureau Chief of Cable News Network, were kidnapped in March 1984; the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian missionary, was kidnapped in May 1984; American University in Beirut Librarian Peter Kilburn, disappeared and was assumed kidnapped in December 1984; and Father Lawrence Jenco, the Director of Catholic Relief Services, was kidnapped on January 5.

⁴ In telegram 345 from Algiers, January 20, the Embassy reported that Ayat had “listened closely” to the *démarche* “and said kidnappers had assured Algerians some time ago that no rpt no physical harm would come to the hostages (Buckley, Weir, Levin). GOA would send someone to Lebanon January 22 and would make maximum effort to secure release of those held. He hoped to have a report the first part of February.” The Embassy commented: “Despite frustrations, GOA gives every evidence that it is going to keep trying.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan 5 thru Sept. 22) On February 11, the Embassy in Algeria reported: “Algeria is in direct contact with Hizballah group holding the hostages and that latter maintain their demand for the release of the three Lebanese prisoners held by Kuwait” who had been convicted of the December 12, 1983, truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Although the Algerians worried that “something may have happened to Weir” since he was being held by another group, they agreed “to maintain dialogue with Hizballah to continue to seek release of Americans without conditions.” (Telegram 770 from Algiers; *ibid.*)

civilized norms of human behavior and common decency, as well as Islamic injunctions regarding hospitality and the treatment of guests.

— Clearly the lives of these five innocent Americans are now in jeopardy. There is no time left for patience. We call upon your government to do everything it can to effect the safe release of the Americans. We have asked for your help in the past, but we may now be running out of time. It is essential that we redouble all efforts to secure the release of these innocent people to their families. We urge you in the strongest terms to take every possible measure you can to free our people.

— Should harm come to these five Americans, the United States would have to take actions which it deems appropriate.

5. FYI only. We are making a separate approach to Iran through the Swiss to let the Iranians know that we will hold them directly responsible should any harm come to our people.

6. Beirut minimize considered.

Shultz

144. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 25, 1985

SUBJECT

FMS Eligibility for Algeria

The Department requests you sign the attached determination that Algeria is eligible to purchase defense articles under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act² requires that the President find that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to a foreign government would “strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace” and sign a determination to that effect. On April 8, 1983, you signed the determination making Algeria eligible for defense services (training).³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (01/22/1985) (2). Confidential. Sent to Shultz under cover of a January 22 memorandum from Chain, in which Chain recommended Shultz sign the memorandum.

² Reference is to P.L. 94-329, the Arms Control Export Act, June 30, 1976.

³ Not found.

Our military relationship with Algeria has been expanding slowly since President Chadli Bendjedid came to power in 1979. The exchange of defense attaches, USN ship visits, approval of selected commercial sales such as 17 C-130 aircraft, initiation of an IMET Program this year and the earlier determination of FMS eligibility for defense services have constituted our measured response in the military sphere to the Government of Algeria's greater moderation in foreign and domestic policy and its avowed desire to improve bilateral relations. These acts have been intended also to advance our own long-term goals of expanding relations with the military as the most important institution in Algeria and of helping Algeria to diversify its sources of military supply at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Algeria is the most stable state in the region and the Algerian military is the guarantor of its stability. It no longer identifies primarily with the Arab radicals on Middle East issues in general and has played a mediating role in the Iraq-Iran conflict, as it did between Iran and the U.S. during the hostage crisis. Neighboring states as diverse as Niger, Mali, Tunisia and Mauritania now look to Algeria in some degree for protection against Libya.

Algeria's more moderate posture clearly coincides far more with US interests than with those of the Soviets and their radical allies such as Libya. Over the past four years there have been a 50-percent reduction in the Soviet military presence in Algeria and no new orders for Soviet equipment. However, this process of reducing the Soviet military presence can go only so far until alternative sources of equipment, parts and expertise are available to the GOA on a reliable basis.

Several Algerian officials, including the de facto Minister of Defense, have recently requested that Algeria's FMS eligibility be expanded to include defense articles. I believe this forthright request is indicative of a new inclination on the part of the Algerian military establishment to deal directly with ours and that a positive response would further both of our long term goals of helping Algeria decrease its military supply dependency on the Soviet Union and expanding relations with the Algerian armed forces.

FMS sales will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not only our objective to reduce Soviet influence in Algeria, but also US relationships with other states in the area and our interest in fostering a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

Signature of the attached Determination would also constitute approval of the Justification that follows it. The Justification and the Determination would be provided to the Congress; only the latter would be published in the *Federal Register*.

Attachment

Presidential Determination⁴

Washington, undated

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF ALGERIA TO MAKE PURCHASES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) requires, as a condition of eligibility for the purchase or lease of defense articles and defense services from the United States under the Act, that the President find that the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned "will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace".

Presidential Determination No. 73-10, dated January 10, 1973, established a consolidated list of countries eligible to make purchases of defense articles and services on a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) basis from the United States Government. Because of changing international circumstances, new countries are added to this list from time to time. Algeria, which had served as intermediary between the U.S. and Iran during the hostage crisis, was made eligible to purchase defense services by Presidential Determination No. 83-6, dated April 8, 1983. It is my judgment that circumstances now warrant that Algeria also be made eligible to purchase defense articles.

Our military relationship with Algeria has been expanding slowly since President Bendjedid came to power in 1979. The exchange of defense attaches, USN ship visits, approval of selected commercial sales such as C-130 aircraft, initiation this year of an IMET Program, as well as the earlier Presidential Determination, have constituted our measured response in the military sphere to the Government of Algeria's greater moderation in foreign and domestic policy and its avowed desire to improve bilateral relations.

Algeria's more moderate posture clearly coincides far more with US interests than with those of the Soviet Union and its radical allies such as Libya. Neighboring states as diverse as Niger, Mali, Tunisia and Mauritania now look to Algeria in some degree for protection against Libya. There has been a major reduction in the Soviet military presence in Algeria. However, this process of reducing the Soviet military presence can go only so far until alternate sources of equipment, parts and expertise are available to the GOA on a reliable basis.

⁴ Confidential.

I have therefore concluded that eligibility for Algeria to purchase defense articles as well as defense services under the Act will further both of our long-term goals of helping Algeria decrease its military supply dependency on the Soviet Union and of expanding relations with the Algerian military, and thereby will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, February 20, 1985, 0355Z

50738. Subject: Kidnappings—Line To Take With Algerians. Ref: Algiers 849.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. At next opportunity you should tell regular Algerian contacts of our great appreciation for their continuing efforts to gain release of American hostages. The line taken by Algerians with Hizballah (reftel) was useful. We hope that advice like their own will eventually persuade Hizballah to release captives either to Syrians, to Algerians themselves or to responsible Lebanese parties.

3. You should inform Algerians that as best we can tell Levin escaped captivity.³ He was not released by or allowed to escape

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan. 5 thru Sept. 22. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Mack; cleared by Johnson (P), David Long (M/CTP), McKinley, Ruth Van Heuven (S/S-O), and Miles Pendleton (P); approved by Raphael. Sent for information Priority to Beirut and Damascus.

² In telegram 849 from Algiers, February 14, the Embassy reported that "Hizbollah told the Algerian representatives in Beirut that Syria had made a démarche to the Iranian authorities urging them to intervene to have the American kidnapes released to Syria." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

³ In telegram 857 from Algiers, February 14, the Embassy reported: "Lallali had telephoned us shortly before 1500Z February 14 to say Algerians have information that Levin 'escaped' (s'est échappé) from his captors this morning and is now with (chez) the Syrians. He could not or would not be more specific as to whether he is reportedly in Damascus or with Syrian forces in Lebanon. Lallali asked that we try to confirm accuracy of this report." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850002-0463) A day later, the Embassy in Algeria confirmed to Lallali that "Levin had in fact escaped and would be turned over to the Embassy at 1000 Damascus time." The Embassy also reported that "in response to Ambassador's hope Algerians would continue to press Hizbollah to release the remaining hostages, Lallali said GOA would certainly do so. He promised to call if he receives further word." (Telegram 860 to from Algiers, February 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

Hizballah. While we remain hopeful that Hizballah will eventually realize the futility of holding Americans, the Levin escape is not evidence of any change in the attitude of the captors. Indeed, the harsh treatment Levin received during his long captivity increases our concern for the well being of the other hostages. We must assume that the health of all of them, especially those who are elderly or require medication, has deteriorated during their captivity. The Hizballah should realize that to continue holding the Americans represents an inhumane decision that puts the lives of the captives at risk and can only create problems for their captors.

4. You should assure the Algerians of our continued appreciation for their discreet role as well informed and professional intermediaries. We will continue to work closely with other governments, especially those of Lebanon and Syria, but will not discuss Algerian efforts with them. In general, we will continue trying to avoid needless publicity surrounding the issue of the hostages. With respect to the visit to Beirut of Mohammed Ali, you should tell the Algerians that the former heavyweight champion's visit was a private one and that he did not carry any kind of message from the USG. Indeed, administration sought to dissuade him from the visit on grounds of the personal security of Mohammed Ali and his entourage. Nonetheless, we recognized his humanitarian motivations and provided a briefing on the hostage situation and conditions in Lebanon. We, of course, did not inform Mohammed Ali of the role being played by Algeria.

5. With respect to purported Islamic Jihad statement that one of remaining captives has been sentenced to death, you should say that we are unable to confirm a link between this anonymous caller and the men holding our hostages. While any action taken to harm the Americans would meet an appropriate USG response, we do not intend to get into a public debate with anonymous phone callers.

6. You should also tell Algerians that in the wake of Levin's escape we are more convinced than ever that Government of Iran has close links to the captors of our four Americans and could, if Iran chose, exercise influence to have them released.⁴ Iranian denials to other governments are to be expected, but they should not fool anybody.

7. Minimize considered.

Shultz

⁴ On March 7, the Embassy in Algiers commented that "it is clear Algerians believe hostages are being held by original Hizballah abductors. They recognize an Iranian connection but do not seem to consider it overriding when it comes to the Dawa prisoners" still being held by Kuwait. The "Algerians are well aware of our suspicions that the GOI could bring to bear decisive influence in this matter if it chose to do so." (Telegram 1274 from Algiers; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Box 1, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan 5 thru Sept. 22)

146. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M# 85–10051

Washington, April 1, 1985

[Omitted here is a table on Algerian-U.S. Trade.]

ALGERIA-US RELATIONS:
MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

President Bendjedid will be the first Algerian head of state to make an official visit to the United States since Algeria's independence in 1962. Bendjedid almost certainly sees his visit as the capstone of his attempts to gain international recognition as an Arab and a Third World leader. He also will be looking for Washington's approval of his cautious but consistent efforts during the past several years to move Algeria away from its earlier radical image. In addition, he will use his meetings with US officials to reaffirm Algeria's commitment to expanding ties with the United States. The Bendjedid regime is particularly sensitive to what it believes is a lingering perception in Washington that Algerians are radicals, support terrorism, and are too closely aligned with the Soviet Union. He will want to focus discussions on economic development and regional stability. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Political Interests

Bendjedid is likely to stress Algeria's role as negotiator on various Middle East issues. He will point to Algeria's efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, to bring together Syria, Jordan and pro- and anti-Arafat groups, and to effect the release of US hostages in the Middle East. The Algerians believe that the Hussein-Arafat agreement merits serious consideration, but Bendjedid is likely to remind US officials that Syrian participation is essential for the success of any peace proposal. Bendjedid almost certainly believes that Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist is inevitable. He will encourage Washington to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Bendjedid may ask for US assistance in prodding Morocco to look for a peaceful settlement of the Western Saharan dispute. Bendjedid believes that his willingness to meet with Moroccan King Hassan in 1983 and his proposal earlier this year—that Western Sahara would control its internal affairs while Hassan would be its titular ruler and

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 3, Algeria (Jan–Dec). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. Information as of April 1 was used in its preparation.

represent the Saharans in international organizations—are clear signs that Algeria wants a negotiated solution. The Algerians view Morocco's construction of the berm in Western Sahara and its intransigence in recent talks as evidence that Hassan is interested only in a military solution. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Bendjedid will support Washington's concerns about Qadhafi's destabilizing activities in North Africa and the need to counter Libyan influence in the region. Algiers is particularly irritated by the Moroccan-Libyan union, which it sees as being directed against it and would like to see the agreement's demise. At the same time Bendjedid is unlikely to support Washington's efforts to isolate Libya, so as not to provide Qadhafi with any excuse for meddling inside Algeria. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Security Issues

Algeria's commitment to diversify its sources of military equipment and upgrade its military technology is an important element in the rapprochement with Washington. Algiers also sees diversification as a way to shake off the close identification it has had with the Soviet Union and to enhance its nonaligned credentials. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Algerians are generally cautious in their military planning and are not likely to ask for equipment that they do not need or cannot assimilate into their inventory. For the moment, the Algerians are interested in US military training and equipment to maintain and enhance Soviet materiel already in place. The Algerians hope the visit will strengthen the prospects of Congressional approval for Algerian purchases of defense items under the Foreign Military Sales program, to which Algeria has just been added. In the long term, depending on Algerian perceptions of Washington's response to this request, Algiers could ask for US fighter aircraft, tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Economic Assistance

Unlike most Third World leaders visiting Washington, Bendjedid will not ask for financial aid. Despite a soft oil market, the Bendjedid government has handled the sharp drop in oil and gas sales with a sensible austerity program and has maintained an excellent international credit rating. Algeria is still committed to socialism, but Bendjedid and his advisers have placed greater emphasis on decentralization and opening up the economy to the private sector. Algeria will seek US help in developing sectors of the economy that were neglected by previous regimes, such as agriculture and water resource management. The issue of US purchases of Algerian liquefied natural gas may be raised, according to the US Embassy, but the Algerians realize that their insistence on maximum prices precludes any significant increase in sales. *[portion marking not declassified]*

147. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 17, 1985, 10:40–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Michael Newlin
Arnold Raphel, Acting Assistant Secretary
Howard R. Teicher, NSC Staff
Zaki Aslan, Interpreter

President Bendjedid
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, Foreign Minister
Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun

The *President* welcomed President Bendjedid to the White House and America, noting that he had looked forward to the visit with great anticipation and hope for future U.S.-Algerian relations. Before turning to the principal issues, the *President* expressed the gratitude of the American people for Algeria's role in obtaining the release of U.S. hostages in Iran. He added that America also appreciates Algeria's continuing effort to secure the release of Americans and others held captive in Lebanon. (S)

The *President* turned his attention to Middle East issues. "America's top priority in the Middle East is to help move the peace process into direct negotiations based on UNSCR 242,"² he said. King Hussein's effort to bring moderate Palestinians into the process should be encouraged. The *President* applauded Algerian support for the King, stressing his hope that it would continue. Palestinian participation is a prerequisite to meaningful negotiations. However, direct PLO representation creates problems for Israel. Prime Minister Peres has been flexible in exploring ways to overcome this hurdle and bring about peace. (S)

The *President* referred to earlier meetings with President Mubarak and King Fahd, noting that both had stressed the important role Algeria plays in shaping Arab attitudes toward the peace process.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, President Bendjedid of Algeria Visit 4/17/85. Secret. Drafted by Teicher. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² See footnote 5, Document 111.

In this context, the *President* commented on the U.S. "appreciation of Algeria's close ties with Syria. The U.S. hopes that President Assad has no doubts about our belief that the Golan Heights is also subject to UNSCR 242 and should therefore be the subject of direct negotiations between Israel and Syria." (S)

The *President* described current U.S. efforts to move the process forward in terms of Ambassador Murphy's current mission.³ He urged President Bendjedid to use his influence within Palestinian circles to develop the most positive, flexible position regarding participation in and the substantive issues of direct negotiations. The *President* stressed that American leverage can only be effective in the context of negotiations. He concluded his remarks by asking President Bendjedid for his assessment of the prospects for the peace process? (S)

President Bendjedid opened his remarks by thanking the President, on behalf of his delegation and the Algerian people, for the invitation to Washington in order to strengthen relations between the two countries.⁴ There is a willingness for better relations on both sides, but the question is how to achieve this goal. (S)

With regard to the hostages in Iran, *President Bendjedid* said Algeria performed its national duty for humanitarian reasons. No U.S. thanks are necessary. Iran's confidence in Algeria helped a great deal. He added that Algeria will continue to exert every effort with the concerned parties to bring about the release of those held today. (S)

Concerning the basic Middle East issue, *President Bendjedid* stated that he welcomed any initiative, no matter how big or small. He described the current situation as likely to "lead to dangerous tension in the Arab world and beyond." He did not believe the Government of Israel was helping to push a solution on the basis of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Referring to the unprecedented Fez proposals, *President Bendjedid* commented that "maybe we can meet halfway." He continued that Arab requests are simple. "All have a right to live in peace and security. Why not the Palestinians?" He further opined that it is improper to call the Palestinians terrorists. They believe in their just cause, and are not just spreading international terror. "Algerians used to be called murderers and outlaws, but we were only seeking our rights. Algeria distinguishes between national action and unruly behavior." (S)

With respect to political action, *President Bendjedid* stressed "Algeria's belief in the Palestinian right to self-determination. This is not for the PLO, but for the Palestinians and everyone else in the

³ Documentation on Murphy's visit to the Middle East to discuss the Arab-Israeli peace talks is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁴ See Document 140.

area. The U.S. should take a step in this direction. It would convince people to act.” He continued that the Jordanian-Palestinian effort “is between them”. Syria also lost land in 1967. Damascus needs something to encourage dialogue. It is just not realistic to think Israel will be wiped out. (S)

President Bendjedid opined that given how the United States gained independence, America should understand the human dimension of the Palestinian issue. The failure to understand has bred extremism. Arabs and Muslims realize they have been insulted. This is why Islamic extremism is growing. The U.S. has a responsible role to play. Algeria has tried to help. But concessions, to be just and fair, must come from both sides. “If there is a will for peace, peace will triumph. Any positive step toward Palestinian self-determination will result in progress.” (S)

Apologizing for his lengthy remarks, *President Bendjedid* turned to the situation in Lebanon. President Gemayel had been in contact with him. Algeria is very worried about continuing outside interference, the religious dimension, and the deteriorating situation. Gemayel is suffering, especially due to those Christian factions who are working with Israel to establish Christian enclaves in the South and East. He hoped that all the interference in Lebanon could be stopped, noting that not only Israel interferes in Lebanon. *Bendjedid* closed his remarks by stressing that “it is Algeria’s duty to do all that can be done to help Lebanon.” (S)

In response, the *President* noted that the U.S. and Algeria seem to be in agreement. “My September 1 initiative is based on direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. The Palestinian problem has to be solved based on land in exchange for peaceful, secure borders.” The PLO’s refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist leads to their exclusion from negotiations. “This is why King Hussein is working with Palestinians, unless the PLO acknowledges Israel’s right to exist.” (S)

President Bendjedid replied that when the Palestinians are asked to recognize Israel, they say “it’s their last card. What would the Palestinians get in return?” (S)

The *President* said that President Sadat showed that negotiations are necessary, and that they work. (U)

The meeting adjourned, and the participants joined the Plenary in the Cabinet Room at 11:07. (U)⁵

⁵ Later that day, Reagan wrote in his diary “Algeria under this Pres. is a different Algeria than it was a half dozen years ago. We have found major areas of agreement—on Quadafi, Middle East Peace etc.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 446)

148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 18, 1985

1. *Algeria*. During our meeting this afternoon,² President Bendjedid noted that Algeria has very good relations with all Arab countries and wishes to be helpful on Middle East issues. He asked what we expect of his government and whether there might be any change in our own approach to the issue. I sought to reassure Bendjedid that the Israelis genuinely are interested in entering into negotiations with an acceptable Arab delegation. I also told him it would be helpful if he would encourage King Hussein and support him once a joint Jordanian/non-PLO Palestinian delegation is formed. Benjedid nodded his understanding. On the Western Sahara situation, he noted that we are now fully informed on Algerian objectives and proposals and expressed the hope that we will encourage King Hassan to seek a negotiated settlement. I told him we understand that Algeria has no territorial ambitions in the Western Sahara and that we are pleased that his government will keep working with the Moroccans on this problem. I assured him that, to the extent we have influence with King Hassan, we will encourage resolution of the problem. I thanked Benjedid for his government's efforts in seeking the release of the kidnapes in Lebanon. I proposed that this subject be taken up in greater detail at the working level. He readily agreed and directed that Col. Bencherchali meet with Acting Assistant Secretary Raphael to pursue the topic. This meeting should take place this evening.³ (SENSITIVE)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading April-June 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² The Shultz-Benjedid conversation is in telegram 120960 to Algiers, Cairo, and Baghdad, April 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850276-0344)

³ In an April 19 information memorandum, Raphael informed Shultz that he had met with Bencherchali on April 18 and told him that "Those holding our hostages have one central demand—the releases of the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait in exchange for our people. The Kuwaiti government has been quite firm, even during the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran, in refusing any prisoner trade. The policy of the United States is equally firm and precludes any trade involving our citizens." Bencherchali replied that while Algeria wanted "to continue to help" he was "not as upbeat as Bendjedid who, earlier in the visit, had said that we might see some positive movement in the next several weeks. Bencherchali believes we still have a long road ahead of us." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D92, Box 1, Nodis Memoranda April 1-30, 1985)

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, June 4, 1985, 1625Z

2935. Eyes Only the Secretary from Newlin. Subject: Hostages in Lebanon. Ref: Algiers 2933.²

1. T.S.—Entire text.

2. For over a year we have worked intensively with the Algerians, Syrians and others in an effort to secure the liberation of those taken hostage in Beirut by Hizbollah.

3. Throughout the past 15 months, we quite rightly have held firm to our position of no concessions to the kidnappers. Kuwait has been just as firm in treating the Dawa prisoners³ as an internal GOK affair with the convicted terrorists subject to Kuwait law.

4. Intensive efforts by Algeria to obtain the prisoners' release on humanitarian and other grounds have been invariably met with the Hizbollah response, "is Kuwait prepared to release the Dawa prisoners?"

5. In the eyes of the Algerians, this standoff shows signs of deteriorating:

(A) Algeria believes there is a risk of conflict between Amal and Hizbollah once Amal gains control of the Palestinian camps. (This is similar to analysis in RCI 15101.)⁴

(B) Algeria also believes Hizbollah will step up terrorist activities in Kuwait and elsewhere.

(C) The Algerians believe the Saudi Consul⁵ was released on orders from Tehran as the result of Prince Saud's recent visit. We obviously have very little leverage with Iran. Moreover, the Syrians have repeatedly

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files: Lot 12D215, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes only for the Secretary.

² Telegram 2933 from Algiers, June 4, reported that Lakehal Ayat "sketched a gloomy picture of the deteriorating situation in Beirut. He promised continued efforts to elicit a reply from Buckley but confided that Algerians were encountering resistance on the part of Hizbollah." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

³ See Document 143.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ In telegram 4740 from Riyadh, May 21, the Embassy reported that after 16 months in captivity, Saudi Consul Hussein Farrash had been released and flown to Saudi Arabia by a private Syrian aircraft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850354–0880)

promised help but without results beyond delivering escaped or freed hostages.

6. Added to the above, are reports the Emir may be considering signing death warrants for the condemned Dawa terrorists.

7. I don't know what other options we have or may be able to develop. The Algerians have not thrown up their hands and are clearly prepared to continue their efforts. At the same time, they have confided that they are finding their contacts increasingly rigid and inclined to further violence. As seen from Embassy Algiers, there is no hope of compromise on either Hizbollah's or Kuwait's side and increasing danger to the hostages. In fact, in our dialogue with the Algerians, we find ourselves no longer discussing possibilities of release but transmittal of letters, etc.

8. In making this judgment, I want to be clear that I am not suggesting any change in our long-standing policy concerning terrorism. But I do want you to know my perception that there are no hopeful signs that the situation of the hostages is going to improve and new indications that events in Lebanon and perhaps elsewhere will make their position even more precarious.

Newlin

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, June 14, 1985, 1724Z

182587. Subject: Presidential Message.

1. Secret. Entire text.

2. There follows for confirmation purposes text of message from the President to President Benjedid.

3. Begin text. — The hijacking of the TWA aircraft is a matter of the most personal grave concern for me.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850276–0344. Secret; Exdis; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Casey; cleared by Poindexter, Oakley, Pelletreau, and Sheldon Krebs (S/S–O); approved by Quinn (S/S).

² TWA flight 847 was hijacked on June 14 shortly after take off from Athens. After a brief stopover in Beirut, where hijackers released 19 passengers, the hijackers forced the pilot to fly to Algiers. Five hours later the hijackers forced the pilot to take off and fly back to Beirut. Further documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

— The hijackers are armed and dangerous. According to the information we have received, they have already shot and wounded three passengers, one of them seriously. They need urgent medical treatment.

— We are uncertain about the quantity of fuel the plane is carrying. As the fuel stock decreases, the hijackers are likely to become increasingly desperate.

— We have been working closely with you on the Americans who are being held hostage in Lebanon and are grateful for your continued efforts on their behalf.

— We have been especially appreciative of your involvement, given the esteem and respect which Algeria enjoys both in the US and in the Middle East.

— I know also the principled nature of Algerian policy. I share a conviction of the importance of dealing with terrorist incidents such as this aircraft hijacking in a firm manner.

— In recent years, Algeria has played an important role as an intermediary between the U.S. and those who regard us as their foe. In light of this special aspect of our very good relations and the special circumstances prevailing in this case, I am requesting you to allow the hijacked aircraft to land, and to not allow the plane to take off again.
End text.

Shultz

**151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Algeria¹**

Washington, June 15, 1985, 2155Z

184123. Subject: Presidential Message to Bendjedid.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador Newlin should seek an immediate, personal meeting with President Bendjedid to deliver the following letter from

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by the TWA Task Force; cleared by Kenneth Quinn, Ruth Van Heuven (S/S-O), and Raphael; approved as text received from the White House.

President Reagan. Ambassador should make clear that the President expects a reply from Bendjedid.

3. Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

I regret disturbing you during the month of Ramadan, but events have been forced upon us which require serious consideration and action.

When we met in April,² I stressed the gratitude the American people feel toward the Algeria for its efforts to bring about the release of our hostages in Iran, as well as your assistance with other terrorist incidents. Tragically, we are again faced with the need to cooperate to resolve a terrorist act of war against the United States in particular, but, in reality, a deed directed against all of humanity.

Recognizing our respect for Algeria's role in resolving this crisis, I appreciate your government's willingness to take all possible measures to end this hijacking in Algiers. We realize that keeping the plane in Algiers entails a certain level of risk for the passengers and crew. However, should the plane depart Algiers and return to Beirut, the passengers and crew would be thrust into a hostile, lawless environment where the prospects for violence and loss of life would be much greater. Therefore, I want to ask that you take the necessary steps to keep the aircraft in Algiers.

Your government has worked skillfully to keep the negotiations going, and I am aware that efforts are underway to involve the ICRC to improve communications with the terrorists. We do not object to the participation of the ICRC, as long as such a process is productive. However, if such a process fails to produce positive results, I am obligated to fulfill my constitutional responsibility to protect the lives of American citizens. Circumstances may arise under which you would find it useful to draw on specialized competence from outside. The United States stands ready to offer whatever assistance your government may find useful, including that of a technical nature which would facilitate negotiations and help prepare for other eventualities. It is my sincere hope that together, we will succeed in finding a successful solution.

It seems clear that a failure to resolve this crisis decisively and immediately can only result in greater danger to the passengers and crew of this aircraft while encouraging more air piracy in the coming summer months. We must directly confront this threat to civilized humanity.

² See Document 147.

I have no doubt that you will continue to play the courageous humanitarian role which has earned you and the people of Algeria worldwide respect and gratitude.³

With highest regards.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan End text.

Shultz

³ In telegram 3145 from Algiers, June 16, Newlin reported: "After listening to oral translation of President's message, he [Bendjedid] said Algeria was willing to continue its efforts. In order to prevent further deaths, it was essential Israel begin to release the Shiite prisoners as it had announced it would do. GOA did not know why hijackers reneged on earlier agreement. One theory was that hijackers had heard radio reports of U.S. Delta-type team in Mediterranean area and had decided Algeria was no longer safe. I made a strong pitch GOA accept U.S. technical assistant on a highly secret basis. Despite initial misgivings over possible leaks, Bendjedid said he would look into possibility with his senior advisers." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) The telegram is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

**152. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹**

Washington, June 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Conversation with Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun

I telephoned Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun and said I would like to talk about the current hostage situation. He responded immediately and came to my office, where we had a good thirty-minute discussion. Highlights are as follows:

— Sahnoun feels that a solution to the immediate problem can be worked out. He believes that the ICRC, working with the Israelis, can be very helpful.

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19796, Folder 19796–005, Algeria—1985. Confidential. Copies were sent to Fuller and Fortier. At the top of the memorandum, Bush wrote: "Good report. GB."

— Sahnoun is aware that the American public is deeply frustrated and angered. He suggested that three things be done:

1. Remind the American people that it is not just the U.S. that suffers from terrorism. Recently, Kuwait,² Jordan³ and Saudi Arabia⁴ have all suffered at the hands of terrorists.

2. An international effort must be undertaken to ensure that security at international airports be enhanced. Sahnoun spoke admiringly of El Al's protective measures and urged that other western airlines take similar measures.

3. Sahnoun said that VOA and USIA do too little in explaining U.S. policy to the Middle East. He stated that we report the news, but do not make clear to Arab people why we do what we do.

— Turning to Lebanon, Sahnoun said, "Israel has awakened a monster by invading Lebanon."⁵ By this he was referring to the Lebanese Shiites, long the numerically dominant segment of the people who are now just beginning to realize actual power through the chaos created by the Israeli invasion. As they have successfully resisted the Israelis, the Shiites have become, in a way, intoxicated by their power and will not be denied. Sahnoun said that the Syrians have been very wise to stay out of Shiite territory or they would also be attacked as are Palestinians and other ethnic groups.

— Sahnoun said that U.S. retaliation in a Lebanese context would be deeply counterproductive. He said that a "profound enmity" would be created among the Shiites toward the U.S. He said that the Shiites are like the Corsicans in that they are prone to carrying on endless vendettas. In talking to the original two hijackers in Algeria, it became clear that their primary motivation was release of prisoners held by Israelis who included many former relatives.⁶ Shiites killed by a U.S. retaliation would have relatives who would dedicate themselves to continuing vendettas against the U.S. Retaliation might also unite Shiites in other countries against the U.S. Sahnoun added that he does not rule out retaliation in all cases, but that if we retaliate, we must be very clear about the consequences with which we will have to deal.

² Reference is presumably to the December 3, 1984, hijacking of Kuwait Airways flight en route from Kuwait City to Karachi. Hijackers shot and killed two USAID workers. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 1, Terrorism, January 1977–May 1985.

³ On June 11, terrorists hijacked a plane owned by Alia, a Jordanian airline, shortly before its planned flight to Amman. After two days, the hijackers released all 71 hostages, blew up the plane on the tarmac at Beirut Airport, and escaped into the city. (Ihsan Hijazi, "Beirut Hijackers Free Travelers, Blow Up Jet," *New York Times*, June 13, 1985, p. A1)

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982.

⁶ Israel used the Ansar detention camp in southern Lebanon to house thousands of captured prisoners after it invaded Lebanon in 1982.

— Finally, Sahnoun urged that we not pull out of Lebanon. He suggested that we keep a low profile, but urged that we maintain a presence so that our influence can be used constructively as the tumultuous results of the Israeli invasion gradually subside.

I thanked Sahnoun for coming and for all that Algeria has done to be helpful in this case.

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, September 9, 1985, 1453Z

275963. For Ambassador Johnstone from Raphael. Subject: GOA Involvement With PLO Operation. Ref: (A) Algiers 4520² (B) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (C) USDAO Tel Aviv IS 12891³ (D) Algiers 2228.⁴

1. (S) Entire text.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan 5 thru Sept. 22. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN), Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA), Quinn (S/S), Ryan Crocker (NEA/IAI), Robert Pace (S/S-O), and Johnson; approved by Raphael. The document is misnumbered in the original.

² In telegram 4520 from Algiers, September 1, Johnstone reported that he had informed Belkheir that recent media reports “would provoke serious concern in Washington about Algerian role in training terrorists.” Belkheir replied that “He wanted to speak frankly on the issue. He would not deny that Algeria had trained many in the PLO since the Revolution. (He did not say the training was continuing but he also didn’t say it had stopped.) He said Algeria could deny categorically that any training was given to anyone with the purpose of carrying out a terrorist act or that the Government of Algeria was involved in any way in planning or promoting any such act. The GOA could not accept accountability for every action engaged in by the PLO because some had trained in Algeria.” Johnstone in turn stated “incidents such as this could not help but work against our bilateral relationship which both countries wanted to improve.” (Ibid.)

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 2228 from Algiers, April 25, the Embassy reported that in response to the United States’ démarche concerning Algerian involvement in an abortive April 20 PLO attack off the coast of Israel, “Kerroum told Chargé that GOA does not hide the fact that it has provided training to the PLO in the past at Tebessa. However, it is GOA policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of liberation movements.” The Embassy commented: “At no point did Kerroum deny that this PLO operation may, in fact, have been launched from Algeria, nor did he answer previous Embassy query about Abu Jihad’s presence here in the first half of April.” Furthermore, the Embassy stated “What is clear, is the GOA is very concerned about the U.S. reaction to possible Algerian involvement as evidenced by its rapid and authoritative response at this high level. Kerroum also reflected his government’s desire to distance itself from any responsibility with this specific operation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850288–0190)

2. Department appreciates your initiative (ref A) in approaching Presidency Secretary General Belkheir regarding the Algerian role in training terrorists. We note that Belkheir's rejoinder is similar to MFA Secretary General Nouredine Kerroum's response to Embassy's April 24 démarche,⁵ shortly after the "Atavirus" incident (ref D). Kerroum stated that the GOA did not provide training or equipment for the Atavirus operation, had no knowledge of the "Palestinian commando operation" and, if the GOA had known about it, it would have done everything possible to prevent it. At the same time, and with a less distant historical context than Belkheir's, Kerroum reiterated GOA policy to provide training for the PLO and not to interfere in PLO internal affairs.

3. Action requested: We believe, however, that we must not allow this incident to be passed over so quickly by the GOA. Embassy should make demarche at the highest possible level concerning these events. Discussion of the incident should be specific and pointed, drawing on reftels and indicating to the GOA our awareness of the following information:

- The PLO group received approximately a year of training in Algeria at a base in Tebessa, including instruction in the use of explosives and artillery;

- In mid-July 1985, the group was organized as a unit at Tebessa and left Algeria for Tunis in early August;

- On August 12, they traveled to Athens where they boarded a passenger ship and sailed to Limassol, Cyprus, arriving on August 14;

- Also on August 14, they boarded a chartered yacht, the "Casselardit", in Limassol and left for Sidon, Lebanon, arriving on the same day;

- The group was refused entry to the Port of Sidon and returned to Cyprus on August 14, remaining there until August 24; they sailed again on August 24 and were apprehended that day by Israeli naval forces; and

- Interrogations also revealed that training of terrorists in Algeria is continuing actively.

5. Embassy should remind GOA that GOA told us that it would not approve of such operations and would act to prevent them. If reports of continuing training of terrorist units for specific hostile actions against Israel are true, at a time of improving relations (including military cooperation) between the U.S. and Algeria, such activity risks harm to both countries' interests and to overall efforts in the Middle East peace process.

Shultz

⁵No record of the U.S. démarche was found.

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, October 8, 1985, 1923Z

309868. Subject: Vice President's Meeting With Foreign Minister Ibrahim.

1. All secret

2. Summary—During a meeting with the Vice President, Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim explained Algerian views on key issues in the Maghreb—the Western Sahara and the threat from Libya—and also discussed the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis.² End summary

3. Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim met with the Vice President on October second at 2:00 p.m. Also attending were Ambassador Sahnoun, D. Gregg of OVP, A. Raphael of NEA and H. Teicher of NSC.

4. The Foreign Minister opened by expressing President Bendjedid's warm greetings. In response, the Vice President said that the Bendjedid visit to the states³ moved bilateral relations forward in a way seldom seen in such visits. The Minister noted that bilateral relations between the two countries were quite good.

5. The Minister then turned to the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis noting that it had engendered intense emotions in Algiers since this is the first Israeli strike against the Maghreb. He said that he had consulted closely the other Arab Foreign Ministers in New York in preparation for the UNSC debate.

6. The Minister noted that efforts in the Maghreb had been directed against Qadhafi who, in Algerian eyes, will never listen to voices of reason. Therefore, Algeria has been attempting to strengthen Tunisia. The GOA had agreed to buy Tunisian products and to fund industrial projects in southern Tunisia. Algiers also wanted to strengthen Tunisia militarily—the Israeli attack had caused major problems for this effort to contain Qadhafi.

7. In response to a question from the Vice President, Foreign Minister Ibrahim outlined the history of the Algerian-Moroccan dialogue on the Western Sahara. He added that Algeria discovered evidence in July that

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850717–0517. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Raphael; cleared by Gregg, McKinley, Pearson, and Ruth Van Heuven (S/S–O); approved by Raphael. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat. Sent for information to Tunis, USUN, and Paris.

² On October 1, Israel bombed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunisia. See Documents 331–334.

³ See Document 147.

Libya was continuing to supply Soviet arms to the Polisario, thereby showing that Libya remained active in the conflict.

8. The Minister noted that in addition to concerns about Libya and the Western Sahara, Algerian efforts in the Maghreb were focussed on a third issue as well—the role of France. Paris is interested in working with the Maghreb countries individually and has no appreciation for the importance of a United Maghreb. Also, the French-Libyan accord⁴ on Chad and the socialist government's policies on the Western Sahara are troubling to Algiers.

9. In response to the Vice President's question on the possibilities for a referendum in the Western Sahara, Ibrahim described the history of the effort noting that three elements were key to a solution of the Sahara issue—a referendum, negotiations, and the withdrawal of all forces before the referendum. The Minister added that the UN Secretary General's new report calls for a referendum without conditions.⁵ The GOA has asked the Secretary to play a role in supervising the referendum.

10. The conversation then returned to the Israeli raid on Tunis with the Vice President saying that it caused a real dilemma for the United States which is a target of terrorism everywhere. We want and need maximum international cooperation to combat terrorism.⁶ At the same time, the mood in the United States would fully support appropriate retaliation in response to the terrorist killings of American citizens. Although we have excellent relations with Tunisia, we also understood the Israeli response to terrorist acts against its citizens.

11. The Vice President went on to say that we do not condone attacks into Tunisia and asked the Foreign Minister to tell President Bourguiba that we are troubled by what has happened. Our friendship for Tunisia is deep and historical. Yet, we must work with like-minded states to find ways to fight the scourge of terrorism.

Shultz

⁴ Reference is to the September 17, 1984, agreement between France and Libya under which both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Chad. Documentation on the accord is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 433.

⁶ In telegram 316383 to Algiers, October 15, the Department reported that Bush had also told Ibrahim that "he is in charge of the President's Special Task Force on Terrorism. He added that we would be glad to exchange ideas, either in Washington or Algiers, on how to counter terrorism. Ibrahim responded that he would pass this message to his government. In any case, cooperation in this field has already begun, and Ibrahim agreed, should be deepened. It is essential, however, that the dialogue be carried out very discreetly." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Nodis Sept 30 thru Dec 17)

155. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, December 17, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to have received your distinguished Ambassador, Mohamed Sahnoun, on December 12 and to hear from him the oral message which you sent outlining your concerns about the situation in North Africa.²

During my discussion with Ambassador Sahnoun, it was immediately clear that we share a common perception about the malevolent designs of Colonel Qadhafi. My government's unyielding view is that Qadhafi is not to be trusted in any context. Over the course of time, he deliberately has pursued a path at variance with the accepted norms of international behavior. Like you, we believe that his regime poses an unrelenting danger to Libya's neighbors and, through the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy, to the international community at large.

Like you, we perceive a Libyan role in the recent Egypt Air hijacking,³ as well as in numerous other instances of terrorism. For example, we have well-documented evidence of Libyan plots to carry out terrorist acts against American government installations in Khartoum. As I suggested when I last met with Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahim, ⁴

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19796, Folder 19796-005, Algeria—1985. No classification marking.

² Telegram 382284 to Algiers, December 16, contains a record of the Bush-Sahnoun meeting as well as Benjedid's oral message. Bendjedid had instructed Sahnoun to "deliver a message directly to the Vice President." The message read in part: "Bendjedid 'very concerned' about situation in area, particularly Qadhafi's moves and possibly 'hidden' motives. These might be related to his intention to do something in Chad." Bendjedid also "turned to the situation in Mauritania where Qadhafi trying to buy adherence to his Arab-African union with Morocco" given that "Mauritania is desperately poor and pressure is on" and that "Bendjedid wants to draw USG attention to developments, call for vigilance. GOA is concerned about perceived temptation for Moroccans to exploit situation by encouraging Mauritanian entry into union—which would complicate situation for Algeria." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Nodis Sept 30 thru Dec 17)

³ On November 23, three members of the Adu Nidal Organization hijacked Egypt Air flight 648 shortly after the plane left Athens. The plane was diverted to Malta. The hijackers shot and killed two female passengers—one American and one Israeli—and wounded three others. Two days later, Egyptian commandos stormed the plane, killing 54 passengers, two crew members, and one hijacker. (Judith Miller, "From Takeoff to Raid: The 24 Hours of Flight 648," *New York Times*, November 26, 1985, p. A1)

⁴ See Document 154.

there is both purpose and scope for close cooperation on these issues. I hope we can pursue this mutual concern.

On other issues of immediate concern which you raised about Qadhafi, our information and assessment are generally very close to yours. There is mounting evidence that Qadhafi contemplates further military moves in Chad. While we are uncertain as to his immediate intentions, we credit reports of a significant buildup of Libyan forces in the northern part of that country. Even if he does not engage in further adventurism to the south, continuing Libyan occupation in the north, to include the Aozou strip, is unacceptable. My government strongly supports the legitimate government of President Habre, and I applaud your decision to meet with him in Algiers.

Even more dangerous to area stability are Qadhafi's attempts to establish hegemony in Sudan. Success would pose a grave threat throughout the region. Qadhafi's plotting and publicized, cynical offer to "buy" Sudanese obeisance fits a pattern of attempts to exploit the economic and financial difficulties which beset many of his neighbors.

Military tensions between Egypt and Libya have abated momentarily, but the threat of conflict remains so long as Qadhafi persists in his relentless determination to destabilize the Government of President Mubarak. I am particularly heartened to know that you continue to consult with the Egyptian government on matters of such concern. We are also in close and continuing contact on this matter. Of particular concern are reports that the Soviets have agreed to major new arms deliveries to Libya, possibly to include SA-5 missiles. Introduction of these would seriously threaten Mediterranean and North African security.

Tunisian leaders are clear in their assessment that Qadhafi represents a continuing and very serious threat to the stability of their country. Your strong, clear and undiminished support for President Bourguiba's government is a vital contribution to our mutual objective of helping assure the security of Tunisia.

Regarding your assessment of the situation in Mauritania, we do not have independent information of plotting against the Taya government. Quite frankly, we believe it unlikely that King Hassan would seek to undermine President Taya who has shown himself to be quite favorably disposed toward Morocco. To me, it is more plausible that Qadhafi might seek to take advantage of Mauritania's economic weakness to pressure that government towards joining the Arab-African Union. Again, we have no information to confirm this. We would not welcome expansion of that union. I invite your continued thoughts on this most important matter.

Mr. President, I deeply appreciate your having informed my government of your decision to meet with Colonel Qadhafi. I well understand that this is a difficult decision for you and that you have sought

to establish conditions aimed at eliciting better behavior from Qadhafi. I share your skepticism about Qadhafi's sincerity, even should he make such commitments. In the same spirit of friendship and candor with which you sent your message, I express my hope that you will use this meeting both publicly and in private to convey the strongest possible message of disapproval to Qadhafi concerning his international behavior. You know even better than we that Qadhafi will try to exploit this meeting to gain international respectability and to advance his regional goals. That would indeed be unhelpful in dealing with this dangerous and erratic dictator.

If it would be of value to you, my government is prepared to send an official to Algeria to provide you personally with a more detailed review of our information about Qadhafi's activities. This could be arranged prior to your meeting with Qadhafi, which I understand will not take place until at least very late this month.

Please accept my highest regards and warmest wishes. I wish you and the people of your great country a prosperous and happy 1986.

Sincerely,

George Bush⁵

⁵ Bush wrote: "Warmest Personal Greetings to you and your family" under his signature.

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 8, 1986, 1654Z

130. Dept pass as desired. Subject: Condemnation of Terrorism: Algerian View.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: MFA SecGen Hamdani heard our demarche on Abu Nidal January 6,² including request to intercede with Syria on

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² In the wake of the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports (documentation scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, (Footnote continues on next page)

cutting its ties with that group. I urged that GOA make its opposition to terrorism well known publicly. Hamdani, after much circuitous and unhelpful argumentation, indicated that GOA does not want to undermine its ability to serve as an interlocutor with wide-ranging groups in the Middle East and, for this reason, will continue to take a reserved public position on terrorism. GOA, at same time, is likely to continue behind-the-scenes support for USG efforts to combat terrorism. End summary.

3. I had a long and, on the surface, not very satisfactory discussion on January 6 with MFA SecGen Hamdani of the issue of terrorism and the need for all states to condemn it forthrightly. Drawing on Dept guidance, I urged that Algeria make its opposition to terrorism well known by condemning publicly such acts as those at the Rome and Vienna airports that were most certainly carried out by the Abu Nidal group with Libyan support. I also gave him our background paper on Abu Nidal³ and urged that GOA intercede with Syria to stop that country's remaining support for Abu Nidal.

4. Hamdani, who was accompanied by Europe-North America Director Ghoulmi and Deputy Director Souibes, took the line that this issue is confused by the lack of a clear and widely accepted definition of what is terrorism and what is national liberation. He said that Algeria certainly sees the attacks in Rome and Vienna as damaging to the Palestinian cause and noted that the GOA had let the press handle this issue through analysis and propagation of the PLO and Arab League condemnations of the attacks. Continuing in a "personal vein," Hamdani said that what really matters for governments is to analyze who is behind the many Abu Nidal terrorist operations which, he said with Ghoulmi's vigorous backing, were consistently damaging to the Palestinian cause. After much indirect accusation, Hamdani eventually got to suggestion that Mossad is "manipulating" Abu Nidal through intermediaries as part of a broad Israeli policy of disrupting the peace process.

vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989), the United States sent a *démarche* to Damascus, which was sent for information to multiple posts, stating that "there is compelling evidence that Abu Nidal's organization was involved. He is a dangerous and ruthless terrorist, committed to violence and destruction." The *démarche* continued: "Abu Nidal cannot operate in a vacuum, however; he is dependent on others to provide sanctuary, facilities, and financial support. Recent evidence indicates that Abu Nidal has obtained increased support from Libya. The only certain way to curtail the bloody activities that Abu Nidal has made his vocation in life is to cut off the support system that keeps his organization alive. Those who provide Abu Nidal assistance must share in the responsibility for his actions, and must likewise be subject to universal opprobrium." (Telegram 265 to Damascus, January 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860003–0712)

³ Not found.

I dismissed this canard, saying that it was quote pure fantasy, even absurd unquote. Referring to Hamdani our secret background paper on Abu Nidal, I said there is no question that Abu Nidal sets his own agenda and carries out his actions with Libyan support. In these terms, I said that it is most important for responsible states to make absolutely clear that these kinds of actions are unacceptable.

5. Hamdani and Ghoualmi then shifted gears, going back to the first issue of the need to condemn terrorism publicly. With extensive references to the FLN's policy and practice in its war for independence which limited itself to direct attacks on the enemy, Hamdani maintained that Algeria does not want to condemn publicly actions such as those at Rome and Vienna because this hides the fact that terrorism comes from the failure to solve underlying problems. What we should be doing, he said, is treating the cause of an illness, not its manifestations. He granted, nonetheless, that Arab states must focus on the issue of terrorism and stop its damaging effects on all of us. They went on to point out, however, that Algeria also has an important resource among all Middle Eastern countries that it must carefully guard—its credibility. This credibility gives the GOA entree in many camps and makes it an invaluable interlocutor. If the GOA is seen to take sides on certain issues, it will take itself out of that intermediary role and thus lose its usefulness. Hamdani acknowledged that GOA had not condemned in public terrorist attacks such as those in Rome and Vienna (although he insisted on taking credit for the Algerian media's carrying of PLO and Arab League condemnations), but he noted also that Algeria had also not criticized the U.S. diversion of the Egyptian airliner carrying the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro hijacking,⁴ even though Algerian public opinion had clamored for such a condemnation.

6. Comment: I returned to our position on the need to publicly condemn terrorism and isolate its backers, making sure Hamdani understood the importance we attach to the issue in our relations with all states. I don't think I left them in any doubt about that. I sense, however, that the GOA feels that it can be more helpful in the fight against genuine terrorist acts like the Rome and Vienna airport incidents (acts of the sort, they emphasized, the FLN never engaged in during a bitter struggle against the French for Algeria's independence) by working quietly behind the scenes. Indeed, the GOA is giving us important cooperation in identifying and neutralizing terrorist operatives, and we have every indication that cooperation will continue.

⁴ After the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship surrendered to Egyptian authorities on October 9, 1985, they boarded an Egyptian passenger plane bound for Tunisia rather than face trial in Egypt. U.S. fighter jets intercepted the plane and forced it to land at the NATO airbase in Sigonella, Italy. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Terrorism, Part 2, June 1985–January 1989.

7. Subsequent to this meeting, Foreign Ministry issued official statement in "threats to Libya" (see septel).⁵ While statement did not specify the U.S. by name, it was a relatively severe criticism of pressure on Libya. GOA undoubtedly felt obliged to make some public defense of an Arab brother, but Hamdani would at the same time take credit with us for not having named the U.S., as such an Algerian statement a decade ago most certainly would have done and in even more virulent terms.

Johnstone

⁵ In telegram 132 from Algiers, January 8, the Embassy transmitted the text of the Algerian statement which read, in part, that the threats against Libya, "which constitute in themselves a serious violation of the standards of international conduct, are unacceptable. Their implementation (carrying out) would generate a grave situation in the region, would place in danger peace and international security and would undermine the efforts of the international community to establish a just and definitive peace in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Algeria, concerned about the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as the preservation of the gains of the brotherly Libyan people, would not allow in any case that they be violated." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860017-0597)

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, January 28, 1986, 0324Z

26509. Subject: Vice President's Letter to Bendjedid.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Following is text of Vice President Bush's letter to Bendjedid. Original letter to follow by courier.

Begin text:

His Excellency

Chadli Bendjedid

President of the Democratic and Popular

Republic of Algeria

Algiers

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Algiers Nodis 1986. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted from text provided by the White House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S-S), McKinley, Zweifel, Johnson, and Robert Pace (S/S-O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information Priority to Rabat.

Dear Mr. President:

One of the more positive and enjoyable events on my 1985 calendar was the opportunity to renew my friendship with you during your highly successful trip to the United States in April.² Your visit proved to be a key step in the rapidly improving relations between our two countries.

High level dialogue between Algeria and the United States continues to increase; the first meeting of our bilateral Joint Economic Commission is about to take place³ and technological exchanges and assistance in such sectors as agriculture are growing. In short, Mr. President, I see many reasons to be pleased with our bilateral relations. Impediments to closer cooperation are being overcome and I am convinced that 1986 will bring us even closer together.

I am concerned, however, by issues which continue to cloud relations between your country and another friend of the United States, Morocco. As I have indicated previously,⁴ I continue to hope that Algeria and Morocco will resume direct talks on questions which divide your two countries, particularly the Western Sahara problem. I have been pleased to learn from close friends in France that you remain open to the possibility of such talks. We remain convinced that the solution to this conflict can best be approached through discussions between your two governments. I have written King Hassan to express this view,⁵ and wish to express to you directly my hope that such talks can take place.

Mr. President, I again reiterate my pleasure at the obvious growth in understanding and friendship between our two great countries. I write to you with the hope that the new year will bring prosperity to both you and the people of Algeria and with the fervent wish that friendship will grow also between those we count as friends in the vital Mahgreb area.

Sincerely, George Bush.

End text.

Shultz

² See Documents 147 and 148.

³ The U.S.-Algeria Joint Economic Commission meetings were scheduled for February 17–18 in Algiers.

⁴ See Document 155.

⁵ For Bush's letter to Hassan, see Document 436.

**158. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, February 7, 1986

Mr. Secretary:

While it is clear that Algeria has been developing more pragmatic domestic policies and less rigid anti-Western foreign policy, I think a number of additional points should be kept in mind to keep the trend toward moderation in perspective and to avoid excessively high expectations. It serves Algerian interests to move toward us, but not too close.

— Although UN votes are only one barometer of foreign policy positions, Algeria's voting record in the UN is among the worst (4.3% coincidence with U.S. in plenary in 1984; 0% agreement on 10 key votes; one of the few Islamic countries to abstain on Afghanistan).

— Algeria's genuine helpfulness on the hostage issue in 1979 and their efforts now stem from their desire and ability to seize appropriate opportunities to enhance their prestige and demonstrate their credentials as a bridge between radicals and moderates.²

— Algeria's desire is to diversify its sources of military supply, not to switch. We should keep this in mind. If Algeria could receive major, sophisticated items from both the U.S. and the USSR, its non-aligned credentials would be much enhanced, as would its political weight in Africa and in the Islamic world.

Michael H. Armacost³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (02/07/1986). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS."

² In telegram 146 from Algiers, January 9, Johnstone reported that in an "extraordinarily frank two-hour exchange" with Belkheir "concerning the future of Algeria and prospects for the U.S.-Algeria relationship," Belkheir "said that the almost-completed revision of the National Charter will usher in a new age of pragmatism and common sense in Algerian political life and that this can and should lead to a major amplification of the U.S.-Algeria relationship." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Algiers Nodis 1986)

³ Armacost initialed "MA" above this typed signature.

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 20, 1986, 1723Z

2057. Subj: Algerian Reaction to Events in Libya.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I saw General Belkheir April 20 at my request to get GOA reading on events in Libya and effects on U.S.-Algerian relations.

3. Algerian Reaction:

Belkheir started and ended session by reminding me that official Algerian reaction was to be opposed to U.S. military strikes against Libyan people (not Libyan state).² He said that Algeria could not sanction military attacks on region no matter what the cause. He underlined this point in an apparent effort to ensure that we did not misinterpret Algeria's mild public reaction.³

4. Situation in Libya:

Belkheir said he had been sleeping in his office during the crisis handling the unending calls from Qadhafi. He said Qadhafi had been very unsettled, even panicky, at the beginning, but that in the last two days he has settled down and is now acting as a man in control of the situation. Belkheir's personal view was that both the initial attacks and subsequent indications of unhappiness in Libyan armed forces had rattled Qadhafi. There was no doubt in Belkheir's mind that the raids had triggered some dissension which led to a shootout in the general headquarters and that at one point two armored units had moved against Qadhafi's apparent wishes, only to be confronted by the Air Force. Belkheir also believed that the Air Force had refused, at one point, to deploy aircraft when ordered to do so by Qadhafi. In his phone calls, Qadhafi had claimed to be under continuing attack. Belkheir looked to me to reassure him that this was not the case, which I did. In any case, Belkheir thought that, notwithstanding these interesting signs of dissent

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² On April 14, the United States bombed Libya in retaliation for the bombing of a disco in West Berlin that killed a U.S. servicemember and a Turkish woman and injured 230 others, including 50 U.S. servicemembers. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

³ In telegram 2008 from Algiers, April 17, the Embassy reported that on April 16 "the Politburo of the FLN, Algeria's sole political party, held an extraordinary session during which it 'studied American aggression against the brotherly Libyan people,' according to 'El Moudjahid,' the country's leading French language daily. The Politburo also called for the 'urgent' convening of an extraordinary Arab summit in order to examine the consequences of the American 'aggression' and to take 'appropriate collective measures.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860297–0676)

in Libyan military, Qadhafi was clearly back in control and probably enjoyed substantially more popular support than previously. He took note, however, of the inevitable distrust (mefiance) which would be left within the Libyan military after the attack and the possible opportunities this implied for removing Qadhafi. Belkheir left no doubt that this remained the preferred solution to the problem provided, he hastened to add, Qadhafi was not replaced by Khomeini (yet another manifestation of Algeria's concern over fundamentalism in the region).

5. Libyan Request for Support:

Belkheir said that Qadhafi had called both privately and publicly for Algerian military support and immediate union. Both, of course, were rejected. Belkheir got in a poke at Morocco, noting that the only promise Qadhafi has ever kept was to the Moroccans. He shook his head over the fact that Qadhafi had said on television that Morocco could be excused for not sending military aid because they didn't have much of a military capacity. He also raised an eyebrow over the Hassan letter to Qadhafi.⁴

6. Future U.S. Action:

Belkheir wanted to know what we would do next. I said I was there to solicit his advice and views. I did note that our actions would be predicated on Qadhafi's own actions and that we had no plans to take further action if Qadhafi behaved himself. I opined, however, that even stronger U.S. actions could well be possible if Qadhafi continued to engage in terrorist actions. Belkheir groaned, saying that he could not believe this would serve U.S. interests. He said Qadhafi was once again trying to establish contact with the U.S. He had asked Algeria (again) to contact us on his behalf. Bendjedid had declined. The Algerians understand the Maltese Foreign Minister now is seized of the issue. I opined that we had nothing to talk about. Our opposition to terrorism was non-negotiable and agreements with Qadhafi were worthless. Actions would speak for themselves. I was sure that we would pose no risk to Qadhafi if he behaved in a civilized way.

7. Arab League Summit:

Belkheir thought it unlikely to take place soon. He said Algeria would host it only if others were unanimous in asking for this.

⁴ In telegram 3730 from Rabat, April 16, the Embassy transmitted the text of Hassan's letter to Qadhafi, which reads in part: "I have learned, both with amazement and consternation, the news of the air attacks against the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi." Furthermore, Hassan stated: "The conflict that today confronts the Libyan Jamahriya and the United States of America goes beyond, far beyond, the context of relations between those two countries. Aggressions aimed at civilian targets, the victims of which are unarmed, innocent people, can find no justification and should henceforth be the object of general reprobation. The entire international community, and in the first place the Arab nation, find themselves affected." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860289-0844)

8. Tunisia:

Belkheir was preoccupied by events in Tunisia. The Tunisians, he thought, were nervous and engaged in altogether too much fratricidal positioning for the succession. He had been disturbed by Tunisian allegations of an imminent Libyan attack which appeared to be based purely on hysterical speculation.⁵

9. Terrorism:

Belkheir expressed categoric disapproval of terrorism (as distinct from Palestinian actions in occupied territories or Israel—a distinction which means everything here). He noted that party PermSec Messaadia had been sent to Tripoli to warn Qadhafi on the issue just before the U.S. strikes.⁶ Qadhafi flatly denied his involvement and Algerians, although totally disbelieving, are hamstrung by the lack of proof at their disposal. I asked to my regret if the Arab world would now bring pressure on Qadhafi to end his support of terrorism. Belkheir went on at some length on the lack of any such thing as an Arab world, noting that no group could have more diverse and incompatible objectives. He returned to the issue by expressing hope that at least some Arab states, certainly Algeria, would tackle Qadhafi on the issue in the strongest terms. Possibly this, coupled with internal voices carrying the same message, could have an effect. He asked if I thought the U.S. would talk to Qadhafi if he would give assurances that he would end support for terrorism. I opined that a Qadhafi assurance wasn't worth the time of day whereas a Qadhafi moratorium on terrorist acts in effect for some time could not help but improve the climate. Belkheir said he thought the effort by some Arab states to cool Qadhafi would be made but he appeared skeptical as to results.

10. Public Opinion:

In closing, Belkheir gave me the usual line about building up Qadhafi by overt confrontation. He said that, although there was strong anti-Qadhafi opinion within the Algerian public, news of the strikes had mobilized the public on his side. I used the opportunity to point out that the press had presented a totally distorted view of events, thereby undermining the GOA's own efforts at moderation. I asked how he could tolerate this. Belkheir agreed that the press had

⁵ In telegram 3707 from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisian Minister of Defense had telephoned the Embassy to report that the "Libyans are mounting air raid on Tunisia and planes may be en route" following "Libyan charges this afternoon reported AFP that Tunisia permitted U.S. to use its territory and airspace during our 'aggression.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860932–0227, D860290–0526) Shortly thereafter, in telegram 3708 from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that "threatened incursion could be by land, sea or air although land confrontation still deemed relatively unlikely." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860932–0253, D860292–0590)

⁶ The Algerian warning to Libya is in telegram 1925 from Algiers, April 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860284–0414)

been hysterical and said he had personally banned further TV coverage of foreign demonstrations, fearing that such footage would provoke problems here. I pointed to a multitude of other press sins. He said he was seized of the problem and that the press would calm down.

11. Hamdani:

Belkheir attached considerable significance to the impending Hamdani visit to Washington—a sign, he implied, of Algeria's willingness to continue business *à la status quo ante*.

12. Comment:

Belkheir is clearly more upbeat on divisions within Libya than is his military security chief. This may be due to genuine differences of interpretation of events or different shading of events for our benefit. In all our conversations here, it is clear that our action in Libya has highlighted for the Algerians the menace posed by Qadhafi for the regime, but it has also reconfirmed their view that Algeria's interests are best served by constant contact with Qadhafi and, more importantly, the other principal players in the Libyan political/military structure. Continued public contact with, and private antipathy toward, the Libyans is likely.

13. Additional points contained septel.⁷ Department please pass Tunis and Rabat.

Johnstone

⁷Not found.

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Mauritania¹

Washington, May 1, 1986, 0225Z

135968. Subject: Under Secretary Armacost Meetings With Algerian Secretary General Hamdani: Libya & Western Sahara.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: Under Secretary Armacost had wide-ranging discussions with Algerian MFA SecGen Hamdani on April 28. Re Libya,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860212–0731. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Ussery, Michele Bova (S/S), Zweifel, Johnstone, Bishop, Andrew Steinfeld (P), George Harris (INR/NESA), Borg, John Hawes (PM), and James Collins (S/S); approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Paris, London, Rome, and Cairo.

Armacost expressed USG reservations about GOA policy of engaging Qadhafi in dialogue; Hamdani contended USG policy of isolating Qadhafi has not worked and repeatedly took line that Libya should be dealt with in Maghreb context, going so far as to posit that solution to Western Sahara conflict would obviate problem of Qadhafi (or at least issue of Algerian-Libyan rapprochement.) Hamdani thus urged USG pressure on GOM to encourage “political will” for resolution. He demurred on possible Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, stating that GOA must be convinced that Moroccans are not just trying to buy time. Hamdani voiced GOA continuing opposition to terrorism but differentiated Palestinian struggle “inside their own country” as distinct from terrorist activity. End summary.

3. Under Secretary Armacost hosted Algerian MFA SecGen Smail Hamdani for meetings in Washington on April 28. During two hour session, discussion focused on Libya, touched on Western Sahara, Chad, and Tunisia.

4. Libya/Terrorism: Adverting to views expressed by Hamdani in earlier, restricted session, Armacost stated that USG has no conceptual problem with regional associations per se. However, USG seeks to isolate Qadhafi pending a change in his conduct; hence GOA approach of drawing him into some sort of Maghreb configuration as a way to influence him will not be effective in our view. At time of Oujda Accord,² King Hassan argued that he would tame Qadhafi as well, but Oujda has benefitted Libya with no evidence of positive change in Qadhafi’s behavior. GOA should be aware of near certain negative American reaction should Algeria persist in drawing closer to Qadhafi. USG and GOA policies are in basic conflict on this point.

5. Assistant Secretary Murphy underlined that USG efforts to combat Qadhafi are a major effort with broad public support. Several willing intermediaries have approached USG over time with suggestions of dialogue with Qadhafi. Our response has been consistent; USG will judge Qadhafi by actions and not words. We have clear evidence of his ties to terrorist activity.

6. Hamdani said that USG set undesirable precedent with use of military force; Armacost responded that it was Qadhafi who set the undesirable precedent with terrorist activity; Qadhafi has isolated himself by attacks on Chad and Tunisia, turning Iraqis and Europeans against him, and generally alienating governments by engaging in increasingly widespread “global” actions. He asked Hamdani how Libyans respond when GOA raises issue of terrorism. Hamdani replied that Qadhafi denied that Libyans were behind these actions. Armacost then stated that USG will not play by Qadhafi’s rules and thus is engaging Libyans where they are unable to compete. He then asked

² See footnote 2, Document 138.

Hamdani's assessment as to possible Libyan domestic consequences of our recent actions.

7. Hamdani stressed he would not defend Qadhafi, only speak for GOA. GOA made clear to Qadhafi that it opposes terrorism. Stemming from Algeria's revolutionary experience, GOA makes distinction between "act of liberation in place to be liberated" and actions committed outside. Thus GOA recognizes Palestinians' right to use violence "in their own country," but not elsewhere. GOA disagrees strongly on USG policy of isolating Qadhafi; contrarily, our actions have made him a hero in eyes of Libyan public, others in Arab world. For example, Qadhafi was disliked in Algeria before the U.S. bombings; since, voices have arisen in FLN expressing support for Qadhafi. In GOA view, Tunisia also faces more difficult circumstances as a result of USG actions. Hamdani reiterated argument that GOA seeks to demonstrate friendship for Libyan people which transcends differences with Qadhafi. He said he had no detailed knowledge of internal Libyan situation, but repeated view that Qadhafi is now a hero in that context.

8. Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun said that attack on Libya appeared very sudden to rest of world. "Thousands" of Americans were continuing to work in Libya. It was not until January sanctions³ that there was a perception of real USG purposefulness in dealing with Qadhafi. Sahnoun felt that action should have been taken in international fora in an effort to gather momentum and force similar to that garnered on Cambodia and Afghanistan issues.

9. Murphy took issue, noting that our bombings had been preceded by five years' of graduated measures to constrain Qadhafi. It appears that Qadhafi and his immediate cohorts believe they are untouchable. USG and GOA may differ on issue, but it is not correct to perceive our latest actions as either unprovoked or "sudden".

10. Hamdani lamented that an unmerited side effect of recent events has been to create suspicion of all Arabs as potential terrorists. He cited Italian decision to require visas for Algerians. There are Italian, French, Spanish and Irish terrorists, but countermeasures apply only to Arabs. Italy and Austria are countries friendly to Palestinian cause, leading Hamdani to muse rhetorically about who benefited from Rome and Vienna bombings; it was "not the Arabs". Terrorism is result, not cause of problems. If it is to be defeated, basic issues (i.e. Palestinian issues) must be addressed.

11. Borg of S/CT noted that Italian passport/visa restrictions stem from fact that terrorists have made frequent use of North African travel documents. Ambassador Johnstone underscored that indeed Arab

³ Reference is to the sanctions imposed by the United States on Libya in the wake of the Rome and Vienna airport bombings. Documentation on the sanctions is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

world as a whole gets blame for Arab terrorist actions; concerted Arab action to combat terrorism is needed if this image is to be corrected. Armacost said USG accepts need to address root causes, among them Palestinian issues, but terrorism tarnishes image of Palestinians and does nothing to bring closer realization of Palestinian rights.

12. Hamdani then discussed GOA call for a meeting of Palestinian factions in Algiers. He cited need for an initiative to help heal divisions among Palestinian groups. GOA objective is to see one organization with one voice “to control” all of the groups.

13. Western Sahara: At several points, Hamdani raised Western Sahara conflict as most important Maghreb issue, even in terms of dealing with Qadhafi. He noted that Oujda Accord had grave consequences for Algeria, forcing it to deal with two potential military fronts. Oujda Accord benefits Morocco, but Qadhafi even more. “Behind” Oujda Accord is Western Sahara conflict. Hamdani several times pressed idea that USG could and should exert influence on King Hassan to settle Western Sahara conflict. This would be in interest both of area stability and domestic tranquility within Morocco—an expressed interest of GOA. If negotiated solution is found, this “will change whole face” of Maghreb. Hamdani proposed that both Libyan and Western Sahara issues should be handled in context of greater Maghreb of Six—i.e. to include SDAR.

14. Hamdani said that the question of a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, rumored in recent weeks, should be put to Hassan. GOA wants a meeting with substance, not a Moroccan ploy to gain time as has happened before. GOA is hopeful that resumption of proximity talks on May 5⁴ will lead to real progress—if GOM is ready to implement principles of UNGA resolution including a ceasefire and referendum without presence of Moroccan Army and administration.

15. Other topics will be covered in septels.⁵

Whitehead

⁴ Reference is to the next round of UN-sponsored talks between Morocco and the Polisario.

⁵ In telegrams 135820 to Tunis, May 1; 139375 to Algiers, May 3; and 139479 to Algiers, May 3, the Department reported on Armacost's discussions with Hamdani about Chad, the Middle East peace process, and Bendjedid's recent visit to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860334–0410, D860342–0641, and D860342–0796, respectively)

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, August 21, 1986, 2218Z

263994. Subject: Vice President's Conversations With Belkheir.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: Gen. Larbi Belkheir, Algerian Presidency Cabinet Director (regarded as GOA's second most important figure) requested appointment with the Vice President to deliver a message from Pres. Bendjedid. Belkheir met twice with Vice President on 8/14; meetings also held with DCI Casey, VAdm Poindexter, and Deputy Secretary Whitehead (with Under Secretary Armacost attending). In first meeting with Vice President, Belkheir expressed satisfaction with bilateral relationship, citing success of first Joint Economic Commission (2/86) and cooperation in areas such as agriculture.² Belkheir noted rumors of possible Algeria-Libya union, but asserted it was out of the question; GOA would not lightly conclude such an arrangement without considerable groundwork and preparation. Belkheir touched quickly on other regional issues, principally Tunisian situation and Western Sahara.

3. In second meeting, Belkheir introduced topic which had prompted request for appointment with Vice President:

GOA concern over Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation growing out of Hassan/Peres meeting.³ Belkheir criticized Hassan's talks as unhelpful to other peace efforts, such as those of U.S. and King Hussein. He asserted that principal product of Hassan initiative is GOM decision to press for a military solution to Western Sahara conflict, using Israeli military assistance. Belkheir cited information from "several sources" that Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation is increasing and that there are Israeli military advisers in Morocco. Vice President expressed surprise, noting we have no information on such an arrangement and that it seems highly unlikely. GOM would be aware of extreme sensitivities raised by such cooperation, risking adverse reactions in the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860008-0210. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Ussery, Pearson (NSC), Jay Bruns (D), Richard Mueller (S/S), Douglas Smith (S/S-O), and Menarchik; approved by Murphy. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and Nouakchott.

² See footnote 3, Document 157.

³ Peres visited Morocco on July 21 and met with King Hassan to discuss the Middle East peace process. In telegram 228781 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, July 22, the Department described the meeting as "a positive development of great historical significance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860559-0574)

Arab world; such cooperation would cause Israel major problems with the Congress and the administration because this “is not what Israel’s defense is about.”

4. Vice President expanded Western Sahara discussion to inquire about possibilities for negotiated solution, taking note of UN/OAU efforts. Belkheir voiced GOA support of any constructive initiatives, but doubted GOM seriousness; Bendjedid open to direct contact with Hassan only in “well-prepared” meeting which would demonstrate genuine Moroccan commitment to go beyond buying time. Meeting ended with brief exchange on terrorism and agreement that cooperation held productive possibilities for mutual benefits. End summary.

5. Vice President granted two sessions, on 8/14, to visiting Algerian Presidency Cabinet Director General Larbi Belkheir, who had requested appointment to deliver message from President Bendjedid. Belkheir transmitted thanks from Bendjedid for Vice President’s get well message following Bendjedid’s back surgery. Belkheir noted Bendjedid’s positive memories of his April 1985 trip to the U.S. and his satisfaction with the course of growing bilateral cooperation.⁴

6. Belkheir continued with synopsis of GOA concerns regarding North Africa, beginning with mention of rumors of a GOA union with Libya. Belkheir stated that such a union is “out of the question for the time being” and that Algeria would not conclude any union quickly and without considerable preparation and groundwork. The Vice President interjected that Qadhafi is “crazy about unions” and even raised the possibility of a union with the PRC in discussions with the Chinese. Belkheir continued that GOA had been concerned by the potential for simultaneous problems on two fronts (Morocco and Libya), thus prompting the dialogue with Qadhafi to neutralize one front. Bendjedid also felt that he should use direct contact to advise Qadhafi to moderate his behavior.

7. Belkheir also touched briefly on the worrisome situation in Tunisia and the “poisoning” influence of the Western Sahara conflict. Responding to the Vice President’s question, he elaborated that the GOA is concerned that the uncertainties of the succession after Bourguiba, coupled with severe economic problems, could lead to serious instability.

8. Lacking time for further discussion, the Vice President arranged for a second meeting with Belkheir, noting, as the first talk ended, interest in discussing U.S. concerns about Libya and the possibilities for a Hassan/Bendjedid meeting.

⁴ See Documents 147 and 148.

9. In the second meeting, Belkheir began his comments by expressing interest in the Vice President's Middle East trip,⁵ stating that the effort was very encouraging to the extent that it might lead to solving the problem of the Palestinian people. Belkheir continued, however, that the Hassan/Peres meetings represent an obstacle both to what the U.S. has been doing in the region and to King Hussein's efforts. Further, he asserted that the GOA has information that the central topic of discussion at Ifrane was the Western Sahara question and, specifically, that military cooperation between Israel and Morocco is being established. The presence of Israeli military advisers in Morocco leads the GOA to assume that Hassan has decided to seek a military, rather than a negotiated, solution to the conflict. (Note: In later meeting with VAdm Poindexter, Belkheir left implication that Israeli assistance would be financial as well as military; this subject was not discussed with other interlocutors.)

10. Belkheir said that Bendjedid is highly concerned and hopes that "our American friends" will use their influence to avoid such a development in the region. The GOA is in favor of stability in the Maghreb; Algeria as always been open to dialogue and there are in fact no bilateral problems between Algeria and Morocco, except for the "Moroccan-Sahraoui problem". Belkeir noted GOA interest in a united Maghreb, implied appreciation for U.S. views on such unity, but worried that there are "other powers in the world" not in favor of a united Maghreb; the GOA does not want to see their intervention in the region.

11. The Vice President responded that we have had extensive discussions with Peres, Shamir, Hussein and Mubarak; "not a single time" was there a mention of Peres' visit to Morocco having any connection with the Western Sahara problem. The Vice President said that the GOA assertion came as a "tremendous surprise," particularly as there was never any suggestion of such a development during his Middle East trip. The U.S. understands that the central focus of the Hassan/Peres talks was the ten points presented by Peres. He continued that it would be surprising if Morocco would even consider Israeli assistance because of the sensitivities in Morocco itself, in Algeria, and the rest of the Arab world. Further, military cooperation of this nature would cause Israel major problems with the Congress and with the administration, despite Israel's special relationship with the U.S.—"this is not what Israel's defense is about." The Vice President said that he believes the Algerian intelligence is wrong, but that we are interested and would appreciate any further available information.

⁵ Reference is to Bush's trip to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan earlier in the month to discuss the Middle East peace process. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

12. Belkheir reiterated President Bendjedid's determination to settle the Saharan problem and stabilize the region. Thus, when this intelligence was received from "several sources", Bendjedid felt it necessary to send Belkheir to discuss it. Belkheir expressed the hope that the information is not correct.

13. The Vice President asked Belkheir to assure Bendjedid that we understand his concern about a problem which would create great difficulties in the region and put the U.S. in a bad position. He emphasized that Belkheir should tell Bendjedid that we have had "no hint, no evidence, nothing about this", but that we will investigate it.

14. The Vice President shifted the thrust of the conversation to the chances for negotiations leading to a Sahara referendum. Asking Belkheir to assume that the information on Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation is incorrect, he wondered how the GOA feels about chances for negotiations and a referendum, citing our feeling that chances for a solution might be better than in the past.

15. Belkheir said that there were hopes surrounding the UN/OAU initiative, but that these demarches had no results. In 1983, Bendjedid proposed a solution to the problem within the framework of a united Mahgreb state.⁶ In 1984, he suggested another solution, a link between the King and "the Sahraoui entity".⁷ These two initiatives failed. Belkheir asked rhetorically how a referendum could occur with the Moroccan Army and administration still in the territory.

16. Regarding a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, Belkheir said Bendjedid is open to the possibility, but has told Hassan that it must be well prepared to avoid an unsuccessful meeting such as that of 1983. Belkheir expressed the hope that the UN SYG would continue his initiative, especially if it is supported by the U.S.

17. Belkheir said that there was another issue which he wanted to raise, i.e., terrorism. Algeria consistently has condemned terrorist acts and has advised "countries and liberation movements" against carrying out such activities, especially outside their area of interest. He maintained that the GOA has so counseled Palestinians of different factions, the Lebanese, and other movements; further, Bendjedid has taken this line with Qadafi each time they have met, although Qadhafi always denies backing terrorists.

18. Belkheir suggested that, now that cooperation has been established between GOA and USG intelligence services, there should be

⁶ See Document 21.

⁷ In telegram 844 from Algiers, February 16, 1984, the Embassy reported that Bendjedid told Hassan they should subsume "the problem within the Grand Maghreb, i.e. some form of confederation between Morocco and Mauritania with autonomy for the Sahrawis. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003-0387)

more frequent exchanges of information to better combat the terrorist threat.

19. The Vice President agreed, adding that “it should be a two way street” and we hope to be helpful to the GOA when we see a problem arising in or around Algeria. “We must present a common front against terrorism”. By the same token, the Vice President asked that the GOA inform us of any threats against U.S. interests which become known to it. He also voiced awareness of the GOA’s deeply emotional commitment to the Palestinians—“we know and respect this”, but hope that no Palestinian group will take advantage of Algerian hospitality, claiming they are training for one purpose when in fact they are training for terrorist acts.

20. The Vice President ended by noting his conviction that a major goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to continue to improve our relations with Algeria: “We have certain differences with you on international issues” but the bilateral relationship is going well. He asked Belkheir to tell Bendjedid how strongly both he and the President feel about our bilateral relations and that we must keep talking; he expressed pleasure that the GOA felt this problem was important enough to make a special effort to discuss it—“it is exactly in this way that we will improve our relations.”

Whitehead

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, November 29, 1986, 1145Z

6003. Subject: Abu Nidal.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Ambassador raised continuing saga of Abu Nidal with Presidential Advisor Larbi Belkheir November 26. Ambassador noted that U.S. and Algerian experts on Abu Nidal had held first session this past week and that U.S. side had not felt that the Algerians had been as forthcoming as they might have been.² Ambassador acknowledged that Algerians had handed over a list of over 200 Abu Nidal operatives

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [less than 1 line not declassified], 1986–88, Tunis. Secret; Priority; [handling restriction not declassified].

² No record of the talks was found.

but, he noted, to be useful such a list must be accompanied by much more information.

3. Ambassador also noted that, as had been predicted by Military Intelligence Chief General Lakehal Ayat,³ some elements suspiciously close to Abu Nidal had opened an office in downtown Algiers. Belkheir expressed surprise, saying that the GOA would never allow an Abu Nidal office in Algeria. Ambassador provided address of office, noting that we had no evidence linking it to any specific act of terrorism but pointing out that any office operated by a man who claimed to be a sympathizer of Abu Nidal exposed the Government of Algeria to both danger and criticism.

4. Belkheir said he would look into matter and get back.

5. Comment: We have been picking up stories, in the rumor mill of the opening of an Abu Nidal office in Algiers. This is the same office previously reported to be at the university. Intelligence Chief Lakehal Ayat had told us about two months ago that the university office was run by a man who had sympathy for Abu Nidal but who was not an active member of the group and certainly not engaged in any terrorist acts. He had said at the time that the university office was closing and that the sympathizer would be moving downtown. We are certainly not satisfied with this response but neither are we persuaded that the rumors being spun out by the local PLO office on the Abu Nidal presence in Algiers have much credibility. We will continue to press issue with GOA in the context of our “cooperation program” on Abu Nidal.

Johnstone

³No record of Ayat’s prediction was found.

163. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 4, 1986

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Algerian Ambassador to the US (U)

(S) Following are highlights of the undersigned’s meeting with Amb Sahnoun yesterday. President Benjedid left yesterday for Tripoli

¹Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Algeria 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

and then Tunis. Basically, Algeria has been asked by moderate Arabs to lay the groundwork for Arab League Summit with Libya and Syria, as well as other Arab states, following the Islamic Conference in Kuwait in January. Getting Iraq and Syria to participate is important. If Heads of State agree, King Fahd will hold Non-Summit Summit with Heads of State during Kuwait OIC meeting. If that meeting is productive and participants are willing, then a formal Arab League Summit would be held in Riyadh the following month.

(S/S) Re Iran: Sahnoun mentioned two interesting points. On behalf of the US, Algeria had been working directly with groups in Lebanon holding US hostages. The Algerian Ambassador to Lebanon at that time knew these groups and was given the task. He consulted with the Kuwaiti Government and these terrorist groups re release of the Dawa prisoners which Kuwait refused to consider. Apparently, they were making progress on a formula whereby Algeria publicly would take responsibility for insuring prisoners would not be executed although they would remain in prison in Kuwait, which would give these groups a pretext for releasing US hostages without concessions by US or Kuwait, when all of a sudden negotiations dried up. He is not sure if timing of this coincided with first reported arms shipments to Iran² (will check when he is in Algiers later this month), but speculated if it does, that would mean the Iran government does have control over these groups and probably told them to stop dealing with Algeria because it was working another track (with us). Since then the Algerian Ambassador to Lebanon was reassigned to Saudi Arabia, and Algeria is not pursuing any negotiations with groups for US hostage release.

(S) Sahnoun then mentioned that he has been asked by State to work with Iran to secure release of the US citizen currently being held in Tehran.³ Using the citizen's family as his excuse, he discussed the matter with the Iranian Ambassador to the US one-on-one. The Iran Ambassador was not optimistic. They also talked about recent US/Iranian "overtures", which he favors (although Sahnoun believes he was speaking personally, not for the Iran government) because he believes it signals moderation and flexibility in US policy re Iran. This said, however, he stated emphatically that timing was all wrong for

² Reference is to a secret deal between the United States and Iran whereby the United States sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iran's help in releasing the seven U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon. Some of the proceeds of the arms sales were then funneled to the *contras*, the anti-Sandinistas rebels in Nicaragua, in apparent violation of the Boland amendment to the House Appropriations Bill of 1982, which prohibited the U.S. Government from overthrowing the Sandinistas. Documentation on the deal and the resulting investigation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XXIII, Iran-Contra Affair, 1985-1988.

³ Not further identified.

such initiatives because there really are no openings in Iran and no one for us to deal with.

(S) Re allegations of a Saudi role in Iran/US arms supply: Sahnoun thought Khashoggi might have been involved⁴ but discounted that the SAG would have been foolish enough to do so given the Israeli connection and potential damage to Saudi credibility if word of its participation leaked. He mentioned however that SAG may be working separate deals with Iran, possibly shipments of oil, in return for decreased Iranian military action against Saudi interests.

Sandra Charles⁵

*Deputy Assistant Secretary
NESA (Acting)*

⁴ Adnan Khashoggi, a Saudi businessman, was later implicated as the middleman in the arms-for-hostages deal between the United States and Iran. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XXIII, Iran-Contra Affair, 1985–1988.

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Charles signed the original.

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 3, 1987, 2045Z

60064. Following State 60064 rpted for your info sent action
Algiers info Rabat Tunis dtd Mar 2: QTE: SECRET State 60064.
Subject: Ambassador Walters Visit to Algiers.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: Ambassador Walters was given red carpet treatment in Algiers, affording him excellent opportunity to convey US position on UN and regional issues to highest levels of GOA. In meetings with Foreign Minister Ibrahim and President Bendjedid, Walters underlined US concerns over Algeria's voting record in the UN and made

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870162–0414. Secret. Repeated from telegram 60064 to Algiers, March 2. The March 3 version was sent for information to USUN. Drafted by Ellen Ivie (IO/UNA); cleared by Zweifel; approved by Hugh Montgomery (IO/UNA). Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.

clear the strength of US views on the Cuba resolution in the UNHRC.² On Iran-Iraq war, Walters confronted Algerian misimpression that US policy has a pro-Iranian tilt stressing US support for quote a solution in which there is no winner or loser unquote. On Western Sahara issue Walters was supportive of UNSYG de Cuellar's efforts. Algerians also expressed support for UN Sahara effort. On UN voting issues they agreed to closer consultation and, somewhat surprisingly, to review voting record and try to be more helpful. Ambassador Walters found President Bendjedid far more secure and confident in his position than in any previous encounter, and the Algerians themselves more open and less "gray" than previously. End summary.

3. Issues covered during visit:

A. Irangate—Walters took on Irangate issue head on,³ explaining to Algerians in each meeting that a U.S. Government could be overturned by a domestic affair such as Watergate but that foreign policy issue such as Iran affair could pose no threat to government. He thought the issue would continue to draw press attention for another three months before blowing over. Algerians took comments on board without comment.

B. Iran-Iraq War: Issue was a preoccupation to all interlocutors. Ibrahim, playing something of a devil's advocate, said that Algeria was convinced that the U.S. was playing the Israeli game of promoting an Iranian victory to destabilize the Arab countries. Walters rejected the notion, pointing out that Israel would face grave risks if Iran emerged triumphant from the war. Walters stressed U.S. policy of seeking a political solution which had neither victorious nor defeated parties. President Bendjedid used same formula in describing GOA policy.

C. Chad and Libya: Issue was touched on in all meetings. Ibrahim said GOA was trying to foster reconciliation between Habre and Goukouni as a step that would facilitate withdrawal of foreign forces. He said Goukouni was quite flexible, acknowledging Habre's leadership and expressing willingness to accept need for French pressure in Chad as long as Libyan forces remained. At previous evening dinner in Walter's honor (attended by high level representatives of MOD and MFA), MFA SecGen Hamdani was less upbeat on Habre's willingness to reconcile with Goukouni. Hamdani thought Habre reluctant to take

² Reference is to UN Human Rights Council Draft Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.29 submitted by the United States on February 24, which called for the Government of Cuba "to ensure that all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction are guaranteed effective enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms" and "to allow any Cuban who might wish to leave or return to Cuba without hindrance, especially in those cases involving the reunification of families."

³ See footnote 2, Document 163.

steps necessary for reconciliation. Algerians all agreed that the Aouzou strip problem should be put on ice for a while, possibly by referring it to international arbitration.

D. Middle East Peace: Bendjedid issued plea for U.S. to allow holding of international conference as a means of stimulating peace process. Walters reviewed U.S. policy.

E. Tunisia: The Algerians engaged in much handwringing over the succession issue, expressing hope that the Tunisians would sort out their affairs in keeping with constitutional norms.

F. Western Sahara: Walters put the emphasis on the UN SecGen efforts, noting that the latter had been pleased by his recent visit to Algeria. Walters thought the problems would boil down to who voted in the U.N.-controlled referendum and what would happen to Moroccan forces. He noted that a formula had been found for Namibia which involved withdrawal of some forces, and cantonment of others. General Belkheir (at dinner) offered no comment to this, whereas Ibrahimi appeared to be pressing for the withdrawal of all Moroccan forces before a referendum could be held. Walters opined that the King could not accept such an action. Ibrahimi threw cold water on the possibility of a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting, noting that it was too soon after Ifrane. He left the door open to a meeting between himself and Hassan, although complained that the Moroccans were telling others that Algeria had rejected this Moroccan offer. Despite the apparent roadblocks, all Algerian interlocutors expressed hope that de Cuellar's mission could proceed and succeed.

G. UN voting: There were lively exchanges throughout visit on Algeria's voting record. Walters pressed the point tactfully, citing statistics. Ibrahimi, after considerable barter, said that Algeria would look to see how the record might be improved. On South Africa, Walters defended the U.S. voting record in the face of Algerian complaints. He pointed out the practical irreversibility of a mandatory sanctions vote and the fact that the U.S. was the first country to impose sanctions.

4. Ambassador Walters cleared the summary only of this cable. Whitehead Unqte.

Whitehead

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, March 10, 1987, 0332Z

68909. Subject: Meeting on Military Sales to Algeria.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. On 2/25/87, Interagency Group met to discuss general views and some specific pending and past cases of military sales to Algeria. Meeting co-chaired by NEA DAS E. Michael Ussery and PM DAS Vladimir Lehovich. Following is text of a memorandum containing a partial record of that meeting, summarizing open remarks, general themes raised by various participants, some indications of agreement on next steps, and a list of attendees.

3. Opening Remarks—Ussery:

— State NEA is concerned that, while USG agreed on a case-by-case approach to Algerian military purchases with good reasons to move cautiously, bureaucratic inertia has unnecessarily delayed decisions in this key bilateral area.

— A review of the bilateral relationship since 1979 accession of President Bendjedid shows slow but steady improvement; Algeria helped in freeing Tehran hostages and has continued assistance to U.S. in dealing with radical regimes (note recent help with Seib case in Iran).

— Vice President's 1983 trip to Algiers² and Bendjedid's 1985 visit to U.S.³ accelerated improvement in relations with latter's visit leading to real efforts to help Algerian military diversification as well as agreements to conclude consular and cultural treaties and set up a Joint Economic Commission.

— Positive aspects are encouraging, but there are real problems and areas of disagreement: basic differences on Middle East policy, how to handle Libya, Algerian closeness to USSR, and Algerian voting record in UN.

— Moroccan/Algerian antipathy, evidenced by long conflict over Western Sahara, also a stumbling block for U.S. which has valuable, longstanding relationship with Morocco.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870183-0436. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by James Pierce (PM/SAS); approved by Zweifel. Sent for information Priority to Rabat and Moscow.

² See Document 130.

³ See Documents 147 and 148.

— U.S./Morocco and U.S./Algeria relations cannot be treated as zero sum game, however, and we must concentrate on building two bilateral relationships with reassurances of regard and respect for both parties—not an easy task.

— We also recognize Bendjedid's problems with internal opposition to his efforts to move closer to the West; combined with severe economic problems limiting GOA budgetary ability to acquire new weapons systems, we must acknowledge that military relationship will move slowly, even without cautious U.S. approach.

4. Opening Remarks—Lehovich:

— Military relationship with Algeria has expanded gradually since 1979 to include an exchange of defense attaches, initiation of an IMET program, U.S. Navy ship visits, commercial C-130 sales, and a Presidential Determination making Algeria eligible for defense purchases under FMS procedures.

— Within the past year, we also have signed a GSOMIA and started the training of Algerian pilots.

— These actions represent measured response to improved bilateral relations and Algeria's expressed interest in diversifying its heretofore predominant dependence on the Soviets and East Bloc for military equipment and training.

— We have reviewed Algerian arms requests on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the regional military balance and security interests with Morocco.

— Record to date has been one of denying requests for advanced weapons and approving sales only of non-sensitive items; denying weapons and/or deleting advanced and sensitive components from weapons systems predictably has lessened Algerian interest in purchasing equipment.

— An interagency exchange on this subject is overdue and today's meeting gives us an opportunity to review the evolution of the military supply relationship, examine previous decisions on Algerian requests and licensing applications from U.S. commercial firms, and discuss possible progress in our military relationship with Algeria.

5. Key Points/Themes Raised by Participants:

○ The "shopping list" of requested military items presented at the time of the 1985 Bendjedid visit consisted exclusively of air force items; the air force leadership change may have affected that service's desires and willingness to shift toward the West. The army may not be as interested.

— In any case, the diversification desired by the Algerians is not, as some think, a replacement of Warsaw Pact sources by Western sources.

The Algerians are not “chasing us”, they will go slow, and they are very picky shoppers.

- Algerians have been very specific, looking for items with special capabilities; regarding these sensitive items, we must address whether the presence of about 800 Soviet advisers in Algeria remains a major worry and whether Moroccan concerns will be aroused by such sales (Note: At this point, DAS Ussery reiterated point that “Moroccan paranoia, and for that matter, Algerian paranoia”, cannot be affected by the U.S.; we must determine sales questions in USG interest).

- Is anyone assuming that sales of sensitive technology to the Algerians would result in an “automatic pass” to the Soviets? (Note: No response offered by any participant). If not, we should assume that we have a valid GSOMIA.

- Does a GSOMIA imply “automatic access to a certain level of classification?” (Note: Answer from several respondents was “no”).

- DOD is concerned that we still do not have a good feel for Algerian “needs”. What uses do the Algerians see for equipment. Also, we need better guidance on how to proceed with sales issues.

- Getting each others’ feedback and improving communication on the sales questions is indeed a problem and is a major reason for this meeting. A regular meeting might be profitable (bimonthly, perhaps?) and consultation among other players outside of the meeting context would be desirable, particularly where a sales request appears to have opposition. Could there not be a quick consultation before action occurs?

- Licensing process does indeed break down in giving little feedback on the “why” and “who objected”. It is important to remember, however, that this is not a “veto” process; a case can be pursued further and pushed forward if arguments overriding a denial are sufficiently persuasive.

- PM has responsibility for managing the process, but this does not rule out active participation of the regional bureau and the desk.

6. Follow Up Actions Agreed To by Participants:

- Sale of C-130H with some type of EW and recon capability can be reconsidered. (Note: shortly before meeting date, Lockheed representatives told NEA/AFN and PM/SAS officers that they remain interested in submitting this request and consider Algeria their best potential customer in North Africa).

- Parachute and paradrop kits have been approved for sale, but present procurement timetable could mean 12–18 months for delivery, thus lessening Algerian interest. Examination will be made of possible expedited procurement from existing stocks.

○ Sale of RPV (Northrop Chukar III), with photo recon capability can be reconsidered.

○ No objection voiced to sale of armored cars (Cadillac Gage) and similar low-tech items; sale can be reconsidered.

○ Objections to TOW remain strong.

○ Upgrades of Soviet equipment (MIG 21 and T-55) are probably moot from Algerian perspective, but are being reviewed.

○ Offices clearing munition list licenses were encouraged to notify PM/MC that a denial letter should not be sent until PM/MC recontacts offices which have granted approval.

○ In general, climate now appears better for consideration of Algerian purchases requests given improved bilateral dialogue, signing of GSOMIA, and other factors.

7. List of Participants:

NEA, E. Michael Ussery

PM, Vlad Lehovich

NEA/AFN, David E. Zweifel, Richard V. Fisher

PM/SAS, James Pierce, Blair L. Murray

PM/ISP, Col. Denis J. Kiely

NEA/RA, Col. John Bircher

T, Stan Sienkiewicz

S/P, Ellen Laipson

INR/NESA, Janean Mann

ACDA/NWC, Joe Clare, Edmund S. Finegold

OSD/ISA, CDR. Tim Hartung, John Norris

OSD/DTSA/M, Len Altman, Wolfgang Maier, Robert Witter

OSD/DTSA/MC, Howard Gardiner

OSD/DSAA, LTCOL Mike Simpson, Dave Monahan

OJCS/J5, MAJ Jerry Thompson

Shultz

166. Information Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

SUBJECT

Improving Relations with Algeria

SUMMARY: Our long-term interests in North Africa are served by a non-radical, increasingly moderate Algeria, and our influence might help reinforce favorable trends in this direction. That process will be long and slow, but we should move to advance the effort begun when President Benjedid visited Washington in 1985. In particular, we should look for ways to expand our bilateral contacts and programs in trade and security areas. *END SUMMARY.*

Algeria: An Alternative We Should Consider²

There are two reasons why we should focus on Algeria. First, the prospects for instability in and among the countries of North Africa suggests that we should develop as many options as possible in our relations with the region. Experience has shown the need for alternatives when a key country we have long relied on in a region (in this case, either Morocco or Tunisia) becomes unexpectedly unstable. Algeria now presents us with certain opportunities to broaden our ties with an important North African state.

The second reason relates to changes in Algeria's domestic and foreign policies. The current leadership's pragmatism has led to two major policy changes since 1979: a diversification of its military supplies and training away from excessive reliance on the Soviets; and an expansion of economic ties with the West. The latter development reflects a change in basic attitudes about the state's role in economic activities, clearly an area in which we can have influence.

In its foreign policy, Algeria selectively seeks to play a pragmatic role in regional and international politics and conflicts; on other issues (e.g. South Africa) its positions remain unshakably ideological. Algeria's essential middleman role in securing the release of our hostages in Iran, its early efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, and

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons: March 1987. Confidential. Drafted on March 5 by Ellen Laipson (S/P). Solomon wrote: "Dick" next to his name on the "From" line. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Pascoe also initialed the memorandum and wrote: "3/10."

² Shultz wrote: "I agree GPS" in the right-hand margin. A typed notation below this reads: "I agree. GPS 3/12/87."

its current activities to help Chad and end Libyan domination there demonstrate its concern about regional stability, and suggest there may be additional opportunities for us to cooperate.

Potential Pitfalls: There are two important policy concerns that must be addressed in order to proceed with improvements in our relations with Algeria. One is managing our sharp ideological differences over certain issues, including Algeria's willingness to allow convicted terrorist Abu Abbas to come to Algiers from time to time to participate in events aimed at uniting Palestinian leadership. The Algerians must understand that major improvements in our relationship will be affected by their actions and policies toward Arab radical causes and the terrorism factor.

The second concern is maintaining the relationship we want with Morocco. We see no reason why an improved relationship with Algeria should affect our ties with Morocco, and we should avoid letting our policy toward one become linked to policy toward the other. The excellent relationship we enjoy with King Hassan is based on Morocco's desire to be firmly in the pro-western camp, not on support for Morocco against Algeria. We must avoid being drawn into the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, especially when the protracted war in the western Sahara heats up and we are pressured to abandon our policy of neutrality toward the war.

Where Can We Work Together?

In 1985, we agreed with President Benjedid to expand our bilateral relations.³ The momentum in that initiative has waned. We should reinvigorate that process, identifying ways to increase cooperation with Algeria gradually and in non-controversial areas. Movement may be possible on economic and trade issues, already of great interest to the Algerians, and we should be ready to move up the ladder on military cooperation.

Trade and Economic Issues: The Algerians are rightly eager to diversify their exports away from hydrocarbons. We can help the Algerians identify promising areas for export promotion, as we have done with the Turks. It is important to steer them away from areas where protectionist sentiment is high, such as steel, and try to identify unexploited markets for their products in the U.S. Algeria is already an important and expanding market for American agricultural commodities.

We can also work together to enhance their agricultural productivity through improved technology. We have shown our willingness to finance pilot farm projects. This is a promising area and provides us a chance to contribute to one of their most acute needs—greater food self-reliance.

³ See Document 147.

Strengthening relationships in the economic area also serves to reinforce privatization trends currently favored among Algeria's leaders.

Regional Cooperation: We should continue to work together on the Chad problem. Algeria permitted overflights to resupply Habre, and we should demonstrate support for their efforts to promote reconciliation among Chadian factions as part of an OAU peace plan. While we are skeptical about prospects for real Chadian unity, it is important to complement the French-U.S. military support for Habre with a political process. Our support for their approach on Chad now may have dividends for us later, in Algeria and with Africa generally, if Algeria succeeds in its bid for the OAU presidency next year.

Security and Arms: We, in effect, agreed to help Algeria diversify its arms supply away from the Soviets when we made them FMS-eligible in 1985. Since then, we have repeatedly rejected their arms requests; and we had to deflect a premature discussion of F-16s last year. We need to get both sides focused on more achievable goals, such as increased training programs, aerial surveillance equipment and low-tech ground forces equipment. Appropriate agencies and bureaus are reexamining the list of Algerian requests with an eye to approving some non-controversial items. We support this, with the understanding that the long-term future of this supply relationship hinges on our increased confidence about Algerian policy attitudes in the Middle East and Africa.

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 14, 1987, 1653Z

2285. Paris for Legatt. Subject: Visit of Ambassador Bremer.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer (S/CT) visited Algeria April 4–5 to consult with senior GOA officials on anti-terrorism policy and explore areas for expanded U.S.-Algerian cooperation. While here, Amb. Bremer called on Director of Surete Nationale, El Hadi Khediri, and on Military Security Director Gen. Madjdoub Lakehal Ayat. He also had extended discussion with MFA Secretary General Smail Hamdani at dinner hosted by Ambassador.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870289–0512. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for Information to Paris.

3. Tone of visit reflected high level GOA desire to see bilateral relationship expand further in area of anti-terrorism cooperation. Khediri and Lakehal Ayat gave their meetings with Bremer a warm, cooperative aura. Khediri emphasized his past cooperation with U.S. law enforcement authorities in dealing with hijackers and he expressed appreciation for data from U.S. sources that have helped Algerian police deter criminal elements. Khediri said that he would like to improve liaison with the FBI and reacted very positively to Amb. Bremer's suggestion that he visit the FBI in Washington. Khediri also expressed his concern at increasing use of Algeria as a transit route for drug traffickers and expressed wish to cooperate more closely with DEA.

4. In meeting with Lakehal Ayat, current status of hostages in Lebanon was primary topic. No new developments emerged. With Lakehal Ayat (as with Khediri), considerable time was devoted to discussion of terrorism and terrorist groups. Amb. Bremer urged Algerians to be more forthright in their condemnation of terrorist acts, and to cut whatever links they have to Palestinian groups that use terrorism as a tactic. The Algerians condemned terrorism against innocent civilians in incidents such as the Rome and Vienna airports or the Achille Lauro affair but maintained that it was acceptable for Palestinians to use acts of violence "on the territory to be liberated". In discussing specific Palestinian groups, Algerians clearly regarded Abu Nidal as acting well beyond acceptable limits. Abu Abbas was in a more nebulous category, apparently based on his importance within the PLO leadership and his role in any PLO unity drive (which the GOA is strongly supporting). General Lakehal Ayat described two Abu Nidal supporters living in Algiers as "no more than students". *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

5. Comment: As we were making plans for Bremer visit, we touched raw nerve of competition between Lakehal Ayat and Khediri for control of turf in security area. By visit, however, Algerians composed whatever internal differences they had and all went smoothly. Khediri explained to us that he, Lakehal Ayat, and head of the paramilitary gendarmerie meet weekly with Presidential Security Advisor Gen. Greziel Benabbes to review ongoing issues and coordinate actions. Khediri noted existence of several GOA agencies with overlapping mandates, but he said that resulting competitive situation produced better intelligence for the government.

6. Visit provided useful exchange with Algerians on some of the more problematic issues in bilateral relationship. Bremer continued process of laying down markers on terrorism in which we have been engaged over past year. Basis was built for further cooperation with both sides of Algerian internecine intelligence/security apparatus.

Johnstone

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, July 11, 1987, 1252Z

213653. Subject: Algerian Ambassador's Read-Out on North African Developments.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun returned to Washington 7/9 from UN meetings in New Delhi. He leaves again 7/10 for Algiers; all Algerian Ambassadors have been summoned back, presumably to be briefed on Algerian-Libyan dialogue and implications thereof.

3. During his recent stay in Algiers, Sahnoun met with President Bendjedid among other GOA leaders. Bendjedid allegedly commented to Sahnoun about likely unease in Washington about the Qadhafi visit to Algiers.² He directed Sahnoun to present the Algerian position and to try to assuage USG concerns.

4. Libya:

— As have other Algerians, Sahnoun insisted that GOA is responding to Libyan initiatives, remains suspicious of Qadhafi's ultimate motives and willingness to follow through on commitments, and will proceed in very measured fashion.

— Sahnoun contends that Qadhafi has always been personally cool towards Algeria, unenthusiastic about entering into relationship in which Libya would be weaker partner. He posited that pressure for closer relations ironically comes more from Libyan military officers than that of Qadhafi himself.

— In recent past, a number of these military leaders have come to Algiers or otherwise contacted Algerian counterparts to appeal for GOA support in lessening Libyan isolation. As portrayed by Sahnoun,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870701-0129, D870547-0407. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Robyn Bishop (S/S-O), John Dobrin (AF/C), and Thomas Benesch (AF/W); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Tunis, Paris, Rabat, Nouakchott, and Ndjamena.

² Qadhafi visited Algiers June 28-July 1. In telegram 3983 from Algiers, July 2, the Embassy reported that "senior GOA officials have spent last 24 hours trying to telegraph to diplomatic corps that the Libyan leader's visit was an unwelcome imposition. An Arab Ambassador with excellent GOA sources told us that the Algerians were forced to accept a Qadhafi visit after his repeated insistence on coming." The Embassy further reported: "Algerians say that since GOA is seeking to bring Qadhafi under control through a broad range of low level engagements it was necessary to keep that process on track by letting him visit Algiers. GOA knew that he would use the occasion to thump for a full unity agreement, but was confident that it could handle whatever theatrics Qadhafi used to push his case." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870522-0743)

the basic message is that such support will constrain Qadhafi by strengthening positions of more rationale Libyan leaders.

— In discussing Algerian attitudes towards quickening pace of Libyan-Algerian relations, Sahnoun several times noted that there are those “especially among the military” who oppose any rapprochement with Libya.

— A document on future Algerian-Libyan relations was drawn up during Jalloud visit (which preceded that of Qadhafi by about one week). Bendjedid has directed FLN Central Committee to study this and make whatever recommendations it pleases. (However, this was not done at just-concluded session of Central Committee.) Any proposals agreed to by Central Committee eventually will have to be submitted to a party congress, thence to a popular plebiscite; this drawn-out process is deliberate GOA maneuver to frustrate faster pace sought by Libyans.

— As to GOA motivation for continuing dialogue, Sahnoun mused about Algeria’s present economic difficulties and speculated that it might be possible to redirect Libyan revenues away from military procurement and nefarious activities towards assistance for Algeria. This is especially important since next year’s repayments to Soviets for previous GOA military purchases will be particularly onerous, and thus far Soviets are insisting on hard currency repayments. When pressed for any evidence that Libyans might come through with funding, Sahnoun admitted that this is more a hope than a real prospect; GOA recognizes that such assistance is not likely to materialize in any significant degree.

— In conversation with Sahnoun, Bendjedid consistently spoke of “coordination”, “cooperation”, and “Maghreb unity” (rather than Algerian-Libyan union). He reportedly told Sahnoun that his ultimate purpose is to be involved in such fashion in Libya so as to “neutralize” Qadhafi. Sahnoun explicitly understands this term in the sense that might be employed by Al Capone.

— As portrayed in public statements and private conversations, GOA line is that any further progress should take form of Libyan adherence to Tripartite Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria. When reminded that the GOA earlier had ruled out Libyan membership as incompatible with treaty’s call for non-interference in affairs of others and recognition of international boundaries, Sahnoun quickly claimed that this is precisely the GOA’s point: to include Libya in this Maghrebian group would imply very significant concessions by Qadhafi on both counts. He said that while in Algiers, Qadhafi committed himself “in writing” henceforth to abide by these principles.

— When in Algiers, Qadhafi pressed to address the FLN Central Committee. Bendjedid refused, saying that Central Committee deliberations are strictly Algerian matter. Bendjedid likewise allegedly rejected Qadhafi’s suggestion that Syria should be affiliated in some

sort of union with Libya and Algeria; GOA is not interested in crossing Maghreb issues with those of Levant.

— Qadhafi, at GOA insistence, met with Libyan dissidents in Algeria. (Sahnoun claimed not to know who these might be.)

5. Chad:

— Both during Jallud and Qadhafi visits, there were Libyan contacts with Gokouni Ouedi. Qadhafi also met in Algiers with an unnamed Habre emissary.

— On Aouzo Strip, Qadhafi's position remains that unratiſed early 20th century boundary demarcation should prevail over 1935 accord which ceded the strip to Chad.³

— GOA is willing to accept referral of this issue to ICJ, but is confident that Libyan position would not prevail.

6. Tunisia:

— Sahnoun surmised that purpose of Bendjedid's subsequent visit to Tunis was to press Tunisians to support Libyan adherence to tripartite accord. He noted long standing Tunisian resistance to this.

— GOA obviously also is pleased to have played a role in fostering at least partial Libyan compensation for Tunisian commercial claims.

Shultz

³ Reference to the unratiſed Mussolini-Laval Treaty between Italy and France that confirmed Italy's possession of the strip.

169. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, August 4, 1987

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation with Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun

The Ambassador had just returned from several weeks in Africa, including a trip to the OAU meeting in Ethiopia. He had flown back

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778-003, Algeria-1987. Confidential. At the top of the memorandum Bush wrote: "Don Fine report *interesting* Thanx GB 8-4."

from that meeting to Algeria with President Bendjedid and they had long talks on the aircraft. The following key points emerged:

— *Algerian policy toward Qadhafi.* Qadhafi has recently received heavy setbacks. Sahnoun said that the American attack had weakened him and had shown that, despite spending billions on weapons, Libya was still vulnerable to America. The recent defeats in Chad have also weakened Qadhafi. In this state, he sought a meeting with President Chadli and suggested that Algeria and Libya unite politically as Libya had previously joined with Morocco.² Bendjedid, who in Sahnoun's words, "would like to get rid of Qadhafi," rebuffed this suggestion. He did tell Qadhafi that if he fully repaired his relations with Tunisia, that Algeria would consider including him in the Treaty of Friendship which currently exists among Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. Qadhafi is moving toward better relations with Tunisia and has agreed to pay reparations for those Tunisian workers forced out of Libya. If this continues, there will be a meeting in Tunisia under Bourguiba's leadership, where Libya's reentry into the concept of Mahgreb unity will be considered.

— *Why Be Nice to Qadhafi?* Sahnoun said that the Algerian diplomatic and military figures are receiving many pleas from Libyan officials urging that Libya not be completely isolated. They fear that Qadhafi, if he feels isolated, may do something utterly foolish which could damage Libya long term. Sahnoun cited the fact that Major Jallud had recently visited Moscow and had proposed to Gorbachev a Treaty of Friendship identical to that which the Soviet Union currently has with Syria. Gorbachev reportedly stated that such treaties take time to negotiate. Jallud said that Libya would like to sign immediately and said that the treaty he had brought was identical to the one existing between Moscow and Damascus. Gorbachev rebuffed the offer, saying "but Libya is not Syria." Sahnoun stressed that Bendjedid does not like or trust Qadhafi and that if he returns to a more radical stance, they will adopt a harder line. He assured me that they remain deeply suspicious of Qadhafi and are not about to be taken in by him.

— *I asked about Abu Nidal.* Sahnoun seemed a little uncomfortable with this subject, but answered quite forthrightly. He said he had been told by the Chief of Algerian Intelligence that they do have periodic contact with the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). Algeria does this in order to keep tabs on what the ANO is doing, to be able to put pressure on the ANO in case of an outbreak of terrorism, and to seek to moderate its stance. He insisted that no support was being given to the ANO, that there are only meetings with ANO representatives when they come to Algeria. Sahnoun said he had been told that ANO representatives had

² See footnote 2, Document 168.

been received at high levels in France and Germany, and that the ANO appeared to be trying to change its image, if not its tactics. (He was a little vague on this.) He assured me that this had been reported by Algerian Intelligence to CIA through established liaison channels.

— *Algeria, Morocco and the Sahara*. Sahnoun was somewhat upset on the Sahara problem, saying that King Hassan had said some helpful things after the recent meeting of Bendjedid, King Fahd and Hassan.³ They were particularly struck by Hassan saying that the Polisario issue is not a problem between Algeria and Morocco and that he (Hassan) knew that only a political solution was logical. Sahnoun said he was aware of the Vice President's interest in this problem and said that if a breakthrough became virtually assured, except for one or two final matters, Algeria might ask for the Vice President's help.

— *The Persian Gulf*. Sahnoun knows the Iranians rather well and says that the situation in Iran and the Gulf is very dangerous. He says that there are people in Iran who oppose Khomeini, but that it is terribly difficult for them to show their opposition due to the war with Iraq. Sahnoun did not think that Iran would make a blatant or open attack on American ships in the Gulf or the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. He did feel that mines would continue to be used extensively. He acknowledged that the U.S. might be forced to retaliate against Iran if more mine attacks were successful, but was concerned that Khomeini would use such attacks to incite the Iranians to further actions of fanaticism. Sahnoun said that the deaths in Mecca were a deeply serious matter and that the next several months in the Gulf area would be very touchy indeed.⁴

— *Bendjedid's Views*. Sahnoun said that Bendjedid hopes very much that you will be elected in 1988. He asked Sahnoun if there was anything he (Bendjedid) could do to help your campaign. Sahnoun smilingly told the President that he "had best keep quiet" so as not to interfere in U.S. politics. Sahnoun stressed how highly Bendjedid regards you. I said that you had been concerned about reports of Algeria's apparent warming toward Qadhafi and that it was very helpful to learn of President Bendjedid's long-term motivations.

Comment: Sahnoun was friendly and forthcoming and I consider this a very useful relationship.

³ Reference is to the May 4 Maghreb Summit during which Saudi King Fahd tried to broker an agreement between Bendjedid and Hassan on the Western Sahara. See Document 450.

⁴ Reference is to the July 31 riots caused by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca which killed over 400 people. (Charles P. Wallace, "402 Die in Clashes of Saudis, Iranians: Killings at Shrine in Mecca Trigger Attacks on Four Embassies in Tehran," *Los Angeles Times*, August 2, 1987, p. A1)

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, September 24, 1987, 1842Z

298742. Subject: Acting Secretary Whitehead's Meeting With Algerian MOD Secretary General Cheloufi—September 21.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is a memorandum of conversation between Acting Secretary Whitehead and General Mustapha Cheloufi, Secretary General of the Algerian Defense Ministry. Cheloufi was visiting the U.S. at the invitation of ASD Armitage, following the latter's visit to Algeria in September of 1986.² The conversation with the Acting Secretary took place at the Department of State on September 21 from 5–6 p.m. Also present at the meeting were NEA DAS Ussery, DOD DAS Gnehm, D staffer Bernicat, Embassy Algiers DATT Di Leonardo and Algeria Desk Officer Fitzpatrick (notetaker).

3. Summary: Acting Secretary Whitehead September 21 told General Cheloufi President Bendjedid's 1985 visit to the U.S. had ushered in a new era of good relations between the U.S. and Algeria, and that ties continued to improve. He pointed out, however, that the U.S. had serious concerns about easing of Algerian-Libyan relations and about Algerian relations with Abu Nidal. Cheloufi told the Acting Secretary the Algerians were well aware of Qadhafi's nature, but said the U.S. must trust the GOA in its effort to stabilize the region. He also assured the Acting Secretary the GOA did not support terrorist activities and took note of U.S. concern about Abu Nidal. On the Western Sahara, Cheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in resolving the conflict. End summary.

4. Libya

— Isolating Qadhafi. The Acting Secretary stressed that Qadhafi must remain isolated from the international community, and the U.S. was therefore concerned that events such as Qadhafi's July visit to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870789–0420. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Ussery, Casey, Gnehm, Carolyn Huggins (S/S–O), and Michael Klosson (S/S); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, and Nouakchott.

² A record of Armitage's September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi and senior members of the Algerian military, during which they signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GOSMIA), is in telegram 4521 from Algiers, September 8, 1986. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860680–0680)

Algiers³ and other bilateral efforts might encourage him and lend him credibility. Cheloufi said the Algerians understood the need to isolate Qadhafi but that separating him from Africa was not the answer. Cheloufi said the GOA's relations with Qadhafi were not easy, and he agreed Qadhafi was unstable and unpredictable. Algeria's geographical position, however, obligated the GOA to pursue regional stability by dealing with him.

— The Moroccan Experience: Pointing to the Moroccan experience with the Oujda Accord,⁴ Cheloufi said the GOA recognized the need to be wary of Qadhafi. Cheloufi deemed the Oujda Accord an "unholy alliance", likening it to a hypothetical alliance between such disparate states as Albania and Chile, and claimed King Hassan's goal had been to isolate Algeria. Qadhafi, who had harassed the Moroccans for years to enter into a union, demonstrated his instability when, 15 days before the accord was reached, said he would never negotiate with King Hassan. This had occurred when President Bendjedid had attempted to bring Qadhafi, King Hassan and President Bourghiba together in Algiers.

— Algerians Seeking Libyan Guarantees: Cheloufi said Algeria had few alternatives. The GOA had to try to settle the problem or find a means to neutralize Qadhafi. The GOA could not sign a unity agreement without guarantees. Should the GOA sign such an agreement, it would make certain Qadhafi adhered to it.

— Qadhafi Pushing for Union: Qadhafi, Cheloufi said, strongly desired union with Algeria. The GOA had told Qadhafi it wanted time to consider such a move. Algeria would enter into such an agreement only with the free and democratic consent of both the Algerian and the Libyan peoples, and the Algerian people for their part could well reject such a union. The GOA believed Qadhafi might become more dangerous without an outlet. Though the GOA was very concerned about Qadhafi, it wanted to calm him down rather than oppose him outright.

— Chad. Cheloufi said the GOA continued to pressure Qadhafi to allow the Chadians solve their own problems, but given the conflicting Libyan and Chadian claims on the Aozou Strip,⁵ the GOA believed the matter must be resolved through international arbitration.

— Tunisia. The GOA was also concerned about the situation in Tunisia, and had warned Qadhafi to refrain from actions against that country. The GOA had also urged Libya to meet Tunisian conditions regarding reparations for Tunisian workers expelled from Libya in

³ See footnote 2, Document 168.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 138.

⁵ Documentation on the dispute between Libya and Chad over the Aozou Strip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

1985. Algeria had good, neighborly relations with Tunisia, and could not accept foreign intervention in Tunisian affairs.

— Caution Urged. The Acting Secretary responded by urging the GOA to be very wary of Qadhafi. Mr. Whitehead explained that he himself had talked with King Hassan just after he had signed the Oujda Accord. King Hassan had assured Mr. Whitehead the U.S. should not worry because he the King could control Qadhafi through the treaty. King Hassan, however, was not able to control Qadhafi and ended up embarrassed. Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the GOA would not make the same mistake.

5. Abu Nidal

— U.S. Concerns. Mr. Whitehead raised US concerns about Algerian relations with Abu Nidal. He told Cheloufi the U.S. believed Abu Nidal was responsible for a large proportion of terrorists acts around the world, many against U.S. citizens. The U.S. found Abu Nidal totally undesirable and was worried he might find refuge in Algeria.⁶ Cheloufi said he had been concerned about criticism of the GOA for Abu Nidal's presence at the PNC this spring. The GOA had a moral commitment to hold an open PNC in order to foster a unified Palestinian approach. The GOA, therefore, had accepted everyone who wanted to participate. Cheloufi said the GOA was absolutely against terrorist activities. The Abu Nidal group had promised to refrain from terrorist acts, and there had been no acts attributable to Abu Nidal since the PNC, Cheloufi said.

Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the GOA no longer would welcome Abu Nidal. He stressed Abu Nidal remained number one on the U.S. most-wanted list, and said U.S. intelligence services knew Abu Nidal continued to plan terrorist acts, even though he may not have been directly involved in recent incidents. Mr. Whitehead urged the GOA to keep its distance from Abu Nidal, because relations with the US could be harmed if Algeria associated with him.

Cheloufi said he had taken good note of the Acting Secretary's concerns in this regard and would delve into the matter further on his return to Algiers.

6. Western Sahara

Cheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in helping to resolve the Western Sahara dispute, and to use its influence to get King Hassan to

⁶ In telegram 118885 to Algiers, April 20, the Department stated: "As post is aware, a variety of sources have reported that both Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna) and Abu Abbas (Muhammad al-Abbas) are (or have been) in Algiers for the current Palestine National Congress and the preparatory meetings which had led up to the PNC." The Department instructed the Embassy "to register our deep concern" and that "we are dismayed by reports that your government has allowed such notorious terrorists to enter Algeria." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870304-0541)

accept the “universally accepted principle of self-determination.” He said Bendjedid had shown Algeria’s good will and that there was not much more the GOA could do. The GOA, moreover, did not oppose King Hassan and had no bilateral problems with Morocco other than the Western Sahara, which would continue to prevent Algeria from normalizing relations.

7. U.S.-Algerian Bilateral Relations

— Improving Ties. The Acting Secretary expressed satisfaction at improving U.S.-Algerian bilateral ties, particularly since President Bendjedid’s 1985 U.S. visit. He asked Cheloufi to extend U.S. good wishes to President Bendjedid. Cheloufi said President Bendjedid asked him to reaffirm good relations with the US and to highlight the GOA’s desire to look sincerely for further areas of cooperation.

— Invitation to Visit. Mr. Whitehead said he had a special affection for Algeria, because he was at Mers el Kebir with the U.S. Navy in 1944. Cheloufi invited him to come again to Algeria to see how things had changed. Ambassador Sahnoun noted Mr. Whitehead had an outstanding invitation. Mr. Whitehead said he would enjoy such a visit.

Whitehead

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 1907Z

339224. Subject: Vice Presidential Letter to Bendjedid.

1. C—Entire text

2. Please deliver the following letter from the Vice President to President Bendjedid. No/no signed original will follow.

3. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: On the anniversary of the Algerian revolution, I want to extend to you and to the people of Algeria my sincere best wishes. The commemoration of this significant event in Algerian history comes at a time when our two countries can take satisfaction at the way in which our bilateral relations have strengthened

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870895-0604. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick and Casey (NEA/AFN); cleared by Ussery, Eastham, Kirby, Courtney (NSC), Laurence Pope (NEA/NGA), Stephen Grummon (S/CT), Bush, Richard Mueller (S/S), and Carolyn Huggins (S/S-O); approved by Djerejian. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.

and progressed. Your well-remembered visit to the U.S. in 1985 marked an important milestone in that process.

Our growing ties make frank exchange essential as we work together to foster greater understanding and cooperation. In this regard, I thought it might be appropriate to share with you our current thinking on several issues of common interest.

As Secretary Shultz stressed in his October 1 meeting with Minister Ibrahim, ² the U.S. remains greatly concerned about the situation in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. does not wish to become involved in an escalating military confrontation with Iran. Rather, we seek to provide protection to U.S.-flag vessels, to help ensure freedom of navigation in Gulf waters, and to support the security of friendly Arab states in the region. We continue to believe that the way to bring peace to the Gulf is to press for an immediate and negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 598. ³ We support the Secretary General in his efforts to seek full and rapid implementation of 598. The U.N. should thus focus major attention on achieving that end. We intend to support a follow-up resolution if acceptance of 598 cannot be secured.

Over the years, Algeria has won a reputation for its skill in helping to ease international conflicts. The U.S. recalls Algeria's indispensable role in the release of the American hostages in Tehran, its successful effort in 1975 to resolve border disputes between Iran and Iraq, ⁴ and the 1981 mediation mission between Iraq and Iran that cost the lives of Algeria's former Foreign Minister Ben Yahia and so many of his colleagues. ⁵ Your country's international relations with Iran provide an opportunity—as the Arab League Summit approaches on November 8—to convey to the leadership in Tehran the need to bring the Gulf war to a prompt end. This savage conflict has cost thousands of lives, brought untold destruction, and has sown instability throughout the region. Social and economic development in both Iraq and Iran have suffered tragically as a result. Likewise, Iran has paid dearly in terms of its relations with neighboring states. Your government can use its influence to persuade Iran that immediate acceptance and implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 as agreed with Secretary

² The Shultz-Ibrahim conversation is in telegram 15091 to Algiers, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870813–0813)

³ Reference is to UN Resolution 598, July 20, which called for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the repatriation of prisoners of war, and for mutual withdrawal to their internationally-recognized border. Documentation on the resolution is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988.

⁴ Reference is to the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accord. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, Document 273.

⁵ Documentation on this issue is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April 1980–January 1985.

General de Cuellar is in its own best interest, and offers an opportunity to begin rebuilding confidence and stability in this troubled area of the world.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate Algeria on its election to the U.N. Security Council for 1988–1989. We look forward to fruitful cooperation with you in the Council both with regard to terminating the Gulf conflict and in all other matters relating to international peace and security.

The United States is also concerned about another problem that threatens stability: international terrorism. I take a personal interest in the issue in my role as head of our anti-terrorism task force. I know that Algeria shares our aversion to terrorist violence, and has worked to secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon. That is why we urge Algeria to refrain from embarking on a relationship with Abu Nidal; such relations would almost certainly have an adverse impact on Algeria's outstanding international image. Abu Nidal's actions are beyond the control of any single government.

These preoccupations do not diminish U.S. interest in Algeria and in the future of the Maghreb—a region that faces significant challenges of its own. The U.S. shares an interest in promoting stability there. National development can contribute significantly to achievement of this common goal. For this reason, the U.S. has sought over the years to support social and economic progress in North Africa. The U.S. applauds the courageous initiatives Algeria has instituted to restructure its economy and to strengthen economic performance through encouragement of privatization and entrepreneurship. Your recent announcement of reform in state enterprises and the banking system reflects steady determination to achieve those ends.

Durable stability in the Maghreb, however, cannot be achieved without satisfactory resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. I think both of our governments agree that a military solution to the Western Sahara problem is neither possible nor desirable, and that the dispute can be resolved only through diplomatic means. The U.S. has closely followed recent diplomatic moves regarding the Western Sahara, including the May meeting between you and King Hassan. The U.S. supports such steps, including the present initiative of the UN Secretary General. In this spirit, it will be important to encourage the efforts of the UN technical mission when it visits the region to lay the groundwork for a possible referendum.

Libya presents a significant challenge to the goal of stability in the Maghreb. It is the U.S. view that Qadhafi has not changed; he continues to foster military aggression, subversion and international terrorism. If he appears conciliatory now, it is because he is feeling the pressures of isolation and of his defeats in Chad. Actions that diminish

his isolation help him out of his present difficulties and encourage further misbehavior. Furthermore, Libya's role in the 1980 Gafsa attack can not easily be forgotten.⁶ We must expect Libya will try again to exploit discontented elements in Tunisia. In our view, the most effective way to control such adventurism still lies in the containment and isolation of Libya. For this reason, the U.S. does not support the idea of Libyan adherence to the 1983 Tripartite Accord. Although we remain concerned about the direction of Algerian-Libyan relations, we are gratified by recent assurances from senior officials such as General Belkheir and General Cheloufi to Ambassador Johnstone regarding their extent and nature.

Though I have outlined the challenges facing us, there are also many potential opportunities ahead as we further strengthen our bilateral relations. The U.S. welcomes opportunities to exchange views on issues of mutual concern as we both endeavour to increase cooperation in the military, economic and cultural fields. In this regard, the fruitful visit I had to Algeria in 1983,⁷ and occasions such as that provided by General Belkeir's⁸ and General Cheloufi's visits to the U.S.⁹ foster growth in our relations, while providing an important opportunity for a frank exchange of views. The U.S. looks forward to continuing the dialogue, both in Washington and in Algiers.

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere good wishes for your future endeavours and for the continued prosperity and progress of your country.

Sincerely, George Bush

Shultz

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 107.

⁷ See Document 130.

⁸ See Document 161.

⁹ See Document 170.

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, February 6, 1988, 0125Z

36414. Subject: Letter to Bendjedid From Vice President Bush.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Please deliver following letter from the Vice President to President Bendjedid. No/no signed original will follow.

3. Begin text

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me great pleasure once again to take up our secret dialogue on issues affecting international peace and stability. In this regard, I very much appreciated your December letter.² The following, Mr. President, are some reflections on events that have occurred since then.

As you know, Mr. President, last December the United States and the Soviet Union moved a step closer to safeguarding international peace by agreeing to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.³ President Reagan was gratified by your solid expression of support for this step. We look forward to Algeria's continued support as we move closer to a second summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.⁴ The INF Treaty, I believe, will make a vital contribution to greater stability. As we prepare for subsequent meetings later this year in Moscow, it is our intention to build on this treaty to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union on the further reduction of nuclear weapons. To this end, U.S. negotiators in Geneva have been

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881021-0206. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick; cleared by Casey, Laurence Pope (NEA/NGA), Eastham (P), Stephen Young (EUR/SOV), Richard Mueller (S/S), Michael Minton (S/S-O), Gerald Feirestein (NEA/EGY), Paul Wilcox (NEA), Joann Alba (S/S-S), Gregg, Perito (NSC), Kirby, and Wayne Miele (H); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.

² In telegram 7604 from Algiers, December 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of Bendjedid's letter, which read in part: "You know—as I have discussed with you in detail—that Maghreb unity represents a cardinal objective for my country and people. Without it the Maghreb will never be able to have an optimal mobilization of its resources at the service of its development." To accomplish this, Bendjedid continued, "This meant normalization of relations between Tunisia and Libya—that is happening now—and it meant that Libya would have its place in this treaty." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871021-0206)

³ Reference to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington on December 8, 1987. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984-1988.

⁴ Reference is to the summit scheduled to be held in May and June in Moscow. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989, Documents 155-164.

instructed, along with their Soviet counterparts, to accelerate resolution of outstanding issues to clear the way for a treaty on strategic offensive arms.⁵ With goodwill and determination on both sides, these efforts can and will bear fruit.

Our continuing consultations on global issues have taken on even greater significance in light of Algeria's election to the UN Security Council. Algerian diplomacy is justly renowned for its efficiency and effectiveness, and it has given your country important influence in the developed and developing world. We welcome Algeria's presence on the Security Council, and look forward to working closely with you.

In this connection, I would like to touch briefly on a key issue now facing the Security Council. Clearly the Gulf war is a major concern. The Gulf area, and the Middle East as a whole, is very important to me. I made two trips to the region in 1986, including my visit in April of that year to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.⁶ There, I sensed the need for the United States to engage the Arab world, not only to protect American security and economic interests, but to help our friends. As we pursue the objective of stability in that region, the Amman summit's call in November for action by the international community to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 598 must not go unheeded.⁷ We must continue to press for urgent adoption of a follow-on, enforcement resolution by the Security Council. While some progress has been made, the Soviet Union continues to counsel delay in the imposition of an arms embargo against Iran as the non-complying party, and to insist that the council discuss its impractical proposal for a UN naval force. The latter focuses only on one aspect of the war—attacks on shipping—rather than on the urgent need to implement Resolution 598 as a comprehensive whole. As Iran prepares for a new offensive which brings the new threat of widening the war to neutral Gulf states, the need for an enforcement resolution to help bring Iran to the negotiating table has become even more urgent. Algeria will play a key role with the Security Council in the period just ahead. We look forward to working closely with Algeria in the coming weeks as we work for the earliest possible adoption of an embargo on the transfer of arms to Iran as the party which has refused to negotiate the implementation of Resolution 598 in good faith. Algeria can help by urging the Soviet Union to end its delaying tactics, and by making clear to China its concern over continuing Chinese arms sales to Iran.

⁵ Reference is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I.

⁶ Documentation on Bush's visit to Saudi Arabia is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 171.

The Gulf war, however, is not the only conflict that threatens stability in the Middle East. The tragic events we have witnessed in recent weeks in the West Bank and Gaza⁸ highlight the critical need for progress toward a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Movement toward this objective will be possible only if all concerned eschew inflammatory rhetoric in favor of pragmatic, realistic positions. Ambassador Sahnoun has passed along your interest in seeing the U.S. help move this process forward.⁹ I can assure you, Mr. President, the U.S. is now intensively engaged in working for a resolution to this conflict. We share your deep concern that reason and moderation must prevail if progress toward peace is to be achieved. On my second trip to the Middle East in 1986, I visited Israel, Jordan and Egypt. I negotiated six points of agreement which showed clearly the desire for movement toward peace that existed in those three countries.¹⁰ Now, the tensions in the West Bank and Gaza have made it clear to everyone that the status quo cannot endure. Time is not on the side of peace. Efforts to achieve progress must be reinvigorated. We were able to take advantage of President Mubarak's presence here to engage in lengthy discussions on how we might move forward in the peace process.¹¹ President Mubarak, as you know, has recently proposed some ideas which contain a number of positive elements. We were able to exchange views in some detail and to share with him some of our latest thoughts. We remain committed to do all we can to promote peace and we will pursue this goal energetically.

The United States also shares an interest in seeing peace and stability in the North Africa. I noted particularly the thoughts about this issue which you outlined in your December letter. The U.S. has closely followed recent developments in the region, including the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Egypt and between Tunisia and Libya, as well as your visits to those latter two countries. Our long-standing policy is supportive of regional arrangements that contribute to the stability of the area. In this, I believe, we share a strong, common goal. Our views diverge, however, on the effectiveness of regional arrangements that include Libya and exclude Morocco. I hope that careful consideration is being given to how Libya's inclusion in the Tripartite Accord could potentially improve Qadhafi's internal, domestic standing and thereby increase his capacity for aggressive activities

⁸ Reference is to the Palestinian uprisings against Israeli forces, or the First Intifada, that began in December 1987. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁹ No record of Sahnoun's communication was found.

¹⁰ Documentation on Bush's 1986 trip to the Middle East is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

¹¹ Mubarak made a state visit to the United States January 26–29. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

abroad, including in Chad and promotion of terrorism. My views on Colonel Qadhafi have not changed. His international behavior continues to be unacceptable to all Americans. It is also a shame what he is doing to his own country—controlling his people with terror, and squandering his country's ample resources on frivolous and misguided foreign adventures.

The U.S. has also followed with close attention the government transition in Tunisia.¹² At the time of the succession in November, we expressed our esteem for the friendship that has characterized U.S.-Tunisian relations over the years, and reaffirmed U.S. support for Tunisia under its new leadership. We will continue our efforts to enhance and refine our bilateral cooperation with the Tunisian Government. The U.S. has also taken positive note of the series of diplomatic exchanges between Algeria and Morocco. Dialogue and diplomacy of this sort can facilitate the kind of communication necessary to developing understandings that are acceptable to both your nations on issues of common interest, such as the Western Sahara.

The United States values its relationships with both Algeria and Morocco. Conflict in the Maghreb is not in our common interest; it prevents and impedes economic progress in the region. The U.S. therefore supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. In this regard, we are following closely the efforts of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. I understand that the UN technical team that visited the area last November has now presented its findings to the Secretary General. The U.S. will continue to support his initiative, and calls on all with influence over the situation to encourage restraint and cooperation as his efforts proceed.

Mr. President, I am gratified at the progress our two countries continue to make as we build our relations in a variety of fields. In this regard, I very much appreciated the invitation of Mr. Rabah Bitat, President of the Popular Assembly, for a congressional delegation to visit your country. I am sharing his letter with my congressional colleague, James Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives. In the economic area, the U.S. looks forward to the meeting of the joint U.S.-Algerian Economic Commission this spring,¹³ as we pursue joint endeavors to solidify commercial cooperation. We have already made significant progress in the agricultural area, and anticipate that this has laid the groundwork for further economic cooperation in other fields. In this connection, I believe such cooperation can be helpful as Algeria pursues its plans for restructuring its economic sector.

¹² Reference is to Ben Ali's removal of Bourguiba and assumption of the Tunisian presidency. See Document 355.

¹³ The U.S.-Algerian Joint Economic Commission was originally scheduled for April, then postponed until May, and ultimately postponed until 1989.

Mr. President, I hope that our bilateral relations will continue to grow in many areas, and that we will progress toward our shared goal of a peaceful, stable Maghreb. Our exchange of letters provides a valued opportunity for facilitating understanding on important questions. I look forward to receiving your thoughts as we progress through 1988. In the meantime, Mr. President, please accept my sincere good wishes for continued progress and prosperity for yourself and the Algerian nation now and throughout the new year.

Sincerely, George Bush

End text.

Armacost

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 10, 1988, 1245Z

1402. Subject: Ambassador Walters' Meeting With President Bendjedid.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador Walters accompanied by Ambassador Johnstone met with President Bendjedid March 7. Also attending were Presidential Cabinet Director Belkheir and MFA SecGen Hamdani. Cordial meeting covered following:

A) PLO Office in New York:

— Bendjedid expressed concern over closing of PLO office.² Walters pointed out that Congress was forcing action and that administration had opposed the move. Walters said he hoped to gain some time to see what might develop. Bendjedid reiterated Algerian concern and cited closing as a dangerous precedent.

B) Middle East Peace:

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880210-0807. Secret. Sent for information to USUN, the Gulf War Collective, and the UN Security Council Collective.

² Reference is to "Chapter 61—Anti-Terrorism-PLO," 22 USC S-5201, in which Congress determined that "the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating in the United States."

— Walters responded to Bendjedid's concerns on peace problem by noting that demonstrations were having major impact on U.S. opinion. He said that there was no going back to status quo of several months ago. Walters pointed to efforts being undertaken by Secretary Shultz in the context of UN Resolution 242³ as a demonstration of U.S. willingness to become involved in a search for a solution. Bendjedid commented on the insufficiency of U.S. proposals and said he was particularly upset over Israeli crackdown on press coverage of West Bank disturbances. Walters counseled moderation, noting that this was a time for a flexible search for solutions and not for fixed positions.

C) Western Sahara:

— Ambassador Walters spoke of his meeting with Hassan⁴ and conveyed strong U.S. support for the efforts of the UNSYG to organize a referendum. Bendjedid offered nothing new in Algerian position.

D) Iran-Iraq:

— 1) Walters spoke of US efforts to get Soviets to support a strong resolution. He said that U.S. was offering a 30–60 day implementation delay for the arms embargo. Walters was optimistic that Soviets would be willing to go along with a resolution and pointedly expressed hope that there would be no effort to get strong resolution side-tracked. Bendjedid agreed but went on to explain that he had found new flexibility in Iranian position during visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani. He alluded to reports of Iranian note supporting 598 in UN.⁵ Walters countered by noting that if Iranian's want to get credit for supporting 598 in UN they must come out and state their support publicly.

— 2) On Larijani visit, Bendjedid said that Iranians had complained at alleged Iraqi unwillingness to go along with a ceasefire. Algerians had argued that solution was a complete package of which ceasefire was only a part. According to Bendjedid, Larijani had expressed willingness to go along with ceasefire and other elements of Resolution 598. He said the two sides had discussed issue of war reconstruction (reparations) and Algerians had told Iranians they would have to make their claims more practical. He concluded by saying that Iranian visit had given him greater hope. He said that if Algeria undertook to do anything (to mediate) it would be in the context of the UNSYG effort.

E) Tunisia:

— In course of discussion of Tunisia, Bendjedid noted that Ben Ali appears to have taken hold effectively. He noted that Tunisia faced economic problems and that Ben Ali needed help on his debt problem.

³ See footnote 5, Document 111.

⁴ See Document 274.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 171.

Bendjedid solicited U.S. review of what it could do to ease Tunisian burden.

F) Libya:

— In short discussion Bendjedid alluded to reference in President's letter (delivered by Walters) on Libya.⁶ He explained Algerian policy along usual lines saying that Algeria had to give priority to regional stability. Walters asked how stability was possible with Qadhafi and reminded Bendjedid of a previous visit in which he had shown Bendjedid photographs of Libyan hardware.

G) Chad:

— 1) Bendjedid said that Algerian role in the postponement of OAU consideration of Chad dispute had been misinterpreted as a pro-Libya position. He argued that Algeria had been concerned that OAU meeting would not achieve results, an outcome that would lead to a breakdown in the situation. He said that Algeria was now attempting to pull together a meeting of Presidents Bongo, Bendjedid, Qadhafi and Habre before OAU meeting in order to explore possibilities.⁷ He thought this could prepare the way for direct contact between Habre and Qadhafi. Bendjedid claimed that both Libya and Chad favored such a proposal. Walters expressed surprise over Chadian willingness and Bendjedid said that Chad agreement was quote in principle unquote. Bendjedid said that the issue now rested with Bongo. Walters offered to discuss it with him during his forthcoming visit.⁸

— 2) Bendjedid noted that issue might eventually be referred to World Court although Libyans were hesitant. Algerians had reminded Libyans of World Court treatment of recent Libya-Tunisia dispute as proof that Court would treat Libya fairly.

H) UN Voting Record:

— Meeting closed on friendly note with Walters giving Bendjedid a useful prod on Algeria's UN voting record.

3. Comment: Bendjedid was relaxed and although clearly in strong disagreement with U.S. Arab-Israeli policy, he did not make the issue the centerpiece of the meeting. On balance, meeting was a useful review of international issues even if no new ground was broken.

Johnstone

⁶ Reagan wrote Bendjedid: "Libyan aggression also remains an important concern for my administration. In this connection, the U.S. continues to encourage a vigilant approach to Libya, and strongly discourages integration of Libya into regional political and diplomatic arrangements." (Telegram 60878 to Algiers, February 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880169-0188)

⁷ The OAU was scheduled to discuss Chad during a May meeting of its Foreign Ministers in Addis Ababa.

⁸ A record of Walters's meeting with Bongo, which took place on March 13, is in telegram 973 from Libreville, March 19. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880713-0696)

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, April 12, 1988, 2014Z

114823. Subject: Algeria and the Hijacked Kuwaiti Aircraft. Ref: Algiers 2113.²

1. Entire text is secret.

2. We appreciate the rapid transmission of information contained in reftel. You took the right line in informing Khediri that the U.S. fully supports Kuwaiti policy of opposing concessions to the hijackers and regards the hijackers as murderers who should be brought to justice.

3. In addition to those ideas, please convey the following additional points to Khediri as soon as possible:

— The United States will not remain silent in the event that a deal occurs in which the hijackers go free. To the contrary, we will explain as fully as possible in public what happened, who was involved and the implication of such a deal, e.g. that everyone is more vulnerable because the hijackers have eluded justice.

— This incident absolutely must end in such a way that the hijackers do not escape or go free as a result of any deal. It would be unconscionable if they would go unpunished. This fundamental position does not mitigate our genuine concern for the hostages. This concern, however, is balanced by the need for efforts to discourage hijackings and the taking of hostages in the future.

— If the terrorists were to go free, Algeria's commitment to countering terrorism would be questioned. More importantly, serious complications in our bilateral relationship could emerge.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Joseph Lake (S/S), Gregory Delawie (S/S-O), and Bremer; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to Nicosia and Kuwait City.

² In telegram 2113 from Algiers, April 12, the Embassy reported that Khediri informed Johnstone that the GOA had granted permission to land the aircraft, which had been hijacked on April 5 en route from Bangkok to Kuwait City, in Algiers "in response to personal request of Kuwaiti Emir to President Bendjedid." The Embassy continued: "Algerian offer is unconditional and prior release of hostages is not repeat not a prerequisite. So too, Algerians have refused to accept any preconditions imposed by hijackers." The Embassy also noted that Khediri "said that Algerians have made it clear to Kuwait that they would try to negotiate release of hostages in return for safe transit (to wherever) for hijackers. Kuwaitis were asked to not criticize Algeria if such a deal came to fruition and they agreed." Johnstone "reiterated U.S. position, namely that U.S. supports firm Kuwaiti policy and opposes concessions to hijackers. (Khediri said Kuwaitis made it clear they would not release any of their 17 prisoners under any circumstances.) Ambassador said U.S. regards hijackers as murderers who are trying to release other murderers and that if at all possible they should be captured and brought to justice." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880311-0448)

— Therefore Algeria should urge all involved parties to hold the plane in Cyprus.

4. We agree that it would be useful to have Embassy personnel at the airport should the plane come to Algeria. However, we believe that Embassy personnel should not repeat not be present at the airport command post or in any way be in a position which appears to suggest an operational role. An Embassy presence at the airport, apart from the Algerian command post, would be appropriate. We have tried to assume a low profile throughout this incident and would want to continue to do so in Algiers. We have also found that during these crisis periods it is generally more useful to have the Ambassador at the Embassy and other officers at appropriate sites. In addition to keeping our profile low, such an arrangement permits more authoritative communications with Washington and between the Embassy and senior GOA officials.³

Shultz

³ In telegram 2130 from Algiers, April 13, Johnstone indicated that he had "carried out reftel instructions to the letter, but I confess to being a little perplexed by the tone of indignation and threats of retaliation contained therein. I urge that we not rush into any hasty public statements or actions to carry out our threats." He also contended "the instructions contained reftel subordinate the safety of the hostages to the objective of punishing the hostage takers" and recommended that "we put our position on the record but in moderate and thoughtful tones which acknowledge the dilemma involved." To do otherwise, he contended, would "seriously complicate" U.S.-Algerian relations. (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988)

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, April 13, 1988, 1814Z

116517. Subject: The Hijackers and US Law. Ref A: State 114823;² Ref B: Algiers 2130.³

1. Secret entire text.

2. The issues you raised in reftel are important and not to be treated lightly. Ref A did not mean to suggest that there are not real

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared in substance by Djerejian (NEA); cleared by Bremer, Mary Mochary (L), Levitsky, Gregory Delawie (S/S-O), and Arena (DOJ/OIA); approved by Armacost.

² See Document 174.

³ See footnote 3, See Document 174.

moral issues involved in situations such as we are facing now. To the contrary it is precisely on that point that our concerns turn, namely our moral obligations to the present and the future and how best to balance both obligations. As you point out ridding the world of the menace of hijackings implies that we cannot give absolute priority to the safety of hostages. How we meet obligations in both directions is not a question for which there are easy and pat answers. In laying out a public position, we would do it in such a manner that is thoughtful yet makes clear our thinking. On balance, we believe our counterterrorism policy is the right one: Concessions to terrorists today lead inevitably to more acts of terrorism against equally innocent people tomorrow.

3. The issue in this hijacking is the immorality of permitting murders to go unpunished. Two murders have been committed. By taking an American citizen hostage, the hijackers have violated US law. Moreover we have just learned that at least one of the hijackers is already wanted by the USG for aircraft piracy and conspiracy to commit murder in the case of the hijacking of TWA 847.

4. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] has positively identified one of the hijackers as Hasan Izz-al-Din. On July 3, 1985, the U. S. District Court in Washington D.C. issued an arrest warrant for Izz-al-Din charging him with hostage taking and conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, resulting in the murder of Robert Stetham, a U.S. citizen.⁴ (Izz-al-Din is charged with violations of Title 49, USC, Section 1472 (I) and (K))

5. Action requested: Please inform Interior Minister Khediri urgently that since an American citizen was among the hostages on KU-422, the hijackers have violated American law. Moreover, one of the hijackers has been positively identified as Izz-al-Din for whom the U.S. already has an arrest warrant for his role in TWA 847. We want the GOA to detain this individual and turn him over to the US authorities to stand trial in the U.S. for crimes committed against U.S. citizens. Our government issued a red notice through Interpol for his arrest two years ago. We are formally asking your government today through appropriate Interpol channels to execute that red notice. (FYI: Provisional arrest request for Izz-al-Din will follow.)

6. While we realize that Algeria is not a signatory to the Montreal or Hague Conventions⁵ and that we do not have an extradition treaty

⁴ Stetham, a U.S. Navy diver, was shot and killed by the hijackers of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985. Documentation on this incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

⁵ Reference is to, respectively, the 1971 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, under which a party to the treaty must prosecute an aircraft hijacker if another state does not request the hijacker's extradition for prosecution of the same crime, and the 1971 International Conference on Air Law at Montreal, a multilateral treaty whereby signatories agreed to prohibit and punish behavior such as sabotaging or destroying aircraft.

with the GOA, nonetheless the US Government understands that under Algerian domestic law Algeria may have the authority to extradite and we would expect the GOA to understand our interest in this individual and our desire to see that he be tried for his crimes in a U.S. court of law. You may inform the GOA that the US would be prepared to provide appropriate assistance to the GOA to help identify and apprehend Izz-al-Din and the other hijackers.

7. You may draw on the facts given in paragraph 4 [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]. Also during your presentation please allude to the fact that given the intense interest in the 847 incident within the USG including the Congress, Izz-al-Din's presence could become public in just a matter of time.⁶

Shultz

⁶The Embassy reported in telegram 2161 from Algiers, April 13, that Khediri "took note of our démarche. I drew him out and he confided that in his view our démarche was not useful and only served to complicate an already complicated situation." Khediri also "politely but flatly rejected any U.S. assistance in the hijacking case. He said this was a matter that would be handled without violence and through negotiations and that GOA has all the capability it needs." (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988)

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 14, 1988, 1704Z

2168. Subject: Kuwait Hijacking—Negotiations Status.

1. Secret/NOFORN—Entire text.

2. General Lakehal Ayat debriefed Ambassador [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at airport on status of negotiations as of 1500 local (1400 GMT) April 14. Ambassador opened discussion by reiterating U.S. opposition to any deals which would involve freedom for terrorists. Lakehal Ayat acknowledged U.S. position and, while not specifically addressing it, made clear his view that U.S. policy was ill advised.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Kuwait City and Beirut.

3. Lakehal said that situation was calm. A doctor has been aboard the aircraft which would help further ease tensions. Lakehal said the terrorists remain adamant and would not accept any solution which did not involve the release of the Dawa prisoners. They were dedicated and well-trained and, in Lakehal's view, would sooner destroy themselves and the hostages than yield on Dawa prisoner issue. Lakehal described Kuwait's position as also hard.

4. Despite this gloomy set of circumstances Lakehal did not appear discouraged. He thought the terrorists were quote calming down unquote (but not softening up) and he hinted at possible Kuwaiti flexibility. Under questioning he offered view that Kuwait would have to commit to some future action vis-à-vis prisoners in order to unblock situation. He thought Kuwaiti's would have to have face-saving formula. He speculated vaguely about the possibility of a hostage and terrorist release now, followed after a few months by specific movement on prisoner issue at which time U.S. hostages in Lebanon could be released as well.

5. Lakehal said that Algerians were pressing the terrorists hard (he went through the negotiating litany). He did not say whether Algerians were also pressing Kuwait but it would seem clear that they are.

6. Ambassador asked for Lakehal's best judgment as to how long negotiations could continue before terrorists would become frustrated and resort to Larnaca-style violence. Lakehal thought situation would hold until about Saturday.²

7. [2 lines not declassified] He said, however, that there were no repeat no terrorists aboard Kuwaiti flight who had also been on 1985 TWA847 hijacking. (One Algerian negotiator involved in 1985 event has been in aircraft and so informed Lakehal.) He will double check.

8. Beirut minimized considered.

Johnstone

² April 16.

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, April 15, 1988, 0131Z

118592. Subject: Kuwait Hijacking; Negotiations. Ref: Algiers 2168.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We read report of Lakehal Ayat debriefing on status of negotiations (reftel) with great interest, particularly his vague reference to a package deal which might eventually include the release of some or all of our hostages in Lebanon.³

3. We of course very much want our hostages to be freed. And we have always said we would talk to anyone or any government about their release. However, what we will not do is make concessions ourselves or encourage others to in order to effect their release.⁴ Hopefully, the Algerians understand that.

4. However, it may be that the Algerians will conclude (or have already concluded) that the way to break the current deadlock is to dangle the bait of U.S. hostages before us to induce us to pressure Kuwait to change its position on the Dawa prisoners. Indeed, Lakehal Ayat's vague speculation in para 4 of your report already points in that direction.

5. In light of where we believe Lakehal Ayat may be leading, we feel it important that you know what the bottom line for the USG is (and is not). Any package that would require us to make concessions ourselves or to pressure the GOK on the Dawa 17 is out.⁵ We want to head off any such thinking right away to avoid later serious misunderstandings. You should take advantage of your meeting with Lakehal Ayat (or Khediri) to make this clear to the GOA.

Kampelman

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bremer; cleared by Burleigh, Gregory Delawie (S/S-O), Joseph Lake (S/S), and Perito; approved by Kampelman.

² See Document 176.

³ An unknown hand circled "great" in this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the words "concessions ourselves or encourage others to in order to effect their release" in this sentence.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, April 23, 1988, 0708Z

128959. Subject: Your Meeting With General Belkheir.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Your meeting Saturday April 23 with General Belkheir provides an opportunity to press the Algerians for a fuller explanation of how the hijacking of KU-422 was resolved.² Specifically we are interested in answers to these questions:

— What were the precise arrangements which led to the release of the hostages and the hijackers?

— Who are the hijackers?

— Where are the hijackers?

— If the hijackers are still in Algeria, what is the GOA planning to do with them?

— What is Algeria's assessment of Iran's involvement in the hijacking?

3. Beyond that we believe that the Algerians should receive a clear account of our views of the incident. You should draw upon the following talking points for your presentation:

— A hijacking presents all interested parties with difficult choices.

— The safe release of hostages is important. It cannot be the sole goal, for that only encourages more hijackings with ever increasing frequency.

— Bringing hijackers to justice is equally important.

— That has not happened yet in the case of the KU-422 hijackers. After hijacking an airliner, murdering two individuals in cold blood

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Marc Grossman (D), Ross, Levitsky (S/S), and David Adamson (S/S-O); approved by Bremer.

² Early in the morning of April 20, the Embassy learned that a deal had been struck. While the hostages had been released and the "members of Kuwaiti royal family were taken to VIP lounge and immediately whisked away to parts unknown," the hijackers remained on the plane. The Embassy suggested that the "final deal may have involved some form of confirmation (possibly by videotape) by Kuwaitis that Dawa prisoners are safe, followed by release of hostages and freedom for hijackers. GOA has promised us an official debrief later today. In the meantime GOA sources aren't talking." (Telegram 23155 from Algiers, April 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880336-0257)

and terrorizing the remaining passengers and crew members, the hijackers reportedly may go free.

— Even more worrisome is the fact that one of the hijackers was possibly Hasan Izz-al-Din, who was part of the team which hijacked TWA 847.

— We would be very concerned if the hijackers were to be freed as part of a deal. Given the GOA's responsibilities, if there is any way to reverse that situation and assure that the hijackers are brought to justice, I urge you to do so.

— For its part the U.S. intends to monitor the situation and will make every effort to apprehend the hijackers.

— We believe that the fundamental principle that hijackers should be brought to justice must be strengthened and made an integral and universally accepted part of any strategy for handling a hijacking situation. Freedom for hijackers is not a solution.

— I bring these issues to your attention in a spirit of frank discussion on an important subject which affects the safety and security of not only the citizens of our two countries but also all other countries. End talking points.

4. If Belkheir's version of events contradicts that provided by Lakehal Ayat's, we would be interested in an explanation of why.³

Whitehead

³ In telegram 2385 from Algiers, April 23, Johnstone reported that he had met with Belkheir and that "Belkheir described matter as a no-win situation for Algeria. He vowed that Algeria would never again accept a hijacked airplane even, he added pointedly, if there were 100 Americans on board." As for the deal, Belkheir said that "the Kuwaitis agreed to a gesture, namely the release of 4-6 prisoners whose terms were about to expire anyway," but only after the hostages were released. Regarding the whereabouts of the hijackers, Belkheir "disclaimed knowledge saying Lakehal Ayat was on top of this." After Johnstone said he "deplored a solution which involved freedom for murderers," Belkheir "rejected notion that capturing hijackers could be given co-equal priority with safety of hostages." (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988)

179. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Armacost to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 11, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

4. *Whitehead in Algeria.* John Whitehead stopped in Algeria May 10–11 on the first leg of a brief North Africa trip. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry claimed the Arabs would neither criticize nor support our Middle East peace initiative at their June 7 Summit in Algiers.² John made it very clear that we want the Kuwait Air hijackers, whose whereabouts remain unclear, brought to justice.³ John also expressed deep disappointment that he had been unable to meet with President Bendjedid during the visit to deliver your letter on key international issues.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was in Geneva to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to discuss INF verification procedures.

² The conversation about regional issues, including the administration's Middle East peace initiative, is in telegram 2759 from Algiers, May 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880787–0184, D880404–0338)

³ In telegram 2760 from Algiers, May 10, the Embassy reported that Whitehead told Hamdani that although the "U.S. does not want this issue [the hijacking] to upset our relations with Algeria," he nevertheless conveyed the United States wanted "to make very clear in the strongest terms that it is extremely important that the hijackers be brought to justice for the criminal actions they perpetrated. The hijackers are criminals. They murdered. If such criminals get away with these actions, more hijackings are certain to follow and Americans—as well as other nationalities—will be affected." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880407–0144)

⁴ In telegram 2758 from Algiers, May 10, the Embassy reported that Whitehead had told Abdelghani that "failure to meet the Chief of State had never happened to him before during his travels and he regarded it as a slap in the face for himself and President Reagan." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis) Reagan had written Bendjedid that while he "joined nations around the world in welcoming the safe release of the passengers held hostage aboard the hijacked Kuwaiti jet," he nevertheless believed "that the perpetrators of these crimes must be brought to justice, because until they are caught and prosecuted, the potential remains for them to strike other innocent victims again. Hijackers are criminals, and must be dealt with as such." (Telegram 147397 to Algiers, May 7; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880396–0139)

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, June 18, 1988, 1907Z

197973. Subject: Letter From the Secretary to President Bendjedid

1. C—Entire text.

2. Please deliver the following letter from the Secretary to President Bendjedid. No/no signed original will follow.

3. Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

The U.S. followed with interest the results of the extraordinary Arab summit you hosted June 7–9 in Algiers.² In the wake of those deliberations, I wanted to share with you some thoughts about our ongoing efforts to achieve progress toward peace in the Middle East.

During my most recent visit to the region,³ the leaders I met with encouraged me to continue with the U.S. initiative. No one suggested the time had come to cease our undertaking. The Arab Summit itself left the door open to continued efforts on our part to achieve further progress.⁴ In this same spirit, I intend to persevere.

Our plan for achieving comprehensive peace rests solidly on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.⁵ All of Resolution 242's provisions and principles—including its promise of exchange of territory for peace—will apply to each negotiation between Israel and its neighbors. The negotiations will be launched by an international conference that will facilitate rather than interfere, impose settlements, or veto agreements reached bilaterally.

Although the odds against a breakthrough remain high, the United States intends to keep moving forward. The plan we have advanced is realistic and workable. It can bring about negotiations; it can help achieve peace. Through this process, Palestinians will achieve their

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880498–0177. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Djerejian, Edward Walker and Ussery, Kirby, Casey, Peter Eicher (NEA/EGY), Eastham, Lynn Pascoe (S/S), Hill, and David Trotter (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.

² A wrap-up the summit's proceedings, resolutions, and final communiqué are in telegram 3249 from Algiers, June 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880498–0177) Documentation on the U.S. reaction to the summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

³ Shultz traveled to the Middle East from June 3 until June 7 to discuss the Middle East peace process.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 111.

⁵ See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 111.

legitimate rights—including political rights—and will be able to enjoy lives of security, dignity, and freedom. Israelis will achieve the recognition and security which they deserve.

As the U.S. continues its efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, it also wishes to express its support and encouragement for the efforts being undertaken to increase cooperation among the states in North Africa, particularly the resumption of full diplomatic ties between Algeria and Morocco. The U.S. views positively regional arrangements that can help reduce tensions, enhance economic progress, and foster a climate in which peaceful resolution of disputes can move forward. The U.S. remains concerned, however, about the potential for regional destabilization posed by the regime of Colonel Qadhafi, and urges its friends in North Africa to exercise full vigilance in order to assure that constructive steps that have been taken toward the promotion of regional harmony not be undermined.

Mr. President, the United States looks forward to continued cooperation with you and with your government on a wide range of issues of mutual interest and concern. In the meantime, please accept my best personal regards, Sincerely yours, George P. Shultz. End text.

Shultz

181. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, September 14, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me great pleasure to write to you on the occasion of the arrival of Ambassador Christopher Ross in Algeria. He brings with him my warm personal regards.

It has been particularly gratifying to me to follow the steady deepening of friendship between Algeria and the United States. I am certain Ambassador Ross, who is known among us for his diplomatic expertise

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 30003, Folder 19868–032, Algeria—1988. No classification marking. Attached to the letter is an Office of the Vice President abstract of correspondence indicating that the letter was “handcarried by our new Ambassador, Christopher Ross.”

and his experience in Algeria, will dedicate himself to enhancing that relationship.

I have followed with great interest the progress Algeria has made toward its national goals, and am confident that our bilateral cooperation can be supportive of those endeavors. Our two countries can work to strengthen relations in the economic and commercial areas, and to increase cooperation in the military sphere. The United States also looks forward to an active visitors exchange program with Algeria, including future visitors from our respective legislatures.

The United States also values the political dialogue that has grown between our two countries on international issues of mutual concern. Algeria's efforts to foster the spirit of compromise in the world community have been highly constructive, particularly as Iraq and Iran move to resolve their conflict and as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan moves toward a close. Similarly, efforts must continue to bring about peace among Israel and its Arab neighbors.

I personally have welcomed the resumption of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco and appreciate your role in that important development. Likewise, I applaud the efforts aimed at increased cooperation among our friends in North Africa, but I must admit to some concern about Libya and its leader. I am hopeful that the prevailing climate of collegiality will enhance prospects for resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. The United States supports the UN Secretary General's efforts in this regard. We noted with satisfaction that Morocco and the Polisario have accepted in principle the Secretary General's proposals for a framework toward resolution of the dispute.

I will look to Ambassador Ross to keep me informed of progress in these and other areas of mutual concern. As Algeria's National Liberation Front Congress approaches later this year, allow me to express my best wishes to you and the Algerian people.

We are now entering the last two months of the campaign and I am pleased with the situation and remain confident. My visit to Algeria remains particularly vivid in my mind and I truly look forward to a continued close and personal relationship with you following the election.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

I-26286/88

Washington, September 27, 1988

SUBJECT

Algerian Multi-Mission Aircraft (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

ISSUE FOR DECISION

(S) Whether to approve, in principle, the Algerian request for a surveillance/reconnaissance capability for an Algerian C-130 aircraft.

BACKGROUND

(S) Several months ago, the Government of Algeria requested the U.S. provide a surveillance/reconnaissance capability for an Algerian C-130 aircraft. The Algerians intend to use this capability for defense purposes and specifically as a surveillance system for border security and curtailment of smuggling.

(S) In April 1988, a three man U.S. Air Force team traveled to Algeria to receive briefings on the Algerian requirements. At that time, the Algerians indicated their needs in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for a Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) system; but, formulation of a specific U.S. proposal awaits a further U.S. policy decision to proceed.

(S) We have very carefully examined the technical, political, and military factors involved in this case and have worked closely with State Department in doing so. The technical information from our U.S. Air Force experts indicates that U.S. equipment that might be provided to satisfy Algerian requirements under this program would be unclassified, off-the-shelf and commercially available, and would be rudimentary compared to the capabilities currently employed by the U.S.

(S) The Air Force further concludes that this program would be a long term one. Following the formulation and agreement on a detailed proposal, and depending on the timing of congressional notification, the contracting, engineering, equipment procurement, and construction

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers, Subject 1988: Countries, Algeria. Secret. Drafted by Palevitz. At the top right of the memorandum, two stamped notations read: "Office of the Secretary of Defense 88 SEP 27" and "Sec Def Has Seen Sep 29 1988." Carlucci wrote above the salutation, then struck through, "Bill—Let's have a brief meeting with Skip et al this PM on this. FC."

would take nearly 4 years. Without U.S. assistance and training, it could take up to seven years to usefully use the system beyond the acquisition of the equipment (TAB A).² The cost to Algeria would be approximately \$40 million, not including whatever Algerian support and facilities that would need to be provided (TAB A).

(S) We also asked [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and CIA to assess the military significance of this [*less than 1 line not declassified*] SLAR equipment relative to the capabilities of Algeria's neighbors, as well as the likely political impact on our relationships with Morocco and Tunisia, if we proceed with this project. These analyses conclude that Algerian acquisition of this equipment will give Algeria a capability similar to [*less than 1 line not declassified*], far more advanced than [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and somewhat better than [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. On the political side, Morocco, in particular, would be displeased and Tunisia may request a similar surveillance system, but Algeria would at least temporarily lose interest in discussing security assistance with the U.S. if we did not proceed (TAB B).³

[*1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified*]

RECOMMENDATIONS

(S) We are faced with the difficult choice of balancing our interests in Morocco, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, against those for Algeria, with the wider implications for U.S. influence in the Maghreb. Having considered these questions thoroughly, I recommend that we proceed cautiously with this approach to improving our defense relationship with Algeria under the following conditions:

- Approve this project in principle subject to the completion of a follow-on study by a U.S. Air Force team and development of a specific proposal.

- Inform the Algerians that the new Administration will need to implement this decision to proceed, but that we will recommend that it do so.

- Algeria will need to use its own national funds for this acquisition.

- The U.S. and Algeria will need to agree on security arrangements to protect the hardware, technology, and data from compromise pursuant to the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed on September 7, 1986.⁴

- The U.S. will work to insure that the timing of congressional notification works to our mutual benefit and is consonant with the prevailing political context.

² Tab A was not attached.

³ Tab B was not attached.

⁴ Armitage signed the GSOMIA during his September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi. See footnote 2, Document 170.

(U) If you agree, I propose to use the talking points⁵ next under incorporating these caveats in my discussions in Algeria on October 1 and 2.⁶ DoD components support this position. State Department is preparing a similar decision memo for Secretary Shultz with the recommendation for approval.⁷

Richard L. Armitage⁸

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)*

⁵ Attached but not printed are the undated talking points, entitled “Algerian Multi-Mission Aircraft.” Acting Secretary of State Whitehead approved the proposal. (Action memorandum from Hare and Holmes to Whitehead, September 27; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D433, Nodis Documents September 1988)

⁶ Telegram 5355 from Algiers, October 3, reported that “on the fringes of dinner” on October 1, after Cheloufi inquired about the status of Algeria’s request for surveillance/reconnaissance capability for its C-130s, “Armitage informed General Cheloufi that the USG had reached a political decision to sell Algeria this capability if the latter wished it.” Cheloufi “expressed his thanks and that of the Ministry of Defense to all those who had worked on this issue, noting that he and his Algerian colleagues were deeply moved.” He also stated that “this step demonstrated the good intentions of the U.S. military towards Algeria.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis)

⁷ Carlucci initialed “Agree.” A stamped notation next to his initials reads: “29 SEP 1988”.

⁸ Armitage signed “VR/Rich” above this typed signature.

183. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 6, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

3. *Riots in Algiers.* President Bendjedid invoked martial law today to try to stop riots in downtown Algiers. The disturbances, sparked by economic malaise and growing frustration with social inequities, have posed no direct threat to U.S. personnel or citizens. Rapid and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading October–December 1988. Secret. Shultz was in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

visible steps are needed to diffuse the tension. These steps might include moving against hardline opponents or announcing steps to alleviate critical food shortages and improve the economy. We should show quiet support for the Bendjedid regime as it seeks to restore order.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

² An analysis of the crisis, along with possible implications for U.S.-Algerian relations, is in telegram 5440 from Algiers, October 6. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis)

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 26, 1988, 1658Z

6885. Subject: President Bendjedid on Libya, Peace Process. Ref: Algiers 6869.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is an action request—see para 10.

3. President Bendjedid engaged me in a few minutes of semi-private conversation in the course of a reception following his inauguration for a third term December 26.

4. President Bendjedid reiterated his congratulations to President-elect Bush on the occasion of his election,³ as well as his best wishes to President Reagan. I replied with warm congratulations on the renewal of his own presidential mandate.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 6869 from Algiers, December 24, Ross reported that Bessaih had expressed "GOA's concern over possible U.S. military attack on the Libyan CW factory at Rabta." He "urged that the U.S. avoid repeating its previous 'mistake,' i.e. the April 1986 strike against Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881123-0053) Documentation on Libyan chemical weapons is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations* 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

³ Bush was elected President on November 8.

5. President Bendjedid then expressed great satisfaction over our decision to open a dialogue with the PLO,⁴ noting that the Palestinians had taken many steps in our direction and could be prevailed upon to take more in the context of a serious peace process. I assured him that both the outgoing and incoming administrations were deeply committed to continuing the search for peace in the Middle East on a sound and realistic basis. In this regard, I said, it was important that the PLO maintain its rejection of terrorism. He replied that this was precisely what he had advised Yasser Arafat.

6. President Bendjedid then told me he wished to reiterate the words of caution that Foreign Minister Bessaih had shared with me concerning Libya December 24 (reftel). The region did not need the “shock” of another military action against Libya. Consequently, President Bendjedid said, he hoped that President Reagan and, subsequently, President Bush would maintain a “prudent and measured” attitude in this regard. President Bendjedid emphasized that his government and he personally were ready to participate in any bilateral, regional, or international diplomatic effort to convince Libya to act responsibly in any area that troubled us, be it terrorism, CW, or anything else. Already, during the visit of ‘Abd as-Salam Jallud December 25, President Bendjedid confided, he had raised the CW problem.

7. I replied that, indeed, the Libyan CW capability concerned us greatly, and we had just completed briefings on this capability at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Anything Algeria could do bilaterally or in concert with others to get Libya to cease and desist would be welcome, and we hoped that diplomatic efforts would prove effective and sufficient to deal with this threat.

8. President Bendjedid closed our conversation by expressing his confidence that we would continue to take into account the dangers that a military action would present for the stability of the region and that we would consequently persist in seeking a diplomatic solution. He and his government would be at our disposal for any help they could give.

9. Comment: We have clearly caught the attention of the leaders of the region on the Libyan CW issue; it is certainly no coincidence that the highest levels have approached us in both Algeria and Tunisia and that Jallud came to Algeria December 25. If, in the first instance, we

⁴ On December 14, after the PLO issued a statement which accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and renounced terrorism, Reagan announced that he had “authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialog with PLO representatives.” He also called the PLO’s statement a “serious evolution of Palestinian thinking towards realistic and pragmatic positions on the key issues.” For the text of the “Statement on Diplomatic Talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization,” see *Public Papers: Reagan 1988*, Book II, p. 1627.

wish to deal with this problem through diplomatic means, we should enlist the assistance of Algeria and other friendly parties with influence in Tripoli in the most concrete manner possible. Specifically, we should:

- Describe in as much detail as feasible our demarches in countries providing equipment, precursors, expertise, and labor. Algeria might be prepared to undertake its own demarches in such countries from the perspective of a country that shares borders with Libya. If we judge that such parallel demarches would be useful, we should provide enough facts to make them credible.

- State plainly what we want from Libya. To judge from the briefings that Messrs. Harris and Geiger presented at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Libya already has a significant capability to produce CW and, indeed, to export it. Beyond ceasing production and exports, what should countries like Algeria be asking Libya to do? Should they be asking it to allow round-the-clock verification or dismantle the plant?

- Describe plainly why a one-time inspection would not end the problem. (FYI, in spite of the overwhelming evidence in our briefings, a number of Algerians (and, for that matter, some of our diplomatic colleagues) seem to want to believe that the CW plant is indeed a pharmaceuticals plant and that Qadhafi is sincere in wanting to demonstrate this.)

- Counter the argument, heard from both Algerian and diplomatic interlocutors, that nothing prevents a state from stockpiling CW weapons. (FYI, so far, with a few trusted interlocutors, I have answered this by pointing out that, the questionable purposes of stockpiling aside, we are aware that Libya has exported CW materials to at least one destination. This has caught people's attention.)

10. Action requested: If the Department wishes to take President Bendjedid up on his offer to pursue the Libyan CW issue, please provide a detailed presentation that specifically requests this and that includes points responsive to those raised in para 9 above for use with the Foreign Minister.⁵

11. Department repeat to Tunis, Cairo, and other interested posts.

Ross

⁵ No record of a Department response was found.

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, January 6, 1989, 0021Z

3110. Subject: Algerian Ambassador's Démarche on Shootdown of Libyan MIGs. Ref: State 1420.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun told NEA DAS Burleigh the GOA was deeply concerned that the January 4 downing of Libyan MIGs would exacerbate regional tensions already high because of U.S. charges about Libya's chemical warfare facility. Sahnoun asked if the action against the Libyan MIGs were part of a larger operation or an accident. Burleigh assured Sahnoun the MIGs incident had nothing to do with U.S. concern about the Libyan CW capability. Indeed, Burleigh said, the U.S. viewed the MIGs shootdown a discrete incident that was now closed. Sahnoun welcomed any further information that could assist GOA in playing "moderating" role with Libya.³

3. Burleigh outlined information known about the MIGs downing incident at the time (just before Jan. 4 1100 EST Pentagon press conference—see State 1420.) Sahnoun did not press for further details, indicating he would await the Pentagon press conference that day for further information and asked to be kept abreast of details as they became known. He said, however, the incident could set back Algeria's efforts to "contain" Libya through diplomatic means and provide justification for Libya to use "other methods" to achieve its goals.

4. Sahnoun then turned specifically to U.S. effort to halt Libya's chemical warfare production capability, stressing GOA had expressed its concern on this issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers at highest levels. He queried whether the U.S. had considered Libya's alleged offer to allow teams to inspect the Rabta facility, which Libya maintained was a pharmaceutical plant only.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890011–0641. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Casey, Sharon Wiener (NEA/AFN), and Timothy Savage (EUR/CE); approved by Burleigh. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Tunis, Paris, Cairo, Bonn, Riyadh, and Rome.

² In telegram 1420 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, January 4, the Department reported that at 5 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, "two Libyan MIG–23's were shot down by F–14 aircraft from the USS *Kennedy*" in international airspace. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890007–0161) The telegram is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

³ See footnote 2, Document 184.

⁴ No record of the Libyan offer of inspections was found.

5. Burleigh pointed out the inconsistencies in the alleged Libyan offer, conveyed by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti December 24. In the offer, Libya had agreed to attend the Paris Chemical Warfare Conference and to abide by any inspection/verification decisions the conference might make on CW facilities.⁵ However, the CW Conference will not address specific inspection/verification issues. Moreover, Libya denies the Rabta facility is a CW production facility. Therefore, it remains unclear whether Libya means to imply that Rabta facility would be covered under any decisions the Paris CW Conference might take—even though it claims Rabta is only a pharmaceuticals production facility. Burleigh again stressed, however, the purpose of the Paris Conference was not to single out any particular country, nor to develop specific inspection/verification regimes. At any rate, inspection of such facilities could not be a one time event by non-experts.

6. When Sahnoun stressed Libya lacked the technical capability to produce chemical weapons without assistance from developing countries, Burleigh agreed. He pointed to U.S. efforts to cut off such supplies through a major diplomatic effort which provided detailed information to a number of countries, including those whose firms were believed to be involved. Burleigh countered Sahnoun's suggestion that friendly states such as the FRG had disputed USG information regarding the nature of the Rabta facility. He said that privately these countries had not questioned the U.S. assessment. The FRG, for example, remained actively engaged in investigating the involvement of several FRG firms in the Libyan CW effort and planned to try to tighten related export controls. Burleigh pointed out that even publicly the FRG had not questioned the U.S. assessment of the nature of the Rabta plant.

7. Sahnoun said GOA planned to pursue its effort to "contain" Libya, and therefore remained concerned about increased tensions in the region. He asked to be kept abreast of developments on recent events as they became known. Burleigh undertook to do so as appropriate.⁶

Whitehead

⁵ The Paris conference on chemical weapons took place January 7–11.

⁶ In telegram 177 from Algiers, January 10, the Embassy indicated that Ross had "made follow-up demarche on shootdown of Libyan aircraft and Libyan CW issue on January 9 to MFA SecGen Hamdani. On the latter, Hamdani said the GOA objected, not to the U.S. concern about Qadhafi's CW capability, but to the style of the 'excessive' U.S. campaign to eliminate that capability. He asserted that it was the responsibility of the international community, and not just the U.S., to control CW use and proliferation—on a world-wide basis, and not just in Libya's case. On the Libyan aircraft shootdown, Hamdani argued that the U.S. planes had been too quick to fire; Ambassador reviewed the U.S. pilots' efforts to avoid contact with the Libyan aircraft." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890022–0721)

Morocco

186. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carlucci to Director of Central Intelligence-Designate Casey¹

Washington, January 6, 1981

SUBJECT

Request by Moroccan King to Send His Emissary to the U.S. for Discussions with
the New Administration

1. A message was received on 6 January 1981 from King Hassan of Morocco² [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. In the message the King said he wants to send a secret emissary to meet with you and the Secretary of State between 20 and 24 January, or earlier if possible. The purpose of this meeting would be to inform the U.S. at the highest level about the upcoming Islamic Summit Conference "to prevent any surprises to U.S. policy makers on Middle East issues and to coordinate Moroccan efforts with U.S. goals and objectives on the Palestinian issue." (The King, particularly in his role as head of the Jerusalem Sub-committee of the Islamic Conference group, will presumably be able to influence strongly the outcome of the Islamic conference in Saudi Arabia from 25 to 28 January.)

2. The King's message, [*3 lines not declassified*] that only the "highest U.S. officials" should be informed. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the emissary could be someone on the level of Royal Counselor, Reda Guedira.

3. [*2 lines not declassified*] It is very characteristic of him to do this at this time, with a change of the administrations. If the proposal were rejected, the King would likely consider it a rebuff and relations between the new administration and Morocco could get off on the wrong foot. Accordingly, I would suggest that you agree to such a meeting. If the timing is not convenient, you may wish to slip it a little, but I would recommend that it be not so much as to appear to be a put-off.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box 16, C-379, Morocco. Secret. Prepared by the Chief of the Near East Division.

² Not found.

4. I would also request that you inform Secretary-elect Haig of the matter and advise his reaction. The Ambassador should be informed and I would like to know how Secretary-elect Haig would like to handle this.

Frank C. Carlucci³
Acting Director

³ Carlucci signed "Frank" above this typed signature.

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, January 24, 1981, 2237Z

19287. Subject: Secretary Haig's Meeting With Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Military Security Head Ahmed Dlimi, January 22.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. In his first meeting with foreign representatives after being sworn in, Secretary Haig received Moroccan delegation January 22 consisting of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Military and Security Head Ahmed Dlimi. Also at meeting were DAS Draper and Country Director Coon (NEA), Secretary's Special Assistant Goldberg and interpreter Sophia Porson.

3. Meeting opened with Secretary Haig stating he was aware of the importance of positions Guedira and Dlimi held in Morocco. He said he had long been an admirer of King Hassan, considering him a true and reliable friend of the West. He solicited their thought on North Africa (including Chad and Libya), problems with the Soviets, the Islamic Conference and any other area the visitors might want to touch on.

4. Guedira launched into a lengthy explanation of purpose of visit, starting with observation that King Hassan was touched that the Secretary had agreed to see his representatives on first day in office. Guedira stressed that admiration Haig had expressed for Hassan was

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (01/24/1981-04/17/1981). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Coon; cleared by Draper, Seitz, and Jane Becker (S/S-O); approved by Goldberg. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda, Cairo, Paris, Algiers, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Khartoum, Baghdad, and Islamabad.

thoroughly reciprocated, that King knew about Haig and was confident he would work for the best interests of the U.S. and also for traditional friends of U.S. Purpose of visit, Guedira continued, was not to plead Moroccan cause since Morocco was convinced that under Haig's leadership, the already good bilateral relations will improve. Rather, King had considered it useful and necessary to coordinate his policies with new U.S. administration in view of grave problems facing the world. King felt he needed a sense of the direction that the new administration's thinking was taking regarding certain problem areas considered urgent. Guedira then described King Hassan's role as head of the Jerusalem Committee in the Islamic Conference and the meeting Hassan had called last December of the committee to prepare proposals for Taif. However, King Hassan, who will present the report, does not simply want to repeat it verbatim but rather to present it in his own terms. Last week he sent messages to various Arab leaders to gain their views as a basis for helping him make as complete and objective a presentation at the Islamic Conference as possible. Guedira had been the King's emissary for this purpose and had met with King Khalid and Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia, with the Amirs of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, with King Hussein of Jordan, with Assad of Syria, and with Yassir Arafat. He now wanted U.S. views, recognizing that new administration might not yet have had time to work its strategy out in detail. The whole point was, he concluded, that the King wanted to do everything he could to make the IC meeting realistic and effective rather than a simple exercise in demagoguery. Guedira then defined the main issues as (a) Afghanistan; (b) Iran/Iraq war; (c) Middle East (including Jerusalem which gives Arab/Israeli problem a Muslim dimension in addition to a purely Arab one); and (d) Libya and its annexation of Chad.

5. The Secretary then responded:

A. Afghanistan: Secretary said we continue strenuously to oppose Soviet occupation there and anticipate increasingly vigorous efforts to make such Soviet activity increasingly unacceptable to the Soviets. Secretary said he was not in a position to say what specific steps President might decide USG should undertake. However, U.S. posture will be more vigorous and hopefully more effective than it has been in the past.

B. Iraq/Iran Conflict: Secretary said that U.S. has taken a hands off and balanced view. No one should misread the recent return of the prisoners² as signalling a prospective change in our attitude toward the regime in Iran. As to Iraq, President Reagan's view, and his own, is that U.S. interests will be served by a steady improvement in relations, and by efforts to help move Iraq into the family of the more moderate Arab

² Reference is to the January 20 release of the 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran since November 5, 1979. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980.

states. Secretary expects more vigorous initiatives toward these ends. Established states in the area must worry not only about revolutionary activity but most particularly about the exploitation by the Soviet Union of these revolutionary movements. We all hope, he continued, that some day the leaders in Iran will share views that the rest of us hold. This is not now the case. Secretary added that he saw no indication that this could be possible as long as the present situation prevailed. Unfortunately, recent events in Iran have placed a security burden on the moderate Arab states that the Shah used to carry in the past.

C. Middle East: Secretary said that President Reagan had endorsed and continued to support the overall framework of the Camp David Accords.³ We were aware of Morocco's constructive role in seeking Middle East peace. Secretary said he did not anticipate, in the short term, any unusual activity in the peace process. He personally believed that the climate required some adjustment before substantial progress could be realized. He expressed concern that Sadat not be exposed to unusual pressures and added that the U.S. will not become the proponent of new solutions—the Jordanian option, for example. Any such departure will require consultation with the parties concerned. The Secretary concluded that he did not see any particular enthusiasm on the part of any party for such changes or new concepts.

D. Libya: Secretary noted that he had been actively concerned with the former crisis in Zaire⁴ and had supported French action in Chad two or three years ago.⁵ He had been disappointed that the French did not remain vigorous in regard to Chad. He had recently expressed this disappointment to Giscard⁶—and after that French forces had been reinforced in the Central African Republic. The Secretary said he believed that the matter of Qadhafi and Soviet-sponsored activity in North Africa was a grave problem for international peace affecting U.S. interests. President Reagan shared his concern. He observed that the new administration would need some time to discuss this situation with friends of U.S. but emphasized the urgency of issue.

E. Algeria, Morocco, and the USSR: Secretary added following observations:

— We are grateful to Algeria for its assistance in the hostage affair.⁷ We are aware that Morocco is conducting discussions with Algeria

³ See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 111.

⁴ Reference is to the Angolan attack on the Shaba Province of Zaire in March 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa, Documents 73, 76, and 77.

⁵ In April 1978, the Government of France sent 2,500 troops to Chad to defend the capital, N'Djamena, from the Libyan-backed FROLINAT forces led by Goukouni Oueddei.

⁶ No record of the Haig-Giscard conversation was found.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 97.

in regard to the Sahara.⁸ We hope that our improving relations with Algeria will serve the interests we share with Morocco. Under no circumstances will our efforts to improve relations with Algeria supplant or jeopardize the historic and long-standing friendship and common purpose we share with Morocco.

— Secretary said he had just approved delivery of the first OV-10 aircraft to Morocco and had instructed the Dept to prepare a letter to Congress which would set in motion the process of responding to the Moroccan request for M-60 tanks.⁹ The Moroccan Embassy, he said, would be officially notified but he wanted his visitors to bring this news to King Hassan personally as soon as possible. (Note: Visitors, per previously arranged schedule, left immediately after meeting for direct flight to Morocco in order to join King Hassan who flew Jan 23 to Islamic Conference in Taif.)

— Secretary said he was aware of Moroccan preoccupation with what his Chinese friends call the “polar bear”. He spoke of need to coordinate U.S. force visits and positioning in locations that best suited common purposes. While noting U.S. not seeking our opportunities to poke the bear in the cage, it must be made clear to the Kremlin that the U.S. will not condone flagrant breaches of international law in period ahead.

6. Guedira showed great satisfaction and added some comments:

A. Iran-Iraq Conflict: Noting that most Arab states, at least those friendly to the U.S., support Iraq, Guedira expressed satisfaction that U.S. evenhanded and neutral posture toward Iran-Iraq conflict would not be affected by hostage release, since the freeing of the hostages has raised suspicions about a possible U.S. rapprochement with Iran. Secretary interjected that it was likely to have the opposite effect. Guedira noted that King Hassan had visited Saddam Hussein and had talked to Saddam Hussein about establishing diplomatic relations with U.S. If U.S. agrees, he is willing to continue these efforts. Secretary replied that he could not set timetables. The process was somewhat complicated by the present conflict, but the long-term direction of U.S. policy would be to seek better relations and to establish diplomatic relations. This sort of thing always requires the development of momentum. There is an increasing convergence of interest between Iraq, the U.S., and the moderate Arab states. The U.S. welcomes this and other such trends, e.g. the growing cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and between Turkey and the moderate Arabs, because they are important in strategic terms.

⁸ In telegram 477 from Rabat, January 21, the Embassy reported: “In a recent interview, Hassan argued that Morocco will have resolved the Sahara conflict militarily by the end of the month, after which there might be negotiations—but not with the Polisario.” However, Hassan also said “there were no negotiations with Algeria now.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810034–1004)

⁹ Not found.

B. Chad/Libya: Guedira said he agreed that the matter was urgent. Morocco sensed the urgency particularly when Qadhafi declared Libya's merger with Chad.¹⁰ The Moroccans reacted immediately; King Hassan received Hussein Habre last week. When Habre asked for help, Hassan got in touch at once with Sadat and Nimfiri as well as Prince Fahd. They all gave their consent for all possible Moroccan aid, and the Moroccans have begun to provide this. Morocco hopes, Guedira concluded, that the U.S. will act with it and on its side. Secretary Haig replied that he would have to discuss this with the President, but he expressed satisfaction that Morocco had been willing to act. He stressed that this was a very sensitive issue. He anticipated that in the very near future the situation would be examined with a view to convincing Qadhafi "that he cannot not succeed."

7. In conclusion, Secretary Haig conveyed again his high esteem and respect for King Hassan. He greatly admired the courage he had demonstrated in the matter of the Shah. He observed that affairs of state must be built on the basis of reliability and that the King had always been a reliable friend.

8. Guedira and Dlimi expressed their appreciation again and conveyed the King's earnest wish that Haig's first visit overseas in his new capacity be to Morocco. The meeting lasted fifty minutes.¹¹

Haig

¹⁰ On January 7, a joint Libyan-Chadian communiqué announced the merger. (Ronald Koven, "Libya Announces Merger With Its Neighbor, Chad," *Washington Post*, January 7, 1981, pp. A1, A17)

¹¹ Haig informed Reagan about the meeting in a January 22 memorandum. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (01/22/1981-02/03/1981))

188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 28, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

3. *Message from King Hassan of Morocco:* Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun met with Bill Clark today to deliver a personal message

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (02/04/1981-03/13/1981). Secret.

from King Hassan.² Hassan asked that I try to arrange for you to see two of the King's emissaries in the March 10–20 period. I received the same emissaries in January and believe it would be a misuse of your time to see them. We are considering how we might handle the King's sensitivities, however, and will keep you informed.

Hassan also sent a moderate written message, acknowledging that Security Council Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords provide the only existing basis for the peace effort. The message specified that they were only inadequate in that they did not sufficiently consider the "question of six million Palestinians whose national rights and legitimate claims cannot reasonably be ignored by any responsible Government." (S)

² The Department transmitted a record of the Clark-Bengelloun discussion in telegram 52120 to Rabat, February 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810096–0508)

189. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, March 13, 1981

SUBJECT

Dick Walters to Rabat? (C)

State's North Africa desk called me today, said Haig would shortly be sending a recommendation here proposing that Vernon Walters be sent to Morocco as a Special Presidential envoy in lieu of a visit here by Dlimi and Guedira.² The desk said this idea "had been discussed with you" (perhaps at Ali Bengelloun's dinner?). (C)

For what it's worth, I think the idea is a *good* one. It will save the President some time and make good use of Dick Walters, who is well

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (1/24/1981–04/17/1981. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Kemp. Lenz initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Rentschler wrote: "Jim" next to his name in the "from" line.

² Telegram 66150 to Rabat, March 14, contains a message from Haig to Hassan, suggesting that Walters visit Morocco for direct consultations with the King. (Ibid.) In telegram 1813 from Rabat, March 16, the Embassy informed the Department of "King Hassan's favorable reply." (Ibid.)

and favorably known to Hassan. It will also finesse—for the time being—Hassan's longstanding disinclination to deal with the State Department in favor of direct communication with the White House (Walters would go as Presidential envoy but in close coordination with Haig & Co.). (C)

Is there any guidance you might care to give me on this alleged mission?

(NB. Quite apart from the 4 years I lived in Morocco, I've had good contacts and dealings with Dick ever since our Paris days a million years ago and would be happy to be helpful to him and you in any way you consider appropriate).³ (U)

³ Below this paragraph, Allen wrote: "Ok—I have talked to him. He is going to come over Monday or Tuesday. I asked him to draft a letter from P to King Hassan. He *will* go as Presidential Emissary as well as of Sec/State. RVA. 3/14."

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 20, 1981, 1955Z

2013. Subject: General Vernon Walters' Conversation With King Hassan.

1. (S—Nodis Entire text.)

2. On March 19th, a few hours after my arrival in Marrakech, I was received at the palace by King Hassan II. I delivered President Reagan's letter to him and he expressed gratitude to the President and Secretary Haig for sending me to see him.²

3. He said that his primary concern in communicating with us was to express his puzzlement and concern at the sudden breakoff by the Algerians of the negotiations he had been conducting with them since 1977. Nearly all of these meetings had taken place at a safe house in Geneva except the last two which had taken place in Paris at the Crillon Hotel. This, at the request of the Algerians. From the beginning the Algerian negotiators had been Mr. Ibrahimi and Colonel (SI) Merbah. They had started under Boumédiène and continued under Chadli. Last October the negotiators on both sides had agreed that they had gone

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

as far as they could without bringing matters to a higher level for decision. They had jointly prepared a working paper for delivery to their respective leaders and it was agreed that the Algerians would contact the Moroccans again within ten days for a meeting between the King and Chadli in Belgium. The Moroccans heard nothing further from the Algerians until the Ta'if Conference. Prince Fahd had asked King Hassan to come on the Thursday before the opening of the conference.³ The King did so and on his arrival the Saudis asked if he would be prepared to meet President Chadli. The King said he would not affront the Saudis by refusing to meet one of their guests and was quite prepared to meet Chadli thinking that they would discuss the working paper prepared by the negotiators. Throughout the conference the matter did not come up again until the following Thursday, the day the conference closed,⁴ when Prince Sultan came to see Hassan "as white as a sheet" and indicated that Chadli would not meet with the King and claimed he had never seen the working paper as he had not had time to see the negotiators, even though two months had passed. The King said that his information was that Chadli wanted to go forward with the negotiations but had been outvoted in the Council of the Revolution by Yahyaoui's partisans and pro-Soviet and pro-Libyan members. He wondered whether we had any ideas of what were the pressures that had brought about this sudden change in the Algerian willingness to negotiate. He himself was sure it was Soviet and Libyan pressure. Hassan said that he had received the Soviet Ambassador the evening before my arrival. He had told the Ambassador in a general way what had happened and asked the Soviet Ambassador what his government believed were the pressures that had changed the Algerian position, thus "putting the monkey on his back". The King would greatly appreciate any thought we might have on this sudden change on the part of the Algerians.

4. He then expressed the hope that Secretary Haig might find time to stop in Morocco when he returned from the Middle East.⁵ I said that as far as I knew the Secretary's schedule was extremely tight and I did not know whether this would be possible or not.

5. King Hassan then discussed the situation in Saudi Arabia. He said that the situation there was one of great concern and he wished me to pass his views on to the President and the Secretary. Khalid the King decided nothing, but nothing was decided without him. Fahd decided everything, but nothing without Khalid. Sultan and Abdallah, as full brothers of the first two, were important but Hassan trusted Abdallah far more than Sultan—and Naif did not really count. Hassan said French greatly distrusted young Turki and he shared that view. Fahd had asked Hassan

³ January 22. The conference took place in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, January 25–29.

⁴ January 29.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 3.

whether he entirely trusted young Prince Saud indicating thereby in Hassan's view that Fahd did not entirely trust Saud. [3 lines not declassified]

6. [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

7. The King then discussed the recent attempted coup in Mauritania.⁶ He said that Kader and the others were indeed friendly to Morocco, had lived and trained here. They had been given Mauritanian passports with which they had entered Mauritania from Senegal, but they had not told him what they intended to do in the way of a coup. If they had, he would have attempted to dissuade them as the scheme they attempted had no chance of success.

8. King Hassan said that he felt Syrian President Assad was being backed into a corner, largely by his own actions in which the only support he had came from the Soviets and his own tiny Alawi minority. King Hassan said that anything the Secretary could do to stop Sadat's public attacks on the Saudis would be helpful. Some way should be found to bring them together. Camp David was important but it was not all. There were other things to do.

9. King Hassan said that he had seen Israeli Labor leader Shimon Peres. Peres was relatively reasonable but thought that his ideas should be the line of departure for any negotiation and that might not be entirely acceptable to the other side. Hassan spoke highly of the new Senegalese President Diouf and said that he would be visiting him in Marrakech next week.

10. Hassan agreed that it was a good idea for us to keep in touch with moderate Algerians and did not seem excessively shocked at idea of possible sale of C-130's to them.

11. The King said that President Reagan had provided inspiration to free men everywhere and Secretary Haig had imparted a new sense of confidence in US foreign policy. He hoped that he could meet with both men some time this year.

12. The King appeared to be in good health, although somewhat more grave and concerned than on other occasions when I had seen him. While we spoke he took a very small pill and placed it on his tongue. He spoke of economic and food problems Morocco would face later this year as a result of the greatest drought of this century. He expressed great gratitude to the President and Secretary for answering his concerns by sending an old friend to see him.

Sebastian

⁶ On March 18, Mauritanian radio accused the Moroccan Government of sponsoring an attempted coup by two exiled colonels. See footnote 2, Document 3.

191. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, March 24, 1981

Dear Al,

(S) As you know, the USG has engaged in an effort to obtain or enhance access to several key air facilities in countries along the Atlantic route to Southwest Asia.

(S) Facilities in Morocco, with some improvements, could satisfy a significant portion of these requirements, and overcome some of our present enroute difficulties. They would also be useful in certain African contingencies.

(S) We are aware of the concern that King Hassan might use such a proposal to seek a “quid” from the United States, but recent U.S. actions have provided Morocco much of the materiel it sought (i.e., approval last summer of the \$248 million aircraft sale, the beginning of OV–10 deliveries in late January and the sale of M60 tanks). Moreover, your willingness to meet with King Hassan’s emissaries during the first few days of this Administration² and the visit of a major U.S. naval vessel to Agadir have put us in a good position vis-a-vis the Moroccans.

(S) To be sure, King Hassan is unlikely to change his position on the Western Sahara, and we will give him an opportunity to raise that issue in access negotiations. This is a real problem, but we cannot hope to provide adequate logistic support to U.S. forces engaged in a conflict in the Persian Gulf area without sufficient enroute facilities. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that discussions be initiated with the Government of Morocco as soon as feasible.

Sincerely,

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret.

² See Document 187.

192. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, May 9, 1981

Dear Cap:

I am writing in response to your letter concerning en route access in Morocco.² I agree that the time is ripe to approach Morocco on this matter. Our recent decisions to be more forthcoming on arms sales to Morocco and to delink them from Moroccan participation in the Saharan peace process should improve the reception we will receive.³

We will raise the issue immediately with King Hassan and propose that a small State/DOD team make a low key survey of airfields in Morocco so that we could consider a more precise proposal to the Moroccans, possibly including improvements to selected facilities. We would make it clear from the outset that we were not seeking base rights but only access to facilities, and that we envision only a small peacetime presence.

Following the survey we may need a formal approach to Morocco. I suggest our staffs work together to define more precisely what we want from Morocco, what facility improvements we may be willing to fund, and what price we are willing to pay in terms of additional assistance. We would also need them to address what we say to Algeria and other area states.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.⁴

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-83-0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan-Jun). Secret.

² See Document 191.

³ See footnote 4, Document 372. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Documents 214-216, 219, 220, 222-224, 230, 232, 233, 235, 237, 242-248, and 250.

⁴ Haig signed "Al" above this typed signature.

193. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 11, 1981

Moroccan Foreign Minister's Visit. Foreign Minister Boucetta delivered a warm, friendly message to us from Morocco and King Hassan this afternoon.² We agreed that Libya was the major source of trouble in North and Central Africa. Boucetta did not criticize Algeria; instead, he suggested that there were moderate elements in the Algerian leadership, who should be encouraged. Boucetta believed that Morocco's position on the Western Sahara would gain additional African support at the upcoming Nairobi OAU Summit.³ He asked that we encourage such support. Boucetta expressed gratitude for our efforts to secure additional economic and food assistance. (Responding to a press query afterwards, he indicated Morocco may seek additional military aid in the future.) Finally, Boucetta shared our assessment of the dangers in Lebanon. He pledged Morocco's help for our efforts to stabilize the situation.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (05/09/1981–06/05/1981). Secret.

² A record of the Haig-Boucetta meeting is in telegram 128429 to Rabat, May 16. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (04/30/1981–06/09/1981))

³ The OAU Summit was held in Nairobi June 24–27. Boucetta and Bush discussed the Western Sahara issue on May 12. A record of that conversation is in telegram 139368 to Rabat, May 29. See Document 377.

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 12, 1981, 1130Z

4133. NODIS. For the President from Secretary Edwards. Dept for White House. Subject: Secretary Edwards' Visit: OAU: King Hassan's Message to the President.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Sensitive. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

1. S—Entire text.

2. In wide-ranging 80 minute conversation with me June 11, King Hassan II requested that the following message be relayed to President Reagan “discretely and securely”. Hassan said he plans to attend the Nairobi Summit of the Organization of African Unity O/A June 23 and he “hopes” that “now that we are in the last round” (in the Sahara) he will be able to bring about an end to the Saharan affair. King said he wants Egypt’s President Sadat to attend the meeting, “even if only for one day”. He explained that Arab/African delegations from Algiers, Tunisia (although Bourguiba would not attend), Libya, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti would be there creating an opportunity which King would like put to use. Hassan indicated that Sadat’s presence could help bring the Arabs closer together and—eventually—break the ice between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

3. Hassan asked that the President approach Sadat without in any way indicating that this was at the King’s urging. Sadat should be told that the King of Morocco planned to attend the OAU summit, that he would be the only leader of a non-rejectionist state there, and that some contact could be timely and helpful. The King asked that he be advised promptly and discretely of President Reagan’s reaction, and of Sadat’s response if an approach is made, via Charge Sebastian.

4. Comment: I strongly recommend that such an approach be made; while substance of my conversation with King will be communicated separately,² it is clear that King’s disposition to administration is highly favorable (King compared President Reagan with President Eisenhower, “men who inspire confidence”) and that King’s geopolitical thinking is insightful, alert to Soviet menace, and generally consistent with broad USG interests in Middle East, North Africa and Mediterranean.

5. Please advise soonest.

Sebastian

² A record of the Edwards-Hassan conversation is in telegram 4163 from Rabat, June 13. (Ibid.)

**195. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State¹**

243–AR

Washington, October 5, 1981

(U) MOROCCO: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

(C/NF) *Summary*

Economic difficulties and pressures for political liberalization portend severe trouble for the Moroccan regime. King Hassan has a variety of political assets, however, including wide acceptance of the legitimacy of the monarchy, his special relationship with the armed forces, disunity among the political parties, and his ability to manipulate his political rivals. Over the short term of 1 to 3 years, Hassan's chances to retain his throne are 70–90 percent.

In the longer term of 5 to 15 years, however, prospects for the regime's survival are less positive. Over time, the divided nature of the political elite, lack of national consensus on long-term political goals, and the growing gap between popular expectations and the regime's capacity to meet them will work against the Moroccan monarchy's survival.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, King Hassan, Morocco Meeting w/President, 10/27/81, 11:30 Luncheon at 12:00. Secret; NoFORN. Drafted by John Damis; approved by Myles Greene.

**196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President
Reagan¹**

Washington, October 7, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

2. *Moroccan Foreign Minister.* I gave Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta a strong message of encouragement this evening² to calm any nervousness which King Hassan may have in the wake of Sadat's

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (09/22/1981–10/08/1981). Confidential.

² No other record of the Haig-Boucetta conversation was found.

assassination.³ He believes that in the wake of Sadat's death moderate Muslim countries such as Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia need to stand closely together and Boucetta promised that Morocco will work for stability and moderation in the region.

Boucetta passed on a request from King Hassan to postpone his visit to Washington until after the Arab Summit which Hassan will host in November.⁴ The King believes that the burden of preparations for the Summit would be great and that the visit would be more profitable after his conclave with Arab leaders. I told Boucetta that we would work out a mutually convenient date for the King's visit. Boucetta also expressed appreciation for our support of Morocco on the Western Saharan issue. He said Morocco was now ready for a referendum of the Saharan population and was sure that it would win. He asked that we continue to support Morocco diplomatically in its efforts to solve the Saharan question; he was assured of our support. (C)

³ Sadat was assassinated by an Egyptian soldier on October 6, 1981. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

⁴ Not found.

197. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 13, 1981

SUBJECT

Serious Escalation in Weaponry in Morocco

Ambassador at Large Vernon Walters just called² to tell me that the Moroccan Ambassador had called him in a state of high agitation to report that a Moroccan Mirage I flying at 30,000 feet was downed by what was believed to be a SAM-6 missile, and that a C-130 at 19,000 feet was also shot down by the same missile.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret. Sent for Immediate information. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation above his initials reads: "The President has seen." Darman also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² No record of the Walters-Allen call was found. For additional information on the incident, see Documents 384 and 385.

The surviving pilots (no specific details available) indicate that the action took place near the Mauritanian border today. The pilots also reported the existence of tracked tanks with turrets in the region.

Ambassador Bengelloun of Morocco will visit the State Department tomorrow to give full details as he has them.³

In any event, King Hassan asked that this information be made available to us at the White House, which is what Dick Walters did.

We will ask the intelligence agencies to provide a report as soon as possible.

³ A record of Bengelloun's meeting with Veliotis, during which they discussed the incident, is in telegram 277038 to Rabat, October 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810490–0383)

198. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Nance) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 7, 1981

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger's Stop in Morocco

Secretary Weinberger has sent you the following report on his meeting with King Hassan of Morocco.

Begin Text:

For our refueling stop on my way to Turkey I chose Fez, Morocco, so that I could meet with King Hassan. I had an excellent ninety minute discussion with Hassan in which he put forward his strategic views and proposals for our security relationship. He is under the multiple threat of the Polisario attacks, economic difficulties and a drought at home, and Soviet efforts of subversion. He clearly wants a closer defense relationship with us.

In particular, he would like us to set up a joint military commission, and he reaffirmed his offer for air transit facilities. On the joint military

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box 16, C–379, Morocco. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A detailed record of the Weinberger-Hassan conversation is in telegram 9008 from Rabat, December 5. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (11/22/1981–12/22/1981))

commission, I told the King that I would recommend to you that we start such a forum, so as to provide a framework for our ongoing relations and to strengthen them. Hassan asked that our Ambassador Reed convey to him a description of such a joint military commission, prior to the visit of Al Haig, and that we get other materials on the subject to him that we agreed.

On air transit bases for us, King Hassan indicated the locations they prefer, which do not quite coincide with our preferred locations. However, the more important issue is the about \$150 million in congressionally approved funding that we would require to prepare the air facilities for our use. Air bases in Morocco could complement our bases in Spain or Portugal for refueling on the way to the Middle East. At a minimum, having the offer from Morocco may help us get a better deal in our ongoing negotiations with Spain and Portugal. [7½ lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

Hassan emphasized he would prefer to have a Moroccan-Spanish defense agreement if he granted us transit facilities. Perhaps he wants to protect the interests of his close friend, the King of Spain, in his base negotiation with us. I had the impression Hassan was telling us in effect that we should not assume that, if we cannot reach agreement with the Spanish on bases, we could automatically get what we need in Morocco.

Hassan discussed his plans for a follow-up to the recent Arab summit in Fez, which failed to produce any agreement. On a strictly confidential basis, he mentioned he intended to host another Arab summit next April—after the completion of Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. His hopes are that Egypt will join the Arab consensus.

Hassan also revealed his plans for negotiation with Algeria. He has some hopes that in a meeting a few weeks hence he can induce Algeria to cooperate with him by shifting Algerian support to the Polisario in exchange for economic cooperation, such as gas pipelines from Algerian fields to Moroccan ports.

At my departure, the King provided me a study for transmittal to you. This study, occasioned by the visit earlier this year of the Secretary of Energy,² was prepared by competent technicians and concerns means of assuring free movement of petroleum from the Arabian Gulf region.

The King remarked to me that his visit to the U.S., probably in January, should be a working visit. Hassan's aim is to get to know you well, including spending some time alone with you. We gave him a

²Not found.

rather historic McClellan cavalry saddle, and he said that, as a horseman of forty years' standing, he would like to go riding with you, and you would be the recipient of a special saddle designed and used by the King—you would get the second one.

End Text

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Marrakesh, February 11, 1982, 7:50–8:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Private Meeting at the Palace. Secretary Haig, King Hassan II. 7:50–8:45 p.m., February 11, 1982. Marrakech, Morocco.

During the preliminary part of the conversation, the King pointed out that there are many countries in Africa that want to be and remain free. Only the U.S. can guarantee and maintain that freedom because whenever the Russians go anywhere they do not give money, they do not give gold of which they have substantial reserves; they give equipment: bulldozers, tractors, and that is really a field where the U.S. is second to none. Rather than give to Somalia or Tanzania money which must be accounted for, the King suggested the U.S. give them some tractors, bulldozers and the mechanics. This will constitute a limited presence. This is a fact that the Russians understand very well.

The King began the substantial part of the meeting by expressing his great pleasure in receiving Secretary Haig at this particular point in time, which offers for Morocco, the U.S., and the world, a propitious set of circumstances.

The King: This, however, is an opportunity that must be grabbed immediately. From the Moroccan standpoint, the consequences of the Western Saharan problem is that the Moroccan people are asking for reliable friends and allies. From the domestic U.S. standpoint, you have a year and a half before you start thinking of the next election. Everything will then come to a halt.

The Secretary: You know us too well, Your Majesty.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 69, February 11, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Alec Toumayan on February 17. The meeting took place at the Royal Palace in Marrakesh. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "Very Close Hold" and circled the word "Morocco" in the subject line.

The King mentioned Europe and his perception of Morocco as part of Europe, Gibraltar being a purely geological accident and Morocco standing at the gateway of the Mediterranean. The King then looked at the map:

— SPAIN: It is the King's strong wish that in 1983 Philippe Gonzalez not repeat² not win the election. The Spanish military is very worried.

— FRANCE: Mitterrand is anti-communist to be sure, but he is a dangerous man. He had said to the King, "I want things after me never to be like they were before me." Mitterrand does not simply want to make changes in society, he wants to change the nature of society. In the FRG, we have a defeatist attitude. The German people were made for war just like the Japanese people, but they have been forbidden to make war. The King stated that the Secretary knew what the situation was in Italy.

The Secretary: Italy is in fact the strongest of the three with Germany and France and that shows you how bad things are.

The King: Then we have Yugoslavia, and Greece, who no longer want to be part of the West. And we have Turkey concerned about cultivating its poppies and producing heroin. To turn now to the Arab countries which ring the Mediterranean on the other side. Leaving Egypt aside, we have Libya. Tunisia is very small, then there is Algeria, and then there is us. The Mediterranean is like a chunk of Swiss cheese full of holes. We are more worried with European defeatism, which is more dangerous, than Soviet penetration in the Sahara because it is an intellectual attitude of defeatism. To whom can Morocco cling? Mauritania to the south of us offers a dangerous situation because there is a vacuum there but to the south of it are strong countries. Senegal is free and wants to remain free. Guinea, under Sekou Toure, made a 180° turn. Mohammed V has given his name to the current graduating school of Guinea students because in Sekou Toure's words, he was the first liberator of Africa and Guinea wants to be free. The Ivory Coast wants to be free, also. The U.S. doesn't have the right to practice political segregation. In the U.S. talk of the free world means Europe. Europe is not the free world by itself. For the U.S., which was the new world 200 years ago, today the new world is Africa. Tomorrow it will be Latin America which is opposite the African continent. Because Brazil is the world of the future, the Royal Moroccan staff must learn Portuguese. Brazil does not know its potential.

The Secretary agreed that Brazil was not prepared to take the effort to discover what its full potentialities were.

² An unknown hand crossed through the word "repeat."

The King stated very strongly that Morocco wants and is determined to have an alliance with the U.S., and that he hopes very much that the answer will be yes. He wants this for his country because his country must live on after him and Morocco stands at a very dangerous crossroads today.

The King recalled at length the role played by Morocco in stopping Turkish penetration thereby saving Europe from a Turkish pincer movement. The King had told the Pope that Muslim Morocco had saved western Christianity. The Pope is coming in October, not to say a Mass for 150,000 faithful, but to address a group of 150,000 young people because the King views the Pope as primarily an educator.

The King stressed that Morocco wants an alliance with the U.S. in a realistic and courageous frame of mind and without demeaning itself. It cannot do as much for the U.S. as the U.S. can give to Morocco, but it will give the U.S. what its history has taught it to give. The King would like to have the Secretary's reaction as well as President Reagan's reaction.

The Secretary: Over the years we have benefitted from Moroccan friendship and from the King's own friendship. We have just emerged from the Vietnam/Watergate nightmare. We are beginning to understand the changes in the world. I agree that the situation in Europe is very dangerous. Mitterrand is on his good behavior for the present but he is a revolutionary and in a year or two, there may be great difficulties with France. The FRG is in a difficult situation. I had long talks with Genscher in Madrid.³ The Bundestag endorsement of Schmidt is a charade. Schmidt barely survived. We can smell the death.

The King: Who comes after Schmidt?

The Secretary: Maybe Kohl who is not strong. Perhaps Genscher as a compromise candidate, who is good and strong and who will make sure that Schmidt is able to operate.

The Secretary described the domestic German political situation and then turned to Spain.

The Secretary: Philippe Gonzalez is strong but if he comes to power the Spanish military will move. If the present government sees the Socialists become the majority in the minority group, they will turn to Fraga and the ["Right."

The King: Fraga is a close personal friend, a good man, and our adviser on tourism.

³ Haig visited Madrid February 7–10 to discuss the status of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with NATO Foreign Ministers. Documentation on the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.

The Secretary: We welcome your close communication with the King of Spain. You know how they feel about Morocco.

The King: The Spanish Air Force Chief of Staff told Colonel Kabbaj that if forced to choose in strategic terms between defending the King of Spain and the King of Morocco, he would choose the latter.

The Secretary: The situation in Africa is extremely dangerous largely because of Qadhafi who destabilizes regimes with money and Soviet military equipment. The U.S. is concerned about the central African countries and Nigeria.

The King: Nigeria especially because Qadhafi was stopped in Chad by Nigeria.

The Secretary: France will not play in the future the role it played in the past in Africa. I go on pressuring them but they are not reliable. Fate may intervene. I get reports that President Mitterrand is gravely ill.

The King: I found his complexion very sallow. He keeps clutching his right arm. De Marenches has given me some confidential information as has my personal physician. The danger in medication is that it affects the decision making process as happened with the Shah of Iran and Boumediene. Mitterrand may die two or three years from now but will he be making rational decisions or will they be irrational?

The King commented on the marital difficulties of Mitterrand.

As an example of confused policies in France he said that at lunch Mitterrand told him, asking him to keep it a secret, that the Russian gas deal had been signed while he, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Trade were uninformed. Four days later, Cheysson, Prime Minister Mauroy, and Foreign Trade Minister Jobert said on French TV that they had not known of the signing of the agreement.

The Secretary commented on the change in Egypt. Mubarak has limited resources. If there is a surprise or a setback, he may panic. He is going to need help, stability, and counseling.

The King pointed out that Mubarak is a flyer, knows how to use a checklist, but is not brilliant like Sadat. Two weeks ago, his Chief of Intelligence came to Marrakech. No one saw him come or go. The King wishes to see Egypt come back into the *Family of Nations* on the occasion of the next Summit which will be held in May or June, for the sake of Egypt and also for the sake of the Saudis so that they are not alone confronting the extremists.

The Secretary expressed his concern about seeing the Saudis move too quickly. He felt a setback would make them lose their nerve. We needed them, but they needed constant reassurance.

The Secretary described U.S. pressure on Begin so that he will stay out of Lebanon, and the fear of the Sinai withdrawal becoming a

problem. The Secretary stated that we felt now that it would be returned and with luck we would prevent an Israeli attack against Lebanon. But the Soviets now understand there were opportunities for them in the Middle East. For the first time Gromyko, in Geneva,⁴ suggested carving out a benign state for Palestine. Begin was itching to go in and crush the PLO. He has six months of equipment, could defeat any combination of Arab states, and buy five or six years of security. That was the danger in the immediate sense.

The King mentioned the large Moroccan Jewish community in Israel; it is large and influential, 600,000 strong. He knew that Begin prayed daily that he would sooner die than return the Sinai.

The Secretary said that Secretary Weinberger had talked to him of his visit to Saudi Arabia.⁵ Two agreements had been signed—one on AWACS, and one on the Joint Commission. (The King had asked about those agreements.) The Secretary described the Saudis' reluctance to discuss anything publicly even in the face of new threats.

The King described the problems he has dealing with the Saudis: they have no sense of time. They never embrace their friends openly and directly, having yielded once to blackmail, they must now pay every time. The King knows for a fact that Saudi Arabia recently gave Syria \$9 billion. The King has asked for 200 million dollars for CBU's and 3 or 4 C130's but the Saudis tell him to wait.

The Secretary concluded that the Saudis are prompt to pay their enemies and not to support their friends. He knows that on Weinberger's agenda was strong pressure on the Saudis to help Morocco. The U.S. would keep up that pressure. The Secretary added he wanted to return to the King's original question. The King has been a stable friend, a strategic thinker, and an experienced leader of the region. How best to achieve a stronger and closer cooperation? Not by formal treaties requiring Congressional action. We can get the same outcome or closer cooperation, understanding, and coordinated work by other means. The Secretary had not discussed this in detail with the President, who looks forward to talking with the King about the dangers and the role of Morocco. The Secretary could assure that President Reagan was not Jimmy Carter. Changes had been made in the Department of State, too, so that dealing with Africa was more realistic. A brief discussion took place concerning Qadhafi.

⁴ Reference is to Haig's meetings with Gromyko in Geneva on January 26. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 137 and 138.

⁵ Documentation on Weinberger's visit to Saudi Arabia is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

The King then outlined the following approach concerning closer understanding with the U.S.: first, regarding the facilities the U.S. was asking for, these are granted. The King agreed that we (U.S.) will get Sidi Slimane, the one we prefer. In the second place, the King outlined a Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese mutual defense treaty which is a very natural arrangement that no one can object to. The Secretary agreed that this was a sound approach which Spain was willing to consider. The new Chief of Staff has been hand picked by the King of Spain. King Hassan said that General Aramburu had recently visited with him and agreed to that approach.

Mrs. Thatcher's strong personality was discussed by the King in very favorable terms, with the Secretary and the King exchanging anecdotes.

The Secretary concluded that he wants DOD to move quickly. The King has received many assurances but seen little action.

The King said: We trust you.

The King pointed out that the Polisario would retreat because of Moroccan military action and also because of the presence of the U.S. in Morocco; Gromyko would tell Chadli, "the more you do the more it brings the U.S. to Morocco." The entire Moroccan people were united, pointed out the King; the defense of Morocco comes first.

The Secretary pointed out that after eight hours with Gromyko he found him confronting great difficulties, which Gromyko did not know how to solve. The King responded that he saw the Polish situation as the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union.⁶

The Secretary observed that for the first time Gromyko was prepared to discuss an arrangement concerning Angola. The Secretary described the parallel withdrawals. Both agreed that in any future Angolan settlement, Savimbi must play a part. The King knew that the Saudis had been asked to give Savimbi \$5 million and had given \$500,000 to Savimbi. A brief discussion of the Clark Amendment took place.⁷

It was agreed that at dinner the discussion would be general, concerning Nairobi, the Bi-National Commission for Cultural Matters, and the Security Assistance Agreement. A private conversation would take place again after dinner.

⁶ Reference is to the recent crisis when, in December 1981, the Reagan administration warned the Soviet Union against invading Poland after Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Documents 116-118, 120-123.

⁷ Reference is to an amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976) (C.P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 729), sponsored by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), which prohibited aid to groups involved in military or paramilitary operations in Angola.

The King said that CBU deliveries would begin arriving in 48 hours. He needed a C130 and two or three helicopters. The Saudis were sitting on these requests.

A brief discussion took place on Syria and the present problems in the North. The King then introduced Professor Alaoui and requested the Secretary's support for a setting up of a cardio-vascular surgery department in the military hospital in Morocco. The Secretary agreed to support this request.

The meeting adjourned at 8:45 p.m.

200. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia (Waterman) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)¹

DDI-2113-82

Washington, March 15, 1982

SUBJECT

Intensification of Military Relationship with Morocco

1. An interagency meeting was held 5 March² under DOD/ISA auspices to prepare for an upcoming Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting scheduled for late April/early May. It is intended to intensify the bilateral relationship at that time, specifically in order to provide redundancy for those intermediate facilities required for projection of US forces into the Middle East proper. The JMC will deal with facilities, usage, training, joint exercises, and FMS credits.

2. DOD plans to program \$3 million from the Secretary's Contingency Fund for immediate use. This, combined with an anticipated reprogramming of \$20 million from Air Force funds for FY83, will serve to improve fuel storage tankage and related facilities at Sidi Slimane Airbase. The JCS is developing plans for an overall [\$] 100 million program over several years, which will focus on air facilities development at Sidi Slimane, Qunaitra, and Muhammad V airfield.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C-379, Morocco. Secret. Sent through the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

² No record of the meeting was found.

3. A Special Forces (SF) pre-deployment team has completed a report regarding training in this field. Its recommendations will be discussed at the JMC, and may result in a SF Military Training Team (MTT) arrangement in Morocco. An airforce training program is currently underway, and will probably entail the stationing of one US pilot in Morocco for a year, charged with developing their tactical capabilities.

4. Intelligence will not be discussed at the JMC. I affirmed that this aspect of the relationship is well in hand.

5. The upshot of the above from our parochial point of view is that the relationship between ourselves and the Moroccans will soon be both more intense and more visible because of its military aspect.

Charles E. Waterman

201. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, March 17, 1982

Dear Al:

(S) Thank you for your very helpful letter of February 22 with regard to future en route access to Moroccan facilities.² Considerable engineering work remains to be done before we can define the total military construction program at Sidi Slimane. Nevertheless, I feel that we should proceed with negotiations without delay. Specifically,

— We are prepared to pursue with the Moroccans an access agreement for both Sidi Slimane and Mohammed V. We are prepared to make up to \$3 million in DoD funds available in FY 82 to begin improvements to Sidi Slimane or Mohammed V. The Air Force will serve as executive agent for the improvement effort.

— We propose that a team be dispatched to Morocco as soon as possible to open negotiations for an access accord.

— We also propose that facilities access be an agenda item for the April JMC, so that our plans can be carefully explained to the Moroccans.³

— We should then strive to complete negotiations urgently, so that, as suggested in your letter, final agreement on access could be reached

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). Secret. Copies were sent to Jones and Clark.

² Not found.

³ See Document 203.

in May during Hassan's meeting with the President. (Formal signature and, if desired, announcement, could take place during the visit or soon after.)

(S) I believe that these actions, coupled with the expanded program of security assistance we plan to initiate in FY 83, will maintain the momentum generated by your discussions with King Hassan,⁴ and will be supportive of Defense interests. This course of action will also allow us more time for longer-term JCS basing plans to be completed, and will give us the benefit of the results of negotiations with other countries (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Egypt). It will also permit us to phase the improvements into our military construction planning while maintaining Congressional support and avoiding major reprogramming actions.

(U) I solicit your support and suggest that you designate someone on your staff to serve as point of contact with my Assistant Secretary Bing West to develop firm plans for implementation of this course of action.

Sincerely,

Cap

⁴ See Document 199.

202. Memorandum for the Record¹

DDI-3517/82

Washington, April 27, 1982

SUBJECT

Bing West Trip to Morocco [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. C/NE [*name not declassified*] and I represented CIA at a meeting convened on 23 April by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs West, in connection with his trip on 26 April to Rabat.² West will lead a delegation to the first session of the US-Moroccan Joint Military Commission. The meeting was intended to inform West on the current arrangement for [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the GOM

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C-379, Morocco. Secret. [*less than one line not declassified*]

² See Document 203.

and to coordinate a cable to Ambassador Reed on a related issue. Reed had recommended that the JMC framework be elaborated to include an intelligence panel. *[portion marking not declassified]*

2. ISA/Africa Chief Jim Woods opened by referring to Reed's cable received only a few days before,³ noting that in effect it responded to a DoD recommendation some months ago, which the ambassador had not commented on. DoD's reply, drafted for West's signature, urges that the questions of an intelligence panel be deferred until West could discuss it with COM, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and DATT. Other subjects on DoD's mind, Wilson continued, were the NDPC security survey of Morocco beginning 10 May and the king's visit to this country at mid month. *[portion marking not declassified]*

3. Wilson then reviewed DoD perceptions of current *objectives*: to establish a military-to-military intelligence relationship, successfully to complete the security survey and to provide tactical military intelligence training; and *problems*: the small number of Moroccans approved for receiving US intelligence and the GOM's slow dissemination of the data. He said the upgrading of Moroccan military capabilities requires an infusion of promptly and properly processed intelligence data. He concluded that on the Moroccan side a way had to be found to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, while on the US side it was necessary to sort out the responsibilities for providing strategic and tactical intelligence. *[portion marking not declassified]*

4. *[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]*

a) *[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]* *[portion marking not declassified]*

b) *[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]* *[portion marking not declassified]*

c) *[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]* *[portion marking not declassified]*

d) Order of battle data *[less than 1 line not declassified]* may be passed by *[less than 1 line not declassified]* to the Defense Attache for Moroccan military *[2 lines not declassified]*. The USDAO is the pegpoint for Moroccan military request for military training. *[portion marking not declassified]*

e) Country team members will keep each other informed on their intelligence disclosure activity. *[portion marking not declassified]*

5. *[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]* *[portion marking not declassified]*

6. West *[less than 1 line not declassified]* left the room briefly and during this time Wilson said that DoD intends to raise with King

³ In telegram 3129 from Rabat, April 22, Reed transmitted his desire for West's "thoughts on discussing intelligence matters" during the upcoming JMC. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820212-0876)

Hassan, during his visit to Washington, the question of access and dissemination within the GOM. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] who will accompany West on the trip to Rabat said that one thought that had occurred to him is that the king might not want the tactical intelligence communicated rapidly to line units, because the Polisario threat serves his domestic political purposes. Wilson reiterated that this would have to be discussed with the king. He added that DoD staffers want to obtain SecDef's account of the breakfast meeting discussion of subject. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. When West returned to the room, [*name not declassified*] having departed for another meeting, the cable to Reed was discussed. It told the ambassador that West would discuss the intelligence panel concept with US officials on arrival and provided a status report on the security survey. West asked me if the contents raised any questions [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. I noted a reference to the survey facilitating the establishment of a military intelligence exchange arrangement and asked for confirmation that any such program would be the subject of separate review and determination. The DoD officers assured me that any such arrangement would be the subject of separate policy coordination. With that understanding, I said, the cable did not appear to contain any contentious issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. Finally, Wilson told West that while the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] analyst accompanying him was prepared to brief intelligence substance, he was not equipped to discuss intelligence relations. If the latter subject was to be raised with mission officers, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] or another officer from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] also should go. West said he would give it further thought. [*1 line not declassified*] [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. [*name not declassified*] attended this meeting as did: Lt. Col Mark Powe, USA, who recently represented DA/ACSI in talks with the Moroccans on army training; Dernell Whit of West's office; and [*name not declassified*] Chairman of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, which sponsors the security surveys. [*2 lines not declassified*] [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 28, 1982, 1600Z

3288. From the Ambassador. Dept please pass DCI; SecDef; Secretary Baldrige; Assistant Secretary West (DOD/ISA); and Lieutenant General Williams (DIA). Subj: King's Meeting With Assistant Secretary West and Ambassador Reed Following Conclusion of Joint Military Commission Sessions.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Following the conclusion of the Joint Military Commission meetings,² Assistant Secretary West and I met with King Hassan for 90 minutes. Foreign Minister Boucetta, General Dlimi and Col. Maj. Kabbaj attended as did Deputy Chief of Mission Sebastian (translator). The following are my verbatim notes on the King's remarks. Where internal quotes are shown, they emphasize phrases to which, by gesture or expression, the King gave special emphasis.

3. The King seemed very pleased with the results of the initial meeting of the Joint Military Commission which he personally hosted in Fez. He stated that "Morocco will now have to live with counter-measures from the Soviet and Eastern bloc as a result of our decision to undertake this commission. The Soviets used to buy 250,000 tons of oranges and now 'with difficulty' they purchase 58,000. There will be other measures taken against us and I must be very careful. I don't like playing this game of ping pong. Frankly, I don't have that much room to maneuver.³ What preoccupies me is that the Soviets could put pressure on certain African and non-aligned countries. They could put enough pressure on me to make it very hot, and that is why I want the United States to support Morocco. The socialist world will exercise pressure on us."

4. "The reasons that I have approved Morocco joining forces with the United States for a Joint Military Commission are that I believe that the Western world is in a state of immobilization and that the Soviets have made major progress in the last few years. The West is threatened. What I am reaching for with the United States is a spirit of cooperation.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Moroccan Hassan (05/18/1982–05/21/1982). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the NSC Message Center.

² Telegram 3210 from Rabat, April 27, contains a record of the JMC's April 26 opening plenary. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820217–1046)

³ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence.

Certain developments in the world have pushed⁴ me to make my decision—Afghanistan (N.B., King emphasized with strong body language his view that the Soviets were ‘digging in’), Poland, Central America. It is in this context of the shifts of balance of power that I will visit Washington next month. You will recall that when Secretary Weinberger visited me in Fez⁵ I predicted that Spain would enter NATO and that with that event Morocco would be only 15 miles away from the nuclear mushroom. You will recall that I talked to Secretary Weinberger about an (Morocco) alliance with Spain and a regional alliance (Morocco-Spain-Portugal). I invited Secretary Haig and I developed the same thesis with him, but I went even further. I asked General Haig (rhetorically) why Morocco would enter into defense agreement with Spain and not NATO.⁶ I suggested that perhaps the United States could supply Morocco with weapons through a military arrangement with NATO. I am concerned for my people and offspring. When the next century comes, I want to have Morocco be as it is today, with freedom and sovereignty. I told General Haig that if there were certain requirements Morocco would not hesitate to join NATO and that my only stipulation was that the ‘N’ be dropped from the ‘NATO’ as I do not believe that the security of the free world rests with the North Atlantic. I have been on this throne for more than two decades; I can recall when Africa was calm because France and Great Britain had great colonies. Then came independence for many nations and with that independence the Soviets have found fertile ground and have put their foot into Africa from one end to the other. The Soviets have created a vast navy and they are looking for territory far beyond their own land and seas. I believe we must protect our nations from Canada to the South Atlantic and from Norway to South Africa. That is why I don’t like the ‘N’ for NATO. I am also concerned for your NATO alliance surviving, as you now have a Europe that is both divided and occupied by socialists. I will certainly talk to President Reagan about this when I see him. I like to dream but take note that I believe that important political acts are made of dreams. At the time of General Haig’s visit he and I talked about a closer military relationship with Morocco and Spain. He promised to send me Walters, who is well known to both Juan Carlos and myself, but I understand a death in the family prevented him from participating. I saw Juan Carlos at length, and we had a long evening together one on one. We then saw the Spanish Foreign Minister the next

⁴ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin highlighting the portion that begins “The reasons that I have approved Morocco” and ending with “Certain developments in the world have pushed.”

⁵ See Document 198.

⁶ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this sentence that reads: “Morocco would enter into a defense agreement with Spain and not NATO.”

day and spoke of a common defense pact. Both Juan Carlos and his Foreign Minister were interested. The Spanish Foreign Minister visited Morocco, and told him I planned to take up this proposal of a military alliance with President Reagan and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. As I don't like to build castles in the sky, I asked the Spanish Foreign Minister for a letter. When I saw that Foreign Minister at a ceremony at El-Jadida, where we signed a major fisheries agreement, I found him 'hesitant on what to put to paper.' I then offered to write him a draft of what his letter might contain, and we now expect this letter in early May. Please note that the Spanish Army—ground, air and sea—is 1,000 percent with us on this proposal. Military and economic cooperation must go hand in hand. These are the pieces of the puzzle in my growing relationship as a result of the visits by you, Mr. West, and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. I am very anxious to have General Walters come to Morocco before I go to Washington to send him to discuss this possible alliance with Spain. 'It is of the greatest importance.'"

5. JMC:

"I want to see the points that we have agreed on in 'document form' with annexes. I want the documents signed by our respective Ambassadors and perhaps further understandings by my Minister and your Secretary. I don't want it to seem that this is piecework; I want to have a sequence."

6. Access and Transit:

"I would like to have a small technical team come to Morocco, and we can work on the details prior to my visit, but the principle remains a formal 'yes.' Though I would like to keep my military understandings with you confidential, I would hope that the Kremlin, Tripoli, Berlin and Algiers would not sleep a week for fear of what I may be doing."⁷

7. Secretary West raised the question that there was "a French concern" over American involvement with Morocco on the JMC and the possibility of "access and transit." King Hassan replied: "France has been split into two. When I spoke with Mitterrand on my recent visit to France, and I saw him two times on formal occasions, we did not speak about U.S.-Moroccan relationships. In addition, he came to my house for lunch and we talked privately and frankly for 90 minutes. There was no mention of this issue. Recently Guedira was asked by the Elysee to come to a meeting at our Embassy in Paris and we were told that Mitterrand will go to Algeria to look deeply into Chadli's eyes and ask him if he does or does not want a referendum. I asked Mitterrand to come to Morocco, and we have set a date in October. We were also given a message from Mitterrand for me which stated that the President had feelings of deep friendship and esteem for me, and he only wished

⁷ See Document 199.

they could be shared. Why does he say that? For a variety of reasons, but principally because of the weight that Morocco has in the Middle East and in the African continent. The other half of France is represented by Jacques Chirac, who came to Morocco where we had a good meeting. Chirac endorsed my desire for a strong, independent Morocco and thought that Morocco was quite correct in searching for an alliance with America. How can you explain this curious situation? The socialists do not speak to me of America and Morocco, but the other half of France encourages me to join forces with America."

8. Secretary West inquired as to how the King viewed Qadhafi. The King replied: "If the U.S. could help me in a certain plan, Qadhafi could be in trouble. Egypt must come back to the Arab world as soon as possible. I know Egypt, and they will respect their engagements. I have sent a message to Mubarak, and I will send Boucetta in a few days to Cairo. There are 20,000 Egyptian soldiers in Iraq . . . what a strange honeymoon! I suggest the U.S. speak to Kuwait in strong terms. Each time that we reach an agreement, they break it up. I am sympathetic with their being one million people with 600,000 Palestinians, but . . . when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance,⁸ they are going to eat Kuwait. The U.S., and Great Britain, whose influence is still considerable, could give Kuwait a real push. It would be good for Kuwait. You should keep Qadhafi busy. How? You could arrange to have the OAU Summit take place somewhere else. That would be something! There will be a Non-Aligned Summit in September, and I will go there and plan to let the group hear some 'home truths.' As a co-founder of this organization four months after my accession to the throne, I am eager to do it. At the time of the founding I was with people like Nasser, Tito, and Nkrumah. I will use this occasion in the fall to attack Qadhafi like a ton of bricks. Qadhafi must be isolated for the good of the world. I have been on this throne for 21 years, and I put my entire experience on the scales. [2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

9. The King concluded the audience with a special request to me to undertake a mission to Washington to nail down all aspects of the forthcoming "working visit." "Reed, this is the turning point in history. General Dlimi and others will be following you to settle the program."

10. Ambassador's comment: Please note that I had two private audiences during the JMC with the King to discuss certain aspects of the official and private sections of the trip to the United States. The King is eagerly looking forward to the trip and considers it a milestone. In addition to his meeting and afternoon with the President,

⁸ An unknown hand wrote two vertical lines in the right-hand margin highlighting the portion that begins "Egypt must come back to the Arab world as soon as possible" and ending with "when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance."

he is looking forward to separate meetings with Vice President Bush, Secretaries Weinberger, Haig, and Baldrige, and Casey.⁹ He also has accepted Senator Percy's offer to speak before a joint meeting of the Foreign Relations and Armed Forces Committees and plans to make a foreign policy statement before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He confirmed desire to accept outstanding invitations from former President Nixon, David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and confirmed he will proceed to Chicago. Note: Boucetta confirmed that the King would spend two days in Canada following his visit to the US. My sense from talking to numerous members of the court in preparatory stages for the JMC as well as at the actual meetings is that everyone repeat everyone at all levels within the power structure has great expectations for this forthcoming visit of King Hassan II to Washington. End comment.

Reed

⁹ An unknown hand wrote a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion that reads: "The King is eagerly looking forward to the trip and considers it a milestone. In addition to his meeting and afternoon with the President, he is looking forward to separate meetings with Vice President Bush, Secretaries Weinberger, Haig, and Baldrige, and Casey."

204. Note From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 17, 1982

Dear Bill,

I am sending you personally this copy of "Prospects for Morocco," an Intelligence Community production which focuses on King Hassan and his regime. Although published the morning of Monday, 17 May, I wish to ensure it reaches you prior to the King's upcoming visit. I believe the study projects a particularly balanced view of internal and regional issues at stake for us in Morocco.

William J. Casey²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). No classification marking.

² Casey signed "Bill" above this typed signature.

Enclosure**Interagency Intelligence Memorandum³**

NI IIM 82–10004

Washington, May 1982

PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO

[Omitted here are a Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

In the coming year, King Hassan II is likely to maintain firm control of Morocco's political system. Hassan probably will continue to use his proven techniques of divide-and-rule, manipulation, and co-option of political parties to regulate the activities of the opposition. His domestic security apparatus will keep a close eye on dissident activity and we expect the armed forces will remain loyal. The military and security service will obey orders to suppress sporadic civil disturbances. Neither Morocco's established political parties and labor unions, which prefer to operate within the system, nor fringe opposition groups pose a serious threat to the monarchy in the short run.⁴

Over the next several years, however, Morocco will face a number of extremely difficult socioeconomic and political problems as well as the seemingly interminable conflict in Western Sahara that cumulatively could pose a serious threat to domestic stability and King Hassan's survival. Many of these problems—rapidly growing population, rising expectations, inflation, and international debt—are common to most developing states. Although Morocco's economy has considerable potential for growth, for the next several years it faces the prospect of—at best—slow growth, austerity, and a declining standard of living.

Over the long term, the strains and pressures in Moroccan society portend serious difficulty for the King, the monarchy as an institution, and Morocco's political system, which is heavily based on patronage.⁵ We question whether this system and Morocco's limited resources will enable Rabat to cope with its serious problems. If, as seems probable, the present system fails to satisfy rising popular aspirations, societal pressures probably will generate demands for major political change.

³ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Issued by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers for Near East Asia and South Asia, Central Intelligence Agency. Prepared by and coordinated with the CIA, DIA, INR, Treasury, and the Intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Information as of May 11 was used in its preparation.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "Morocco" and ending with "which."

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "Over the long term" and ending with "an institution."

It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be before serious instability develops. The situation is not irretrievable, but Hassan will have to demonstrate astute managerial skills to deal with existing economic and social problems.

In international affairs, Western Sahara will remain the primary focus of Moroccan attention. The threats Morocco perceives from Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union also will absorb Moroccan attention. In pursuit of Moroccan interests, King Hassan will continue to adopt foreign policies that often parallel or coincide with US interests.

Neither a military nor a political solution to the Western Sahara quagmire is in the offing.⁶ The economic burden of the war will remain bearable for Morocco so long as Saudi Arabia continues to provide financial assistance to cover the bulk of the war's costs. The Moroccan armed forces should be able to resist Polisario attacks but will not be able to defeat the guerrilla forces so long as they have sanctuary in Algeria and external sources of military assistance. For their part, the Polisario will not be able to take control of the Sahara by military means. Barring greater flexibility by all parties and in the absence of minimal mutual confidence, the wide divergence of views leaves little hope for a negotiated settlement. None of the parties would support a referendum that did not appear to ensure an outcome favorable to its interests.

Parallel interests have contributed to a recent effort by both the United States and Morocco to intensify their close relations. The accelerated pace of cooperation, however, risks serious regional and bilateral misunderstandings. In the short run, and especially among elements of the Moroccan military, the prospect of augmented US help could lead to unrealistic expectations regarding the extent of US support and strengthen the conviction that military victory in the Sahara is attainable. Interest in a negotiated, settlement consequently could be set back.⁷ Regionally, Portugal and Spain might misperceive US intentions and assume lessened US interest in established bases in Iberia.

In the longer run, unmet expectations could produce a reaction in Morocco dangerous both to US interests and to those of the King. An impression that the United States had made promises to Morocco it could not keep, or that the King had proved inept in his dealings with the United States, might harm close US-Moroccan relations and undermine military and popular confidence in Hassan.

A close US-Moroccan relationship—especially one involving increased military aid and the granting of air transit facilities—will complicate efforts to improve US-Algerian relations. Algerian leaders consider US military aid to Morocco evidence that the United States supports a Moroccan military solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

⁶ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁷ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

They also are concerned that US-provided equipment may ultimately be used against Algeria. Although Algeria's leaders are more interested than in the past in reaching an accommodation with Morocco, they will not abandon the Polisario and will continue to view the developing US-Moroccan relationship with suspicion.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

205. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 19, 1982, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Alexander M. Haig, Secretary of State
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Morocco
Nicholas Veliotis, Assistant Secretary, State Department

King Hassan II
Ambassador Ali Bengelloun
His Excellency Ahmed Reda Guedira, Counselor to the King
His Excellency M'Hamed Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs

A focus of the Oval Office discussion was on *peace* in the Middle East, with special reference to the Camp David negotiations and the King's peace initiative to settle the Western Sahara War. The President told the King that despite differences between Morocco and the United States on the Camp David peace process, we hope to find some common ground. The President received the King's views on the Palestinian issue and on the Iraq-Iran War. In this respect, prospects for peace in the Gulf were discussed in detail.

Regarding the Western Saharan peace process, the President was pleased to acknowledge Morocco's continued adherence to the King's peace initiative for a cease-fire and referendum presented to the Organization of African Unity.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Moroccan Hassan (05/18/1982–05/21/1982). Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

² See footnote 2, Document 400.

The President and the King had lunch in the State Dining Room from 12:15 to 1:30 p.m. A focus of the luncheon discussion was on *security* in the Middle East. In this respect, the President and King talked about their common perceptions of threats to the area and the need for increased strategic cooperation between the two countries. Considerable time was spent on the Persian Gulf in general and on Iran in particular. The King surmised that Iran would not end the war until President Saddam Hussein of Iraq is replaced. The following participated in the luncheon:

United States	The President
	The Vice President
	Secretary Haig
	Secretary Baldrige
	Edwin Meese, III
	William P. Clark
	Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed, Jr.
	Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters
	Assistant Secretary Nicholas A. Veliotis
	Raymond Tanter, NSC
Morocco	King Hassan II
	His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Abdallah, King's brother
	His Excellency M'Hamed Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	General Moulay Hafid El Alaoui, Chief of Royal Protocol
	Ambassador Ali Bengelloun
	His Excellency Taieb Bencheikh, Minister in charge of Economic Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister
	General Ahmed Dlimi, Director of the King's Aides de Camp
	His Excellency Reda Guedira, Counselor to the King
	Colonel Major Mohamed Kabbaj, Inspector, Royal Moroccan Air Force
	His Excellency Abdelfattah Frej, Director of His Majesty's Private Secretariat

206. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 26, 1982

SUBJECT

DCI Meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco

1. On 20 May 1982, from 1740 to 1850 hours, the DCI met with King Hassan of Morocco at Blair House. General Ahmad Dlimi, Ambassador Reed and the undersigned were also present. The principal topics discussed were as follows:

- a. *[1 line not declassified]*
- b. The impending OAU Summit and Qadhafi's chairmanship.
- c. The Saharan conflict.
- d. Efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war.
- e. *[1½ lines not declassified]*
- f. Soviet activities in Morocco.
- g. *[1 line not declassified]*

2. *[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]*

3. The DCI asked for the King's opinion as to a strategy for handling the upcoming OAU Summit, noting that the Egyptians have the idea of holding a pre-summit which would be a continuation of the aborted Addis Ababa Foreign Ministers Conference which resulted in the seating of the Polisario. Without responding specifically on the Egyptian idea, the King said that immediately following his visit to Washington, he would send his Foreign Minister Mohammad Boucetta officially to Cairo. *[3½ lines not declassified]* It is imperative that Morocco have on its side the vital one-third of the OAU membership in order to block a quorum. Three or four more countries are needed and the U.S. could be helpful by using its influence on Nigeria and Kenya. The King said it was inconceivable to think of Qadhafi as head of the OAU for the upcoming year. *[2 lines not declassified]* If this comes about, he observed, it should be easier for a concerted action to be developed against Qadhafi's chairmanship.

4. Turning to the Sahara problem, King Hassan *[8 lines not declassified]* said that the only way to get out of the Sahara "process" was to apply the decisions of the Nairobi summit, that is, a cease fire and referendum. The King promised to keep the DCI informed *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C-379, Morocco. Secret. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

5. Referring in turn to Algeria, [3½ lines not declassified] in the framework of the Islamic conference (IC). Hassan dismissed this idea, saying that as far as the IC is concerned, there already is a mediation sub-committee at work under the chairmanship of Sekou Toure, and it has been unsuccessful so far. As for Algeria, [2 lines not declassified]. He argued that no one has any real influence over Iran. He had proposed to Secretary of State Haig ("the sharpest Secretary of State I have seen") that the U.S. sponsor a cease-fire initiative in the UN Security Council. It would be difficult for anyone to pose a veto, as one cannot stand against a cease-fire and peace. [5 lines not declassified] The King said he was hopeful that the U.S. would make a move on 21 May for a cease-fire in the UN. [8½ lines not declassified]

6. [1 paragraph (20½ lines) not declassified]

7. [1 paragraph (15½ lines) not declassified]

8. [1 paragraph (17½ lines) not declassified]

9. The King is worried about Soviet actions against Morocco in the economic sphere, in reaction against Morocco's rapprochement with the U.S. He cited two recent Soviets actions in this regard. First, the Soviets have reduced their purchase of Moroccan oranges from 250,000 tons to 50,000 tons this year. Second, they have stopped buying Moroccan wine. The King found a recent editorial in the communist paper *Al Bayane* to be instructive. The paper welcomed the King's visit to the U.S. but added pointedly that the rapprochement should not be at the expense of the Morocco's other ties.

10. [1 paragraph (14½ lines) not declassified]

[name not declassified]
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

**207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)¹**

Washington, May 29, 1982

SUBJECT

Morocco, En Route Access Agreement

The Agreement which the Secretary signed yesterday is substantially the same as the draft which we forwarded to you last week.² The final text of the exchange of notes and annex is at Tab 1.³

The Agreement provides for rent-free access to Moroccan airfields in emergencies and for training. It is a six year agreement that will only expire if one party abrogates it with two years notice, after it has been in effect for four years.

The King of Morocco wrote the President concerning the agreement. His letter, which Foreign Minister Boucetta handed to the Secretary yesterday, is at Tab 2.⁴ The purpose of the letter is to allow King Hassan [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that he has a [*2 lines not declassified*]. We interpret the phrase [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in the King's letter to be a vague enough formulation to permit Hassan to define [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as the circumstances demand, but it certainly will include the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with which Hassan identifies. Hassan made a point of telling the Secretary that it would not, for example, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

[*1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified*]

We are considering whether the King's letter requires a response and will make a recommendation to you next week.⁵

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents: Not for the System Documents 1979–1989, Evening Reading 1980–1989, Personal Sensitive 1979–1989: Lot 92D630, Not for the System—May 1982. Secret. Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum read: "White House Situation Room" and "82 May 31."

² Not found.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ No recommendation was found.

208. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, July 10, 1982

SUBJECT

U.S.-Moroccan En Route Access Agreement

King Hassan of Morocco sent a letter to the President² describing his willingness to provide facilities to U.S. forces in Morocco and defining circumstances under which those facilities should not be used. The Departments of State and Defense find the King's formulation of these circumstances to be acceptable and believe therefore that no response to the King's letter is necessary.

The key phrase in the King's formulation is that the facilities [*1 line not declassified*]³—as for instance [*6 lines not declassified*]. We are well aware of the types of circumstances which would, [*2 lines not declassified*]. There is nevertheless sufficient ambiguity in the King's formulation to accommodate necessary U.S. use.

Since a reply to the letter is not demanded by the terms of the letter itself, we believe that our interests are best served by leaving the degree of ambiguity in the King's letter rather than either clarify or confirm it with a formal response.

In accordance with the Case Act,³ the Department of State will notify Congress of the agreement and will explain the letter.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "White House Situation Room."

² See Document 207.

³ Reference is to the Reporting International Agreements to Congress Act of 1972, also known as the Case-Zablocki Act, statute 1 U.S.C. 112b(a), which requires the Secretary of State to transmit the text of any international executive agreement to Congress, other than a treaty, within 60 days of the agreement's entry into force.

209. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 26, 1982

SUBJECT

Letter to Moroccan King Hassan

At Tab A² for your signature is a letter to King Hassan of Morocco in light of his recent letter at Tab B.³

King Hassan describes your discussion with him at the White House during May as fruitful and candid.

The King states that as a result of common values and interests, Morocco granted the U.S. use of its facilities in the event of Middle East military contingencies that may require U.S. forces. The King also defines circumstances under which use of the facilities may not be granted. A purpose of the King's letter is to allow him to tell his Arab friends that he has a "secret agreement" with you that the United States will not use the Moroccan bases to support Israel in attacks on Arab states. The Agreement, however, does not contain any such restrictions on American usage of Moroccan facilities, and you have not entered into any secret agreement with the King.

State and Defense believe that the King's formulation is acceptable yet conclude that no response to the King's letter is necessary.

I concur that the King's interpretation is acceptable but believe that you should send a letter to the King without mentioning his letter nor addressing in detail substantive issues concerning facilities access.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108). Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Tanter. A copy was sent to Bush. At the top of the memorandum a stamped notation reads: "The President has seen." Another stamped notation reads: "Signed." Darman also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Tab A was not attached. The letter reads in part: "Your Majesty, your visit to the White House will always be remembered as one of the highlights of my presidency. One outcome of the visit of great import is the agreement between our two countries for the use of Moroccan facilities. I especially appreciate your personal efforts that led to the successful conclusion of the agreement." It is available in telegram 206628 to Rabat, July 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820385–0867)

³ Tab B, letter from Hassan to Reagan, was not attached. See footnote 3, Document 207.

⁴ Reagan checked and initialed the "Approve" option.

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, September 20, 1982, 0925Z

7084. Department pass the White House for the President and Judge Clark. Dept also pass to DOD for the Secretary and pass to CIA for the Director. Subj: Message to the President From His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The evening of September 19, King Hassan II and Royal Counselor Reda Guedira spoke with Ambassador Reed and General Vernon Walters by phone to inform them that a letter would be arriving from King Hassan to be transmitted to President Reagan. At eleven p.m. Foreign Minister Boucetta and Interior Minister Basri both came to the Ambassador's residence to deliver the letter; a translation from the French follows below.

3. Begin informal Embassy translation:

Quote:

His Excellency Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Message (continued):

Mister President and great friend,

I know perfectly how you feel, as a father and as a world leader responsible for peace and war, about what has happened in Lebanon,² and it is for this reason that I am abstaining from any comment.

However, I am unable to hide from you that what has happened in Lebanon involves the responsibility of the United States, in the following way. The Palestinians who could die, weapons in hand, defending their unarmed wives, children, and parents who remained behind, have however left their families, trusting in your government, even if this was not stipulated in the agreements signed between the parties to the conflict. In a word, they had confidence in you and I think, as I know you, that your moral anguish is unbearable. You have been deceived by those who call themselves your allies. We are all looking to your for redress.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnote 6, Document 28.

The U.S.A. must, morally and politically, absolve itself of the wrong inflicted upon it, by every means, including a military presence in Lebanon, a credible presence for the defense of the weak and the disarmed. What is happening in Lebanon has nothing to do with war. It is quite ruthlessly and simply a slaughter and in the scriptures it is written: "Thou shalt not kill".

Mister President and great friend,

These are the painful moments that every statesman must go through in his career. You will do so, I am convinced, with courage, determination and wisdom. Your friend who writes these lines is close to you and prays to God that he direct you on the right path, that of justice and equity.

Please be assured, Mister President, and great friend, of my sincere friendship and my very great consideration.

Royal Palace at Ifrane

September 19, 1982

Hassan II

King of Morocco

End quote.

Reed

211. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, September 22, 1982

Your Majesty:

I deeply appreciated your letter of September 19 on the tragic events which took place in Lebanon this past week.² I share with you feelings of outrage and revulsion over the murders of innocent Palestinian civilians. There can be no justification for this heinous crime which has only deepened the suffering in Lebanon and made more difficult the goal of achieving national reconciliation, an imperative objective shared by all men of good will.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108). No classification marking.

² See Document 210.

As I told the American people on September 20,³ we must and will act with all friends of Lebanon to bring to an end this nightmare of suffering. To this end, we have once again agreed with our French and Italian allies to constitute a multinational force and dispatch it urgently to Beirut. If all goes well, this force will arrive in Lebanon within the next few days. It will have as its task assisting the Government of Lebanon to assume full responsibility over its capital, an essential precondition for extending its control over the entire country. It is only by beginning this process that we can stop the cycle of violence which has swept Lebanon for the past seven years and move forward the search for peace and a solution to the plight of the Palestinians.

I am convinced the Lebanese people deeply yearn for peace and a restoration of stability in their troubled country. Given the opportunity and proper conditions, I believe they will bend every effort to return to constitutional government. This has been most lately evidenced by the election September 21 of Amin Gemayal as President of Lebanon. An absolute precondition for the return of normality to Lebanon, however, is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that troubled land. I can assure you, Your Majesty, that my government will spare no effort towards this end.

It is essential in the period ahead that the friends of Lebanon work together towards our common objectives. We must all bring our influence to bear in constructive ways to restore stability in Lebanon and create the conditions which allow the process of national reconciliation to go forward. I am sure that Your Majesty will do everything possible in achieving this goal. As always, I value highly your views and wise counsel.

Please be assured, Your Majesty, of my friendship and high esteem.
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

³ Reference is to Reagan's September 20 address regarding the new Multinational Force in Lebanon. For the text of the address, see *Public Papers: Reagan 1982*, Book II, pp. 1187–1189. Documentation on the MNF is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Lebanon, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984.

212. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA 83–10042

Washington, February 1983

MOROCCO: ISLAM AND POLITICS*[portion marking not declassified]*

Islamic consciousness has increased in Morocco since the Iranian revolution in 1979. But this revivalist sentiment has not seriously challenged the dominant political-religious system—which is already conservative in practice—nor have there been broad demands for radical reform. In the near term, King Hassan should be able to control Islamic extremism. *[portion marking not declassified]*

A small number of militant fundamentalist groups have formed in the past several years, primarily in the major cities where the stress of modernization and recent economic hardships have been felt most acutely. Some extremists seek to wipe the slate clean and establish a “true” Islamic state through violence. Revivalist sentiment seems to have a certain attraction for the country’s many young people, and it is possible that they will gravitate in greater numbers toward Islamic extremism should they become significantly dissatisfied with the government’s handling of key domestic and foreign policies. Closer US-Moroccan ties, initially well received in Morocco, may eventually become the focus of attack from fundamentalists who strongly oppose Western influence. *[portion marking not declassified]*

The traditions of Morocco and particularly the religious nature of the monarchy will continue to be bulwarks against Islamic extremists. King Hassan’s dual role as religious and secular leader of the country gives Islam and the King preeminence in Moroccan life, making it difficult to challenge the King without seeming to attack Islam itself. Moreover, the tradition of tolerance found in Moroccan Islam, which allows for a wide variety of religious practice within the faith, makes it difficult for extremists to find a rallying cry with widespread appeal. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Morocco’s traditional religious establishment is closely associated with the monarchy, gives strong support to King Hassan, and is not likely in the foreseeable future to challenge the government. Moroccan religious leaders (ulama) have strong ties to the palace and are often employed in government institutions, which has enabled the King to co-opt and control them. More importantly, Hassan consults the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (02/22/1983–03/10/1983). Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. Prepared in the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis and coordinated with the National Intelligence Council. Information as of February 14 was used in its preparation.

ulama frequently and visibly, allowing religious leaders a voice in matters of policy. This has kept the religious establishment content and has enabled the King to present himself to the public as an observant Muslim. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Hassan has also used his considerable political skills to keep religious critics off balance. The King, apparently trying to draw Muslim fundamentalists out rather than driving them into clandestine organizations, has thus far elected to deal less harshly with them than with secular critics on the left. To counter religious militancy, the government is encouraging a revival of some of the traditional Muslim brotherhoods and has established government-sponsored religious groups to provide controlled outlets for increased religiosity. The government's ability to co-opt the fundamentalists greatly reduces the potential threat posed by radical Muslim elements. [*portion marking not declassified*]

It is questionable, however, whether King Hassan's designated successor, 19-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed, has the political astuteness of his father that would allow him to manage religious detractors or other opponents with much deftness. Should heightened religious sentiments persist in Morocco through a succession from Hassan to his son, a variety of exploitable issues might develop which would play into the hands of extremists. Moreover, the King, like the late President Sadat, could fall victim to a religious fanatic. On balance, however, a serious challenge from religious extremists does not appear likely in the foreseeable future. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco and the United Kingdom¹

Washington, March 9, 1983, 0524Z

63951. Exdis, Eyes Only Amb Reed/DCM, London Amb. Walters only. Subject: Possible Reprogramming of Moroccan FMS: Letter to King Hassan.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: It now appears we shall have to reprogram most of Morocco's FY83 FMS allocation for El Salvador, pending restoration via a supplemental.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830129-0306. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Velities, John Wolf (T), Hill, Charles Gillespie (ARA), and McFarlane; approved by Eagleburger.

3. We expect NSC tomorrow to take decision to reprogram \$60 million for El Salvador.² If so, money (\$55 million) will have to be taken from Moroccan FMS allocation. When this occurs matter will become public.

4. To deal with this situation we are “pre-positioning” (see para 5) a Presidential message to King Hassan. Ambassador Reed should deliver that message to the King when, and only when, Department instructs after decision is taken. Talking points for the Ambassador’s use on presenting the President’s message are in para 6. We shall ask General Walters to come to Rabat as soon as he can following reprogramming decision to reinforce with King Hassan the expression of the President’s continuing interest in Morocco. Given time constraints you should not rpt not await General Walters’ arrival to deliver letter.³

5. Begin text of Presidential letter:

Your Majesty: I was most grateful for your account of the recent meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid.⁴ I hope that it will mark the beginning of a new era in intra-Maghrebi relations for which, I know, you have long worked. I also hope that it will enable Morocco and the other parties to achieve progress towards a solution of the Saharan problem along the lines of Your Majesty’s Nairobi offers and the OAU Implementation Committee’s recommendations. You have the strong support of the U.S. as you proceed with this important and constructive effort for peace.

Allow me now, Majesty, to turn to another problem. Our discussions have revealed wide agreement between us on the importance of stemming the forces of the left. These forces, strongly supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, are today engaged in an effort to destroy the foundation upon which a stable and democratic government can be established in El Salvador. This is yet another arena in which the Soviet Union and its proxies are threatening freedom and independence.

Recent months had seen positive developments in El Salvador culminating in the scheduling of elections next December. Cuba and the Soviet Union have responded to these developments with stepped up military support for Salvadorean guerrillas. Government forces are fighting to contain this onslaught and repel it but are in urgent need of additional American assistance. They now must meet ammunition and other battle field needs. This turn of events has compelled me to allocate additional financial resources to the support of the Salvadorean Government, pending congressional action on a separate request for funds. We have taken these monies from the Moroccan program but I wish to assure you that I will do my utmost to restore them at the earliest possible time.

² No record of the NSC decision has been found.

³ See Document 214.

⁴ See Document 406.

I know Your Majesty will understand the circumstances which have compelled me to take this step. I have asked Ambassador Vernon Walters to come to discuss the details with you, confident that Your Majesty will know these measures in no way reflect any lessening of American interest in Morocco, its region, and of my high esteem for you and your many contributions to our joint endeavors. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

6. Begin text of talking points:

As the President wrote you, we are at a crucial point in El Salvador's struggle to resist communist aggression and to move toward free, democratic elections. A great deal hinges on our ability to help this friend resist the forces that would destroy it.

— El Salvador has immediate needs for ammunition and the training necessary to keep the initiative with its forces on the ground.

— The appropriations passed last December cut worldwide FMS levels by over 20 percent. In allocating resources, we have had to cut back on most of our key programs around the world.

— The President proposes now to reallocate to El Salvador \$52 million of the \$75 million in FMS guaranties provided to Morocco in the continuing resolution. This will leave \$25 million of MAP—the first grant military assistance ever—and \$23 million of FMS guaranties of which \$20 million is already committed to loans—in the aggregate \$18 million more than the \$30 million in FY82 FMS.

— At the same time, the President is amending the current FMS supplemental before Congress to provide a means to restore reprogrammed funds to Morocco before the end of the current U.S. fiscal year. End text.

Shultz

214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 11, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

2. *Reprogramming of Moroccan Funding for El Salvador.* Ambassador Reed and Dick Walters briefed King Hassan today on your decision on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading January–March 1983. Secret.

reprogramming for El Salvador which compelled us to take the money out of the Moroccan allocation. Walters told the King we would do our best to replenish these funds later in this fiscal year and that this decision in no way represented a lessening of our commitment to Morocco.² Although the news came as a shock, Hassan said he knew you as a friend of Morocco who would not have taken this step had it not been necessary. The King noted that “it is when you are in trouble that your friends have to help” and said he was confident you would do your best to replenish these funds. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

² In telegram 2031 from Rabat, March 11, Walters reported that he had informed Hassan and Guedira that the administration was cutting FMS to Morocco and other “African and Asiatic countries” due to “the emergency need to find substantial sums for El Salvador which was fighting for its life against communist aggression.” Walters assured Hassan that “this action in no way represented a lessening of our commitment and interest in Morocco.” (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (02/22/1983–03/10/1983)) Documentation on U.S. support for the El Salvadoran Government against leftist guerrillas is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XIV, Central America, 1981–1984.

215. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Reed) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Rabat, April 22, 1983

Mr. Secretary:

I want to call your attention to a growing problem in our relationship with Morocco that I believe must be dealt quickly. Morocco is going through the most severe economic crisis since its Independence; senior civil and military officials are becoming increasingly bitter at the pressure they are under from the United States Government and the possible Brooke Amendment sanctions to repay their arrearages on foreign military sales.² The money is not there—imports are now under

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (04/01/1983–05/03/1983). No classification marking. An attached handwritten note from Reed to Teicher reads: “HJT—We are heading for BIG trouble. And for *chips*! I’ve done my best but I now need help before we wake up to ask ‘*how* did this happen?’ All the best. JWR.”

² Reference is to Section 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), which prohibits the distribution of any new foreign assistance to any country that fails more than one year past due in servicing its debt obligations to the United States.

strict control, government budgets are being slashed, and the Saudis are not coming through with anticipated financing. In FY 1983 Morocco will have to pay the United States more than \$45 million for loans due and \$18 million to avoid application of the Brooke Amendment. In FY 1983 Morocco is scheduled to receive \$25 million in FMS grants and \$23 million in FMS loans, a *net* to Morocco \$3 million.

The reason for the bitterness is not that we are rich and they are poor. They rightly believe that Morocco has done more than its share to support U.S. strategic interests. Morocco has sought political friendship with the United States of America—The King has chosen sides! Hassan II signed an Access and Transit Agreement,³ in effect for President Reagan, which was strongly criticized by his close Advisors as a “giveaway”. Morocco is engaged with the United States in a series of major joint military exercises that are clearly in the interests of U.S. military commands. U.S. Nuclear powered vessels are welcomed in all Moroccan ports and received with great honor. As we drain their meager resources at this painful period senior officials feel they are being “used” by the U.S.A. *Morocco knows that the United States is taking more out of Morocco than we are putting in.*

We must take a very hard look at converting a major part of our Foreign Military Sales program to grants. The rationale is Morocco’s support for U.S. military security, the importance to us of having a strong Moroccan military as a stabilizing force in North Africa and its availability for emergencies elsewhere. Most important at this critical time, is the role King Hassan is playing and will be able to play in the Mid-East peace process, both as a Chief of State and as Chairman of the Arab League. Morocco is a strong and useful friend of the United States. This is not the time to squeeze Morocco!

Just a few weeks ago the Administration needed funds for El Salvador and took \$52 million from Morocco’s 1983 FMS loans of \$75 million.⁴ I strongly advocate that we restore the \$52 million to Morocco in the form of grants. For fiscal year 1984 and onward we should look at a) rescheduling their debt and b) a much higher ratio of grants to credits in security assistance.

What I am arguing for costs very little in relation to its contribution to U.S. national security and political interests. It is inconceivable to me that two F-15s (which cost in the range of what we are seeking) provide more security for the United States than a strong strategic partnership with Morocco. It is entirely within our power to maintain and build that partnership. President Nixon, who knows Morocco well, told me “it would cost us peanuts!”

³ See Document 207.

⁴ See Document 214.

As a former banker I've never been known to be the type of person who panics, but this situation in Morocco causes me very grave concern. Recent events have convinced me that it is imperative that a group be set up to resolve the arrearages problem in time for the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Military Committee meetings to be held in Washington, May 11–12.

J

216. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 17, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Morocco Joint Military Commission (JMC) (U)

(C) We have just completed the second annual U.S.-Morocco JMC. Although the meeting took place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and candor, it was nevertheless under the cloud of Morocco's very serious economic problems. As you recall, we took \$52M of FMSCR away from Morocco as part of our reprogramming of \$60M for El Salvador and, at this point, the Moroccans are within a few days of missing a \$10.3M repayment on older loans, which will require us by law to invoke the Brooke Amendment.² The Moroccans reminded us loud and clear of the commitment made by the President in his letter to King Hassan to do our utmost to restore the \$52M.³ The message was strong: they expect us to deliver on the President's promise and are asking our help in any way we can to assist them with their current arrearage problem, particularly as they are facing the paradoxical situation where their repayments virtually match our security assistance allocation.

(C) The Moroccans have contributed significantly to the stability of the Africa/Middle East region, and they have not been reluctant to support our objectives with troops, if necessary. I believe it is in our

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (05/04/1983–07/31/1983). Confidential. Weinberger wrote: "Bill" above Clark's typed name in the addressee line.

² See footnote 2, Document 215.

³ See Document 213.

interest to continue to support Morocco, and we should do our utmost to assist this strong ally through this difficult period.⁴

Cap

⁴ In a May 24 memorandum to Weinberger, Clark replied: "I agree with your assessment of the importance of assisting this strong ally. We need to do our utmost to restore the \$52 million of FMSCR taken from Morocco as a part of the reprogramming of \$60 million to El Salvador." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (05/04/1983–07/31/1983))

217. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

US-Moroccan Joint Military Commission (JMC) (U)

(U) In response to your tasking memorandum, of May 24 (TAB A),² an interagency review (IG), chaired by Assistant Secretary Armitage, was held on June 10.³ See TAB B for the list of attendees.

(C) The consensus of the representatives is as follows:

— The reported GOM payment of \$10.3M eases the immediate crisis, as it delays Brooke Amendment sanctions until at least September, when payments totaling \$10.9M (plus late charges) are due to avoid Brooke Amendment sanctions.⁴

— In the spirit of the Presidential commitment to King Hassan,⁵ and given Morocco's responsiveness to US policies, as well as its strategic importance, it is incumbent upon the Administration to step up efforts to restore to Morocco the \$52M diverted for El Salvador.

— It appears reasonably certain that Congress will appropriate \$22M for Morocco in the FY 83 supplemental bill. In regard to the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (04/27/1983–05/03/1983). Secret. Tabs B and C are attached but not printed. Printed from an unsigned and uninitialed copy.

² Tab A is attached but not printed. See footnote 4, Document 216.

³ No minutes of the IG meeting have been found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 215.

⁵ See Document 213.

remaining \$30M, however, we need to wait until we have a clearer view of the extent Congress will satisfy the Administration's requests for El Salvador.

— Should we fail in restoring the \$52M FMSCR, due to Congressional or other actions, we would look for alternative ways of satisfying Morocco's requirements. Such action might take the form of lesser sums of ESF.

(C) Although not within the purview of the IG, the group took advantage of the assembled expertise to briefly and informally discuss Morocco's needs for FY's 84–85 and the out years. An OSD position paper on this subject, intended for consideration by the State Department in the normal budgetary process, is at TAB C.

(C) It was agreed that, although the immediate problem has been somewhat mitigated by Morocco's payment, it will continue to require high-level attention, given that no relief to Morocco's dire financial condition is in sight for the foreseeable future.

218. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 15, 1983

SUBJECT

DCI and DDCI Meeting with Secretary of State, 15 July 1983

1. The following topics were discussed:

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

— *Morocco: Relations with the US.* The DCI cited the King of Morocco's need for moral support in dealing with the IMF and regarding the reprogram to El Salvador of \$52 million originally slated for Morocco.² Eagleburger said that they had some measures they could undertake to fix the situation. The DDCI suggested that the Secretary visit Morocco to assure him of continued US support. Shultz said he was not eager to travel, but said that he is going to Algeria in September. The DDCI said that if he were to visit Algeria it would be imperative that he visit Morocco first. Shultz said he would visit Spain at the end of this month. The DCI said that he suggests that it would just be a hop

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Box 11, Mtgs w/Sec of State (Memos for the Record), Apr '81–Dec '85. Secret. [less than 1 line not declassified].

² See Document 214.

over to Morocco and that he ought to do it. The Secretary seemed to be persuaded.

Action: Per the DDCI's request, I notified the DDI/NESA, DDI/CPAS, and DDI/EURA, as well as DDO/NESA and DDO/EUR to be sure to provide the Secretary with appropriate intelligence support.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

[name not declassified]

219. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State¹

659-AR

Washington, August 1, 1983

(S/NF) MOROCCO: POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE REGIME

(S/NF/NC/OC) *Summary*

Morocco currently is beset by numerous internal difficulties that pose potential threats to King Hassan's regime. Above all, a number of serious economic problems have brought the kingdom to the brink of financial crisis. Bad harvests caused by recurrent droughts, declining phosphate revenues, and a sharp cutback in generous financial assistance from Saudi Arabia have combined to produce large current account deficits. Morocco's poor short-term financial situation undercuts the government's ability to obtain new credits. The economic burdens add to other societal problems, including a growing population of unemployed young people with little hope for a secure future. On the political front, the country's many parties generally are disgruntled over the regime's manipulation of this year's elections.

Despite these difficulties, the regime has assets working in its favor, including the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, the national consensus over the Sahara issue, the political parties' stake in the present system, and Hassan's ability to control the political process. The military appears to be loyal, apolitical, and content with the current conduct of the Sahara war. Even if events go badly for the regime, it can and will resort to its effective apparatus of repression, which will maintain it in power at least in the short term.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (08/01/1983-12/31/1983). Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. No drafting information appears on the report.

The King's expedients in coping with short-term problems will damage long-term stability, however. The monarchy's prospects for survival are weak because the King is not creating institutions to keep the country on an even keel after he dies. The divisions within the political elite stymie the political process in Morocco. In addition, the regime may face the challenge of a strong Islamic fundamentalist movement in the 1990s. Finally, Morocco's limited economic potential will undermine the regime's ability to stave off an extended confrontation with the movement of social forces against it.

220. Message From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey¹

Rabat, undated

SUBJECT

Msg for DCI

1. DDCI requests following be passed to DCI as quickly as possible:
2. During 15 November meeting with King Hassan II,² DDCI raised question of probable Arab world/Middle Eastern response to an American retaliation for the Beirut bombing³ of the MAU headquarters. [*5¼ lines not declassified*]
3. [*1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified*]
4. The King listed benefits of an "appropriate response" as
 - A. Elevating the prestige of the US.
 - B. Weakening the Syrians who are a negative influence throughout the region, and

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 85M000364R: Box 14, C-379, Morocco. Secret. Attached to a November 15 typewritten note from Casey to McFarlane which reads "Dear Bud, I think the President will be interested in this message from King Hassan." Reagan initialed the top of the message. Above the subject line Casey wrote "King Hassan (Morocco) thoughts on striking back in Lebanon."

² A record of McMahon's meeting with Hassan is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco, 12/13/1983–02/03/1984.

³ Reference is to the October 23 bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks and French Army barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Marines and 58 French servicemen. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984.

C. "Improving the balance" in the Iran/Iraq war by weakening the Syrians and Iranians, both of whom are enemies of Iraq.

5. [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

6. Ambassador Reed, who also attended audience [less than 1 line not declassified] is preparing a similar message to the President.⁴ [less than 1 line not declassified]

End of message

⁴ Reed's message to Reagan is in telegram 9409 from Rabat, November 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830011-0302)

221. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Rabat, December 11, 1983, 2331Z

Secto 15075. NSC for Bud McFarlane. Dept for C. Hill. Subject: Memorandum for the President—Visit to Morocco; Discussion With King Hassan.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. King Hassan of Morocco received me today with his usual warmth, candor, and interesting advice. He was much more subtle and understanding than the Tunisians had been about our relations with Israel.² He said he accepted with full confidence my explanation that our military cooperation with Israel was directed against the Soviets, not the Arabs, and that we had strongly reaffirmed to Shamir our intention to maintain close relations with our Arab friends and our determination to proceed with your September 1 peace proposal.

3. Hassan said he knew the U.S. needed an ally against the Soviets in the Middle East. He said, however, we could be the victim of a torrent of criticism at the coming January summit of Islamic countries³ unless we did two things. First, we should explain carefully our policies towards Israel. Second, we should divert attention from Lebanon and isolate Syria by creating new motion in the peace process.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² For a record of Shultz's conversation with Bourguiba, see Document 311.

³ The Fourth Summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference was scheduled to be held in Casablanca January 16-19, 1984.

4. He developed this latter concept in some detail. He had recently heard from Arafat that the PLO would undertake in writing to support negotiations with Israel by a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation in accordance with your September 1 proposal provided the USG agreed to Palestinian self-determination. (Hassan had made this same proposal some eight months ago and we dodged it because it required unacceptable changes in your proposals. I therefore reacted cautiously.)

5. Hassan went on to say that we should deal with the Syrian problem by creating a new focus of Middle Eastern attention on the peace process. Syria would find itself isolated and no longer in a position "to say yes or no on behalf of all Arabs." He was pleased when I said I would report these views to you.

6. I told Hassan we thought this was time for us to strengthen our relations with Iraq and asked him for his advice and support. Hassan urged that we resume full diplomatic relations with Iraq, and volunteered to get word to the Iraqis that the U.S. was prepared to take this step. I accepted his offer and urged him to encourage the Iraqis to respond. Hassan also reaffirmed his intention to bring about the return of Egypt to the Islamic Conference, thus beginning to establish a better moderate counterweight to Syria.

7. We also took up several specific bilateral matters. I asked if he could expedite negotiations of a new VOA agreement and he agreed. He asked for help with the too rigorous economic conditions being imposed on him by the IMF and I agreed. Saying that he preferred our discussion to focus on global issues, he asked if he could send to Washington a "commission," perhaps headed by his new Prime Minister, to discuss the details of our economic and military assistance and get some private investment problems straightened out. I replied we would welcome such a group and start inter-agency preparations immediately. Finally he spoke about his Western Sahara problem. He asked, not that we support his right to the area, but that we get out word that he was acting in good faith to hold a referendum which, he explained, he was certain would verify his claim. I replied we would not hesitate to say that we supported him on his commitment to the OAU referendum.

8. All in all, we had a good exchange on Middle Eastern issues and on how we can help each other in a number of specific areas. It is clear that Hassan is looking for more economic and military help from us. My conversation with him confirmed that our relations with Morocco are worth our investment in them.⁴

Shultz

⁴ A complete record of the Shultz-Hassan conversation is in telegram 10269 from Rabat, December 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830736–0509)

222. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Schneider) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 24, 1984

SUBJECT

Additional Assistance for Morocco

We agree with NEA that more assistance to Morocco would be useful.² We do not believe NEA has made a sufficient case for \$40 million as compared with the \$20 million we propose. The fact is that the FY 1983 level was artificially high because of the Congressional earmark on military assistance. Had the funds not been earmarked, the FY 1983 levels would have been \$40–50 million lower to meet unmet, and higher priority needs elsewhere, e.g., in Pakistan.

The add-on we propose is substantial. It is multiples above the \$5 million we allocated to Tunisia last week—in the face of very similar circumstances. To go higher now for Morocco will also have FY 1985 implications, since we would again face a perceived requirement to sustain Morocco's upward aid trend. In the global framework, this privileged status for Morocco does not seem warranted.

If you believe we must provide additional funds to Morocco, there are essentially two options.

1) *Cut Zimbabwe ESF by \$10 million and reduce the unallocated FMS pool by \$10 million.* To cut Zimbabwe further now would vitiate the impact of our action last month. You decided then to make the cuts and allow that action to speak for itself. It is too early to say how the message was received, but there is little doubt that a further cut would be read as a U.S. decision to write off Zimbabwe. There would also be Congressional costs. While the FMS was officially described as unallocated, we had notionally earmarked the entire sum for Lebanon. The pol-mil team that visited Lebanon last week indicated we would draw on the pool to pay for the tanks and artillery that the LAF now seeks. While we will in all likelihood seek a supplemental, we need all of the pool money as bridge financing.

2) *Shift \$20 million ESF from Turkey to Morocco in FY 1985*—We have proposed \$175 million ESF for Turkey in FY 1985, an amount we may not be able to allocate when we actually see what we are getting from

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/21/1984–01/24/1984). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Covey initialed the memorandum in the top right corner and wrote: "1/24."

² NEA's recommendations are in an undated action memorandum from Murphy to Shultz sent through Eagleburger and Schneider. (Ibid.)

Congress. Nevertheless, the Turks already are miffed that we are not seeking a supplemental for the \$36.5 million ESF shortfall in FY 1984. They are inevitably aware informally of the FY 1985 numbers and likely would see any cut now as a political signal on Cyprus. It may be that we choose to shift money next year, but this is a decision whose cost we cannot measure now. DOD (and EUR) would strongly object, and you likely would have to face off Weinberger on the decision.

Recommendation

A) That you agree to our proposal to allocate an additional \$20 million in PL–480, D.A., and/or ESF to Morocco for FY 1984.³

B) In addition, if you agree with NEA that an additional \$20 million is necessary above the amount we recommend:⁴

That you agree to cut Zimbabwe by \$10 million and shift \$10 million in FMS to Morocco from the funds identified for additional Lebanon requirements.

Alternately that you agree to shift \$20 million in FY 1985 ESF from Turkey to Morocco.

³ Shultz initialed the “Agree” line of this recommendation.

⁴ Shultz did not indicate agreement or disagreement with either of the following recommendations.

223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 1, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

4. *Morocco: Official Visit of the Prime Minister.* Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and I met late this afternoon to summarize the results of his visit.² We have signed a major agreement, for expansion of the existing Voice of America broadcast facility, and initialed another, a bilateral investment treaty. We have found additional funds for FY 84 PL–480 and have restored some FMS credits. I believe we have been successful in reassuring the Moroccans of our commitment to develop assistance programs in FY 85 and FY 86 which take Morocco’s great needs into account. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading January–March 1984. Secret.

² A record of the Shultz-Karim-Lamrani conversation is in telegram 61214 to Rabat, March 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840137–0085)

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and France¹

Washington, March 3, 1984, 0441Z

63328. Rabat pass Amb Walters Paris for Cheshes. Subject: The President's Meeting With Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The President received Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani at the White House on March 1, 1984 at 1:30 p.m. Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, National Security Advisor McFarlane and Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed were with the President. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Ambassador Ali Bengelloun.

The President opened with a warm greeting to the Prime Minister. He asked the Prime Minister to send his warmest regards to King Hassan II. The President said that the U.S. is grateful for the King's help with such matters as landing rights and with his work for peace. The President looked forward to having the benefits of King Hassan's continuing assistance for his administration and for the country.

Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani thanked the President for receiving him. He said that King Hassan had asked him to come to Washington. Karim-Lamrani said King Hassan had told him that he was giving him (Lamrani) two gifts: First to meet one of the great men of our time; then to carry out a mission for cooperation and peace. Karim-Lamrani said that the King had been right. The Prime Minister wished to transmit his government's and his people's warmest feelings of friendship and affection for the President and the United States. He said that King Hassan nourishes towards the President and the United States more than friendship—true affection. The Prime Minister said he had been given three tasks: First, he had come as a messenger from his Chief of State to hand the President a message (in both English and Arabic) describing the purpose of his mission to deepen and enlarge the economic and military cooperation between the two countries. He and his delegation had been asked to come to the United States to make sure the administration understands the great economic difficulties in which Morocco now finds itself. Morocco's problems are many but they are all exacerbated by what is now ten years of drought. Water is lacking not only for agriculture but for human consumption as well. Morocco needs help to meet its current difficult situation. The Prime Minister said that with American support and assistance for the critical period of the next two years Morocco would see its way clear to handle its other problems. "We count on you Mr. President."

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840141-0670. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Karen Clark (S), Murphy, Schneider, McKinley, and Thomas Randall (S/S-O); approved by Kimmitt.

Karim-Lamrani closed by apologizing for having to be so outspoken. He said that the Moroccan people feel true friendship for the U.S. and explained that because Moroccans feel themselves to be true friends they feel able to ask for additional assistance in such pressing terms.

The President responded that he reciprocates King Hassan's feelings both for himself and in behalf of the American people.

He said he knew the Prime Minister had been discussing his country's problems and that he (the President) was aware of them. The President said he knew that the constraints under which we are laboring in trying to be of assistance, has been explained. He indicated the US wants to do all it can; that we will do our best.

Karim-Lamrani then said that his second message concerned a resolution voted unanimously by the recently concluded OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) summit which had convened at Casablanca last month. King Hassan is transmitting this message in his capacity as the current OIC summit Chairman. The conference had discussed the U.S. position on UNESCO² and the King's transmission of the resolution which had been voted by it. King Hassan hoped that it might be taken into consideration. The Prime Minister said that King Hassan feels that the greatest country in the world, respected by all, must be able to continue to make its contribution. He hoped, the Prime Minister concluded, that the President's decision would be taken in the interests not only of the U.S. but of the entire free world. The President said he would read the message with interest and would respond.

The Secretary of State then said that, with respect to UNESCO, the President had made his reasons for concern very clear. We would have to withdraw by the end of this year if the situation which generates our concern has not been corrected by then. It is not that the U.S. does not support UNESCO. It is, rather, that it believes the organization has strayed virtually 180 degrees from its course. We are working with others, said Secretary Shultz, to see whether this situation can be corrected and the problems it poses for us can be resolved. Should we fail, we feel we would have no place in the organization.

The President then said he would respond to this message as well.

Prime Minister Karim Lamrani, speaking personally, then told the President that everyone in Morocco is following the American Presidential election campaign with extreme interest. "People want to see you remain for many years at the head of the U.S." Karim Lamrani said that this was not only the sense of his King and of the Moroccan Government but also expressed the sentiments of large numbers of Moroccans who believe that the President's personality is a guarantee

² Documentation on the administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO is in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XL, Global Issues I.

for peace and for a better future. The feeling is not only widespread, the Premier said but it's spontaneous and sincere. The President vowed to do his best to remain in office a few more years. Karim Lamrani, closing, said "when you are re-elected all of Morocco will celebrate your victory."

Shultz

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 6, 1984, 1309Z

5063. Dept. Pass SecDef, CINCUSNAVEUR London UK, CINC-USAREUR Heidelberg GE, CINCUSAFE Ramstein AB GE, USDOCO South Naples IT, USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE—to be treated as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary Weinberger's Meeting With King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 4683 (Notal).²

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: During discussions May 17–18 with King Hassan in Fez, Secretary Weinberger reviewed a broad range of bilateral military assistance and related issues, and had the opportunity to discuss a variety of regional security matters. King Hassan talked at length about recent developments in Morocco's relations with Libya and Algeria. He asked for U.S. support for a Moroccan-Portuguese mutual defense treaty. Discussion of bilateral matters focused on U.S. military and economic assistance to Morocco, and the need for an increased percentage of grant aid over the next few years. The Secretary expressed support for increased levels of assistance in FY 85 and FY 86, and for a more favorable mix of grant aid vs. loans. End summary.

3. Secretary Weinberger met with King Hassan late May 17 and early May 18 in two separate sessions, preceding and following dinner hosted by the King in the Secretary's honor at the Royal Palace in Fez. King Hassan was joined by Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and Royal Counselor Reda Guedira; Secretary Weinberger was accompanied by

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840365–1039. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and USUN.

² Telegram 4683 from Rabat, May 24, contains a record of the May 17 discussion between Weinberger and Karim-Lamrani. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840339–0122)

Ambassador Reed, ASD/ISA Armitage and interpreter Alec Toumayan. The pre-dinner private meeting lasted 25 minutes, with an additional private meeting of 30 minutes following dinner.

4. Secretary Weinberger opened the conversation by noting that the third Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting, which had begun the same day in Rabat, was going well, and that its results would no doubt be a further step forward in U.S.-Moroccan relations.³ King Hassan agreed, and said that he understood the meaning of the Secretary's simultaneous visit to Morocco, and appreciated the broader political understanding which it represents. In this context, The King commented that he had received a Libyan delegation led by Colonel (Hafiz) Mas'ud that same morning. The Libyans had asked Hassan about the reason for the Secretary's visit, which the King explained. Hassan said that the Libyans had left reassured and "fully understanding" the reasons for the Secretary's visit. Turning to the mission of the Libyan delegation, the King explained that they had come because the Libyans felt that Morocco might have been involved in last week's "coup attempt" in Tripoli.⁴ Some of those arrested carried Moroccan passports. "I told the Libyans that those were passports issued before July, 1983." (Comment: The current rapprochement between Libya and Morocco dates from July, 1983, when Qadhafi visited the King in Rabat.⁵ End comment.)

5. The Secretary noted that the U.S. remains concerned about Libyan activities around the world, and that during the recent crisis at the Libyan People's Bureau in London,⁶ the Libyans had made threats against U.S. diplomats there and elsewhere. The U.S., he stressed, continues to watch the situation carefully. The Secretary then referred to his last meeting with Hassan,⁷ when the King had expressed a desire to cut off Libyan arms shipments to the Polisario, and asked Hassan whether Qadhafi had in fact stopped all arms shipments into the Sahara. Hassan said that arms shipments from the Libyans had come to a complete stop. He then reported that Prime Minister Thatcher had asked him to act as intermediary during the London crisis and that, as a result, Hassan had talked with Col. Mas'ud (who he referred to as commander of Libyan forces during Qadhafi's first incursion into Chad). Libya had later given assurances to the British about the safety of British citizens remaining in Libya, in which, Hassan suggested, Prime Minister Thatcher could be confident. Commenting on the Libyan economy,

³ A record of the discussions at the JMC is in telegram 4647 from Rabat, May 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840335-0601)

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ See Document 22.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 41.

⁷ See Document 221.

The King said that U.S. measures had been successful: "Qadhafi has no liquidity, no dollars. He has had to barter for everything with oil." The King urged the U.S. to keep the pressure on. The Secretary asked whether reports of internal opposition in Libya could be considered reliable, to which the King replied that the situation appeared very serious. Commenting on recent developments, he said that the commando unit involved not only had infiltrated across the Tunisian border, but had also succeeded in seizing a building opposite the barracks where Qadhafi resides. The plan was revealed, however, when a driver who picked up three hitchhikers noticed they had sand on their boots. The driver informed the local police, who arrested the three. They were carrying a full list of accomplices in Libya, which the police then rounded up. Hassan commented that the Libyans consider the event as a warning. There will be other similar attacks in the future, they believe.

6. The Secretary congratulated the King on the successful conclusion of the recent Congress of Moroccan Jewish communities held in Rabat. The King said that it was now up to Israel and, in particular, Jews in the U.S. to "help and understand us." In this regard, the King noted that Congressman Stephen Solarz, who had participated in the Rabat meeting, had seemed to reverse his position on Morocco, and had promised to lobby for Morocco with Democrats in Congress. The Secretary commented that Solarz is a key figure in Congress.

7. Turning to the Secretary's meeting with Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani earlier the same day (reftel) the Secretary said that the meeting had been very useful. The U.S., he said, would endeavor to secure more military and economic assistance for Morocco. In an aside, the Secretary commented that Congressman Solarz would be very useful in this regard. The Secretary then delivered President Reagan's letter of May 14 to the King,⁸ [3 lines not declassified]. The King recounted an anecdote from Moroccan Air Force Inspector Colonel-Major Kabbaj, dating from a visit to the USS *Saratoga* during a joint exercise, when a U.S. Officer had told Kabbaj that the conflict in the Western Sahara marked the first time a regular army had defeated a guerrilla force. The officer claimed that the U.S. military had originally believed that Morocco could not win. The Secretary replied that the U.S. had, in fact, been worried because of the resupply problem, but that everything had worked out well. Recent victories demonstrate Morocco is safe and strong.

8. The King agreed, noting that there was no longer a serious military threat to Morocco. Algeria will not intervene. Three or four

⁸ In his May 14 letter to Hassan, Reagan said he was "delighted" that Weinberger would be able to attend the upcoming JMC, which he considered "an important manifestation of our close working relationship with Morocco and as tangible evidence of our shared goals in regional stability and peace." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564-8206108))

years ago he had been worried about Algerian intervention—now he is “just concerned, not so worried.” He added that he is determined to do nothing to provoke the Algerians. “If we do have to fight, however, we have been in the field for 10 years—we are well trained, and we will be more effective.” The Secretary agreed that Morocco’s armed forces are superior to those of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The Libyans, in particular, have large stockpiles of weapons, but do not know how to use them. The King said that Bendjedid had told Hassan’s recent envoy to Algiers (presumably Royal Counselor Guedira) that “he personally had ordered MIG 25’s to overfly Moroccan territory” and was pleased that Hassan had sent an envoy to discuss the situation. Continuing, the King said that he would not allow a situation to develop which might lead to conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

9. The King concluded the pre-dinner conversation with a brief reference to the possibility that Iran, according to intelligence he had received, might be developing “nuclear facilities.” He said that he understood that the German company which had developed rocket facilities in Zaire was now involved in development of nuclear facilities in Iran, and suggested that the U.S. should look into this possibility.

10. Following dinner hosted by the King, the Secretary raised a series of bilateral questions. He informed Hassan that the “Thunderbirds” aerial demonstration team would visit Morocco July 6 for graduation exercises at the Air Force Academy. The King expressed great pleasure, remarking that he had first seen the team over New York Harbor in 1963. The Secretary then confirmed that the U.S. would soon be able to provide training for Moroccan military bands. A survey team would arrive in June, to be followed by instructors. The King thanked the Secretary and said that Colonel-Major Kabbaj would be especially pleased, since he had long sought to reshape the Air Force Band in the “American style,” which he preferred to that of the French. Third, the Secretary and Ambassador Reed said it was urgent for the King to appoint a coordinator for the weather modification program. The King said that “you have my approval with 11 hours to spare, and I have appointed Kabbaj as coordinator.” (Telex confirmation of the Kabbaj appointment was received by the Embassy within 7 hours.) [4½ lines not declassified] The King pointed out that, until now, Moroccan forces had fought in terrain with deep gullies and canyons. “Now, if the Polisario wants to do anything, it will have to do so on flat terrain.”

11. Turning to multilateral issues, the King said that since the Secretary would be visiting Portugal on May 18–19, perhaps he could carry a message. Hassan said that he had urged the Portuguese to consider a mutual defense treaty with Morocco, and that the Portuguese appear to be well disposed. Spain, on the other hand, seems reluctant to join in such a treaty. [4½ lines not declassified] The Secretary agreed to

inform the Portuguese Defense Minister that the U.S. would be favorably disposed toward a mutual defense treaty between Morocco and Portugal.⁹ Portugal, he said, is a loyal friend of the United States. The King said that Prime Minister Soares had told him that, while he was a committed socialist, he was not a communist.

12. The Secretary indicated that the USG looked forward to welcoming Matti Jorio, the Moroccan Ambassador-designate to Washington, in the near future. The King said that Jorio would soon be in Washington. Referring to Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani's earlier comments, Secretary Weinberger said that the President and he are determined to secure from Congress as much military and economic aid for Morocco as possible. It will be difficult to obtain much more in FY 85 but all efforts will be expended in FY 86 to obtain substantial increases. The State Department is involved in this effort, as well. The President hopes to get agreement from Congress, and to obtain a flexible and more useful combination of grants and loans. The U.S. understands the need to avoid adding to Morocco's indebtedness, if possible, and therefore will work to maximize grants and military training.

13. The King expressed confidence that the President would be reelected, and that these initiatives would become reality. He reiterated that he fully understood the significance of the Secretary's visit as an expression of political support for Morocco at an important time. Jokingly, he added that if the U.S. were not in a pre-electoral period, he would gladly decorate the Secretary. Given the politics of U.S. Presidential campaigns, however, that might not be a good idea now. Closing the conversation, Hassan said that he hoped to visit the U.S. for the opening of the Moroccan pavilion at the Epcot Center in September and that he would like to stop in Washington and have lunch with the President while also seeing "old and good friends" of the administration.

14. This message cleared by ASD/ISA Armitage.

15. Nouakchott minimize considered.

Kirby

⁹ In telegram 5130 from Lisbon, May 25, the Embassy reported that Weinberger passed Hassan's message to Eanes, who "shared Secretary Weinberger's assessment that King Hassan is a skilled and intelligent leader." Eanes also said "he was very interested in the situation in Morocco because of the strategic trilateral relationship that exists between Portugal, Morocco, and Spain. They control the entrance to the Mediterranean and needed to act in concert to keep those waters open in the event of an emergency requiring the rapid deployment of forces to the Middle East." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840007-0321)

226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 21, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

2. *Morocco: General Walters to Confer with King Hassan.* Dick Walters departs for Morocco tomorrow to explain to King Hassan why we postponed joint military exercises which had been scheduled for August and September. It was our judgment that carrying out these exercises might have provoked the Algerians to lessen their efforts aimed at release of the Beirut kidnappers.² Since Walters' trip was conceived, the King and Colonel Qadhafi announced their "Treaty of Federation."³ Although we have been assured by the Moroccan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister that this does not signify any shift in political orientation, it is nonetheless a matter of some concern. We have therefore prepared points for Walters⁴ to raise with Hassan making clear to the King our reservations about the potential implications of his quickened relationship with the Libyan regime. (*SENSITIVE*)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive.

² Documentation on the kidnappings of U.S. citizens in Beirut and Algerian efforts to secure their release is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Parts 1 and 2, Terrorism.

³ Telegram 7069 from Rabat, August 14, contains the text of a joint Libyan-Moroccan communiqué announcing the union of the two nations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840517–0979)

⁴ Talking points for Walters were not found.

227. Memorandum From Robert Kimmitt of the National Security Council Staff to Geoffrey Kemp and Philip Dur of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of:²

The following excerpt is for your information only. *Please do not refer to it in any discussions.*

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (03/13/1984–08/24/1984). Secret.

² An unknown hand wrote: "8/24/84."

2. *King Hassan on Morocco/Libya Ties.* Dick Walters met August 23 with King Hassan to discuss the recently concluded "Treaty of Federation" between Morocco and Libya.³ Hassan said his action grew out of the "isolation" forced on Morocco by the conclusion last year of a "Treaty of Friendship" between Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania.⁴ Hassan said "I have no illusions about Qadhafi. Either I tame him or the union breaks up. . . ." Meanwhile, intelligence reports⁵ cite former Foreign Minister Boucetta as having said that the primary motivation for the treaty was economic and that Libya had agreed to as much as \$600 million "counter trade" a year to be paid for with oil. Hassan's explanation is, obviously, not totally satisfying, but we should reserve judgment until after conversations with Royal Counselor Guedira whom the King is dispatching to Washington on September 4.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

³ A record of the Walters-Hassan conversation is printed as Document 38. See also footnote 3, Document 226.

⁴ An unknown hand wrote: "Kemp" and "Dur" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ Not found.

228. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 5, 1984

1. *Meeting With Moroccan Envoy.* I met today with Reda Guedira, sent by King Hassan II to explain the Libyan/Moroccan "Treaty of Union."² His message was that King Hassan is courageous, wise and fundamentally devoted to the same principles and values that we uphold. Against this background, the Treaty is a vehicle by which Hassan hopes to impel Qadhafi towards responsible behavior. Hassan perceives himself as uniquely positioned to play a positive role in the Maghreb, the Arab world and Africa and believes his ability effectively to do so is enhanced by his Treaty with Qadhafi. I asked Guedira to convey to Hassan our deep concern about the Treaty. Qadhafi is reprehensible in every respect and his regime should be isolated. Through

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive.

² A record of the Shultz-Guedira meeting is in telegram 267326 to Paris, September 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010–0334)

the Treaty, Hassan has cast his mantle of respectability over this mad man. I noted the possible transfer of technology, potential compromise of US intelligence, and the turn over of Libyan dissidents as points of particular concern. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, September 18, 1984, 1854Z

8140. Subject: September 17 Audience With King Hassan.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Monday evening, September 17, during wedding festivities for his daughter, King Hassan granted joint half-hour interview to me, Ambassador at Large Walters, and former Ambassadors Neumann and Duke.

3. The King began by saying that he understands the difficulties that the Moroccan-Libyan union agreement² has caused for U.S.-Moroccan relations and that he especially understands that this is potentially difficult for President Reagan in this election year. He said that he hopes the President and the American Government will understand that Morocco had never before found itself as diplomatically isolated as was the case this past summer. Hassan said that he had seen an opportunity to break out of that isolation and had grasped it. He said that his decision to sign the accord with Libya related to his own sense of timing and his estimate of Moroccan national interests and of how they could best be served. He noted that as King of Morocco he must do what he considers to be in the country's best interests. He said that he is naturally sorry that his decision has turned out to be difficult for some but that he felt that the opportunity which he had seen was one that he simply could not pass up. The King continued that he is working on Qadhafi to turn him into an "opponentist" if need be, rather than a terrorist. Noting that he, too, is an opponentist when the occasion demands, Hassan said that he wants Qadhafi to move in the direction

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840593–0121. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Paris and Ndjamena. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo.

² See Document 226.

of responsible opposition toward policies and events with which he disagrees rather than remain in his longtime posture of strident, disruptive behavior.

4. Turning to yesterday's announcement in Paris of the troop disengagement in Chad,³ Hassan said that President Mitterrand had called him Monday morning to say that "everything has been concluded and will be announced today." The King said that troop withdrawal will occur between September 25 and November 1. While disclaiming paternity for the French-Libyan agreement, Hassan appeared nonetheless to be trying to leave the impression that Morocco had played some kind of facilitative role, if even only a minor one. In disclaiming paternity he said that "my only genius" was to bring Mitterrand here to Morocco at the right time and to persuade him that the moment was ripe for Mitterrand's brother to visit Libya.

5. The King then launched into a lengthy dissertation on Arafat. He pointed to a recent Arafat interview with "Der Spiegel" in which Arafat allegedly said that he is ready to recognize Israel and go to the negotiating table directly with Israel. (Comment: We have not seen this interview. End comment.) Hassan said that Arafat has asked him to reconcile him (Arafat) with Qadhafi. Hassan then said that "I am taking full credit for managing Arafat and I hope your President will recognize that." Hassan implied that he would appreciate some kind of message from the President and Secretary expressing sympathy and support for his role in this regard.

6. The King noted that he will send Royal Counselor Guedira to Tripoli next Monday⁴ to begin working out terms of reference and the structure of the union with Libya. Guedira and his counterparts on the Libyan side will attempt to work out the distribution of duties under the accord. The King then said, somewhat curiously, that Morocco and Libya may identify some issues in their union that they do not agree on and that these could be taken to the International Court of Justice. (Comment: We would speculate that the King may have been trying to signal that this could be a way of dragging out and delaying further elaboration of the union and its structure. End comment.)

7. The King then returned to the personality of Qadhafi, saying rather sharply that he wished the Americans generally and our media in particular would stop referring to Qadhafi as a terrorist and giving him a high public profile, thus making him appear bigger and more important than he really is. The King quipped quietly that Qadhafi is crazy and perhaps is even a terrorist in some respects, but said that

³ Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁴ September 24.

it suits nobody's interest to puff Qadhafi's own sense of self by calling him such. Hassan continued that Syria's Assad, not Qadhafi, is America's real problem: "He is a much bigger problem for you than Qadhafi." Hassan said bluntly that it is Assad who is the terrorist—"he murders more people but just doesn't say very much about it." The King then pointedly said that the death of U.S. Marines should be laid at Assad's door since he is the one who controls the Shias in Lebanon.

Reed

230. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 21, 1984

SUBJECT

(U) US-Moroccan Relations Next Steps

(S) King Hassan was surprised at the overwhelmingly negative US reaction to the Oujda Treaty and has appealed to us to help him out of his dilemma. The following thoughts, in conjunction with Joe Reed's message,² should be helpful as we deliberate the future of US-Moroccan relations in the aftermath of the Treaty.

(S) State's informal legal assessment is that, despite the Treaty, we still are dealing with two countries, Morocco and Libya, and, hence, there are no direct legal consequences of the agreement (i.e., third country transfer prohibitions continue to be operative). However, there is

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0004, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco (Sep–Dec). Secret. Weinberger wrote: "Bud" above the title Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" in the address line.

² In telegram 8139 from Rabat, September 18, Reed reported that following his return to Rabat, "this is how I see the current situation in U.S.-Moroccan relations. One month has passed since signature of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union. While practical steps have yet to be taken to implement the agreement, King Hassan—although now well aware of strong U.S.G. concern—clearly plans to test the advantages of union. In these circumstances, I believe the USG should adopt a somewhat more reserved profile in Morocco over the months just ahead." He continued that the United States should also underscore its "serious concern while preserving basic U.S. interests in Morocco and the long-term relationship." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840593–0261)

strong interagency concern³ that King Hassan has not been forthcoming in his explanation of various provisions of the Treaty, that information on possible secret codicils has been withheld, and that the King has not been truthful with us on the treatment of the Libyan dissident returned to Libya.

(S) Given our close, historic ties and significant interests in Morocco, we believe it is important to give King Hassan the benefit of the doubt. However, we also must get some straightforward answers and make clear that our position has not changed on Qadhafi and his policies of terrorism and subversion.

(S) Significant, highly visible actions taken against Morocco to signal our displeasure (e.g., immediate cancellation of visits or exercises, etc.) would disrupt US-Moroccan relations, jeopardize US military programs in Morocco—including US access/transit rights—and force King Hassan into more radical positions on the Middle East. Such actions would be exploited by Qadhafi and those in Morocco who desire to destroy US-Moroccan relations as evidence that the US is unreliable and unwilling to keep security commitments.

(S) Thus, we should avoid public positions that visibly force King Hassan to put distance between the US and Morocco. Although we may want to adopt a more reserved profile, as Joe Reed suggests, we should not stop visits, cancel exercises, or visibly decrease US-Moroccan cooperation in military and economic fields.

(S) Instead, we should set out markers that offer King Hassan ways to restore US confidence in Morocco and the means to back away from the agreement with Libya. This could be done in a high level demarche to the King to:

- Inform him that, while we will continue relations on all levels, we are aware of Moroccan deception in handing over Libyan dissidents to Libya. Such deception cannot continue if US-Moroccan relations are to proceed.

- Ask King Hassan directly if there are secret codicils to the treaty, while stating that further surprises could destroy US-Moroccan relations.

- Obtain King Hassan's written secret agreement that Libyan military/intelligence officers will not be based in Morocco.

(S) Regarding the security of US technology/equipment in Morocco, an area of major concern, we should:

- Recommend that the NDPC Survey Team, which has requested permission to visit Morocco 12–16 November, be given utmost cooperation by Moroccan authorities.

³Not found.

— Encourage Morocco to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to help reassure Administration and Congressional officials of Morocco's intentions.

— Strongly urge Moroccan Ambassador and other officials to meet and present candidly their case to members of Congress.

(S) Following the above plan of action will allow us to protect US interests in the short-term until full implications of the Moroccan-Libyan agreement become clear. To that end, we should seek a candid explanation from King Hassan about his comment that the union will last "one or two months" at the most and what tangible gains he expects.

(S) If the Treaty is an aberrant, short-term tactical maneuver, we will be able to take advantage of the opportunities it presents to modify Qadhafi's behavior (Libyan forces out of Chad; possible reduction of immediate Libyan threat to Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia; possible reduction of Libyan terrorist/subversion activities). There is the possibility that we might obtain some gain for Egypt out of the entire affair. We might urge King Hassan II to restore formally ties with Egypt as a signal to all (including Qadhafi). Although Hassan would probably consult with the Saudis, we might be helpful. If the Treaty has a longer life than we expect, we can revise our policy as necessary.

Cap

231. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Exercise AFRICAN EAGLE with Morocco

An air defense combined exercise in Morocco (AFRICAN EAGLE) is scheduled to commence November 16. Final approval for this exercise had been held in abeyance pending our Maghreb policy review

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/21/1984–11/19/1984). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation below the date reads: "White House Situation Room."

(NSSD-6-84)² which is still incomplete. We nevertheless recommend that we proceed with the exercise on schedule.

We cannot permit King Hassan to believe that, after our initial negative reaction to the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union, we have reverted to business as usual. However, we also believe strongly that unilateral actions such as the cancellation of exercises on the scale of AFRICAN EAGLE are neither effective nor befitting our relationship with an ally as old as Morocco. (In fact, proceeding with the exercise may well produce some strain in relations between Qaddafi and the King which could contribute to the unraveling of the agreement.) The King has responded to our expressions of concern by assuring us that implementation of the treaty will not involve actions against our interests.

We must now monitor that implementation to hold the King to his word. We will continue to maintain an open and frank dialogue with King Hassan to ensure that he is in no doubt about our concerns and remind him that although we have approved this exercise, and others, there remains a tension in our bilateral relationship induced by the Treaty of Union. We also need a clearer idea of what the King seeks to gain from the union.

Continued air operations in Morocco are extremely important to the USAF. The location is convenient and does not require tanker support during the deployment. The weather is ideal, the ranges are close to the runways, live ordnance can be dropped, and the air traffic is minimal. In addition, it is one of the few places in the European Area of Operations where we can conduct supersonic dissimilar air combat training. Cancelling AFRICAN EAGLE denies the USAF valuable training and a relationship between the military services which has taken years to develop. In fact, there is concern in EUCOM that cancellation of the exercise would mean the future permanent loss of the ranges.

We would appreciate formal NSC approval of exercise AFRICAN EAGLE no later than Tuesday, November 13.³ This request has the full support of Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger and General Vessey.

Charles Hill⁴
Executive Secretary

² See Document 45.

³ No record of final NSC approval for the exercise has been found.

⁴ McKinley signed for Hill above this typed signature.

232. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 30, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

2. *Morocco: Overtures From Moscow.* King Hassan told Ambassador Reed that a Soviet military officer dangled before the Moroccans the possibility of altering Moscow's Western Sahara policy to support Morocco's position. The Soviet also intimated a willingness to offer Rabat military/technical assistance at "no cost".² Moscow has actively pursued greater visibility in Morocco over the past year in an obvious attempt to counter U.S. influence. Soviet ship visits have continued; trade has expanded, benefitting the GOM which has sold significantly greater amounts of phosphates; the GOM accorded extensive publicity to a large Soviet trade delegation in October. Aware of Algeria's increasing disenchantment and desire to diminish Soviet influence, the Soviets may be reassessing their strategy in the Maghreb. They may conclude that Morocco's severe economic difficulties and increasing diplomatic isolation provide fertile ground for undercutting the U.S. Hassan assured Reed that he is well aware of Soviet duplicity and is not taken in by Soviet enticements. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility that Hassan may find further warming of relations with the USSR useful. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading July–December 1984. Secret.

² In telegram 10634 from Rabat, November 29, Reed reported that during a November 27 conversation, Hassan "recounted a recent Soviet démarche that had the stated intention of reducing U.S., and increasing Soviet, influence in Morocco. The King assured me he was not taken in by the Soviet enticements, but I found the boldness of the Soviet advance potentially disturbing." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840763–0016)

233. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, December 11, 1984, 1228Z

11001. Dept for Secretary Shultz. Dept please pass to White House for National Security Advisor McFarlane and Admiral Murphy. Dept please pass to Department of Defense for Secretary Weinberger. Subj: Audience With King Hassan—Message for the President.

1. (Secret-Nodis)—Entire text

2. Summary: During an audience in Fes on December 10, King Hassan dictated a message to President Reagan, urging that the United States provide larger amounts of material assistance to Morocco. The King's warning that the United States is getting more from Morocco than it receives in return undoubtedly reflects the growing domestic and international pressures which he is under. End summary.

3. In the course of a 90 minute audience December 10 at the Royal Palace in Fes (full reports of which I am sending by septels),² the King, acknowledging my renewed expression of concern over Morocco's relations with Libya, asked me to convey "textually" the following "question" to "my friend" the President and his senior advisors, which he insisted that Pol Off take down verbatim.

4. Begin text: "America knows it can do what it wants in Morocco. Morocco has given you the access and transit agreement, an active military exercise program, unrestricted ship visits, permission to expand your Voice of America station, and a host of other programs. I must ask, what have you done for Morocco in exchange? I value the close relations I have with the leaders of the United States, and appreciate the many signs of friendship I receive, but I am disappointed to note that the friendship is rarely backed up with corresponding substance. What is America going to do? You will have to make a choice." End text.

5. In parting I asked Hassan why he had chosen this moment to convey such a message rather than during the visits to Morocco last

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840014-0312. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 11043 from Rabat, December 11, Reed reported that Hassan considered French-Moroccan relations "excellent." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840792-0013) In telegram 11047 from Rabat, December 11, Reed reported that Hassan had provided "a brief description of the current border situation with Algeria during a December 10 audience in Fes, down-playing the risk of direct military conflict but indicating readiness to fight if attacked." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840792-0056)

year of the Vice President³ and the Secretary of State.⁴ He responded, “I did, but, perhaps I was too oblique. Now with Addis and New York this is the moment of truth.” The King reiterated his desire for continued close ties, reminding me he had given his word that the “union” with Libya would not in any way affect the U.S. relationship.

6. Hassan also observed somewhat ominously that, while he was still unhappy with the Soviet Union and its equivocal stance on the Western Sahara, he had received indications from the Soviet leadership that it will soon change its policy on the Western Sahara.⁵

7. Comment: In my 20 years of acquaintance, I have never seen the King more tense or impatient than at the December 10 audience. At several points during the conversation, I interrupted to set the record straight with regard to substantial American assistance to Morocco. In this connection, I noted that we have done more for Morocco in the intelligence field than any other country, but Hassan put this aside as “a case apart” and instance of “apples and oranges”. He had clearly rehearsed the message he wished to deliver and was in no mood to be dissuaded or side-tracked. As we have reported, he is under increasing pressure at home following recent diplomatic defeats and increased conflict in the Sahara (Rabat 10923).⁶ Under such stress, Hassan is prone to react as the tribal, Bedouin, Berber and Francophile chieftain which he is. While the Soviet Union is clearly maneuvering to gain ground here (Rabat 10634)⁷ Hassan—isolated and lacking other options—is in my view using the Soviet threat as a bargaining chip to gain leverage with us. Despite his message above, which reflects the King’s current mood, I believe that Hassan remains committed to continued close ties with the United States. Hassan is, however, passing through his most difficult period in recent years, and we will need to be alert both to our own interests and to the possibility of unpredictable reaction to pressure. I will be formulating recommendations on how to respond to Hassan for discussion during consultations in Washington on December 18.

Reed

³ See Document 26.

⁴ See Document 221.

⁵ See Document 232

⁶ In telegram 10923 from Rabat, the Embassy reported: “a series of diplomatic defeats in the OAU and UN, as well as stepped up military activity by the Polisario and Algeria over the past two months, have confronted Morocco with perhaps its most difficult foreign policy challenge in recent years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840781–0228)

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 232.

**234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Morocco¹**

Washington, January 24, 1985, 1952Z

22608. For Ambassador. Subject: Informing King Hassan of Bendjedid Visit.

1. S—Entire text

2. We are postponing the simultaneous USG–GOA public announcement of Algerian President Bendjedid's state visit until you have the opportunity privately to inform King Hassan. Following points are provided for your use:

— As you know, President Reagan extended an invitation to President Bendjedid to make a state visit in 1985. Bendjedid, accepted and a date for the visit now has been set—April 17.

— This will be the first visit to the US by President Bendjedid, and the first visit by an Algerian head of state since 1972 when President Boumedienne visited.

— We welcome our improving bilateral relations with Algeria. These relationships do not detract from our long-standing close ties with Morocco.

— Indeed, we strongly believe that strengthened US relations with Algiers will enhance our ability to contribute to stability and progress in the Maghreb.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850054–0426. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas Wukitsch (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel and Linda Mysliwy; approved by Nassif. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers.

**235. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Platt) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Relations with Morocco/Presidential Message to King Hassan

On December 10 King Hassan posed to Ambassador Reed (Rabat 11011-NODIS),² the question "What has the United States done for Morocco in exchange" for access/transit, military exercises, ships' visits, and other areas of cooperation. Hassan stated that he is "disappointed to note that the friendship is rarely backed up with corresponding substance."

This theme has been followed up in subsequent conversations with Hassan and high level Moroccan officials. It is now clear that the King expects a response from the President,³ even though the original conversation was cast in rhetorical terms. The King also issued invitations through Ambassador Reed to you and to Ambassador Kirkpatrick to visit Morocco.⁴

The Executive Branch's FY-86 assistance request, which essentially straightlines Morocco, will become public when it is presented to the Congress in the very near future. We believe it important to precede this unwelcome news with a Presidential message assuring Hassan of the President's continuing personal interest.

On January 23, Moroccan Ambassador Jorio informed the Department⁵ that the King now wants to "send" Minister of Information Filali to deliver a personal message to President Reagan. Filali is close

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108). Secret; Nodis.

² The telegram number is in error. Reference is to telegram 11001; see Document 233.

³ In telegram 310 from Rabat, January 10, Reed reported that a day earlier, "the King asked me if the President had responded to his message of December 10." After Reed explained that the letter "was, at his suggestion, still being reviewed, the King asked me to extend a personal invitation to National Security Advisor McFarlane to visit Morocco 'as soon as possible after the inauguration.' He said such a visit would provide a good opportunity to review 'where things stand,' as well as to provide you with an opportunity to examine on your own the current programs of cooperation between the two countries." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (09/21/1984–01/11/1985))

⁴ In telegram 314 from Rabat, January 10, Reed reported that Hassan "extended a warm invitation (and at the end of the audience, reiterated the point) for you and Dr. Kirkpatrick to attend the 1985 Fête du Trône." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850021–0334)

⁵ No record of Jorio's discussion with the Department has been found.

to the King (his son, presently with Sears World Trade in New York, was married to the King's eldest daughter last September) and the King likely believes that he is better suited as an emissary, with the ability to address issues in the "American style". Filali is heavily tipped to be the next Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet which the King is expected to announce on or before March 3. In requesting this meeting, Ambassador Jorio disclaimed knowledge of the substance of the message. He insisted, however, that delivery directly to the President is essential from the King's point of view, although the meeting could be very brief. The King would like Filali to come at the earliest possible date. Ambassador Jorio requested that this issue be worked through the Moroccan Embassy in Washington rather than through our Embassy in Rabat.

Prior to this, various Moroccan officials had broached with Embassy Rabat the subject of high level visits to Washington. In December and again in January, we discouraged King Hassan from pursuing a personal interest in coming. We also questioned the utility of a visit by Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani who had expressed the desire to bring a delegation of ministers to "lobby" the Congress relative to FY 86 assistance levels.

We understand that the President has endorsed Ambassador Kirkpatrick's acceptance of the King's invitation to participate in the Feast of the Throne celebrations on March 3.⁶ In view of this decision, we believe it would be appropriate to leave Hassan's invitation to you open at this time. Ambassador Vernon Walters will also attend as the personal guest of the King (virtually an annual event for the Ambassador).

Hassan has stated that he intends to hold Throne Day celebrations in El-Aayoune, the major population center in the Western Sahara. US policy has been not to make high level official visits to the territory while its status is under dispute. Criticism from some European members of the diplomatic corps in Rabat regarding the propriety of attending official ceremonies in the disputed area may move Hassan to dispense with the presence of the corps in El-Aayoune but receive them formally in a Moroccan location, thus avoiding the issue. We note that the Algerians have already weighed in with us and others on the

⁶ In telegram 32898 to Rabat, February 2, the Department indicated that Reagan had accepted Hassan's invitation to have Kirkpatrick visit Morocco for the Throne Day celebrations, but "NSC Advisor McFarlane will not accept the King's invitation at this time." Reagan, the Department added, would receive Filali "briefly and dates are being worked out with Ambassador Jorio." The telegram also contains the text of a letter from Reagan to Hassan to that effect. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850002-0233)

subject of diplomatic representation at an official Moroccan ceremony held in the Western Sahara.

The Department recommends that the President agree to meet briefly with Minister Filali. We further recommend that the President send a message to Hassan which could include reference to the meeting with Filali and Ambassador Kirkpatrick's visit to Morocco.⁷

Nicholas Platt⁸
Executive Secretary

⁷ The suggested Presidential message was not attached.

⁸ Quinn signed for Platt above this typed signature.

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 22, 1985, 9:50–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Filali (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam
Acting Assistant Secretary Arnold Raphel
Ambassador Joseph V. Reed
Howard R. Teicher
Alex Toumayon (Interpreter)

Abdellatif Filali, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs
Maati Jorio, Ambassador to the United States

President Reagan opened the discussion by congratulating Filali on his reappointment as Foreign Minister. He then provided Filali with a photograph of the President and His Majesty King Hassan, and asked

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, February 1985. Secret. Prepared by Teicher. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In a February 9 memorandum to Gregg, Platt wrote: "Hassan is increasingly sensitive to what he judges is American coolness in the relationship since the Oujda treaty. Confronted with mounting economic difficulties, Hassan is turning to us for support." Platt also noted that Bendjedid's impending visit "provides yet another cause for unease at a time of flux in relationships in the Maghreb." (Ibid.)

Filali to carry the photograph and the President's warmest regards to King Hassan. (U)

Foreign Minister Filali began his presentation by expressing how deeply honored he felt to be received by the President. King Hassan, through Filali, expressed his friendship and very high regard for the President. Noting that the King had not yet seen the President since the beginning of the second term, King Hassan never doubted the friendship which the President had extended to Morocco. Filali described the visit of the Prime Minister one year ago as a demonstration of Moroccan cooperation and friendship.² King Hassan "stresses the irreversible nature of Moroccan friendship and alliance with the United States. Perhaps from time-to-time, some situations appear not to conform to this fact." But Filali confirmed that no fundamental changes could occur in Morocco's policy. Morocco has always been a member of the West and the Free World. Friendship with the United States is an important tradition in Morocco. King Hassan is convinced that the moment is opportune to reopen discussions on bilateral issues and regional problems. King Hassan places particular emphasis on Moroccan willingness to extend military facilities to the United States to defend the Free World. Filali continued that the region's problems "require restructuring, and the United States can play a moderating role to find solutions to problems that divide the region." Filali ended his message from King Hassan by extending the King's invitation to the President to make a visit to Morocco in the context of the President's trip to Europe in May.³ Filali noted that it was a tradition of Republican Presidents to visit Morocco. Eisenhower did so immediately after Morocco achieved its independence,⁴ and this example of U.S. support was a great comfort to the Moroccan people. (S)

President Reagan asked Filali to convey to His Majesty that American friendship has not lessened. The King should be assured that the U.S. values this friendship very highly.⁵ With regard to a visit, the President noted the complications, but said "if it is possible, I would like to visit." The President thanked Filali for carrying King Hassan's message. (C)

Filali thanked the President for his kind words for Morocco and repeated his hope that the President would visit Morocco. (U)

² See Document 224.

³ Reagan visited Western Europe April 30–May 10. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988.

⁴ Eisenhower visited Casablanca on December 22, 1959.

⁵ In telegram 56991 to Rabat, February 26, the Department reported that during his February 21 meeting with Filali, Shultz agreed that "it is important to renew and reenergize periodically all elements of a relationship. He said it is time to put problems behind us and to move and build the relationship." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850129–0199)

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 12, 1985, 1732Z

2328. For NEA/DAS Thomas Nassif from Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed. Subject: Invitation to President Reagan to Visit Morocco. Ref: (A) Nassif/Reed Telcon of March 6² (B) State 66616³ (C) Rabat 2097.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Per ref (A), Mission has not yet conveyed message contained in ref (B). We continue to hope that a means will be found to respond favorably to King Hassan's invitation consistent with recommendations of Ambassador Kirkpatrick contained in ref (C). If such a response is not possible, as discussed in ref (A), I believe that the news should be conveyed to Hassan via a brief and personal message from the President.

3. I anticipate my next audience with King Hassan, during the visit of General Lawson, in Marrakech on March 20 after the King's return from a week-long tour of Southern Morocco and the Western Sahara. The King will be out of contact in the meantime and I recommend that I convey any message on this subject to him March 20. If the reply to his invitation is negative, I recommend that the President's message make reference to the possibility of receiving Hassan should he visit the United States later in the year. Reference could also be made to the forthcoming visit to Washington of Prime Minister Karim Lamrani to head the GOM delegation to the Joint Economic and Military Commission meetings in May.

Reed

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 66616 to Rabat, March 6, the Department instructed the Embassy "to convey to the King President Reagan's deep personal regrets that it not possible for him to accept the King's kind invitation to visit Morocco. In conveying this message, you should avoid any suggestion of an invitation for Hassan to visit Washington." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis)

⁴ In telegram 2097 from Rabat, March 6, the Embassy transmitted the text of a message from Kirkpatrick to Armacost, in which she wrote: "I strongly urge that the President stop a few hours in Morocco on his way to or from Portugal and Spain. It would be safe and extremely important to Morocco. Should that for any reason be impossible, I urge that the King be invited for a State visit because it is terrible for him to have his greatest rival, President Bendjedid, offered a State visit, while he, who has supported us in so many ways, has only been invited for a lower level (official) visit three years ago." (Ibid.)

238. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, April 12, 1985

Your Majesty:

I am extremely pleased that high-level contacts between our two countries have been resumed. You know how much I value your wisdom and experience, and I hope that our exchanges will continue to expand.

Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Walters and USIA Director Wick have informed me of the warm welcome and traditional hospitality which you extended to them on the occasion of their recent visits to the Kingdom.² Mr. Wick was particularly pleased by Your Majesty's remarks that our expanded Voice of America relay station at Tangier will be good for Morocco as well as for the United States.³

Regrettably, I will not be here when Prime Minister Karim Lamrani comes to Washington for the meetings of the Joint Economic and Military Commissions; however, I assure you he will be well received.

I noted with pleasure that National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane accepted your kind invitation and had planned to visit the Kingdom April 21–23. However, I have asked him to participate in a very important government exercise taking place on those dates. This will necessitate postponement of this trip. I hope that Your Majesty and Ambassador Reed can reschedule Mr. McFarlane's trip for an early, mutually convenient date.

During our fruitful exchange in February, Minister Filali conveyed to me Your Majesty's gracious invitation to visit the Kingdom after my May trip to Europe. Unfortunately, the constraints on the schedule make it impossible for me to do this, and I greatly regret missing this opportunity to see Your Majesty and your beautiful country.⁴ However, I hope we will have occasion to meet soon.

Mrs. Reagan joins me in sending good wishes to you.

Your friend,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Exdis April 1985. Confidential; Exdis. The Department transmitted the message in telegram 112936 to Rabat, April 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850143–0695)

² See Document 428. Kirkpatrick's message is in telegram 2035 from Rabat, March 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003–0318)

³ A record of the Wick-Hassan conversation is in telegram 2025 from Rabat, March 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850143–0695)

⁴ In telegram 3739 from Rabat, April 22, Reed reported that during an April 17 meeting, "Hassan read the letter carefully at least twice before commenting. The King told me that he was deeply disappointed that a brief Presidential stopover even if for four hours would not be possible during the May European trip. He said he was equally disheartened that the National Security Advisor could not come to Morocco, although he said he looked forward to the visit being rescheduled at the earliest date." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850277–0884)

239. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Morocco—Suggested Letter From You to King Hassan

ISSUE FOR DECISION: Whether you should send a letter to King Hassan following his request for postponement of the Joint Economic and Military Commission meetings.²

DISCUSSION: Among the steps Ambassador Reed recommended to deal with present strains in our relationship with Morocco is a letter from you to the King, acknowledging and expressing understanding for his decision to request postponement of the Joint Economic and Military Commission meetings, which were to have taken place in Washington May 7–10. We agree with the Ambassador that such a letter is in order. Attached is a draft for your consideration (TAB 1). It contains a few changes from Ambassador Reed's suggested draft, made to remove any encouragement for Hassan to involve himself in the Middle East peace process, (which we consider might be counterproductive), or any commitment by you to participate in or meet with the Joint Commissions when they eventually convene.

For your information, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has already sent a message to Hassan.³

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the cable message and sign the original (to be pouched to Rabat) at TAB 1.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (05/02/1985–05/06/1985). Secret. Sent through Armacost. Drafted on April 30 by Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Nassif, and in substance by Loustanou (DOC) and Savitt (DOD). Neither Murphy nor Armacost initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." McKinley also initialed the memorandum and wrote: "3 May."

² In telegram 3946 from Rabat, April 26, Reed reported that King Hassan had decided to postpone the JMC and EC meeting scheduled to take place May 7–10, which reflected his "fears that Commission meetings without tangible results would aggravate growing problems of perception in the bilateral relationship." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850292–0342)

³ No record of Weinberger's message has been found.

⁴ Below this recommendation, Shultz wrote: "OK G." A stamped notation next to this reads: "May 6 1985."

Tab 1

**Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to
the Embassy in Morocco⁵**

Bonn, May 6, 1985, 0117Z

Secto 9016. Subject: Message From Secretary Shultz to King Hassan.
Ref: Rabat 4002.⁶

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Please deliver following message from Secretary Shultz to King Hassan. Signed original being pouched.

3. Begin text:

Your Majesty:

Ambassador Reed has conveyed to me your decision to postpone for several months the meetings of the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Economic and Joint Military Commissions which were scheduled to be held in Washington from May 7–10.

The postponement of these meetings should, in no case, detract from the considerable importance which we continue to attach to the Joint Military and Economic Commissions as valuable catalysts for strengthening bilateral cooperation in these areas between our two countries. We will continue to address this issue in the light of the close relationship which exists between our two countries and the value we place upon our association.

We look forward to receiving your government's suggestions regarding appropriate new dates for the holding of these meetings, and I am confident a mutually agreeable schedule can be established.

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurance of my highest respect for your leadership and for the historic friendship and bonds which unite Morocco and the United States. Sincerely yours, George P. Shultz.

His Majesty

Hassan II,

King of Morocco,

Rabat. End text.

Shultz

⁵Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Barrett; cleared by [illegible] and Hill; approved by McKinley. Sent for information to the Department. Shultz was in Bonn for the Economic Summit and to accompany Reagan on his state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

⁶In telegram 4002 from Rabat, April 29, Reed stated "I strongly recommend that you acknowledge and express understanding for King Hassan's recent decision to postpone the Joint Economic and Joint Military Commission meetings in Washington for several months" and proposed a draft message from Shultz to Hassan. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850297–0715)

240. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Reagan and King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, May 11, 1985, 6:24–6:32 p.m.

President Reagan's Telephone Call to Moroccan King Hassan II, May 11, 1985. Call began 1824 local time and ended at 1832 local.

President Reagan: Your Majesty, I'm just returned from the trip, I'm back in Washington now, and I just wanted to express my appreciation for the invitation you had extended to visit Morocco and my regret that it couldn't be arranged.

King Hassan: Mr. President, do you listen me?

President Reagan: Yes.

King Hassan: Mr. President, I am very very touched by your call at this hour. And I appreciate very deeply your kindness to call me. And I'm as sad as you to not meet you on the phone on behalf of Morocco.

President Reagan: Well, Your Majesty, I had hoped that maybe something would develop that I could, as you said, just fly across the Mediterranean,² but then not only was the schedule so full, but I had some problems you might even have read about in your press over there, back here that brought me back because of our budget and the problems I'm having with the Congress.

King Hassan: I know all your problems, and I think that you are in the same situation for the \$14 million as President Carter was with the Angola problems with 13 million problems.

President Reagan: Yes, Your Majesty, I was talking about you with our mutual friend, King Juan Carlos.

King Hassan: He called me.

President Reagan: He did!

King Hassan: He told me that you give him message for me, you and Mrs. Reagan and appreciate that very deeply.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Exdis June 1985. Secret; Exdis. From a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. An unknown hand wrote: "For Bob Pearson" at the top of the memorandum. The Department transmitted an abstract of the telephone call in telegram 146819 to Rabat, May 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

² See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 237.

President Reagan: Well, I knew that he would be talking to you or seeing you from our conversation so I had asked him to do that, didn't realize that he would be so prompt. But I just want you to know that I (pause) Hello!

King Hassan: I shall call the King and I shall hope he will send me the (few words unintel.) or I send him (unintel.) to give me the (unintel.)

President Reagan: You know we still continue our strong interest in the close relations between our country, our two countries. I'm especially appreciative of our security cooperation, it benefits us very much and I have a message, Nancy wants me to give you her very best regards. She remembers your visit here with great pleasure.

King Hassan: Mr. President, like you, I have one heart and one home and Morocco and I, we are friends of you and your country. You are in good health, God will give you long life and I am hoping you'll visit in Morocco when you want.

President Reagan: I'm hoping for that also. I remember your invitation at the time that you were here and . . .

King Hassan: Will you please for me kiss the hand of Mrs. Reagan and remind her that she promised to make a small short visit in Morocco please.

President Reagan: I certainly shall do that and I . . .

King Hassan: Thank you.

President Reagan: I believe that high level dialogue is very important and I know that my National Security Advisor McFarlane . . .

King Hassan: Yes.

President Reagan: Is I believe now he had hoped that he was coming. I believe that he is going to try to make a visit to your country in June and I hope so just as I hope that we shall be able to get together in the not so distant future.³

King Hassan: We are waiting him when he wants and I made the program to visit the United Nations in September. Maybe at this moment I could see you Mr. President.

President Reagan: That would be fine. You are visiting here in September?

King Hassan: Yes. For the anniversary of the United Nations.

President Reagan: I shall tell our people and we shall take a close look at our schedule before it gets too filled up with things. I would enjoy that very much.

³ An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word "just" and ending with the word "future."

King Hassan: Thank you, Mr. President and God be with you and abiento.⁴

President Reagan: It's good to talk to you and I shall look forward to seeing you.

King Hassan: Excuse me for my English but it is mine.⁵

President Reagan: Listen, you're doing much better than I could do in (laugh) someone else's language, so I respect you very much for your being able to do this.

King Hassan: Thank you, Mr. President and good evening to you and Mrs. Reagan.

President Reagan: Good-bye friend, Your Majesty.⁶

⁴ An unknown hand underlined "Abiento" in this sentence and placed an exclamation point in the left-hand margin.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined this comment and wrote: "Great line" in the right-hand margin.

⁶ At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "MAC—Abiento is not, of course, a bien tôt. Rather it is dialectical Moroccan for [illegible Arabic script] a reference to the King's great regard for Maureen.—M." Maureen refers to Reagan's oldest daughter.

241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 14, 1985

SUBJECT

McFarlane's Projected Invitation to Morocco

I was not keen on Bud's initial plan to visit Morocco. However, it seems to me that having agreed to a trip, we are compounding our problems with King Hassan by continually walking away from it.

If you wish to avoid having Bud go, we could ask Dick Walters to do so en route to or from Syria should he go to see Assad. He could certainly deal effectively with key issues like Chad and Libya.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Papers of George Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982–1989: Lot 89D94, Family Group Luncheon, 1984–1985, June 14, 1985, 12:00–1:00 p.m. Secret; Sensitive. A stamp at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS."

We need to make up our minds this morning since we understand there is a good sense Bud will raise the issue at today's luncheon.² Moreover, it appears that the King is expecting Bud at the end of next week. If there is not to be a visit, we should let the King know as soon as possible.

Michael H. Armacost³

² No record of the luncheon has been found.

³ Armacost initialed "MA" above this typed signature.

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, June 18, 1985, 1839Z

185939. Subject: McFarlane Visit to Morocco.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. It has been decided at the highest levels of the administration that a visit to Morocco at this time by McFarlane would be inappropriate.

3. President, Secretary Shultz and NSC Advisor McFarlane have given very careful consideration to King Hassan's invitation to McFarlane to visit Morocco June 21–24. At the time of the President's telephone conversation with King Hassan,² when the President mentioned that McFarlane would be coming, there was no expectation that the King intended to take any steps which might further reinforce Qadhafi's regional ambitions or international legitimacy. On the contrary, all held the view that Hassan was sincere in his professed intentions to limit effects of Oujda Treaty and pursue a strategy designed to moderate Qadhafi's behavior.

4. Consequently, President and his advisors were dismayed by King's initiative to broaden the Afro-Arab Union to include Chad. Qadhafi's behavior, as recently recounted to the King, has actually grown worse since the Oujda Accords were concluded, and there is no indication Oujda tie with Morocco will have any restraining effect on

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850255–0840. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); cleared by Johnson (P), Nassif, Raphael, Bishop, McFarlane, McKinley, Bruce Strathearn (S/S-O), and Hill; approved by Shultz.

² See Document 240.

him. Inter alia Qadhafi has launched a new campaign against Libyan dissidents abroad,³ including the US, and tried to mount an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. While Hassan had made clear to us the narrow tactical purpose of Oujda, he had also professed that treaty, in addition to serving GOM objectives in Western Sahara and vis-à-vis Algeria, could modify Qadhafi's behavior and thus serve a purpose consistent with American interests, goals, and values. This has not occurred and the King's expanding cooperation with Libya makes it undesirable at this time to resume the high level dialogue in the manner that GOM desires. Resumption of this dialogue will depend on USG perception that Hassan's implementation of the Oujda treaty will not encourage Qadhafi's ambitions and baser instincts. As long as the King is trying to expand the union without being able to show any countervailing benefits for US interests a McFarlane visit would be counterproductive.

5. With this as background you should inform Foreign Minister Filali that the visit has been postponed, because of our serious concern over recent developments involving Chad and the continuing activities of Colonel Qadhafi. You should tell the Foreign Minister that the President and Secretary of State felt that the timing for such a visit was inappropriate pending clear indications concerning the outcome of the Chadian situation. You should at the same time give him the following message in writing from McFarlane to the King. You may use the material in paras 3–5 to reply to any questions from Filali.

6. Message from NSC McFarlane: begin text:

Your Majesty,

As our Embassy has informed your government I will not be coming to Morocco this month as I had expected to. I am sorry about this change of plans as I had been looking forward very much to the visit. The President and Secretary Shultz had both considered this a good occasion for a thorough exchange of views between our two governments, an opportunity for a discussion of the whole range of issues of mutual interest to Morocco and the US.

However, the great concern of the administration over the situation in Chad and about the continuing activities of Colonel Qadhafi has led to the conclusion that such a trip would be inappropriate at this time and until we can have a clearer view of future developments concerning these subjects. With best regards, Sincerely. End text.

Shultz

³ Documentation on Libya's campaign against dissidents and alleged role in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 19, 1985, 1100Z

5625. NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy and DAS Nassif. Subject: McFarlane Visit to Morocco. Ref: (A) State 185939;² (B) Rabat 5605.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. While I will, of course, if Washington insists, deliver McFarlane-Hassan message contained in ref (A) and explain to Foreign Minister Filali the cancellation of Mr. McFarlane's visit along lines contained in reftel, I see certain risks to our interests in hanging the McFarlane cancellation/postponement so directly and completely on our concerns about Hassan's assumed efforts to bring Chad into the Morocco-Libya union. Doing the latter would, I think, make it difficult to maintain a useful dialogue with Hassan over the period just ahead on issues of common concern. With the strong prospect of a special Arab League summit here in Morocco a few weeks from now, we may find that there are matters of substantial interest that we would want to discuss with Hassan prior to, or in the general context of, such a summit. Similarly, Washington may well wish to consider later the value of discussing terrorism/hijackings in the Middle East with Hassan prior to the convening of an Arab summit. Finally, delivering message as envisaged in ref (A) could complicate, or render null, our attempts to schedule a useful JEC and JMC at an early date.

3. My strong recommendation is that I be authorized to tell Foreign Minister Filali this afternoon (meeting is at 1600 local, 1100 Washington time) that Mr. McFarlane regrets that he cannot visit Morocco at this time but that he hopes to visit at some future mutually convenient date.⁴ We could cite this heavy schedule and current preoccupations (e.g. TWA hijacking) as precluding trip at present. I could then tell Filali in all candor that indications that Hassan had tried to bring Chad into

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850428-1038. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

² See Document 242.

³ In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 18, Kirby asked the Department to provide "information relating to the reasons for the McFarlane postponement and anything you might have with respect to dates for a visit in the future." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850428-1038)

⁴ In telegram 5660 from Rabat, June 19, Kirby reported that he had informed Filali that "unfortunately National Security Affairs Advisor McFarlane will be unable to visit Morocco next weekend as previously suggested. I said that while President Reagan and Mr. McFarlane believe in the value of continuing the high-level dialogue with Morocco Mr. McFarlane currently has too many things on his plate, including the TWA hijacking, to permit him to undertake such a visit at this time." Kirby continued: "Filali was clearly disappointed and said that the King would be, as well." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850433-0549) Documentation on the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism.

the Morocco-Libya union had also given Washington pause, and that as we think about re-scheduling McFarlane visit at some future date, GOM should assume that Washington will continue to keep Morocco's actions toward Libyan Union under review.

4. Foregoing approach would, I think, retain the essence of the Washington message (ref A) while encapsulating it in a somewhat more acceptable form on the eve of the Eid al-Fitr holiday. It would also give us a little breathing room as I try to discover from Filali this afternoon just how hard Hassan did, or did not, push the Arab-African Union idea with Habre while the latter was here last weekend. Until I have seen Filali, and in the absence of other reporting, the question arises whether the cautions we earlier expressed to Hassan about bringing Chad into the union may not have slowed him down somewhat when he prepared for meeting with Habre.

5. I plan to try to telephone DAS Nassif on secure phone at OOB to see whether my instructions can be modified along lines of para (3) above. If we fail to make contact, an immediate cable response from Department would be appreciated.

6. I recommend that telegrams on this topic continue in Exdis, or more restrictive, channel.

Kirby

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, August 2, 1985, 2121Z

237782. Subject: Acting Secretary's Post-Luncheon Conversation With Moroccan Prime Minister Karim Lamrani.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Following the July 29 luncheon,² a smaller group including Under Secretary Armacost and Assistant Secretary Murphy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850552–0905. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Murphy, Johnson, Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), and James Collins (S/S–O); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Khartoum, Ndjamena, and USCINCEUR. The document is misnumbered in the original.

² In telegram 238579 to Rabat, August 3, the Department reported on the discussion during the luncheon, which “was dominated by Karim Lamrani who chose to focus on Syria's role in the Middle East. He bluntly labeled the SARG as ‘imperialist and hegemonistic’ and a cat's paw for the Soviets.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850552–0123)

met in Acting Secretary's office for a further exchange, nominally on bilateral issues. As at the luncheon, Karim Lamrani was voluble as he stressed Morocco's preoccupation with Algeria and argued that coincident USG and GOM interests should be translated into significantly higher levels of economic and military assistance for Morocco. End summary.

3. During post-luncheon discussion of nominally bilateral issues, Prime Minister Karim Lamrani spoke emotionally and at length about the perceived threat from Algeria. He epitomized Algerian policy towards Morocco as an "aggressive posture", constant since Algerian independence. Elementary rules of international morality impede a direct Algerian attack on Morocco; hence, the GOA has chosen to work through the Polisario. The acceptance by the OAU of the SDAR—which controls no territory, has no government or legal institutions, or no identified population—sets a dangerous precedent. Over the past 20 years the Algerians have undertaken incursions into Morocco on four occasions. Recently armed commandos were apprehended coming from Algeria; their mission was to create a "pre-revolutionary climate" in Morocco.

4. The order of battle is 2–10 times in Algeria's favor, depending on the weapons or force discussed. There is a prospect for more Soviet support for Algeria. Morocco does not have aggressive intent, but Algeria does. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to address the GOM's minimal military requirements. The JMC is seized with implementation of Morocco's five year plan. The real problem is one of finance. The GOM is cutting back on social and economic development in order to purchase necessary arms. However, Morocco can no longer bear the cost. There is no hope of help from the Eastern bloc without unacceptable political costs. The USG, as leader of the free world, must look to Morocco's strategic location and act to preserve our interests there.

5. Despite this threat, the PM stated, the GOM heretofore had not pressed for increased financial assistance. However, it is necessary now to look at the allocation of USG resources in the area. He contended that Morocco is strategically more important to the U.S. than is Israel. Yet, the balance of resource allocation is dols 6 billion (sic) for Israel as opposed to dols 179 million for Morocco. Something should be done to meet Morocco's needs in keeping with U.S. interests there.

6. Acting Secretary Whitehead responded that the USG is sympathetic to the Moroccan needs and concerns; these will be taken into consideration. Nonetheless, increasing Morocco's military capabilities if and as the Soviets increase those of Algeria is not the ultimate solution to problems. Both the GOM and the GOA should be aligned with the USG against Soviet influence in the area. The Algerian-Moroccan

dispute ultimately should give way to the more important objective of peace in the region. The special, longstanding USG relationship with Israel and Egypt and assistance to those nations serves the cause of peace.

7. The Acting Secretary went on to note USG budgetary problems. With a dols 200 billion deficit our ability to expand assistance is limited. Congress is under pressure to reduce the deficit by dols 50 billion. This year our global assistance will amount to dols 12.5 billion. We will be lucky if we can achieve that amount next year; in fact, we probably will end up with lower global levels. This is not meant to be a negative reaction to the Prime Minister's presentation, but we do not want to raise GOM hopes. We are aware of the GOM's needs, and there is a special friendship for Morocco. The USG "will do its best to give careful consideration" to these needs.

8. The PM responded vigorously that Morocco will not be the instigator of any escalation in the Western Sahara. The GOM has no problem with Algeria. In the interest of peace, the GOM acquiesced to Algerian annexation of some of Morocco's historic territory. Contrarily the Algerians seek to destabilize the regime in Morocco and "to annex Moroccan territory" through the Polisario. Morocco is part of the free world while Algeria's "true colors" are as natural allies of the Soviets. Karim Lamrani went on to ask rhetorically what would happen if Algeria were to bomb the bases encompassed in our mutual access and transit agreement? If more pressure comes from Algeria, the answer will not lie alone in military equipment. What, the Prime Minister asked, would happen if Morocco were to be lost to the West? Then the cost would be much greater than dols 12.5 billion; the situation would be irreversible.

9. Regarding levels of USG assistance, Karim Lamrani opined that if there is to be a reduction in FY 86, this should be shared proportionately among recipients.

10. In his only volunteered remarks on the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, the PM stated that the Polisario had received support from Algeria and Libya. The Treaty of Union with Libya was designed to stop Libyan support. This issue was of such importance as to warrant an "alliance with the devil". The treaty succeeded in neutralizing Libyan support, but Algeria has continued to arm the Polisario.

13. The Acting Secretary thanked the PM, then pointed out that the USG believes Libya to be a much greater problem than Algeria. USG would be much more sympathetic if the Moroccan efforts were aimed at Libya rather than against Algeria which we do not perceive to be a serious enemy. Karim Lamrani riposted that Algeria is a fundamental, systemic foe of the West. The Libyan Government is a one man affair "with a mad man at the helm". The Libyan people on the other hand are good. The USG has been unable to control Qadhafi. Hassan is trying

to tame him. The GOM believes Qadhafi is less dangerous than he was a year ago and that he might further quiet down. The PM went on to assert that the reason why the recent TWA hijacking didn't involve stops in Tripoli was that Qadhafi was conscious that King Hassan would not tolerate any Libyan action to harm the American hostages.

Armacost

**245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
Morocco¹**

Washington, August 3, 1985, 1727Z

239050. Subject: Presidential Letter to King Hassan—S/S #8522806.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Following for your information is the text of President Reagan's letter to King Hassan which Deputy Secretary Whitehead will deliver during his forthcoming visit:

Quote: Your Majesty: John Whitehead is visiting Morocco during his first trip overseas since his appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. I am particularly pleased he will meet you and have asked him to convey my continuing high regard for you and the Kingdom of Morocco. He is prepared to discuss a number of issues in the spirit of candor and friendship which characterizes our personal and official relationships.

I have asked Secretary Whitehead particularly to raise with you two issues he discussed with your Prime Minister in Washington on July 29.

The first is the Western Sahara. We have a continuing concern that the Western Sahara dispute could spread to Mauritania or even lead to direct conflict between Morocco and Algeria. We have discussed recent developments with both your government and that in Algiers. Again, I urge that every step be taken to avoid escalation.

Your Majesty, I am convinced that only a negotiated solution to this problem has any prospect of durability and stability. I hope that the direct, high-level negotiations between you and the Algerians will be renewed and ultimately lead to success.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850255-0840. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted with text received from the White House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S-S), Joseph Timbie (D), McKinley, and Janet Andres (S/S-O), and in draft by Zweifel; approved by Murphy.

I have also asked Secretary Whitehead to explore with you the dangers to regional peace posed by Colonel Qadhafi, including his undiminished support of international terrorism. My purpose is not to infringe in any way on your sovereign responsibilities. As National Security Advisor McFarlane stated to Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani,² while my confidence in and friendship for you is steadfast, I remain puzzled over your strategy for dealing with Qadhafi.

Nonetheless, we both must candidly acknowledge that this issue remains the major irritant in the relationship between our two nations. I therefore would appreciate your sharing with Secretary Whitehead your assessment of Qadhafi and his objectives. I have publicly stated that I consider Qadhafi's Libya as one of the five states most directly involved in sponsoring international terrorism.³ I did so after reviewing carefully what my government knows of the activities spawned in Tripoli.

Last September, when General Walters first expressed to you my very deep concerns about Morocco's new relationship with Qadhafi,⁴ you conveyed through him your hope that you could quote tame unquote Qadhafi and bring him toward acceptable international behavior. Sadly, the record does not show that Qadhafi has modified his policies. Rather, he continues to seek every opportunity to foment discord, to plot against his neighbors, and to terrorize and assassinate those Libyans at home and abroad who may have a different vision for their country. The menace posed by Qadhafi is clear, palpable, and growing. Many of our mutual friends in Africa feel the same way. We strongly believe that the regime in Libya should be isolated politically and economically until there is a real change in Qadhafi's policies.

Your Majesty, you are a great and good friend who shares many values and objectives with the people and Government of the United States of America. We wish to continue our close relationship which has served our common goals so well. We can best do so by maintaining our dialogue, both through visits such as that by Secretary Whitehead and through Ambassador Thomas Nassif, who will arrive in Morocco shortly to take up his duties as my representative. Ambassador Nassif has my full and complete confidence, and I am certain he will be a most able envoy to the Kingdom of Morocco.

² No record of the McFarlane-Karim Lamrani meeting has been found.

³ On July 8, in his remarks before the American Bar Association, Reagan identified Iran, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua as five state sponsors of international terrorism. For text of the address, see *Public Papers: Reagan 1985*, Book II, pp. 894–900.

⁴ See Document 229.

I know you will accept these views in the spirit of concerned amity in which they are sent. I have asked Secretary Whitehead to report personally to me the results of your conversations.

Please accept the expressions of my highest regard which Nancy joins me in sending. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End quote.

Armacost

246. Memorandum From James Stark of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, August 5, 1985

SUBJECT

FMS Reapportionment for Morocco

State and Defense have proposed reallocating to Morocco \$5 million in FMS originally approved for Lebanon (Tab I). These are FY85 funds which Lebanon cannot use and does not need, since it already has a backlog of \$20 million in old FMS credits. This reallocation is unrelated to the \$18 million in Lebanese ESF which was the target of an earlier raid.

Normally, such a reallocation would be handled between State and Defense with no NSC involvement. However, because of the sensitivity of our relations with Morocco, they are requesting your approval.

Without going back for Congressional approval, FMS can only be reallocated to countries which did not receive full funding for that year's FMS request. The table at Tab II² lists these countries and shows the size of the underfunding for FY85. Note that the Lebanese FMS can be reallocated at either Treasury (commercial) rates or concessional rates (about 5 percent), depending upon the nature of the underfunding.

Of the thirteen eligible countries, three—Guatemala, the Philippines, and Turkey—are ineligible due to legislative restrictions. Congress has

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (08/05/1985–09/30/1985). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamp at the top of the memorandum reads: "RCM HAS SEEN." An unknown hand wrote "TEICHER" underneath the stamp.

² Tab II, a table listing countries eligible for reapportionment, is attached but not printed.

specifically forbidden any additional FMS funds for Guatemala and the Philippines. Any reallocation to Turkey would automatically entail additional funds for Greece to conform to the 7:10 ratio. Since Greek FMS was fully funded, this move would require Congressional approval.

There are several reasons why each of the remaining countries are not good candidates for the \$5 million reallocation. Some—Dominican Republic, Peru, and Panama—have serious debt problems and would have trouble repaying a loan even at concessional rates. Others—Indonesia and Malaysia—would be unlikely to process the necessary paperwork prior to the end of the fiscal year. Oman and Malaysia already have unused FMS credits they can draw on, while Thailand could only receive \$2 million of the available funds. Tab II reviews the specific rationale for each country.

Moroccan FMS was underfunded by \$7 million in FY85. Unlike most countries, the U.S. has identified for Morocco a specific FMS/MAP funding level needed just to maintain its existing equipment. That level was requested, but not fully funded, in the FY85 CPD. Thus, shifting funds to Morocco would only slow the deterioration of their material readiness, but would not support purchase of new end items. The Moroccan Ambassador has authority to locally sign a credit agreement which would assure action prior to the end of the fiscal year.

The argument against reallocation to Morocco centers on Hassan's ties to Libya. Withholding these funds could be used to reinforce our other negative signals to King Hassan over Oujda. But such a move would also hurt the military—one of the primary supporters of stability in the country. While a shift of funds to Morocco is not unambiguously positive, I believe that in this case the pros outweigh the cons.

OMB and Treasury also support reallocating these funds to Morocco.

Don Fortier and Howard Teicher concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to inform DoD and State that NSC interposes no objection to the proposed reallocation to Morocco.³

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

Tab I

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

PROPOSED REAPPORTIONMENT OF \$5 MILLION IN
FMS FROM LEBANON TO MOROCCO

The Departments of State and Defense, with the concurrence of OMB and Treasury, wish to reapportion \$5.0 million in FMS credits from Lebanon to Morocco. Other alternatives—countries with allocations below the FY 1985 CPD level—have been studied. (Please see attached.)⁵ However, it is believed that reallocation of the funds to Morocco would be the most effective course.

OMB has informed State that it will not apportion \$5 million in FY 1985 FMS credits programmed for Lebanon. The reallocation would have no negative programmatic impact on Lebanon. The Lebanese would still have over \$20 million in old FMS credits that are available to them after this \$5 million is moved to Morocco.

The reallocation of the \$5 million in FMS credits will have no effect on the remaining \$20 million plus in unused FMS credits available to Lebanon, or on Lebanon's remaining ESF. (These credits have no relationship whatsoever with the no year ESF funds provided to Lebanon by the U.S. Congress in the FY 1983 Lebanon supplemental.) We anticipate no adverse Congressional reaction to this routine reallocation of funds.

There are sound programmatic reasons for such a reallocation to Morocco. DSAA estimates a Moroccan program sustainment level of \$58 million for FY 85. The present MAP/FMS allocation is \$48 million. This reallocation would have a beneficial effect on U.S.-Moroccan relations, particularly in light of the recently concluded JMC meeting.⁶

Since Morocco's funding level of \$3 million in FMS credits is currently below its FY 85 FMSCR request level of \$10 million, no reprogramming or reallocation notification to the Congress would be necessary. In addition, we do not believe that this extra \$5 million at concessional rates would have a significant adverse impact on Morocco's debt situation.

We would like to proceed with this reallocation as soon as possible. Our past experience indicates that it usually takes Morocco about two months to sign up for a new loan.

⁴ Confidential.

⁵ See footnote 2 above.

⁶ The JMC was held in Washington July 27–31.

247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 13, 1985

1. *Morocco: Whitehead Meeting with King Hassan.* John Whitehead met with King Hassan on Monday.² After presenting your letters,³ he told Hassan that our relationship is being damaged by his continuing union with Libya. Hassan acknowledged that Qadhafi's behavior has not improved as a result of the treaty, but argued that the union is non-binding and can be broken at any time, and that through it, he ended Libya's involvement in the Western Sahara war. John reminded Hassan that Americans perceive Qadhafi to be the epitome of evil; therefore, popular and informed political opinion in the US about Morocco was damaged by the treaty with Libya. Hassan attempted to deemphasize the importance of the treaty, offering to explain Morocco's position to the Congress when he is here in October. Hassan clearly understands that this issue is a major cause of concern for us. Turning to his perception of the United States Government's role in the peace process, Hassan said that he would seek discreetly to talk to the Peres government urging greater Israeli flexibility on the composition of the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. He believes that a meeting between such a delegation and US representatives would constitute irreversible Palestinian acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338. Hassan noted that he was charged by the Arab League Summit to present the results to you and Gorbachev before your November 19 meeting. Hassan plans to be in New York in October, and clearly hopes to call on you then. (*SENSITIVE*)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading July–December 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² August 12. A record of the Whitehead-Hassan meeting is in telegram 7563 from Rabat, August 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

³ See Document 245. Whitehead also carried a copy of the letter translated into French. See telegram 240694 to Rabat, August 6. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850558–0524)

248. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, August 15, 1985

Dear Bud:

I have just returned from an 11-day visit to the Middle East. As you know, my last stop was Morocco, where I had a long visit with King Hassan.² I delivered the President's letter which expressed serious concern about Morocco's treaty with Libya.³

I emphasized to Hassan in very strong terms that this treaty puts a serious strain on his 200-year-old relationship with the U.S. I explained that Qadhafi is considered here as the epitome of evil, the terrorist head of an outlaw nation, and that the American public, the Congress, and the Administration do not understand and have enormous difficulty in accepting this relationship. The King seemed to understand our concerns but explained that he had concluded the treaty in order to get Libya out of the Western Sahara war and that this had been accomplished.

At the end of the formal session with the King, he took me aside for a ten-minute private talk. He said that he could not terminate the treaty with Qadhafi, as I had urged him to, or they would come back into the Western Sahara war. He stated, however, that as a result of his relationship with Qadhafi, he now has considerable influence over him and is in a position to take specific steps to moderate his international behavior. He offered to use his influence with Qadhafi to advance American interests and virtually asked for an opportunity to prove to us that his relationship with Qadhafi would produce positive results for the United States. "Give me an assignment," he said.

In this private talk he also said that "nothing in this part of the world is forever," and if the United States could help him achieve his objective at the UN to get a referendum on the Western Sahara, over the objections of Algeria, an achievement which would end the war, then he would no longer need the treaty.

He said that he hopes to hear from you some time after August 25 regarding your plans to visit Morocco and that he would very much welcome such a visit. We are taking a hard look at Hassan's comments

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (08/05/1985-09/30/1985). Secret.

² See Document 247.

³ See Document 245.

and, of course, stand ready to assist in every way in preparing for your own possible visit to Rabat.

Sincerely,

John C. Whitehead⁴
Acting Secretary

⁴ Whitehead signed “John” above this typed signature.

249. Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to the Ambassador to Morocco (Nassif)¹

Washington, September 16, 1985

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you assume your new responsibilities as United States Ambassador to Morocco, I want to review our objectives there and to outline some areas for your priority attention. These overall guidelines will be supplemented with specific, issue-related instructions as needed. I hope that you will be better able to approach specific issues and give them their appropriate weight in the light of the priority areas described below.

U.S. objectives in Morocco are to: (1) induce the GOM to reconsider its unity accord with Libya; (2) pursue appropriate levels of political, military and economic cooperation; (3) promote self-sustaining economic growth and political stability; and (4) work to avoid escalation of the Western Sahara dispute and to encourage the search for a political solution to that conflict.

Your overarching task will be to continue the strong, traditional and friendly relationships with the Kingdom of Morocco. Unfortunately, these now are troubled by Hassan’s arrangements with Qadhafi. Absent abrogation of the agreement, an immediate USG objective is to limit areas of Moroccan/Libyan cooperation. I am particularly concerned about the possible compromise of U.S. equipment and intelligence, and your alertness in forestalling such will be of great importance.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Exdis September 1985. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN) on August 13; cleared by Zweifel. The Department also transmitted the letter in telegram 285089 to Rabat, September 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850658–0465)

As you work with the Moroccan government, you should pay particular attention to development of a realistic perception of the policy and resource constraints which affect our bilateral relationship. Your careful, critical appraisal of Moroccan assistance requests and your recommendations on how to promote economic and social development will be especially important inputs in our program decisions. Our overall goal is to assist the GOM to carry out necessary economic reform measures with particular emphasis on reliance on competitive market forces and the private sector.

Our military relationship with Morocco provides the U.S. with critical strategic assets of major importance to the United States both in Europe and the Middle East. Continued access to Moroccan facilities is a high priority. We recognize the importance of adequately responding to Morocco's legitimate security requirements, but the Moroccans must understand that our assistance is not designed either to compensate or to underwrite the costs of their Saharan conflict. We remain convinced that that dispute can only be resolved through political negotiations. We want to keep the parties to the conflict out in front and not to identify the USG too closely with either the Moroccan or Algerian positions.

The Mission's ability to monitor issues affecting political stability should be improved, particularly reporting on groups not associated with traditional elites.

I know that you will take appropriate steps to ensure the greatest possible physical security for all U.S. mission personnel and property and support the morale of U.S. and FSN personnel.

In the course of your duties, you will have contact with many officials, on a variety of matters, and you will receive solicited and unsolicited advice and counsel on actions you should take. The line of authority for any action or decision on your part flows from the President to me and from me through the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to you. I look to the NEA Assistant Secretary to issue instructions in my name and to serve as the primary communications link between us. You should channel all messages dealing with policy proposals, policy implementation, program activities and post operations to or through him.

I look forward to reviewing the goals and objectives statement for your mission. I am asking the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and North African Affairs to work with you on this statement, which will be forwarded to my office through the bureau.

As you undertake this challenging assignment, I wish you well in your many duties, and I reiterate my full confidence that you will be successful in your mission.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

250. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 11, 1985, 0914Z

9721. D for Deputy Secretary Whitehead; P for Under Secretary Armacost; NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy; Dept please pass NSC for Mr. McFarlane. Subject: King Hassan Cancels Planned U.S. Visit.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Abdelfattah Frej, Secretary to King Hassan, and Foreign Minister Filali separately informed Ambassador October 11 that Hassan has decided not to attend U.N. 40th anniversary celebrations as he had long planned. Both GOM officials first attributed Hassan's decision to cancel to the proliferation of regional events engaging his attention, but then obliquely made it clear that the real reason for cancellation is GOM-USG inability to arrange a private meeting for Hassan with President Reagan during Hassan's projected U.S. visit. This confirms fragmentary signals we had begun to receive early this week from sources close to Palace that Hassan might well cancel if Presidential meeting not in offing, but that local rationale for cancelling would be regional developments.

3. In his speech opening Parliament late October 11, Hassan himself announced publicly that he has decided not to go to New York "for several reasons".

4. Prime Minister Karim Lamrani will now lead Moroccan delegation to New York for anniversary celebrations. He plans to leave Morocco October 18 to arrive New York October 19. PriMin will be preceded to New York by Filali. (Septel gives further details of their trip and hope to see senior U.S. officials).² We assume, and strongly recommend, that PriMin be invited to President's October 23 reception now that Hassan will remain here. Filali and spouse have accepted the President's invitation.

5. Hassan is clearly disappointed at inability to arrange a meeting with the President. From their recent comments, Hassan's closest associates, i.e., Filali, tend to attribute non-meeting to continuing USG concerns about the Morocco-Libya union. While we do not predict any

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850729–0163. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

² In telegram 9722 from Rabat, October 11, the Embassy reported that Filali told Nassif that he "will return to New York next Tuesday, October 15, to have further discussions on UNGA business (above all, Western Sahara)." Karim-Lamrani, meanwhile, would arrive on October 19. The Embassy reported that he "very much hopes to meet with Vice President Bush." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850729–0172)

dramatic change in U.S.-Moroccan relations in the months ahead, we do think that things are likely to remain on dead-center and that there will not be much movement in any domain until the President and Hassan have an opportunity to meet face-to-face for the air-clearing discussions which Embassy recommended in Rabat 9058.³ Ambassador strongly recommends that Department and White House place Hassan prominently on the list of state or official visitors in the first half of 1986 and that we be prepared to tell GOM at an early date that we are prepared to schedule such a visit. Our so informing the GOM would salve Hassan's present hurt and embarrassment as well as prepare the way for a meeting (at the top levels of government) which should go far toward protecting and extending U.S. interest over the years ahead.

Nassif

³ In telegram 9058 from Rabat, September 25, Nassif reported that he had been called in by Basri, who told him that the King wanted to meet with him later that day in order to discuss Hassan's upcoming visit to New York. Nassif continued: "I assume that the King's urgent request to see me follows receipt by him of word from Ambassador Jorio that the President will be unable to receive Hassan in New York." Nassif predicted that Hassan will "almost certainly press me hard for reconsideration of the White House decision." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850682-0764)

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, December 24, 1985, 1258Z

12186. NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy from Ambassador. Subj: Letter of Instructions/Goals and Objectives. Refs: A) State 285089;² B) State 118267.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Secretary Shultz's September 16 letter to me, repeated in ref (A), contained Secretary's initial instructions, goals and objectives for my

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850922-0744. Secret; Exdis.

² See footnote 1, Document 249.

³ In telegram 118267 to all Near Eastern and South Asian Posts, April 19, the Department informed the posts that all newly appointed Chiefs of Mission would "receive a letter of instruction from the Secretary defining goals and objectives. Within 120 days of his or her arrival, the Chief of Mission will confirm these instructions or seek modifications." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850270-0645)

mission to Morocco. There follow my comments on those instructions, as well as some reflections on how we should pursue those objectives here, as requested ref (B). I hope that in formulating a final goals and objectives statement for this Embassy for the next 12 months, the Department will take into account these comments on the limits of the possible and on modalities for achieving our objectives.

3. Policy objectives:

I concur that the four specific objectives listed in paragraph (2) of the Secretary's letter are central to U.S.-Moroccan relations and appropriate for this mission. Regarding objective number (1), "inducing the GOM to reconsider its Unity Accord with Libya" Washington and this Embassy need to think through, and perhaps have a further dialogue on: (a) what would in fact constitute success in achieving that objective; (b) the current impediments to achieving total, fully visible success; and (c) the tactics we should pursue in trying to achieve it.

4. As recent Embassy [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reporting have clearly indicated, the Union Accord is not flourishing. It is being implemented slowly, largely in relatively non-controversial areas, and there is strong evidence that some senior officials like Prime Minister Lamrani are deliberately slowing it further. Apart from Morocco's dissatisfaction with Qadhafi, the USG can itself take considerable pride in its own contributions to date to slowing the accord: We have consistently argued against the wisdom, and indeed the morality, of aligning with a terrorist like Qadhafi, and we have left the Moroccans in no doubt that their relationship with us will not be wholly restored until the Union Accord is past history. These efforts have enjoyed substantial success. On the other hand, the accord is unlikely to disappear immediately through any dramatic renunciation by Hassan so long as he believes in its utility in preventing a renewal of Libyan support for the Polisario.

5. Under these circumstances the question arises of what U.S. tactics and strategy should be to bring about final dissolution of the Morocco-Libya union. It seems to me there are two basic alternatives: (1) to continue to apply about the same amount of pressure as we have applied to date in the hope, and indeed expectation, that we can continue to keep Morocco off balance with respect to the union, thus probably ensuring the Union Accord's prudent and less than total implementation, and its eventual demise; or (2) to put on a full court press with the GOM at the highest levels of our two governments designed to bring a quick end to the accord. Apart from the fact that the desirable latter goal is probably unobtainable in the immediate future, to adopt such a strategy would require our being prepared to answer the almost certain GOM question of whether the U.S. is prepared to support Morocco against Qadhafi. Such a question would have implications for U.S. aid levels to Morocco, for U.S.-Moroccan defense cooperation, or both. (I would note that such

GOM figures as PriMin Lamrani and FonMin Filali have since mid-summer hinted that at some point the GOM could conceivably ask us whether we would be prepared to give Morocco financial support to counter renewed Libyan support for the Polisario, should Morocco dissolve the union.) In summary, as the U.S. reflects on how it wishes to pursue our laudable objective of putting as much distance as possible between Hassan and Qadhafi, we need to consider clearly the limits of the possible and how much we might be prepared to pay politically and monetarily to achieve total, visible success.

6. More briefly on other policy goals:

— To pursue appropriate levels of political, military, and economic cooperation, and to promote self-sustaining economic growth and political stability in Morocco (objectives no. 2 and 3 in the Secretary's letter) will require the continued provision to Morocco of substantial amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. To pursue those goals vigorously would require much larger inputs than we are now making or are projected. To do any less than we currently plan would risk seriously compromising both objectives. Given the increasingly tight U.S. budgetary situation, it is difficult to argue for greater assistance for Morocco, and yet the Country Team and I believe that objectively greater aid is necessary and warranted.

— Re the Western Sahara (objective no. 4), the U.S. should continue its present policy of quiet encouragement to Algeria and Morocco to negotiate a political solution which could be put to the people of the Western Sahara for endorsement in a referendum or similar device. Since the present seems unpropitious for a break-through, the U.S. should avoid any temptation to take on a mediation role and the attendant risk of getting squeezed between the two main parties and seeing our relations with both suffer.

7. Management objectives:

Simply put, I think our objectives in the management area should be: (1) to maintain effective management controls to ensure that we sustain the official U.S. presence in Morocco at the lowest possible cost; (2) to provide the greatest possible measure of security for our personnel and installations; and (3) to maintain employee morale at the highest possible level.

8. I have thoroughly reviewed our budget, procurement, and related management controls (suggested goal no. 1 in para 8) and believe we have this problem well in hand. It will receive my continuing attention, however. I am happy to report that American and FSN employees attest to extremely high morale; we intend to keep it that way (goal no. 3). With regard to goal no. 2—physical security—we need the Department's help in ensuring timely financial assistance and hands-on construction supervision and follow-through to ensure that

the security enhancement plans that have grown out of the many security enhancement visits from Washington the past two years are carried through to early fruition. Specifically, we need money now to purchase the land for a new Ambassador's residence that has been made available to us at low cost through intercession by King Hassan. We would also like to see Washington proceed to budget for, and draw plans for, construction on the current Embassy compound of an annex designed to house USAID and USIS.

Nassif

252. Telegram From Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 9, 1986, 1347Z

226. For the Secretary and NEA/AS Murphy. Subject: January 8 Audience With King Hassan on Dealing With Libya.

1. Secret—Nodis

2. Summary: King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech on January 8 to discuss the President's January 7 announcement² and next steps to deal with terrorism. Emphasizing that the United States reaction was "fully legitimate," he expressed the fear that, given the numerous expressions of solidarity with Libya and lack of support from European allies, the U.S. measures would appear ineffective, and Qadhafi would seem the victor in the confrontation. Hassan told me that, in fact, Qadhafi is deeply concerned and had called him earlier on January 8 to tell him so. Hassan said he was sending Royal Counselor Guedira to Tripoli to hear what Qadhafi intended to do to prove he is willing to respond positively to the U.S. position. I told Hassan that the President earnestly hoped that other countries would join with our initiative to drive home the point that terrorism is unacceptable. I said the U.S. hoped that Hassan, as head of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference, could make a statement in support of the President's

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Reference is to Reagan's January 7 statement at a press conference that he had issued Executive Order 12543 prohibiting trade and certain transactions involving Libya. Documentation on this decision is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For the text of the Executive Order, see *Public Papers: Reagan 1982*, Book II, pp. 14–15.

initiative. I emphasized to Hassan that words from Qadhafi were insufficient, that only actions, for example such as expulsion of Abu Nidal from Libya, were of interest. I told him that one of the main United States objectives and one of my main goals as Ambassador was to see Morocco's union with Libya ended. He said he hoped to talk with President Reagan about that matter in coming months. End summary.

3. King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech urgently on Wednesday afternoon, January 8. We spoke for an hour in his private quarters. The King was accompanied by Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and President of Parliament Ahmed Osman.

4. Hassan opened by telling me he had called me "as a friend" of President Reagan and of the United States. He said he had seen the measures against Libya announced by the President on January 7. The United States reaction, he noted carefully, was "fully legitimate" in his eyes. He said he understood the U.S. attitude toward terrorism and its desire to stop it.

5. He went on to note, however, that he was concerned about how effective the measures would turn out to be. They are economic measures, he said, not military ones. Qadhafi, he feared, would still be able to obtain the benefits of U.S. technology through other countries. He said he had analyzed the reaction over the past few days to talk of sanctions against Libya and had noted that the European allies were not at all supportive. The Arab and Islamic communities had both stated their solidarity with Libya. A number of non-aligned countries were doing the same. Hassan said that the United States position might have been better understood if its reaction had been more decisive. "You should have sent a commando unit, and talked about it later." Hassan said he understood the reasons for the President's decision, but in the current environment, he said he feared in the short term, the appearance would be that it is the United States, not Libya, that is isolated on the issue. Hassan said that he did not want to see that impression develop. The U.S. must appear as succeeding in this matter. He said it was important to look at the next steps.

6. Hassan observed that, for the moment, Qadhafi is "strutting about" acting victorious as a result of all the declarations of solidarity Libya is receiving. It is a false impression, Hassan stated. Qadhafi is deeply frightened by actions the U.S. might take. He said that the Libyan leader had called him earlier on January 8, and was clearly shaken by the President's speech.³ Emphasizing that Qadhafi had in no way requested the visit, he said he had decided to send Royal

³ Reference is likely to Reagan's January 7 press conference, during which he accused Qadhafi of providing "sanctuary and support" for the perpetrators of the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports. See *Public Papers: Reagan 1982*, Book II, pp. 17-24.

Counselor Reda Guedira to Tripoli on January 9 to see what Qadhafi was willing to do in response to the President's speech.

7. I then interjected to clarify the United States position. I explained at length the President's January 7 statement, and the background which had led up to it. I emphasized the deep outrage in the United States towards terrorism, and in particular towards Libyan support of it. President Reagan felt strongly the need to act now to stop the terrorist threat, and his January 7 executive order was meant to do just that. I told Hassan that the United States seeks support from all countries in order to make its economic measures against Libya more effective. I urged him, as President of the Arab League and of the Islamic Conference, to join in that effort, condemning terrorism and Libyan support of it. I left him talking points on the President's executive order and what we hoped friends of the United States would do to further its goals. (State 5472)⁴

8. I commented on Hassan's intention to send Guedira to Tripoli, pointing out that the Libyan leader's position was already well-known. I noted that Qadhafi had first praised the December 27 terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna only later to "condemn them".⁵ I emphasized that the United States was not interested in words or promises from Libya. The United States wanted to see a halt to unacceptable Libyan behavior, for example expelling Abu Nidal and ceasing all support for him.

9. I told the King this was one issue on which every American was in complete agreement. When he told me he wanted to try to lower regional tension, I responded that we want to see an end to terrorism. The King showed a renewed awareness on the depth of U.S. feelings on the question. He told me that he was considering the pros and cons of sending Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed to Washington later in the week to deliver a letter from him to the President and speak to the President, "if only for a few minutes," on the terrorism question. Later in the conversation, however, he said he would only send the Crown Prince if he received an appropriate response from Qadhafi. Hassan went on to say he felt a personal friendship for President Reagan, and emphasized he had no such feelings toward Qadhafi. "I might have a treaty with Libya," he observed, "but we have been friends of the United States for hundreds of years."

10. Toward the end of the conversation, I confided privately to the King that he had to understand the United States' position. I said that it is a USG objective and one of my top priorities as Ambassador to

⁴ Telegram 5472 to all diplomatic posts, January 8, contains the text of the executive order. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860015–1078)

⁵ Reference is to the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks. See footnote 2, Document 156.

Morocco to see an end to the treaty of Oujda. I explained that anything Morocco did or said with regard to Libya would be viewed by the U.S. in the context of the Oujda Accord. The U.S. overriding interest was in terminating that relationship. Hassan agreed that it was a matter he would have to discuss personally in Washington. I then added that any discussion with the President could usefully include an exchange of views on possible contacts between Hassan and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (State 367280).⁶ Hassan said that he would like to make a brief working visit to Washington in the early spring to pursue those questions.

11. Comment: During the meeting, Hassan was relaxed and seemingly far removed from the pressures of an Islamic Conference ministerial meeting in Fes. I do not believe that I was convoked to carry out any particular Arab League or Islamic Conference commitment. Hassan, as the Department is aware, has long sought to insert himself as a middle-man between the U.S. and Qadhafi. He also continues to attach great importance to a meeting this year with the President and may have regarded the ill-conceived idea of sending Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed with a message as a first step in that process. Without impugning the Crown Prince's abilities, I did my best to discourage the proposal emphasizing that the USG position on Libya would be determined by specific actions only, not words. In fact, there is a bizarre discontinuity between Hassan's aspirations to play a mediator's role and Interior Minister Basri's report, shared with me on the same day, about possible Libyan terrorists transiting Casablanca for the U.S. (Rabat 205).⁷

12. These contradictions and Hassan's self-serving interest in mediation and a meeting with the President should not, however, obscure what I believe is a genuine attempt to be helpful on his part. The executive order and current U.S. crisis with Libya occur at a time of maximum friction in Morocco's union with Libya. Hassan, in my view, is not ready to risk resumed Libyan support to the Polisario by an outright rupture and is worried that the crisis could impact adversely on his relations with the U.S. His concern that the U.S. not become isolated in the Arab and Islamic groups by a groundswell of support for the

⁶ In telegram 367280 to Rabat and Tel Aviv, December 3, 1985, the Department agreed "that likelihood of an early Hassan-Peres meeting is doubtful at present," but indicated that "it is possible that quiet communication will continue between the two leaders." The Department also urged the Embassy in Morocco to "encourage Hassan and his advisors to continue to play a constructive role" in any future discussions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850862-0824)

⁷ In telegram 205 from Rabat, January 8, the Embassy reported that Basri shared with Nassif the text of a telegram from "Casablanca security services reporting alleged plan by Libyan terrorists to infiltrate the United States via Casablanca." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860018-0624)

“underdog” Libya appears genuine. I am under no illusions, however, that the King, if he chooses to even raise the issue, is likely to prevail with Qadhafi in seeking expulsion from Libya of Abu Nidal or other specific indications of change in Libyan behavior.

13. On the other hand, why not respond to Hassan that if he is interested in lowering the temperature, he can take a first step by telling Colonel Qadhafi to publicly admit his support for Abu Nidal, announce his imminent expulsion from Libyan territory and an immediate cessation of further financial and political support for him. Regardless of the potential for success, such a role would shift the burden of lessening tension to Hassan and call his hand on the issue of whether the union can live up to its advertised moderating potential. It would also put more pressure on Hassan to abrogate the treaty if he fails to pass the “test” and is consistent with our démarches world-wide.

Nassif

**253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Morocco¹**

Washington, January 11, 1986, 2135Z

10312. For the Ambassador. Subject: Response to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 226.²

1. Secret—Nodis.

2. We want to reinforce the excellent representations you made to King Hassan in your 1/8 meeting. You should seek another audience at earliest possible time and draw on the following points:

— We appreciate your recognition that the measures announced by President Reagan are “fully legitimate” and your understanding of the United States Government’s attitude toward terrorism and our desire to stop it. We reemphasize the important point that Ambassador Nassif made in his meeting with you on January 8. Our goal is an end to unacceptable Libyan behavior. We have no confidence in words or promises of Colonel Qadhafi.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Quinn, Oakley, Zweifel, Simeon Moats (S/S-O), and Pamela Rockwell (L/EBC); approved by Armacost.

² See Document 252.

— The USG regrets however, that the Government of Morocco is associated with the OIC consensus declarations.³ These include egregious and hostile mischaracterizations of the measures now taken by the United States.

— The USG is resolved to make Qadhafi pay a price for his persistent support of terrorism. In coming weeks, we will seek other governments' support in a series of measures to reduce the threat of terrorism and isolate Libya. We are encouraged by indications that European and other governments are considering measures consistent with these objectives.

— Morocco's leadership role in securing approval of Arab League condemnations of terrorism is appreciated; such a position, however, is seriously weakened by the strong support given Libya in Arab League and OIC fora.

— We are confident that our condemnations of Qadhafi are well founded. His protestations of innocence cannot be believed, nor can his word be trusted. For example, in addition to the many terrorist actions which can be traced to the Libyan Government, you should know that Libyan officials now are telling Western European governments that Abu Nidal is not in Libya, but operating from Morocco.

— We appreciate his Majesty's thoughtfulness in raising the possibility of a visit to the US by the Crown Prince to consider further the possibility of moderating Qadhafi's behavior. As Ambassador Nassif has stated, however, we have no interest in engaging in any dialogue, even indirectly, with Qadhafi. We do not trust his word. If he is interested in moving toward international acceptability, let him demonstrate that through such actions as that suggested by Ambassador Nassif.

— We welcome His Majesty's thoughts about Qadhafi, but remain firm in our belief that Libya's support for terrorism has remained undiminished as has its threat to international order.

Shultz

³ On January 7, the OIC released a statement that in part proclaimed "its solidarity with the Libyan Arab people and its active support of the defense of its sovereignty and the integrity of its territory and territorial waters." The full text of the statement is in telegram 233 from Rabat, January 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860020-0879) On January 9 the OIC adopted a second, consensus resolution "expressing solidarity with Libya" which "toughens the earlier language adopted" by specifically condemning "the measures taken by the United States against (Libya)." The Embassy's informal translation of the resolution is in telegram 281 from Rabat, January 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860023-0285)

254. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Invitation for King Hassan To Visit the U.S.

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to recommend to the NSC early announcement that King Hassan of Morocco will be invited to Washington during the first half of 1986.

DISCUSSION

King Hassan was among those Chiefs of State whom the Department recommended be invited to Washington during the first half of 1986. The White House has not announced a final decision, but we have been told informally by the NSC that there is a good possibility that the visit for Hassan will be approved.

Also, in terms of our face-off with Qadhafi, it would be to our advantage to have the visit announced soon. We are sure that Hassan would immediately respond in positive fashion to an invitation.²

Announcement of our invitation during Deputy Secretary Whitehead's current trip would have the additional political value in demonstrating to the Europeans the continuing vitality of U.S.-Arab relations.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (01/16/1986). Confidential. Sent through Armacost. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." McKinley also initialed the memorandum and wrote: "21 January."

² In a January 22 note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "I am inclined to endorse this request. We have important interests at stake in Morocco. Hassan has been eager to come for some time, and the prospect of a meeting may offer some leverage on his relationship with Libya." He continued: "I do believe a Presidential meeting could afford us opportunities to sow seeds of discord between Rabat and Tripoli. While our objective, at least, should be to precipitate a break in the Oujda Union, realistically we are not likely to succeed simply by offering a visit, since both budgetary and political constraints inhibit us from making the kinds of commitments to Hassan that would precipitate such a shift in his relationships." (Ibid.)

³ Whitehead visited Europe January 15–24 for consultations with the NATO countries about Libya and terrorism. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum⁴ recommending this course of action to the White House.⁵

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Shultz approved the recommendation on January 24.

**255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Morocco¹**

Washington, March 4, 1986, 0358Z

65573. Subject: President Reagan's Response to King Hassan's Letter of February 7 (8606811).

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The following are texts of King Hassan's February 7 letter to President Reagan regarding the Middle East peace process and President Reagan's answer. Ambassador should deliver reply. Signed original will follow.

3. Begin text of King Hassan's February 7 letter:

Dear Mr. President:

We have met more than once since the American people have brought you to the highest office to conduct their destiny which often happens to be linked with that of other people. In fact, nothing humanly relating to the peace and progress of our society today could remain alien to the man who, dutifully aware of his responsibilities and determined to fulfill, for the general good, the mission which, in rather historically rare moments, is vested in him. Indeed, we are now going through a historically rare moment full of hopes as well as numerous questionings and deep concerns. Together, we have tackled a number of problems related to hotbeds of confrontation and insecurity.

My triple capacity of current Chairman of the Arab Summit, Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee has, in our joint reflections and our exchange of views, naturally made us dwell more particularly on the Middle East

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Josiah Rosenblat (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Hill, McKinley, Gregory Talcott (S/S-O), Pearson, and Brian Curran (P); approved by Murphy.

conflict. It was then with special attention and interest that I tried to understand your position, seeking to grasp as much as possible of the depths of the motives behind it. This I did with the greatest effort and the maximum degree of “fair play”, in order to free myself from any eventual preconceived ideas which, I had thought, might have caused so many harmful prejudices, thereby obstructing the way of comprehension and agreement here and there.

Today, I am asking you, most amicably and sincerely, to make the same exorcizing effort so that we may, together, gradually perceive the true significance of that which is preliminary, that which is principal, that which is transient, that which is temporary, that which is essential and that which embodies peace for the Middle East as well as that which may bring about the success of such a peace or endanger it.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is today at a decisive turning point. Not long ago, differences were deep; now, they are so reduced that one may hope to achieve the goal of peace so longed for. The error of not taking advantage of the opportunity which presents itself would be so unforgivable and would entail far-reaching consequences, especially that, in addition to the open or disguised war Israel and the Arabs have been waging one against the other for forty years now, a new hotbed of instability and insecurity has emerged along the Red Sea—something which could put all of the nations of the region into a situation whose evolution no one would dare control.

In this exceptionally strategic region, America has so many peace-seeking friends whose progress and development are unfortunately obstructed by the prevailing situation. Your determination to help your friends is so known, as it obviously results from a fair appraisal of the supreme interests of the United States of America which you value in a global manner and, consequently, in relation to every link between your country and the rest of the world.

I feel confident that you realize, as I do, that the time of hesitation is over and that the hour of beneficially liberating decision has come.

The main goal is to make a contribution—however modest—to the design of peace so wholeheartedly called for by the entire world.

Being far from the region, we naturally feel free from any inhibition or, quite simply, from anything that might hinder healthy reflections.

At this stage, the teachings deriving from the frequent contacts maintained with one party or another give reason to believe and hope that the perspective of what could be the way towards the solution has now become relatively clear and concrete.

I—The aim is and remains that of installing a just, global and durable peace ensuring full security for all and an atmosphere of quiet and stability for the region.

II—The means, as well as the terms and conditions, of achieving it must be negotiated between all the parties interested or concerned.

III—In the negotiations to be held, the Palestinian people will be represented by the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative, *de facto* and *de jure*. In this respect, my deep conviction—based on utterly objective motives and rejecting any puerile sentimentality—is that it would be illusive and absolutely useless to think that the Arabs—and particularly the Palestinian people—could be involved and validly committed through the appointment or the imposition of representatives other than those legitimately acting on behalf of the Palestinian people for over ten years now.

IV—Negotiations should be accompanied with an official statement recognizing the Palestinian People's inalienable right for self-determination within a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, in concordance with the agreements concluded in Amman between His Majesty the King of Jordan and the PLO Chairman. Simultaneously, the PLO would confirm its adherence to the United Nations and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Middle East conflict, including Resolutions 242 and 338.

V—The valid and appropriate framework for the negotiations should be that of an international conference which would group, apart from the parties directly interested or concerned, the Security Council members.

In my estimation, these suggestions have the advantage and the merit of drawing a nearly total consensus. In any event, so far as Mr. Gorbachev concerned, he expresses the following in his reply of 6 December 1985 and in response to the message I had addressed to him on the occasion of your Geneva Summit: "It is only according to the extent to which the interests and the rights of all parties are reciprocally taken into account that deadlocks could be avoided in the Middle East settlement. Actually, such an objective can be reached only within the framework of an international conference with the participation of all parties interested, including the PLO, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people who are the greatest victims of the Middle East tragedy. In our opinion, there is no other alternative."

Since the cardinal virtue of clarity has always made relations easier among men, allowing for dialogue to proceed further, there is a point which, I believe, needs clarifying.

The Israeli air-raid against the PLO headquarters aimed at the physical elimination of its chairman. Wrongly or rightly, the American responsibility has been implicated. I personally find it difficult to think, one moment, that the President of the United States, whom I know and appreciate, could have allowed to be involved in such a blatant aggression act; however, I believe that a clarification from you would

efficiently enhance and comfort the feelings of the Arab masses and their leaders which the role attributed to the United States in the Israeli aggression has unfortunately not left unaltered.

In this respect, the PLO Chairman has asked me this: “must I still be considered sentenced to death by those who are Israel’s support? I want to know so that the PLO could draw the adequate conclusions. Isn’t there a contradiction between the death sentence which I still may continue to be the object of and the fact that I am personally and persistently asked to recognize, on behalf of the organization I lead, Resolutions 242 and 338 so as to allow the peace process to prosper?”

The suggestions which I submit to the friend and the official who, to a large degree, holds the fate and destiny of the peoples of the countries of the Middle East, result from a ripe reflection and a steady concentration the various responsibilities have allowed me to undertake.

Should these suggestions meet with your approval, we could join forces so as to bring together, and unify around them, all the parties interested or concerned.

Please accept, Mr. President and great friend, the assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

Most sincerely yours, Hassan II, King of Morocco. End text.

4. Begin text of response. Your Majesty, Ambassador Nassif has delivered your message of February 7. I appreciate your thoughts on the requirements for a peace settlement in the Middle East.

As you know, a just and enduring peace in the Middle East remains a paramount objective of my government. It is of great concern to me personally, as well. I can only agree with you that a dispassionate analysis of all the factors involved must underlie any effort to resolve this complex and difficult problem. Otherwise, those efforts are doomed to failure.

You write of “a just, global and durable peace ensuring full security for all.” That is indeed our common goal. You also note that such a peace must be a negotiated peace. I fully concur: an imposed solution would not be a lasting peace. I would add, however, that such a peace must be negotiated directly by the parties. This could take place under international auspices, if the parties so decided and according to mutually agreeable arrangements.

The internationally recognized basis for any such negotiations are those contained in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is my view, Your Majesty, that all parties to negotiations would logically have to subscribe to these fundamental principles. This includes, of course, the representatives of the Palestinian people.

During the course of negotiations those principles—as well as others, such as the legitimate rights of the Palestinians—would be brought to bear.

We in the United States followed the recent discussions in Amman with great interest. I can only accept His Majesty King Hussein's assessment of the causes of the failure of those talks as he detailed them in his speech of February 19.² I take particular note of his judgement that he is "unable to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy." I believe that the breakdown of the Amman negotiations, despite the valiant efforts of King Hussein, was a significant event in the search for peace in the Middle East. It has brought us to a period of reflection on all sides.

You refer in your letter, Your Majesty, to lingering suspicion that the United States Government may have played a role in the attack by Israeli military aircraft on the Tunis headquarters of the PLO. I can only state once again that such accusations are totally unfounded. My government had no advance knowledge nor in any way facilitated the Israeli raid on the capital of a friendly state. I would be grateful if you would convey this message to any who remain in doubt.

I have long admired your efforts to encourage understanding on both sides of the Middle East conflict. Your letter reflects your continuing dedication to the cause of peace in that region. During this period of reflection, in particular, the candid expression of your views is most welcome. Please accept my sincere appreciation and best wishes.

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
End text.

Shultz

²Reference is to King Hussein of Jordan's February 19 speech in Amman, in which he announced "he was ending a yearlong effort to devise a joint speech strategy" with the PLO. ("Hussein Drops a Yearlong Effort to Join In Peace Bid With Arafat," *New York Times*, February 20, 1986, pp. A1, A4)

256. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 22, 1986, 1807Z

3965. Subject: Internal Debate Continues Over Reaction to U.S. Attack on Libya.² Ref: Rabat 3829.³

1. Confidential—Entire text

2. Summary: Differences within Morocco on appropriate reaction to U.S. military action against Libya have sharpened with the opposition complaining that the GOM has quashed parliamentary and popular manifestations of solidarity with Libya. The charges have some validity and several contacts have confirmed press reports that police rapidly cracked down on incipient protests in various Moroccan cities. The government controlled press has also begun to move beyond the Libyan issue. Hassan has a strong domestic motivation for wanting to keep protests under control and, equally important, he is anxious that no incident jeopardize the effort to restore normalcy to relations with the U.S. End summary.

3. Moroccan reaction to U.S. military action against Libya has increasingly become an internal political issue. Leaders of opposition parties have complained strongly of “weak” official Moroccan response to the April 15 attack. Mohamed Yazghi, generally considered the second most powerful figure in the Socialist Party, told EmbOff April 18 that he was “astounded” that King Hassan’s April 15 letter to Qadhafi contained no condemnation of U.S. action. He said that in April 16 parliamentary debate, government parties, clearly acting on orders from the Palace, had deliberately watered down a resolution on the U.S. attack. The resolution finally approved, while denouncing the U.S. by name for the “aggression”, confines itself to “supporting the position of solidarity with Libya expressed by King Hassan” and “supports any action of the King to restore peace and security in the region.” The Istiqlal and Socialist Party press have also strongly criticized the GOM

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860308–0389. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Damascus, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Cairo, Paris, Madrid, London, and USUN.

² See footnote 2, Document 159.

³ In telegram 3829 from Rabat, April 17, the Embassy reported: “Reaction to the U.S. raid on Libya is mixed here. After a 24-hour delay, the political parties have come out strongly pro-Libya, and a special session of Parliament on April 16 emphasized those same sentiments. Privately, many Moroccans have offered a different line, expressing understanding and sympathy with the U.S. action, and even the hope that the U.S. goes further in combating Qadhafi.” The Embassy continued: “many observers doubt whether there will be much permanent benefit for Libya or damage to the U.S. image here.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860295–0358)

for preventing protests, noting that in other parts of the Islamic world, governments have declared official periods of mourning.

4. Contacts outside Rabat confirm press reports of attempted protests against the U.S. action. Peace Corps volunteers, especially in northern Morocco, report isolated instances of schools being closed. One volunteer reported that the high school in Ouezzan had been closed for two days, and said that, at one small student demonstration, an American flag had been burned. The stabbing of four British tourists (resulting in the death of one) in Marrakech on April 15 would appear to be an exception to the generally nonbelligerent protests, although police officials insist that the sole attacker has a history of mental problems. Police contacts maintain, however, that student protests, while in response to April 15 raid, also reflect a combination of grievances, such as the lack of job prospects as the end of the school year approaches and generally depressed economic conditions. Most protests appear to have been concentrated in northern Morocco where economic and political disaffection tends to be highest, but have now largely subsided.

5. The GOM has already begun to signal its intent to put the Libyan attack behind it, at least in terms of domestic political sentiment. On the one hand, police have been unusually solicitous to avoid any incident involving an American citizen. Peace Corps volunteers around the country report that authorities have gone out of their way to offer protection, in some cases personally visiting the PCV homes on a daily basis. In Rabat, authorities have exceeded what the Embassy requested in terms of protection. The pro-government press, in the meantime, has continued straight forward reporting on Libya. While Communist Party daily "Al Bayane" gave banner headlines to a "Washington Post" report⁴ alleging that the April 15 attack sought the death of Colonel Qadhafi, pro-government dailies have avoided reference to the "Post" report. By contrast, semi-official daily "Le Matin du Sahara" described in detail inter-Arab divergences over convoking an extraordinary Arab League meeting to condemn the attack. Equally significant was an extensive report carried on Moroccan television on April 18 on activities of a delegation of ten governors on an IVP trip to the United States. The story focussed on the delegation's meeting with USIA Director Wick,⁵ with the voice-over quoting both sides' comments on "excellence of" the "perennial ties" with the United States.

6. Comment: Hassan has several reasons to keep "displays of solidarity" with Libya within reasonable bounds. Government officials claim that vocal demonstrations by a small minority would

⁴ Reference is presumably to George C. Wilson, "Qadhafi Was A Target of U.S. Raid: 'Hoped We'd Get Him,' Official Says; At Least 1 Jet Aimed at Compound," (*Washington Post*, April 18, 1986, pp. A1, A17).

⁵ No record of Wick's conversations with the ten governors has been found.

misrepresent the depth of actual sentiment in Morocco over Libya. One senior police official also told EmbOff that the Interior Ministry is suspicious that demonstrations to date have been less spontaneous than they would appear, and report that known Libyan contacts have been the most active in fomenting protest. From the King's perspective, it could set a bad precedent to allow popular protests which could also give vent to discontent over current social and economic conditions. Additionally, the palace is also clearly anxious to protect its ties with the U.S. and does not want to risk reactions to the U.S. attack on Libya jeopardizing prospects for a royal visit to Washington.

Nassif

257. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead¹

Washington, April 30, 1986

SUBJECT

USG Reaction to Moroccan Efforts for an Arab League Summit

At the April 30 morning meeting,² you asked whether we should consider sanctions against Morocco in light of Hassan's efforts to organize an Arab League Summit.³ For several reasons, sanctions against Morocco would be counterproductive.

— Morocco is the venue for the highest level U.S.-host country military exercise out of NATO.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D93, Exdis Files Apr, May, June, Jul, Aug 1986. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussery and John Hawes (PM). Zweifel initialed for both Ussery and Hawes. Murphy did not initial the memorandum. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in S/S at 5:25 p.m. on April 30.

² No record of the April 30 morning meeting has been found.

³ In telegram 4077 from Rabat, April 24, the Embassy reported: "MFA SecState Cherkaoui confirmed to Embassy April 24 that emergency Arab League summit in Fes now appears likely for next week, but not yet certain." The Embassy continued "Cherkaoui expressed understanding for U.S. position and assurances that King Hassan would work against any criticism of the U.S. He offered no strategy, however, for how Morocco might prevent such a summit from becoming a forum for Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860316-0556)

— Our existing access and transit agreement with Morocco has strategic importance for our military posture in the area as well as utility as an alternative to Spanish and Portuguese bases or access agreements. We are building our largest global VOA transmittal station at Tangier.

— The GOM has been very responsive on short notice to requests such as the designation of Casablanca as an alternate landing site for space shuttle flights.

Since conclusion of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty, our relations with Morocco have been marked by an appropriate coolness, but we have been careful to protect important interests such as those cited above. In this vein, we have signaled to Hassan that his latest efforts on the Arab Summit further might complicate possibilities of a visit to Washington. I believe that is where we should draw the line for the moment.

258. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M#86-20098

Washington, June 30, 1986

Morocco: On the Eve of King Hassan's Visit to Washington
[portion marking not declassified]

Summary

Moroccan King Hassan's visit this month will be his first official visit to the United States since 1982.² He views the trip as signifying that bilateral relations are back on track after a strained period following the announcement of the Moroccan-Libyan Union in August 1984. He will be looking for additional economic and military assistance to help ease mounting economic pressures and as a measure of Washington's appreciation for his support for US interests in the region. [portion marking not declassified]

The King's hold on power is secure over the near term. Nevertheless, deteriorating economic conditions coupled with high expectations among the burgeoning youthful population are threats to his authority. [portion marking not declassified]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, Hassan Visit (12/20/1985-06/30/1986). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, based on information received as of June 30.

² See Document 205.

Hassan has been slow to face up to domestic problems and immerses himself in foreign policy issues. He views himself as an international statesman and is likely to stress during his visit that his ties with Washington, contacts with Israel, and his position as head of the Arab League give him the opportunity to broker a Middle East peace settlement. The King's foreign policy preoccupation, however, continues to be Morocco's war with the Algerian-backed Polisario Front in the Western Sahara—a struggle that he appears determined to win on the battlefield despite professing openness to a negotiated settlement in recent UN sponsored mediation talks.³ A sensitive issue for him is the Moroccan-Libyan Union; Hassan persists in maintaining the accord even though the benefits to Rabat have been limited. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

³ Reference is to the ongoing attempts by Pérez de Cuellar to negotiate a settlement of the Western Sahara war at the UN. In telegram 156552 to Algiers and Rabat, May 17, the Department informed the Embassies that "lack of progress in initial rounds of Western Sahara proximity talks under the auspices of the SYG is not surprising. Although we have no reason to assume that the longer run outlook for these talks is more promising, Department believes that there are substantial advantages to encouraging continuation of this mediation effort." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860383–0596) For more on these negotiations, see the Western Sahara chapter.

259. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, July 15, 1986, 1159Z

6931. Subject: Hassan to Postpone U.S. Trip Meet Peres. Ref: State 218582.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary. King Hassan told me late July 14 that he would not travel to the U.S. as planned for scheduled working visit. He said he will meet Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres on either 7/21 or 22 in Morocco to try to relaunch the Middle East peace process. I explained

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A White House Situation Room handling slip affixed to the top of the telegram indicates that McDaniel, Pearson, Rodman, and Morton saw the telegram.

² In telegram 218582 to Rabat, June 12, the Department transmitted talking points for the Embassy to convey to Hassan in support of a Hassan-Peres meeting. (Ibid.)

that Washington had been interested in discussing a number of issues during the visit in addition to the Middle East. Hassan responded that a meeting with Peres to discuss the Fes Plan was the best way to truly isolate Libyan leader Qadhafi. He said he hoped that President Reagan would understand, and appealed that if his initiative with Peres bore fruit, he would very much need U.S. support later on. He said he nevertheless felt it important for now to keep Washington free from identification with what had to be, at least initially, an Arab-Israeli initiative. End summary.

3. King Hassan called me in late July 14 for a one-hour meeting. Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister Filali attended throughout.

4. Hassan opened by telling me he had "good and bad news". He said that he would not be able to travel to the U.S. for his scheduled working visit in Washington to begin July 22. The reason, he explained is that he had agreed with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to meet here in Morocco on July 21 or 22.

5. Hassan said the two had agreed to try to re-launch the Middle East peace process, and would meet to that end. They would discuss on the basis of the peace plan drawn up at the 1982 Fes Summit. He reminded me he remains president of the Arab League, and said he was still charged by the league to defend the Fes Plan. "Who better to talk to about it", he asked rhetorically, "than the most interested party?"

6. Hassan said the meeting would and must take place in complete secrecy. He said he did not want to give the Soviets a chance to say "no". He noted that secrecy would spare certain Arab countries—he specifically cited Syria and Jordan—embarrassment. Similarly it would eliminate any pressure on European countries to feel the need to support his initiative. He was not clear on where he thought his discussions with Peres would lead, but added that he saw it as the beginning of a long process.

7. Hassan said he regretted having to postpone his meeting with the President, and expressed the hope that it could be re-scheduled in the following months. Specifically mentioning August or September as hopeful future dates for a U.S. visit.³ He noted, however, that he felt it important that his meeting with Peres be seen as a purely Arab-Israeli initiative, not one concocted in Washington. To meet with the President a few days before or after meeting Peres would inevitably be seen by all as a U.S. plot. He said he did not want to be perceived as plotting. He hastened to add, however, that U.S. support for his initiative was extremely important. "The first round may be bilateral and in Morocco," he said, "but the second, third and fourth may very well need to be

³ An unknown hand underlined "August or September" in this sentence.

in Washington.” He recalled that the President in his end-of-Ramadan message to him,⁴ had praised the Moroccan monarch as a leader of the Arab world. He said he was fulfilling his Arab responsibilities, and felt sure that the President would understand.

8. I told the King that Washington, like I, would be most disappointed by the news of the visit postponement. I conveyed to him the points contained reftel regarding our support for a Hassan-Peres meeting. I noted, however, that Washington had hoped to discuss a broad range of issues of importance to both the U.S. and Morocco. Hassan responded quickly. That he knew Washington wanted to talk about Libya and how best to isolate that country. He said, however, that the best way to isolate Qadhafi was precisely by supporting a Hassan-Peres meeting. “We will be discussing on the basis of the Fes Plan,” he recalled. “Libya was the one state that has never endorsed that plan.” He argued that by meeting Peres. He would serve U.S. interests far better than merely by travelling to Washington. Any discussion on U.S./Moroccan cooperation against Libya could be taken up by visits to Morocco of Weinberger and/or Casey.⁵

9. After my meeting with the King, I called Foreign Minister Filali. We met just before midnight at his home. I explained to him my concern for the bilateral relationship of this postponement. He said he was also completely surprised by the King’s decision. He noted how hard he himself had worked to bring about the visit. He asked me why the Israelis were pressing so hard for a visit at this moment. He said that Peres had told Hassan that a September visit would come too late to be of electoral assistance and needed a visit right away. I expressed our view per Tel Aviv 9047 that a meeting would probably have no effect on the National Unity Government in Israel although it would provide Peres a political benefit.⁶ I suggested that a meeting before or after the Washington visit could be easily arranged given the desire of both sides to meet. The Foreign Minister suggested that he speak with the King the next day about his decision and would get back to me.

10. Comment: Hassan’s decision to postpone the visit may have stemmed from two bases: first, with the U.S. centerpiece being cooperation against Qadhafi and termination of the Oujda Accord, Hassan may have felt he had little to gain and much to lose, especially in light of the

⁴ In telegram 175561 to Rabat, June 4, the Department transmitted Reagan’s Ramadan message. The message reads in part: “I know that through your leadership Morocco will remain a bastion of civilized values, setting an example in the Middle East and around the world.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860432–0097)

⁵ An unknown hand drew an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁶ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. The telegram was not found.

Libyan-Algerian dialogue.⁷ Secondly, he may feel that to improve U.S. military and economic assistance during austere times he would have to go to Washington with a very strong hand. A successful face-to-face with Peres would in his view do nicely. Any Washington pique over the postponement could be overcome by a subsequent meeting with Peres in Washington.

Nassif

⁷ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, September 3, 1986, 1901Z

276390. Subject: Letter from President to King Hassan re Breaking Treaty of Oujda. Ref: 1. State 276002² 2. Rabat 8742.³

1. S—Entire text.

2. Following is approved revised text of Presidential letter to King Hassan. No signed original will be issued.

3. Begin text: Your Majesty: It will be no surprise to you to hear of my satisfaction over your decisiveness in breaking the Treaty of Union with Libya. From the outset, I and my government have had serious reservations about that union, and it is a measure of our abiding friendship that we have been able to have such an open dialogue on this issue over the past two years.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Roscoe Suddarth (NEA), Ussery, Quinn, Vladimir Lehovitch (M), Morton, and Laurie Tracy (S/S-O); approved by Armacost.

² In telegram 276002 to Rabat, September 3, the Department transmitted the text of the original version of Reagan's letter to Hassan. (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 8742 from Rabat, September 3, Nassif reported: "Following his courageous decisive action in abrogating the Oujda Accord Hassan will I think expect his first communication from the President on this subject to convey an indication that the U.S. is prepared to stand by his side if need be, as he faces the uncertain future menace from Qadhafi." Nassif continued that the original message from Reagan was "too mild and will come as a disappointment to Hassan." (Ibid.) He then proposed revisions to the letter received in telegram 276002. (See footnote 2, above.)

We remain committed to a firm policy of countering Libyan acts of terrorism with all vigor. Qadhafi's repugnant use of terrorism as state policy has conditioned my own government's policies towards Libya to seek to isolate him and thus diminish his capacity for threatening the peace and security of Libya's neighbors.

Your Majesty, you are well aware of several of the actions which the United States Government has taken in seeking to constrain Qadhafi. The USG has both the political will and military capability to act directly against Libya if necessary. Your good personal friend and my able Ambassador to the U.N., General Walters will be in Europe this week to consult again with allied governments on appropriate actions which might be taken to contain the Libyan menace.

I have instructed Ambassador Nassif to deliver this message and to discuss with you and your government both the implications of this welcome decision by Your Majesty and how we might jointly proceed to deal with threats that might be posed to Morocco by the Qadhafi regime.⁴

Again, please accept my heartiest congratulations on the action you have taken. I look forward to seeing you in Washington at a mutually convenient date.

Your friend,
Ronald Reagan.
End text.

Whitehead

⁴ In telegram 8865 from Rabat, September 4, Nassif commented: "The King's reaction to President Reagan's letter was cool to lukewarm, possibly because he felt he had just delivered to the U.S. the one thing it wanted most from him and expected the level of exhilaration to match the previous level of pique." Hassan, Nassif continued, "believes he had placed himself squarely in the U.S. camp with his denunciation of Qadhafi and his meeting with Peres. His economic and military needs are enormous and he is looking to the U.S. to give him substantial assistance." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis) For more on Hassan's decision, see Document 73. For information concerning the Peres meeting, see Documents 247 and 259.

261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Carter)¹

I-25864/86

Washington, October 1, 1986

SUBJECT

US/Moroccan Defense Cooperation (U)

(S) The Foreign Minister of Morocco has proposed to the Secretary, on behalf of King Hassan, that Morocco would welcome closer cooperation with the U.S., Spain and Portugal in the defense of the western Mediterranean/Straits of Gibraltar and in the defense of NATO interests more generally.² I would appreciate your views on whether Morocco could usefully contribute to these objectives, whether there are additional areas of military cooperation beneficial to U.S. forces that we might propose to Morocco and how we should best respond to the King's proposal.

(U) I would appreciate your response by 21 October. My point of contact is CDR Hartung, x79745.

Richard L. Armitage³

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)*

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-88-0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1985. Secret. Prepared by Hartung (ISA/NESA).

² According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Hartung, during a September 30 meeting, Filali told Weinberger: "Morocco has taken a political decision to participate with Spain, Portugal and NATO in defense of the Mediterranean and Straits of Gibraltar. In order for that to be done with dignity, the US should think about new development and other aid. This was the King's message to the Secretary." (Ibid.)

³ Armitage signed "Rich Armitage" above this typed signature.

262. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Carter) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage)¹

DJSM 1850–86

Washington, October 29, 1986

SUBJECT

US/Moroccan Defense Cooperation (U)

1. (S) The Joint Staff has reviewed your memorandum² concerning King Hassan's overture on regional defense cooperation and has determined that a positive, but guarded response would be appropriate. Morocco has the potential for substantially contributing to regional and NATO defense objectives by participating in multilateral exercises, affording US/NATO units training areas, and by providing bases access rights in times of war/crisis. While these are intriguing possibilities, we need to determine the extent of Morocco's willingness to support NATO interests, as well as the attitudes of Spain and Portugal. Additional factors to be considered are the Western Sahara conflict and relations with Algeria.

2. (S) It is recommended that, at the forthcoming Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks,³ we discuss the proposal with our counterparts in executive session to determine Moroccan expectations/limits. Given the fiscal constraints on both sides, the most feasible vehicle for pursuing the proposal in the near-term is the development of multilateral exercises. Currently, Morocco participates in regional defense exercises with Spain for air defense, and with the United States for air/naval/special operations. Multilateral exercises would enhance regional security capabilities and support King Hassan's long maintained position that his country is strategically valuable to NATO.

3. (S) The King's proposal merits serious consideration by the US military and by the Department of State. An interagency group (IG) should evaluate the proposal and consider the potential ramifications on US/Moroccan relations with regional states, NATO, and the Soviets. The IG should produce a proposed US position prior to the

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1985. Secret.

² ASD/ISA Memo, I–25864/86, 1 October 1986, subject as above. [Footnote is in the original. The memorandum is printed as Document 261.]

³ A summary of the JMC meeting, which took place December 3–4 in Rabat, is in telegram 12089 from Rabat, December 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

JMC, evaluate the information obtained at the JMC, and then prepare recommendations on how the President should respond to the King when they meet next year.

4. (U) Enclosed, for your information, is a background paper prepared for me on this subject.⁴

P. F. Carter, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

⁴Not attached.

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, November 19, 1986, 1450Z

11410. Dept pls pass USUN New York. Subject: Ambassador Walters' Meeting With King Hassan.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary/introduction: Ambassador Walters had lengthy, cordial meeting with Hassan November 15. King looks forward to SecDef Weinberger visit in December, hopes to visit U.S. in March. These and other topics discussed are summarized below. End summary.

3. U.S. economic/military assistance: Walters began by telling Hassan that although the political climate for US-Moroccan relations is excellent in Washington, Morocco should not expect increased assistance this year, and will in fact probably suffer some cuts, because of tight U.S. budgetary situation. Hassan seemed to understand.

4. Weinberger visit: Hassan said he is greatly looking forward to seeing Weinberger here since "Weinberger is a true friend of Morocco."

5. Hassan visit to U.S.: The King said March looks like a good time for him and that he will suggest actual dates to Embassy later. He expressed a strong preference for an official-working visit rather than a State visit (this runs counter to recommendation for upgrading visit to

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Nodis.

a State visit contained in Embassy Rabat 9174).² Hassan wants to visit California while in the U.S.

6. Other travel: Hassan confirmed his intention to visit Spain and the U.K. in 1987.

7. Moroccan internal scene: Hassan described the Moroccan political situation as “calm,” noting that there has been some improvement in the country’s economic prospects.

8. Relations with Algeria/Western Sahara: Hassan said he is trying to reestablish direct contact with Chadli Bendjedid, but that the road to doing so has not been easy. Hassan thinks Bendjedid is gravely ill, and Hassan would like to reach some measure of understanding with Algeria while Bendjedid is at the helm, since he does not know who will succeed him.

9. Islamic summit: Hassan considers it “madness” to hold the OIC Summit in Kuwait in January given the presence there of so many Palestinians, the proximity of Iran, and the potential for disruptive, terrorist activities by one or both groups. Nonetheless, he plans to attend.

10. Withdrawal from Arab League presidency: recalling his decision to give up the presidency following criticism from some Arabs of his meeting with Shimon Peres,³ Hassan said he withdrew rather than run the risk of being asked to step down, comparing the potential ignominy that the latter would have entailed to Egypt’s situation upon being voted out of the Arab League. He implied that Morocco’s continuing membership in the League is largely passive.

11. Arafat/Peres: Hassan said that several months ago—prior to his own meeting with Peres—Arafat had asked Hassan to arrange an Arafat-Peres meeting. Hassan had sent an emissary to Peres in the belief that doing so was the safest, most reliable way of delivering the message. Although he had appeared interested in the idea of an Arafat meeting, Peres declined on the grounds that such an encounter would entail unacceptable political risks in Israel unless Arafat could be brought to accept Israel’s right to exist prior to the meeting.

12. Cameroon and the Fifth Committee: After hearing General Walters’ description of obstructionist Cameroonian attitudes and activities in the UNGA’s Fifth Committee consideration of the G–18

² In telegram 9174 from Rabat, September 15, the Embassy reported that Hassan told Nassif that “he would like to re-schedule his postponed visit (originally scheduled for last July) for January 1987.” The Embassy continued: “Embassy strongly recommends that official working visit envisaged for last July be upgraded to State visit. Hassan has not paid a State visit during this administration and not, in fact, since the 1960’s.” The Embassy noted that it was important that the Department “make such a gesture after the Hassan-Peres meeting and rupture of the Oujda Accord.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860699–0762)

³ See Documents 247 and 259.

report,⁴ Hassan said he would send an emissary to the Cameroon President to urge him to adopt a more constructive approach.

Nassif

⁴ Reference is to the Group of 18 nations report on administrative and financial reform of the UN. Documentation on the report is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues I.

264. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, December 3, 1986

Your Majesty:

I have asked Secretary Weinberger to convey to you my best wishes and those of the American people. Secretary Weinberger's visit to your country reflects my deep personal commitment to the strong and enduring friendship that binds our two nations.

Your courageous actions in recent months, particularly your historic meeting with then Prime Minister Peres,² bear tribute to your statesmanship and visionary leadership. I also applaud your continuing commitment to our close bilateral security ties, a prime element of the partnership between our countries. The security and economic well-being of Morocco remain very important to the United States.

As Your Majesty is aware, the United States has entered an era of severe budgetary restraint, limiting our efforts to help our friends throughout the world. This situation, however, should bring us closer together to ensure that the limited assistance provided is used effectively to bolster Morocco's security. The ongoing efforts of our Joint Military Commission are a critical part of this process.³

Your Majesty, I remain determined to do everything possible to preserve and enhance our friendship and solidify the bonds between our peoples and governments. I pray this letter finds you in good health.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/27/1985–02/25/1987). No classification marking.

² See Documents 247 and 259.

³ See footnote 3, Document 262.

265. Memorandum From William Burns of the National Security Council Staff to the Acting Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger's December 5 Meeting with King Hassan

Attached is Cap Weinberger's report to the President on his December 5 meeting in Rabat with King Hassan. Cap's visit to Morocco, the first trip to the Arab world by a Cabinet official since the Iran affair broke,² helped counter the perception that we are "adrift" in the region and no longer capable of being a reliable partner. Hassan is clearly interested in broadening our security relationship, at least in part to attract more U.S. assistance for his stumbling economy and the Moroccan military. Cap will follow up on two points of special interest to Hassan: (1) the possibility of eventually basing some U.S. F-16s in Morocco and (2) the feasibility of a barter sale of F-16s to the GOM. The UAE has apparently agreed to provide oil to underwrite such an arrangement, in return for ongoing Moroccan military support and advice.

Hassan also expressed interest in visiting Washington in the first half of 1987.³ We have proposed to Don Regan that Hassan be invited for an official working visit in June/July 1987 (you may recall that Hassan postponed a visit last summer in order to meet with Prime Minister Peres). It would be useful to pin down a date as soon as possible.

Dennis Ross, Clark Murdock, Howard Teicher, and Frank Lavin concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab I),⁴ forwarding Secretary Weinberger's report on his meeting with King Hassan.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/27/1985–02/25/1987). Secret. Sent for action.

² See footnote 2, Document 163.

³ See Document 263.

⁴ Tab I is not attached. Keel did not indicate his preference in respect to the recommendation.

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan⁵**

Rabat, December 6, 1986

SUBJECT

My Private Meeting with King Hassan, 5 December 1986, for about two hours, 9:30–11:30 p.m. (before dinner)

I met with King Hassan, at his request, with only an interpreter present most of the time, and then again during a long dinner, we continued our discussions at a table for two.

We covered many topics, but the principal impression I have is that the King is very anxious to resume much closer relations with the United States and the West in general, that he needs economic and other assistance, some of which he is already getting from other Arab nations; that he has the highest possible respect for you; that he is a skilled and experienced world politician; and that we have an excellent opportunity now to improve our own strategic position and that of our allies as a result of the King's attitudes and needs. It is, of course, true that if we ignore, spurn, or react with less than a substantive set of responses, he would probably start to look elsewhere, although I do not think he has too many places to go that would be consistent with his principal aim, which is the preservation and strengthening of the Monarchy and his Kingdom.

Under the heading of Regional Security, the King firmly and directly suggested he would like to become a member of NATO, probably as "sort of an associate member, perhaps like France." He feels Morocco can contribute substantially to regional security, and in any event he would like to have some kind of closer triangular relationship with Spain and Portugal. He spoke of the exceptionally good Air Force facilities in Morocco (which is true), and responded quite favorably and with considerable interest when I suggested in a general way that because of the Spanish apparent insistence on our removing our 72 F-16s from Spain, (which I mentioned to you in my report of the NATO meetings),⁶ these planes might be transferred to, and based in, Morocco.

He said this would be quite logical, both from the point of view of our needing to protect the Southern Flank of NATO (which would be

⁵ Secret.

⁶ Not found.

made very difficult if Spain actually went through with ordering our tactical air wing out of Spain), but also because Morocco has the facilities, and because he has already decided to buy F-16s himself.

This led us to the subject of this aircraft purchase. He said the decision had been made and that the first payment of \$14 million will be made shortly, and thereafter a schedule of payments would be drawn up. He hoped the manufacturers (General Dynamics) would be able to offer good terms, and he was quite pleased when I told him we had been able to drive down the price of F-16s and there was no reason he should pay more than we did. He then wondered aloud if I thought a barter transaction could be worked out such as his paying for the planes with oil (presumably from UAE) rather than cash. I told him there were such barter transactions, and there were companies that specialized in them and that General Dynamics might agree to such a sale.

Concluding this topic, he said he believed that there will not just be East-West divisions and issues in the future (that is, disputes between the U.S. and USSR), but that many of the problems of the future will be "North-South problems;" and, therefore, it is important for us and for NATO to have strong support in a country situated as Morocco is.

He also talked about the many economic problems they have and was pleased at the suggestion that we might be able to reduce interest payments on past debts, as we are trying to do with Egypt, although he said frankly, he would much prefer to have the debt cancelled. He mentioned the great disparity between the treatment of Egypt and Israel and the rest of the world. He was pleased at the possibility that we might be able to secure additional security assistance in a Supplemental to be submitted in January. He also liked the possibility I raised of our buying more supplies in Morocco for our troops in Europe.

He inquired most sympathetically about the problems with Iran and reminded me that in one of his recent trips to Washington, he had spent considerable time warning us all about the risks involved from a government such as Iran's. He accepted my explanations of the arms sale to Iran, and said he remained in the fullest possible support of you and your policies, and he was most pleased when I handed your personal letter to him. He said he hoped he may be able to accept our pending invitation to visit Washington, perhaps sometime in the spring.

In a private conversation with the Ambassador and me, he responded to a request that had been submitted to him by the Ambassador for 20 acres of land for a new satellite installation to upgrade and safeguard our communications. He said he did not want any rent or compensation for this, but that being quite a visible installation, it would be reasonable to help strengthen their military so as to enable them to protect our installation against possible attack.

He responded appreciatively to my compliments on the way they have stabilized the Maghreb situation by extending defensive berms further and further south in the Western Sahara. He is worried, however, that the Algerians continue to support the Polisario in the region, and while he did not seem very worried about Algerian President Bendjedid's visit to Libya, some of our intelligence reporting indicates that he should have been.⁷ He said again that his only reason for entering into the now broken agreement with Qadhafi had been to prevent Libya and Algeria working together to support the Polisario.

He expressed great worry about "the tragedy" that is unfolding in Tunisia, referring to the increasing senility of President Bourguiba and the fact that there are no successors left, since President Bourguiba has thrown all possible successors out of the country. He feels that after Bourguiba dies, there is almost bound to be a conflict between Algeria and Libya over Tunisia.

He feels that Egypt needs a great deal of support because they are going through difficult economic times now, and while Morocco has no official relationship with Egypt, it is important that Egypt be helped.

The King did not speak of the Arab Summit coming up shortly, nor of a reported advance "conference" he is supposed to call before the Summit to solidify positions and presumably try to make the Summit more successful than previous Arab Summits have been.

He was most complimentary about our military-to-military relationship and of the Joint Military Commission, the meetings of which concluded while I was there.

Returning to the NATO Southern regional security, he said that he had a good friendship and a lot of respect for the Spanish and a particularly close relationship to Portugal, and that he considers Portugal, even though they do not have a Mediterranean border, to be virtually a Mediterranean nation.

The King has always been particularly friendly and supportive of the United States and also very friendly and cordial in his personal relationships with me, but he outdid himself this time, particularly in his exceptionally strongly voiced support for you.

We are looking into the two points he seemed most interested in—that is transferring the 72 F-16s to Morocco from Spain and the possibility of a barter sale of other F-16s to Morocco—and we will get back to him.

With warm regards,

Cap

⁷Not found.

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 19, 1987, 1822Z

1745. Dept pass White House and SecDef. For the Secretary and NEA Asst Secy Murphy from Ambassador. SecDef for Weinberger from Ambassador. White House for NSC from Ambassador. Subject: Renewed Offer for U.S. Air Base in Morocco.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. In a meeting with the Foreign Minister to discuss U.S. representation for the Fête du Trône.² I advised that Treasury Secretary Baker would be head of delegation. After explaining arrival and departure dates. I asked the Foreign Minister to give us some idea of what plans the King has for the delegation. He advised that he would speak with the King and try and give us a notional schedule.

3. He then asked me how our negotiations with the Spanish were going and why it was important to keep the 401st in Madrid.³ I explained that there had been hard bargaining and an insistence by the Spanish that the U.S. presence be reduced due to the commitments made by Gonzales in the NATO referendum.⁴ Filali then asked why we didn't just move the base to Morocco. He reiterated conversation between Hassan and Defense Secretary Weinberger.⁵ I asked the Minister whether King Hassan was prepared to make a firm commitment to basing the 401st in Morocco subject to negotiations should a decision be made to leave Spain and come to Morocco. His answer was a firm yes. I explained that our obvious strong preference was to keep the 401st in Madrid and that if that was not possible we would consider other locations in Europe and elsewhere, including the possible return to the U.S.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Rabat 1987 Nodis. Secret; Nodis.

² Reference is to Morocco's Feast of the Throne, which celebrates the day of the enthronement of the King in 1933 in defiance of French colonial rule. During King Hassan's reign (1969–1999), the Fête occurred on March 3.

³ In telegram 1514 from Madrid, February 5, the Embassy summarized the most recent round of negotiations between the United States and Spain over basing and military aid, which took place in Madrid February 3–4. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870425–0247, D870090–0295) Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988.

⁴ Reference is to the national referendum held on March 13, 1986, on whether or not Spain should remain in NATO. Spanish citizens voted to remain in NATO.

⁵ See Tab A, Document 265.

4. I mentioned Ambassador Bargach's discussions with DOD⁶ as a follow-up to Hassan's statement to Secretary Weinberger that Morocco was interested in an oil barter deal for F-16's. He told me he knew of no present Arab source of funding.

5. The Minister mentioned that he understood President Reagan would be visiting Italy in May or June for a State visit. I told him that I understood that it was in connection with the economic summit.⁷ While he did not press me further, the implication was that it may be a good time for the President to pass through Morocco for a brief stop. I did not, however, suggest that possibility.

6. Filali remarked that the invitation to the King for a visit in 1987 had not yet been extended. I explained that we were considering a convenient date and remarked that this summer was a possibility. I told the Foreign Minister that since Hassan would be going to London July 14-17 it might make sense for him to thereafter go to Washington in time to celebrate the bicentennial anniversary.⁸ I also explained that I did not have an indication that those dates were open for an official working visit but if he thought that was a good idea I would pursue it. The Foreign Minister wholeheartedly supported that suggestion and said he would feel out Hassan on the question.

7. Comment: It appears clear that Hassan's offer to Weinberger on basing in Morocco was not made lightly. The Moroccans see many advantages inuring to their benefit by both the offer of a base in Morocco and the possible acceptance of that offer by the United States.

It is also clear that the Moroccans are becoming somewhat sensitive that in the year of the bicentennial the USG has neither extended the invitation to the King nor offered a major celebration of that anniversary in the U.S. I strongly urge that Secretary Baker have in hand an invitation from the President to make an official working visit the week of July 20, 1987. I also urge that if there are any new programs or additional aid contemplated for Morocco, that the Secretary announce them during his visit.

End comment.

Nassif

⁶ No record of these discussions has been found.

⁷ Reference is to the 1987 G-7 summit scheduled to take place in Venice in early June.

⁸ Reference is to the ceremony marking the bicentennial of the U.S.-Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 6, 1987, 1801Z

2259. Dept pls pass Treasury for Secretary Baker, SecDef and other addresses as desired. Subject: Secretary of Treasury's Meeting With King Hassan.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Secretary Baker delivered President's invitation for Hassan to visit Washington July 20² and also told King the USG will be able to provide an additional \$25 million in food aid this year. The King was appreciative on both counts. In response to Secretary Baker's assurance that a purposeful, cohesive government continues in Washington, Hassan said he had no doubt whatever and that had he been in President Reagan's shoes, he would also have tried opening to Iran.³ King talked in genial terms about his desire to see established a consortium of developed countries, oil rich LDC's and LDC's with meager resources to "moralize" trade and assist the less advantaged LDC's to solve their debt problems. The Secretary explained how the Baker Plan was designed to assist debtor LDC's and described some recent developments in the framework of that plan.⁴

3. While not mentioning specific arms, Hassan said he would like to get U.S. permission to buy certain types of U.S.-designed military equipment manufactured in Korea and Taiwan in order to save foreign exchange. He seemed confident that Morocco can stay the course in the Western Sahara and said Morocco urgently needs M-60 tanks. In low key, Hassan struck his familiar theme that in strategic cooperation Morocco is doing more for the U.S. than vice versa and said that while he did not want to make any specific demands, he hoped U.S. would be forthcoming on assistance. Secretary Baker assured the King that President Reagan and the USG place great value on U.S.-Moroccan relations, that the U.S. will continue to assist Morocco, and that he would convey the King's views to the President.

End summary.

4. Secretary Baker, Ambassador Walters, DAS Ussery, Ambassador, DCM and interpreter had cordial 80 minute meeting with Hassan

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 95D26, 1987 Nodis Telegrams, Box 17, Rabat 1987 Nodis. Secret; Nodis.

² No record of Reagan's invitation was found.

³ Reference is to the Iran-Contra affair. See footnote 2, Document 163.

⁴ Documentation on the Baker Plan is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance.

March 3. Hassan was grateful for the invitation to visit Washington. Noting that he had already accepted the idea of a visit to the U.S. "in principle," he said he would have to examine further the proposed July 20 date and get back to us.

5. The King seemed mildly surprised but quite pleased when Mr. Baker informed him that despite severe U.S. budgetary constraints, the U.S. is prepared to provide an additional \$25 million in food aid to Morocco in FY 87. Secretary Baker noted that he would be discussing details with GOM Ministers (septel).⁵

6. At the outset the King expressed the greatest respect and friendship for President Reagan. Speaking at length in a philosophical and often theoretical vein, Hassan said he was worried at what appeared to be a current tendency for the U.S. press and competing political institutions to denigrate the Presidency. Referring to the East-West divide, which Hassan believes will long endure, he emphasized how important it is to the West and countries friendly to the West for the U.S. to be strong and purposeful. Secretary Baker generally agreed with Hassan's analysis. He suggested that Americans do need to learn some restraint lest the Presidency over time be eroded.

7. Mr. Baker continued that the President and the Presidency are currently in good shape and that the U.S. Government will continue to move with confidence in those areas where there is an important ongoing agenda. He said that the President had asked him to reassure the King there will no further sales of military equipment to Iran. Hassan cut in, saying that he wanted it to be clear he had not questioned U.S. policy toward Iran: "The U.S. is too good a friend of Morocco for me to cite Iran as a reference point in our relations." Hassan continued that had he been in the President's shoes, he would also have explored the possibility of an opening to Iran. He concluded this portion of the conversation by saying that given Iran's strategic significance and the fragility and uncertainty in the region stretching from the Middle East to South Asia, it is important for the U.S. to continue its efforts in the area "if perhaps in some better way."

8. Hassan then began to discuss the importance of developing countries helping the more disadvantaged countries with their trade, debt, and investment problems. He saw a need to "moralize" trade and resource flow patterns and suggested that a consortium be set up which would group some 15-18 countries—about a third would come from the fully developed countries, another third would be oil producing LDC's, and the remaining third would be comprised of countries like Morocco without great resources but of some strategic and political interest to

⁵ A record of these discussions is in telegram 2164 from Rabat, March 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870425-0247, D870172-0856)

the West. Hassan described his idea as a “pilot project” which might, if successful, be expanded over time to embrace additional countries. Although, he was not precise on details, he argued in general that the developed countries would provide technology to other members of the consortium at a reasonable cost, the oil producing countries would provide energy at a reasonable cost, and the resource poor countries would agree to follow sound economic policies. All members of the consortium would enjoy reasonable growth.

9. Secretary Baker said he did not disagree with the need to ameliorate the debt and trade problems of resource poor LDC’s. He thought it would be extremely difficult to construct and implement the kind of plan the King was suggesting to even out profits on a nearly global basis, given the human tendency toward accumulation. On the other hand, he thought that the U.S. and some other countries had already taken some steps in the direction the King described. The U.S. has encouraged surplus countries to do more through multi-lateral lending institutions to help on LDC debt and resource problems. Before the decline in oil prices, we had pressed the Saudis to be more helpful. More recently, the U.S. has encouraged Japan to participate in IDA8,⁶ and we have given up some of our own bank shares to bring that about.

10. The King briefly returned to his consortium scheme, saying that if there were such an arrangement, the consortium could perhaps agree with the multilateral institutions on the rules for economic reform to be followed by the debtor countries in the consortium and the latter countries might then be more prepared than at present to accept IMF-type conditions. He registered a brief flash of annoyance with present IMF conditions relating to Morocco but then backed off by acknowledging that the IMF is currently trying to be helpful to Morocco.

11. Mr. Baker then referred to the “Strategy for Growth,” or “Baker Plan” which he and the U.S. put forward in Seoul. He said that the U.S. strongly believes that the only solution to the debt problem is growth. Ways have to be found to increase production. The Baker Plan simply provides a framework for attacking the growth/production problem. The IMF understands and appears to have accepted the general philosophy, and in its most recent agreements (e.g., Mexico) has been moving in the direction of growth by providing better terms and some new money.

12. The King said he wished to sound the USG informally on whether it might be possible for Morocco to buy from Korea and Taiwan certain types of military equipment made in those countries under U.S. license. He said that such arms are of good quality and are cheaper and

⁶ Reference is to the 8th replenishment of funding by donor nations, approved in February, for the International Development Agency of the World Bank.

easier to obtain than from the U.S., which often seems to provide matériel "drop-by-drop." He thought that Morocco might be able to work out some kind of barter arrangement with Korea which would partially involve Korean arms in return for fishing rights in Moroccan waters. In any case, whether the purchases were from Korea or Taiwan, Hassan thought he would save valuable foreign exchange. He said it was his understanding that U.S. authorization is required for such purchases.

13. The Secretary replied that the U.S. would take a sympathetic look at Hassan's request consistent with current U.S. laws and regulations. We might also have to determine what the attitude of Congress might be. In response to Mr. Baker's question regarding the type of arms he had in mind, Hassan said he had wanted to try out the idea informally and would later "look at the catalogue" depending on our response. He referred vaguely to his desire to purchase unspecified types of missiles and rifles.

14. Referring to Feb 24–25 battles in the Western Sahara, Secretary Baker regretted Moroccan loss of life but said he was glad that the U.S. had been able to be helpful and responsive in a moment of need. The King expressed profound thanks on behalf of himself and his senior military officers. Saying that U.S. actions had demonstrated that America is a true friend.

15. Hassan noted that the section of the berm where the sharpest recent engagement took place is the most dangerous sector since it is close to Polisario bases in Algeria. He said that the Moroccan military has, and will continue, to make special logistical and other dispositions designed to deal with any further difficulties in that portion of the berm closest to Tindouf. He said that it was understandable that the Polisario would attack in that sector since the extension of the berm currently going forward farther south is too far away for the Polisario to move heavy equipment and attack in force in the area. Noting that "only armor can fight armor," the King indicated that apart from the additional TOW's and night-sight devices now on order, Morocco also needs more tanks. He noted the current Morocco-Algeria tank imbalance of 1:7, and said he would like to see it improved to a 4:7 ratio. (In a separate earlier conversation with Ambassador Walters,⁷ the King apparently said he would like to see the ratio move to 1:4.) Hassan claimed that the U.S. "has more M-60's than it needs—you have huge stocks and are even providing them to your National Guard. Let me buy M-60's or help me find them elsewhere."

16. Hassan terminated the conversation with a somewhat oblique statement designed to illustrate the depth of his friendship and support for the U.S. He noted that he and the President had signed an access

⁷ No record of the Walters-Hassan conversation has been found.

and transit agreement which may one day be of great importance to both countries. He said that except for operations directed against other Arab countries, the U.S. can use Morocco logistically as U.S. needs dictate. He asked Mr. Baker to tell the President that Morocco has already given the U.S. a great deal and is even prepared to offer further facilities including possibly bases, if need be. He said Morocco has recently agreed to provide the U.S. land for a military communications facility which Hassan considers to be “worth more than 100 tanks.” (Comment: The King is somewhat confused on this issue, since he has agreed to provide land to upgrade Embassy communications, not military communications. Embassy will clarify this matter for him at the first opportunity. End comment.)

17. Hassan asked Mr. Baker to remind the President of the ways in which Morocco has demonstrated its friendship. Hassan said that every other Arab leader he knows would have asked for hundreds of millions of dollars in return. “I am not like other Arabs. Friendship cannot be weighed or measured but must be expressed,” he concluded. Secretary Baker responded that he would convey the King’s thoughts to the President. He said there should be no doubt of the very high value that the U.S. places on its current relationship with Morocco and on the 200 year treaty relationship. The King labelled it a “privileged relationship,” and Mr. Baker agreed.

18. Comment. The King was very relaxed and friendly and seemed to be exerting special effort to make a favorable impression on Secretary Baker. Nonetheless, at the end of the conversation, Hassan, as he has with such other recent visitors as SecDef Weinberger and Codel Chappell,⁸ made it clear that he is now ready to start making specific requests rather than general characterizations of needs, and that while he is prepared to extend further strategic cooperation to the U.S., it will be at a cost. He stated that he has an immediate need for tanks, given the threat he sees from the Polisario and Algeria. He will doubtless expect to hear from us in the months ahead about what, if anything, we are prepared to do for him with respect to tanks, and perhaps aircraft.

Nassif

⁸ Congressman William “Bill” Chappell Jr. (D-South Carolina), the Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, visited Morocco November 20–21, 1986.

268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, April 16, 1987, 0306Z

114161. Subject: Vice President Receives Moroccan MinFin Berrada.

1. S (Entire text).

2. Summary: On 4/10, Vice President Bush received Moroccan Finance Minister Berrada accompanied by Amb. Bargach. Warm and friendly 45 minute conversation focused on importance of the bilateral relationship and of continuing cooperation. Other attendees included Don Gregg and Doug Manarchek of VP's staff, Bill Burns (NSC) and Mike Ussery, Roger Merrick (notetaker) and Eliza Burnham (interpreter). End summary.

3. Vice President welcomed Berrada and Bargach saying that he was happy to be able to have them in his home. He asked that Berrada relay a short message to King Hassan: The United States truly values its important bilateral relations with Morocco; we have great respect for His Majesty King Hassan; we are pleased that the Oujda Accord was abrogated; the President looks forward to the visit of King Hassan to Washington; and we regard celebration of the bicentennial of the U.S.-Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship as an important event which can convey greater understanding of Morocco to the American people.

4. Berrada replied that this truly was a visit of courtesy and friendship. Moroccans value United States' democratic experience. He was pleased to be able to convey personally the great esteem which King Hassan has for the Vice President. Morocco has embarked upon a liberal democratic experiment: private sector is being encouraged; there is less government control; and, local institutions are being developed with greater authority. All of this constitutes a dramatic reorientation of Morocco's economy. He continued that Morocco's basic policy is to "support peace in the world." Visit of Israeli PM Peres should be seen in this light; it symbolizes Morocco's link between West and Arab world.

5. Vice President replied that he had intended to mention Peres visit in his opening statement. He clearly understood that this had not been an easy step for the King. He (Vice President) had been on a visit to region at that time and had spoken of King Hassan's courage both in Israel and to Arab leaders including King Hussein. He then said it would be "wonderful" if a settlement to the Western Sahara dispute

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870606-0516, D870598-0037, D870294-0568. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Robert Downey (S/S-O), Quinn, Gregg, Zweifel, and Pearson; approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Algiers and Tunis.

could be negotiated and expressed hope that Algeria “would come to relinquish its last vestiges of radicalism.”

6. Berrada replied that Morocco also wants peace in Western Sahara, but not at expense of Moroccan sovereignty. He noted that Algeria is five times the size of Morocco. As an economist, he appreciates the importance of better relations and trade with Algeria. He promised to convey V.P.’s statements to the King, particularly noting invitation for visit to Washington and that bicentennial be given all the importance that it deserves.

7. Vice President said that in summary our bilateral relations are extremely stable. He and President are grateful for King’s offer of base facilities. He could not think of a greater gesture from a friend than such an offer. He hopes, however, that U.S. will not have to burden Morocco with such a request. He then explained how we had tried to give additional assistance to Morocco through FY87 supplemental, and noted that \$25 million of additional food assistance had been provided. He said that King should understand that this is not a question of will. Administration desires to go farther with assistance for Morocco; problem is simply a lack of means. “There is no question about our desire to go farther.”

8. Visit ended after five-minute tour of gardens at V.P.’s residence.

Whitehead

**269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Morocco¹**

Washington, May 24, 1987, 0101Z

159266. Subject: Id Al Fitr Message. Please deliver following message from President Reagan to King Hassan at appropriate time:

1. Quote: Your Majesty: I am particularly pleased in this bicentennial year of our Treaty of Peace and Friendship to convey my best wishes to you and the people of Morocco for the holy feast of Id Al-Fitr. May you and your people be blessed with achievements and success next year similar to those attained over the past year. I applaud your

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870641–0195, D870401–0553. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted in NEA/AFN from text received from the White House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S–S), Zweifel, Benjamin Pascoe (S/S), and Michael Minton (S/S–O); approved by Ussery.

recent meeting with President Bendjedid, and hope that it will hasten progress toward peace and reconciliation in the Western Sahara.

I am confident that we can continue our strong history of mutual cooperation, which has been productive for both our peoples.

I look forward very much to your visit to the United States.² Your good friend, Ronald Reagan. [Unquote]

2. The White House does not plan to release text but has no objection if GOM wishes to do so.

Armacost

² In telegram 143240 to Rabat, May 12, the Department instructed the Embassy, in discussions with Hassan, to "underscore interest of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and NSC in this visit. It would be regrettable if timing again becomes 'the' issue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870626-0663, D870363-0798)

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Rabat, July 13, 1987, 1717Z

6723. Subj: King Hassan Comments on Bilateral Military Issues.

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. King Hassan and I discussed two bilateral political-military issues during our July 12 meeting (see also septels):² U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation, and Moroccan interest General Dynamics' F-16.

3. U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation: I noted that Morocco had asked us to put our own thoughts together to produce a comprehensive proposal for U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation, notably in the field of exercises; outlined for Hassan the process whereby different branches of the U.S. military are evaluating their interests for eventual coordination at the level of the Secretaries of Defense and of State; and asked Hassan how we should proceed on organizing such matters as site visits for the elaboration of training or exercise proposals.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870606-0408. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Madrid, Lisbon, Riyadh, Paris, Casablanca, Tangier, and USCINCEUR.

² Not found.

4. Hassan stressed that the issue of military cooperation is one that involves the political will of each side and that Morocco is open to our proposals. He noted that the Moroccan people are very sensitive to international affairs; that he alone is capable of persuading the Moroccan people to welcome a foreign military presence on Moroccan soil; and that in this era of “third-worldism” and “non-alignment” (even as fictive as Cuba’s), people would be attentive to what benefits each side was contributing and deriving from military cooperation. Hassan spoke dismissively of a piecemeal case-by-case approach to military cooperation as something which would limit activity to “the grocery store level.” He said that if Spain remained obdurate, Morocco and Portugal could prove helpful, and suggested such helpfulness could come in the context of a bilateral mutual defense treaty between Portugal (as a “happy” NATO member) and Morocco.

5. On the specific question of how to proceed on organizing visits designed to further U.S. military thinking on cooperation, Hassan said the Embassy should work through Foreign Minister Filali and General Achahbar (or in his absence, Colonel Major Kadiri) regardless of what service branch is involved. Hassan stressed that this procedure will ensure that he is informed of developments and that such visits are properly handled at the local level, i.e., cooperatively, discretely, and positively. (Note: In this regard Hassan made passing reference to a German request for access to a Moroccan airfield for training purposes. End note.)

6. Comment. I briefed King Hassan on this matter because he had been briefed by General Kabbaj on the USAREUR portion and had requested this matter be discussed with Secretary of Defense Weinberger or his envoy. I wanted to correct the impression that the Secretary of Defense had already approved a military cooperation program.

Nassif

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 9, 1987, 1820Z

316492. Subject: UNGA: The Secretary's Meeting With Moroccan FonMin Filali, October 1, 1987.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary. Foreign Minister Filali expressed pessimism on the Gulf war and the peace process, sought U.S. support for Moroccan candidacy for the UN Security Council, invited the Secretary to visit Morocco as part of his upcoming Middle East trip,² and asked the U.S. to support the UNSYG efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. On the level of U.S. assistance to Morocco, Filali stressed Morocco and the administration had to make Congress sensitive to Morocco's special situation, but recognized U.S. budgetary problems. The Secretary said the U.S. appreciated Morocco's stand on the Gulf war and its attempts to assist in the peace process, including the Hassan-Peres meeting. He said he welcomed the invitation to visit, but that time prevented him from paying the kind of visit that would allow for good, reflective exchange of views. The Secretary stated the U.S. had a traditional position of refraining from expressing a view on Security Council candidacies at an early stage, but from his own standpoint, would like to see Morocco on the Security Council. End summary

3. Gulf War. Filali said the GOM was very concerned the Gulf war would destabilize the entire region. The Iranians were attempting to neutralize Resolution 598,³ and may have succeeded in splitting the Security Council, which would be detrimental to the credibility of the SC and the five Perm Reps. Morocco had close relations with countries in the region, and after the Mecca incident,⁴ was willing to lend both political and military aid to safeguard the stability and independence of the Gulf area. The GOM very much appreciated the U.S. position and the dispatching of U.S. naval vessels to protect the area. The Secretary expressed appreciation for Morocco's readiness to stand by its friends, stating we had to remain firm and strong.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870834-0412. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Haugh (S/S-O), Lisa Kubiske (S/S-S), Murphy, and Richard Mueller (S/S); approved by Shultz.

² Shultz visited the Middle East October 16-19.

³ See footnote 3, Document 171.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 169.

4. Extraordinary Arab League Summit.⁵ Filali was pessimistic the summit would achieve concrete results, either on the Iran-Iraq war or the Arab-Israeli dispute. He said a consensus could not emerge, given the extent of intra-Arab problems, and the probable attempt of some to sow disarray by introducing extraneous issues.

5. Middle East Peace Process. The Secretary welcomed GOM views on the peace process, stating there seemed to be some movement toward willingness to think creatively on the Middle East problem. Filali stressed intra-Arab disputes impeded efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, and said the former had to be resolved in order to focus on the latter. He characterized Israeli Foreign Minister Peres's UNGA speech as moderate, and was hopeful it could lay a foundation for progress, even though it did not meet all Arab requirements.

— International Conference. Filali said he had discussed the summit and the peace process recently in Jordan. The core issue of Jordanian-Palestinian problems also had to be resolved before an international peace conference took place. The Secretary wondered whether King Hussein could designate certain Palestinians as part of the delegation. Filali said such a solution would not work. He had heard contacts among West Bank peoples had been initiated by the people themselves, but that Palestinian problems remained murky. The Palestinians were subject to considerable pressures from various sources, including Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria.

— Moroccan Role. Filali pointed to the Fez Summit and the Hassan-Peres meeting as evidence of Moroccan attempts to resolve both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli problems. The Secretary agreed the Peres meeting had been a dramatic, powerful statement. Filali said the Moroccans had been surprised at initial Arab reaction to the meeting, but that things had quieted down since then. He said the Syrians, had recently dispatched intermediaries to Morocco to discuss gradual resumption of ties.

6. Moroccan UNSC Candidacy. Morocco had seniority rights over Algeria to the contested Security Council seat, Filali asserted. Morocco could help its friends if it had a seat on the Security Council. The Secretary expressed the traditional U.S. position that the U.S. did not express its views at an early stage in the selection process, but added his own view that he would like to see Morocco on the Security Council.

7. Western Sahara. Filali asked the U.S. to support the UNSYG's efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute through a UN referendum in the Sahara region, calling this the "last chance" to resolve the conflict. He said Algeria and its friends were reluctant to hold a referendum because they were not used to free elections. The Secretary assured him Morocco could rely on the U.S. to support the UNSYG's efforts.

⁵ A summit of the Arab League was scheduled to take place in November.

8. Algeria. Filali expressed concern about the Algerian “game” with Iran, claiming some Gulf states also were worried about what Algeria was doing with Iran. He also mentioned the Algerian-Libyan unity plan as a cause for concern.

9. U.S. Assistance to Morocco. The Secretary agreed with Filali that he would like Congress to increase the level of assistance to Morocco. Filali said Morocco, and the U.S., had to work more closely with Congress on the issue.

10. Visit invitation. King Hassan was anxious to have the Secretary visit Morocco as part of his Middle East trip, according to Filali. The King wanted to convey Morocco’s perspective on the Gulf war, peace process and current Maghreb problems, and believed a visit at this time would be most helpful. The Secretary said he very much wanted to visit, but time was a major problem for him.

11. Participants. U.S.: The Secretary, General Walters, Assistant Secretary Murphy, Assistant Secretary Redman, Ambassador Boeker, Country Officer Fitzpatrick (notetaker), interpreter Alec Toumayan. Morocco: Foreign Minister Filali, UN Ambassador Slaoui.

Whitehead

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, December 23, 1987, 1740Z

12466. Military addressee treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Ambassador’s Talks With FonMin Filali.

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Begin summary: In Dec. 22 call, Filali expressed positive interest in discussions on US military activities; explained that the King had not gone to Antibes because it would contrast with his absence at Amman;² said that Saudis and UAE would soon be visiting Morocco to discuss

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871049–0414. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat. Sent for information to Algiers, Riyadh, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Nouakchott, and USCINCEUR. Repeated to the NSC as telegram 399068, December 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871053–0353)

² References are to, respectively, the 14th Franco-Africa summit, which took place in Antibes December 10–11, and the Arab League summit, which took place in Amman November 8–9.

financing for F-16s; noted that the Algerians had been very disappointing in bilateral talks in Rabat; and stressed importance of King's call for meeting of Al Quds Committee Foreign Ministers to discuss violence in West Bank and Gaza. Comment in para 13 below. End summary.

3. On December 22, I requested a meeting with FonMin Filali to brief him on my meeting with King Hassan and the Joint Military Commission meetings in Washington. Also to debrief him on the Franco-African summit and the Joint Commission Meeting in Saudi Arabia.

Joint JMC and King's Visit to the United States

4. I told the Foreign Minister that the JMC had gone very well in Washington³ with both sides able to discuss the outstanding problems in a very positive atmosphere. I explained that I had spoken with King Hassan after my meeting with the Foreign Minister and before my departure for Washington.⁴ I had then taken both the King's and FonMin's messages to Washington where I shared them with the appropriate USG officials.⁵ I also told the FonMin that I was in the process of sending a message to Washington⁶ suggesting a next step in the baseline study and a suggested format for financing future US-Moroccan military cooperation. He was very positive in his response saying that it would signal a new change in US thinking should we be able to look at long-term strategic military planning together with funding for Morocco.

Franco-African Summit

5. I explained Washington's and the Embassy's surprise at the King's failure to attend the Franco-African summit after having cancelled Secretary Shultz' visit.⁷ The Foreign Minister explained that King Hassan did not go to France because of the inevitable criticism he would have received from the Arabs since he had not gone to the

³ No record of the JMC meeting has been found.

⁴ In telegram 11477 from Rabat, November 29, Nassif noted that during a "relaxed" November 28 discussion, Hassan in part "underscored Moroccan desire for a broad political review of the long-range strategic situation and the place of US-Moroccan relations in that picture" and "reiterated his willingness to undertake a State visit to Washington in 1988, noting this could be in January, February, the end of March, or April." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870978–0184)

⁵ In telegram 11420 from Rabat, November 25, Nassif reported that during their November 25 meeting, Filali "stressed GOM interest in major long term military relationship with U.S., their lack of interest in relatively minor activities such as low level flights and bombing ranges," and expressed "great disappointment at levels of U.S. assistance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870974–0142)

⁶ Not found and not further identified.

⁷ No record of the cancellation of a Shultz visit to Morocco, which Filali had suggested during his October 1 meeting with the Secretary (see Document 271) has been found.

Amman summit. He expressed his hope that a visit by the Secretary could still take place at the next earliest opportunity.

6. The meeting with the Africans in France had gone very well and was necessary because Morocco does not belong to the OAU and has few opportunities to speak with African leaders. The fact that the next summit will be held in Morocco he considered to be a very good sign and a positive step in the Moroccan-African relationship.

Morocco-Saudi Joint Commission Meeting

7. I asked the Foreign Minister whether the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Saudi Arabia and replacement by Moroccan troops had been discussed in Riyadh. He told me that the Pakistani question had been discussed but that the Saudi's were not yet prepared to discuss Moroccan troop presence in the Gulf. There will be a GCC meeting soon in the Gulf to discuss Gulf states military cooperation. He did, however, add that Morocco was prepared to send troops to Saudi Arabia should they be requested.

8. I then asked whether funding for an F-16 purchase had been discussed. His response was negative but he added that both Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Shiek Zaid of the UAE would be coming to Morocco in January and financing the F-16s would be taken up at that time.

Algeria and the Maghreb

9. Although the Foreign Minister was absent for the talks with the Algerians, I wanted to know if he was still as optimistic about moving forward on the bilateral side as he had been before his departure for Europe and the Gulf. He responded that the Algerians again were acting strangely. They now say that the Western Saharan problem must be resolved before bilateral issues can be addressed. They took notes on Morocco's positions on the bilateral problems concerning trade and open borders but gave no responses. They do however want to continue the talks. The Foreign Minister offered that it would be up to Algerian FonMin Ibrahimi to suggest a date for a follow-on ministerial meeting.⁸

10. I asked Morocco's view of the recent Algerian activity vis-a-vis Libya and Tunisia. Filali's position was that Algeria again appeared to be attempting to isolate Morocco. Tunisia would probably reestablish diplomatic relations with Libya before the end of the year and he understood that Libya would much prefer a bilateral union to adhesion to the Treaty of Friendship between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. He added that Qadhafi had recently given a major address in which he

⁸ Reference is to the December 20 Algiers summit of Foreign Ministers from Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, during which Algeria pressured Tunisia to allow Libya to join the Tripartite Union. See footnote 3, Document 85.

referred to Algeria and in unusually glowing terms. I then asked about the Moroccan-Libyan relationship which he responded was good, especially on the economic side. He had been checking with Casablanca businessmen and found that TBC Libyans are now paying their bills.

11. In response to my question about the future of a United Maghreb, Filali posited that Morocco was looking more to Europe and the United States because it unfortunately could not look to its Maghreb brothers, especially Algeria for support. There were too many problems outstanding between them. I asked about whether the Western Sahara could be resolved in a Maghreb context as had been suggested in Algiers at the bilateral, and he mentioned the discussions between King Hassan and Prime Minister Baccouche of Tunisia. He said it was the first time there had been a Moroccan-Tunisian discussion on resolving the Western Sahara. He didn't quite understand, however, Tunisia's apparent willingness to accept Libya into the treaty of friendship.

Al Quds Committee

12. Concerning King Hassan's call for an Al Quds Committee meeting in Morocco, Filali said the King felt it was an extremely important item that needed to be discussed in an Arab context. When I suggested that it also would be a positive step toward Moroccan reentry into the Arab fold and the first such meeting since the Ifrane summit between former Prime Minister Peres and King Hassan, Filali readily agreed. He said that Shamir was incredibly hard lined on the problem in the occupied territories, but Peres and his people are still taking a positive line. Morocco looks to the United States to help move the Israelis on this question. The Israelis have been incredibly insensitive and in his opinion creating a very volatile situation throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

13. Comment: This was the first time a high level Moroccan ever indicated that discussions with Gulf states were about to take place on the question of financing F-16s. Although we had been told Gulf financing would be forthcoming for many years, this was a new step. On the question of Moroccan-Algerian relations, Filali was considerably less optimistic than he had been at my last meeting. He again attributed this change to the split within the FLN and the difficulty of getting a united position on such an issue in a one party system. He did appear to hold out hope that at a higher level progress could still be made. It was also clear from Filali's response to my explanation of next steps in the base-line process that Morocco was anxious to enter into serious long-term strategic discussions and is desperate to find a way to increase U.S. dependence upon and therefore increase U.S. assistance for Morocco.

Nassif

273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, January 30, 1988, 0203Z

28881. Subject: FY 88 Security Assistance Allocations for Morocco: Special Talking Points.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. You will have received by septel final FY 88 security assistance figures for all countries and extensive talking points for briefing host governments.² The following points may also be used in briefing the GOM on the unique features of the Moroccan FY 88 program:

— Morocco did exceptionally, almost uniquely, well in a period of major retrenchment;

— Morocco's FY 88 ESF, MAP, and FMS total 72 million dollars compared with 54 million dollars in FY 87;

— In comparison, the administration's overall request was cut 14 percent and the net after earmarks was a 93 percent cut;

— In 30 countries, security assistance will be eliminated; nearly all countries, including very important ones, will take massive cuts. For example, our ESF request for Turkey of 120 million was cut to 32. The actual Turkish program in 87 was 100 million. Jordan will receive 26.5 million of a requested 40 million, a substantial cut from the 39.9 million FY 87 actual level;

— In sum, these results show, if it needed to be shown, the high regard with which Morocco is held in the U.S.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880081-0376. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley (NEA/AFN); cleared by William McGlynn (NEA/ECON), Ralph Boyce (D), Benjamin Pascoe (S/S), and Carolyn Huggins (S/S-O); approved by Ussery.

² In telegram 29684 to Vienna, February 4, which repeated telegram 29684 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 3, the Department outlined the approved FY 88 security assistance allocations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880624-0215)

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 12, 1988, 1210Z

2507. For Assistant Secretary Crocker from Ambassador. Subject: Discussion With Hassan on Angola. Ref: State 72889.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Pursuant to reftel, I sought and obtained an audience with King Hassan in Marrakech on March 11. I explained that I had sent a message to Washington describing the conversation that had taken place during the Fete du Tron between King Hassan, Ambassador Walters and representatives of the MPLA.³ I told King Hassan that our government was interested in following up on this meeting and obtaining further information.

3. I explained that we had been invited to Luanda soon to discuss the details of the Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) and that if we obtained a detailed calendar for that withdrawal, Assistant Secretary Crocker could travel there soon. I went through the balance of the talking points including our discussions with the Soviets and the MPLA as well as our approach on CTW, UNSCR 435,⁴ and NR in Angola.

4. I asked Hassan whether in his opinion Kito had been speaking for Dos Santos on NR or whether he was speaking for himself. The King's answer was one word, "both." He felt that Kito's associate Mpayo was a powerful player. While he did not outrank Kito, he must be very well placed in the MPLA. Dos Santos is expected to visit Rabat on March 25th for 24 hours. I asked whether the MPLA had responded to King Hassan's suggestion to bring Dos Santos and Savimbi together. The King acknowledged he had received a response but the response was negative. The MPLA see themselves as a legitimate government and Savimbi as a rebel and therefore did not want to enter into talks with him. The King quipped, "then why do you want me to enter

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D552, Rabat 1988 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

² In telegram 72889 to Rabat, March 9, the Department transmitted talking points for further discussions with the Moroccan Government regarding the Angolan/Namibian negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.

³ Telegram 2232 from Rabat, March 4, contains the message about the Walters-Hassan-MPLA meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880189–0421)

⁴ Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 435, adopted on September 29, 1978, which called for a ceasefire and UN-supervised elections in Namibia. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 96, 98, 101–103, 112, and 350.

the talks with the Polisario?" King Hassan feels that the question of a Savimbi-Dos Santos meeting is more a conflict of personalities than it is a rejection of meeting with the UNITA representatives. He, in fact, will ask both MPLA and UNITA to select representatives to come to Rabat and meet with King Hassan sometime after the Dos Santos meeting. Savimbi will also be invited soon but Hassan was not sure whether he would do so before or after Dos Santos' meeting on the 25th. In Hassan's opinion, there is no question but the MPLA is ready to talk to UNITA but not Savimbi.

5. Hassan denied any efforts to arrange talks between the MPLA and the South African Government and also replied negatively when I asked if he had been in touch with other key African players, e.g., Nigeria, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Kenya, Ivory Coast, on this issue. It seems unlikely King Hassan would not have discussed this with at least one or two of his closer African friends, since it is clear that he sees this as an important African card.

6. He asked me to request two notes verbale that he could have in hand when Dos Santos arrived. They would be from the U.S. Government, one taking a hard line and one taking a moderate line. Whichever one was necessary to use with the MPLA he would use. He told me that he wanted to stay in constant touch with me between now and the arrival of Dos Santos on the 25th. He wanted me to request permission to be received by Dos Santos at that time. (Comment: It is obvious that Hassan has an important need to show he is in fact working closely with the USG on this question. He was frank that we would be doing an old friend a big favor if he was seen as contributing to a resolution of this problem.) I suggested that possibly Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Crocker might be interested in coming to Morocco and possibly during the time Dos Santos was here. Hassan said that he felt that might be too high a profile at this time and that Dos Santos might prefer to be more discrete. I agreed to pass on these messages to Washington and to respond as quickly as possible.

7. Comment: I am happy to continue to assist in these discussions in whatever low-key fashion or otherwise you might desire. I have committed to nothing except that I would make King Hassan's views and requests known in Washington. It was clear during my monologue on the background of U.S. activities vis-a-vis Angola/Namibia that Hassan was extremely interested. It was quite unusual for him to want to involve me so directly in discussions he was having with another country but on the other hand, understandable given his desire to improve his position with his African neighbors. I leave it to you whether to prepare these notes verbale and if so, what they will contain as well as the decision on any further participation of mine in the discussions with King Hassan and/or Dos Santos. I would not rule out the

possibility of suggesting to King Hassan that I bring with me someone from the African Bureau at a level below that of Assistant Secretary if you think that would be helpful and appropriate. Please advise as soon as possible.

Nassif

275. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rabat, April 2, 1988

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and King Hassan II of Morocco, Friday, 1 April 1988

The King indicated that he wished to talk to me alone and dismissed the interpreter. After initial pleasantries, and recalling our prior meetings, the King told me how pleased he was with Ambassador Nassif. He considered him to be sensitive, responsive, and knowledgeable. He had heard that Ambassador Nassif was going to leave and hoped that that would not be the case. I told him Ambassador Nassif needed to place his children in school and would probably leave before the end of the year.

In chatting about the American election campaign, the King expressed high admiration for Vice President Bush. Bush had shown great sensitivity at the time the King announced union with Libya, a move he had to make in order to “buy himself two years in the Sahara war”. He sincerely hoped that Bush would be elected President.

The King talked at some length about his relations with Algeria, the sum and substance of which was that he was trying to make some moves to put an end to the feuding between Algeria and Morocco. He felt he was making good progress toward an agreement. He hoped that the UN effort he was pursuing with regard to the Western Sahara could serve as an “umbrella” for such an agreement. He got along well with President Bendjedid, but he had scant regard for Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahim, a man who had not participated in the revolution, was an “intellectual” set on trying to prove his worth. Ibrahim does not want peace.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: Meetings 03/29/88–04/02/88. Secret. A shorter version of the meeting is in telegram ToSec 60114/104618, April 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880284–0069)

The King noted that Ambassador Nassif had given him a memorandum on our relationship with Morocco.² The memo was divided into short, medium, and long-term steps. This division was inappropriate. As far as he was concerned, the short-term and the long-term were the same. The relationship between Morocco and the United States should be like a marriage. Once the decision is made the friendship should last forever. Unfortunately, he does not see that kind of commitment coming out of the United States.

The King noted that Morocco was somewhat of an outcast. Many of the neighboring countries were run by the military. Arabs in general preferred single party states to the multi-party system in Morocco. The King needed to feel that the security of his people would be assured once he passes from the scene. To achieve this he needed a special relationship with the United States.

I asked him how we might start to develop that relationship. He responded that as far as he was concerned, the most important thing was for us to let the world know that Morocco was truly America's friend. This message needs to be spread by "all your leaders and all your Ambassadors".

I praised the King's efforts to develop a close relationship with Portugal. The King responded enthusiastically and asked me to help. He said he had already had a visit from Mario Soares who was a "wonderful person". I urged him to establish relations with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva as well, and he said he would. His fervent hope was that he could develop a triangular relationship: Morocco-Portugal-NATO. Such a relationship would ensure that the West could control the Straits of Gibraltar. Portugal needed to understand that it was a Mediterranean nation as well as an Atlantic nation.

I gave the King a review of our relationship with the Soviets, concentrating on my meeting with Yazov and our Arms Control negotiations.³ The King expressed great sympathy for what Gorbachev was trying to do and said we should help him.⁴ I noted that as far as I was concerned, "the jury is still out on that score". I noted that Gorbachev was trying to make substantial changes in the USSR, but those changes had yet to impact the military establishment. The King seemed surprised when I told him the Soviets continue to pour out offensive weapons and that I

² Not found and not further identified.

³ In telegram 1860 from Bern, March 16, Carlucci summarized his meeting with Soviet Minister of Defense General Dmitry Yazov, noting that it covered "dangerous military activities, military-to-military contacts, policies and doctrines, and arms control" initiatives between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

⁴ Reference is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Documentation on the talks is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I.

had not seen any visible signs of a change in their doctrine. I noted that it would not serve our purposes to help Gorbachev modernize his economy if the end result were only a more efficient military machine. On the other hand, I agreed we needed to maintain a dialogue with the Soviets. I intended to continue military to military contacts and we were all working very hard to bring about further agreements in the arms control area. The King seemed particularly interested in verification and I walked him through the verification issues involved in START. I also described to him the difficulties of verifying chemical weapon production. He noted that the Iraqis has made a “horrible error” in using a poison gas.⁵

The King had no special message other than the usual plea for a close relationship with the United States. It was clear, however, that he was anxious to talk. He seemed somewhat lonely, almost thirsty for an exchange of views on the state of the world.

Frank C. Carlucci

⁵ Reference is to the Iraqi Government’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish city of Halabja on March 16. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of State and Defense, the Commander-in-Chief, European Command, and the Secretary of the Air Force (Aldridge)¹

Rabat, April 29, 1988, 1939Z

4315. Personal for DAS Ussery, ASD Armitage, LTGen Brown, Gen Richards and Mr. Aldridge from Ambassador Nassif. Subj: F–5E for Morocco (S).²

1. Entire text Secret.

2. Col-Maj Kadiri, Chief, External Intelligence Services (DGED), called on me this afternoon to relay a personal request from King

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Service Center. A stamped notation reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN MAY 22 1988.” Underneath the stamp, Carlucci wrote: “We ought to try to do this. FC.”

² Carlucci underlined the subject line.

Hassan with regard to SecDef Carlucci's³ offer of excess USAF F-5E aircraft. He said that the King had told him specifically to ask me to intervene and ask the USG if it could provide ten F-5E's in lieu of the six which were offered. He emphasized that while he understood the price of the aircraft would be somewhere between four hundred thousand and a million dollars that the King had asked that we provide these ten at quote a very good price unquote.⁴

3. This highly unusual method for receiving this request from the GOM, i.e. Kadiri to me instead of military to military, suggests the strong personal interest of King Hassan. It is this type of request and more importantly our response which Hassan uses to gauge our relationship.

4. Both my MUSLO Chief who had been summoned earlier to RMAF HQ's where he received a similar request from Acting Chief, Col-Maj R'Rani and I informed our interlocutor that the balance of the aircrafts may have been spoken for but would do our best to determine if more were available.

5. It is my estimation that we have an opportunity to satisfy a valid need with material which is militarily correct and hopefully at a very generous price. We are awaiting the King's response to the baseline proposal and are trying to get the exercise program off deadcenter. A positive response to this request could put us over the line and move us quickly in the direction we want to head vis-à-vis our military-to-military relationship with Morocco.

6. I strongly support the King's request for four more F-5E aircraft. There is no question that he needs them. I have no idea whether the GOM believed that the SecDef would be offering up to 20 aircraft before he arrived but that is a possibility. Even so the request is a reasonable one and our ability to fulfill it for little or nothing would be very timely.

Nassif

³ Carlucci underlined: "SecDef Carlucci's."

⁴ Carlucci underlined: "Ten F-5E's in lieu of the six which were offered" and "while he understood the price of the aircraft would be somewhere between four hundred thousand and a million dollars that the King had asked that we provide these ten at quote a very good price unquote."

277. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, May 6, 1988

Your Majesty:

I wanted to avail myself of the opportunity of John Whitehead's visit to Morocco to share some thoughts about recent regional developments and to solicit your views in return.

On numerous occasions, you have shared with us your keen insight into the problems of the Middle East. I would welcome your thoughts on the continuing conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors—a problem which remains a key concern for my Administration. If we are to achieve a comprehensive settlement that realizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, while protecting Israel's security, the United States is convinced that the efforts of all involved must be redoubled. Morocco has an essential role to play in this regard, not least by helping to influence the debate within Arab circles in moderate directions—as you have done so ably on many occasions in the past.

Your Majesty, the continuing conflict in the Gulf constitutes a significant problem for us as well as for the moderate Arab states of the region. Our first desire is to see this agonizing war ended through immediate implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. The United States cannot stand by, however, and watch innocent shipping subjected to lawless attacks when we have the means to assist. As a reflection of our continuing commitment to freedom of navigation in international waters, I have therefore decided to make available U.S. assistance under certain circumstances to ships in distress, without increasing current force levels.

Your Majesty, as we continue to work together to resolve the problems that confront us, it is my sincere hope during this holy month of Ramadan that Morocco—under your wise guidance and leadership—will offer its collective prayers for peace, so that our peoples will one day be able to live in a world where stability and tranquility prevail.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Morocco 1988. No classification marking.

278. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 17, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

2. *Whitehead in Morocco*. John Whitehead met with King Hassan May 12² to convey your letter to the King³ and to review regional issues. The King criticized Shamir harshly saying his policies were putting Israel in serious danger. He observed that a US peace initiative in an election year faced severe challenges, but agreed we must continue the search for common ground. Whitehead also met with Minister of Interior Basri,⁴ who welcomed increased cooperation in combatting narcotics production and trafficking. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading April-June 1988. Secret.

² Telegram 4785 from Rabat, May 13, contains a record of the Whitehead-Hassan meeting. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 95D552, 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Box 7, Rabat 1988 Nodis)

³ See Document 277.

⁴ Telegram 4769 from Rabat, May 13, contains a record of the Whitehead-Basri meeting. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, lot 95D552, 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Box 7, Rabat 1988 Nodis)

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, July 6, 1988, 1552Z

6562. Pass NSC for Colin Powell; OVP for Don Gregg; OSD for Secretary Carlucci and ASD Armitage; State for Deputy Secretary Whitehead and AS Murphy. From Ambassador. Subject: F-16s for Morocco: Hassan's Emissary to the President.²

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-90-0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram reads: "SEC DEF HAS SEEN JUL 7 1988." In the right-hand corner of the telegram, Carlucci wrote: "I don't understand the issue here. We do not oppose the sale. Is he looking for more FMS to finance them? FC."

² Carlucci underlined the subject line.

1. Secret, Entire text.

2. General Achabar, Secretary General of the National Defense Administration, summoned me urgently July 6 to inform me that the King was sending him to Washington as a personal emissary with a message for the President regarding the long-standing issue of Moroccan acquisition of F-16s. Achabar said that the Moroccan Embassy in Washington would be making a formal request for a meeting with the President,³ but that he wanted to give me the precise reason for the King's request for such a meeting. He gave no hint of the content of the King's message on the F-16s. Achabar said he would be arriving in Washington July 14, via London. He would be available in Washington for a meeting with the President at any time through the following week.

3. Comment: Hassan's interest in the F-16 has a long history. In choosing to highlight it at this moment, he may be trying to make a last minute appeal to an administration with which he has had excellent relations. I suspect the appeal may turn out to be some form of linkage between acquisition of F-16s and the U.S. proposals for expanded military training activities in Morocco, which have been under discussion for some time. I was recently contacted by Royal Counselor Guedira with regard to the U.S. plans. Guedira's message was that the King wanted to discuss them with me personally prior to my departure from Morocco, now set for July 14, and that in the meantime I should not discuss them with anyone else, including Foreign Minister Filali who has been our designated interlocutor up to this point. If my estimate is correct, the King may use my farewell interview to express his general views on expanded U.S. military activities, but will reserve ultimate decisions until he has in hand the U.S. reaction to his as yet undisclosed message to the President on the F-16s. That, I recognize, might take us into the next administration. But the King has indicated several times that he has a long perspective.⁴

4. Comment continued: Recognizing pressures on President's schedule, I nevertheless strongly urge that every effort be made to find time for him to receive King Hassan's personal emissary on the issue of the F-16s. Keeping a dialogue open with King Hassan is particularly important at this time not only in view of our own plans for military activities but also because of the rapid pace of events in North Africa. Notably between Morocco and Algeria and our own upcoming Presidential election. I will be in Washington on consultation week of July 18 and would be available to participate in such a meeting if deemed appropriate.

Nassif

³ Carlucci placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ Carlucci drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, August 18, 1988, 0201Z

268930. Subject: Message to King Hassan.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Please deliver the following Presidential message to King Hassan in response to the oral message from the King to the President which General Achahbar delivered to General Powell and Secretary Carlucci.² There will be no signed original.

3. Begin text. Your Majesty:

I received with great satisfaction your message as conveyed by General Achahbar. I welcome the reaffirmation of your intention to acquire F-16³ aircraft. I am pleased to confirm to you in turn that the United States also remains fully committed to this proposal.

Your Majesty, my government's interest in expanding military cooperation with Morocco is based on the common defense perceptions our nations share. As Morocco and the U.S. stood together during World War II, so Morocco remains a pillar of security in the Western Mediterranean region today. The fifteen-year program of expanded cooperation which was briefed to your government in March of this year reflects the close nature of our bilateral relations.

I am asking my representatives to the next Joint Military Commission meeting to pursue these complex matters in greater detail, including the potential benefits of expanded military cooperation—benefits which could help facilitate our common goal of enhancing the readiness of our two countries' armed forces. I am also asking our Department of Defense to remain in close contact with your government to review these and other issues.

Your Majesty, in closing, permit me to extend to you my sincerest best wishes for your well being and for the continued progress of Morocco under your wise leadership. Yours sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

3. This message has been coordinated with DOD.

Whitehead

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880724-0452. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley (NEA/AFN); cleared by Casey, Eastham, Leonard Csensny (PM/ISP), Palevitz (DOD/ISA), Philip Zelikow (S/S), Negroponte, Perito, James Collins (S/S), and James Carragher (S/S-O); approved by Burleigh.

² No record of the Powell-Achabar conversation has been found.

³ See Document 279.

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of Defense and State¹

Rabat, September 30, 1988, 1226Z

9582. Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. DOD for Carlucci. Dept NEA for Murphy. CIA for Gates. NSC for Burns. EUCOM for General Richards. Subject: Hassan Meeting With ASD/ISA Armitage.

1. Secret, Entire text.

2. Begin summary: In unusually lengthy, cordial and candid discussion Sept 29, Hassan told ASD/ISA Armitage that he was prepared to consider all options presented by the U.S. for future military cooperation. He asked that discussion begin with the more demanding longer term items, since the creation of de facto permanent bases would be a change in the nature of the military relationship. He explicitly linked expanded programs to provision of F-16s to Morocco. On other topics, he announced that Royal Air Maroc would buy Boeings rather than Airbus, and said AFERDOU 88² cancellation had been due to political optics of timing in conjunction with Maghreb meetings in Morocco. Hassan expressed his great esteem for President Reagan, for SecDef Carlucci and former SecDef Weinberger, adding that he greatly appreciated the understanding Morocco had always enjoyed in the Pentagon. End summary.

3. Hassan received ASD/ISA Armitage in Rabat Sept 29 for nearly two hours. Also present were Chargé, the Crown Prince, Royal Counselor Guedira, Prime Minister Laraki, General Achabar, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach and Military Attaché in Washington Colonel Kostali. After initial pleasantries, Hassan launched into an extended expose of his thinking on defense cooperation.

4. Focus on Long-Term

Hassan noted that he had read the baseline study which US had submitted on military cooperation.³ These were, he observed, divided into short, medium, and long term proposals. He said he would not exclude consideration of any of the U.S. proposals in any area. However,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-90-0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Specat; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Algiers. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Service Center.

² Reference is to the planned United States-Moroccan joint exercises scheduled for early September.

³ Not found.

it was necessary first to determine what the real issue was. In Hassan's view, there is a fundamental difference in the nature of U.S. military activity proposed in the long term, from what presently exists under the 1982 access and transit agreement. In effect, what the U.S. is seeking is one or two military bases. The change is thus not simply a matter of degree.

5. Given the far-reaching nature of the change in the relationship which the creation of *de facto* bases would imply, these proposals need to be studied in depth. In that process, Hassan said he hoped U.S. would consider Moroccan requirements along with U.S. military requirements. Hassan noted that the Moroccan armed forces had always been his private preserve. The Parliament had never discussed the military budget, which he claimed showed absolute popular confidence in his management of national security issues. Since he had that public confidence, Hassan said he was willing to consider any options, even those which, like the creation of operational/maintenance bases, could seem to conflict with Morocco's other international obligations. As examples of potentially conflicting obligations which would have to be considered, he noted Morocco's membership in the Arab League, the Non-Aligned movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the OAU (cited even though he noted, Morocco is not presently participating). Such U.S. military cooperation options could only be considered, however, on condition that he could be convinced, and could convince his people, that they would be for the net benefit of the Moroccan people and nation.

6. Hassan recalled, for example, that he had once remarked publicly that, if the Arab League had recognized the Polisario, he would have withdrawn from the organization and signed a defense treaty with Israel. Such a move would have met the criteria of being justifiable to the Moroccan people as defending national security and territorial integrity. Hassan contended that the Moroccan mentality was unique in the Arab world. The Moroccan people could be counted on to show the necessary flexibility, imagination, and maturity to support whatever decisions are necessary. To do this, however, they need logical, historical arguments to support any decision. If such arguments were available, Hassan said he was prepared to discuss U.S. long-term proposals, "and even beyond".

7. Making Use of *Détente*

In response to ASD/ISA's question, Hassan said that Morocco was not overjoyed with the present situation with regard to U.S. military cooperation, but was not complaining. The primary problem is that the Congress does not understand the importance of U.S.-Moroccan military relations. For the future, Hassan suggested that the best approach is to seek to improve and build on the existing access and transit

agreement as much as possible, possibly through further exchanges of letters. In the process, we should jump over the middle term, to get directly to discussion of the longer term.

8. Hassan observed that the world was entering what promised to be a prolonged period of détente. This was a period which should be used to take steps to ward off future trouble. It is a good time to look at the long term, calmly. Many things can be done together, directly and indirectly. A study, beginning now, of the long term, would look at how we can work together to defend our civilization, our values, our liberties.

9. Citing various examples of long-term preparation, Hassan noted that Morocco had pursued an application to join the EC, which had been greeted sympathetically. Clearly membership was not for tomorrow, but he said he was sure it would come eventually. Europe, he argued, would find itself in need of strategic depth in the political area, just as it has found it needs strategic depth in the military field. He noted, as another example, Morocco's excellent relations with Portugal, and discussions on defense cooperation. He said that Portuguese PM would be bringing a draft defense treaty when he visited Morocco in October.

10. The F-16 Quid

Armitage said that the U.S. would be prepared to discuss long term questions, but only if it could be ensured that Morocco would not feel that its sovereignty had been violated or its interests neglected. We would not want to get into a position where Morocco felt it could not support what we had discussed. Armitage said that the U.S. had done an analysis which provided order of magnitude ideas on the benefits to Morocco of the proposals we had presented. There were certain direct benefits, e.g. monies spent on military construction. There were also indirect benefits, such as the degree to which enhanced cooperation with Morocco would make the Congress more receptive to arguments for greater military and economic assistance. There were also benefits from Moroccans employed by U.S. programs.

11. Hassan said that this was a simple matter. International relations involve a balance of compensations, give and take. All that would be required would be to ensure that he was in a position to show a suitable counterpart to his people, which would be sufficient to make Moroccan defense credible until 2010. In this regard, his primary interest is in "my squadron of F-16s."

12. Armitage said that it would be up to the U.S. and Morocco together to consider a payments schedule for such an acquisition, and how funds might be applied against the schedule. He noted that the dols 52 million of security assistance earmarked for Morocco this year

would not be sufficient to the purpose. Hassan interjected that it was not only inadequate for purchase of F-16s, but did not reflect Morocco's geostrategic importance. Armitage said there could be other possible approaches. For example, one approach might be to provide F-16s on lease, although he stressed that he was not sure this was possible.

13. Hassan concluded that he hoped ASD/ISA Armitage would inform the President and Secretary Carlucci that he wanted to consider the long term relationship, but that he wanted the work on this to start now. Armitage asked if Hassan would entertain a further US presentation on benefits. Hassan said he would, but asked that it not be made a subject of official correspondence, but simply be passed orally for Moroccan representatives to take notes. Armitage said he would be in contact with Ambassador Bargach and Defense Attaché Kostali on this.

14. The Sahara and the Maghreb

Hassan said that there was a promising future in the Maghreb. The conflict in the Sahara continued for the moment. Algeria had a psychological problem, in that they clearly wanted out of the conflict, but in a way which would keep them from losing face, particularly in front of all the countries they have pushed to recognize the Polisario. Morocco, for its part, would not retreat from its demand for a referendum. The present "atmospheric disturbances", however, would not change the basic movement toward resolution of the Sahara conflict. Morocco and Algeria have signed an agreement for a gas pipeline which will make Europe less dependent on Soviet gas. Both Morocco and Algeria have a strong interest in the success of that accord, despite the continuation of the conflict in the Sahara. Hassan asserted that the gas pipeline accord had, in fact, settled the question of war and peace in the region.

15. Looking at the Sahara problem, Hassan commented that Algerian President Bendjedid is trustworthy, "a gentleman". But he had not yet gained full control of what was a very bad internal situation. The FLN Congress in December, and the presidential election in January, were part of that process, and Hassan said he strongly hoped that Bendjedid would win. In that campaign, Hassan saw Bendjedid's platform as based on (1) economic reform; and (2) the normalization of relations with Morocco.

16. Whatever the shape of the Maghreb, Hassan asserted, Morocco will preserve its military independence. It would be crazy to do otherwise. Hassan added that Morocco is currently studying a military rebuilding program keyed to the end of the Sahara conflict and the anticipated ensuring period of détente. It should be a period, he noted, in which the countries of the Maghreb can attend to their reequipment needs with less concern for the reactions of their neighbors than in a period of tension.

17. Boeing Purchase by Royal Air Maroc

In the category of things which Morocco and the U.S. can do for each other, Hassan noted that he had decided that Royal Air Maroc would purchase Boeing 737–400s, as replacement aircraft, rather than the competing Airbus model. He said that the long competition between the manufacturers had come down to packages which were essentially equal. Thus, he had to make a political choice, which he had done on the basis that there was insufficient U.S. private sector involvement in Morocco, in comparison to the heavy European private sector involvement in everything from public works to banking. Moreover, RAM has had a good experience with Boeing planes over the years.

18. AFERDOU Cancellation

Responding to ASD/ISA's concern that cancellation of exercise AFERDOU 88 might have indicated that Morocco was reacting negatively to something the U.S. had done, Hassan said that the timing of the exercise had conflicted with what he called the "prenuptial" period in Maghreb relations. The Maghreb Commission will meet in Rabat in late October. This will be followed by a Maghreb summit, which Hassan said would also be held in Morocco by virtue of his status as senior head of state. In this context, it would not have been good to have the exercise go forward. But this did not mean that for the future Morocco did not want to have an active mutually beneficial exercise program.

Hawes

282. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in Morocco¹

New York, October 6, 1988, 0727Z

Secto 17070. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Moroccan FonMin Filali, 10/04/88.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Participants: US—The Secretary, Ambassador Walters, Assistant Secretary Murphy, Assistant Secretary Redman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Burleigh, Algeria Desk Officer Fitzpatrick, Interpreter Eliza Burnham. Morocco—Foreign Minister Filali, UN Permanent Representative Jaidi, UN Mission Officer Bengelloun.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880891–0437. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, and USUN. Shultz was in New York for the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly.

3. Summary: During their October 4 meeting in New York, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Filali focussed on events in the Maghreb, including restoration of relations between Morocco and Algeria and progress toward resolution of the Sahara dispute. The Secretary expressed full US support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General in this regard, and offered the full assistance of the US Mission to the UN to facilitate the effort. Filali dodged the Secretary's invitation to describe the outcome Morocco would like to see in the Sahara by requesting the Secretary's view on the current round of Angola/Namibia negotiations. The Secretary also asked Filali to convey his personal greetings to King Hassan. End summary

4. The Secretary welcomed recent positive developments in North Africa, including restoration of relations between Morocco and Algeria.² Filali described the resumption of ties with Algeria as the result of much patience and painstaking effort. Morocco had succeeded in overcoming obstacles toward improving ties and wanted to do everything possible to encourage Algeria to open up to the free world. The Secretary interjected that it might help Algerian President Bendjedid if Algeria were part of a more cohesive Maghreb in participation with Morocco. Filali agreed, stating the GOM wanted to bolster Bendjedid's reform effort. The GOM sought to draw Algeria into a cooperative effort with Morocco in the Western Mediterranean. Morocco also wanted to strengthen ties with the US and with its European neighbors. The upcoming visit to Morocco of the Portuguese Foreign Minister and the King's planned visit to Spain October 8 were manifestations of Morocco's success thus far.

5. Turning to the Western Sahara issue, Filali said that in the spirit of compromise the GOM had accepted the UNSYG's plan to structure a referendum on the future of the region,³ though the plan might not have been entirely satisfactory. The GOM believed the best way to ensure a definitive resolution to the conflict was to encourage the SYG to persist in his efforts. Morocco had encouraged the SYG to appoint a Special Representative to begin work on the process, and believed he would name one soon. The GOM was counting on the US delegation at the UN to help if the effort flagged. The Secretary stressed the US was ready to work with the GOM and that the US had long supported the SYG's efforts. Ambassador Walters reaffirmed USUN's desire to be helpful in this regard. At this point, the Secretary asked Filali to describe the outcome Morocco desired for the Western Sahara. Filali, however, turned to the issue of Angola/Namibia negotiations.

² See Document 88.

³ See Document 458.

6. Filali stressed the GOM stood ready to facilitate dialogue in the Angola national reconciliation effort,⁴ but that the two parties must work out their own solution. The Secretary agreed that national reconciliation was key, and could not be put off, as the Angolan Government wanted, until after the issues of South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola had been resolved. Assistant Secretary Crocker was hopeful, following current round of Brazzaville negotiations, that an agreement might be near. The GOM's continued work to further efforts toward Angolan national reconciliation would be a major contribution in this effort. Filali affirmed the GOM would continue to cooperate in this regard.

Shultz

⁴ In telegram 20968 from London, October 3, Crocker reported: "In a decidedly upbeat exchange on Angola-Namibia, King Hassan confirmed our understanding of current Black African moves toward reconciliation in Angola." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0688) Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 20, 1988, 0233Z

342158. Subject: Presidential Letter to King Hassan.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is text of letter from the President to King Hassan, which post should deliver as soon as possible. No/no signed original will follow.

3. Begin text:

Your Majesty:

I very much appreciated the kind personal greetings you conveyed via my representative Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage following his audience with you in Rabat.² I was also gratified to get a

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880931–0728. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Burleigh, Terrell Otis (PM), Eastham, Perito, Richard Mueller (S/S), James Carragher (S/S-O), Daniel Dolan (EB), Joann Alba (S/S-S), and Gnehm (DOD/ISA); approved by Paul Hare (NEA).

² See Document 281.

personal report of your views on the prospects for enhanced military cooperation between the United States and Morocco. My government and I look forward to pursuing your discussion in greater detail in the days and months ahead.

I also wanted to make special mention of the news you conveyed to Mr. Armitage concerning your decision to acquire additional U.S. manufactured aircraft. The U.S. appreciates the import of this action, which will further strengthen the strong links that bind our two countries.

I fully agree with your assessment of the need for vigilance as progress toward peace is achieved in regions of the world that have been previously plagued by conflicts. The United States and its close friends like Morocco must remain strong to defend our shared values. We look forward to consulting closely with you on how to enhance our defense relationship in mutually beneficial ways. As we strive toward our shared goal of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, let me assure you, Your Majesty, of the high regard both I and the American people have for you and your people and of the value the United States attaches to its excellent relationship with your esteemed country.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

His Majesty

Hassan II,

King of Morocco,

Rabat.

Shultz

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 28, 1988, 0141Z

415651. Subject: Moroccan Démarche: Libyan Chemical Weapons Capability

1. Entire text—C.

2. Moroccan Ambassador Bargach urgently requested a meeting with DAS Burleigh on December 27. Making what he described as his

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881125-0854. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley (NEA/AFN); approved by Burleigh. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, Paris, and Madrid. Documentation on the Libyan chemical weapons program is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

last official démarche, Bargach said that his government had instructed him to say that Morocco, as a good friend of the United States, urged restraint and moderation in the U.S. approach to the question of the Libyan CW production facility. Bargach said that Rabat had noted that the briefing recently provided to the GOM had coincided with reports President Reagan had said the U.S. was consulting with its allies about possible direct action against the Libyan facility. The GOM hopes that U.S. will not act precipitately, particularly in the light of the opening to the PLO with its potential for progress towards peace in the Middle East. Noting Libyan assertions that the Rabat plant was producing pharmaceuticals, Bargach said the U.S. should make absolutely certain that the facility in question is really a CW production plant before considering any action. Saying that Morocco was very concerned about the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, Bargach assured Burleigh that the GOM would monitor the situation closely and pass on any information it developed to the U.S.

3. Burleigh thanked Bargach for his presentation and assured him the U.S. welcomed and valued Morocco's advice. He said that the presentation already made in Rabat had put the GOM in possession of the facts which lead us and many of our allies to conclude that Rabat is indeed a chemical weapons production plant. The U.S. has been conducting a diplomatic campaign to bring world attention to focus on the threat posed by the Libyan facility.² The U.S. is also actively supporting the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons and believes it is important to find ways to reinforce the 1925 agreement banning such weapons.³

Whitehead

² In telegram 12658 from Rabat, December 28, the Embassy commented: "While Morocco is seeking to cover all its bases vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors, it has up to now eschewed condemnation of U.S. policy, and is bending over backwards to prevent the Libyan CW affair from damaging U.S.-Moroccan relations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881128–0134)

³ Reference is to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Tunisia

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, January 24, 1981, 0519Z

19133. Subject: Hedda-Draper Tour d'Horizon.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Tunisian Ambassador Hedda called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Draper January 21 to discuss bilateral military issues, Libya, and possible Middle East initiatives under new administration. After presenting copy of congratulatory message from Bourguiba for delivery to President Reagan,² Hedda came to point of call—suggestion that high level Tunisian military delegation of three to four persons visit U.S. soon to exchange information with U.S. counterparts. Hedda proposed late February or early March for visit, which he hopes will include stops at various agencies in Washington as well as elsewhere in country. Draper suggested that March might be best, since new U.S. team should be in place by that time. He indicated also that we would do what we could to facilitate such a visit.

3. Hedda confirmed, as indicated earlier this week by Tunisian Military Attaché, that GOT wants to pin down squadron of F-5's originally slated for Sudan.³ Draper felt this should be possible, since other government considering squadron now appears to be interested in different aircraft. Hedda said GOT also wants M-60s.⁴ Draper noted that

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810036-0344. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Jerrilynn Pudschun (NEA/AFN); cleared by Coon; approved by Draper.

² See Document 286.

³ In telegram 14723 to Tunis, January 20, the Department reported: "Tunisian MilAtt Azzabi called at Dept late 16 January in some excitement to report that GOT had decided to buy squadron of F-5E/F Interceptors." It indicated that the Minister of National Defense had provided a copy of a telex, which asked Northrup Grumman to accept the order for the squadron "previously been destined for Sudan if it is still available." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810029-0056)

⁴ In telegram 812 from Tunis, January 30, Bosworth reported: "Over the past several days we have had a series of discussions with Ministry of Defense officials, including two meetings between Minister of Defense Baly and myself, on Tunisia's plans for the modernization of its defense forces. The Minister has confirmed that Tunisia wishes to buy as soon as possible 12 F-5 Interceptors and 54 M-60 tanks. These two purchases would meet Tunisia's top priority needs." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810046-0351)

M-60 line could be shut down at any time and that in any case orders placed now could only be filled in three years because of backlog. Hedda insisted that GOT could not wait that long and jokingly suggested that they had better send Minister of Defense rather than high level team. Draper said that Hedda should discuss question of M-60 availability with General Graves at DOD.

4. Hedda asked whether there have been any changes in USG position on Libya in view of events in Chad.⁵ Draper noted that some developments were positive. We are pleased that African nations themselves are becoming concerned and that OAU involvement is being considered. He said it was too early to be authoritative but, speaking personally, he was confident that, as far as U.S. relationship with Tunisia is concerned, new administration will want to maintain strong ties. It may be interested in taking tough stance toward Libya. Hedda pointed to Mzali speech⁶ as indication that GOT is trying to cool atmosphere between two countries. He sees encouraging signs from Algeria, which he feels is worried about Libya-Polisario connection and Qadhafi's idea of sub-Saharan state. Finally, he noted that though French reaction was initially slow, it has now become very tough.

5. Moving on to Middle East question, Hedda asked whether incoming administration plans any new initiatives. Draper again cautioned that the new administration still had to develop specific policy guidelines. Speaking personally, he anticipated—on basis of Secretary Haig's testimony—that no major new initiatives should be expected until after Israeli elections,⁷ particularly in view of fact that Sadat believes he cannot accomplish anything more with Begin's government. Hedda asked about Jordanian option.⁸ Draper said that we were taking a very cautious and noncommittal stance. It was a sensitive

⁵ See footnote 10, Document 187.

⁶ Reference is to Mzali's December 29, 1980, speech to the Tunisian National Assembly. Telegram 3835 to DOD, January 7, repeated the text of telegram 35 from Tunis, January 5, in which the Embassy included the following passage from his remarks: "We are working to establish relations marked by deep friendship and cooperation with Libya." The Embassy reported, however, that privately "Tunisia entertains no illusions" about Libya's "power play in Chad." Should Qadhafi "turn his attention to Tunisia," Tunisian officials were "prepared to stall Qadhafi by talking about steps toward unity short of full fusion between the two countries." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810009-0992)

⁷ According to a January 10 *New York Times* article, during which he discussed his impending confirmation hearings, Haig "refused to discuss future policy in the Middle East, except to say that any changes in the Camp David agreement had to be the result of intense consultation." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Stand Reflects a Fading of Détente," p. A1) The parliamentary elections in Israel were scheduled to be held in June.

⁸ Reference is to the so-called "Allon Plan" of 1967, which, in the wake of the Six Day War, proposed a line of fortified Israeli settlements along the Jordan River and the demilitarization of the remainder of the West Bank. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, footnote 4, Document 213.

issue for Hussein. If it were ever to be explored seriously by any party, this would take place after Israeli elections and much would depend on relations between Arafat and King Hussein. Hedda asked about rumor he had heard that two very high level U.S. officials would soon be going to Middle East. Draper said he has heard nothing about such a visit, which would depend on new Secretary. Speaking as close friend of Arab League Secretary General Klibi, Hedda suggested that we build contacts with Arab League. Draper confirmed our great respect for Klibi and noted that we do have continuing contact with him, but repeated earlier position that it would be very difficult for us to receive Klibi in Washington or to arrange meeting for him with new Secretary.

Haig

286. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, January 28, 1981, 1332Z

706. Subject: (U) Letter From President Bourguiba to President Reagan.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Ambassador received on evening Jan 27 original copy of a letter dated Jan 23, addressed to President Reagan from President Bourguiba.² Following is Embassy's informal translation of this letter from French original, which is being pouched to Department.

3. Begin quote: Dear Mr. President: As you begin to take on the high responsibilities which the American people have entrusted to you, it is my pleasure to express the best wishes which all friends of the United States, and particularly Tunisia, extend to you on your accession to the Presidency of the United States.

4. In a world which is more and more threatened by lack of respect for the principles of law and morality, as well as by the hegemonistic and expansionist behavior of certain powers—both great and less great—the role of the United States and of its President becomes more essential than ever before.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba—Cables. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Not found.

5. I rejoice, in this regard, in the help which the Government of the United States has extended to Tunisia in support of its efforts to meet its defense needs. The fact, in particular, that the (FMS) credit proposals which have been allocated for Tunisia in 1982 are \$60 million, even though this figure is below the levels requested by our country following many a technical discussion with American experts in this field, constitutes, in our view, a first response which is both positive and promising.

6. I would have also wished to discuss directly with you the problems concerning our region, most especially those regarding Tunisian security as well as the need to strengthen relations between our two countries. Various reasons, however, due notably to precautions which my health requires me to take, unfortunately prevent from realizing this objective in the near future.

7. It is for this reason that I would sincerely hope that you might receive in Washington, as soon as possible, my Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Mzali, who will share with you Tunisia's serious concerns regarding both its security and the future of our region, a region which bridges the Arab world, Africa and Europe, and whose strategic importance is known to you.

8. Please accept, Mr. President, both my warmest wishes for your success and the expression of my highest regard. Signed Habib Bourguiba. End quote.

9. Comments by septel.³

Bosworth

³ In telegram 705 from Tunis, January 28, Bosworth reported: "I believe it in the US interest to invite Mzali to make a brief working visit to Washington within the first few months of the new administration." Such a visit, Bosworth contended, would "reassure the Tunisians of our continuing commitment to help Tunisia preserve its security in the face of the growing threat from Libya." A visit would help "Mzali's efforts to consolidate his position as Bourguiba's successor." Bosworth added that while others could also succeed Bourguiba, the Embassy judged Mzali "would follow policies that help preserve our long-term interests here." Finally, the visit could be "a useful element in an overall US policy response to the growing Libyan threat to the stability and security of the entire region." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, April 16, 1981, 1226Z

2854. From General Walters. Subject: (U) Meetings With Mzali and Belkhodja.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. On April 14, with Amb Bosworth, I saw Tunisian Foreign Minister Belkhodja and Prime Minister Mzali. They were visibly pleased by Secretary's gesture in sending me to brief them.

3. Both spoke of importance of relationship with the U.S. for Tunisia and emphasized their country's exposed position between Algeria and Libya and its need for assistance. I told them I was going to Algeria² and both felt this was positive move. They regarded President Chadli and Prime Minister as relative moderates fighting to prevail over more radical Libyan-influenced Yahyaoui factions. Belkhodja in particular gave me much advice on the care, feeding and handling of susceptible Algerians. I believe a good deal of it was useful.

4. Both listened with great interest to my delivery of Secretary Haig's message³ about U.S. and its intention to strengthen itself and its friends. Both expressed great concern on Qadhafi's antics and regarded him as Soviet instrument rather than Islamic fanatic. Atmosphere of both meetings was extremely cordial and friendly throughout. Both asked me to reassure President Bourguiba, who is very concerned about Qadhafi. This proved to be an understatement. As between Algerians and Moroccans they were definitely pro-Moroccan while feeling that my visit to Algeria could be profitable.

5. Both made pitch for grant aid and more generous terms on military sales. Stated Tunisian military delegation would be in U.S. next week.

6. Mzali stressed need for continuing U.S. economic assistance as well as military aid. He is obviously hoping to be invited to the U.S. later this year.

Bosworth

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810182-0823. Secret; Exdis.

² See Document 105.

³ In telegram 2853 from Tunis, April 16, Walters reported on his April 15 meeting with Bourguiba, during which he delivered to Bourguiba Haig's "message re US intentions to redress military balance, stand by its allies, consult and put financial house in order." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) No other record of Haig's message was found.

288. Memorandum for the Record¹

Tunis, May 23, 1981, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Mr. West, ASD/ISA (designate) and President Bourguiba

ATTENDEES

Amb Bosworth, MOD Baly, Mr. Habib Bourguiba Jr, LTG Graves, Dr. Denoon,
BG Granger

1. President Bourguiba opened by expressing his pleasure that the Sixth Fleet Commander, VADM Small, had invited the TN CNO, Cpt. Fedilha, to his upcoming Change of Command ceremony.

2. President Bourguiba then recounted in considerable detail (to include readings from a book) an episode from his life which took place during WW II. At that time he was incarcerated by the French in Marseilles. He had composed a letter to Dr. Habib Thameur (a functionary with the Neo Destourian party) which was smuggled out of the prison by his son. In the letter, Pres. Bourguiba expressed his strong conviction that the Allies would win out over the Axis powers and he directed Dr. Thameur to insure that the party members and supporters contribute in every way possible to support the Allied cause. Pres. Bourguiba was subsequently released by the Germans (specifically by a Klaus Barbi whom he described as a war criminal) and worked his way back to Tunisia. By a sheer stroke of luck he avoided being swept up [by] the Germans as Tunisia fell and was in Tunis when the English arrived. He then had to convince General Juin, interim Resident General, that he was indeed on the side of the Allies, one of the few Arab leaders to be so.

3. President Bourguiba then took the group around his office and showed them various pictures and mementos to include Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kennedy, a rock from the moon as well as a Tunisian flag which had been carried to the moon. He also discussed a gallery of mug shots of various Tunisian fighters in the struggle for independence.

4. At this point, having clearly established his credentials as a longtime friend of the West and especially the US, President Bourguiba asked what Mr. West had to tell him. Mr. West responded by saying the group was honored that President Bourguiba was meeting with

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia. Confidential. Drafted by Colonel Eugene Fox, U.S. Army, U.S. Military Liaison Office, Tunisia, on May 26. The meeting took place in the Presidential Palace.

them—that he was one of the great men of the 20th Century. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy he wished to convey how strongly we feel our interests are mutual and that we want to work with Ministry of Defense at all levels—equipment, exercises, intelligence—in order to leave no doubt about our intentions.

5. President Bourguiba then launched into a description of the Gafsa incident and Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize Tunisia.² He said that the insurgents had been told that they only had to fire one shot and everyone would join them. Using Soviet arms they killed 45 new inductees who had just been vaccinated and were in a weakened condition. President Bourguiba said he himself was in Nefta, a short distance away, and refused to leave the scene while the emergency continued. In spite of wild stories on the Libyan radio about other cities joining, no one did and all the conspirators were caught. Thirteen were condemned to hang, President Bourguiba refused clemency, and the sentences were carried out.

6. President Bourguiba then commented that Qadhafi had gone into Chad.³ He then moved on to the Jerba Agreement⁴ where he said that, in 1974, Qadhafi had taken advantage of him when he was very sick and got him to sign a document of unification. However, it was one of the shortest on record only having lasted 2 hours. He said he has instructed the Prime Minister that before there will be any cordial relations between the two countries Qadhafi must return the unification document and permit joint oil exploitation of the continental shelf. He closed by saying that Qadhafi is just waiting for him to die and that he was crazy. He commented that he has as many tanks in Libya as all of France or maybe Europe.

7. Mr. West repeated Secretary of State Haig's statement that the U.S. had no intention of permitting any illegal interventions.⁵ He said that the recent expulsion of the so-called Peoples Representatives⁶ was

² See footnote 2, Document 107.

³ Reference is to Libya's 1980 invasion of Chad.

⁴ Reference is to the January 1974 Djerba Treaty of Union between Libya and Tunisia. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120.

⁵ Reference is presumably to a Haig statement made during a March 16 interview. In reference to a question concerning Afghanistan, Haig referenced "ongoing Soviet activity abroad which is illegal, interventionist, imperialist, and poses a great threat to international stability and peace." (Department of State *Bulletin* November 1981, pp. 23–25.

⁶ In early May, the United States Government closed Libya's "People's Bureau" in Washington, D.C. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. In the fall of 1980, in response to the possible renewal of a "Libyan assassination campaign" aimed at Libyan dissident émigrés, in particular the shooting of a Libyan graduate student in Colorado, the Carter administration asked the Government of Libya to arrange for the departure of 19 students and one member of the People's Bureau from Washington. (*Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Documents 140–144)

just one step to make it clear about the unacceptable international conduct of Qadhafi – especially the exportation of thugs, terrorists, and assassins. He also said it was the intention of the U.S. to work with friends for peace and security.

8. President Bourguiba said that Tunisia wants to buy the minimum necessary equipment for its defense and will pay to the best of its ability. Mr. West said a request for increased credits had already been sent to Congress.⁷ President Bourguiba indicated that at the time of Gafsa that President Carter had sent APCs and Congress sent a telegram of support.⁸ He added that he wanted to leave the Tunisian people what they need so they could fight for themselves. Mr. West said he expected that Bourguiba and Reagan would be exchanging telegrams 7 or 8 years from now and then added that the prosperity of the people versus defense needs was worldwide—a U.S. problem to help solve. President Bourguiba then said that Prime Minister Mzali and Bourguiba, Jr. would be coming to the States and he hoped that an agreement on defense requirements could be signed then.⁹

9. Mr. West said he would try. He continued by noting that President Bourguiba had mentioned support from other countries—particularly Saudi Arabia. This was good news because it was obvious that Qadhafi was a threat to many countries. On the subject of an economic plan for equipment he said he wanted to discuss it with MOD along with other means of signaling our intentions.

10. President Bourguiba closed by saying that the Sixth Fleet was welcome to Tunisia wherever and whenever it pleased. He also emphasized that he now felt more at ease now having heard the reassurances of U.S. support.

11. President Bourguiba at this point presented the Order of the Republic (Grand Officer) to Mr. West and the Order of the Republic (Commander) to LTG Graves.

Eugene A. Fox
Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief, USLOT

NOTE: A short press interview was held at the end of the meeting. Mr. West said he was heading a group from DOD for two days of mutual security discussions. The first meeting was with President Bourguiba, whom he found in excellent health. President Bourguiba had discussed

⁷ No record of the request has been found.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 205.

⁹ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

his close relations with the U.S. from WW II to day. Mr. West said there had been a cordial, frank exchange of views.

289. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Clark to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 8, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Meetings with Foreign Ministers of Morocco and Tunisia.* Al Haig met with the Foreign Minister of Morocco last night² and the Foreign Minister of Tunisia early this morning.³ Both expressed profound regret at the loss of Sadat,⁴ and deep concern about the stability of the Middle East in the aftermath of the tragedy. Both offered to work closely with us.

The Tunisians urgently appealed for improved military assistance on the basis that while threats to Tunisia are now greater, it cannot abandon domestic economic and social progress to improve its military capability.⁵ They also pleaded that we seek prompt Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, perhaps ahead of schedule. This would constitute an early, positive success for Mubarak and help him stabilize fragile Egyptian domestic and external political positions. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret. Clark was acting for Haig who was en route to Cairo to attend Sadat's funeral.

² See Document 196.

³ A record of the Haig-Bourguiba meeting is in telegram 277315 to Tunis, October 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810491–0324)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 196.

⁵ An unknown hand wrote: "?" and a checkmark in the margin above this sentence.

290. Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Military Commission¹

Tunis, November 9–10, 1981

*Minutes of the Meetings of the Tunisian–American Joint
Military Committee, Tunis, November 9–10, 1981*

The Tunisian-American Joint Military Committee, organized within the framework of the friendly relations existing between Tunisia and the United States for the purpose of promoting military cooperation, met at the Ministry of National Defense in Tunis, November 9–10, 1981, under the chairmanship of Mr. Slaheddine Baly, Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Tunisia, and Mr. Francis J. West, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

The following members of the Tunisian and American delegations were present:

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

After the opening session, the work of the committee was conducted in four subcommittees, as follows: first subcommittee on intelligence; second subcommittee on assistance; third subcommittee on combined exercises; fourth subcommittee on training. The membership of the subcommittees is given in Annex 1; the subcommittee minutes are found in Annex 2.

The minutes of the opening and closing sessions of the committee are given below.

Monday, November 9, 1981, 12:10 p.m.

I. Opening Session

Welcoming remarks by Defense Minister Baly

Mr. West and I take pleasure in opening the working session of the Tunisian-American Joint Military Committee. The committee was organized to promote military cooperation on a privileged basis between the United States and the Republic of Tunisia. I hope that it will be able to enhance already existing cooperation, under the direction of the Liaison Office, in the areas of training, combined exercises, intelligence exchanges, and security assistance. The competence and ability of the participants will guarantee the successful outcome of the committee's work.

¹Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1981. Secret. Printed from a translation, dated November 13, prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State. All Annexes are attached but not printed.

President Bourguiba is determined to equip the Tunisian armed forces to carry out their mission. The President of the Republic has met with Assistant Secretary West and discussed his concerns with him.² The present situation in the region, the drift towards destabilization, and the deliberately hostile posture of Colonel Qaddhafi are cause for concern by both Tunisians and Americans.

The Minister explained the program to equip the armed forces, and noted that Tunisia has decided to procure materiel from the United States because of its privileged relationship with that country.

President Bourguiba has discussed his interest in modernizing the armed forces with Mr. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary West, and Senator Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The sizeable 1982 FMS [Foreign Military Sales]³ credit is indicative of United States concern with respect to Tunisia. Nevertheless, the terms of repayment are too severe for the Tunisian budget, with a 13% interest rate and relatively short payment periods.

The procurement program includes 2-C130 transports, 1 squadron of F-5 interceptors; 54 M60-A3 tanks; 19 155 mm self-propelling guns; 300 Chaparral-F missiles; 65 TOW night vision devices; and various types of ammunition. The program should take into account a supplementary request for the procurement of a second squadron of interceptors.

The delivery times for this equipment are inconsistent with the urgency and imminence of the threat. I therefore request the United States Government to reconsider its position and to shorten delivery times as much as possible.

I should like to point out to Mr. West and the Committee members the Tunisian request to acquire military equipment (other than that procured on a payment basis) on a grant or lend-lease basis.

Mr. West

The Assistant Secretary of Defense thanked Minister Baly for his kind welcome and clear-sighted remarks. Secretary Haig and Secretary Weinberger are aware of the potential threat to Tunisia and welcome the formation of the Joint Military Committee, which is not meant to interfere with the excellent work being carried out by the Ministry of National Defense and the Liaison Office; its true value lies in what can be learned from that collaboration.

² See Document 288.

³ Brackets are in the original.

II. *Comments of Major General Balma on the threat from the southeast:*

- Introduction on Libya.
- Tunisian relations with Libya.
- The threat of subversion.
- The threat of military aggression.

See text in Annex III.

Mr. West

Commenting on this report, the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted that the United States is aware of the threat posed by Libya, acting with Soviet and Cuban support. The Aden pact,⁴ the recent assault on Guelta Zemmour by the Polisario forces,⁵ Libyan provocations in the Sudan,⁶ the weakening of Somalia, and the fighting between North and South Yemen are matters of concern. Americans rely on the efforts of their friends to counter this subversive offensive, have over the past two years helped identify the Libyan threat, share the same anxieties, and hope to consolidate efforts against any future threats through cooperation in the area of intelligence.

Mr. Baly

Concurrence in the analysis of the threat. Qaddhafi's avowed and persistent hostility towards the Tunisian regime poses serious problems and constitutes a threat that one should guard against. Qaddhafi has stated publicly that the Libyan and Tunisian regimes cannot coexist and that the latter regime must disappear. Tunisia, with its geographic situation and its position in the forefront of the free world, is threatened. The plan of the Soviet Union, with Qaddhafi as its executing agent, constitutes a threat to the southern flank of NATO as well. The foothold being gained by Soviet power in Libya and the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is part of a general framework of penetration of Europe and other areas. Strong, well-equipped Tunisian armed forces can take part not merely in the defense of Tunisia but in that of the free world as well, thanks to the assistance of a friendly nation such as the United States.

⁴ Reference is to the treaty signed in August among Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Documentation on the treaty is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

⁵ Reference is to the October 13 battle between Moroccan and Polisario forces. See Document 386.

⁶ An unknown hand wrote: "Sudan." Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

Mr. West

Assistant Secretary of Defense West again thanked the Minister for his detailed presentation on the threat to Tunisia, which the United States regards as serious, and expressed certainty that a solution will be found to the danger posed by Libya and the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The identical viewpoints of the Americans and the Tunisians will allow the subcommittee talks to begin in a relaxed atmosphere.

III. Presentation of the procurement plans of the Tunisian Army by Brigadier General Gzara.

- Plan for modernization of army units.
- Proposed procurement from the United States.
- Minimum equipment necessary for the Armed Forces.

IV. American assistance and the status of FMS credits, presented by Mr. Rudd.

- Materiel already received under FMS credits.
- Outline of the IMET training program.
- Status of FMS contracts with the Ministry of National Defense.
- Scheduled delivery of materials already procured.
- Status of the 1982 FMS credit.
- Payment period for proposed procurement.
- Delivery schedules for future procurement.

The work was continued in separate subcommittee meetings at the end of the first session of the committee.

November 10, 1981

The Committee met at 4 p.m., in a closing session to review the work of the subcommittees.

I. Reports by the subcommittee chairmen.

1. Subcommittee on Intelligence: Major Gen. Balma.
 - Perception of the Libyan threat: logical, plausible, and real.
 - Means taken and to be taken to warn of an attack.
 - Reaction resources.

See Annex II-1.

2. Subcommittee on Combined Exercises: Brig. Gen. Gzara.

- PHIBLEX series exercise.
- SAHEL series exercise.
- Practice gunnery at Ras Engelah and Cap Serrat.
- Low-altitude instrument navigation.
- Special Forces mobile training team.

See Annex II-3.

General Lutz

— Possibility of reducing the number of Special Forces mobile training team instructors as well as the duration of the exercise by combining the third phase into one maneuver and using Tunisian instructors.

— Housing and transport expenses to be assumed by the Ministry of National Defense.

Minister of National Defense

— A priori agreement on the proposals.

3. *Subcommittee on Assistance*: Col. Machta

— Timetable of the plan of development decided on.

— FMS credits anticipated for 1982–1983.

— Amendment of the tenders on the M60–A3 tanks and the M109 guns in connection with the addition of the required equipment.

— Logistical support for materiel already deployed.

— Financing of proposed procurements.

See Annex II–2.

Mr. West

— A comprehensive five-year program is a logical approach.

— It would be best to plan on the basis of a \$95 million credit for 1982 with the hope of having it increased later.

4. *Subcommittee on Training*: Colonel Barkett

— Distribution of the 1982 IMET budget.

— Stay of the Special Forces mobile training team.

— Programming of the 1983 courses of instruction on the basis of a package of between \$0.7 and \$1.5 million.

— Written materials from American schools.

See Annex II.4.

General Secord

— It would be beneficial to make full use of the American Liaison Office.

— Consider the possibility of officer exchanges in the Tunisian and American Liaison Offices.

Mr. Baly

In my view, the work of the Joint Military Committee has produced positive results. This meeting was necessary for a number of reasons. It was a demonstration of mutual trust and esteem and an attempt to attain the objectives of both governments. All problems were aired, including ones that cannot be dealt with publicly. The Americans

were apprised of the current situation of the Tunisian army, learned of conditions in the Sahara where units led by young officers trained in the United States are stationed, were able to assess the armament of the Tunisian army and its forward positions opposite a very active, aggressively-inclined neighbor. The atmosphere in which the meetings took place showed the special relationship between our two countries. Tunisians would rather have had economic, political, and diplomatic relations only; however, the current situation, the presence of the USSR, and the wave of destabilization throughout the world and in the North African region has forced us to look to a longstanding friend for military cooperation. The fundamental options of Tunisia are well-known. Its people's love of peace is matched by the commitment to their independence, well-being and sovereignty. They are proud of these qualities and determined to defend their interests.

Mr. West

The Assistant Secretary of Defense thanked the Minister for his hospitality and said he looked forward to working with him in the future and to welcoming him to Washington for the next meeting of the Committee.

291. Defense Estimative Brief Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DEB-118-81

Washington, November 12, 1981

Defense Estimative Brief: Tunisia (U)

(U) *Summary*

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Tunisia's aging President Bourguiba, who has maintained tight control over the country's political life, is expected to pass from the scene within the next few years, and a struggle for power within Tunisia's predominant political party is likely. Additionally, there are serious socioeconomic problems—especially the alienation of Tunisia's youth—that provide fertile ground for political exploitation, particularly by Libyan President Qadhafi and

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-83-0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. [1 line not declassified]. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on December 17 at 12:08 p.m.

Islamic fundamentalists. Tunisia will continue to rely on close relations with its two principal Western friends, France and the United States, while also strengthening relations with Algeria as a counter to the Libyan threat. The key to domestic security will be the loyalty of the Armed Forces, which seems assured; however, care will be required in dealing with them to avoid politicizing their ranks and to retain the Government's legitimacy in the eyes of Tunisians. The continued expansion and modernization of Tunisia's Armed Forces will enhance their effectiveness but fall short of providing the capability of countering aggression by Libya. Overall, we expect Tunisia to face serious challenges over the next several years, but we believe the country will overcome them.

1. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) *Political Situation.* Tunisia's aging and chronically ill President Habib Bourguiba will likely pass from power within the next few years. Although he periodically displays remarkable vigor, stamina, and activity for an octogenarian, Bourguiba suffers from senility. Nonetheless, Bourguiba is likely to continue to maintain control over Tunisia's political system through his well-organized Destourian Socialist Party for as long as his faculties permit. Although the President has placed Prime Minister Mzali in a position to succeed him, many conservatives in the party hierarchy are not fully reconciled to Mzali's liberal views. Mzali has appointed men he trusts to key positions in the Government and party; however, if Bourguiba does not actively back him or if his liberal policies meet setbacks, opportunists like former Party Director Mohamed Sayah will attempt to unseat the Prime Minister. Considering the many socioeconomic challenges facing Tunisia, it is likely that, without Bourguiba, Mzali's position will be threatened by factions within the ruling party, as well as by Libyan President Qadhafi's meddling in Tunisian affairs.

2. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) The first "contested" election in Tunisia's history, conducted on 1 November 1981, was characterized by intimidation of the opposition, claims of election irregularities, and a complete sweep of all seats by the regime's candidates. This will undermine the credibility of the step-by-step liberalization process that Mzali has hoped would serve to bridge the gap between the ruling establishment and the disaffected younger generation. Although the three groups which challenged the ruling Destourian Socialist Party have some hope of continued legitimate participation in the Tunisian system, the Islamic right was excluded from the election and has little prospect of sanctioned participation in the political process during the Bourguiba era. The strongly secular regime will likely continue to be intolerant of Islamic fundamentalists despite their increasing number and influence. Tunisia's fundamentalists are not likely to develop sufficient strength to successfully challenge the regime in the near term,

although the movement will appeal to elements of Tunisia's alienated youth, poor, and traditionalists.

3. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) *Economic*. The Tunisian economy continues to grow at a fast rate (7.3 percent real GNP growth in 1980), but there are several troubling trends that threaten not only future growth but the relatively high standard of living and social stability that Tunisia has enjoyed since gaining independence. Tunisia will be faced with growing stagnation in the agricultural sector, declining petroleum production (and revenues), growing unemployment, and increasing requirements for defense spending in the eighties. As a result, Tunis will find it impossible to fund social programs at current levels, create sufficient jobs, and maintain adequate foreign reserves. The best, although unlikely, prospect for continuing the rapid rate of economic growth lies in the discovery of significant new oil reserves. In addition to petroleum and agriculture, the health of the Tunisian economy is also dependent on foreign investment, tourism, remittances from workers abroad, and foreign aid, as well as effective government control over the economy. Serious problems in one or more of these areas could stall Tunisia's economic growth entirely. Accustomed to a relatively high standard of living, well educated Tunisians have developed rising expectations, which are likely to be frustrated by an economic downturn. Such a recession could lead to social unrest with significant political implications.

4. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) *Foreign Policy*. Tunisia's moderate, pro-Western foreign policies contrast with those of Libya, which will remain Tunisia's primary external threat as long as Qadhafi is in control. Friction between the two began to emerge following Tunis' abrogation of the 1974 Tunisia-Libya merger accord.² Differences over both ideology and exploitation of offshore oil will continue to sour their relations despite superficial improvement from time to time. Libyan orchestration of the aborted rebellion in the Tunisian town of Gafsa in January 1980³ and apparent Libyan involvement in Tunisian student disorders in February 1981⁴ reflect the Libyan goal of destabilizing Tunisia. Qadhafi's increasing suspicion of neighboring countries with strong Western ties and his messianic drive for a pan-Islamic state under Libyan leadership bode ill for Tunisia. To counterbalance Libya, Tunisia will continue to develop a security relationship with Algeria and to rely upon France and the United States for military assistance. Frequent French and US naval visits to Tunisia's major ports give substance and visibility to these relations. While the Tunisians have

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120.

³ See Document 288.

⁴ Not further identified.

allowed Soviet naval units limited use of local ship repair facilities, suspicion of Moscow will restrict Soviet-Tunisian relations during the next few years.

5. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Officially, Tunis will remain hostile to Israel and sympathetic to the Palestinians, but in the event of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement Tunisia would have little difficulty accepting a permanent Israeli presence in the Middle East. Although Tunisia broke relations with Egypt over the Camp David Accords and now provides the headquarters and president for the Arab League, Tunis will continue to maintain close unofficial ties with Cairo, in large part as a deterrent to Libyan adventurism. Tunis will also seek to maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan while not alienating any of the radical Arab states.

6. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) *Military.* Tunisia's Western-equipped and -trained Armed Forces will remain too small to effectively deter or counter the military threat posed by Libya despite efforts to expand their size and upgrade the quality of their weaponry. Since the Libyan-backed trouble at Gafsa in 1980, Tunisia has become increasingly aware of the inability of its poorly equipped 25,000-man Armed Forces to defend against potential threats. Significant increases in US military assistance, together with an expanded indigenous effort, will lead to substantial improvement in Tunisia's military potential. Obsolete and often non-operational systems, such as the M41 light tank or the F-86 fighter, are being replaced with more modern systems, such as the M60 medium tank and the F-5 aircraft. Also, continued receipt of new systems, such as Chaparral and TOW, will provide Tunisia with new air defense and anti-armor capabilities. At best, however, force modernization and expansion efforts will only enable the Tunisians to field a force capable of delaying a Libyan attack long enough for French or US assistance to arrive. In fact, the Tunisians will want to avoid creating a force strong enough to provoke their larger neighbors.

7. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) The Armed Forces are expected to remain apolitical and loyal to the Tunisian political system. In the event of a serious succession crisis following Bourguiba's departure from the scene, the Armed Forces would attempt to remain uninvolved. Should serious social disturbances break out, the Army would obey orders to restore calm.

8. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Morale problems caused by low pay and inadequate benefits, cronyism, poor leadership, a lack of modern weaponry and a general feeling of neglect will continue to characterize officer and enlisted personnel at all levels. The morale problem is particularly severe in the Air Force where pilots have resigned in large numbers, thereby raising the spectre of not having the necessary pilots to man the US-supplied F-5s when they arrive in the

first half of 1984. Although poor morale will continue to undermine efforts to build up Tunisia's military capabilities, it is not likely to be sufficiently serious to provoke coup plotting among the Armed Forces.

292. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 28, 1982

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Courtesy Call on President Bourguiba of Tunisia.* Together with General Dick Walters, I made a call today on President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and his Foreign Minister, Caid Essebsi.² The President has been in Washington and Philadelphia to obtain medical treatment.³ He is still so incapacitated by his ailments that we could not have a substantive discussion. Bourguiba said he would soon return to Tunisia because of the pain he was suffering in his mouth and arm. I assume that he will not be able to stay for the meeting you have tentatively planned with him on February 10 (we will confirm this). Foreign Minister Essebsi afterward discussed Tunisia's continuing wariness of Qadhafi. He made an anguished plea for concessional terms for Foreign Military Sales this year, placed in the context of Tunisia's need for defense against Libya.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (01/05/1982-01/29/1982). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reads: "White House Situation Room," and indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:02 p.m. Stoessel was acting for Haig, who was in Jerusalem to discuss the Egyptian-Israeli peace process with Begin.

² A record of the conversation is in telegram 25913 to Tunis, January 30, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820053-0876)

³ In telegram 187 from Tunis, January 11, the Embassy reported: "It has just been announced in a communiqué from the Office of the President signed by two physicians that President Bourguiba is ill and is to go abroad for treatment." His ailments included "a gum infection and a partial paralysis of the right arm." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820016-0138)

293. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, March 30, 1982

SUBJECT

Objectives For the Working Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali

We propose the following objectives for the working visit of the Tunisian Prime Minister in late April:

1. Reaffirm our traditional friendship for Tunisia and President Bourguiba.

President Bourguiba led Tunisia to independence in 1956 and has dominated it ever since. His personal friendship for the U.S. is largely responsible for Tunisia's openness to us and the anti-Soviet cast of its foreign policy. The aging President is trying to link his country's destiny to that of the U.S. before he passes away.

2. Reaffirm our Support for Tunisia's economic, social, and political development.

Tunisia has had dramatic success in improving the economic and social lot of its people since independence in 1956. The Tunisian government is very concerned that it not have to divert resources from economic to military purposes before the economy has found a stable footing. The US has contributed about \$1 billion to economic development since 1956, and is extending \$10 million of PL 480 Title I² in FY 82. Development projects will also continue for several years, although new appropriations ceased in FY 81. Mzali was the architect of elections held last November in which opposition groups were allowed to participate for the first time since independence in 1956.

3. Reaffirm our support for Tunisia's security.

Relations with Libya deteriorated after an abortive declaration of unity in 1974.³ In 1980, Tunisians trained and backed by Libya attacked the Tunisian city of Gafsa.⁴ Qadhafi made a state visit to Tunisia in

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (February–March 1982). Confidential.

² Title I refers to concessional sales of agricultural commodities in U.S. dollars with a generous repayment scheme.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 288.

February 1982, resulting in limited rapprochement.⁵ The Tunisians nevertheless remain wary of Qadhafi and are continuing to build up their neglected military defense. The U.S. formed a Joint Military Commission with Tunisia last year and is extending \$85 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to Tunisia in FY 82.

4. Encourage Tunisia to continue working for moderation in the Arab-Israeli imbroglio.

Although voting with the Arab bloc in Arab-Israeli matters, Tunisia plays a moderating role behind the scenes within the bloc. It was an early advocate of recognizing Israel's right to exist and it refuses to attend the meetings of the extremist Steadfastness Front.⁶ Privately, Tunisia welcomed Sadat's initiative to bring peace to the Middle East. As the provisional seat of the Arab League, Tunisia is in a position to exert a moderating influence out of proportion to its small size.

5. Encourage Tunisia to continue its moderation in the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, the OAU, and other international forums.

Tunisia is one of the more temperate non-aligned countries. It was of great help to us during its term on the UN Security Council in 1980 and 1981. It cast the decisive vote for sanctions against Iran during the hostage crisis and voted to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example. Last year it entered a reservation to the unhelpful Non-Aligned declaration on Puerto Rico and did not participate in the drafting of the hostile UN communique of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁷ We expect Tunisia to be helpful in managing the planning for the OAU Summit in Tripoli, and will want to consult closely with Mzali on this issue.

L. Paul Bremer, III⁸
Executive Secretary

⁵ Reference is to anti-Israel movement created by the PLO, Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen in 1977 after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel. The Front also rejected UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.

⁶ In telegram 2269 from Tunis, March 25, the Embassy informed the Department that the Tunisian Government had instructed its Ambassador in New Delhi to register its reservation to the Puerto Rican portion of the communiqué issued by the NAM at its Ministerial Conference in New Delhi. The communiqué called for Puerto Rican self-determination and independence from the United States. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810141-0657)

⁷ In telegram 4615 from the USUN, December 11, 1981, the Mission reported that Tunisia, along with 15 other nations, had voted against a "tendentious draft" NAM communiqué "on 'threats' to Nicaragua" from the United States. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810601-0309, D810589-0120)

⁸ Deputy Executive Secretary Alvin Adams signed for Bremer above this typed signature.

294. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M#82–10152

Washington, April 23, 1982

TUNISIAN PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION*[portion marking not declassified]***Summary**

Tunisia's aging President Habib Bourguiba is spending less time directing policy, although he continues to dominate it. Bourguiba's wife Wassila and various ministers, including Habib Bourguiba, Jr., will continue to compete with Prime Minister Mzali for power and influence in the period preceding Bourguiba's departure.² Although these individuals exert varying degrees of influence, *[3 lines not declassified]*. The resulting inconsistencies have encouraged a government of sycophants and have alienated labor and political opposition groups seeking reform. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the slogans of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party are seen as increasingly irrelevant by Tunisia's youthful population. *[portion marking not declassified]*

When Bourguiba departs the scene, the Prime Minister, currently Mohamed Mzali, is the constitutionally designated successor for the remainder of the current National Assembly term which runs to November 1986. The timing of the succession will be a crucial factor in Mzali's ability to consolidate his position and to win his first presidential election. Mzali's success in gaining support and respect from the ruling party, labor, and opposition groups will determine the duration of his time in office. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Although Tunisia's military expenditures are increasing, the military remains small and apolitical. It will probably be loyal to any legal successor. Widespread popular revolt is also unlikely. *[portion marking not declassified]*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R, Box 17, C-384, Tunisia. Secret; *[handling restrictions not declassified]*. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near East/South Asia Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, using information available as of April 23.

² In telegram 2752 from Tunis, April 8, the Embassy reported: "Although the Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali has had his ups and downs, the regime is probably stronger now than when he took office two years ago. He has been the prime force behind Tunisia's process of political liberalization." The Embassy continued: "Despite their somewhat ambivalent relationship, Mzali retains Bourguiba's support as the best qualified Tunisian to lead the country once Bourguiba's rule ends." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820186–0124)

Tunisian foreign relations under Mzali would emphasize the country's nonaligned and pro-Arab status. Neither Mzali nor other presidential contenders would align Tunisia with the USSR. Tunisia almost certainly will continue to look to the US and Western Europe for military support and economic investment. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

295. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 28, 1982

SUBJECT

Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali

1. I met today² *[1 line not declassified]* who was somewhat apprehensive about the outcome of the visit of Prime Minister Mzali. Basically, it appears that there is a group of Tunisian Ministers who favor closer ties with Libya, as opposed to Prime Minister Mzali, and who would like to see the Mzali visit to Washington be something less than a success in the eyes of President Bourguiba.

2. *[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]*

3. What is important here *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and I understand that this coincides with U.S. views and objectives, is that Bourguiba perceives the Mzali visit as a success. *[less than 3 lines not declassified]* you may be able to solidify Mzali's position through a private letter from you to Bourguiba, and allow Mzali to carry this letter back to his President.³ *[less than 1 line not declassified]* such a letter should simply contain a reaffirmation of your support for the Bourguiba regime and a statement indicating that it is now clear to you that Bourguiba was wise to select Mzali as the man to implement his, Bourguiba's, principles.

William J. Casey⁴

Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, PM Mzali, 04/29/82 (04/03/1982–04/23/1982). Secret. Copies were sent to Haig and Clark. The date of the memorandum is in error; *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

² A record of the meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box 17, C–384, Tunisia.

³ See Document 298.

⁴ Casey signed "WJ Casey" above this typed signature.

296. Memorandum From Raymond Tanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 28, 1982

SUBJECT

Memcon of Weinberger Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali on April 27, 1982

At Tab A is a memorandum of conversation from the Secretary of Defense regarding his meeting with Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia.

A key point in the memorandum concerns Foreign Military Sales credits. The Administration has requested \$140M for FY–83, half of which would be on favorable (concessional) terms, i.e., at interest rates lower than commercial rates. I believe that the Administration should push very hard to obtain favorable rates for the Tunisians.

The Tunisians, however, should not be given the impression that Congress will approve the \$140M request nor the proposal for \$70M on concessional terms. Indeed, State informally has indicated to the working level Tunisians that they should anticipate receiving only about \$85M instead of \$140M.

The Secretary of Defense's memo states that the Tunisians: "hope that in addition to the \$70 million in FMS, the other \$70 million could be provided 'as you do for Israel' (i.e., forgiven). Secretary Weinberger said that 'essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the Congress.' We hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a promise."

Unfortunately, this exchange suggests that the Administration is requesting that \$70M be forgiven, which is not true. To clear up this confusion, I suggest that Michael Wheeler send to State a copy of the Secretary of Defense's memcon and let State straighten out this matter. Otherwise, the Tunisians will go into the meeting with the President with the false idea that the Administration has asked for the Congress to approve \$70M in forgiveness for the Tunisians.

Another issue is the Tunisian request to seek another U.S. Navy ship of similar displacement to the current Tunisian flagship. The Prime Minister will be raising this issue directly with the President.² The Navy has advised the Secretary that no ship is presently available for transfer.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Tunisia (04/28/1982–04/29/1982). Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Tyson. Wheeler initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Mzali did not raise the issue of the Tunisian flagship during his meeting with Reagan. See Document 297.

The Secretary promised to see if anything suitable can be found and said he will have further information before the Prime Minister meets with the President on Thursday, April 29. The Secretary will send under separate cover a paper addressing the request for another flagship.³

Chris Shoemaker concurs.

Recommendation

That Michael Wheeler send a copy of the Secretary of Defense's Memcon to State.⁴

Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation⁵

Washington, April 27, 1982, 11:30 a.m.–1:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia (U)

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>Tunisia</i>
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense	Mohamed Mzali, Prime Minister
Ambassador Walter Cutler, U.S.	Slaheddine Baly, Minister of Defense
MG Carl Smith, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. James Woods, Director, Africa Region, ISA (Notetaker)	Habib Ben Yahia, Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S.
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Dept of State (Interpreter)	Colonel Mokhtar Gmati, Military Attache
	Colonel Brahim Boudabous, Chief, Liaison Bureau, MOD

(U) Prime Minister Mzali opened the meeting by noting Minister of Defense Baly's invitation to Secretary Weinberger to visit Tunisia. Secretary Weinberger said that he had not thus far had the opportunity to visit Tunisia but would very much like to do so. The Prime Minister said "You will be most welcome."

(C) Secretary Weinberger noted that Tunisia occupies a strategic and important location and that the U.S. is very conscious of this. Prime Minister Mzali responded that Tunisia has noticed with pleasure

³ Not found.
⁴ Poindexter approved the recommendation for Clark. Tab I, a memorandum from Wheeler to Bremer, is not attached.
⁵ Secret. Drafted by James Woods, (DOD/ISA); approved by Weinberger. The meeting took place at Blair House. Also sent under an April 28 covering memorandum from Weinberger to Clark.

an “increasing interest” on the part of the Government of the U.S. in Tunisia, especially since President Reagan came into office. The Tunisian people and President Bourguiba personally are very grateful for this. Secretary Weinberger said that this was a very correct perception and that President Reagan is a great admirer of President Bourguiba. The U.S. appreciates Tunisia’s importance and its support, in the UN and elsewhere, of the same principles as the U.S. President Reagan is looking forward to meeting the Prime Minister, he emphasized.

(C) President Bourguiba’s attitude is not dictated by events, but is a constant attitude based on principle, the Prime Minister said. President Bourguiba has always supported and been supported by the United States, since independence. Tunisia would always be on the side of the West and of the United States, and attached to peace and freedom. Tunisia would never attack the United States, like some states which regrettably find it “fashionable” to do so. Secretary Weinberger said that the U.S., and President Reagan personally, were quite aware and appreciative of this. We are, in turn, anxious to be as helpful as we can. We are happy to have been able to provide more FMS credits in FY82 and want to do much more in the future. But to do so we must first persuade Congress. I have had very fine reports on Tunisia from Mr. Carlucci and Mr. West following their visits there,⁶ said the Secretary, and these only add to my desire to visit Tunisia myself; I hope that I can therefore accept Minister Baly’s kind invitation soon.

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then explained that Tunisia has, since independence, devoted the bulk of its resources to development—health, education, etc. Over 40% of the Tunisian national budget goes to development. Tunisia had not emphasized defense, but the Libyan-inspired attack on Gafsa (January 1980)⁷ reminded Tunisia that an effective military force was needed as a deterrent. But military equipment is very expensive, and while Tunisia must do more for its military it cannot thereby jeopardize its commitment to development. In this light, “we appreciate your credits very much, but the terms are heavy, and we hope they can be made lighter in the future.”

(C) Secretary Weinberger said that the U.S. understood that good social conditions make for good soldiers; however, it is also true that we must maintain our deterrence against mischief-makers like Libya and the Soviet Union. The terms of FMS are a disappointment to many countries.

⁶ For West’s conversation with Bourguiba, see Document 288. Records of West’s May 23 and 24, 1981, conversations with Mzali and at the Ministry of Defense, respectively, as well as Carlucci’s July 14, 1981, conversation with Guiga, are in Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 288.

We are seeking in FY83 to make a larger part of the program concessional, with much better terms. But the Congress is not yet fully persuaded. We are glad that FY82 is at \$85 million and hope we will get our full \$140 million in FY83, as requested; we "know it will go to a good cause."

(C) Prime Minister Mzali responded that, with respect to FY83, they are interested both in the proposed increase in volume (to \$140 million) and in improving the terms, since "current terms are draconian." They hope that in addition to the \$70 million in FMS, the other \$70 million could be provided "as you do for Israel" (i.e., forgiven). Secretary Weinberger said that "essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the Congress." We hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a promise.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said this was all the more urgent since "our Saudi friends, on whom we count so heavily, have not given us an answer on more help." He had talked with Prince Fahd after the Gafsa incident, and Fahd had promised \$500 million in financial support for military purchases. \$50 million was provided soon after, but nothing for the past two years. Prince Fahd is "personally benevolent" and says that the security of Tunisia is closely linked to the security of Saudi Arabia, but "we see slowness in their responding to our request which is, after all, only a drop in the ocean to them." The Prime Minister said he had discussed this problem previously with Mr. Carlucci and with Mr. West and now wanted to discuss it personally with Secretary Weinberger.

(S) Secretary Weinberger noted that, unfortunately, the situation described was becoming typical of the Saudis with respect to several countries. We will, he said, encourage them to fulfill their plans to support your country. We hope too that they will find persuasive the arguments we make with our own Congress, in seeking higher support for your program.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said that he wanted to give an example of how the Tunisian development effort is linked to defense. Our main enemy is unemployment, he said. After the recent visit by Colonel Qadhafi, Tunisia reopened its border with Libya.⁸ In one month, 34,000 young Tunisians crossed into Libya in search of jobs. So countries like Libya will receive our youth, and train and arm some of them and send them back by infiltration. This, not tanks and missiles, is our main threat. For example, only last month, we picked up seven young Tunisians who reentered from Algeria, after military training in Libya. So our main problem is subversion and infiltration; development is the answer and harsh FMS terms handicap our efforts to improve the economy!

(C) Secretary Weinberger agreed that the example was a good one. We understand and this is another reason we want to be as helpful as

⁸ See Document 13.

we can. We want the economies of our friends to be healthy, and that is why we extend economic as well as military assistance. We know the strains that FMS puts on your economy. We see the internal danger you face, and the threat of infiltration.

(S) The Prime Minister continued his example. Of the 34,000 young men, six or seven thousand came back soon after; they found that Libya was “no El Dorado.” Jobs are short there too, and Libya is going through economic difficulties. Libya has laid off many Tunisian workers from the oilfields. But there is also an ideological dimension: the Libyans appeal to these young, unemployed men to join in “just causes,” such as the cause of the PLO. This is tempting to some of these unemployed men, and may cause them to join the Libyan military forces.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali then turned to a new subject. He wanted to state how pleased he was with two of our efforts in particular. The first was military training. The U.S. has assisted Tunisia for years in this area, and it has been of great benefit to all the services; he hopes it will be continued. Second is “that confidential area we don’t discuss in public,” namely joint exercises. He approves of them and they are very helpful. The Secretary replied that we are pleased to hear this and we certainly want both training and military joint exercises to continue; we are grateful to Tunisia for the opportunity for joint training.

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then said he had been instructed by President Bourguiba, to seek a replacement of the Tunisian flagship, *The President Bourguiba*, with another U.S. Navy ship “of the same displacement,” about 700–1,000 tons. He was instructed to raise this personally with both Secretary Weinberger and President Reagan. President Bourguiba has made this a very personal matter; “he feels it deeply as a matter of personal prestige.” Secretary Weinberger responded that President Reagan has a deep appreciation for President Bourguiba and would certainly want to help. Unfortunately, Navy has advised that no ship is presently available for transfer. We will pursue this to see if we can find anything at all suitable. New construction might be a possibility; if Tunisia were to have a ship built in Europe, we would of course like to see American equipment on it. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for this information.

(U) At this point, the formal meeting ended, and a signature ceremony took place, with Secretary Weinberger and Minister of Defense Baly signing the FY82 FMS loan agreement for \$85 million.

(S) After the signature ceremony, a working luncheon was held, with an extensive exchange between the Prime Minister and Secretary Weinberger. Principal points were:

— Continuing heavy pleas, by Prime Minister Mzali, for better FMS terms in the future.

— A further strong request for help on the problem of a replacement for flagship *President Bourguiba*; Secretary Weinberger said that he would ask the Navy to make an immediate further review of this matter, so that he would have their further advice before the Prime Minister met with President Reagan on Thursday.

— Agreement on the very serious situation in the Middle East at the present time, particularly with respect to the Iran-Iraq war. Prime Minister Mzali voiced the strong fear that, if this war is not settled soon, the results could be destabilizing to the entire Gulf.

(U) The luncheon ended at 1:40 p.m. with Prime Minister Mzali again urging that Secretary Weinberger plan to visit Tunisia soon.

James L. Woods⁹

Director, ISA Africa Region

⁹ Woods signed "J.L. Woods" above this typed signature.

297. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 29, 1982, 11:40 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali

PARTICIPANTS

President Ronald Reagan
 Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Secretary of State
 Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Walter Cutler, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
 Nicholas Veliotis, Assistant Secretary, State Department
 Raymond Tanter, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali
 Slaheddine Baly, Minister of Defense
 Mestiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
 Mohamed Hachem, Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister
 Kamel Rekik, Staff Assistant, Office of the Minister of National Economy
 Moncaf Ben Abdallah, President of the Investment Promotion Agency
 Mohamed Gherib, Minister Counselor at the Embassy

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, PM Mzali, 04/29/82 (04/29/1982–05/10/1982). Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

The meeting began at 11:40a.m. in the Oval Office.

The President welcomed Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali to the United States, praised Tunisian President Bourguiba as a steadfast friend of the United States, and expressed regret that his health precluded a meeting with the President. He praised Tunisia's development strategy of seeking private American investment capital to replace declining U.S. economic assistance. The President gave strong support for Tunisian security.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for his warm words of welcome. The Prime Minister gave the President best wishes from President Bourguiba. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the President's reaffirmation of friendship with Tunisia, support for Tunisia's development strategy, and U.S. concern for Tunisia's security. The Prime Minister said that the Tunisian economy is very fragile. There are impoverished areas in Tunisia, especially along the borders with Algeria and Libya. From the standpoint of Tunisia's economic development plans, it is very important that it receive U.S. Foreign Military Sales credits on concessional terms. Otherwise, the defense burden would pose an unacceptable tradeoff with economic development. Tunisia does encourage private investment and appreciates the praise given by the President for doing so. The Prime Minister told how some of his closest associates are in touch with U.S. business executives to identify alternatives for investment in Tunisia.

The President acknowledged Tunisia's economic problems and said that the United States would do as much as it could to assist Tunisia.

The Prime Minister said that Tunisia wants to increase the number of its students in the United States. He very much admired the American educational system and wanted to encourage Tunisians to study in the States. Tunisia needs help in order to increase the number of students studying in America.

The President replied that he was unaware of the issue of Tunisian students in America and would discuss it with the Secretary of Education and other relevant officials. He remarked that it sounds like a good idea to increase the number of Tunisians studying here and would like to get comments from his advisors as to how the U.S. might be of assistance.

The Prime Minister mentioned the Libyan threat to Tunisia as a very serious matter. He said that the Libyan threat fully justifies the Tunisian request for Foreign Military Sales credits. The Prime Minister suggested that Tunisia be treated by the United States as it treats Egypt and Israel. For example, Tunisia would like to receive half of its Foreign Military Sales credits in the form of loans at lower than commercial interest rates and the other half would be forgiven.

The President replied that he understood that the Prime Minister had met with the Secretary of Defense, and that he would do the very

best to make sure that Tunisia receives good terms that will enhance its security.²

The Prime Minister said that he was very concerned with the threat Libya poses to Tunisia.

The President replied that the United States shares Tunisia's concern with the Libyan threat and would like to be as forthcoming as possible in helping Tunisia meet this threat.

The Prime Minister said that Foreign Military Sales on concessional terms allow Tunisia to spend more on economic development. Too many Tunisians are going to Libya because there are greater opportunities to find work there than in Tunisia. When young Tunisians come back from Libya, they are radicalized.

The President said that the West has not been as successful in selling freedom as in marketing products. Nations such as Singapore and Taiwan have chosen the path of freedom and are thus better off economically than other nations.

The Prime Minister asked about the President's views on broader issues in the Middle East. He said that President Bourguiba was interested in hearing about the U.S. attitude on the Iraq-Iran War, especially regarding Iran and Syria's collusion against Iraq. Tunisia is very concerned about the threat to the Gulf as well as about peace in Lebanon.

The President responded that he was going to discuss these wider issues during the luncheon and the discussion about these issues was deferred. The President ended the discussion by telling a story about the need for foreign language competence to which the Prime Minister enthusiastically concurred.

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane adjourned the meeting at 12:10 p.m., at which time the group went to the President's residence for the luncheon.

² See Tab A, Document 296.

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, May 26, 1982, 1737Z

144544. For Ambassador. Subject: Letter From President Reagan to President Bourguiba (S/S 8214850).

1. Please deliver the following letter from President Reagan to President Bourguiba

2 (A) Begin Text: Dear Mr. President: The visit of your Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali,² is a tangible expression of the friendship between our two countries. I very much appreciated the visit.

(B) As you know, it had been my hope to see you when you were here in January.³ It had been my intention to tell you personally that the constancy of the friendship between our countries is very important to me. I was happy to convey this to you through your able and eloquent Prime Minister.

(C) We are all deeply impressed by the exemplary development of Tunisia, which you have led into full freedom and the modern world. As Americans, we are proud to have been your partners in that adventure. I hope the next decade of our friendship will be as productive for us both as the last years have been.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

Stoessel

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850275–0584. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted from text received from the White House; cleared by Adams (S/S–S), Flaten (NEA/AFN), and Schneider; approved by Veliotis.

² See Document 297.

³ See Document 292.

299. Letter From Tunisian President Bourguiba to President Reagan¹

Tunis, June 17, 1982

Mr. President:

The close, friendly relationship between our two countries prompts me to inform you of the extent of my concern about recent developments in the Middle East. The avowed purpose of the Israeli attack on Lebanon, which is greater in scope than all similar previous operations against that country, seems to be the total destruction of the Palestinian resistance.

This aggression—which borders on genocide—has aroused the indignation of all countries and people who love freedom and justice. The already intense indignation of the Arab countries is compounded by a feeling of legitimate frustration about such flagrant violations of the principles of law and international ethics.

For this reason we deeply appreciated the unanimity initially expressed by the Security Council in establishing a direct link between the need for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Israeli troops.

I must tell you, however, that we were surprised by your delegation's veto of the resolution presented to the Security Council by Spain, a Western friend.² This action disappointed and disturbed all those who share with the United States the same values of justice and liberty.

I am convinced that the irresponsible acts of the Israeli government threaten not only to make the peace to which we all aspire less attainable but also to satisfy the ambitions of all those who count upon the frustration of the Arab peoples to establish their influence decisively throughout the Middle East, the Arab world, and the Islamic community.

That is why I am appealing to you personally, in the name of our common ideals, so that there may be a clear and categorical end to the schemes of Israel and its government, schemes whose fanaticism only serves the interests of the enemies of freedom.

I greatly fear that if the United States does not fully assume its responsibilities in this matter, the countries which enjoy its friendship

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba (8205139–8302312). No classification marking. Printed from a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State.

² Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution S/15185, June 8, which demanded that Israel withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

will find themselves in a situation that is at best awkward and at worst untenable.³

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Habib Bourguiba⁴

President of the Tunisian Republic

³ In telegram 4506 from Tunis, June 14, the Embassy reported that Bourguiba's recent public "expression of 'profound regret' at US support for Israel in the aftermath of the invasion of Lebanon" was "not Bourguiba's style, particularly where the US is concerned, and the fact that Bourguiba authorized Mzali to make the statement is an indication of how upset he is. The statement also reflects the Tunisian Government's efforts to deal with the public's bitterness over the Israeli invasion and U.S. policy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820310–0033)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

300. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 24, 1982

SUBJECT

Letter from Tunisian President Bourguiba Concerning Lebanon

At Tab A for your signature is a letter for President Bourguiba of Tunisia. It responds to his letter at Tab B² regarding the situation in Lebanon.

A key element of President Bourguiba's letter is that American Tunisian relations could be damaged by a prolonged occupation by Israel of Lebanon. Your Ambassador to Tunisia considers this message to be a very serious statement. He feels that the Tunisians are not the type of people who generally threaten their friends or who choose such words lightly.

I believe that you should not respond directly to Tunisian threats to alter its friendly relations with the United States because of the situation in Lebanon. Your letter acknowledges the value you place on relations with Tunisia and expresses grief over the human suffering in Lebanon.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (June 1982). Secret. Drafted by Tanter. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Another stamped notation reads: "signed."

² Not attached, printed as Document 299.

Tab A**Letter From President Reagan to President Bourguiba³**

Washington, June 25, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter concerning the recent tragic events in Lebanon is a tribute to the depth of friendship between our countries.

All Americans are deeply grieved by the enormous human and material losses which the Lebanese people and innocent Palestinian residents of Lebanon have sustained in this terrible two weeks of war. For this reason we must continue to stress the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis and work to bring relief to the suffering.

We exerted our best efforts during the past year to maintain the cease-fire negotiated by Ambassador Habib. Israel and the other interested parties well understood our position.

As I hope you recognize, we cannot dwell on the past. Much must be done and quickly if Lebanon is to have a future. Ambassador Habib has been extremely active during the past two weeks. He has had discussions with Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese leaders and has been in close consultation with me throughout this period. These efforts were directed at achieving a cease-fire. We are making every effort to see that it holds and that the danger of a wider war is averted. For the last several days Ambassador Habib and Secretary Haig have been acting on my instructions to exert every effort to broaden the cease-fire and to halt the fighting between Israeli and PLO forces. We will not rest until we have succeeded and the guns are at last silent across Lebanon.

While an effective cease-fire is an essential first step, the cease-fire is only the beginning. The United States remains committed to Lebanon's independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We want compliance with security council resolutions 508 and 509 with all reasonable speed.⁴ We seek a Lebanon reunified, strong, and free of foreign military forces.

Beyond this, however, I believe the task of assisting Lebanon to reconstruct itself physically, politically, and spiritually must begin immediately. A return to the conditions which existed before June 5 would not serve the interests of the region as a whole. In time, I fear, the same unstable situation which led to the present tragedy would

³ No classification marking.

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 508, June 5, and UN Security Council Resolution 509, June 6, respectively called for the immediate end of hostilities between the PLO and Israeli forces in Lebanon and demanded that Israel withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

only reassert itself. Instead, this opportunity to restore Lebanon's territorial integrity must be seized and the Lebanese Government must be enabled to expand its authority throughout the country as quickly as possible.

At the same time, we cannot return to a situation in which the PLO again can rocket or shell Israel's northern villages. This will require an effective mechanism to police an enlarged zone in southern Lebanon and imaginative and creative thinking from all of us.

Finally, the recent events in Lebanon must serve also to refocus our energies on making early progress toward a resolution of the Palestinian problem. The United States is determined to press ahead on fulfilling the promise of the Camp David framework and to build on the progress already made. We will be resuming efforts toward that goal as soon as conditions permit.

The United States highly esteems its friends in the region, particularly Tunisia, and will continue to consider their well-being in grappling with the arduous task of helping to bring peace and justice to the area now in turmoil.

Mr. President, enduring friendship bids me heed your kind words on behalf of your country and the search for peace. Your sincerity makes me regret still more that we did not have the opportunity to meet and discuss the situation in the Middle East earlier this year.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

301. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 31, 1982

SUBJECT

Your Reply to Tunisian President Concerning Lebanon

At Tab A for your signature is a reply to President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who wrote you about the situation in Lebanon (Tab B). He suggests that you take action to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (June 1982). No classification marking. Sent for action. Drafted by Tanter. A notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Reagan signed the letter on August 5.

Your response expresses concern for the suffering of innocent people, states that Phil Habib is doing his best not only to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end but also to enable the Lebanese to rebuild their country without outside interference.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.²

Tab A

Letter From President Reagan to President Bourguiba³

Washington, August 5, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 9 concerning events in Lebanon is an eloquent statement of the tragedy facing the region.⁴ The quality of your friendship and the traditional balance of your approach to the problems of the region add special weight to your communication. You were in the forefront of those leaders in the Arab world who counselled an approach based on mutual understanding at a time when to do so required special courage.

We share your humanitarian concern for the people in Lebanon, and we will spare no exertion to help bring an end to the fighting. Disengagement with honor for all parties continues to be the theme of Ambassador Habib's diplomacy. The United States is pursuing vigorous initiatives to enable the Lebanese to rebuild their country without interference.

As I told the American people on June 30,⁵ we intend to persevere in our continued efforts to resolve the underlying problem of the Palestinians once and for all as soon as we have attained our more urgent objectives. We are under no illusion that this task will be easy.

² Reagan checked and initialed his approval of the recommendation.

³ No classification marking.

⁴ In telegram 6081 from Tunis, August 16, Cutler reported that the "French Ambassador, who saw Bourguiba at his summer residence in Monastir shortly after he received President Reagan's second message to him on Lebanon, tells me that he appeared to be quite pleased by it. 'President Reagan holds me in high regard,' Bourguiba said. He was still upset by the situation in Lebanon, but made clear to the French Ambassador that he had not by any means given up hope in the U.S: 'If the Americans don't defend justice, who will?'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820409-1055)

⁵ Reagan made the remark during a June 30 news conference in which he was asked to respond to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 826-834.

Patience and wisdom will be put to the test on all parts. We will need the advice and cooperation of our friends, especially good friends such as Tunisia, if we are to succeed. We hope to benefit from your goodwill and your insight in the long labor of helping to bring a just, enduring peace to the Middle East.

I deeply appreciate the concern which inspired your message to me and look forward to a continuing dialogue with you in the spirit of the values we share.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Tab B

Letter From Tunisian President Bourguiba to President Reagan⁶

Tunis, July 9, 1982

Mr. President:

The state of siege that continues around West Beirut is, over the short term, a terrible threat to the lives of thousands of people and, in the long run, will exacerbate a situation that could deteriorate into a conflagration of incalculable consequences.

This is why I turn to you again in the context of the consultations that continue between your country and mine and, in particular, between you, Mr. President, and myself.

Your ambassador has informed my government that the United States does not wish to humiliate or to destroy the leadership of the PLO. It considers that once the Lebanese problem is settled, the PLO leaders and the Palestinian people will be able to safeguard their interests and work towards achieving their aspirations of nationhood.

Your ambassador reassures us that your government is doing everything possible to spare other human lives, whether Palestinian or Lebanese.

Convinced, therefore, of your determination to prevent the worst from happening, I appeal to you and to your great country for a rapid end to the current situation. It is high time for you to take vigorous action to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end and to ensure that reason will prevail over brute force.

⁶ No classification marking. Printed from a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State.

We who share the same belief in the ideals of freedom and justice know full well that brute force will never prevail over the determination of a people to defend its most sacred rights, especially its right to exist.

We are dutybound to do everything possible to prevent needless deaths and a catastrophic deterioration of the situation in that region, which would only serve the interests of those who oppose freedom.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my friendship and my high consideration and esteem.

Habib Bourguiba⁷

President of the Republic of Tunisia

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, August 24, 1982, 1426Z

6295. Subject: Tunisia's Security Needs. Ref: (A) Tunis 6247,² (B) Tunis 6202.³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary and action requested. Deteriorating relations with Libya and arrival of PLO contingent from Beirut pose a substantial security burden on Tunisia, for which GOT looks to USG for relief.⁴ Tunisian

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820439–0532. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

² In telegram 6247 from Tunis, August 21, Cutler reported that, during their August 21 meeting, "Bourguiba asked me to convey to President Reagan congratulations on achieving resolution of Beirut crisis. He was glad Tunisia could play useful role by receiving large number of PLO, including Arafat." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820435–0662)

³ In telegram 6202 from Tunis, August 19, the Embassy reported: "Interior Minister Guiga told Ambassador August 19 of strong Tunisian interest in screening PLO members coming to Tunisia before their arrival." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820431–0600)

⁴ In telegram 6035 from Tunis, August 12, the Embassy reported: "The announcement late August 10 by Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi that Bourguiba had agreed to a request from Arafat to accept what was described as the 'first wave' of Palestinians to evacuate Beirut came as a considerable surprise to Tunisians. It is still early to assess

(Footnote continues on next page)

officials, from Bourguiba on down, have recently cited increased security needs, and this theme can be expected to be raised in upcoming high-level discussions with USG. Although GOT has been cautioned repeatedly that funding level for FY-83 might well be limited to a continuing resolution authority, U.S. security assistance at same level as last year instead of at increased level of \$140 million will be a disappointment, particularly in view of current economic weaknesses which make military modernization even more of a burden. Action requested: Recommend Department review question of concessional financing, which could compensate to some degree for lack of increase in new appropriations for Tunisia. End summary.

3. Prime Minister Mzali and Defense Minister Baly, in separate conversations with me August 24, argued strongly for higher levels of U.S. assistance (septels).⁵ Both pointed to severe difficulties in financing military modernization at full levels without additional U.S. help. It is clear that President Bourguiba has issued firm instructions to move ahead rapidly on this issue, but that GOT is hard pressed to find adequate funding within its own budget. (Baly indicated there were no other potential sources of financing at present—e.g., Saudi Arabia.)

4. Our recent conversations indicate that GOT views increased security requirements in light of (A) growing Libyan threat as result of discord over abortive OAU summit⁶ and (B) imminent arrival of 1,000 PLO fighters from Beirut. Tunisians consider that their policies on these issues have benefited U.S. aims, and feel it is therefore logical that GOT should look to USG for additional help under new circumstances. President Bourguiba pursued this general theme in our August 21 meeting (ref A), as did FonMin Essebsi separately and in more detail same day. Interior Minister Guiga, in discussing PLO arrival with us on

reaction, but many Tunisians, in the political establishment and out, seem to be puzzled and worried. Emotional identification with the Palestinian cause coexists here with a very strong distaste for the politics of the eastern Arabs and a belief that, considerations of principle aside, Tunisia should keep them at arms length." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820419–0208)

⁵ Records of Cutler's conversations with Mzali and Baly are in telegram 6359 from Tunis, August 25 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820441–1028) and telegram 6356 from Tunis, August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0455, D820441–0954)

⁶ Because a two-thirds quorum did not attend, the OAU meeting scheduled for August 5 in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that "most of the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara." Others had "misgivings about Colonel Qaddafi's assumption of the OAU membership for 1982–83;" they considered his policies in Africa "too radical." (Geoffrey Godsell, "OAU Summit Fizzles in Qaddafi-land," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9, 1982)

August 19, also pressed for U.S. help in meeting new security burden arising from PLO presence (ref B).

5. Embassy believes Tunisian security concerns should be taken seriously. We understand that Libyan threats have become more explicit recently, with Qadhafi personally telephoning warnings of dire consequences because of Tunisian unwillingness to support him on OAU summit in Tripoli. Libyan rhetoric against states receiving PLO contingents has also been sharp, as Dept is aware. Of equal if not greater concern to GOT are possible consequences of presence here of 1,000 PLO fighters, who could well create internal security problems over time. We see considerable merit in Tunisian argument that USG has been an important beneficiary of Tunisian policies vis-à-vis both OAU and PLO. We also share Tunisian view that the security burden will be disproportionately heavy in comparison with Tunisia's modest resources and currently weakened economy.

6. In view of fact that higher levels of security assistance do not appear likely in near term, I strongly recommend that further serious consideration be given to seeking concessional financing for the funds which are being appropriated. Such concessional funding would help ease somewhat Tunisian problems in implementing the military modernization program. In addition, it would provide a clear political signal at a critically important time that the U.S. continues to support Tunisia's moderation, thereby encouraging the GOT to play a supportive role with respect to Middle East peace efforts.

7. USG will need to be prepared to address Tunisian concerns re the level and terms of U.S. security assistance in upcoming high-level bilateral discussions, such as during Defense Minister Baly's attendance at Joint Military Commission meeting in September and his subsequent meetings in Washington, as well as during FonMin Essebsi's expected bilateral at UNGA.

Cutler

303. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 7, 1982

SUBJECT

Tunisian Joint Military Commission

The second annual U.S.-Tunisia Joint Military Commission (JMC) met in Newport, Rhode Island on September 2–4, 1982.² The U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West and the Tunisian delegation by Minister of Defense Slaheddine Baly. I represented the NSC Staff. The meetings included a comprehensive threat briefing by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and committee sessions on security assistance, combined exercises and military training. The subject of access or prepositioning did not come up other than in the context of that inherent in the agreement to continue combined exercises. The JMC was a very useful exchange of views on our security assistance programs. It focused on repeated pleas from the Tunisians for more security assistance funding by the U.S.

Minister Baly presented a detailed report on the depth of commitment made by President Bourguiba in aligning with U.S. interests globally and in the region. Baly stressed the threat from Libya. Tunisia's participation in the solution of the West Beirut problem³ and their part in the failure of the O.A.U. summit have resulted in a worsening of relations with Libya. He stressed that while the U.S. 6th Fleet is a guarantee, President Bourguiba insists that Tunisia must remain sovereign and have the means to defend itself. He pointed out that this decision, and the one of political alignment with the U.S. were very difficult for Tunisia. Tunisian resources must be dedicated to their domestic problems. Therefore he summed up in asking for more assistance in building a credible military defensive capability. He asked for FY 83 increases in grants, loans on better terms, FY 82 supplemental increases, and reprogramming of any excess FY 82 funds from other countries to Tunisia.

Defense did an excellent job of pointing out that the President had requested \$95 million in FY 82 and \$140M in FY 83. The Congress reduced the FY 82 figure to \$85 million. Congress had removed any FY 82

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (September–December 1982). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Teicher, Kemp, North, Helm, and Boverie.

² No minutes of the meeting were found.

³ Reference is to Bourguiba's decision to allow Arafat and the PLO to leave West Beirut for Tunisia. See Document 302.

supplemental funds for Tunisia. He pointed out that Congressional action to date in FY 83 indicates a level less than the President's request. The possibility of a Continuing Resolution (C.R.A.) at the FY 82 level of \$85 million was also discussed. Minister Baly and Ambassador Ben Yahia plan to make calls on the Hill during the week of September 6 to urge support for Tunisia.

The possibility of obtaining help from their Arab friends, such as the Saudis, was discussed. The Tunisians said that the Saudis have not been very forthcoming in this area.

The discussion on combined exercises went well. The two ongoing annual exercises, one with the 6th Fleet and one with U.S. unconventional warfare elements in Europe will continue in 1983. There were no major problems in this area. The training committee reviewed requests for more funding (IMET) and increased numbers of Tunisians in the U.S.

Defense will be working on the specific issues raised during the JMC. It was obvious that the Tunisian delegation was seriously disgruntled only in the area of security assistance funds available from the U.S.

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 18, 1982, 2250Z

6978. Subject: Tunisian Démarche re Beirut Massacre.

1. Foreign Ministry Secretary General Fezzani (in the absence of Foreign Minister who went to Paris today with President Bourguiba) called me in urgently tonight, September 18, following reported massacres of Palestinians in Beirut.² He said Bourguiba had personally telephoned from Paris with instructions that he convey to the U.S. Government Bourguiba's "shock, consternation and indignation" upon hearing the news from Beirut. Bourguiba also urged that the members of the multinational force "honor their responsibilities." Fezzani said he was conveying the same message from Bourguiba to my French and Italian colleagues here.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850439-0532. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Paris, Rabat, and Rome. The document is misnumbered in the original.

² See footnote 6, Document 28.

2. I told Fezzani the U.S. Government shared President Bourguiba's sentiments, as clearly evidenced by President Reagan's public statement today expressing outrage and regrets concerning the killings.³ I noted further the President's call for immediate Israeli withdrawal from West Beirut followed by withdrawals of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

3. In response to my query, Fezzani said Bourguiba did not specify exactly what he expected the three members of the multinational force to do. I reminded Fezzani that the force's mandate was limited in scope and did not encompass maintenance of Lebanese internal security, which was the responsibility of the Lebanese Government. Fezzani said he understood this, but observed the situation had been radically altered by the Israelis move into West Beirut, which he viewed as a violation of the agreements worked out by us with Israel and Lebanon. He urged that we use all possible means to bring the Israelis into line.

5. Noting the rather graphic coverage of the killings in Beirut on Tunisian television that evening and the claim that 1,400 Palestinians had been murdered, I said that all the facts were apparently not yet known and expressed the hope that Tunisians would exercise caution until they were. I also took the occasion to express my satisfaction regarding the excellent cooperation we had received from Tunisian security officials in handling the volatile public reaction to events in Lebanon throughout the summer, and my hope that such cooperation would continue. Fezzani assured me it would.

6. Comment. Fezzani's *démarche* was generally low-key and obviously was made on rather sketchy instructions from Bourguiba. We can probably expect to hear more from the GOT as developments unfold.⁴ Fezzani's reference to the emotional impact which the killings are likely to have on PLO fighters dispersed in Arab countries probably reflected one of the GOT's principal concerns. He did not indicate, however, whether the PLO contingent in Tunisia had yet reacted.

Cutler

³ In his September 18 statement, Reagan said he was "horried to learn this morning of the killing of Palestinians which has taken place in Beirut. All people of decency must share our outrage and revulsion over the murders, which included women and children." Reagan also announced that he had demanded "that the Israeli Government immediately withdraw its forces from west Beirut to the positions occupied on September 14." *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, Book II, p. 1181)

⁴ In telegram 7015 from Tunis, September 20, Cutler reported that in regard to Reagan's September 18 statement, "Bourguiba had been encouraged by the President's strong reaction to the massacres and his insistence on Israeli withdrawal. Bourguiba had also appreciated our determination not to be diverted from pursuing the Middle East peace process." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820485–1129)

305. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in Tunisia¹

New York, October 7, 1982, 0539Z

Secto 13072. Subject: Secretary's Oct. 5, 1982 UNGA, Bilateral With Tunisian Foreign Minister Essebsi.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: The Secretary received Tunisia's FonMin Essebsi for half-hour bilateral on Oct. 5. Essebsi raised the Palestinian problem, outlining past and current actions by his government to further a solution lying "between" the Arab League's Fez Summit plan and the President's Sept. 1 principles.² Essebsi urged an equitable approach towards the Palestinian people and praised the courage of the President's principles which have earned Tunisia's support despite its imperfections "because we have faith in the U.S. and its leaders." Essebsi also adverted to the threat posed Tunisia's security by Qadhafi's Libya and urged additional U.S. efforts on the terms of our credits which, with the absence of tangible help from Saudi Arabia, was onerous to the point of compelling Tunisia to rethink its development plans. End summary.

3. The Secretary received Tunisian FonMin Beiji Caid Essebsi in New York on Oct. 5. Essebsi was accompanied by Tunisia's Ambassadors to the U.S. and the UN Messrs. Ben Yahia and Slim. Assistant Secretary Veliotes, NEA/AFN Director and Alec Toumayan (interpreter) also sat in.

4. Essebsi opened with congratulations on the Secretary's accession to his current responsibilities.³ He pointed out that Prime Minister Mzali and MOD Baly had recently come to the U.S. to present Tunisia's views on key issues—particularly Tunisia's security situation. Unfortunately, Tunisia's relations with Libya had been deteriorating for the last three years and Libya is heavily armed by the Soviet Union. His government, Essebsi said, considers Libya at present to be a direct threat. He noted that this threat had compelled Tunisia to plan for the procurement of additional military equipment. This is an expensive undertaking and had forced Tunisia to rethink its development plans. Essebsi pointed out that Tunisia's Saudi friends have not been helpful materially in this context and even a well disposed U.S. provides military credits only on

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820517-0927. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shultz was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly.

² See footnote 2, Document 114. Documentation on the initiative is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

³ Shultz became Secretary of State on July 16 after Haig resigned on July 5.

commercial terms. The FonMin hoped that the U.S. would be willing to make a further effort in 1983 particularly insofar as the terms of its credits are concerned.

5. Essebsi then summarized Tunisia's involvement in the Middle East problem since 1965 when President Bourguiba pleaded for an equitable solution based on the region's realities (i.e. Israel).⁴ This Tunisian attitude, which had been and remained a constant, had been well received in the U.S. though not in the early years by the Arab world. In 1982 Tunisia involved herself once more. It backed up American Ambassador Habib's efforts;⁵ agreed to receive PLO combatants which helped induce other Arab states to do likewise and tried to assist with the development of the Arab League's Fez peace plan based on President Bourguiba's ideas of record.

6. Tunisia had noted President Reagan's Sept. 1 principles "and had worked to assure for them a not unfavorable Arab response." In part as a result of these activities, the Fez Summit's Committee of Seven would come here to explore the U.S. principles further and to offer clarification on the Fez Summit peace plan.

7. Tunisia reacted positively to President Reagan's principles not because they are complete but because they show an American political will to find equitable solutions. The principles, in Tunisia's view, are incomplete because they call up Israel to deal with Arab countries when they should call on Israel to deal with the Palestinian people. Tunisia fears that the President's proposals may be seen by some as a continuation of the Camp David Agreements (CDA)⁶ in that they seem to imply a continuation of indirect contacts with the Palestinians, this time through Jordan and Egypt.

8. Tunisia is concerned that in such a case the desired results would continue to fail of achievement. However, the President's principles recognize a U.S. responsibility for the situation in the Middle East and the Tunisian Government has faith in the US and in its leaders. It therefore feels the need to give the President as much support as it can. This is reflected in the letters which President Bourguiba sent President Reagan⁷ and which, while praising President Reagan's courage and assuring the latter of President Bourguiba's support, calls for a (MidEast) solution "falling between the Arab and the American peace

⁴ During a March 9, 1965, press conference in Jerusalem, Bourguiba had said that Arabs could cooperate with Jews. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIV, Africa, footnote 3, Document 147.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 17.

⁶ Reference is to the framework of agreements signed by Egypt and Israel on September 17, 1978. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition.

⁷ See Document 299 and Tab B, Document 301.

plans." Tunisia has thus acted on this issue with faith in the future while wondering what the future will bring.

9. The Secretary responded that the USG appreciates the constructive initiatives Tunisia has taken which have contributed to a better atmosphere more conducive to a solution in the region.

10. With regard to the CDA there are matters of strategic import to keep in mind. Israel had signed its name to a document calling for the achievement of Palestinian rights and subscribed to a process leading to self-government for the Palestinian people. To abandon CDA would be to let go of this Israeli commitment. That would be a mistake.

11. The Secretary continued that the interpretation given the CDA stipulations by Israel are incorrect. Hence we have cast our proposals in terms of the CDA but give them a different interpretation which, we believe, can lead to a very different situation on the West Bank and Gaza.

12. Political developments, the Secretary said, take place in stages. Problems must first be recognized before they can be resolved and the Israelis now know that there is a Palestinian problem which needs to be addressed. As a consequence, there are now many people planning on how these problems are to be dealt with. It is our view that after the next round of consultations, including the visit to the president of the Fez Summit's Committee of Seven, the stage of position-taking will have ended and the search for compromises between the positions will have arrived at the negotiating table. It is at this stage, the Secretary said, that it is important for King Hussein with Palestinian support and that of others to be able to enter the talks so that the process originally envisaged can begin to move. When this occurs, people will look to a different future in the region and compromises will become possible.

13. The Secretary then reiterated the gratitude of the U.S. for Tunisia's help and its hope that Tunisia and its Foreign Minister would keep telling people to be realistic and to become part of the solution rather than remain part of the problem.

14. The Secretary said that we understand Tunisia's concerns about Libya "and we will support you." We welcome the strengths of our bilateral ties.

15. In closing, Essebi urged an equitable approach to the Middle East problem. He said that the Israelis clearly are entitled to their security and asserted that this was well understood throughout the Arab world. On the other hand, the Palestinian people are also a reality and are entitled to similar "rights and obligations." There will be no solution in the region unless there is equity in the treatment of the Palestinian people, he said.

16. Bilaterally, Caid Essebsi said in closing, there are no problems except Tunisia's problems of security and in this context Tunisia hopes not to have to face its burdens alone.

17. As the Secretary escorted FonMin Essebsi to the door the latter thanked him for the cordiality of his reception and urged him to come to Tunisia. The Secretary said that he would like to do so.

Shultz

306. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 20, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Tunisian Defense Minister*. Ken Dam, Bill Schneider and Dick Walters met with Tunisian Defense Minister Baly today.² The Minister argued that the military threat to Tunisia from Qadhafi was mounting and that President Bourguiba counted on the US to supply enough security assistance for Tunisia to finance the military equipment it had agreed to purchase from the US. The Minister was told that Tunisia was a close friend whose security remained very important to us but that Congressional action on our request for security assistance would probably preclude extending this year all the aid for which the Tunisians were asking.³ (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, January–March 1983. Confidential.

² Records of these discussions are in telegram 23456 to Tunis, January 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830046–0772)

³ In his personal record of his meeting with Baly, Dam wrote: "One meeting which may have significance for the future was a meeting with the Tunisian Defense Minister, who came to complain about our present level of foreign aid and justified his complaint by the assertion that Libya was getting very close to a major incursion into Tunisia. This may very well be the case, and frankly, it is not the executive branch which is unable to deliver the level of military assistance to Tunisia that we had already promised. The result of our present embarrassment vis-à-vis Tunisia is simply the fallout of a Congressional budget process where foreign assistance bills do not seem to get voted on by the Congress." (Personal Note Prepared by Dam, January 20; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983) During a January 21 meeting with Weinberger, Baly repeated his "previously stated concern in regard to the seriousness of the Libyan threat to Tunisia." He "pleaded for increased grant aid saying that Tunisia is as much threatened as other countries which receive a large portion of assistance in grants. 'Tunisia is in the advance front of the Free World and defends also the interests of the US.'" (Memorandum of Conversation, January 26; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–85–0023, 1983 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 25, Tunisia 1983)

307. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Bourguiba¹

Washington, February 3, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

I have chosen to write to you because it has become our practice to communicate matters of the highest importance directly with one another. This personal exchange arises naturally from the friendship and esteem I have come to feel for you, who have guided Tunisia so wisely through its history of accomplishments, and reflects the amity which binds our two peoples.

The visit of General Walters, my trusted personal emissary, reinforces the message of this letter:² the United States continues to stand by your side as a friend and a supporter. We will continue to do all that we are able to safeguard a free and prosperous Tunisia. We owe this both to friendship and interest. Moreover, it is important that Tunisia stand among the new nations of the world as an example of the benefits of enlightened leadership.

Because of the worldwide economic recession and related economic hardships facing the United States, Congress has not granted us all the resources we requested for security assistance this year. This development will require us to begin this year's assistance program at somewhat lower levels in many countries, including Tunisia. You have my personal assurance, however, that my government and I will seek additional funds from the Congress for Tunisia so that we may make a greater contribution to Tunisia's legitimate defenses. I remain confident that the long-term, integrated military modernization program we have worked out with the able attention of Prime Minister Mzali and other concerned ministers will remain a valid plan for Tunisian defense against any would-be aggressor. We also recognize the urgency of the threat you face and your need for a rapid supply of military equipment to meet that threat.

I also want you to know how grateful I was for your support of my September 1 proposal for peace in the Middle East.³ It was personally gratifying to be supported by such a steadfast friend of the United States. And it was heartening to be supported by a leader whose political judgment, particularly concerning the Middle East, has earned him

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia 1983 (01/25/1983–05/19/1983). No classification marking.

² Walters visited Tunisia February 13–15. See Document 308.

³ See footnote 2, Document 114.

unparalleled international stature. I expect to benefit from your wise counsel as I work toward peace in the Middle East.

I hope the new year has found you happy and well. Nancy and I send you and Mrs. Bourguiba our best wishes for you and your people.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 16, 1983, 1652Z

1352. Dept. for S/AL. Khartoum please pass Ambassador Walters. Subject: Visit to Tunisia of Ambassador Walters.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary. During visit here February 13–15, Ambassador Walters reassured President Bourguiba and his principal advisers that, despite severe congressional cuts in FY–83 security assistance funding, the administration was committed to seeking additional funds for Tunisia and to pursuing the long-term military modernization program worked out by our two governments. Bourguiba reacted very positively to President Reagan's message² which, like Walters' presentation, struck just the right note in both substance and tone. While the Tunisians remain anxious regarding the pending shortfall and only cautiously hopeful as to prospects for a supplemental, Walters' visit was notably successful as a timely demonstration of our continued political as well as material support of a long-time friend and ally. End summary.

3. Ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters' visit to Tunisia February 13–15 included separate meetings with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and Defense Minister Baly; a working lunch with Caid Essebsi, Baly, Interior Minister Guiga and Military Security Chief, Gen. Balma; and a meeting with President Bourguiba in the southern oasis of Nefta, in which Mzali, Caid Essebsi and Baly also participated. The visit was given prominent coverage by Tunisian media.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830089–0164. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers and Rabat. Sent for information Immediate to Khartoum.

² See Document 307.

4. In his meetings with the ministers, Walters reconfirmed the bad news they had already received: that because of severe congressional cuts in global security assistance funding for FY-83, the amounts available for a number of our key friends and allies, Tunisia included, are less than what the administration had sought or anticipated. Walters stressed, however, the administration's determination to work hard to obtain from Congress supplemental funds adequate to carry on our assistance programs at levels originally programmed. He made clear this effort would not be easy and offered no predictions as to results; but he assured the Tunisians that the administration was committed to do its very best. We fully recognized, he said, the security problems facing Tunisia, particularly with respect to Qadhafi, whose policies of terrorism and attempted subversion of neighboring countries had in our view not changed. It was inconceivable that the U.S. and other friends of Tunisia would remain indifferent should Tunisia's security be seriously menaced.

5. The Tunisians, for their part, made clear their disappointment and dismay with regard to the reduced level of U.S. assistance. Prime Minister Mzali said that he had been "astonished" by the reduction, that he did not know how the GOT could fill the large, unexpected cash gap which that reduction had created. On the other hand, all of Walters' interlocutors were low-key in making their points—friendly regret rather than irritation or anger—and all responded very favorably to his assurances, both general with regard to the steadfastness of our overall support and specific with regard to our doing all possible to secure additional funding for FY-83.

6. This same general reaction of disappointment with action taken, understanding of why it was necessary, and hope that it will soon be rectified carried over into Ambassador Walters' meeting with the President. Bourguiba greeted Walters warmly as the old friend that he is, and was obviously pleased by the special attention which Walters personified. In this respect, Bourguiba commented that it seemed like a long time (i.e., last September)³ since he had received any personal communications from our President. As is his custom, Bourguiba read President Reagan's letter slowly and out loud, interjecting at several points his own words of satisfaction with the assurances of support it contained. Upon finishing, Bourguiba said, I understand. You have had difficulties in supplying all the help we need, but you will do all you can to provide what is not now available. That's good. I will count on your assurances." He went on to recount what those needs are—planes, tanks, missiles—and to note the importance of strengthening however,

³ No record of a personal communication between Reagan and Bourguiba in September 1982 has been found.

press for accelerated deliveries of the M60 tanks, perhaps reflecting the counsel of his advisers. (Essebsi had told Walters beforehand that the GOT's raising the tank-delivery issue with the Egyptians was not rpt not a viable option; and that, in any case, it would serve only to advance deliveries to Tunisia by a few months.)

7. In response to Mzali's prompting, Bourguiba did raise the issue of a U.S. replacement for the aging flagship *Habib Bourguiba*. Baly recalled for Bourguiba that last year the U.S. had identified five possible replacement ships, none of which had been deemed suitable, and that discussions were continuing with Tunisian representatives in Washington. Walters noted some of the problems we had encountered, including the shortage of diesel-powered ships appropriate to Tunisian needs, and the possibility of the GOT's acquiring third-country manufactured hulls for fitting with U.S. armament. Walters assured Bourguiba that we would keep this matter under active review and said he would look into it personally. Bourguiba expressed his appreciation, noting with a half smile that each year his birthday is celebrated with salvos from his flagship equivalent in number to his age, and that the number is getting to be pretty high.

8. Bourguiba also raised the Middle East peace effort, expressing concern about the slow pace of the Lebanon negotiations and Israeli defiance of our call for a freeze on additional settlements in the West Bank. He blamed Begin for this intransigence, which jeopardized prospects for peace negotiations. Walters assured Bourguiba that the U.S. remained serious in its determination to move ahead quickly in Lebanon and expressed optimism that this could be accomplished. The problems of the occupied territories and the eventual status of Jerusalem were difficult and would require patience and hard work by all parties to resolve. But the very fact that President Reagan had lent his own name to the September 1 proposals meant that he fully intended them to succeed. Bourguiba could count on our persisting.

9. There was a final discussion of the GOT's program, instigated personally by Bourguiba, to increase dramatically the number of Tunisian students studying at U.S. universities. Caid Essebsi noted that, despite language and other obstacles, the overall academic performance of these students was excellent. Bourguiba noted the high cost of this program to the GOT and appealed for greater U.S. assistance in the form of scholarships. I observed that the USG had limited resources in this field, but that private sources, such as foundations and U.S. companies with interests in Tunisia, could be of some help. For example, a U.S. company, Jacobs Engineering, soon to be involved in developing Tunisia's phosphate resources, had already offered to sponsor training of Tunisian engineers.

10. Comment. Ambassador Walters' visit provided just the right touch at the right time. The Tunisians have been worried by rising domestic problems, both economic and political, and by continuing tensions with Qadhafi next door. They have been aware of the attention we have been according Algeria and Morocco (Bourguiba mentioned the latter specifically) and have noted in contrast the relative absence of high-level visitors coming to Tunisia. The severe cut in our FY-83 FMS/MAP program to levels well below FY-82 came as an unexpected jolt and threatens to create a serious financial problem for them at a time when their own budget is stretched thin. The fact that they received Ambassador Walters with such cordiality, refrained from any table-pounding, and responded favorably to his presentations reflects not only the solid rapport he has long enjoyed with Tunisian leaders but also the notable effectiveness with which he handled the sensitive issues now before us. The Tunisians of course understood beforehand that Walters was not in a position to bear good news of any concrete nature. But there is no question that they were genuinely pleased by his visit and encouraged by President Reagan's personal assurances that we would strive to do our best by them. While we do not believe they are under any illusions as to the difficulty of securing supplemental funding (and Walters was careful not to raise expectations in that regard), tactically they will be looking to the administration to fulfill its assurances to do its best before they start considering alternative financing options. This, we believe, explains their lack of interest in discussing such options during Walters' visit. From the standpoint of strengthening the long-standing political bonds between the U.S. and Tunisia Walters' visit was an outstanding success. As I have already recommended, following up this visit with further high-level demonstrations of U.S. support would serve our interests well.

11. This message was drafted following Ambassador Walters' departure from Tunis.

Cutler

**309. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)¹**

Washington, April 6, 1983

SUBJECT

Presidential Message to President Bourguiba of Tunisia

Under Secretary Eagleburger will travel to Tunisia and Algeria during the week of April 11.² A major purpose in Tunisia will be to reassure President Bourguiba and his government of U.S. support for Tunisia's security.

President Bourguiba, who regards politics in intensely personal terms, is proud of his personal contact with U.S. Presidents as far back as Eisenhower. Previous letters from President Reagan have impressed him enormously, and we feel that a similar Presidential imprimatur is called for on Under Secretary Eagleburger's basic message of reassurance.

We accordingly request that you approve the attached letter for Under Secretary Eagleburger to deliver to President Bourguiba.

Charles Hill³

Executive Secretary

Attachment

**Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President
Bourguiba⁴**

Washington, April 8, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to extend to you my warm greetings in the spirit of personal friendship we have developed. Ambassador Walters has reported to me that his recent meetings with you and your able

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba (8302445–8408275). Confidential.

² For a summary of the trip, see Document 310.

³ Shirley signed for Hill above this typed signature.

⁴ No classification marking.

Prime Minister, Mr. Mzali, fully reflected the closeness of our two governments.⁵

I have asked Ambassador Eagleburger to visit North Africa in view of our important interests there. Tunisia is an important stop because of our friendship, the strength of the ties that link our two countries, and your enlightened leadership. The Under Secretary carries a message from me and the people of the United States: we stand with you and the people of Tunisia as friends and supporters of your security and independence in these times of trouble.

As we have discussed in previous letters, I believe that the peace proposal I enunciated on September 1 of last year contains the best hope of resolving a dispute which brings sorrow to so many nations and peoples.⁶ I also believe that we must free Lebanon of foreign forces for a resolution of the conflict to endure. Be assured of my resolve to pursue the goal of peace consistently and vigorously in the time ahead. I hope that I can rely on your frank and sage advice as we move forward on this issue of truly global importance.

The United States was pleased to note that Tunisia played a part in the recent diplomatic activity that promises to make the Maghreb a more harmonious part of the world.⁷ We hope that this auspicious development will continue with the benefit of your counsel and wisdom.

With warmest regards,
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

⁵ See Document 308.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 114.

⁷ Reference is presumably to Bendjedid's March visit to Tunisia. See footnote 4, Document 20.

310. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, April 18, 1983, 1240Z

3040. For P and NEA from Ambassador Cutler. Subject: Under Secretary Eagleburger's Visit to Tunisia: Follow-up.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Under Secretary Eagleburger's visit to Tunisia April 13–15 provided timely, high-level consultations on both bilateral and regional issues. Together with the recent stop here by Agriculture Secretary Block,² Eagleburger's visit went a long way in assuaging concern among Tunisia's leaders that traditionally close U.S. friendship and support were showing signs of atrophy; that the U.S. with all its pre-occupations in the region, was beginning to take its long-time Tunisian friend somewhat for granted. These anxieties should for now be mostly allayed, although we must anticipate the need for further high-level contacts, particularly as Tunisia faces the increasing uncertainties surrounding transition from Bourguiba to a new political era.

3. Eagleburger's discussions, reported separately, were notable on several counts.³ First and foremost, they revealed the extend of GOT concerns regarding the future of our military assistance program. Prime Minister Mzali made a particularly impassioned plea, reflecting not only a genuine concern for the fate of Tunisia's military modernization efforts in the face of continuing Libyan threats, but also the political implications, both international and domestic, of U.S. failure to live up to perceived commitments. Tunisian leaders fear that the perception of faltering U.S. support will serve to encourage Tunisia's enemies abroad (e.g., Qadhafi), will damage both Tunisian and U.S. credibility, and will subject the government to domestic charges that the highly-touted "U.S. connection" is not paying off. Mzali, Bourguiba's heir-apparent and an outspoken advocate of close U.S.-Tunisian ties, is particularly vulnerable to such charges.

4. Both Mzali and Defense Minister Baly⁴ also made clear that, in addition to the military and political implications of cuts in U.S. security assistance, the GOT will be faced with serious, unexpected budgetary

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0115. Confidential; Priority; Stadis.

² A record of Block's conversation with Mzali is in telegram 2499 from Tunis, March 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830173–0355)

³ A record of Eagleburger's conversation with Bourguiba and Mzali is in telegram 3053 from Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0112)

⁴ A record of Eagleburger's conversation with Baly is in telegram 3055 from Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0322)

problems as well. Here the immediate focus is on the payments due in June which, without supplemental FMS/MAP funding or some other form of relief, they claim the GOT will not be able to meet.

5. The Tunisians welcomed Eagleburger's reiteration of the administration's commitment to do its best to obtain supplemental funds to increase FY 83 FMS/MAP from its current level of \$67 million to the \$140 million originally requested. At the same time they were reminded again that obtaining a supplemental would not be easy, given U.S. economic conditions and congressional attitudes. While I doubt Tunisian leaders expect to see the full \$140 million, they will be looking for some increase—up to last year's level of \$95 million at a minimum. I consider it important to our interests here that the administration seek all possible ways of effecting some such increase, either through a supplemental or, failing that, through reprogramming. Meanwhile, we should be exploring ways to alleviate the more immediate problem of the June payment gap, preferably by deferring payment pending a supplemental or the availability of FY 84 funding.

6. Considering Tunisia's financial difficulties, the apparent likelihood of major shortfalls in U.S. security assistance funding, and the political as well as economic importance of maintaining a credible level of support for Tunisia, we should consider other ways by which we might help the GOT. One, which I strongly recommend, is to respond positively and promptly to the GOT's appeal for additional PL 480 assistance. (Our specific recommendations are contained in septels.)⁵ Another is to respond favorably to the GOT's proposal that \$2 million of Tunisia's ESF funding be used for financial support of Tunisian students in the U.S. This program, initiated personally by Bourguiba with a view to breaking out of the French orbit and tapping into U.S. technology, carries with it both long-term political and commercial advantages for the U.S. and therefore warrants our support.

7. Finally, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the high-level political consultations mentioned above, I would urge Secretary Shultz to stop here when he visits Algeria later this year. Prime Minister Mzali made an appeal to this effect during his meeting with Under Secretary Eagleburger. A stop here, even overnight or for a matter of hours, would yield significant dividends in terms of our overall political relationship.

Anderson

⁵ In telegram 3360 from Tunis, April 29, the Embassy reported that Cutler and Ahmed Ben Arfa, the Tunisian Secretary of State for International Cooperation, "signed and exchanged letters extending the American offer of blended credit and conveying Tunisian acceptance of the offer." In a press release, the GOT announced "This arrangement on agricultural credits together with the long-standing PL-480 program represent a continuation of the close relationship between the United States and Tunisia." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830241-0850)

311. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Rabat, December 10, 1983, 2201Z

Secto 15066. For S/S. Subject: Visit of Secretary Shultz to Rabat—My Meeting in Tunisia, December 10, 1983.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I spent six working hours in Tunisia December 10 and met with President Bourguiba,² Prime Minister Mzali³ and Foreign Minister Essebsi.⁴

3. They had prepared two basic messages—linked by the perception of the threat which all agreed Qadhafi represents—which every interlocutor addressed. One of these dealt with Tunisia's economic difficulties and related requirements for softer U.S. assistance—particularly military assistance terms. The other concerned Arab perceptions of the imbalanced reinforcement of our relations with Israel after the Shamir visit.⁵ This struck them as dangerous to their interests as well as ours.

4. Prime Minister Mzali carried the ball on the terms-of-aid issue. He pointed to the exponential curve of Tunisia's indebtedness to the U.S. as a result of the commercial interest rates under which we allocate FMS credits and pled for concessional terms. He reviewed the rationale for Tunisia's arms purchases "imposed upon us by Qadhafi's Gafsa raid" and was at pains to highlight the Tunisian budget's primary emphasis on education, health and development, to illustrate the modesty of this country's unavoidable but essential military outlays. President Bourguiba put it in a nutshell when he said Tunisia needed help half in credits, half in grants. I told the Tunisians we were aware of the problem and would be seeking approval for more concessional and grant aid from the Congress, and I was hopeful we would be in a position to present more favorable terms next year.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² A record of the Shultz-Bourguiba conversation is in telegram Secto 15070 from Rabat, December 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830730–0088)

³ A record of the Shultz-Mzali conversation is in telegram 9290 from Tunis, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0434)

⁴ A record of the Shultz-Essebsi conversation is in telegram 9291 from Tunis, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0397)

⁵ Shamir visited the United States November 27–30. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

5. Foreign Minister Essebsi spoke to me at length about our "enhanced" relations with Israel. Taking the decision announced after the Shamir visit⁶ as his point of departure Essebsi found them comprehensible only as evidence of Washington's sense that a strong Israel was the best and only barrier to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Tunisia and other moderate Arabs could not share this American view. To the contrary, they believed that Israeli nationalism, competing with Palestinian nationalism for the same soil, had found expression in the rejection of the promising Reagan plan ("we thought that a solution was finally in sight"); had led to the invasion of Lebanon exacerbating the turmoil there; had turned Syria "which came to Fez and Washington believing at the time that Moscow could do nothing" back towards the Soviets for support. Tunisia, in short, saw an aggressive Israel as the agency through which the Soviets were enabled to exploit new opportunities in the region. Essebsi urged not an abandonment of Israel "whose right to exist is not challenged," but more balanced American relations with the countries of the region. Such balance would best protect American interests, he said, as well as those of our Arab friends. Bourguiba echoed this theme and so did Mrs. Bourguiba, in a state of high emotion on the subject of Arafat's tribulations, which the news of Israeli raids on Lebanon kept on everyone's mind.

6. I said that the U.S. has had, has and will have strong links to Israel. I told all of my Tunisian friends of the important "Arab side" to our policy which, in fact, has the balance they desire. I stressed we had explained to Shamir in Washington that Israel's willingness to withdraw from Lebanon and to negotiate the status of Gaza and the West Bank would, ultimately, make or break any negotiation which might yet come to pass. I spoke repeatedly about our awareness of the centrality of legitimate Palestinian interests and our intention to seek an improvement of the quality of Palestinian life.

7. I believe I was heard. However, we clearly confront a strongly skeptical Arab reaction to recent events in the Levant and shall need to show by what we do and say that our policy towards Arabs and Israelis is indeed balanced and responsive to need.

Shultz

⁶ In remarks after his November 29 meeting with Shamir, Reagan announced that the two nations "have agreed on the need to increase our cooperation in areas where our interests coincide, particularly in the political and military area." (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1984, pp. 30-31)

312. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, January 4, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

I met with Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia this afternoon. He came in to brief me on the food riots in Tunisia that have followed the more than doubling of the price of bread and of rice in Tunisia. This was a budget measure agreed upon by President Bourguiba, who seems to have made a serious mistake in introducing the price increase all at once. Ben Yahia of course emphasized their suspicion that the Libyans were either behind the riots or at least taking advantage of them.² He had a series of requests, including a request for intelligence-sharing on what the Libyans were up to, as well as various financial measures to assist Tunisia. I agreed that we would provide them, at least on a foreign office to foreign office basis, with information that we had and that we certainly would look at a variety of measures that might be conceivable on the financial side, including the acceleration of military deliveries under our security assistance program. But I suspect there is very little we can do, and I did not hold out a great deal of hope.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. Secret. Shultz summarized Dam's meeting in a January 4 memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, January–March 1984)

² In telegram 20 from Tunis, January 3, the Embassy reported: "President Bourguiba called in Chargé January 3 to request that U.S. accelerate deliveries of military equipment as a deterrent to Qadhafi, whom he saw as being behind disturbances in Tunisia." Essebsi also said "GOT could get over current disturbances, but that Tunisian military feared Libya and looked to U.S. for support." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840004–0137)

313. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Bourguiba¹

Washington, January 9, 1984

Dear Mr. President:

I have sent Dick Walters, a trusted aide, to speak with you about my concern over the recent unrest in Tunisia. I applaud your courage in facing up to Tunisia's economic challenge and I understand how difficult it was to deal with the disorders. Tunisia's friends will now want to consider how they can help your government and we in the United States are considering ways to do so.

With regard to the external threat, I have requested General Walters to share with you our latest assessment of Libyan activities in the region, and to reassure you of our continuing efforts to monitor Libyan activities. The United States remains concerned for the continued security and territorial integrity of Tunisia.

I know you will speak candidly to Dick Walters and I look forward to a report from him upon his return.²

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba (8302445-8408275). No classification marking.

² For a record of Walters's visit, see Document 315.

314. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Schneider) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 11, 1984

SUBJECT

Additional Assistance for Tunisia

We have real problems with Tunisia in the wake of the bread riots. Much of the problem is psychological, rather than economic, stemming from Tunisia's understandable tendency to see a Libyan hand everywhere and uneasiness over the Bourguiba succession. Nonetheless, we need to respond quickly with a solid gesture that demonstrates to the Tunisians we are willing to help.

Vernon Walters is now in Tunisia with a package consisting of 1) improved terms for our \$134 million CCC credit (bureaucratically no mean achievement, but worth little over \$500,000), and 2) agreement to increase deliveries of some military equipment. While Alan Wallis believes this is sufficient, we disagree.²

There are two ways to supplement this package—PL-480 (I) reserve funds and ESF. PL-480 (I) has the advantage of meeting the proximate cause of the riots—the increased price of bread. It is also easier to deliver in that it does not require painful reallocation of limited ESF funds. On the other hand, the Tunisian Ambassador, supported by Senator Percy, has appealed for ESF funds. His preference is both expected and understandable. ESF is essentially budget support, and would give the Tunisians more flexibility. Further, there is no doubt the Tunisians could use the money, e.g., to repair damage to the transportation system caused by the riots.

NEA believes, and we agree, that the best course is to provide Tunisia with \$5 million from the PL-480 (I) reserve immediately. Bill Schneider thinks OMB can be convinced of the need. We think Tunisian and Congressional pressure for ESF can be managed by a timely offer of PL-480 (I).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (01/11/1984). Confidential. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." In the top right-hand corner, Covey wrote his initials above Shultz's stamp.

² On January 10, Wallis wrote Shultz that he did "not concur in the additional PL-480 Title I. We have provided Dick Walters a respectable package to go along with a basically 'hand-holding' mission. The improved blend on CCC credits was a significant concession not lightly obtained. In addition, we are manipulating the military credits and deliveries to Tunisia's advantage." (Ibid.)

In anticipation of the Moroccan delegation's visit next month, we will be sending you shortly a separate memo on Morocco, which of the two has the greatest need for ESF.³ In both cases, we must recognize that, faced with sizeable ESF shortfalls worldwide, not only is ESF for Morocco or Tunisia a zero-sum game, but it will also require painful reallocations elsewhere, e.g., Oman, Middle East regional, or Zimbabwe. However, the Moroccans cannot go back empty-handed, and some ESF, in addition to PL-480, may be our only recourse.

Meanwhile, we recommend that General Walters be authorized to tell the Tunisians that we are prepared to provide an additional \$5 million in PL-480 (I). If you agree, we will try to push this through the interagency process before Walters leaves tomorrow.⁴

³ See Document 222.

⁴ Shultz approved the recommendation. A stamped notation next to his initials reads: "JAN 11 1984." Below the recommendation, Covey wrote: "NEA AND T alerted. JC 1/11."

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, January 11, 1984, 1421Z

221. Please pass White House for Vice President and Department for S/AL from Walters. Subject: Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters' Meeting With Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. On January 11, accompanied by Chargé Anderson, I called at the President's palace at Carthage. We were initially received by Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and I told him in broad terms, without mentioning figures, what the purpose of my mission was. I mentioned the President's letter² and his and the Secretary's concern for the security, independence and territorial integrity of Tunisia. He seemed pleased and indicated that the Tunisians had just been through a most traumatic experience. We were then received by President Bourguiba at

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840019-0378. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Paris, Rabat, and the White House. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.

² See Document 313.

0900 in the presence of Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib Bourguiba, Jr.

3. I then expressed my gratitude for being received so promptly after my arrival by the President and his ministers, and our satisfaction that much of the tension surrounding recent events seemed to have dissipated (though armed soldiers and armored personnel carriers were in evidence near the residence and the palace). I went on to say that we understood the dilemma in which they found themselves in trying to end the costly subsidies while achieving steady economic development. We were aware of the fact that they faced difficult challenges both internally and from potentially unfriendly neighbors. President Reagan had therefore directed me to come to Tunis to deliver a letter to President Bourguiba and I was pleased to do so. I then handed over the letter together with a French translation done by the Embassy. Bourguiba started to read it but had difficulty and the Foreign Minister read it to him.

4. After President Bourguiba had read the letter, I expressed the United States' concern for the stability, security, independence, and territorial integrity of Tunisia. Bourguiba interrupted to say that these were defended by arms. I replied that I would come to the matter of defense equipment at once. What I would give them was a preliminary report on what we would do in the light of the situation that had developed over the past few days in Tunisia. The Department and DOD had agreed that 15 M60A3 tanks would be delivered in March instead of in October. (in consultation with Chargé and Country Team we had decided that the tanks would be the most reassuring option for the Tunisians since the APCs are scheduled to be delivered in March anyway.) I said that I understood that the agreement for the MTT and the TAT had already been signed by them and they confirmed this. I pointed out that the radios might not be available at the time of the delivery of the tanks but that they could be installed later. I confirmed that for FY-84 there would be a \$87 million credit and \$18 million in MAP grants and that these funds would now be available for drawdown at once.

5. Prime Minister Mzali said that the advance date of delivery of the tanks was the only new element in the program, with which they were familiar. Their real problem was the immense amount of money they had to spend to service their debts and which prevented them from carrying out the economic programs that would lessen unemployment and give the young the sense of a future in which they could participate. Credits were helpful but what they really needed was some oxygen in the form of grant aid that would not further increase their indebtedness. President Bourguiba strongly supported this statement and said that their problems would not be solved by going further into debt. He reiterated his request for 50 percent grants in security

assistance. The measures he had announced would give them three months' breathing space, but then they would have to find solutions. He emphasized the permanent threat from Libya which they had to face. He said Tunisia was a showcase of a moderate Arab state. They were under attack because they were the friends of the United States.

6. I then said that in the field of agriculture, I was pleased to be able to tell them that in the blended credits of 132.8 million the proportion of interest-free credits had been raised from 14 to 19 percent. This would enable Tunisia to buy wheat with a much larger interest-free portion of the credit. We could not go to the 20 percent they had requested for a variety of reasons. I asked them to hold the fact of the 19 percent interest-free credit in great confidence. A number of other countries had asked us for similar treatment and we had been obliged to refuse. They promised to keep this matter to themselves.

7. Bourguiba then asked if I was aware of the blowing up of the pipeline in southern Tunisia³ and I assured him that I had talked to Col. Landy Nelson, our military attaché, who had visited the site the previous day and he had given me a full account with color photography of what had happened. Bourguiba was convinced that the Libyans or Tunisian dissidents trained and equipped by the Libyans had done this. All in all my impression was that they emphasized any Libyan participation in the recent rioting less than I had expected in the light of their previous claims.

8. I then proceeded to give them a briefing on the situation in western Libya for which they were grateful. I indicated that we had no indications of abnormal military moves in Libya and we would continue to remain watchful for any such moves and would promptly advise them. Bourguiba noted that while we could perceive any substantial military moves we could not pick up individual commando-type raids.

9. Mzali then made an impassioned plea for more grant aid, both military and agricultural. I said that we were preparing to do something in respect to PL-480 but I did not have precise figures but hoped for something on the order of slightly less than a million dollars but would try to see what could be done beyond that. I explained that we had many legislative constraints that limited the ability of the executive to do certain things. Habib Bourguiba, Jr. then pointed out that in the case of Israel the aid proportion to grants was about 50 percent and

³ In telegram 184 from Tunis, January 10, the Embassy reported that "after briefing the U.S. Chargé, the French Ambassador, and various press representatives, the Tunisian Government went public with the sabotage of the Algerian-Tunisian oil pipeline at a point just inside the Libyan border" perpetrated by, the Tunisian Government contended, "four armed men wearing sandals, and that they returned to Libyan territory after carrying out the operation. A note had been sent in this regard to Libyan authorities." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840016-0381)

wondered why small friendly country in danger could not do as well. Then he answered his own question by saying that they simply did not have a sufficiently large Tunisian lobby in the United States.

10. Mzali then said that much of the recent troubles was due to the large unemployment figure in excess of 20 percent, especially involving young people coming out of school and with no hope of a future. The service of Tunisia's debts to us, to the French and to others was so large a burden that it prevents them from developing programs that would aid development and provide new jobs to stimulate the economy. He said that he had made these points recently to Vice President Bush⁴ and to the Secretary⁵ when he was here. Prime Minister Mzali commented that they were currently talking to the Kuwaitis about more assistance from Tunisia. He asked, seconded at once by Foreign Minister Essebsi, that we urge the Kuwaitis and the Saudis to be more helpful to them. The Prime Minister commented with satisfaction that Ambassador Cutler was a friend and understood Tunisia's situation well.

11. President Bourguiba then invited me to lunch with him superseding the planned luncheon by the Foreign Minister and I accepted.

12. During a session with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the Prime Minister raised the possibility of our lending them some military equipment on an emergency basis. I said that I would transmit this expression of his interest but was not in a position to make any commitment.

13. Comment. The Tunisians were grateful that I had been sent but basically they felt I was not bringing too much that was new, that their danger was great, that they should be a showcase to show how successful a moderate Arab state could be and most of all they pleaded for a much greater percentage of grant aid. I said that I would certainly transmit their views to the appropriate U.S. authorities, but they must understand that the demands on us were very great. They asked if I would make a short statement to the press, which I did on leaving the palace.⁶ The President said that it was most friendly of President Reagan to have sent me at this difficult time. I will have further discussions at lunch and will see Defense Minister Baly this afternoon. On the basis of my previous visits to President Bourguiba, whom I have known for 30 years, I found him in relatively good shape. He was not unduly emotional. He was less visibly disturbed by the recent events than I might have expected and the trembling of his hands was no greater than the last time I saw him about six months ago. He obviously had difficulty in reading the translation of President Reagan's letter but

⁴ See Document 27.

⁵ See Document 311.

⁶ No record of Walters' public statement was found.

other than that it seemed to be one of his better days. He was obviously pleased and grateful that I had been sent to him with a friendly personal letter from President Reagan. End comment.

Anderson

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, April 21, 1984, 0009Z

117333. Subject: Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia's Call on the Vice President.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia called at his request on the Vice President April 16. AFN Director Sebastian also participated. The Ambassador reviewed both U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and Tunisia's regional relationships. On bilateral matters, Ben Yahia emphasized the need for greater U.S. security and economic assistance. On regional affairs, Ben Yahia reviewed recent Libyan activities and concluded that Qadhafi continued to pose a serious and perhaps enhanced threat to Tunisia. End summary.

3. Ambassador Ben Yahia called on Vice President Bush at the former's request on April 16. AFN Director Sebastian sat in. The Ambassador opened with a statement of appreciation for the Vice President's visit to Tunis last year,² noting that the Vice President had had a powerful and positive impact and expressing hope he would find it possible to return. The Vice President said he remembered his sojourn in Tunis and the hospitality extended to him with pleasure and would gladly consider another visit should the opportunity present itself.

4. Ambassador Ben Yahia said that much had happened since last September. The January riots had had both internal and external causes, but the country had recovered its perspective under the wise leadership of President Bourguiba, "our George Washington". The President was fully involved in the political decision-making. The Prime Minister was

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840262-0649. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Schneider, Richard Kauzlarich (S/S), and Teicher; approved by Gregg. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris.

² See Document 27.

in charge of the day-to-day administration of the government. Reform measures favoring the disadvantaged classes of Tunisian society and the less favored regions of the country were under way. Clearly, Tunisia's leaders had under-estimated the pressures in the environment when it discussed the bread price reforms. Adjustments were nonetheless being made, the Ambassador said. Tunisia was grateful for the prompt American response.

5. Reverting to President Bourguiba's health, Ben Yahia said that Bourguiba is holding up well, despite his 82 years. Bourguiba had just gone through a cataract operation (in Lyon) which had been successful. He would return to Tunisia after a few days of rest in France. The Vice President asked that his best wishes for President Bourguiba's rapid and complete recovery be conveyed to him.

6. The Ambassador then addressed the external dimension. In response to the Vice President's question, he said that Qadhafi had unquestionably played a role in the January unrest. Three thousand Tunisians had been expelled from Libya just prior to the riots in Tunisia. While the attempt to double the price of bread had triggered the demonstrations, others had been prepared to make trouble too. Tunisia, however, was not looking for scapegoats.

7. Expanding on the Libyan threat, Ben Yahia said that Qadhafi's intention remains hostile. He seeks to destabilize Tunisia. The situation in this respect is deteriorating because Qadhafi is becoming more aggressive. He has now disrupted the flow of Libyan tourists to Tunisia and the Tunisian authorities have the distinct impression that he is "cooking something". The GOT is also disturbed because in Qadhafi's March 28 speech, he offered facilities to the USSR ("another power"). Ben Yahia pointed out that Qadhafi made this speech as an official statement of policy at a meeting with the Ambassadors of all Mediterranean powers.³ His objective is to alarm the regional powers, the NATO Allies and the U.S. He is using a combination of carrots and sticks, however, as in last week's announcement, intended to entice the attention of consumers and deter them from action, of a huge new offshore oil find. The GOT judges, Ben Yahia said, that Qadhafi feels under pressure following the bombing of Omdurman and seeks to break out of his isolation in his own way. Tunisia must take seriously the danger he represents. He is unpredictable. The GOT, therefore, requests the U.S. to monitor the area closely. The Vice President undertook to pass this request along. He noted our continuing interest in Tunisia's security. The Ambassador then amplified on his earlier remarks, saying that the time had come to do more than react to Qadhafi's transgressions. Ben Yahia said that his government is in close touch with the Sudanese, Egyptians, Algerians

³ Not further identified.

and Moroccans. Tunis is, however, concerned over Morocco's rapprochement with Libya.

8. The Vice President enquired whether Tunisia felt King Hassan was being taken in by Qadhafi. For our part, we do not think so and believe the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement to be purely tactical. Ben Yahia said the GOT was surprised when King Hassan sought publicly to justify Qadhafi's presence in Chad. "That is going too far." The Vice President agreed. He said that we understand Tunisia's concerns about Libya. Ben Yahia said that his government had discussed with the Moroccans their rapprochement with Algeria in order to sensitize the Moroccans to Tunisia's security concerns with respect to Libya. Tunis does not want to draw closer to Algeria at the expense of relationships with its other friends. The Vice President replied that we understand completely. Ben Yahia amplified that it is Tunisia's policy to "contain" Qadhafi. If Tunisia had not been on better terms with Algeria, January's "events" could have had catastrophic consequences. Tunisia, in short, seeks enhanced stability in the region and hopes that Morocco will join in the effort sooner or later.

9. On the bilateral side, the Ambassador said there had been some hold-ups in the promised early delivery of U.S. military equipment. AFN Director interjected that problems had been worked out and that most of the equipment remaining to be delivered would be turned over shortly to the Tunisians at the point of origin. Ambassador expressed appreciation at this news. He then said that GOT had been surprised at reduced level of FY-85 security assistance requested by the administration for Tunisia. The GOT hoped for upward adjustments of levels and improved terms. The Vice President responded that the administration was faced with the need to spread available resources and stressed that the reduction of requested aid levels for Tunisia in no way reflected any reduction in American interest in Tunisia's security or well-being. The Vice President added that the administration would remain alert to opportunities to improve this situation in the future. The Ambassador thanked the Vice President and said he hoped for the Vice President's help with A.I.D. to bring the latter to view Tunisia not repeat not as an A.I.D.-graduate. The Vice President repeated that while the administration had had to go forward with the figures known to the Ambassador, Tunisia's needs would retain the administration's full attention.

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317. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA 84–10249

Washington, August 1984

TUNISIA: MOVING TOWARD CRISIS*[portion marking not declassified]*

The prospects for stability in Tunisia are poor. President Habib Bourguiba shows no inclination to address the grievances of disaffected youth and the unemployed, the urban and rural poor, and those wanting to revitalize the Arab-Muslim character of Tunisia. Disorders similar to the economic riots last January could occur with little provocation and accelerate the erosion of government authority. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Senior officers, struggling to maintain the apolitical character of the armed forces, and moderate leaders of the country's growing Islamic fundamentalist movement continue to be forces for stability. Their strength is eroding, however, under popular pressures for reform. Bourguiba's paternalistic rule has created a sycophantic political elite that has acquired privileges resented by the poor. The aged President's failure to build a constituency beyond this group is encouraging the trend toward radicalization and thus invites foreign, particularly Libyan, meddling. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Prospects for stability appear even worse should Bourguiba die in office. Bourguiba's constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, has shown little ability to build a broad base of support. His blatant efforts to weaken his rivals have damaged his political standing even in official circles, setting the stage for a prolonged and bitter struggle after Bourguiba's death. Such a crisis may prompt the armed forces to step in to secure an orderly transfer of power or to ensure that their own favorite assumes the presidency. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Opposition to US policies among newly radicalized Tunisians is growing and may soon prompt the government to give additional emphasis to the Arab and nonaligned aspects of its foreign policy. Although ties to the United States and Western Europe probably will remain important for defense support and economic investment, Tunisia's need to demonstrate its nonaligned credentials may push it closer to the Soviet Union

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, Reference File 1984. Secret; *[handling restrictions not declassified]*. Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations based on information received as of July 16.

in the post-Bourguiba era. This—in the worst case—could jeopardize the unrestricted passage of US naval vessels through the 140-kilometer strait between Tunisia and Sicily. NATO would then have to devote more assets to keeping this vital sea lane open during a confrontation with the Soviet Union. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is a map of Tunisia and the body of the assessment.]

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the White House¹

Cairo, October 14, 1984, 1047Z

31039. White House for the President. Department for SecState Shultz. Department of Defense for DepSecDef Taft. National Security Council for Mr. McFarlane. Personal from Secretary Weinberger. Subject: My Visit to Tunisia.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. I have just completed a 24 hour visit to Tunisia as a guest of the Minister of Defense. Our discussions were remarkably friendly, warm and straightforward, and included talks with the Defense Minister,² Foreign Minister,³ Prime Minister and the President of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba.⁴ I passed to President Bourguiba your personal letter⁵ and followed up with an oral message of support and admiration for Bourguiba's accomplishments in this moderate Arab state from you. He has unbounded admiration for you and for America.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Tunisia (02/02/1983–01/28/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Poindexter also initialed the telegram.

² A record of the Weinberger-Baly conversation is in telegram 8028 from Tunis, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840659–0022)

³ A record of the Weinberger-Essebsi conversation is in telegram 8027 from Tunis, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840659–0013)

⁴ No record of Weinberger's conversations with either Mzali or Bourguiba were found.

⁵ In a September 28 letter, Reagan wrote Bourguiba: "Allow me to reaffirm that the security and territorial integrity of Tunisia are of fundamental importance to the United States. We rely on our strong friendship to help ensure peace and promote stability throughout the region." (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia 1984 (07/06/1984–11/28/1984))

3. The Foreign Minister made three points. He expressed continued dismay at the Oudja union of Qadhafi and King Hassan of Morocco and its impact on the regional balance. I indicated that we followed this very closely and were equally concerned. He then raised Jordan's restoration of relations with Egypt, but I did not sense any permanent unhappiness that Jordan had broken from Arab League consensus by taking such action. He made it clear that Tunisia has longstanding ties to Egypt and regards its role in the Middle East as pivotal in finding a resolution to the problem of a lasting peace. Lastly, the Foreign Minister expressed his strong hope for flexibility on the part of new Israeli Government in resolving the Palestinian question. I told him that I had high hopes your initiative would now be able to be realized given the new Israeli Government's decision to withdraw from Lebanon, and Jordan's action in recognizing Egypt.

4. The majority of the talks concerned Tunisia's economic problems and, in particular, the difficult burden of debt servicing. Tunisia faces severe demographic problems with approximately 70 percent of the population under 25 years of age. Tunisia faces high unemployment, higher underemployment, and rising expectations from its population. This is combined with the stirrings of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly among the young.

5. Added to these economic difficulties, Tunisia has as its neighbor the unpredictable Libyan, Col. Qadhafi. Qadhafi has been the cause of unrest in Tunisia and is constantly looking for opportunities to destabilize this strategically important country. The Libyan threat drives the need for Tunisia's military modernization. We have engaged in a five-year plan with Tunisia and have completed 56 percent of it. However, the major thrust of the Defense Minister's remarks concerned an appeal for better financial terms to help Tunisia meet its security requirements without further damaging Tunisia's fragile economy. Tunisia's interest repayments will double within a few years and will soon exceed the amount of annual payments of aid. Although I offered no guarantees, I agreed to explore in Washington the possibility of obtaining better credit terms and additional grant aid, and did reaffirm your commitment to assist both in economic and military terms to our greatest possible extent.

6. President Bourguiba was most effusive in his praise of you. He was complimentary of the support which Tunisia has received from your administration. I mentioned to him that I had recently seen a new biography of President Eisenhower in which Bourguiba was prominently mentioned. It was the Eisenhower administration which was the first to recognize the newly independent Tunisia in 1956. Bourguiba is particularly proud of autographed photographs he has from you and

from President Eisenhower.⁶ He also asked me to be sure to convey his warm regards to "Nancy Reagan."

7. Bourguiba is most distrustful of Qadhafi and very wary of his habit of saying one thing and doing another.

8. The President presented me with a decoration, the grand order of independence, which I accepted in the name of the American people.

9. My final meeting was with Prime Minister Mzali, who is the constitutional successor to President Bourguiba. He primarily stressed economic issues and mentioned that perhaps a commission could be established to review the problem of debt servicing for Tunisia. Additionally, we discussed ship repairs which are performed on Soviet ships in Tunisian yards. This is a big source of foreign exchange and provides approximately 2000 jobs. I indicated that I'd see if the USN could have more of their necessary work performed in Tunisian yards so as to reduce the Soviet presence in Tunisia.

10. In sum, they are looking to us to help them avoid potential domestic unrest as a result of poor economic conditions while they continue to need our help to improve Tunisia's military capabilities. The question of the post-succession period and Tunisia's survival as one of the few forces of democracy and one of our few friends in the area also weighs heavily in their minds. In this context, the degree to which we continue our military support and provide economic relief through far better FMS terms may well decide not only Tunisia's survival but the future of our bilateral relationship. End comment.

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⁶ During an October 19 breakfast meeting at the Pentagon, Weinberger told Casey and the other attendees that Bourguiba "was physically weak; that after sitting down it took him awhile before he could bring his hands down to the level of the table; finally, that President Bourguiba spent a great deal of time reading inscriptions on photographs he had been given by earlier US Presidents. The Secretary noted, however, that the people around the President are sharp and energetic." (Memorandum for the Record, October 19, 1984; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R, Box 11, Mtgs w/ Sec & Dep Sec Defense (Memos for the Record), May '81-Dec '85)

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, November 17, 1984, 1545Z

342369. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Tunisian Defense Minister Baly on November 14.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: Tunisian Defense Minister Slaheddine Baly met November 14 with the Secretary in advance of the convening of the 4th U.S.-Tunisia Joint Military Commission. The discussion focused on the Libyan threat to Tunisia and the GOT's concern that regional developments, including the Moroccan-Libyan accord and Libya's troop withdrawal from Chad, would increase the Libyan security threat to Tunisia. Baly also reiterated Tunisian requests for larger levels and increased concessionality of U.S. security assistance. The Secretary told Baly that the U.S. shares Tunisia's view of the Libyan threat to the region and that the U.S. would do what it could, within severe budgetary constraints, to help Tunisia with its continuing security needs.

3. Baly opened the conversation by expressing President Bourguiba's happiness over the reelection of President Reagan. President Bourguiba also remembered fondly his last meeting and conversation with Secretary Shultz in Tunisia.² Baly had met with the President just before coming here. He said that the President's recent heart troubles had constituted a "warning" to be careful, but the President was recovering and doing fine now.

4. Baly went on to express his appreciation for the scope and quality of U.S. assistance. Tunisia needed to develop itself economically, socially and militarily. But Tunisia needs assistance if it is to develop in all three areas. Its defense must be global, a well-equipped army and people. There cannot be just a diplomatic component without a civil and military component.

5. Tunisian foreign policy was based on non-interference but that policy was not shared by other countries. The threat from Libya is blatant. Since the Gafsa incident the Tunisians concluded they must arm themselves. They tried to restore relations with Qadhafi but Qadhafi believes the Tunisian regime must be brought down and that the two

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840738–0042. Confidential; Priority, Exdis. Drafted by Nassif; cleared by Raphael, Zweifel, Robert Clarke, Covey, and Robert Ayling (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat, Paris, and Algiers.

² See Document 311.

regimes cannot coexist. For Tunisia Qadhafi is the enemy. Qadhafi uses every opportunity to reiterate that Tunisia is plotting to harm his regime. Qadhafi will not forgive President Bourguiba for allowing the *Nimetz* to make a port call in Tunisia after the Gulf of Sidra incident.³ Qadhafi also believes that the May 8 attack⁴ was fomented by Tunisia, plotting with the U.S. and UK. He alleges that the participants received asylum in Tunisia and crossed into Libya from Tunisian territory. Qadhafi accuses Tunisia of boycotting the OAU meeting in Tripoli in order to prevent Qadhafi from becoming president of the OAU.

6. Baly said that the Moroccan-Libyan Union was also directed against Tunisia. Some countries believe that Qadhafi can be reclaimed by improving their relations with him. Tunisia must now face Qadhafi's hostility against it, the Moroccan-Libyan Union, and European overtures to improve their relations with Qadhafi. Libyan troops that withdrew from Chad are now on Tunisia's border yelling anti-Tunisian slogans. When Foreign Minister Essebsi went to Libya he was greeted by threats from Qadhafi. The appointment of Masmoudi to the UN is a hostile act inimical to Tunisian interests. Qadhafi has made statements privately and publicly that a union with Tunisia will occur in spite of the Tunisian Government, but not with the Bourguiba regime.

7. Baly went on to talk about the Soviet naval presence in the harbor off the coast of Tunisia. He told the Secretary that Tunisia was an outpost of the West constantly endangered by the Soviet fleet. The Soviets are looking for a warm water port in the Mediterranean. Their presence would pose a serious danger to NATO and provide a base from which to attack Europe.

8. Baly summarized by asking the Secretary to review the terms and mix of our assistance on FMS so that they would be able to bear the costs of their defense. He also stated that President Bourguiba wanted to develop the south of Tunisia, an area in which the Libyans are fomenting discontent.

9. Secretary Shultz told Baly that the U.S. shares the Tunisian view of Qadhafi. We are upset over the union and have made that known to the Moroccans. We don't share the view of other countries like Italy that

³ Reference is to the August 19, 1981, Gulf of Sidra incident, when, after being fired upon, two U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan SU-22 Fitter fighter jets. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁴ In telegram 135419 to Brussels, London, Rome, Tunis, and Cairo, May 9, the Department noted press reports about "an armed attack on the barracks in Tripoli where Col. Qadhafi is said normally to reside. Department does not, rpt not, have detailed information on the alleged attack, but believes some sort of military action, either by Libyan dissidents or aimed against them, may have taken place May 8 in Tripoli." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840300-0322)

Qadhafi will be changed by going along with him. Our strategy is to isolate him. He is a terrorist and an aggressor. The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. wants to be helpful to Tunisia, which is on the front line of the problem. We continually review our programs but are constrained by our budget. The Secretary added that when Finance Ministers come to this country they are always telling us to get our deficits down. On the question of promoting development in the south, the Secretary said he had not been aware of that request. It sounded expensive but as plans were formed we would be willing to talk about that. However, Tunisia should not expect to see large sums of money going into that development. The Secretary added that President Bourguiba should also know that he has a friend in Washington and one who shares his views on Qadhafi.

10. Baly added that the U.S. policy of isolating Qadhafi is made more difficult by actions of those who wish to boost Qadhafi's image, for example by the Moroccan-Libyan Accord, and the increasing European audience. This has enabled Qadhafi to become more daring toward Tunisia.

11. Participants at the meeting included Arnold Raphel, Thomas Nassif of NEA, Arnold Kanter of PM and M/G Burns of DOD/ISA.

Shultz

320. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 28, 1984

Dear George:

(S) We have just completed the fourth US-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meeting.² During our two days of discussions, Tunisian Minister of Defense Baly made a strong plea for increased US military and economic assistance for FY 86. He stressed Tunisia's increasingly severe internal economic problems and the rising external military

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 9, Tunisia (Nov–Dec). Secret.

² No minutes of the meeting have been found.

threat from Libya. I am very sympathetic to Tunisia's situation, and believe that more should be done for Tunisia in terms of economic aid.

(S) Recent analyses of Tunisia's economic situation appear to support this view.³ Tunisia's external debt situation has been worsening as markets declined sharply for Tunisia's principal foreign exchange earners—petroleum, phosphates and tourism. Tunisia's debt service ratio was pushed to 18.5 percent in 1983 and it is expected to be higher, closer to 25% in 1984 (not counting the military debt to the US). In addition, our unspoken, but well-recognized concern for Tunisia's stability is based on the deteriorating health of Tunisian President Bourguiba and the uncertainty that in his declining health he, or his designated successor, will be able to maintain stability in Tunisia.

(C) Currently, the FY 86 integrated budget with OMB pegs \$54 million for FMS—half at concessional rates, \$16 million MAP and \$15 million ESF. Perhaps we together could suggest a greater ratio of concessional credits.

(S) In addition, I would like to ask you to consider an increase in the FY 86 ESF request for Tunisia from \$15 million to \$30 million. The additional \$15 million would allow us to initiate a four-year, \$40 million program to establish a security belt—a series of "kibbutz-like" agriculture settlements for nomadic tribes in southeastern Tunisia along the Libyan border. Minister Baly raised this idea in discussions with me on the first day of the JMC. While I made no commitments to him on this proposal, it makes a lot of sense both from an economic and a security standpoint.

(C) Tunisia's case is a serious one. I hope that together we can explore every opportunity to assist Tunisia and aid in some measure the stability in the Maghreb.

Sincerely,

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³Not found and not further identified.

321. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 63–84

Washington, December 1984

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate examines Tunisia's political, economic, and societal problems, the likelihood of further unrest, and the prospects for President Bourguiba's regime over the next two years. Given Bourguiba's stature in Tunisia, questions regarding stability had tended to focus on the post-Bourguiba era. The January 1984 bread riots, however, illuminated a more pressing question—will the state survive Bourguiba's continued reign? The youthful populace and the disadvantaged do not perceive the regime or the ruling Destourian Socialist Party as responsive to their needs and aspirations. Libyan-supported subversion and the Islamic resurgence add to the regime's challenges. This Estimate addresses the implications for the United States in the event of domestic upheavals which produce a new government, and examines alternative scenarios.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Prospects for more political instability in Tunisia are high:

— President Bourguiba has shown no inclination to address fundamental economic, social, and political grievances that trouble many Tunisians. Bourguiba's mental and physical capabilities are declining—he recently entered a hospital suffering from heart spasms—but the 81-year-old President shows no sign of stepping down voluntarily. His continued rule will stifle desperately needed change and increase the likelihood of violent change.

— Although many Tunisian leaders recognize the need for reforms, they are unwilling to confront Bourguiba directly. Instead, many officials are content to adopt measures that appear responsive to the public, but fail to meet growing public demands for real change.

Given Bourguiba's inflexibility, the subservience of his officials and the decline in political institutions, Tunisia's future is likely to be increasingly turbulent, although we do not think the regime will be toppled as long as Bourguiba remains alive and in control. Nevertheless, the boiling point for dissension may have been substantially and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, Reference File 1984. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board based on information received as of November 27.

permanently reduced; future unrest may be touched off by a far less momentous event.

Opposition forces, while growing in strength, are not well organized. The legal, secular opposition seeks only an expanded role in the decisionmaking process and a broadening of the political process. The illegal opposition—particularly the Islamic fundamentalists—is growing, but remains poorly organized, factionalized, and publicly committed to nonviolent change.

The likelihood of serious instability and chances for an abrupt change in regime will increase greatly once Bourguiba dies, however. His constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister Mzali, has little popular support. Many of Tunisia's elite—clan patriarchs, government officials, and party leaders—fear that the unpopular Mzali's accession would trigger widespread unrest and ultimately threaten their wealth and positions in Tunisia. Thus, Bourguiba's heart spasms precipitated vigorous efforts to encourage the President to alter the constitutional succession procedure or to replace Mzali as Prime Minister.

The President has long hoped that his son, Habib, Jr., would replace him; however, the latter has previously opted out of the contention. The cause of Minister of Public Works and Housing Sayah is also being pressed. Such a substitution might smooth the way for succession in the post-Bourguiba era; however, it offers little hope of reform to the disadvantaged and alienated, who will view the power struggle as the elite's attempts at protecting itself. As long as Bourguiba retains his grip on power, substantial change cannot be expected, and this will increase the pressure for violent change. For his part, Prime Minister Mzali will intensify efforts to garner support.

Bourguiba's death in office and the uncertainty surrounding the succession process would give Islamic fundamentalists and secular radicals opportunities to extend their influence and perhaps take over the government. Younger Tunisians—about 70 percent of the population is under 26—and the growing number of unemployed are increasingly turning to the fundamentalists and would probably be willing to support them in a succession crisis. Bourguiba's secular policies and the Westernization of the privileged classes have given Islamic fundamentalism credibility among the disadvantaged and alienated. Although the strength of the Islamic Tendency Movement—the most prominent fundamentalist group—is difficult to measure, its appeal to the youth is evident and is likely to increase. The Movement's more radical members are well placed to exploit discontent.

Moreover, the turmoil likely to surround the succession process would offer external actors—particularly Libya—chances to interfere in Tunisian politics. Libya's Qadhafi remains intent on developing a Tunisian dissident organization capable of fostering armed revolt.

While he has had little success to date, if he does develop such an organization, it could provide him with the pretext for invasion.

The Tunisian military, traditionally apolitical and under tight civilian control, may become a significant factor in the succession process. Although uneasy with riot-control duties, the military has obeyed civilian direction, and we believe it will continue to do so while Bourguiba is in power. The military could potentially become the dominant element in choosing Tunisia's next leader.

The military's role in the succession process will depend on how that process unfolds. If the succession process proceeds smoothly and according to law, we doubt that the Army will intervene. In the face of prolonged instability or unrest generated by squabbling over the succession, however, the military could feel compelled to intervene—provided it does not fragment—and take power. Moreover, the possibility of a coup by radical younger officers cannot be ruled out. *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Within the near term, Prime Minister Mzali is the strongest candidate as Bourguiba's replacement, provided the constitutional process operates. Barring a serious miscalculation, Mzali is likely to retain Bourguiba's confidence. Should Mzali lose his office, possible alternatives—other than Public Works and Housing Minister Sayah—include Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) Director Baccouche and Foreign Minister Caïd Essebsi.

Tunisia's relations with France and the United States would not change substantially under Mzali or any other PSD successor. Political reality will force the successor to rely upon and maintain relations with Tunisia's traditional friends. Tunisia will have to adhere closely to the broad Arab consensus on regional issues; however, under Mzali or another PSD figure, Tunisia would be likely to remain a voice of moderation in Arab and nonaligned fora.

From the US perspective, the most favorable scenario would be a peaceful transition to a constitutional successor government dedicated to widening the political process and correcting inequities. A broad-based government of national unity would be an acceptable alternative, but such a regime would have great difficulty operating effectively over the longer term. A military-controlled government might prove the only one capable of ensuring stability; however, it would be no more desirable than a civilian regime and no more adept at solving Tunisia's problems.

The accession of an Islamic fundamentalist government would reduce Western influence; however, an eventual modus vivendi with the United States and the West could be possible. Such a regime would probably prove less harmful to US interests than a radical leftist regime.

Finally, the seizure of power by a patently anti-Western regime would adversely affect US interests in the Maghreb and beyond. Such a development would be widely perceived as a severe blow to US prestige and policies. Should such a regime perceive itself weak and threatened by the United States and the West, it might turn to the USSR with ominous implications for vital US and Western security interests.

Tunisia's economic woes, partly the product of the international recession, will remain a problem throughout the decade. Oil revenues probably will decline slowly, and the growth in worker remittances from abroad will be slight. The prospect of worker migration to Europe and the wealthier Arab states, a traditional relief valve for excess labor, is declining. At the same time, economic growth in Tunisia cannot accommodate the 3.8-percent annual increase in the manpower pool. Tunisia increasingly will be unable to afford the large foreign exchange expenditures for food imports. Thus, increased agricultural productivity will be crucial to future balance-of-payments stability.

Petroleum production, a mainstay of the economy, probably has peaked at 120,000 barrels per day. Although production from fields still under development should allow overall oil production to approximate current levels over the near term, the rapid growth of domestic requirements will cut into net oil export volume. Tunisia will probably become a net oil importer by the end of the 1980s, further worsening the financial pressures. The troubled financial picture, coupled with the elite's unwillingness to share its wealth or broaden access to economic opportunities, will increase the difficulty of reallocating resources to neglected economic sectors.

The USSR's principal interest in Tunisia is to neutralize its pro-Western orientation and to maintain and expand access to port facilities—part of an overall objective of expanding regional access. Moscow must view the Bourguiba succession issue and other domestic problems as opportunities to advance Soviet political and military interests. Although there is no evidence of overt Soviet destabilization efforts, Moscow would clearly benefit from the damage to Western interests that might proceed from a radical change of regime in Tunisia. Libyan subversive activities against Tunisia also serve Moscow's longer term interests.

Unable to keep pace with Libyan and Algerian military modernization and expansion, Tunisia's military goal has been to develop only a force capable of delaying an invading army until foreign assistance arrives. The Bourguiba regime has forged tacit security relationships with France and the United States and, more recently, improved ties with Algeria to counter the Libyan threat. Algiers would respond to a Tunisian request for assistance. Likewise, France would employ its

armed forces to repulse any encroachment of Tunisian sovereignty. An unequivocal French and US commitment to Tunisia's security remains the best guarantee against direct Libyan aggression.

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

322. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 3, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Meeting with Tunisian Official.* Ken Dam met briefly today with Mahmoud Mestiri, Tunisian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to discuss Libya's role in North African politics.² Mestiri suggested that the Morocco-Libya union will persist as long as both Libya and Morocco perceive major problems with Algeria. The Tunisian government does not anticipate a frontal attack from Libya, but subversion will be a fact to deal with so long as Qadhafi is around. Mestiri noted that Qadhafi's earlier threat to expel as many as 98,000 Tunisian workers is in abeyance pending further bilateral discussions. Although Qadhafi could not expel so many over night, he is capable of such action over time. Massive expulsions would be a disaster for Tunisia. Mestiri also painted a dark picture in discussing the Tunisian economy and financial prospects. He concluded by saying that the situation is "difficult, but in hand" and made a non-specific appeal for "help from our friends." (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box President's Evening Reading, July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive.

² In his record of the meeting, Dam wrote: "I also met with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and the Foreign Trade Minister of Romania, in each case discussing issues involving that country. In the case of the Tunisians, we also discussed Libyan actions in the region, and our analyses of Qadhafi's policies seemed quite similar—namely, that he is an opportunist who seeks to expand power in any direction whenever at all possible and that therefore Tunisia is not in immediate danger, although Qadhafi is trying to bring pressure on the Tunisian Government." (Personal Note Prepared by Dam, January 20; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)

**323. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Platt) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 27, 1985

SUBJECT

Request by Tunisian President Bourguiba for Private Call on President

Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba February 16 asked that Ambassador Sebastian convey Bourguiba's desire to make a visit to the U.S. later this spring. The centerpiece of such a visit would be a private call on the President. Bourguiba, at least eighty-three, is increasingly anxious to pay his respects to the President; Bourguiba for health reasons was unable to accept the President's invitation for a private meeting two years ago.

Since suffering heart troubles last November, Bourguiba has seemingly become more conscious of his advancing age and the need to set in place as firmly as possible the future direction of Tunisia's foreign policies. One of his concerns is to solidify further U.S.-Tunisian relations, which under Bourguiba have always been close and productive. If the visit materializes, we assume that Bourguiba's entourage would include several of his ministers who would pursue substantive meetings here.

Even though Bourguiba's health is fragile and may ultimately preclude a visit, the Department strongly recommends that the President agree to receive Bourguiba during a private visit to Washington in late spring. The Department proposes sending the attached draft cable conveying this message to the GOT.²

Attached also is Tunis 1467, which expresses Ambassador Sebastian's strong views on the desirability of a visit.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Nodis February 1985. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Eisenbraun (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Nassif, Johnson, and Selwa Roosevelt (S/CPR).

² Not found.

Attachment

Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State³

Tunis, February 16, 1985, 1259Z

1467. Pass White House. Subject: President Bourguiba Asks to Meet President Reagan. Refs: Tunis 1386⁴ and previous.

1. (Secret/Nodis—Entire text.)

2. Summary. President Bourguiba wants to make a symbolic sentimental visit to Washington to meet with President Reagan. He has suggested May. His intimates and physicians remain opposed to the idea given his health but have proved unable or unwilling to dissuade the President. We do not see, now, how we can refuse Bourguiba's request, which was couched in all the warm feelings this devoted friend holds towards the U.S. We recommend that we promptly respond with an agreement in principle for a private visit at a date in the spring to be agreed upon later. End summary.

3. This is an action message (see para. 9 and 10).

4. President Bourguiba asked to see me this morning (February 16). We talked for about twenty minutes. Prime and Foreign Ministers were present.

5. President Bourguiba said that he had last been in the United States two years ago. It had been a private visit and he had gone to consult an eminent dentist—Dr. Amsterdam of Philadelphia. President Reagan had been kind enough to invite him to stop by to see him then, but he (Bourguiba) found himself in bad oral shape ("my teeth were mush") and had had to decline. "Now I am 81, Bourguiba said, and cannot live much longer" (et la mort n'est pas loin). He had met virtually every President since Eisenhower (FonMin was sent off to find Ike's photo with a warm dedication) and "If President Reagan wants to see me" he (Bourguiba) would have closed the circle, viz, seen the last President likely to be in office before his own passing. May seemed like a good month for his trip, Bourguiba continued. It would be warmer then and the President would have a clearer calendar than at present.

³ Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

⁴ In telegram 1386 from Tunis, February 14, Sebastian reported that Mzali had told him that "Bourguiba had wanted for some time to come to the U.S. to visit with 'his friend' President Reagan. Ill health had interfered but he now felt sufficiently recovered and 'is badgering FonMin' to arrange the visit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850002-0468)

6. I told Bourguiba that I felt certain President Reagan would be delighted to receive him at the first mutually convenient moment. I knew that as a dean of world leaders and a staunch friend of the U.S. since prior to Tunisia's independence, the President held him (Bourguiba) in high esteem—as witness also his 1982 invitation to stop by. I would report his desire promptly. Bourguiba then said that he “and my wife” really looked forward to the trip and sent the President his warm good wishes “for a second term as pace-setting (*retentissant*) as the first term had been.”

7. Comment: Before I was taken in to see the President I had a few minutes in the ante-chamber with Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi. The latter knew the Prime Minister had seen me and may well have known what was said (*reftel*) but I cannot be sure. Operationally, we shall have to ascertain ASAP whether the Prime Minister's request is or not overtaken. In any event we will wish to shape our responses in ways which do not/not make it appear that the sending of physicians is in anyway a polite substitute for the requested meeting—or, worse, a checkup to see whether President Bourguiba seems likely to survive pending this possible trip to the U.S.

8. Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi, in alerting me to the likely tenor of President Bourguiba's *démarche*, agreed that any visit which might materialize would need to be structured to allow a maximum of flexibility. This suggests a private visit at an agreed date undertaken pursuant to assurances that during it, the President would be most pleased to receive President Bourguiba for, say, lunch (FYI—lunch with Bourguiba and visitors at Carthage usually lasts one hour from start to finish). The likely (and, indeed, necessary) presence of Wassila Bourguiba would also permit a more intimate get together—should the White House prefer—to, say, tea in the family quarters. In short, assuming we are prepared to accept a visit on some such terms, the format would need to meld personal contact between the principals with settings responsive to the limitations imposed on Bourguiba by his infirmities. End FYI.)

9. Recommended action—President Bourguiba's request speaks for itself. He made clear in his comments this morning that he feels keenly the passing parade of Arab leaders through Washington (“the President has seen the Saudi King, Chadli Bendjedid is going and Mubarak. . . so if he wants to see me. . . etc”). In his eyes these men are all much his juniors and have far to go before their friendship for the U.S. and what it stands for can compare with his. Of course, all those who benefit from the status quo here will be reluctant to see him go, given the inherent risks, but arguably Bourguiba probably draws more vitality from his continuing sense of political centrality and relevance than from the cautions of his physicians or intimates.

10. I do not see how we can decently do other than welcome him at a mutually convenient date for a private visit. As the date approaches he either will or will not be able to travel. If he can, we buy some risk but surely should the trip prove too much for him the world will place responsibility for its effects on those who let him go rather than those who would honor and receive him at his request during a "private" sojourn. Alternatively, we could, of course, temporize or refuse to accept him, but he has an old man's tenacity and, justifiably, a view of his own achievements which would lead him to perceive an overly delayed or less than welcoming response as a serious and undeserved slight. Our relationship would suffer the consequences. Given this cost-benefit calculus, therefore, I hope that President Bourguiba's request will be granted and would welcome an early favorable reply in principle pending agreement on a mutually acceptable date "this spring."

Sebastian

324. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to Secretary of State Weinberger¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

Dear Cap:

I very much appreciated your letter of November 28th in which you expressed your concern for the continued stability and security of Tunisia as the Bourguiba era draws to a close.² We are closely following events there and share your concern and sympathy for Tunisia's difficult economic circumstances and complicated security environment. As you noted, Tunisia's economic and security needs are inter-related, and we fully share your desire to contribute to Tunisian development while minimizing the negative impact of our security assistance on Tunisia's increasingly burdensome foreign debt.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia. Confidential. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "SEC DEF HAS SEEN MAR 11 1985."

² See Document 320.

Fortunately, the foreign assistance proposals for Tunisia contained in the FY-86 budget submission to the Congress will contribute considerably to Tunisian economic development and security. The \$22.5 million ESF proposal, for example, is an increase over the \$20 million FY-85 earmark and represents a substantial jump from earlier years. At the same time, combined FMS and MAP proposals of \$69 million are somewhat larger than the \$65 million of the previous year, and, more importantly, concessionality has been improved.

In the area of economic development, we are keenly aware of Tunisia's need to concentrate its resources on rural development. However, Minister of Defense Baly's request³ during his visit here last November for our assistance in developing a series of settlements designed to enhance security in the Saharan region of southern Tunisia is an ambitious and costly proposal. While the value of extending government services to the nomadic people in the area is self-evident, it is far less certain that the proposed settlement scheme would work or could ever have a positive security value. Our experience with similar settlement schemes in this and in other areas of the world suggests extravagant per capita costs and a very high probability of failure. Without overwhelming evidence to the contrary, we would be reluctant to use economic assistance funds for these settlements.

In our meetings last November, while I assured Minister Baly that we would be willing to discuss the project again as it takes shape, I was not in a position to commit a U.S. contribution. Subsequent consideration by AID and the State Department has led us to conclude, based on what we have seen so far, that other projects to which we are already committed are more promising and cost-effective vehicles for USG economic development or security assistance funding than this settlements project would be.

In the meantime, you can be assured that we remain very much interested in assisting Tunisia through this difficult transition period by the most effective means available.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz⁴

³ Baly made the request to Shultz during a November 14, 1984 meeting. See Document 319.

⁴ Shultz signed "George" above this typed signature.

325. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M#85–10121

Washington, June 11, 1985

**TUNISIA ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON**

Summary

Tunisian President Bourguiba will be making his third official visit to the United States when he comes to Washington this month. Bourguiba sees his visit as highlighting the close ties Tunisia has had with the US since Tunisia gained its independence in 1956. Bourguiba is aware of US concern about his poor health and almost certainly will seek reassurances that Washington will protect Tunisia from domestic turmoil and external aggression once he passes from the scene. He also will be looking for additional military and economic assistance to help ease mounting economic and security pressures and as a measure of Washington's appreciation for Tunisia's consistent support for US policies over the years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Bourguiba's visit comes at a time of unprecedented challenges to his rule. His government is viewed by a growing share of Tunisians as out of touch and insensitive to their concerns, particularly declining living standards, rampant corruption, and record unemployment. These problems will complicate the government's efforts to ensure a smooth succession process when Bourguiba dies. The longer he lives and fails to address Tunisia's economic problems the greater the possibility of widespread unrest and a radical regime coming to power. Any successor probably will be more reserved toward the United States, if only to establish an identity separate from Bourguiba. Short of a regime tied to Qadhafi, a post-Bourguiba government is likely to maintain Tunisia's currently pro-Western orientation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asia Analysis.

326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 17, 1985

1. *Tunisia: Discussion with Foreign Minister Essebsi.* In my conversation with Essebsi, he appealed for our comprehension of Tunisia's difficult economic circumstances and an increase in assistance levels.² I expressed our understanding of the issues, but noted that we cannot commit ourselves to increased levels at this time. Essebsi termed Libya a real and present threat to Tunisia, and noted that the existence of training camps in Libya for subversives is of special concern to Tunisia. Tunisia is not happy with the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union, and I told him we also see this as a negative development and, while not overreacting, we have made our views clear to the Moroccans. Essebsi expressed mild optimism about the Middle East peace process. I briefed him on the state of play and urged Tunisian support for King Hussein. With regard to the hijacking,³ Essebsi said that he would send a supportive message to Nabih Barri and others in Lebanon as soon as possible and was confident that President Bourguiba would also contact President Gemayal on the problem. I then suggested he might even call Barri to urge the earliest possible release of the remaining hostages. Essebsi said he would attempt to do so immediately after our meeting. Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia subsequently called the Department⁴ to report that Foreign Minister Essebsi and *Mrs.* Bourguiba "have done their duty . . ." He was not sure whether this meant that they had succeeded in talking to Barri and/or Gemayal. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, April-June 1985. Confidential.

² No other record of the Shultz-Essebsi meeting has been found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 150.

⁴ No record of the Ben Yahia call has been found.

327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, June 22, 1985, 1716Z

192277. Subject: Secretary's June 20 Meeting With President Bourguiba.

1. On June 20 Secretary Shultz met briefly with President Bourguiba at the residence of the Tunisian Embassy in Washington. With President Bourguiba were Minister Bourguiba, Jr., Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi, Minister of Plan Khelil, Ambassador Ben Yahia, Ambassador Karoui, Mohamed Gherib, Deputy Director for the Americas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Hassen el Ghouayel, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister. Accompanying the Secretary were Ambassador Sebastian, NEA Assistant Secretary Murphy, PM Acting Director John Hawes, NEA/AFN Director Zweifel and Tunisian Desk Officer O'Neill.

2. President Bourguiba opened the session by reminding the Secretary that the purpose of his visit was to obtain greater levels of assistance, particularly military assistance, and he inquired about the U.S. response to this request "after all we (the Tunisians) have done" in North Africa. Secretary Shultz presented the President with a signed letter from President Reagan extending congratulations on the occasion of Id al-Fitr. President Bourguiba expressed gratitude for the sentiments expressed by President Reagan.

3. Secretary Shultz then began to review the "very positive" results of this visit. He said that President Reagan was pleased with the substantive discussion of matters of common concern to the two countries as provided against the background of our historic relationship.² He said that on the question of Qadhafi and Libya, the views of the two countries are quite parallel and the U.S. wants to be as helpful as it can to Tunisia. With regard to the requests for aid financing included in the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850442–0242. Secret; Priority. Drafted by O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Murphy, McKinley, and Jonathan Benton; approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Algiers, Amman, Damascus, Rabat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. Shultz summarized the meeting in a June 20 memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, April–June 1985)

² No record of the conversation between Reagan and Bourguiba, which according to the President's Daily Diary for June 18 took place from 11:35 until 11:52 a.m., has been found. Reagan, Bourguiba, and U.S. and Tunisian officials also met from 11:52 a.m.–12:20 p.m., and then participated in a working lunch from 12:20 until 1:36 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of those conversations was found. In his personal diary, dated June 18, Reagan wrote of their meetings: "They were good sessions & he is really a friend of America. Tunisia is the only Moslem or Arab country that practices Monogamy & gives women equal rights. The Pres. is also a declared enemy of Quadaffi. He is 85 yrs. old, in bad health." Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 336)

memorandum given to the Secretary by Foreign Minister Essebsi on June 17, the Secretary said that similar problems confront other governments friendly to the U.S. The GOT presentation deepened USG comprehension and will be carefully studied. We cannot say for sure where we will come out. The USG wants to be "as helpful as we can." President Bourguiba responded that he hoped that once back in Tunisia he would not be disappointed. He said the Tunisians were counting on his trip. "I cannot go back empty-handed," he said.

4. The Secretary continued that President Reagan had expressed admiration for the prompt and clear statements of support on the hijacking of TWA flight 847. He added that the U.S. knew that President Bourguiba had sent his Ambassador to Lebanon back to Beirut, and President Reagan appreciated these acts of assistance on the part of the Tunisians.

5. President Reagan was also interested in the discussion on the peace process that he had had with President Bourguiba and in learning the long-standing view that the Tunisian President held that in the end there had to be direct negotiations. The United States, he said, would welcome Tunisia's encouragement to King Hussein on this matter. President Bourguiba responded that Hussein was in a delicate situation with little maneuvering room because of the opposition of the Syrians and some PLO dissidents. Bourguiba (with Foreign Minister Essebsi chiming in) opined that Hussein's "courageous stand" exposes him to the threat of assassination. "His life is at stake," he said. The Secretary noted that additional Arab support would provide King Hussein with more room for maneuver; he agreed that it is necessary to produce progress in the peace process that would rebound to Hussein's benefit to offset his critics.

6. The Secretary continued that President Reagan had benefited from hearing President Bourguiba's views on the situation in the Maghreb and especially with regard to Qadhafi and the Polisario. The Secretary said that this exchange, following so quickly on the exchange the President had with President Bendejdid, was especially helpful.

7. The meeting was interrupted when the Secretary was called to attend an urgent meeting at the White House. In bidding farewell to the interlocutors, President Bourguiba reminded Assistant Secretary Murphy that it was necessary that he return to Tunisia with concrete and positive results to his requests for assistance.

Shultz

328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, July 3, 1985, 1845Z

203796. Subject: The Bourguiba Visit: A Wrap-up.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In meetings with the President,² and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,³ President Bourguiba reiterated GOT requests for increased U.S. economic and military assistance at more concessional rates. In a memo prepared by Minister of Planning Khelil, the GOT requested military assistance comprised of 50 percent in MAP grants and 50 percent FMS in concessional credit.⁴ We have responded that the economic/financial problems confronting Tunisia are shared by other countries; we want to do what we can, but cannot say precisely where we will come out. We expressed understanding for Tunisia's problems in dealing with Qadhafi. Bourguiba and his delegation issued supportive statements on the hostage situation and on the issue of direct talks between Israel and the Arab parties. President Bourguiba also dispatched a separate emissary to Beirut to confer with Nabih Berri on the American hostages. The Tunisians seemed cautiously optimistic about the Middle East peace process. President Bourguiba appeared glad to have had the opportunity to make his aid requests to the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government, but clearly he is reserving judgement on the overall utility of the visit until such time as the administration responds positively to these requests. End summary.

3. During his official visit to Washington, June 14–26, President Bourguiba met with President Reagan, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, House Speaker O'Neill, President Pro Tem of the Senate Thurmond, and other Members of Congress. He also met with the Presidents of the World Bank and IMF, selected business leaders and had a routine medical examination at Walter Reed hospital. Mrs. Wassila Bourguiba, Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, and Minister of Planning Ismail Khelil accompanied the President. The Ministers had separate meetings with NSC, State, Defense, Treasury,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850471–0504. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Rosemary O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Kirby (NEA/MEN); approved by Zweifel. Sent for information to Algiers, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and Tel Aviv.

² See footnote 2, Document 327.

³ No record of the Weinberger-Bourguiba meeting has been found.

⁴ The memorandum, dated June 17 is in Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia President Habib Bourguiba (June 1985).

Agriculture and AID officials. During the visit, Bourguiba, Jr. also addressed the American Enterprise Institute and the Foreign Minister held a seminar at Brookings.

4. Although his movements were stiff (perhaps from the medication he was taking), President Bourguiba was in excellent health during his visit and in feisty spirits. The results of the medical examinations at Walter Reed indicated that he is in generally good health. In deference to the President's age, official meetings were scheduled only during morning hours, and with the exception of his call on President Reagan, all meetings were held at the residence of Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia.

5. Through this visit President Reagan, senior administration officials and Members of Congress had an opportunity to send an important signal to Tunis and other North African capitals of the high regard in which they hold President Bourguiba and their concern for Tunisia's security and territorial integrity. The Tunisians were pleased at the warm reception they were accorded at the White House and the solicitude extended to President Bourguiba. President Reagan was particularly gratified that during the visit Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi issued a statement condemning the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and that President Bourguiba dispatched his Ambassador to Lebanon back to Beirut to confer with Nabih Berri.

6. In connection with President Bourguiba's visit, Minister of Planning Khelil prepared a memorandum outlining the difficulties confronting the Tunisian economy and requesting increased U.S. economic and military assistance. This memorandum was distributed to various administration officials during calls on Bourguiba and at meetings with the Tunisian delegation. Specifically, the memorandum requested that the U.S. reconsider the phasing out of CIP and development assistance programs for Tunisia, requested an unspecified increase in ESF levels with greater programming flexibility, and urged a reversal in the downward trend of PL480 Title I assistance to be stabilized at 15 million dollars over several years. President Bourguiba stressed the need for a qualitative improvement in military assistance (from 50 percent in MAP grants and 50 percent FMS in concessional credit, an increase in IMET, and a commitment "for coming years" to insure full financing of U.S. military equipment). In his presentation at various stops, Minister of Planning Khelil spoke to the fact that Tunisia is repaying the US 200 million dollars a year, twice what Tunisia was receiving in new aid; he said that without softer concessional terms Tunisia will reconsider continuing its military modernization program with the U.S.

7. Secretary Shultz in reviewing the aid requests noted that similar economic and financial problems confront other governments friendly to the U.S. The Tunisian presentation strengthened U.S. comprehension

of the problem and will be studied. The Secretary, Secretary Weinberger and NSC Advisor McFarlane separately answered the Tunisians that “the U.S. wants to be as helpful as possible.” However, no precise commitments were made, and it was stressed that the USG will focus on FY 87 in whatever we might do. President Bourguiba appeared glad to have had the opportunity to make his requests to the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government, but clearly he is reserving judgement on the overall utility of the visit until such time as the administration responds positively to these requests.

8. The Tunisians characterized Libya as a “clear and present danger to Tunisia,” and said that Qadhafi’s threats imposed on them a burden to modernize Tunisia’s military at the expense of agricultural and rural development. Foreign Minister Essebsi noted that traditional Libyan markets for Tunisian exports had been closed and Libyan threats to expel some 100,000 Tunisian workers is a “sword of Damocles.” To forestall such action, it is necessary to sustain a dialogue with Libya. President Bourguiba was more explicit about the Libyan threat, telling President Reagan that Qadhafi is waiting for Bourguiba’s death before attacking. Essebsi thought that in the event of such an attack, assistance would come from Morocco (perhaps belatedly) and Algeria, (portrayed as a not entirely welcome insurer). He emphasized that military preparedness would not suffice to put down instability in Tunisia in the absence of economic reform. Essebsi spoke of the necessity of a Maghrebian “ensemble;” this would be a form of economic community, not repeat not a political union. Essebsi went on to note that the Western Sahara question was the most important issue dividing the North African states.

9. The Tunisians were cautiously optimistic with regard to the Middle East peace process. In the statement to the press following his meeting with President Reagan,⁵ President Bourguiba noted that he had advocated negotiations between Arabs and Israelis within the framework of pertinent UN resolutions as early as 1965 and that his judgement had been vindicated by the Fez Summit. Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi told NEA Assistant Secretary Murphy that the PLO is committed to going forward in the peace process with King Hussein and that the Tunisians support this. He urged quick action to take advantage of the February 11 accord between Hussein and Arafat (i.e., an early meeting between U.S., Jordanian, and Palestinian representatives) and a speedy follow-up meeting with the Israelis thereafter to maintain momentum in the peace process. Caid Essebsi said that in a first phase non-PLO Palestinians are acceptable to the PLO, although it was

⁵ A record of Bourguiba’s remarks is in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 776–778.

important for the PLO to be tied into a preliminary conversation. While the PLO might be able to distance itself from non-PLO Palestinians in an initial phase, he doubted that it could do so in a subsequent phase involving the Israelis. He was confident that some formula could be worked out to resolve the problem of representation in Phase I.

10. Comment: Though low-key, the Department believes this visit signalled to the Tunisians and their neighbors that we share the GOT's concerns about Tunisia's security and economic viability. It is clear however that they eagerly await a positive response to their pleas for assistance. The measure of success of this visit to GOT eyes will be in terms of additional aid for Tunisia gleaned from an already tight USG budget. End comment.

Shultz

329. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Carter) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage)¹

DJSM 1794-85

Washington, September 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Tunisia Security Situation (U)

1. (S) Reference your memorandum² soliciting comments and recommendations regarding US support to Tunisia in its current crisis with Libya.

2. (S) The following are offered for the circumstances you outlined:
a. (S) *Current situation.*

(1) Despite the harsh rhetoric from Libya, DIA reports³ that Libya has not moved forces or made any preparations to take military action against Tunisia. We do not rule out further deterioration of the situation, given President Bourguiba's strong feelings and Qadhafi's penchant

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-88-0058, 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 2, Tunisia 1985. Top Secret.

² Reference: ASD /ISA Memo, I/20745/85, 22 Aug 85, "Tunisia Security Situation." [Footnote is in the original. The memorandum has not been found.]

³ Not found.

for violence, but our expectation at this point is that Libya will continue to expel Tunisians in the near term, and then the crisis will fade.⁴

(2) This appraisal notwithstanding, President Bourguiba clearly feels exposed in the current situation and would greatly appreciate any support provided during the crisis.⁵ If State and OSD desire, USCINCEUR is prepared to schedule a major USN combatant port visit to Tunis in the near future as a symbol of US support. Admiral Watkins' visit on 4 September 1985 will also be perceived as a strong signal.

(3) There is little in the security assistance pipeline that could be accelerated. However, sixty-five TOW night sights, which have been identified by our ambassador as a possible priority requirement, could be provided on an expedited basis after depot conversion. The conversion would be necessary because the appropriate configuration, the AN/TAS 4C (Export Model), does not exist in Army inventory. The 65 night sights would be incrementally available during a 45 day period after program implementation. Limited numbers of jeeps, armored personnel carriers, and heavy machine guns could also be provided from SDAF stocks, as well as selected ammunition items. Mortar ammunition, 105mm ammo for the M60A3 main gun, 155mm HE, and limited quantities of 7.62mm linked ammunition are available. Other support would require diversion from Army stocks or active/reserve units. Security assistance funding or Section 506(a) authority would be required for items coming from Army inventory. For those items not coming from Army inventory, security assistance funding would be required.

b. (S) *Increased hostilities.* The most likely threat from Libya is subversion by agents hidden in the recent flood of deportees. Tunisia's simmering labor problems are expected to generate strikes and unrest this fall. If Qadhafi orchestrates widespread confrontations like the 1980 Gafsa incident⁶ in conjunction with this unrest, the army would be stretched thin. Ideally in such circumstances, a Franco-Tunisian or Algerian-Tunisian joint exercise that introduced an excess of helicopters

⁴ In telegram 7504 from Tunis, August 21, the Embassy reported that Baly "repeated GOT's growing conviction that Qadhafi making major effort to destabilize Tunisia. He predicted that more Libyans, including diplomats, would be expelled if expulsion of Tunisian workers continued. Ambassador reiterated that we awaiting GOT's suggestions on how we might be of help." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850594–0860)

⁵ In telegram 7605 from Tunis, August 23, the Embassy reported "Minister of Defense Baly called in Ambassador urgently afternoon August 23 to request USG assistance in three areas to help GOT meet Libyan threat," including intelligence, surveillance aircraft, and TOW night sights. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850601–0923)

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 288.

and trucks could increase the mobility of the Tunisian armed forces. In circumstances of domestic unrest where Libyan provocations were veiled, it would be best for the US not to have its own forces in Tunisia.

c. (TS) *Conventional military attack.*

(1) If, however, Libya conducts a large scale offensive into Tunisia, we should be prepared to support a French military response, if requested by the GOT. After the credibility loss France suffered in Francophone Africa last year over Chad,⁷ we believe the GOF would be strongly inclined to assist Tunisia. A US Navy CVBG operating off Libya as intimidation should satisfy both French and Tunisian interests for support of French actions. In the case of smaller scale border raids, Paris is likely to offer increased military assistance but try to avoid direct involvement. In either case, France would resent the US taking the lead.

(2) No specific CONPLAN exists addressing a Libyan attack on Tunisia, although a general retribution-on-Libya plan is in preparation. A CONPLAN to assist Tunisia as directed by NSDD 168⁸ has not been started, pending OSD/State guidance on what joint planning with the French, and perhaps the Algerians, is authorized. Your assistance in coordinating with State on this matter is requested.

3. (U) The above has been coordinated with the Services and DSAA.

P. F. Carter, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

⁷ Reference is presumably to the September 17, 1984, agreement between France and Libya, under which both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Chad. Documentation on the accord is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁸ See Document 53.

330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Carter)¹

I-35382/85

Washington, September 4, 1985

SUBJECT

Tunisia Security Situation (U)

(S/S) I appreciate your response to my memorandum regarding US support to Tunisia in its current crisis with Libya.² However, your response regarding the third scenario—conventional Libyan attack—is incomplete in that it does not address possible unilateral US actions, other than visits and providing specific security assistance articles.

(TS) While one aspect of the problem does involve working with our allies, such as France, we also should be prepared to address this problem if we have to do it alone. Therefore, I request you provide more specific unilateral military actions that could be considered if events in the region take an unexpected turn for the worse. For example, what role would you envision for the US Navy CVBG off the Tunisian coast—just “show the flag” to intimidate or actively engage in reconnaissance or other activities; should joint/combined exercises be included in the spectrum of responses; do we provide air cover/combat air patrol in order to free limited Tunisian air assets? Because of his comments on this subject to President Bourguiba during his June visit,³ the Secretary has expressed an interest in your response.

(S) Regarding contingency planning in conjunction with our allies, I intend to ask State to chair a meeting on this.⁴ In the interim I would appreciate your response as soon as possible, not later than 9 September 1985.⁵ The ISA point of contact for this request is LTC Jim Carney, NESA, x75173.

Richard L. Armitage⁶

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)*

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-88-0058, 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 2, Tunisia 1985. Top Secret.

² See Document 329.

³ See Document 327.

⁴ No record of such a meeting has been found.

⁵ The response was not found.

⁶ Armitage wrote: “Many thanks” below the last paragraph of the memorandum and signed “Rich Armitage” above this stamped signature.

331. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Call on Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi

Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi expressed to me in strong terms his government's reaction to the Israeli air strike against the PLO facility near Tunis.² Essebsi was shocked and disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction, which he characterized as supporting or rationalizing the Israelis "aggression" against Tunisia. He asked what our position was.

I conveyed our condolences and sympathy for the loss of Tunisian lives, but told him that a definitive U.S. reaction had to await a fuller clarification of the facts. He expressed appreciation for the condolences, noting with some bitterness that the statements of Larry Speakes³ and other spokesmen had been disappointing in their failure to express any sympathy for Tunisia as a friend of the U.S.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Quinn initialed the top of the memorandum and wrote: "10/1."

² The Department of State received confirmation from the Israeli Government about the attack at 1000 hours. NESAs believed that while Israel wanted to "signal" King Hussein of Jordan "that he must crack down on Fatah activities in Jordan," the "choice of PLO facilities in Tunis as a target instead of PLO targets in Jordan, however, indicates that for the time being Peres' prime motivation remains to limit the damage that retaliatory attacks inflict on the peace process." (Spot Commentary, October 1, 1985; Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85); (10/01/1985–10/02/1985))

³ In telegram 302819 to USUN, all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, and Beirut, October 2, the Department reported that on October 1, Speakes said in part: "We're distressed by and deplore the cycle of violence in the Middle East, of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores the urgent need to work for peace in the Middle East. As a matter of U.S. policy, retaliation against terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and expression of self-defense." He also said the United States was not warned in advance of the Israeli attack. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850699–0582) In telegram 303005 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts and multiple addressees, October 2, the Department transmitted excerpts from the October 1 press briefing, at which Redman commented: "We deeply deplore the rising pattern of violence of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores the need to work on the peace process." The Department also repeated Speakes's comment about the legitimacy of self-defense against terrorist attacks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850700–0238)

⁴ Later that day, Shultz wrote Reagan: "Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi made it clear to Mike Armacost today that he was shocked and deeply disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction. Essebsi said that he personally did not believe this

(Footnote continues on next page)

Essebsi went on to make the following points:

— Tunisia considers itself a victim of an act of aggression and “state terrorism” that has resulted in a significant number of innocent dead and wounded, mostly Tunisians (60 dead, 100 wounded at the latest count).

— Tunisia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been violated and its security threatened. Excuses for Israel’s action are not convincing. Tunisia was in no way involved in the actions at Larnaca⁵ and there was no evidence that Tunisian territory had been used to plan or direct that action.

— Tunisia’s policy on terrorism is clear and consistent—it condemns terrorism, whatever its source. Every time the U.S. has been a victim of terrorism, Tunisia has been quick to condemn the act and to express sympathy. The TWA hijacking was only the most recent example. Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the U.S.

— In 1982 Tunisia had acceded to the PLO’s request to receive its headquarters after the U.S. had encouraged it to do so in the context of facilitating a U.S. effort to break an impasse in Lebanon. Its agreement to do so had been a gesture on behalf of peace, not an expression of support for terrorism.

— Israel’s action was clearly directed against the peace process, as its timing (while King Hussein was still in Washington) makes clear. This being the case, all who work for the peace process should condemn the attack as directed not against Tunisia, but against the peace process as a whole.

— Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for condemnation of the act of aggression and of the aggressor and to seek reparations. Tunisia hopes for support from all its friends, including the U.S.

In addition to extending our condolences, I told Essebsi that:

— The USG had no prior knowledge or involvement in the incident.

could accurately represent the U.S. position. Essebsi expressed appreciation for our condolences but said that Tunisia considers itself a victim of an act of aggression and ‘state terrorism,’” and that “Tunisia’s policy to consistently condemn terrorism, whatever its source, and that Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the U.S. Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for condemnation of Israel’s act and to seek reparations.” (Memorandum from Shultz to Reagan, October 1; Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85))

⁵ On September 25, during the Jewish Holy Day Yom Kippur, gunmen from the PLO’s Force 17 unit hijacked an Israeli yacht off the coast of Larnaca, Cyprus, killing all three Israeli citizens aboard.

— We have deplored the cycle of violence in the region, of which this action is an example. It confirms our view that moving the peace process forward is imperative.

— We know that there are people on all sides of the issue who wish to derail the peace process.

— The Israelis see their action as a response to the terrorist incident in Larnaca, for which a PLO faction has claimed responsibility and consequently see their action as directed against the PLO, not against Tunisia. We understand why Tunisia feels that its sovereignty has been violated and recognize that Tunisians have been killed. This we deeply regret.

I assured Essebsi that I would see that his government's reaction was conveyed to the Secretary and to the President. I reiterated that the rising cycle of violence is of great concern to us because the peace process is its principal victim; that the US had expended a tremendous amount of energy and political capital on the peace process; and that we remain committed to moving the process forward.

Michael H. Armacost⁶

⁶ Armacost initialed "MA" above this typed signature.

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, Secretary of State Shultz in New York, and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Tunis, October 2, 1985, 1217Z

9028. Military address handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With President Bourguiba: Israeli Raid and

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850700-0690. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat, Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Paris, Tel Aviv, Rabat, and USCINCEUR. The document is misnumbered in the original.

the American Position. Refs: (A) Tunis 8966,² (B) Tunis 8964,³ (C) Secto 19057,⁴ (D) Secto 19055,⁵ (D) Sebastian-Armacost telecon Oct. 1.⁶

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary. President Bourguiba expressed strong concern and disappointment over U.S. attitude toward Israeli attack, in meeting with me October 2. He was especially disillusioned by White House approval of the raid, expressing view USG must have given advance blessing. I insisted that U.S. had not been consulted nor had we participated in any way, and presented President's message and talking points in full. Bourguiba pessimistically foresaw U.S. veto in Security Council, which would have "devastating" effect on our relations and show our previous warm words of support to be a "sham." Prime Minister Mzali, also present, strongly urged U.S. abstention in UNSC.⁷

² In telegram 8966 from Tunis, October 1, Sebastian noted that he would meet with Bourguiba and recommended "(a) strong public USG statement condemning raid on Tunisian target and deploring Tunisian casualties, (b) message I can pass to Bourguiba on subject, and (c) a U.S. position in UNSC making clear that U.S. was unwitting, would have opposed raid if asked, supports compensation for Tunisian victims, and condemns cycle of violence which undermines peace efforts." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0104)

³ In telegram 8964 from Tunis, October 1, the Embassy reported: "In relatively friendly atmosphere, GOT has signaled its dismay over Israeli raid. President Bourguiba is convoking Ambassador Wednesday morning. The GOT is fearful that public reaction to the bombing will undermine close ties with the U.S., and hopes the USG will help assuage the Tunisian public. Qadhafi, GOT believes, will attempt to use the incident to condemn GOT and force wedge between U.S. and Tunisia. GOT leaning toward calling for Security Council meeting." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0051)

⁴ In telegram Secto 19057 to Tunis, October 2, the Department transmitted the text of a message from Reagan to Bourguiba which read in part: "The difficult circumstances through which you and the people of Tunisia have lived during the last twenty-four hours have caused me great sorrow." After expressing his "heartfelt condolences and sympathy to you and your people," Reagan closed by reassuring "that the U.S. Government is sincerely devoted to the security and stability of Tunisia and that we will continue to work for these noble objectives." (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85): (10/01/1985–10/02/1985))

⁵ Telegram Secto 19055 to Tunis, October 2, included talking points for Sebastian. It reads in part: "The U.S. Government strongly deplores the pattern of violence of which the Israeli attack on PLO facilities near Tunis is a part. Such acts of violence are contrary to our shared objective of a peaceful, stable Middle East" and "this pattern of violence cannot be allowed to harm the positive and mutually beneficial relations between our two countries." The Department also included the following talking point: "I want to make it clear that the Israeli Government did not inform or consult the U.S. Government concerning this attack, and there was absolutely no, repeat no, U.S. involvement in it." (Ibid.)

⁶ Not found.

⁷ In telegram 9077 from Tunis, October 3, the Embassy reported that "Senior GOT official has accused 'someone' in USG of lying in denying foreknowledge of raid. President Bourguiba was also reportedly further angered when told that U.S. had undertaken to 'dissuade' Israel from such an act. Although current high-level Tunisian threats to re-evaluate relations with U.S. should be seen partly in current heated atmosphere, U.S. veto in UNSC would accelerate deterioration of U.S.-Tunisian relationship." (Department of

(Footnote continues on next page)

Habib Bourguiba, Junior, commented separately after meeting that his father was broken-hearted over U.S. attitude, which negated life-long efforts of friendship with U.S. End summary.

3. I was summoned and received for just under an hour by President Bourguiba at Carthage Palace this morning (Oct. 2). Also present were: PriMin Mzali, Special Counselor Habib Bourguiba Jr.; Acting FonMin Mestiri; MinCabinet Chief at Presidency Skhiri. President Bourguiba looked drawn but was calm, spoke at some length and was in full command of his faculties. Atmosphere was courteous but burdened by scope political problem now posed Bourguiba and more generally GOT as friends of the U.S. in Arab world in wake Israeli strike on PLO facility here.

4. President Bourguiba opened by stating that Tunisia's sovereignty had been brutally infringed by Israeli strike⁸ of which White House Spokesman had approved forthwith. This prompt expression of American support which tended to legitimize the raid against an urban target inhabited largely by Palestinian "refugees" (qte the 'big cheeses' of the PLO weren't there and weren't caught unqte) and by Tunisians must have had advance American blessing. The United States had thus taken position in favor of Israel—no surprise—but at the expense of Bourguiba and Tunisia, notwithstanding our long friendship and the President's assurances of U.S. interest in Tunisia's security and integrity during his last Washington visit and since (viz. in the context of Tunis confrontation with Libya). I interrupted the President at this point to insist that the U.S. had neither been consulted by Israel on the raid nor had had any part whatsoever in it.

5. President Bourguiba went on to deplore both the terror and the tenor of the Speakes statement: What would, what could he say to the Tunisian people in its wake? Habib Bourguiba Jr., manifestly [*under?*] emotional pressure, then pulled out scrap of paper and read what he described as quotes attributed to President Reagan approving of the raid. (FYI VOA newscast heard here in English at 0700 local Oct. 2 quotes the President's informal comment to press characterizing raid as justified. End FYI.) This launched President Bourguiba into a rerun of the points already made. I was thereafter invited to respond.

6. I read the President's message (ref C) carefully translating it into French. Last point elicited reaction from almost everyone present to effect that it was incompatible with position we had taken on the raid. I then used all talkers (ref D) emphasizing once more unilaterality of Israeli act, our non-involvement in any way whatsoever and our

State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Nodis October 1985) The United States abstained from the UN Security Council vote, which took place on October 4. (Telegram 2528 from USUN, October 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850710-0833)

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 331.

desire to work closely with Tunisia in upcoming UNSC consideration of Tunisia's complaint. President Bourguiba picked up on this point saying he assumed that the outcome of the Security Council proceeding would be an American veto. If so, the effect here would be devastating because the Tunisian people would see in it the confirmation that the U.S. approved of the blow inflicted upon Tunisia and feel that our earlier warm words of support for himself and Tunisia had also been a sham.

7. The Prime Minister then said that, thinking about the future, if we could manage an abstention in the UNSC, it would give the GOT a little something to work with, "a little balm for the Tunisian heart."

8. President Bourguiba and the Prime Minister then returned to the issue of the White House statement. Could we not have waited to form a judgment? Silence would have been better than this.

9. I then tried, on personal basis, to invite consideration of the scope and seriousness of terrorism as a contextual problem, urging cooperation towards the goal of direct negotiations between the parties to the Middle East conflict as the sole means of extirpating the hatreds on which it fed. It got me nowhere: we had approved the ravaging of Tunisia's sovereignty and talk of terrorism was an unacceptable excuse. I was then dismissed courteously, the President expressing appreciation for the efforts I would not fail to make to "make people (in the U.S.) understand what we are feeling."

11. Habib Bourguiba Jr., escorted me from the President's office. Once in the hall he said he needed to tell me what his father could not. Bourguiba Jr. said that the events of which we had expressed approval could kill his father who was brokenhearted. Bourguiba Sr. had held fast all of his life to the ideas of reasoned dialog and alignment with the democratic West. The Israeli raid had made a shambles not only of the PLO compound but of Bourguiba's life's work. "How can he continue to defend our friendship? Your position is a betrayal (*"il est cocu"*). The Tunisian people are angry. Already the police are feeling the pressure rising against Americans and the Jewish community here. The French are gleefully exploiting the opportunity handed them. Qadhafi is gloating: "that's what you get for being the friends of the U.S." We could at least have warned Tunisia of what was coming. It was simply not credible that the U.S. Sixth Fleet, etc., was unaware of an Israeli squadron flying the length of the Mediterranean here.

12. I answered the correspondent's questions at the exit with a short statement saying I had heard President Bourguiba's sorrowful views on yesterday's Israeli raid, had delivered a message from President Reagan and offered verbal amplification of our views. Acting FonMin Mestiri was preparing a separate declaration which seems likely to be hardhitting.

Sebastian

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, October 10, 1985, 1825Z

312882. Subject: Tunisians Still Smarting Over Israeli Raid.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Secretary met briefly afternoon of October 9 with Tunisian FonMin Essebsi. Appointment had been set up prior to the October 1 Israeli raid as an opportunity to express USG support for the GOT in dealing with the threat from Qadhafi. Intervening Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters and *Achille Lauro* affair preempted earlier planned discussion.

2. Essebsi began by stating his distress that our friendship has been put to such a severe test as a result of the bombing in Tunis. He then went on to state very firmly GOT's political will to continue the dialogue with USG, in spirit of friendship. Essebsi said that we must look to the future and find ways to put this event behind us.

3. Secretary asked Essebsi to relay to President Bourguiba President Reagan's high regards and friendship. He also drew FonMin's attention to our statements during the UNSC debate which clearly demonstrated our support for Tunisia.

4. Apart from bombing event, USG believes that Libya poses a continuing threat Tunisia which we must jointly resist. President Bourguiba knows our concern in this regard and our willingness to be helpful.

5. Escalating pattern of violence in the area is the greatest enemy of peace. We must deal effectively with terrorism or peace process will come to a halt. In this regard, USG disagrees with the Egyptian Government's handling of the *Achille Lauro* incident; the terrorists should be held, tried, and penalized. It is likely that an American was murdered. The USG looks to the GOT and other governments to take a clear position that justice must be served and that these terrorists should not escape unpunished.

6. Essebsi responded that he shares our abhorrence of the *Achille Lauro* incident. GOT policy against terrorism has been constant, forceful. Unfortunately innocents pay the price of terrorism. Israeli attack must be seen in this context as well. Tunisia committed no violation of

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850724-0876. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Murphy, Carol Thompson, and Quinn; approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Cairo, Algiers, Rome, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Shultz summarized the meeting in an October 9 memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, July-December 1985)

international law. GOT admitted the Palestinians in 1982 on the clear understanding that PLO would not interfere in internal Tunisian affairs or act against international law. Now innocent Tunisians have suffered, and, he noted testily, GOT had not received the benefit of real understanding from its friends. This has resulted in real frustration. Tunisians now are asking whether they made the right choice in pursuing friendship with the US. (Essebsi left this question unanswered.)

7. Closing on a better note, Essebsi stated that the Israeli bombing did not justify action such as the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*.

Shultz

334. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 22, 1985

1. *John Whitehead's Meetings in Tunisia*. In meetings with the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and President Bourguiba,² John got an earful of Tunisian indignation about our perceived involvement in the Israeli raid on the PLO base in Tunisia and our reaction to it. As the day went on, however, the atmosphere of bitterness and resentment seemed to steadily improve. Although the Tunisians are pessimistic about the peace process and continue to be bitter toward Israel, all John's interlocutors made strong pledges of continued friendship and cooperation with the US. Significantly, they agreed that they will not allow Abu Abbas into the country as long as there is any doubt at all about his involvement in the hijacking.³ All indications are that the Tunisians consider the mission to have been a success. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, July–December 1985. Secret.

² A record of Whitehead's meetings is in telegram 9713 from Tunis, October 22. (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia 1985 (10/07/1985–12/11/1985))

³ See Document 333.

335. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (Rodman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 29, 1985

SUBJECT

The Future of U.S.-Tunisian Relations

SUMMARY: We thought it might be useful to examine the implications of recent developments in U.S.-Tunisian relations for the near-term succession process and our interests in post-Bourguiba Tunisia. Any successor regime is bound to distance itself from the United States. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has accelerated this development and temporarily undermined Tunisian leaders who favor closer relations with us. However, Tunisia's need for U.S. aid and support against Qadhafi, combined with its desire to counterbalance its growing dependence on Algeria, will limit the degree to which Tunis strays from its American connection. *END SUMMARY.*

The Outlook for Tunisia

It is likely that there will be a constitutional succession to Bourguiba and, at least initially, an orderly transfer of power. There is little reason to assume, however, that Prime Minister Mzali will have the prestige, as Bourguiba has, to manage all of Tunisia's challenges or that he will be able to consolidate power. Moreover, it is doubtful that Tunisia's underdeveloped political institutions will be able to mobilize the political groups that were excluded from political participation under Bourguiba to support the new regime.

Indeed, the underlying political, economic, and social trends suggest that the potential for significant instability is very high and that Tunisia may well experience severe turmoil even before Bourguiba's death. Among the more serious problems are: a high level of political alienation, especially among the country's youthful population; the ruling party's loss of support and declining effectiveness; severe unemployment and underemployment particularly in urban areas; rapid population growth; a stagnating economy; and enormous regional economic disparities.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, October 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on October 22 by Richard Sokolsky (S/P); cleared by Raphael and Zweifel. A copy was sent to Whitehead. Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: "10/29."

The Succession and U.S. Interests

Faced with these problems, the successor regime will likely pursue a foreign policy that is more responsive to Tunisian public opinion, which was expressing growing opposition to the government's support for U.S. Middle East policies even before the Israeli raid. In addition, the regime will wish to avoid any moves which would add to its domestic problems or limit its room to maneuver. Thus, even a regime committed to maintaining Bourguiba's pro-U.S. policy will adopt a more publicly nonaligned posture and adhere more closely to the Arab consensus on regional issues.

Nonetheless, as long as Tunisia perceives a serious threat from Qadhafi, the desire to establish a more independent foreign policy will be tempered by Tunisia's continued dependence on U.S. military and economic aid. While Tunis will express more vocal opposition to U.S. Middle East policies, our security programs and joint military cooperation should remain largely intact, although the GOT may act to limit the visibility of our military presence in the country.

Implications of the Israeli Raid

Our reaction to the Israeli raid will only hasten what was bound to happen anyway—pursuit of a more nonaligned posture, at least publicly, toward the United States. We have temporarily weakened the position of Tunisian leaders who support a closer relationship with us. Moreover, it will take considerable time to restore Tunisian trust in us. Nonetheless, our actions have contained much of the damage caused by the Israeli raid and overt Tunisian anger has already begun to dissipate as it refocuses on the Libyan threat.

Indeed, Tunisia's crisis with Qadhafi has brought about a major change in its policy toward Libya that may not be significantly affected by recent events. Until recently, Tunisia followed a policy of accommodation designed to expand economic and commercial interests in Libya. As part of this policy Tunisia sought to publicly distance itself from our anti-Libya policy.

Despite their doubts about U.S. credibility, Tunis seems determined to maintain its firm line toward Qadhafi. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has probably slowed down, but not arrested, the trend toward closer U.S.-Tunisian ties set in motion by the current crisis with Qadhafi. Tunisia's tougher stance toward Libya enjoys the broad support of the Tunisian people. Although Mzali's position towards Qadhafi has been sometimes ambivalent, his room to maneuver on this issue will be limited. Thus, while Mzali may tone down anti-Libyan rhetoric, the GOT likely will use our common opposition to Qadhafi and our reaction to the Israeli raid as levers to obtain more assistance from us.

Our handling of the Israeli raid will, however, impel Tunisia to reduce the visibility of its American connection for some time. Instead, Tunisia will probably seek even greater security cooperation with Algeria and Egypt. This is a sensible policy for Tunisia to follow given the political costs of close association with us and our own constraints in meeting all of Tunisia's security needs.

We should not push Tunisia in the direction of more visible military cooperation despite our desire to enlist Tunisian support for our Libya policy. Such cooperation could further inflame Tunisian public opinion and weaken more pro-American Tunisian leaders. Tunis is obviously the best judge of what the political traffic will bear. We should not complicate its already serious public opinion problem, however, by making statements that heighten popular perceptions that the Bourguiba government is a U.S. client incapable of conducting an independent foreign policy.

We should look for additional ways to quietly support Tunisia and thus restore its confidence in the credibility of our security commitments. Such low-key steps as upgraded intelligence sharing and contingency planning will reassure the GOT without posing domestic and regional problems that attend overt cooperation with us. In addition, we should give even greater emphasis to expanding cultural, educational, and economic ties in ways that will directly benefit the Tunisian people. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should go the extra mile to increase our aid to Tunisia even though we face serious budgetary constraints.

It is perhaps too early to evaluate the full impact of the Tunis raid on U.S.-Tunisian relations. The political fallout and Tunisian mistrust will linger for some time. But while the present strains are serious, they are probably not permanent. Indeed, after the Tunisian leadership assuages public opinion and overcomes their own feelings of hurt and disappointment, they may well resume their search for a greater U.S. security commitment that was started several months ago. In the last analysis, Tunisia's vulnerabilities, coupled with its strong distrust of Algeria and political constraints on cooperation with Egypt, give it a strong stake in preserving its American option.

336. Message From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, November 15, 1985, 1946Z

Subject: SecDef Meeting With Defense Minister Baly (U).

1. (S) Principals met for thirty minutes after full honors were accorded Minister Baly on 13 November. Meeting was very cordial with main theme being current state of crisis in Tunisia, and how important it is for President Bourguiba to restore Tunisian people's confidence in his government. Ambassador Sebastian attended.

2. (S) After SecDef welcome, Minister Baly discoursed on dire situation in Tunisia, stressing that major threat is Libya. He iterated now familiar list of problems Tunisia currently faces, summing up by saying Libya is portraying Tunisia as part of a US/Israeli plot. Qadhafi is not calling for revenge, but calling on Tunisians to overthrow their Western leaning government. MOD stated that Tunisians do not understand position of their government as a friend of the US which supports Israel. Tunisian Government must work very hard to restore the confidence of the people in their leaders. He added that Tunisia needs grant aid at greater than 50 percent rate requested last year to improve its military and make it possible for Tunisia to defend itself, and to allow Tunisia to participate as partner in defense of free world.

3. (S) SecDef said we would do all we could in the context of our own budget restraints. He continued that he had directed ASD Armitage to work hard in JMC to maximize Tunisia's benefits from current assistance levels and noted that Congress seems inclined to increase grant aid and concessionality for Tunisia. SecDef pointed out our own lack of an appropriations bill and said some have forecasted upcoming foreign assistance levels as lowest in a long time. He summed up saying that although our resources are constrained, our relationship is extremely important and we will do all we can to strengthen Tunisia's defense capabilities, including joint contingency planning if Tunisia wishes.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCEUR, the Defense Attaché's Office in Tunisia. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the DOD Message Center.

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 12, 1986, 0956Z

1369. Department also for D, T and NEA from Ambassador. Subject: Cuts in the Tunisian Military and Economic Assistance Accounts. Refs: (A) Tunis 983,² (B) Tunis 1007.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

Summary and action requested:

Reftels reported GOT reactions to our FY86 funding levels for Tunisia and mission's hope that reductions could be obviated at the first opportunity from fall-out funds. This message focuses on emerging political cost to us here of our FY86 funding level decision-making and urges earliest restoration of small sum involved. We assume that Congress would be receptive to restoration urged herein given its interest as reflected in legislative history of the appropriation.

2. I should like to register my concern over the impact of our decision-making on ESF and MAP cuts in the Tunisian account. These cuts were triggered by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings⁴ and congressional underappropriation of MAP. They have involved reductions of almost 10 percent in the Tunisian FY86 accounts, as follows:

(1) FMS-C from \$27M [to] \$25.839M; (2) MAP from \$40M to \$33.495M; (3) ESF \$20M first to \$19.14 and now to \$18.974M and (4) IMET from \$1.7M to \$1.435M.

3. It is obvious that we are talking here about comparatively small sums. Accordingly, my concern centers on the outsize political impact of the event rather than on the pain inflicted by the unanticipated \$9M reduction as such.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² In telegram 983 from Tunis, February 3, Sebastian expressed appreciation that Ussery had said "we will be alert to any opportunities for the administration to restore funds for Tunisia." Sebastian noted that the Embassy did not want to raise "GOT hopes" regarding additional FY 86 funding but cautioned that "American credibility is very much at issue in any possible restoration of funding levels initially endorsed by the administration." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860085-0150)

³ In telegram 1007 from Tunis, February 3, the Embassy reported that Essebsi had "convoked Ambassador February 3 to complain about the USG decision to cut Tunisia's FY 86 security assistance allocation" and alluded "to the 'very regrettable' reduction he had learned of from his Ambassador in Washington." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860085-0504)

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 65.

4. In Tunisia's case, our reductions, most particularly those (levied beyond the GRH cuts) reallocating resources from Tunisia to Guatemala, fly in the face of support commitments made in general terms by our most senior decision-makers during and following Bourguiba's visit to Washington,⁵ to the top leadership of this country. They conflict with what we have had to say at high levels following the Israeli raid last October. They contradict our frequently and publicly expressed concern over the threat represented by Qadhafi to our friends and our interests. They symbolically emphasize rather than mitigate harsh and now critical decline in Tunisia's economic and financial circumstances accelerated by the collapse of oil prices and the resulting socio-political impact on this country's stability in which we have both a bilateral and a regional stake.

5. This is the more preoccupying since our public rationale is bound to lack credibility in Tunisian ears: We appear to have told them in Washington that these cuts represent "last-minute decisions" which "took everyone by surprise." We have said that LG Gast, DSAA (then visiting Tunis) was "not even aware of them" and that the cuts were the result "of a purely budgetary approach" divorced from "political reasons."

6. The Tunisians can scarcely be expected to credit an assertedly apolitical, purely budgetary approach which allegedly comes "as a surprise" to the administration after they have been assured repeatedly at the highest levels of the USG of our willingness to help and continuing interest in their security and stability. No wonder Ambassador Ben Yahia professed himself unable to understand these decisions.

7. I think we need to stand behind the administration's repeated pledges—even if they were formulated in non-specific terms. Tunisian confidence in our leadership is too precious a commodity to be breached for a piddling sum of money. I know we needed to scrape the barrel and can appreciate how tough it has been to distribute the shortfall but this is a case in which political content of systemic reallocation decisions is too high to rely on the "purely budgetary approach." In short, the situation here is sufficiently tenuous so that we can ill afford to accept the reduced levels in MAP, IMET (especially IMET) and ESF as final if, as seems likely, cost to us in the GOT will include an additional loss of trust by our friends and exploitation by our opponents of this further indication of U.S. indifference—as they will put it—to Tunisia in its hour of need. I urge therefore that the sum cut be promptly restored. Fallback remains, obviously, positioning the Tunisian account for fall-out funds if latter become available but in my book price we may well pay for delay involved in that scenario seems much too high.

Sebastian

⁵ See Document 328.

338. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Bourguiba¹

Washington, March 7, 1986

Great Patriot and Good Friend:

It is with real satisfaction that I greet you on the occasion of another visit to your wonderful country by Vice President George Bush.² His presence in Tunis serves once again as a demonstration of the friendship that exists between our two governments and peoples and the importance that I place on those relations.

Vice President Bush's trip comes at a time of particular tension and turbulence in North Africa. Much of this stems from the policies pursued by Colonel Qadhafi. The latest attacks by rebel forces in Northern Chad,³ clearly encouraged and supported by Libya, are but another example of Qadhafi's determination to destabilize neighboring governments. Such actions, and his equally evident and unremitting pursuit of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, are clearly unacceptable.

Your visit to Washington last June was a memorable occasion for me.⁴ At that time, I pledged to continue to support Tunisia politically and through economic and military assistance programs. I take pride in the fact that, despite very difficult budgetary restraints, the U.S. government assistance levels to Tunisia in 1986 reflect that commitment made to you.

Mr. President, I wish you good health, and wish the people of Tunisia the tranquility and prosperity that they so richly deserve.

With sincere regards and respect,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia 1986. No classification marking.

² See Document 339.

³ Reference is to the abortive February 10 attack by Libyan and GUNT forces aimed at taking Ndjamen. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁴ See Document 328.

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, March 10, 1986, 1533Z

2360. Department please repeat to USCINCEUR Specat Exclusive. Following repeat sent action Lisbon March 8th repeated for your action/info. Quote. For the Vice President's Party. Subject: The Vice President's Visit to Tunisia: An Overview.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The Vice President's March 8 visit to Tunisia was strongly welcomed by PriMin Mzali in the plenary (closing) session for which he had assembled most to the Cabinet. Mzali said that some time in which to discuss current issues and views face to face humanized facts and figures and made reality more comprehensible. He thanked the Vice President for coming.

3. The Vice President's stop over did give GOT's senior members an opportunity to put their concerns directly to the administration at leadership level and this was appreciated. It permitted the Vice President to express confidence in Mzali, in words the latter needed to hear. It provided an occasion in which concerns by both sides with Qadhafi could be aired and shared. Indeed, we now have an advance expression of Bourguiba's support for any Gulf of Sidra penetration we may choose to make to illustrate the international nature of these waters.²

4. The Vice President telephoned Habib Bourguiba Jr., an old friend, to greet him. Bibi had not expected to participate in the event and had called me earlier to decline (with regret) to come see A/S Murphy "socially" at the residence on the grounds that, as a private person, he had really nothing to say to him. But the Vice President's call moved him deeply and he appeared at the initial session (where his father asked him to translate President Reagan's letter) and at the lunch. Unfortunately, father and son had another falling out for reasons as yet unclear after we had retired to the restricted afternoon session. Still, Bibi knows that we remain interested in him and in his well-being and that is potentially quite important.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860183–0377. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, and Rome.

² See Document 338. In telegram 2359 from Tunis, March 10, the Embassy reported that Bourguiba "reiterated Tunisia's long-standing, firm friendship for the United States. He concurred in the need for a strong stand against Libyan threats and territorial claims." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860183–0704)

5. Mme Wassila Bourguiba did not appear. Mme Mzali did the honors for Mrs. Bush. Mme Bourguiba, however, sent a touching letter to the Vice President and Mrs. Bush bidding them welcome, in very dignified language, as warmly as she had been welcomed to the U.S., and citing her health as the reason for her absence.

6. President Bourguiba was in relatively good form. He drifted occasionally back and forth between the Libyan threat to his new social housing program—currently uppermost in his mind—and reviewed his responses to the Israeli bombing, but the theme was unchanged: Tunisian friendship for the U.S.—as deep as Israel's. His sense of relationship to President Reagan, whose warm letter he would certainly answer and his expectation of understanding and support from the U.S. He ate somewhat untidily but amply at lunch and did not fail to invite the Vice President's attention to the fact that he (Bourguiba) remained erect in his posture and his walk. . . .

7. Substantively, Mzali made the expected pitch for extra aid; he could not—in Tunisia's current circumstances—do otherwise. The potentially major novelty in the Tunisian line was the FonMin's invitation to us to consider Tunisia as a confrontation state (*vis-à-vis* common enemy Libya). While this clearly had self-serving aspects, it nevertheless deserves careful reflection in Washington because new factors adduced in its support are real enough there has been introduction of new and more highly sophisticated weapons; they do change the tactical and perhaps even the strategic givens; events including the Israeli raid and Libyan challenges are tending to expand the problems of the Machreq into the Maghreb; and, finally, there are new grounds for concerns of an East-West nature in Soviet support for Libya at present.³

8. Request clearance of Vice President's party and retransmission to appropriate addressees with Tunis as an info addressee.

Sebastian

³ In telegram 76106 to Tunis, March 12, the Department reported that Bush "took Prime Minister Mzali aside and told him privately" that "far be it for me to interfere in Tunisian internal affairs, but I want you to know that you have my personal confidence whatever happens and, of course, none of can read the future, but should you assume the Presidency you can be assured of my personal support and assistance and that your calls to the White House will always be answered. I am saying this to you and nobody else." Mzali "expressed gratification and assured the Vice President if God should will him to have the burden of the Presidency descend upon him, he would faithfully pursue and follow 'Bourguibism.'" (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis)

340. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Dealing with Post-Bourguiba Tunisia

SUMMARY: Tunisia faces unprecedented political, economic, and social problems, which will come to a head with Bourguiba's death. A successor regime will find it difficult to govern effectively and to sustain Tunisia's American connection. To protect our interests in Tunisia, we should support Prime Minister Mzali and use our assistance to encourage political liberalization and economic reform. *END SUMMARY*

Political Malaise

Tunisia's political process is moribund. The aged Bourguiba (now 84) is out of touch with public attitudes, and widespread perceptions of corruption have eroded public support for his government. The ruling Destourian Socialist Party has failed to broaden its base. Prime Minister Mzali, Bourguiba's constitutional successor, faces strong opposition within the party, is unpopular with the military, and has a narrow political base. Popular participation in the political process is virtually non-existent. And as long as Bourguiba remains in control, the government is unlikely to pursue meaningful political liberalization.

The absence of a viable opposition movement and legitimate channels of dissent will almost certainly complicate a peaceful transition of power. The moderate opposition parties are weak and disorganized and have little credibility among younger Tunisians, who are turning to more radical alternatives. All the ingredients exist for serious polarization and political instability once Bourguiba departs the scene.

Bleak Economic Outlook

The Tunisian economy is a mess. Declining oil revenues, a slump in phosphate exports, poor agricultural performance, rapid population growth, a growing foreign debt, a drop in worker remittances, high unemployment, and a reduction in foreign aid have all combined to create a stagnant economy. Over the next two years, the government

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron April 1–30, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 9 by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky, Zweifel, and O'Neill. Sokolsky initialed for Ledsky, Zweifel, and O'Neill. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "GPS." Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: "4/10."

will have to cope with almost zero economic growth, belt-tightening, and a severe financial crisis. According to a recent World Bank study, correcting Tunisia's economic problems will require a sweeping structural adjustment program of considerable political risk.

Growing Social Mobilization

A high degree of political alienation exists at all levels of society. The frustration of the lower classes was evident in the 1984 bread riots.² More disturbing is the growing alienation of the middle class—the traditional bulwark of support for the regime—as a result of the squeeze of economic austerity. Moreover, sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise among students and unemployed youth. Mzali's crackdown on Tunisia's main labor organization will fuel greater popular discontent by closing a legitimate channel of political expression.³ In this environment, a government decision to raise food prices could touch off large-scale unrest which extremist groups and Qadhafi could easily exploit.

The Politicization of the Tunisian Armed Forces

The Bourguiba government still commands the loyalty of the generally pro-American senior officer corps. However, the officer corps is increasingly unhappy over economic austerity, high-level personnel changes and Tunisia's pro-Western policies. Moreover, there is growing discontent at lower levels of the Tunisian military, stimulated by poor leadership, corruption, and equipment shortages. These problems could pave the way for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the regular Army and a breakdown of its reliability in the post-Bourguiba period.

The Libyan Threat

The Libyan threat to Tunisian security has intensified over the past year and will probably increase as the situation in Tunisia deteriorates. Bourguiba has pursued a strong pro-U.S. stand in our confrontation with Libya. Most recently, Tunisia refused to support the Arab League's condemnation of U.S. actions in the Gulf of Sidra. Qadhafi has warned Tunisia that it will be a target if the U.S. attacks Libya, and Qadhafi will almost certainly use his assets in Tunisia to stir up trouble.

² See Document 314.

³ In telegram 3070 from Tunis, March 27, the Embassy contended that while "Tunisia is still far from becoming a police state, the breakdown of popular channels for expressing dissent has been matched by the increasing use of an expanding security apparatus to repress any signs of dissidence." Mzali in particular "continues to be unpopular," since "he has used threats such as that posed by Libya to justify the security forces' actions towards trade unions and student opposition." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860240-0427)

The Future and U.S. Policy

Mzali is likely to succeed Bourguiba when he dies or if is incapacitated. The longer Bourguiba lives, the more time Mzali has to expand his personal power base. However, Mzali's staying power and ability to contain the severe turmoil that is likely to attend Bourguiba's demise are uncertain. Mzali has little popular support. He is widely regarded as a tool of the ruling elite, committed to perpetuating the status quo and unwilling to press for urgently needed economic reforms, social justice, and meaningful political participation. Mzali's use of the security apparatus to repress dissent and his crackdown on the opposition have laid the groundwork for a serious challenge to his leadership. His position would be further undermined if he were forced to rely on the Army and security forces to contain unrest in the post-Bourguiba period.

As NEA has suggested in its memo "Tunisia at the Crossroads",⁴ we should give priority to alleviating the root causes of political and social unrest. This is easier said than done. Tunisia's needs are massive, and our assistance levels will fall far short of the government's requests for increases in economic aid (from \$20 million to \$100 million) and military assistance (from \$70 million to \$800 million over a seven year period).

Our policy toward post-Bourguiba Tunisia will also have to adjust to the fact that *U.S.-Tunisian relations will probably cool* as Mzali realigns Tunisian policies with domestic public opinion and the Arab world. We will want to show a degree of understanding if Tunisia adopts a more independent foreign policy—expressing our concerns privately but avoiding public recriminations.

We should also support constitutional succession, despite our concerns over Mzali's weaknesses and prospects. To do otherwise would be to introduce another unsettling element in the situation. Moreover, there is a reasonable prospect that Mzali, once he feels secure, will permit some opening of the political process. He was instrumental in promoting the limited political liberalization that has occurred, and at one time expressed an interest in opening a dialogue with the opposition.

Our support for Mzali should not be unconditional. Nor should we convey the impression that Mzali is our hand-picked choice. The theme we want to emphasize is U.S. support for Tunisia's constitutional process. The following approach, while not without risks, may be the most effective way of helping Mzali muddle through the transition while keeping our options open in case he falls on his face:

— We should buck up Mzali through continued high level contacts, such as that provided by Vice President Bush during his recent visit to Tunis.

⁴ Not found.

— We should support political liberalization and encourage Mzali to help establish a credible centrist opposition. This will be a touchy issue and we must ultimately let Mzali determine the timetable for implementing democratic reforms.

— We should use the leverage of our aid program to promote economic reform and structural adjustments, especially a rapid reduction in the current account deficit and external debt, deep cuts in public spending, increased agricultural productivity, and an opening up of the economy. We should not push Mzali to adopt a wrenching austerity program, given its potential for causing political and social upheavals.

— We should try to bolster our image among the Tunisian people. USIA should be urged to expand our cultural and educational programs, and we should publicly express support for democratic reforms and economic progress.

— We should not push for an increase in visible U.S.-Tunisian military cooperation. We should try to dampen Bourguiba's enthusiasm for a high U.S. profile and support Mzali's more cautious approach. Where possible, we should let Mzali be the final judge of what the political traffic will bear.

— We should ask our European and Asian allies to help Tunisia. France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea should all be encouraged to provide more foreign aid on highly concessional terms.

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, April 14, 1986, 2146Z

115614. Subject: U.S. Action Against Libyan Terrorism (TS). For Chargé from Secretary.

1. Top Secret—Entire text.

2. The President has directed that U.S. military forces attack terrorists and terrorist-related targets in Libya in the very near future. These attacks are being undertaken with land and sea based U.S. military aircraft. Chargé is instructed to draw on text below to alert personally the

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files: Lot 12D215, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams. Top Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis Special Encryption. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Poindexter and Quinn and in S/S-O; approved by Shultz.

highest ranking, appropriate host nation officials as soon as possible after 2359 GMT on April 14. No reference should be made to this cable or appointment requested prior to 2359 GMT.

3. Talking points as follows:

— In the past we have had significant circumstantial evidence of Libyan plans for terrorist action against the United States. A number of these activities have been undertaken in European, Middle East, and African countries.

— We now have confirmation of direct Libyan-sponsored activity against the U.S. in both Berlin² and Paris.³ In both of these operations, the Libyan goal was to inflict maximum numbers of indiscriminate casualties.

— We have additional information that Libya is well underway in planning further operations against U.S. citizens in twelve other countries. We have good reason to believe that some of these operations in Sudan, West Germany, Turkey, Syria, Spain, Central African Republic, Kenya, and in several Latin American countries will take place in the immediate future.

— Despite our efforts to warn our citizens and host governments in advance, it is inevitable that unless something is done to stop Qadhafi now, other innocent victims will die.

— Because the evidence we have on direct Libyan involvement is so convincing and our information on Qadhafi's future plans is so threatening, the President has reluctantly taken the decision to use U.S. military forces to attack targets in Libya that are involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities.

— The President has also authorized attacks against certain command and control functions and logistics support for terrorist operations. Our military will also undertake limited suppression missions in order to defend our own forces.

— I am instructed to assure you that we are not targeting civilians, economic facilities, or regular military troop concentrations.

— The USG has no illusions that these actions will eliminate entirely the terrorist threat posed by Qadhafi. We are however, convinced that

² Reference is to the bombing of La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5 in West Berlin that killed a U.S. service member and a Turkish woman and injured 230 others, including 50 U.S. service members. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

³ Reference is to three bombings that took place in Paris February 3–5 at popular bookstores and shops. The bombings wounded approximately 20 people. French police defused another bomb discovered at the Eiffel Tower on February 3. (Richard Bernstein, "Bombing in Paris Wounds 9, 3 Badly," *New York Times*, February 6, 1986)

we must demonstrate that officially sponsored terrorist actions, undertaken by the Libyan Government, incur a significant cost.

— Over the longer term, we expect that Qadhafi and others like him, who support and sponsor terrorism, will come to realize that the costs are higher than they wish to bear.

— We also believe that the measures we have decided to take will inevitably weaken the ability of terrorist organizations to commit their criminal attacks as we work through diplomatic, political, and economic channels to alleviate the more fundamental causes of such terrorism.

— In the past, Qadhafi has been able to claim that he conducts these activities with impunity and without risk. He has lied to his own people and intimidated his moderate neighbors, because there has been no response to his one-sided pattern of violence.

— The President believes that this is a crucial time for the Western democracies and other moderate governments. Citizens of many countries, and American tourists, servicemen, and diplomats are being brutally murdered by Qadhafi's terrorists. The United States feels a special responsibility because we are in a position to act decisively.

— The President has asked me to alert you to this military operation and ask for your support in this undertaking. He hopes, for all of us, that it will be forthcoming.

— After we have taken military action, the President will address the American people regarding our operation. I will provide you with a text of his statement as soon as we have it.

4. Appropriate enhancements to normal security measures should be undertaken as necessary immediately after U.S. military strikes against Libya. SecState will advise via Flash cable once strikes are underway.⁴

Whitehead

⁴ In telegram 3643 from Tunis, April 15, the Embassy reported that after hearing the Ambassador's presentation of the U.S. position, Acting Foreign Minister Mestiri responded: "Tunisia uncomfortable. It shares U.S. views on terrorism, particularly Qadhafi's. But U.S. strike made for non-combatant casualties which RAI-UNO (Italian television seen here) showing this morning, leaving impression Libyan Arabs being massacred. This likely upset Tunisian public." Mestiri continued: "Tunisian Chancery and residence damaged by U.S. raid; former severely ('rendered unusable') and latter had windows blown out." The Embassy concluded: "City remains calm at this writing." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23. Tunis)

342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, May 6, 1986, 0440Z

141465. Subject: Vice President's Meeting With Tunisian Amb.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia met on May 1 with Vice President Bush to deliver a personal letter from President Bourguiba to President Reagan.² President Bourguiba's salutary letter (reported septel) is in response to President Reagan's letter which the Vice President had presented during his March visit to Tunis.³ The Ambassador followed delivery of the letter with an updated view of U.S. actions on Libya and Tunisia's situation vis-à-vis Libya and a call for supplemental and accelerated U.S. assistance to Tunisia to help the GOT in its deteriorating economic situation. End summary.

3. Ambassador Ben Yahia gave Vice President Bush a letter from President Bourguiba to President Reagan in response to the President's letter which was presented by the Vice President during his March visit to Tunis. The Ambassador again expressed the GOT's deep appreciation for the Vice President's visit and President Reagan's letter. He asked to apprise the Vice President of developments since his visit and began by noting that political party conventions will be in June and parliamentary elections in November. He stated that this is a "delicate time" for Tunisia following U.S. action on Libya and economic difficulties and with the current economic difficulties.

4. Ben Yahia encouraged the U.S. to continue economic, diplomatic and military pressure on Qadhafi which he said is making Qadhafi nervous. Ben Yahia added that Qadhafi is reinforcing the militia against the regular army and buying more weapons. He stated that Tunisia is "doing its part" having broken diplomatic relations with Libya and helped "reinforce the opposition inside Libya in May, 1984," and by maintaining an embargo on Libyan deliveries, however, Ben Yahia said Tunisia is becoming isolated; Algeria is moving closer to Libya over oil and Morocco continues its relationship with Libya because of the Polisario; Libya remains in Chad and is improving its situation in Sudan.

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners Files, OA/ID 19817, Folder 19817–104. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Algiers, Rabat, Khartoum, and Ndjama. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 142256 to Tunis, May 6, contains the text of Bourguiba's letter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860350–0157)

³ See Document 338.

5. Turning to the economic situation Ben Yahia said Tunisia was not in the "red line" but would have to be careful as foreign currency reserves have dropped this year from a three month to a six day reserve. He asked for "special emergency support" which he said PM Mzali had raised with the Vice President. He specifically requested supplemental funds and accelerated an immediate disbursement of all FY86 funds.

6. The Vice President responded that the U.S. would look into the situation and see what could be done to help Tunisia. He told Ben Yahia we believed Qadhafi was in control in Libya but only following some turmoil. The Vice President commented that resolving Qadhafi problems also would permit Tunisia to utilize more of its resources for other priorities.

Whitehead

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, July 22, 1986, 1401Z

7228. Subject: Conversation With MinInt Zin el Abidine Ben Ali. Refs: A. Tunis 7126,² B. Tunis 7144.³

1. S—Entire text.

1A. This is an action cable, see para 7.

2. Summary and introduction: I had unprecedented 90 minute one-on-one conversation with BG Zin el Abidine Ben Ali, MinInt of GOT, at latter's invitation, July 21. We met in his Tunis office. His putative

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 86. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not declassified].

² In telegram 7126 from Tunis, July 18, the Embassy reported it was "picking up indications that departure of ex PriMin Mohamed Mzali has led perhaps significant stratum of Tunisian public opinion to anticipate evolution of GOT's relations with Libya and Algeria" given that Mzali had taken a "very strong anti-Libyan posture. In so doing he shifted markedly from the traditional Tunisian attitude of flexibility he espoused until last year's Libyan worker expulsion and letter bomb campaigns." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860554-0679) In telegram 6701 from Tunis, July 8, the Embassy reported Bourguiba had "dismissed" Mzali and replaced him with Sfar. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860527-0861)

³ In telegram 7144 from Tunis, July 18, the Embassy provided an analysis of Ben Ali's "rapid rise to the center of political power" in Tunisia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860554-0983)

purpose was to elicit my (read: the U.S.) assessment of Tunisia's internal situation. The tenor of his questions was singularly impolitic and one of the issues flowing from the conversation is Ben Ali's true motivation: why was it held? My answers to the questions were framed in an acute awareness that they might be recorded or misused to Ben Ali's possible private purposes. Be that as it may, my tentative assessment—which may evolve—is that Ben Ali's charge—internal security—has led him into the heart of Tunisia's domestic political conundrum and that he felt acute need to explore American perception of dramatic transformation of country's political geography. (FYI: He's not alone; everyone is asking what we think about "the changes".) While I responded as carefully as possible, I also decided not/not to sidestep issues Ben Ali raised, as his position, potential and current standing in GOT warrant an effort to dialog and perhaps ever to develop a closer (but correct) relationship with him. Indeed, Ben Ali said after our talk that he had found the exchange valuable and hoped for more soon.

3. A number of operational issues emerged during our talk, particularly with respect to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Libyan opposition and the Palestinian presence here. They will be reported in septels or other channels.⁴ Agranians did not arise. This message gists the essence of the conversation. A full memcon will be pouched to NEA/AFN.⁵ End summary and introduction.

4. Ben Ali began by saying he wanted this talk to be "private" viz., between us as political men and not between the Tunisian MinInt and the U.S. Ambassador. He then asked me about my assessment of the Tunisian internal security situation. I responded with an honest but generalized description, focussed on the long term socio-economic trends, the exacerbation of stress built into the current economic situation and the impulse which would be given all manner of "Oriental" options were the Western-oriented socio-economic model to fail. Ben Ali agreed but, to my surprise, then asked what the solutions might be. I responded it would need to be a mix of measures decided by Tunisian political authority to foster consensus, confidence and participation across the political spectrum. This suggested need to free up market place of ideas so that PSD could defend its choices and benefit from critiques in a political dialog conducted along generally recognized norms of legitimacy. "At present most safety valves appear to be tied down." Ben Ali agreed: "I tell them we are sitting on lid of a volcano, if pressure keeps building it will blow."

5. Ben Ali then asked blandly whether I thought new PriMin Sfar could do the job? I responded by listing his many widely agreed positive

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not found.

qualities, and observed it seemed clear President intended continue hold on to central decision making power. This suggested Bourguiba looking to new PriMin first of all for help with economic crisis. His leadership role thus might well be complementary to President's. Limits of PriMin's capacity could be judged only if and when, ultimate authority came to be vested in him. PriMin's most important task now, I thought, was to generate that public confidence which was necessary to successful economic recovery.

6. Ben Ali then turned to the succession: What did I think about a possible constitutional amendment? I said we had heard talk about a proposed amendment, still in gestation, creating a Tunisian Vice Presidency designed to fit Habib Bourguiba, Jr. Its utility seemed open question since much clearly depended upon degree to which confidence and responsibility would be shared between incumbent and his successor and/or PriMin in current or any future constitutional context. Ben Ali, I assumed, was well aware of widespread speculation about Bourguiba's ultimate intent with respect to current PriMin. Did President contemplate further changes around upcoming November parliamentary elections? For present seemed clear that President Bourguiba had vested confidence in new PriMin Sfar whom constitution made ipso-facto his successor. Both thus now at center of Tunisian political reality and changes to succession, if enacted, would clearly involve new political relationships as well.

7. Ben Ali then turned to PLO. What did I think of its presence here, which he ascribed to Wassila Bourguiba: "She invited PLO to come here." I thought outside world saw "Tunisia's invitation" to PLO as GOT effort to demonstrate Arabism and sympathy to Palestinian cause during Israel's Lebanese adventure. Since PLO's arrival, events had changed context and weakened organization. ALCON had had to adjust. PLO's presence in Tunisia had been reduced. Absent direct threats against Americans here, question became complex, regional and political. I went over our position on eventual dialog with PLO. PLO remains a problem for us as long as its leadership, weakness and related internal contradictions inhibit peace process. Ben Ali then said he had tightened down on PLO gradually for years. Fighters had left. GOT had received Oued Zarga camp. PLO efforts create autonomous capabilities in Tunisia (e.g. police) had been nipped-in-bud. PLO notables comings and goings remain under close scrutiny. Total Palestinian presence in Tunisia, including families, now less than 500. While presence of PLO political headquarters/Wafa as such not a problem for GOT now, Ben Ali said he inclined tighten down further. He asked for my reaction, explaining that he was uninstructed and raising issue on his own. I said I would secure "authoritative" response. He asked I do so "discreetly." I noted that PLO HQ in friendly Tunisia had, I thought, conceivably

some advantages for us to PLO in, say Aden, but I would get back to him. Action requested: Please instruct on reply I am to make, bearing in mind Ben Ali purports to speak for himself alone.

8. Ben Ali asked me to speak to the Tuniso-Libyan relationship. What were our views? I said we were aware that PriMin Mzali's departure had fuelled expectations that there might now be opportunity for normalization of relations (ref A). We had even heard Libyan delegation expected "today" in Monastir. Ben Ali said 74 Libyan sportsmen had asked for visas "in Arab League context." Bourguiba had turned them down flat, reiterating GOT position: No relations; no access; no visas; no visitors—until Qadhafi goes. No/no change in GOT position therefore in offing.

9. I reminded Ben Ali of what our posture had been: we had recognized Tunisia's need to deal with disagreeable, dangerous neighbor as best it could. We had never urged course of action on Tunisia, believing that GOT knew best what protection its vital interests required. We had understood and sympathized with GOT's decision to sever its ties with Tripoli in 1985. There had been ample cause. On other hand, we were aware of impact on southern Tunisia of resulting absence of Libyan trade and tourism. We had finally offered assurances GOT would not face Libyan invasion alone. Our views on Qadhafi regime were known. They remained unchanged. If GOT came to feel some adjustment in its posture towards Libya were to become necessary, we would, I felt sure, welcome opportunity to consult before final decisions were made.

Sebastian

344. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 63–84¹

Washington, August 1986

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SCOPE NOTE

NIE 63–84,² published in December 1984, examined Tunisia's political, economic, and social problems, the prospects for the regime

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia Reference File 1985–1986. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board based on information received as of August 22.

² See Document 321.

of President Bourguiba over a two-year period, and the implications for the United States. It predicted an increasingly turbulent future for Tunisia. Developments in Tunisia since the publication of the NIE, including heightened political and economic tensions, recent changes in the cabinet and the prime ministry, and Bourguiba's increasing infirmity and capricious behavior, pose new questions about the country's political stability over the near term.³ This Memorandum to Holders focuses primarily on the viability of the Bourguiba regime, especially in light of the President's recent dismissal of his designated successor, the likely course of Tunisian politics during the next 18 months, how these trends may effect the transition after Bourguiba's death, and the implications for the United States. The paper also addresses the outlook for Tunisia over the longer term when appropriate. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is a map of Tunisia.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

Economic, social, and political problems in Tunisia continue to build dangerously as the ailing and aged President Habib Bourguiba fails to treat them. Action to redress major grievances will not come as long as Bourguiba remains in power, and the longer he remains at the helm, the more intractable these problems become. *[portion marking not declassified]*

The threat of *revolutionary* change still remains low, but there are now greater chances for a breakdown in public order that would severely tax the capabilities of the regime of the 83-year-old President. The lack of political unity within the government—reflected in Bourguiba's sudden change in prime ministers recently—makes a *turbulent transition of power more likely and increases the chances of military intervention*.

— Regardless of who succeeds Bourguiba, Tunisia's traditionally close ties to the United States will weaken, and Tunisia—at a minimum—will shift toward a more nonaligned posture. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[less than 7 lines not declassified] the country's many problems. These include:

- A deteriorating financial position.
- Indications of discontent within the military and security forces.
- The growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalists.

³ In telegram 9100 from Tunis, September 17, the Embassy reported: "There has been dramatic slippage of Bourguiba's image among the Tunisian populace. This has been brought on by his perceived excesses in public, as well as in his private life. He is increasingly seen as senile and manipulated by a new clan of politically inept maneuverers." The Embassy continued: "It is unclear whether Bourguiba will produce one of his patented bold strokes to defuse the situation. Indeed, we must question whether he is any longer capable of doing so." (Department of State, S/S Records, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis)

- Alienation of political, labor, and student groups.
- Continuing threats from Libya. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Tunisia's unprecedented economic crisis (largely the result of plummeting oil prices) is adding to political tensions, but government fears that new austerity measures will prompt a repeat of the bloody January 1984 food riots have so far held Tunis back from effectively addressing Tunisia's economic woes. These same fears will also probably hamper a timely implementation of the government's proposed IMF program. Tunis will likely temporize as long as possible on potentially explosive reforms (food price hikes, for example) to avoid a popular backlash, but ultimately will be forced to adopt much stricter austerity measures to obtain crucial foreign aid. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The longer term economic prognosis for Tunisia is grim. Low oil prices, declining reserves of exploitable petroleum, the unlikelihood of new discoveries of oil or other natural resources, and demographic pressures will work against any quick reversal of economic trends, even if the government decides to make comprehensive structural reforms. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The regime perceives a significant threat to domestic stability and will likely continue its turn toward *authoritarian* policies to maintain its grip on the country. To deal with negative political and social reactions, the government will probably have to intensify its crackdown on both organized and unorganized opposition. The most likely result will be heightened political tensions *before* the November election—[*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Although this will hasten a decline in the government's legitimacy in the short term, Bourguiba's turn to harsh methods probably will prove effective in suppressing the political opposition. Opposition groups do not have the charismatic leaders capable of rallying dissidents and none feel strong enough to challenge the regime in the streets. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In contrast, the potential for *mass-based* violence stemming from economic grievances will remain high. The greatest danger is the threat that disorder will provide internal opponents and Libya with fuel to foment regime-threatening violence. We believe the security forces are not strong enough to contain rioting if it became widespread, and the government's use of combat troops to restore public order would produce further tensions within the armed forces. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Qadhafi has long provided support for Tunisian dissidents and undoubtedly has agents of influence in place, but he cannot precipitate a revolution. During widespread disorder, however, Qadhafi has significant capability to worsen Tunis's problem through terrorism, dissident raids, propaganda, and military posturing. He is unlikely to invade Tunisia during the period of this estimate because he fears US, French, or Algerian reaction. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Bourguiba's demise during the next 18 months would produce political infighting and could lead to an open power struggle, raising considerably the prospects for military intervention:

— Even though the Tunisian military has been apolitical by Arab standards, officers are increasingly frustrated with the government's inability to cope with Tunisia's problems. While the military almost certainly would rally before an open Libyan threat, discipline within the ranks would dangerously weaken if troops were repeatedly called upon to put down internal disturbances sparked by the same economic concerns that worry officers and conscripts.

— A military-controlled government might prove the only one capable of ensuring stability but it would be no more adept at solving Tunisia's problems. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Bilateral ties to the United States will remain close as long as Bourguiba is in charge, despite increasing public hostility toward the United States and the President's own misgivings over what he believes to be shortcomings in US economic and military aid. Bourguiba's stance, however, poses increased dangers for US interests. His dual strategy of leaning on the United States and the West for financial assistance, while cracking down on dissent at home, will tend to identify the US Government with Bourguiba's unpopular policies. However, any attempt by Washington to cultivate relations with opposition groups or lobby the government to open up the political system would anger Bourguiba, our closest friend in the country, and possibly signal vacillating US support for the regime to the opposition. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The President's demise will almost certainly lead to a government more committed to developing Tunisia's nonaligned credentials and reducing high-visibility ties to Washington. The current group of civilian contenders for the succession would try to broaden ties to other Arab states and the Soviet Union but they would not want to jeopardize vital economic and security links to the United States and France. While a regime controlled by *senior* military officers probably would try to maintain good relations with the United States because of its political inexperience and need for foreign support, we doubt that such a government could long afford to rule much differently than a civilian successor. A government led by *junior* officers would more likely be less sympathetic or even hostile to the United States, but not necessarily more amenable to Soviet interests:

— If in the longer term, a successor regime, or regimes, is unable to consolidate power and rectify the country's problems, we believe revolutionary change and a more fundamental realignment on international issues is likely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 10, 1986, 1540Z

8818. Subject: GOT Decision to Participate in Joint Contingency Planning.

1. Secret/Entire text.

2. The apparently unequivocal GOT decision to accept the ten month-old U.S. proposal for Joint Contingency Planning came as something of a surprise.² That decision, conveyed to Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage³ with the request that it be kept in deep confidence and coupled with the U.S. decision to recommend sale of Stingers to the GOT, resulted in an extremely productive sixth meeting of the Joint Military Commission. This message attempts to delve into the reasons that led the GOT to proceed with joint contingency planning.

3. The Minister of Defense, Slaheddine Baly, advised ASD Armitage confidentially of the GOT decision at the beginning of the visit. The highly positive tone of subsequent working meetings served as a further sign that the word had obviously gone out to cooperate with the U.S. The senior Tunisian military officers in the know have termed the decision an “historic” one, which makes interesting the apparent lack of internal GOT debate surrounding it.

4. There is no indication that any of the other national security leaders outside of the MOD had any substantial input into the decision. Min Int Ben Ali did not participate in any of the Armitage sessions, FonMin Caid Essebsi was absent, and PriMin Rachid Sfar acted as if he were hearing the proposal for the first time when Baly briefed him on ASD Armitage’s meeting with President Bourguiba (which Sfar did not attend). Baly told us the decision was made “some weeks ago.” Another senior military officer told us the decision had been fully studied and staffed within the military over past months. The original U.S. proposal having been made at the 1985 JMC, he explained, it was only “natural” that the GOT response be given at this year’s meeting. When we pointed

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 336.

³ In telegram 8682 from Tunis, September 5, the Embassy reported that during Armitage’s September 4 meeting with Bourguiba, “Baly briefed President on opening session of JMC, including GOT’s indication of readiness to discuss joint defense planning with US. Bourguiba ratified his previous decision in that regard.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis) Baly notified Armitage of his government’s decision on September 3. (Telegram 8636 from Tunis, September 4; *ibid.*)

out that several crises had arisen in the course of the year during which GOT had asked how we might help, our interlocutor replied that the GOT had not wanted to take the decision while "under pressure." We believe that Baly having assessed the new atmosphere and conscious of support for the proposal among his Chiefs of Staff, simply bided his time and ran it by his President in the certitude that the latter, given his pro-American leanings, would approve.

5. That said, the single most important factor in leading the GOT to its decision was the removal from the scene of former PriMin Mohamed Mzali.⁴ Mzali's Arab-leaning tendencies and his sensitivity to opposition views not only made him chary of a close relationship with the U.S.; he appeared at times to nurture the image of someone willing to resist us. Ironically, it was his mischievous hypothetical questions posed to us in late September 1985 that led to our own proposals for joint planning.

6. To be sure, the country's economic straits argue for some adjustments in Tunisian defense planning. The GOT may have accepted part of our rationale that joint planning could reduce their own expenditures. The realization also appears to have come home that credits likely to be available from USG are simply not going to permit acquisition of past GOT wish lists. Hence a desire to please the U.S. and particularly DOD, which is seen as more "appreciative" of Tunisia's strategic value to the U.S. in pushing for additional funds than is the State Department. PriMin Sfar was rather blatant on this point during his meeting with Armitage (Tunis 8684).⁵

7. Baly repeatedly stressed the need for tight secrecy surrounding the upcoming planning discussions, for reasons relating to Tunisia's internal situation and regional relations. We must honor that request. It is true that the GOT decided to be totally up front in its media coverage of the JMC meeting. But this does not mean that it can afford to ignore its political vulnerabilities, even though President Bourguiba apparently does not pay much heed to them. New incidents in the region, ranging from another bombing of Libya, sudden improvements in the Libyan-Tunisian relationship, or pressures from an Algeria likely to frown on U.S. forces exercising in Tunis, could alter the political context in which the GOT has taken decision to proceed with us.

8. One other matter needs to be addressed. Although we believe that GOT leaders understand the distinction between a formal mutual

⁴ See Document 343.

⁵ In telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, the Embassy reported: "In hour-long and animated discussion with Assistant Secretary Armitage, PM Rachid Sfar gave energetic exposé of Tunisian positions on US-Tunisian military cooperation, Tunisia's economic problems and their impact on country's security posture, position of Palestinians in Tunisia, and current Maghreb politics." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677-0376)

defense pact and contingency planning designed to facilitate subsequent—ad hoc—political decisions to employ U.S. assets, it will be necessary to reinforce that understanding as the opportunities present themselves in coming months.

9. Department please pass as appropriate.

Brown

346. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 28, 1986

SUBJECT

Weekly Activity Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

Meeting with Tunisian Ambassador: On Wednesday, Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia asked to meet with me to convey the following message from Defense Minister Baly.² Regarding U.S./Tunisian contingency planning initiated earlier this month between European Command and Tunisian military officials, the Minister expressed his deep satisfaction with our progress thus far, and with our mutual commitment to Tunisia's security that is implied through these planning talks. Secondly, he asked for our support in doing what we can to keep Tunisia's FY 1987 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from being cut. I responded that FMS are a problem for us in many countries, which is why it is important for us to find ways to make our dollars go farther, such as through planning efforts and exercises, to improve Tunisia's military capability.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0040, 1986 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, DOD 1986. Top Secret.

² In telegram 7853 from Tunis, November 25, Sebastian reported that on November 24 Mabrouk informed him: "President Bourguiba would like the President and SecDef to know of his satisfaction with tenor and progress of recently conducted joint planning talks." Bourguiba, he commented, also "remains committed to ultimate reliance on the U.S. in case Tunisia's security is threatened by Qadhafi. He wants talks to proceed and clearly hopes that, notwithstanding conditional and contingent nature of results, U.S. interest in Tunisia's security and integrity will be further strengthened." (Ibid.)

The Ambassador then stated that Minister Baly had asked him to convey President Bourguiba's full support for this initiative and his interest in continuing such cooperation. President Bourguiba wants us to know that he believes the challenge and the menace are no less than they used to be, and therefore we must remain vigilant. I assured him that we share this view of the Libyan threat completely. Finally, Ambassador Ben Yahia stated that he had been asked to convey, on behalf of both the President and Defense Minister, the fullest sense of U.S./Tunisian credibility to us at a time when they know U.S. credibility is being questioned. President Bourguiba wants us to be assured that Tunisia has the fullest confidence in, and fully supports, us. I expressed my gratitude for this warm and welcome message, noting that I would pass it to you directly.

This was a welcome meeting and message. We need the Tunisians, and I was delighted that they feel our joint work with them is helpful. (TS)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

Cap

347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, December 25, 1986, 0531Z

398326. Subject: Letter to FonMin on Security Assistance Levels for Tunisia.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Embassy is requested to deliver letter from Secretary Shultz to FonMin Hedi Mabrouk as follow-up to notification of FY 87 security assistance allocation for Tunisia (being provided septel).²

3. Begin text.

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

Ambassador Sebastian will have informed you on United States Government assistance to be made available for Tunisia in FY 87. The

¹Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Rosemary O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Ussery, Marion Creekmore (NEA), Hawes (PM), Robert Bauerlein (T), Donald Adams (AID/PPC/PB), Mueller (S/S), Peter Covington (S/S-O), Gaffney (DOD), Irwin Pernick, and Marc Grossman (D); approved by Shultz.

²Not found.

assistance to be extended to Tunisia reflects severe cutbacks mandated by Congress for both military programs and the economic support fund.

Our friends and allies should understand that a strong and vibrant US economy is essential, not just to our own security and prosperity but to economic stability and growth throughout the world. Federal expenditures have an important effect on the state of our economy, and this year the Congress took steps to impose some discipline on the levels of expenditure in the Federal budget. The result is that the total budget that the Congress approved for fiscal year 1987 is considerably less than that which the President originally requested.

I do not take issue with the principle that we must curb expenditures and adhere to budget limitations. I believe, however, that the foreign affairs portion of the budget has absorbed more than an equitable share of this year's reductions. I intend to do everything I can to restore our foreign affairs programs to equitable levels.

I recognize that the reduced economic assistance levels came at a time when your government is proceeding with implementation of its courageous and difficult economic structural adjustment plan. We need, therefore, to work particularly closely with your government to devise ways in which these resources can best be utilized to support this endeavor.

With respect to military assistance, while it has not been possible to meet our planned levels, we have been able to follow through on our commitment to President Bourguiba for greater concessionality. Military funding for fiscal year 1987 will be on a totally grant basis.

Mr. Minister, reduced levels of United States assistance do not reflect any lessening of our commitment to Tunisia's security and economic wellbeing. Our shared interest in those objectives remains the cornerstone of our close and cooperative bilateral relationship.

Sincerely yours, George Shultz

End text.

4. There will be no signed original.

Armacost

348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, January 28, 1987, 2058Z

23812. Subject: Tunisian Ambassador's Call on Vice President Bush.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Introduction and Summary: On January 23, Vice President Bush met with Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia to accept on behalf of President Reagan a personal message from President Bourguiba.² In relaying message, Ben Yahia assured Vice President concerning Tunisian contacts with Libya and expressed GOT satisfaction about U.S. Tunisian military contingency planning.³ Discussion also focussed on Chad, Libya's relations with Morocco and Algeria, Bourguiba's health, Tunisia's economy and U.S. assistance.

3. Libya. Ben Yahia opened conversation by referring to Qadhafi's isolation in North Africa. Rapprochement with Algeria had not gone well, and Libya had suffered serious defeats in Chad. Ben Yahia said he had been instructed by Bourguiba to advise President Reagan that GOT is not about to "save" Qadhafi from his isolation by normalizing ties with Libya. There will be no normalization without Libyan compensation for expelled Tunisian workers and for \$200 million in seized assets. Ben Yahia expressed GOT's conviction that Qadhafi will be unable to meet Tunisian demands.

4. To Vice President's query about Morocco's relations with Libya, Ben Yahia responded that Hassan had told GOT FonMin Mabrouk that GOM's break with Libya was final. Meetings between Algeria and Libya had been a signal to Morocco. Qadhafi's flirtation with Morocco is over. With regard to Algerian-Libyan ties, Ben Yahia noted that while GOA recognizes that Libyan situation is a "mess," Bendjedid is reluctant to condemn Qadhafi in part because of situation in Western Sahara. Libya and GOA share positions in OPEC; that is their only common interest.

5. Chad. Ben Yahia expressed GOT satisfaction at losses Qadhafi has suffered in Chad and for U.S. and French support for Chad. He said Bourguiba had discussed Chadian situation with Mitterrand and Chirac during his recent visit to Paris. Tunisians are gratified to see change in Mitterrand's attitude toward Chad. With French logistical

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by O'Neill; cleared by Gregg, Pearson, Quinn, and Laurie Tracy (S/S-O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Algiers, Rabat, Ndjamen, Cairo, Paris, and Brussels.

² Bourguiba's message was not found.

³ See Document 345.

support, Habre dealt a severe blow to Qadhafi. GOT is concerned as to how Qadhafi might respond to this defeat. At present, only pressure being placed on him is from Chad.

6. Contingency Planning. Bourguiba also instructed Ben Yahia to relay to President Reagan his gratification over good work accomplished by US and Tunisian military on joint contingency planning. Meeting at Stuttgart in November resulted in a new phase in USG-GOT cooperation that will assure Tunisia's security in event of Libyan aggression. He expressed hope that next meeting in March in Tunis will be equally successful.

7. Vice President expressed appreciation on behalf of President Reagan for messages on Libya and USG-GOT military cooperation and inquired about President Bourguiba's health. Speaking to Bourguiba's continuing attention to detail in governing Tunisia, Ben Yahia referred to President's vision in initiating structural adjustment program to turn around Tunisia's economic crisis. He said that with US help 1987 will be a better year than 1986 for Tunisia.

8. U.S. Assistance. Referring to the U.S. budget squeeze, Vice President said that Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger had complained bitterly about cuts which their departments had to absorb. Despite foreign aid reductions, USG remains determined to try to assist Tunisia. Noting that U.S.-Tunisian relations are built on mutual respect for shared values, Vice President asked Ben Yahia to convey to President Bourguiba President Reagan's assurance of a U.S. commitment to Tunisia's prosperity.

Shultz

**349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Tunisia¹**

Washington, January 29, 1987, 2304Z

25273. Subject: Foreign Minister's Correspondence With Secretary Shultz. Ref: 85 State 398326.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870072–0385. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Rosemary O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared for information by Ian Peters (AID/MENA), Denis Kiely (PM), Robert Bauerlein (T), and Gene Griffiths (NEA/ECON), cleared by Quinn, Zweifel, and Robert Downey (S/S-O); approved by Ussery.

² Reference is in error. The reference should read "86 State 398326." See Document 347.

1. In January 27 meeting with Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia transmitted response to Secretary Shultz' December letter to Tunisian Foreign Minister Mabrouk. Following is text of letter:

2. Begin text.

Mr. Secretary:

I have received your message regarding the assistance that the United States Government is prepared to furnish Tunisia during fiscal 1987.

I thank you for your consideration, indicative of the excellence of our political relations, and while I do not consider myself qualified to evaluate in any way the choice of the American Government, I find it comforting "that the reduction imposed by Congress on the budget submitted by President Reagan should be equitably distributed among the various chapters of the federal budget."

For it would be, in my view, in the interests of the United States to restore the cooperative programs administered by the Department of State to a level that will confirm the reputed economic solidity of the United States and its leading role in the international arena. We will, therefore, work in close cooperation to make the most judicious determination of how amounts already approved will be used and, at a time when the government of President Bourguiba is courageously striving to implement its plan of economic structural adjustment, I believe it necessary to work together so that the assistance of the United States Government for the current fiscal year will contribute substantially to the success of that plan.

Tunisia is the first country in the world to conclude with the United States a new PL 480 agreement (Title I-Section 108 and 106³ for the promotion of the Tunisian private sector). In addition, it has always committed U.S. financial assistance well before the September 30 deadline. Thus, I feel that additional assistance under the Economic Support and Food Aid Fund (PL 480, Section 416) would express, in practice, the political willingness of the high American authorities to support my country's efforts to restructure and develop its economy.

And, while I thank you on behalf of President Bourguiba for the quality of the military assistance and your gesture in illustration thereof for fiscal 1987, I must draw your attention to the fact that the military debt is exerting ever-increasing pressure on our balance of payments

³ Title I-Section 106 permits the proceeds to be used for economic development. Section 108 allows repayment in local currencies. The United States could then put the proceeds in accounts in international financial institutions, which would then re-lend the money to the private sector in the recipient nation.

and that it would be highly desirable to envision relief for those contracts already concluded under our military cooperation program.

Such cooperation, which assures Tunisia of America's firm commitment to its security, in accordance with the wishes of President Bourguiba, could be improved in terms of both volume and quality by the granting of fully concessional FMS credits.

I look forward to meeting with you whenever you are available, and assure you, Mr. Secretary, of my highest consideration.

Hedi Mabrouk.

End text.

Shultz

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, March 12, 1987, 0219Z

72156. Subject: GOT Claim for Ex Gratia Compensation From Israelis. Ref: (A) Tunis 2394;² (B) 86 Tunis 5052.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Department agrees with Embassy speculation (para 4 reftel) that renewed GOT pressure for ex-gratia payment from Israelis well might

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Paul Wilcox (NEA), Andrew Steinfeld (P), John Arbogast (L/NEA), James Bindenagel (S/S-O), and Pascoe (S/S); approved by Murphy. Sent for information to Tel Aviv.

² In telegram 2394 from Tunis, March 9, the Embassy reported: "GOT Deputy Foreign Minister Taieb Sahbani convoked Chargé morning March 6 to raise question of compensation to Tunisia as a result of October 1, 1985, Israeli attack on PLO Headquarters at Hammam Chatt." The Embassy continued: "Security Council Resolution called for compensation and that Tunisia had the consequent right to go back to the Security Council." The Embassy also reported that "Sahbani reviewed background on question" and noted that "Sahbani's main point was that Tunisian losses incurred at Hammam Chatt continue to be a domestic political issue for the GOT with ramifications for US-Tunisian relations." (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 5052 from Tunis, May 22, 1986, Sebastian reported that he had told Essebsi "in our good offices capacity, we have made some progress on the question of possible ex gratia payment in compensation for Tunisian losses flowing from Israeli Oct. 1 raid. PM Peres has told us that he is prepared without commitment at this stage to study detailed listing of Tunisian casualties and/or property damage stemming from the raid." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams. N860005-0542)

stem from publicity surrounding Pollard affair.⁴ It is therefore especially imperative that we not imply to Tunisians that USG was responsible either for the raid or obligated in some manner to compensate for damages. Accordingly, any suggestion that aid funds be labeled as compensation for the Israeli bombing is totally unacceptable. We also want to avoid implying to GOT that we see much chance that Israelis will respond positively to a Tunisian request. Indeed, we believe the chances of this are virtually nil. We are willing, nonetheless, to go back to the GOI on this if GOT wishes us to do so.

3. Accordingly, Embassy Tunis should go back to Sahbani with following points:

— As GOT knows, 10/1/85 attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis was an Israeli action without any USG involvement. Likewise, any decision on ex-gratia payments must be one for the Israelis alone to make.

— It is entirely inappropriate to suggest that USG funded programs, whether aid or otherwise, be labeled as compensation for the Israeli attack. To accept such a proposal would incorrectly imply that USG was responsible for damage which resulted from Israeli raid.

— Such a proposal thus would run counter to the understanding, voiced by President Bourguiba and other top ranking GOT officials, that matter of Israeli attack is not a U.S.-Tunisian bilateral issue.

— If the GOT wishes to continue to pursue the question of possible compensation from Israel, we believe the best course would be to put together the specific data earlier requested by the Israeli Government (FYI reftel B). Again, although the USG cannot predict what ultimate Israeli decision might be, we remain willing to relay Tunisian data relevant to GOI consideration of this matter.

Shultz

⁴ Reference is to Jonathan Pollard, a former intelligence analyst who pled guilty in 1986 to spying for Israel. On March 4 he was sentenced to life in prison. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, April 27, 1987, 2211Z

126190. Subject: Assessment of Washington Visit by Tunisian FonMin Hedi Mabrouk. Ref: 1) State 122253,² 2) State 120965.³

1. Secret (entire text).

2. Summary: FonMin Mabrouk did not pursue a particular agenda during his 4/20–24 visit to Washington. Rather, his approach was to respond to issues which were put to him by various interlocutors. This he did with Cartesian elegance. Our purposes were to reenforce friendship for Tunisia, assure Mabrouk of continuing USG support within budgetary constraints, caution against too-fast rapprochement with Libya, sensitize GOT to our growing concerns about human rights situation in Tunisia (without taking position on specific cases), and exchange views on a range of topics of regional concern. Overall, visit should have been gratifying from Mabrouk's point of view. We achieved most of our objectives, although our position on human rights issues may be attenuated—if not misinterpreted—for GOT and Tunisian public consumption. End summary.

3. In developing program for Mabrouk, we responded to GOT requests for very high level meetings. This was designed to honor Mabrouk (partly with an eye to his post-Bourguiba leadership potential). At Tunisian request, we arranged for extensive photo coverage of meetings; on other hand, they deliberately turned aside opportunities to interact with American media.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870072–0385. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussey, Steinfeld (P), Pelletreau, Peter Covington (S/S–O). Deborah Graze, and Quinn, cleared for information by Robert Rackmales (HA); approved by Murphy. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Rabat, Paris. Sent for information to the Secretary of Defense.

² Telegram 122253 to Tunis, April 24, contains a record of the Shultz-Mabrouk meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870314–0020)

³ In telegram 120965 to Tunis, April 22, the Department noted that in his meeting with Murphy, "Mabrouk voiced strong Tunisian support for international conference on Middle East peace; Murphy explained USG's skeptical willingness to contemplate such a conference if it leads to direct negotiations. There was consonance of views on Iran-Iraq war; Mabrouk will lead Arab League démarche in Beijing on subject, pressing for ceasefire and return to ante-bellum boundaries. On North African topics, Mabrouk reiterated GOT's willingness to come to terms with Libyans under certain circumstances. He foresaw little movement on Western Sahara dispute. On resource issues, he made low key, general appeal for more support and asked whether it might be possible to review issue of FMS debt relief (Murphy did not respond). Finally, Mabrouk stated his interest in reviving Joint Economic Commission (for which there is little USG enthusiasm)." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870310–0367)

4. Having spent a rest day consulting with his astute Ambassador, Habib Ben Yahia, Mabrouk was well-primed to handle USG questions about current, troubling events in Tunisia, especially those surrounding arrest of Muslim fundamentalists.⁴ Tunisian Embassy was at pains to shield FonMin from sharp exchanges or criticism. For example, it was only after Department's repeated urging that Mabrouk finally arranged a meeting with Congressman Wolpe. Tunisians candidly admitted that they thought Wolpe would be sharply critical of human rights situation, and Mabrouk allegedly was prepared to be stiff in reply. In the event, meeting was a productive and friendly one. Mabrouk had two, controlled public appearances (with Heritage Foundation and with Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies). Incident at latter forum underscored Tunisian sensitivities. One CSIS invitee (Dr. Abdulgader Ali Muttardy) posed a rather hostile question after having introduced himself as a Libyan. Tunisian Embassy subsequently (and clearly on instruction of FonMin) raised this with Department in terms of security concern—that Muttardy or anyone else could have "brought in a bomb . . ."

5. Despite Mabrouk's apparent lack of specific agenda, he had a clear objective: to reenforce for GOT and Tunisian public the close identification between USG and Bourguiba government. This was achieved with our active involvement. On touchiest issue, that of deteriorating human rights situation in Tunisia, Secretary Shultz sought to sensitize Mabrouk to USG's concern by pointing to GOT's historic adherence to an open political system, rule of law, and respect for rights of the individual. Tunisian media, presumably guided by GOT, trumpeted this as firm endorsement for GOT as a laudable, democratic government.

6. Mabrouk also had one specific, close-hold message: to reassure us that GOT leadership is working closely to assure smooth transition to post-Bourguiba government (details by septel, notal).⁵

⁴ In telegram 3866 from Tunis, April 8, the Embassy reported that "Tunisian Government (GOT) actions to crack down on Islamic opposition, following earlier squeezes against union leadership and opposition parties, have increased concerns among non-Destourian Tunisians that no dissident political activity will be tolerated by GOT in current circumstances." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870272-0164) The Neo Destour was the political party headed by Bourguiba.

⁵ In telegram 122280 to Tunis, April 23, the Department reported: "In a one-on-one session aside, Foreign Minister Mabrouk told Secretary Shultz that a decision has been made on how to handle the transition following Bourguiba's death. The plan calls for the Prime Minister to be named President (in conformity with constitutional provisions), but for an interim period only. This caretaker government will immediately call for elections in eight months time." Furthermore, "the caretaker government meanwhile would undertake no treaties or other permanent forms of legislation. Mabrouk did not indicate who, including Bourguiba, has agreed to this plan, and he did not identify major parties." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987)

7. Mabrouk did not press hard on resource issues, although he noted untimeliness of a reduction in assistance coincident to implementation of GOT's structural adjustment program (which USG strongly supports) and continuing heavy FMS debt burden. Among few issues he raised was proposal for revitalization of Joint Economic Commission. Department, AID, Treasury and Commerce all were relatively noncommittal in response, noting that other venues for discussion of specific issues might be more productive. However, we are prepared to examine issue if GOT continues to press for another JEC meeting.

8. In sum, we believe that Mabrouk left with a sense of accomplishment. He should feel reassured of close relations which USG intends to pursue with GOT, but not overly optimistic about increased levels of assistance. Despite manner in which GOT appears to portray visit for its domestic purposes, we believe that Mabrouk clearly understood our reservations about Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement and our concern about the current course of events as the GOT pursues its internal security concerns.

Shultz

352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, September 3, 1987, 2113Z

276215. For Pelletreau. Subject: U.S. Posture re Fundamentalist Trials. Ref: A. Tunis 9726 (Notal);² B. Tunis 9605 (Notal).³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870767–0634, D870726–0519. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Casey; cleared by Ussery, Eastham (P), Joyce Barr (HA/HR) and Mueller, and in substance by John Craig (NEA/ARP); approved by Djerejian. Sent for information Priority to London, Paris, and Riyadh.

² In telegram 9726 from Tunis, September 1, the Embassy reported that Pelletreau had met with Mestiri, the Secretary General of the opposition Social Democratic Movement (MDS), on August 31. Mestiri wished "to solicit US intervention to help save MTI leader Rachid Ghannouchi from execution. Mestiri's presentation was based on his certainty that Ghannouchi will be found guilty of a capital offense even though the government's case against him rests on the shakiest of evidence—i.e. general statements of support for the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and political activities since his release from prison in 1984." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870763–0078, D870716–0557)

³ In telegram 9605 from Tunis, August 28, the Embassy reported that an MTI representative, "making what he called an official statement, told PolOff August 27 'the MTI is

(Footnote continues on next page)

1. S—Entire text.

2. Following are our reactions to issues raised refuels concerning trial and possible execution of Tunisian Islamist Rachid Ghannouchi. They are provided as possible background for your anticipated meetings with former PM Bahi Ladgham and others. We welcome your comments.

3. Re appeal to you by opposition leader Ahmed Mestiri for U.S. intervention to save Ghannouchi from execution, we are concerned that U.S. intervention could be construed by the GOT as explicit U.S. support of or sympathy for the Tunisian fundamentalist movement. We anticipate GOT would be particularly sensitive on this question since the U.S. (to our knowledge) has not so intervened in the past. Moreover, GOT's decision to bring Ghannouchi to trial along with those accused of involvement in the August 2 hotel bombings complicates efforts to maintain distinction U.S. has scrupulously drawn between lawbreakers and peaceful oppositionists. Additionally, as you have rightly pointed out, it is important to avoid appearances of having arrived prematurely at conclusions about Ghannouchi's culpability or about the validity of the Tunisian judicial process.

4. Rather than focusing U.S. concerns on the outcome of the trials (which may be problematic) or on the fate of a particular individual, we believe it would be more productive to emphasize our often-expressed interest in a stable future for Tunisia, focusing on what we perceive as the need for mechanisms of political participation and expression as an integral part of maintaining stability. We believe it might be time to encourage GOT in a quiet and low-key fashion to start thinking in terms of a more active political program to parallel its no-nonsense approach to violence and to lawbreakers. For example, it appears to us that the GOT, in making a determined effort to control Islamic activism and to stamp out associated violence, is overlooking the question of whether fundamentalism may not reflect a broader political malaise that stems from a lack of safety net features, such as opposition press, independent trade unions, etc. To our thinking, a pure law and order approach is unlikely to make Tunisia's Islamic problem disappear, and may well exacerbate GOT's woes, especially if the fundamentalists decide to up the ante (ref B). A dual-track strategy might help alleviate mounting political pressures.

not like Hizbollah in Lebanon, not like Iran . . . all of our actions up to this point have been non-violent, but a (State Security Court) death sentence against (MTI President Rachid) Ghannouchi would be the point of no return." The representative also said "the MTI was engaged in a re-evaluation of its goals and tactics, and that a death sentence would convince MTI moderates that violence was the only way to express their views." He also denied involvement in the August 2 hotel bombings. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870758-0659, D870706-0050)

5. UK Embassy here raised Mestiri approach to British Ambassador in Tunis regarding Ghannouchi's fate. We told UK Embassy U.S. was currently in a wait and see posture pending outcome of the trial, and that any action we might rpt might undertake would likely focus on broader concerns such as U.S. support for human rights, political tolerance, and U.S. concern for Tunisia's political future. UK Embassy indicated that UK was disinclined at this point to take up Ghannouchi's case on its own, but could envision joining an EC démarche based for example on concern for human rights and on the need for political good sense.

6. We would be interested in learning whether or not Saudi Arabia might be contemplating action regarding Ghannouchi, given past Saudi discussions with GOT on Tunisian Islamism and given presence of exiled Tunisian Islamist Abd al-Fatah Mourou in Saudi Arabia. As a possible alternative to a U.S. démarche on Ghannouchi's behalf, we might wish to consider the utility of approaching interested Arab countries such as Morocco and Algeria to inquire of their intentions. We also wonder whether President Bourguiba, who we believe values his country's reputation in the Socialist International, might be open to thoughts from that quarter.⁴

7. Reftels repeated to info address.

Whitehead

⁴ In telegram 10821 from Tunis, September 28, the Embassy reported: "The State Security Court sentenced 7 Islamic fundamentalist defendants to death, two in custody who had admitted to committing violent acts, and 5 in absentia. MTI leader Ghannouchi received a life sentence, and others received from 2 to 20 years in prison. There were 14 acquittals." The Embassy also reported: "Most observers expected much harsher sentences for Ghannouchi and other MTI leaders, and initial reaction in Tunis seems to be general relief. The sentences, unlike the charges, differentiated between individual responsibility for violent acts and political opposition are likely to be seen by most Tunisians as just." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870798–0027)

353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, October 16, 1987, 0717Z

322446. Subject: Ben Ali Nomination: Implications for the U.S. Refs: A. Tunis 11489² B. Tunis 11526.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Department appreciated receiving thoughtful analysis (ref A) of implications of Zine Ben Ali's appointment as Prime Minister of Tunisia. Over the coming months, we will want to monitor developments closely as Tunisia adjusts to Ben Ali's stewardship. The following points come to mind as issues we both will need to address in our continuing analysis of the situation.

Tunisia's Islamic challenge reflects not only discontent with the dominant but out-of-touch Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), but also dissatisfaction at the lack of credible alternative political institutions to the PSD. As non-PSD institutions like the trade union movement and the opposition lost ground over the past several years, Tunisia's Islamic challenge has grown. How will Ben Ali address this basic problem?

— Ref A describes circumstances of PM Sfar's abrupt dismissal; questions of competence appeared to have little to do with it. What assurance do we have that Ben Ali is not equally vulnerable to such

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870850-0781. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Casey and Rosemary O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Eastham, Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA), Klosson (S/S), and Huggins (S/S-O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Rome.

² In telegram 11489 from Tunis, October 9, the Embassy reported that "Bourguiba's abrupt dismissal of Sfar and elevation of Interior Minister Ben Ali again demonstrates President Bourguiba's personal control of power in Tunisia. Ben Ali's appointment puts a strong man in the Prime Ministry and a heartbeat away from the Presidency." The Embassy also stated "U.S. interests are well served by Ben Ali's appointment since it will enhance stability in the near and longer term. While he is not 'America's Man,' he carries no ideological baggage which would impede close working relations. U.S. interests are also served by Ben Ali's tentative opening to critics which should be encouraged." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870758-0659, D870833-0457)

³ In telegram 11526 from Tunis, October 9, Pelletreau reported that in his initial call on Ben Ali, Ali "sketched broad lines of Tunisian policy which parallel closely our thinking on the major Tunisian and regional issues treated." After working to improve the economy, Ali said he wished to improve "public order," which "will allow him to work for an internal political dialogue to which he claimed he and President Bourguiba are committed. On relations with Libya, he said GOT would go cautiously, stopping short of full normalization, while at same time strengthening security cooperation with U.S. Tunisia will also improve its relations with Egypt." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870834-0057)

treatment? Why should his hold on the Prime Ministry be any more secure than that of his predecessor or of his predecessor's predecessor?

— Ben Ali now holds both the interior and Prime Ministry portfolios. His ability to keep order is likely to affect his success rate as Prime Minister significantly. Doesn't this, in fact, impose a double burden on him? What are his prospects if the security situation should worsen rather than improve?

— Ben Ali was the man Tunisia looked to in 1978 and again in 1984 for order in times of violence and civil strife. During the intervening period of calm, he was removed from the political scene and dispatched as Tunisia's Ambassador to Poland. Is there a possibility this pattern could repeat itself?

— Ben Ali has solid experience in the security field but little where such matters as economics, foreign policy, and socio-political reform are concerned. How effectively will he handle these aspects of his portfolio?

Ben Ali's previous responsibilities afforded him little opportunity for building the political support critical to his success as Prime Minister. The position he took on the Islamic trials and his subsequent meetings with human rights activists offer a good beginning in the right direction. He must still, however, deal with the legacy left by his 1978 encounter with the trade union movement. How will he overcome this and other similar problems? To what extent can he count on support from within the PSD, especially with hardliner Mahjoub Ben Ali at the helm of the PSD? Will erstwhile competitors of broader political experience (e.g. Education Minister Sayah) rally around him or seek to sabotage his efforts?

— Ben Ali is the first military officer to be named PM and thus nominal successor to Bourguiba. Does this have fundamental implications for the nature of the Tunisian regime? Has a red line been crossed? Has Ben Ali's appointment had an effect on possibilities for the rise of the military to power in Tunisia? If one military officer can be named Prime Minister, why not another, such as the ambitious Saida Sassi protégé, Air Force Chief Naaman?

Finally, what impact will Ben Ali's appointment have on Tunisian rapprochement with Libya, given his undoubted interest in the impact such a move would have on internal security, and in particular the prospects it offers for Libyan exploitation of Tunisia's present difficulties with Islamic activists.

Whitehead

354. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

Takeover of Power in Tunisia

What Happened

Zine Ben Ali, who was named Prime Minister only last month,² relieved President Bourguiba from power at dawn November 7 by having him declared medically incapacitated.³ The immediate catalyst for the bloodless action was apparently President Bourguiba's insistence on retrying Islamic leader Ghannouchi in order to have him sentenced to death—a development likely to have precipitated severe civil unrest.⁴ Ben Ali immediately named leading PSD moderate Hedi Baccouche to succeed him as Prime Minister, and replaced his opponents in government with people he can trust. A military officer and former director for national security, Ben Ali presently appears to have the full backing of the Tunisian armed forces. Many elements across Tunisia's political spectrum have welcomed the move.

What It Means

Ben Ali is well thought of, but lacks experience in critical areas. He will need to rely heavily on his advisors, and has already moved to install or retain competent professionals such as the new Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri. Ben Ali's key problem is that he has no political base of his own. For the moment this is not critical, as the country, anxious about its future, closes ranks behind him. Because of his military background, Ben Ali can probably count on the continued support of the Tunisian military, but he may have to fight rearguard action by PSD hardliners like Mohamed Sayah (now under house arrest), who can be expected to attack the constitutionality of his action, to exploit Bourguiba's continued in-country presence, and to utilize key parts of the party apparatus they still control. Over the long term, Ben Ali will

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (10/30/1987)–11/29/1987). Secret. Drafted on November 7 by Casey; cleared by Ussery, Eastham, and Murphy. A stamped notation reads: "87 NOV 9P 3:05."

² See footnote 2, Document 353.

³ In telegram 12553 from Tunis, November 7, the Embassy transmitted an informal translation of Ben Ali's communiqué "announcing the removal of President Habib Bourguiba and the formation of a new government." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0219)

⁴ See Document 352.

have to establish his own political legitimacy, presumably by calling for new elections.

Implications for the US

Ben Ali is pro-U.S., and can be expected to seek our assistance as he confronts the challenges that will face him in the days to come. We will want to continue our traditional close support for Tunisia, without appearing to intervene in what is going on or to lend our support to the individual personalities involved. We will want to be alert to possible Libyan efforts to exploit the situation, although Ben Ali's tough anti-Libyan views should help put Qadhafi on notice. Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis has met with new Foreign Minister Mestiri,⁵ a long time friend of the United States, who conveyed Tunisia's desire to maintain its close cooperation with us, and said Tunisia would seek U.S. help if Libya became a problem. We will also want to stay in close touch with the French government as developments unfold. We have issued a statement reaffirming US friendship for Tunisia, our support for its territorial integrity and security, and urging continued calm and moderation. The Embassy convened its emergency action committee to keep the public security situation under close review. We are also sending the customary messages from you and others.

Internal Implications

The loss of Bourguiba will be a shock to the Tunisian political system, but we can expect a period of consolidation as the country pulls together to manage its affairs without his leadership for the first time since 1956. Anxious to preserve its reputation as a moderate and reliable country, Tunisia is striving to create the appearance of business as usual. The composition of the new cabinet is designed to foster confidence at home and abroad. While the presidential palace and the homes of Ben Ali opponents are surrounded, the GOT has refrained from putting the army onto the streets. Any uncertainty among the Tunisian public appears to be outweighed by relief that a prolonged period of political sclerosis is finally over. Ben Ali publicly promised new legislation on political parties and the press, as well as increased citizen participation in government. This, along with the November 7 meeting GOT held with key members of the opposition, should help alleviate the immediate concerns of Tunisians about the political future of their country.

⁵ A record of Pelletreau's November 7 conversation with Mestiri is in telegram 12554 from Tunis, November 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0223)

**355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Tunisia¹**

Washington, November 9, 1987, 0630Z

349229. Subject: Presidential Message to Ben Ali.

1. Please transmit following message from President Reagan to President Ben Ali at earliest possible time:

Begin text:

Mr. President:

At this time, I want you to know of my personal commitment to continued close relations between our two countries. Just as the United States supported Tunisia at independence and throughout its continuing struggle to achieve social and economic progress for its people, so will the U.S. support Tunisia in the challenges it now confronts. We remain committed to Tunisia's independence and territorial integrity and to its continued economic, social and political development.

The future holds promising opportunities. The strengthening of Tunisia's economy and its traditions of political pluralism can open new horizons of progress. As you begin this important task, Mr. President, please accept my best wishes. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

2. There will be no signed original. White House does not intend to publish text, but has no objection should GOT chose to do so.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870921-0701. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted by O'Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Casey, Ussery, Eastham, Pascoe (S/S), Courtney (NSC), and Adamson (S/S-O); approved by Djejerian.

356. Letter From Tunisian President Ben Ali to President Reagan¹

Tunis, November 12, 1987

Mr. President:

It was with deep satisfaction and great pleasure that I received the cordial message Your Excellency sent to me upon my accession to the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia.²

Allow me to offer my warm thanks and to tell you how pleased I am to see a great and friendly country welcome a calm transition in a country that is fiercely devoted to the rule of law and mindful of preserving, with order and discipline, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia. Our commitment to insure continuity with stability, to which you have lent support and encouragement, has no other purpose than to assure harmonious development for our democratic institutions and to reaffirm the achievements of the nation and the right of the Tunisian people to dignity, well-being, and progress.

Under such circumstances, it was natural for us to anticipate the support of friendly countries like the United States which have spared no effort to support us, as much in our struggle to recover our independence as in the building of a modern society. We are delighted, yet not surprised, by the generous feelings expressed in your warm message and your provisions to continue and strengthen the close and friendly relations between our two countries.

We also share the optimism about the future which you have so cordially noted. We hope this future is bright and full of promise for the development of the bonds of friendship between our two countries.

Accept, Mr. President, my sincere wishes for your personal good health and happiness and for the well-being and prosperity of our friends, the American people.

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali³
President of the Republic of Tunisia

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia 1986–1987. No classification marking. Sent to Stevens under a November 27 covering memorandum from McElhany. (Ibid.) Printed from a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State.

² See Document 355.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

357. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben Ali¹

Washington, February 25, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased that my good friend Dick Walters can personally convey my best regards to you and your government. The United States applauds the courageous political steps your government has taken during the past four months. The proposals set forth in your November statement can help foster the kind of political stability important to a secure defense against foreign intervention.

The United States has also been reassured by Tunisia's reaffirmation of its desire for continued close ties with the West, and looks forward to our on-going cooperation. As we communicated to your government in close consultations in recent months, Libyan aggression remains an important concern for my Administration.² In this connection let me assure you Tunisia can continue to rely on U.S. support for its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The United States encourages your government to exercise continued vigilance in its bilateral relations with Libya, and strongly discourages efforts to integrate Libya into any regional political and diplomatic arrangements.

I would also like to congratulate you on your courageous structural adjustment program. The Tunisian people have been asked to make many sacrifices to restore their country's economy. Despite our own severe budgetary restraints, the United States will continue to support programs designed to strengthen the Tunisian economy.

Dick Walters' visit to Tunisia comes at a time of serious turmoil in the Middle East. Events on the West Bank and in Gaza have demonstrated that the status quo cannot endure. The U.S. has therefore engaged in a series of active diplomatic consultations as a means of reinvigorating the process necessary for progress toward peace.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia (02/01/1988–07/31/1988). No classification marking. Negroponte forwarded to Reagan the letter and a letter to Bendjedid under a February 23 memorandum, which read in part: "The letter to Ben Ali, your first substantive letter to the new Tunisian leader since he came to power last November, is a particularly important means of reiterating U.S. support for Tunisia and the sound domestic and foreign policies that Ben Ali is pursuing." (Ibid.) Negroponte recommended Reagan sign copies of the letters to both Ali and Bendjedid.

² In telegram 25712 from Tunis, January 28, the Embassy reported that on January 22, Armacost told Ben Yahia: "The US strongly discouraged Tunisia's cooperation with Algeria to bring Qadhafi into the Tripartite Agreement. The US had worked to isolate Qadhafi with some success. There was no evidence that his ambitions had changed" and the U.S. worried that "the overall effects of Tunisian policy was to loosen the effort to isolate Qadhafi." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880073–0364)

The U.S. looks forward to discussing these and other key issues during Foreign Minister Mestiri's visit to the United States later this month and during Secretary Carlucci's anticipated visit to Tunis. In the meantime, Mr. President, please accept my warm good wishes for your continued endeavors as you and your government build for Tunisia's future.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

358. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Algiers, March 8, 1988, 0928Z

1324. Subject: Ambassador Walters' Meeting With President Ben Ali on March 5.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: In his March 5 meeting with President Ben Ali, Ambassador Walters reviewed the current U.S. initiative in the Middle East² and elucidated U.S. policies on the Maghreb and in the UN. Ben Ali expressed pessimism about resolution of the Western Sahara conflict; affirmed that he had taken a tough stance toward Qadhafi; and noted that former President Bourguiba was being well cared for. End summary.

3. March 5 President Ben Ali received Ambassador Walters, accompanied by Ambassador Pelletreau, for a one-hour exchange of views on regional and UN Security Council issues. Ambassador Walters also presented a Presidential letter to Ben Ali.³ Tunisia Desk Officer-designate Kunstadter attended as notetaker.

4. Western Sahara: Ambassador Walters reiterated U.S. support for the SYG/OAU initiative.⁴ Ben Ali said Tunisia was trying to get both

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880199–0519. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State, Cairo, Ndjamena, Rabat, and USUN.

² Reference is to the Shultz's proposal for a three-year transitional phase of limited self-rule for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Documentation on the proposal is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

³ See Document 357.

⁴ See Document 455.

sides to make goodwill gestures, but there was a stalemate. He believed Morocco and Algeria would have to normalize relations before it would be possible to resolve the issue.

5. Libya: Ben Ali stated that in a recent lengthy meeting with Qadhafi he had bluntly told the Libyan leader to shape up. However, he was under no illusions that Qadhafi would soon become more reasonable. Because of Qadhafi's instability, Ben Ali doubted whether Libya would push for entry into the Tripartite Pact. Ben Ali acknowledged Ambassador Walters' point that a regional treaty excluding Morocco would not make sense.

6. Chad: Ben Ali said he had reproached Qadhafi for using mercenaries. Qadhafi was now trying to get rid of them since they were evidently causing problems for him with his own troops. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee was ineffective and the matter of the Aouzou Strip would have to be referred to the ICJ. However, it was not certain the ICJ would decide in Chad's favor, since the French had apparently told Qadhafi that the Aouzou belonged to Libya. Ambassador Walters responded by pointing out that France had never ratified the Franco-Italian colonial agreement transferring the Aouzou to Italian Libya.

7. Middle East: Ben Ali was supportive of U.S. determination to continue its current initiative, but was skeptical that Israel would move forward to a definitive peaceful settlement.

8. Iran/Iraq: Ben Ali did not seem entirely convinced that either the French or Soviets had supplied the guidance system for the missiles Iraq was currently using. He queried Ambassador Walters about Khomeini's health and wondered whether someone other than Khomeini was now making the key decisions about waging the war. He expressed interest at Ambassador Walters' offer to send information on the current military situation for a briefing by Ambassador Pelletreau.

9. Tunisia: Anticipating a question about Bourguiba, Ben Ali said the former President was very comfortably installed and well cared for. Owing to unemployment, drought and the resulting poor harvest in 1987, it would not be easy to carry out the November 7 program. Nevertheless, the GOT was determined to move ahead.

10. This cable was cleared by Ambassador Walters.

Johnstone

359. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NESA M 88–20032

Washington, March 18, 1988

TUNISIA: HIGH MARKS FOR BEN ALI'S PERFORMANCE
[portion marking not declassified]

Summary

The government of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali is stable after four months in power, and the prospects are good that Ben Ali will consolidate his position. The public disorder and disruptive political maneuvering that marked the last days of the Bourguiba era have dissipated. Ben Ali is pursuing the market-oriented structural adjustment program adopted by the previous government and is gradually introducing reforms that will allow greater political freedom. Tunis also wants close ties with Washington as a complement to its efforts to deflect pressure from Algeria and Libya. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Ben Ali has performed well in his political honeymoon period; his willingness to open up the political process and ability to invigorate the economy will now come under close scrutiny. He has yet to decide on the status of the Islamic fundamentalists or the proper role of organized labor—potentially the most powerful political groups in the country. There also are signs of intra-regime friction about how to create jobs and sustain economic growth. These problems will persist for years to come. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: Meetings 3/18/88. Secret; *[handling restrictions not declassified]*. Prepared in the Office of Near East/South Asia Analysis.

360. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 30, 1988

SUBJECT

General Powell's Meeting with Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri, March 29, 1988, 4:10–4:30 p.m., The White House

After welcoming Foreign Minister Mestiri to Washington, General Powell noted that he and other senior Administration officials followed events in Tunisia closely. Powell recalled the meeting that he had had with Ambassador Ben Yahia on November 7, 1987,² shortly after President Ben Ali's accession, as one of the most memorable moments in his tenure at the White House. Ben Yahia had handled his difficult task very skillfully, and Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali both deserved great credit for the dignity with which the change of power was conducted. Powell congratulated Mestiri on the success that the new regime has enjoyed since November. He emphasized continued U.S. support for Tunisia, and for the efforts of President Ben Ali at political liberalization and economic reform.

Mestiri thanked Powell for his remarks, and said the GOT was determined to continue along the progressive path that Ben Ali had charted. The Foreign Minister added that he had had a very good meeting with Secretary Shultz, reviewing the full range of bilateral and regional issues.³ He had handed the Secretary a letter from President Ben Ali to President Reagan,⁴ responding to the message which Dick Walters had delivered in early March.⁵ Mestiri said he had also met with Secretary Carlucci, an old friend with whom he had shared service in the Congo.⁶ He and Carlucci had discussed Tunisia's FMS debt problem at some length; Carlucci had promised to get in touch with Secretary of the Treasury Baker to see what more might be done to help Tunisia and other FMS debtors.

Powell responded that the Administration as a whole had been concerned about the FMS debt problem for some time. Making good on his promise to Mestiri, Carlucci had raised the issue with Secretary Baker on the margins of a meeting at the White House earlier on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 02/01/88–07/31/88. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Burns.

² No record of the meeting has been found.

³ A record of the Shultz-Mestiri meeting is in telegram 99606 to Tunis, March 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880274–0185)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See Document 357.

⁶ No record of the meeting has been found.

March 29. Powell said he would urge Baker and other senior officials to do everything we could to ease the military debt burden on friendly countries like Tunisia, but acknowledged that Baker had a number of serious obstacles to contend with. Chief among them was the worrisome precedential effect of FMS debt relief for the Treasury's huge domestic loan portfolio.

Powell then inquired about the GOT's efforts to establish a National Security Council, similar to the U.S. model. Mestiri said Tunisia's NSC experiment seemed to be working well, although it was still in the development stage. In addition to the President and the Prime Minister, the Tunisian NSC included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior. The group was served by a very small secretariat, whose purpose was to coordinate decisionmaking.

Powell observed that he had two main responsibilities as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The first was to make the interagency process work. This meant ensuring that the President received an honest, objective presentation of options and issues for decision. The second was to advise the President, based on the balanced decision package that had been assembled. He often had to walk a delicate line between his coordinating and advisory functions.

Turning to regional issues, Powell asked Mestiri about the state of Tunisian-Libyan relations. Mestiri said the GOT sought more normal relations with Qadhafi, but was keeping its guard up and resisting pressures (especially from Algeria) to force the pace of normalization. Qadhafi had been on good behavior during his recent official visit to Tunisia; he had seemed quiet and reflective, at times almost depressed. But then he had returned to Tunisia with President Bendjedid for a brief ceremony commemorating Algerian and Tunisian independence, and had disrupted the event with a vitriolic speech denouncing the U.S. and extolling the virtues of Arab unity. Tunisia had subsequently informed Algeria that it had no intention of admitting Libya to the Tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation anytime soon. Qadhafi simply couldn't be trusted. Bendjedid had told Ben Ali he understood Tunisia's position, but Algeria through FLN Chief Messadia was still pressing for greater GOT flexibility toward Libya and seemed to be moving toward an interim Algerian-Libyan unity agreement of some sort.

Mestiri continued that the Algerians seemed to have a variety of motives for closer relations with Libya. They could be seeking Libyan support for the Polisario, and in Algeria's overall rivalry with Morocco; perhaps they hoped to attract Libyan financial support; some elements within the Algerian leadership were great proponents of "unionism" and were receptive to Qadhafi's appeals for Libyan-Algerian unity. Mestiri said all of this made Tunisia nervous, and a little suspicious of Algerian intentions. Algerian FLN party chief Messaadia had recently

come to Tunis and criticized the GOT's moves toward a multi-party democracy; the GOT had been "amazed" by Messaadia's comments. Nevertheless, Mestiri concluded, Tunisia was pleased with the generally good relations that it had with Algeria and its more normal relationship with Libya. Powell urged continued Tunisian caution in dealing with Qadhafi.

The meeting concluded at 4:30 p.m. Foreign Minister Mestiri was accompanied by Ambassador Ben Yahia, MFA advisor Bouzayen, and DCM Gharbi. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau, Bob Oakley, and Bill Burns also sat in.

361. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 19, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Tunisian Appeal*. The Tunisian Ambassador asked Mike Armacost for our support for Tunisia's appeal to the UN Security Council on the alleged Israeli murder of Abu Jihad and the violation of Tunisian territory.² The Ambassador recalled the October 1985 Israeli attack on PLO headquarters; we abstained on the Security Council resolution. Saying that we have condemned this political assassination—prohibited in the U.S.—Mike asked the Tunisians to supply us with any evidence on this action that was available. The Tunisian Foreign Minister is on his way to New York to attend a Security Council session on this issue, which could take place as early as Wednesday morning. We will continue to urge the Tunisians to moderate their approach in the Council and to avoid a formal resolution.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading. April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was en route to Moscow to discuss preparations for the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev summit scheduled for May 29–June 2.

² No other record of the Armacost-Ben Yahia discussion has been found. Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad ("father of struggle"), the PLO's most senior military official, was assassinated in Tunis on April 16. (Alan Cowell, "P.L.O. Accuses Israel in Killing of Senior Arafat Deputy in Tunis," *New York Times*, April 17, 1988, p. A1) In telegram 4354 from Tunis, April 22, the Embassy reported: "For the first time since Nov. 7, President Ben Ali is confronting serious domestic political criticism as a direct result of the killing of Abu Jihad April 16. Most embarrassed by the attack are GOT's security forces where suspicions of U.S. complicity are widespread." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

362. Electronic Message From Robert Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to William Burns of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, April 22, 1988, 3:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

Prof Note to General Powell on Tunisian Security Council Resolution

1. Security Council debate on the Abu Jihad resolution continues.² USUN does not anticipate a vote before Monday morning, although the situation remains fluid and a vote could come late today.

2. The latest version of the Tunisian draft, which has been already sent to Secretary Shultz, is much improved. It makes no reference to "terrorism," and contains no mention at all of Israel in its operative paragraphs. USUN is still negotiating with the Tunisians to tone down references to Israel in the preamble, but in general I believe that this latest draft is very close to what we have been looking for.

3. It remains true that there is yet no incontrovertible material evidence of Israeli responsibility for Abu Jihad's assassination, other than the undisputed presence of Israeli 707 off the coast,³ but I don't think there is any doubt in anybody's mind that Israel carried out this operation. Before the MOA signing, none of the Israelis disavowed it during a chat about the event in which they complained about accuracy and detail of the *Washington Post* story⁴ on how Israeli inner cabinet made the decision.

4. It is also true that events have taken a turn for the worse for U.S. interests (and Israel) in the Middle East. The continued violence

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 02/01/88–07/31/88. Secret.

² The draft resolution, Security Council Resolution 611, which did not specifically mention Israel, in part condemned "vigorously the aggression perpetrated on 16 April 1988 against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct." The UN Security Council voted 14–0 to adopt the resolution on April 25. The United States abstained from the vote. The text of the resolution is in telegram 1191 from USUN, April 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880354–0855)

³ In telegram 1191 from USUN, April 26, the Mission reported: "Tunisia was turning over to the UNSYG a dossier of its investigation. The dossier related principally to the logistics support provided by the Israeli plane tracked near Tunisian airspace by Italian authorities. Malta had also informed the Tunisian delegation that the Israeli aircraft had overflowed Maltese territory." (See footnote 2, above.)

⁴ The *Washington Post* reported on April 22 that sources in Jerusalem said that the raid "was approved by the inner cabinet and carried out by a special Israeli commando squad." (Glenn Frankle, "Festivities, Security Alert Help Israel Turn 40," p. A11)

in the Occupied Territories and hardened Israeli attitudes,⁵ the fact that our peace initiative is seen as having run aground, our previous vetoes of UNSC resolutions against Israel, and now the assassination of Abu Jihad have all contributed to a very heated environment. We need to do what we can to cool it down, or at least avoid doing things that will make it boil over.

5. On the basis of Tunisia's latest draft—with whatever further improvements we can make—I strongly recommend that we swallow hard and vote for the resolution.

⁵ Reference is to the First Intifada, an uprising by Palestinians against Israeli occupation forces, which began in December 1987 and lasted until 1991. Documentation on the First Intifada is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

363. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben Ali¹

Washington, May 6, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to receive your reply² to my letter of February 25, 1988, and wished to take advantage of John Whitehead's visit to write again.³

The United States was glad to maintain a close dialogue with you during the recent United Nations Security Council debate.⁴ I can assure you personally that the United States had no knowledge of the assassination committed in violation of your country's territorial integrity. Our condemnation of such acts has been clear and unequivocal, as has our support for the inviolability of Tunisia's sovereignty.

The discussions held during Foreign Minister Mestiri's Washington visit in March,⁵ and Secretary Carlucci's subsequent meeting with you in Tunisia,⁶ reflected our common interest in furthering a close and cooperative relationship.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 02/01/88–07/31/88. No classification marking.

² See footnote 4, Document 360.

³ See Document 357. For Whitehead's May 11–12 visit to Tunisia, see Document 364.

⁴ See Document 362.

⁵ See Document 360.

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 360.

The United States will continue to participate in efforts to offset the damaging drought now confronting Tunisia. Despite our own budgetary constraints, we will support Tunisia's structural adjustment program. We also place a high premium on our programs of military cooperation with Tunisia. As Tunisia pursues its goals of political and economic reform, be assured of our full support.

I look forward to discussing these and other issues with you during your anticipated visit to Washington in September. I am delighted to invite you to meet with me at the White House on September 19. In the meantime, you have my best wishes during the holy month of Ramadan.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

364. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Armacost to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 12, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

4. *Whitehead Visit to Tunisia*. During his visit to Tunisia May 11–12,² John Whitehead presented President Ben Ali with your letter inviting him to Washington in September.³ John signed a \$15 million Food for Peace agreement and the U.S.-Tunisian Consular Convention. He also announced the revitalization of the U.S.-Tunisian Joint Economic Commission.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading, April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was in Geneva meeting with Shevardnadze about INF verification procedures and the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev summit scheduled for May 29–June 2.

² A record of the Whitehead-Ben Ali meeting, which the Embassy described as "characterized on both sides by friendship and common sense," is in telegram 5195 from Tunis, May 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D8803418–0605)

³ See Document 363.

365. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to the White House Chief of Staff (Duberstein)¹

Washington, August 23, 1988

SUBJECT

Cancellation of Official Working Visit of Tunisian President Ben Ali

The Tunisian government formally requested on August 18 that President Ben Ali's September 19 official working visit be postponed until later this year.² We responded on August 23 that postponement was impossible,³ and that we were very disappointed that the GOT was unable to fulfill a commitment that it had made to us months ago. The Tunisians subsequently confirmed that they would be unable to keep the September 19 date.

Both domestic and foreign policy considerations probably influenced Ben Ali's unfortunate decision to back away from the visit. Tunisia's domestic calendar is overloaded this fall; Ben Ali has just reshuffled his Cabinet, and is preoccupied with completion of political reforms prior to the November 7 anniversary of his assumption of power. He is also actively involved in a would-be mediation effort on the war in Chad.

Neither of these concerns, however, has prevented Ben Ali from going ahead with a state visit to France September 12–15. What may have swung the balance against a Washington visit was the fact that it would have occurred at exactly the same time as the upcoming meeting of the Palestine National Council in Algiers. In the wake of the 1985 Israeli bombing of the PLO and the assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunis four months ago,⁴ the GOT may have decided that the potential gains of a Washington visit were not worth the political risk of having its President in the U.S. while the PLO was meeting to consider major issues like a declaration of independence or a government in exile.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 08/01/88–08/31/88. Secret. Copies were sent to Oglesby, Courtemanche, and Ryan.

² In telegram 8599 from Tunis, August 19, the Embassy reported that Ben Yahia had summoned the Chargé to explain that "internal political affairs have assumed a new urgency." The Embassy further reported that "regional developments have further infringed upon Ben Ali's schedule—notably, Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement and the ensuing progress toward Maghreb unity, developments in Tunisian-Libyan relations (Chadian leader Habré is expected in Tunis about Aug. 25) and settlement of the Western Sahara dispute." The Embassy continued that the possibility the Palestinian National Council could move from Algiers to Tunis "would entail major security problems for the Government of Tunisia." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880730–0754)

³ Not found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 361.

366. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1988

SUBJECT

Meeting with Outgoing Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia

PARTICIPANTS

Colin Powell

William J. Burns, NSC Staff

Peter Burleigh, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State

Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia

Mr. Hedi Gharbi, Deputy Chief of Mission

Ambassador Ben Yahia paid a brief farewell call on General Powell on September 9 following his photo opportunity with the President.² *Ben Yahia* thanked Powell for his support for Tunisia, and pledged that he would do all he could in his new position in the Foreign Ministry to further strengthen U.S.-Tunisian ties.

Ben Yahia then explained at some length Tunisia's approach to relations with Libya. He said recent progress toward greater Maghreb cooperation offered a means of "regional containment" of Qadhafi. At the same time, there was a great deal of "fermentation" inside Libya. Qadhafi's partial relaxation of some internal controls had allowed Libyans a glimpse of what more open societies had to offer. Since the GOT opened its borders with Libya in 1987, fully one-third of the Libyan population had visited Tunisia. Their experiences in Tunisia only reinforced their interest in pressing for further loosening of Qadhafi's economic, social, and political controls.

Ben Yahia emphasized that the Tunisian government's profound distrust of Qadhafi had not diminished one bit. But Tunisia had to co-exist with Libya and movement toward increased regional economic integration and related changes inside Libya gave the GOT a way to come to grips with the threat that Qadhafi posed. Tunisia remained deeply concerned about Qadhafi's CW program, his support for Palestinian extremist groups, and his habitual efforts to destabilize his

¹Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 09/01/88–12/31/88. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation, Burns sent it to Schott Stevens under a September 12 covering memorandum recommending that Schott Stevens approve it. There is no indication that Schott Stevens approved it.

²In a five minute meeting in the Oval Office, Reagan "expressed appreciation for Ambassador Ben Yahia's distinguished service in Washington" and promised "that the Administration would continue to work to strengthen bilateral ties with Tunisia." (Memorandum of Conversation, September 9; *ibid.*)

neighbors. The best strategy for countering that threat, from Tunisia's perspective, was to build regional restraints on Qadhafi's behavior and encourage the process of internal Libyan change that was underway. This did not mean open-ended political agreements with Qadhafi; Ben Yahia stressed that "we won't make the same mistakes Morocco did in signing the Oujda Accord."

In the meantime, *Ben Yahia* said, Tunisia remained firmly committed to close consultation with the United States on Libya. Ongoing cooperation with DOD and CIA would continue. The U.S. needed to trust Tunisia's judgment on Qadhafi. "Benign neglect" might be the best U.S. approach to dealing with Qadhafi—since it denied him the international attention that he thrived upon, and that magnified his role out of all proportion to his real importance.

General Powell responded that the United States had full confidence in Tunisia's judgment. We too preferred that Qadhafi's role not be hyped. At the same time, Ben Yahia was well aware of U.S. concerns about Qadhafi's continuing troublemaking. His CW program³ and support for terrorists were very serious matters. So long as these activities continued, it was dangerous to grant him political respectability—and we hoped Tunisia would not give him credibility and legitimacy that he did not deserve, and had not earned.

Ben Yahia reassured Powell that the GOT would continue to deal very carefully and cautiously with Libya. He added that President Ben Ali was determined to push ahead on a bold program of domestic political liberalization and economic reform. Greater democracy and privatization—borrowing from the U.S. model—were very important goals for Ben Ali. *General Powell* said the U.S. applauded Tunisia's efforts.

Finally, *Ben Yahia* explained that Ben Ali had been very disappointed that he had been unable to visit Washington in September. Three main concerns had prevented him from coming. First, Tunisia's domestic political calendar was overloaded, as Ben Ali sought to complete a series of reforms prior to the anniversary of his assumption of power on November 7. Second, Tunisia was heavily involved in regional diplomacy, particularly efforts to mediate a settlement between Chad and Libya and to promote a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Third, the PLO had still not made up its mind whether to hold the fall PNC meeting in Tunis or Algiers. A Tunis venue would create massive security headaches for the GOT, and Ben Ali—a "very security-minded fellow"—felt he could not make any extended foreign trips while this question remained.

³ See footnote 1, Document 284.

General Powell noted that he was sorry that Ben Ali had been unable to come to Washington as planned. This had caused some temporary administrative problems, but would have no negative effect on the strong U.S.-Tunisian relationship. He concluded by congratulating Ben Yahia again on his new appointment, and reiterating the U.S. Government's deep appreciation for Ben Yahia's superb service in Washington.

367. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben Ali¹

Washington, October 28, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

As you approach the conclusion of your first year in office, I wanted to be among the first to convey my sincere good wishes on this anniversary occasion.

Tunisia can take full satisfaction in the changes that have occurred since November 7, 1987, a date that marked an important milestone in Tunisian history.² The United States applauds Tunisia's continued commitment to political and economic reform.

The United States also welcomes the growing cooperation among the North African states. Such efforts can promote the stability and economic progress we both deem desirable. America will strive to ensure that bilateral cooperation with its friends in North Africa is conducive to these goals.

As you know, the United States does not see Libya as a force for constructive diplomacy—in North Africa or elsewhere. Libya's efforts to present a reformed image are unfortunately not matched by its continuing deeds. Libya continues to make numerous overtures to the United States for improved relations. Our response remains steadfast:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: 09/01/88–12/31/88. No classification marking. Powell forwarded the letter to Reagan under an October 26 covering memorandum, recommending Reagan sign the letter. The memorandum reads in part: "The attached letter reiterates our support for Ben Ali's program of political and economic liberalization in Tunisia, and our commitment to a strong U.S.-Tunisian relationship. It also notes our continuing concern about Qadhafi."

² Reference is to Bourguiba's removal from office. See footnote 3, Document 354.

concrete evidence of durable change in Libya's terrorism policy is a prerequisite for any dialogue.

I take deep satisfaction in knowing that U.S.-Tunisian relations have flourished during my Administration. Tunisia can be confident of continuing American support as you and your government build toward a strong and promising future for your countrymen.

I appreciated the kind words you wrote in your August 30 letter. While I had hoped to have the opportunity to review issues of common interest with you directly, our exchange of letters has been valuable. I am confident that the bonds of friendship linking our two countries will strengthen with each passing year. As you celebrate this important anniversary, please accept my very best wishes and those of the American people for your continued success and well-being.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

368. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, December 23, 1988, 1622Z

13092. Recat to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] per State 414953. Subject: President Ben Ali Discusses Cooperation Against Libya.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This report should be read in conjunction with Tunis 13091² reporting the bulk of my December 23 conversation with the President on Libya.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], 1986-88, Tunis. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² Telegram 13091 from Tunis, December 23, reported that "President Ben Ali gave clear assurances that Tunisia is not being taken in by Qadhafi. Normalization is part of Tunisia's defensive strategy, the President said. Tunisia wishes to cooperate with the U.S. in developing the best possible information on Libya's CW capability, but the President cautioned against military action to remove it." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881120-0642)

3. President Ben Ali said he wished to repeat the assurance that he had given the U.S. a year ago.³ [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] Until then, Tunisia would remain vigilant and treat its normalization with Libya as part of its over-all defense strategy. There was no change, Ben Ali said, in Tunisia's "strategic choice" of close relations with the United States.

4. [*1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified*]

5. For S/S: Suggest you share para 4 with Director INR/IRE [*name not declassified*].

Pelletreau

³Not found.

Western Sahara

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 24, 1981, 0830Z

555. Subject: Comments on Hassan's Hard Line on the Sahara. Ref: Rabat 477.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. The Embassy offers the following comments regarding King Hassan's purposes and objectives in taking a hard line on the Sahara conflict in his recent "Der Spiegel" interview (reftel). They coincide with those of two very high level government officials who, while not direct participants in the King's current Sahara planning, possess the position and background to offer particularly well-informed judgments. In the interview Hassan spoke of winning the war militarily by the end of the month, continued to rule out talks with the Polisario as such and highlighted the danger to all posed by Qadhafi's rogue regime. He also said that negotiations are not now in train with Algeria (which country he avoided criticizing.)

3. Our contacts believe, as do we, that the interview had major tactical aspects and that the possibility of a meeting with Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid at Ta'if was an important determinant of its content; clearly, a Moroccan projection of strength is to be expected as contingency planning before any possible meeting with Chadli. We have learned that it was decided at time of interview (Jan 8) that it would be embargoed until Jan 21, and it is clear that date of its release was picked with King's imminent departure

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810038-0350. Confidential. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bonn, Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, and USUN.

² In telegram 477 from Rabat, January 21, the Embassy reported: "In a recent interview, Hassan argued that Morocco will have resolved the Sahara conflict militarily by the end of the month, after which there might be negotiations—but not with the Polisario. The King saw an evolution in Algerian policy and expressed the belief that Morocco now has less reason to be concerned about OAU condemnation. He said there were no negotiations with Algeria now." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810034-1004)

for Ta'if summit,³ in mind—where efforts have been underway to bring him together with Chadli and where, additionally, Gulf state donors are due a reading on the results of their heavy donations to Morocco's defense budget. The accession of the new American administration was also undoubtedly relevant to interview's timing, as was French PriMin's visit beginning Jan 22.⁴

4. Part of the interview was directed at Europe. As noted above, it was given Jan 8 immediately following King's conversation with Lord Carrington (1/6)⁵ and FRG Chancellor Schmidt (1/7).⁶ As we know, King struck certain themes during these talks which reappear here, viz., Morocco's military progress in Sahara; need for greater European support for Morocco's efforts there and for its future economic viability (e.g. on question of Morocco's exports to EC); need for equitable MidEast solution which would take account of Palestinian rights, given that US will not abandon Camp David and that (as Hassan believes) MidEast peace not achievable without some form of Soviet participation; the desirability for active European role in MidEast to strengthen hands of moderate (read: Morocco) to achieve all this.

5. The interview also quite naturally reflects the evolution of situation on ground, viz., expansion of Moroccan system of fortifications in Western Sahara which Polisario has been able to slow but not prevent; increasing control of Moroccans over key Saharan population centers and an improved sense of security there; growing concern in Africa and beyond over Libyan activities in Chad and over Afghanistan; approaching presidential election in France; Saudi effort at Ta'if to heal rifts dividing Moslem world and collapse of Begin government in Israel. Finally, the interview provides an assessment of the results of five years of fighting clearly meant to influence political parties and reassure the local population, which has tended increasingly to perceive Moroccan economic and financial problems as war-related. In sum, the King's interview was addressed to several

³ In telegram 370 from Algiers, January 24, the Embassy reported: "Such summits always stimulate speculation" that Hassan and Bendjedid "will meet and perhaps settle the Western Sahara issue. The Algerian precondition for such a meeting so far has been that there must be an agreed agenda, meaning that Algeria would agree to such a meeting only if it were a prelude to Morocco-Polisario negotiations." The Embassy concluded: "Even if the two chiefs of state do meet bilaterally we doubt that they will address the Western Sahara problem directly." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810037–0950)

⁴ French Prime Minister Raymond Barré visited Morocco January 21–24.

⁵ British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington visited Morocco January 5–6.

⁶ Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt visited Morocco January 6–7.

audiences: Moroccan, American, Algerian, European and that of the Ta'if summit participants. Hassan, at this juncture, has persuasive reasons for wanting to look like a winner to all of these: Bendjedid whom he could face across a negotiating table; the Saudis and other supporters; the new American administration (Morocco which has soldiered on without much American help is a winner, worthy of support and with much to offer in African and MidEast arenas); Moroccans concerned about their daily bread; and Europeans to whom he presents himself as the Arab spokesman.

6. Treatment of negotiation issue seems worthy of particular note. The King does not say that there have been no contacts with Algeria—and, indeed, statements to the contrary have been bandied about for months—nor does he assert that there will be none, only that there are no negotiations being held with Algeria now. Polisario, he adds is not fit interlocutor because it is not Moroccan. Obviously, the long-standing Moroccan thesis that peace requires a prior understanding with Algeria would have been fatally weakened had the King left open the possibility of Polisario negotiations while the Algerians continue to decline to participate publicly in talks. Significantly, he asserts that he will see once he has won who his interlocutors will be. Any feint in that (Polisario) direction would not only have produced domestic discord and dismay but would also have tended to validate the Algerian thesis that Morocco's quarrel is with the Polisario, not Algeria. Any indication that contacts with the Algerians were continuing would have offended the Algerians, who have maintained publicly that there aren't any; raised suspicions among Moroccan politicians that a deal—which they would be asked to endorse—was being concocted behind their backs by Hassan and Chadli; and, finally, raised to unrealistically high levels public anticipation of a "miracle" meeting at Ta'if between the two heads of state, which if not held or unsuccessful risked the danger of dealing with disillusionment. In sum, we think Hassan clearly still wants to meet with Chadli and that his denial of current contacts with Algeria seems to have been designed precisely to keep open the possibility of a productive meeting with his Algerian counterpart.

7. Unsurprisingly, in view of the above, the King was as tough as he has ever been on the question of negotiating with the Polisario. One new element was Hassan's redefinition of the Polisario: its Saharan component is authentically Moroccan—though only one of ten "authentic" Saharan groups. As Moroccans, its members can be pardoned but never accepted as negotiators.

8. The OAU referendum element of problem is notable by its absence in King's presentation. It is not at all clear whether Hassan

judges that Libya's activities in Chad have so alarmed key OAU states such as Nigeria that the pressure for implementing the "Wisemen"⁷ recommendations has eased—or whether, on the other hand, Hassan for his own reasons wants to preserve the concept of a popular consultation staged among increasingly more secure Sahara population. Our contacts believe the King's eventual decision on "consultation" will be an ad hoc one, subject to the full range of relevant factors as they emerge this spring.

Duke

⁷ In telegram 6384 from Rabat, September 12, 1980, the Embassy reported that an ad hoc, six-member "Wisemen" meeting on Western Sahara in Freetown proposed a "six-point recommendation for a peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict," which included "a 'just and general' referendum" organized by the OAU "with UN assistance," as well as a ceasefire monitored by the UN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800435–0765)

370. Memorandum From the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 24, 1981

SUBJECT

Moroccan Port Visit

(S) As you are aware, Secretary Haig would like to offer to Morocco a visit in the first week of February by elements of the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to a Moroccan port south of Tangier.² The main objective of the visit would be to signal the Soviets who, since January 16,³ have been keeping a destroyer, frigate and oiler off

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret.

² No record of Haig's offer has been found.

³ The date is in error. In telegram 184 from Rabat, January 10, the Embassy noted a DAO report of "the presence of Soviet naval ships off the Western Sahara coast. On or about January 5, a Soviet minesweeper reportedly crossed the 12-mile limit off Cape Baras (Western Sahara), an area considered by Morocco as territorial waters. The Moroccans may not be aware of this intrusion. A Soviet frigate moved in on Jan. 6 close to the limit near Dakhla, where one Cuban and three Soviet trawlers are being held." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810015–0874)

Western Sahara waters apparently in response to the Moroccan seizure of 3 Soviet trawlers, 1 factory ship, and 1 Cuban ship which were fishing inside Moroccan-claimed waters.⁴ We do not know if the Moroccans have asked for such a visit or whether it is Secretary Haig's idea to offer to them.

(C) The United States has long had an excellent port relationship with Morocco. Visits generally occur every two to three months. The last visit was by three ships into Tangier, September 29–October 3. The next scheduled visit is by two ships of the Mediterranean ARG, the USS EL PASO (LKA-117) and the USS NEWPORT (LST-1179), into Tangier February 7–9. These ships have a combined crew of 579 and 330 embarked Marines.

(S) The seized Soviet and Cuban ships are being held at Dakhla, which is in the territory contested between the Moroccans and the Polisario. A visit to Dakhla would be viewed as a sharp tilt to the Moroccans in this struggle, a stance we have tried to avoid because we are interested in building our relationship with Algeria (which has substantial economic ties with the United States) and because recently there are intelligence reports that Morocco and Algeria are about ready to settle the dispute. It is fair to say that we have, from time to time, tilted toward the Moroccans in the past, most especially through the provision of weapons (F-5s, OV-10s, etc.),⁵ but we have done so largely to avoid a tilt in the military balance in the Western Sahara against the Moroccans. Our calculation has been that, without our military assistance, King Hassan might be unable to cope with either the Polisario or internal pressure and it definitely is in our interest that Hassan retain his throne. At the same time we provided military assistance, we pressed the King to settle the dispute and avoided gestures which indicated we agreed that the Moroccans had sovereignty in the Western Sahara. In the current situation, there is no need to take a position in the Polisario context and strong reasons—avoiding disruption of our Algerian relationship and the possible settlement—not to do so. Accordingly, we recommend against a visit to Dakhla.

(S) There are other ports south of Tangier which the ships could probably be rerouted to, e.g., Casablanca (JCS and Navy are looking at the technical feasibility). None of these are very close to Dakhla. However, because we do not usually visit these ports, the Soviets

⁴ In telegram 9345 from Rabat, December 8, 1980, the Embassy reported: "General Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan Commander in the Sahara, has confirmed to AFP that the Moroccan Coast Guard has taken in to Dakhla one Cuban and two Soviet fishing vessels. Dlimi mentioned that one Soviet seaman had been wounded when the Moroccans fired warning rounds at the vessel found illegally in Moroccan waters." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800585-0311)

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 100.

should notice the change and there is some possibility that they would take it as a signal, although the distances are sufficiently significant (and we have occasionally had port visits to Casablanca—one frigate in last year) so that they likely would miss the point. Assuming (as is likely) the technical feasibility of visiting, for example, Casablanca, there is little reason not to do so if such a visit would be satisfactory to the Moroccans. Normally, port visits are scheduled a month or more in advance, but short-notice procedures do exist and such a visit could be accommodated from their side if they wish. On the other hand, if the point is to impress the Soviets, the Moroccans might well wish the ships to come further south and, as indicated above, such an action would have significant drawbacks. In short, while a visit to Casablanca has few drawbacks, an offer to visit Casablanca might get us into waters we'd rather avoid.

(S) There is an alternative which would make the point to the Soviets, yet avoid the drawbacks of a visit to Dakhla. We could operate either by ourselves or in conjunction with the Moroccans in the vicinity of the Soviet fleet. (The JCS and CINCLANT could be tasked to come up with an appropriate mix of ships.) If the problem persists over time, we could shorten the interval between our regularly scheduled port visits to Morocco (although I would note the Moroccans and Soviets are negotiating over the disposition of the fishing vessels and we have indications that the dispute will be solved reasonably soon, with the Soviets paying a fine and leaving).

(S) In sum, I recommend against altering our currently scheduled port visit. I would instead propose that we explore with the Moroccans the desirability of our operating in the vicinity of the Soviet warships.⁶

Franklin D. Kramer
*Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (Acting)*

⁶ In telegram 21635 to Rabat, January 28, the Department reported: "The Secretary with concurrence of DOD has decided that a well-publicized US naval visit to Agadir would be desirable in order to send a signal to the Soviets in response to their positioning of three naval vessels off Dakhla, Western Sahara following Moroccan seizure and detention of several Soviet fishing vessels in December and January." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810040–1154) Agadir is approximately 285 miles from the Western Sahara-Morocco border.

371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco and Nigeria¹

Washington, February 14, 1981, 0107Z

38353. Subject: Western Sahara and the OAU Ministerial. Refs: (A) Rabat 980;² (B) Lagos 1806.³

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Department is concerned that if issue of Western Sahara is raised at Addis OAU Ministerial⁴ and attempts made to admit SDAR, debates will be highly divisive and deflect from current OAU efforts to seek removal of Libyan forces from Chad. In addition, debates on this issue would impede progress towards settlement of the Saharan dispute within the OAU framework, and would in particular hinder our own efforts to bring the Moroccans to the negotiating table.

3. For Lagos: In light of current Nigerian efforts to seek resolution of Chad problem, we suggest following points be made to Nigerians at level and in manner you consider most appropriate:

— As you know, the USG strongly supports OAU and Nigerian efforts to secure withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810070–0610. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Coon; cleared in draft by James Roach (S/P), R. Grant Smith (IO/UNP), and Borg; cleared by Princeton Lyman (AF/I); approved by Draper. Sent for information Priority to OAU Collective.

² In telegram 980 from Rabat, February 9, the Embassy reported on February 6 that Tazi “asked for US diplomatic support in capitals for GOM efforts now in course to block Algerian moves designed enhance status of Polisario ‘government’ (SDAR) in OAU. He said Moroccans would fight efforts of Algerians and others in NAM to introduce Saharan issue into proceedings.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810065–0417) In telegram 657 from Algiers, February 15, the Embassy reported: “In a joint FLN-Polisario communiqué published in Algiers February 11, the FLN ‘reaffirmed the total and unconditional commitment of the Algerian revolution to the struggle carried on by the Sahrawi people under the leadership of its sole and legitimate representative, the Polisario Front, for national liberation, for the achievement of its national independence, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its state. The FLN considers that the SDAR constitutes a factor of equilibrium and stability and that respect for the SDAR is a condition for peace, cooperation and concord in the region.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810073–1181)

³ In telegram 1806 from Lagos, February 12, the Embassy agreed “that every effort should be made to forestall moves to secure SDAR admission to OAU at the Addis meeting.” The Embassy also commented: “There appears little appreciation in the GOM of the strength of Nigerian opposition to the present situation in the Western Sahara.” The Embassy continued: “On the other hand the Nigerians do not want to see an open split in the OAU and will go to some length to avoid a confrontation over the issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810067–0804)

⁴ The OAU Ministerial meeting was held in Addis Ababa February 23–25.

⁵ References are to, respectively, the OAU’s call for Libyan withdrawal from and the holding of free elections in Chad made at the November 1980 OAU meeting in Lagos and Nigeria’s attempts to secure Libya’s withdrawal from Chad.

— We realize the importance of African unity on this issue and recognize the leadership role which your government is playing in maintaining that unity.

— Efforts to raise the issue of SDAR membership at the upcoming OAU Ministerial could have divisive effect on African unity and detract from the efforts you and other African governments are making to secure the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad.

— We think we have made some progress with Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. This administration wants to explore subject further with the GOM in order to see how it can best help lay the groundwork for a solution within the OAU framework.

— Meanwhile it would be helpful if the OAU Wisemen could use the period between now and July summit to attempt to engage the Moroccans in steps following up in the Moroccan GA statement last fall.⁶

— For all these reasons, it would be helpful if the issue of SDAR membership were not debated at the Addis summit, both to avoid dividing OAU at critical juncture, and in order not to limit our and the OAU's options for achieving a negotiated settlement.

4. For Rabat: You should inform Tazi or other GOM official of foregoing. At your discretion, you may also pass on the suggestion that Morocco send a special representative to Lagos (para 8 ref B).

5. For info addressees: We expect to authorize at least some of you to weigh in along comparable lines but prefer to await initial feedback from Lagos and Rabat before giving green light. Meanwhile you may if you wish send Department your in-house reactions to foregoing. We would also appreciate your comments on Lagos' suggestion that a Moroccan delegation be sent to shore up support among other African moderates.

Haig

⁶ In telegram 5035 from USUN, November 12, 1980, the Mission reported that the Moroccan representative "insisted on its right and duty to defend its territorial integrity, and declared the UN resolution on the Sahara null and void." Reference is to the Albanian resolution which called for a popular referendum in Western Sahara. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800544–1044)

372. Information Memorandum From the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, February 27, 1981

SUBJECT

Report of IG on the Western Sahara Situation, February 25, 1981

(U) Bob Pelletreau attended the Interagency Group (IG) meeting on the Western Sahara yesterday, accompanied by Jim Woods, Director of the ISA Africa Region. Joint Staff was represented by BGen Granger (J-5). Assistant Secretary of State (designate) Nick Veliotis chaired the meeting.²

(S) Most of the meeting was devoted to developing background information to bring decision-makers up to date on the situation and policy options available to the U.S. The discussion focused principally on diplomatic options (whether to take a passive, active, or wait-and-see stance with respect to the search for a negotiated settlement of the war). Principal conclusions:

(S)—Militarily, the Moroccans are in much better shape than a year ago; conversely, the POLISARIO are feeling the pinch (lower morale, some depletion of combat strength, difficulties in recruiting).

(C)—But the economic costs of the war are very great (\$2 million a day or more) for Morocco; and the POLISARIO continue to have the edge on the diplomatic front (with the OAU, in the UN, and with the “non-aligned” states generally).

(C)—Therefore, the only practical solution remains a negotiated diplomatic settlement acceptable to all the principal parties (Morocco, Algeria, POLISARIO).

(S) How active a role the U.S. should play in this negotiating process remained unresolved; the discussion paper is to be reworked and presumably another IG meeting will be called to pick up the discussion.³ (The pace may pick up as a consequence of a Congressional hearing called to review the Administration’s proposal to sell 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco. This hearing, chaired by Mr. Zablocki, will be held March 3, on behalf of the Sub-Committee on Africa and the Sub-Committee

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-83-0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan-Jun). Secret. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Secretary’s office at 10:57 a.m. on February 27.

² No minutes of the meeting have been found.

³ Not found. There is no indication that another IG meeting took place.

on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.⁴ Witnesses will include ex-Ambassador Duke, ex-Ambassador (Algeria) Haynes, and ex-NSC staffer Bill Quandt. So far, a Defense witness has not been called.)

(U) Points made by Defense representatives at the meeting:

(S)—The need for better national intelligence on this situation, and especially on the POLISARIO; a higher priority must be assigned and more resources dedicated if we are to have the kind of intelligence appreciation needed to support policy formulation.

(S)—The necessity to consider Morocco as a strategic factor in our en route military access to the Middle East and Persian Gulf; particularly in light of our continuing difficulties in obtaining satisfactory access assurances from Spain and Portugal, the need for an approach to Morocco is becoming urgent (Mr. Veliotis accepted, in principle, the importance of facilities access in Morocco and is receptive to initiating an interagency review of the feasibility of such an approach; a paper we are now preparing will address this issue and propose a formal approach to State).

(S)—The desirability of developing other contingent options for support of Morocco in its military struggle (ISA will develop such a list, in consultation with Joint Staff).⁵

(S)—Fundamentally, the need to consider more broadly our basic national security interest in the outcome of the war (i.e., is it really a matter of indifference to us whether the result of future negotiations is the creation of an economically unviable, Marxist-oriented and Libyan-supported mini-state on the Atlantic).

(S) No specific action responsibilities were assigned at the meeting; as noted above, we are working separately on the facilities access question and on the preparation of a list of possible additional military support measures for Morocco.

Franklin D. Kramer
*Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (Acting)*

⁴ The hearings, entitled "Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict in the Western Sahara: An Assessment of U.S. Policy," took place on March 25. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981)

⁵ No record of the list of options has been found.

373. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz), and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Stoessel)¹

Washington, March 23, 1981

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and the Western Sahara Conflict

ISSUE

At a recent IG meeting² a virtually unanimous consensus emerged that *U.S. strategic interests* and determination to stick by its friends require a strong bilateral relationship with Morocco, and that these factors, not the conflict over the Sahara, *should determine our arms supply toward Morocco*. This *contrasts with* the arms supply policy of the past year and a half, which was based on a *linkage* between our willingness to supply certain kinds of arms and Moroccan willingness to negotiate on the Sahara dispute.

There was, however, *some disagreement* in the IG meeting over what kind of a *diplomatic strategy* would best suit U.S. bilateral and regional interests. To what extent should the U.S. play—or be seen to play—a relatively active role in bringing the Moroccans and their adversaries to the negotiating table? After further exploring relevant issues, we have concluded that *we can best define our options* for a specific U.S. diplomatic strategy *later*; meanwhile we should be taking certain intermediate steps.

Two HFAC Subcommittees are holding a joint *hearing* on our Moroccan arms policy and the Western Sahara conflict on March 25.³ We believe we should *publicly state the new basis for our arms supply policy* toward Morocco at that time, recognizing that it will be strongly opposed by those Congressmen who have insisted that our willingness to deliver arms to Morocco be linked to positive Moroccan steps to negotiate a compromise political settlement of the Sahara conflict.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Africa General (03/10/1981–04/14/1981). Secret. Drafted on March 19 by Coon; cleared by Burt, Pelletreau, Palmer (JCS), Rentschler, Ames (CIA), Smith, John Maresca (EUR/WE), Richard Baker (P), Joseph Montville (INR/NESA), Flaten, and James Michel (L).

² In a March 21 memorandum to Stoessel, Veliotes noted that on February 25, the IG recommended that the United States “delink our arms policy from progress toward negotiations on the Saharan issue.” (Ibid.) No minutes of the meeting have been found.

³ See footnote 4, Document 372.

We should also make it clear at this hearing that we will be reviewing our diplomatic objectives and options, and eliciting the views of other interested parties on prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The relationship of our Moroccan arms policy to the Western Sahara conflict has long been a matter of sensitivity with the Congress, in part because of questions under international and domestic law. These legal questions, and the historical context in which they have arisen, are described briefly at Tab 2.⁴

This *memorandum proposes* that you (a) approve our recommended basic posture toward arms sales to Morocco; (b) authorize us to base our public testimony at the March 25 HFAC hearing on this posture; (c) authorize us to take certain defined intermediate steps; and (d) agree to our analyzing and defining our diplomatic options for future SIG consideration.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE

A. *Agreement on Fundamentals.* At an Interdepartmental Group meeting February 25 there was broad agreement that the following elements of our position with respect to the Western Sahara should be emphasized in articulating our policy:

1. Morocco's *importance* to us, already great, will grow in the years ahead. DOD has defined a strategic requirement for DOD access to Moroccan military air facilities to support both Mideast/Persian Gulf contingencies and certain NATO contingencies.⁵ In addition, we value Morocco's role as a regional strong point and stabilizing force in Africa (Shaba, etc.).

2. Morocco has been a *reliable friend* over the years, pursuing moderate and constructive policies on many issues that concern us, and demonstrating a readiness to stick its neck out at some risk to its interests. We need to make it very clear that this Administration is determined to stand by America's friends, both in terms of our Maghreb policy, and to send a clear signal of American reliability to Sadat and others around the world.

3. Morocco's *stability*, as well as a stable balance of power in the region, is of great importance to us as well as to other friends like France, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Senegal.

4. We should not, therefore, link our willingness to supply Morocco arms to Moroccan willingness to compromise its political position on the Saharan issue, as we have done in the past. Such a posture directly undercuts our global interest in achieving a stronger security relationship with Morocco and encourages inflexibility on the part of Morocco's adversaries. (We continue, of course, to retain the right to

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ See Document 372.

withhold individual weapons sales to Morocco, as to any other country, at any time.)

5. We should continue to maintain the *public* posture that a) we favor a peaceful solution of the conflict, involving further expression of the wishes of the indigenous population, as a prerequisite to a future settlement; and b) that we are studying the question of how our diplomacy can best contribute to our objectives in the region, including that of a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile we should solicit views of other interested parties but refrain from active efforts to contribute to a peace process or settlement.

6. We continue to have an interest in strengthening our ties with Algeria and certain other countries in the region and we should do what we can, bilaterally and regionally, to support such interests, but without compromising our primary strategic objective of strengthened ties with Morocco.

B. *Agreed Next Steps.* There was general agreement at the IG meeting that the following early steps should be undertaken in order to serve one or more of the following purposes: to maintain the level of dialogue with all the interested parties needed to sustain our ability to influence them on matters of concern to us; and to provide the new Administration with an improved base from which to plan its future strategy. We are already beginning to move on some of these measures.

1. Consultations with the French at the working level, specifically on the Western Sahara.

2. A trip to the area by a State Department representative later this month to obtain the views of the parties. A similar mission currently being considered for Sub-Saharan African states in connection with Libya/Chad strategy could also seek African views on the Sahara problem.

3. Meanwhile we will examine how best to approach the Moroccans concerning military access.

4. [3½ lines not declassified] We plan a joint examination by State, DIA and CIA to explore ways to task appropriate collecting agencies with specific requirements at appropriate levels of priority.

5. DOD and State also intend jointly to examine prospects for upgrading the effectiveness of our military program to Morocco without appreciably increasing our profile there (e.g., by helping their military logistic and repair capabilities).

6. Further develop diplomatic strategies to be considered by the SIG. This should be done promptly so as to minimize chances that passage of time might foreclose any individual options.

C. *Defining a Diplomatic Strategy.* At the February 25 meeting and in subsequent discussions, three possible basic approaches emerged:

(a) *Play a relatively active role in contributing to efforts to reach a peaceful solution.* This approach holds that a continuation of the war in the Western Sahara runs directly counter to U.S. strategic interests, both regional and global. Our strategic interests are engaged in Morocco; we need to move forward on military access to Moroccan facilities in

connection with RDF. Morocco is a strong point in our strategic network, yet the war in the Western Sahara affects negatively both Morocco's stability and our offensive on the Chad/Libya issue, complicates our relations with Algeria, raises new problems with Mauritania and exacerbates general problems of public and Congressional acceptance of our arms supply policies. The issue is therefore of such importance to our interests that the U.S. must be seen as contributing to a peaceful solution.

(b) *Proceed somewhat more cautiously than the above option, beginning with the next steps indicated in the previous section of the memorandum, but refraining meanwhile from any significant commitment of U.S. influence or prestige pending further review.* Underlying this option is the assumption that we may well conclude that a more active role in bringing about a peace process has some chance of being effective, in which case we will be predisposed to give it a try since our regional interests can best be served by a stance that gives us some influence over how a peace process develops, and keeps us talking to Morocco's adversaries as well as to Morocco itself.

(c) *Follow a policy that would stress bilateral relations with the countries of the region (especially Morocco) while avoiding an activist posture toward the Western Sahara dispute.* Under this option, U.S. strategy would give priority to our support for Morocco, and compensate with Algeria and others by being forthcoming within the framework of these bilateral relationships. We would deliberately forego U.S. emphasis on achieving a near-term negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara dispute on the grounds that: (1) the conflict is not amenable to diplomatic solution at this time; (2) the level of violence has been tacitly reduced by the parties; and (3) the U.S. could not pursue an active intermediary role without exerting intense pressure on Morocco, and simultaneously alienating Algeria and Nigeria, both countries of considerable importance to us.

It became clear during our discussions that before choosing among these options we needed a better data base. Most importantly:

— It was felt that the DOD requirement for military access facilities in Morocco needed to be refined and reviewed from the point of view of its political implications, and a scenario developed for approaching the Moroccans. In addition, we need a better sense of the relative importance of alternative facilities for enroute access, and the best available estimate of the cost of necessary improvements to the Moroccan facilities.

— It was generally acknowledged that more information is needed on the actual conduct of the war, morale and aims of the Polisario, Libyan and Algerian roles and support, and certain related issues.

On balance, therefore, we have concluded that our most sensible course of action at this time, if you approve, is to accord priority to our bilateral relationship with Morocco and go ahead with the immediate steps we have described, while undertaking a thorough analysis of possible diplomatic options for SIG consideration.

*Recommended Action:*⁶

1. That you approve the following statement of policy:

"U.S. strategic interests and our determination to stand by American friends require a strong bilateral relationship with Morocco. These factors, along with Morocco's legitimate military requirements, rather than the conflict over the Sahara, should be the principal determinants of our arms supply policy toward that country."⁷

Or, alternatively, defer public announcement of a policy until we have a request from Morocco for Sahara-related weapons.⁸

2. That you approve the talking points at Tab 1⁹ as the basis for the Administration's public statement at the March 25 HFAC Subcommittee hearing.¹⁰

3. That you approve the six specific intermediate steps described above.¹¹

4. That you agree in principle that (a) we should plan to hold a SIG when we have adequately defined our options for a diplomatic stance vis-a-vis the Saharan conflict; and (b) that until a decision is made as to what our stance should be we should refrain from diplomatic initiatives or other moves that would tend to commit us to any specific course.¹²

⁶ Stoessel drew a bracket in the left-hand margin from "Recommended Action" to the bottom of the memorandum.

⁷ Stoessel initially checked the "Approve" option, then checked the "Disapprove" option, then struck through both and wrote: "nothing marked" in the left-hand margin.

⁸ Stoessel checked the "Approve" option. It was stamped "24 MAR 1981."

⁹ Not attached.

¹⁰ Stoessel checked the "Approve" option. It was stamped "24 MAR 1981."

¹¹ Stoessel checked the "Approve" option. It was stamped "24 MAR 1981."

¹² Stoessel checked the "Approve" option. No record of the SIG meeting has been found.

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 30, 1981, 1215Z

2223. Subj: The Saharan War: A New Phase in Prospect? Ref: (A) Rabat 2023² (B) Rabat 2057³ (C) Paris 9021.⁴

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: The Sahara conflict seems about to enter a new and more worrisome phase, marked by a wider area for military confrontation and possibly the use of more sophisticated weaponry. Escalation would not only foster the fragmentation of the weakest contestant but would harm U.S. interests in the region. We urge countervailing U.S. initiatives and suggest several. End summary.

3. As Department will be aware, the nasty Saharan conflict in northwest Africa appears to be poised on the threshold of a new phase. If its history and current indications are any guide, it seems likely to expand both geographically and become more classical in terms of the weapons involved.

4. Where for the last 2-1/2 years this desert war involved essentially hit-and-run scrimmaging between Moroccan regulars and handfuls of Polisario guerrillas in a northern portion of the ex-Spanish Sahara, these hostilities have meanwhile expanded territorially to involve southern Morocco proper and the Tiris el-Gharbia. Other powers—Libya as well as Algeria—are now more broadly involved. The conflict now seems ready to transform classical Mauritania's northern regions into a new "live" front.

5. Where the Polisario once relied essentially on mobility and small arms, they now feature the use of heavy artillery including rockets

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810148–0903. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Dakar, Nouakchott, and Paris. Sent for information to Madrid and USUN.

² See footnote 3, Document 3.

³ In telegram 2057 from Rabat, March 23, the Embassy reported receiving information concerning the deployment of Moroccan troops to Agadir, which "suggests that direct original planning link between coup attempt and movement of this force unlikely." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810137–0942)

⁴ In telegram 9021 from Paris, March 26, the Embassy reported that a member of the French Foreign Ministry "was concerned about the future of Mauritania after the coup attempt." The Embassy continued: "the speed with which Algeria provided military assistance, among other factors, led him to believe that the GIRM and the Algerians were expecting something." The official also speculated: "It is possible that Mauritania may soon slip decisively away from its avowed policy of neutrality" in the Western Sahara. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143–1090)

and advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The Moroccans have increasingly transferred more equipment from the north until roughly 80 percent of their military strength is now concentrated in the south. The Algerians/Libyans (B) are busily arming Mauritania.

6. It is not the purpose of this message to try to assign responsibility for this trend to which all of the parties have to some degree contributed. It may, however, be helpful, as we ponder what these developments may mean for the United States, to spotlight some essential aspects of the war's dynamic.

7. On the Moroccan side there is a politically determinative deep-seated consensus that Algeria, since Moroccan assistance during its war for independence, has betrayed Morocco.⁵ Moreover, there is also the sentiment that the colonial powers, principally Spain and France have wronged Morocco: its territories were occupied only to be returned in the post-war era to the King's legitimate sovereignty grudgingly, under pressure and in bits and pieces. France is also blamed for creating a related latent territorial conflict between Morocco and Algeria by assignment [of] former Moroccan territories to the jurisdiction of the French residency in Algiers. Paris thus ultimately created today's Algeria (consolidated by Ben Bella's betrayal after Ferhat Abbas⁶ fall and sanctified by the OAU in its post-colonial frontiers) at Morocco's expense. The Moroccans, then, see themselves in the Western Sahara as reclaiming their own, having already paid a heavy political and territorial price in '73 at Ifrane⁷ in agreeing to relinquish "their" Algerian lands.

8. We defer to our colleagues in Algiers for any discussion of the basic reasons which have moved both the Boumédiène and the Bendjedid governments to allow a rebellious third country political movement to use Algerian territory to attack a neighbor and to support the Polisario in its endeavors with everything necessary for the conduct of "its" hostilities. Clearly, one reason will be Algeria's response to the Moroccan perception, i.e., its interest in a Morocco so weakened and otherwise occupied further west that it will not reopen the latent territorial issue with Algeria (Rabat never ratified the Ifrane Accord,

⁵ See Document 140.

⁶ Reference is to Ferhat Abbas, who was the first President of Algeria's constitutional assembly following independence. Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first President, subsequently expelled Abbas from the Front de Libération Nationale, Algeria's ruling party, and placed him under house arrest from 1964 until 1965.

⁷ The date is in error. Morocco and Algeria signed an agreement in 1972 demarcating a common boundary. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-9, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Part 1, Document 87. Negotiations began at Ifrane in 1969 after the two nations signed the Treaty of Fraternity, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation.

charging Algerian non-compliance with some of its terms) referred to above.

9. Morocco's annexation of the Tiris el-Gharbia,⁸ finally, has brought Rabat's self-proclaimed sovereignty up against the traditional borders of Mauritania, a weak and artificial state also created by the former colonial power, in which the Polisario seems about to play the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon. All the ingredients for Mauritania's fragmentation now exist as eloquently described by our colleagues in Nouakchott.

10. First French security guaranties, the GIRM's withdrawal from the conflict and its follow-on posture of neutrality assured Mauritania a degree of protection from external shocks and internal political imbalances. The withdrawal of that protection, the ascendancy of GIRM's pro-Algerian/Polisario Requistat wing and Algiers (as well as Tripoli's) apparent eagerness to try to exploit new opportunities which this affords, seem from here the principal operative elements of the new situation which now confronts the parties. These elements appear to us more significant than Morocco's role—whatever that turns out finally to have been—in the failed March 16 coup in Nouakchott, because whatever Morocco's miscalculations, Rabat's initiatives look to us essentially reactive. Morocco, in short, appears to have perceived (or perhaps misperceived the extent) Mauritania's slide towards the embrace of its enemies, Algeria and Libya, and may have moved to stop this evolution in its tracks. However that may be, a domestically polarizing Mauritania used by the key belligerents to exploit perceived advantages (Algeria, Libya) or to preempt (Morocco) virtually guarantees the growth of the conflict in the region.

11. What to do? If the players are left to their own devices, the war's expansion/escalation seems very likely further to damage inter alia our bilateral and regional interests. Whether Mauritania as now constituted will remain viable in such circumstances is anybody's guess. From here, its Chadianization seems rather more probable (cf Paris 9021).⁹ The OAU Wiseman option also becomes more difficult of execution and Morocco, our friend, becomes more deeply enmeshed in a war that it can ill afford over a cause it will not and cannot abandon. Given this unpleasant outlook we would urge the Department to consider countervailing measures. These might include

⁸ Reference is to Morocco's 1978 annexation of the Tiris al-Gharbia (Gharbiyya) region of the Western Sahara, which had been annexed by Mauritania in 1975 after Spanish forces left the area. Mauritania withdrew from the region after three years of Polisario guerrilla activities. For more on Mauritania's decision to withdraw, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Documents 234–236.

⁹ See footnote 4 above.

some form of demilitarization or guaranteed respect by all the parties of Mauritania's northern frontier; a new "neutral" Western (if France remains unavailing) commitment to the GIRM for protection against Polisario incursions, thus supporting that government's loudly-proclaimed desire to keep the Polisario out; encouragement to the OAU to get on with its Wiseman option by taking the actions recently suggested in DAS Draper's March 25 congressional testimony;¹⁰ a US effort to engage Algeria and Morocco directly in active dialogue on ways to limit and eventually to end these hostilities. (Dept's 77983 was received and welcomed after this was drafted.)¹¹

Sebastian

¹⁰ Draper's testimony, based upon the issues discussed in Document 373, is in telegram 76358 to multiple posts, March 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810142-0536)

¹¹ Printed as Document 4.

375. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Amman¹

Washington, April 7, 1981, 1929Z

Tosec 20154/87810. For Draper and General Walters. Following CIA 040048Z Apr 81, sent action DIRNSA Dept of State DIA Treasury Dept White House NSC CIA Office of Current Operations, being repeated for your info. Subject: Indications of Moroccan Readiness to Pursue Polisario Forces Into Mauritania.

[less than 1 line not declassified]

1. *[3 lines not declassified]*

2. In early April, *[1 line not declassified]* Moroccan King Hassan II has decided that Moroccan forces will be permitted to pursue Polisario units into Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again launches a major attack from Mauritania against Moroccan positions in the Western Sahara. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the King had made this decision

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810165-0136. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thor Kuniholm (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Imbrie (NEA) and Sylvia Blumenthal (INR/INC/IC); approved by Coon. Haig was visiting Amman and Riyadh to discuss the Middle East peace process.

after receiving “solid evidence” that Polisario forces had come from positions inside Mauritania prior to launching their late March attack against the Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmur. The King added that Morocco was prepared to take this action despite the probability that relations between Algeria and Morocco would worsen as a result.² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] did not specifically state what form the Moroccan pursuit would take, but implied that the Moroccan forces would launch air attacks against retreating Polisario units if they are found in Mauritanian territory.) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: [*1½ lines not declassified*] the King has decided to permit Moroccan forces to attack the Polisario inside Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again uses Mauritania as a staging area for attacks against Moroccan positions. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the initial Moroccan response would be air attacks against Polisario units found in northern Mauritania, but if such strikes “did not solve the problem,” ground troops would be committed across the border.)

3. [*2 lines not declassified*]

4. There continues to be a heavy, urgent build-up of Moroccan armed forces in the combat zone of Smara and Guelta Zemmur in preparation for “a special mission.” In late March–early April elements of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (RIM) located in the Boucraa and Smara zone were reinforced with the following equipment: 42 assorted trucks to transport munitions, supplies and water; ten LandRovers/Jeeps; twelve 130mm cannons. The 4th Royal Artillery Group (GAR) in the Smara zone also received the following additional equipment: 47 assorted trucks, 23 LandRovers/Jeeps, three 105mm cannons, three 89 mm Lance rocket launchers, twelve 14.5mm machine guns, twenty 12.7mm machine guns, and 13 unspecified anti-aircraft machine guns. Accompanying both of these reinforcements of vehicles and arms was an assortment of support equipment, such as radio transmitters and receivers, fuel and food. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*]) comment: Moroccan forces in the combat area have been placed in a high state of readiness in preparation to conduct a special mission to block off Polisario forces in the area between Smara and Guelta Zemmur. The 4th GAR, and 6th RIM will conduct sweep operations in coordination with a special task force currently

² In telegram 2174 from Rabat, March 26, the Embassy reported: “Rabat Core Country Team assessment is that a Polisario attack did take place on Guelta Zemmour on or about March 23–24, that Polisario forces very likely did at least cross Mauritanian territory, but that the attacking force was considerably smaller than the Moroccans have publicly claimed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143–0813)

located at Guelta Zemmur. These Moroccan units will be ready to pursue Polisario forces if they retreat into Mauritanian territory.) [3 lines not declassified]

376. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, April 15, 1981, 1615Z

1694. Tunis for General Walters. Subj: Western Sahara: Thoughts for General Walters' Meeting With President Bendjedid. Ref: (A) Algiers 1473;² (B) FBIS Abidjan R 141219Z Apr 81.³

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Embassy fully supports points made reftel, particularly those aimed at preventing escalation of conflict onto Mauritanian territory, a prime short-term policy goal, in our opinion.

3. Furthermore, Embassy proposes one more policy option: Since Morocco refuses to deal directly with the Polisario, and Algeria refuses to deal only with Morocco, and the Polisario want to deal only with Morocco, why not suggest that all parties to the war—Polisario, Morocco and Algeria—sit down together. Algeria is a co-belligerent, whether admitted or not, since it provides equipment and, more importantly, a sanctuary. If all three parties were to get together—and a format could be determined—they would, at least insofar as Moroccans and Polisario were concerned, be making an initial accommodation which, in our opinion, would be viewed favorably by African and international opinion.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810179–0882. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information Priority to Paris.

² In telegram 1473 from Algiers, April 13, the Embassy reported: "As the Western Sahara conflict drags into its fifth year, there is still little sign of movement toward negotiation. The U.S. is caught up in a situation not of its making, where we have limited leverage, but where we should do what we can to contain the conflict and move it toward a peaceful resolution." The Embassy continued: "As long as the war goes on it bears the risks of escalation (as we see now in the Mauritanian affair) and presents the United States with difficult policy choices in balancing its relations with Morocco and Algeria, both of which are important to us for different reasons." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810176–0221)

³ Not found.

4. Note that we leave Mauritania for the time being out of the negotiating equation: ref FBIS item contains statement by Mauritanian Foreign Minister Zamel concerning Mauritanian merger with Saharan state. Zamel is quoted as saying that “if objective reasons for the formation of a federation between Mauritania and the Saharan state exist, there is no reason why it should not be created.”⁴ This represents farthest statement along these lines we have seen by GIRM official. This could then be one of the factors to be negotiated by the three parties concerned. We believe that Mauritania would not object to the tripartite negotiations, since they would feel that their interests would be well-represented by both Polisario and Algeria.

5. These three-sided negotiations would also serve to preclude Libya, since it would not technically qualify as a belligerent and does not have a common border with the disputed area.

6. It would appear to us that if anyone is going to have to pay the price of peace, it is going to be Mauritania, or at least part of its territory; in this regard, GIRM Foreign Minister is now on the books as not being opposed to some sort of arrangement, which a conference of the other three parties could determine.

Schrager

⁴ In telegram 98132 to multiple diplomatic posts, April 16, the Department indicated that it was “intrigued by” the Embassy’s “quote of GIRM Foreign Minister Zamel which appears to leave door open to formation of a federation between Mauritania and a future SDAR.” The Department continued: “we are curious whether basic idea could conceivably provide a new basis on which to seek a negotiated compromise peace settlement. Without implying U.S. support for the idea in discussions with foreign officials, posts are encouraged to provide any analysis or further information which is relevant.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810182–0897)

377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, May 29, 1981, 0111Z

139368. Subject: Moroccan Foreign Minister's Meetings With Vice President Bush and Under Secretary Stoessel. Ref: Rabat 3491.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta held discussions with Vice President Bush and Under Secretary Stoessel on May 12. The meeting with Vice President Bush was a brief but useful visit attended by Secretary Haig, Assistant Secretary Veliotis, and Admiral Murphy (the Vice President's Chief of Staff), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen and NSC Senior Staff Member James M. Rentschler. Boucetta delivered King Hassan's message to the Vice President.³ In his exchange with the Vice President Boucetta stressed the danger of Qadhafi's subversive activities in North Africa.

3. Sahara Background. With Under Secretary Stoessel, Boucetta reviewed the evolution of the Sahara issue in the OAU, confirming Morocco's acceptance of both a ceasefire and a UN-supervised referendum. Boucetta said last year 16 or 17 OAU members would have joined Morocco in walking out if SDAR had been admitted, including Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sudan. He said there were 26 members who recognized the SDAR. He said there are about 60,000 people left in the settled areas of the Sahara.

4. Sahara Consultation. While Boucetta pointed out that modalities for the popular consultation still needed to be worked out, he envisaged a procedure similar to the one used in West Irian.⁴ In conducting a consultation the 1974 Spanish census could provide a useful tool, he

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810251-1030. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noform. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Flaten, Seitz, Rentschler, Nance, and Dennis Sandberg (S/S-O), and in substance by Richard Baker (P); approved by Veliotis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Dakar, Libreville, Kinshasa, Lagos, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Abidjan, Conakry, Cairo, Bamako, Dar es Salaam, Paris, and Lomé.

² In telegram 3491 from Rabat, May 16, Sebastian said Boucetta had called him in "to say how much he had appreciated courtesies shown him during his recent sojourn in Washington" as well as the "extensive substantive exchanges afforded him" by Haig, Stoessel, "and their collaborators concerned with Morocco's part of the world." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810232-0671)

³ No record of Hassan's message to Bush has been found.

⁴ Reference is to the so-called 1969 "Act of Free Choice," whereby inhabitants of Papua and West Papua (West Irian or Western Guinea) were allowed to vote in a referendum on whether or not they wished to become independent from Indonesia.

said.⁵ In response to a question by Stoessel on the nature of the consultation, Boucetta replied that it would give the population a choice between independence or the status quo. In response to a follow-up question, Boucetta confirmed that the official Moroccan position was to accept some form of consultation under UN or OAU supervision in which Saharans would be given an option of independence or joining Morocco. He said Morocco will consider any formula for the consultation and supervision. He left clear impression, however, that Morocco does not have proposal of its own, but is awaiting proposal from the OAU.

5. Algeria. Boucetta said that the Algerians were reluctant to get involved in negotiations for fear of being confronted with questions about the justice of territorial adjustments made by France during the colonial era in which Morocco lost some of its patrimony to Algeria. Boucetta acknowledged that Moroccan-Algerian discussions had taken place in France, Switzerland and Taif. Algeria, like Morocco, agrees to support the OAU's call for a ceasefire and referendum. Boucetta said it is in the interest of Algeria and Morocco to work together.

6. OAU Summit. Regarding the possibility of SDAR membership in the upcoming OAU summit in Nairobi, Boucetta said this would destroy current efforts to implement the OAU Wisemen recommendations; Morocco seeks an honorable solution. He said the issue of SDAR admittance to the OAU must await the completion of the procedure on the Wisemen recommendations. He hoped that the U.S. could support Morocco particularly in the Anglophone countries of Africa.

7. Mauritania. Boucetta stressed that Morocco had no territorial design on Mauritania wishing only that it remain neutral in the conflict.

8. UN. In discussing Morocco's acceptance of a UN supervised referendum in the Western Sahara, Ambassador Bengelloun noted that SecGen Waldheim was proceeding very cautiously in this regard because of the forthcoming UN Secretary General election. (Bengelloun said that Morocco preferred OAS SecGen Orfila over Tanzania's UN representative, Salim, whom he described as a Marxist). Boucetta said that the UN had not approached Morocco about holding a referendum. In response to Veliotis question he said the Algerians continue to prevent the UNHCR from conducting a census of the refugee camps in Tindouf.

9. Military Situation. In reply to a question about Polisario military activity, Boucetta told Stoessel that the Polisario have sophisticated

⁵Spain controlled Western Sahara until it gave joint control of the region to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975.

weapons but they lack manpower and were trying to recruit in Mauritania. Boucetta said that Libya is the main arms supplier to the Polisario and the chief financial, political, and diplomatic supporter as well. (He said that the Moroccans had captured some equipment still bearing Libyan stencils.) He claimed that the Polisario are being trained in Libyan camps assisted by Soviet advisors.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Haig

378. Memorandum From Dennis Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

Message from King Hassan of Morocco

Casey's memo gives an accurate account of King Hassan's gambit at the OAU summit. Although the idea of a referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our policy, it is by no means clear that Hassan's particular proposal will succeed in gaining majority support. There is considerable support in the OAU for the idea of recognizing the SDAR,² and if Hassan walks out, he may take only one or two more states with him. We need to involve the State Department in this issue, deciding how much public support we will give to Hassan, and at what level it will be expressed. This is not a matter which Casey and the President should be deciding alone without other input. (S)

Fred Wetters concurs, as does Geoff Kemp.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981-07/21/1981). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² In telegram 14164 from Nairobi, June 27, the Embassy reported: "All of the SDAR's major supporters have endorsed King Hassan's call for a referendum in the Western Sahara, although Libya has remained silent. A committee on implementation of the referendum began work as soon as it was appointed; the draft resolution it has prepared is certain to be controversial." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810303-0437) The text of the resolution is in telegram 14236 from Nairobi, June 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304-0423)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.³

Tab I

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan⁴

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

Message from King Hassan of Morocco (U)

Bill Casey has sent you a detailed memo on King Hassan's plan for a Western Sahara referendum. The King intends to present his plan on June 25 at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Nairobi. He requests a message from you at that summit publicly supporting the plan. (S)

We have a few days to analyze the advisability of such a message to the King. A referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our overall policy, however it is by no means clear that King Hassan's plan will carry the day at the OAU. In addition, it is not clear whether you should personally send the letter to Hassan at the summit or it should be sent at a lower level. We should discuss the issue with State and reach a consensus position.⁵ (S)

³ Allen checked and initialed the "Approve" option on June 23. An unknown hand wrote: "Hand carried orig to Darman's ofc."

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

⁵ At the bottom of the memorandum, Reagan wrote: "I'm willing to do this unless there is some pressing reason why I shouldn't. RR." To the right of Reagan's notation, an unknown hand wrote: "done—w/ [illegible] 7/1."

Tab A

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan⁶

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

Re, King Hassan's Western Sahara Peace Initiative at Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit

On my April visit to Morocco, King Hassan told me: he would make, in June at the OAU summit a peace initiative to settle the war with the Polisario in the Western Sahara. He said he would need the help of his friend and would provide details of the peace initiative as soon as he formulated it.

[8 paragraphs (28 lines) not declassified]

The King believes it would aid his cause greatly in Nairobi if you were, immediately following his speech, to send him a supportive public message congratulating him for his proposal. He stressed that this is not a "pressing request." If you find it premature of [*or?*] inopportune, let it go. Nevertheless, when the King first told me about his proposed initiative back in April, he said he would want help from his friends and he clearly wants a gesture of support from the United States.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The question is what should you do. He is very anxious that the formulation of his proposal not be disclosed before he makes it public and asked that his request be presented directly to you. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The State Department will recommend to you whether a message should be sent and what it should say. Perhaps State should check with other countries when Hassan's statement becomes public. Hassan would probably be satisfied by a statement that his proposal appears to be a hopeful first step down the road of a peaceful solution over the conflict of the Western Sahara.

As a matter of timing

— *[1 line not declassified]*

— Hassan will speak on Thursday.⁷

— State should advise on the response on Thursday.

— Stoessel and Veliotas are informed and will get papers as soon as they come in from Morocco.

⁶ Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

⁷ June 25.

379. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 26, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Western Sahara.]

3. *OAU SUMMIT*. King Hassan today proposed a “controlled referendum” for the Sahara in his address before the Nairobi OAU Summit. Mauritania and Sudan endorsed the proposal. However, each made recommendations which will be unacceptable to Morocco. The Polisario rejected Hassan’s proposal out of hand. The French Foreign Minister today issued a statement endorsing Hassan’s idea in the context of self-determination which will give Hassan trouble. We are preparing recommendations concerning our best public posture along with a proposed reply from you to Hassan’s oral message of a few days ago.² (C)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (06/06/1981–07/02/1981). Secret.

² See Document 380.

380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, June 29, 1981, 1511Z

170682. For Chargé. Subject: Message From President.

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. A few days ago King Hassan sent an oral message to the President² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] soliciting the President’s support for the referendum proposal on the Sahara which the King planned to make at the Nairobi OAU Summit. Please pass the following oral message from the President to the King as soon as possible.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810006–0124. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Veliotis; cleared by Crocker, Nance, Seitz, Robert Stern (S/S–O), and in substance by Stoessel; approved by Haig. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

² See Tab I, Document 378.

— The President wishes again to thank Your Majesty for your message which described your intention to propose a referendum at the Nairobi summit. The President wishes you to know that we very much appreciated the receipt of the full text of your planned remarks.

— The President extends his congratulations to Your Majesty for this important and courageous initiative which, he hopes, will lead to the desired peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara matter. The President wishes to bring to Your Majesty's personal attention the public statement of the Department of State concerning this matter.

Begin text: The United States welcomes the proposals made by King Hassan II of Morocco on June 26 in his speech to the OAU Summit concerning the modalities for compliance with the objectives of the OAU's Wisemen recommendations. The United States believes that the King's proposals constitute an important step in seeking a peaceful resolution of the contentious issue of the Western Sahara and hopes that plans for the proposed referendum can be formulated and accepted by the parties concerned in the near future. End text.

— The President hopes that Your Majesty will find our public position helpful to HIM on this auspicious occasion. The President wishes to express his deep appreciation of Your Majesty's sincere and deep friendship and to assure Your Majesty that these sentiments are fully reciprocated by the President and his entire administration.³

Haig

³In a July 2 memorandum, Allen informed Reagan that Hassan had told Sebastian he had received Reagan's message and was "delighted with the 'warmth of its tone and the friendly sentiments which permeated it throughout,' and asked that his reaction be conveyed to you. He was delighted there were no objections by the White House to publishing the entire text." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564-8206108))

381. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, July 18, 1981, 1156Z

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY

Algeria/Western Sahara²

SUBJECT

FLN Affirmation of Algeria's Willingness to Impose a Political Settlement on The Polisario Front³ [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*4 lines not declassified*]

1. [*1½ lines not declassified*] the Front of Liberation National (FLN) recently characterized Algeria's current position on the Western Sahara as follows: Algeria has become persuaded that a continuation of the war in the Western Sahara will not benefit Algerian national interests and that regional developments dictate an end to the conflict as quickly as possible.⁴ Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid has definitely concluded that the Polisario must abandon the idea of continuing military hostilities indefinitely, and if need be, a political solution must be imposed on the Polisario.

2. Following the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Kenya and the most recent meeting of the FLN Central Committee, both of which events had an important effect in framing Algerian policy

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec '81). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² An unknown hand underlined "Algeria/Western."

³ An unknown hand underlined a portion of the subject line beginning with "Algeria's Willingness" and ending with "Polisario Front."

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "Algeria has" and ending with "interests."

toward the Western Sahara. Algeria is prepared to accept a settlement in the Western Sahara with the following three caveats:⁵

A. Algeria wants at all costs to prevent Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi from developing a controlling influence over the Polisario Front;

B. Algeria will not accept a ceasefire in the Western Sahara without the agreement of the Polisario Front;

C. Algeria will not require that the Polisario accept less than recognition of the Western Sahara's territorial independence.⁶

3. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Comment: The meaning and importance of [*name not declassified*] three caveats has been a matter of speculation in the FLN. There is general agreement in the FLN that the Algerian Government is in fact prepared to bring its full weight to bear in influencing the Polisario to accept a ceasefire. This influence would be in the form of a reduction of military assistance⁷ on the one hand, and guarantees of continuing Algerian political and economic support of the other. Within the FLN, there is a consensus that while territorial independence is an essential element to a settlement, the amount of territory which would be involved is a Saharan entity is definitely negotiable.⁸ The caveats, therefore, should not obscure the fact that Algeria is committed to an end to hostilities in the Western Sahara, and prepared to show considerable flexibility in arriving at a political settlement.)⁹

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "Algeria is prepared to accept a settlement in the Western Sahara with the following three caveats."

⁶ An unknown hand placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

⁷ An unknown hand underlined "a ceasefire" and "reduction of military assistance" and wrote: "KEY MOVES" in the left-hand margin.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "The amount of territory which would be involved is a Saharan entity is definitely negotiable" and wrote: "MAYBE THE PART OF SAHARA WHICH MAURITANIA ONCE HELD" in the right-hand margin.

⁹ An unknown hand placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

382. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 13, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Western Sahara.]

3. SAHARAN POLISARIO MAY BE LOSING ALGERIAN AND LIBYAN SUPPORT (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*])

REF:² [2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

POLISARIO leaders are divided and depressed, and there is a general sense of drift among the rank and file. Much of this is the result of the June meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),³ which gave the POLISARIO greater international visibility and created a sense of false optimism but which did not lead to any significant concession from Moroccan King Hassan. On the contrary, it enabled Hassan to play on the national interests of both Algeria and Libya in such a way as to make both these countries deal with the POLISARIO in new and, from the POLISARIO angle, disturbing ways. POLISARIO currently believes that neither Algeria nor Libya can be counted on to continue their previous strong support for Saharan self-determination and sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

In recent talks between POLISARIO leaders and Algerian Government officials, the Algerians used new phrases, such as “supporting the POLISARIO while protecting Algerian interests.” The guerrillas reportedly fear that this is shorthand for withdrawing military support, demanding that the POLISARIO curtail its military activity, and providing financial support under increasingly restrictive conditions. For the first time, POLISARIO must conclude that its interests and Algeria’s no longer coincide.

The Saharan guerrillas’ alarm at this development is accentuated by a similar trend in its dealings with Libya. During a recent trip to Libya for the purpose of requesting military aid, the so-called Minister of Defense of POLISARIO was, in effect, rebuffed by Libya’s leaders. The Libyans he met did not refuse to consider his request, but they clearly specified that no military assistance will be provided in the near

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “AUG 14 1981 DEP SEC HAS SEEN.” Rixse initialed the top of the report.

² None of the reference reports were found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 378.

future. The Libyan spokesmen who met with the POLISARIO leader spoke favorably of the concept of a referendum in the Western Sahara and urged POLISARIO to remain patient and avoid military action until the meaning of Hassan's referendum proposal becomes clear.

[3 lines not declassified] French spokesmen also said that neither Algeria or Libya appears ready to respond to any French initiative on the issue at this time.

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

We have no doubt that somehow the mood and the situation in North Africa has changed regarding POLISARIO. Only recently, we received information that Hassan and Libyan leader Col Qadhafi have quietly agreed to reestablish formal diplomatic relations—a development that suggests a lessening of Libyan support to POLISARIO.

We are, however, less certain that Algerian support is waning significantly. While we believe that Algeria is looking for a solution to the Saharan quagmire, the country is not likely to drop so quickly a cause it has supported for over 5 years. POLISARIO launched a major operation against Morocco on 11 August. This must be viewed as illustrative of the problems that still plague the Saharan scene. The attack may also be aimed at showing Algeria and Morocco that POLISARIO must be included in any negotiations aimed at a political settlement.

383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, September 5, 1981, 0805Z

238561. Subject: Moroccan Ambassador Requests U.S. Support on Western Sahara.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. On September 1 at his suggestion, Ambassador Bengelloun reviewed the recent decisions taken at the OAU implementation meeting in Nairobi (Nairobi II)² with NEA Assistant Secretary Veliotis. DAS

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810419–0146. Secret. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Ralph Graner (AF/I), Morton, Smith, and Flaten; approved by Constable. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi.

² In telegram 2572 from Addis Ababa, August 28, the Embassy reported: "OAU Asst SecGen Onu has described the recently concluded Nairobi Heads of State meeting on the Western Sahara as a limited success, with the OAU perceiving some light at the end of the tunnel. However, the official reactions of Morocco and the Polisario to the OAU decision have not been received and problems could arise." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810405–0166)

Peter Constable, AFN Director Robert Flaten, and Moroccan Country Officer, Thor Kuniholm participated. After describing the results and recommending King Hassan's August 29 speech³ as essential to a full understanding of Morocco's position Bengelloun asked for our assessment. We told Bengelloun that we were pleased with the progress made at Nairobi II and with the constructive role played by King Hassan. In response to our question about official acceptance of the Nairobi II decisions, Bengelloun replied that Algeria and Morocco had accepted the results while the Polisario was holding out for direct negotiations.

3. Bengelloun also asked for our assistance to limit the size of the UN presence in the Western Sahara; in fact King Hassan would prefer an OAU peace-keeping force, he added. We responded that while UN presence need not be large, some UN participation is important to ensure international acceptance of the referendum. We added that we believe it unlikely that the UN would decide upon an excessively large and costly presence.

4. Concerning Algeria, Bengelloun asked for our assistance with the Algerians to lean on the Polisario for its acceptance of the ceasefire. He said that he hoped the Algerians would accept the Spanish census as the basis for voter eligibility instead of countering with exaggerated demands for a larger electorate. (Bengelloun commented that Morocco believes that 110,000 should be the upper limit of eligible population.) We told Bengelloun that we would continue to urge all of the parties to cooperate with the OAU mediation effort, otherwise we made no specific commitment to intervene with the Algerians.

5. For Embassy Rabat: You may share our preliminary upbeat assessment of the Nairobi II outcome including our appreciation of the constructive role played by King Hassan. We believe that the King deserves special credit for stepping down from his original call for an "affirmative referendum" and agreeing to a vote on the issue of independence or integration with Morocco. You may tell the Moroccans that we are pleased with the outcome. You may mention that we are also in touch with the Algerians on Nairobi II and that we shall recommend they urge the Polisario to respect the ceasefire. Finally, you may tell the Moroccans that we expect to encourage UN participation in the referendum but believe that the UN presence in the Western Sahara need not be large.

Stoessel

³ In telegram 6210 from Rabat, September 1, the Embassy reported that in his August 29 address to the nation, Hassan "presented the outcome of the Nairobi II as cause for great satisfaction, due to its vindication of Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara, in general, and of Hassan's recent initiatives for settlement, in particular. He emphasized as important gains for Morocco the de facto recognition at Nairobi II of the Moroccan administrative and military presence in the Sahara, i.e. there was no request for its withdrawal." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810410-0395)

384. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 14, 1981

1. *Message from King Hassan of Morocco.*² Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun passed on urgent message to you from King Hassan concerning the destruction of two Moroccan aircraft flying at high altitudes over the Sahara.³ He sent similar messages to the UN and the OAU. The King believes that the Libyans have introduced sophisticated surface to air missiles (SAM-6 or SAM-8) into the Polisario inventory. More importantly, Hassan believes that no African personnel are able to manage these weapons, suggesting that Cuban, East German or even Soviet personnel might now be involved. Under the circumstances the Moroccans have requested a public statement from us reaffirming our support and continuing close consultations as the situation on the ground worsens. I took the occasion of my public remarks⁴ at Joe Reed's swearing in to make some appropriate comments, as did the Department's press spokesman today also in answer to questions.⁵ (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² The text of Hassan's letter to Reagan is in telegram 277329 to Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa, October 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810491–0336)

³ In telegram 7444 from Rabat, October 14, the Embassy reported: "King Hassan convened Parliament in extraordinary session October 13 to launch a new diplomatic offensive in the wake of the shooting down of two Moroccan aircraft yesterday morning and the sighting of Polisario armored vehicles. Hassan's message to 29 world leaders and heads of international fora described the incidents and alleged that Polisario's use of newly acquired tracked armored vehicles and SAM missiles was an effort to introduce a 'new dimension' into the Saharan conflict." The Moroccan Parliament subsequently "condemned Algeria and Libya for the attack." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810483–1152)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not found.

385. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 16, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. *Algerian Views on Western Sahara Fighting*. On Thursday,² Assistant Secretary Veliotes raised with Algerian Ambassador Malek our serious concern about the escalation of fighting between Morocco and the Polisario in the Western Sahara—especially the destabilizing effect of the introduction of advanced SAM missiles.³ Malek said he could deny categorically the Moroccan assertion of participation by “non-Africans,” i.e., Soviets, Cubans or East Germans. Malek attributed the latest fighting to a desire on the part of the Polisario to make a “statement” on the eve of the expected UN debate on the Sahara. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret; Sensitive.

² October 15.

³ A record of the Veliotes-Malek discussion is in telegram 276044 to Algiers, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810489–0146)

386. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

Washington, October 22, 1981, 0038Z

281066. Nouakchott for Asst Sec Crocker. Subject: Western Sahara: Moroccan-Mauritanian Tensions. Ref: A) Rabat 7641,² B) FBIS NC 2022041,³ C) Nouakchott 5020,⁴ D) State 277390 (Notal),⁵ E) FBIS NC 211500,⁶ F) State 280002.⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Tensions caused by the Oct 13–16 battle between Moroccan and Polisario forces at Guelta Zemmour in the Western Sahara have now spread to include Mauritania. King Hassan has warned the Mauritians against use of its territory by the Polisario (ref A) and Morocco's General Dlimi has reportedly claimed that Morocco's

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810498–0751. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Rabat, Nouakchott, Algiers, Nairobi, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos, Freetown, Dakar, and Jidda. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN); cleared by Flaten, Bishop, Kaplan, and Richard Sherman (S/S–O); approved by Veliotis. Sent for information Priority to Madrid, Paris, and USUN.

² In telegram 7641 from Rabat, October 20, the Embassy reported that Hassan had received a warning that “while after the Guelta Zemmour attack the King had restrained Moroccan forces from hot pursuit of Polisario units escaping into Mauritanian territory, the GIRM will be held liable for any future Polisario incursions into the Western Sahara. The warning was in the form of an open letter” to Mauritanian President Ould Haidallah. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810496–0678)

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 5020 from Nouakchott, October 20, the Embassy reported that Haidallah replied to Hassan's open letter. According to the Embassy, Haidallah responded that it was “clear that Your Majesty's accusations were aimed at justifying an aggression against our country . . . in case this should unfortunately happen, Your Majesty will bear the entire responsibility and should know that our army and our people will be in a position to defend our territorial integrity.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810496–0756)

⁵ In telegram 277390 to Nairobi, October 17, the Department instructed the Embassy “to seek urgent meeting with Foreign Minister to convey Secretary's concern” about an escalation of the Western Sahara conflict and “urge Kenya as Chairman of OAU to take urgent measures to counter current threat to OAU mediation efforts, possibly by immediately reconvening the Implementation Committee in order to begin negotiations toward cease fire called for in Nairobi II Resolution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810490–0728)

⁶ Not found.

⁷ In telegram 280002 to Algiers, October 21, the Department reported on Malek's October 20 meeting with Veliotis. Malek “agreed that OAU Implementation Committee was a logical forum for negotiations involving the belligerents. He did not repeat not press Polisario demand for direct talks with Morocco, but rather agreed that indirect negotiations were more practical.” Malek also claimed “Saharans alone were involved in the Western Sahara fighting and said he knew from his experience in Moscow that Polisario contacts with the Eastern bloc were limited.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810495–0503)

Air Force has struck at Polisario forces inside Mauritania (ref B). Mauritania's President Haidalla has denied both the King's allegations and Dlimi's claim. (Ref C.)

3. These developments increase the urgency of action on the part of the OAU Implementation Committee to begin negotiations on the cease-fire envisioned at Nairobi II. The Secretary has already recommended that Kenya's President Moi take the lead in this regard. (Ref D.) We are aware of press reports that Moi has sent a message to the Polisario (and presumably other parties) urging an end to the fighting (ref E) in reply to which the Polisario has reiterated its demand for direct negotiations. We believe that the Implementation Committee itself provides a viable forum for negotiations to this end, and that the Polisario's demand, and Morocco's refusal, to negotiate a cease-fire directly should not rpt not delay the opening of negotiations.

4. For Nairobi. Citing the increasing tensions between Morocco and Mauritania, you should once again raise our suggestion that the Implementation Committee convene to begin negotiations towards a ceasefire. You should seek information on and express appreciation for efforts President Moi has undertaken and encourage the Kenyans to persist despite procedural obstacles, i.e. direct vs. indirect talks. (You may share with the Kenyans indications we have from the Algerians that they would not rpt not support the Polisario demand for direct talks. (Ref F.)

5. For Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos and Freetown. Based on public information, such as ref E, of renewed call for ceasefire negotiations you should reinforce at appropriate levels in Foreign Ministries the approach we are making to the Kenyans, if you believe it will be helpful. You should not rpt not characterize Kenyan effort as US initiative.

6. For Rabat: Septel provides guidance for urging Moroccan restraint in dealing with Mauritania.⁸

7. For Algiers. You should encourage the Algerians to use their influence with the Polisario to calm the situation in the area and to encourage Polisario participation in negotiations under Implementation Committee auspices (i.e. indirect talks) to bring about a ceasefire.

⁸ In telegram 281064 to Rabat, October 22, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Foreign Minister of the U.S. démarche to the OAU (see footnote 5 above), adding: "In light of October 21 statement that its forces have gone into Mauritanian territory, you should also express our concern that the situation not be permitted to escalate further." The Department continued: "You should reassure the Moroccans that we continue to support His Majesty's initiative toward a ceasefire and a referendum. We are most concerned that further military operations in Mauritania may unravel the process so hopefully begun in June." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810498–0344)

8. For Nouakchott. Express our hope that Mauritania can remain a non-belligerent and take all measures within its capabilities to insure that its territory is not exploited by any foreign forces.

9. For Dakar and Jidda: You should describe to Governments of Senegal and Saudi Arabia diplomatic efforts USG is taking to help prevent further deterioration of situation. Since SAE and GOS were recipients of special pleas from King Hassan, which GOM has shared with us, we would like to work with them in any way they feel useful to help defuse situation. While the exact situation on the ground is a subject of contradictory reports, it is clear that tensions have dramatically escalated and we hope friends of Morocco and Mauritania can be helpful in resolving the problem.

Clark

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 27, 1981, 1903Z

286550. Subject: Secretary Haig's Message to King Hassan on SAM-6 Request.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The Secretary has approved the following message for delivery by Ambassador Reed to King Hassan in response to a letter from Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun requesting assistance to counter the use of SAM-6s in the Western Sahara:

Begin Quote: Your Majesty: I have read with great concern the recent letter from your Ambassador to Washington describing the introduction for the first time of more sophisticated weapons into the fighting at Guelta Zemmour. I am disturbed by this escalation in the technology employed

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-83-0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul-Dec '81). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Flaten, Rudd (DOD/DSAA), Bremer, Morton, Ted Strickler (S/S-O), George Harris (INR), Burkhalter, Arnold Kanter (PM/P), Graner (DOD/JCS), Richard Secord (DOD/ISA), Carlucci, Constable, Walters, and Richard Aherne (T); approved by Haig.

² An unknown hand underlined the subject line.

in the Saharan conflict at the very moment the OAU is³ endeavoring to arrange a ceasefire preliminary to holding a referendum in the Western Sahara.

Ambassador Bengelloun's letter of October 16 contains specific requests for assistance to meet the new situation.⁴ I have authorized the following actions to be taken in response:

— The Department of Defense will make available a team of specialists to provide advice on tactics to use against the SAM-6.⁵

— The Defense Department will do everything possible to expedite delivery of ammunition that already has been ordered by Morocco.

— We agree to sell an appropriate number of CBU's for use against SAM-6 systems.

Additional decisions will be communicated to you separately.⁶ We will continue to consider with you and in close collaboration with Ambassador Reed other steps, that can be taken to be helpful to Morocco at this time.

Let me take this opportunity to repeat my deep respect for the imagination and courage of Your Majesty for having taken the initiative within the OAU on behalf of peace. The recent incident demonstrates the urgency of proceeding with the negotiation for the ceasefire which was proposed by Your Majesty and endorsed by the OAU. Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End quote.

2. Ali Bengelloun's letter to the Secretary dated October 16 follows:

Quote: Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are aware, developments this week in the Sahara have escalated the situation and caused grave concern within our government. On the afternoon of October 13, 1981, Moroccan forces near the town of Guelta-Zemmour were attacked on force by Soviet armor and a large number of troops. The battle was continued for several days. The opposing forces have proved quite formidable, especially with the increasingly sophisticated equipment being used. Of greatest concern to us is the introduction of the SA-6 missile, its associated equipment, and very well-trained and experienced missile operators. You will recall similar concern raised by Israel when they discovered the same threat in Lebanon earlier this year.

To date Morocco has lost 3 aircraft and crews—a C-130 and 2 Mirage F-1's. The fact that the Mirage aircraft was shot down at over

³ An unknown hand highlighted "disturbed by this escalation in the technology employed in the Saharan conflict at the very moment the OAU is."

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted "the new situation."

⁵ An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph.

⁶ Not found.

30,000 feet, while supersonic, indicates to us that the SA-6 operators are quite experienced and well-trained.

Morocco has no counter to the SA-6 missile system. We therefore must give up air superiority and support for our forces in the area. Morocco urgently requires the support and immediate aid of the United States to meet this escalation and neutralize the new equipment. Specifically, we need:

1. Reconnaissance information on opposing forces and equipment, specifically EOB (electronic order of battle) and GOB (ground order of battle) information. This should include quantity and location.

2. ALO-119 jamming pods with the velocity gate pull-off (VGPO) program to counter SA-6. Without these programs the pods will not help. B-10 are needed immediately with proper technical support and logistical support. More may be needed later.

3. CBU's including the Rockeye (anti-armor) and CBU-58 (anti-SAM site). We need 100 x CBU-58 and 400 x Rockeye immediately.

4. 30 anti-radiation missiles (ARM)—to counter the SA-6 radar. Additional cockpit wiring and operational support as necessary.

5. Immediate delivery of 155 mm and 105 mm projectiles/ammunition.

6. USAF logistical support, tactics and advice on operations to use against the SA-6.

7. Any type of stand-off jamming capability to be used against SA-6 acquisition radar.

Mr. Secretary, the use of such sophisticated weaponry and tactics is an undeniable escalation of the Sahara situation. It is obvious that strong support is being made available from the Libyan side to give our opposition their new capabilities. Without a counter to this sophisticated equipment, we urgently need the help of the United States Government and people. As a long-standing ally, I respectfully request your earliest response in this time of heightened peril to Morocco and the stability of North Africa. With warm personal regards, Ali Bengelloun. End quote.

8. *[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]*

Haig

388. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 30, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

2. *My Meeting with King Hassan's Special Emissary.* In our meeting today, King Hassan's special emissary, Reda Guedira,² said that Morocco's recent military defeat in the Western Sahara saw the introduction of SAM-6s and heavy armor for the first time in the war. The Moroccans are convinced that the SAM-6s were supplied by the Libyans with Soviet approval. Guedira asked us for help at the UN to get a resolution sponsored by the Organization of African Unity tabled supporting a ceasefire and referendum. I agreed. He also asked us to warn the Russians that the U.S. is not indifferent to the fate of the Western Sahara. I assured Guedira that I would make this point to Ambassador Dobrynin Saturday.³ Finally, he requested immediate U.S. assistance to counter the Polisario SAM-6 capability. I referred to my recent message to King Hassan⁴ and noted that a high-level DOD team will visit Morocco next week which will consider additional actions we might take. Finally, on your behalf I asked Guedira to assure King Hassan that we consider him an ally and irreplaceable world leader. Guedira appeared reassured by my remarks. He left a personal congratulatory message from King Hassan to you on your AWACS victory, which is being forwarded separately.⁵ (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (10/29/1981–11/28/1981). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:12 a.m. on October 31.

² A record of the Haig-Guedira discussion is in telegram 292159 to Rabat, November 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810519–0532)

³ Haig and Dobrynin met on October 31. According to telegrams 291727 to Moscow, October 31, and 293442 to Moscow, November 4, they discussed Cuba, Afghanistan, arms control, Kampuchea, and Angola. The issue of Libya's and the Soviet Union's alleged role in arming the Polisario with SAM-6s was not raised. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number] and N810009–0015, respectively)

⁴ See Document 387.

⁵ The letter has not been found. Hassan referenced the Senate's October 28 rejection of a resolution disapproving the administration's decision to approval the sale of five Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Documentation on the sale is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, November 5, 1981, 2218Z

295362. Subject: Allegation of US Military Involvement in Western Sahara. Ref: A) Algiers 3893,² B) Rabat 8043.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. In response to allegation reported ref A, Embassy is authorized to make flat denial that there are any US military personnel in the Western Sahara providing technical assistance to Moroccan combat units.

Haig

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810526–0206. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Hull; cleared by Kuniholm, Flaten, Dietrich (INR), Herbert Hoffman (DOD/ISA), and Richard Erdman (S/S–O); approved by Constable. Sent for information to Rabat.

² In telegram 3893 from Algiers, November 2, the Embassy reported that at a recent social function an Algerian Foreign Ministry official “remarked to an Embassy officer present that if he would come to the Foreign Ministry ‘proof’ would be produced that U.S. military personnel are providing technical assistance to Moroccan combat units in the Western Sahara. EmbOff expressed skepticism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810518–1052)

³ In telegram 8043 from Rabat, November 3, the Embassy informed the Embassy in Algiers: “There are no rpt no US military personnel providing technical assistance to Moroccan combat units in Western Sahara,” adding that U.S. “personnel may not rpt not provide services to FAR in contested territory but must confine their operations to Morocco-proper, as USG defines it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810521–0154)

390. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cohen) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Stoessel)

Washington, November 6, 1981

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified.]

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 22, 1981, 1650Z

4597. Subject: Algeria's Attitude Toward Morocco and the Polisario. Ref: Algiers 4591.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. From my Dec 21 conversation with FM Benyahia (who apparently has been Algeria's principal interlocutor with the Moroccans on the Western Sahara) the following impressions emerged:

(A) Algeria is actively searching for a political solution in accordance with the OAU decisions.

(B) Algeria is unwilling to negotiate publicly with Morocco on the Western Sahara since it is not a party to the conflict.

(C) Algeria is prepared to act as a go-between (as it did during the hostage negotiations) and to discuss the Western Sahara privately with Morocco in the broader context of regional cooperation, something that would benefit all parties.

(D) The recent parade of high-level U.S. visitors to Morocco and our post-Guelta Zemmour military assistance has alarmed Algeria which fears the possibility of counter-move by Libya and, perhaps, the Soviets. This alarm is expressed obliquely by opposition to U.S. military involvement in the conflict.

3. Current Algerian national policy as enunciated and practiced is to concentrate on regional stability abroad and domestic development at home. Neither of these overriding objectives is served by a continuation of the Western Sahara conflict. Algeria thus supports the OAU referendum process and states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people.

4. At the same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be "serious". That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to the extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken place, Algeria apparently doubts

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810609–0435. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat. The document is misnumbered in the original.

² Telegram 4591 from Algeria, December 22, contains a record of Newlin's December 21 meeting with Benyahia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810608–0738)

King Hassan's commitment to a serious referendum.³ The implication of Benyahia's remarks was that Algeria was prepared to continue its private bilateral contacts with Morocco with a view to working out the modalities of the referendum which both Morocco and the Polisario could accept (presumably at the planned January meeting of the OAU Implementation Committee).

4. From here, the various positions seem to be:

(A) Algeria is prepared to work quietly for a serious (i.e. honest) referendum and will abide by its outcome.

(B) Morocco is unwilling to agree to terms of a referendum which might result in a majority vote for independence.

(C) The Polisario—unclear the Polisario gives lip service to the OAU decisions, but is known to have doubts about a referendum and insists on direct negotiations.⁴ If Algeria and Morocco were to agree on modalities, it would be up to Algeria to try to sell such an arrangement to the Polisario. Should the Polisario balk, it would be difficult for Algeria to try to impose the arrangements given its traditional position on the Western Sahara and its general posture of support for liberation movements. Algeria will therefore be cautious in its discussions with Morocco.

5. Only one thing seems reasonably clear: As long as they are going on, Moroccan-Algerian exchanges offer the best prospect for eventual progress on this issue. This suggests that Washington discussions with the King should be designed to encourage continued bilateral discussions with the Algerians and eventual indirect talks with the Polisario at the OAU Committee meeting.

Newlin

³ In telegram 4597 from Algiers, December 22, Newlin reported that Algeria "supports the OAU referendum process and states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people. At the same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be 'serious.' That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to the extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken place, Algeria apparently doubts King Hassan's commitment to a serious referendum." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810609-0435)

⁴ In telegram 4221 from Algiers, November 28, the Embassy reported: "The Polisario is carrying on an intensive and unprecedented diplomatic and propaganda campaign urging direct Morocco-Polisario negotiations and alleging U.S. military assistance to Morocco is an obstacle to OAU and UN peace efforts." Continued U.S. military assistance to Morocco, the Polisario charged, "will inevitably lead to escalation of the Sahara conflict." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810566-0443)

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kenya¹

Washington, January 9, 1982, 2316Z

6618. Subject: Western Sahara Status of Negotiations: Implementation Committee Meeting. Refs: (A) 81 State 300474,² (B) 81 State 314187.³

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Department is in process of evaluating where the OAU's Western Sahara peace initiative stands and how we might be helpful. As part of this process, we believe it would be useful to solicit in a frank exchange of views President Moi's thoughts on what he sees as the next steps in the OAU's peace efforts in the Western Sahara. At the same time, we could share with him our assessment of Algerian and Moroccan positions—as we currently understand them—on resolution of the Western Saharan conflict which may be valuable to him as he focuses on an agenda and strategy for the reported January OAU Implementation Committee meeting. We could also take this opportunity to reiterate our desire that there be progress in the OAU's efforts in the Western Sahara and that the modalities of a cease-fire and referendum be well established before the OAU chairmanship is scheduled to be taken up by Qadhafi this summer.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820014–1005. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William Hudson (AF/W) and Hull; cleared by Robert Bruce (AF/W), Marie Huhtala (AF/C), Flaten, Richard Roth (AF/E), and Bishop, and in substance by Albert Fairchild (AF/I and for information by Douglas McElhaney (IO/UNP); approved by Crocker. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Lagos, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, USUN, London, Khartoum, and Freetown.

² In telegram 300474 to multiple recipients, November 11, 1981, the Department reported: "At this juncture it is critical both that no party believe it can successfully pursue a military solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara and that the momentum generated by the OAU summit this summer and the subsequent meeting of the Implementation Committee not be allowed to lag. To this end the USG will supply Morocco, in the framework of the long-standing US/Moroccan military relationship, with defensive equipment which will allow it to counter the sophisticated weaponry recently introduced in the Western Sahara. At the same time, we seek to encourage the OAU to get ceasefire negotiations underway as soon as possible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810534–0625)

³ In telegram 314187 to Rabat, November 26, 1981, the Department instructed the Embassy to emphasize "that the primary policy of the United States with regard to the Western Sahara conflict is support for the OAU process which is based on the King's initiative and which aims at a peaceful solution of the conflict through a referendum." However, the Department stressed, "we do not rpt not believe a military solution is feasible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810563–0093)

3. You should seek a meeting with Moi to share with him our assessment of the Moroccan and Algerian positions on resolution of the Western conflict as outlined paragraph four. Ref B outlines U.S. position. You should also solicit Moi's views on what he hopes to accomplish at the January Implementation Committee meeting. Will the focus on the meeting be on provisions for a cease-fire and groundwork for a referendum? In this context, we would be interested in the outcome of his consultations with the UN SecGen. Does he think the consensus decision is enough to move ahead and fulfill the Nairobi II resolution? Finally, how does President Moi see the Western Saharan peace process unfolding in the next six months? Does he think it can be sufficiently in place to prevent interference by Qadhafi when he is scheduled to assume the OAU chairmanship next summer?

4. Post should draw on paragraph 3 the following talking points and reftels for meeting with Moi:

Assessment of Moroccan and Algerian positions on Western Sahara:

— We are aware of high-level contacts between the Moroccans and Algerians before, during and after the Fez Summit.⁴ We understand that the Western Sahara was discussed within the context of regional stability and cooperation. These series of bilateral contacts now seem to have been suspended, but it may have contributed to an improvement in bilateral relations.

— Both the Moroccans and the Algerians have emphasized to us their continuing support for the OAU peace process. There are serious differences on thorny issues related to the modalities of the proposed referendum. While not minimizing these differences, it is reassuring that a commitment to the process remains despite the escalation of fighting last October.

— Both parties seem concerned that a solution be achieved over the next six months while the Implementation Committee is led by Kenya. Both parties seem to believe that useful negotiations might continue under the auspices of the Implementation Committee.

U.S. concerns:

— We agree with Moroccans and Algerians that the interests of all parties are served by continuing progress of the OAU Implementation Committee's peace initiative in the Western Sahara.

⁴ Reference is to the Arab League Summit held in Fez November 6–9, 1981.

— In this regard, we believe that progress in the next six months is crucial in order to ensure (a) the interested parties do not opt out of the peace process and decide to pursue their goals through renewed fighting and (b) the modalities of a cease-fire and referendum are well established to minimize interference by Qadhafi.

5. FYI for Ambassador Harrop. You will receive septel⁵ instructing you to emphasize to Moi the continuing importance of Chad in the OAU framework. This message will be in response to your conversation with Biwott (Nairobi 28825).⁶ We realize Moi faces a formidable task of dealing simultaneously with two issues of critical importance to the OAU, Africa and the international community. We continue to believe we should press him to remain active on both fronts.⁷ End FYI.

6. For info addressees: Any relevant information on proposed January Implementation Committee would be appreciated.

Haig

⁵ Not found.

⁶ In telegram 28825 from Nairobi, December 31, 1981, the Embassy reported that Biwott said "Moi's first OAU priority will be Western Sahara which is in fact a more urgent and more important problem" than Chad. "Moi," Biwott continued: "is responsive to Hassan's urgent desire to resolve this issue while a compatible moderate chairs the OAU. When Qadhafi becomes chairman, no progress will be possible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820001–0942)

⁷ In telegram 1466 from Nairobi, January 20, the Embassy reported that in response to the U.S. démarche, "in addition to ceasefire, President Moi expects Sahara Consultative Ministerial (February 3–6) and Summit (February 7–8) will discuss voter registration rolls question, interim administration, and other modalities for referendum in Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820032–1072)

393. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 24, 1982, 1610Z

302. For Deputy Secretary Designate Stoessel from Ambassador. Subject: Western Sahara: Encouragement of Negotiations. Ref: A) Rabat 474,² B) State 18162.³

1. S—Entire text.

2. We would like to comment briefly on a few points in reftels from the perspective of Algiers.

3. In para 8 of ref A, it is stated that Morocco has accepted the OAU resolution and Algeria is seeking to reinterpret it.⁴ Without going into a detailed examination of the respective positions (which are laid out in the cable traffic), we would simply like to say that it is natural, in a negotiating situation, that each side will interpret a basic text in a way favorable to itself. While Algeria pressed a UN resolution which called for direct negotiations in order to demonstrate international support for the Polisario position, Morocco has as yet shown little inclination to accept a fair referendum, as called for by the OAU. In any case, these differences are matters to be resolved in future negotiations.

4. Para 8 of ref A states that "Algiers must be persuaded that prolonging war by postponing a settlement will be resisted by Morocco to point of unpredictable repercussions, which could prove dangerous and damaging to Algeria itself". If we use this language with Algerian leaders, it will seem to them a threat to escalate the war through greater U.S. assistance to Morocco, perhaps even through U.S. intervention, unless the conflict is settled on Morocco's terms.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 474 from Rabat, January 19, the Embassy commented that Hassan's decision "to undertake an unprecedented alignment with the US stems from his increasingly pessimistic appraisal of Morocco's problems. The course of developments in Europe and the Maghreb, together with Morocco's own socio-economic conditions, have induced him to table the option of a break with the Kingdom's traditional non-aligned stance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N820001–0487)

³ In telegram 18162 to Rabat, January 23, the Department provided a summary of Guedira's January 21 meeting with Stoessel, noting: "King Hassan wants to examine carefully the possibility of an alliance relationship with the U.S. either bilaterally or in an inter-regional context. He would like a discussion with Secretary Haig in Morocco to further prepare for a dramatic move to result from his visit to Washington." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820039–0699) Haig and Hassan discussed this on February 11. See Document 199.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 378.

Since we have little leverage with Algeria, such a threat would not help resolve the conflict and would only worsen U.S.-Algerian relations to no purpose. On the other hand, we certainly have no objection to repeating our exhortations to Algeria to work for a peaceful solution which would enhance regional stability, and will continue to encourage Algeria in this direction at every opportunity. We must be very careful in the language we use with Algeria, particularly since in the Algerian view it is Morocco which is refusing to settle the war through organization of a fair referendum.

5. Our recent exchange of messages indicated that for the time being neither Morocco nor Algeria can settle on terms acceptable to the other side. We therefore need a U.S. position which will be viable for a considerable period of time, pending political changes in Morocco or Algeria which will make a peaceful solution possible. Current U.S. policy strikes us as right for the long term: Limited assistance to Morocco to help the King, neutrality on the final outcome, support for the principle of self-determination, and encouragement of all to seek a peaceful solution (which at present means support for the OAU resolutions). It is dangerous to believe that any particular U.S. action, such as pressure on Algeria (or on Morocco) can resolve the problem quickly. Should diplomatic activities in the OAU context and bilateral Algeria-Morocco discussions bring the sides closer together, there will be time enough to consider how the U.S. can use its leverage to close the gap.

6. In para 6 of ref B Royal Counselor Guedira is cited as stating that Morocco's desire for a close alliance with the U.S. has nothing to do with the Western Sahara problem. Whatever judgement one might make as to Guedira's sincerity, we would note that Algeria would certainly view a U.S.-Moroccan alliance in the light of the Western Sahara conflict.

7. Department repeat as desired.

Newlin

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the Embassies in Morocco and Tunisia¹

Algiers, January 25, 1982, 1511Z

328. Subject: Status of Polisario Relations With Algeria and Libya.
Ref: A) [*less than 1 line not declassified*], B) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. S—Entire text.

2. We would like to draw Department's attention to the two referenced [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports, which highlight a critical element of the Western Sahara conflict—Libya's present denial of arms to the Polisario following its June accord with Morocco.²

3. Ref A reports [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that fundamental differences exist between the Polisario, Libya and Algeria over how to proceed in the Western Sahara conflict. While the Polisario wishes to press forward militarily to achieve its objectives, Algeria and Libya are urging reliance on the OAU negotiating process. With regard to Algeria this seems to us an accurate reading for, as we have noted before, Algeria increasingly sees its interests in terms of regional stability and economic cooperation. In addition, the U.S. response to Guelta Zemmour³ has probably convinced Algeria that military escalation is a no-win proposition and gravely risks super-power involvement.

4. On the other hand, Libya's denial of sophisticated arms to the Polisario seems more fragile than Algeria's policy of restraint. Libya's purpose last June, as we understand it, was to secure Moroccan acquiescence to Libya's chairmanship of the OAU and an end to Moroccan military assistance to Habre. We doubt Qadhafi has much faith in OAU efforts to reach a Western Sahara settlement or would hesitate to resume supplying sophisticated weapons to the Polisario if he thought it in his interest to heat up the "situation".

5. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It seems to us that the paramilitary training which General Dlimi has reportedly agreed to provide anti-Qadhafi elements is exactly what Qadhafi would regard as grounds to break the June accord. If that occurs, it could have a profound effect

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820041-0859. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² Reference is to the June 17 meeting between Hassan and a Libyan diplomat regarding a rapprochement between the two countries contingent upon Libya ending its military support for the Polisario.

³ See Document 385.

on U.S. and Moroccan interests in a peaceful settlement of the Sahara conflict. This is only one part of the picture, but one we hope will be taken into account in our discussions with Morocco on its future relations with Libya.

Newlin

395. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 10, 1982

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

2. *Western Sahara*. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) concluded its summit meeting on the Western Sahara on February 9, adopting a draft proposal for a ceasefire and referendum.² Neither the Polisario Front nor Morocco has accepted the proposals and the burden now falls on the OAU chairman to negotiate their agreement and set a date for a ceasefire. Secretary Haig will meet with Moroccan King Hassan tomorrow,³ and Assistant Secretary Veliotis will meet with the Algerians on Saturday.⁴ These talks will be important in our assessment of the situation.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (02/02/1982–02/27/1982). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates it was received in the White House Situation Room at 9:15 p.m. on February 10. Haig was in Madrid on February 10 to attend the CSCE follow-up meeting and later that day traveled to Lisbon to meet with Portuguese officials.

² The text of the proposal is in telegram 3283 from Nairobi, February 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820074–0496)

³ Haig was in Marrakesh February 11–12. See Document 199.

⁴ February 13. For a report on Veliotis's meeting, see Document 396.

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, February 14, 1982, 1435Z

688. Subject: Highlights of Veliotēs' Algiers Discussions February 13.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Herewith are highlights of Assistant Secretary Veliotēs' Feb 13 in-depth discussions with Foreign Minister Benyahia, Acting DefMin Col. Belloucif and MFA Secretary General Dembri.

3. The hour and twenty minute discussion with Foreign Minister Benyahia was the last, but most significant, of Assistant Secretary Veliotēs' meetings in Algiers, taking place in the evening immediately after Benyahia's return from Nairobi. Veliotēs was accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director Flaten and DCM Lorenz.

4. Benyahia spoke heatedly and with great pessimism about what he considered the deteriorating situation in the Western Sahara. He believed it ridiculous to assume that Nairobi had succeeded. It had failed.² Morocco insists on a confirmatory referendum contrary to the OAU's decisions, and wants to organize the referendum instead of the OAU or UN. The reason for Morocco's unwillingness to accept a political settlement was clear: U.S. military aid had led Morocco to believe it could win the Sahara conflict and there was therefore no reason to search for a peaceful solution. Because of Morocco's obstinacy the conflict was likely to continue for 5, 10 or 15 years. It would almost certainly escalate, each stage of escalation carrying with it an increasing threat of great power confrontation.

5. Benyahia strongly criticized the recent decisions taken at Marrakech regarding the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship.³ Algeria viewed these decisions with "enormous concern." He termed the Joint Military Commission and the decisions on access rights "a quantitative and qualitative augmentation" of that relationship. Veliotēs explained that the JMC and the access understandings could in no sense be so interpreted. The JMC was no more than a useful mechanism for managing our bilateral military aid relationships—one which worked well

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820082-0254. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to London, Jidda, Nairobi, Paris, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and Tunis.

² Reference is to the OAU Foreign Ministers' meeting in Nairobi February 8-9, during which the OAU agreed for the first time to seat the SADR delegation, thereby granting de facto recognition to the Polisario's political wing. Morocco and 16 other OAU members walked out in protest.

³ See Document 199.

in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt. As for access rights, their sole object was to counter the threat of Soviet military intervention in the Gulf. This had nothing to do with northwest Africa.

6. Veliotis continued that while the recent agreements with Morocco were not a substantial augmentation, the U.S. was determined to maintain an equilibrium in the area and to continue support of its old friend, Morocco. He noted that equilibrium depends on both sides: The military balance had been significantly altered last fall by the introduction of SAM–6s, and the U.S. intended to restore that balance. Benyahia responded that the U.S. concept of equilibrium in the region was to allow Moroccan aircraft to roam at will throughout the Western Sahara.

7. Benyahia said that Algeria had no quarrel with America's close relationship with Morocco. Indeed, Morocco was Algeria's friend too. What Algeria did object to was a military aid relationship of such magnitude that it impeded a political settlement of the Sahara conflict.

8. One of Benyahia's main points was that the U.S. had no real need of transit rights in Morocco in a situation involving threat to the Gulf since it already had such rights in the Azores, Spain and Italy. Veliotis explained at length the need for redundancy. Nevertheless, Benyahia clearly perceived the base rights as an opening wedge for massive U.S. assistance to Morocco in the Sahara conflict. Veliotis concluded this part of the discussion with the comment that he knew he was not going to persuade Benyahia now, but was confident that with the passage of time Algeria would acknowledge America's constructive contribution to a Sahara settlement. (The discussion then turned to other issues, including Chad, the Middle East situation, Angola and Poland, which will be reported separately.)⁴

9. Accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director Flaten and PolCouns Thompson, Veliotis had 90-minute, wide-ranging talk with the SYG of the MOD Belloucif (in reality, in day-to-day charge of the Defense Ministry since President Bendjedid holds the Defense portfolio.)

10. Algero-American Relations. Belloucif stressed Algeria wished to have good relations with the U.S. as well as all other countries. Algeria recognized the great U.S. contribution to international cooperation. He was critical of U.S.-Moroccan discussions re RDF transit arrangements as inconsistent with Morocco's avowed non-alignment. Algeria did not want to see a military presence by the super powers in North Africa. Such military cooperation made it more difficult for Algeria to resist

⁴ Records of Veliotis's discussions with Dembri and Bengelloun on these issues are in telegram 695 from Algiers and telegram 698 from Algiers, both February 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820082–0256 and D820082–0261, respectively)

Soviet pressures for military facilities. If Algeria were to sign such an agreement with the USSR, Belloucif was sure King Hassan and the U.S. would not be pleased. He did not ask for a response since he knew this to be true.

11. Veliotis stressed the strategic nature of our access discussions and the practical advantages of the mixed military commission. He noted that the access discussions were not related to the Western Sahara. Belloucif listened closely but did not seem to be reassured.

12. Western Sahara. Belloucif reiterated Algeria's position that the belligerents were Morocco and the Polisario. He did not hide Algeria's support for the Polisario but also agreed with the Ambassador that this gave Algeria leverage vis-à-vis the Polisario. Belloucif cited the high rank and large number of recent U.S. officials visiting Morocco and said Algeria sometimes has the feeling it is considered as a hostile state. Veliotis denied this was the case. (For political aspects of the Western Sahara, see below.)

13. On Libya, Belloucif said Algeria tries to moderate Qadhafi's actions and added that the thought the U.S. was making a mistake in building up Qadhafi by so much publicity. He stated Algeria had told Tunisian PM Mzali Qadhafi had been warned not to attack Tunisia. Moreover, Algeria was helping the GUNT and supporting the OAU effort in Chad, but the basic problem was lack of precision on the role of the PKF. Belloucif made it clear Algeria sought to keep Libya out of Chad and from interfering with its other Maghreb neighbors. Finally, Belloucif stressed that Algeria had paid too high a price for its own independence to allow Cuba, the USSR, East Germany or any outsiders into the Western Sahara.

14. Same U.S. participants plus DCM attended working lunch hosted by acting Foreign Minister Dembri. Director of West European and North American Affairs Benouniche and Deputy Director for North America Mekideche also was present.

15. Western Sahara. Dembri was quite forthcoming re results of Nairobi III. (But this was before Benyahia had returned with his much more pessimistic personal evaluation.) It was necessary, Dembri said, for President Moi to follow up quickly with the parties to get the OAU-UN presence in place, to agree on the modalities of the referendum, to arrange a ceasefire and, finally, to supervise the referendum. Dembri hinted that indirect Moroccan-Polisario contacts could take place via an OAU intermediary and cited the example of the Iran hostage negotiations. Benouniche noted that neither Morocco nor the Polisario had yet formally responded to the committee recommendations.

16. U.S.-Moroccan Military Cooperation. Veliotis gave Dembri essentially same explanations he had given Belloucif. Dembri said Algeria considered neither King Hassan nor the Moroccans to be

enemies. Algeria was determined to remain friends with Morocco despite the Western Sahara. However, U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation risked polarization, super power intervention and radicalization of the Polisario. In response to Benouniche's question Ambassador said we had irrefutable evidence that the Polisario had SA-6's and SA-9's in addition to other sophisticated military equipment.

17. Middle East. Veliotis gave an in-depth description of the status of the Middle East peace process and the dedication of the U.S. to progress on the question of Palestinian autonomy. The Algerians responded with their known position. Concerning the prospects for reconvening the Fez Arab League Summit, Dembri indicated Saudi Arabia, Algeria and SYG Klibi would meet in Tunis to see what could be done. Dembri spoke in rather positive terms of the Fahd plan as a possible basis for an Arab position.

18. Iran-Iraq. Dembri reviewed Iran-Iraq developments along the lines of his recent conversation with the Ambassador (Algiers 546).⁵ He said Iranian FM would arrive in Algiers Feb 14 for discussions. Dembri and Benouniche smiled when the Ambassador observed that it would be good to get back to something along the lines of the 1975 Algiers Accord.⁶ We shared with Dembri our assessment of the Iran-Iraq situation (State 31329).⁷

19. Comment. These conversations revealed both the positive and the negative elements in our current relations with Algeria. The Western Sahara continues to be the principal negative element, and Benyahia at least appeared very pessimistic that Nairobi III would lead to an early settlement. Clearly the Algerians are extremely upset over the announcement of our access discussions with Morocco and the establishment of the Joint Military Committee. Although they talk of the danger of superpower military involvement in the Maghreb, we expect the Algerians will continue to resist any pressures from the Soviets for similar arrangements here. Their presentation on this point was somewhat self-serving and ambivalent, but the strongest theme was a focus on Algerian nationalism and independence.

⁵ In telegram 546 from Algiers, February 7, Newlin reported: "On instructions, I raised possibilities of negotiations concerning Iran-Iraq war with Algerians with forthcoming results." Dembri "commented on what Algeria sees as favorable trends in both countries which may present opportunities for an intermediary role." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820067–1075) Documentation on the war is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April 1980–January 1985.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 171.

⁷ Telegram 31329 to multiple recipients, February 5, repeated the text of telegram 29508 to multiple recipients, February 4, in which the Department offered an assessment of recent military activities between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820064–0562)

20. Assistant Secretary Veliotes arrived just after announcement of our expanded military cooperation with Morocco and Algeria's presumed disappointment with Nairobi III.⁸ Despite their frank criticisms, the message that Algeria would like to have better relations with the U.S. was also communicated.

Newlin

⁸ See footnote 3 above.

397. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

Washington, February 27, 1982, 0025Z

52115. Subject: OAU Ministerial and Western Sahara. Ref: (A) Rabat 1577,² (B) Addis Ababa 791.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department concurs with suggestion made in para. 4. reftel A, and requests action addressees (except Addis) to make démarches outlined below at highest appropriate level to insure action before final

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105-0962. Secret; Immediate. Sent to Cairo, Monrovia, Libreville, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Ouagadougou, Tunis, Rabat, Lilongwe, and Nairobi. Drafted by Fairchild; cleared by Larry Williamson (AF/I), Hudson, Flaten, Samuel Peale (NEA/EGY), and Sherman; approved by Bishop. Sent for information to OAU Collective.

² In telegram 1577 from Rabat, February 26, Reed indicated that Sebastian received "an urgent request," from a member of the Foreign Minister's cabinet for "the earliest and most vigorous possible US representations to Egypt, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Upper Volta, urging them to leave the current OAU Ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa. With fifteen states having already walked out, by Moroccan count, departures of these countries would deprive the OAU meeting of a quorum and would nullify OAU Secretary-General Kodjo's admission of the Polisario to participation in the meeting." Reed closed by saying he "strongly" supported these representations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820104-1068)

³ In telegram 791 from Addis Ababa, February 26, the Embassy reported: "Three more states (Comoros, Gambia, and Somalia) have joined the walkout for total of 15. Three more are needed for preventing quorum. Some states who have had ambivalent positions might be turned around. Most likely appear: Upper Volta, Gabon, and Egypt. Whereas blocking Third World would not reverse Polisario/SDAR seating, it should cut off current technical discussions and possible political resolutions. More importantly, it would publicize opposition and encourage cooperation of moderates in preparation for Tripoli meetings." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105-0069)

OAU Ministerial plenary session in Addis, afternoon of Saturday, February 27.

3. For all posts (except Addis): Embassies should inform host governments that U.S. is increasingly concerned that the OAU peace initiative in the Western Sahara may be severely hampered if not rendered meaningless by the OAU Secretariat's recent unilateral decision to seat the SDAR at the ministerial meeting still underway in Addis Ababa. You should state that our concerns are clearly shared by a significant number of member countries of the OAU who have dramatically demonstrated their opposition to the Secretariat's action by refusing to participate in the ministerial meeting. FYI, these countries are: CAR, Cameroon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire, Comoros, Gambia and Somalia. You should also note that seating the SDAR as a member state of the OAU could prejudice the referendum process approved earlier by the OAU and all parties involved in this conflict, and thus could well destroy the hope for a peaceful resolution of this problem. You should urge that host governments send immediate and unambiguous instructions to their delegation heads in Addis to join those African states refusing to participate further in this meeting.

4. For Tunis: We believe the statements made by the Tunisian delegation have been positive and very helpful, but request you raise the issue once again with the GOT with a view to encouraging them to suspend their participation in the final plenary session as a protest against the action taken by the OAU Secretariat.

5. For Cairo: We appreciate the Egyptians discussion with us in Addis per Addis Ababa 794.⁴ In light of seriousness of the Secretariat's action and the importance we attach to the OAU mediation effort, however, we request you raise issue with the Foreign Office to encourage GOE to send instructions to Egyptian delegation to suspend participation in final session.

6. For Rabat: Re Rabat 1577, you may inform the GOM that we are following up with the listed countries plus Kenya and Upper Volta (requested by Ambassador Bengelloun) and Tunisia. Believe, however, the request is for assistance with Malawi rather than Mali per reftel. The Department believes that most effective presentation to Egyptians can be made by Moroccans themselves. Suggest you urge GOM to make direct request to Egyptians at suitably high level.

⁴ In telegram 794 from Addis Ababa, February 26, Roberts, in reference to seating the SDAR, commented: "Time for helping Moroccan initiative to organize a blocking vote at the Ministerial is perhaps too short for practical." He continued: "I have contacted Egyptian del and found them very reluctant to commit themselves, especially if they were the deciding factor." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0330)

7. For Addis: You should contact delegation heads of action addressee countries, note that U.S. is making *démarche* at high level in their countries, and encourage them as appropriate along lines presented in para. 6.

8. For Nairobi: You will know best how to present this in most effective manner to Kenyans.

9. As appropriate Embassies may wish to refer to previous telegrams on this subject for further talking points.⁵ Ref. B outlining latest state of play in Addis being repeated FYI.

Haig

⁵ In telegram 811 from Addis Ababa, February 28, the Embassy reported: "Thanks to last-ditch efforts by Embassies Monrovia and Ouagadougou, the Upper Voltan and Liberian delegations received instructions early Sunday morning 2/28 to walkout of the OAU Ministerial conference," which meant that a quorum would not be reached. The Embassy commented: "The walk-outs, even if they do not stop the conference in its tracks, represent a modified victory for Morocco while not reversing the Polisario/SDAR seating." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820107-0531)

398. Telegram 1642 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State

Rabat, March 1, 1982, 1722Z

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Secret; Priority; [handling restriction not declassified]. 1 page not declassified.

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, April 5, 1982, 1246Z

1509. Subj: Western Sahara—Algeria Asserts Polisario Accepts Principle of Referendum.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Ambassador took advantage of talk with Benouniche, Director of European and North American Affairs, on other subjects April 4 to ask how Algeria saw future prospects for the Western Sahara after the Nouakchott meeting.²

3. Benouniche began by saying that the admission of the SDAR to the OAU was an irreversible fact. He noted that there was talk of a restricted summit meeting to discuss the matter, but he doubted such a gathering would be very credible.

4. I then asked if the Nouakchott communiqué meant that the problem had been returned to the OAU Implementation Committee to carry forward on the Nairobi decisions.³ After much circumlocution, Benouniche affirmed that this was the case.

5. In response to probing on the current position of the Polisario, Benouniche said the Polisario accepted Nairobi I and II, that is, the principle of a general, free and regular referendum. The Polisario did not accept Nairobi III but, after the “balancing action” at Addis, there was now a possibility for progress.

6. Benouniche rehearsed Algeria’s strong doubts about King Hassan’s sincerity. He then went on to compare the situation with the hostage crisis after Khomeini’s famous four points were announced. Each side could accept the principles, but their respective difference in interpretation was so wide that there was, in fact, no agreement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820178–0757. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Lagos, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat. Sent for information Priority to Nairobi.

² Mauritania hosted the Sixth Conference of Saharan States, which included Libya, Mali, Algeria, Chad, and Niger, March 28–29. In telegram 1560 from Nouakchott, March 30, the Embassy reported: “Despite trappings of outward unity, conference was characterized by backstage bickering over the Western Sahara and the SDAR. The SDAR did not seek admission, but its specter dominated the proceedings, even in such a small regional grouping.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820168–0273)

³ In telegram 1560 from Nouakchott, March 30, the Embassy reported: “The final communiqué of the Heads of State encouraged the OAU Implementation Committee to undertake negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.” (Ibid.) No other record of the communiqué was found.

7. Seizing on this analogy I said what was needed was some intermediary activity, possibly by President Moi or others, to do what Algeria had done in the hostage negotiations. Benouniche confirmed that Polisario FornMin Ibrahim Hakim had met President Moi in Nairobi and he considered this to be positive development.

8. I again strongly urged if Algeria and the Polisario had doubts about Moroccan sincerity to test this factor through the Implementation Committee process.

9. Comment: While Benouniche was negative on the idea of a restricted summit and defensive concerning the SDAR's admission to the OAU, it was interesting that he implied the action at Addis Ababa now permitted the OAU to carry forward discussion on the modalities of a referendum and a ceasefire.

Newlin

400. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

Washington, May 8, 1982, 0430Z

125206. Geneva for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subject: Kenyan Mediation Efforts on the Western Sahara. Ref: A) Nairobi 9494,²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820241–1164. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Bamako, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, Conakry, Khartoum, Freetown, Rabat, Algiers, and Dakar. Sent for information to Nairobi, Nouakchott, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Cairo, London, Paris, USUN, Tunis, Gaborone, and the Mission at Geneva. Drafted by Hudson; cleared by Graner, Flaten, and in substance by Richard Roth (AF/E); approved by Bishop.

² In telegram 9494 from Nairobi, April 22, the Embassy reported: "Discussions about moving toward a negotiated ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara seem persistently to skirt the real problems now blocking progress." The roadblock stemmed from the Polisario's demand for direct negotiations with Morocco and the Moroccan willingness to engage only in "indirect" or "proximity" talks "under OAU or OAU Implementation Committee auspices." The Embassy suggested that if the Algerians believed that the Moroccans would not negotiate, that Algerian officials should "be urged to put Morocco to the test by inducing the Polisario to accept some sort of indirect formula for discussions under OAU auspices." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820211–0895)

B) Algiers 1818,³ C) Nouakchott 1827,⁴ D) Nouakchott 2140,⁵ E) Algiers 1889,⁶ F) Nairobi 10846.⁷ Paris for Cheshes, London for Lanpher.

1. C—Entire text

2. We continue to seek means to reinvigorate OAU Implementation Committee peacemaking efforts in the Western Sahara and are encouraged by OAU Chairman Moi's apparent determination to follow up on Nairobi III (reftel F) as well as indications that the parties may be ready to receive President Moi or his envoy (refrels D and E).

3. Our efforts are based on the premise that U.S. interests will be served by a public demonstration by the parties of their willingness to support the OAU mandate to engage in discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire and referendum under the auspices of the Implementation Committee. Should the Polisario refuse to participate in OAU sponsored talks, the current tendency to blame the 19 countries who walked out of the Addis meeting could be transferred to the Polisario and its backers.

³ In telegram 1818 from Algiers, April 26, the Embassy noted that Moi had endorsed the "sensible suggestion that the parties should be induced to engage in indirect discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire and referendum" contained in telegram 9494 from Nairobi. (See footnote 2 above.) The Embassy also indicated its previous support for this idea, adding that Moi "is the ideal person to make progress on this issue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820217–0442)

⁴ In telegram 1827 from Nouakchott, April 15, Schragar reported: "We share everybody else's bleak outlook (with the possible exception of the Polisario) concerning the OAU mini-summit at Lagos and doubt that anything worthwhile will come out of it." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820197–0357)

⁵ In telegram 2140 from Nouakchott, April 30, Schragar reported that Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould Minnih "instantly ruled out extraordinary summit saying that approval by two-thirds of Chiefs of State was impossible. He said that GIRM view was that OAU Bureau had no authority on the matter in any event, thus its deliberations were non-binding." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840810–1012, D820228–0820)

⁶ In telegram 1889 from Algiers, May 3, Newlin reported that he had reminded Benouniche that during an earlier meeting Benouniche "had agreed that the communiqué of the Nouakchott meeting of the Saharan states meant that the OAU Implementation Committee should continue its efforts to resolve the Western Sahara problem. I then noted that the Nairobi meeting of the OAU Bureau did not appear to have had significant results." Benouniche replied: "The important result of the bureau meeting in Nairobi was that there was no question of suspending the OAU membership of the SDAR, and any political difficulties could be dealt with at the Tripoli summit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820230–0142)

⁷ In telegram 10846 from Nairobi, May 6, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office Political Director said that Ouko "was embarking on a major diplomatic mission" to seven African nations and that "Western Sahara would be primary topic of these talks." The Embassy commented: "We can only hope that Ouko intends to make a try at consultations leading to ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara as mandated by OAU Implementation Committee." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820238–0994)

4. The most apparent means for the U.S. to assist the OAU peace process at this juncture will be for a strong U.S. *démarche* to the Implementation Committee members and parties to the conflict urging them to support Moi's efforts to follow up on Nairobi III.

5. Action addressees should seek early meeting with host governments to make following points:

— Underscore U.S. support for the OAU peace initiative in the Western Sahara and the decisions taken at Nairobi III and express our concern that the decision to seat the SDAR, taken unilaterally by Sec General at Addis, not be allowed to call into question or frustrate plan for referendum and ceasefire as laid out by Implementation Committee.

— Express U.S. hope that progress continue and that the Implementation Committee resume responsibility to undertake its mandate to implement a ceasefire and referendum in the Western Sahara.

— Express the hope, as an interested outsider, that in this connection President Moi's efforts to fulfill his responsibilities under the mandate of Nairobi III will be fully supported by Implementation Committee members and will be met with cooperation from the parties to the conflict.

— Encourage host government as member of Implementation Committee to make these points to Moi or his emissary.

6. For Algiers: We realize that recent death of Foreign Minister and many of his aides⁸ might handicap GOA ability to respond to Kenyan initiative. For this reason, we believe it is all the more important for Embassy to reiterate US position to acting Foreign Minister and MFA's Director for African Affairs at earliest appropriate opportunity.

7. For Rabat: In making your *démarche*, you should stress importance of GOM's continued cooperation with Implementation Committee. (As you know, Congressional Committee are actively engaged in considering foreign assistance levels and debating the Moroccan program with renewed focus on the Western Sahara.)

8. In discussions with host governments, Embassies should avoid any indication that we are aware of upcoming Ouko trip (reftel F).

Eagleburger

⁸In telegram 1920 from Algiers, May 4, the Embassy reported that Benyahia and his colleagues died in a plane crash in Iran. The Algerian Politburo called them martyrs to the cause of peace for their efforts to end the war between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820232-1032)

401. Editorial Note

King Hassan II of Morocco made a state visit to the United States, May 19–22, 1982, during which he discussed bilateral and regional issues, such as the status of the Western Saharan conflict and the proposed Organization of African Unity referendum, with United States officials. See Documents 205 and 206.

402. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 18, 1982, 0915Z

4691. Subj: Berm in Western Sahara Completed—Or Is It?

1. (LOU) With the announcement that the “berm” (the earthen wall which GOM has been building in southern Morocco and the Sahara) was completed between Boucraa and Boujdor on June 12, Hassan II sent a laudatory letter to General Ahmed Dlimi, Commander of Moroccan forces in southern Morocco and the Sahara.² “We are happy”, the King said, “to see that our officers and valiant soldiers have completed this work over the past months with exemplary courage and resolution.”

2. (LOU) With the reported completion of this section of the berm, the Moroccans claim that the Tan-Tan—Boujdour “axis” is now fully protected from Polisario incursions. The area involved is therefore reportedly open to unhindered movement of people and goods.

3. (C) Comment: The efficacy of the system of berms protecting the “useful Sahara” has surprised once skeptical Western observers. GOM, however, has not publicly addressed the inconsistency between protecting the relatively small section of the Sahara which it deems “useful” and the recent statement by FonMin Boucetta that Morocco “will

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820319–0786. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Casablanca, Nouakchott, and Paris.

² In a May 14 memorandum, the CIA reported: “The seven-year old ground war over the Western Sahara is virtually at a standstill. The tides of military fortune do not shift as freely as they once did because Morocco’s recently completed defense perimeter—an earthen wall called a ‘berm’—has imposed a new and more static military strategy” that the Agency contended would make a conclusive battlefield victory “elusive.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco 04/18/1982–04/20/1983)

not give up one inch" of the Sahara. Furthermore, we understand that in spite of the public announcements cited above, the Boucraa-Boujdor section of the berm is not yet complete: 15 kilometers of earthworks for which completion has been claimed are not yet in place; and no mines, radar, barbed wire, or observation posts have yet been constructed along the entire segment. End comment.

Reed

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, August 25, 1982, 1255Z

3429. For Asst Sec Veliotis from Chargé. Subject: Algerian Policy Towards the Sahara in the Aftermath of Tripoli. Refs: A. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] B. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] C. [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. C—Entire text.

2. During a recent talk with MFA, Secretary General Azzout, dealing mainly with other subjects, I asked Azzout what he thought the effect would be of the disarray at the OAU Summit² on the search for a Sahara settlement. Azzout reflected a bit (he is so new on the job that canned policy does not leap immediately to mind) and gave me what I believe is an honest answer. He said all Algeria's efforts are focused on trying to restore unity within the OAU. He found it hard to believe that there would be real movement on the Sahara in the Implementation Committee or any place else before a summit took place healing the wounds of Tripoli.

3. Starting from this kernel of Algerian policy, it may be useful to examine the concrete interests that the GOA is now, and probably will be pursuing, in the wake of the Tripoli meetings. The main threads would seem as follows:

—Algeria's overriding interest has got to be to rebuild its influence in Africa (and it follows among the non-aligned), given the fact that

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820441-0833. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, London, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Paris, Oran, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN.

² Reference is to the abortive OAU summit scheduled for August 5-8, which was canceled after a quorum failed to attend. See footnote 3, Document 17.

it is viewed by many Africans of all persuasions as a major culprit in causing the troubles that beset the OAU. Algeria has brought on itself this disfavor by its fervent and dogmatic support of SDAR admission into the OAU at Addis Ababa and Tripoli. It is not to be thought that in pursuing its interest in African unity (or put another way, the assertion of Algerian influence in Africa) Algeria will abandon its position on SDAR admission. At least it will never admit it has abandoned it.

—Algeria went to the lengths it did in pressing SDAR admission for several reasons, the dominant reason is unquestionably a determination to maintain Algerian control over the Polisario and not allow it to slip into waiting Libyan hands. Thus Algeria's total inflexibility on the SDAR issue at Tripoli, which led purposefully to the summit's failure, stemmed directly from Algerian-Libyan rivalry. That rivalry of course encompasses much more than control of the Polisario: It is based on a profound distrust of Qadhafi's territorial ambitions and radical Islamic beliefs by a pragmatic and basically conservative military regime. (It is a regime, of course, which sees radical Third World rhetoric as a natural adjunct of its pursuit of influence internationally and of security at home.)

—Interestingly, one objective which Algeria has pursued with great consistency under Bendjedid is to maintain as normal relations with Libya as are possible given the two countries' sharply conflicting interests. Algeria maintains that it is much better able to influence Libya if business-like relations exist, and cites as evidence its important role in getting Qadhafi out of Chad. [*less than 1 line not declassified*], we understand that after Foreign Minister Ibrahimi had given the coup de grace to the summit at the preceding Foreign Ministers' meeting, President Bendjedid spent five days at the doomed summit buttering up Qadhafi—to the point that relations between the two countries are again on an even keel.

4. If control over the Polisario is a dominant Algerian concern (and SDAR admission a means to that end), what are the implications for Algerian post-Tripoli policy on the Western Sahara conflict? First, as implied by Secretary General Azzout, a serious effort to move towards a diplomatic settlement seems momentarily on the back burner. (This despite the fact that we believe such a settlement is the only kind Algeria sees as realistically possible.) Second, all indications point to an effort to keep the lid on the Polisario militarily. There is no evidence that Algeria has provided sophisticated equipment to the Polisario in recent months. In fact, recent intelligence indicates that Polisario leaders are becoming restive under the lack of Algerian guidance and direction in the post-Tripoli period (ref A). In short, it would seem that the Algerians believe they have their work sufficiently cut out for them in Africa without stimulating a Polisario dust-up with Morocco. Finally, in

the consultations related to another effort to convene an OAU summit, we doubt that Algeria will again press SDAR admission to the point of a breakdown—so long as the venue is other than Tripoli.

5. Comment: It is ironic that at Tripoli Algeria should have helped achieve U.S. (and Moroccan) objectives because of its distrust of Libya while at the same time pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to ours on the question of SDAR admission. U.S. and Algerian interest clearly converge at important points even though the rhetoric remains far apart. This paradox obtains on matters other than the Western Sahara: In Lebanon, for example, the public Algerian line vigorously opposes U.S. policy, yet by accepting a large contingent of PLO combatants the GOA contributed to the success of the Habib Mission. There are of course many areas of convergence between U.S. and Algeria which are more straight-forward, one of the most important being the recent breakthroughs in LNG negotiations. If the Department is of the view (as we are) that immediate progress towards a Sahara settlement is not a vital U.S. interest, we conclude that the time is ripe for initiatives to cement and improve U.S.-Algerian relations.)

Lorenz

**404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Morocco¹**

Washington, November 7, 1982, 0145Z

313691. For Ambassador from Veliores. Subject: Visits by Senior U.S. Military Officials to Western Sahara.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. I understand that King Hassan may intend to invite General Smith to visit El Aaiun in Western Sahara following the General's observation of the coming joint military exercise. General Smith (or any other officer present in connection with the exercise) should not rpt not make such a visit to the Western Sahara. Such action would be read as indicating U.S. military involvement in the Western Sahara in association

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820617-0630, D820577-0284. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis for Reed. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by McFarlane, McManaway, Robinson (S/S-O), and Mayhew (DOD/ISA); approved by Veliores. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Algiers, CINCEUR, and DOD.

with Morocco. Not only would this be an unnecessary provocation in our relations with Algeria but also, whatever King Hassan's intention, it would damage the basis for U.S.-Moroccan relations. Important elements in the Congress, on which we are dependent for assistance to Morocco, would strenuously object to policies they would infer from the visit. Please assure that this USG position is strictly applied at the time of the coming exercise.²

Shultz

²In telegram 8406 from Rabat, November 8, the Embassy reported: "The Moroccans were unhappy not to be able to make their case—which they believe is a good one—but we have explained to our hosts and our distinguished visitors the policy problem of having visits and briefings take place during the joint exercises." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820607–0963, D820578–0533)

405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

Washington, January 3, 1983, 1705Z

160. Subject: US and the OAU. Ref: Belgrade 10008.²

1) Secret—Entire text

2) The following paragraphs (3–5) contain background information requested reftel. Para 6 offers guidance for your conversations with Yugoslav and African interlocutors.

3) The OAU, Africa's 19 year old political body, is currently experiencing a severe organizational crisis. It is divided over the issues of membership in the organization for the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR—the political wing of the Polisario) and the unsuccessful bid in August by Qadhafi to become OAU Chairman. While we were

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830002–0611. Secret. Drafted by Fairchild; cleared by Ann Korky (NEA/AFN) and George Humphrey (EUR/EEY); approved by John Davis (EUR/EE). Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lagos, Lusaka, and USUN.

²In telegram 10008 from Belgrade, December 27, 1982, the Embassy reported that in private conversations with Yugoslav diplomats "a surprising number of African countries are advancing the Libyan contention that the USG is exploiting OAU internal differences in order to get at Qadhafi." The Embassy therefore requested "background information for use with Yugoslavs and African diplomats" in reply to charges. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820668–0934)

obviously not pleased at the prospect of Qadhafi's chairmanship (which would have been his by tradition as host for the 1982 OAU Summit meeting had a quorum been present in Tripoli), we also believed that any overt action to sabotage that meeting would have been counter-productive. We did speak often, however, to the issue of the Western Sahara, noting our support of last year's OAU peace plan involving a referendum. Seating the SDAR as a "member state" of the OAU—which occurred by virtue of the arbitrary decision of the Secretary General at a February Foreign Ministers meeting³—is clearly incompatible with such a plan. Our corridor lobbying on the Western Sahara at that meeting eventually contributed to the evaporation of a quorum, which subsequently led to a number of anti-U.S. comments by some members on our "meddling" in OAU affairs. In August there were enough OAU members who either agreed with our logic on the Western Sahara or who disliked Qadhafi sufficiently to prevent the two-thirds quorum required by the OAU Charter to hold a summit meeting. Perhaps because of the February events or "normal" suspicions about the unseen American hand, we were accused by several member states (mostly the radicals) of having sabotaged the Tripoli Summit.

4) Our policy has been characterized by carefully limited involvement with the OAU per se and support for the OAU's earlier peace plan for the Western Sahara, which is focussed on a ceasefire followed by a referendum. This policy served a number of purposes up to now: (a) it kept the pot boiling on the issue which was the most effective yet indirect means of frustrating Qadhafi's plan to become OAU Chairman, thus denying Qadhafi an institutional basis for inserting himself into African problems in which the OAU Chairman might conceivably be given a role; (b) it preserved our relationship with and interests in Morocco; (c) it allowed us to maintain a noninterference posture toward the OAU, which deflated potential criticism and kept us on good terms with a number of African states and leaders whose help is vital to us on important issues like the Namibia/Angola negotiations.⁴

5) Clearly shocked at the ongoing disunity in the organization, the vast majority of members—on both sides of the SDAR issue—appeared to favor holding a summit in November to reunite the OAU. They were also apparently willing to pay the price of holding the summit in Tripoli and having Qadhafi as chairman. A pre-summit ministerial meeting was eventually called for November 15 in Tripoli to make preparations for a November 23–26 summit. The

³ See footnote 2, Document 396.

⁴ Documentation on the negotiations on Namibia and Angola is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984, and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.

major stumbling block to holding a summit seemed to have been removed since both the Polisario and Algeria agreed that the SDAR would not attend these meetings. "Tripoli II" was also a failure, as was its August predecessor, but the issue which blocked a quorum in November was which Chadian delegation to seat: that of the actual government of Hissène Habré or that of the Libyan-backed former President Oueddeye Goukouni. In the end virtually the same group of moderates aligned earlier against the SDAR seating refused to participate in the November meetings because Libyan-led radicals held out for not seating any Chadian delegation.

6) Our public position on the OAU can be summarized as follows:

A) The U.S. has always supported and continues to support the OAU as Africa's principal political organization.

B) We believe it has made many positive contributions to peace and stability in Africa, and has the potential to make further contributions.

C) The U.S. actively supported the OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad.

D) We believe that the OAU Implementation Committee's peace plan for the Western Sahara, founded on a ceasefire and a referendum, offers the best hope for resolving that conflict.

E) The U.S. continues to believe that Qadhafi, because of his well known adventurism throughout the world and his active destabilization efforts against his African neighbors,⁵ is an inappropriate spokesman for the continent. We also recognize, however, that the choices of a summit site and a chairman for the OAU are for the membership of that organization to decide.

F) We regret the current state of disunity within the OAU and hope that responsible efforts to restore the unity lost twice at Tripoli will be successful.

G) The U.S. did not lobby anyone in an effort to prevent a quorum at Tripoli. We believe that the failure to produce a quorum resulted directly from the contentious issues which split the OAU membership and from many members' doubts about a Qadhafi chairmanship.

Shultz

⁵ In telegram 45276 to the OAU Collective and multiple recipients, February 17, the Department reported: "Following the Tripoli II failure, Qadhafi vowed to increase his assistance to the Polisario. The inventory of tanks and other conventional weaponry in Polisario hands has, in fact, increased over the past several months, and most of it probably comes from Libya." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830092–0370)

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 6, 1983, 1615Z

961. Dept please repeat to the following posts for info: Nairobi, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat. Subject: Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara. Ref: State 59329.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We appreciated receiving repeat reftel which throws additional light on the Bendjedid-Hassan Feb. 26 summit during which the two sides reportedly had several hours of discussion.

3. Frankly, we wonder how King Hassan squares the position he reportedly outlined to Bendjedid with his formal acceptance of the OAU Implementation Committee's resolution providing for a referendum of self-determination, with the options being independence or integration with Morocco.

4. It would appear that King Hassan's statement that the flag and the stamps must be Moroccan together with his rejection of an independent Saharan state contravene both the letter and the spirit of the OAU decisions.

5. We have noted the King's suggestion that the Polisario hold talks with the Moroccan-backed Saharan group—presumably within the context of a Moroccan state—and the reported Algerian promise to consider the proposal. Since Algeria maintains that the Western Sahara is not a bilateral Algerian-Moroccan problem, this may turn out to be the face-saving mechanism, if the Polisario is willing to accept the ground rules. In any case, Algeria can be expected publicly to support the principle of self-determination as it is contained in various OAU and UN resolutions.

6. Finally, we would agree with the comment of the Moroccan official who said it was much more difficult for Bendjedid to agree to the summit than for Hassan. It means that Bendjedid and company are

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 59329 to Algiers, March 4, repeated telegram 1746 from Rabat, March 3, which contains a record of Walters's meeting with King Hassan, who reported on his meeting with Bendjedid. According to the Embassy, Hassan "told the Algerians that only two real problems divided them: the Western Sahara and the Saharoui people. With respect to the former, the flag and the stamps must be Moroccan, everything else is negotiable. As for the latter, Hassan is prepared to accept the results of a referendum. He expects to win easily; but will honor a loss. He could not accept a small Saharoui state; but suggested the two Saharoui factions meet to reconcile their positions, thereby preventing a loss of face for anyone in a referendum. Chadli promised to study the suggestion." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002-0210)

putting Algerian interests in better relations with their Maghreb neighbors ahead of their support for Polisario aspirations. As to the question of “why now” we are tempted to see opposition to Qadhafi’s trouble-making in addition to Saudi and Tunisian peacemaking efforts.³

Newlin

³ In telegram 1122 from Algiers, March 14, the Embassy reported that Polisario official spokesman Ould Salek had four conversations with the Spanish Ambassador to Algeria. Salek reported that the “Polisario is extremely bitter over the Bendjedid-Hassan summit but vows to fight on to total victory.” The Spanish Government, the Embassy commented, was “also worried over possible Polisario attacks on Spanish fishing vessels off the Western Sahara coast and the possibility that the Polisario might resort to terrorism in Spain.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830140–0329)

407. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, June 9, 1983, 0820Z

1972. Paris for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subj: OAU Summit: Success From the Jaws of Failure and Its Implications. Ref: Addis Ababa 1967.²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Sekou Toure is the summit’s unsung hero (though it could have turned out differently) because he rallied opposition to the seating of the Polisario and carried the day. But the choice that Mengistu and other radicals made when they decided to break with Qadhafi over the SDAR seating issue has important implications.³ We

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830327–0872. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Conakry, Djibouti, Khartoum, Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Rabat.

² In telegram 1967 from Addis Ababa, June 8, the Embassy stated that the 19th “OAU Summit convened at a few minutes before eight p.m. Addis time with all delegate seats filled except Libya’s, and with no representation or seating arrangement for SDAR.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830326–0156)

³ In telegram 1926 from Addis Ababa, June 6, the Embassy reported: “The Ethiopians have clamped tight control over the Polisario and the Goukouni delegation. Polisario Foreign Minister Hakim told reporters on June 4 that he would hold a press conf at the Hilton morning June 5. The Ethiopians canceled the press conference but a Polisario rep told reporters that the SDAR Chief of State would make a declaration on arrival later same day; but when he arrived, the Polisario leader was given a bouquet of flowers and hustled off to his limousine.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830319–0242)

may not necessarily have an easier time of it with Mengistu, but the chairmanship of the OAU should make him more cautious toward his neighbors. And he has shown that where he sees clear evidence of benefit to himself and to Ethiopia he is ready to cast off the more extreme version of radicalism. End summary.

3. The OAU Summit opening last evening can claim place among the finest examples of cliffhangers, a classic case study in the snatching of success from the jaws of failure.⁴ When the diplomatic corps, journalists and mid-level delegation members arrived at Africa Hall late in the afternoon of June 8, the universal expectation was still that the pro and anti Polisario blocs were headed for a showdown. Conjecture centered around whether the Guinean led moderate bloc, which was still at that moment meeting at the Ghion Hotel, would be able to hold on to enough members to prevent a quorum's being reached.

4. How the Polisario was brought to the decision to withdraw from the summit, who played what role and what deals were struck, will probably become clearer when delegations return home next week and recount their experiences, and when we have the opportunity to talk with some of the African actors here. The result will be of more than strictly historical interest. It may tell us a lot about what we can expect from the various parties further down the road. What can be said now with reasonable certainty is that the shaping of the outcome began on the afternoon of June 7 but things did not actually come together until fairly late in the day of June 8, and that the Committee of Nine composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Congo, Uganda, Cape Verde, Mauritania and Zambia played a major role. By its composition this group was well placed to talk reason to the Polisario. A different turn of events could have made Sekou Toure the villain of the summit and dashed hopes for a Conakry meeting. As it turned out, he is the summit's unsung hero. By rallying the opposition to the Polisario he made the majority face up to the prospect of a split in the OAU if it continued to insist on the Polisario's being seated, and he carried the day.

5. The stunning humiliation delivered to Qadhafi by the collective African leadership when faced with the choice between his insistence on seating of the Polisario and the possible break up of the

⁴ In telegram 1936 from Addis Ababa, June 7, the Embassy reported: "The OAU Summit has, as expected, run into trouble over the SDAR seating issue, but the trouble has been compounded by Qadhafi's unexpected attendance which has stiffened the SDAR's insistence on being seated. Moi has formed a Group of 21 to try to come up with a solution. A pall of pessimism has begun to form over the summit but few here are yet ready to write it off as failed." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830321-0505)

OAU is a lesson that will be remembered for a long time in all quarters.⁵ There was probably at work here a kind of collective survival mechanism. Almost everyone realized that this was the OAU's last chance and thus the course down which Qadhafi wanted to direct the organization meant likely, if not certain, disaster. But some interesting choices had to be made by the radicals, in particular Mengistu. At Mengistu's dinner for delegation heads June 7, there were dour mutterings among members of the Egyptian delegation that Mengistu, faced with choice between the interests of the OAU and his friendship with Qadhafi, had chosen Qadhafi. This conclusion turned out to be premature. We do not know yet what role Mengistu played in the talks that led to the Polisario's stepping aside—probably it was significant—but had he decided to give Qadhafi his support the outcome would very likely have been entirely different. Mengistu had good reason to do what he did. He had staked a lot of prestige, both domestically and internationally, on a successful summit, and a deadlock would have hurt him. His hesitation to split with Qadhafi is probably what caused the struggle that preceded the convening to become so protracted and so bitter. Mengistu did not want to part ways with his Libyan ally if any other solution were possible. It was probably only when other avenues were foreclosed that he was ready to make his choice.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Korn

⁵ In telegram 2038 from Addis Ababa, June 14, the Embassy commented: "But the success of the 19th Summit has heavily mortgaged the 20th which without serious progress toward settlement of the Western Sahara dispute (and for most, progress means a referendum) faces uncertain prospects at best." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830337–0825)

408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia¹

Washington, June 24, 1983, 2138Z

177093. Subject: OAU and Western Sahara Problem. Ref: Addis Ababa 2137.²

1. Department believes that acting on Onu's suggestion that U.S. weigh in with Morocco in favor of continued informal talks with Polisario would not be appropriate or effective at this time. GOM public position remains opposed to such talks, even though it is well known secret that such talks have occurred. Our assessment is that future of direct GOM-Polisario contacts is extremely delicate at this point, especially in wake of OAU Summit resolution,³ but that contacts will probably continue. GOM has always been extremely prickly on this subject, even with U.S. interlocutors. GOM is also well aware of often stated U.S. position favoring cease fire followed by referendum and that action responsibility should remain with OAU Implementation Committee, in accordance with 1981 Nairobi Agreement. We thus must pass on Onu's suggestion at this time.

2. Embassy is therefore requested to thank Onu for his intervention on this issue and to explain along above lines why we are not prepared to act on it at this time. Embassy should also tell Onu that USG values his views as acting Sec Gen and as veteran observer of African scene, and that we trust that our less than our disinclination to comply with his suggestion on this occasion will not inhibit his offering us his thoughts on this and other issues in the future.

Dam

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830362-0425. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Fairchild (AF/I); cleared in draft by Kenneth Scott (AF/W) and Sebastian; approved by Bishop. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Algiers, and USUN.

² In telegram 2137 from Addis Ababa, June 22, the Embassy reported: "OAU Interim Secretary General Peter Onu considers the Western Sahara the most urgent issue facing the OAU and is taking a serious and apparently constructive approach to it." Onu also "asks that the USG encourage Morocco to agree to meet with the Polisario in the aim of preparing the ground for a cease-fire and referendum." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830355-0599)

³ The text of the resolution, which called for "direct negotiations" between Morocco and the Polisario, is in telegram 2019 from Addis Ababa, June 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830333-0593)

**409. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clark)¹**

Washington, July 20, 1983

SUBJECT

Letter to The President from Polisario Chief Mohamed Abdelaziz

We transmit for the record a letter addressed to President Reagan from the "President" of the "Saharan Democratic Arab Republic," the Polisario "government." It was delivered to our Embassy in Algiers June 27. We understand that the Polisario addressed similar messages to all the permanent UNSC members.

The letter is artfully crafted to assert for the SDAR the status of a fully accepted entity. In fact, the administrative action taken by the Organization of African Unity Secretariat to seat the SDAR as a member state precipitated an 18 month crisis during which the OAU was unable to convene a summit. The crisis was resolved only last month when the Polisario's representatives agreed not to attend the Addis summit.²

Both the fact of the letter and its text attempt to prejudge the outcome of the referendum on the future of the Western Sahara that Moroccan King Hassan has accepted and we support. The letter distorts the force of the Western Sahara resolution adopted at the Addis Summit,³ blurring the resolution's "urging" that the parties to the conflict (Morocco and the Polisario, not the SDAR) enter into direct negotiations on a ceasefire with its "direction" that the Implementation Committee resume its charge to organize the referendum that is to follow the ceasefire.

Any response or acknowledgment by the USG of this letter would tend to grant a degree of acceptance or recognition of the status which the author claims for himself and his "government" that would conflict with our longstanding support for the OAU's ceasefire/referendum approach to resolving this conflict. Consequently, we recommend there be no reply.

Charles Hill⁴
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Africa General (07/01/1983–07/30/1983). Confidential. A stamped notation indicates the memorandum was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:51 p.m. on July 20.

² See footnote 2, Document 407.

³ See footnote 3, Document 408.

⁴ Covey signed his name above Hill's typed signature.

Attachment

Letter From President of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic Abdelaziz to President Reagan⁵

Hauza, June 25, 1983

Excellency:

The war between the Saharan people and the Kingdom of Morocco, sparked by Moroccan military aggression against our country, is one of the most serious crises that the world is facing at this time.

At its 19th summit conference held June 6–11 at Addis Ababa, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), to which the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco belong, made an important decision to end this conflict.

You are surely aware, Excellency, that Africa's major concern is to spare our continent and the world the dangers that this war represents in terms of undermining peace, and to ensure respect for the sacred principle of the people's right to self-determination and independence, a right elevated by the U.N. and O.A.U. Charters to the level of a standard of *jus cogens*.

Resolution 104 (AHG XIX) takes a position both on the grounds for the conflict and the appropriate manner of settling it. The participation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco in the decision-making process made it possible for this resolution to be unanimously adopted.

The emphasis placed on a referendum by the Saharan people for free, general, and just self-determination, on terms and conditions that must be negotiated directly by the two parties to the conflict, the Polisario Front and Morocco, clearly indicates the O.A.U.'s desire to contain this conflict within its natural, just, and true dimensions as a case of decolonization of an African country that is the victim of an expansionist neighboring State.

The requirement by the 19th O.A.U. summit conference that the two parties to the conflict enter into direct negotiations before December 1983 with a view to a cease-fire and to establish the terms and conditions of the referendum for self-determination and independence indicates the path chosen by the O.A.U. to settle the conflict.

The firmness and clarity of Resolution 104 (AHG XIX) express the unanimous desire of the African States to eliminate the difficulties

⁵ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation prepared in the Division of Language Services. All brackets are in the original.

that have been deliberately created by Morocco to impede O.A.U. action to ensure, in conformity with the sacred principles of its Charter, a political, peaceful, and permanent settlement to the war between the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco while respecting the people's right to self-determination and independence.

The motives that induced me to send you this letter are based first on the fact that the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has a great international responsibility to promote peace, stability, and respect for the sacred principles of the U.N. and O.A.U. Charters, and also on my conviction that you could intervene personally in this situation to ensure the implementation of Resolution 104 in conformity with the will of Africa.

Insofar as my government is concerned, I can assure you of its complete willingness to proceed immediately with the implementation of this resolution, for any delay or evasiveness in this respect would seriously complicate and impede the African peace plan.

In addition, we avail ourselves of this opportunity to warn Morocco against any attitude that might hinder or impede the implementation of this plan in any way.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of our high consideration.

Hauza (Territories liberated by
the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic),
June 25, 1983

Mohamed Abdelaziz⁶
*President of the Saharan Democratic
Arab Republic*
Secretary General of the Polisario Front
[Presidential stamp]

⁶ Printed from a copy that indicates Abdelaziz signed the original.

410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, July 30, 1983, 2257Z

214438. Subject: Crocker-Yaker Meeting on Western Sahara.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Following is summary of Western Sahara portion of memcon of July 29 conversation between AF Assistant Secretary Crocker and Algerian Ambassador Yaker.

3. Yaker cited King's speech of July 9² and large scale military operations triggered by Moroccan attacks³ as "showing Morocco in contradiction with spirit and letter" of Addis OAU Saharan resolution. He urged the U.S. to use its influence on Morocco in favor of compliance with OAU resolution.⁴ He noted in passing, that American political, diplomatic, and military support for the King fueled the war. Hassan's July 9 statement, Yaker asserted, prejudices referendum thus voiding it of its content. This and Moroccan military activities creating increasingly "risky" situation which could expand, drawing in other countries, transforming conflict into an East-West confrontation, and ruining opportunities for regional cooperation. Though claiming not to speak for Polisario, Yaker stated his belief that once good faith negotiations began "between the parties and with help of Implementation Committee" the level of violence would seriously diminish.

4. During the course of the eighty-minute conversation Crocker, accompanied by AF DAS Bishop and NEA/AFN Peter Sebastian, countered that it is not Morocco which is responsible for the current

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435-0385. Confidential. Drafted by Jeffrey Davidow (AF/I); cleared by Thomas Williams (AF/W), Sebastian, and Bishop; approved by Crocker. Sent for information to Lagos, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Cairo, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Dakar, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Paris, Rabat, and USUN.

² In telegram 5547 from Rabat, July 15, the Embassy reported: "Morocco is now fully engaged in a display of unanimity on the Western Sahara question. The campaign to put forward a united front received new impetus from the King's July 9 address, in which he announced postponement of parliamentary elections to focus on the referendum on the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830404-0347)

³ Reference is to the July 10 Polisario attack at M'Sied, near Tan-Tan in Morocco proper. In telegram 1731 from Casablanca, July 15, the Consulate reported that it "was the most significant military action in the south in well over a year." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830404-0470)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 408.

fighting. Those with influence on Polisario should make that organization realize that current attacks make it more difficult for the OAU process to proceed. We are not about to press the King to participate in a negotiating process which both he and the U.S. have already welcomed as providing for a resolution of the conflict. We tend to read the King's recent speech as designed for the many audiences which he, as any statesman, must address. It could of course be read simply as an expression of Moroccan confidence that the referendum will produce a result favorable to its interests. In our view, the ball is in the court of the OAU Implementation Committee whose mandate we support.

5. Yaker agreed that the OAU Committee could play an important role in indirect encounters between Morocco and the Polisario to clear away the underbrush. But indirect talks, he insisted, could only be useful in the initial stages of negotiation. Unfortunately, GOA has yet to see Morocco take steps to begin process of implementing Addis OAU resolution. Crocker responded that pragmatism is key. Progress will require compromise. If Polisario objective is limited to form, viz., to appear as co-equal party, progress will be difficult. Yaker closed with reiteration that Morocco needs to begin to talk to other party. GOA cannot negotiate for Polisario but desires to help and remains committed to OAU solution and process of rapprochement with Morocco.

6. The meeting was a cordial one. Crocker invited Yaker to meet with him again next week to continue the conversation and to discuss Chad. The brief exposition of Algeria's position on Chad which Yaker provided in the July 29 meeting seemed rigidly wrong-headed.

Shultz

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, August 3, 1983, 1449Z

3624. Subject: The Sahara Issue—Mauritanian Views. Ref: A. Rabat 5894,² B. Algiers 3188,³ C. Algiers 3189.⁴

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: As a participant with relatively little input but with a potentially major stake in the outcome, Mauritania is watching events in and around the Sahara with growing concern. In particular, what is seen as Morocco's hardening stance has dashed Mauritania's hopes for a near-term OAU-style solution. In this context, Chief of State Haidalla urges the US to reiterate forcefully its support for a settlement along Addis guidelines. End summary.

3. The thoughtful and perceptive analyses of developments in the region contained in reftels arrived shortly after the Ambassador was convoked by Haidalla for a brief meeting, sandwiched with difficulty between other engagements, at which he discussed the same general subject. For the GIRM, the Western Sahara issue has long and understandably been the primary external concern (with very significant internal aspects as well). Until recently, there was a tendency to react with somewhat unrealistic optimism to any indications of progress in

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830440-0544. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Casablanca, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

² In telegram 5894 from Rabat, July 28, the Embassy reported: "During the past three weeks there have been sustained military operations by the Polisario within Morocco. The attacks, centered in the area of M'Seid (inside Morocco proper) appear to signal a change in Polisario military strategy. Moroccan policy to date has been to meet all attacks firmly, but not to counter-attack on the ground or allow the conflict to interfere with the referendum process or long-term rapprochement with Algeria. On the other hand, current Moroccan willingness to view continuing rapprochement and Algerian acquiescence, if not open support, for Polisario operations as separate tracks could be eroded if fighting is prolonged at present levels." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830430-0158)

³ In telegram 3188 from Algiers, July 31, the Embassy reported: "Algeria remains firmly committed to the process of rapprochement with Morocco, although movement has stalled because of lack of progress in resolving the Western Sahara conflict. GOA leaders were especially surprised by King Hassan's July 8 [9] speech which reinforced the perception—shared by many in the OAU—that the King is basically insincere concerning a genuine referendum of self-determination." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435-0559)

⁴ In telegram 3189 from Algiers, July 31, Newlin wrote: "Reflecting on the above messages, I am struck by the fact that there appears to be an articulated desire on the part of both Hassan and Bendjedid to arrive at a compromise settlement on the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435-0561)

the direction of a peaceful resolution. Thus the February 26 meeting between Bendjedid and Hassan,⁵ in which both the Saharan conflict and the resultant Moroccan-Algeria estrangement were viewed as virtually resolved, kindled high hopes in Nouakchott. (A series of high-level Algerian emissaries overcame Mauritania's initial fears that both it and the Polisario had been abandoned in the process.) The GIRM's quiet elation, however, faded away as it became clear that nothing really significant had occurred as far as the Sahara was concerned. The process was restarted on the occasion of the OAU summit, which the GIRM initially seemed to believe had removed all obstacles, a euphoria soon replaced by a growing fear that things were waxing worse instead of better. In all of this, Mauritania ceaselessly worries that its own interests might be sacrificed to smooth the way for a settlement.

4. In his meeting with the Ambassador, Haidalla expressed profound disappointment and concern over what he described as Moroccan intransigence. Until quite recently, he said, he had been hopeful that the summit's consensus resolution,⁶ coming in the wake of the SDAR's comportment at Addis, and coupled with Algeria's forthcoming position on bilateral issues, would have been sufficient to convince Hassan that the best interests of his nation and the entire region would be served by accepting the recommendations. The advantages accruing to all the peoples of the area were so compellingly obvious, he added, and the cost of continuing the war so high, that he was taken completely aback by the July 8 [9] statement.

5. Haidalla said that Moroccan inflexibility had already produced the one thing that everyone had hoped to avoid: renewed military activity. No longer convinced that the path of diplomacy offered much hope, the Polisario had felt obliged to remind Hassan that it still has a military option. According to Haidalla, the attacks on M'Seid were not a direct reaction to the July speech,⁷ but to the continuing evidence of a Moroccan decision to ignore the summit resolutions almost from the time of their issuance. The fact that the attacks took place inside Morocco, he added, indicate that they are also a signal from Algeria that the status quo is just as unacceptable as the announced Moroccan position on future developments in the Sahara.

⁵ See Document 19

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 408.

⁷ In telegram 3267 from Algiers, August 6, the Embassy reported: "According to a reliable Arab journalist who met Aug. 3 with Polisario's Algiers representative Ould Salek, Polisario is very pessimistic on possibilities for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Salek said King Hassan has shown that he does not accept the most recent OAU Summit Resolution; in such circumstances, the Polisario offensive at M'Sied is to make the point that without negotiations, the war will continue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830450–0545)

6. The situation is hopeless, Haidalla went on, if even those few countries that are still able to discuss the issue with Hassan are unable to persuade him to abandon a specious claim to territory belonging to a group whose claims are recognized by almost the entire world. He pointed out that the US has been one of the major contributors to Moroccan economic development and military capabilities and has had a close and productive relationship with Hassan since he came to the throne. He urged that we seek to encourage the King to be pragmatic and flexible on the Saharan issue and that we use our access to insure that he is aware that we strongly support the OAU resolutions.

7. The Ambassador reminded Haidalla that the US has continuously and publicly endorsed the position adopted by the OAU on the Western Sahara and had promptly announced its support of the decision reached at Addis. Morocco is in no doubt whatsoever as to our policy on the subject but, as a sovereign nation, makes its own decisions. Haidalla said he only wished to suggest that "Hassan be fully aware that virtually no one supports his position". The Ambassador replied that although the Sahara question is very important, it is only one aspect of our very broad overall relationship with Morocco.

8. Comment. The GIRM suspects Rabat would be happier with a government in Nouakchott that tilted a little more toward the Moroccan position. Haidalla has on occasion indicated that he fears the Moroccan objective is considerably more than just a similarity of views on various issues. In a French radio interview, published July 26, responding to a question, how he viewed challenges to Mauritanian existence Haidalla said, "as far as I know, the existence of Mauritania has not been disputed except by one of our neighbors". This appears to be a reference to Morocco and, however paranoid, seems to be a belief shared by many in the leadership, who point to the failed coup of February 81 as a concrete illustration of Rabat's intentions.⁸

9. Haidalla therefore sees a continuation of the impasse in the Sahara as increasing the threat to his regime as well as the dangers to the region. Nevertheless, he was also very evidently interested in putting his observations on the situation in a positive light. He agreed that if [it] hadn't been in Algeria at the Maghreb summit, they would have met and talked, and he reminded the Ambassador of the July 10 speech in which he stated that the current lack of diplomatic relations is a temporary aberration in brotherly ties. In short, Haidalla knows he has to do his best to get along with the King, but he sees little to work with either in the bilateral context or, of perhaps far greater significance, in the Saharan context.

⁸ See Document 3.

10. On the latter issue, he was quite somber, giving the impression that he has little hope that Hassan will change his announced stance. He made only a passing reference to the US arms supply program, and did not voice any criticism of our policy. He appeared to be very interested in being reassured that the USG's position has not changed, even though he seems to believe that Morocco itself has vitiated the OAU process.

Peck

412. Editorial Note

September 11–16, 1983, Vice President George H.W. Bush visited North Africa to discuss bilateral issues, the status of the Middle East peace negotiations, and the conflict in Western Sahara. Bush visited Morocco September 11–13, Algeria September 13–15, and Tunisia September 15–16 before departing for Yugoslavia. For a record of his September 12 meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco, see Document 26. On September 14, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Ibrahimi gave Bush “further details of the Bendjedid-Hassan Feb 26 meeting and stressed Algeria’s desire to find a peaceful solution” to the conflict in the Western Sahara. (Telegram 3943 from Algiers, September 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830534–0254) The subject of the Western Sahara was not raised during Bush’s September 14 meeting with Algerian Prime Minister Mohamed Abdelghani. A record of that conversation is printed as Document 130. A record of his September 15 meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali is printed as Document 27. For the full text of Bush’s statements, addresses, and remarks during the North African portion of his trip, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1983, pages 10–15.

413. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, September 23, 1983, 0833Z

3534. S/S/O please deliver to appropriate officers opening of business. Subject: Western Sahara Implementation Committee Meeting Fails. Ref: (A) Addis Ababa 3520,² (B) Addis Ababa 3521.³

1. (C—Entire text)

2. The OAU Western Sahara Implementation Committee meeting collapsed on the afternoon of September 22nd after the Moroccan delegation refused either to sit at the same table or in the same room, and some say in the same building, with the Polisario delegation to negotiate over the Western Sahara.

3. From OAU sources, Tanzanian diplomats and others we have the following sketchy outline of what happened. OAU sources state that the Moroccan delegation included a group of Saharans who, they said, were competent to discuss the Western Sahara problem with the Polisario. According to OAU sources, the Polisario agreed to negotiate with the Moroccan Saharans on the Western Sahara provided that the Moroccan delegation would sit at the same table with the Polisario. The Moroccans adamantly refused to do so. Tanzanian source did not provide such detailed information but did confirm that Morocco refused to negotiate in any way with the Polisario.

4. According to OAU sources, Sekou Toure tried to have documents presented by the various factions to the Implementation Committee,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830551–0573. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Lagos, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 3520 from Addis Ababa, September 22, O'Neill reported that the "Ethiopian Ambassador to Sudan, who is attending the Implementation Meeting on the Sahara, told me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the meetings have been adjourned. He said that the Moroccan delegation would not talk to the Polisario either face-to-face or through intermediaries. There is now some attempt to reinstitute a smaller meeting but the Ambassador feels that this is highly unlikely." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830548–0534)

³ In telegram 3521 from Addis Ababa, September 22, the Embassy reported: "The Moroccans almost from the beginning stated that they were in Addis Ababa under the Nairobi OAU meeting guidelines. The other members of the Implementation Committee stated that they were in Addis Ababa for this meeting under the 19th OAU guidelines; the latter which requires negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. This was the first clash and was the sign of troubles to come." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830550–0115)

which the Implementation Committee declined to accept.⁴ At this point, a substantial majority of the Implementation Committee agreed that Morocco was avoiding all OAU agreements agreed to at the 19th OAU session.

5. When Morocco remained adamant, Tanzania, Mali and Ethiopia pushed for immediate adjournment and cancellation of further meetings. Toure, Peter Onu and the OAU Staff, plus some friends of Morocco, tried to mount a salvage operation, but Nyerere's departure late afternoon of September 22nd squashed that option. By the morning of September 23, the Sudanese, Malian and Tanzanian delegations had left Addis Ababa with the remaining parties expected to depart shortly.

6. Comment: There is consternation at the OAU and puzzlement among diplomats in Addis Ababa why the Moroccans would send a large delegation, led by the Crown Prince, to say no to what was commonly believed to be a pre-arranged face-saving situation for Morocco. Also, concern is already being expressed in the African diplomatic community over prospects for the 20th OAU summit conference in Conakry.

O'Neill

⁴ In telegram 3554 from Addis Ababa, September 25, O'Neill reported that as a result of information "secured during a meeting at airport" that there were "assurances given by Sékou Touré's Ambassador, in Addis Ababa, definitely verbally and some say in written form, that Morocco would negotiate with the Polisario. It was on this basis that the meeting was called. The Moroccans vehemently deny that they gave any such assurance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830555-0370)

414. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, December 28, 1983

MOROCCO-ALGERIA-WESTERN SAHARA:
The War Grinds On

The chances of a political resolution of the eight-year-old war in Western Sahara, which were increased somewhat by a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria earlier this year, have diminished in recent months. As the deadline for an OAU-sponsored referendum this month runs out, the disputants have stiffened their positions. King Hassan remains under pressure to find a solution to the conflict, however, and Algeria is anxious to keep alive prospects for a settlement. [handling restriction not declassified]

Hassan tacitly accepted an OAU resolution² last summer that named Morocco and the Polisario Front as the parties to the conflict, but he has steadfastly refused to hold public talks with the insurgents. [less than 4 lines not declassified]

In a recent letter to African heads of state, Hassan reaffirmed his willingness to hold a referendum in Western Sahara. He insisted, however, that the OAU first has to arrange a cease-fire.³ [handling restriction not declassified]

The Algerian Position

During the past year, Algeria has begun to direct its policy in North Africa away from confrontation with Morocco in an effort to promote stability in the region. [handling restriction not declassified] [less than 1 line not declassified] has included a decision to seek a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] that Algeria no longer favors an independent Saharan state because it could introduce a new element of instability in the area. Instead, [less than 1 line not declassified] that the solution to the Western Sahara problem could be found in some kind of confederation scheme with Morocco and Mauritania.⁴ [less than 1 line not declassified] Algeria is willing to assist in negotiations by "working on the Polisario." [handling restriction not declassified]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Maghreb 1983 and 1984. Top Secret. [codeword not declassified]

² See footnote 3, Document 408.

³ No record of Hassan's letter has been found.

⁴ In telegram 5414 from Algiers, December 9, the Embassy reported: "There have been private indications Algeria is prepared to work for a compromise of less than independence for the Sahrawis within the context of the grand Maghreb ideal if Hassan will negotiate openly with the Polisario." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830726-0663)

Algerian President Bendjedid, however, is constrained by the Army and other less conciliatory elements in the government and by Algeria's longstanding commitment to the principle of self-determination for the territory. As a result, Algiers will continue to support the Polisario's position that Rabat deal directly with the insurgents rather than through Algeria, as Hassan would like. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

While the recent fifth party congress of the National Liberation Front strengthened Bendjedid's authority, he is still unlikely to adopt policies that offend the Army—his main power base. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

In any event, Algiers is unlikely to take any new initiatives in the next several months. Among other things, the Algerians are increasingly preoccupied with the presidential election to be held next month. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Other Pressures

African states are anxious to see progress in settling the conflict before the OAU summit scheduled for May in Conakry, Guinea. The interim Secretary General of the OAU says the Polisario leaders have agreed not to attend a ministerial conference in February to avoid further disrupting the organization. He expects, however, that the insurgents will insist on attending the summit and claiming a seat.⁵ [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Morocco's moderate African supporters, who thus far have gone along with Rabat's insistence that the Polisario not be seated at the OAU, are restive over Morocco's position on implementing the OAU resolution. If the Polisario's self-declared "republic"—recognized by 27 of the OAU's 50 members—is admitted as a member state at the summit, only a few other members would be likely to follow Rabat in its probable walkout. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Rabat's serious financial difficulties, which are caused in part by the cost of the war, may eventually add to the pressures on Hassan to compromise. Although acquisition of Western Sahara remains a popular cause among Moroccans, the continuation of economic austerity measures could cause political problems for the King. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Aid from Saudi Arabia, which earlier had helped offset military expenses, has dropped off over the past two years. In recent months,

⁵ In telegram 4674 from Addis Ababa, December 9, Korn reported: "Onu says that in any event he expects the Polisario to stick to its pledge not to attend the February 1984 OAU Ministerial Meeting. The Polisario will insist on attending the summit, and Sekou Touré may choose to postpone the summit—otherwise scheduled for May—rather than have to face a decision on this issue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830726–0904)

the Saudis reportedly have [*less than 1 line not declassified*] encouraged all parties to seek a solution to the conflict in the interest of regional unity. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Military Outlook

Polisario insurgents are likely to continue the sporadic but well-organized military attacks they began in July in the hope of forcing Morocco into direct, public negotiations. Their tactics have included efforts to breach the Moroccan defensive barrier, but they do not have the ability to hold territory actively defended by Moroccan forces. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The guerrillas also probably will increase harassing attacks with the intention of luring Moroccan forces outside the barrier. In addition, they may continue efforts to shoot down Moroccan aircraft, which frequently attack Polisario camps in Western Sahara. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The recent start of Moroccan construction to extend the barrier to the Mauritanian border will further frustrate the Polisario and reinforce its determination to fight on. Without increased support, however, the Polisario is unlikely to be able to put enough military pressure on Morocco to force it to compromise any time soon.⁶ [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Algeria probably will not increase substantially the Polisario's military capabilities or loosen the controls that inhibit the insurgents' access to Moroccan territory. On the other hand, the Algerians are likely to have approved heightened guerrilla activity in the past six months. They may calculate that Rabat will not be ready for a compromise solution until after Moroccan resources have been strained further by the conflict. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

[Omitted here is a map of the Western Sahara.]

⁶ In telegram 10491 from Rabat, December 22, the Embassy stated "some 2,000 Moroccan military drawn from two brigades moved into the Amgala area on December 21 assembling over the past weeks at Bou Craa. Their mission is to secure the area in order to extend the berm and enclose the Amgala region." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830755-0432)

415. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 17, 1984, 1130Z

490. Rome please pass to Codel Lantos. Military for Polads. Subject: King Hassan's Views on the Western Sahara Issue. Ref: A) Rabat 407 (Notal),² B) Rabat 404 (Notal).³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Codel Lantos spent January 12 in Casablanca where the Congressmen had lengthy meetings with Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and many members of the Moroccan Government followed by a long meeting with King Hassan II (see reftel A). This cable reports on King Hassan's comments on the Western Sahara.

3. During the meeting with Codel Lantos, Congressman Pickle of Texas asked what the United States might do to help resolve the Sahara problem. He also asked what would help Morocco most, MAP, FMS or to have the United States say publicly that it is on Morocco's side.

4. The King responded that the problem of the Sahara is a political one and its neighbors have made it a military one. He explained that when Morocco wanted a solution it went to the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and noted that the Treaty of Madrid had been sanctioned by the United Nations. He said that as Morocco's neighbor insists on military solutions, he had to react in a military manner although the final solution could only be political.

5. Turning more directly to the question of what is expected from the United States, the King said that he hopes that the United States will give him the "oxygen" he needs to be able to keep hold militarily of the situation. He added that even more important was the political support of the United States. He said the United States should state that Morocco is correct because it wants to hold a free and fair referendum. "Here we need the help of the United States."

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840033–0602. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, Rome, USUN, Tangier, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 407 from Rabat, January 13, the Embassy reported on the "extraordinary effort by King Hassan and the Moroccan Government to demonstrate their interest in the Codel and their friendship for the United States." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0244)

³ In telegram 404 from Rabat, January 13, Reed reported that he had conveyed the talking points to King Hassan contained in telegram 8877 (see footnote 3, Document 417). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0051)

He noted that the adversary who asked for a referendum for years no longer wants it despite all guarantees by the OAU and UN observers. The King said that he believes the referendum should take place now. He argued that the opposition has opted for a subversive war because they want Morocco to have a financial hemorrhage. Pointing out that with its natural gas Algeria earns \$15 billion per year and Morocco does not have \$500 million. "Algeria wants to lead us to bankruptcy." The King added that Morocco is very troublesome to some countries because it has freedom of the press, labor unions, a constitution which guarantees freedoms and in two months will hold legislative elections. The King wryly remarked that Morocco is a subversive state in the other direction. He concluded his answer by saying that Morocco was in an undeclared war Morocco must win, and to do that it must be strong on the field.

6. Congressman Seiberling asked the King what was preventing Morocco from going ahead with the referendum without waiting for Algeria and others to support it.

7. The King responded that the reason is simple. When he went to Nairobi and made the offer for the referendum, he made it clear that he wanted to have no responsibility in organizing it. For the referendum to take place the Implementing Committee had to come to determine when and where it would be held and to agree on questions, and to put in its observers or UN observers. "When I say that it is time to have a referendum, the other side says no." The King said that Morocco has no role to play in organizing a referendum but that he would make resources available to the OAU. The King closed by saying that Morocco's adversaries now pose arbitrary and trumped up reasons why the referendum cannot be held at this time.

8. Minimize considered Nouakchott.

Reed

416. Memorandum From [name not declassified]

Washington, February 22, 1984

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, February 23, 1984, 2224Z

53901. Subject: Moroccan Request for U.S. Support for GOM Position on Western Sahara Dispute. Ref: A) Rabat 1648² B) State 8877³ c) State 32456.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department believes that sharing information with Foreign Minister Belkeziz on the Western Sahara issue is most appropriate. This message provides an interim response to FonMin's request. We expect to follow up with more extensive discussion of Western Sahara at Belkeziz-Eagleburger meeting in Washington next week.

3. Reftel A suggests that Belkeziz is already aware of the latest developments regarding the Conakry summit, particularly its possible

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840120–0441. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kenneth Scott (AF/W); cleared by Sebastian, Edward Perkins (ADF/W), James Vincent (AF/I), Edmund van Gilder (AF/W), Schermerhorn, Raphel, and Schneider; approved by Bishop. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Abidjan, Accra, Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, and Nouakchott.

² In telegram 1648 from Rabat, February 21, the Embassy reported: "Foreign Minister Belkeziz reiterated Morocco's request for more active U.S. support on the Western Sahara dispute during a February 20 meeting with Ambassador Reed." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840113–0132)

³ Telegram 8877 to Rabat, January 12, 1984. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840021–0534)

⁴ In telegram 32456 to Algiers, February 2, the Department repeated telegram 1116 from Dakar, February 2, which reported that Senegalese Foreign Minister Moustapha Niasse had warned that at the next OAU Summit, scheduled for later in the year in Conakry, "it would not be surprising if the radicals—led by Madagascar—turned the tables on the moderates at Conakry" on the issue of seating the SDAR. The Embassy continued: "By that he means that the radicals have more than a 'blocking third' and there is therefore a real risk that the summit may not take place unless some of the radicals can be wooed away." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840072–0331)

postponement until fall 1984, and of the general expectation that the SDAR will not press its case at the ministerial but will go all out at the summit to be seated. Specific talking points conveying information gained from discussions with selected African officials follow later in this cable.

4. We are concerned, however, by Belkeziz's request that the U.S. "undertake diplomatic soundings" prior to the ministerial and "encourage" various African countries to "refrain from supporting a Polisario move to be seated at the OAU ministerial".⁵ We believe that his specific request that the U.S. approach countries such as Algeria, Ghana, and Mauritania is impractical since the U.S. has little or no leverage on this issue with such countries. In addition there is the danger that these states might use charges that the U.S. is "pressuring" OAU members on Morocco's behalf and interfering in the internal affairs of the OAU to undermine Morocco's own efforts to carry out its strategy. Such *démarches* would also risk eliciting further requests for the U.S. to weigh in with King Hassan and use what African countries consider to be our considerable influence with the GOM to make the GOM "more reasonable" on the issue of negotiating directly and publicly with the Polisario. As Embassy is aware, we have already been asked to intercede with Morocco several times and have demurred. We recall also Senegalese FonMin Niasse's admonition to the U.S. (repeated ref C to Rabat and others): "be discreet, even invisible" on the Western Sahara issue during the months preceding the next summit. In sum, we believe that our interests and Morocco's are best served by continuing our discreet low-key discussions with friendly and knowledgeable key players on the Western Sahara and keeping the GOM informed of the results. The following talking points reflect the useful discussions we have had in Conakry and Dakar and in Addis with members of the OAU Secretariat since the Secretary's conversation with King Hassan.

5. Talking points:

— We find our continuing dialogue on the Western Sahara dispute very useful in keeping abreast of an issue of great importance to Morocco and the U.S.

— Following the Secretary's discussion with King Hassan on January 12,⁶ we asked our Ambassadors in selected key African

⁵ In telegram 877 from Nouakchott, February 25, the Embassy reported: "Chief of State Haidallah called in the Ambassador Feb 25 to advise that the GIRM will extend diplomatic recognition to the SDAR on the 27th. He wanted the USG to know that in taking this step, after long and careful study, Mauritania hoped to advance the cause of peace and reduce tensions; it does not wish to see an intensification or prolongation of the fighting." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840124-0538)

⁶ The date is in error. Shultz and Hassan met in Rabat on December 11, 1983. See Document 221.

countries to discuss the Western Sahara issue at the highest levels. In response to your specific request of February 20, I would like to share with you now what we have ascertained from these discussions about the February Foreign Ministers' meeting.

— The general expectation is that the SDAR will not seek admission to an OAU meeting before the 20th summit. Presumably this would apply to the February 27 Foreign Ministers' meeting, which is expected to focus primarily on OAU budgetary matters.

— Having said that, however, some radical African states may seek to have the SDAR seated at the ministerial. We understand that the OAU Secretariat wants to avoid controversy at the ministerial and hopes that the SDAR will stay away. It is always possible, however, that an SDAR delegation may show up in Addis Ababa and claim a seat, even if the SDAR has not been extended an invitation.

— We understand that the Polisario intends to pursue its claim to a seat at the 20th summit, particularly if it voluntarily absents itself from the Addis ministerial. As you remarked during our last meeting, there is a possibility that the summit may be postponed until November; this would give Morocco more time to deal with the situation within the OAU. We fear that unless there is some progress in resolving the Western Sahara dispute there may be erosion in the diplomatic support which Morocco has enjoyed from key members of the OAU, who, as a result, may acquiesce in the seating of the SDAR at the Conakry Summit.

— We will, of course, continue our discussion with key interlocutors. But we have little influence in this area with three of the countries you mentioned in our February 20 discussion (and Ivory Coast is Morocco's friend), and believe an initiative on our part on this issue with them could be counterproductive to the interests of our two countries.

— We look forward to hearing the results of Morocco's continued efforts with its friends in the OAU to deal with this question, in particular its strategy for handling the Polisario's likely move to claim a seat at the summit. We look forward to discussing this and other aspects of the Western Sahara issue with you in Washington during the Prime Minister's visit. Under Secretary Eagleburger will be hosting a breakfast for you on March 1⁷ and hopes to have a thorough discussion of the Saharan issue at that time.⁸

Shultz

⁷ No record of the Eagleburger-Reed breakfast meeting has been found.

⁸ In telegram 1930 from Rabat, February 29, the Embassy reported that in Belkeziz's absence "Tazi expressed appreciation for the message" expressed in telegram 53901, "and made no further request for U.S. political support." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840133–0382)

418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea¹

Washington, March 24, 1984, 2008Z

87650. Subject: Western Sahara and the OAU: Sekou Toure's Next Steps. Ref: Addis 1330 (Notal).²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Last week AF and NEA completed a series of consultations with the Algerian Commerce Minister,³ Peter Onu,⁴ Guy Penne,⁵ and the Nigerian Foreign Minister.⁶ Each discussion dealt with, in varying degrees of intensity, the Western Sahara issue and its effect on the upcoming Conakry OAU Summit. This week Sekou Toure carried his

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840195–0274. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Scott; cleared by Perkins, Sebastian, Van Gilder, Vincent, and Bishop; approved by Crocker. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Rabat, Addis Ababa, and Dakar.

² In telegram 1330 from Addis Ababa, March 20, the Embassy reported: "OAU official with responsibility for Western Sahara tells us that the OAU Secretariat is making plans, under instructions from interim Secretary General Peter Onu, for another Western Sahara Implementation Committee meeting in late April or May. The planning does not yet have the blessing of OAU Chairman Mengistu but Onu will discuss this initiative with Chairman Mengistu when he (Onu) returns to Addis Ababa later this month." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840182–0152)

³ In telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16, the Department reported that on March 12, Khelif told Shultz "that Morocco's hardening position on the Sahara, in particular its apparent choice of military rather than political means to achieve a solution, risked further deterioration in Morocco's already difficult domestic situation." The GOA, Khelif said, had tried "to promote a political solution by enabling Hassan to agree to the direct negotiations with the Polisario that are necessary for a settlement," but "the King had chosen not to do." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806)

⁴ In telegram 83506 to Addis Ababa, March 22, the Department reported that during a March 16 meeting with Crocker, Bishop, and Lyman, Onu informed them that, with regards to the OAU Ministerial, "there were no prospects for breaking the impasse over the SDAR issue, which is preventing the name of a summit date. SDAR supporters are demanding prior assurances that Guinea allow the SDAR to attend the summit and, if the SDAR is seated, to pose no obstacles." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840186–0566)

⁵ In telegram 78878 to Addis Ababa and Paris, March 17, the Department noted that during a March 14 meeting with Crocker, French Presidential African Affairs advisor Guy Penne "commented that prospects for holding the Conakry summit were not at all clear because the SDAR recognition issue may constitute a serious obstacle." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0337)

⁶ In telegram 79210 to Lagos, March 17, the Department indicated that on March 15, Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Ibrahim Gambari told Shultz that "Nigeria wants to see movement" on the Western Sahara, "especially to ensure that it and the Chad question do not prevent the holding of the OAU Summit. As a member of the Implementation Committee, Nigeria is looking for something to implement. It wants to see movement from Morocco and the other parties involved." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0599)

personal OAU diplomacy to Rabat⁷ and Algiers.⁸ The Department believes that now is the time to engage Toure in a searching discussion of the Western Sahara and the prospects for staging a successful summit in Conakry this year.

3. You have seen from the cables reporting the Washington discussions that the OAU appears to be at an impasse over the issue of seating an SDAR delegation at the summit. We remain concerned that Morocco will be isolated in the OAU and, indeed, may be alone in walking out of the summit should the SDAR be seated. At the moment, we do not envision an active role for the U.S. in dealing with this imbroglio; we believe, however, that it is essential to learn Toure's views and intentions as OAU Summit host in light of his recent consultations in Algiers and Rabat and the need for him and the OAU Secretariat to set a summit date.

4. You should therefore seek an appointment with Toure as soon as possible⁹ and put before him the following questions:

— A) Will the summit take place o/a May 25, as originally scheduled, or will there be a delay? If there is a delay, when will it be rescheduled?

— B) Would a delay help in defusing the dispute over the seating of an SDAR delegation?

— C) Would Sekou Toure allow an SDAR delegation into the country?

— D) Will two-thirds of the OAU members show up in Conakry?

⁷ In telegram 2520 from Rabat, March 19, the Embassy reported on Sékou Touré's visit to Morocco indicating that, according to Moroccan officials, "he remains committed to holding the summit on schedule and that his visits to Fez and Algiers are an effort to resolve the diplomatic impasse over the Western Sahara." Furthermore, "Belkeziz summarized that there were two options for the Conakry summit: either failure on the order of the abortive Tripoli summits or an acceptable formula to manage the Sahara issue. The summit, he said, must convene and study the issue without pre-conditions on admission of the SDAR." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840179–0362)

⁸ In telegram 1426 from Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that Sékou Touré, upon departing Algeria, "proclaimed himself wholly satisfied with his visit" to Algiers, "but said that the two sides had 'somewhat divergent views on some problems.'" The Embassy commented: "Although GOA still professes its willingness to assist in reconciliation of Western Sahara problem, it shows no sign of falling off its minimum requirement for direct contact between the Polisario and Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840185–0687)

⁹ On March 26, Sékou Touré died while undergoing a cardiac procedure at the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio. In telegram 2835 from Rabat, the Embassy commented: "The unexpected death of Guinean President Sékou Touré is a serious blow to Morocco's diplomatic position on the Western Sahara which has depended in large part on confidence that, with Sékou Touré at the helm of the OAU, Morocco would gain the upper hand in subsequent discussions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840200–0356)

- E) Will the SDAR be seated?
- F) Is there any possibility of a conditional seating of the SDAR that would not prejudice the holding of a referendum?
- G) Is there anything that can be done between now and the summit that could head off the seating of the SDAR?
- H) Might some kind of diplomatic activity (such as shuttle diplomacy by a respected African) provide enough appearance of movement to make the seating of the SDAR less likely?
- I) Has Peter Onu seen Toure since Toure's visits to Rabat and Algiers (Onu told us here that he planned to spend several days with Toure before returning to Addis Ababa, but that presumably was disrupted by Toure's travels in North Africa).
- J) Is there a possibility of successfully convening a meeting of the Implementation Committee prior to the summit to deal with the issue of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario?
- K) What is the potential for the Chad issue to delay or disrupt the summit?
- L) Is there anything that the U.S. can do to be helpful, in Toure's view?

5. For Dakar and Addis Ababa: Department would appreciate your posing questions, at your discretion, along the lines of those above to your interlocutors in the GOS and the OAU respectively.¹⁰

Shultz

¹⁰ In telegram 3161 from Dakar, March 27, the Embassy reported: "While we are not privy to the details of their conversations," Senegal "is clearly carrying on an active triangular diplomacy with Morocco, Algeria and the SDAR." The Embassy continued: "We will do our best to learn the tenor of all these conversations, but the Senegalese clearly don't wish to share the details with us for the moment, at least." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840202-0315)

419. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 19, 1984

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 1984. Secret; Sensitive; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. 3 pages not declassified.]

420. White House Situation Room Note¹

Washington, May 21, 1984

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

Algeria Perceives Change in U.S. Western Sahara Policy

In discussions yesterday with Deputy Assistant Secretary Nassif,² Algerian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Kerroum characterized Secretary Weinberger's May 18 remarks in Rabat³ as a change in U.S. policy on the Western Sahara, "embracing the most extreme Moroccan theses."⁴

◦ The government of Algeria had expected a more neutral U.S. position—rather than exclusive references to the OAU's Nairobi

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, Algeria—1984. Secret.

² Telegram 2421 from Algiers, May 21, contains a record of the Nassif-Kerroum conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840329–0640)

³ An unknown hand underlined "Secretary Weinberger's May 18 remarks in Rabat." See footnote 4 below.

⁴ In a May 22 memorandum to Gregg, Eckert reported on Weinberger's Rabat speech, noting that Weinberger had said in part: "We offer our continued support for a peaceful settlement of the problems in the Western Sahara, a settlement based on the Nairobi resolutions of the OAU." Eckert continued: "What Secretary Weinberger did here was refer to the Nairobi OAU resolutions (which called for a cease-fire and referendum, as proposed by King Hassan) *without* reference to the *later* Addis OAU resolutions that identified the parties to the dispute as Morocco and the Polisario (not Algeria) and 'urged' those parties to enter direct negotiations (Hassan will not publicly acknowledge talking to a 'band of rebels created by Algeria'). What Weinberger should have said is our standard line that 'we support OAU efforts.'" (George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, Algeria—1984)

resolution as if the 19th OAU summit had never occurred, the U.S. should have stuck to previous formulations of general support for OAU efforts.

◦ This new U.S. policy will reinforce Moroccan illusions that the war can be won militarily and prolong the conflict.

◦ Algeria fears that Rabat's berm expansion program may lead to Moroccan attacks on Mauritania, in which case the Algerians could not fail to react.⁵

Our embassy comments that Kerroum's remarks were delivered without rancor and with his usual wit, but with the clear conviction that the U.S. has indeed altered its Western Sahara policy.⁶ Following on previous demarches encouraging Algeria and Morocco to place less emphasis on form and more on substance in trying to resolve the problem, Secretary Weinberger's remarks are viewed in Algiers as the logical progression in what appears to be a growing U.S. public embrace of traditional Moroccan theses.

◦ In the Algerian analyses, such a change could only reinforce Moroccan perceptions that the war can be won militarily, thus prolonging the stalemate even further. (S)

Algiers 2421, PSN 55456⁷

⁵ In telegram 3932 from Rabat, April 27, the Embassy reported: "Moroccan forces continue to expand the berm as Polisario shelling of Moroccan positions fails to slow the pace of construction. As berm construction turns westward toward Smara, the likelihood of direct Moroccan-Algerian confrontation diminishes. Algerian and Moroccan forces remain, however, in close proximity in the southern part of the common border." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840276-0130)

⁶ An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and underlined "with the clear conviction that the U.S. has indeed altered its Western Sahara policy."

⁷ For telegram 2421, from Algiers, see footnote 2. PSN55456 was not found.

421. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Deputy Secretary of State Dam¹

Washington, August 10, 1984

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Morocco, Algeria and the Western Sahara

We understand that the issue has been raised of whether the US should begin to play a more active role toward achieving a settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. Our policy judgment is that the US should not depart from the policy toward North Africa established at the outset of this Administration: that we should emphasize our bilateral relationships with Morocco and Algeria and subordinate settlement of what is essentially a regional dispute to our larger strategic objectives in the region. The following background information may be of use as you make your own determination.

BACKGROUND

Western Sahara. Basic US policy toward the Western Sahara dispute has been that (1) we acknowledge Moroccan administrative control of the area but not Moroccan claims to sovereignty; (2) we wish to see a negotiated solution to the dispute but are neutral with respect to its eventual modalities; and (3) we prefer OAU to UN mediation efforts.

- Before 1979, US arms sales policy toward Morocco was relatively unforthcoming and was crafted to prevent Moroccan use of US-supplied arms in the Western Saharan conflict.

- In 1979, this policy was changed.² US arms sales were expanded to include weapons that could help Morocco maintain its *administrative* control over the Western Sahara, pending a negotiated solution. Specifically, and for the first time, OV-10 helicopters, a weapon particularly suited for anti-guerrilla warfare, were sold to the Moroccans.

The 1979 policy change was designed to position the US to follow a self-consciously *two-track* policy of promoting negotiations, on the one hand, and using US military assistance to prevent what then seemed to be imminent Moroccan military defeat, on the other. It was anticipated

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–15, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Morton; cleared by Kaplan. Kauzlarich initialed the memorandum and wrote: "8/10."

² For Carter's decision to provide OV-10s and arms to Morocco, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 49.

that a stronger military position would give Morocco the confidence it needed to pursue the negotiating track. The Presidential Directive outlining the 1979 policy change contained stipulations (never fully communicated to the Moroccans or to the Congress) that required the Moroccans to negotiate directly with the Polisario and made delivery of the OV-10s contingent on a demonstrated Moroccan willingness to negotiate.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration changed US policy toward Morocco and the Western Sahara. Emphasis on the negotiating track became muted on the ground that Morocco is a staunch friend of the US having helped the West in Zaire, being willing to provide strategic access, and taking moderate positions on issues pertaining to the Middle East. Any effort by the US to bring about a negotiated solution was judged to have the potential of forcing us to "lean on" Morocco, to the harm of that friendship. Emphasis on the military track was increased, partly to enhance Morocco's strategic and regional security position, partly to aid Morocco in establishing a stronger military position in the Western Saharan war. US security assistance [*1½ lines not declassified*] have contributed to a strengthened Moroccan position in the usable Sahara, which is being effectively integrated into Moroccan society.

The Region. The Reagan Administration policy of emphasizing bilateral relationships and eschewing the policy of pressing the parties to the Western Sahara dispute to negotiate has served US interests well. Morocco has scored military and diplomatic successes and the US-Moroccan bilateral relationship has strengthened to our mutual advantage. The US-Algeria bilateral relationship continues to improve, and the Algerians place their own pragmatic interests above solidarity with the Polisario. Most important from a regional perspective, the Moroccans and Algerians have improved their own bilateral relationship and secret talks are underway between them toward the end of settling the Western Sahara dispute. (We believe that the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement is transitory and was designed, in part, to show Morocco's pique at Algeria for not dropping its insistence that the Moroccans engage in direct talks with the Polisario.)

US POLICY

We believe that interjection of the US into the Western Sahara dispute would serve only to antagonize each of the major parties—Morocco and Algeria. Trying to work with each to find modalities for solution of the dispute would be misinterpreted as exertions of pressure. Each side would probably misperceive the US role as being that of secretly siding with its adversary and the capital that we have built up in each of the two bilateral relationships would be squandered. Finally, an election year is probably not the appropriate time

to undertake a new initiative, the purposes of which could be misperceived in the region and at home.

American efforts to try to resolve the Saharan conflict also would run the risk of causing us to bear the burden if failure occurs. On the other hand, a naturally evolving solution to the Western Sahara dispute would enable the US to improve its bilateral ties with both Morocco and Algeria—free of current Moroccan perceptions that we are doing too little to aid them on the Western Sahara and perceptions by the Algerians that we are doing too much. *Premature* efforts to resolve the dispute, under whatever auspices, could lead instead to the creation of an unviable Polisarian “mini-state” that would contribute to continuing instability in the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks into Moroccan territory, and potential Soviet strategic access to facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

You have already received a joint AF-NEA memorandum on this subject (attached at Tab A). S/P supports Options (1) and (3) which, in combination, constitute a continuation of present US policy. S/P recommends disapproval of Option (2), believing that the US should not play a more active role in the negotiating process until the Moroccans and the Algerians are closer to finding their *own* solution—and then only if both parties take the initiative in asking for US “good offices”.

In this framework, resolution of the Western Sahara dispute could serve US interests by contributing to stability in the region and enabling Morocco to devote fuller attention and more substantial resources to its pressing internal economic situation. Healing of the rift between Morocco and Algeria would permit each to play a more vigorous role in counter-balancing Libya and in protecting weaker states of the region from Libyan aggression—particularly Tunisia and Niger. Regional economic benefits could also be obtained if Morocco and Algeria were able to take advantage of inherent complementarities in their economies and the benefits that would accrue to Algeria from Moroccan-facilitated access to the Atlantic. But these benefits only would accrue if Morocco (and Algeria) sought our help in seeking an agreement.

As for the concern expressed by NEA and AF about the possibility of Moroccan diplomatic isolation at the OAU and UNGA, this has been a perennial problem and one that usually is met by an eleventh-hour solution. Even if a worst-case scenario were to transpire and Morocco were to walk out from the OAU without being joined by others, the negative effects, both for Morocco and for the OAU, are not likely to be long-lasting. While it would set an unfortunate precedent with respect to other entities like the PLO, seating of the SDAR by the OAU (1) may not actually happen, and (2) if it *does* occur, the seriousness of this event for US interests does not merit rushing head-long into a US-sponsored Saharan negotiating effort designed to head it off. In any case, Embassy

Rabat has concluded that, for the King, "there is no choice between claims to the Sahara and OAU membership: Morocco clearly intends to walk out, with or without company, if the SDAR is seated."³

Tab A

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)⁴

Washington, August 6, 1984

SUBJECT

The Western Sahara—U.S. Policy

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether the U.S. should take some initiative to stimulate positive movement on the Western Sahara dispute prior to the UNGA and the next OAU summit, expected to occur in November.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the only international entity engaged in efforts to resolve the Western Saharan dispute which dates from 1977. Because most OAU members view Moroccan refusal to negotiate directly with the Polisario as the principal obstacle to a settlement, we expect a majority to acquiesce in the seating of the putative Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) by the OAU at its next summit, for which the target date is November.

From the U.S. perspective, seating the SDAR is objectionable for a number of reasons. First, the SDAR is not a state and recognition of an armed political movement as a state is an undesirable precedent with implications well beyond the OAU, namely in a UN context. Secondly, seating the SDAR would further internationalize the dispute,

³ In telegram 6799 from Rabat, August 4, the Embassy contended that "options for U.S. mediation remain limited," and recommended, based on recent developments, "at a minimum reassessment and, possibly, some modest tailoring of present policy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840498-0024)

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 1 by Bishop and Schermerhorn; cleared by Nassif, Perkins, Zweifel, and Jeffrey Davidow (AF/RA). An unknown hand initialed for Murphy. Kauzlarich initialed the memorandum and wrote: "8/10." Attached but not printed are a map entitled "Polisario Activity April 16-22, 1984" and an undated paper entitled "The Western Sahara—U.S. Policy" prepared in NEA/AFN.

“legitimizing” military assistance to the Polisario by radical and east bloc countries. The abandonment by the OAU of its support for negotiation/referendum solution to the question of legitimacy would put us at odds with an African majority which would include a number of states whose regard we value. And finally, it would tend to isolate Morocco diplomatically and widen the dangerous cleavage between Morocco and Algeria.

Morocco, which previously has demonstrated diplomatic resourcefulness presenting its case internationally, appears to be preparing itself for the inevitability of loss of its diplomatic support. Morocco’s apparent willingness to forego African support may stem from the improvement of its military position established through successive extensions of the “berm” which now prevent Polisario attacks throughout most of the Western Sahara.

THE OPTIONS

Our longstanding policy has been to support the OAU’s peace keeping activities by urging the Moroccans and Algerians to be cooperative and the OAU to be energetic. No party has asked us to be an intermediary (although the Algerians and others have suggested that we put pressure on the Moroccans to negotiate directly). We have taken the view that others are better positioned in terms of interests and culture to play such a role; e.g., the Saudis. We have given the Moroccans quiet diplomatic support. We have made the point that admission of the SDAR to the OAU would be inconsistent with the ceasefire/referendum the OAU itself has repeatedly said should determine the status of the Western Sahara.

Since the origin of the dispute, we have supported the principle of self-determination. If the outcome of a referendum were an independent Sahara, however, we believe such an entity would not be viable and its creation could undermine stability in Morocco. At the same time, we believe it is in the interests of both the Moroccans and the Algerians to reach a *modus vivendi* in order to settle the impasse definitively. This implies a negotiated settlement which has substantial international acceptability.

In the likelihood that there is no settlement prior to the UNGA, the 4th Committee will again consider resolutions condemning Morocco. The eleventh hour compromise resolution language which prevented us from having to take sides in 1983 is unlikely to be repeated unless there has been considerable movement on the issue.

The U.S. government could become more active itself in promoting a settlement. As a first step, we should undertake in house to devise a strategy which we think could lead to an outcome acceptable to all parties. One possibility is a Saharan autonomous region within Morocco

but set in a network of political and economic arrangements with real appeal for Algeria. This would perforce mean that we would put forward our own proposals in substantive points which would inevitably be seen as partisan. Indeed there would be considerable inclination to favor an outcome most acceptable to Hassan, a result which might put us at odds with a number of friendly African governments, particularly the Algerians.

Once devised, a more forward USG strategy could be used as a basis for engaging Hassan and Bendjedid in discussions aimed at defining with each of them⁵ a realistic outcome consistent with our and their other regional interests.

Independent of efforts to devise and promote a settlement, we could explore with the Moroccans procedural tactics to head off the seating of the SDAR at the OAU later this year. There is some margin for maneuver. For example, Morocco's natural allies within the OAU could capitalize on well-crafted statements of Moroccan intentions. Rabat could agree to talks with a formula close to the OAU's urging but likely to provoke a Polisario rejection—shifting the onus to the Polisario and its Algerian backers for blocking the peace process. This option, if it becomes public, would provoke charges that we have become a wholehearted proponent of the Moroccan position. Side negotiations with the Moroccans could be inferred by Hassan to constitute a USG commitment to ensure an outcome which meets his objectives.

Another potential negative consequence of becoming engaged as an intermediary is that we would "Americanize" a dispute in which our role heretofore has been limited. Escalating US involvement risks Soviet response and the burdening of the Soviet-American agenda with yet another dispute. A more direct USG role could remove the impetus from the Algerians and the Moroccans to continue high level direct, secret discussions on the issues. Given the intractable nature of the problem, we must also assess the political and other costs should our efforts fail. Thus, by assuming a higher responsibility, we might set ourselves up for a foreign policy defeat.

However, it is not likely that a purely military strategy on Morocco's part can, in fact, lead to a stable result or a settlement. To be durable, and enhance Moroccan and regional security, we believe there needs to be a process that obtains legitimacy—something Morocco cannot do by itself. In the absence of a probe by the US, it is difficult to test either Morocco's or Algeria's bottom line or to explore the basis for a "pre-cooked" compromise that might defuse the situation.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "defining with each of them."

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That we continue our present course, quietly encouraging as opportunities arise all parties to work toward the OAU-mandated negotiated political settlement.

(2) That we examine possibilities of a strategy for achieving an outcome acceptable to all parties, thereafter that we discuss this with Hassan and Bendjedid. (AF and NEA support this option).

(3) That we consult now with the Moroccans on procedural steps which might be taken to avoid SDAR admission to the OAU later this year.⁶

⁶ Armacost did not approve or disapprove the recommendations.

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, October 19, 1984, 1506Z

8157. Department repeat as desired. Subj: The Outlook for the OAU Summit: Conversation With Peter Onu.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Summary. In conversation with Ambassador, OAU SYG Peter Onu elaborated on his concerns that precipitous OAU Summit could well lead to OAU split of the type envisioned prior to Tripoli Summit collapse. Onu believes that various maneuvers being planned may lead more moderate states to join Morocco in walk out—thereby fragmenting organization.² He thinks current OAU Chairman is unlikely to seek compromise formula which might preserve OAU Unity. Onu has shared these perceptions with GOT (MFA Essebsi is going to Tripoli on October 18 and will visit Morocco in near future) and asked Bourguiba

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840669–0212. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, and USUN.

² In telegram 4737 from Addis Ababa, October 16, the Embassy reported: “We have heard from a number of sources, including senior officers of the OAU, that the Polisario reps in Addis Ababa have advised their friends in the OAU Secretariat that they will take their seat at the OAU Summit in November. Polisario officials are saying that, if they are not seated at this summit, they will lose any chance of ever being seated. The Polisario reps are calling this ‘a do or die effort.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840660–0414)

in role of elder statesman to contact other African heads of state to help avoid radical/moderate confrontation over SDAR issue. End summary.

3. I had 80 minutes evening October 17 in private with acting OAU SYG Peter Onu, whom I have known for about ten years. Following emerged.

4. Onu, in response to my questions, said that as date of summit approaches indications are growing that a number of OAU-member governments are getting worried about the outlook. He (Onu) had seen the Moroccans and Libyans (Treki) in UNNY. The Moroccans had told him the organization and its members should brace for a surprise. The Libyans had been unclear as to their intentions in conversation with him, but he (Onu) had pieced together indications of a scenario "which the Algerians would find it difficult to cope with." One should never underestimate King Hassan, Onu mused.

5. Onu then said that there seemed to be a plan to introduce a "Moroccan" motion at the outset of the conference which would seek to define the attributes of a state (territory, control, sovereignty, etc.) which the Polisario/SDAR could not meet. This motion would fail. Upon its failure, another motion would be introduced which would raise the OAU Charter issue—the organization is to be open to states—in the light of the anticipated failure of the first motion (viz. if you are unwilling to pass a motion which describes the attributes of a state—seeking membership—in ways which would exclude the Polisario, what is it you are prepared to admit by seating the SDAR?). If the SDAR were subsequently seated, these motions would have laid the basis for a walkout different from that inherent in the Western Sahara conflict. That, Onu said, could in turn bring the walkout with Morocco of a far greater number of states.

6. In all of this, Onu pointed out, the Libyan attitude remains important. The Swazi representative had just told Onu that Libya had urged delay in convening the summit "since the issue of the Western Sahara is not yet ripe for settlement." Libya had told the Swazi, waving a list of states allegedly ready to walk out that an untimely summit risked the fragmentation of the OAU. The Swazi had shared his fears for the organization's future with Onu after hearing the Libyan warning. Onu had taken note—there were other such straws in the wind—but repeated that Treki had waffled in conversation with him.

7. Onu deplored the situation in which the organization now found itself. A premature summit which saw the SDAR seated would at best give Algiers a pyrrhic victory. Morocco having left the OAU, the problem would not merely remain unsolved on the ground—but the Nairobi resolution would become a scrap of paper. The excessive OAU focus on direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario had caused members to overlook certain key aspects of the Saharan conflict, viz. that Morocco had accepted a referendum "at any time"

but the Polisario had not/not “ever” done so and that Morocco’s reservations on “direct negotiations” had been entered ab initio having been repeatedly cited since. Fragmentation of the OAU remains a very real possibility, Onu said, and would represent a loss to all of the members attached to the survival of the organization. Finally, the Chairman (Mengistu) is not likely to pick up a pilgrim’s staff to go to capitals to drum up support for a temporizing measure, e.g. a new set of Wisemen to replace the immobilized eroding Implementation Committee.

8. Comment: Onu is understandably afraid for the survival of the OAU. He believes that rising time pressures, uncertainties over Libya’s use of its link to Morocco and influence with clients, Moroccan maneuvering, Algerian intransigence and Mengistu’s rigidities may be steering the organization on the rocks. Right or wrong, he is far from sure that Morocco’s withdrawal “with one or two friends” is all that will happen if the SDAR is seated. It has penetrated that any Algerian summit success could comport a heavy price to OAU members without solving the problem in situ.

9. Onu has shared some of this with Tunisian FonMin Caid Essebsi who is going to Tripoli today—and reportedly to Morocco shortly—as well as with Bourguiba. Bourguiba has promised “as doyen d’age” of all of Africa’s leaders to write a letter to his peers urging them to avoid splitting the organization. We shall seek GOT’s reactions to Onu’s visit and report further as warranted.

Sebastian

423. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, November 8, 1984, 0532Z

5230. Department pass OAU Collective. Subject: Outlook for the Twentieth OAU Summit.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. The OAU Summit, the twentieth since the organization’s founding, is headed for convening on schedule next Monday, November 12. Unlike the nineteenth summit, which was a cliffhanger, it looks like a

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840715–0763. Secret; Immediate.

relatively easy one, with few potential disruptions in prospect. Following in brief is the prognosis five days before the scheduled convening:

—Western Sahara: After much hemming and hawing, the consensus now is that the Polisario will be treated as a full member from the start. Latest word is that its admission will not even be a subject of discussion by the heads of state in their informal session just before convening; we are in fact told that the Polisario will join this session and go on from there to take its seat, with nameplate and flag, like everyone else. The Polisario's supporters have turned the tables this year and are threatening a walkout if it is not seated from the start. Without their presence there can't be a quorum (last time it was the opponents of the Polisario who deprived the summit of a quorum at Tripoli and threatened to do the same in Addis). Most other African governments are simply sick and tired of seeing the OAU deadlocked at every turn by the Western Sahara problem. They are ready to go along with seating the Polisario in the hope that that will set to rest, even if only momentarily, the dispute that has so long raged over the issue.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. For the results, check back this time next week.²

Korn

² In telegram 5300 from Addis Ababa, November 13, the Embassy reported: "The opening session of the Twentieth OAU Summit unfolded exactly according to forecast," adding "the Polisario made its entry along with the other delegations and took its seat in front of its nameplate—RASD—and its flag. Mengistu excoriated constructive engagement" on South Africa "and lambasted Morocco for failing to implement the nineteenth summit's Western Sahara resolution." The Embassy also noted that "the session closed with a speech by the Moroccan delegate announcing his government's withdrawal from membership in the OAU because of the seating of the Polisario. Zaïre spoke eloquently in support of Morocco and declared suspension of its participation though not its membership. 'A few' more may walk out November 13 but not enough to put the quorum in jeopardy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840724-0088)

424. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (Montgomery) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armcast)

Washington, November 20, 1984

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Secret; Sensitive. 3 pages not declassified.]

425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

Washington, December 13, 1984, 0529Z

366367. London for Raphel, Paris for Cheshes. Subject: Western Sahara: Démarches to the Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors. Ref: (A) State 363217² (B) State 351001.³

Military address handle as Specat Exclusive

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: Per ref A, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Armacost made démarches to Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by mischance an unfortunate incident could develop. End summary.

3. Meeting first with Sahnoun, Under Secretary Armacost adverted to the November 23 conversation with Foreign Minister Secretary General Kerroum in which this same topic had been discussed (ref B). We accepted at face value the GOA's assurances that it has no aggressive intentions towards Morocco. Nonetheless, we are worried that the mere presence of sizeable military forces in the border area could lead to clashes which might get out of hand. Accordingly, we hope the GOA will exercise caution and seek in every way to avoid military conflict.

4. The Under Secretary also noted the GOA intentions to send a special envoy to Rabat, inter alia to discuss the Western Sahara. He invited Sahnoun's views on the prospects for these discussions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840796–0666. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel and Schermerhorn; cleared by Nassif, Cassius Johnson (S/S–O), and Covey; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Priority to the Secretary of Defense, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. Sent for information to Tunis, Nouakchott, London, and Paris.

² In telegram 363217 to Algiers and Rabat, December 11, the Department instructed both Embassies to make the points “to the highest level of authority available” that “various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations,” that “we are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area,” and the U.S. feared “misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840789–0766)

³ In telegram 351001 to Algiers, November 28, the Department reported that on November 23, Kerroum told Armacost that “the GOA is pleased with SDAR seating in OAU, but fully recognizes this does not solve Western Sahara issues. GOA continues to believe that solution should and can come only through negotiation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840759–0574)

5. In response, Sahnoun said that he had received information which essentially confirms that there have been border incidents and that the situation is tense. He reiterated that the GOA does not seek conflict with Morocco and is still hopeful that either a personal advisor to President Bendjedid or Foreign Minister Ibrahim will be received in Rabat. He has no concrete information as to whether and when such a meeting might take place.

6. Under Secretary Armacost thanked Sahnoun for these reassurances and again stressed that our *démarche* stems from our concern for valued relations with both the Algerians and Moroccans. He noted that we would carry out a parallel *démarche* with the Moroccan Government. Ambassador Sahnoun thanked the Under Secretary for this friendly expression of views which he promised to relay to his government.

7. Armacost later told Ambassador Jorio that as a friend, we would be remiss in not expressing our concern over the deterioration in Algerian-Moroccan relations and the increase in tensions in the border area. While we take seriously his government's professions of lack of aggressive intent, we believe that the possibilities for mischance are now greater. We hope that both governments will exercise caution, and we have given Ambassador Sahnoun the same message earlier. He asked Jorio if the contacts which we understood Morocco and Algeria had over the past eighteen months will continue.

8. Ambassador Jorio explained that the situation has become very difficult *unquote* after Morocco's problem in Addis. The contacts would as far as the Moroccans are concerned remain alive but we must understand the history. At each stage, he said, the GOM has researched the problem and tried to respond. Each time the Moroccans have made the concession asked, the Algerians have considered it as a gain and then asked for something else. The GOM considers the conflict over the Sahara as a pretext for Algerian hegemonic ambitions, not the basic problem itself. Algerian ambitions have been a problem since 1963. The whole history is a series of concessions which have not given rise to reciprocal concessions on the Algerian part.

9. For Morocco, he said, the problem is now an internal one. The country as a whole does not understand the moderation and conciliation which the government has exercised. The government will continue to pursue negotiation *quote* as long as we can *unquote* but there are domestic concerns to be taken into account.

10. Under Secretary Armacost concluded by noting that our *démarche* is not in response to a particular party's actions or concerns; rather, every buildup increases the potential for direct confrontation. We are speaking in an evenhanded manner to both sides.

426. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, January 13, 1985, 1212Z

189. Subject: Algeria Says it Will Make Major Effort to Break Western Sahara Impasse.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary. Kerroum says Algeria is prepared to make a major effort to break the Western Sahara deadlock. Although the Jan. 8 visit of Guedira and Filali made no substantive progress, high-level contacts will continue. Algeria is prepared to make King Hassan an offer which takes full account of his preoccupations. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that the King might not want a peaceful settlement for domestic reasons. Kerroum reiterated that no Algerian Government could accept Moroccan military annexation of the territory even if continuation of the present situation risks eventual destabilization in Morocco.² End summary.

3. After discussing another matter Jan. 12, Kerroum dismissed the notetaker and launched into a lengthy discussion of the Western Sahara. He said the Jan. 8 visit to Algeria of Guedira and Filali was in the nature of reestablishing contact and that no substantive progress was made. As agreed, the high-level secret contacts would continue.

4. Speaking with great intensity, Kerroum said Algeria was preparing to make a proposal which King Hassan would find extremely difficult to reject and one which took full account of his preoccupations. He again expressed Algerian opposition to the extremes of independence and annexation.

5. In response to probing, Kerroum said the GOA was looking at the “ambiguous” Oct. 1975 advisory opinion of the ICJ.³ He referred to a “Solomonic solution” within the context of a Grand Maghreb.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0342. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 19274 to Algiers, January 19, the Department commented that during a January 18 meeting with Murphy, Sahnoun “expressed regret that Algerian-Moroccan progress on the Western Sahara issue had been thrown off track by the Libyan-Moroccan treaty. The GOA now reluctantly has concluded that King Hassan may believe that a military solution is possible (here Sahnoun cited the recent berm extension).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850043–0371) For more on the August 1984 Morocco-Libya Union, see Documents 37–40.

³ Reference is to the International Court of Criminal Justice’s unanimous ruling that “Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was not a territory belonging to no one (*terra nullius*),” and that “legal ties between this territory” existed with both Morocco and Mauritania. (“Summary of the Advisory Opinion,” October 16, 1975)

Kerroum hinted that the proposal would involve an interim status looking toward the eventual construction of Maghreb unity.

6. Algeria would take the initiative in the interest of regional stability. Kerroum then expressed deep concern that the King might not want a peaceful solution of the conflict. Some were of the view that the war was the "cement" which held the monarchy together. Others contend the King wants to keep the army busy in the Sahara far from royal residences. One thing seems certain: continuation of the present conflict risks an eventual social upheaval in Morocco whose result would be abolition of the monarchy and destabilization.

7. Without directly asking, Kerroum hinted that U.S. support for Algeria's initiative would be welcome. In response to a question on the Saudi position, Kerroum ruefully observed that Hassan's influence on Fahd was greater than vice versa.

8. Indicating that his official remarks were concluded, Kerroum said he wanted to ask me, personally and unofficially, what I thought a possible solution could be. I replied that not being a citizen of the Maghreb, this was difficult. Clearly a face-saving solution that would be durable and meet the minimum requirements of those involved was the general prescription, but only those involved could have a realistic appreciation of what a solution might look like. When Kerroum persisted, I said personally the kinds of ideas we understood were discussed in the 1983 meeting between President Bendjedid and King Hassan seemed to offer hope.⁴

9. Kerroum said Algeria considered the King to be a very competent statesman. However, Algeria was concerned over his apparent miscalculations in his rapprochement with Qadhafi.

10. Comment: This was a rare glimpse behind the scenes. I have never seen Kerroum so intense and animated. Based on this conversation, I conclude Algeria is prepared to make a major effort to reach a compromise with the King on the Western Sahara. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that the King may not want (or feel able) to accept a peaceful solution. As long as pressures exist for the two principal parties to negotiate, I thought it best to take evasive action when asked for my personal views on a solution. It is also clear Algeria will insist that the Polisario be brought into the negotiating process if sufficient prior general agreement can be reached between Algeria and Morocco.

Newlin

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 19.

427. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, February 21, 1985, 1045Z

965. Subject: Algeria Proposes Compromise on the Western Sahara.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian official outlines compromise solution on the Western Sahara which Algeria has proposed to King Hassan. In it, the King would exercise sovereignty over a Saharan entity linked to a wider Maghreb group. According to Algerians, negotiations with Morocco on the Western Sahara are “on dead center”. End summary.

3. At conclusion of Feb 20 meeting with MFA SecGen Kerroum on other matters, Ambassador and DCM asked where contacts stood with King Hassan on the Western Sahara. After reflecting, Kerroum replied, “on dead center”.

4. After many discussions with Morocco, Algeria he said had “assumed the heavy responsibility” of proposing a compromise solution which avoided the extremes of independence and annexation “without the permission of the Saharans.” It incorporated elements of the 1975 ICJ decision,² which recognized that there had been historic ties between certain tribes in the north Sahara and the Moroccan throne. Algeria, he said, was willing, if Morocco accepted the “national reality” of the Western Sahara (Kerroum used the analogy of Quebec within Canada) to support extension of this principle throughout the former Spanish Sahara.

5. At the same time, the Polisario had been seated in the OAU and this could not be reversed. The Western Sahara, he implied, should have a separate identity within a Maghreb grouping but with the King at its head. Kerroum cited the precedent of Byelorussia and the Ukraine in the UN, the King, not the Saharan, would represent the entire country in meetings with Chadli or Bourguiba, for example.

6. Kerroum said such a solution, if accepted by Hassan, would be difficult to sell to the Polisario and even to some in Algeria who believe closer cooperation with Morocco hold little economic benefit for Algeria. However, Algeria was thinking in terms of Maghreb stability. In the short run, Morocco would gain by a settlement but in the long run, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia would be the beneficiaries. Kerroum

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850118–0738. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat, Tunis, and Nouakchott.

² See footnote 3, Document 426.

said the King's reaction to Algerian proposals was leading to a question once again of whether Hassan has an interest in a peaceful solution.

7. Comment: Kerroum's outline, if accurate, is hard to square with King Hassan's statements to us that Algeria has been completely intransigent. (See Algiers 962.)³

Newlin

³ In telegram 962 from Algiers, February 21, the Embassy reported that in spite of Hassan's criticisms, "Algeria has backed off its previous position of an OAU referendum on the alternatives of independence or incorporation into Morocco. Instead, Algeria increasingly speaks of avoiding these extremes and finding a compromise" and "speaks of a solution that will humiliate no one." The Algerians, the Embassy continued, "are willing to envisage some kind of federation or autonomy with the King having 'the flag and the postage stamps' (i.e., certain attributes of sovereignty)." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850118-0508)

428. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 5, 1985, 1830Z

2078. From Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Subject: March 4 Audience With King Hassan. Ref: State 59695.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: During a 90-minute one-on-one audience in Marrakech March 4, King Hassan questioned me closely and at length on politics of the UN and strategies for handling the Western Sahara issue. Hassan clearly attaches the highest priority to moving ahead with a referendum and is determined to make a major effort at the United Nations this year. Our conversation dealt almost entirely with UN matters, and the King was clearly attempting to learn from my experience in that forum. End summary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850149-0515. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to USUN. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Dakar, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and Addis Ababa.

² In telegram 59695 to Rabat, February 27, the Department transmitted the draft text of a letter from Reagan to King Hassan, in which Reagan wrote in part: "I am very pleased to designate Ambassador Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick as my personal representative to the celebrations on March 3 honoring your accession to the throne of Morocco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850135-0288)

3. Prior to seeing Hassan, I met at length on March 3 with newly-appointed Foreign Minister Abdellatif Filali³ who alerted me to the King's interest in reviewing in detail with me Morocco's strategy at the United Nations and plans to reorganize GOM multilateral diplomacy. I took the occasion to discuss at length with Filali the importance of regional blocs at the UN and the need for active Moroccan diplomacy in the African and non-aligned context.

4. The March 4 audience took place at the Marrakech Palace following the annual ceremony of allegiance. After I presented the President's letter (reftel), with which Hassan was clearly pleased, the King turned the conversation to the United Nations. He made clear his real determination to settle the question of the Western Sahara by holding a referendum next year. He expressed complete confidence that Morocco would win in a fair referendum and, after expressing regret that I was leaving government service, sought my reaction to his strategy for handling the issue.

5. Hassan told me that Morocco will take the Western Sahara issue to the Security Council, seeking an arrangement under which the Council and Secretariat would organize a referendum in the Sahara. He reiterated that Morocco could no longer accept a referendum under auspices of the OAU, which has already pronounced itself on the issue and is now under factional control of Ethiopia and other radical states. The OAU, the King told me, is a closed subject and there is no possibility of Morocco re-joining the organization. Hassan predicted that other member states will also withdraw as radical domination of the OAU is further extended.

6. Turning to the Security Council, Hassan told me that he was confident of support in the Security Council for a UN-organized referendum in the Sahara. Noting a recent conversation with a high-level Soviet, possibly a special emissary or the local Ambassador, Hassan said that the Soviets have assured Morocco of support for self-determination. India too, he told me, has expressed support for a process of self-determination. Like Morocco a founding NAM state, India remains committed to decolonization and self-determination. Finally, Hassan reported that, during a conversation in the last few days, former French Culture Minister Maurice Druon had assured him that France would support Moroccan efforts in the Security Council.

7. Hassan outlined for me the new team which he is sending to New York to reactivate Moroccan diplomacy at the UN. The Permanent Representative, Mehdi Alaoui, was selected for broad expertise and contacts in the Third World, political savvy

³ No record of the Kirkpatrick-Filali conversation has been found.

and a reputation as a “good Moroccan” (Rabat 2022).⁴ Two deputy PermReps, Dr. Mohammed Bennouna, an expert in international law, and Ambassador Khalil Haddaoui, now in Monrovia, will round out the GOM team. Implementing the effort in Rabat will be Foreign Minister Filali, a colleague during earlier UN service of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, with whom he has good personal relations.

8. In response, I told Hassan that, frankly, I was less optimistic about the outcome in the Security Council because, Soviet and other commitments to self-determination notwithstanding, one should not underestimate levels of cynicism at the UN. I encouraged Hassan, however, to undertake this important initiative with maximum publicity, insuring that the world is aware of Moroccan efforts. He should draw on public relations and other resources, I urged, to make known Morocco’s commitment to a UN-supervised referendum. Morocco should, nonetheless, face the fact that efforts in the Security Council could be blocked or otherwise sidetracked. I also pointed out that, given Algerian influence at the UN, it would be difficult to get an SC resolution providing for a referendum on terms acceptable to Morocco.

9. The King also questioned me closely on the General Assembly, expressing interest in a UNGA resolution this year on the Sahara. The 1983 outcome and lack of majority support for Algeria in 1984, he suggested, left grounds for optimism this year. He was particularly encouraged that, among the EC-10, only Greece and Spain had supported the Algerian position. Referring to USUN consultations with Royal Counselor Reda Guedira last November, Hassan thanked me and the USUN team of Ambassadors and Counselors for our counsel and support.

10. I also urged that Morocco be represented at all caucuses and meetings of the non-aligned, even small strategy meetings which sometimes set subsequent policy. In sum, effective UN diplomacy required an active policy in both the NAM and OAU, combined with world-wide lobbying. I described Nicaragua’s success and efforts world-wide.

11. Hassan expressed hope that, at the working level, USUN staff could share thoughts with his new UN team on key countries and tactics to enforce disciplined behavior from certain UN states. I said that it was most important that, in conversation with other heads of state, he underline the importance Morocco attaches to the Western Sahara in the UN. While I was there, President Kountche called about plans for a

⁴ In telegram 2022 from Rabat, March 2, the Embassy reported that Alaoui, while “at first glance an unusual choice” for UN Ambassador, “appears to be in tune with the palace on key diplomatic questions facing the country, namely the Western Sahara and related Maghreb issues. A proponent of Maghreb unity, he is among the socialists taking the hardest line on the Western Sahara and relations with Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850143-0607)

future meeting and Hassan afterwards praised the Niger head of state. I told him that it was also important that the GOM Foreign Minister follow through in greater detail with his counterparts, mentioning, for example, GOM disappointment over the role of countries like Senegal during last year's UNGA.

12. The King referred to the practice by certain countries of buying UN votes, and I urged that Morocco make this impossible by prior lobbying and firm commitments from foreign ministers or heads of state which would limit maneuvering room for PermReps in New York. Citing Nicaraguan behavior, I stressed the importance of the new GOM team visiting every delegation in New York except those which are certain to vote against Morocco. Even with such efforts, I cautioned, Morocco should be prepared to lose in the Security Council. A fall-back could be selection of a few countries to represent the international community as observers for a referendum. Professional groups, as during voting in El Salvador, could also help with ballot box technology.

13. Hassan had already anticipated such a fall-back and was prepared to seek observer delegations from the NAM, Arab League, ASEAN and the OAS. He told me that he had also "secured", after consulting with President Mitterrand, the services of former French PermRep Jacques Leprette and international lawyer Maitre Dupuy, as formal consultants.

14. Comment: King Hassan was extremely well informed on UN voting patterns and is obviously giving top priority to organizing a Saharan referendum next year. He is briefed on details of past votes and committed to mounting as professional an operation as possible at the next UNGA. I was impressed by the seriousness with which he has informed himself and reflected on the problem. He is optimistic, but has included a realistic fall-back in his planning. The King clearly made maximum use of me as a resource during our 90-minute conversation.

Reed

429. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 17, 1985

SUBJECT

- (1) Reported Moroccan Request for Soviet Arms
- (2) Algeria's View of the Western Sahara

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Shultz
 Foreign Minister Ibrahim
 Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun
 Ambassador Newlin

Foreign Minister Ibrahim said the Soviets had informed the Algerians, on the eve of President Bendjedid's visit to Washington,² that King Hassan had sent a message to Gorbachev requesting T 72 tanks and helicopters. According to the Foreign Minister the King said he wanted Soviet arms "in order to be free of American pressure."

On the Western Sahara, Ibrahim said President Bendjedid had sent him to see King Hassan shortly after the OAU decision to seat the Polisaro. He had asked the King for his views on how to find a solution.

The King reportedly asked if Algeria had territorial ambitions in the Western Sahara. To which, Ibrahim assured him Algeria had no territorial ambitions whatsoever and was content with the boundaries it had inherited at Independence. He said the King had asked him this question on ten separate occasions.

(Ibrahim then recounted the February '83³ meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid. At that time, Bendjedid asked for the King's views on how to proceed with a referendum as called for by the OAU. King Hassan reportedly on this occasion opposed a referendum on the ground that it would result in a victor and a vanquished. It could also leave a lasting wound in Algerian-Moroccan relations. Instead, the King proposed a formula under which Morocco would have "the flag and the postage stamps" and the Saharans would have wide autonomy. Secretary Shultz noted the idea of a referendum had been proposed by the King.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared by Jonathan Benton and Quinn. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Family Quarters of the White House.

² See Document 147.

³ The two leaders actually met in March 1983. See Document 20.

When in late '84 Ibrahimi reminded the King of the flag/stamp formula, the latter authorized Ibrahimi, Filali and Guerdira to draw up such a plan. When a document was presented to the King on February 6, he rejected it citing the example of New Caledonia.⁴ Once autonomy was achieved, the Saharans could then demand independence.

Ibrahimi replied Algeria was ready to guarantee autonomy; Morocco would also have to guarantee not to annex the Western Sahara.

While rejecting the flag and postage stamp proposal, and stating that Morocco would never meet with the Polisario, the King sent a secret emissary to meet with the Polisario in Lisbon. About the same time, critical articles appeared in the European press inspired by Morocco concerning the "Algerian proposal."

Ibrahimi said Algeria had tried to fathom why the King had changed his mind and had come up with the following factors:

- (a) The policy of the French Socialist Party in power was different from that of the French Socialist party in opposition.
- (b) Saudi money enabled the King to continue the war.
- (c) The Qadhafi factor.
- (d) Some Moroccan opposition parties were more royalist than the King on this issue.

Despite the fact contacts on this issue had been interrupted since February 6, 1985, Algeria intended to continue its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

⁴ Reference is to the French Overseas Territory of New Caledonia, located in the South Pacific. Residents enjoyed French citizenship and representation in the French Parliament and were governed by French laws and regulations.

430. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)

Washington, May 15, 1985

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, *[text not declassified]*. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

Washington, June 29, 1985, 1802Z

200276. Subject: Potential for Increased Tensions in the Western Sahara. Ref: Algiers 3349.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. We are concerned by the prospect for increased Polisario activity raised by Algerian Intelligence Chief Lakehal Ayat with Embassy Algiers (reftel). Although there is more than sufficient responsibility and blame to portion out among the various parties, the fact remains that any significant increase in Polisario operations would presuppose at least Algerian acquiescence if not active support.

3. For Algiers: you should seek an early opportunity to discuss the matter further with Ayat and/or other high level GOA officials, making the following points:

— The USG is concerned by reports that the Polisario is pressing for transit through Mauritanian territory. In the past, the Mauritanian Government has had difficulty in adequately patrolling its vast and underpopulated northern areas.

— That government has objected to incursions into its territory by outside forces, including the Polisario. Friendly neighbors, including the GOA should seek to assist the Mauritians by discouraging challenges to Mauritanian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

— An expansion of the Western Sahara conflict such as that foreseen by Ayat would be contrary to the interests of all the governments directly affected, including the GOA.

— The USG urges that the GOA use its considerable influence with the Polisario to discourage any such expansion.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850461-0749. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Gregory Talcott (S/S-O), Richard Sokolsky (S/P), Bishop, Johnson (P), and James Collins (S-S/O); approved by Nassif. Sent for information to Nouakchott and Paris.

² In telegram 3349 from Algiers, June 25, the Embassy reported that Lakehal-Ayat said he "could not visit the U.S. as planned this fall" as "Morocco seemed bent on pursuing the war" in the Western Sahara "as witnessed by the further extensions of the berm. Some of these now ran along the Mauritanian border." He also "predicted a stepping up of Polisario operations in the autumn." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850447-0765)

— The USG has noted with satisfaction the willingness of the GOA to enter into direct discussions with the GOM on the Western Sahara.³ We urge that this dialogue be resumed and intensified, a point which we will also make with the GOM.

4. For Rabat: You should seek appointment at the highest appropriate level to make the following points to the GOM:

— The USG is concerned by the continuing tension in the Western Sahara and the possibility this raises for an expansion of the conflict.

— A wider conflict would be contrary to the interests of all governments directly concerned, including the GOM.

— The USG has noted with satisfaction the direct Moroccan-Algerian dialogue on Western Sahara issues and urges that this be resumed and intensified at the earliest possible date.⁴ We are making the same point with the GOA.

Shultz

³ In telegram 3506 from Algiers, July 6, Newlin reported that after he made the *démarche*, Ibrahim *"immediately and uncharacteristically heatedly laid much of the blame for the present situation on the French who, he claimed, were trying to sell new arms to Morocco at a time when Morocco is pursuing a military solution. He also blamed King Hassan for bad faith."* (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850477–0497) In telegram 3526 from Algiers, July 7, the Embassy reported that during a follow-up discussion, Kerroum responded to Newlin *"in quiet and measured tones. He said that it is a very difficult situation if there is not equal will on both sides to find a political solution."* (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850477–0555)

⁴ In telegram 6239 from Rabat, July 5, Kirby reported that Filali said he *"considered the U.S. initiative in raising this matter in Algiers and Rabat to be 'very positive.' Acknowledging that there has been some continuing military action in the area where Morocco is now extending the berm, Filali claimed that Morocco has intelligence that the Polisario and Algeria may be 'preparing something' to coincide more or less with the OAU Foreign Ministers' meeting later this month."* (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850476–0133)

432. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead¹

Washington, August 16, 1985

SUBJECT

Moroccan Positions on Libya, Western Sahara

ISSUE

How to respond to King Hassan's request for a more detailed dialogue on Libya and the Western Sahara.

DISCUSSION

At the end of your August 12 meeting with King Hassan² and in your subsequent conversation with Foreign Minister Filali,³ the Moroccans made four specific proposals:

— Hassan stated a willingness to raise specific issues of concern to the USG in putting Qadhafi to the test. The King implied that he would be willing to terminate his relationship with Qadhafi if he failed to achieve modified Libyan policies.

— To continue the relevant dialogue, the King appealed for an early visit by National Security Adviser McFarlane and a detailed message from DCI Casey concerning Qadhafi's involvement in terrorist acts.

— Both Hassan and FonMin Filali suggested that if the USG could persuade the Algerians to settle the Western Sahara dispute on terms acceptable to Morocco, this would remove the necessity for a continuing Moroccan-Libyan tie.

— Finally, the GOM requested vigorous USG support on the Western Sahara issue at this fall's UNGA.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. Pressure Algeria to Resolve the Western Sahara Dispute.

Filali's formulation ("if the US and others could persuade Algeria to agree to what Morocco would consider a reasonable settlement of

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, August 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zweifel on August 15; cleared by Sokolsky, Bishop, Ross, and John Willett (IO). Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. Bova initialed the memorandum and wrote: "17 Aug." An unknown hand wrote: "August 17, 1985" at the top of the memorandum. A stamped notation below the date line reads: "AUG 1985 J.C.W. has seen."

² See footnote 2, Document 247.

³ A record of the Whitehead-Filali discussion is in telegram 7565 from Rabat, August 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850575-0835)

the Western Sahara, the need for a Moroccan-Libyan arrangement probably would wither”) presents several problems. Clearly the GOA’s written proposal of February 1985⁴ was unacceptable to the Moroccans. Just as clearly, the Algerians advanced their diplomatic advantage, now claiming to have presented the only comprehensive proposal for a settlement.

The following points are of relevance:

— After several Department and inter-agency reviews,⁵ we remain convinced that there is no advantage for the USG to assume a direct role in solving the Western Sahara dispute. Our interests are served by maintaining our present policy which has a slight bias towards Morocco.

— Filali’s formulation gives us an opening again to urge the GOM to be explicit in detailing its version of an acceptable, negotiated settlement. We should encourage the GOM to table this as a counter to the Algerian plan, thereafter being prepared to consider if and how we or other third parties might help narrow differences between Moroccan and Algerian plans.

4. *Work With Morocco at the UN.*

We should be cautious about automatic support for GOM proposals at the UN. Realistically, in the Fourth Committee (decolonization) and at the UNGA, the Algerians will be able to muster a majority in support of their position. A defeat for Morocco would only add to its diplomatic isolation and diminish the prospects for some kind of UN role in a negotiated settlement.

In an August 10⁶ conversation with members of the House Armed Services Committee, Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi said the GOA would be willing to accept a UN-OAU jointly organized referendum in the Western Sahara. This sets the stage for a possible compromise under which the GOM would again accept an OAU role while the GOA would accept a much more direct UN responsibility. The modalities likely would have to remain vague at this stage. GOA demands for a referendum without the presence of either Polisario or Moroccan forces in the Western Sahara is impractical and the GOM insisting on narrow definition of eligible voters is another difficulty.

⁴ See Document 427.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ The date is in error; the conversation took place on August 11. A record of the conversation between Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Charles Price’s (D-Illinois) delegation and Ibrahimi is in telegram 4206 from Algiers, August 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850572–0798)

Concerned bureaus should work with USUN to devise a strategy aimed at facilitating a consensus resolution, even though this will be difficult to achieve.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the attached⁷ Platt-McFarlane memorandum recommending an early visit by McFarlane to Morocco. McFarlane should be accompanied by a [*less than 1 line declassified*] official who can give Hassan a detailed briefing. We would use this visit to respond to the King's request for specific USG policy objectives vis a vis Qadhafi.⁸

2. On the Western Sahara dispute, that you reaffirm existing USG policy (i.e. no direct USG role in this regional dispute which should be settled through negotiations among parties directly concerned, the settlement ultimately to reflect the views of the area's inhabitants) and that this be communicated to the GOM.⁹

3. That we encourage the GOM to table a proposal on settlement of the Western Sahara explicitly outlining conditions which it would find acceptable.¹⁰

4. That IO, USUN, AF and NEA should devise a strategy to facilitate a consensus resolution on the Western Sahara at this fall's UNGA.¹¹

⁷ Not attached.

⁸ Whitehead did not check the approve or disapprove option, and wrote: "Hold off on this until I can talk to the Secretary" in the right-hand margin.

⁹ Whitehead did not check the approve or disapprove option, and wrote: "Let's wait on this until we get the answer to 3" in the right-hand margin.

¹⁰ Whitehead approved the recommendation.

¹¹ Whitehead approved the recommendation.

433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, September 20, 1985, 0310Z

STAT 289810. Subject: U.S. Policy Toward the Western Sahara. Ref: (A) Rabat 8280² (B) Algiers 4558³ (C) Rabat 8576.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department appreciates insights into current GOM and GOA approaches to Western Sahara (reftels). We are particularly encouraged by fact that:

— GOA still talking in terms of a referendum under UN auspices and has not ruled out consensus resolution;

— GOM also talking in terms of ceasefire/referendum and has reopened possibility of some OAU role in conjunction with UN (para 4, reftel C).

3. We are now considering our own approach on this issue at this year's UNGA. Timing may require us to make decisions based on what we presently know, but we want nonetheless now to encourage the GOM to table a proposal explicitly outlining conditions which it would

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850668–0886. Secret. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel and in draft by William Imbrie (P), Craig Karp (INR), Willett, David Lyon (AF), Sokolsky, and Mark Gatanas (PM/NESA); approved by Raphel. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, and USUN.

² In telegram 8280 from Rabat, September 4, Nassif reported that on September 2, after he presented his credentials, Filali informed him that "Morocco hoped that the Western Sahara could be kept off the agenda" of the upcoming NAM meeting in Luanda. Filali continued: "Morocco will determine its strategy with respect to the Western Sahara in the upcoming UN General Assembly after it sees the results of Luanda" and he hoped that USUN "will be able to provide some support in New York this fall to the Moroccan position that there should be an early UN-sponsored referendum on the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0198)

³ In telegram 4558 from Algiers, September 3, the Embassy reported that during pre-General Assembly consultations with the Algerian Government, "GOA officials said that Polisario will not seek admission to Non-Aligned Movement at Luanda Summit. Instead, Algeria will urge affirmation of all UN resolutions relating to the Western Sahara." The Embassy continued that de Cuellar told Abdelaziz "his report on the Western Sahara situation, and the possibility of a UN referendum, would conform with previously adopted UN resolutions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850622–0719)

⁴ In telegram 8576 from Rabat, September 11, the Embassy reported: "The September 2–7 Non-Aligned Ministerial meeting in Luanda was a case of damage limitation for Morocco. While language adopted on the Western Sahara contains elements unacceptable to Morocco and Zimbabwe was not Morocco's first choice as next NAM Chairman, most GOM officials maintain that the results could have been much worse. The SDAR was not seated at Luanda and GOM fears of an Algerian chairmanship did not materialize." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850447–0556)

accept for settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. This would not have to make direct reference to the earlier GOA plan which was clearly unacceptable to the GOM. However, to be a step forward, it must be more than a statement of willingness to abide by an ill-defined referendum decree/form of autonomy would the GOM be willing to extend to the Sahraouis, for example?

4. In seeking a more detailed and comprehensive statement of GOM terms,⁵ for a Western Sahara settlement, Ambassador may use the following talking points:

— The United States is prepared to work closely with the GOM on the Western Sahara problem at the UN in the forthcoming session.

— We note with satisfaction that the GOM has made intensive efforts to contact other states who may have an influence on the outcome of UN debates on this issue.

— We hope that it will be possible to achieve a consensus resolution on the Western Sahara which both Morocco and Algeria will be able to support.

— In recent conversations GOA officials have kept open the prospect of working for a consensus resolution.

— We note that the NAM Ministerial incorporated Morocco's call on the OAU Chairman and the UN Secretary General to seek new ways to secure a ceasefire and referendum.

— In order to avoid a sterile procedural consideration of this issue this year and perhaps a repetition of last year's result, we think that it would be opportune for Morocco to seize the diplomatic high ground by putting forward a plan for a detailed comprehensive settlement.

— While there are features of Algeria's earlier plan for a comprehensive settlement which are obviously unacceptable to Morocco, Algeria has made much diplomatic capital out of its claim to have proposed a comprehensive settlement.

— Morocco itself achieved a breakthrough and much support when King Hassan originally called for a ceasefire and referendum. To regain the initiative and to facilitate resumption of a direct dialogue between Morocco and Algeria on the Western Sahara, Morocco would be well served to come forward with a new comprehensive plan designed to gain as much as possible from the people of the Western Sahara.

Shultz

⁵Not found.

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 31, 1985, 0537Z

334309. Subject: Vice President's Mtg With Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary—The Vice President met with Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani on October 25. The Prime Minister focused his remarks on the Moroccan initiative on the Western Sahara as well as King Hassan's thoughts on how best to counter terrorism. End summary

3. Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani of Morocco met with Vice President Bush on October 25 at 1100 hours in the Vice President's office. Also attending the meeting were Foreign Minister Filali, Ambassador Jorio as well as A. Raphel of NEA, D. Gregg of OVP and H. Teicher of NSC.

4. The Prime Minister opened the conversation by noting that his address to the U.N., given on behalf of the King, focused on the Saharan issue.² After 10 years of war, the GOM believes the issue should be put behind us. Therefore, King Hassan had called for a unilateral cease-fire which will be fully observed unless Moroccan forces are attacked.³ Also, the GOM has called for a referendum, to take place after January 1, 1986, to decide on self-determination for the Saharan people. The referendum would be under the aegis of the UN which could invite any other organization (e. g. the OAU), to assist.

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners Files, OA/ID 19801, Folder 19801-068, Meetings with Foreigners—October 1985: Prime Minister Karim Lamrani of Morocco, October 25, 1985. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Tunis, Algiers, Nouakchott, Dakar, and USUN. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 2892 from USUN, October 24, the Mission reported: "In his October 23 address to the GA, Moroccan PM Karim-Lamrani stressed the historical ties of Morocco to the territory of the Western Sahara. Accusing 'the enemies of Morocco' (led by Algeria) of blocking peace and delaying resolution of the conflict, he confirmed Morocco's commitment to the self-determination referendum proposed at the 1981 OAU Summit in Nairobi. He requested that this referendum take place in January 1986, under UN auspices. He also declared a Moroccan unilateral cease-fire, stressing, however, that Morocco would defend itself if necessary." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850759-0752)

³ Following an October 15 meeting with Hassan, Nassif reported on "Moroccan tactics for the upcoming U.N. sessions," including Karim-Lamrani's planned call for a ceasefire, in telegram 9845 from Rabat, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850738-0601)

5. Karim-Lamrani added that the referendum should be supported by all states interested in peace; the GOM hoped for full and active U. S. support. In response to a question from the Vice President, the Prime Minister said the GOM had ruled out negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario since it would prejudice the outcome of the referendum and, in any case, the organization is not representative of the Saharan people.

6. The Prime Minister added that although there had been no official Algerian reaction, the Algerian media had emphasized the demand that the GOM talk with the Polisario. The Algerians are treating the referendum idea as clearly overtaken by events, even though Algeria originally favored a referendum.⁴ Karim-Lamrani said the issue was really very simple. The Western Sahara, historically, geographically, and in every other way, is part of Morocco. Algeria wants to annex it. Everything else is just cosmetic. Karim-Lamrani went on to say that his only answer is for responsible countries to give the U.N. a wide mandate to organize a referendum with OAU support. The Prime Minister gave the Vice President a copy of Morocco's draft resolution.

7. The Vice President responded that the U.S. welcomes any proposal to end the Saharan conflict, and promised that the USG would review the Moroccan proposal carefully. We have also always encouraged talks between Morocco and Algeria on this issue. Once we have discussed the proposal within the government, we would be back to the GOM with a considered and full response.

8. In response to the Vice President's question about Diouf's view of the proposal, Karim-Lamrani said that even though Morocco has withdrawn from the OAU, Diouf had indicated that if asked for help by the U.N. Secretary General, he would respond positively.⁵

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Shultz

⁴ During an October 2 meeting with Bush, Ibrahim said that from Algeria's perspective, "three elements were key to a solution of the Sahara issue—a referendum, negotiations, and the withdrawal of all forces before the referendum." (Telegram 309868 to Algiers, October 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850717-0517) See Document 154.

⁵ During an October 24 meeting with Bush, Diouf indicated that "he was prepared to work with the U.N. Secretary General to bring a resolution to this difficult question. He said that if an acceptable resolution was introduced in the UN, he would do everything in his power to see that it was passed. Bush asked about the problem this conflict created for relations between Morocco and Algeria. Diouf responded that the problem was not between Morocco and Algeria, but rather between Algeria (sic) and the Polisario." (Telegram 345750 to Dakar, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850805-0875)

435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 8, 1985, 0039Z

343528. Subject: Instructions on Western Sahara Debate at UNGA.
Ref: (A) USUN 3023,² (B) USUN 3121,³ (C) 84 USUN 3538.⁴

1. C—Entire text.

2. Moroccan Resolution. Mission is authorized to vote for Moroccan resolution as introduced and to support Moroccan parliamentary efforts to achieve an up or down vote on the Moroccan resolution (preferably avoiding speeches on parliamentary maneuvers).

3. Algerian Resolution. Mission should abstain on this resolution as presently worded. We assume that Algerian resolution will be voted on prior to the Moroccan resolution. Mission should give explanation of vote closely paralleling last year's statement (ref C) and drawing on following points:

— U.S. has consistently supported efforts to solve the Saharan conflict through peaceful negotiations.

— Thus, USG has urged a consensus resolution which could be supported by both Algeria and Morocco.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840801–0699. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Merrick; cleared by Keith Wauchope (AF/W), Zweifel, Susan Biniarz (L/NEA), Raphael, Gilbert Kulick (IO/UNDP), Lynda Clarizio (L/AF), and Milton Kovner (IO); approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and Algiers. Sent for information Priority to Nouakchott, Dakar, Tunis, and Addis Ababa.

² Reference is in error. Telegram 3032 from USUN, October 31, contains the text of UN draft resolution 39/40, which “reaffirms all relevant resolutions adopted by “the OAU and UN “on the question of Western Sahara and calls upon the current Chairman of the OAU and the Secretary-General of the UN to continue their efforts in finding a just and durable solution to this matter.” The Mission also noted the draft “was pushed through the African group despite the fact that it is not acceptable to Morocco (which refused to participate in the vote on 39/40).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850779–0042)

³ In telegram 3121 from USUN, November 6, the Mission reported that Haddaoui informed a mission officer that the Moroccans “have decided to attempt to invoke rule of General Assembly Procedure 116 in the Fourth Committee vote November 8 on their Western Sahara Resolution. Rule 116 permits cloture on debate in a committee after a representative has moved for an adjournment of debate.” The Mission continued: “The Moroccans evidently think that, if successful, this procedure will permit them to have a better chance of having their resolution emerge unamended by the Algerians and thus subject to a straight up-or-down vote.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850794–0987)

⁴ Telegram 3538 from USUN, December 4, 1984, contains the text of a statement delivered by Feldman that indicated the U.S. delegation would abstain on a resolution introduced by Algeria in the General Assembly that called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840776–0148)

— Standard which determines U.S. position on resolutions now under debate is whether a resolution contributes to solution.

— Abstention on the GOA resolution reflects USG assessment that call for direct GOM-Polisario negotiations does not contribute to a settlement.

— USG continues to support position that a settlement ultimately must reflect views of inhabitants. Last year, USG supported concept that UNSYG arrange for a referendum under appropriate international auspices. This would be consistent with USG support for 1981 OAU resolution.

— International community should have an opportunity to vote for a resolution which supports the concept of a ceasefire, international observers and a referendum under UN auspices, in consultation with the OAU.⁵

Shultz

⁵ In telegram 3300 from USUN, November 14, the Mission reported: "Algeria's resolution calling for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario passed 91-6-43 (US). After Morocco's failed attempt to block Algerian amendments to its own resolution, Morocco withdrew its resolution. Morocco's FonMin Filali said Morocco would no longer participate in any meeting or debate in the UNGA, Fourth Committee or Committee of 24 in which Western Sahara was discussed." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850814-0055) However, in telegram 3802 from USUN, December 13, the Mission reported that Haddaoui advised the United States "to take with 'a very large grain of salt' Foreign Minister Filali's statement." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850892-0728)

436. Letter From Vice President Bush to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, January 24, 1986

Your Majesty:

The beginning of a new year is both a time to look ahead to new challenges and to look back on past accomplishments and satisfactions. One of the great satisfactions of 1985 is the continuation of the United States' long friendship with the Kingdom of Morocco.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1986 (01/01/1986-02/11/1986). No classification marking.

Looking ahead, we remain concerned by the situation in the Western Sahara. Your continuing willingness to seek a political settlement is an important, positive factor. It was in this spirit that my Government worked closely with yours at the United Nations. I regret that that debate was again sterile but I am heartened to learn from close friends in France of your willingness to address this issue in other fora.

Your Majesty, you know that my Government is convinced that a solution to this problem can best be approached through discussions between Morocco and Algeria. Your previous high level dialogue with President Bendjedid and his government held out hope, and is still referred very positively by Algerian officials.

Now that the dust has settled after the unfruitful United Nations' debate, it would seem a propitious time again to examine whether renewed high level contacts between you and President Bendjedid might not produce movement. Based on my personal conversations with him and other ranking Algerian officials, I believe there is an increasing receptivity on the Algerian side to such a dialogue.

I will subsequently be writing President Bendjedid to suggest to him, as I am to you, that this could be an important moment to work for peace in the Western Sahara.²

Please accept, Your Majesty, my continuing best wishes for the health and well-being of yourself and the people of Morocco.

Sincerely,

George Bush

² In a January 28 letter to Bendjedid, Bush wrote: "We remain convinced that the solution to this conflict can best be approached through discussions between your two governments. I have written King Hassan to express this view, and wished to express to you directly my hope that such talks can take place." (Ibid.)

437. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armancost)

Washington, January 24, 1986

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, *[text not declassified]*. Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages not declassified.]

438. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 7, 1986, 0934Z

1319. SecState pls pass White House for Vice President Bush. Dept also pass to USUN and AmEmbassies Algiers and Dakar. Subj: February 7 Audience With King Hassan—Initiative on the Western Sahara. Ref: (A) Rabat 1178² (B) SecState 26510.³

1. Secret/Nodis—Entire text.

2. Summary: During my February 7 audience with King Hassan on other subjects, I referred to the Vice President's message (ref B) exploring possibilities of direct Moroccan-Algerian talks on the Western Sahara, emphasizing the U.S. did not want to interfere but was willing to be helpful. Hassan expressed thanks for the Vice President's interest. He said that he was willing to enter into a direct dialogue with Algiers, and would initiate one. He cautioned, however, that past experience had shown Algiers is increasingly opposed to self-determination in the region, and said that talks without a third party as witness allowed Algiers to intentionally misconstrue to others the tough positions

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Lot 95D23, 1986 Nodis Telegrams, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 1178 from Rabat, February 5, Nassif reported that during a February 4 meeting, Filali "briefed me on current prospects for renewing dialogue with Algeria on the Western Sahara." Nassif also reported that Filali said "Morocco is also following closely current soundings on the issue by the UN Secretary General and OAU Chairman and believes that progress could also be made through those channels" and "expressed interest in U.S. thinking on a Saharan settlement." (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 26510 transmitted the Vice President's message. See Document 436.

they took with Rabat. Hassan said the U.S. could advance the process by encouraging OAU Chairman Diouf to link up with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's efforts, and backing Morocco's calls for a referendum of self-determination for the region. End summary.

3. Following discussion of other subjects with King Hassan at my February 7 audience in Marrakech, I raised the issue of the Western Sahara. (Prior to the audience I had lunched with Foreign Minister Filali, who noted to me the "interesting letter" from Vice President Bush to the King (ref B) regarding contacts with Algeria on the Western Sahara which had been delivered the day before. He encouraged me to raise the issue with Hassan, noting that it might be time to again seek to move things along on the subject.) I emphasized to Hassan that the US had no desire to insert itself into the process of resolving the issue, but wanted to be helpful if it could. I explained to him that Algeria had been very active diplomatically, and had told the U.S. Government of its desire and readiness to resolve the issue if Morocco was interested in renewing the bilateral dialogue that has been dormant since early 1985.

4. Hassan expressed appreciation for the Vice President's interest, noting that for a variety of reasons, it is only natural that the United States should take an interest in the Saharan issue. He emphasized that Morocco was willing to renew the bilateral dialogue. Morocco is in a strong position, he explained. Like a lawyer who knows he has a strong case, it is not interested in who pleads first. Thus, Morocco would not stand on protocol, and was prepared to seek renewed contacts with Algeria but did not specify a time frame.

5. He cautioned, however, against expecting too much from such contacts. Algeria is not interested in the solution of self-determination for the Sahraoui people through a referendum, and in fact appears to be gradually backing away from that solution. Moreover, Algeria has to date insisted on face-to-face talks with Morocco rather than with a third party (other than the Polisario) because it "wants no witnesses." He explained that Algeria portrays one thing as its position to third countries, while in its actual contacts with Morocco, it says something entirely different. Hassan recalled that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had in early 1985 proposed Moroccan-Algerian talks at his palace in Marbella with the Saudis acting as facilitators, and that Algeria would have nothing of it.

6. Hassan said the U.S. could help facilitate a solution to the Western Saharan question, however, by helping to move along the efforts currently underway with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in New York (ref A). He asked if the US could "push" OAU Chairman Abou Diouf to cooperate with Perez de Cuellar. He emphasized his high esteem for Diouf, and said he had spoken on several occasions recently "on the phone and through emissaries" with Diouf. He noted that

Diouf' s mandate as OAU head runs out in mid-1986, and expressed fear that Diouf could be followed "by some leftist" who would complicate more than help matters. At the same time, he said, the U.S. would be useful if it helped push for a referendum of self-determination of the Saharan population. He emphasized that only a referendum would serve as the basis for a lasting settlement in the area, and that the sooner both sides moved toward that position, the better.

7. Comment: Hassan seemed somewhat less enthused about the efforts under way in New York than Filali had been just two days earlier (ref A) but sees usefulness in pursuing that path and would appreciate U.S. help in encouraging it. He has no illusions, however, about the difficulties any of the negotiating options will face.

Nassif

439. Telegram 40098 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco

Washington, February 8, 1986, 0057Z

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, *[text not declassified]*, 1986–88, Algeria. Secret; Immediate; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 1 page not declassified.]

440. Telegram 7835 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State

Rabat, August 6, 1986, 1605Z

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, *[text not declassified]*. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 2 pages not declassified.]

441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 6, 1986, 0710Z

280047. Subject: Western Sahara Policy Review.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Over the next 2–3 weeks NEA and AF will be reviewing policy options for the Western Sahara. As this dispute is a fundamental element of the competition between Algeria and Morocco, the scope of the review will necessarily include our bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria as well as regional questions such as maintaining support for Tunisia, maintaining Mauritania's neutrality, and limiting expenditure of our diplomatic capitol on this issue in Africa. The value of the review will be enhanced by a discussion of the widest range of options. The purpose of this message is to solicit contributions for this review which should be sent Stadis no later than September 11.

3. We propose that the review initially examine long and short term U.S. interests which relate to the conflict (last review was based on an assessment of prospects for a negotiated settlement). These U.S. interests would include the following:

— Regional stability and the U.S. strategic posture for the long term are best served by the territory of the Western Sahara remaining under Moroccan control. Our interests would not be served by an independent non-viable Western Sahara state subject to Libyan, Soviet or other influences hostile to or nonsupportive of U.S. strategic interests.

— U.S. interests are best served through maintaining good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Moroccan/Algerian cooperation is the best assurance of long term regional stability. Competition between these two states, however, is fundamental in regional politics. Contrary to our interests, both states have used their relationship with Libya as an element in this competition.

4. Policy propositions (the intent here is to be stimulative—not inclusive):

— We should avoid entanglement in efforts to mediate the Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria as long as prospects for a settlement remain unpromising.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677–0664. Secret; Priority, Stadis. Drafted by Merrick; cleared by Bishop, Willett, Mann, and Laipson; Ussery in substance, and Biniaz for information; approved by Suddarth.

— Continue to encourage Moroccan and Algerian cooperation and flexibility.

— We wish to avoid policies that might lead to greater direct U.S. involvement in the Western Sahara war. At the same time a Moroccan military defeat by Algeria in an expanded conflict would lead to severe destabilization of a friendly regime, and is therefore to be avoided.

— We do not want Moroccan/Algerian friction over the Western Sahara to escalate, given the danger of direct military conflict between Algeria and Morocco and its consequences.

— After the King's meeting with Peres and his abrogation of the unity agreement with Libya, we wish to increase support for Morocco (and to be perceived as doing so). However, our budgetary resources are severely limited. Are our Western Sahara policies an area in which we can demonstrate support without undue harm to our relations with Algeria nor changes to our basic view of the legal status of the territory?

— We wish to avoid extension of the hostility to Mauritanian soil.

5. Policy options: We would appreciate each post defining Western Sahara policy options as they see them with suggested changes as well as a discussion of the pros and cons of each option. While we expect the outcome of this examination will lean toward the no change or modest change end of the spectrum, discussion of longer term and wider ranging policy alternatives is encouraged. The review will examine our policy and guidelines for casual incidental contact with the Polisario. Other issues which might be considered are:

— A Western Sahara referendum under other multilateral sponsorship, perhaps stimulated by the U.S. (assuming lack of success of referendum proposals by the OAU and UN).

— How we should react if Morocco takes moves towards a unilateral referendum?

— Liberalized travel policies for U.S. officials in the Western Sahara. Who should be allowed to travel and under what circumstances?

— Should we formally include the territories ceded by Mauritania in the area we consider under Moroccan administrative control?

— Can we constructively discuss limiting Libyan support for the Polisario with Algeria? What will be the effect of greater Libyan support for the Polisario on our bilateral relations with Algeria? How will Libyan support for the Polisario color our wider perceptions of the Western Sahara conflict?

— If the Polisario adopts indiscriminate terrorist tactics in Morocco, how will our posture change on the conflict? Can we persuade Algeria that the adoption of such tactics by the Polisario would be inimical to their interests?

— We have generally been supportive of Moroccan positions on the Western Sahara in international fora, particularly the U.N. and in OAU countries. What would be the effect of increased support? Would it be productive? How would it affect our relations with African states?² Algeria?³ Can we encourage more effective Arab support of Moroccan positions on the Western Sahara?⁴

In this exploratory phase, posts may wish to examine some “straw man” options⁵ which they oppose simply to widen the area of discussion.⁶

Shultz

² In telegram 8819 from Tunis, September 10, the Embassy replied: “Aside from encouragement of Tunisian initiatives and continuing our consultations with the GOT on the problem, there seems little the U.S. can do from Tunis. Tunisia already gives its quiet approval to our support of Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860689–0963)

³ In telegram 4583 from Algiers, September 11, the Embassy replied: “We agree that the U.S. should continue to avoid direct entanglement in proposals to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. Nevertheless, we should continue to maintain a posture to encourage all sides to seek a political settlement and not lead any to expect that a military solution would be acceptable to the U.S. In the end, we continue to believe that direct Algerian-Moroccan discussions offer the best prospect for resolving the conflict.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860691–0280)

⁴ In telegram 3988 from Nouakchott, September 11, the Embassy replied: “This Embassy welcomes the chance to participate in the Western Sahara policy review, though we regret we have no new ideas to offer. In our view, protracted conflict is inevitable, and the role of policy must be reduced to damage control. A Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement would certainly assure regional stability and best serve U.S. interests, but it is utopian to expect that it is possible.” The Embassy continued: “Current U.S. policy on the Western Sahara, while not particularly satisfying, seems appropriate.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860702–0175)

⁵ In telegram 2600 from USUN, September 13, the Mission replied: “We think that the U.N. is no place for the USG to deal directly with the Polisario or to initiate changes in our current policy.” The Mission continued: “Polisario has not been able to improve its official status here” and contended, “while we could actively seek to keep Polisario’s access limited, its lack of progress under current conditions argues in favor of a more discreet approach—if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860696–0921)

⁶ In telegram 9197 from Rabat, September 15, the Embassy reported: “The Western Sahara issue appears to be on dead-center with little hope of early resolution. We consider just about right the present U.S. policy of stated neutrality with respect to the outcome of a negotiated settlement or referendum, while encouraging Algerian-Moroccan contacts and urging a peaceful solution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860711–0273, S860700–0329)

442. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Assistant (Menarchik) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, November 1, 1986

SUBJECT

Response to President Bendjedid's Message on the Western Sahara

President Bendjedid of Algeria sent you a message concerning his complaints that US/United Nations actions were incompatible with stated USG policy (see Tab 2).

The Algerian concern arose as a result of Ambassador Walters' statements and actions during UNGA discussion on the Western Sahara. Ambassador Walters defined Morocco and Algeria as the parties to the dispute, rather than Morocco and the Polisario. This point, and the fact that Ambassador Walters' rhetoric was slanted in an anti-Algerian tone, irked the Algerians and precipitated the complaint to you (see Tab 3).

BACKGROUND: During the 1986 UNGA debates, the Algerians appeared to be predestined to "win" their case again on the Western Sahara issue (Algeria, perennially gets near automatic support from Third World supporters). The Moroccans were opposed, but did not actively participate; rather the Moroccans "leaned" on the US to "carry their freight for them." This Ambassadors Walters and Reed did with enthusiasm. Evidently USUN wanted the US to vote NO rather than ABSTAIN as State instructed them to do.² A donnybrook arose between the State Department and USUN. State instructed USUN to abstain and to explain the abstention by citing the intransigence of the Polisario.³ Several "heated" phone calls ensued between Ambassador Walters and Asst Secretary Armacost.⁴

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19816, Folder 19816-022, Western Sahara—1986. No classification marking. Sent through Fuller.

² In telegram 330954 to USUN, October 22, the Department instructed the Mission to abstain on the Algerian resolution. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860803-0345) No record of the Mission's desire to vote "no" on the resolution has been found.

³ No record of the Department's instructions has been found. In telegram 3425 from USUN, October 23, which contains the text of Walters's statement of explanation, the Mission reported: "The impact of Ambassador Walters's explanation of vote given before the vote was enormous. Literally dozens of delegation representatives descended on U.S. delegation requesting copies of the statement." The Mission also reported: "The level of support for Algeria in the resolution appeared to have slightly dwindled since 1985," by four votes. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860804-0926)

⁴ No record of the telephone calls has been found.

Ambassador Walters appeared before the Fourth Committee of the UNGA (the committee on decolonialization) and delivered his rather emotional, pro-Moroccan speech.

STATE RECOMMENDATIONS: The State Department believes that a formal response from you is not expected, but provided a draft letter should you choose to answer President Bendjedid.

NSC and OVP/NSA RECOMMENDATIONS: NSC (Dennis Ross) and OVP/NSA believe you should respond with a verbal answer (using OVP/NSA as your surrogate) using the draft letter as an outline.⁵

Tab 2

Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State⁶

Algiers, October 28, 1986, 1556Z

5462. Dept pass VP Office for Don Gregg. Subject: Bendjedid Message to VP Bush.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. After discussing Syria (septel),⁷ Foreign Minister Ibrahim pulled Ambassador aside saying he had been asked to pass personal message from President Bendjedid to VP Bush. The message was simply to raise to the Vice President's attention Bendjedid's concern over the activities of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations over the past two weeks.

3. Ibrahim said that Algeria found the U.S. Mission's role during the debate on the Western Sahara to be incompatible with stated U.S. policy on the region. The Mission had lobbied for Moroccan positions, even trying at one point to convince the Algerian delegation to accept Moroccan amendments. Although Algeria had, in the interest of keeping peace at the UN, not proposed any substantive changes to last year's

⁵ At the bottom of the memorandum, Bush wrote: "1. Yes, keep channel 'open.' 2. Ask Johnstone to reiterate policy thanking Bendjedid for his message. GB 11-3."

⁶ Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

⁷ In telegram 5461 from Algiers, October 28, the Embassy reported that Ibrahim "said he had received report on British Ambassador's démarche made to Hamdani. The British had put forward a convincing case that three officials of the Syrian Embassy in London were deeply implicated in the attempt to blow up the El Al airliner. Nonetheless, Ibrahim said that he remained personally convinced that the hand of Israeli intelligence was behind the entire event." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860819–0263) Documentation on the attempted bombing of the El Al airliner is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

UN resolution, the U.S. Mission worked very hard to undermine the Algerian position. In addition to Ambassador Reed's efforts to lobby on behalf of Moroccan amendments, General Walters had involved himself personally in the fray (for the first time, he said), having given a strong speech critical of the Algerian resolution just prior to the vote. Ibrahimji judged that the speech had cost Algeria several votes.

4. Ibrahimji summarized by noting that the U.S. has reiterated its neutral policy in the Western Sahara in statements in Washington during the past year. The policy pursued by the U.S. Mission in New York, he claimed, seemed to be unrelated to that of Washington. He reiterated the President's hope that his concerns would be passed on to VP Bush. He did not leave the impression that a reply was expected.

5. Ambassador promised to transmit the message but expressed the view that U.S. Mission in New York was simply fulfilling its mandate to seek areas of agreement in its discussion of the resolution in question. He said U.S. abstention was proof positive of U.S. position and, although he said he had not yet had the opportunity to see the text of any U.S. Mission statements, he was quite confident that no one had taken sides on the Western Sahara conflict. In any case, there was no question of there having been any change in the well-defined U.S. policy in the region.

Johnstone

Tab 3

Telegram From the White House to Air Force Two⁸

Washington, November 1, 1986, 2130Z

WH00504. Please Deliver to LtCol Doug Menarchik. Memorandum for Mr. Donald P. Gregg, The White House. Subject: Algerian Message on the Western Sahara Problem.

Growing out of last week's debate in the U.N.'s Fourth Committee on the Western Sahara conflict, the Algerians have complained to us that USUN's actions were incompatible with stated USG policy.

In considering the request for Department views and recommendations concerning President Bendjedid's message to the Vice President on this subject (Algiers 5462, Nodis), we noted that Ambassador Johnstone responded to Foreign Minister Ibrahimji in very good fashion and that Embassy Algiers does not think a formal response is expected.

⁸ Secret.

This would be the Department's preferred course of action as well. However, a proposed draft is appended should the Vice President choose to answer President Bendjedid.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

His Excellency
Chadli Bendjedid
President of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria
Algiers

Dear Mr. President.

I am pleased to continue our exchange of messages on issues of concern. These messages provide an invaluable means through which we can further the growth of mutual understanding and cooperation between our governments.

You will recall that I wrote to you in January of this year on the subject of the Western Sahara. At that time, I expressed my concern about the continuation of the conflict, an issue which I find particularly disturbing as it involves two friends of the United States, Algeria and Morocco. My concern is undiminished, Mr. President, just as the basic policy of the United States Government toward the dispute remains unchanged. We still are convinced that this problem cannot be solved militarily, that a resolution will come only through direct negotiations among the concerned parties, and that any solution must reflect the desires of those directly affected.

Regarding your observations on the recent United Nations debate, I wish there could be closer correlation in our views on a range of topics in international fora. In this case, I want to reassure you that Ambassador Walters' statement to the Fourth Committee was, in itself, an expression of our deep apprehension about this issue. Our long-held position is that resolutions which do not have support from all those directly involved do not enhance prospects for solutions to problems and might actually impede progress. This is the context of Ambassador Walters' explanation of vote, as well as of my government's abstention on your resolution.

Mr. President, I reiterate my pleasure at hearing from you again. I continue to count on your friendship and assure you that you may count on mine and that of the United States Government.

Sincerely,

George Bush

443. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 13, 1987, 1047Z

354. Subject: Western Sahara: Algerian Initiative. Ref: Algiers 16.²

1. (Secret/Nodis—Entire text)

2. Summary: Embassy does not think there is much prospect of moving the Western Sahara dossier off dead-center. On the other hand, it would be useful for the U.S. to remind both Algeria and Morocco of our continued interest in an early negotiated settlement, provided we are careful to avoid becoming substantively involved in the test of wills between Algiers and Rabat. Embassy has previously recommended strongly that Vice President Bush head a high-level delegation to Morocco for March 3–4 Feast of the Throne/U.S.-Morocco bicentennial kick-off celebrations. We recommend that the Vice President visit Algeria as well and that he take up the Western Sahara in both capitals. U.S. should approach this exercise with modest expectations, however, and not unnecessarily use up political capital. End summary.³

3. Embassy read reftel (and reports on previous contacts in Algiers) with great interest and is intrigued by the Algerians' efforts to bring the U.S. into the negotiating process on the Western Sahara and by the GOA's insistence that a 2–3 month window of opportunity for ameliorating the problem is now open. Since this Embassy does not see much likelihood of an early settlement, we wonder about the reasons for the full court press by the Algerians. It may well be that the GOA believes Moroccan plans to build the sixth berm and extend it to Mauritania, will further solidify the Moroccan position and thus close the window of opportunity. (According to our DAO, if the Moroccans go all out, they can complete the main construction in less than two months.) It may also be that the GOA is trying to make an impact on what they perhaps consider to be a warming trend in U.S.-Moroccan relations. In any

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder 19874–017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Underneath the date line, Gregg wrote: "Mr Vice President: Sensible cable. I might suggest that a PRG be held to look at this issue, if a trip to the Maghreb is at all of interest to you." No record of a subsequent PRG on Western Sahara has been found.

² In telegram 16 from Algiers, January 3, Johnstone reported that during a December 31, 1986, meeting, "Ibrahimi thought the U.S. had a critical role to play" on the Western Sahara and believed "it would be useful if the Vice President would renew the appeal he made last year encouraging a negotiated settlement and possibly visit the region in the next few months." (Ibid.)

³ Gregg drew a vertical line in the left-hand and right-hand margins bracketing the last three sentences of this paragraph.

case, given U.S. interest in enhanced regional stability, Embassy thinks that with certain cautions, the Algerian proposal that the U.S. reiterate its interest in a peaceful settlement could be pursued.

4. Implicit in the Algerians' proposal are several apparent assumptions that we think may be invalid: (1) The first is that if the Algerians can deliver the Polisario, the U.S. can deliver the Moroccans. Apart from the asymmetry of the suggestion—Algeria, after all, is itself a party to the conflict with its own interests to serve in a settlement—it is far from clear that either the Polisario or Morocco is prepared to make major concessions. The Western Sahara remains, for the King and the Moroccan populace, a national issue of historic dimensions. U.S.-urged concessions would be politely but firmly rebuffed; (2) there is an assumption that Morocco is disposed to negotiate when it is in fact in a position of growing strength, having forced a stalemate in the war on the ground and now moving to fill in the final link in its defenses. The Moroccans think they are playing from a strong hand, and, if we read them correctly, they have a long-term strategy of gradual absorption of the Sahara which would not admit major concessions at this time. There appears to be at least a hope on Algeria's part that Morocco is tiring of the game and may be ready for talks, when the prospects have actually diminished for a political settlement that would do much more than put the seal on what Morocco already holds. Although Algeria has won the diplomatic battle for SDAR recognition by a substantial list of countries, the GOM has, as noted above, outflanked the Polisario and, following on its efforts to stabilize the Sahara militarily, is already moving to develop the populated areas economically. Seen from this perspective, the motivation for wide-ranging negotiations has diminished since 1984.

5. We note that the Algerians have been careful to keep this project separate from the SYG's effort and his presumed visit in late January to Algiers. We doubt that either side puts much stock in Perez de Cuellar's ability to resolve the issues.

6. Leaving aside the actual prospects for the Algerian proposal to us, what should be the U.S. attitude? So long as the U.S. observes certain principles and cautions, we see some merit in a new U.S. effort to stimulate direct talks between Algeria and Morocco. Whether or not the proposed meeting between Bendjedid and King Hassan takes place, we think it would be useful to have a high level U.S. visitor in the region at the end of February–early March time frame. This Embassy has already proposed a Vice Presidential visit to kick off the bicentennial of U.S.-Moroccan relations on the anniversary of the "Fete du Trone", March 3. This might well be an opportune moment for us to undertake a high-level review of the bidding on the Western Sahara and perhaps to urge a meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid. The Vice President could

presumably then travel to Algiers (and we would urge Tunisia or some other regional stop also).

7. We would strongly urge that the U.S. limit its role to that of friendly but noninvolved party. We should be careful lest Hassan sense any Algerian-inspired pressure on him, which might stiffen his resolve to let events take their course. We should make it clear to all that we are not substituting for the parties, are not going to get involved in the substance of the dispute and that we seek merely to play a facilitating role in bringing the two sides together.

8. We do not think the preliminary visit suggested in para 6-F would be productive on this issue.

9. Department please pass to Algiers.

Nassif

444. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, February 27, 1987

SUBJECT

Military Situation in the Western Sahara

— A large Polisario armored force attacked Morocco's defensive barrier (berm) in the Western Sahara February 25.²

— This was the largest Polisario armor movement ever, and the first large-scale attack employing armor unit tactics.

— Timely warning and inadequate Polisario air defenses enabled the Moroccans to fend off the attack; [*1½ lines not declassified*].

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D432, Nodis Memoranda March 1987. Secret; Noform; Nodis. Drafted by Jefferson. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Mar 2, 1987."

² In telegram 1974 from Rabat, February 26, the Embassy reported that "Moroccan forces in the Al-Mahbas (Northeastern) sector of the Western Sahara defensive berm sustained a major Polisario armored/mechanized attack in the morning hours of February 25." The Polisario "breached the berm and reportedly penetrated as far as three kilometers before being driven off." One-hundred eighty Moroccan soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870152-0229)

— Nevertheless, the Moroccans are vulnerable to such attacks, due to thinly spread armor resources; more night-capable anti-tank weapons would bolster their defenses.

Morocco forewarned. Following several minor attacks on the berm last week, the Polisario attempted a major attack in the Mahbas area (see map)³ February 25. Preparations for the attack began February 18–22 when five tank and six mechanized companies—a substantial portion of the entire Polisario armor force—left garrison in Algeria. [3 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

We have no explanation for this uncharacteristic failure to provide adequate air defense for the assault force. (An SA–6 inside Algeria downed a Moroccan F–1 during a smaller attack in 1985.) Possibly, the Polisario realized they had been detected and launched their attack before the preparations were complete.

A real problem. Moroccan forces along the berm are stretched thin. There are only some 78 tanks along the entire segment of the berm running south parallel to the Algerian border—the area which can easily be reached by heavy equipment operating from Polisario base camps in southern Algeria and northeastern Mauritania. The problem has been exacerbated by the shift of some units to protect the construction force now extending the barrier southward from the Bir Enzaran area. Only some 15 or so fighters are available at southern airbases.

There is some question as to how capable the Polisario are of continuing such attacks. They have only recently begun to conduct armor unit exercises, and will doubtless have difficulty replacing trained tank crews. Nevertheless, in this case and in numerous others, fairly large Polisario units have proved capable of using the terrain and the cover of darkness to approach the berm undetected and launch surprise attacks. Moroccan ground and air surveillance is quite deficient, due to budgetary constraints affecting both the overall equipment inventory and proper maintenance.

TOWs would help. [1½ lines not declassified] it is clear they face a potentially serious armor threat. The Moroccan army might find it hard to cope with a large armor force if that force used surprise to get inside the berm and was adequately supported by mobile SAMs. A large supply of TOWs and launchers would help redress the potential imbalance in armor in such a scenario. Equipped with night vision devices, these anti-tank missiles would also give the Moroccans a means of preempting an attack at night, when the Moroccan air force's planes are out of the equation. For Moroccan overall defensive strategy to be fully effective,

³ Attached but not printed.

major improvements to Moroccan ground and air-surveillance capabilities are also needed, as is an upgrade in electronic protection (ESM) of Moroccan aircraft against Polisario/Algerian SAMs.⁴

⁴ In telegram 582037 to Rabat, February 27, Weinberger requested that the Embassy transmit the following message to Hassan: "We have received your request for rapid military support. I give you my firm assurance that the United States will stand by its esteemed friend—the Kingdom of Morocco—in its hour of need. I have therefore approved your request and we will begin shipping requested items within 15 days." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-90-0023, 1987 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 44, Morocco 1987) On February 26, the Moroccan Defense Attaché, Mohamed El-Kostali, wrote Armitage requesting 50 TOW launchers and 500 TOW missiles. (Letter from Kostali to Armitage; *ibid.*)

445. Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in Morocco¹

Rabat, March 4, 1987

SUBJECT

Possible Libyan Resumption of Arms Assistance to the Polisario

At Ambassador Nassif's reception for Secretary of the Treasury Baker March 4, Moroccan Foreign Minister Filali and Moroccan Air Force Chief Kabbaj asked to see the Secretary and the Ambassador to pass on a message from King Hassan.² The King wished to inform Washington of his concern that Libya may have resumed arms aid to the Polisario and be rushing military equipment to the Polisario via an "air bridge."³ From February 28 through March 4, the Moroccans have registered 11 Libyan flights to Tindouf in Algeria near the Moroccan border. The Moroccans

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/26/1987-04/08/1987). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kirby. At the top of the memorandum, Kelly wrote: "Jim—FYI," drew an arrow and wrote: "Pls pass to Bob Oakley," and to the right of this wrote: "Frank gave to Gates to check out. BK." In telegram 2245 from Rabat, March 6, the Embassy transmitted a similar version of the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870177-0296)

² A record of the Baker-Filali conversation, which took place before the reception, is in telegram 2246 from Rabat, March 6. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870177-0314)

³ In telegram 73536 to Rabat, March 13, the Department reported: "Embassy may inform FM Filali that, based on information available to us, we are unable to confirm that there was any resumption of Libyan military support to the Polisario." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [*text not declassified*], Rabat, 1986-88)

think the aircraft may be Soviet-built Antopov transports. Each plane has remained on the ground in Tindouf about one hour.

Noting that Libya's Qadhafi had rhetorically attacked King Hassan publicly in remarks delivered March 2,⁴ and that the head of Algeria's FLN has also spoken out strongly against Morocco this week,⁵ Foreign Minister Filali said the GOM wonders whether it is about to face a major escalation in the Western Sahara.

While noting that the primary purpose in asking for the brief meeting with Secretary Baker was simply to inform the Washington community about Morocco's concerns, the Moroccan officials said that it would be very helpful if the U.S. could, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, discover the nature of Libyan shipments to Tindouf and inform the GOM.

Secretary Baker offered to carry the Moroccan request to Washington expeditiously and said he hoped the USG could assume a heightened state of observance in the region.

⁴ In telegram 2236 from Rabat, March 6, the Embassy reported: "Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi attacked King Hassan in March 2 remarks made to the Libyan General People's Congress. These public personal attacks, the first that Qadhafi has made on Hassan since September, indicate that Libyan-Moroccan relations are probably in for a period of renewed tension." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870177–0036)

⁵ Not further identified.

446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco and Algeria¹

Washington, March 7, 1987, 0936Z

67502. From Under Secretary Armacost, please hold for COM's return. Subject: USG Policy re Western Sahara.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. After careful review, Department concludes that present USG policies and practices relative to Western Sahara dispute serve USG

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870178–0920. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussery, Thomas Benesch (AF/W), Smith, Mann, Laipson, Biniaz, Mueller, Bishop, and Peter Covington (S/S–O); approved by Armacost. Sent for information to Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, and USUN.

interests very well.² These are reiterated for information and guidance of addressees.

3. Essential points on solution to Western Sahara dispute are as follows:

— A military solution to this issue is neither possible nor desirable. The dispute should be settled through negotiations between and among the parties directly concerned (USG assiduously has avoided specification of “parties”, but consistently has made clear that Algerian involvement would be a *sine qua non* to a settlement.)

— USG acknowledges GOM administrative responsibility in that part of Western Sahara under Moroccan control. This does not constitute acceptance of Moroccan sovereignty, a matter to be decided through the political process foreseen in first tick.

— Solution to conflict ultimately must reflect the views of those directly affected. (We must avoid formulations which further would prejudge issue of who would participate in referendum—e.g. use of either “Saharaouis” or “inhabitants”; this is another issue to be determined through negotiations.)

— In confidential exchanges with the GOA and GOM we have expressed reservations about the viability of an independent Saharan state.

4. We neither seek nor reject contact with Polisario/SDAR representatives.

— As a matter of practice, meetings between administration officials and Polisario/SDAR officials will take place in Algeria, be infrequent, take place at political counselor level or below, and be subject to prior, case-by-case approval by Ambassador or Chargé to Algiers.

— At such meetings, USG interlocutor should reiterate to Polisario/SDAR officials that this does not constitute USG recognition of SDAR.

— If Polisario/SDAR officials directly present formal written communications addressed to USG, they should be informed that there will be no USG response. Such communications, and any received via other means (e.g. via delivery to our Embassy in Algiers) will be forwarded routinely to NEA/AFN.

5. Travel by administration officials to Western Sahara:

— Travel by executive branch personnel will be on an exceptional basis at the working level (specifically excluding the Ambassador and DCM) and subject to prior case-by-case approval by the Ambassador or Chargé.

² See Document 441.

— Approval will not be granted for visits by U.S. military personnel, except on a case-by-case basis with Washington interagency approval necessary.

— When travel is performed, USG personnel should reiterate that this does not constitute USG recognition of GOM sovereignty over disputed territory.

— Codels which visit the territory may be escorted by Mission officers of the lowest appropriate rank.

— Consuls may go to the Western Sahara as necessary to handle consular cases.

Whitehead

447. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, March 9, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Johnstone has reported to me his conversations with you, General Belkheir and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi on the difficult Western Sahara issue.² I continue to take a personal interest in this issue³ and am hopeful that a way might be found to restore peace to the Western Sahara in a manner that advances the interests of Algeria and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, William J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/26/1987–04/08/1987). No classification marking.

² In telegram 1626 from Algiers, March 17, Johnstone reported that during a March 14 office call Belkheir provided the following update: "The Pérez de Cuellar initiative remains on track but major stumbling blocks remain. The UNSYG reports that Hassan has agreed to quote UN organization and supervision unquote of a referendum. Belkheir attaches some significance to this language in that previous Moroccan formulations, he says, have agreed to supervision but not a UN role in organization. The question of Moroccan troop and administrative presence in the Sahara remains a stumbling block. Certainly no fair referendum can be held as long as Moroccan troops are co-located with the Saharan population." Belkheir also said "the question of what exactly the Saharans might be invited to vote on has not even been broached." Johnstone indicated that Belkheir believed that "the Western Sahara problem would have to be dealt with before there could be any easing of Morocco-Algeria tensions." Johnstone commented that Belkheir "appeared convinced that Hassan's recent dealings with the UNSYG had turned up a new, albeit tenuous, element of flexibility." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870561–0463, D870548–0821, D870206–0787)

³ See footnote 2, Document 443.

Morocco and which takes into account the legitimate interests of the people directly concerned.

I have asked Ambassador Johnstone to explore further with you and your government any ideas you may have on the possibilities of beginning a process which could lead toward peace in the Sahara. I look forward to hearing your views. For my part, I am prepared to continue to play a role in helping develop this process if, in my judgment, there would appear to be a reasonable prospect of success.

With best wishes,⁴

Sincerely,

George Bush

⁴ Bush also wrote: "& Respects!" after "With best wishes."

448. Telegram 113526 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco

Washington, April 15, 1987, 2034Z

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco 1982–1990, *[text not declassified]*. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 1 page not declassified.]

449. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)

Washington, April 27, 1987

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco 1982–1990. Secret; Sensitive; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 3 pages not declassified.]

Tab A

**Telegram 1486 From the Embassy in Mauritania to the
Department of State**

Nouakchott, April 7, 1987

[Secret; Immediate; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 2 pages not declassified.]

Tab B

**Telegram 107160 From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Mauritania**

Washington, April 9, 1987

[Secret; Immediate; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. 1 page not declassified.]

**450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in
Belgium and France¹**

Washington, May 18, 1987, 2328Z

139837. The following State 139837 8 May 87 sent action Rabat Algiers info Nouakchott Tunis Riyadh being repeated for your info.

Quote: 139837. Subject: Washington Readouts on 5/4 Maghreb Summit.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary: NEA/DAS Ussery invited resident Ambassadors from Algeria and Morocco for separate conversations aimed at their initial impressions of 5/4 Maghreb Summit² and what that might

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870356–0048. Confidential. Sent for information to Brussels and Paris. Drafted by Fisher; approved by Zweifel. A repeat of telegram 139837 to Rabat and Algiers, May 8.

² For more on the Maghreb Summit between Bendjedid and Hassan, which took place on May 4, see footnote 4, Document 78.

portend for developments in Western Sahara. Sahnoun of Algeria (stating he had talked to Belkheir) gave essentially downbeat assessment, although he stressed that this was not a failure since “psychologically” it had defused tense situation. Bargach of Morocco took opportunity to make impassioned appeal for unequivocal USG support for GOM’s position on Western Sahara. End summary.

3. During 5/6 conversation, Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun said that GOA had been disappointed with summit. Through King Fahd, Algerians had anticipated that Hassan would bring “something new” to discuss on Western Sahara, drawing on last bilateral summit (2/83) and subsequent GOA “plan” presented in early 1985. Instead, Hassan had avoided almost all discussion of Western Sahara, sticking to previous positions. GOA more convinced than ever that Moroccans are intent on military solution to conflict.

4. Even though brief summit was “politically sterile”, it was not a total failure in GOA assessment. “Psychologically” it helped defuse building tensions. Fact that this was first time these two leaders had agreed on joint communiqué—albeit bland—was significant. Sahnoun also pointed out that Hassan and Bendjedid had been stiff at outset, just shaking hands; at conclusion, two embraced. Although there is no precise format or timing, Sahnoun anticipates that GOA and GOM FonMins will have follow-on discussions at an early date.

5. Sahnoun expressed view that Fahd’s principal purpose in meeting with Maghreb leaders was to press for Arab League summit. Sahnoun believes that lack of progress on Western Sahara does not necessarily forestall that meeting. In replying to inquiry about Bendjedid’s recent visit to Mauritania, Sahnoun replied that this had been to reassure GIRM of GOA support—especially economic.

6. On 5/7, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach said that he had no direct feedback yet on summit. He observed that resolution of a major problem is not possible in one and one half hours’ of meetings in two segments. Most significant item is that summit took place at all. Hassan has always wanted dialogue with Algeria on Western Sahara issue, believing that this is fundamentally an issue to be solved politically between Algeria and Morocco. Bargach also noted that issuance of joint communiqué pointing to further contacts is positive.

7. Concerning Mauritania, Bargach on several occasions referred to GOM’s strong support for its territorial integrity and pointed to Moroccan restraint in not exercising its “right” to hot pursuit of Polisario forces which attack through, then seek refuge in Mauritania. He said that Mauritians were irritated by GOA offer of support which GIRM felt it did not need. What Mauritians want is GOA action to prevent Polisario forces in Algeria from crossing the Mauritanian frontier.

8. Amb. Bargach then launched into lengthy, impassioned review of history of Western Sahara problem, point of which was to press hard for unequivocal USG support for Moroccan positions. Following were points stressed:

— Settlement can only come from agreement between Morocco and Algeria.

— American neutrality in the conflict actually supports Algeria's position.

— Polisario is creation of GOA, and Algerian claims of not being able to negotiate for Polisario are a pretext.

— Conversely, SDAR statement at time of summit (that GOA could not speak for it) is evidence that Polisario now is a challenge, destabilizing factor in internal Algerian politics.

— GOM has long supported a referendum and will respect results thereof. But Moroccans will "never" agree to independent state in Western Sahara or relinquish Moroccan claims thereto.

— Algeria which had originally proposed referendum now opposes it.

— Continuation of the war opens avenues for the Soviets, Iranians and Libyans to exercise greater influence.

— If Western Sahara were to become independent, Soviets would have ports/bases there within two months.

— Only "legitimate" governments in Africa are Morocco, Ivory Coast, Senegal. All others came into being through irregular processes.

— Lack of U.S. support on the Western Sahara and continued low levels of military and economic assistance are raising questions among Moroccans about value of our bilateral relationship.

— Economic benefits of a negotiated settlement for all Maghreb countries.

9. Throughout, Bargach appeared frustrated by lack of success at efforts for a political settlement and what he saw as U.S. neutrality in a dispute involving an old and close friend.

Whitehead

Unquote

Shultz

451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Embassy in Ethiopia¹

Washington, July 28, 1987, 1509Z

231651. Subject: Western Sahara: AS Crocker's Meeting With UN Secretary General. Ref: A) USUN 2040;² B) Addis Ababa 2909.³

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. In a July 21 meeting on other subjects with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, AS Crocker asked about the status of UN efforts to mediate the Western Sahara problem. The SYG confirmed report in ref A that he would take the issue up with Algerian President Bendjedid and SDAR "President" Abdelaziz at the forthcoming OAU Summit in Addis Ababa.⁴ He will also discuss the Western Sahara with the new OAU Chairman, whoever that turns out to be. Meanwhile, current OAU Chairman Sassou-Nguessou is planning to present a report on the Western Sahara at the Addis summit.

3. The main problem, according to the SYG, revolves around the dispatch of a UN technical team to the area to assess factors involved in implementation of a UN-sponsored ceasefire and referendum. Though Morocco has agreed to facilitate the team's work, Polisario is seeking assurances that GOM is prepared to accept the consequences of such

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870724-0059, D870599-0434. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Willett; cleared by Thomas Benesch (AF/W), Zweifel, Crocker, Joseph Lake (S/S), William Haugh (S/S-O), David Kenney (P), and James Shinn (IO/UNP); approved by Smith. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Brazzaville, Cairo, Geneva, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 2040 from USUN, July 21, the Mission reported that on July 17, Diallo provided a "readout" from De Cuellar's July 9-10 meetings in Geneva: "Polisario is still refusing to cooperate with SYG plan to dispatch a UN technical team to the Western Sahara. Secretariat officials now convinced that Algeria and Polisario are tacitly opposing referendum because they do not expect to win. Talks on dispatching the UN technical team will continue at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870573-0315)

³ In telegram 2909 from Addis Ababa, July 22, the Embassy noted that the July 21 session of the OAU Council of Ministers "was highlighted" by the report of Secretary General Oumarou, which touched on a number of "key issues." Regarding the Western Sahara, Oumarou "reported that the failures of recent initiatives in Geneva and the ongoing violence in Western Sahara provided 'no hope' for a rapid solution." In addition, "Morocco's construction of a sixth defensive wall had escalated tensions and threatened the tranquility and neutrality of Mauritania." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870582-0282)

⁴ In telegram 3118 from Addis Ababa, August 6, the Embassy reported that the OAU Summit and Council of Ministers meeting "concluded July 30 without taking major new steps on political issues such as Chad, Southern Africa or the Western Sahara." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870634-0042)

a referendum and to respect it. In the SYG's view, it will not be easy to obtain such assurances.

4. The SYG said he is considering how to handle forthcoming meetings with Bendjedid and Abdelaziz. He hopes to convince them that acceptance of the technical team does not, in and of itself, entail acceptance of anything else. He noted the considerable financial costs that the proposed ceasefire and referendum would entail for the UN, and the "absolute need" to assess these costs in advance through the sending of a team. "We will try to persuade the Polisario not to be suspicious, but I can't ask the King to sign a promissory note." The SYG said he would put Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim Farah in charge of the team, if it ever gets off the ground.

5. Comment: There was an element of irritation towards Polisario on the SYG's part in his presentation of the problems regarding the dispatch of a UN technical team. Department will be particularly interested in whatever Embassy Addis can pick up in coming days, in addition to ref. B, on the Western Sahara issue at the OAU Summit.

Shultz

**452. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Zambia¹**

Washington, October 21, 1987, 1414Z

327995. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Covering the President's Meeting With President Kaunda.

1. S Entire text.

2. There follows memcon of the President's meeting with President Kaunda at the White House on October 8, 1987.

Begin text:

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Meeting with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
October 8, 1987

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Larry Napper (AF/S), Waugh (S/S-O), Michael Klosson (S/S), and Green; approved by Chas Freeman (AF). The text of the telegram is also scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 Secretary Shultz
 Secretary Baker
 Chief of Staff Howard Baker
 National Security Advisor Frank C. Carlucci
 Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein
 Acting Administrator Jay Morris
 Assistant Secretary Crocker
 U.S. Amb. to Zambia Paul J. Hare
 Herman J. Cohen, NSC

President Kenneth David Kaunda
 Amb. Nalumino Mundia
 Minister of Finance Gibson Chigaga
 Minister of Foreign Affairs Luke J. Mwananshiku
 Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs Henry Meebelo
 Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs J.C. Mapoma
 Special Assistant to the President for Press, Social, and Cultural Affairs Naphy
 M. Nyalugwe
 Roving Amb. Paul F.J. Lusaka

Date, Time, Place

October 8, 1987, 11:00 a.m.–1:40 p.m., Oval Office, Cabinet Room, Residence (tete-a-tete—Oval Office)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Western Sahara Problem

Secretary Shultz asked President Kaunda to give his view as OAU Chairman of the Western Sahara problem. The Secretary said that we talk to both Algeria and Morocco about the issue and that we support the initiatives of the UN Secretary General. The problem, however, seems to go on and on without any solution.

President Kaunda said that as Chairman of the OAU, he has met with President Bendjedid of Algeria and President Azziz of the Saraoui republic (Polisario). He has not yet met with King Hassan of Morocco who has not been available, mainly because Morocco is not in the OAU, and the King does not attend summit meetings. Kaunda said that the UN Secretary General will be sending a technical team to collect data. After that, we will have to figure out the next step. Kaunda said he asked the UN Secretary General to continue with his present line which is to find out what the population was when the Spanish gave up control of the Spanish Sahara. "Morocco has been cheating by infiltrating Moroccan citizens to make sure any referendum will result in Morocco winning control.

We must ask the original residents their opinion, not the Moroccans." Secretary Baker said that it must be a very difficult problem to decide

what is the right cutoff date for determining population. Also, it is possible that the Polisario have also infiltrated people into the territory. President Kaunda said that the UN technical report might be helpful in this regard. King Hassan dragged his feet on the population count to the point that it is a very difficult problem right now. He clearly wanted to manipulate the data, President Kaunda said.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Armacost

453. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, December 12, 1987, 1152Z

7560. Subject: Western Sahara: Prospects and Policy.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We are impressed, but remain unpersuaded, by the general surge of optimism on the prospects for settlement of the Sahara question and/or an improvement in Algeria/Morocco relations.

3. Our skepticism is rooted in the following fundamentals:

A) Algeria is not about to abandon the Polisario. Even the most moderate AL would insist on a settlement which would include the return of the Sahrawi refugees to the Western Sahara with some form of local autonomy.

B) There is no sign that Hassan is prepared to accept any kind of compromise. His strategy is clearly designed to buy time for the permanent implantation of the imported Moroccan population in the Western Sahara. If, as is unlikely, the Saharans are ever allowed back, it will be as a minority group in a Moroccan Sahara with no special political status as an indigenous people.

C) A Moroccan-run referendum would be won by Morocco. A referendum of the Saharan people would be won by the Polisario. Hence, the two sides will never likely reach an accord on terms for a referendum.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871019–0603. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Riyadh.

D) The 180,000 Moroccans now living in the Sahara are not going to quietly allow Hassan to compromise their privileged and dominant status for the sake of peace with the Polisario. They certainly have no intention of giving the Saharans political control even as an autonomous part of Morocco.

E) The U.N. process will eventually confront these realities and will stall or be scuttled, probably by Morocco. (The Algerians have the U.N. clout to shape the process their way.)

4. The current round of optimism does not alter these fundamentals, and therefore, we believe it is unlikely to yield lasting results. The military balance in the Sahara will fluctuate depending on tactical or weapons improvements by one side or the other. The Morocco-Algeria relationship will also ebb and flow but will not improve fundamentally as long as the Saharan war continues.

5. As to U.S. policy, it will (and should) continue to be ambivalent because:

A) This is not a critical issue for the U.S.

B) We would like to preserve good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Taking sides works to our disadvantage by inviting the Soviets to play a greater role.

C) We cannot support Moroccan absorption of the Sahara without violating our own views on rights of self-determination.

D) We cannot support true self-determination without destabilizing Morocco and risking the creation of a nuisance mini-state.

E) Playing it the way we have, we get our cake and eat it too. The only price we pay is occasional Moroccan and Algerian whining and a perpetual state of nervousness in Mauritania. As desirable as it would be to see a settlement of the conflict, this is beyond our reach. Given this, our current policy is the best we can do.

Johnstone

454. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, February 29, 1988, 1253Z

1152. Subject: Tunisian Mediation of Sahara Conflict.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Tunisian Ambassador Abdelhamid Escheikh says that Tunis has offered to use its good offices to help find a solution to Western Sahara problem. According to him, the Algerians have agreed but Rabat has yet to respond.

3. Asked what Tunisia had in mind, Escheikh said that one possibility was to create Saharan state out of that portion of Sahara which had come under Mauritanian jurisdiction after Spanish withdrawal. Escheikh noted that Mauritania had abandoned its claim to this territory and Morocco had not claimed it.

4. Ambassador Escheikh agreed that Polisario would find this an inadequate solution, but he thought Polisario might accept such a solution if they could leave open the possibility of further negotiations with Morocco on northern portion of Sahara.

5. Comment: We recall similar proposal being, floated some months ago by Spanish official.² It looks somewhat farfetched but does have some appeal in that Morocco ends up controlling only significant portion of Sahara and Algeria is able to secure recognition of a Saharan state. We would be interested in views of Embassy Rabat and Nouakchott.³

Johnstone

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880172–0245. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, Madrid, and Nouakchott.

² Not further identified.

³ No response from the Embassy in Rabat has been found. In telegram 865 from Nouakchott, March 2, the Embassy reported: "We take it as a given that the GIRM would welcome any reasonable effort at finding a negotiated solution to the conflict." The Embassy continued: "On the other hand, if the Tunisians are trying to broker a solution around the idea of creating a rump SDAR state out of the abandoned GIRM territorial claim to the southern third of the Western Sahara, GIRM leaders would be likely to view this possibility with very mixed feelings." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880692–0250, D880180–0670) During a March 28 meeting, Mestiri told Shultz: "Tunisia had tried to make an effort to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, but all progress was stymied by Algeria and Morocco. The UN Secretary General seemed optimistic about his future visit." (Telegram 99606 to Tunis, March 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880274–0185)

455. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 28, 1988

SUBJECT

Western Sahara: 1988 a Window of Opportunity

In the search for settlement of the Western Sahara dispute, 1988 could be a window of opportunity.

— The bottom-line objective for Algeria and Morocco is a sustainable cessation of hostilities, but the process and exact terms of settlement remain to be determined.

— Moroccan/Algerian negotiations are tied to broader North African politics, including Algeria's attempt to build a unified Maghreb, and Morocco's improving ties to Libya.

— Progress toward a settlement would benefit both Morocco's King Hassan and Algeria's President Bendjedid, but might also create some frictions between Hassan and his army.

— Polisario will be forced to follow any Algerian lead, although some hard-liners may seek alternate aid and use of Mauritanian territory in a futile effort to fight on.

— UN Secretary General Peres de Cuellar is trying to develop a mechanism which assures Moroccan control of the Sahara while allowing Algeria to save face.²

— While a Sahara settlement and greater Maghreb cooperation could complicate US efforts to strengthen its Maghreb presence and influence, it would enhance regional stability and dilute Soviet influence.

If this window of opportunity is not opened, a new one may not appear for some years. An analysis is attached.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D433, Exdis Documents for March 1988. Secret; No for; No contract; Orcon; Exdis. Drafted on March 16 by Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA).

² In telegram 705 from USUN, March 11, the Mission reported that de Cuellar "plans early April trip with OAU Chairman Kaunda to Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to nail down framework for referendum which would then be presented for approval to OAU summit in May. Algerians are wary but appear ready to cooperate." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880210-0858)

Attachment

Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State³

Washington, undated

WESTERN SAHARA: 1988 A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

Defining a Settlement. While a cessation of hostilities is the end-goal, both the process and terms of a settlement remain to be determined. Polisario has sought Saharan independence. Morocco wants international legitimation of its control of the territory, and an end to the threat from Polisario forces in Algeria. But Morocco and Algeria are now committed to a referendum—proceeded or followed by negotiations—which would let Sahraouis choose independence, Moroccan rule, or a still undefined alternative.

The Setting. The UN Secretary General is set to visit the Maghreb in early April, four months after a UN technical team's visit. Faced with ongoing Saudi pressure to strike a deal, President Bendjedid and King Hassan could again meet, as they did in May 1987 in the presence of King Fahd. Tunisia is also trying to mediate. Morocco prefers to delink bilateral ties from the Sahara issue and move toward detente, but Algiers argues detente is impossible until the Sahara issue is resolved.

Algeria. A Sahara settlement (especially one on Algerian terms) fits neatly into Bendjedid's plans for reelection. He is fighting old-guard opposition to his agenda for military professionalization, political pluralization, greater openness to foreign technology and capital, distancing from the Soviets, and detente and economic cooperation with Morocco. His political battle will peak at the December convention of the ruling FLN party, where he will likely be reelected President.

Bendjedid could purge his opponents, but would prefer to show the FLN progress on a Sahara settlement, along with an economic upturn, and reintegration of Libya into an Algerian-inspired Greater Maghreb. The first would reduce expenditures on Polisario and on the Sahraoui refugee population, which Algiers would like to see return to the Sahara. It would also open the prospect of cooperation with Morocco, which many Algerians see as economically complementary.

Bendjedid's Sahara strategy entails some risks. He knows Hassan cannot accept much less than sovereignty, nor grant Polisario much more than a political sop. Polisario reaction is also unpredictable; faced

³ Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Exdis.

with Algerian concessions to Morocco, its hard-liners could try to defy Algerian constraints on Polisario military activity, or assert itself in Mauritania. Also important, though probably manageable, is the reaction of states which, under Algerian diplomatic pressure and often at the cost of a rupture with Morocco, have recognized Polisario.

Morocco. Hassan's interests have changed little since 1975, but he too is interested in a settlement. A Sahara deal would open up several prospects: lessen diplomatic isolation from much of the Third World; satisfy Saudi desire for Algerian/Moroccan rapprochement, and erase a hindrance to enhanced ties with the US and the EC, possibly leading to greater economic and military aid. It might also reduce military costs: the overall effect of military outlays is arguable, but any redistribution of funds to increasingly unruly urban areas would respond to growing domestic ills.

Nevertheless, while Hassan stresses commitment to a Saharan referendum, he recognizes that the status quo has served him well. The war gives the Moroccan military a *raison d'être* and deflects its interests from politics. And the pluralization which he granted in return for partisan backing of the war enhances his international image.

Hassan built, and subsequently expanded, a protective berm and adopted a defensive strategy after 1981 military reverses. The berm assures control of useful areas of the territory, while a relatively static defense avoids embarrassing defeats. It also employs large numbers of young men whose return would exacerbate Morocco's employment problems and create a serious new pool of discontent. As long as he seems to be successfully asserting Morocco's claim, the war is a source of internal political strength.

Hassan has recently given mixed signals on willingness to make concessions. Modifying a long-term position, he told the BBC that Polisario, not Algeria, was Morocco's opponent in the Sahara. He later waffled, saying negotiations with the Sahraoui Democratic Arab Republic (the Polisario's political arm) would be possible only if Polisario won a referendum in the territory. He has now dropped references to negotiations with Polisario, although secret talks take place sporadically.

Polisario. Polisario is well-armed and capable of adapting to Moroccan defensive advances. It cannot defeat Morocco, but believes it can fight a successful war of attrition. Moderates know a referendum will probably be held and have tried to influence determination of those who will have voting rights.

Some Polisario hard-liners advocate terrorism in Morocco, but it is unlikely anyone in Polisario has responded to third-country offers of aid, such as those from Iran. Such aid would be quickly blocked by Algiers. Some Sahraouis think Bendjedid is moving toward compromise

under Saudi and other pressure. But Polisario will not soon risk a break with Algeria—its primary source of financial, diplomatic, and logistic support—and has little scope for independent operation in any case.

Libya. While Qadhafi may have given Polisario some aid in the last eighteen months, he now sees support for Polisario as secondary to the larger strategy of incrementally improved relations with his Maghreb neighbors. Qadhafi insists on union with Algeria, has renewed ties to Tunisia, and uses links to Morocco to counter Algerian influence.

After promising Morocco financial aid (and, according to unconfirmed Libyan assertions military aid as well), Qadhafi is pushing Hassan to reactivate union as provided for by the 1984 Oujda Accord. Like Tunisia, he has offered to mediate between Morocco and Polisario. It is unlikely Qadhafi will play any direct role in the Sahara negotiations, but his rapprochement with Morocco might sap Algeria's confidence and enhance Morocco's bargaining leverage.

Saudi Interest. King Fahd's 1987 talks with Hassan and Bendjedid gave major impetus to current Sahara negotiations. Fahd has not been as directly engaged recently, but still clearly wishes a reduction in Maghreb tension. Riyadh believes a mechanism must be found to integrate the Sahara into Morocco, give Sahraouis special status, and help Algeria save face.

Polisario thinks Saudi financial aid is now a major determinant in Algeria's Sahara policy. This is implausible; even in Morocco, where the Saudi financial contribution is considerably more significant, Saudi pressure is only one influence on Western Sahara policy.

The UN. Algiers and Rabat agree in principle on a UN framework for a settlement, and know UN-brokered negotiations and/or referendum could allow Rabat to soften demands slightly, and allow Algiers to make concessions while saving face. Determining Sahraoui population and voting rights is a problem, but Perez de Cuellar, Rabat, and Algiers would accept a Spanish role in interpreting census figures from the colonial period. Other thorny questions include disposition of Morocco's army and administration during a referendum. Polisario wants both removed. Hassan will draw troops back to barracks, but wants to retain Moroccan civil authorities.

Perez de Cuellar will reportedly present Hassan written proposals for significant Moroccan troop reductions (from the present 120,000 down to 25,000, to be joined by a UN supervisory force of 10–12,000), and a restricted role for the Moroccan civil administration. Algeria (and Mauritania) would agree that Polisario forces be confined to their bases and subject to verification and control by the UN force. The Moroccans have rejected similar recent suggestions by OAU Chairman Kaunda.

Prospects. Algeria clearly considers 1988 a year to make a deal and will try to press Rabat intensively while preparing for concessions.

Hassan has a narrow margin of maneuver, however, and may fear backlash from the military, opportunistic politicians, and Moroccan settlers in the Sahara. He could yet prove unwilling to make the diplomatic gestures necessary to give Algeria an honorable way to abandon the Saharan war.

The 1988 window of opportunity is created largely by Bendjedid's internal political ambitions. Although Bendjedid could be bolstered by the December FLN Congress, his immediate incentive for a deal with Morocco will dissipate, and settlement will become more difficult by early 1989. The next readily apparent window will not open until after 1992, when EC limits on Maghreb imports sharpen Maghreb economic problems and intensify the need for a unified Maghreb economic strategy.

US/Soviet Stakes. Resolution of the Sahara conflict would be a clear plus for US interests, helping both Morocco and, Algeria economically and removing a contentious issue which the US has felt itself obliged to straddle diplomatically. It would reduce tensions and help assure North African stability.

To the extent such a settlement, leads to movement toward expanded regional cooperation and a Maghreb point of view on economics, the Middle East, or Mediterranean security, US diplomacy in the Maghreb could become more complex. Algerian and Libyan views may influence the thinking of pro-Western Morocco and Tunisia, and be influenced in turn. Successful Maghreb cooperation would further dilute Soviet influence in Algeria and perhaps in Libya, giving the US an overall net gain.

456. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, May 22, 1988, 1229Z

2909. Subject: Algeria, Morocco, and the SADR: What You See Is What You Get. Refs: (A) Rabat 4850;² (B) Algiers 2862;³ (C) Algiers 2852.⁴

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. The restoration of Algerian-Moroccan relations has left unanswered the question of Algeria's intentions toward the Sahrawis. Although the Algerians have continued to make public statements of support for the SADR,⁵ there is nothing to suggest that the Moroccans committed themselves to anything beyond the "legal and free referendum" mentioned in the joint communiqué. We note, for example, Basri's statement (ref A) that agreement contained no more than the public language and that it would take a year to resolve the Saharan conflict. In other words, there is no settlement of the war included in the new bilateral agreement.

3. The Algerian press has balanced its enthusiasm for restoration with gentle reminders that Algeria still supports the SADR and still

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880440–0511. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Casablanca, Cairo, Nouakchott, Riyadh, Kuwait City, Paris, London, Abu Dhabi, and USUN.

² In telegram 4850 from Rabat, May 17, the Embassy reported: "The decision of King Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic relations is a major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can take some credit." See Document 88.

³ In telegram 2862 from Algiers, May 17, the Embassy reported: "GOA-controlled media have hailed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco as a positive step toward creation of greater Arab Maghreb unity and toward a peaceful solution of the Western Sahara conflict." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0541)

⁴ In telegram 2852 from Algiers, May 16, the Embassy reported: "Algeria and Morocco have apparently agreed to restore diplomatic relations following Bendjedid's meeting with Moroccan envoys." The Embassy further noted: "The Algerians until now had insisted that progress toward settlement of the Western Sahara be a prerequisite for re-establishing relations. This latest step means either that the two sides have made progress or that the Algerians have dropped their condition. Nothing we have seen recently," the Embassy continued, "would suggest that either side has compromised its basic positions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880421–0355)

⁵ In telegram 2989 from Algiers, May 26, the Embassy commented: "The Algerians appear to have put Polisario on the shelf for the sake of broader Maghreb goals and domestic political reasons." The Embassy continued: "Thus they have moved from costly support of a liberation movement to support of regional economic integration and Arab solidarity, both of which promise economic benefits for Algeria that support for the Polisario could never provide." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880451–0826)

hopes to see direct talks between it and Morocco.⁶ The public reaction, however, is even more positive and uncomplicated. Algerians we have talked with have said, "it's about time. We should have done it years ago." Although no one expects that the restoration will bring an immediate improvement in availability of consumer goods (the first priority of all Algerians), those we spoke with hope that Algeria, free from the need to be hostile to Morocco, can devote itself to solving its stubborn internal economic and social problems. Of course, many Algerians are already asking about traveling to Morocco.

4. Why have the Algerians apparently abandoned a long-held position and accepted the Moroccan urgings that improving bilateral relations should proceed separately from the issue of the Western Sahara? There are two reasons, one domestic and one foreign. On the domestic front, the Algerians had already signaled their desire to settle regional disputes in order to concentrate on internal economic reforms. Bendjedid had inherited the Western Sahara problem from his predecessor. His willingness to put it aside and settle with Rabat is a sign of confidence at home, that his reform program is moving ahead, and that opposition to it is weak and disorganized.

5. On the foreign front, Algerian policy has always moved in multiple spheres: Third World, Nonaligned, African, Islamic, Maghrebian and Arab. This latest move represents the Arab and Maghrebian spheres taking priority over Africa and the Third World. With the coming Arab Summit and with the new situation in the occupied territories, Algeria must refurbish its Arab credentials. The Western Sahara never was an Arab cause. On the contrary, it divided Arab states and created ill will toward Algeria from both Morocco and her (rich) Arab friends. Algeria has staked considerable prestige on hosting an Arab summit with high-level attendance, and reconciliation with Rabat may bring not only King Hassan but other Arab Kings, Amirs and Presidents to Algiers in June.

6. After the March setback to Algeria's "eastern" Grand Maghreb efforts, Algeria did not want another diplomatic defeat. Checked by the Libyans, Algeria can now proceed with its "grand Maghreb strategy" (in partnership) with Morocco, the only other regional state that can match Algeria's weight and influence, inside the tent rather than out.

Brayshaw

⁶ In telegram 2340 from Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: "According to Mauritanian military and other sources, the Polisario leadership in Tindouf is reacting gamely to the resumption of diplomatic ties between Algiers and Rabat, saying that it will not hinder their struggle. Significant numbers of Polisario rank and file, however, apparently believe that the restoration of diplomatic relations signifies that Algeria is abandoning the Polisario cause." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880480-0473)

457. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 31, 1988

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. *Western Sahara Mediation.* The UN has announced that Morocco and the Polisario Front have agreed in principle to a UN plan to end their 13-year dispute over the Western Sahara.² The UN plans a cease-fire and demilitarization of the territory as a prelude to a referendum on the political future of the Saharan people. The UN will seek to move promptly, but contentious issues remain unresolved, including Moroccan military and civil presence in the Sahara, establishment of a voter list, and the Polisario's demand for direct negotiations with Morocco. We have supported the UN's efforts over the past year to find a peaceful resolution to this dispute.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President's Evening Reading July–September 1988. Secret.

² In telegram 9578 from Geneva, August 29, the Mission reported the details of the UN plan. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880762–0037)

458. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 5, 1988, 0046Z

325045. For Chargé from Crocker. Subject: My Exchange With King Hassan on the Western Sahara.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Herewith is my report of the salient points that emerged on the Western Sahara during my one-on-one with King Hassan on October 2. Generally, Hassan took a line consistent with what we had heard from

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880885–0598. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Drafted and approved by Crocker; cleared by Casey and Jim McVerry (S/S–O). Sent for information Priority to Algiers.

Foreign Ministry State Secretary Cherkaoui.² I opened the topic by indicating our support for UNSYG Perez de Cuellar's diplomatic initiative and our hopes that the optimistic noises we were hearing are based on reality. I then asked Hassan how he viewed the UN process and how he assessed Algerian decision-making on the unresolved issues.

3. Hassan responded warmly to our support for the diplomatic process and expressed confidence in Perez de Cuellar's efforts. He made it clear that, from the Moroccan perspective, the ball lies in the Algerian court and that he doesn't expect a basic decision that would nail down an agreement before the Algerian Party Congress in December. Continuing, Hassan stressed his belief that President Bendjedid is fully committed to Maghrebian rapprochement across the board, including such fields as economic cooperation, opening of borders, the construction of a regional political framework and a Saharan solution. Hassan spoke enthusiastically, for example, about the impact on Algerian public opinion of first-hand experience by hundreds of thousands of Algerians who had visited Morocco recently and witnessed its relative prosperity. That said, he strongly implied that Bendjedid had further homework to do in his own ranks before the next formulas would emerge to assuring a pre-cooked outcome of a Saharan referendum.

4. In response to my blunt question as to whether time was on Morocco's side in this matter, Hassan said it was, and he indicated that there were no deadlines that had to be kept. In sum, if it takes a few months for outstanding issues to be clarified and for Bendjedid to sell some face-saving formula to his colleagues, that is acceptable to Morocco.

5. In informal conversations, Cherkaoui expanded on Hassan's thinking by stressing that the principal obstacle to necessary Algerian compromises lies in certain unspecified party hardliners and especially in the Algerian Foreign Ministry, which has acquired a long-standing vested interest in the all-or-nothing diplomacy of backing the SDAR's cause. Cherkaoui repeated well-known Moroccan positions to the effect that the removal of Morocco's military presence and civil administration during the settlement process was out of the question. As to the prospects for a UN resolution in the Fourth Committee, Hassan and Cherkaoui both felt that a polarizing resolution could be avoided. Cherkaoui was reluctant to see an Algerian hand in supporting extreme

² In telegram 9690 from Rabat, October 3, the Embassy reported that in an October 1 conversation with the Embassy political officer, Cherkaoui indicated: "The outcome in the Fourth Committee was not only a crucial test of Algerian intentions, but would prefigure results of the December FLN Congress—i.e., whether Bendjedid could assert his authority, take out the hardliners, and end of the influence of the MFA, which had always opposed normalization." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0718)

Polisario language in New York. Hassan claimed there was evidence of Cuban support for a confrontation in the UN.

6. Overall, Hassan left me with the clear impression that he is relaxed and confident about the course of events about the Maghreb generally and the Sahara question specifically. He added with a smile that global events favored our common interests in the region and that, in any case, one had to be an optimist when dealing with the affairs of state.

Whitehead

459. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

Nouakchott, November 10, 1988, 1212Z

4844. Subject: President Taya Opposed to Western Sahara Settlement. Ref: (A) Nouakchott 3969;² (B) Nouakchott 2952.³

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Mauritanian Chief of Staff Minnih confided that President Taya is worried that a rapprochement may be underway between Morocco and the Polisario.⁴ Minnih

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881001–0504. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, Dakar, Paris, and Rabat.

² In telegram 3969 from Nouakchott, September 19, the Embassy reported: “According to the French DCM in Nouakchott, President Taya sent a personal message to President Mitterrand expressing the GIRM’s concern about the possible impact on Mauritania of a settlement of the Western Sahara War. Taya fears that a hard core of Sahrawi insurgents might continue its struggle against Morocco from Northern Mauritania. He also fears that Polisario followers of Mauritanian origin might return to Mauritania and destabilize the GIRM.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880832–0377)

³ In telegram 2952 from Nouakchott, July 17, the Embassy reported: “According to the French DCM in Nouakchott, the GIRM has made clear to the French that it fears part of the Polisario might move to Mauritania in the event of a Western Sahara settlement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880613–0099)

⁴ In telegram 10922 from Rabat, November 8, the Embassy reported: “In his Green March Anniversary address to the nation, November 6, King Hassan at once reaffirmed the validity and inalienability of Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara and issued a call to the Polisario for reconciliation with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880993–0926) The Green March was a 1975 demonstration organized by the Government of Morocco designed to force Spain to withdraw from the Western Sahara. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 99–104, 107, 108, 110, 111, and 114.

stated that the President had asked him whether Mauritania should attempt to derail this incipient rapprochement, which Taya believes would be inimical to Mauritanian interests. Minnih reportedly replied that Morocco and the Polisario are unlikely to reach a lasting agreement and recommended that the GIRM let the current U.N. peace initiative fail on its own. End summary.

3. In a lengthy, private conversation during the week of October 30th [*less than 1 line declassified*] Mauritanian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ahmed Ould Minnih reportedly said the President periodically consulted him about the Western Sahara conflict. The President believes Minnih possesses a good understanding of the protagonists as a result of his tenure as Foreign Minister (1980–1986) and his earlier service as military attaché in Algeria. Minnih stated that the President is worried that a rapprochement might be underway between Morocco and the Polisario, a development he believes would be inimical to Mauritanian interests. The President recently asked Minnih whether he thought the GIRM should try to derail this incipient rapprochement. Minnih said he replied that Morocco and the Polisario are unlikely to reach a lasting agreement. He predicted that the current U.N. peace initiative will fail on its own and therefore recommended that the GIRM, simply let events follow their natural course. Minnih reportedly told our contact that Taya does not want the conflict to end, since the war is the justification the Mauritanian military uses to remain in power.

4. Comment: We have received several indications in the past few months that Taya is worried about the impact on Mauritania of an eventual peaceful resolution of the Sahara war. In September 1988 he sent a personal emissary to French President Mitterrand to express this concern. The emissary conveyed, in particular, Taya's fear that a peaceful settlement might trigger an influx of radical Sahrawis into Mauritania, who could threaten GIRM, stability (refs A and B). Minnih's comments confirm that Taya's concern indeed runs deep—although the Chief of Staff apparently believes this concern has more to do with a selfish desire to keep the military in power than with larger considerations of Mauritania's national interest. We cannot tell whether this interpretation is accurate. [*less than 1 line declassified*] the Chief of Staff is convinced that Mauritania's successive military governments have failed and for that reason he favors a return to civilian rule. This jaundiced view of military rule might account for Minnih's cynical interpretation of Taya's motivations. But regardless of whether Minnih is right or wrong about the President's motives, this swipe at Taya is nonetheless significant. It is the first indication we have that Minnih's support for the President may be less than wholehearted. End comment.

Twaddell

